



**Study on the best practices in cooperation between  
authorities and civil society with a view to the prevention  
and response to violent radicalisation**

**A report by The Change Institute**

**July 2008**

**A study commissioned by DG JLS of the European Commission**

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## CONTENTS

|   |            |
|---|------------|
| <b>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</b> .....  | <b>4</b>   |
| <b>1. INTRODUCTION</b> .....  | <b>9</b>   |
| <b>2. METHODOLOGY</b> .....   | <b>10</b>  |
| <b>3. LITERATURE REVIEW</b> .....   | <b>12</b>  |
| 3.1 Context of the study.....   | 12         |
| 3.2 Understanding civil society.....  | 14         |
| 3.3 Civil society and public policy.....  | 15         |
| 3.4 Development of civil society and social capital.....                          | 17         |
| 3.5 Arts, culture and civil society.....  | 18         |
| 3.6 Terrorism and civil society.....  | 19         |
| 3.7 ‘Uncivil society’.....  | 20         |
| 3.8 Civil society and Social Movements Theory.....                                | 21         |
| 3.9 Role of civil society in counter radicalisation.....                          | 22         |
| 3.10 Best Practice Framework.....   | 24         |
| <b>4. COOPERATION AND COUNTERING RADICALISATION ACROSS EUROPE</b> .....           | <b>26</b>  |
| 4.1 National themes.....  | 26         |
| 4.2 Civil society.....  | 29         |
| 4.3 Responses to violent radicalisation.....                                      | 31         |
| <b>5. PRINCIPLES OF GOOD PRACTICE</b> .....                                       | <b>39</b>  |
| <b>6. ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS</b> .....                       | <b>42</b>  |
| 6.1 Emerging Themes.....  | 44         |
| <b>7. EXAMPLES OF GOOD PRACTICE</b> .....   | <b>52</b>  |
| 7.1 Belgium.....  | 52         |
| 7.2 Denmark.....  | 55         |
| 7.3 France.....   | 59         |
| 7.4 Germany.....  | 68         |
| 7.5 Hungary.....  | 72         |
| 7.6 The Netherlands.....  | 74         |
| 7.7 Spain.....  | 82         |
| 7.8 Sweden.....   | 93         |
| 7.9 United Kingdom.....   | 94         |
| 7.10 International.....   | 116        |
| <b>8. CONCLUSIONS</b> .....   | <b>119</b> |
| 8.1 The value of co-operation between authorities and Muslim civil society.....   | 119        |
| 8.2 Priority areas for engagement.....  | 120        |
| 8.3 Principles of engagement.....   | 121        |
| 8.4 Development Needs of CSOs.....  | 123        |
| 8.5 Development Needs of Public Authorities.....                                  | 124        |
| <b>9. RECOMMENDATIONS</b> .....   | <b>125</b> |
| 9.1 General recommendations.....  | 125        |
| 9.2 Recommendations for developing effective co-operation with civil society..... | 125        |
| <b>Appendix A: Bibliography</b> .....   | <b>128</b> |
| <b>Appendix B: Researchers</b> .....  | <b>134</b> |

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

1. The review of European member state approaches to cooperation with civil society, and particularly Muslim and minority led civil society, highlights how there are a wide variety and complexity of public authority structures and experiences of development of policy and programme processes at national, regional and local government levels. There are a range of specific history and development paths for civil society organisations, particularly organisations working with, or led by, Muslim communities, their agendas and interests, the needs they are meeting, and the capacity issues that they may have.
2. Coherent member state responses to violent radicalisation through effective working with civil society organisations are limited. A range of additional key drivers that contribute to counter radicalisation responses can be identified:
  - a. The identification and development of integration, social inclusion, intercultural and interfaith projects and initiatives seen as necessary or complementary tools for prevention of radicalisation;
  - b. Many Member States are looking to develop institutional partners with domestic representatives of Islam; (it should be noted that the integration of the faith will not necessarily equate to the integration of Muslim communities)
  - c. The majority of direct counter radicalisation activity is being undertaken by civil society organisations and in some cases predates the public policy concern with terrorism; this often goes unrecognised by authorities;
  - d. Volatile political climates are reinforcing risk averse responses from public authorities and officials;
3. From the review of national approaches and examples of good practice, a number of key themes can be identified to inform understandings of what constitutes good practice:
  - a. ‘Indirect’ and more subtle approaches that do not necessarily overtly and directly address issues of violent radicalisation are key components of effective work with civil society organisations;
  - b. Protecting the actual and perceived autonomy and initiative of civil society organisations is central to the development of effective activity;
  - c. Genuine joint ownership of projects and partnerships is also central to legitimating and effective cooperation;
  - d. The complexity of questions of violent radicalisation limits and even precludes evaluation of initiatives based on crude assessment of the direct and visible impacts of initiatives intended to turn people away from violent radical paths.
4. The hindering factors for Member States in effective working with civil society organisations include:

- a. Problems of ‘securitisation’ of cooperation agendas undermining trust between CSOs and authorities;
  - b. Risk averse authorities given the absence of clear political mandates and strategic guidance;
  - c. A hostile wider political climate destabilising and undermining cooperation activity;
  - d. The organisational and capacity limits of civil society organisations as well as funding uncertainty and constraints;
5. A number of priority areas for engagement and interventions can be identified;
- a. Education – including school curricula, strategies for responding to radicalisation, capacity and leadership development for key individuals and CSOs from Muslim communities, capacity building and intercultural competence development for public officials, particularly teachers, infrastructural and development support for CSOs;
  - b. Safe spaces for critical engagement and dialogue; such spaces should include spaces for political expression, arts and culture as well as interfaith dialogue;
  - c. Equalities, justice and political engagement; initiatives to address real concerns relating to economic and social discrimination, social justice and political voice are central to any effective response.
6. In addition, there are key issues relating to the profile of engagement with civil society organisations including:
- a. The need for multiple relationships and multiple tiers of engagement;
  - b. The need to prioritise the practical case for engagement over concerns about values and ideologies of CSOs, in particular whether they are ‘mainstream’ or ‘moderate’. These concerns may shift over time which further destabilises engagement;
  - c. The need to recognise and cooperate with the full range of CSO organisational forms and types and not just ‘representative’ organisations.
7. A developmental approach to civil society is necessary in order to foster genuine cooperative relationships based on trust including:
- a. Civil society development; developing holistic relationships; the need for outreach to CSOs and the need for practical support from authorities;
  - b. Public authority development; a pressing need for competence-building initiatives for professionals in response to a lack of knowledge of the issues and questions of violent radicalisation, lack of intercultural understanding and knowledge of the Muslim ‘field’ and working practices;
  - c. Recognising the importance of the Muslim ‘field’ as organic and looking at activities and civil society organisations as an ‘ecology’; this will necessitate a broad based range

of responses and facilitate targeting of support where it is most effective and most needed. This includes recognising where work is necessarily medium and long term and avoiding the search for ‘quick fixes’ as the primary focus of public authority activity and ensuring an appropriate scope of activities.

#### 8. *General recommendations*

The study does not address the issue of knowledge about radicalisation processes in the political (local, national and European), public policy and media sectors. However, given the interaction between civil society and these fields, there is value in developing targeted awareness programmes for these actors to enhance the likely effectiveness of cooperation with civil society organisations. Principled and coherent action is necessary to ensure that polarising and discriminatory representations and narratives are not promoted without facing challenge and critique. In this field there is real value in interventions to improve intercultural competence and develop understanding of Muslim communities as well as Islam.

It is also important for public authorities at European, national and local levels to support the emerging civic and political engagement of Muslim communities and their efforts to secure a presence in the public policy and political spheres. Training, development and networking programmes aimed at enhancing this presence should be encouraged.

There have been a number of efforts by individuals to develop a pan-European forum for Muslim CSOs, indicating the interest in participation and dialogue at EC level. In the medium term the EU should look to support and accelerate these types of initiatives, looking to include Muslim and non-Muslim CSOs with an interest in challenging Islamophobia, anti-Semitism and discrimination against the full range of minority groups. Such a forum could support the implementation of anti-discrimination measures and minority community participation at all levels of Member State and EC economic, social and public life.

#### 9. *Recommendations for developing effective co-operation with civil society*

A holistic and systemic approach is necessary to address the complexity of the field. The recommendations we make are intended to reinforce each other and a ‘pick and mix’ approach is unlikely to be effective. For ease and a memorable shorthand we have referred to this as a 5 ‘P’s model. The key components at Member State levels are:

- a. *Policy*. There needs to be more clarity in policy at Member State, regional and local level prioritising CSO involvement and setting out principles and a framework for co-operation. The approach should focus not solely on Muslim civil society but including other CSOs interested in the maintenance and development of harmonious community relationships. This should be reflected in:
  - i. Clear national strategies
  - ii. Clearer mandates for authorities and public servants.

- b. *Partnership* approaches. There needs to be greater understanding of effective principles and approaches to developing genuine partnerships, and joint ownership of the issues. There also needs to be clarity in what is / is not up for negotiation in cooperation, about respective roles, and about how programmes and work will be sustained. Partnership approaches should be underpinned by:
  - i. Taking a holistic developmental approach to cooperation and development of partnerships that recognises that CSOs in the field often have multiple purposes and needs.
  - ii. Joint training and development programmes that bring together a range of key individuals and stakeholders from civil society and public authorities.
  
- c. *Programmes*. Policy and partnership need to be reflected in programmes that are adequately resourced and this may require building capacity, leadership and infrastructure. A mix of programmes at a variety of levels is likely to be more effective, as well as programmes that do not label (and reinforce) the view of the community (and radicalisation) as the only issue or problem for these communities. The priorities here include:
  - i. Indirect programmes and recognition of the broad range of holistic work undertaken by many CSOs
  - ii. More flexible and adaptable terms of reference and specifications for funding.
  - iii. Developing an understanding of the civil society sector as organic and working to develop the ‘ecology’ of the sector. For example, in many cases, there may be an imbalance in support and funding available, with CSOs providing direct services or undertaking direct anti-radicalisation initiatives finding it relatively easier to secure funding. Other important ‘intermediate tier’ organisations (that may be focusing on influencing policy / networking/ working on anti-discrimination issues) may find securing funding more difficult. In particular, it is apparent that some of the most progressive and newer organisations in the field are women’s groups and youth organisations, yet they often face the greatest difficulties in securing public authority support.
  
- d. *Practice*. Public service professionals, whether in crime prevention, criminal justice, education, health and social welfare are facing and having to respond to issues relating to Muslim community needs, including pressures arising from radicalisation in their day to day work, yet support and development opportunities remain informal and underdeveloped. Professional development work needs to be undertaken, beginning with:
  - i. Development of mechanisms and processes for bringing together those working with the issues on the ground.

- ii. Joint training, education and capacity building for public authority officials with CSOs in the Muslim field.
- e. *Performance*. There need to be frameworks and mechanisms for ongoing review and learning by public authorities and Member States in this field:
  - i. Underpinning principles, approaches, and strategies need to be evaluated as well as specific programmes and projects at local, regional, national and EC level. Assessment and evaluation of approaches needs to be based on a more thorough mapping of the existing and desirable ‘ecology’ of the sector, to ensure that the full range of groups that can assist in addressing this agenda are being funded. Such a mapping should include key considerations such as type of organisation, intervention characteristics, target group and beneficiaries, geographical focus, cultural and faith background.
  - ii. A focus on the problem of radicalisation and perceived cultural and theological problems and issues in some Muslim communities will be limited in its effectiveness. A holistic approach is necessary at EC and Member State level that recognises the focus of policy needs to include the social and economic integration of Muslim and other minority communities in Europe if some of the root causes of ‘grievance’ are to be addressed.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Identifying and addressing the factors that contribute to violent radicalisation are central issues in the fight against terrorism. This need is recognised in all relevant documents adopted by the European Union (EU), including the declarations following the Madrid and London attacks; the *Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism* adopted in June 2004 and revised every six months; the Commission's *Communication on prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist attacks*; and the Hague programme adopted by the European Council in November 2004.

In its *Communication on Terrorist recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation*, the Commission identified existing EU policies that could play an important role in addressing the problem. This Communication was an initial contribution to the development of an EU Strategy and Action Plan on Radicalisation and Recruitment which was adopted by the Council of Ministers in December 2005. The Strategy reflects the Commission's approach in highlighting the need to "develop our understanding of the problem" and recognises the role of the Commission in delivering the strategy through "channelling its policies effectively, including through the investment of funds for research".

Aware of the enormous complexity of the subject, the Commission has acknowledged in its Communication that far more in-depth research and analysis is required. A European expert group on violent radicalisation has been established while three studies on violent radicalisation have been conducted that will help the Commission develop more efficient and better targeted policy making and will help confirm, adapt or reject commonly held assumptions in the field. Based on extensive fieldwork and collection of new empirical data, the studies will also provide the necessary academic and empirical support to its policies.

The studies cover the following areas:

- the factors that may possible trigger or affect violent radicalisation processes, particularly among youth;
- the beliefs, ideologies and narratives of violent radicals; and
- the methods through which violent radicals mobilise support for terrorism and find new recruits.

## 2. METHODOLOGY

The general objective of this study is to identify cooperation initiatives between authorities and civil society in countering violent radicalisation, and to guide and support the Commission's future policy making. Specifically the study is intended to:

- identify and analyse the current approaches being taken by Member States to cooperate with civil society in the development of policy, programmes and initiatives to counter violent radicalisation;
- identify best practices where these are occurring;
- compare approaches and identify common themes and patterns in Member State approaches and assess their significance for the response of the EU as a whole;
- identify how existing policies, programmes and initiatives for cooperation could be improved or how they might be modified to be applied EU-wide;
- suggest possible new initiatives and explore feasible policy options that are not Member State specific for improving cooperation between public authorities and civil society.

Research was conducted from August 2007 to March 2008. The study consisted of four key phases:

*Literature Review;* drawing on key work from academia and public policy and civil society, as well from contemporary debates in civil society, a literature review was conducted to identify practice and contemporary dynamics in relation to civil society, its role in public policy and how it is set within the context of counter terrorism. The literature review sought to draw on a wide range of policy areas.

*Development of data gathering and analytical framework;* based on the findings of literature review and consultation with key strategic individuals and with the core European research team, a data gathering and analytical framework was developed to guide and inform the delivery of the study throughout Europe.

*Individual country mapping;* research was conducted for each member state utilizing local researchers. Country reports were developed that mapped experiences and policy and activity in each member state in relation to cooperation approaches to civil society, as well as contemporary dynamics within the member state 'Muslim' CSOs<sup>1</sup> field and their relationship to authorities and broader civil society. Reports also assessed the extent and characteristics of member state counter radicalisation responses. Key member state literature and relevant public

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<sup>1</sup> In this report Muslim CSOs refers to organisations with a Muslim faith or 'cultural' identity or working closely with Muslim communities

policy was reviewed and stakeholder consultation interviews were conducted. Respondents included:

- Representatives of authorities, (national, government, etc) with responsibility for counter radicalisation agendas;
- ‘Muslim’ civil society representatives;
- Academics / journalists;
- Individuals with key strategic insights into contemporary questions of violent radicalisation in Member States.

*Review of examples of co-operation between authorities and civil society organisations;* as part of the individual country mapping exercise a range of examples were identified spanning a variety of approaches and sub-sectors but also set within a range of different contexts – including some contexts where perceptions of the threat were small and the experience of intercultural working with Muslim civil society was highly limited. The review of examples was based on agreed data collection and evaluation frameworks to support comparative review, including a findings workshop with key researchers. Respondents included:

- Key individuals involved in the design and delivery of the initiative to include both;
  - civil society representatives;
  - authorities representatives;
- Additional individuals or organisations identified as important to the delivery of the scheme or study;
- Individuals or organisation with additional insights into the delivery and effectiveness of the initiative and broader perceptions of the credibility of the initiative, including local community stakeholders;
- Intended beneficiaries.

In addition to the core project team, 28 researchers and over 200 respondents have contributed to this development of findings within this report.

### 3. LITERATURE REVIEW

In order to frame, identify, evaluate and propose effective approaches to civil society as part of a counter radicalisation agenda, a literature review of key material has been conducted. Drawing on key work from academia and public policy as well from contemporary debates in civil society the review covers the history and shape of civil society, its role in public policy and how it is set within the context of counter terrorism.

#### 3.1 Context of the study

The challenge of countering violent extremism has become increasingly important in light of the contemporary threat presented by terrorist groups and networks underpinned by an abusive interpretation of Islam. The origins of these movements and groups are highly complex and incorporate a range of key influencing factors and actors, with a cross-fertilisation of beliefs, values and ideologies emanating from distinctive institutions and regions; namely the Salafi Wahhabi theology / ideology of Saudi Arabia, the ideology of members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and notably Sayyid Qutb's work 'Milestones', and organisations such as Mawdudi's Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan. These ideas and movements fed into the violent Mujahedeen insurgency against Soviet rule in Afghanistan in the late 1980s, with the support of the US and Saudi governments via Pakistan, and provided the setting for the evolution of these currents and ideologies into the al-Qaeda narrative espoused by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri that has since been promoted to an expanding Muslim diaspora.

The ideological and practical impetus of the Afghan wars was maintained with the creation of al-Qaeda by Osama bin Laden in response to perceived US imperialism in the Middle East and the 'insult' of their presence in the holy places during the Gulf War, the Palestinian intifada, as well as a range of hitherto unconnected political conflicts and disputes. Al-Qaeda and associated jihadi networks sought to knit together a range of grievances to create and claim leadership of a broader international movement, with their declaration of war on the United States in 1998 a significant step in this development. With the strategic shift of al-Qaeda operations toward attacking the 'far enemy' from its base in Taliban controlled Afghanistan reaching its zenith in 9/11 attacks, followed by the US 'war on terror', the arenas of Iraq and Afghanistan as well as Pakistan's North West Frontier, have all become key theatres of conflict. During this time France also experienced post colonial terrorism and violent radicalisation emanating from nationalist and Islamist groups from North Africa.

In Western Europe, and specifically the UK, key cultural links to sites of ideological development and arenas of conflict representing opportunities for practical participation (Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bosnia) have fed into dense and fissiparous social networks exploring new found identities and relationships with their faith, social and political status. The presence of key radical movement interlocutors and ideologues promoting jihadist 'takfiri' ideology<sup>2</sup>, as well as those returning from Afghanistan and Pakistan and later the Bosnian war,

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<sup>2</sup> In Islamic law 'takfir' is the practice of declaring as 'unbelievers' or 'kafir' a Muslim individual or group previously considered to be Muslims. The act which precipitates takfir is termed the 'mukaffir'. The use of this term by salafist-jihadists in relation to their political enemies (among other things) encouraged leading Muslim clerics at the International Islamic Conference in 2005 to release a statement

have played a fundamental role in the development of domestic radical and jihadist networks in the UK during the 1990s. The UK became a global hub for radical ideology and foreign terrorist activity facilitated by the so called 'covenant of security'. With the strategic shift of al-Qaeda, highlighted by the attacks of 9/11, and subsequent high profile participation of the UK in the 'war on terror', Europe has become a target for terrorists groups underpinned by an abusive interpretation of Islam, as well as a location for recruitment.

While the attacks on Madrid rail transport in 2004 killing 191 people were primarily undertaken by foreign participants, the following year's attacks on the London transport system that killed over 50 people were perpetrated by British nationals born and raised in UK towns and cities, including one convert, and from a range of social and educational backgrounds. Whilst these attacks were seen as newsworthy, however some Muslim youth from the UK and France as well as from other Muslim communities in Western Europe had already been participating in violent conflicts of relevance to them around the world.

Europe has increasingly become a space where quasi-autonomous networks and ideological frameworks underpinned by an abusive interpretation of Islam are developing. While these European groups, narrative and ideologies are set within the context of global political dynamics, and in some cases are linked to varying degrees by networks of individuals and organisations to violent groups such as al-Qaeda, over time they exhibiting a specifically European experience and outlook.

Framing these dynamics in Europe has been the development of a revivalism of Muslim identity amongst diaspora populations that is mediating the reality and sentiments of living in a society hostile to their presence, or suspicious of Islam in the current climate, as well as the particular experiences of being second or third generation minority populations in post colonial European States. These political and identity dynamics are commonly set within dense social networks, sometime mediated around discovery of new forms of religious practice, but also political awareness and concern about key political issues. These political concerns are often linked to the politics of diaspora but also heavily informed by universal principles and ideas and debates.

Whilst there are many common themes and issues of concern across these generations, clear variations and differences in both rhetoric and methods for resolution can be seen. The dynamic and contexts being described incorporate a wide diversity of individual and group actors and participants from the progressive to conservative, the political radical to religious pietist, the doctrinal fundamentalist to the disaffected, through to those attracted to a rhetoric or a practical commitment to violent action, be it in wars in Europe or abroad. This context needs to be understood, and responded to as a broad based social movement where violent radicals are attempting to recruit new members and on occasion are able to gain wider tacit or explicit support on specific occasions around issues that are of concern to all Muslims, including discrimination and economic and social marginalisation.

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denouncing takfir and emphasising that it is not possible to perform takfir on any group of Muslims who believe in Allah, the Prophet Muhammad, the five pillars of Islam, and do not deny any of the necessary articles of the faith.

### 3.2 Understanding civil society

*“Civil Society is the arena of un-coerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market; though in practice the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred, negotiated and evolving. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power.”<sup>3</sup>*

While conceptual understanding of civil society has developed throughout the history of political theory, universal definitions remain elusive and reflect the complex sociological character of civil society. Understandings of civil society emerge from a variety of perspectives, including macro-sociological views of how state and society interact, to more politically informed conceptions of the role of civil society born from classical and enlightenment political thought, through to more normative approaches prioritising the outputs and virtues of the development of civic space. Other approaches commonly focus on the shape, form and function of civil society organisations.

Civil society is usually situated as one of the four key components of social organisation along with the market, the state and the family. However the boundaries of these spheres are highly contested and often delineated on the basis of the political perspectives and the agendas of those employing them. Classical, enlightenment descriptions and understandings of civil society focus on an active sphere of citizen organisation, directly engaged in the shaping of political and institutional life, but also understood as being distinct from the state. For many theorists, central to all descriptions and definitions of the concept of civil society is the necessity for an ethos of active civic engagement. Such engagement, as described for example by de Tocqueville, often starts with specific issue based groups that bring people together in new coalitions, breaking down old ethnic, familial and feudal ties.<sup>4</sup>

Normative approaches mainly focus on individual participation in social networks and the value generated by this participation in a social space. These spaces are commonly recognised by dense personal contact and horizontal social networks that are a central driver in the development of social capital. Social capital is an increasingly prominent concept employed by academics such as Robert Putnam that highlights the value of social interaction and engagement as a key counterpart to more traditional concepts such as human capital.<sup>5</sup> The development of the social spaces and networks that characterise civil society has been an uneven process across different countries depending on their specific social and political contexts. However, many analysts of the 1989 revolutions ending Communist rule in Eastern and Central Europe suggest that the development of even a normative civil society was in itself a political act, and a key challenge and contributor to the eventual downfall of a totalitarian system of governance.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> London School of Economics Centre for study of Civil Society, 2004

<sup>4</sup> Whaites, Alan: *Let's get civil society straight; NGOs, the state and political theory* (Development in Practice, 2000)

<sup>5</sup> Putnam, Robert D: *Bowling alone; the collapse and revival of American community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000)

<sup>6</sup> Kaldor, Mary: *Global Civil Society, an answer to war* (London: Polity, 2003)

Organisational approaches towards understanding civil society focus on the role and infrastructure that civil society may provide in delivering public goods and services to members and broader constituencies. In particular this focus has centred on the role of CSOs in filling market gaps created by heterogeneous demand. CSOs also play a central role in the delivery of goods that are hard to quantify or allocate, for example cultural goods; essential requirements for effective state or market delivery<sup>7</sup>.

When considering the formation of minority groups within western European countries, it is the normative approach that best captures the multifaceted nature of minority and migrant CSOs. Such CSOs might, and commonly do, simultaneously combine shared cultural social spaces, delivery of essential welfare services and genuine advocacy with a highly active membership, but are also recognised by an ethnic or religious identity.<sup>8</sup> In addition, the modes of organisation within migrant and minority CSOs may also follow particular cultural forms and paths, in particular in relation to the role and structure of faith, which may contrast with traditional approaches to European civil society.

### **3.3 Civil society and public policy**

The role of civil society and public policy has been a prominent theme in contemporary political and public administration approaches across Europe. The attention afforded to the role of civil society in public policy delivery is not a new phenomenon, and in many ways it can be viewed as a reassertion following the general development of state provision throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Its role in public policy can be seen in a number of areas, primarily in the delivery of public goods and services as well as in shaping delivery and governance of public authorities.

In the context of public service delivery, CSOs commonly develop in response to a felt need that is not being provided for by the state or market, and are consequently primarily demand led. In many European states, particularly in education, CSOs play fundamental roles in public service provision. Civil society can also be seen to play important functions in the delivery of health and criminal justice provision. International development is possibly the most prominent role where CSOs are involved in the delivery of developmental programmes in contexts where the state is either weak or an impediment to developmental goals.

Characterised by horizontal social networks with high personal contact, CSOs are highly responsive to needs and necessities of provision and to the demands of their participants. They often possess a wide range of expertise, while also being highly innovative, flexible and closely engaged with the populations that they serve. However, delivery relationships in particular can often blur the boundaries of civil society and devolved state delivery, with CSOs coming to adopt the hierarchical 'vertical' structures associated with the imperative of consistent and planned service delivery by the state.

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<sup>7</sup> Morris, Susannah: *Defining the non-profit sector:; Some lessons from history* (LSE, Centre for Civil Society, 2000)

<sup>8</sup> Castles, Stephen: *The age of migration / Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller. Age of migration : international population movements in the modern world : 3rd ed.* (New York, Guilford Press, 2003)

In addition to the delivery of state provision, less formal, visible and often less quantifiable are the wide range of services delivered by grass roots CSOs recognised by horizontal social networks. Such CSOs may develop functions to meet new and fluid demands which by virtue of their form they are best placed to meet. In particular a key area for such developments in response to the absence of more formal provision can be seen across a wide range of ethnic minority organisations providing cultural, social, health and advocacy services, as well as personal contractual settlements and other forms of legal advice.

In relation to international development in particular, practice has come to identify the role of civil society as moving away from that of formal public service delivery towards acting on development and as a conduit for the targeting of resources enabling communities to shape their own futures according to their own needs. Analysts also point to acknowledgement by the Commission of a more general potential role for “civil society...and NGOs as... partners in implementing its agreed strategic goals of sustainable economic growth and social cohesion”.<sup>9</sup>

The role of civil society in shaping public service policy is also increasingly a key area of attention. In influencing public policy, CSOs play a wide range of roles including policy analysis and design, advocacy and delivery as well as monitoring and review of policy. The contribution that civil society can make in improving the responsiveness of authorities to public policy challenges and delivery is evident by virtue of their particular structures and development histories. As part of an agenda of improving responsiveness of public services and general democratisation of public institutions, civil society is seen to have a key role to play in developing participatory structures that move away from passive or transactional relationships with authorities and service provision and towards a genuinely engaged public policy and service delivery.

The imperative for opening up decision making processes at all levels is driven by decreasing levels of trust in authorities that is being recognised by a wide range of public bodies, including the European Commission in its white paper on European Governance.<sup>10</sup> Declining trust is a serious challenge to the development and maintenance of genuinely responsive democratic participatory systems, and even to the efficiency of economic systems.<sup>11</sup> By contrast, trust is a central characteristic of CSOs, which are based on a tight network of social relations, and are often viewed as highly trustworthy.<sup>12</sup> Issues of trust in authorities and the important and multifaceted functions of CSOs therefore increasingly drive developmental approaches to civil society.<sup>13</sup> A developed and vibrant civil society sector, with avenues of engagement with public authorities, is commonly seen as an essential feature and partner in the re-establishment of trust and legitimacy in public policy development, delivery, institutions and governance.

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<sup>9</sup> European Council, Lisbon 2000 in Kendall, Jeremy: the third sector and the development of European public policy – Frameworks for analysis: civil society working paper 19 (LSE, Centre for Civil Society, 2001)

<sup>10</sup> Brussels 25.7.2001 COM (2001)428 final

<sup>11</sup> Anheier, Helmut K. and Kendall, Jeremy: Trust and voluntary organisation: three theoretical approaches (LSE, Centre for Civil Society, 2000)

<sup>12</sup> NGOs are now the most trusted institutions worldwide, according to Edelman trust barometer survey carried out for this year's world economic forum. Elderman Trust Barometer: the 9<sup>th</sup> global opinion leaders study, 2008

<sup>13</sup> Jochum, V, Pratten, B and Wilding, K: Civil renewal and active citizenship: a guide to the debate (NCVO, 2005)

### 3.3.1 *Limits of civil society*

When considering the role of civil society in public policy, it is also important to recognise some of the limitation of its role. For example:

- while civil society has an important function in mediating interest and developing public policy, it remains the democratic state that is the primary arbiter of strategic direction for policy. Civil society is not primarily characterised by the vertical structures commonly associated with efficient and consistent delivery of public goods;
- civil society is commonly under resourced and is limited in its capacity and its functions. Such resource constraints can often include key organisational or human resources. In particular they are commonly under resourced for public policy delivery functions without significant state support to develop the necessary functions and apparatus to deliver consistent services;
- whilst CSOs are inherently ‘legitimate’ by virtue of their very existence, they are not necessarily representative organisations. Rather they reflect the common purpose and values of those people who constitute the organisation. Civil society groups are not necessarily equitable or consensual in operation.

## 3.4 **Development of civil society and social capital**

In the US, despite concerns expressed by some commentators relating to the contemporary approach to civil society as part of the ‘war on terror’, government has a long history of high levels of cooperation with civil society in delivering public policy objectives. This contrasts with the European experience, which has more commonly reflected a more centralised state delivery of public welfare provision and other public goods. This situation, reflecting both the US tradition of small government and the primacy of individuals allied, formal equality and high value placed on local communalism, has developed a political economy of public service provision that has a civil society sector integrated into extensive, if not necessarily equal, contractual relationships with multiple tiers of government.<sup>14</sup>

This model of service delivery has seen the US government play an instrumental role in the development of the non-for-profit sphere through wide ranging funding relationships and working closely with the sector to address a range of health and social welfare provision. This arrangement has been referred to as ‘contracting regime’ of welfare delivery and some analysts propose that this political economy, with high levels of social capital, has been instrumental in the development and delivery of landmark legislation over the 20<sup>th</sup> century that has been influential around the world including driving the international development approaches of the Washington consensus.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Moulton, L and Anheier, H: Public-private partnerships in the United States: Public-private partnership in the United States: Historical patterns and current trends (LSE Centre for Civil Society)

<sup>15</sup> *ibid*

In recent years the normative understanding of civil society has focused on the important role of social capital in the delivery of economic growth, social inclusion, improved health and more effective government. Key indicators of social capital include social relations, formal and informal social networks, group membership, trust, reciprocity and civic engagement. Social capital is generally understood as the property of the group rather than the property of the individual. However developmental approaches toward civil society and improving social cohesion are more recent public policy developments in European contexts.

The focus on social capital to develop engaged and cohesive societies has been given prominence by US academics such as Robert Putnam, who suggest that declining social capital undermines key public policy spheres.<sup>16</sup> Approaches focusing on developing social capital are now receiving increasing attention from public policy in order to address this supposed decline.<sup>17</sup> In this sense civil society is seen as a key contributor in the development of social capital, cohesive societies and participatory governance by enabling citizens to identify and articulate their values, beliefs, civic norms and democratic practices.

### **3.5 Arts, culture and civil society**

Although attention has begun to focus on the intrinsic value of civil society to western societies, a key area of public policy that has historically been led by a wide range of civil society actors is that of arts and culture. High quality arts and culture is a public good not best delivered entirely by the market or the state. In this arena, a diversity of arts and cultural CSOs have often been at the forefront of meeting needs with their capacity for creativity and innovation, as well as having the social networks to develop new activity and directions.

While arts and cultural practice is commonly led by CSOs, there is a long tradition of state support for the arts in Western Europe through the funding of arts and cultural organisations. Arms length developmental approaches have often been adopted in arts and cultural policy from local to national levels to ensure that a wide range of vibrant and contemporary arts is developed as a public good. Commonly such funding and institutional relationships have developed with arts organisations and national institutions of excellence that have developed more 'vertical' institutionalised characteristics. However these major organisations, as well as more 'grass roots' orientated companies, groups and practitioners, remain characterised by their horizontal networks and capacity for artistic innovation, practice and excellence that may sometimes receive state developmental support.

These approaches are predicated on the development of personalised 'soft' relationships throughout the sector that enables the identification of existing and emerging practice and support of this activity through strategic developmental backing. This support may be directed at individuals or organisations of many different shapes and sizes and may include capital and / or revenue support, guidance and advice. In particular, successful approaches support a range of organisations and activities in order to develop a dynamic sector that is able to incubate innovative and quality arts practice and output.

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<sup>16</sup> Putnam, Robert D: *Bowling alone; the collapse and revival of American community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000)

<sup>17</sup> Some analysts have expressed concerns that the findings of Putnam are linked particular contexts, in particular the suburbs of US cities, and the appropriateness of their transferability to other settings.

This approach has been referred to as developing an arts ‘ecology’ in order to characterise how a range of organisations and practice combines to develop a vibrant arts scene from which innovative and high quality practice may emerge. Central to this approach is recognition of the intrinsic value of supporting a range of organisational types and arts practices in order to generate a context in which ‘useful things happen.’ In addition these development approaches also recognise the challenges of evaluating practice within an inherently subjective field. While assessments of ‘quality’ are still highly relevant (and contested), the approach recognises the limitations of crude input- output orientated approaches to evaluation of specific activity.

### **3.6 Terrorism and civil society**

Civil society is increasingly viewed as a key partner and actor in the development of public policy in a broad range of policy fields. It is also understood as a fundamental component of cohesive, inclusive and participatory democratic societies. In line with these trends, counter terrorism and more specifically countering violent radicalisation is increasingly turning to civil society, with organisations such as the European Commission viewing civil society as a key partner in the fight against terrorism and violent radicalisation. Given the form and function of civil society it is in many ways the key arena for any study of terrorism and political violence and development of associated prevention and response strategies. This understanding is highlighted in the policy focus amongst organisations such as the EC which recognise that countering terrorism and extremism cannot be achieved through legislation and security measures alone, but is necessarily addressed through a broad based coalition which generates local level support and involvement.

However whilst there is a shift in the relationship to civil society concerning issues of violent radicalisation, the historical as well as much of the contemporary relationship between authorities and civil society remains characterised by an extension of the power of the state over civil society. This extension ranges from direct steps to regulate and control the activities of civil society to the curtailment of advocacy functions through legislative responses, and in some instances direct targeting of ‘suspect’ CSO groups. These relationship patterns have been seen in many of the responses undertaken by states across the globe and by the US ‘war on terror’, with many national governments clamping down on the activities of domestic CSO organisations.<sup>18</sup> Other areas of activity have also felt the effects in a variety of ways. In particular, the international development sector is an arena where the aims, objectives and activity of CSOs have been increasingly leveraged to meet the security agenda.<sup>19</sup> In addition many NGOs have also become caught up in US attempts to target potential front organisations and funding vehicles for terrorist organisations with knock on effects on their ability to carry out their activities.<sup>20</sup>

In Western Europe many CSOs are also increasingly concerned about levels of regulation and restrictions on their activity, ranging from direct imposed regulation of their day to day

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<sup>18</sup> Jude Howell et al: *The Backlash against Civil Society in the Wake of the Long War on Terror* (LSE Centre for Civil Society)

<sup>19</sup> Howell, Jude: *The Global War on terror, development and civil society*. *Journal of international development* 18, 51-67 (2006)

<sup>20</sup> Quigley, N & Pratten, B: *The impact of counter-terrorism measures on civil society organisations* (NCVO, 2007)

operations to instances of targeting and monitoring by security services.<sup>21</sup>In addition some CSOs are also concerned that the powers contained in counter terrorism legislation may be employed in a way that has an impact on their ability to fulfil legitimate advocacy functions, both in relation to the Muslim field, e.g. with regard to Middle East tensions and conflicts, and beyond.

### **3.7 ‘Uncivil society’**

However, while the theme above is one of an erosion of autonomy of civil society by state actors in response to real and perceived threats, civil society is not merely a passive sector but has a far more active and complex role in issues of radicalisation and terrorism. In a number of respects, civil society is the primary locus of activity and study when considering questions of violent radicalisation and terrorism, while those groups adopting non-state violence can in themselves be viewed as bi-products of civil society.

Civil society, as an arena of un-coerced collective action independent from the power and control of the state, is the key arena of activity for non state actors promoting political violence and terrorist tactics. Extremist groups target individuals and organisations within and throughout civil society in order to develop constituencies of support. They seek to promote their own agendas and promote their influence throughout the civil society field. Some groups may even seek to dominate the structures and culture of civil society itself by influencing cultural practice and through political and faith ideologies, or through adopting ‘entryist’ tactics, while others may provide key community services and welfare functions that further cements their role and legitimacy amongst civil society and the population independently of the state.<sup>22</sup>

It is also possible to view terrorist organisations as participants in the ‘uncivil’ or militant wing of civil society. As non state groups they are independent of the activities of the state and coalesce around shared interests or identities, as do civil society groups in general. In particular, terrorist groups often exhibit many of the organisational characteristics of CSOs. They commonly consist of loose horizontal associations autonomous from the state and are recognised by dense social networks of practice, united by and circulating shared narratives but consisting of a variety of groups, cells, religious institutions, NGOs, charities and even lone individuals. However, the existence of violent groups such as these are also indicative of a certain level of tension in relations between the state and parts of the population that has seen the development of groups that promote violent strategies and uncivil sectarian political action.

The proximity of the relationship between civil society and what might be described as a militant wing is important to any assessment of countering violent radicalisation in partnership with civil society. If civil society is the area of activity it is no longer a neutral space but an arena of negotiation and contestation. Likewise, for CSO organisation and its militant wing, shared institutional forms and constituencies adds further complexity to the relationship between the civil and militant wing of society. However, it is also through such proximity generated by shared spaces of activity as well as the similarities in organisational shape

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid

<sup>22</sup> Bendle, M, F: Existential terrorism: civil society and its enemies: *Journal of Politics and History*: Vol. 22, November 1, 2006

characterised by horizontal networks that civil society is best placed to identify and contest the activities of a militant wing and develop effective responses. How such dynamics within civil society manifest themselves are best understood in the context of social movements.

### 3.8 Civil society and Social Movements Theory

Social movements are informal networks, based on shared beliefs and solidarity, which mobilise around conflictual issues, through the frequent use of various forms of collective action. Recent analysis of the groups or networks associated with the contemporary wave of terrorism, and in particular those global movements associated with al-Qaeda has proposed that the current phenomena of jihadist salafist networks may be analysed as a social movement in itself as well as one expression of broader, highly diverse and globalised social movements. Social movement approaches to terrorist networks, recruitment and radicalisation have been adopted by numerous authors, particularly when considering radicalisation experiences of Western European Muslims.<sup>23</sup>

Broadly, social movements consist of eight core characteristics:<sup>24</sup>

- Public protest or radical action; the use of unconventional or radical means to foster or halt change based on the assumption that change cannot be achieved within the system is central to the nature of social movements;
- Transformative events; social movements creating change through the process and impact of the movement rather than as a planned incremental programme of change;
- Collective activity; the nature of action, outlook and goals define movements through collective action whilst also constructing shared identities around these goals and beliefs;
- Voluntary association and social relationships; social movements are spontaneous and self organising; however the recruitment to social networks is a more complex dynamic process;
- Organised and spontaneous; in their inception they are spontaneous whilst the form that they take to perpetuate themselves may be as a formal organisation, an organisation of collective action or as a connecting structure or network;
- Political; by their very nature movements are contested politics and their members 'protester' and the aims of the movement political, with it necessary at some point to engage with those who hold influence within the system;

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<sup>23</sup> Ransthorp, Hafez, Ami

<sup>24</sup> Bate, P. and Bevan, H. and Robert, G. *'Towards a million change agents' A review of the social movements literature: implications for large scale change in the NHS. Literature review.* NHS (National Health Service), UK (2005).

- Conflict; often seen as subversive, unwelcome or oppositional force that challenges institutionalised systems of power. The oppositional polarised nature also contributes to the generation of group identity and solidarity;
- Durability; the construction of collective identity within a movement is central to its longevity and durability, where personal identity comes inextricably bound with the circle of an active movement and the social relationships and identities forged there.

There are a wider range of factors central to evaluating individual choices for participation in movements. These include motivational, rational, emotional, social or normative issues as well as behavioural, organisational and leadership factors, all of which influence the development of social networks and communities of practice; their development, direction and perpetuation. McAdam's model of high risk activism highlights how sustained and perpetuating commitment is reinforced once people have entered the 'circle' of an active movement and begun to forge social relationships and have a shared identity with each other.<sup>25</sup> Once people are in the movement circle they are more likely to remain there by virtue of the cyclical dynamics of contact, interaction, socialisation, shared understandings, belongingness and community.

Any engagement between public authorities and civil society needs to be premised on a clear understanding of the social movement that is being responded to - its beliefs, methods of recruitment and operations, and most importantly, an understanding of the appropriate civil society organisations to work with, and the most effective approaches towards countering a social movement that advocates terrorism and violence. Currently the focus of cooperation where it exists largely focuses on monitoring and gathering knowledge ('intelligence') about communities with preventative projects largely focusing on education initiatives and Imam training, as well as being framed by integration approaches and in particular interfaith and cross cultural projects. Less apparent, and sometimes absent, are policies, strategies and programmes to address the context in which these social movements are operating.

### **3.9 Role of civil society in counter radicalisation**

It is possible to identify the manner in which public policy has drawn on the specific qualities of civil society when delivering public policy. The key features of civil society in development and delivery of public provision includes high levels of social capital and trust that enables high levels of responsiveness to shifting contexts and needs. The role of CSOs can be seen in key advocacy contributions to design and delivery of policy, from the local to the strategic. Civil society organisations have played key functions in the practical delivery of public goods as well as monitoring and evaluating their delivery.

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<sup>25</sup> For Mc Adam please refer to Ate, P. and Bevan, H. and Robert, G. 'Towards a million change agents' A review of the social movements literature: implications for large scale change in the NHS. Literature review. NHS (National Health Service), UK (2005).

For Wiktorowicz please refer to Wiktorowicz, Quintan (ed), *Islamic activism: a social movement theory approach* (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2004) and Ransthorp, Magnus & Herd, Graeme P.; *Approaches to Countering Terrorism; In The ideological war on terror, Worldwide strategies for counter terrorism;* Anne Aldis and Graeme P. Herd (eds) (Routledge, Oxford, 2007)

In addition to these more instrumental approaches to civil society, it has also been noted how civil society plays a vital role in the development and maintenance of participative, responsive and legitimate democratic political systems. Vibrant civil society spheres are increasingly valued for their role in developing social capital as part of stable and prosperous societies but also promoting continuous engagement with the institutions of public service delivery that ensure the legitimacy of governance and political systems central to the prevention of the use of terrorist tactics. It is within civil society spaces that innovative ideas and policy may be incubated that respond to shifting and dynamic challenges such as violent radicalisation. Civil society can also be a discursive and pluralistic cooperative space that promotes pluralistic identities and understandings of diversity that serves to promote a 'civil' society that undermines fundamentalist and exclusive group identities.

In line with the more prominent role of civil society in public policy more generally the US has developed responses to violent radicalisation in which civil society is the primary arena for development and delivery. The US has long recognised the role of civil society organisations in delivering on key ideologically based public policy goals, from the 'cultural' cold war, through the experiences of third wave democratisation and transitions of the late 1990s, and now in relation to countering violent radicalisation.

Recent work has highlighted how the CIA penetrated and influenced a wide range of cultural groups and organisations as part of the fight against the Soviet ideology, particularly in the initial decades of the cold war following WWII.<sup>26</sup> Funding was provided by a range of front organisations, including the Congress for Cultural Freedom, as well as a range of journals, and with varying degrees of knowledge and collusion with participants. Criticism of specific US policies and the excesses of capitalism were even allowed as part of this activity, but within a broader narrative of attacking the 'un-freedom' and corruption of the Soviet system.

In the context of post war Europe, this approach had twin aims, of heading off potential anti-capitalist and anti-American sentiment among European intellectuals and promoting more appreciation of the culture of the US. Through organisations such as the National Endowment for Democracy, the US also focused on providing support for civil society groups as instrumental elements in the promotion of political systems based on democratic principles and the instigation of political, economic and social transitions, including in the recent case of Serbia and the Ukraine.

More recently, US policy has acknowledged a key gap in US strategy in the war on terror and refocused attention on the role of civil society.<sup>27</sup> Informed by the cultural and ideological struggles of the cold war as well as the successes in fostering democratic transitions, US activity across the world is being stepped up as part of a more effective public diplomacy 'hearts and minds' strategy. This strategy is seeking to shift key ideological trends by boosting particular organisations and generating good will through activity ranging from workshops for political activists, through to the preservation of mosques and other key heritage sites. While

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<sup>26</sup> James Petras: *The CIA and the Cultural Cold War Revisited*, review of Frances Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper: The CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (London: Granta Books): Monthly Review November 1999

<sup>27</sup> Kaplan Hearts, David E: *Minds, and Dollars, In an Unseen Front in the War on Terrorism, America is Spending Millions...To Change the Very Face of Islam: US News.com* 4/17/05.  
<http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/050425/25roots.htm>

this activity is being delivered across the world, in a reflection of prevailing concerns in US policy circles, a key focus of activity has been directed toward the Muslim populations of Western Europe.<sup>28</sup>

Activity in Europe includes the funding of ‘moderate’ Islam think tanks as well as the development of engagement and exchange programmes with community leaders, educators, youth influencers, journalists, and community-based organisations. These programmes are building relationships between US government and non-for-profit sectors and Muslim counter parts in Western Europe and around the world by exploring key salient issues such as integration and equality, diversity and culture, educational and employment issues, while also providing developmental support to key ‘moderate’ and ‘progressive’ groups and individuals to enhance their influence.<sup>29</sup> There are indications that in some US public policy circles there is concern over whether Europe has the will or the capacity to integrate its Muslim and minority populations and what it means for the US if this fails to happen.<sup>30</sup>

The experience of India also serves to further highlight the role a vibrant civil society sector can play in countering extremism and violent radicalisation. In contrast to more instrumentalised approaches to the role of civil society as ‘agents’ of public policy, the Indian experience highlights how a vibrant civil society can be the source of wider social resilience that some commentators see as having prevented the development of jihadist terrorism on the scale that might be expected for a state bordering Pakistan, involved in the Kashmir dispute, and despite the presence of a large Muslim minority population with significant grievances relating to a rise of Hindu nationalism in Indian politics, and experiencing direct communal violence in some areas.

A range of initiatives can be identified focusing on exchanges, advocacy, and provision and, in particular, the role of religious CSOs, addressing a full range of areas. What is important in this experience is how the existence of a vibrant civil society has been instrumental in developing the spaces for engagement and activities that are fundamental in preventing violent radicalisation and terrorism and effectively becomes a fundamental component in preventing terrorism and violent radicalisation.<sup>31</sup>

### **3.10 Best Practice Framework**

Based on a review of literature a range of identifiable criteria can be identified to test for good practice in cooperation including:

- Credibility and legitimacy of public authorities with groups and organisations working with Muslim communities;
- Level, breadth and depth of engagement, including with key influencers and gatekeepers in civil society organisations working with these communities;

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<sup>28</sup> Leiken, Robert S: Europe's Angry Muslims : Foreign Affairs, July/August 2005

<sup>29</sup> <http://researchfunding.duke.edu/detail.asp?OppID=4090>

<sup>30</sup> Consultation with US stakeholder

<sup>31</sup> Swati Parashar: Responding to terrorism: An Integrative Approach, The role of Civil Society including Religious Organisations and Building Awareness in the Public: International Terrorism Watch Project, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi : <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers14/paper1302.html>

- Resources, including funding made available;
- Developmental approaches that recognise the autonomy of civil society organisations and yet are able to agree a common agenda;
- Evidence of emerging joint ownership of the issues by civil society organisations;
- Evidence of sustainability of the approaches and work that is taking place;
- Evaluation/ feedback from beneficiaries of civil society programmes where these exist.

Based on the literature review and analysis of existing theoretical and policy frameworks, as well as frameworks laid out by the European Commission, the following table outlines the typology of best practice developed to test in the fieldwork elements of the study. Additional key areas for examination included the degree to which initiatives:

- are based on cooperation between civil society and government and build and maintain constructive relations based on mutual trust;
- include competence-building initiatives for professionals (for example, teachers, police or law enforcement officers, social welfare workers, policy advisors, civil servants, etc), spokespersons, spiritual/ political leaders and youth organisations;
- develop and update containment plans, including public relations strategies, for any potential backlashes, reprisals or any form of retaliatory actions in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack;
- develop initiatives for mutual support between authorities and civil society as well as amongst civil society in environments known to be more conducive to violent radicalisation than others (for example, prisons);
- develop initiatives to provide adequate channels for addressing grievances;
- empower voices that challenge terrorist rhetoric;
- engage with spiritual / religious and political leaders, spokespersons and representatives;
- formal/informal education initiatives both ‘mainstream’ and religious;
- identify reliable points of contact and trustworthy interlocutors on both sides that contribute to a better understanding of the issues surrounding the radicalisation processes;
- improve the identification of early signs of potentially radicalised individuals and exchange expertise on how to constructively deal with such situations;
- involve media representation/ engagement initiatives;
- involve political representation/engagement initiatives;
- constitute targeted ‘de-Radicalisation programmes’.

## **4. COOPERATION AND COUNTERING RADICALISATION ACROSS EUROPE**

A central aspect of this study was a review of contexts and activity in Member States. This section provides an overview of national contexts in relation to approaches to cooperation between civil society and authorities, the awareness and response to questions of violent radicalisation, and identification of any key themes from the national context of relevance to the study. The review of European member state approaches to cooperation with civil society, and particularly Muslim and minority led civil society, highlights a highly diverse field and a number of areas that are central to any development of cooperation approaches to civil society more generally, and more specifically as part of a countering violent extremism agenda.

National variables include a range of differing histories of democratic experiences; a range of overt historical national approaches to religion in public life; a wide range of experiences and development of cooperative relations with minority communities, as well as particular administrative structures and highly dynamic political environments. Also of particular importance to this agenda are the profile and dynamics of Muslim, immigrant and minority CSOs and their relations with the state. In this respect a number of key themes can also be identified and are outlined in this section. In addition the study also identified a range of key findings and themes that frame the recommendations and models of best practice that are developed later in the report.

### **4.1 National themes**

The review of member state approaches highlights a range of key contexts that must be addressed when developing analysis of cooperation approaches. While many differences exist between individual Member States, a number of similarities in the experiences and policy responses of some states allow for a number of key generalizations to be proposed across broad regional groupings.

#### *4.1.1 North West Europe: (Belgium, France, Germany, Holland, Ireland, Luxembourg, UK)*

The states of North West Europe are all characterised by a range of highly developed national approaches to the relationship of state, religion, ethnicity and civil society. As developed democracies and economies these states tend to have advanced public policy responses across the full range of public policy competency, and commonly incorporate civil society actors into both development and delivery. While there are variables in the autonomy of civil society and the balance of power between state and society, in general such variations are largely cosmetic in nature and the principles of an independent civil society sphere and recognition of the necessity for partnership approaches is shared.

However distinct differences do exist in relation to church / state relations, as well as in responses to diversity and minorities, that have ramifications for the development of cooperative relations with key partner CSOs. The approaches identified range from French Laicism that places clear limits on appropriate relations between the State and Church to the more institutionalised relationships in Belgium and the UK. Similarly, there are also particular

approaches to ethnicity and minorities, best highlighted by the contrasts between British multiculturalism and the principles of the French Republic that have clear implications for the delivery of funding.

The principles and approaches identified were largely laid down as integral components of the development of democratic systems of governance during the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, most notably in the case of the Laicism of the French Republic's response to the power of the Catholic Church (though it should be noted that the Catholic Church has enjoyed a privileged position by virtue of funding legislation from the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, including enabling public funding of religious buildings existing at the time). Also informing these specific approaches was the desire to constitutionally ensure freedom of worship in line with enlightenment democratic principles, often with certain levels of institutionalisation, notable in Belgium as well as the UK.

Clear national approaches to diversity within the Member States can also be identified and are informed by a range of experiences. For example, the UK approach of multiculturalism has developed through a liberal laissez faire legal framework and the historical legacy of incorporating four national identities into the Union. The French approach, the classical contrast with that of the UK, remains informed by the progressive principles of the French Republic *égalité, fraternité, liberté*. Also important to note are the federal approaches adopted in states such as Belgium and Germany that ensures highly regionalised approaches to public policy and delivery.

These systems and principles are now all under intense scrutiny given post colonial and labour migration and associated shifting demographics. With the arrival of new ethnic minorities into these states during the late 1960s and progressively throughout the following decades, public bodies have been under pressure to respond to these shifting realities. Large sections of these minority and immigrant populations, now into second and third generations, come from Muslim cultural and religious heritages, though the range of countries of origin spans the full diversity of the Muslim world. In particular all of these Member States are responding to a growing faith revivalism, but also associated questions of national identity and values as well as terrorist threats.

The responses of public authorities to these new and shifting demographics can be seen to be set within these historical approaches. The institutionalised approaches to religion of Belgium and multicultural approaches of the UK, and to a lesser extent Holland, have facilitated the development of cooperative relationships with CSOs of migrant communities. However, in the case of France, the institutionalised response recognised as the 'Islam of the Consulates' is also increasingly augmented by localised delivery and adaptation within the national principles of the republic. What is also clear, however, is that these national approaches and responses are all increasingly becoming national political issues, ranging from questioning of the merits of 'multiculturalism' in the UK to recent proposals to adapt the principles of the Republic to the new realities of France. These debates can be seen in key political dynamics, ranging from opposition to Mosque building in Germany to the presence of overtly Islamophobic politicians in Holland and ongoing debates relating to national identity and citizenship in the UK.

#### *4.1.2 Southern Europe: (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain)*

The more recent democratic experiences of Greece, Portugal and Spain contrast with that of the states of north west Europe. While all three are fully democratic political systems, with a developed civil society sector and advanced public policy development and delivery processes, the development of generic cooperative relations between civil society and authorities is still limited in comparison and characterised by more hierarchical relationships between authorities and civil society.

The Italian context is different in two important respects; it has a much longer democratic history and a highly developed approach to cooperation with civil society. In particular, public policy development and delivery is highly dependent on the role of CSOs, with extensive evidence of associated partnership platforms and approaches in a range of policy fields, most notably integration.

The particular history and relationship of the Italian state with the Catholic Church, a significant non state authority with extensive service delivery capacity, plays a key role in informing the development of the Italian approach to cooperation with civil society. In particular this influence can be seen in the development of *Intese Giuridiche* agreements with the representatives of religious denominations. Similarly in Spain, the influence of the Catholic Church and its particular place in civil society can be seen in its privileged partner status with authorities in Spain.

For all the states of Southern Europe, with the partial exception of Portugal, the arrival of significant migrant populations of Muslim heritage is a more recent development, and also commonly undocumented. These populations are still largely in their first generation and primarily originate from north Africa, as well as Albania in the case of Italy. National policy responses and debates remain largely focused on an immigrant integration approach that focuses on initial integration of migrants into labour markets and assistance in access to services.

#### 4.1.3 *Scandinavia: (Denmark, Sweden, Finland)*

The general social progressivism of Scandinavian public administration, allied to historically more affluent migrant profiles settling in Scandinavian states, means that historically there has been generally well developed and open cooperation between civil society and authorities across a range of key policy fields. Civil society organisations are commonly integral partners in the development and delivery of policy, and have often received extensive funding from public bodies. These partnerships are highly cooperative in character, with high levels of devolution in a range of areas, including educational delivery. The highly progressive and accessible funding system has also promoted the development of cooperative relations with minority groups.

However it is also apparent that there is an increasingly hostile and contentious political climate in relation to migration and also in relation to national culture and values and their 'compatibility' with Islam. The most striking example of this is in Denmark where the use of discourse that can be labelled as generally hostile towards migrants (and therefore targeting the Muslim community which forms the biggest part of recent migrants) is indicative of a broader concern and hostile response to cultural diversity, coupled with a desire to preserve particular representations of national cultures. Such dynamics can also be seen to a certain extent in both

Sweden and Finland and are in danger of undermining the effective cooperation that is facilitated by progressive public policy approaches.

*Central Europe and Baltic States: (Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Austria and the Baltic States)*

The states of central Europe are recognised by their relatively recent transition into democratic systems following Communist rule. With civil society playing a central role in the end of Communism, the subsequent development of a vibrant civil society in most central European states has been a key feature. However, consultative and cooperative relations are still developing and hierarchical cooperation relationships remain common. There are a range of approaches to church / state relations with institutionalisation approaches being the primary theme.

Commensurate with low levels of recent migration or associated minority ethnic communities, there is little development of relations with minority civil society groups. Recent migration and entry into the EU has ensured that state responses to immigrant integration are commonly framed by newly developed anti-discrimination and integration legislation. While relations with migrant led civil society is largely nonexistent, cooperation is undertaken with more generic NGOs concerned with migrant integration and interculturalism.

Visible throughout the region is a highly specific relationship with Islam reflecting the history of Ottoman rule in the region. There are a number of historical Turkish and Tartar communities throughout some of the eastern states. These states and communities have highly localised approaches and are generally considered to be highly integrated populations, a notable example being the Drogo-bea model of Romania. However what is also apparent is that in many of the Central European states with very small Muslim populations, there is widespread popular hostility and resistance by authorities to cooperation with these very small communities.

## **4.2 Civil Society**

The second key aspect to the review of the national contexts for the development and delivery of cooperation approaches is an assessment of the profile of civil society across the Member States. The study focused in particular on the nature of development as well as characteristics of organisations working with, or led by, Muslim communities. What is clear from the research is a massive diversity of experiences and development, not only across, but within Member States.

There are a wide range of specific histories and development paths for civil society organisations working with Muslim communities, their agendas and interests, the needs they are meeting, and the capacity issues that they may have. In addition it is also apparent that the Muslim CSO field is highly diverse, organic, evolving and rapidly changing. Whilst it is not within the scope of this study to undertake a detailed analysis of CSO development among Muslim communities in Europe, a range of key themes and factors that are important in understanding the diversity of experiences in Europe should be noted;

*Recent migration;* Muslim civil society is generally in early stages of development in the Member States of Europe. This is particularly the case in most Member States where Muslim populations are first generation immigrants but is also broadly the case in those states where

there has been a longer history of migration. Consequently the Muslim CSO sector is highly localised and 'grassroots' in character, and often initially focusing on faith and cultural services.

*Less developed relationships with authorities;* in general the Muslim CSO field is characterised by high levels of autonomy from authorities, and in many instances complete absence of relations with many authorities. Even in Member States with long history of migration and multicultural policies, for example the UK, Muslim civil society generally remains less 'developed' and largely underfunded. While many Muslim CSOs are concerned with issues other than faith and cultural services, service provision roles have been limited while advocacy groups remain largely marginalised. The reasons for this are multiple and include questions of capital, capacity and difficulties in accessing public support.

*Diversity;* the context of settlement has had identifiable impacts on the development of CSOs. The different experiences of managed migrant labour in contrast to the experiences of asylum arrivals can be seen through the development of CSOs in Member States. Similarly, CSOs have been developed to meet a range of needs not provided for by the state. As Muslim communities are largely migrant communities, they have often had to close gaps in service provision in a wide range of areas and this is reflected in the nature of CSOs.

*Global Civil Society;* the post colonial diaspora relationship remains extremely important for many grass roots CSOs. Many of the cultural and faith organisations identified during the course of the research have extensive links or affiliations with cultural, political or faith organisations from the countries of heritage, in particular those of Pakistan, Turkey and North Africa. These CSOs are heavily networked within Member States as well as between Member States. There are even signs of more formal organisational structures developing at European levels.<sup>32</sup> Such transnational linkages and activity can be set within a global civil society, and reflect the transnational dimension of faith practice as well as diasporic links and flows.

*Ethnic and faith identities;* from the review it is evident that while CSOs develop to meet needs and have a wide range of functions, organisations are primarily based around ethnic and or particular cultural faith traditions, either formally or informally. This is reflective of the grass roots nature of much of the Muslim CSO sector and its key functions in responding to local needs and provision of cultural and faith services. Whilst both approaches are equally prominent, as already noted there are moves reported in many Member States to develop national Muslim CSOs rather than CSOs based around ethnic or migrant identities.

What should be noted however is that highly localised dynamics can have significant impacts on the balance of these identities. For example, the diversity of the French suburbs has limited the development of ethnic or faith based CSOs and their role in social provision. This contrasts with the situation in the UK where many Muslim CSOs have particular characteristics reflecting highly specific community identities, including ethnic and regional identities from the countries of origin and associated schools and branches of religion.

*Post colonial relationships;* in a number of contexts, particularly in relation to faith, strong institutional relationships have been promoted by Member States between key CSOs and originating countries, for example the French 'Islam of the Consulates.' However it is also

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<sup>32</sup> For example the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe FIOE

apparent that there is a general erosion of perceived legitimacy and relevance of these organisations to the broader community constituency. In addition, many Arab states and charitable organisations provide funding and support for cultural and faith organisations in Europe to support Islam and serve Muslim communities in Europe.

*Hostile climate;* in general there is a negative and volatile political and social climate in relation to Islam and Muslims which severely undermines the scope for stable CSOs that are necessary for the development of coherent and sustainable working relationships and programmes of activity. There is an identifiable trend of resistance towards the recognition of Muslim CSOs across Europe. This climate is a key factor contributing to the development and entrenchment of Muslim and other faith based identities amongst Muslim and migrant populations in Europe.

*Muslim identity;* there is an increasingly active and energised Muslim civil society in Europe. There is an increasingly distinct Muslim identity to CSOs, where previously ethnicity and country of origin might have more commonly been the primary organising principle. This dynamic can also be linked to an increasingly hostile climate regarding Islam in Europe and general dynamics of revivalism amongst Muslim populations (a global phenomenon also evident in other religious denominations).

*'Mainstream' and Progressive CSOs;* it is apparent that in many cases Member States are working with the 'familiar,' those individuals and organisations that are already well known to the authorities. There is a danger that these are more likely to be dominated by older and more conservative members, often male, who may act as 'gatekeepers' to the wider community, and in practice be less influential with groups authorities wish to engage with. Virtually all active Member States are also focusing on attempts to co-opt or co-operate with 'moderate' organisations'. In some cases, a lack of knowledge and awareness of CSOs and their histories can make for sharp turns in authority support, as they come to believe another organisation may be more 'moderate or more 'representative than those they have been working with. This focus can detract from the need for authorities to identify new and emerging organisations, often led by youth and women, which may have progressive and / or secular public policy agendas for Muslim communities.

### **4.3 Responses to violent radicalisation**

One of the key findings to emerge from the national review of Member State responses to violent radicalisation is that levels of development of preventative counter radicalisation activity by Member States is highly varied across the Union. In general there is a lack of coherent or broad based national policies or actual identifiable activity responding directly to the agenda. The primary reason for this appears to be a general lack of understanding of the emerging issues (including their transnational nature) or the perception that it was a relatively low priority compared to other urgent, immediate and visible issues (for example, visible symptoms of anti-Semitism in some Member States).

Very few states reported national counter radicalisation strategies, delivered by multiple agencies and with identifiable associated programmes, implementation plans and associated funding. In general, where responses to violent radicalisation were identifiable they were commonly seen as 'security' based responses, i.e. programmes and activities funded and / or delivered by security and law enforcement bodies.

The most significant exceptions to this are the UK and Holland which both have clear national strategies for countering violent radicalisation that are set within a counter terrorism framework but supported by a broad based programme of activity that is delivered through a range of agencies and, at least formally, in cooperation and consultation with CSO partners.

#### 4.3.1 *The UK*

The UK response to the challenge of violent extremism is titled Preventing Violent Extremism and is set out in the UK counter terrorism strategy CONTEST which highlights the need for “*preventing terrorism by tackling the radicalisation of individuals at home and abroad*”<sup>33</sup>. While a preventative response had been in the early stages of development by the Home Office following the events of 9/11, following the bombing of the London Transport system of 2005 a series of community consultation exercises were fast tracked in order to develop the subsequently titled Preventing Violent Extremism Together (PVET) programme.

While the PVET programme is a cross-departmental programme, until now the department which has been undertaking the main amount of activity has been the Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG). The CLG, which has also held primary responsibility for addressing issues of community cohesion following race charged riots by Asian youths in 2001, launched the Preventing Violent Extremism Action Plan in 2006. The Plan set out the government’s plans to engage with Muslim communities to prevent violent extremism under four priority areas:

- Promoting Shared Values;
- Supporting Local Solutions;
- Building Civic capacity and Leadership;
- Strengthening the role of faith institutions and leaders.

This programme of activity was initially to be supported by the Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Delivery Fund, a nationwide funding scheme totalling £6 million that was to support the delivery of projects at Local Authority level. In July 2007 a further funding of £70 million was announced in the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review, for a three year period running from 2008 - 2011, of which £45 million has again been earmarked for ‘priority’ Local Authorities, with significant Muslim populations. In addition the CLG launched the £650,000 Community Leadership Fund during 2007. This fund is aimed at national-level projects on preventing violent extremism as well as an additional £25m announced to go to national schemes including training for faith leaders and Imams to better engage with youngsters and stepping up citizenship education in mosque schools.

The recent round of renewed funding has had the intention of bringing more breadth and depth to the programme and a range of new funding and activity priorities have been set out including:

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<sup>33</sup> CONTEST 2003 (2006)

- Teenagers and young people - to build resilience to extremists' messages and giving them strength and skills to face down the voices of division in later life;
- Mentoring and peer support – to reach out to young people and particularly the disaffected;
- Internet based projects to provide platforms for engaging young Muslims and fostering tolerance and understanding;
- Working directly with communities – including the setting up a national Muslim women's network and advisory board.

However, whilst the main delivery vehicle for PVET has so far been the Pathfinder Fund, PVET is progressively being mainstreamed into other areas of public activity with a renewed role for the Home Office, the department with original responsibility for the development of the strategy. This cross cutting approach has been regularly reemphasised during speeches by government ministers and outlined in the role other departments have been asked to play in responding the PVET agenda. This is now beginning to drawing responses from the Department for Culture, Media and Sport and its key agency Arts Council England, the Department for Children, Schools and Families and the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills. In addition to the pathfinder fund, local authorities are now being encouraged to mainstream activity throughout their work, and not just via the pathfinder fund. This has resulted in the inclusion of PVET objectives in existing performance monitoring and assessment frameworks for local government, further emphasising the need for local authorities to respond in a 'joined up' or integrated manner.<sup>34</sup>

#### 4.3.2 *The Netherlands*

As with the UK, Holland has also developed a fully resourced broad based prevention programme. The national counter radicalisation programme, born out of the murder of Theo van Gough, but also in response to concerns about the far right and animal rights extremist groups, is led by the Ministry of Justice, Directie algemene justitiële strategie (2005). The policy consists of three key strands. The first is concerned with binding the individual to civil society and to the constitutional state. The second is about empowerment or the strengthening of the power of defence. The third is targeted towards the de-radicalisation of radical elements in society. The policy also focuses on gathering information on radicalism and identifying radical elements in society.<sup>35</sup>

In 2006 the General Intelligence and Security Service Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD) was involved in developing a wider approach to the problem of radicalisation. This involved not only the national government, but also local government, civil society and - in the case of Muslim radicalisation – 'moderate' key figures from the Muslim society in the Netherlands. The AIVD advised that a wider approach meant that intervention options should

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<sup>34</sup> Public Service Delivery Agreement 26 and National Indicator 35 of the New Performance Framework for Local Authorities and Local Authority Partnerships

<sup>35</sup> Ministerie van Justitie, Directie algemene justitiële strategie (2005). *Nota radicalisme en radicalisering*. The Hague, Ministerie van Justitie, p. 21.

not only be conceived in a preventive but also a pro-active way.<sup>36</sup> Concrete activities that have already been taken by national government include:<sup>37</sup>

- Creating preconditions for social commitment through the *Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning* (Social Support Law);
- Strengthening the approach of school dropouts through *Operatie Jong* (Operation Young);
- The memorandum *Onderwijs, integratie en burgerschap* (Education, Integration and Citizenship) from the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sciences which promotes active participation in society, but also promotes the increase of security at schools, the institution of a Radicalisation Office, offering training to teachers, social workers, but also of students on the issue of radicalisation;
- Promoting integration and commitment to society through sports, arts and cultural sciences.

In 2008 the *Actieplan Polarisatie en Radicalisering 2007-2011* (Action on Plan Polarisation and Radicalisation 2007-2011) was adopted. Led by the Ministry of Internal- and Kingdom Affairs, three goals were set out:

- To prevent the processes of isolation, polarisation and radicalisation by educating and giving work to people who threaten to turn away from Dutch society (Prevention);
- To point out radical elements in society through government and professionals and thus creating a pro-active approach on this subject (Pro-action); and
- To exclude people from their community who have clearly violated standards and with this prevent them to influence others (Repression).<sup>38</sup>

Backed up by €28million euro budget the action plan encompasses the activities of eight ministries including Interior and Kingdom Relations, Justice, Housing, Communities and Integration, of Social Affairs and Employment, of Health, Welfare and Sport, of Youth and the Family, of Education, Culture and Science and of Foreign Affairs. Naturally, the General Intelligence Service and the National Coordinator for counter terrorism. In addition the Association of Municipalities is co-author of the action plan. These departments as well as representatives of Amsterdam and Rotterdam participate in monthly meetings in order to coordinate activity.

However, while there are activities at a national level, much of the activity in Holland has been and continues to be led at local level. In particular, the City of Amsterdam has been active on countering (violent) radicalisation since November 2004. Building on research by the Institute

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<sup>36</sup> Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (2007). *Jaarverslag 2006*. The Hague, AIVD, p. 44.

<sup>37</sup> Ministerie van Justitie, Directie algemene justitiële strategie (2005). *Nota radicalisme en radicalisering*. The Hague, Ministerie van Justitie, p. 22.

<sup>38</sup> Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties (unknown date). *Actieplan polarisatie en radicalisering 2007-2011*. The Hague, Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, p. 7.

for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES) of the University of Amsterdam titled *Radicaliseringsprocessen: waarom moslimjongeren in Amsterdam radicaliseren* (The Process of Radicalisation: Why do younger Muslim in Amsterdam radicalise?) published in October 2006,<sup>39</sup> the City of Amsterdam has now developed a counter radicalisation strategy which is spearheaded by three pillars:

- The feeding grounds of radicalisation. By dealing with discrimination and intolerances, pointing out the diversity of Islam, handling the media and public opinion and increasing social capital and (political) confidence of (Muslim) minorities;
- Those who seek their identity. Amsterdam tries to strengthen their defence against radicalism by offering training and social activities. The focus is on Muslims and females in particular;

Those who shown signs of radical behaviour. The Amsterdam policy is to target them and take them out of circulation before radicalisation leads to extremism or terrorism.

The range of activities being undertaken in Holland; resilience training and peer education for young people; projects intended to stimulating a dialogue between religion and broader society, research programmes to improve understanding of the phenomenon, citizenship education, youth social work intervention and counselling, promotion of social cohesion, educational material on 'extremism in the news' for schoolchildren and providing teachers with concrete tools to help deal with radicalisation in the classroom.

#### 4.3.3 *Countering radicalisation: integration, social inclusion, equality, interfaith activity*

In the context of a general predominance of security based responses as well as a lack of clear broad based national strategies addressing radicalisation, there is evidence that a number of Member States are beginning to develop more coherent policy responses to the violent radicalisation agenda. While the existence of formal plans is variable, what is notable is that policy areas such as integration, social inclusion, interfaith or access to justice issues are now being commonly understood as representing a response to what are *understood* as issues relating to radicalisation more widely, as opposed to violent radicalisation.

These approaches can be highly problematic. Firstly, the identification of integration and inclusion approaches as representing a nascent counter radicalisation response are largely based on assumptions made about the nature of radicalisation. Simplified understandings based on direct causal relationships that link economic or social exclusion with susceptibility to radicalisation and recruitment are common. Common concerns about the management of Islam in order to promote particular values, often informed by a clash of civilisation narrative, are also increasingly viewed as a response to the agenda of violent radicalisation. In addition, policy debate and understanding of the issues also exhibits a tendency unduly focus on the biographies of the most recent perpetrators or 'cause celebre'.

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<sup>39</sup> Gemeente Amsterdam (2007). *Amsterdam tegen radicalisering*. Amsterdam, Gemeente Amsterdam, p. 5.

In reality, the situation and the phenomenon is far more complex with a range of variables that not only encompass individual experiences and perspectives, including psychological experiences as well as a range of other factors, but also the variety of different groups and contexts that are relevant to this study. In particular, the contemporary violent radical threat is better understood as a political phenomenon rather than just as one that has its roots in religious management, failures of integration, or specific government actions or policies, something commonly not recognised in national approaches.<sup>40</sup> In addition to questions of more general political engagement there is also a need to understand the broader political movements and groups that are actors within this field and develop specific, direct and appropriate responses to them as they manifest on the ground.

However it is also the case that the phenomenon of violent radicalisation is not a discrete challenge that can be addressed with highly targeted policy interventions. Rather it is set within a context of a broad based social movement that is characterised by a reconstruction of diaspora identities in Western Europe imbued with revivalist dynamics. It is clear that any effective programme of countering violent radicalisation will necessarily encompass a broad range of fields in order to address the full complexity of the issues. Responses may include specific actions such as forums for cooperation and interfaith activity but will also need to encompass a much broader range of fields and interventions.

There are also additional practical concerns when considering the relationship between policy areas such as integration and inclusion and preventing violent radicalisation. For example, whilst integration and social inclusion responses are of central importance, there are distinct differences between the two. In particular, integration policy in most Member States is commonly associated with more recent immigrants, with less attention paid to second and third generation migrant communities and associated questions of equalities, diversity and cohesion. Consequently future challenges may not be anticipated and important themes neglected.

However, more developed approaches to integration, cohesion, equality and diversity, although commonly drawing in many areas of activity, including faith, education and access to justice, do not necessarily address the specifics of the social movement under study and its associated violent radical threat. This is particularly the case in relation to questions of faith that remain problematic in many national contexts. Nor do examples of more advanced policy always represent genuinely holistic equalities, diversity or cohesion strategies that in practice span the full range of sectors and authorities. As with questions of integration and equalities, while important aspects in counter radicalisation programmes, an over reliance on such approaches also threatens to misunderstand the complex nature of processes of violent radicalisation.

Nevertheless, what is clear is that the development and delivery of policy in these agendas does hold many lessons and opportunities for the development and delivery of prevention strategies. In particular, a prioritisation of equalities and diversity, including access to justice, will be a central component in any effective response to processes of violent radicalisation linked to a political phenomenon set within a social movement context. Societies respectful of diversity with inclusive understandings of citizenship and responsive to the needs and culture of all citizens are likely to not only draw people away from alienation and recruitment to violent

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<sup>40</sup> The Beliefs, ideologies and narratives of violent radicalisation; The Change Institute (European Commission, Forthcoming)

radical movements and groups, but also represent a direct and potent challenge to the ideologies and narratives of violent radicals.

In addition, there are often previously well developed institutional cooperation relationships at a range of levels and with a variety of CSOs, including with minority CSOs of relevance to this agenda. These fields already have developed cooperative CSO authority relationships and partnerships that may facilitate the promotion, development delivery and evaluation of policy. In particular, intercultural working relationships and practices, the institutional capacity and capability of CSOs and authorities required to mediate these relationships, trust based relationships and availability of soft intelligence via these channels are already in existence, with good practice developed, learning available and channels often open.

The organisational capital and expertise to be found in these relationships can be an essential component in the development, delivery and evaluation of effective counter radicalisation programmes. However, it is dangerous to overemphasise the opportunities represented by these relationships. In particular, those groups participating in integration and social inclusion initiatives will not necessarily be those groups with genuine and effective knowledge of the specific issues of violent radicalisation nor will they necessarily have the knowledge and resources to develop effective responses. The introduction of new, controversial agendas into relationships may undermine trust as well as distorting the efficacy of existing initiatives and relationships. These sectors nevertheless do represent key arenas for practical learning when developing preventative work and should be recognised and utilised.

Integration, inclusion and social justice should necessarily be understood as components of any broad prevention strategy that effectively address the full complexity of the problem. These policy fields not only target many causal problems but also represent areas where good practice and relationships between authorities and civil society have been developed. Any approach that fails to understand these existing linkages is one that may ineffectively target narrow groups preying on and reflective of problems of social and political exclusion and alienation, or negatively fuelling a reassessment of identity and revivalist dynamics.

#### *4.3.4 Institutionalising Islam*

Questions relating to the place of Islam in Europe are also being understood as part of a broader response to violent radicalisation. There is also great concern about the teaching of Islam in Europe, and a perception that this may limit the integration of Muslims into western societies. There is an emergence of an identifiable pattern where authorities are attempting to find, engage with, and fund 'moderate', 'mainstream' or 'representative' Muslim voices or bodies. In particular a number of Member States are actively seeking a consultative body or partner in order to develop a formal institutional relationship with the faith. While there are some examples of success, the case of Italy highlights how concerns about developing an institutional relationship with Islam in line with the approach to other faiths has been less than productive and limited the development of practical preventative approach to issues of violent radicalisation.

The prioritisation and promotion of 'moderate' or 'representative' bodies as part of a consultation / institutionalisation strategy can have other negative effects. Institutionalisation strategies have in some instances excluded smaller, more progressive voices who may be largely marginalised in umbrella representative groups but who should be supported as part of a

violent radicalisation agenda but also in other policy fields. Such approaches also tend towards homogenising engagement strategies that do not recognise or engage with the great diversity of Muslim populations in Europe. In particular many respondents reported poor or limited knowledge of sectarian differences, with authority tactics often shifting in response to fluid debates and current pressures rather than based on balanced assessments. This instability has further complicated the development of relationships between authorities and many faith based organisations.

#### *4.3.5 The initiative of civil society*

Counter radicalisation, both in the narrow and more sophisticated understandings of the threat, and when considered as part of a broad ‘secondary’ output, is primarily undertaken by civil society organisations autonomously of authorities. This activity commonly encompasses a wide range of actions from the specialised to the more general, and is reflected in the range of relevant CSOs. Some examples of these grass roots initiative are outlined in following sections and include; the Muslim Youth Helpline and Khayaal Theatre in the UK; The Brotherhood of Abraham and Muslim Scouts in France; the Mendenek integration projects in Hungary as well as grass roots driven initiatives in the Netherlands.

Much of CSO activity happens within communities and often goes unrecognised or unseen by authorities. This finding is in line with the particular function of civil society in responding to areas that the market, state or family have not been able to address. This also highlights how a CSO sector that shares common institutional forms as well as many of the same social spaces as violent radical currents is intrinsically better positioned than authorities to identify, understand and respond to the challenges of violent radicalisation.

#### *4.3.6 Volatile political climate*

A negative and volatile political and social climate in relation to Islam and Muslims has been reported across much of Europe during the course of this study. This climate can be seen in symptoms ranging from the controversy around the Geert Wilder film *Fitna* in the Netherlands, protests against mosque building in countries such as Germany and protests surrounding the publication of the *Cartoons of Mohammed* in Danish newspapers. Almost all Member States have seen some form of public debate around values of free speech and the role of Islam within the country, including discussions about the accession of Turkey into the European Union. In addition the general securitised climate associated with the ‘war on terror’, high alert warnings and awareness of both perceived and real threats from groups underpinned by an abusive interpretation of Islam all contribute to a volatile landscape.

This climate has implications for the development of coherent and effective public policy in a range of areas. It can distort policy focus and turn debates and approaches into questions of principle to the detriment of practical responses designed to address the complex reality on the ground. It has had the effect of disrupting the development of relationships between authorities and civil society. In some respects, strategies of institutionalisation are informed by this climate and a desire to exert more control over a religion that is promoted by some, particularly far right groups, as a threat to European ‘values’. At more local levels it can also be seen to be causing greater uncertainty amongst public officials, while also making it more difficult for CSOs to participate in initiatives that are associated with a ‘negative’ or stigmatising political climate.

## 5. PRINCIPLES OF GOOD PRACTICE

The development and delivery of policy through partnership between authorities and civil society is not new or unique to countering violent radicalisation or terrorism. While approaches vary, in western European states with well developed civil society spheres and democratic practices, activity is already heavily integrated into public policy delivery. In those states where democratic practice is a more recent phenomenon, cooperation approaches appear to be developing civil society partnership approaches in line with the ethos and principles of the European Union, albeit from a lower base.

The Commission itself has taken recent steps to outline how partnership approaches and good governance involving civil society in its own operation should be approached through its white paper on European Governance.<sup>41</sup> There are many-layered, complex and varied ways in which the wide range of public authorities may interact and cooperate with civil society organisations to support (or hinder) their development or effectiveness.

What is clear about the arena of violent radicalisation, in particular that underpinned by an abusive interpretation of Islam, is that a range of acute pressures are brought to bear on the harmonious development of productive and genuinely cooperative relationships. Pressures include the highly politicised nature of the subject, through to complexities and specificities of minority, migrant and Muslim led civil society organisations in Europe. In addition the complexity of the agenda itself and its recent development as an area of policy attention further compound the difficulties of evaluation.

Nevertheless, based on the key findings and themes identified during this study, and when drawing on the experiences of a range of sectors with more developed cooperative relations with civil society, notably international development, health and education, it is possible to identify a range of key criteria for the development of good practice in civil society cooperation that we believe could be usefully applied when seeking to counter violent radicalisation. These criteria include:

- Credibility and legitimacy of public authorities with groups and organisations working with Muslim communities is a priority and level / seniority of the public officials involved needs to reflect this;
- There needs to be engagement at a range of levels, more breadth and more depth in engagement, including with key existing and emerging influencers and gatekeepers in civil society organisations working with these communities but also those more autonomous social networks operating;
- Adequate resourcing, including funding, being made available. Developmental approaches need to recognise the autonomy of civil society organisations and yet focus on agreeing a common agenda in this critical area;

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<sup>41</sup> European Governance ‘A white paper’ COM (2001) 428 final

- A focus on developing joint ownership of the issues by civil society organisations and enhancing the quality and trust in relationships;
- Sustainability of the approaches and work that is taking place needs to be a key consideration and built in from inception. Lack of consistency in engagement alienates CSOs and makes it more difficult to engage on the next occasion;
- How success will be measured, including evaluation/ feedback from beneficiaries of civil society programmes needs to be built in from inception. There needs to be awareness and understanding among public officials of the different modes of leadership and organisation working that might exist in CSOs working in Muslim communities. Specifically, recognition that organisations may not follow a conventional model of Anglo-Saxon management and organising practices yet may be highly effective.

## 5.1 Transferable principles for good practice in cooperation

In addition there are a range of *transferable principles for good practice in cooperation* that emerge from the study that we consider should be adopted by Member States in order to facilitate the development of cooperative relations and good practice:

- Development of clear policy aims, frameworks and priorities for engagement;
- Policy aims and priorities are reflected in programmes and initiatives, particularly competence building initiatives for public service professionals, spokespersons, spiritual/political leaders and youth organisations:
  - Strong and thought through links with related State policies and programmes on anti-discrimination, integration and cohesion, intercultural dialogue, faith and belief;
  - A high level of awareness and mapping of the ‘field’ of civil society organisations working with Muslim communities. Deep understanding of the agenda, interests and needs of these organisations;
  - Programmes and initiatives that target known fields and public spheres where there are known to be violent radicals promoting narratives, e.g. prisons, higher education institutions, or where there is readily identifiable scope for bridge building and enhancing understanding between communities e.g. media organisations, the arts;
  - A breadth and depth of engagement processes, e.g.:
    - Consultative arrangements;
    - Development of forums for discussion and dialogue;
    - Formal agreement around aims or joint public statements on violent radicalisation;

- Joint programmes, projects and initiatives; particularly aimed at and involving young people and women;
- Funding and other forms of support for CSO work and initiatives;
- Development investment to enhance capacity of CSOs to respond to the violent radicalisation agenda (including infrastructure support for progressive voices);
- CSO involvement with public authority policy development related to counter terrorism as part of wider government agendas addressing discrimination, integration and cohesion, inter-cultural dialogue;
- Progress being made against policy aims;
- Perceived good practice elaborated and documented;
- Processes for evaluation and learning about what works.

## 6. ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS

The review of examples of best practice is intended to highlight the kinds of activity that is being adopted across Europe within both narrow and wider perspectives and approaches towards countering radicalisation work. More specifically the exercise is intended to provide an insight into the key themes of entering into effective cooperation between authorities and civil society that are emerging from examples of activity from around Europe.

Examples were selected to span a variety of approaches and sectors but also a range of different contexts, including some where the perception of the threat of violent radicalisation is currently small and the experience of intercultural working with Muslim communities highly limited. The variety of the selection offers insights into the principles that underpin successful initiatives in cooperation between civil society and authorities and also the challenges presented, both for the agenda of countering violent radicalisation and in the particular cultural context.

A number of examples have been included that are primarily integration and inclusion initiatives, rather than explicitly or specifically aimed at countering radicalisation. These examples have been included in order to highlight experience of what works in developing initiatives with minority communities and to highlight the important relationship between these agendas and that of prevention violent radicalisation through the promotion of inclusion amongst minority populations. This is apparent in the experiences of many Western European states where inclusion issues have not been addressed in the past and states are now struggling with problems of segregation and exclusion and, in some cases, violent radicalisation.

Given the nature of the sector, the examples do not fit into neat or discrete categories and there is much blurring and cross-over in aims, activities and functions. Nevertheless they can be characterised into broad categories;

*Educational and cultural development:* these initiatives commonly explore questions of culture, faith and identity and in some instances directly address questions of violent extremism. They often promote critical enquiry into the place of Islam in contemporary Europe and look to contribute to the development of contemporary Islamic culture in a variety of ways. Examples include Khayaal Theatre in the UK, the Institute of Islamic Culture in Paris and IslamWijzer in Holland.

*Grass roots integration and inclusion initiatives:* these initiatives highlight how grass roots organisations respond and adapt to emerging issues and challenges on the ground. The initiatives highlighted here address a range of issues, including integration in the case of Mendenek for Muslim women, social inclusion in the case of the Sjakket project and the Muslim Scouts of France in Grenoble. While these initiatives may not be directly linked to preventing violent radicalisation, there are important links between areas such as integration and social inclusion, both in relation to benefits of successful projects as part of a broad based prevention strategy, but also in the lessons to be learned from the experience of practical cooperative activity in these areas.

*Capacity improvement and training:* these projects are generally aimed at improving knowledge and capacity of authorities and CSOs. While these initiatives may share

many themes with the educational projects described above, including the development of understanding of Islam in Western European contexts, they are commonly more focused on practical learning outcomes. In addition these initiatives also focus on improving leadership and contributing to the development of a more significant dialogue between the CSO sector and public bodies. Examples of these projects include the work of the Catholic University of Leuven and School of Intercultural Dialogue and the Intercultural Mediators initiative.

*Improving public policy:* These initiatives are intended to improve public policy responses in defined geographical areas that are considered to have particular problems and challenges. They commonly bring a range of actors together in order to develop joint responses to identified needs. In the case of the Valsta project in Sweden the initiative is responding to more general issues of social exclusion, while the Actieplan Slotervaart in Amsterdam is directly addressing concerns relating to violent radicalisation.

*Managing the climate:* these are joint programmes of activity that help to open up channels of communication between a range of groups and representatives. They commonly develop public policy responses to shared concerns and through the improvement of communication and understanding aim to improve shared responses to emerging problems and improve trust. Such initiatives can improve trust and dialogue more generally for the benefit of public policy development and improving the general climate within which cooperation between civil society and authorities occurs. Examples of these kinds of activities include the Islam form Berlin and the Euro Arab Foundation.

*Strategic networks:* These initiatives draw on membership networks that span a range of sectors who share common interests and goals. It is through these networks that these initiatives are able to identify emerging issues through soft intelligence provided by members and associates, and develop innovative and tailored responses and projects that draw on the resource contained in their networks. Examples of these organisations include the Lib for All foundation and the Brotherhood of Abraham.

*Security service dialogue:* these examples highlight initiatives being undertaken by security services to open up dialogue with communities in order to improve intelligence on the challenge of violent extremism. These initiatives also aim improve dialogue and understanding between security services and CSOs where there may previously have been low degrees of trust in public institutions. Examples of such initiatives include the Muslim Contact Unit in London and the Danish Imams initiative.

*Strategic policy:* the Preventing Violent Extremism programme (PVET) is included here in order to highlight the approach taken to the development of the largest programme of prevention activity that is being undertaken in Europe at present. This example provides insights into the relationship between civil society and public authorities in the development and delivery of the PVET programme and highlights some of the challenges presented.

## 6.1 Emerging Themes

During the assessment of national approaches and in-depth assessment of identified examples of good practice, a number of key themes were identified through the use of the evaluation framework. It should be noted that while these are considered separately, in practice they were often found to be related and overlapping.

### 6.1.1 *Credibility and legitimacy: autonomy and initiative of civil society*

A key theme identified during the study is the importance of the independent initiative and autonomy of civil society actors involved. The majority of activity had been initiated by civil society itself and often remains highly autonomous of authorities in the practical realisation of projects or initiatives. In those initiatives where the activity is predicated on the development of partnership forums, these were characterised by highly equal relationships amongst the partners in shaping the agenda and response; examples of this include the Berlin Islamoforum as well as the Actieplan Slotervaart.

Civil society organisations are particularly well placed to identify and respond to needs and issues as they develop on the ground. The characteristics of these organisations and their proximity to issues provide them with extensive soft intelligence. In addition, high levels of social capital enable the development of appropriate and effective responses that are targeted to the specific needs or challenges that have been identified. Examples of this include the Mendenek initiative in Hungary that have responded to the highly specific needs of a local marginalised community in order to prevent exclusion and promote cohesion and citizenship, and the MYH which developed to respond to identified needs that otherwise would not have been met by public social services. The Muslim Scouts as well as the Brotherhood of Abraham are also initiatives that have been developed independent from support from authorities.

It is important that public authorities avoid damaging these specific characteristics and abilities by instrumentalising, co-opting and eroding the autonomy of civil society organisations. For example overly prescriptive funding streams tied to specific centrally determined objectives will undermine the ability of organisations to develop programmes and activity that responds to the actual needs of local communities. Such programmes can instead force organisations to respond to preconceived funding objectives that are inevitably less responsive to community need, often with unintended consequences of diverting activity away from needs.

In addition overly prescriptive approaches can also serve to undermine authenticity and credibility of CSOs. Trust is a key feature of CSO organisations that are also commonly characterised by their horizontal participative structures. In addition, when considering that civil society is itself a target for violent radicals, being overly associated with the objectives of authorities may be highly damaging to the perceived authenticity of the CSO. In particular, the problems that have faced IslamWijzer have been suggested to be in part caused by an erosion of trust that has been compounded by political controversy and subsequent suspicions of its objectives and authenticity.

One avenue is the adoption of indirect approaches to address issues of violent radicalisation that avoids undermining the authenticity of CSOs as well as the development of genuine partnership approaches that address a shared agenda. However it will also be important for authorities to develop more sophisticated relationships with CSOs in order to draw on the key

strengths of the sector, including their authenticity and innovation, without inadvertently undermining their activities. The challenges of resourcing and evaluation are highlighted as areas for attention below as well as a developmental approach to relationships that supports CSOs in order to incubate innovative activity.

### *6.1.2 Credibility and Legitimacy: securitisation and trust*

Concerns regarding instrumentalisation and autonomy were raised in a number of examples and touch on particular CSO concerns relating to the importance of trust and the particular threat presented by the security agenda. CSOs, and particularly their users, commonly report low levels of trust in public authorities, with concerns about the motives of authorities, and the erosion of autonomy commonly explicitly reported by CSOs. These concerns are firmly placed within a CSO culture that recognises the central importance of autonomy and trust in their formation and continued existence. These key characteristics can be threatened and undermined by association or institutionalisation of relationships with authorities, and its ability to address issues of violent radicalisation in a social movement context. One such example of the impact of an erosion of trust is the problems encountered by the Mendenek initiative. While not related to a security agenda, the involvement of a national TV company dissipated the levels of trust and confidence in the initiative to the detriment of membership and participation.

In this respect, the use of ‘securitisation’ language and approaches in policy, programmes and initiatives can be unhelpful and can disrupt trust based dialogue and cooperation. The use of securitised language can promote a general climate of tension and fear and distrust in public policy and organisational motives. Any promotion of a security agenda that relegates the core concerns of CSOs day to day activity will also undermine trust and confidence. Where security is an essential remit of the relationship, it needs to be discussed and understood as a collective concern for all participants, with a shared understanding of what this means between partners.

This is not to say that directly addressing issues of violent radicalisation, or framing public policy in these terms, should be avoided altogether. Rather, it is imperative that CSOs feel comfortable with the terms of the agenda and are able to develop their response to it with a large degree of independence and in response to the needs of their constituents. The benefit of this approach has been noted by the UK PVET programme as well as by the Dutch action plan. In addition some organisations expressed uncertainty about being associated with a study on violent extremism for precisely this reason and in some instances declined to participate.

### *6.1.3 Principles: indirect approaches*

From the examples of good practice outlined in this study, it is clear that it is not necessary to solely or explicitly address the aims of countering violent radicalisation to contribute to the prevention agenda. In particular, very few of the projects studied for the review were solely exercises in countering violent extremism. The majority of projects sought to address a range of issues and concerns, or work in particular sectors with an awareness and understanding of how the activity could contribute toward countering processes of violent radicalisation. There are also instances where initiatives do acknowledge that they are addressing issues of violent extremism, but wish to avoid this labelling in order to avoid undermining the credibility of the initiative, with many initiatives in the CLG’s pathfinder fund adopting this approach.

In particular, for many of the civil society led initiatives identified here, the responses and approaches that were being developed are predicated on highly nuanced and localised

understandings of the phenomenon. This nuance is very important for authorities to recognise, particularly when considering the key values of civil society, including extensive social capital and trust and their function in responding to felt need and gaps in provision. Understanding how this activity fits together and can be supported as part of a broader based response to violent radicalisation will be an essential plank in developing effective and holistic preventative programmes that respond to real and practical challenges and drivers of violent radicalisation.

For example, the core activities of the Muslim Youth Helpline do not necessarily overtly or directly address issues of violent radicalisation. However they acknowledge themselves that not only do their counselling services contribute to supporting youth in distress but that their work also places them in a critical position to understand the nature and shifting concerns of youth the UK and the challenges of radicalisation. This knowledge can be seen to inform the development of the citizenship programme that is receiving funding from the CLG community leadership fund and which addresses questions of citizenship as part of a broad cohesion as well PVET agenda.

The French example of the Muslim Scouts of France is indicative of an initiative that has been set up to address youth exclusion in a working class area of France through its general activities and approach to faith as part of an interfaith movement. An example of a different type of indirect approach is that of the Berlin Muslim forum that addresses issues of violent extremism as part of a broad agenda that addresses the full range of policy issues and concerns. The Spanish examples are also not solely concerned with preventing violent extremism, but acknowledge how their activities fit within a broad based agenda.

However, it should also be noted that there is a critical role for activities that do directly address issues of violent radicalisation. Many national responses are predicated on preconceived notions of links between issues such as integration or the management of faith and processes of radicalisation, nevertheless there are number of approaches that that can be highlighted that do directly address the challenge of violent radicalisation. Good examples of these approaches include Lib for All and activities that are undertaken by Khayaal theatre in the UK and the Brotherhood of Abraham in France.

What is notable about these initiatives is that they view their approach and founding principles as a counterpoint to violent radical elements. They see themselves as representing a challenge to normative approaches to Islam and religion, and promote values based culturally informed approaches to faith. In addition they also seek to embody principles of pluralism and interfaith. Their activities commonly encompass not only educational activities but also promote critical engagement, dialogue and reflection through their chosen sectors, the performing arts in the case of Khayaal or through debates and political outreach, and sectarian engagement in the case of the Brotherhood

However whilst initiatives that represent an alternative to the perceived problems of normative Islam, there are a number of caveats. Firstly, the concern with normative approaches to religion, whilst an important question when considering integration and cohesion approaches, should be approached with great care as part of a prevention programme. A conflation of orthodoxy and violent radicalisation is often incorrect and inappropriate, and in some instances is also indicative of the continually shifting and ill informed understandings of the challenge of violent radicalisation and the full complexity of faith groups. Such suspicion also often omits the fundamental principles of freedom of religion and the legitimacy afforded to a range of

orthodox religions in Europe who often have strong presence in the public institutions of governance.

In addition, recent attempts to promote interpretations of religion that are perceived as being in tune with public policy objectives and attitudes to religion, most notably the recent shift to support Sufi sects, can also have unintended adverse affects. This is particularly the case where authorities cannot assume moral authority. Selective support can have the effect of alienating other perfectly legitimate sectarian groups and hindering the development of crucial potential partnerships and relationships, whilst also reinforcing a sense of exclusion and alienation from 'acceptable' public mainstream. In addition such support may also undermine the chosen groups who become perceived as the government sponsored 'acceptable face of Islam', sometimes critically damaging their own authenticity.

The case of the Muslim Contact Unit highlights a critical role for engagement with groups who might be from a more conservative orthodox wing that are considered at odds with progressive Western European values by many commentators, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. The MCU has taken a rationalist and highly pragmatic approach to their 'street level' engagement and sought to open dialogue and negotiation with groups who operate in close proximity to violent radicals, have a track record of dealing with them as rival sectarian groups and who can intervene with vulnerable or susceptible youth in a way beyond the capabilities of other authorities or CSOs.

#### *6.1.4 Level, breadth and depth of engagement: risk aversion*

Throughout the study there has been a noted reluctance among a range of public bodies to engage in cooperative relationships. The reasons for this may include a negative political climate and lack of knowledge about both the issue of violent radicalisation and prevention approaches. In addition a general lack of engagement with Muslim communities, an associated lack of knowledge of the various groups and sects have all combined to produce risk averse responses from public authorities to engaging with the radicalisation agenda and developing partnerships with CSOs.

A key theme that has been reported has been the negative impacts of hostile and volatile political climates. These climates have had some direct impacts on the viability of projects. One example of this has been the IslamWijzer project in the Netherlands whose development has been directly and negatively impacted on by a difficult political climate. These climates also mean cooperative relationships are more generally placed under strain, often before they have had a chance to develop. For example concerns were raised about the potential impact of the film *Fitna* in the Netherlands on the cooperative initiatives in Slotervaart.

In particular authorities can be put under undue political pressure by groups seeking to make political capital out of community divisions and tensions or perceived 'favouritism' or even domination of Islam and Muslim communities. This has been highlighted by recent successes of the far right but also the normalisation of such rhetoric into mainstream political parties.<sup>42</sup> This climate can also undermine the necessary trust based relationships that need to be developed with CSOs as authorities try to respond to these pressures. In addition associated

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<sup>42</sup> Camus, Jean-Yves 'The use of racist, anti Semitic and xenophobic arguments in political discourse' European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) 2005

highly politicised debates around questions of ‘principle,’ (e.g. freedom of speech and freedom of religious expression) have also had significant impacts on the development of activity, and in some instances undermined the development of effective initiatives that respond to practical realities.

An example of challenges to the development of initiatives on the basis of principle includes that of IslamWijzer, whilst the MCU has also come under repeated attack by a number of commentators. Another example of the impact of a negative climate noted during the study was in relation to Khayaal’s acclaimed production *The truth about your father*, addressing the issue of suicide bombing. Although supported by local and national government and designed to be an educational tool local, reporting of the play was highly sensationalist and placed local schools under intense pressure in relation to its showing, and possibly compounded community divisions in the area.

Compounding these problems is a more general lack of knowledge and understanding of Muslim communities within public authorities. This has led some authorities to develop relationships with organisations that have in some instances proved difficult politically and have generated significant controversy within a volatile political climate as well as some negative outcomes. This problem has been noted in particular in the French examples, where in the case of the Muslim scouts the local authorities were reluctant to support the initiative due to negative experiences in the past when dealing with faith groups, while the institute of Islamic Culture consciously stepped away from what were seen as flawed engagement approaches. In addition it has also caused some authorities to turn away from some groups based on misunderstanding of their approaches and principles, and unnecessarily excluded them from both prevent programmes but also more general engagement strategies.

The political climate, a lack of awareness of Muslim communities and a lack of knowledge about issue of violent radicalisation have all contributed to producing risk averse responses from many public authorities. This risk aversion was a particularly common theme reported in relation to the education sector, with a number of respondents and initiatives such as the MYH reporting particular problems in developing relationships. Reasons for this include uncertainty about the agenda itself and concerns about eroding relationships with students and parents through to general uncertainty about the place of faith in schools. Of particular concern are the pressures that the education system can be placed under in a volatile political climate, with examples such as the reporting of the Khayaal production in school a good example of the sort of incident that is likely to cause school leaders to turn away from complex and challenging areas such as preventing violent extremism. This situation is further compounded where schools are not clearly mandated to engage in the agenda in an effective manner and local political support is not always certain. The inclusion of the ‘the Team’ project highlights an example of a schools initiative that is looking to address difficult youth issues that may provide useful learning for the violent radicalisation agenda beyond generic ‘citizenship’ education approaches.

When faced with complex issues set within a tense political climate, and with no clear mandate, perceived authority or resources, public bodies have commonly adopt risk-averse approaches towards engaging with CSOs. This is of particular importance where approaches towards radicalisation are not necessarily based on a holistic understanding of the issues at hand. A lack of mandates and clear understanding of issues of violent radicalisation may inhibit the development of innovative responses. For example, the Muslim scouts example is indicative of

how faith based organisations are faced with barriers to developing relationships with public bodies who may be uncertain in principle about developing relationships with organisations working on faith related issues. In particular, genuinely engaging civic and political participation initiatives have reportedly been avoided by some authorities in favour of more ‘moderate’ and politically ‘acceptable’ initiatives.

In order to address the challenge of risk averse public authorities and support the development of new and innovative activity in a range of sectors, including those previously reluctant to participate in the agenda, clear mandates from senior authorities as well as clear leadership are required. However, while policies and programmes such as the PVET strategy in the UK and the Dutch Action Plan provide such mandates to a selection of public authorities, they do not necessarily guarantee action. The Dutch approach is based on a consensual model that does not require authorities to take action which has meant some municipalities and sectors have not done so. The UK approach that includes the PVET agenda as part of overall performance monitoring frameworks has yet to see local authorities develop genuinely innovative programmes and there is reported continuing reliance on (pre-existing) cohesion approaches. Both still report difficulties in addressing issues in decentralised education systems, for example.

There is therefore an acute need to develop the intercultural competence and capacity of public authorities to engage in cooperative relationships. A number of examples of this kind of activity are included as examples of best practice. The Belgian initiative at the Catholic University of Leuven, the School of Intercultural Dialogue in Spain, the association of intercultural mediators and the professional course on Islamic religion and culture are all examples of courses that are designed to build the capacity amongst public bodies as well as among CSOs. In addition, the examples of the Brotherhood of Abraham and the Lib for All foundation are examples of networks that are supporting individuals and helping organisations to develop responses to these challenges, including in the education system, through projects and strategic support.

#### *6.1.5 Joint ownership of projects and partnerships*

The examples of initiatives predicated on forums and partnership initiatives are all notable for their joint ownership from inception. All have responded to political imperatives and identified needs on the part of both civil society and of authorities. In particular joint ownership provides such initiatives with legitimacy for all partners, as well as among the broader CSO field and authorities and political interests. This is an important aspect when considering the importance of authenticity and credibility for CSOs, particularly within a politicised and contested field where the challenge of violent radicals is most keenly felt.

It is through such joint ownership that initiatives may draw on and respond more effectively to the combined needs and circumstance for all partners and have practical outputs. Critically, it also enables organisation to present their participation in such terms in order to maintain the legitimacy of their activities and negate attempts to undermine their authenticity. Such partnership principles also promote a genuine engagement with the development of new working partnerships of broader benefit throughout the organisations involved, often feeding into organisations in very practical ways. The Berlin Forum and the subsequent cooperation between CSOs is a prime example of the benefits of this approach as is the development of the Slotervaart Actieplan.

### *6.1.6 Funding, resources and sustainability: The limits of civil society*

The limits of civil society should also be noted as part of this study. Civil society organisations are not necessarily intended to be ‘representative,’ nor are they solely delivery vehicles for public services and goods. In particular any policy that instrumentalises civil society will rapidly erode many of the unique qualities and characteristics of these organisations. It is also necessary to directly address issues of social welfare and equality, political access and access to justice that CSOs may raise. While civil society organisations may have key advocacy roles, and in some cases take on delivery roles, authorities must recognise that it is ultimately incumbent on the state to ensure equitable delivery of these fundamental rights for all its citizens.

Similarly, there are limits for authorities in this process of engagement. Many of these concerns relate to questions of capacity and capability when engaging with culturally diverse groups as well as knowledge of the countering violent radicalisation agenda. However it is also clear that while there is a role for authorities to support communities and ensure that safety and security is delivered to all equally, it is also important that the security imperative allows space for civil society to respond to the issues at hand. Excessive or ill thought through intervention and development activity may not only alter the civil society sector but generate a range of unintended consequences, ranging from sectarianism through to disengagement and exclusion.

Funding is a clear issue in relation to the development of initiatives, and particularly the development of CSOs. Levels of funding are fundamental to an organisation’s sustainability, with many organisations reporting limited and variable resources and funding as a key concern. Funding regimes are highly variable, often with informal and inconsistent approaches toward Muslim CSOs in particular. The sustainability of funding is also a key area of concern, with examples of funding being withdrawn in response to rapidly changing political climates and expediency.

In addition there other organisational capacity issues, in particular human resource and infrastructure development issues. While funding can underpin such development, it is also notable that proactive developmental relationships often identify and meet specific development needs. For example, the developmental support received by Khayaal theatre in relation to practical rehearsal space, through to networking with local arts organisations and public officials has been a key supporting factor in the development of their work.

### *6.1.7 The challenge of evaluation and assessment*

The complexity of the issue of violent radicalisation limits and even precludes evaluation of initiatives based on effective outcomes with direct reference to preventing violent radicalisation. In addition, the specific qualities and soft influence and resources of civil society must also be recognised as part of any evaluative approach. In this respect target and output driven relationships, often limited to quantitative indicators of the number of people ‘touched’ by an initiative will not be as productive as approaches that prioritise developmental and trust based relationships with civil society organisations. In addition, evaluations that involve data gathering from putative beneficiaries of schemes suffer from the associated problems of issues of confidentiality and possible anxieties and fears that beneficiaries may have in offering any negative feedback on public authority involvement in a context of unequal power and funding relationships.

There are issues in considering evaluation approaches once resources have already been committed, as they had been in some of initiatives looked at, and a temptation to rely on more easily generated quantitative measures of inputs or processes. There are severe limitations in current evaluation approaches used by many public authorities in this relatively new field, and there is a lack of an evidence base to support many of the initiatives identified. The limitations of current approaches and practice in evaluating effectiveness necessitates an approach grounded in what is already known about good governance and partnership approaches – whilst recognising the challenges of the arena of violent radicalisation. For instance lessons can be drawn from other public policy areas where the understanding of the role of civil society is more developed. This may include development and use of important ‘soft’ qualitative indicators of the state of cooperation in relation to perceived credibility, clarity of expectations and understanding of the need for both pursue and prevent activity, and levels of effective communication between authorities and CSOs and understanding of each authority / CSO agendas and needs.

In particular, if the process of engagement and cooperation has intrinsic value, evaluation of programmes and initiatives can be targeted on what is known about measuring trust, quality of relationships, good management practice and developmental approaches. In addition assessment of the direction of activity at a strategic level should be holistic and focus on continual review of the development of a range of activities in the CSO field that represents a broad based counter radicalisation response that also incubates new and innovative activity. This is in contrast to overly prescriptive instrumental approaches that are predicated on narrow, partial and shifting interpretations of radicalisation that may also limit innovation.

## 7. EXAMPLES OF GOOD PRACTICE

The examples of best practice were all identified as good practice relevant to the aims and objectives of this study during the national review of counter radicalisation approaches. The projects selected do not represent the full range of activity that is being undertaken in Europe but are intended to give readers an insight into the range of activity that is being undertaken. The following evaluations are intended to provide an overview of the initiative and to assess these against some of the key areas of importance included in the evaluation framework already outlined.

### 7.1 Belgium

#### The Catholic University of Leuven

The Catholic University of Leuven, a public university in Belgium, has begun delivering a diploma within the fields of education and association management titled Religious sciences: Islam. The course is intended to provide practical training and leadership development for individuals from Muslim communities whilst also providing education for a range of individuals from sectors that include education, civil servants, police and security officials and other interested groups. The course provides education relating to Islam from an overall knowledge perspective and does not focus on the theology of Islam. The emphasis allows for the study of Islam as a culture and civilisation.

The need for the course was highlighted in research conducted by the Centre for Interdisciplinary Research on Islam in the Contemporary world that highlighted a need for an academically grounded Islamic training and education to be made available for future Muslim community leaders and other interested public officials, including officials within the State education system. In particular, although there is state supervision of Islamic instruction in schools, the training available in Belgium has been generally delivered by a fragmented array of private, unregulated, and often ideologically driven, centres.

The course was developed through consultation with academics and experts as well as with the support of the school inspectors of Islamic teaching – a body of civil servants for the Belgium government who are also members of the Muslim Executive that is the representative body of the Muslim population in Belgium. Classes are mixed and increasingly oversubscribed, with only a small fee charged due to subsidy from the University and Belgium authorities.

#### *Principles*

The course provides participants with a rounded understanding of Islam that is rooted in a practical contemporary approach. It does not attempt to provide theological instruction in Islam; rather it aims to promote a cultural, historical, scientific approach that enables students to undertake critical reflection on Islam within contemporary Belgium. The course is open to all and has attracted a mixed group from a range of backgrounds, which also has the added benefit of fostering cultural understanding, developing networks and improving leadership in this field in a range of sectors.

While the course has been developed in response to an identified need for practical training and support for individuals interested in the future of Islam, Muslim and non-Muslim, it also provides recognition for a group of potential Muslim community leaders. Through this the course aims to help shape the relationship between Islam and

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|   | <p>cosmopolitan European societies while also developing skills and leadership in areas such as cooperation with authorities and community leadership.</p> <p>Although not directly focused on countering violent radicalisation, the course should be seen as a long term component within a developmental strategy that is helping support the development of community leadership as well as improving organisational competence and awareness. The benefits of such a strategy can potentially have a dual impact within any counter radicalisation approach. By seeking to foster improved community leadership and improving competence of individuals and public organisations it can contribute to the development of more effective and appropriate approaches to broader social challenges in the context of multi-faith and diverse communities. Areas that may see benefits include education, religious leadership, and community and youth engagement as well as general service development and delivery. In addition the development of leadership within communities as well as the benefits of networking between participants may also help support the development of effective cooperative responses to specific challenges of violent extremism in the future.</p> |
| <i>Credibility and legitimacy</i>             | <p>The course has been developed through the work of key individuals at the university who also ensured that relevant interested individuals and experts were consulted. The course has received critical support from the Belgian government, the university and the key representative organisation in Belgium. The course is also subject to review by the scientific council of the university. In particular, the oversubscription to the course is a testament to its quality and credibility.</p> <p>While the course has received support from the inspectors of Islamic teaching in Belgium, it has drawn some criticism from other members of the Muslim executive, the official organisation representing Muslims in Belgium. However, it has been suggested that some of this criticism is part underpinned by the resentment of pre-existing providers of rival courses.</p>  |
| <i>Level, breadth and depth of engagement</i> | <p>The course has received support from many of the key stakeholders of relevance within Belgium, though as already noted the Muslim executive was unable to give unanimous support. In addition the course receives funding from the Minister of Sciences from the French community of Belgium and is fully integrated into the universities' scientific and administrative structures.</p> <p>Despite good relations with authorities and good attendance on the course, participants remain predominantly of North African heritage, with less participation by Turkish communities. This is in part informed by the particular context of Belgium, with the course being taught in French presenting a barrier to access for Flemish speaking communities. This participant profile is also informed by the pre-existing links and engagement between the developers of the course and specific communities and individuals.</p>   |
| <i>Resources</i>                              | <p>The course receives funding from the university and the government while charging a relatively small fee to participants. Initial concerns about the availability of teachers for the course have been resolved and a number of professors contribute their time free of charge to teach aspects of the course. However it will be important for a greater</p>  |

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|                                 | supply of appropriate teachers to be developed for future provision.  |
| <i>Evaluation and feedback</i>  | <p>The administrators gather feedback from participants in the course and on the basis of this have undertaken an ongoing refinement of the content and focus of the course. There is reported general satisfaction with the content and delivery of the course and the mix of participants involved. In particular there was a general agreement on the benefits of the critical and discursive approach that has been adopted and that has introduced the complexity and subtlety of the issues to participant understanding of religion and culture.</p> <p>Nevertheless, one of the key tests for the course is the pedagogical challenge of tailoring a course effectively for a wide diversity of students from different backgrounds, professional perspectives and knowledge of the religion. In particular, concerns about the nature and quantity of didactic materials offered by the course has been reported by some participants, as well as concern about the time spent responding to queries to the perceived detriment of the depth and breadth of the course. However, the administrators of the course have sought to respond and refine the offer on an ongoing basis in order to effectively respond to the needs of participants and ensure that the course remains relevant in meeting its core aims.</p> |
| <i>Sustainability</i>           | <p>The course is fully integrated into the structures of the university with stable funding streams as well as an oversubscription of students. Initial concerns expressed when first setting up the programme about the quantity of available teachers to participate in what was perceived as a wide ranging and complex course were resolved by drawing on a range of academics, some of whom were semi-retired.</p> <p>However, it will be important for the course and broader university to be able to develop new expertise for the teaching of the course to ensure that it remains viable. In addition it may also be necessary for additional didactic material to be developed further in response to some requests. However, it is also evident that the managers of the course seek to develop the course content and focus in order to respond to feedback and evaluation and ensure that it remains relevant to participants and contemporary Belgium. It is this approach that will be the key to its sustainability.</p>   |
| <i>Intercultural competence</i> | <p>The mixed courses with a range of professionals are helpful in facilitating exposure to intercultural settings, and are key element in the leadership development for participants. There are some imbalances in the profile of students, including a lack of Turkish representation, driven in part by the course being taught in French rather than Dutch, as well as the North African backgrounds of the course promoters.</p>   |
| <i>Transferability</i>          | <p>The motivations and approach adopted by this course is of great relevance to many Member States in Europe. While some of the specifics of the course content and profile of participants will necessarily be tailored to local conditions, the underpinning principles of the course and the approach adopted are adaptable and transferable. The challenges in identifying the relevant expertise to underpin the teaching of the course teaching may present difficulties in other contexts, with a reliance on the motivation of key individuals and strategic support from university, government authorities and key representative groups.</p>   |

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|  | Underpinning the development of the course has been a policy of one step at a time and an incremental approach in order to overcome key challenges, including the availability of teachers. However it is also apparent that the development of the course has been facilitated by the proactive approach to religion in public life that is evident in Belgium. This context contrasts with many other national contexts. The challenges overcome in this case may be more acute when trying to replicate the approach elsewhere. |
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## 7.2 Denmark

**Danish Security and Intelligence Service in dialogue with Imams in Denmark**

The dialogue initiative between Danish Security and Intelligence Service with Imams in Denmark is of particular interest as it illustrates:

- How dialogue between parties that seem to have diametrically opposed opinions about central societal issues can be developed and;
- The potential for such a dialogue to contribute towards creating a degree of mutual understanding and lead to joint efforts in areas of common interest.

It needs to be emphasised that it characteristic of most of the matters that the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) deals with that they do not develop into actual criminal cases. This also means that the results of the work carried out by the Service traditionally have not been made known or brought to the knowledge of the public. As a consequence it has not been possible to get detailed information on this project or to interview the Imams participating in this dialogue.

It is possible that this dialogue based approach can play a significant role in preventing violent radicalisation amongst young people with a Muslim background attending religious institutions run by the Imams taking part in these regular meetings. These meetings were started by the Service towards the end of 2003 / beginning of 2004. The group representing ethnic minorities did not consist only of Imams but included representatives from different ethnic minority associations, as well as individuals with an ethnic minority background.

These representatives were split into two groups and until recently regular meetings have been held with these two groups. Jakob Ilum from the Preventive Security Department of the Danish Security and Intelligence Service, elaborating on this dialogue based approach emphasised that there are a few central elements that are essential for positive trust building development via this process.

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| <i>Principles</i> | The dialogue initiative between groups that have traditionally been largely remote has been intended to develop a degree of mutual understanding in order to lead to joint efforts in areas of common interest, namely improving security and preventing violent radicalisation. However the challenges of bringing groups together who have traditionally had little interaction and may in some instances have quite different perspectives on central societal issues does present some key challenges. Consequently the initiative has been underpinned by some key principles: |
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|                                   | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The basic approach in this dialogue is based on principles of human equality and elements such as active listening, language that deescalates conflicts etc. as having a central role;</li> <li>2. Emphasis on the fact that it is a very small minority group amongst Muslims in Denmark that is involved in violent radicalisation;</li> <li>3. Clarity that in the opinion of the Service, members of Muslim communities are not considered as a part of the problem but a part of the solution;</li> <li>4. The controversial subjects being debated in Danish society must not be ignored but be part of the agendas of these dialogue meetings. Examples of controversial subjects could be some arrests of suspects planning a terrorist activity and/or the drawings of Mohammad published again recently again in several Danish newspapers, rumours that a group of Danes were going to publicly burn a copy of the Quran etc.;</li> <li>5. Employees at the Danish Security and Intelligence Services' Preventive Security Department participate in meetings and social activities arranged by the members of the dialogue groups.</li> </ol> |
| <i>Credibility and Legitimacy</i> | <p>It needs to be emphasised that it characteristic of most of the matters that the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) deals with that they do not develop into actual criminal cases. This also means that the results of the work carried out by the Service traditionally have not been made known or brought to the knowledge of the public. As a consequence it has not been possible to get detailed information on this project or to interview the Imams participating in this dialogue.</p> <p>However it is clear that these relationships must be managed very sensitively in order that the trust based position and authority of Imams is not eroded by their participation in such a scheme.</p>  |
| <i>Sustainability</i>             | <p>The whole process of this dialogue was being evaluated by the Service at the time of investigation, with further adjustments and/or modifications likely to result from this assessment.</p>   |
| <i>Intercultural competence</i>   | <p>The project is of particular note as it brings quite disparate cultures and world views together in an attempt to build relationships of cooperation and trust. The challenges of this are central to the project itself and the key principles underpinning the development of the project described seek to negotiate these challenges.</p>  |
| <i>Evaluation and feedback</i>    | <p>It was not possible to gain access to participants in the project to obtain primary feedback on the effectiveness of the dialogue programme.</p>   |
| <i>Transferability</i>            | <p>The transferability of this initiative is highly dependent on the development of trust based relationships between the parties. The principles elaborated as a central aspect of the development of the relationship are largely transferable; however such principles are necessarily developed in partnership to ensure shared ownership between parties. In addition trust that is developed in dialogue may also be</p>  |

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|  | <p>challenged by external activities and events and it is dependent on the quality of relationships that have been developed.</p>  |
| <p><b>“Sjakket” (The Team)</b></p> <p>This project was started in 1991 as a project for “street kids”. In 1991 The City of Copenhagen hosted a widely attended conference on the subject of street kids where some participants’ realised that that it was possible to apply for funds to run a centre for street kids. This was the start of the Team or “Sjakket”.</p> <p>The target group were ‘street kids’ but it was soon realised that there was a huge need for a place where young people could come together informally, have someone to talk to and also be together with peers belonging to their age group without having to register or needing to fulfil membership requirements.</p> <p>The project began with a group of volunteers with small premises and gradually grew. In 1993 the Team was established as a separate institution where the only person who was employed was the head of the institution. The rest of the staff worked on a voluntary basis.</p> <p>Approximately 300-400 young people use the Team during the course of a year. The school classes function during the day but the premises are also used during the evenings and at the weekends by other volunteer associations and organisations, for example for sports activities. The participants come from all over Copenhagen. Most of the activities focus on the local community and work is carried out with a diversity of age groups. Furthermore the participants are involved in the development and planning of the activities of the team.</p> <p>The work has several different kinds of effects. Broadly speaking it has to do with general behaviour towards others i.e. the socio – pedagogical work that is undertaken. The young people report that they experience a significant reduction in problems with others when they use some of the communication strategies learned. They also start attending school more regularly and becoming aware of a number of new opportunities that can prove beneficial for them.</p> <p>Another important aspect of their work is that they have achieved something that is often neglected when talking of integration and social inclusion. Often it is assumed the issue relates to ethnic minorities, however in a city like Copenhagen there are several local groups and their relationship to each other plays an important role in local communities. In addition the basis for conflicts between these different groups exists but the Team has managed to create mutual understanding through dialogue between the different groups. As a result there is close cooperation and understanding between individuals belonging to these diverse groups.</p> <p>The existence of an organisation such as the Team is dependent upon an open ended approach from public organisations. It has been and still is extremely important that the people representing the authorities get into a serious dialogue with groups like the Team, are active listeners, and provide assistance in getting over the hurdles they may face in relation to other Departments or authorities.</p> |  |
| <p><i>Principles</i></p>   | <p>While this project is more commonly understood as a youth intervention programme, what is notable is how it is able to access a range of youth from a variety of backgrounds who would otherwise be remote from education systems. In particular, as a space for a diversity of groups and individuals it is engaging with these youth, enabling them to have a stake in the development of activities. Initiatives such as the Team can be viewed as important components in a preventative strategy. They not</p> |

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|  | only supports youth at risk of exclusion but also provides insights into the challenges for such excluded youth that enable the further development of more specific responses to issues such as that of violent extremism.  |
| <i>Credibility and Legitimacy</i>            | <p>The most interesting aspect of the Team project and its perceived effectiveness is that it is basically a grass roots project that has been able to survive on its own and today it is functioning despite the demands from a modern bureaucracy.</p> <p>There is close cooperation between schools and the Team and as a result the Department of Schools in Copenhagen is contributing funds towards the running of the Team. In addition the cultural and extracurricular activities Department of the Municipality of Copenhagen is also giving funds to the Team for sports and athletics related activities that the Team organises and implements.</p>   |
| <i>Resources</i>                             | Initially funding was received from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Copenhagen Commune. Currently most of the funding comes from the Department of Social Affairs in Copenhagen. In addition funding is received from The Department of Culture and Extra Curricular Activities in Copenhagen and there is also cooperation with The Department of School and Youth Education.  |
| <i>Sustainability</i>                        | Normally such projects die out or are taken over by the professionals but not in the case of the Team project. This project has been able to adapt and still functions as a grass roots project. This is also the reason why the adults working there have good contacts with the group of marginalised youth they work with. This can be clearly seen at one of their satellite clubs called Club 36 in the area of Mjoelner Park.  |
| <i>Level breadth and depth of engagement</i> | The Team has been successful in reaching out to excluded youth in Copenhagen in an effective way. In particular the project is notable for engaging with a diversity of youth and not just with select groups, something that is considered a particular strength and success of the Team. In addition the initiative has developed good cooperative relationships with the relevant public authorities in the city without compromising its grass roots nature.   |
| <i>Transferability</i>                       | <p>Key principles underpinning success include the flexibility of the adults involved in the Team project in coping with the changes in the target group; the willingness amongst the adults to discuss and reflect upon the needs of the beneficiaries and adjust approaches related to activities; the awareness amongst the beneficiaries about the opportunities they have and ways in which they can adapt to working with authorities and benefit from these possibilities; developing a feeling amongst the beneficiaries that they are important and valued member of the society and assisting them in achieving goals that can give them a better life.</p> <p>The effectiveness of this approach is thought to be based on regular and close contact with the parents as well as with the Imams at the local mosques and the focus on violent radicalisation as a subject that can be discussed openly. A project such as the one run by the Team places particular demands on the official administration's willingness to cooperate with partners working in alternative ways that may not fit into the way the administration would tackle similar situations.</p> |

### 7.3 France

#### **Muslim Scouts of France, (France, Grenoble)**

Set up in 1990, the 'Muslim Scouts of France' was set up as a secular association of Muslim inspiration open to all faiths as part of the world scouting movement. It was recognised by the Ministry for Youth and Sport in 1992 as a national association for popular education and joined the Federation of French scouting in 1994. It now has around 4,000 members, including boys and girls.

The Grenoble branch of the district of la Villeneuve is a working class area predominantly populated by Algerian communities. While not necessarily a severely deprived neighbourhood, unemployment and criminal activities are a symptom and there are particular concerns about youth alienation by some local residents, underpinned by an identified lack of youth activities, particularly activities that could also provide any moral or religious education appropriate for the Algerian community in the area.

Despite the apparent gap in provision, the scope for the development of provision was originally hampered by the local authorities' requirement to work with organisations delivering youth activities recognised at a national level. This requirement led local residents, including a local educator who had been working with the scouts at a national level, to take steps towards setting up a local branch and approaching local authorities in order to obtain support for the group. However, initial resistance was encountered, partly informed by experiences of previously unsuccessful initiatives and a general generally negative climate toward funding Muslim CSOs at local level. These were eventually negotiated following representations made by the founding member of the French Muslim scouts and a senior member of the world scouting movement.

Activities include trips, camping and other outdoor activities and games and membership is growing. The group offers educational guidance on a wide diversity of areas and is firmly committed to interfaith dialogue, environmental activities and welfare. The scouts seek to practically explore and work with key issues such as integration, segregation, radicalisation and educational inequalities.

#### *Principles*

Offers modern religious youth education through a Muslim organisation that belongs to a larger multi-confessional movement. Guidance is intended to provide more complete teachings of religions while offering education and guidance on a whole range of areas, such as the environment through to practical skills and personal development. It does not focus on religious texts nor does it provide religious instruction, but it does participate in interfaith and intercultural activities. It seeks to provide participants with a well rounded and culturally and religiously responsive experience but is a secular organisation open to all.

While not directly targeted at countering violent extremism, the scheme was set up in response to concerns about alienation amongst Algerian youth in the area. The initiators of the project felt that there was a clear need for activities that were appropriate for the Algerian community and youth in particular. In addition it was felt that setting these important youth activities within a broader multi-denominational context would also play a key role in preventing and alleviating social marginalisation common in violent radicalisation amongst youth, while also promoting an alternative vision of relationships between religions. In particular, participants have highlighted

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|   | <p>the successful emphasis on education and promotion of a range of political concerns of relevance to many youth – from both Muslim and non-Muslim background - that have contributed to rapid and discernible impacts on many alienated youth who had previously espoused radical views.</p>   |
| <i>Credibility and legitimacy</i>             | <p>The Villeneuve chapter of the Muslim Scouts of France has been developed by local residents and has generally had good levels of support and participation from among the Algerian community. This is in contrast to levels of participation in free local state provision which has been limited among the local community. The contrast between the two is particularly marked as the Muslim scouts charge for activities. This is felt to be the result of reported concerns about the secular nature of free provision and its lack of any culturally specific content that has made many parents uncomfortable with their children participating.</p> <p>The Muslim scouts have been able to directly address these concerns and provide content that has been largely well received. In particular, due to the credibility arising from the grass roots nature of the initiative and its culturally tailored content, participants and users have reported successes in addressing challenging views and opinions espoused by some of the more alienated youth, as well as broadening religious education.</p>  |
| <i>Level, breadth and depth of engagement</i> | <p>While some support was gained from local politicians, and funding is received, this has not been instrumental in its development and the relationships with local public authorities are negligible. Nevertheless, the chapter is part of a national and worldwide movement that opens up engagement with a wide range of other branches. In addition the scouting movement, a movement with a long and prominent tradition, is generally well received by authorities.</p> <p>The scouts can be seen to be reaching out and engaging with a variety of groups in the local community and breaking down barriers with local youth. Souad, 21, a practicing Muslim, born and bred in the district, who obtained her diploma of youth organiser through the scouts, has described an evolution in the behaviour of the youth in the neighbourhood “At the beginning, the girls wearing Islamic clothes were wary of me. They felt that I was not a good Muslim because I wore the uniform of the guides with a skirt and a short sleeved shirt showing my arms and legs. They were also shocked that that I took part in mixed activities. Nowadays they are looking for discussions with me. They say they would join us if they were not so involved in their own practice. I hope we will continue this dialogue with them.”</p> |
| <i>Resources</i>                              | <p>Resources are small, with some received from local authorities, and marginal in comparison to other youth organisations in the area. The organisation faces the challenge of maintaining activities through the use of volunteers; in addition reported concerns about the sustainability of the project were mainly underpinned by the need to charge for the activities provided by the scouts. While there is support for the activities, the charges have presented problems for some of the intended beneficiaries of the project who are largely drawn from a working class community. This is further compounded when contrasted with other providers who offer services for free, though they do not provide the cultural content offered by the scouts.</p>  |

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| <i>Developmental approaches</i> | In line with a general lack of resourcing and support, developmental support from the local authorities is not a feature of this example. The scouting movement does offer training and educational programmes in order to support other civil society organisations and has provided guidance and support to the Villeneuve chapter to help its establishment and ongoing activities.   |
| <i>Joint ownership</i>          | The Villeneuve chapter is a grass roots initiative that was set up by members of the local community in response to a felt need in the local area. Support was only received from the local authorities following a campaign by key individuals. While the authorities have come to recognise that the group operates in line with their aims and objectives and have continued to support it, this is fairly limited in contrast with the support received by other local and national providers.   |
| <i>Sustainability</i>           | While the project is a grass roots initiative, the reliance on volunteers as well as parental contributions and the absence of consistent and significant support from public bodies presents a threat to the sustainability of the initiative. This is particularly an issue in a working class area where the scouts are in competition with extensive free state provision.   |
| <i>Intercultural competence</i> | <p>The Villeneuve chapter was set up by local residents in response to a felt lack of provision of culturally sensitive activities for local youth. In particular, although youth activities are provided for free by local authorities there has historically been a reluctance to access such services among many in the local community. While the reasons for this may vary, a common theme is unease about the nature of the cultural and moral guidance that was on offer that is felt not to be tailored to respond to the desires and needs of many in the local community.</p> <p>In addition to providing culturally competent services for the local community, the group is also part of a multi-faith world movement. As part of this movement the scouts hope to provide further opportunities for the youth of Villeneuve to participate in intercultural and interfaith activities and educational spaces beyond that of the local branch.</p> |
| <i>Transferability</i>          | The development of this local branch was in direct response to local needs identified by a group of local residents. In addition it has faced particular local challenges at its inception and has relied on the motivation and expertise of key individuals. However the principles underpinning the work of the group are nevertheless highly transferable. It has sought to provide youth activities allied to a moral guidance that is in tune with the desires of the local community and in a manner that moves away from more sectarian approaches to religion and promotes a value based approach towards faith. It should also be noted that the scouting movement is an international movement and its model of youth education and activities is highly successful and adaptable to a range of social and cultural contexts and the la Villeneuve branch is firmly within this approach.  |

### **The Brotherhood of Abraham**

The Brotherhood of Abraham was set up in 1967 following a meeting at the Grand Mosque, Paris as an organisation promoting interfaith dialogue between the three Abrahamic faiths. Brought together by a group of academics, intelligentsia and prominent individuals within the religions in France it has organised monthly conferences on theological and political themes and edits a review distributed in 27 different countries. The Brotherhood, which has charitable status and considers itself secular, aims not to organise worship but to develop dialogue between the three religions that have evolved from Abraham. It defines its objectives as:

“Bringing forth the witness that the world expects from them, Jews, Christians and Muslims – in absolute respect of their religions and faiths – have decided to unite together to develop awareness of everything that since Abraham constitutes their shared spiritual and cultural heritage, but also to work together to effectively reconcile all those who, in whatever way, are Abraham’s descendents today and to free the world from the damaging effects of hatred, of fanatical violence, of pride in race and blood by revealing to the world the authentic and divine sources of a fraternal humanism”

Following the events of 9/11 the group made a conscious effort to not only challenge the narratives and ideologies being promoted as part of the attacks, but promote ideas of tolerance and dialogue. The group also recognised that it was essential to bring their work and approach to a broader audience. In particular work with teachers, social workers and parents has been developed in order to support their work with youth and countering violence. In particular there was an identified need for the development of education that promotes respect, understanding of secular values, critical understandings and scientific approaches to religion and belief, as well as teaching about religion through lessons on literature, philosophy and the arts.

The Brotherhood has offered support to the League of Teaching, a national teachers association, to build partnership between teachers and civil society organisations in order to develop intercultural and interfaith activities and dialogue. This is in part born out of an identified lack of teaching competence in these areas that has prevented the roll out of a new national religious education syllabus. The syllabus developed by the philosopher Regis Debray and commissioned by the Ministry of Education in 2001 proposed a rational and scientific approach as the best way of fighting fundamentalism and fanaticism that echoed the approach of the Brotherhood.

A series of conferences and debates have also been arranged in urban areas where such events may were not common. In particular the debates sought to discuss questions of interculturalism and promote a critical engagement with the meanings of religion and move away from a perceived emphasis on rites and rituals. In particular the group has had success in accessing and engaging a range of different mosques, groups and individuals in their interfaith approach. This includes not only those who were the brotherhood's original constituency, but also those with less formal education and fewer opportunities to engage in such events.

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| <i>Principles</i> | The group approaches the teaching of religion as an exploration of knowledge, science and critical reflection. Rooted in a long tradition of the promotion of interfaith dialogue, and ‘revealing the divine sources of fraternal humanism’ it seeks to promote a values based understanding of religions as well as breaking down barriers between faiths. They have sought to apply these principles to the challenges presented by 9/11 |
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|   | <p>and subsequent events.</p> <p>In particular, the approach of the Brotherhood is intended to contrast with normative ritualistic approaches to faith, with greater emphasis on critical reflection on meaning. It is through this approach that the Brotherhood feels that it may better engage students and enable them to develop independent critical reflection, knowledge and understanding as the best counter to religious fundamentalism. In addition they are seeking to bring this approach and vision to a wider audience, including through interfaith forums and conferences, including more sectarian mosques and in deprived areas that do not normally have such opportunities.</p>   |
| <i>Credibility and legitimacy</i>             | <p>The organisation is a long established institution with an extensive network of members and associates who are respected individuals across a wide range of fields and sectors. While it has traditionally been seen as a relatively exclusive organisation, it has made proactive efforts to meet the organisation's core aims and objectives in a manner that responds to contemporary challenges in France.</p> <p>The Brotherhood's knowledge capital and networks enables it to develop relationships of trust and respect with a diversity of groups and organisations. This trust and credibility has enabled them to bring their approach into a range of settings that might normally have been resistant. It has also enabled them to be responsive to needs and particular local circumstance and tailoring their approach where necessary.</p>   |
| <i>Level, breadth and depth of engagement</i> | <p>The Brotherhood, as a networked membership organisation, has extensive links and contacts throughout France and across a range of sectors. This network enables them to identify needs, to develop and refine approaches and responses and support people in a wide range of areas in their work. However the Brotherhood has not always received formal recognition for its work; most notably a grant from the Paris Municipal Authorities was withdrawn following a change in the political leadership in 2002. Likewise the secular nature of national government has prevented any monetary support being provided to the Brotherhood, though there is evidence of a dialogue.</p> <p>The Brotherhood has extensive international reach through its journal and is well positioned to develop debate and disseminate good practice. In addition it is now developing outreach into areas where it previously did not undertake activities, including working with poorer communities as well as other sectarian groups. However, its ability to continue the development of this activity, particularly into schools, is threatened by uncertainty surrounding funding.</p> |
| <i>Resources</i>                              | <p>The Brotherhood has existed for over 40 years and possesses a wealth of knowledge, skills, capacity and social capital by virtue of its networks. These networks of members are the key resource that enables the Brotherhood to respond effectively to emerging needs and evolving dynamics. In addition this high level of social capital also equips the Brotherhood with the expertise to develop effective responses across France.</p> <p>However it has recently lost some revenue with the withdrawal of funding from Paris authorities in 2002. Whilst this withdrawal of funding is not a threat to the ongoing existence of the organisation it has hampered the development of outreach activities,</p>  |

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|                                 | with some of the schools activities including fieldtrips for youth suffering in particular.  |
| <i>Developmental approaches</i> | No developmental relationships with authorities have been reported, with restrictions on funding at national levels and local funding recently withdrawn. However the Brotherhood is underpinned by an approach that seeks to transfer knowledge and develop projects and initiatives through its members and in partnership with groups, individuals and organisations across key sectors.  |
| <i>Joint ownership</i>          | The Brotherhood is a network membership organisation and is joint owned and based on participatory approaches. However, while one of its key strengths is its breadth across sectors, it is also largely isolated from formal relationships with authorities. In particular, while an education curriculum based on the Brotherhood's approach has been approved, a lack of trained teachers remains a limitation on its delivery. However the Brotherhood does develop a range of relationships with other organisations in order to develop their initiatives and projects.                      |
| <i>Sustainability</i>           | The organisation has been in existence for over 40 years and, by virtue of its membership basis and products such as the journal, is likely to continue. While the withdrawal of funding has been damaging to some of its activities it is in a position to continue its work in a variety of areas.   |
| <i>Intercultural competence</i> | Central to the work of the Brotherhood is an intercultural and interfaith approach to the teaching of religions. High levels of knowledge and experience throughout the membership as well as experience of conducting activities over 40 years has left them well placed to impart this knowledge and experience to other organisations. In addition, the membership of the organisation has also enabled it to develop relationships with a wide range of organisations and gain access to groups and areas that may otherwise have proved problematic.  |
| <i>Transferability</i>          | The Brotherhood has been undertaken activities over a long period of over 40 years. Although their recent work has entailed a shift in the focus and activity of the organisation, the development and existence of a network of individuals has enabled them to meet this challenge. The universal principles and methods of the Brotherhood would be transferable into other contexts, however the key challenge is the development of a committed network over a period of time with the necessary reach, knowledge and capacity to develop effective work that reaches into challenging areas. |

### **The Institute of Islamic Culture, Paris**

Located in the Parisian area of La Goutte d'Or, North of Paris, the Institute of Islamic Culture (IIC) is a public building and space founded by the Paris Council in 2006 after negotiation with a number of different local civil society partners. The IIC undertakes a range of activities including conferences and seminars on the historical, cultural and sociological aspects of Muslim culture. A wide range of fields are covered including literature, arts, cinema, history and current aspects of Islamic thought.

The aims behind the creation of the IIC include the promotion of a better recognition of Islam in the city, keeping public order in the Goutte d'Or area and the building of social cohesion in the capital. Generally it aims to give Islam a better reception and place in the public sphere. One of the key players in the IIC

from the local bureaucracy, Hamou Bouakkaz, said; “In the public eye, Islam is linked to terrorism and radical violence. It’s not viewed as a religion like others. This project is intended to promote the diversity of this religion and also build a more positive status for Islam in the city.”

The Institute can also be viewed in the context of a community development and relations strategy. In the past, local officials seeking to address the perceived disorder created by teenagers of migrant background have often turned religious militants into unofficial mediators between migrant populations and public authorities. In this instance, the Paris council has created the IIC in the hope of actually shaping tendencies in the religious field and influencing the developing shape of French secularism (Laïcité).

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| <p><i>Principles</i></p>                             | <p>The Institute aims to be a centre of excellence for the exploration of Islamic cultures in France. As part of this, and given its location in the Goutte d’Or it intends to shift negative perceptions of Islam among non-Muslims, to create a meeting place for the diverse Parisian population, and to encourage social cohesion. In this respect the Institute is more specifically a long term community development strategy that has provided a key institution and service for a previously marginalised community.</p> <p>Although the specific outputs of the institute do not focus on the specific challenges of violent extremism, its activity does address many of the key issues of violent radicalisation. In addition to the benefits of a community development approach and benefits regarding cohesion and public perceptions, in providing a public space for engagement, debate and enquiry, the Institute in part provides for an opportunity for an exploration and development of Islam, faith and identity in contemporary France.</p> <p>The IIC aims to challenge the growth of sectarian Islam in Paris by emphasising the promotion of a cultural Islam, arguing that it might be an alternative to the normative or overly political approaches to the faith. Sufism is emphasised in the IIC programme and activities, despite being a minority following within the French Muslim population, as potentially representing a counter to the influence of normative Islam. Such activity for many represents a crucial avenue for engagement of Islam with French identity and culture and can represent an implicit and in some cases a direct challenge to the ideas that promote violent radicalisation and terrorism, for example in the case of the Sufi programming.</p> |
| <p><i>Level, breadth and depth of engagement</i></p> | <p>The development of the IIC was the result of a partnership between the Paris council and a range of civil society groups including scholars, migrant associations such as the Association of North African Workers, and other cultural organisations in the Goutte d’Or. It was a stated principle of the development of the initiative that consultation would be conducted widely, both within the local area and across Paris in order to shape the programme and activities offered by the Institute.</p> <p>This partnership approach was central to the creation of an Institute that could promote Islamic culture in a manner that engages people in dialogue and counters negative stereotypes associated with Islam and Muslim communities. In this respect, the Institute has gone a long way to achieving its goals insofar as a diversity of people, Muslim and non-Muslim, access the Institute in an area of Paris that might not normally be visited, as well as participating in the programming of the Institute. However, some critics do see the project as having an overly intellectual appeal,</p>   |

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|  | <p>with some respondents suggesting that participants are predominantly drawn from middle class and more formally educated backgrounds. In particular some feel that the project attracts participants drawn by the Sufist nature and values of much of the content, values that promote autonomy and self awareness that are considered more amenable to French middle class values.</p> <p>There are concerns about the Institute’s reach with local working class youth. It is notable that the Institute has become a meeting place for local populations, but they remain largely ‘outside’ the Institute both in relation to the content and programming offered, but also the physical space – tending to congregate at the front of the project. In this sense, the Institute while promoting the development of an Islam engaged with contemporary France, is considered by some key informants as less relevant to, and consequently having limited impact on, those who already feel or see themselves as marginalised from many aspects of contemporary mainstream France.</p> <p>Whilst the Institute recognises the contrast in the profile of those who access its services and the population of the local area, one respondent noted their concern about perpetuating the commonly perceived link between Islam and social problems; “We are thinking about creating a social department in the Institute but we are not sure. It would [confuse] the aims of the Institute. It would also reinforce links between Islam and social problems” Nevertheless it is recognised that the working class is an important constituency that needs to be brought into the activities of the Institute and the debate is ongoing.</p> |
| <p><i>Credibility and legitimacy</i></p> | <p>The development of the Institute was underpinned by a desire to create a place for critical reflection, debate and cultural services to further understanding of the place of Islam in modern France. Its programming including debates, exhibitions and a range of courses which are generally well regarded and it is increasingly playing an influential role in this broader debate and development.</p> <p>However some objections have been raised to the fact that the Paris council failed to make some Muslim associations a partner in the creation of the Institute. This perception has underpinned criticism from one local Mosque who attacked the Institute as an attempt by the Paris authorities to control Islam. In addition (and already noted) there are concerns about the limits to its reach among local working class populations. While this concern is being considered, there are reported tensions in the aims and essence of the Institute between on the one hand those who view the Institute as an academic and intellectual project and those with a more immediate and pragmatic approach concerned with attempting to shape contemporary culture among a wider demographic.</p>  |
| <p><i>Resources</i></p>                  | <p>Resources have been provided by the local authorities to support the creation of the Institute, with activities also contributing to revenue and the daily operation of the Institute and scope to develop additional programmes and activities. In addition, the Institute is intended to become a site for education and training and the development of human capital.</p>  |

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| <p><i>Sustainability</i></p>  | <p>The inception of the Institute has been underpinned by the support of the local Paris authorities. This support was received after a change in the administration of Paris and in response to reported issues in relation to a lack of community facilities that were causing tension throughout the area. However, whilst the Institute has developed, its ongoing survival may be affected by any changes in political will to support the Institute.</p> <p>While it is possible for the Institute to diversify its revenue it will be necessary for it to ensure that programmes remain at the necessary standard to maintain support and ensure that its services are utilised. However, this may undermine additional efforts to undertake outreach to broaden its appeal among a broader demographic. Consequently the direction that the Institute takes in its ongoing development will be of particular importance to its sustainability should political and funding climate alter.</p>   |
| <p><i>Transferability</i></p> | <p>The birth of the IIC is strongly linked to a change from right-wing governance to that of the left. The IIC was placed on the agenda in a political context in which local authorities revisited the approach to Islam in the city. In particular, it should also be noted that the IIC was aimed at solving a key problem of public order in the Goutte d'Or and the absence of adequate prayer facilities in the local area.</p> <p>Offering a centre for intellectual excellence in a disadvantaged area does challenge the effects of urban segregation by allocating resource and providing opportunities, as well as breaking down negative perceptions of the area. Insofar as urban segregation is one of the circumstances shaping the forms of radicalisation in European countries, the IIC can be considered as a good practice, the principles of which could be followed elsewhere, including extensive consultation and partnership approaches with a range of national and local actors.</p> <p>However a number of key challenges can also be seen when evaluating the potential transferability of the concept of the Institute. These include ensuring that the nature and shape of the programming is of the necessary quality but also avoiding excessive 'engineering' and ensuring that it is a genuinely open and critical exercise that is open to a variety of voices. Such an approach is important in order to avoid a situation where some groups may feel excluded and voice these concerns. In addition, managing the tensions between an 'intellectual' project and one that looks to reach out to a wider section of society is of critical importance if such an exercise is to be relevant to contemporary Islam and community in Europe.</p> |

## 7.4 Germany

### The Islam Forum Berlin

A national Islam forum was set up in Germany by a range of CSOs in 2002. The forum incorporated a mix of organisations including ethnic and faith umbrella organisations. The forum brings together a range of civil society groups including government representatives, and includes the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. Topics for the forum are wide ranging and selected by participant organisations and include constitutional questions, citizenship, equality and diversity.

While a range of regional forums were also set up, the Berlin forum has been the most significant due to the high level of representation from authorities. The Islam Forum Berlin was initiated and is coordinated by the Commissioner for integration and migration of the Senate of Berlin and the Muslim Academy of Germany who both played key roles in determining membership of the forum, and has included a range of groups and organisations representing a wide range of different Muslim communities and strands in Berlin.

The outputs of the forum include developing guidance on partnership working between Muslim civil society and authorities. It has been highly active in developing and releasing joint statements and responses to events and key anniversaries such as the commemoration of 9/11. Its major project to date is continuing education for Imams. Following feedback from Muslim CSOs and Imams, a course was designed to provide Imams and mosque institutions with practical knowledge and training on a range of practical issues such as the German political system, social security, health insurance, educational system and vocational training in order to better support their communities.

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| <i>Principles</i>                 | The Forum is populated by a range of faith and ethnic groups who consider themselves Muslim organisations. However, the Forum is not primarily a religious forum; rather it is intended to provide a platform for authorities and civil society organisations to meet and discuss practical issues. Central to the effectiveness of this approach is the development of trust based cooperative relationships where previously such relationships were very limited. While the forum is not directly focused on issues of violent radicalisation, questions of security, radicalisation and terrorism are nevertheless treated as one part of what is a broad practical agenda. When these issues are raised they are treated appropriately as issues of common concern for all parties. |
| <i>Credibility and legitimacy</i> | The Forum's strength and function has been heavily dependent on its credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the participants. In an effort to ensure that the Forum achieved a high level of credibility it was developed through extensive consultation between authorities and CSOs. In particular, membership has been designed to be representative of the full range of groups and communities in Berlin and bring on board a range of grass roots perspectives that also bring genuine reach into the communities of Berlin.<br><br>As part of this approach the Forum has not sought to bring all organisations claiming to be representative or umbrella on board if it was felt that they did not bring the   |

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|  | <p>required representation, reach and legitimacy amongst communities. In addition, while their direct involvement in the Forum remained problematic, Islamist groups were consulted during the set up of the forum in order to gain their tacit support, and through the membership of the forum Islamist groups continue to be consulted on its work.</p>  |
| <p><i>Level, breadth and depth of engagement</i></p> | <p>As already noted, a central feature of the Forum has been the inclusion of a wider range of groups and the avoidance of some claimed ‘representative’ umbrella groups. This has been intended to bring a greater degree of engagement across the city. In addition, the Forum has also brought high level engagement and participation from public authorities. Of particular note has been the participation of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution as well as other security officials and departments. In addition, through the inclusion of a wider range of more grass roots orientated groups it is also hoped that the Forum will have a wider impact into the communities of Berlin. The membership includes:</p> <p>Public administration representatives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Senator for domestic affairs of the senate in Berlin, Mr Erhard Körting</li> <li>• Mayor of the district “Berlin-Mitte” (Central Berlin)</li> <li>• Mayor of the district of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg</li> <li>• State Association of commissioners for integration and migration</li> <li>• Police: State criminal office</li> <li>• Police: Representative of police president</li> <li>• The head of the Senate Office for the Protection of the Constitution</li> <li>• Senate office for Education, Youth, and Sports</li> <li>• Senate Office for Science, Research and Culture</li> <li>• Management of the Quarter of Moabit West</li> <li>• Management of the Quarter of Soldiner Street</li> </ul> <p>Muslim Civil Society Organisations:</p> <p>In relation to Muslim CSOs the focus of selection was not on the associations and / or individuals (as in the Deutsche Islam Konferenz) but on representatives of Muslim communities. In a moderated selection process a number of representatives were selected, including different schools of Islam (highly debated in other places): Sunni, Shia, Alevi and Ahmadiyya. Some communities felt to be too “Islamist” were not</p> |

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|                  | <p>selected, but tacitly gave their consent to the selection of the Islamoforum.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ahmadiyyah – Muslim Community Berlin</li> <li>• Promotion Association Alevite Memory</li> <li>• House of Wisdom</li> <li>• Initiative of Berlin Muslims (IBMUS)</li> <li>• Inssan for Cultural Interaction</li> <li>• Intercultural Center for Dialog and Education (IZDB)</li> <li>• Islamic Federation Berlin</li> <li>• Islamic Cultural and Educational Center Berlin (IKEZ)</li> <li>• Islamic Cultural Center of Bosniacs in Berlin</li> <li>• Cultural Center of Anatolian Alevites</li> <li>• Turkish-Islamic Union of the Institution for Religion (DITIB)</li> <li>• Association of Islamic Cultural Centers (VIKZ)</li> </ul> <p>Migrant Civil Society Organisations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Al-Huleh</li> <li>• Turkish Community in Berlin</li> <li>• Turkish Association Berlin-Brandenburg</li> </ul> <p>Other Religious Communities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Archbishopric Berlin – Catholic Church Berlin</li> <li>• Protestant Church of Berlin-Brandenburg</li> <li>• Jewish Community of Berlin.</li> </ul> |
| <i>Resources</i> | <p>The Forum is only resourced in kind by the Senate Office and the Muslim Academy, with the costs of publications also borne by the ministry. The Imams education project has a budget of €60,000 from the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees.</p>   |

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| <i>Developmental approaches</i> | The Forum has been a central component of developing a more consistent and open dialogue between authorities and Muslim community civil society organisations. In this respect the Forum has contributed heavily to developing the delivery of effective services and public administration in Berlin through these relationships. In addition specific projects, such as the Imam’s education project, have also sought to directly support civil society organisation to develop their skills and capacity as part of this relationship in order to deliver the benefits externally.                   |
| <i>Joint ownership</i>          | As a partnership forum, joint ownership has been a central component from the outset. The principles of the development of the forum have been very clear; it is a joint exercise with an agenda that has been formed by both parties on an equal basis. The benefits and outputs of the Forum are also intended to be of equal value for both parties. In addition the membership of the Forum has been developed in consultation between authorities and civil society groups, with the overall profile of civil society organisations being determined by civil society actors involved in the Forum. |
| <i>Sustainability</i>           | If the practical outputs of the Forum for civil society actors are reduced, the ongoing viability of the forum may be threatened. In order to avoid this, commitment on all sides needs to be reaffirmed and a proactive approach taken to the development of the agenda and practical cooperative initiatives such as the Imam training.  |
| <i>Transferability</i>          | The Berlin Forum has been adapted from national level initiatives and applied to the Berlin context. In particular, the approach to membership has been an innovative development and one that is more reflective of and responsive to the various Muslim communities in Berlin. In particular however, when considering the transferability of the forum, its strength and ongoing sustainability is predicated on the commitment of participants from all sides. It is this commitment, the consequent credibility and subsequent results will determine the ongoing success of the forum.             |

## 7.5 Hungary

### **Mendenek Migrant Support Foundation's Women's group project (Budapest, Hungary)**

The Mendenek Migrant Supporting Foundation's Women's group was originally set up as a self-managing group in 1997 and has evolved through three stages since this time. Its central aim has been to support the integration of participants through exploring Hungarian language and Hungarian culture, while also providing a social space for participants.

The core aims and approach of the group evolved from the experiences of the original establishment of the group. The group was set up for a second time following a period of inactivity due to lack of resource, including personal circumstance of volunteers, while also reflecting the development in experience and knowledge of the professionals involved in developing the project. These objectives were:

- Strengthening the self image of the members
- Helping their integration.

The group was facilitated by a number of volunteers from a social work professional background which has informed the approach that has been adopted. Sessions were approached with a good degree of structure in order to meet overall objectives. However, an equally important aspect of the group was it representing a shared space for women to learn as a group and also to explore the challenges of developing a life in Hungary together.

The participants in the groups have ranged from a pre-existing social network of Afghan women through to a more diverse range of cultures and professions, necessitating a highly adaptable approach. The key results of the group have been participant learning of the Hungarian language and entering into the labour market, while also providing a supportive social space for women facing the challenges of adapting to the country.

However, following involvement of a Hungarian TV station, the group operation was damaged and members left the group. Plans are in place to restart the group with the same constituency of women, with a return to a tighter focus on language training. However problems with venues following the move of Mendenek has so far prevented this from happening.

#### *Principles*

The project was set up through an identified need by staff at Mendenek working with the local Afghan community who noted that as housewives they had fewer opportunities open to them to develop their lives in Hungary, in particular in relation to language. This was in contrast to their children of schooling age who were learning Hungarian language along with men. The group has sought to contribute to improved social inclusion and integration for women in the community and supports them in their role as mothers and in dealing with the challenges of life in Hungary.

While the aims of the project are that of an integration project, it is important to recognise the importance of supporting new minority communities in Member States.

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|   | The lessons of many western European Member States and subsequent issues of exclusion, marginalisation and the more recent issue of violent radicalisation point to the importance of such projects as part of a broad based prevention strategy.   |
| <i>Credibility and legitimacy</i>         | At inception, potential barriers and suspicion of the project, in particular amongst men in the community, were due to pre-existing relationships between Mendenek and the community. These links enabled a more effective communication of the aims and objectives of the group. Although not totally self organising, it is guided by social work professional principles, and the group has evolved and been shaped by its participants. However, the involvement of a TV company has had a damaging effect on its credibility and the group membership declined to so that the work had to be put on hold and is only recently being restarted.     |
| <i>Level, breadth depth of engagement</i> | The group runs without any direct support from authorities. The host organisation, Mendenek, does receive funding from authorities. Volunteers and paid workers are largely drawn from social work professional backgrounds and have links with these organisations.  |
| <i>Resources</i>                          | The group is self funded and primarily reliant on volunteers. The ongoing availability of volunteers due to personal circumstance has regularly impacted on the functioning of the group. Although the group is in line for a 1 million Hungarian florint donation from a Hungarian national television company this has not been received due to lack of infrastructure support for the group following the moving of the Mendenek premises.   |
| <i>Sustainability</i>                     | As the project has been operating for 10 years there is a certain level of sustainability. However, in the absence of organisational development support, and a strong reliance on the individual commitment of volunteers, the group has had to be put hold in terms of activities on several occasions without guarantee of continuation.   |
| <i>Evaluation and feedback</i>            | Feedback was received from beneficiaries and social workers implementing the project. Beneficiaries reported that the project had made a positive impact on their lives and the lives of their families. In addition the approach of the social workers and the running of the group has evolved and adapted according to the needs and wants of participants.  |
| <i>Intercultural competence</i>           | A good awareness of intercultural considerations has been integrated from the outset of the development of the women's group. In particular, awareness and sensitivity to male concerns in the community facilitated the successful development of the group which would otherwise not have been possible. In addition adaptation and learning has been demonstrated throughout the project as well as adaptation of formal professional approaches into an approach more appropriate for the group. In practice the group is an effective space for intercultural learning for all participants, including beneficiaries and social worker volunteers. |
| <i>Transferability</i>                    | This example of activity is representative of a grass roots initiative that is looking to respond to local problems. By virtue of its grass roots nature it is not necessarily directly transferable. However the development of these kinds of groups holds important lessons in relation to gaining wider support beyond the target group in the  |

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|  | community for initiatives and flexibility and adaptation in approach. In addition it also points to the need to support organisations such as Mendenek in order that such initiatives can be developed in response to needs as they materialise on the ground. |
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## 7.6 The Netherlands

### Actieplan Slotervaart Het tegengaan van radicalisering

Following increasing awareness of the issues of violent radicalisation and the development of a national strategy that prioritises the delivery of issues at the local municipal level, particular attention was paid to the Sub Municipality of Slotervaart which was considered by many as a potential ‘hotbed’ of radicalism, in part informed by the young age demographic of the area as well as the high percentages of those of Moroccan and Turkish decent.

The municipality has sought to develop a preventative response with the key objectives of stimulating reflection on radicalism and its consequences and preventing youth from becoming involved in radical groups. A range of key actors have been involved in the development and delivery of a municipal action plan in order to achieve these aims. These include the Amsterdam municipal authorities and a pre-existing Amsterdam forum, ‘Amsterdam together’. The action plan brings together the city and sub municipal authorities with a range of civil society actors that include youth groups, mosque federations and individual mosques from the area, migrant organisations as well as other key figures and individuals from the community.

The key aims and objectives of the preventative approach being adopted by the sub municipality include:

- Stimulating improved awareness of issues of radicalisation and their consequences amongst the local youth population
- Strengthening the resilience of local youth against all religious forms of radicalisation.

Sub-objectives of the approach include:

- Widening knowledge and insights on the differences in religion and in society;
- Involving different key partners within Slotervaart in the process of countering violent radicalisation;
- Improving social cohesion and trust through the developing partnerships between key parties;
- To develop new and innovative approaches toward countering radicalisation.

In order to deliver on these aims and objectives the programme is adopting a range of key measures primarily focused on the youth population in the area, including:

- Raising consciousness amongst (Muslim) youth and their social environment of the dangers of radicalisation processes;

- Facilitating a development of competences which improves the resilience of youth and their parents against radicalisation;
- Supporting parents in raising youth;
- Supporting Mosques and Imams in coping with radicalising youth and countering radicalism;
- Ensuring an effective alert and response network to respond to dynamics of radicalisation;
- Facilitating the collaboration between public schools and youth provision;
- Promoting interaction between different groups of people and religions.

#### *Academia Islamica*

A central pillar of the delivery of the action plan is a youth intervention education programme, called Academia Islamica (AI). AI, developed from a proposal by key individuals with firsthand experience of the challenges of radicalisation was brought on board by the chair of the local municipality. Its approach is predicated on attempting to empower key figures in the community, organising a series of debates and the personal coaching of radicalised youngsters. Key activities have included:

- *Empowering key figures:* AI has given training for informal key figures from Amsterdam Slotervaart. This training has focused on the identity of youth and the role of religion within their development.
- *Organising debates:* AI has organised five debates around themes such as emancipation and diversity among Muslim women and norms and values in society. Because of the success of the debates and the large group of people attending there was a sixth debate.
- *Personal coaching and counselling of radicalised youngsters:* In the case of youngsters who are already identified as radical, Mohamed Cheppih is often asked for counselling. The arrangement is formalised in a contract so that he is not held responsible for the future actions of the youngsters themselves.

#### *Principles*

The action plan prioritises preventative measure against youth violent radicalisation in the local area. It has sought to bring together a range of key stakeholders in order to develop an appropriate response. The partnership approach that spans across a range of organisations has been supported by the clear overview of the key areas that are being targeted in order to respond to problems of violent extremism. This framework provides a clear and common agenda in which a range of organisations can participate.

A key to the overall success of the plan however is seen as shifting the attitudes of youth away from violent radical sentiments and promoting a greater degree of identification with their community and society. In particular, the approach of AI has been underpinned by perceived gaps in personal identity development among many

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|   | <p>of the youth in the area.</p> <p>Informed by a perceived gap between cultural and religious background and social contexts, AI seeks to try and explore these gaps and provide avenues of expression: <i>“Muslim youngsters feel a gap in their identity and try to fill this with their religion. Most of the time this is not a problem, but sometimes these youngsters go from orthodox to unhealthy narrow-mindedness, so that they are a threat to themselves and their environment. Lots of Muslim youngsters don’t feel at home in Dutch society, therefore it is necessary that they [have] a place of their own where they don’t feel excluded and where it is safe to talk about their issues.”</i><sup>43</sup></p>  |
| <i>Credibility and legitimacy</i>             | <p>The process of pulling together and delivering the action plan is part of a process of developing partnership working approaches with a range of CSOs. Good levels of participation and engagement indicate high legitimacy, however as the project is still in development its credibility is also dependent on evidence of genuine progress and change. A set of key principles underpinning the development of cooperation approaches have underpinned the basis for cooperation, and there is general agreement by actors on the need for action.</p>   |
| <i>Joint ownership</i>                        | <p>While the initiative for the action plan was informed by government policy, the design, development and delivery has been undertaken through a partnership approach with clear aims and objectives framing its development. In addition, shared commitment to the aims and objectives of countering violent radicalisation has mediated the development of the action plan and provides clear vision and objectives that parties are able to agree to and cooperate on. The initiative has also helped to develop improved leadership in the area, with in informal leadership network for mutual support and development of skills across the network.</p>   |
| <i>Level, breadth and depth of engagement</i> | <p>The action plan brings together the chair of the sub municipality as well as other key city government bodies with a wide range of civil society organisations. The key theme of the action plan is the development of a cooperative platform. However some concerns have been raised regarding the level of ‘horizontal’ communication and cooperation which is seen by some as an impediment to developing a genuinely joined up response and has producing some ‘hollow’ and isolated practice.</p> <p>There are some concerns about the ability to reach all youth in the area. Some reported concerns include a lack of felt relevance among some parents in relation to their children. While this may not be problematic in itself, it is important that participation and commitment to the AI and the activities of the plan are reinforced in order to maintain the relevance of the activities. The initiative is also aware of the difficulties in targeting those individuals who may already be considered at risk, particularly in the absence of compulsion powers.</p> |
| <i>Resources</i>                              | <p>The sub municipality received €30,000 as a start up grant from the Administrative Service of the Municipality of Amsterdam. They also received €400,000 from the combined Ministries of Internal and Kingdom Affairs and of Living, Districts and</p>   |

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<sup>43</sup> Interview with M. Cheppih, March 15th, 2008.

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|                                 | <p>Integration.</p> <p>As the initiative is a multi-agency partnership approach it is able to bring a range of skills and competencies to bear on the delivery of a broad based youth engagement strategy. However, the delivery of the action plan is still hampered by a variable understanding of the issue of violent radicalisation. A particular concern noted by one respondent related to the competency of some organisations providing training to professionals on the issue of preventing violent radicalisation despite poor understanding of the issues, including an inappropriate conflation of orthodoxy with radicalisation.</p>   |
| <i>Developmental approaches</i> | <p>The action plan has enabled the development of an educational and intervention programme in the area, and the associated organisational requirements to support this delivery. In addition, the action plan and the educational programme are also furthering the knowledge and capacity of a range of civil society organisations and authorities on the issue of countering violent extremism. This was identified as important aspect as there is commonly confusion and misunderstanding of the phenomena. In addition key individuals involved in the action plan have set up an informal leadership network to support each other and develop their skills.</p>   |
| <i>Evaluation and feedback</i>  | <p>A formal evaluation of the programme is underway; however no formal data is yet available. Nevertheless anecdotal evidence suggests that many of the activities are being well received by many of the youth participants.</p>  |
| <i>Sustainability</i>           | <p>The success of the action plan and educational initiative is highly dependent on the participation of a range of civil society organisations. In addition it is also predicated on ongoing financial support from national and local authorities. There are a range of stakeholders participating, many of whom readily recognise the need for action and have taken the initiative to push the agenda of the action plan forward. There are some concerns that at present horizontal communication and cooperation have not developed to the extent that was hoped. However it is also acknowledged that this development is part of the process and aims of the plan itself and it is hoped that the leadership network will help.</p> <p>The main threat to the ongoing sustainability of the initiative relate to the broader political dynamics within Holland. Many participants reported concerns that the impact of prominent individuals such as Geert Wilders and the release of his film Fitna may erode the confidence and trust of stakeholders and beneficiaries of the action plan. It will be important that such delicate situations are handled sensitively both at national and local level in order to avoid damaging the relationships developed in the network. It is the relationships and capital developed by initiatives such as the action plan that will also provide the best avenue for responding and preventing adverse impacts of such political dynamics.</p> |
| <i>Intercultural competence</i> | <p>The educational programme is designed to provide a service that incorporates essential cultural considerations and education as an integral part of the programme. No specific intercultural competence needs are acknowledged as part of the action plan, however the creation of a space for cooperation facilitates the development of intercultural competence and cooperation.</p>   |

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| <i>Transferability</i> | The action plan brings together a range of local actors under a clear framework of aims and objectives and with associated resourcing. The approach is highly transferable but is dependent on sufficient commitment and engagement from key individuals and organisations as well as a genuine partnership approach from the outset that recognises the concerns of all partners and the specific needs and context of the local areas. |
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### **IslamWijzer**

IslamWijzer is an internet initiative that has been set up by a group of CSOs in order to provide more neutral representations of Islam on the internet. It offers a virtual meeting space for Muslim youth and functions as an intermediary space for a range of different organisations and parties.

Specifically the objectives are to:

- Be a platform on which the diversity of the Islamic believers can be brought to wider attention;
- Be a meeting ground for a wide spectrum of Islamic movements and believers;
- Be a source of information for people who want to learn more about the role of Islam in the Netherlands.

The website is an attempt to respond to two general currents that are perceived as problematic and important in any analysis of violent radicalisation. The first is a high level of public debate on Islam within Holland. The founders of the site feel that many representations of Islam and much of the debate are underpinned by a lack of understanding of the faith, its teachings and its subscribers. Consequently the site hopes to become a resource for those who are interested in Islam to improve their knowledge and debate and support an informed discussion that contributes to the development of Islam in Holland.

The second issue concerns a perceived domination of the web spaces accessed by Muslim youth in Holland by proponents of divisive violent radical beliefs, ideologies and narratives. While many of these sites are only short lived, other more general sites were also being used by more extremist individuals to promote their ideas and recruit individuals. IslamWijzer is therefore intended as an alternative space on the internet that challenges these individuals, groups and ideas.

In order to meet these objectives and aims the content of the website is driven by five general themes;

- *Islamic Authority*: the website tries to aim at parents, mosques, Imams and other Islamic authority figures in order to influence the dissemination and learning of the faith in Holland.
- *Equality / Respect*: on the website are articles on how Muslims should respond to the practitioners of other religions and atheists.
- *Diversity in Islam*: although the general belief is 'Unity in God' or 'Unity in Islam', the Islamic community in the Netherlands shows a 'Unity in Diversity'. IslamWijzer aims at the theological and cultural diversity of the Dutch Islamic community.
- *Emancipation of Islam*: like Christianity, Islam projects a utopia of liberation of oppressed people. However history teaches that dictatorial leaders may oppress their people and use the

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|  | <p>Quran in justification. Is there emancipation in Islam? The website gives - amongst other subjects within this theme - attention to the role of females in Islamic society, sexuality and marriage.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Islam and democracy</i>: Separation is one of the foundations of a democratic state. The website publishes articles on the subject of democracy and politics in relation to Islam.</li> </ul>  |
| <p><i>Principles</i></p>                             | <p>IslamWijzer is a mutual project of people and organisations that are connected to each other by the Islamic tradition and hope to contribute to the development of Dutch society. IslamWijzer seeks to address social and spiritual issues of participants and provide a broad based approach to Islam that engages with contemporary Dutch life. While the site is intended to be a resource for individuals it is also intended to be a discursive space for people and organisations as a counterpoint to radical and jihadist currents present on the web.</p>   |
| <p><i>Credibility and legitimacy</i></p>             | <p>The site brings together a wide range of actors, including those with other websites so it has a substantive stakeholder investment. It is an initiative that was started off by grass roots participant organisations themselves in response to a felt need. However, as with most web based initiatives, credibility and legitimacy is highly user driven and will be dependent on active usage and outputs. However, the production of quality content for the site has been problematic, and reliant on voluntary contributions, a situation brought about by a significant cut in funding available for the website.</p> <p>There are also significant questions around the credibility and legitimacy of the site as it stands. Whilst the founders of the site have sought to develop good links with the main websites that are accessed by young Muslims in Holland, at present the website is only receiving limited traffic. As a result of this there is very nominal participation in the site's interactive features, undermining a key objective of the site.</p> <p>Of particular note is that some respondents have suggested that public political controversy surrounding the site and its association with the Ministry of Justice has undermined the credibility and authenticity of the website, particularly among more orthodox groups. In addition some have also suggested the presence of a non-Muslim web manager may also reinforce these concerns about the site's perceived authenticity in relation to questions of Islam.</p> |
| <p><i>Level, breadth and depth of engagement</i></p> | <p>The project is a collaboration of multiple non-government organisations. While the project has received some funding from government there has been little developmental support. The relationship with some authorities has also been problematic, with the site becoming the subject of political debate and motions opposing its development by right wing politicians.</p> <p>Most of the organisations actually involved in the development of the site are youth websites with an Islamic target group (such as Marokko.nl, Maroc.nl and Hababam.nl). Furthermore other non-government organisations such as the SMN and Inspraakorgaan Turken in Nederland (IOT) play an important role in the project. Universities, including the University of Amsterdam and the University of Professional Education In Holland participate by supplying interns for the Production Team. There remain question marks over the extent of its engagement with its critical target audiences.</p>   |

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|                                 | <p>However, it should be noted that the site is new and the development of audiences can take time.</p>  |
| <i>Resources</i>                | <p>The project originally received €400,000 funding from the Ministry of Justice, later taken over by the Ministry of Internal and Kingdom Affairs. In October 2007 the funding was questioned by the (Christian) political parties ChristenUnie (Christian Union) and the SGP (Political Reformed Protestant Party) who stated that ‘it is no job of the Government to fund this kind of religion.’ The motion that was carried was in the end supported by Rita Verdonk, former Minister of Integration and Foreign Policy, who had originally agreed the financing of IslamWijzer.</p> <p>Consequently funding for 2008 was halved to €200,000. Although no plans are being made for external funding in the form of sponsors or selling advertisement space, the budget for 2008 has a shortfall of approximately €80,000 with avenues for advertising space now limited due to the lack of necessary development resources.</p> |
| <i>Developmental approaches</i> | <p>No formal developmental support was received from the funding authorities. The organisations themselves have had to draw on their own shared expertise and networks in order to ensure the successful development of the site, including some key production support provided by the university partners. However the development of the site is now being significantly hampered due to the lack of resourcing that is limiting the production of sufficient quality content for the site.</p>   |
| <i>Joint ownership</i>          | <p>The website is a collective exercise by a range of CSOs who have come together in order to develop a site in response to shared aims and objectives. In particular, the development of the website has been focused on maintaining a cooperative approach that brings relevant key stakeholders on board. This has been a conscious effort on the part of the project manager and other key participants in the team who recognised the importance of bringing other youth websites on board. However, whilst the site has received some limited funding it has not been afforded consistent support and this has undermined the viability of the project.</p>  |
| <i>Sustainability</i>           | <p>In the absence of consistent and adequate funding the sustainability of the project has been called into question. As the funding has been halved following political pressure the project’s ability to fully meet its aims and objectives, particularly in respect to the content of the site, is limited. This controversy has not only undermined the production of the site's content but also, for some, its credibility and as a result the site is yet to generate the levels of site traffic and interaction originally envisaged. At present the project is funded for 3 years, however in the absence of political support it is unlikely that this funding will be renewed and new sources of revenue will need to be generated for the site to continue.</p>  |
| <i>Intercultural competence</i> | <p>The aims of the site itself were to help address the various issues of Islam in Holland in a diverse and discursive fashion. It is hoped that the site will contribute to the development of Islam within Holland and improve understanding of the religion amongst the Dutch population – both Muslim and non-Muslim. In addition the site hopes to provide a counter point to those proponents of divisive radical agendas that are perceived to dominate the web spaces accessed by Muslim youth in the Netherlands.</p>   |

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|                               | <p>However, while the site itself is an attempt to improve intercultural understanding and develop the role and place of Islam within Holland, key actors have undermined its ability to do so. In particular, many public figures and authorities have demonstrated poor understandings of the aims and objectives of the site and have sought to undermine it, often in the pursuit of political agendas.</p>  |
| <p><i>Transferability</i></p> | <p>The principles of the site are commendable and the approach is one that can be adapted. There are genuine well founded concerns about the level of understanding of Islam and associated debates. This has contributed to polarising societies and contributed to a hostile climate that is a key dynamic within issues of violent radicalisation. In addition the attempt to develop quality content that is aimed at developing Islam within the context of Holland is also one that is a felt need and important in supporting community development in states such as the Netherlands.</p> <p>However, the nature of the support provided to the initiative has been highly detrimental to its development. While funding was helpful, the subsequent ill informed political posturing and controversies have undermined the credibility and authenticity of the site in the eyes of its intended audience. In addition the subsequent withdrawal of funding has limited the scope for the site to develop content and deliver on its core aims and objectives. Nevertheless, the site is in its early days and has some committed partners. There is scope for the site to further improve its traffic and levels of participation in its user driven functions.</p> |

## 7.7 Spain

### School of Intercultural Citizenship (Spain)

The School of Intercultural Citizenship was set up in 2005 as part of the Foundation CeiMigra, as part of the statutory objectives of the Foundation to promote understanding of citizenship and the rights that come with it, and improve integration. The course was created in response to a context where there is little knowledge about, and suspicion of, immigrants. The aims of the school include:

- To educate on the rights and duties of citizenship in Spain;
- To facilitate adaptation into a new society beyond labour force access to also address questions of citizenship including personal, family and community issues;
- To create a relationship between the population and new arrivals that will also promote positive views of migration.

The School has sought to deliver on these aims through a variety of activities in three broad fields:

- The inclusion of intercultural and citizenship modules in the labour integration courses provided by the Foundation CeiMigra;
- The development of courses and workshops that facilitate personal and collective development for newcomers;
- Volunteering and civic work courses aimed at both natives and migrants promoting interculturalism and cohesion, and guidance to professional associations on best practices concerning diversity.

#### *Principles*

The project was set up with the dual aim of promoting citizenship and promoting social integration of new migrants. Rather than being solely focused on labour market integration and practical guidance the course also seeks to provide an introduction to Spanish culture as part of a promotion of intercultural dialogue. In particular, the promotion of the participant's psycho-social well being is approached from a global perspective that views processes and issues of transnationalisation as a fundamental element of the migration experience and an area that can be addressed through intercultural approaches. As part of this, special attention is given to the situations in which transnational families live and how they build their relationships, with a view to the creation of networks of mutual support amongst the participants.

Although this project is primarily an integration project it is important to recognise the important role that effective integration programmes may play in any strategy in preventing violent radicalisation. In particular, the approach of the School of Intercultural Citizenship, with its emphasis on intercultural dialogue, is seen by respondents as addressing key aspects of violent radicalisation through three areas where they see notable successes:

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|   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The incorporation of a module on immigrants rights and obligations in all labour integration courses;</li> <li>• The development of workshops on the social impact of the new culture that migrants experience in the new society which impact on their experiences in daily life, including the challenge of transnational families and the potential future experience of young people of the second generation;</li> <li>• The support and guidance provided to technicians, professionals and leaders of associations for best practice in the management of diversity and interculturalism.</li> </ul>  |
| <i>Credibility and Legitimacy</i>             | The School of Intercultural Citizenship is a prominent example in Spain of strong collaboration between the authorities and civil society. The Foundation collaborates with all levels of the Spanish Public Administration (municipal, provincial, autonomous and state-owned, in addition to the European) and also with most of the key CSO actors concerned with migration and integration in the region. It is through this broad based partnership approach that the school has been able to generate credibility and legitimacy with the range of organisation and companies with whom the school works enabling it to secure placements and provide training.   |
| <i>Level, breadth and depth of engagement</i> | <p>A feature of the initiative is the wide numbers of actors involved in the project development and delivery, including a range of authority and civil society actors, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Valencian Government, Council of Immigration y Citizenship.<sup>44</sup></li> <li>• The Compañía de Jesús, Provincia de Aragón<sup>45</sup>.</li> <li>• The Valencian Foundation Service of Labour (SERVEF).<sup>46</sup></li> <li>• The University of Valencia.<sup>47</sup></li> <li>• The Migra-Studium Foundation.<sup>48</sup></li> <li>• The University Institute of Studies on Migrations (University Pontificia Comillas).<sup>49</sup></li> <li>• Centre Arrupe of Valencia.<sup>50</sup></li> </ul> |

<sup>44</sup> <http://gva.es/jsp/portalgv.jsp?br=2&re=1&co=en-US&chflash=true>

<sup>45</sup> <http://jesuitasaragon.es/>

<sup>46</sup> <http://sve.es/>

<sup>47</sup> <http://uv.es/~webuv/>

<sup>48</sup> <http://migrastudium.org/php/index.php>

<sup>49</sup> <http://upcomillas.es/pagnew/iem/index.asp>

<sup>50</sup> <http://centroarrupe.com/>

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|                               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The “Bancaja” Foundation.<sup>51</sup></li> <li>• The “Sud-Nord” Board of Trustees of the University of Valencia.<sup>52</sup></li> <li>• The Cooperation and Internacional Relations Office of the University of Alicante.<sup>53</sup></li> <li>• The Municipal Board of Trustees of the Housing of Alicante’s town hall.<sup>54</sup></li> <li>• The Compañía de Jesús, Provincia de Aragón.<sup>55</sup></li> <li>• Hermanos de las Escuelas Cristianas de La Salle.<sup>56</sup></li> <li>• The “Jovesólides” Association.<sup>57</sup></li> </ul> <p>In addition to the range of actors participating in the development and delivery of the programme, the courses are also delivered to a range of beneficiaries. One of the key constituencies of the programme is migrants who have settled in the region of Valencia and wish to participate in the programme. Successful promotion has been via schools linked with migrant associations in the region. In addition the course is also attended by individuals who are concerned with issues of migration and integration in the region and are commonly drawn from civil society organisations and other public bodies for which these issues are relevant.</p>                              |
| <p><i>Joint Ownership</i></p> | <p>The range of organisations involved in the development and delivery of the course is also reflected in the management structures of the School. A board of trustees’ consists of both authorities and representatives of the lead civil society body, Compania de Jesus. This board is responsible for the supervision of the activities of the school and the appointment of the key administrative roles and posts. However, while there are a range of organisations participating in the development of the project it is notable that there is a lack of direct grass roots CSO representation on the board. At present three of the places are appointed by the Valencian government Council of Immigration and Citizenship, and three appointed by Compania de Jesus, a national Catholic organisations active in this field.</p> <p>While the Compania de Jesus is a local branch, it is not necessarily representative of the needs and experiences of local migrant and minority groups and CSOs in the region. This situation is in part a product of a broader theme of a lack of engagement by authorities with grass roots civil society organisations, particularly those that are non-catholic; it is important that the representatives to the board that are appointed by</p> |

<sup>51</sup> <http://obrasocial.bancaja.es/>

<sup>52</sup> <http://uv.es/psudnord/>

<sup>53</sup> <http://ua.es/es/internacional/prog07/proymagreb/convpatrimonio0506conv.html>

<sup>54</sup> <http://alicante-ayto.es/accionsocial/home.html>

<sup>55</sup> <http://jesuitasaragon.es/>

<sup>56</sup> <http://lasalle.es/paternaep/>

<sup>57</sup> <http://jovesolid.es/>

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|                        | <p>Compania de Jesus should reflect the range of experiences and needs in the region in order for the governance of the school to be considered a genuinely joint venture.</p>  |
| <i>Resources</i>       | <p>The School of Intercultural Citizenship is primarily financed with the contributions of the Council of Immigration and Citizenship of the Valencian Government and the Bancaja bank, particularly through its <i>Social Work</i>" (Interv-AM). Nevertheless although it receives public funding, the School is integrated in the CeiMigra Foundation, which in response to growth in demand for its services is now looking to diversify its sources of financing from both public and private institutions.</p> <p>This diversification is intended to augment the original contributions of the Valencian Government, the European Social Fund, Bancaja, Caja de Ahorros del Mediterráneo, Caja Madrid, La Caixa, universities and the Valencian Academy of the Language. During 2006 the CeiMigra has been establishing agreements with different autonomic and state departments, European organisations and other social institutions; including the Main Directorate of Cooperation for the Co-development programs and Residences; the Main Directorate of Social Services for formation courses; the Main Directorate of Family for advising and family classroom; the Main Directorate of Investigation for publications and days; and the Main Directorate of Housing for the program of Infovivienda.</p> <p>As a study centre, the CeiMigra has agreements for collaboration with universities of Valencia: Estudi General (Valencia), Alicante, Jaume I (Castellón), as well as with other similar Foundations for specific courses and aspects of activity including the Foundation Luis Vives for the development of trainers, the Foundation RAIS for the repopulation program or the Chambers of Commerce for the program of emigrants' formation. Particular emphasis is also to be given to the collaboration with trade unions in order to generate good practice in incorporation into the labour market.</p> |
| <i>Transferability</i> | <p>The development of the project has come about through committed work by a range of organisations. It is evident that good levels of support have been provided by authorities as well as participation from a range of civil society and academic actors. The approach of the school, in looking to improve intercultural approaches to questions of integration, is addressing an often neglected aspect of the migration experience that commonly focuses primarily on labour market integration. In addition, the school has also served to develop and improve the extent of relationships between the variety of authority and civil society actors in the area. The benefits of this should also be considered when assessing the transferability of the project as a crucial bi-product is the potential improvement in responses to any future manifestations of violent radicalisation.</p> <p>Nevertheless, whilst the approach is commendable, it should be noted that in respect to an agenda of addressing violent radicalisation, a focus on migrant integration approaches that are predicated on largely targeting first generation migrants will not necessarily always be appropriate, though these are the largest groups in Spain. While relevant at present, as population demographics shift it will be important that public and CSO responses adapt. This adaptation is also central to any question of transferability, with any developments needing to be responsive to local contexts. In addition, the relationship between integration and issues of violent radicalisation, and</p>   |

how integration initiatives sit within this context, also needs to be better understood.

### **The EuroArab Foundation for Higher Studies**

The EuroArab Foundation for Higher Studies has its origins in the agreement reached by the European Parliament in 1984 for the creation of the EuroArab University. In October 1995 the EuroArab Foundation for Higher Studies was set up, an institution unique in the international arena due to its composition and its mission - to create a space for dialogue and cooperation between the countries of the EU and those of the League of Arab States. Through its activities the Foundation aims to dedicate its efforts to promoting Euro-Arab cooperation, supporting academic and cultural activities and disseminating new ideas and trends in Science and Humanities. Its aims and objectives include:

- To encourage teaching, research, information and technical assistance, exchanges and to collaborate with institutions from other geographical areas, strengthening ties with the countries of the Euro-Mediterranean basin in particular;
- To promote postgraduate programmes in universities and research centres in Europe and the Arab world, for the exchange and dissemination of knowledge;
- To contribute to economic development and to promote cooperation between Arab and European countries through training programmes in human resources and executive management;
- To introduce into society the idea of respect for Science, and for the values of tolerance, objectivity, freedom, and good practice, favouring the promotion and practice of economic, social and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights;
- To become a provider of useful, up-to-date and comprehensive information and resources through the creation of a network of institutional and social contributors.

The EuroArab Management School is currently the hub of the only pan-Arabic and pan-European network devoted to the development of company management. By providing training and support to companies, the School offers solutions to problems that European and Arab executives face in their management tasks. However, since 2005 and particularly so since 2007, the school has broadened its focus to developing social leadership with the Arab and Muslim communities of Spain.

The activities of the Foundation aim (i) to stimulate scholastic, research and information exchange; (ii) to collaborate with academic, research and scientific institutions in countries of the Mediterranean basin and (iii) to stimulate post-graduate programs between university research centres of European and Arabic countries for exchange and dissemination of knowledge, as well as to introduce into society the values of tolerance, objectivity, freedom and good practice. Its activities include:

- Research exchanges through mobility scholarships granted by the Foundation within the framework of the International Cooperation Masters, focused on the Maghreb;
- Developing technical personnel, particularly specialised executives in governance in the Mediterranean area. An example is the "Project POLIBIUS", whose objective is to deepen the study of governance of the Mediterranean Public Administrations, including Spain, Algeria, Lebanon, Belgium and Tunisia;

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|   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Post-graduate students, mainly through an International Cooperation Masters, but also through the "University Expert in Foreign Rights " and "Project TEMPUS", whose objective is to develop Tourism studies as well as to establish collaboration between firms and universities in the management of tourist resources;</li> <li>• The Muslim communities; given the perception of the Muslim communities in the city of Granada, the promotion of diverse discussion groups. One of these was between Imams, presidents and directors of the mosques, with the aim, among others, of pursuing through political democratic routes a wide range of demands from Muslims. A discussion group between Muslim women was also organised.</li> <li>• Migrants and citizenship activities in general, both Muslim and non-Muslim, since most of the Foundation's activities have a public character.</li> </ul>  |
| <p><i>Principles</i></p>                      | <p>To create a space for dialogue and cooperation between the countries of the EU and those of the League of Arab States. The development of such a space for cooperation will help to contribute to improved dialogue between states. In addition it will also help open up non-state relations and channels of communication through trade, and promote intercultural relations in a range of areas.</p> <p>Whilst these activities are not directly related to issues of violent radicalisation, in the context of 9/11 the development of such links are seen as important in contributing to the development of the community in Spain and improving its resilience. It can also contribute to improving resilience and relations between countries during difficult political environments.</p>   |
| <p><i>Breadth and depth of Engagement</i></p> | <p>By means of collaboration agreements, the Foundation maintains relations with more than thirty educational, cultural, research and economic institutions including public authorities, business, education institutions and CSOs. The Foundation's Board of Trustees consists of six representatives; one for each of the following institutions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The European Union;</li> <li>• The League of Arab States;</li> <li>• The Ministry of Education and Science;</li> <li>• The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation;</li> <li>• The Andalusian Government;</li> <li>• The University of Granada.</li> </ul> <p>Up to now the Foundation has signed collaboration agreements with the following institutions: Alcántara para el desarrollo de las relations entre España y Marruecos" Association; Association of Political Scientist Women; Santander Central Hispano Bank (BSCH); Caja Rural de Granada; School of Political Scientists and Sociologists of Granada; The Andalusian Audiovisual Council; The Andalusian Ombudsman; County Council of Granada; Internacional Festival of Music and Dance of Granada;</p> |

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|  | <p>“Business School of Andalusia” Foundation; “Legado Andalusi” Foundation; Iberia Airlines from Spain; “Granada” Institute of Secondary Education; Peace and Conflict Institute, University of Granada; The Ministry of Education and Science; The University of Granada; “Menéndez Pelayo” Internacional University; The Technical University of Madrid.</p> <p>However whilst the Foundation is characterised by a wide range of participating organisations, the emphasis of the activities of the organisation have undergone an important shift during its lifetime as described by the foundation’s present Executive Secretary:</p> <p>"During the ten first years of the Foundation’s existence, from 1995 to 2005, its performance was more directed to cultural, economic and business elites, with the level of impact on the Muslim immigrants remarkably small. In fact, around 95% of the budget was destined to the EuroArab Management School. The new team considers that it was an error to adopt so elitist an approach, and that it is necessary to maximise social leadership, to reorient the Foundation’s performance towards the practices of good government and the Foundation serving as a test lab for society. It is now the Foundation has really begun to develop the work for which it was set up, to institutionalise the Arab communities. The Spanish Government of the time and the European Union made a considerable effort to establish a specialised centre that connected the academic, cultural and social spheres.</p> <p>Following this shift in emphasis the Foundation is now looking to provide ‘The Muslims of Granada with a platform for physical interaction and dissemination for their activities throughout communities, associations, etc., as well as developing discussion and work groups with representatives and Muslim leaders.’</p> |
| <p><i>Credibility and legitimacy</i></p> | <p>An elite initiative that has good support from a number of high level officials, whilst the focus is gradually being broadened to incorporate the local Muslim communities of Spain.</p>  |
| <p><i>Joint Ownership</i></p>            | <p>The EuroArab for Foundation Higher Studies is one of the best existing examples in Spain of strong and solid collaboration between the authorities and civil society. The Foundation has managed to collaborate at all the levels of the Spanish Public Administration (local, provincial, autonomic and state, in addition to the European) and, through the signing of collaboration agreements, with almost all types of existing actors within the civil society: associations; private banks; professional schools; politically independent public institutions of the Andalusian Government which work autonomously or independently; festivals; public and private foundations with a not for profit purpose; private companies; public education institutions; and universities and centres.</p> <p>SIC involves hundreds of actors in Spanish civil society, and the social, economic and cultural network existing around the EuroArab for Foundation Higher Studies is wide ranging and broad.</p>   |

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| <i>Resources</i>  | During the first ten years of its existence (1995-2005) the Foundation managed a budget of about 12 million Euros, approximately 1.2 million Euros annually. Since 2005 the budget has been reduced to about 500,000 Euros annually. Although this budget has been reduced by a half, the Foundation at the moment is involved in a greater number of activities and organisations than in the past, partly through rationalisation and greater efficiencies in operation. Funds are received from (i) The Spanish agency of International Cooperation (AECI) (ii) the agency Andaluza of International Cooperation (AACI) of Presidencia's Consejería of the Andalusian Government; (iii) and Ministries of Cultura, Defensa and Educación.   |
| <i>Transferability</i>  | <p>For the Foundation to develop further it is felt by some that it would be advisable to seek greater autonomy from political funders and financial independence. In addition it is also important to maintain the consensus between the members of the Board of Trustees.</p> <p>In addition at a cultural level it would also be necessary for the Foundation to adopt a more commercial and less restricted or elitist approach to culture, through the celebration of musical concerts, popular dance, etc., which would attract the majority of the Muslim immigrants rather than small or more exclusive circles. In this sense it is necessary to transform elitist approaches towards a focus on developing social leadership. This also requires the adoption and implementation of concrete policies reflected in clear aims.</p> |
| <p><b>Asociación de mediadores interculturales (Association of Intercultural Mediators - ASMIN)</b></p> <p>ASMIN began in 1999 as the University of Granada's first course in intercultural mediation. It is an apolitical and independent non-profit association working with the diverse social and cultural communities in Andalusia. It focuses on the challenge of migration, harnessing and developing new methods of intercultural intervention between the receiving society and the incorporation of immigrant people; strengthening through its associative principles values of the Universal Declaration of the Human Rights; improving the intercultural competences of citizens and workers in Andalusia; and developing positive intercultural communication. "ASMIN has mediated in the resolution of cultural and social conflicts between the receiving population and the immigrant population and supported the scholastic, social, sanitary and labour integration of the immigrant population, ethnic minorities and refugees".<sup>58</sup> Since its creation, through its statutes, it promotes in Andalusia cultural diversity as advancing European integration and supporting the Alliance of Civilizations.</p> <p>The goals of ASMIN, underpinned by the principles of intercultural medication, are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To represent the Association's intercultural mediators before the governmental, university authorities and public opinion;</li> <li>• To defend the general interest and to develop the organisation members' rights;</li> <li>• To promote mediation as a means for conflict resolution;</li> </ul> |  |

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<sup>58</sup> ASMIN Respondent

- To stimulate and participate in activities whose aim is to spread favourable values, attitudes and practices for intercultural coexistence in any social and/or political ambit;
- To investigate, publish and disseminate topics related to interculturalism;
- To establish relations with organisations and associations that have similar objectives around mediation and immigration and with which it is possible to collaborate in national and international cooperative actions;
- To promote intercultural coexistence through a range of activities and initiatives;
- To take part in specific mediation work in intercultural contexts where this is considered opportune by the association;
- To prevent the sprouting and development of conflicts that damage intercultural coexistence, to denounce attitudes and practices that affect coexistence in intercultural fields;
- To promote new ways and spaces of coexistence in an intercultural context.

Working principles as perceived by the different members of the Association, as well the groups with which it has worked (particularly the Muslim communities and the local administration) include:

- Involving civil society (Muslim communities, Spaniards and immigrants) and the local and regional institutions, with the ultimate intention of valuing intercultural coexistence;
- Promoting local diversity and cultural differences, not an exclusive model which separates and limits, but an enriching model;
- Analysing the social inequalities for different Muslim groups and spaces for encounter, communication and cultural interaction and developing a neutral space for communication;
- A specific mediation developed for the demands of Muslim communities and the local administration;
- Considering the different objectives, goals and results, intercultural mediation can be important work in a range of fields such as social services, family, minors, house, health, justice, work, mass media, education, culture, etc.

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| <i>Principles</i> | Using principles of intercultural mediation AMIN works to fight against discrimination and for integration and respect of fundamental human rights through the empowerment of people, groups and communities. However, situations of fragility, institutional and socio-cultural discrimination and internal conflicts with groups, where there is an unwillingness to move out of one's own culture, can be a determining factor in increasing inter and intra-community cohesion. It should be noted that one of the respondents from ASMIN stated that "The main principle of |
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|  | <p>“Best Practice” is to ensure that the established Muslim community in Granada is by itself seen as a valid interlocutor for the city council of Granada ”.<sup>59</sup></p> <p>Intercultural mediation cannot in itself prevent the possible radicalisation of groups and/or represented ethnic minorities in the Spanish state. Rather it seeks to address issues of inequality and promote cultural understanding. In this respect it affects the social structures that are a context for possible radicalisation, constituting, in its work of mediation, a bridge between two cultures that for different reasons collide.</p>   |
| <p><i>Level, breadth and depth of engagement</i></p> | <p>The different practices and projects carried out by ASMIN have from its beginning (2000) included a wide range of social and other representative actors in the local administration.</p> <p>The target actors (the Muslim people of Granada), immigrants and converts are organised in “Islamic religious entities” around premises meant for the exercise of prayers (mosque or oratory). They have taken into account the Muslims who manage the mosques and those who take part in all kinds of activities related to these places of worship, including men and women, adults and young people. In addition AMIN works with a range of CSOs focused on combating religious discrimination.<sup>60</sup></p> <p>However a problem that has been noted is the existence of internal divisions within the local Muslim CSO field. In particular whilst the "Granada City Council of Mosques" has been created it is not a representative body of all the Muslims established in the city. "Not all the communities that exist in Granada have been allowed to be represented by the "Granada City Council of Mosques” and many of them do not even agree in working on the same lines.”<sup>61</sup></p> <p>Public actors (local government) are mainly representatives of the Municipality of Granada. Among other collaborators, it is worth noting the support received until 2003 from the Spanish Workers’ Socialist Party, the United Left and the regional Andalusian party managing the commune. The two municipal departments directly involved in the initiative as a co-financiers were the department of education and the labour and social welfare department. These departments changed their political colours in May 2003 after the local elections gave a majority to the Popular Party. Equally, the association has maintained relations at regional and autonomic level with the Andalusian Government, particularly with the General Direction of Migratory Policies. In this it has participated actively in the immigration provincial Forums, which facilitates collective communication between immigrants, the receiving society and the provincial and central administration. At state level at present it is planning to develop activities collaborating with the Ministry of Justice, particularly with the Foundation Pluralism and Coexistence.</p> |
| <p><i>Resources</i></p>                              | <p>In its different work phases and projects, the ASMIN Association have received as much external as internal financing. Funds have been received from:</p>   |

<sup>59</sup> ASMIN Respondent

<sup>60</sup> For further information see Lonzano, E.: *op. cit.*, pp. 250-251.

<sup>61</sup> Anonymous Respondent

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|                                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The European Social Fund. Equal Initiative.</li> <li>- The European Union's Action Plan for the fight against discrimination (European Social Fund).</li> <li>- Foundation Charles Leopold Mayer.</li> <li>- National Formation School of Children Villages in Spain.</li> <li>- Subvention of the General Direction of Migratory Policies, Andalusian Government.</li> <li>- the City council of Loja, the City council of Alhambra of Granada, the Delegation of Granada, the Delegation of Almuñecar, personnel of the City council of Cenes de la Vega, the City council of Baeza (Jaén), the City council of Girona (Catalonia), etc.</li> </ul>  |
| <i>Sustainability</i>          | <p>The project effectiveness is in part reliant on the support of public bodies, making it vulnerable changes in political support. Depending on the political leadership of local authorities, and its predisposition regarding religious minorities in the city of Granada, the sustainability may change. As one respondent noted; "the main impediment in continuing work in mediation between the Muslim communities and the city council is that the popular party is reluctant to speak with us".</p>  |
| <i>Evaluation and feedback</i> | <p>ASMIN has been credited with promoting civil partnership, local diversity and working towards addressing social inequality, particularly amongst Muslim communities, and mediating between communities and local authorities. ASMIN accomplishes important work in the areas of: social services, family, minors, house, health, justice, employment, news media, education, culture, etc. It has increased awareness of religious and ethnic discrimination and enhanced the wider social participation of religious leaders.</p>   |
| <i>Transferability</i>         | <p>The principles of intercultural mediation are not unique to this project. The association's aims are intimately related to the concept of cultural mediation that seeks to provide a bridge between different actors or social agents with the purpose of preventing and/or solving and/or reformulating possible conflicts and maximising communication, with the ultimate objective of developing the intercultural.<sup>62</sup> This approach is also set within an understanding of the sociology of inequality and discrimination that impacts on likely engagement by minority populations.</p> <p>However there are a number of areas of learning that can be identified when considering questions of transferability, in particular the need to address internal divisions in local Muslim communities and inequalities in representation in local community and faith structures. In particular there are reported concerns relating to</p> |

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<sup>62</sup> Service of Social Intercultural Mediation (SEMSI).

[http://www.carabanchelsemueve.org/conocenos/red/servicio\\_de\\_mediacion\\_social\\_intercultural\\_\\_semsi\\_.html](http://www.carabanchelsemueve.org/conocenos/red/servicio_de_mediacion_social_intercultural__semsi_.html)

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|  | <p>the lack of representativeness of the "Granada City Council of Mosques", which ASMIN has had to respond to.</p> <p>The internal evaluation of the association, problems of coordination and dissemination of the work by the different members was also noted by respondents highlighting the need to work through "networks, teams as well as using the Internet as a platform for work "</p> |
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## 7.8 Sweden

### "Valstasatsning", The Valsta Project

The Valsta project is a neighbourhood forum and community project set up to counter a number of key social problems in the areas by Sigtuna Commune and Sigtuna Homes, the organisations responsible for council housing accommodation in the area. The area has high levels of ethnic minority populations. Formed in 1997 the project aims to:

- Combat the bad reputation of the Valsta area by highlighting positive aspects, including the activities citizens are involved in;
- Involve citizens from all different groups living in Valsta;
- Start an activities group exclusively for women with a focus on activities they were interested in;
- Establish a lecture help group for school pupils;
- Run study groups on subjects of interest.

A range of activities are available in the evenings. Every Friday there is a music/film/internet evening for the youth living in the area until 1am. On Friday evening a group of 7 volunteers function as "night watchers" and keep an eye on the young participants. The total number of adult volunteers for this "night watchers" group is 60.

In particular the initiative has close contacts with several civil society based organisations, including religiously based. Regular meetings are held with the local Imams teaching Arabic and/or the Quran to young people living in the area.

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| <i>Principles</i> | The Valsta project does not directly address issues of violent radicalisation. Rather it is important as a case in that it seeks to address a range of issues that may influence processes leading to violent radicalisation and extremism. It aims to improve social inclusion in the area and directly address issues and themes seen as relevant; including issues such as citizenship, religious education and cultural activities. |
| <i>Resources</i>  | Most of the people involved were originally involved on a voluntary basis. The situation has changed slightly over the years, and there is now a combination of voluntary workers and paid workers. The annual budget for the Valsta Project is 1.3 million Swedish Crowns. The organisation Sigtuna Home contributes 1 million and   |

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|  | Sigtuna Commune gives 300.000 Swedish Crowns per year. This sum includes the salaries for paid personnel.   |
| <i>Legitimacy and credibility</i>      | The Valsta association has a committee that represents the citizens living in the area of Valsta. The committee is an elected body and consists of people from a range of educational and ethnic backgrounds who are also involved in the activities going on at the cultural centre Frejagaarden. It is this open management approach and attempts to ensure wide inclusion of groups from the area that gives the project credibility in the area and ensures that is well received and attended. |
| <i>Level and breadth of engagement</i> | Special efforts were made to involve members of the various ethnic minority groups living in the area as well as to develop relationships with a wide range of CSOs. It is from its broad engagement with groups in the area that the project draws its strength and enables it to develop innovative activities and projects.  |
| <i>Intercultural competence</i>        | As a working model discussions in language based groups were encouraged and interpreters were assigned to the different groups. Ideas and / or proposals from the different groups were communicated to the organising group at the plenary session at the end of the group discussions and became a part of the summary of ideas emerging from these gatherings.   |
| <i>Transferability</i>                 | The model for the project is one that can be replicated elsewhere. The project has received good levels of funding from public authorities which has reinforced the commitment of volunteers who helped to develop the project. It is essential that a genuine partnership approach is adopted to ensure that the project has the kind of reach that is necessary to ensure full participation in activities and to bring community groups into the initiative.                                     |

## 7.9 United Kingdom

### Preventing Violent Extremism Together

The UK Government's counter terrorism strategy, known as CONTEST, has the strategic goal "to reduce the risk from international terrorism, so that people can go about their daily lives freely and with confidence" and underpins the government's long term aim of countering international and home grown terrorism. It is a wide-ranging strategy and programme of work and covers four principal strands (known as the "4Ps"): *Preventing* terrorism by tackling the radicalisation of individuals at home and abroad; *Pursuing* terrorists and those that sponsor them; *Protecting* the public, key national services and UK interests overseas and *Preparing* for the consequences of a terrorist attack. The Government's assessment<sup>63</sup> is that violent extremism is caused by a combination of interlocking factors:

- An ideology which justifies terrorism by manipulating theology as well as history and politics;

<sup>63</sup> Home Office; 'The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England Stopping people becoming or supporting terrorists and violent extremists', June 2008.

- Radicalisers and their networks which promote violent extremism through a variety of places, institutions and media;
- Individuals who are vulnerable to the messages of violent extremists;
- Communities, which are sometimes poorly equipped to challenge and resist violent extremism; and
- Grievances, some genuine and some perceived, and some directed very specifically against government.

The Prevent strand, known as Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE), is a programme of activity which was developed through a series of Muslim community consultations following the 2005 London bombings. These community consultations identified seven key areas of focus:

- Engaging with young people;
- Education;
- Engaging with Muslim women;
- Supporting regional and local initiatives and community actions;
- Imams training and accreditation and the role of mosques as a resource for the whole community;
- Community security, including addressing Islamophobia, increasing confidence in policing and talking extremism; and
- Tackling extremism and radicalisation.

The delivery of the Prevent agenda takes place through the Preventing Violent Extremism Action Plan<sup>64</sup> which commenced in April 2007 which sets out the government's plans to engage with Muslim communities to prevent violent extremism under four priority areas:

- Promoting shared values;
- Supporting local solutions;
- Building civic capacity and leadership (including the role of Women); and
- Strengthening the role of faith institutions and leaders (including regulatory oversight and

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<sup>64</sup> See <http://www.communities.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1509398>

enhancing good governance and accessibility).

The overall Prevent agenda is delivered by the Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG), which also works alongside the Home Office and other government departments on the corresponding Prevent strategy (see below), and leads on the government's community cohesion, equalities and integration agenda. PVE is intended as a targeted approach which deals with a specific threat, principally through building resilience at the community level as part of the broader objective of countering the global terrorist threat.

In June 2008, the Home Office announced the government's 'Preventing Violent Extremism – a Strategy for Delivery'<sup>65</sup>, in which an additional £12.5m on top of funds already received in 2007 were unveiled. The new strategy specifically aims to help local authorities, schools, community groups and police tackle violent extremism, with funds targeted at institutions working to counter terrorism and those most vulnerable to radicalisation. The Prevent strategy has five key strands aimed at addressing the causal factors that the government believes leads to violent extremism, and supporting the overall aim of stopping people becoming or supporting terrorists or violent extremists:

- Challenging violent extremist ideology and supporting mainstream voices;
- Disrupting those who promote violent extremism and strengthening vulnerable institutions where they are active;
- Supporting individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremism;
- Increasing the capacity of communities to challenge and resist violent extremists;
- Addressing the grievances that ideologues are exploiting;

These are supported by a cross-cutting work stream which is seen as critical in delivering the strategy:

- Developing understanding, analysis and information; and improving strategic communications.

Whilst the Prevent strategy acknowledges the need for a specific response, it also recognises the important links required with the wider community work to reduce inequalities, tackle racism and other forms of extremism (e.g. the activities of the extreme far right), build cohesion and empower communities. Key elements of the strategy include:

- Extending police-led multi-agency projects to identify and support people at risk of being targeted by violent extremists;
- Working closely with young people whose criminal backgrounds have left them open to extremist views;

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<sup>65</sup> See <http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/prevent-strategy/?view=Standard&pubID=559320>

- Working in prisons to identify, tackle and stop the spread of radicalisation;
- Getting more involved with grassroots projects designed to help communities dealing with extremist residents.

The strategy emphasises the need for local authorities and the police to take a lead in ensuring that local partnerships are clearly tasked with driving delivery of a jointly agreed programme of action. A corresponding guide was published with the announcement of the Strategy to help local authorities, the police and other partner agencies, including members of Local Strategic Partnerships and Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships, to take the Prevent work forward at local levels. The guide provides advice on establishing effective partnership working, planning and implementing a programme of action and monitoring its impact, and more detail on each of the objectives of the Prevent strategy, outlining why each is important and how they can be addressed at a local level.

*Credibility and legitimacy*

The CLG adopts a cross-departmental and statutory agency partnership approach on PVE, providing a strategic framework aligned to three tiers of delivery with a range of authority partners including those at national, regional and local level. These cover other Government departments such as the Home Office, Regional Government Offices and local authorities through their Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships and Local Strategic Partnerships. Other partners include statutory partners operating at a local level including Youth Justice Boards, Youth Offending Teams, prisons and educational institutions. In part this reflects an acknowledgement of the need for a multi-faceted approach required in building community resilience, but is also related to recognition of the importance of local delivery of the PVE agenda.

For Muslim communities, accepting the credibility and legitimacy of authority engagement on these issues has been challenging, particularly in light of communities concern that the Government’s PVE agenda may be driven by an political imperative that is seeking to change the ‘character’ of the UK’s Muslim communities through cultivating an Islam deemed to be more appropriate for the UK / Western world. Underlying this is a fear of a government led ‘reformation’ of Islam that ignores the importance of theological tradition. Additional concerns include the growing prominence of the ‘security’ agenda across public policy issue areas and the expansion of counter-terrorist measures which are seen as threatening the spaces for Muslim civil society to flourish and begin to systematically counteract the radicalisation threat confronting their communities on their own terms.

It is widely perceived that there are an increasing number of Muslims who are becoming the target of unfair and discriminatory attention from the security services. Incidents cited include a number of high profile raids that have resulted in casualties but with no substantial evidence emerging of terrorist activity. For example in Forest Gate, east London, two brothers of Bangladeshi descent were subject to a terrorist raid by policing authorities on the basis of intelligence provided by the security services that was subsequently determined by the Independent Police Complaints Authority (IPCA) to be skewed. One of the brothers was shot by the police during the raid and there is a widespread perception in the local Muslim community that the approach by the authorities during the raid was unnecessarily heavy handed, and that the subsequent handling of the incident in the media by the policing authorities was

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|  | <p>manipulative. This has heightened the perceptions of victimisation and a reluctance to engage with authorities on the counterterrorism agenda.</p>   |
| <p><i>Level, breadth and depth of engagement</i></p> | <p>The scale of engagement under Prevent is significant and unprecedented in terms of authority engagement with Muslim civil society. In October 2007 the CLG announced funding of £45 million (out of £75 million) for local partnerships from April 2008 to March 2011. Both the level of funding and the number of authorities in receipt of funding is set to grow and the distribution of funding has been based on the size of local Muslim communities.<sup>66</sup> Currently, seventy-nine ‘priority’ local authorities have been provided with £12 million for the financial year 2008/09 to support local projects. The range of range of work funded includes;</p> <p>Reading Forum Against Extremism</p> <p>The Reading Forum Against Extremism (RFAE) received £10,000 of Pathfinder Funding. One of its aims is to encourage grass-root debate on issues around extremism in order to counteract extremist messages. The RFAE worked closely with the Local Strategic Partnership and other local partners to produce a project which provided the opportunity for local people, in particular young people, to discuss what they felt about extremism. Thirteen discussion events were held from February to April 2007 in a variety of venues around Reading designed to act as forums for discussion of these difficult issues. In particular, discussions were held on what people believed the causes of extremism to be, and what solutions there might be for dealing with it. RFAE used ‘project ambassadors’; people who were already working with their local communities, to facilitate the discussion events.</p> <p>One Extreme to the Other</p> <p>The play <i>One Extreme to the Other</i> was developed in partnership with GW Theatre Company in 2007. It focuses on extremism, both from the extreme far right and in the name of Islam. The play is aimed primarily at young people from year 10 upwards, but also at adult audiences. It is hard hitting but also intended to be entertaining and funny as a piece of theatre to stimulate debate around extremism amongst young people.</p> <p>The play has been performed to over 2,500 year 10 pupils in Oldham secondary schools, and students at The Oldham College, Oldham Sixth Form College and the University Centre. It has also been staged at 25 community venues around Oldham. Performances of the play have been commissioned in other parts of the country. A website<sup>67</sup> has been developed as part of the commission containing follow-up material (including lesson plans for teachers in participating schools) as well as comments from people who have seen the play. One person is reported to have commented: “<i>The play made me think about the issue of extremism and think and respect others. Before the play I never really thought about the issue but it has changed my views</i>”</p> |

<sup>66</sup> See [www.communities.gov.uk/communities/preventingextremism](http://www.communities.gov.uk/communities/preventingextremism).

<sup>67</sup> see [www.extremenews.org.uk](http://www.extremenews.org.uk)

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|                         | <p><i>now. The play had a strong message, it was very effective.”</i></p> <p>Operation Nicole</p> <p>Operation Nicole is a two-day ‘storyboard’ counter-terrorism tabletop exercise, developed by Lancashire Constabulary and recommended for wider use across forces by the Association of Chief Police Officers. The exercise is designed to explore community concerns, give the police a greater understanding of the community, and the community a greater understanding of counter-terrorism operations. The participants make decisions and are provided with legislative guidance by a specialist senior investigating officer. The process is designed to give participants a better understanding of the factors that support the decision making process from the time that information is received through to the point of planned police action. The strength of these exercises is seen as the opportunity for communities to explore the reasoning behind the need to arrest people for terrorist offences.</p> <p>The Oxford Muslim Pupils’ Empowerment Programme</p> <p>In late 2007 Imam Monawar Hussain, the Imam of Eton College, devised the Oxford Muslim Pupils’ Empowerment Programme, using funding from the Oxford Pathfinder Fund. The programme was designed to engage Muslim school pupils by creating a space where they could discuss issues which concerned them. The project, based in a local secondary school, consisted of a series of lunchtime forums at which pupils could discuss subjects such as Afghanistan and Iraq, Islamic history and the Sunni / Shia divide. The aim was for Muslim pupils to become equipped with a deeper understanding of the Islamic tradition, be able to recognise the complex nature of identity, and to equip them with arguments against a violent extremist ideology.</p> <p>National projects that are being funded under Prevent range from a national scholar’s road show, branded as the ‘Radical Middle Way’, Mosques and Imam’s National Advisory Board (MINAB) looking at governance issues within Mosques, corresponding Imam training programmes, a National Muslim Women’s Advisory Group, national and regional Muslim youth forums to provoke debate and contribute to policy development, developing a Islamic Studies framework for higher education institutions, and supporting the establishment of a board of leading Muslim scholars to assist in the articulation of Islam in Britain.</p> |
| <p><i>Resources</i></p> | <p>The Action Plan is currently being delivered through the Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Delivery Fund (PVEPDF)<sup>68</sup>, a nationwide funding scheme, currently totalling £75 million (excluding the additional £12.5 million additionally announced in June 2008) that supports the delivery of projects at local authority level, alongside projects that have national reach. Through the PVEPDF the government is financing a range of locally developed and focused projects around the country that seek to challenge extremist propaganda and support alternative views, increase the capacity of communities to resist and reject violent extremism, and help in creating</p>  |

<sup>68</sup> *Preventing Violent Extremism: Community Leadership Fund: Department for Communities and Local Government: 2007*

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|  | <p>mutual understanding and shared values across communities. With most projects starting up in 2007 it is too early to assess the success and impact of the UK national Prevent strategy and delivery at regional and local level as substantive evaluation of the programme is just getting underway.</p> <p>In addition, the Prevent agenda is also supported by the Preventing Violent Extremism Community Leadership Fund, a grants programme designed to build the capacity of Muslim communities to take practical steps to reject violent extremism and feel a more welcome part of wider British society. Through community outreach and open funding criteria the Fund is intended to identify and support innovative projects that may be replicated nationally. The Fund currently focuses on three key strands: leadership capacity – building the capacity of leaders in the Muslim communities as part of a broader resilience drive to help communities resist the influence of violent extremists and promote positive and engaged ideas of citizenship; organisational capacity; and developing the capacity of Muslim women so that they are empowered to engage with young Muslims at risk of being targeted by violent extremists.</p> <p>However there are concerns that have been expressed by Muslim consultees and stakeholders in relation to the current funding approach. One issue relates to the reluctance of some Muslim communities to access PVE funding streams; they find the criteria too prescriptive and associated process difficult to access. In addition, limitations in readily accessing alternative sources of funding is seen as problematic, particularly for those sections of the community that fear PVE funding would damage their wider credibility in the field. Other concerns relate to the transparency of the funding process at local authority level, including a perception that funding decisions are skewed towards those dominant (predominantly older and male) Muslim groupings already active in the local area who already have long established relationships with local authority bodies.</p> |
| <p><i>Developmental approaches</i></p> | <p>The early phase of Prevent delivery has allowed a process of learning and adaption to occur in relation to development approaches with Muslim civil society organisations. Recognition of the importance of community legitimacy has meant recent approaches have allowed more scope for Muslim civil society autonomy and an acceptance that partnership approaches need to accommodate more robust and challenging community demands. An example is the Radical Middle Way Project (RMW) that recognises the negative ramifications in the wider community for organisations seen as being too close or proximate to government. The RMW organises a series of national ‘road shows’ consisting of leading scholars and theologians combined with cultural events that explore notions of active citizenship, political engagement and what it means to be a Muslim in Britain today. Despite receiving funding from national government for these activities, it has been firm in keeping authority level involvement in designing and directing its activities at arm’s length.</p>  |
| <p><i>Joint ownership</i></p>          | <p>Though it is far too early for any rigorous evaluation of impact, emerging evidence suggests that joint ownership is developing on these issues with some elements of Muslim civil society. In part this reflects the internal debates already taking place within these communities as to how best to respond to the challenges that they face and the importance of what some have termed a community ‘correcting process’ that</p>  |

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|                                 | is underway.  |
| <i>Sustainability</i>           | Whilst the aims and objectives of Prevent have been clearly set out, evaluation of PVE related projects are at an early stage. Consequently, any substantive body of evidence suggesting good practice or considering the sustainability of projects is still developing. The evidence that does exist (see local project examples above), suggests that some of the early phase Prevent projects have been relatively successful and have been well received.  |
| <i>Evaluation and feedback</i>  | <p>For local authority partners, while they remain critical in delivery, there are concerns and sensitivities about how PVE delivery plays out on the ground, in particular the potential for PVE initiatives to be divisive both within the Muslim community and between different communities in ways that could fracture relations that have taken a long time to develop. In addition, there are concerns that PVE is too skewed towards extremism in Muslim communities, ignoring extremist threats from either the far right or other faith groups. Finally there are also concerns that there is a lack of clarity about what precisely Local Authorities are being asked to achieve.</p> <p>Given the inherent difficulties in evaluating the success of initiatives where a key outcome may be that violent action does not occur, there are debates as to whether the scope of the PVE programme remains too broad. What is clear from our examination of the Prevent strategy is that despite the national and local projects that are underway, there remains a process of embedding real change on these issues at a micro level which requires engaging with communities within the family and schooling context. In part this seems to have been recognised by the Delivery Strategy now emerging from the Department for Children, School and Families.</p> <p>The framing of initiatives and funding streams under the banner of PVE has led to a reluctance of Muslim civil society to actively engage on the agenda, particular those Muslim community groupings that have greater leverage and the legitimacy to engage on this issue amongst target ‘vulnerable’ groups. Related to this are community concerns that the concept of de-radicalisation may translate to the effective de-politicisation of Muslims: that for Muslims to engage on this agenda, they may need to give up all idea of Muslim identity politics, whether it takes a democratic and participatory form or not.</p> <p>While authorities emphasise and point to the political / legislative rights and safeguards that are open to Muslim communities alongside entry points for civic and political participation (despite the varying degrees of accessibility that these entry points provide), the government’s prevent and integration agendas confines the integration of Muslim communities in the UK to the cultural sphere and the attack on extremism rather than economic and social integration. Finally, the variable level of public authority awareness, expertise and skills in relation to Muslim communities and the actual ‘violent radical’ landscape and /or simplistic and subjective understanding of community and faith dynamics has also been cited as being a problem in developing authority credibility and legitimacy in the Muslim field.</p> |
| <i>Intercultural competence</i> | Appropriate strategic framing of the Prevent strategy requires a rapid skilling up of the awareness and competency of public officials at both national and local levels.   |

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|                        | <p>For instance, identification of community led projects (with the relevant legitimacy to access target groups) requires a greater degree of ‘cultural competency’ on the part of officials making judgements on project eligibility and appropriateness of engagement models. Without understanding the various characteristics of Muslim communities and organisations, histories and dynamics, effective project identification and corresponding funding decisions can become skewed.</p> <p>In addition it needs to be acknowledged that levels of understanding and sometimes an inability to analyse the agendas and interests of participating individuals and organisations is often aggravated by information sources that may be deliberately distorted, and the pressures of operating in a complex and rapidly shifting media / political context. Finally, policies and strategies are not attempting to address a dynamic phenomenon, including a range of players in the Muslim field and actors who have their own strategies and approaches and will act to undermine or counteract policies and initiatives they believe to be contrary to their and their constituent interests, including violent radicals themselves.</p>               |
| <i>Transferability</i> | <p>In the absence of robust evaluation, it is unclear whether Prevent approaches offer best practice models for other Member States to adopt. The initiative documentation offers a wide and useful range of insights into the full range of emerging issues that public authorities need to consider and take into account and what should be ideally done; however our view is that the success of the projects delivered primarily at local level will be critically dependent on the skills and capabilities of public officials. There is little evidence that there is the level of capacity and expertise available at local levels to make a significant difference or that this capacity can be built quickly enough to make a short term impact. There are wider concerns about the emphasis in the UK’s Prevent approach on preventing radicalisation without an equivalent and visible policy push on economic and social integration of Muslim communities. In the absence of attempts to support the largely self mobilised and growing civic engagement and political participation of Muslim communities visible across Europe, the UK attempt to engage Muslim civil society in mitigating the terrorist threat may be limited in impact.</p> |

## **Muslim Contact Unit**

The Metropolitan Police Special Branch (MPSB) established the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU) in January 2002 in response to the Al-Qaeda attacks in the USA on 11th September 2001, with the aim of establishing partnerships with Muslim community leaders equipped and located to help tackle the spread of al-Qaida propaganda in London. It is engaged in a challenging reciprocal partnership with Muslim individuals, groups and leaders in London as well as beyond, underpinned by a strategy that specifically aims to build and maintain relationships with those community leaders and representatives seen by the MPSB as best positioned and equipped to counter the threat of terrorist and extremist propaganda.

A secondary aim has been to support the existing work that some mosque and community leaders are already undertaking on counter radicalisation issues, as well as providing a confidential avenue for the disclosure of information about individuals seen as at risk of getting involved in terrorism. Since its creation, it has been described as a model of good practice in engaging with the Muslim communities on these sensitive issues by government and other authority partners, including the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and its National Community Tensions Team (NCCT) Unit. The NCCT leads on all ACPO Prevent related activities, monitors community tension issues across the UK and acts as a point of liaison and assistance for both police bodies and external organisations.

The core objectives of the MCU are to:

1. Work with those leaders in Muslim communities that are influential and have leverage;
2. Identify and support those Muslim communities best equipped to respond to Al Qaeda;
3. Build and maintain community partnerships for strategic (operational) and community intelligence;
4. Provide advice to other Government agencies.

The MCU is staffed by experienced police officers, Muslim and non-Muslim, who are primarily drawn from Special Branch (known as the Counter Terrorism Command since 2006), and includes officers with substantive experience in community liaison who have existing contacts in the field. The rationale for this approach is that 'deep knowledge of Muslim communities is rare in the service. If you are going to understand who is extreme and who is dangerous, different [concepts], you have to understand the community' (senior police service consultee).

The MCU is in part driven by applying the principles of community policing, developed by forces since the 1980s, to the field of counter terrorism. It also promotes the concept of partnership working with Muslim community organisations, and contrasts this with what has been seen by some in the policing community as repressive and counter-productive policing tactics that were deployed during the height of the IRA campaigns. Another former senior police officer consultee instrumental in the MCU's inception sees the best way to turn young Muslims away from jihadist tendencies as being to work in partnership with the community and in particular with influential community figures: 'The only really effective response to this political propaganda – this is political – are leading community figures. They are the only ones who can do anything about it'. The consultee noted that well known Muslim public figures whom he believes are effective propagandists against Al Qaeda may often be subject to critique the press and from government sources as well as being potential targets of 'counter terrorism activity' from other policing colleagues. This ambivalence in strategy in the service itself (bearing in mind the relative

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| <p>autonomy of regional police forces in operations) can on occasion prove problematic for the MCU in building partnerships.</p> |   |
| <p><i>Credibility and legitimacy</i></p>   | <p>The credibility and legitimacy of the MCU has largely been established through what they term ‘a targeted and focused community partnership model’, principally with those Muslim individuals and faith institutions that are recognised as being best equipped and located to counter the threat of terrorist and extremist behaviour within the Muslim communities in London, and who have themselves been on the receiving end of terrorist and extremist propaganda.</p> <p>The MCU identify these partners through a community liaison approach that picks up early intelligence and concerns about where threats are emerging. During the early development and operational phase of the MCU, this was sustained through the activities of three principal officers within the MCU, one Muslim and two non-Muslim, who brought expertise of special branch intelligence operations to bear alongside insights and knowledge of the varied Muslim communities in the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) area. These individuals gained credibility and legitimacy amongst the MCU target audiences through involvement in key terrorist and extremist incidents, including those relating to the Brixton Mosque and Richard Reid in late 2001 and the controversy over the leadership of the Finsbury Park Mosque.</p> <p>These incidents are seen to have demonstrated the Unit’s understanding of the community complexities and reputation for sensitive handling, particularly in an environment scarred by the legacy of fractured police – community relations of the past. In addition, from its inception the MCU has adopted an approach that actively responds to the various theological positions and political currents operating within the Muslim ‘field’, particularly those that understand more fully the threat posed by Al Qaeda such as Salafis, the Ikwan and Tabligh Jamaat. The MCU believe that this has allowed them to develop their ‘legitimising capital’ as their partners are more often ‘critical partners’ rather than ‘appeasing friends’. For example, Massoud Shadjareh of the Islamic Human Rights Commission, which campaigns against alleged police harassment against Muslims, has praised the way the MCU has worked: ‘<i>Out of all the Metropolitan police, this... deals with the issue of Muslims on facts rather than on Islamophobic perceptions</i>’. Similarly, Azad Ali, former Chairman of the Muslim Safety Forum where Islamic representatives and senior officers discuss policing issues, has stated; ‘<i>they’ve done a lot of good work in reassuring communities</i>’.</p> |
| <p><i>Level, breadth and depth of engagement</i></p>   | <p>The breadth of engagement is based on an operational focus on those Muslim individuals and faith institutions that are recognised by the MCU officers as being best equipped and located to counter the threat of terrorist and extremist behaviour. The MCU adopts an engagement approach that is largely driven by maintaining proximity to areas and communities where concerns about potential Al Qaeda threats and linkages are seen by credible community leaders with whom relationships have been forged. These also include those who are initiating effective and credible community efforts to counter the threat.</p> <p>To date, this has largely translated into work with the various Salafi and Islamist</p>   |

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|                                 | <p>orientations that exist within Muslim communities, such as the Salafi community based around the Brixton Mosque in South London, including those that the ‘mainstream’ might see as having dangerous proximity to ‘terrorist threats’. In addition, the post 7/7 environment where the issue of ‘home grown’ terrorists has come into sharp focus has also shaped the engagement approach. While the MCU operate across the Metropolitan Police Service area, since July 2005 this has expanded to areas outside of the London region in cases where support and advice is required by other police forces in England and Wales.</p> <p>Following the 7<sup>th</sup> July London bombings, the Home Office and ACPO announced plans to establish similar ‘Specialist Intelligence Units’ across England, including Yorkshire, north west England and parts of the Midlands to enable authorities to collect "community by community" knowledge of where extremism is building up. This represented an acknowledgement that police intelligence on what is happening in Muslim communities was low and needed to be boosted. Modelled on the MCU, these units would be staffed by officers, including those with community language skills, who would seek detailed knowledge of the dynamics of Islamic communities in their areas. They would fulfil two primary roles; helping protect Muslim communities from Islamophobic abuse and attacks and gathering intelligence on extremist activity. Any leads on extremists would be passed to the security services or acted upon by police themselves. A consultee said, <i>‘unless you know the subject well and what they are saying, often in Arabic or Urdu, and what the context is, you are not going to get a feel for it. It is not about spying. It's about policing; it's not just about being nice to communities. You protect them against Islamophobia, and work with Muslims to protect them against extremists. Ultimately all communities want positive relations with the police. Around many Muslim communities the cultural gulf with the police has been wide. You need dedicated staff.’</i> In practice, however, the MCU model has not been explicitly replicated across police forces to date.</p> |
| <i>Resources</i>                | <p>At present there are no ring fenced funding streams or resources that are specifically earmarked for the MCU. Funding is largely derived from the overall Metropolitan Police Service budget, as negotiated with the Metropolitan Police Authority alongside other Central government grants. In 2006/07<sup>69</sup> this amounted to £3223 million, of which counter-terrorism grants amounted to £260 million (8.1% of the total budget). Resourcing received by the MCU is made up of core personnel costs, with no allocation to fund substantive partnership projects with Muslim CSOs (in part because this is beyond the formal remit of the MCU). However, CSOs can seek funding through the national government’s Prevent Violent Extremism fund, including for partnership projects with authority bodies such as the MCU.</p>  |
| <i>Developmental approaches</i> | <p>The community partnership model is seen as a critical development approach to sustaining relationships with Muslim CSOs. It is one that recognises that proximity with partners needs to be negotiated in ways that sustains partner legitimacy in highly charged community contexts where concerns about being spied upon, Islamophobia and police harassment are rife, together with anxieties about a perceived hard line</p>   |

<sup>69</sup> Metropolitan Police Service and Metropolitan Police Authority Annual Report, 2006/07; [http://www.met.police.uk/foi/pdfs/annual\\_report/mps\\_annual\\_report\\_2006-07.pdf](http://www.met.police.uk/foi/pdfs/annual_report/mps_annual_report_2006-07.pdf)

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|                                 | counter-terrorism and security approach being pursued by government. In addition it marks a substantive departure from traditional counter-terrorism approaches, in which proposed community ‘partnerships’ were seen by communities as a cover for an underlying agenda of intelligence gathering and developing an informant base.  |
| <i>Joint ownership</i>          | Joint ownership with Muslim CSOs has clearly developed over the six years that the MCU has been in existence, with many of the most critical and influential Muslim groupings and currents engaged on the issue of challenging the terrorist threat within their communities in London having some proximity to the work of the MCU. Important examples include the Brixton Mosque and the Muslim Safety Forum. In the former case, the Brixton Mosque has gone on to develop, with the support of the MCU, a localised de-radicalisation project, called ‘The Street’, which specifically targets young Muslims at risk from extremists, working alongside other authority partners and Muslim CSOs in the locality. However, recent policy shifts driven by a greater emphasis on community cohesion and integration, alongside a move towards working with more ‘mainstream’ Muslim communities suggest a ‘passive disengagement’ with some of these individuals, currents and groups. It is too early to tell whether this will have a detrimental impact on the gains that the MCU have made to date.  |
| <i>Sustainability</i>           | Currently, policy shifts in relation to community engagement on counter-terrorism is leading to a reconfiguration of the MCU model. With a new Prevent policy being rolled out across England and Wales by the Association of Police Officers (APCO) and a greater focus on ‘supporting mainstream voices’, there are concerns that the specialist and nuanced approach pioneered by the MCU will be seen as less important and this may have implications for the intelligence needed to counter terrorist threats. In part, these shifts represent tensions across the political and public policy landscape on how best to engage with Muslim communities on these issues; whether there should be a sustained focus driven largely by specialist CT officers on those sections of the community that have leverage amongst vulnerable groups; or whether a more broader community approach driven by local community officers suits best. Currently, police services are undergoing an operational re-orientation aligned to the changing counter-terrorism landscape in the UK, which emphasises more work to be driven by neighbourhood policing teams, with guidance provided on counter-terrorism by specialist officers from the Counter Terrorism Command (formerly known as Special Branch). |
| <i>Intercultural competence</i> | Prior to the MCU’s establishment, it had been widely accepted by the policing community that within the Metropolitan Police Service there was little breadth or depth in understanding of Muslim communities and that therefore an approach that allowed for the development of more nuanced knowledge and expertise was valuable. Critical to its subsequent success has been an operational approach that acknowledges the presence of Muslim personnel within the Unit is a key feature. For the MCU, this demonstrates to external Muslim audiences that it is aware of the cross cultural environment it operates in, and ensures that its partnership model is made real through Muslim personnel leading the unit. In a context where violent radicals promote isolationism and argue that to even be associated with non-Muslims is ‘haram’ (forbidden) and represents a ‘toxification’ of the Ummah, the profile of Muslim officers within the Unit and their shaping of the community partnership   |

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|                               | <p>model, particularly in terms of who the MCU should be building partnerships with, was seen as critical in establishing credibility.</p> <p>Following the London bombings, the policing community also intensified their wider efforts to recruit more minorities, including Muslim officers. The Metropolitan police now have approximately 300 officers from a Muslim background and there is an acknowledgment that more Muslim officer recruitment, particularly into the area of counter-terrorism, is important; <i>"we need officers who can go out and make contact with communities and build trust, so that as a result people give us information. Intelligence is the life blood of policing (ACPO consultee)."</i></p>   |
| <p><i>Transferability</i></p> | <p>The perceived successes of the MCU demonstrated by the Richard Reid/Brixton Mosque and Finsbury Park Mosque incidents are based on a number of elements including the intercultural competence of key operational personnel (both Muslim and non-Muslim) who have the ability to initiate credible trust building amongst the community, and an approach that explicitly makes everyone part of the solution. This allows for a high degree of operational 'entrepreneurialism', providing officers with some latitude to 'take risks' in terms of partnership building with stakeholders in the field who are able to respond to the terrorist threat, for instance partnership building with currents in the Muslim communities that mainstream political and policing opinion see as being too close to the Al Qaeda threat.</p> <p>The scope for transferability of MCU working principles is implicit in the operational design of the model, and to varying degrees this occurs with MCU authority partners. However, this is invariably contingent on acceptance amongst authority partners (including leadership buy in) and the ability to navigate complex, competing and shifting public policy and political terrains both within the UK and at European levels. A key concern amongst those in the Muslim field include the limits to the MCU model being extended, particularly where a few specific MCU personnel have been largely critical in developing sustainable partnerships with Muslim communities on the ground.</p> <p>In terms of the MCU meeting its objectives, it has been successful in developing partnerships with leaders in the Muslim communities that have leverage in mitigating the terrorist threat to varying degrees. One area of concern that has been noted by those involved in or having proximity with the work of the MCU is the degree to which it is able to identify all the relevant leaders and influencers and emerging new leaders within Muslim communities, particularly in light of changing radicalisation dynamics in the field. For example, concerns about radicalisation amongst women and new generations of Muslim youth have exposed the need for the MCU to adopt new partnership identification and relationship building approaches.</p> <p>A former key officer of the MCU, now at the University of Exeter, has noted that the relatively small scale of the MCU initiative and its inability to distance itself from the adverse impact of the wider war on terror in Muslim communities, means that hard measures of its success can only be seen in marginal, individual cases that have no impact on wider perceptible trends. Nonetheless, while in evaluation terms, given the nature of the intervention and the documentation publically available, it is impossible to gauge the success of the initiative in turning potential recruits away from violence,</p> |

the 'street level' police officers and Muslim community groups that pioneered this approach insist it could become a cost effective and complementary counterterrorism tool if it were modestly resourced and integrated into a cohesive national strategy.<sup>70</sup>

### **Muslim Youth Helpline**

The Muslim Youth Helpline (MYH) was officially founded in August 2001 with the aim of providing faith and sensitive support for services for Muslim youth. Its web based service Muslim Youth.Net was launched in 2004 in recognition of the increasing role of the internet in the lives of Muslim youth. The services of MYH are designed to reduce the isolation of young Muslims in the UK, and since its inception it has been run by young British Muslims for young British Muslims. Through recruiting volunteers from within the community to deliver services, MYH also aims to build the capacity of the Muslim community to tackle its own problems, promote active citizenship and train future mentors, role models and leaders.

The young people who contact MYH seek support on a wide range of social issues, particularly those that are regarded as 'taboo' within the community and are commonly helped by culturally and faith sensitive responses. These issues include personal relationships, sexuality as well acute personal problems, including issues of drug abuse or mental health. The helpline also receives letters from inmates at youth offending institutes across the country and has also conducted a prison outreach campaign underpinned by letters of support and gift boxes during Ramadan.

More recently MYH has commenced a programme of activity with the support of the department for Communities and Local Government Community Leadership Fund that explores questions of citizenship and identity amongst Muslim youth through a series of workshops and production of an accompanying documentary of the activities and outcomes. The objectives of project are intended to:

- target disaffected British Muslim youth from different cultural backgrounds who are not engaged with mainstream society in order to gain a better understanding of their issues and concerns;
- encourage dialogue and expression amongst young Muslims, by giving them a platform on which to air their concerns on a range of issues thereby revealing what they feel are the barriers to political engagement. The campaign is aimed at the grassroots of the community in order to better motivate disenchanted young people towards accessing mainstream and specialist community support services, and better educational and employment prospects;
- to create opportunities for the development of informal peer support networks between Muslim youth from different communities through discussion and creating a better understanding of Muslim sensitivities thereby aiding the social inclusion of disenfranchised youth Muslims into British society.

MYH is in the early stages of developing relations with a local NHS mental health trust. This relationship is being developed to improve the capacity of MYH in clinical aspects of counselling and mental health, but also to provide advice and guidance to clinical services on common cultural questions presented by the experiences of young British Muslims. However, MYH has noted that they have

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<sup>70</sup> Robert Lambert, Empowering Salafis and Islamists Against Al-Qaeda: A London Counterterrorism Case Study, 2007, PS Online [www.apsanet.org](http://www.apsanet.org)

encountered risk averse responses from some public bodies to their activities, in particular among schools approached to participate in the citizenship and identity campaign. Nevertheless, in the current political climate MYH is regularly called on by government and media to shed light on the challenges facing Muslim youth in the UK and violent radicalisation.

MYH has a large number of committed voluntary staff with core full time staff working as supervisors and on projects. The helpline has extensive human resource and social capital and can draw on a wide range of expertise through formal and less formal networks. It is seeking to improve its capacity and skills base with a range of public authorities and other civil society organisations, both to improve core service but also to integrate advice on the development of localised services in order to close gaps in provision.

*Principles*

Muslim Youth Helpline aims to respond to the needs of Muslim youth through the provision of non-judgmental non-directional peer support, through engaging and empowering young volunteers as leaders, to support the emergence of a strong British Muslim Identity, confronting the causes of disaffection with cultural sensitivity and improving the welfare of young British Muslims.

While the helpline is not directly aimed at countering processes of violent radicalisation and extremism it should be recognised that the provision of counselling services to Muslim youth experiencing difficulties in their lives inevitably contributes to any agenda of countering violent extremism. Counselling services are clearly of benefit to youth who are going through difficulties, and effective interventions by organisations such as MYH who are able to provide culturally responsive services that may be more appropriate and effective than mainstream offerings and services should be recognised as key elements in supporting Muslim youth negotiate their own personal development in a manner that does not lead to violence.

The existence and development of MYH is an important component in any developmental approach to preventing violent extremism. Set up by Muslim youth for Muslim youth and developing professional relationships with a range of statutory services and local and national government is in itself a key counter to violent radical narratives of division and hostility. The organisation is developing outreach throughout the country which will make its approach more visible and offer services to a wider audience. In addition it will provide more opportunities for participation and opportunities for individuals to volunteer and participate in its activities promoting social inclusion and social capital among the community.

*Credibility and legitimacy*

The work of MYH as a confidential counselling service is predicated on high levels of trust and legitimacy gained among their users. The trust draws on the grass roots nature of the initiative and careful selection and training of their volunteers who reflects the profile of those who access its services. In particular it is the quality and uniqueness of the service that is fundamental to its success.

The core function of MYH and the profile of an organisation that is staffed by Muslim youth means that it is ideally positioned to identify and understand key dynamics and issues amongst Muslim youth. However, while their own human capital and soft intelligence places them in a position to be highly responsive as the

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|  | <p>organisation there has is a need to codify this intelligence in order to better shape their services and to provide research based guidance to other organisations on providing faith and culturally sensitive support services to young British Muslims.</p>   |
| <p><i>Level, breadth and depth of engagement</i></p> | <p>MYH are progressively developing their links with public authorities in a range of sectors and at a number of levels. In particular they are developing a working relationship with the Department for Communities and Local Government through the receipt of funding and development of projects, including the citizenship project. While much of their funding at present is project based, which does have implications for the scope for MYH to set the agenda, their own development and standing, and the development of new partnerships mean that MYH is entering into relationships as an equal partner.</p> <p>The MYH is now developing cooperative relationships with local statutory social services, local authorities and local civil society organisations across the UK. The development of these relationships is in part informed by an organisational development strategy that is aiming to improve the scope and reach of MYH’s activities through the integration of their approach into local delivery of face to face support complementing the national helpline. Examples of these developments include an approach to MYH by a local mental health trust to improve provision of mental health services to culturally diverse populations in the area. MYH is also in advanced stages of developing local services with a metropolitan council.</p> <p>However, whilst the MYH have in the main been able to develop effective cooperative relationships with a range of public authorities, education remains a key exception. In particular, the citizenship project has been hampered by the reluctance of schools to participate in the project. Reasons for this are unclear, however the experience of the MYH has been that there is uncertainty and nervousness in schools about cooperating with the MYH. It is felt that although the organisation is non-proselytising and progressive it delivers services to a specific faith community and this has raised reported concerns about generating tensions and objections amongst other communities, even where the population is drawn from predominantly Muslim communities.</p> <p>In addition to their developing relationships with a range of public bodies in the United Kingdom, the key feature of MYH is the scope and breadth of their engagement throughout the community. While the service at inception was met with some suspicion in some quarters, its success is highlighted in the numbers of people accessing their services. The high numbers of people participating in the Prisons outreach project is also indicative of the breadth of MYH’s engagement in the community, as are the voluntary contributions, financial and in kind, that are provided to MYH.</p> |
| <p><i>Resources</i></p>                              | <p>The MYH is largely dependent on grant funding and voluntary donations. Project based resources are received from some government departments, however MYH is looking to diversify its funding and move away from project based funding in general as this can hinder planned organisation development and delivery of core services and mean MYH responds to already set agendas. MYH is also seeking increasing philanthropic and private donations in order to ensure a sustainable</p>   |

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|                                 | financial footing in the event that the priorities of current public funders change.   |
| <i>Developmental approaches</i> | MYH is currently undergoing a strategic review of its core service delivery with a view to enabling MYH to share its approach and learning with a wider range of public and civil society actors. While preserving the core character of its service, it is beginning to provide advice and support to public bodies and local civil society organisations to develop services in local settings, while improving relations with other youth and social services provision. This development is being undertaken on the back of research and the formalisation of MYH own anonymous service database. While there is little formal support from public authorities in a process that has largely been driven by MYH and supported by its own networks and resources, it has received support from key individuals and public bodies are seeking to develop cooperative relationships with MYH. |
| <i>Joint ownership</i>          | MYH is a grass roots initiative that has been developed largely without the support of authorities. It has developed a number of projects in response to funding streams from public authorities. In particular, they feel that those funding programmes that have enabled flexibility in approach, and were less prescriptive about aims and outcomes, were more attractive. The Community Leadership Fund provided open criteria that CSOs applying are free to meet; this approach appealed to MYH for the citizenship project.   |
| <i>Sustainability</i>           | Having been built on the initiative of volunteers, MYH is now largely on a sustainable financial and institutional footing. It is currently going through a developmental phase in order to further develop the nature of the service and the scope of what MYH can deliver. In addition it is also looking to diversify its revenue streams away from project based funding to better support organisational development and planning. As part of all of these initiatives MYH is acutely aware that central to the sustainability of their service is the maintenance of an authentic and trustworthy identity that their users feel comfortable with.   |
| <i>Intercultural competence</i> | The MYH is predicated on provision of culturally competent services to Muslim youth and its success has been based on their ability to provide this service to their client population. In addition, the more recent organisation development has focused on transferring this approach and knowledge to organisations outside of MYH who are in a position to deliver locally tailored services. In this respect MYH is looking to help improve intercultural competence of a range of public organisations, from local authorities, youth services, to mental health trusts. However, while their relationships with public bodies have generally been successful, both through the initiative of MYH and the capacities and initiative of public bodies, there are still problems developing relationships with some sectors, most notably education.                                       |
| <i>Transferability</i>          | The MYH has been developed on the initiative of key individuals and eventually has developed into an exemplar grass roots initiative that is providing important and highly sensitive services to a high standard. The development of this organisation has been predicated on the hard work of individuals and tailored to the needs of youth in the UK. MYH is acutely aware of the need to continually develop to respond to the changing needs of Britain's Muslim youth and in this respect, while services would necessarily need to be developed in response to local needs, the  |

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|  | <p>principles and approach of the MYH is one that can be commended and replicated. It is a service that is responding to an absence of provision in existing public services, a situation common to many European countries.</p> <p>Of particular note is that current developmental phase of MYH is aimed at developing a transferable model for more localized delivery of counselling services and integrating the helpline into local statutory provision. MYH feel it is important that local organisations are equipped with the requisite knowledge and intelligence to provide similarly sensitive and tailored support, both within civil society and public bodies. As part of this MYH is developing cooperative partnerships whilst also providing advice and guidance to public organisations.</p> |
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**Khayaal Theatre**

Khayaal Theatre Company is a registered charity set up in 1997 with the objectives of developing and presenting educational performing arts that explore Muslim world literature, heritage, culture and arts. It is the UK’s first award-winning professional theatre company dedicated to the dramatic exploration of classic Muslim world literature and the experience of Muslims in the modern world. Khayaal undertakes a range of activities including theatre production, including community, period, contemporary and issue-based theatre. It also undertakes theatre in education work, including story telling workshops for children through one-off or thematic issue-based residencies. They also conduct drama workshops for adults, as well as developing advocacy work relating to Islam and the arts and broader areas relating to science, humanities, dogma and story within Islam.

The founders of Khayaal, in addition to wanting to develop wider appreciation of performing arts and the canon of Muslim world culture, also identified a key role for the arts to play in promoting integration and multiculturalism in the areas that they were living. The arts were identified as a potentially shared and accessible space that could bring a diversity of people together. In addition, the formation of Khayaal was developed in response to a felt lack of arts provision among Muslim communities that addresses contemporary questions of identity and ethnicity and draws on cultural heritage as opposed to more dogmatic theological approaches to culture.

Khayaal Theatre received Pathfinder funding from CLG in 2007/08 to develop a play, *Hearts and Minds*, which tells the story of Asif – who is ‘Pakistani by memory, urban British by culture and Muslim by sentiment’ – by exploring conflicting discourses, loyalties and identities and what it means to be young, British and Muslim today. The play is accompanied by a workshop which enables the audience to make more accessible the messages of the play in an intuitive, engaging and enjoyable way. *Hearts and Minds* was originally commissioned in late 2007 by the Muslim Education Forum in Luton and the Reading-based Berkshire Forum against Extremism and the theatre company worked closely with its local commissioning partners to shape the project and choose the schools where the play is presented. The production subsequently toured schools, colleges, universities and young offender institutions in both regions in March 2008. In the following month, a week-long run of public performances staged in London attracted large audiences. Khayaal Theatre plans to tour *Hearts and Minds* nationally in autumn 2008.

Other examples of recent work include the production *The truth about your father* which portrays a woman attempting to explain the death of his father to his son. The production has been staged in a variety of public settings, including a number of schools. The play explores the issues of violent radicalism and suicide bombing in a discursive and non-prescriptive fashion that seeks to engage and

challenge the audience, whilst drawing on historical stories and legends from Muslim culture. The production has been accompanied by an adult workshop titled "the sun and the wind" that is designed to draw out some of the themes that emerge from the production and explore them in more depth in a manner that enables adults, including teachers, to identify and address issues of violent radicalisation.

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| <p><i>Principles</i></p>                             | <p>Khayaal is a multicultural and multi-faith professional arts organisation with a commitment to the principles of artistic quality and a passion the performing arts. It seeks to draw on and present material from the Muslim world in the form of performing arts and theatre and does not draw on religious texts. It presents often well known and highly accessible stories and legends imbued with multiple layers of meaning that encourages critical reflection and engagement from participants and audiences. This approach is intended to promote and encourage exploration and discovery of the issues that promote self empowerment.</p> <p>It seeks to reclaim, represent and mainstream stories of shared virtues and values within Muslim world literature through the universally appreciable language of drama. In particular, Khayaal tries to facilitate acculturation and reconciliation between tradition and modernity and generate contemporary social-cultural capital and popular currency. It hopes to mainstream positive and inspiring representations of Islam and Muslims and promote greater intercultural engagement, dialogue about, and understanding of, Islam.</p> <p>The group is producing a number of productions, particularly aimed at youth audiences that address directly the pressures confronting Muslim youth in the UK and the threats of violent extremism. The work of Khayaal, promoting critical and discursive culturally rooted and values based approaches to faith, represents a challenge to the approaches and interpretations promoted by violent extremists. While promoting the performing arts in schools in a manner that may be more engaging and relevant to Muslim youth than other experiences, it also provides alternative avenues for engagement and encourages young people to participate in creative activities.</p> |
| <p><i>Credibility and legitimacy</i></p>             | <p>Khayaal has received a range of awards for its work. In the absence of any core funding, their activities are being driven by high levels of demand for their productions. Khayaal's productions such as <i>Hearts and Minds</i> are highly engaging and well produced, with enjoyable narratives and characters with depth that convey the complex emotional pulls and fluidity of questions of identity as well as the emotional challenges that are present for many young people in the UK today. <i>The truth about your father</i> has been well received and has played to a range of audiences, including schools but to adult audiences. One respondent where the production was played to a largely adult audience commented on how the play was able to reach out and challenge preconceived ideas, and encouraged the audience to interrogate their own attitudes and perceptions; for many leaving a lasting impact.</p>   |
| <p><i>Level, breadth and depth of engagement</i></p> | <p>Khayaal work with a range of public authorities and organisations, including undertaken advocacy and advice with a range of government departments, as well as with Arts Council England (ACE). They have recently developed a more consistent relationship with the department of Communities and Local Government, and other organisations. They have good relations with the local Luton arts development unit who have provided some developmental support which has brought Khayaal into</p>   |

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|                                 | <p>contact with key local government officials and elected representatives, facilitating their work with a range of local schools when staging productions and delivering workshops.</p> <p>The relationship with local schools and beyond has been facilitated by these links and political support in the Luton area, however it has recently come under threat due to sensationalist reporting in local newspapers about the staging of <i>The truth about your father</i> in schools. While the standing of Khayaal and the support of key authorities and individuals has largely negated any negative impacts the incident is indicative of the volatile environment that Khayaal is operating within and the lack of understanding and nervousness of some authorities of engaging with organisations working on faith related issues. While this has been negotiated in the case of education, lack of funding from national organisations, including the main arts development body in England, for the only professional Muslim theatre company in the UK is indicative of the lack of clarity and uncertainty surrounding the funding and support of these types of organisations.</p>   |
| <i>Resources</i>                | <p>Khayaal has only recently received very limited short term funding from the CLG Community Leadership Programme. Limited financial resources have been received from Luton Council, with support mainly provided in the shape of practical assistance such as practice space and some development support. The main arts development body in England, Arts Council England, has not provided substantial funding or development assistance, despite the unique nature and quality of their work. One respondent noted that; “they just need a break and someone to support them” in order for the company to move onto the next stage of development and to progress its work.</p> <p>The lack of financial support is linked to a lack of institutional awareness and willingness to engage with faith and culture in the arts but is also indicative of a broader trend of reluctance of public organisations to engage with faith related CSOs who are undertaking critical activities. While a highly committed team have brought Khayaal to this stage of development, as a professional arts company production costs are high, something often not recognised among the community and a key reason why arts practice often requires development assistance from public funding bodies.</p> |
| <i>Developmental approaches</i> | <p>Luton local authority have provided some developmental support linking Khayaal to local arts networks and public bodies, based on identification of lack of arts and cultural provision to the major Muslim south Asian populations of the local area. More recently the Department for Communities and Local Government has provided some core funding in support of Khayaal.</p>   |
| <i>Joint ownership</i>          | <p>Khayaal is an autonomous organisation with productions developed by Khayaal and its associates in response to demand for their work. Their work responds to needs identified through the company's own work, its social networks and its own creative impetus. Very little work has been developed in conjunction with authorities, with support for productions more commonly arriving in order to help completion rather than at the inception of a project.</p> <p>Nevertheless, whilst Khayaal’s work is largely autonomous, Luton Council arts development unit has been instrumental in supporting the work of Khayaal in the</p>  |

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|                                 | <p>area. This has enabled Khayaal to develop productions for schools and gain access to these schools and subsequently beyond and should be recognised as a critical component in the company's current success.</p>   |
| <i>Sustainability</i>           | <p>Although the ongoing development of the organisation is under pressure due to resource constraints, the quality of their work and levels of demand for it are likely to ensure that Khayaal's work will be sustained into the future. However consistent developmental support from organisations with greater arts resources than a local authority would be beneficial in supporting the activity of Khayaal.</p>   |
| <i>Intercultural competence</i> | <p>Khayaal, as a multi cultural and multi-faith organisation, embodies intercultural working practice. In addition their work brings together Muslim culture and stories and presents them in a predominantly European performing arts format. It is this intercultural approach that is one of the core themes and underpins the power of Khayaal's productions.</p>  |
| <i>Transferability</i>          | <p>The work of Khayaal has been developed to meet identified local needs as well as in response to key dynamics identified in relation to Islam, culture and dogma. Whilst some of these dynamics are highly particular to the cultural and ethnic background of the local populations they have also been developed in response to concerns regarding literalist and dogmatic representations of the Muslim religion. Though responding to local contexts, many of the themes and stories presented by Khayaal draw from universal and timeless stories and legends and convey stories and themes that transcend cultural boundaries. While the material and productions are the material of Khayaal the narratives, themes and values that are contained in much of their work are highly transferable and not the property of any one company.</p> <p>The human and cultural capital present within Khayaal has meant that it has been able to develop a sophisticated response to sometimes controversial subject areas, including violent extremism, through professional productions of high quality. The work of Khayaal theatre, dependent on the initiative and passion of a group of people, and sustained with low levels of developmental support, has brought together an innovative fusion that showcases the arts and culture of the Muslim world via a format that is drawn from both European traditions of the performing arts but other oral narrative traditions.</p> <p>Such an initiative is dependent on the creative impetus of the people involved and any assessment of transferability is dependent on the right blend of individuals coming together to create such a company and will ultimately also be dependent on effective and appropriate arts development support either from public bodies or philanthropic support. However, it should be noted that the company wishes to take their work to as wide a range of audiences as possible, throughout the English speaking world and beyond, something that would be facilitated by improved developmental support.</p> |

## 7.10 International

### Lib for All Foundation: Indonesia and global

The Lib for All Foundation, established in 2003, is a predominantly Indonesian based civil society initiative that aims to develop a strategic network of individuals and organisation to counter extremism and fundamentalism. Lib for All was cofounded by former President Kyai Abdurrahman Wahid and aims to promote local pluralistic and tolerant traditions of Islam in order to counter imported fundamentalist interpretations of religion. The Lib for All Foundation is also developing its approach on a global basis with activity throughout South Asia, north Africa, the middle east and recently in Europe through its European branch, Stichting Lib for All, based in Holland.

It operates throughout the key areas of religion, education, popular culture, business, government and media via a network of individuals and organisations who are able to identify and respond to emerging issues and radical narratives. The Foundation undertakes a range of initiatives, including conferences and research activity challenging the spread of - in particular - Salafi and Wahabbi Islam. Key activities have included:

- Mobilising leaders from the world's two largest Muslim organisations to support pop star and Lib for All board member Dhani following a radical backlash to his album that challenged radical rhetoric. The album and message were subsequently utilised as part of a global campaign that resulted in record sales of an estimated 6 – 7 million copies;
- Developing a counter strategy to infiltration of the world's second largest Muslim organisation Muhammadiyah by radical and Islamist groups through support and coordination of key individuals and reaffirming commitment to pluralism and tolerance;
- Blocking of radical scholars in Indonesia through the strategic intervention of Kyai Abdurrahman Wahid;
- Mainstreaming of religious education to develop school curricula promoting tolerance, led by faculty members at top Islamic state universities in response to reported concerns, subsequently developed for broader dissemination;
- Development of educational material for teaching of pluralist Islam throughout South Asia as part of a Grass Roots Pluralist Network TV/ Video project.

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| <i>Principles</i>                 | The network promotes a pluralistic version of Islam that is informed by local traditions in response to literalist and radical interpretations of the religion. It seeks to empower and network key individuals and organisation to enable rapid response to key issues as well as developing proactive programmes and initiatives to counter radical interpretations of Islam.   |
| <i>Credibility and legitimacy</i> | The organisations operations in Indonesia are predicated on the involvement and support of key leaders, organisation and individuals from a range of sectors. In particular, the presence of Kyai Abdurrahman Wahid brings significant authority to the Foundation's activity. As a network based initiative its strength lies in its ability to draw key individuals into its activities. It is through the network that soft intelligence |

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|   | <p>is generated to identify problems and potential avenues for activity and to bring the necessary expertise to bear in order to develop effective responses.</p> <p>In order for this approach to be successful, the ongoing credibility of Lib for All is a key component that has brought the necessary individual and organisations into its activities and networks. As described by one of the participants in the Foundation's work in Europe a key reason for participating in the network is an understanding that it offers the best platform for individuals and organisations who share a common agenda. It is through this credibility that the ongoing viability of Lib for All will be maintained as the necessary organisations and individuals are drawn into their network and activities.</p> |
| <i>Level, breadth and depth of engagement</i> | The work and effectiveness of the Foundation is predicated on an extensive network of key individuals and organisations in a range of sectors and organisations who share the aims and objectives of Lib for All. It is through these networks and resources that the foundation is able to identify key issues that are emerging and bring together a range of key actors to develop responses.   |
| <i>Resources</i>                              | The Foundation is heavily resourced by its founders with large levels of philanthropic support coming from US foundations and key international organisations. The Foundation, in cooperation with partners, also obtains project based funding for many of activities. However, as already noted, its main resource is the legitimacy provided for its activities by high profile individuals, as well as the shared commitment and participation of strategic and influential individuals who are able to bring their expertise to bear on projects and initiatives.   |
| <i>Developmental approaches</i>               | The Foundation is able to bring together a range of expertise to support key CSOs in developing responses to radical narratives. The work of Lib for All members has ensured that the Foundation is receiving key developmental support from a range of international and regional organisations that are supporting the development of their activities.  |
| <i>Joint ownership</i>                        | The Foundation facilitates projects that meet the identified needs of the project partners. Its key influence and support enables it to work effectively with a wide range of authorities, from the local to the global.   |
| <i>Sustainability</i>                         | The Foundation's work is well funded and is gaining increasing standing independent of its key sponsors and members. However its strength is predicated on the quality and support of participants which must be maintained through ongoing ability to support and develop effective responses as part of a supported agenda and approach, and free from overt political influence or instrumentalisation by particular authorities.   |
| <i>Transferability</i>                        | The Foundation formation and approach has been heavily informed by the experiences and context of Indonesia. It has been able to rely on the support of key figures in Indonesia and subsequent high level networks of key individuals and organisations. The approach predicated on a network of key individuals is a transferable concept; however a number of key developmental challenges are presented when considering its transfer into Europe. These challenges include the development of networks of key individuals and organisations, in particular in the absence of a comparably developed   |

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|  | <p>civil society context as in Indonesia, or the presence and support of high profile figures such as Kyai Abdurrahman Wahid. It would also be necessary to respond to the key dynamics and diversity of European Muslim populations, and the development of appropriate effective activity and counter narratives. The success of this response is predicated on the expertise, understanding and knowledge of members and resources, including networks, to develop responses to key local dynamics.</p> |
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## 8. CONCLUSIONS

### 8.1 The value of co-operation between authorities and Muslim civil society

This study has shown how civil society organisations are at the forefront of grassroots based approaches seeking to reach young people at risk, and in countering the spread of radical ideologies and recruitment to violence. In particular, CSOs possess a range of characteristics that are indispensable in countering violent extremism as part of a counter terrorism agenda. These include:

- they exist in the same space as social networks and movements relevant to violent radicalisation;
- they are characterised by responding to needs and providing services, filling key gaps in authority services or market provision;
- they possess understanding, knowledge, competences and skills that are more likely to be effective than authorities in the ‘Muslim’ civil society field on the issue of countering violent radicalisation;
- they are made of dense horizontal social networks, and have social capital that can be employed to meet needs and develop responses to radicalisation;
- they commonly already have a developed understanding of emerging trends, the need for counter radicalisation measures and are often undertaking relevant activity including:
  - engaging with spiritual / religious and political leaders, spokespersons and representatives; but also, and critically, with the young
  - offering support and empowering voices that can challenge terrorist rhetoric
  - advocacy, and encouraging civic and political engagement and participation as an alternative to violence
  - in some cases targeted counter radicalisation and ‘de Radicalisation programmes’
- they possess detailed knowledge of evolving contexts and the particular nature of the threat in local contexts;
- are more likely to understand ‘what will work’ and be able to target interventions at a micro level based on grass roots social intelligence;
- they are more likely to embody participatory / consensual and organic approaches likely to be effective in civil society.

Of particular importance is the power and role of civil society itself in countering violent radicalisation and violent radical actors. Not only is civil society the incubator of effective

responses, but taking into account the social movement context, a strong, vibrant, engaged and discursive civil society is in itself an alternative to violent radical narratives and actors. It is a space that facilitates engagement and participation as well as cooperative working, and can promote critical engagement whilst deconstructing exclusionary group based identities and fundamentalist interpretations of ideology.

However, whilst the key functions and benefits of civil society can be seen throughout the examples of best practice reviewed, it is also clear that these specific qualities can also be threatened directly by state responses to terrorist threats. Security responses have often directly targeted civil society organisations, commonly imposing restrictive regulation and even directly seeking to bring civil society organisations under greater control of authorities. In addition CSOs own strengths, such as authenticity and legitimacy, as well as responsiveness to grass roots needs, can also be undermined by poorly conceived relationships with public authorities who may not be perceived as having moral legitimacy.

Developing cooperative approaches between authorities and civil society in such a security and political climate exacerbates many of the key concerns and challenges common when developing such partnerships. Issues relating to trust and uncertainty about the motivations of the other party on both sides are common, as are key CSO concerns about instrumentalisation and autonomy, and the danger of relegation of other core group and community concerns for discussion and action at some indefinite point in the future.

Therefore it is imperative that authorities and civil society organisations develop cooperative relationships that preserve the key strengths of CSOs. These strengths include their ability to respond to new and emerging issues, shifting challenges on the ground and develop innovative responses. In addition the high levels of trust and authenticity they often enjoy are of particular importance when considering the challenge of violent radicalisation and the context in which it operates. A developmental approach toward the civil society sector is not only important as part of a countering violent radicalisation agenda, it is likely to be the critical component in the longer run for success; an issue that has emerged from Muslim civil society may be contained by security and control measures, but will ultimately only be resolved by a strong and determined civil society response that requires the support of the EC and Member States.

## **8.2 Priority areas for engagement**

Set within an understanding of the range of activity that is being employed as part of preventative approaches to countering violent radicalisation, a range of key areas can be seen to be essential components of any broad based counter radicalisation response:

- i. The importance of education; Education is a key influencer in responding to a social movement and regularly identified as a key intervention area by civil society groups. Education approaches may include:
  - o Schools curriculum that allows space for youth to explore heritage, identity, citizenship, civic and political engagement;
  - o Intercultural education implemented in school curricular;

- Strategies for responding to radicalisation efforts on campuses in further and higher education institutions;
  - Capacity and leadership development for key individuals and organisations from Muslim communities, with a particular focus on women and young people;
  - Capacity building and intercultural competence development for public officials, particularly teachers;
  - Infrastructural and developmental support for CSOs.
- ii. Spaces for critical engagement, dialogue, reflection, debate and participation; It is evident that cultural, social and political spaces for engagement enable the exploration and expression of identity and culture and the development of political voice. Support for such spaces undermines the ability of violent radicals to promote their narratives and representations without effective challenge. Such activity not only includes areas such as interfaith dialogue but should also include areas such as arts and culture, ‘single issue’<sup>71</sup> and local activism, civic participation and mainstream electoral politics as well as their role in influencing broader popular culture.
- iii. Anti-discrimination and social justice issues; where violent radicalisation is seen as building on ‘grievances’, there is a need to address real concerns about discrimination and social and economic integration. Visible movement on these issues enables civil society organisation to give credible responses to the narratives promoted by violent radicals, including that Muslims are not wanted in Europe, and provides new spaces for legitimate engagement and participation.

### 8.3 Principles of engagement

Throughout the delivery of the study a key issue that arose was concern and uncertainty about the identification of the groups with which to engage and/ or partner. The rationale and methods for engagement is a core component of the evaluation approaches outlined in the following sections. However, as with the range of sectors that should be considered when developing counter radicalisation responses, a similar approach should be adopted when engaging with organisations from this range of sectors. Key principles include:

- *Engage with multiple tiers and a wide range of actors.* A broad range of cooperative relationships and consultative arrangements should be developed between authorities and CSOs. This includes developing leadership throughout the community and in particular at grass roots levels but also at the various tiers of authorities – from front line to strategic levels. In addition, consultative relationships should be developed in a broad based manner and not be reliant on identifying sole individuals deemed to be ‘representative’ of diverse and heterogeneous communities.

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<sup>71</sup> Single-issue groups and politics involves political campaigning or political support based on one essential policy area or idea.

- *CSOs may have a range of interests relating to Muslim and minority communities; avoid limiting engagement to faith organisations.* Engagement should not be limited to particular types of organisations, CSOs should include those who might be considered overtly Muslim groups (religious or cultural) but also groups that work to meet the needs of a range of people that may include participants who would consider themselves Muslim or coming from a Muslim cultural heritage.

CSOs generally develop in order to meet felt needs and gaps in provision and are commonly be concerned with social welfare provision and cultural services for migrant and minority groups. However they may also serve more strategic interests and needs such as advocacy, civic and political engagement and participation. Less formal social networks can be central and influential actors in setting parameters of debate and can be at the front line in moulding social discourse. All these types of groups add important value to cooperation initiatives and may inform the models that might be developed.

- *Avoid screening organisations who are opposed to violence on perceived values and ideology.* The development of broad based cooperative approaches should also not delineate on ideological or faith based lines. Civil society organisations have intrinsic value beyond their cultural and political agendas and, as organisations springing from recognition by communities of their own needs, often have strong legitimacy by virtue of their existence alone. Engagement approaches should not be limited to specific groups who at a given time may be seen as more in tune with member state aims, whilst seeking to undermine (deliberately or tacitly) those groups who are seen as negative influences.

In particular those groups who are seen as being favoured by the state can have their legitimacy eroded, while such actions may also feed into the narratives and arguments of violent radicals. Rather than simply cooperating with those perceived as ‘moderates’ and / or ‘representative’, it is necessary that authorities engage with a wider range of both progressive groups as well as with those groups who may make less comfortable ideological partners but are nonetheless opposed to violence for political ends.

- *Be a ‘realist’ in engagement with groups.* Experience has shown that selective approaches based sometimes on misinformation or supposed ideological orientation often excludes groups unnecessarily and unfairly. Such exclusionary approaches often serve only to cut off key sources of expertise in countering violent extremism and undermine approaches necessary to fully address the complexity and diversity of the field of violent radicalisation. Public debates that cut to the heart of fundamental questions such as democracy, freedom of expression (including freedom of religious expression) and minority rights should be engaged with in the public discursive space of the civil society arena and not undertaken in closed forums by appointed administrators of public bodies who are unlikely to have a full or complete understanding of the issues being faced by communities.

Consequently groups that may be perceived as conservative or politically radical may represent key partners in the development of a broad based counter radicalisation response. Groups that exist in close proximity to violent radical groups can bring counter narratives and previously developed responses to violent groups by virtue of

their own ‘rivalry’ with them. Likewise pious religious groups may also be able to bring to bear different kinds of interventions with youth at risk, or even ‘de-radicalisation’ approaches that would be outside the capabilities of more ‘mainstream’ groups and public authorities.

However, this activity should be part of a broad based approach that engages with a range of organisation in order to develop a variety of preventative activity and interventions. In this respect it is also clear that when developing preventative approaches to violent radicalisation that are informed by social inclusion and integration responses, those groups that embody progressive pluralistic discursive practice and dialogue have particular value within this agenda. In addition actively progressive groups, while often marginalised historically in relationships between authorities and civil society organisations, play an important role in progressing ideological responses to violent radical narratives and world views in a social movement context.

#### **8.4 Development Needs of CSOs**

A developmental approach towards strengthening and supporting CSOs that prioritises the maintenance of ongoing relationships with a range of CSOs and actors and in a range of fields is essential. Developing and supporting the CSO sector as a whole is important in order for the sector to be able to continue to develop innovative and targeted responses to the complex and shifting features of violent radicalisation. Key features of a developmental approach in Member States would include targeted support in the following areas:

- *Developing holistic relationships*; trust is a key consideration for civil society organisations. Cooperation on counter radicalisation within a holistic approach addressing a broader range of community issues and needs are likely to give organisations more confidence. Prior relationships with organisations and recognition of the wide range of activities that they are commonly engaged in, as well as recognising their priorities are fundamental principles in developing such relationships.
- *Outreach*; the development of open channels of communication with civil society actors is essential in developing nuanced intelligence on relevant activity occurring in the civil society sector. The development of such intelligence necessitates proactive outreach from authorities toward the civil society sector. This may be developed through a systematic programme of mapping communities with their support or through forums that bring together a wide range of actors as a starting point for dialogue.
- *Practical support*; practical support for civil society organisations is essential. This includes adequate funding and resources as fundamental to the development of a sustained partnership approach. Funding requirements should encourage access participation, support in meeting requirements and not so rigid as to lose the overall holistic value added of the work that groups are engaging in. Developmental assistance for organisations should also be provided.

## 8.5 Development Needs of Public Authorities

In order for public authorities to undertake effective development approaches for civil society, there is a pressing need for competence-building initiatives for professionals (for example, teachers, police or law enforcement officers, social welfare workers, policy advisors, civil servants, etc) and managers. Key concerns include the lack of knowledge of the issues of violent radicalisation, lack of intercultural competence and skills, and lack of knowledge and understanding of the Muslim (and other minorities) CSO sector. Key development needs of public authorities and their officials include:

- *Joint learning, training and development with CSOs*; a key issue arising from the study is the role that joint learning can play in not only developing these key competencies but also helping to build the relationships and trust necessary for effective authority / CSO partnerships.
- *Understanding and adopting 'ecological' approaches to developing the CSO sector*; the phrase ecology is intended to highlight the diverse range of organisations and activities that are undertaken, and need to be undertaken in the civil society sector. Such an approach recognizes how a diversity of activity, sectors, organisations and approaches are all essential to incubate and develop counter radicalisation activity, whilst also being a buffer to violent radicalisation itself. A broad range of interventions need to be delivered through a range of public policy fields. Such an approach can facilitate the targeting of resources and provide a transparent rationale for engagement and development approaches.
- *Prioritisation of issue areas for supporting CSOs*; While particular national and local circumstances are obviously relevant in the identification of priority areas for support, we would propose a broad prioritisation of activity in the following areas:
  - High priority areas would include:
    - Education interventions, including in relation to faith education;
    - Access to justice – particularly in relation to anti-discrimination, including the application and use of EU law;
    - Civic participation and political engagement education and awareness programmes;
    - Youth engagement and support for women's groups and organisations.
  - Other important interventions would include:
    - Arts and intercultural engagement;
    - Training and employment initiatives;
    - Interfaith and intercultural programmes;
    - The Media and representation of Muslims / Islam;

- Equitable public service delivery
- Appropriate health, social and welfare support services.

## 9. RECOMMENDATIONS

### 9.1 General recommendations

The study does not address the issue of knowledge about radicalisation processes in the political (local, national and European), public policy and media sectors. However, given the interaction between civil society and these fields, there is value in developing targeted awareness programmes for these actors to enhance the likely effectiveness of cooperation with civil society organisations. Principled and coherent action is necessary to ensure that polarising and discriminatory representations and narratives are not promoted without facing challenge and critique. In this field there is real value in interventions to improve intercultural competence and develop understanding of Muslim communities as well as Islam.

It is also important for public authorities at European, national and local levels to support the emerging civic and political engagement of Muslim communities and their efforts to secure a presence in the public policy and political spheres. Training, development and networking programmes aimed at enhancing this presence should be encouraged.

There have been a number of efforts by individuals to develop a pan-European forum for Muslim CSOs, indicating the interest in participation and dialogue at EC level. In the medium term the EU should look to support and accelerate these types of initiatives, looking to include Muslim and non-Muslim CSOs with an interest in challenging Islamophobia, anti-Semitism and discrimination against the full range of minority groups. Such a forum could support the implementation of anti-discrimination measures and minority community participation at all levels of Member State and EC economic, social and public life.

### 9.2 Recommendations for developing effective co-operation with civil society

A holistic and systemic approach is necessary to address the complexity of the field. The recommendations we make are intended to reinforce each other and a ‘pick and mix’ approach is unlikely to be effective. For ease and a memorable shorthand we have referred to this as a 5 ‘P’s model. The key components at Member State levels are:

- i. *Policy*. There needs to be more clarity in policy at Member State, regional and local level prioritising CSO involvement and setting out principles and a framework for co-operation. The approach should focus not solely on Muslim civil society but including other CSOs interested in the maintenance and development of harmonious community relationships. This should be reflected in:
  - a. Clear national strategies
  - b. Clearer mandates for authorities and public servants.

- ii. *Partnership* approaches. There needs to be greater understanding of effective principles and approaches to developing genuine partnerships, and joint ownership of the issues. There also needs to be clarity in what is / is not up for negotiation in cooperation, about respective roles, and about how programmes and work will be sustained. Partnership approaches should be underpinned by:
  - a. Holistic developmental approaches to cooperation partnerships
  - b. Joint training and development programmes that bring together a range of key individuals and stakeholders from civil society and public authorities.
  
- iii. *Programmes*. Policy and partnership need to be reflected in programmes that are adequately resourced and this may require building capacity, leadership and infrastructure. A mix of programmes at a variety of levels is likely to be more effective, as well as programmes that do not label (and reinforce) the view of the community (and radicalisation) as the only issue or problem for these communities. The priorities here include:
  - a. Indirect programmes and recognition of the broad range of holistic work undertaken by many CSOs
  - b. More flexible and adaptable terms of reference and specifications for funding.
  - c. Developing an understanding of the civil society sector as organic and working to develop the ‘ecology’ of the sector. For example, in many cases, there may be an imbalance in support and funding available, with CSOs providing direct services or offering to undertake a direct anti-radicalisation initiative finding it relatively easier to secure funding and other important ‘intermediate tier’ organisations (that may be focusing on influencing policy / networking/ working on anti-discrimination issues) finding it more difficult. In particular, it is apparent that some of the most progressive and newer organisations in the field are women’s groups and youth organisations, yet they often face the greatest difficulties in securing public authority support.
  
- iv. *Practice*. Public service professionals, whether in crime prevention, criminal justice, education, health and social welfare are facing and having to respond to issues relating to Muslim community needs, including pressures arising from radicalisation in their day to day work, yet support and development opportunities remain informal and underdeveloped. Professional development work needs to be undertaken, beginning with:
  - a. Development of mechanisms and processes for bringing together those working with the issues on the ground.
  - b. Joint training, education and capacity building for public authority officials with CSOs in the Muslim field.

- v. *Performance.* There need to be frameworks and mechanisms for ongoing review and learning by public authorities and Member States in this field.
  - a. Underpinning principles, approaches, and strategies need to be evaluated as well as specific programmes and projects at local, regional, national and EC level. Assessment and evaluation of approaches needs to be based on a more thorough mapping of the existing and desirable 'ecology' of the sector, to ensure that the full range of groups that can assist in addressing this agenda are being funded. Such a mapping should include key considerations such as type of organisation, intervention characteristics, target group and beneficiaries, geographical focus, cultural and faith background.
  - b. A focus on the problem of radicalisation and perceived cultural and theological problems and issues in some Muslim communities will be limited in its effectiveness. A holistic approach is necessary at EC and Member State level that recognises the focus of policy needs to include the social and economic integration of Muslim and other minority communities in Europe if some of the root causes of 'grievance' are to be addressed.

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