COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

Brussels, 20.5.2009
C(2009) 3770 final

COMMISSION DECISION

of 20.5.2009

modifying the technical specifications for the uniform format for residence permits for
third country nationals
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THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1030/2002 of 13 June 2002 laying down a uniform format for residence permits for third country nationals¹, and in particular Article 2 thereof,

Whereas:

(1) Regulation (EC) No 1030/2002, which has been substantially amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 380/2008 of 18 April 2008², empowers the Commission to adopt further technical specifications for the residence permit for third country nationals in order to prevent counterfeiting and falsification.

(2) It is appropriate that the committee created by article 6 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1683/95 of 29 May 1995 laying down a uniform format for visa³ continues to follow the technical developments in view of the integration of further elements to render the residence permit more secure.

(3) In order to render more difficult to counterfeit or to falsify the residence permit, it is essential to integrate new common security features produced according to high security standards such as the UV- and microprint. In view of the particular nature of these additional common security measures, they should be kept secret and therefore should not be published.

(4) Commission Decision C (2002) 3069 of 14 August 2002 establishing technical specifications for the implementation of the uniform format for residence permits should be amended accordingly.

(5) According to the Regulation (CE) No 1030/2002, Member States are allowed to incorporate, as additional national security features, certain security standards set out in a list to be defined by the Commission.

² OJ L 115, 29.4.2008, p. 1
³ OJ L 164, 14.7.1995, p. 1
Furthermore, technical specifications should be established for the implementation of biometric identifiers to be stored on a contactless chip in the residence permit for third country nationals.

The technical specifications for the implementation of the biometric identifiers should enter into force for the facial image at the latest two years and for the two fingerprint images at the latest three years, after the adoption of this Decision.

As regards Iceland and Norway, the Regulation (CE) No 1030/2002 constitutes a development of provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the association of those two States with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point C of Council Decision 1999/437/EC on certain arrangements for the application of that Agreement.

In accordance with Article 3 of the Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Community, the United Kingdom gave notice, by letter of 29 December 2003, of its wish to take part in the adoption and application of the Regulation (CE) No 1030/2002.

In accordance with Article 3 of the Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Ireland gave notice, by letter of 19 December 2003, of its wish to take part in the adoption and application of Council Regulation (CE) No 380/2008.

In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on the position of Denmark, annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, Denmark does not take part in the adoption of Regulation (CE) No 1030/2002, and is therefore not bound by it or subject to its application. Given that this Regulation builds upon the Schengen acquis under the provisions of Title IV of Part Three of the Treaty establishing the European Community, Denmark should, in accordance with Article 5 of that Protocol, decide within a period of six months after the adoption of the Regulation (CE) No 1030/2002, whether it will implement it in its national law.

As regards Switzerland, the Regulation (CE) No 1030/2002 constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement signed by the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the latter's association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point C of Decision 1999/437/EC read in conjunction with Article 4(1) of Council Decision 2004/860/EC.

As regards Liechtenstein, this Regulation constitutes a development of provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Protocol signed between the European

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4 OJ L 176, 10.7.1999, p. 36.
5 OJ L 176, 10.7.1999, p. 31.
Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen *acquis*, which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point A of Decision 1999/437/EC, read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision 2008/261/EC.7

(14) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee created by Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 1683/95,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

**Article 1**

1. The Annex to Decision C (2002) 3069 is replaced by the text set out in Annex I to this Decision.

2. The technical specifications on biometrics in residence permits for third country nationals issued by Member States shall be as set out in Annex II to this Decision.

3. The optional national security features which may be incorporated into the residence permit for third country nationals by Member States individually shall be as set out in Annex III to this Decision.

**Article 2**

Member States shall implement the amendment to Decision C (2002) 3069 as referred to in Article 1 paragraph 1 at the latest two years after the adoption of this Decision.

**Article 3**

Member States shall cooperate in the implementation of this Decision in particular by exchanging information on all the technical specifications.

Each Member State shall send to the Commission and to the other Member States a reference specimen of the residence permit for third country nationals which it issues. Each Member State shall also keep specimens of subsequent print runs and shall hold them at the disposal of the Commission and the other Member States.

**Article 4**

This Decision is addressed to the Member States, except the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ireland and the Kingdom of Denmark, and is shall be transmitted to the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Principality of Liechtenstein and the Swiss Confederation".

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7 OJ L 83, 26.3.2008, p. 3
Done at Brussels, 20.5.2009.

For the Commission
Jacques BARROT
Vice-President

CERTIFIED COPY
For the Secretary - General

Jordi AYET PUIGARNAU
Director of the Registry
Annex I


"The Annex I is classified "SECRET_UE""
Biometrics Deployment of EU- Residence permit

EU – Residence permit Specification

1. **Scope and Limitations**

This document describes solutions for chip enabled EU Residence permit, based on the EU document [1] titled


The document is based on international standards, especially ISO standards and ICAO recommendations on Machine Readable Travel Documents, and accommodates:

- Specifications for biometric identifiers: face and fingerprints
- Storage medium (chip)
- Logical data structure on the chip
- Specifications for the security of the digitally stored data on the chip
- Conformity assessment of chip and applications
- RF compatibility with other electronic travel documents

The following considerations are out of scope of this document:

- Specifications on the physical document.
- Specifications of the mechanical mounting of the chip in a Residence permit, durability and mechanical testing procedures.
- Specifications on standard operation procedures (SOP) for the enrolment or the inspection process.
- Implementation for optional national applications. This optional implementation, SHALL - if implemented- respect the data protection rules and MUST ensure a complete separation between data for national use and data defined in the scope of the EU regulation [1].
2. **BIOMETRICS**

2.1. **Primary biometric – Face**

2.1.1. **Standard compliance**


The facial image MUST be stored as FRONTAL IMAGE\(^8\), according to [2, 4].

2.1.2. **Format**

The face SHALL be stored as a compressed IMAGE FILE, not as vendor specific template.

Although both JPEG and JPEG2000 compression is standard compliant [2], JPEG2000 is RECOMMENDED for EU-Residence permit because it results in smaller file sizes compared to JPEG compressed images.

2.1.3. **Storage requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Remark</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>JPEG compression</td>
<td>Approx. 12-20 KByte per photo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>JPEG2000 compression</td>
<td>Approx. 6-10 KByte per photo</td>
<td>recommended (see 2.1.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.1.4. **Other issues**

- Photograph Taking Guidelines taking into account the requirements of facial recognition technology have to be adopted according to ICAO standards [2]

2.2. **Secondary biometric – Fingerprints**

2.2.1. **Standard compliance**


\(^8\) According to ICAO standards, the “Face biometric data interchange image recorded in Datagroup 2 of the LDS shall be derived from the Residence permit photo used to create the displayed portrait printed on the data page of the Machine Readable Residence permit; and shall be encoded either according to full frontal image or token image formats set out in the latest version of ISO 19794-5.”
2.2.2. Type

The primary fingerprints to be incorporated into the European Residence permit SHALL be

**PLAIN IMPRESSIONS OF THE LEFT AND RIGHT INDEX FINGER.**

In the case of insufficient quality of the fingerprints and/or injuries of the index fingers, good quality, plain impressions of middle fingers, ring fingers or thumbs SHALL be recorded.

2.2.3. Format and Quality

The fingerprints MUST be stored as IMAGES, according to [5].

The quality of the fingerprint images SHALL be according to [5] and [6].

A compression of the images using the WSQ-algorithm according to [6] MUST be used in order to decrease file size.

2.2.4. Storage requirements

The use of fingerprint IMAGES requires approximately 12 – 15 KByte per finger.

3. STORAGE MEDIUM (RF-CHIP ARCHITECTURE)

3.1. Standard compliance

- ISO/IEC 14443, Identification cards - Contactless integrated circuit(s) cards - Proximity cards [7]

3.2. Chip Interface

According to [2], both type A and type B RF-interfaces are considered to be ICAO standard compliant.

Residence permits MUST be equipped with contactless chips of either type A or type B RF interfaces, requiring border inspection systems to accommodate both standards for Residence permits. In addition to the contactless interface, the Residence permit MAY also be equipped with a contact-based interface. The contacted-based interface may be provided by a dual-interface chip (i.e. one chip that provides both a contactless and a contact-based interface) or by a separate chip.

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9 The storage format (CBEFF – Common Biometric Exchange File Format) will record the type of fingers used (left index, right middle etc.) in order to ensure verification with the correct finger.
3.3. Storage capacity

According to the ICAO Logical Data Structure [2], alphanumeric data of the machine readable zone (MRZ) of the document and digital document security data (PKI) MUST be stored on the chip together with the biometric identifiers.

Member States are required to use appropriately sized RF chips to hold the personal data and biometric features according to the EU regulation [1]. See also chapter 2.1.3 and 2.2.4.

If, in accordance to the EU Regulation [1], a Member State wishes to include other data, extra storage capacity might be required.

As an aid for automatic identification of Residence Permits by machine readable inspection readers the MRZ characters used to identify the document should be consistent.

The ICAO regulations stipulate that for identity documents the first character on TD1 size card should be either A, C, or I and that any further characters used may be at the discretion of member states however these may not be V or C (after I). Equally if the TD1 is a passport card the first two characters must be IP and that on a Crew Certificate the characters are AC.

It is RECOMMENDED that for a Uniform Residence Permit the second character is “R”. The first character is left to the discretion of the member state within the constraints stipulated by ICAO as stated above.

4. Electronic Residence Permit Chip Layout (Data Structure)

4.1. Standard compliance


4.2. Correlation with printed data

The alphanumeric data, printed in the MRZ of the Residence permit, according to [2], MUST correlate to the data digitally stored in DG1 of the chip according to [2].

4.3. Chip Logical Data Structure

MUST be according to [2].

5. Data Security and Integrity Issues

The traditional Residence permit document incorporates a number of anti-counterfeiting measures, including security printing and optically variable devices according to [1]. The integrity, the authenticity and confidentiality of the data, digitally stored in the Residence permit’s chip, have to be equally secured.

5.1. Standard Compliance

5.2. Digital data security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Remark</th>
<th>Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Passive Authentication</td>
<td>Proves that the contents of the SO(_D) and the LDS are authentic and not changed.</td>
<td>REQUIRED for all data (ICAO mandatory security feature)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[2]</td>
<td>Does not prevent an exact copy or chip substitution.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Does not prevent unauthorized access.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Does not prevent skimming.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2a)</td>
<td>Active Authentication</td>
<td>Proves that the SO(_D) is not a copy but has been read from the authentic chip.</td>
<td>OPTIONAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[2]</td>
<td>Proves that the chip has not been substituted.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Does not prove that the content of the LDS is authentic and not changed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Does not prevent eavesdropping on the communications between chip and inspection system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b)</td>
<td>Chip Authentication</td>
<td>Proves that the SO(_D) is not a copy and has been read from the authentic chip.</td>
<td>Additional protection REQUIRED for all data at the time when fingerprint data are introduced or at the latest 36 months after the adoption of the technical specifications. Such a protection MUST NOT be enforced by the chip but EU inspection systems MUST use this mechanism, if supported by the chip.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[3]</td>
<td>Proves that the chip has not been substituted.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Prevents eavesdropping on the communications between chip and inspection system.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Basic Access Control</td>
<td>Prevents skimming.</td>
<td>REQUIRED for all data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[2, 3]</td>
<td>Mitigates the risk of eavesdropping on the communications between chip and inspection system (see 2 b).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Does not prevent an exact copy or chip substitution (requires also copying of the conventional document).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Remark</td>
<td>Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Terminal Authentication [3]</td>
<td>Prevents unauthorized access to fingerprint data.</td>
<td>Additional protection REQUIRED for fingerprint data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Prevents skimming of fingerprint data.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Requires additional key management.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Does not prevent an exact copy or chip substitution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(requires also copying of the conventional document).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[SO_D\] Document Security Object (SO\(_D\)). This object is digitally signed by the issuing State and contains hash representations of the LDS contents.

LDS Logical Data Structure  
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document  
MRZ Machine Readable Zone  
EAC Extended Access Control being according to ICAO the combination of chip authentication and terminal authentication

5.3. Public Key Infrastructure for Residence permits

In order to ensure integrity and authenticity of the digital data stored on the chip, a PKI is introduced: Each Member State MUST set up only a single Country Signing CA\(^{10}\) acting as the national trust point for all receiving states and at least one Document Signer issuing Residence permits. Details on this PKI infrastructure (including signature algorithms, key lengths, and validity periods) can be found in [2].

The “Brussels Interoperability Group” (BIG) will develop a common extension for the Document Signer Certificate to indicate that the Document Signer is only authorized to issue Resident Permits. This extension SHOULD be used by a Country Signing CA and MUST NOT be marked critical.

Every Member State MUST notify the name and contact details of the organization responsible for the operation of the Country Signing CA and the Document Signer(s) to the Commission. The Country Signing CA Certificate MUST be made available to the Commission 90 days before the certificate is used to issue Document Signer Certificates.

5.4. Public Key Infrastructure for Inspection Systems

To prevent unauthorized inspection systems to access fingerprint data stored on the chip another PKI is introduced: Each Member State MUST set up only a single Country Verifying CA\(^{11}\) acting as the national trust point for the Residence permits issued by this Member State.

\(^{10}\) This could be the same CSCA as for the passport or a dedicated CSCA for the residence permit  
\(^{11}\) This could be the same CVCA as for the passport or a dedicated CVCA for the residence permit
and at least one Document Verifier managing a group of authorized inspection systems. Details on this PKI infrastructure can be found in [3].

Every Member State MUST notify the name and contact details of the organization responsible for the operation of the Country Verifying CA and the Document Verifier(s) to the Commission. The initial Country Verifying CA Certificate MUST be made available to the Commission 90 days before the certificate is used to issue Document Verifier Certificates. Link certificates for the Country Verifying CA MUST be distributed at least 14 days before the certificate to be replaced expires.

### 5.4.1. Certificate Validity Periods

The validity of issued certificates MUST be within the following time frames.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Minimum Validity Period</th>
<th>Maximum Validity Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country Verifying CA Certificate</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document Verifier Certificate</td>
<td>2 weeks</td>
<td>3 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection System Certificate</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>1 month</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5.4.2. Certificate Scheduling

To plan the scheduling of certificates the following processing and distribution times MUST be respected.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Certification Authority</th>
<th>Maximum Processing Time (Certificate Request)</th>
<th>Maximum Distribution Time (Certificate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country Verifying CA</td>
<td>72 hours</td>
<td>24 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document Verifier</td>
<td>24 hours</td>
<td>48 hours</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5.4.3. Certificate Policies

The Country Verifying CA of each Member State SHALL publish a Certificate Policy compliant to [13] and may set up a Certification Practice Statement in accordance with the common Certificate Policy [13], in particular indicating the conditions under which a certificate for a (foreign) Document Verifier will be issued. Every Member State SHALL notify the adoption of the Certificate Policy to the Commission.

### 6. CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT

The BIG will convey interoperability of Residence permits conforming to the present specification.

#### 6.1. Standard compliance

- ICAO NTWG, RF Protocol and Application Test Standard for E-Passport; Parts 2&3 [11]

• ISO/IEC 7816-8, Identifications cards – Integrated circuit cards – Part 8: Commands for security operations [9]


The "BIG" will develop the latter document within one year after the Commission Decision on the technical specifications.

6.2. Functional Evaluation

For the functional evaluation of MRTD chips the appropriate standards [11, 12] SHALL be used.

Every Member State MUST contract a test laboratory accredited by a Member State’s accreditation body to certify functional compliance to the relevant standards on all ISO/OSI layers. Issued certificates MUST be notified to the Commission.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISO/OSI Layer</th>
<th>Standard</th>
<th>Scope</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-4</td>
<td>ISO 14443 [7]</td>
<td>Hardware</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>ISO 7816 [8, 9]</td>
<td>Software (OS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>ICAO Application [2, 3]</td>
<td>Software (Application)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.3. Common Criteria Evaluation

Residence permit chips MUST be evaluated and certified in accordance with the Common Criteria Protection Profile [10] or – if optional national applications are implemented – by a Common Criteria Protection Profile that claims conformance to [10] to ensure a complete separation between data for national use and data defined in the scope of the EU regulation [1].

The Common Criteria Certificate MUST be notified to the Commission.

7. Normative References


FBI: Wavelet Scalar Quantization (WSQ) - www.itl.nist.gov/iad

[7] ISO/IEC 14443, Identification cards – Contactless integrated circuit(s) cards – Proximity cards


ANNEX II.b

COMMON CERTIFICATE POLICY FOR THE EXTENDED ACCESS CONTROL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR RESIDENCE PERMITS ISSUED BY EU MEMBER STATES

Version 1.0

20/08/2008

1. INTRODUCTION

The goal of the Certificate Policy (CP) is to achieve trust and sufficient interoperability between the Country Verifying Certification Authorities (CVCA’s) and Document Verifiers (DVs) of different Member States for the EAC-PKI to operate.

This Certificate Policy is established in accordance with Article 5.4.3 of the Technical Specifications on Standards for Security Features and Biometrics in Residence Permits issued by Member States, set out in Commission Decision C(2008) XXXX of XX.XX.XXXX 12.

The Certificate Policy only concerns the use of certificates to control access to fingerprint biometrics on Extended Access Control enabled Residence Permits for the purposes of border control.

This common Certificate Policy provides a common set of minimum requirements upon which each Members State SHALL base a National Certificate Policy for use of certificates for border control purposes.

A National Certificate Policy MUST, as minimum, meet the standards of this common Certificate Policy but MAY place further restrictions on the control and usage of certificates within that Member State. A Member States MUST NOT require a DV in another Member State to adopt restrictions above those in this common Certificate Policy as a pre-requisite of issuing a certificate to that DV.

The issuing of certificates by a CVCA to domestic DV’s is outside the scope of this common Certificate Policy.


1.1. Overview

A certificate policy is a set of named rules that indicate the applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of application with common security requirements.

For both CVCA’s and DV’s this policy offers the same quality as that offered by the Extended Normalized Certificate Policy (NCP+) as defined in ETSI TS 102 042, version 1.2.2 (2005-06).

This Certificate Policy operates within the Public Key Infrastructure described in TR-EAC paragraph 2.2 “Public Key Infrastructure”.

1.2. Documentation Name and Identification

This Common Certificate Policy is identified by its name and version number.

A National CP SHALL contain an OID which MUST identify the document and its version uniquely.

1.3. PKI Participants

This section gives an overview of the Certification Authorities, Certificate Holders, Registration Authorities, and Relying Parties of the Extended Access Control Public Key Infrastructure (EAC-PKI). The EAC-PKI is part of the international security infrastructure to ensure and verify integrity and authenticity of Residence Permits issued by a Member State.

The overview of all PKI participants is summarised in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Certification Authority</th>
<th>Registration Authority</th>
<th>Subscriber</th>
<th>Relying Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document Verifier (DV)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection System (IS)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence Permit (RP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 Overview of PKI participants of an EAC-PKI

1.3.1. Certification Authorities

Country Verifying Certification Authority The Root Certification Authority (CA) of a national EAC-PKI is called a Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA). The public keys of a national CVCA are contained in both self-signed CVCA certificates and link CVCA certificates. Both classes are called CVCA certificates. A national CVCA determines the access rights to sensitive data stored on domestic RP's chips for all DVs (i.e. domestic DVs as well as foreign DVs) by issuing DV certificates entitling access control attributes.

A national CVCA issues certificates to its Certificate Holders (Subscribers). In this document, a Certificate Holder is called a Document Verifier (DV). A DV is an organisational unit that manages inspections systems belonging together.
**Document Verifier Certification Authority** Each country SHOULD have only one certification authority at the level of a Document Verifier (DV). However, this may not be possible for some Member States due to the way in which responsibility for border and immigration control is devolved within those states. In such cases the Member State MAY operate up to three DV’s. In order to minimise administrative overhead, subject registration SHOULD be carried out in a coordinated manner by the DV’s.

A DV operates a CA to issue certificates for its inspection systems. The inspection system certificates issued by a DV usually inherit both the access rights and the validity period from the underlying DV certificate. However, the Document Verifier MAY choose to further restrict the access rights or the validity period.

### 1.3.2. Registration Authorities

**Country Verifying Registration Authority** For each national CVCA there is only one Registration Authority, the corresponding national Country Verifying Registration Authority (CVRA). Typically it is operated by the same authority as the CVCA.

The national CVRA is responsible for performing identification and authentication of certification requests of Document Verifiers, that is certification applications for subscriber certificates are only allowed by Document Verifiers. In addition, a CVRA initiates the issuance of certificates to Document Verifiers and it validates the process of revoking and renewing certificates issued by the corresponding CVCA.

For the purposes of the remainder of this document the CVRA will be assumed to be part of the CVCA and only the term CVCA will be used. Member States MAY divide/combine the role of CVCA and CVRA as they wish.

**Document Verifier Registration Authority** Each Member State SHALL operate only one Registration Authority for each Document Verifier.

DV’s are responsible for performing identification and authentication of certification requests of Inspection Systems. In addition, a DV initiates the issuance of certificates to Inspection Systems and it validates the process of revoking and renewing certificates.

For the purposes of the remainder of this document the DVRA will be assumed to be part of the DV and only the term DV will be used. Member States MAY divide/combine the role of DV and DVRA as they wish.

### 1.3.3. Subscribers

Subscribers under this policy are Document Verifiers (DV) and Inspection Systems (IS). A DV is defined in Section 1.3.1.

For the purposes of this Certificate Policy an Inspection System is defined as the infrastructure, hardware and software required to obtain certificates from a Member States DV, store and manage those certificates, and to obtain fingerprint biometrics from RP’s using those certificates, including mechanisms controlling access to the inspection systems.

### 1.3.4. Relying Parties

Relying Parties within an EAC-PKI are Document Verifiers, Inspection Systems, and RP’s.
A relying party is an entity who verifies the signature of a certificate using a trusted certification path (see section 1.4). A member state shall clearly identify which trusted certification path a relying party has to use to verify a certificate (see section 1.4).

1.3.5. Other Participants

If a member state identify other participants, then this paragraph has to be fulfilled by the member state. Other participants identified by member state, who has role and/or interacts with PKI, doesn’t have to be in conflict with the security requirements defined in the present CP.

1.4. Certificate Usage

To enable read access by Inspection Systems to fingerprint biometrics stored on the RP's as indicated in the certificates, for the only purpose of verification of the identity of the holder by means of directly available comparable features.

For a Member State CVCA, keys pairs and certificates are used for the following purpose:

- CVCA private key shall be used to sign national and external DV certificate and may be used to signs DV certificate request to provide to other authorized Member state CVCA (see section 3.3);
- CVCA certificate shall be used to verify signatures realized by a national or other Member State DV;
- DV private key shall be used to sign national IS certificates;
- DV certificate shall be used to verify signature of national or external IS certificate.

Those certificates enable to read access by Inspection Systems to fingerprint biometrics stored on the RP's as indicated in the certificates, for the only purpose of verification of the identity of the holder by means of directly available comparable features. To do that, it is necessary to have clear identification of which trusted certification path to be used.

Trusted certification path managed by a CVCA shall be composed of the following certificates:

- CVCA certificate: self-signed certificate;
- If needed, intermediate link CVCA certificate;
- DV certificate: DV certificates are signed by at least the national CVCA;
- IS certificate: IS certificates are signed DV.

Relying parties trusted certification path are for:

- DV:
  - national CVCA certificate and authorized Member State CVCA certificate;
– IS:
  • national DV certificate, national CVCA certificate and authorized Member State CVCA certificate;

– RP's:
  • authorized Member State IS certificate, authorized Member State DV certificate and national CVCA certificate and possibly national link CVCA certificate and the corresponding CVCA certificate.

Note: national refers to the Member State who issues the CVCA, DV, IS and RP's. Authorized Member State refers to a Member State which is authorized to collect data from RP's of third-country nationals using a DV (and IS) signed by the national CVCA of the Member State issuing the RP to the third-country nationals.

1.5. Policy Administration

European Commission
Directorate General for Justice, Freedom and Security
Directorate B, Unit B1
1049 Brussels
Belgium

1.6. Terminology, Definitions and Acronyms

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

A “Member State” is defined to be a state participating in Regulation (EC) No1030/2002 as modified by Regulation (EC) No 380/2008.

“Domestic” is defined to mean of the same Member State.

“Foreign” is defined to mean of another Member State.

A “Valid Key” is defined to be a key for which the current time is within the validity period of the corresponding Subscriber Certificate and for which the corresponding Subscriber Certificate has not been revoked.

Further definitions and acronyms used in this policy are given in Appendix

2. Publication and Repository Responsibilities

The European Commission is responsible for maintaining a list of contact details for CVCA’s and DV’s at the European level. The content and integrity of this list is preserved by diplomatic means. The corresponding information is available on the web site of the Directorate General for Justice, Freedom and Security (DG-JLS) of the European Commission.
3. **IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION**

3.1. **Naming**

As defined in TR-EAC A.4.1, the Certification Authority Reference is used to identify to public key to be used to verify the signature of the certification authority (CVCA or DV).

The Certificate Authority Reference MUST be equal to the Certificate Holder Reference in the corresponding certificate of the certification authority (CVCA Link Certificate or DV Certificate).

The Certificate Holder Reference SHALL identify a public key of the certificate holder. It MUST be a unique identifier relative to the issuing certification authority. It SHALL consist of the following concatenated elements:

1. The ISO 3166-1 ALPHA-2 country code of the certificate holder’s country;
2. A mnemonic that represents the certificate holder;
3. A numeric or alphanumeric sequence number.

**NOTE:** It is not guaranteed that the Certificate Holder Reference is a unique identifier in general.

Members State shall defined identity as follow:

- **CVCA certificate:**
  - Certification Authority Reference: national CVCA identity;
  - Certificate Holder Reference: national CVCA identity;

- **DV certificate:**
  - Certification Authority Reference: national CVCA identity or other authorized Member State CVCA (see section 3.3) identity;
  - Certificate Holder Reference: national DV identity;

- **IS certificate:**
  - Certification Authority Reference: national DV identity;

3.2. **Initial Identity Validation**

3.2.1. **National CVCA**

Each Member State SHALL clearly identified who is responsible of the authentication and the definition of the CVCA identity.
3.2.2.  **CVCA to CVCA**

In order to validate requests from DVs, a CVCA must be able to confirm the identity of the DV with that Member States CVCA. Therefore prior to DVs submitting certificate requests the CVCA’s of participating states MUST validate each other’s identity.

CVCA identity validation SHALL be carried out under the supervision of the European Commission. CVCA’s SHALL submit the following information to the European Commission for distribution to other participating CVCA’s:

(a) The National Certificate Policy;
(b) The public part of the CVCA’s Certificate Practice Statement, if it exists;
(c) A copy of the CVCA Public Key;

In event of a change to any of the above, CVCA’s SHALL submit the updated version to the European Commission for distribution to other participating CVCA’s.

3.2.3.  **DV to CVCA**

When a DV from one Member State first submits registration information to a CVCA in another Member State this SHALL be done by a mutually agreed trusted channel.

The DV MUST include the following in the registration information:

(a) The public part of the DV’s Certificate Practice Statement;
(b) The latest Certificate of Conformity with the National Certificate Policy for the DV;
(c) A list of the organisations using Inspection Systems subscribing to the DV;
(d) A Certificate Request as specified in TR-EAC, paragraph A.4.2. This Certificate Request MUST include an Outer Signature, as defined in TR-EAC paragraph A.4.2.4, signed by the DVs supervising CVCA.

In the event of a non-trivial change to any of the above, the DV SHALL submit details of the change to the CVCA to allow it to make an assessment as to whether a new Initial Identity Validation is required.

3.2.4.  **IS to DV**

DV’s SHALL have a proper mechanism in place to identify an authenticated inspection system. When the initial key material is generated and the Certificate Request is compiled, staff authorised by the DV SHALL be physically present.

3.3.  **Identification and Authentication for Re-key Requests**

As specified in TR-EAC, paragraph A.4.2.
3.3.1. **DV to CVCA**

The CVCA SHALL ensure the validity of the request by confirming:

(a) That the request is formatted in accordance with TR-EAC paragraph A.4.2
(b) That the CVCA for the DV’s Member State continues to list the DV as valid;
(c) That the DV’s Certificate of Conformity is valid;
(d) That the outer signature of the request is created with a key which is valid with respect to a certificate of that DV, issued by the CVCA

3.3.2. **IS to DV**

The DV SHALL only issue a certificate once it has confirmed:

(a) That the Inspection System remains registered as operational;
(b) That the Inspection System is not listed as stolen/missing;

4. **CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS**

4.1. **Certificate Application**

4.1.1. **CVCA**

Each Member State shall define which entity is responsible to authorize the CVCA creation.

4.1.2. **DV to CVCA**

Following successful Initial Identity Validation as per 3.2.3 above, DV Certificate Application SHALL be carried out in accordance with TR-EAC A.4.2 Certificate Requests and TR-EAC 2.2.2 Document Verifiers.

4.1.3. **IS to DV**

Inspection Systems MAY submit Certificate Applications upon completion of successful Initial Identity Validation as per 3.2.4 above.

4.2. **Certificate Application Processing**

4.2.1. **Certificates issued by CVCA to CVCA**

A CVCA SHALL only issue a self signed CVCA certificate or a link certificate to a former CVCA certificate, during the key ceremony, that complies with its own National Certificate Policy.

CVCA’s MUST check that a certificate request is authorized and valid (see section 4.1.1).
4.2.2. Certificates issued by CVCA to DV

A CVCA SHALL only issue a certificate to a DV that is complying with its own (the DVs) National Certificate Policy that is, at minimum, in accordance with this Certificate Policy and the usage (governmental and non-governmental) of fingerprint biometrics in the RP is in conformance with Section 1.4 of this document.

CVCA’s MUST check that a certificate request is valid.

CVCA’s MUST acknowledge a certificate request upon its receipt.

The CVCA MUST process the certificate request within the timeframe of 72 hours set out in point 5.4.2 of Commission Decision C(2008) XXXX of XX.XX.XXXX.

In the event that a CVCA system is non-operational for more than this time frame, it MUST inform all subscribing DVs no later than 7 days before the loss of service, if planned, and as soon as is reasonably possible in the event of an unplanned loss of service.

4.2.3. Certificates issued by DV to IS

A DV SHALL only issue a certificate to an IS that is complying to its own National Certificate Policy and that is using the certificates in accordance with part 1.4 of this document.

DV’s MUST check that a certificate request is valid prior to issuing a certificate.

4.3. Certificate Issuance

4.3.1. CV Issued Certificates

CVCA’s SHALL take measures against the forgery of certificates and ensure that the procedures of issuing the certificate is securely linked to the associated registration, certificate renewal or re-key, including the provision of any subject generated public key.

Certificates SHALL be generated and issued in accordance with TR-EAC A.4 CV Certificates.

4.3.2. DV Issued Certificates

DV’s SHALL ensure they issue certificates securely to maintain their authenticity.

DV’s SHALL take measures against the forgery of certificates and ensure that the procedures of issuing the certificate is securely linked to the associated registration, certificate renewal or re-key, including the provision of any subject generated public key.

Certificates SHALL be generated and issued in accordance with TR-EAC A.4 CV Certificates.

4.4. Certificate Acceptance

CVCA self signed certificate SHALL be accepted by the entity responsible for the CVCA after its creation at the end of the key ceremony.
A DV or IS SHALL be deemed to have accepted a certificate upon its receipt.

### 4.5. Key Pair and Certificate Security Rules

CVCA’s, DV’s and IS’s and MUST fulfil the following requirements as appropriate.

- Ensure that accurate and complete information is submitted to the CVCA/DV in accordance with the requirements of this policy, particularly with regards to registration;

- The key pair is only used in accordance with the limitations imposed by this CP;

- Ensure there is no unauthorised use of the private key;

- Keys are generated in accordance with TR-EAC.

- Only use private keys for signing or decrypting within a secure cryptographic device as described in section 6.2;

- Notify a CVCA/DV without any reasonable delay, if any of the following occur up to the end of the validity period indicated in the certificate:
  - A private key has been lost, stolen, potentially compromised; or
  - Control over the private key has been lost due to compromise of activation data (e.g. PIN code) or other reasons; and/or
  - Inaccuracy or changes to the certificate content, as notified to the subscriber or to the subject;

- Following compromise, the use of a private key is immediately and permanently discontinued;

- In the case of being informed that a CVCA or DV’s Private Key has been compromised and certificates signed by these Private Keys SHOULD NOT be relied upon and SHOULD act appropriately.

Key pair and certificate usage SHALL be as indicated by the certificate issuer (CVCA or DV) in the Certificate Holder Authorisation Field of the Certificate.

DV’s and ISs SHALL only use the private key corresponding to the received DV and IS certificate for the following purposes only;

- The purpose as described in Section 1.4 ‘Certificate Usage’ of this CP;

- In accordance with the content of the issued certificates.

### 4.6. Certificate Renewal

Not allowed

### 4.7. Certificate Re-key

Certificate re-key MAY only take place where:
(a) The DV or IS certificate is about to expire.

(b) A DV certificate is revoked;

(c) An IS key is compromised;

(d) Where a DV\IS certificate requires modification due to changes in the DV\IS attributes;

The CVCA\DV SHALL ensure that requests for certificates issued to a previously registered DV\IS are complete, accurate and duly authorised. The CVCA\DV SHALL:

(a) Check the existence and validity of the certificate to be re-keyed and that the information used to verify the identity and attributes of the DV\IS is still valid;

(b) Issue a new certificate based on verification of the subject’s signature on the request only if the cryptographic security of that signature key is still sufficient for the new certificate’s validity period and no indications exist that the key used to generate the subject’s signature on the request has been compromised.

Certificates SHALL be issued in accordance with 4.3 Certificate Issuance above.

In the case where a DV certificate is about to expire (see 4.7a above), TR-EAC A.4.2 Certificate Requests MUST be followed.

In the case where a DV certificate is revoked, expired or requires modification (see 4.7b,c,d above), re-keying is equal to the procedures when a DV applies for a DV certificate for the first time.

In the case where an IS private key is compromised or expired, re-keying is equal to the procedures when an IS applies for an IS certificate for the first time.

4.8. Certificate Modification

This is covered by section 4.7, ‘Certificate Re-Key’, of this document.

4.9. Certificate Revocation and Suspension

See section 5.7, ‘Compromise and Disaster Recovery’, of this document.

4.10. Certificate Status Services

See section 5.7, ‘Compromise and Disaster Recovery’, of this document.

4.11. End of Subscription

Not applicable.

4.12. Key Escrow and Recovery

MUST NOT be used.
5. MANAGEMENT, OPERATIONAL, AND PHYSICAL CONTROLS

5.1. Physical Controls

Each CVCA and DV SHALL ensure that it operates of its services in a secure environment. This SHALL include:

(a) Site location and construction: The CVCA/DV are operated in a physically protected area.

(b) Physical access: Access to the CVCA/DV is controlled and audited. Only authorised persons have physical access to the CVCA/DV environment.

(c) Media storage: The storage media are protected against unauthorised or unintended use, access, disclosure, or damage by people or other threats (e.g. fire, water).

(d) Waste disposal: Procedures for the disposal of waste are implemented in order to avoid unauthorised use, access, or disclosure of sensitive data.

(e) Off-site backup: An off-site backup of critical data MAY be installed.

5.2. Procedural Controls and System Access Management

Procedural controls SHALL be implemented, especially the separation of duties by implementing a two person principle for critical tasks.

Each CVCA, DV, and IS SHALL ensure that system access to any EAC-PKI device is limited to individuals who are properly authorised on a need to know basis. In particular, the following requirements apply:

(a) Controls (e.g. firewalls) SHALL be implemented to protect the CV internal network domains from external network domains accessible by third parties.

(b) Sensitive data SHALL be protected against unauthorised access or modification.

(c) Sensitive data SHALL be protected (e.g. using encryption and an integrity mechanism) when exchanged over networks which are not secure.

(d) Each CVCA, DV, and IS SHALL ensure effective administration of users (this includes operators, administrators and any users given direct access to the system) access to maintain system security, including user account management, auditing and timely modification or removal of access.

(e) The CVCA, DV, and IS SHALL ensure access to information and application system functions are restricted to authorised staff and that the EAC-PKI systems provide sufficient computer security controls for the separation of trusted roles, including the separation of security administrator and operation functions. Particularly, use of system utility programs is restricted and tightly controlled. Access SHALL be restricted only allowing access to resources as necessary for carrying out the role(s) allocated to a user.
CVCA, DV, and IS personnel SHALL be successfully identified and authenticated before using EAC-PKI applications related to certificate management or access to RP’s.

CVCA, DV, and IS personnel SHALL be accountable for their activities, for example by retaining event logs as defined in Section 5.4.

Sensitive data SHALL be protected against being revealed through re-used storage objects (e.g. deleted files) being accessible to unauthorised users.

5.3. Personnel Controls

All EAC-PKI systems, that is the CVCA, DV and IS systems, SHALL be operated by qualified and experienced staff. In particular, the following requirements hold:

(a) Each CVCA, DV and IS SHALL employ a sufficient number of personnel which possess the expert knowledge, experience and qualifications necessary for the offered services and as appropriate to the job function;

(b) Personnel SHALL undergo domestic security screening appropriate to the role(s) they are carrying out;

(c) Appropriate disciplinary sanctions SHALL be applied to personnel violating CVCA, DV or IS policies or procedures;

(d) Security roles and responsibilities, as specified in the system’s security policy, SHALL be documented in job descriptions. Trusted roles, on which security of the system’s operations are dependent SHALL be clearly identified;

(e) All personnel (both temporary and permanent) SHALL have job descriptions defined from the viewpoint of separation of duties and least privilege.

(f) Personnel SHALL exercise administrative and management procedures and processes that are in line with the Procedural Controls described in 5.2 above;

(g) All CVCA, DV and IS personnel in trusted roles SHALL be free from conflicting interests that might prejudice the impartiality of the system’s operations;

(h) Personnel with access to private keys within the EAC PKI SHALL be formally appointed to trusted roles by a senior management responsible for security of the IS;

(i) CVCA’s, DV’s and IS’s SHALL NOT appoint to trusted roles or management any person who is known to have a conviction for a serious crime or other offence which affects his/her suitability for the position. Personnel SHALL NOT have access to the trusted functions until any necessary checks are completed;
5.4. Audit Logging Procedures

Each CVCA, DV, and IS MUST implement appropriate logging procedures to analyze and recognize any proper and improper use of its system within the EAC-PKI.

CVCA’s, DV’s and IS’s SHALL ensure that all relevant information concerning a certificate is recorded for an appropriate period of time, at minimum to ensure compliance with audit requirements as described in 8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessment.

CVCA’s and DV’s SHALL ensure that:

(a) The confidentiality and integrity of current and archived records concerning certificates is maintained;

(b) Records concerning certificates are completely and confidentially archived;

(c) The precise time of significant environmental, key management and certificate management events is recorded

(d) All events relating to the life-cycle of keys are logged;

(e) All events relating to the life-cycle of certificates are logged;

(f) All events relating to registration are logged;

(g) All requests and reports relating to revocation, as well as the resulting actions, are logged;

(h) The specific events and data to be logged are documented;

(i) Events are logged in a way that they cannot be easily deleted or destroyed (except for transfer to long-term media) within the time period they are REQUIRED to be held;

IS’s SHALL maintain a log including:

(a) The logging of the key management part of the Inspection System SHALL be done in such a way that the responsible DV can detect misuse of the system and apply appropriate countermeasures.

(b) Protection against modification or deletion of logs.

(c) Records SHALL be kept to enable the auditor to confirm that misuse can be detected.

5.5. Records Archival Procedures

Each CVCA, DV, and IS SHALL implement appropriate records archival procedures for its system within the EAC-PKI. Procedures SHALL ensure the integrity, authenticity and confidentiality of the data.

The archives SHALL be created in a way that they cannot be deleted or destroyed (except for transfer to long term media) within the period of time that they are required to be held.
Access to archives SHALL be restricted to authorized operators only.

If the original media cannot retain the data for the required period, a mechanism to periodically transfer the archived data to new media will be defined by the archive site.

Inspection Systems SHALL NOT log or transmit fingerprints obtained from RP's. These biometrics SHALL be deleted immediately after finishing the comparison process between fingerprints acquired from the bearer and fingerprints read from the RP's.

Archived records SHALL be held for a period of time as appropriate for providing necessary legal evidence in accordance with the applicable legislation of the Member State.

5.6. Key Changeover

CVCA’s and DV’s SHALL ensure that keys are generated in controlled circumstances and in accordance with the procedures defined in Section 5.2 Management, Operational, and Physical Controls.

Full self-signed certificates plus link certificates SHALL be provided by the CVCA

5.7. Compromise and Disaster Recovery

CVCA’s SHALL take reasonable measures to ensure that continuity of service is maintained, including:

(a) Measures to minimise the impact of disruption to power services;
(b) Measures to minimise the impact of events such as flooding or fire;
(c) Measures to minimise the impact of the loss of availability of key staff;

5.7.1. Incident and Compromise Handling Procedures

Any CVCA, DV and IS SHALL ensure in the event of a disaster, including compromise of the participant’s private key, that operations are restored as soon as possible. In particular, the following requirements hold:

1. Each CVCA, DV and IS SHALL define and maintain a continuity plan to enact in case of disaster (see also Section 5.7.4).
2. CVCA and DV systems data necessary to resume CVCA and DV operations SHALL be backed up and stored in safe places suitable to allow the CVCA and DV to timely go back to operations in case of incident/disasters.
3. Back up and restore functions SHALL be performed by the relevant trusted roles.
4. The EAC-PKI business continuity plan (or disaster recovery plan) SHALL address the compromise or suspected compromise of a private key as a disaster and the planned processes SHALL be in place (see also Section 5.7.3).
5.7.2. Computing Resources, Software, and/or Data are Corrupted

If a private CVCA key is unusable for non-critical reasons, the procedure described in Section 5.6 is processed.

5.7.3. Entity Private Key Compromise Procedures

A Document Verifier SHALL immediately inform all CVCA’s that have issued certificates for this DV about DV or IS private key compromise or misuse.

If an Inspection System is lost or stolen, the responsible Document Verifier SHALL inform all CVCA’s that have issued certificates for this DV about the corresponding incident as soon as possible, but not later than the next certificate request.

Each country SHOULD publish to all other countries in which way the requested information is made available.

5.7.4. Business Continuity Capabilities after a Disaster

Each CVCA SHALL maintain a Business Continuity Plan detailing how it will maintain its CVCA services in the event of an incident that affects its normal capability.

5.8. CVCA or DV Termination

In the event of a CVCA terminating its operations it SHALL:

• Notify all CVCA’s with which it is registered of the termination;

• Notify all CVCA’s, with which it is registered, of the CVCA, if any, which will be taking over responsibility for national DVs;

• Notify all DVs which it supplies with certificates of the termination;

• Notify all DVs, which it supplies with certificates, of the CVCA, if any, which will be issuing certificates in its place;

• Any replacement CVCA MUST continue to provide certificates for RP's issued under the original CVCA;

• The CVCA SHALL destroy, or withdraw from use, its private keys;

In the event of a DV terminating its operations, it SHALL notify its national CVCA which will then notify all CVCA’s issuing certificates to that DV.

6. Technical Security Controls

6.1. Key Pair Generation

CVCA’s and DV’s SHALL ensure that CA keys are generated in controlled circumstances according to Section 5 Management, Procedural and Physical Controls of this document.
Key generation SHALL be carried out within a trustworthy device which is compliant with Appendix B.

Before expiration of a CVCA or DV signing key, the CVCA or DV SHALL generate a new certificate-signing key pair and SHALL apply all necessary actions to avoid disruption to the operations of any CVCA, DV or IS which may rely on that key. The new key SHALL be generated and distributed in accordance with TR-EAC and this policy.

CVCA’s and DV’S SHALL ensure that the integrity and authentication of their public keys and any associated parameters are maintained during distribution to DVs and IS’s.

6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls

Private signing keys SHALL be held and used within a trustworthy device which is compliant with Appendix B.

CVCA’s SHALL implement technical and procedural mechanisms that require the participation of multiple trusted individual authorizations to perform sensitive CVCA key operations (such as creation, back-up, restore, destruction and use).

DV’S SHALL implement technical and procedural mechanisms that require the participation of multiple trusted individual authorizations to perform sensitive DV key operations (such as creation, back-up, restore and destruction). DV must implement trusted role authentication process with the DV HSM to allow DV key usage.

IS key operations (such as creation, back-up, restore, destruction and use) MUST be restricted to authorized personnel appointed to this role.

When outside the signature–creation device, private signing keys SHALL be protected in a way that ensures the same level of protection as provided by the signature creation device.

If private keys are backed up, they SHALL be stored and recovered only by personnel in trusted roles using, at least, dual control in a physically secured environment. The number of personnel authorised to carry out this function SHOULD be kept to a minimum.

Backup copies of the private signing keys SHALL be subject to the same or greater level of security as keys currently in use.

Where keys are stored in a dedicated key processing hardware module, access controls SHALL be in place to ensure keys are not accessible outside the hardware module.

Private signing keys MUST NOT be used beyond the end of their lifecycle and all copies of the key SHALL be destroyed or put beyond use at the end of their life.

The security of cryptographic devices MUST be ensured throughout their lifecycle including ensuring that certificate and revocation status signing cryptographic hardware is not tampered with during shipment or storage, functions correctly when in operation and any private keys stored on the equipment is destroyed upon device retirement.
6.3. Other Aspects of Key Pair Management

Operational periods as specified in point 5.4.1 of Commission Decision C(2008) XXXX of XX.XX.XXXXX:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Minimum Validity Period</th>
<th>Maximum Validity Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country Verifying CA Certificate</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document Verifier Certificate</td>
<td>2 weeks</td>
<td>3 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection System Certificate</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>1 month</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.4. Activation Data

The requirements applicable to the activation data SHOULD be determined by the DV itself based on a risk analysis.

It MAY make use of de-blocking the activation data, but this MUST be in line with the security level offered by the activation data.

6.5. Computer Security Controls

CVCA’s, DV’s and IS’s SHALL comply with the procedures for computer security controls described in Section 5 Management, Operational and Physical Controls.

CVCA/DV/IS components MAY include the following functionalities:

– Require authenticated logins for trusted roles;
– Provide Discretionary Access Control;
– Provide a security audit capability (protected in integrity);
– Prohibit object re-use;
– Require use of cryptography for session communication and database security;
– Require a trusted path for identification and authentication;
– Provide domain isolation for process;
– Provide self-protection for the operating system.

6.6. Life Cycle Security Controls

The trustworthy devices used by CVCA’s, DV’s and IS’s SHALL be protected against modification.
An analysis of security requirements SHALL be carried out at the design and requirements specification stage of any systems development project undertaken by the CVCA, DV or IS that impacts on trustworthy systems or products to ensure that security is built into IT systems.

Change controls procedures MUST exist, and be documented, and used for releases, modifications and emergency software fixes for any operational software of CVCA’s, DV’s and ISs.

6.7. Network Security Controls

CVCA’s and DV’s SHALL comply with the procedures for network security controls described in Section 5 Management, Operational and Physical Controls.

6.8. Time-stamping

Not applicable

7. Certificate and CRL Profiles

7.1. Certificate Profile

CV Certificates as specified in TR-EAC A 4.1 CV Certificates.

7.2. CRL Profile

Not applicable

7.3. OCSP Profile

Not applicable

8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessment

A DV can only claim conformance with this CP if it is able to show it is conformant with a National Certificate Policy that meets the standard of this document. Other CVCA’s must assess whether the National Certificate Policy is compliant with this Certificate Policy, prior to issuing certificates to DV operating under that policy. In the event of a dispute, arbitration SHALL be carried out under the supervision of the European Commission.

DVs MUST select an independent accredited company/organisation ("Auditing Body") to audit the DV according to their National Certificate Policy and their Certificate Practice Statement.

The Auditing Body MUST be accredited for this purpose by a Member State’s accreditation body. The audit MUST not only check that procedural security controls are specified but also that they are adhered to in practice. This also includes the operation and management of Inspection Systems subscribing to the DV. Audits MUST be performed at least every three years.
The Auditing Body SHALL carry out a review at least once a year by a team of one or more auditors to ensure ongoing compliance with this CP.

Proof of conformity with the CP is only recognised if the DV can show a ‘certificate of conformity’ issued by the Auditing Body stating that the DV is compliant with this CP by way of being compliant its National Certificate Policy.

In the event that an audit indicates that a DV is not conforming to its National Certificate Policy, the DV is REQUIRED to notify all CVCA’s from which it receives certificates.

In the event a DV is not certified to be compliant with its National Certificate Policy, or its certification becomes invalid or expires, other Member States MUST not issue any further DV Certificates to this DV.

It is recommended that a DV implement an Information Security Management System (ISMS) for its CA and RA functionality in accordance to ISO/IEC 27001. The ISMS is based on an ISMS policy of which its scope is defined by the National Certificate Policy and the associated Certificate Practise Statement.

9. **Other Business and Legal Matters**

9.1. **Fees**

Not applicable.

9.2. **Financial Responsibility**

Not applicable.

9.3. **Confidentiality of Business Information**

Not applicable.

9.4. **Privacy of Personal Information**

ISs are not permitted to log or transmit fingerprint biometrics obtained from RP's. These biometrics MUST be deleted immediately after finishing the comparison process between the fingerprint biometric collected by the IS from the bearer and the fingerprint biometric read from the RP's.

9.5. **Intellectual Property Rights**

Not applicable.

9.6. **Representations and Warranties**

Not applicable.

9.7. **Disclaimers of Warranties**

Not applicable.
9.8. Limitations of Liability
Not applicable.

9.9. Indemnities
Not applicable.

9.10. Term and Termination
Not applicable.

9.11. Individual Notices and Communicating With Participants
All key management tasks MUST be carried out by robust communications channels.

All CVCA’s and DV’s MUST be able to carry out such communications by Email at minimum, although other additional online or offline communication channels MAY be mutually agreed.

In the event of disruption to a CVCA’s normal communication channels it MUST notify subscribing DVs of an alternate channel by which Certificate Requests can be submitted. This SHALL be done in a timeframe that minimises the risk of current certificates expiring

Email messages MUST conform to the following format and, where appropriate, MIME compliant attachments MUST be used.

9.11.1. Register
Subject: Register
Body: URLs to be used to contact this state
Attachments: none

9.11.2. CVCA Certificate
Subject: CVCA Certificate
Body: Unspecified
Attachments: CVCA Link Certificate(s)

9.11.3. DV Certificate Request
Subject: DV Certification Request
Body: Unspecified
Attachments: Certificate Request(s)
9.11.4. DV Certification Receipt Acknowledgement

Subject: DV Certification Request Receipt Acknowledgement
Body: Unspecified
Attachments: Certificate Request(s)

9.11.5. DV Certificate

Subject: [Reply to] DV Certification Request
Body: If a DV certificate is not to be issued, the reason why.
Attachments: DV Certificate (if at least one is issued)

9.11.6. Suspension of CVCA Service

Subject: {Nation States} CVCA Suspension
Body: Details of start and end date of CVCA service suspension
Attachments: Unspecified

9.12. Amendments

Member States may revise their National CP. Additional reviews may be enacted at any time at the discretion of the Member State. Spelling errors or typographical corrections which do not change the meaning of the CP are allowed without prior notification, but after the changes have been made Member States and the European Commission should be informed. Prior to approving any major security changes to the CP, the Member State SHALL notify the European Commission and other Member States that have DVs signed by national CVCA.

A Member State SHALL notify other authorized Member States and the European Commission and CVCA/DVs on its intention to modify the CP no less than 3 months before entering in a modification process on the CP and the scope of modification.

CP OID's SHALL be changed if a Member State determines that a change in the CP modifies the level of trust provided by the CP.

9.13. Dispute Resolution Procedures

Not applicable.


Not applicable.

9.15. Compliance with Applicable Law

Not applicable.
Not applicable

Not applicable
APPENDIX A.1. DEFINITIONS

1. **Certification Authority** – An entity that issues certificates

2. **Certificate Revocation List** – A list of revoked certificates;

3. **Certificate Policy** – A named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of application with common security requirements;

4. **Certificate Practice Statement** – A statement of the practice that a certification authority employs in issuing, managing, revoking and renewing or re-keying certificates;

5. **Common Certificate Policy** – The outline Certificate Policy published by the Commission which sets the minimum requirements for Member States National Certificate Policies to meet, in order to be included within the EAC-PKI.


7. **Extended Access Control Public Key Infrastructure** – The infrastructure required to control access to fingerprint biometrics on RP's utilising Extended Access Control.

8. **Document Signer** – the entity signing the original document, in this case the organisation that issues the RP's;

9. **Document Verifier** – an entity within the EAC-PKI that requests certificates from CVCA’s and, on the basis of those certificates, issues certificates to Inspection Systems;

10. **Evaluation Assurance Level** – a numeric grade assigned to an IT system or product following the completion of a Common Criteria security evaluation

11. **Inspection System** – the operational system that reads fingerprint biometrics from RP’s.

12. **International Civil Aviation Organisation** – A UN organisation tasked with fostering the planning and development of international air transport. In this role it sets international standards for RP’s.

13. **Key ceremony** - A procedure whereby a key pair is generated using a cryptographic module and where the public key is certified.


15. **Residence Permit** – Any authorisation issued by the authorities of a Member State allowing a third-country national to stay legally on its territory, with the exception of:
• visas;

• permits issued pending examination of an application for a residence permit or for asylum;

• authorisations issued for a stay of a duration not exceeding six months by Member States not applying the provisions of Article 21 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders;


17. Object Identifier – a unique numerical sequence allowing a document to be identified;

18. Public Part of the Certification Practice Statement – A subset of the provisions of a complete CPS that is made public by a CA

19. Registration Authority – An entity that establishes enrolment procedures for certificate applicants, performs identification and authentication of certificate applicants, initiate or pass along revocation requests for certificates, and approve applications for renewal or re-keying certificates on behalf of a CA

20. Trusted certification path – A chain of multiple certificates needed to validate a certificate containing the required public key. A certificate chain consists of one or more CVCA-certificates, link certificates as appropriate, a DV-certificate and the IS certificate.

APPENDIX A.2 ACRONYMS

CA Certification Authority
CC Common Criteria
CP Certificate Policy
CPS Certification Practice Statement
CRL Certificate Revocation List
CSCA Country Signing Certification Authority
CSPKI Country Signing Public Key Infrastructure
CVRA Country Verifying Registration Authority
CVCA Country Verifying Certification Authority
EAC-PKI Extended Access Control Public Key Infrastructure
APPENDIX B.1 – REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES

The crypto modules used by certificate authorities SHALL be evaluated and certified in accordance with one of the following standards:

- FIPS PUB 140-1 level 3 or higher\textsuperscript{13}
- FIPS PUB 140-2 level 3 or higher\textsuperscript{14}
- PP-SSCD\textsuperscript{15,16,17}
- BSI Cryptographic Modules Security Level “Enhanced”\textsuperscript{18}

APPENDIX B.2 – REQUIREMENTS FOR INSPECTION SYSTEMS

Member States SHALL adopt security targets for their inspection systems in accordance with Section 6. The inspection system SHALL be evaluated at a minimum level 2 and the key management component SHALL be evaluated at Level 4, augmented by VLA4 or VAN5.

\textsuperscript{13} Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules (FIPS PUB 140-1).
\textsuperscript{14} Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules (FIPS PUB 140-2).
\textsuperscript{15} BSI-PP-0004-2002T Protection Profile – Secure Signature-Creation Device Type 1, Version 1.05
\textsuperscript{16} BSI-PP-0005-2002T Protection Profile – Secure Signature-Creation Device Type 2, Version 1.04
\textsuperscript{17} BSI-PP-0006-2002T Protection Profile – Secure Signature-Creation Device Type 3, Version 1.05
\textsuperscript{18} BSI-PP-0036-2008: Cryptographic Modules Security Level "Enhanced" Version 1.01
Annex III

List of national Security features that could be used in the Residence permit

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- **Front side** of the residence card *(transparent or invisible at normal sight)*
  1. perforated security feature, e.g. with additional portrait of the card holder
  2. transparent overlay with additional DOVID-elements, e.g. individual photo/data of the card holder and/or machine verifiable security structure
  3. transparent surface pattern (matt/gloss finish)
  4. relief security pattern and/or tactile laser engraving
  5. integrated markers for document analysis (e.g. anti-stokes inks)

- **Back side** of the residence card *(placed in field 15/16)*
  1. data storage devices, e.g. contact-chip interface, optical memory stripe, 2D-barcode
  2. secondary photo of the card holder
  3. additional DOVID and/or optically variable ink, optically variable laser device (e.g. CLI, MLI)
  4. security thread, e.g. with individual data of the card holder and/or machine verifiable security structure
  5. perforated security feature, e.g. with additional portrait of the card holder
  6. transparent DOVID-overlay, e.g. with individual photo/data of the card holder and/or machine verifiable security structure
  7. transparent surface pattern (matt/gloss finish)
  8. relief security pattern and/or tactile laser engraving
  9. integrated markers for document analysis (e.g. anti-stokes inks)