EVALUATION OF THE CRISIS RESPONSE AND PREPAREDNESS COMPONENTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S INSTRUMENT FOR STABILITY (IFS)

OVERALL PROGRAMME-LEVEL EVALUATION

Final Report
12 July 2011

Evaluation for the European Commission
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ACRONYMS

AU  African Union
CBRN  Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP  Common Security and Defence Policy
EAM  Exceptional Assistance Measure (of IfS)
EDF  European Development Fund
EEAS  European External Action Service
EPLO  European Peace-building Liaison Office
EU  European Union
EU-NAVFOR  European Union Naval Force
EUSR  European Union Special Representative Policy Instruments
IFS  Instrument for Stability
IGO  International Governmental Organisation
JNA  Joint Needs Assessment
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAMF  Facility for urgent action involving Policy Advice, Technical Assistance, Mediation and Reconciliation for the benefit of third countries affected by crisis situations
PbP  Peace-building Partnership (of IfS)
PCNA  Post Conflict Needs Assessment
PDNA  Post Disaster Needs Assessment
PSC  Political and Security Committee
RCRPO  Regional Crisis Response Planning Officers
RELEX  Directorate-General for External Relations
RRM  Rapid Reaction Mechanism
SSR  Security Sector Reform
TOR  Terms of Reference
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
WB  World Bank

GLOSSARY

Effectiveness
The extent to which the intervention’s objectives were, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.

Efficiency
A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.

Evaluation
The systematic and objective assessment of the design, implementation and results of an ongoing or completed project, programme or policy, which aims to determine relevance and fulfillment of objectives, development efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability.

Impacts
Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by an intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.

Relevance
The extent to which the objectives of an intervention are consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners’ and donors’ policies.

Reliability
Consistency or dependability of data and evaluation judgements, with reference to the quality of the instruments, procedures and analyses used to collect and interpret evaluation data.

Results
The output, outcome and impact (intended or unintended, positive and/or negative) of an intervention.

Sustainability
The continuation of benefits from an intervention after assistance has been completed. The probability of continued long-term benefits. The resilience to risk of the net benefit flows over time.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EVALUATION OBJECTIVES AND PROCESS

In line with Article 21 of the Regulation of the European Union’s Instrument for Stability (IFS), the European Commission authorised an independent evaluation of the IFS’ crisis response and preparedness components — Articles 3 and 4(3) of the IFS Regulation, respectively. As the first horizontal appraisal of these components since the IFS inception in 2007, this evaluation assesses the relevance of the two components across various dimensions, with a view to contributing to upcoming decision-making about the future of the IFS after its current legal basis expires in 2012.

In line with the terms of reference, the main objective of the evaluation is “…to ascertain the results to date of the Instrument for Stability crisis response and preparedness components and help enhance IFS approaches towards future crisis response measures and strategies for future preparedness programming.”

The key legal and policy documents related to the IFS’ creation and functioning, as well as key policy documents of the European Union in the area of peace and security, constitute the baseline of the evaluation. In addition, a range of programme documents related to selected case studies were examined.

As this is an overall programme-level evaluation, its scope and process did not include specific in-depth project-level reviews; hence this evaluation is not meant to draw conclusions on the effectiveness and impact of specific IFS crisis actions on the ground, nor on capacity-strengthening activities at project level. However, documentation on five case studies was reviewed to bolster the conclusions made here. These comprised four Exceptional Assistance Measures (EAMs) in Georgia, Sudan, Somalia and Indonesia, and support to Post Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) and Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) methodology development and training.

In order to refine findings, the evaluators elaborated a set of ‘qualifiers’ used to review findings as they emerged from the evaluation process. These include:

- Institutional opportunities/constraints, ranging from access to high quality information on crises, to a small team managing a large budget;
- The inherently political nature of the IFS, which enables the EU to play an enhanced role as a foreign and security policy actor;
- The fact that the IFS operates across the security and development nexus and is designed to complement, and often to prepare the ground for the EU’s mainstream external action instruments;
- The high risk and highly volatile environments in which crisis response instruments like the IFS often operate; and
- The complex nature of the international crisis preparedness, response and peace-building architecture.

THE IFS AT A GLANCE

The IFS was launched one year after the 2006 reform of the European Commission’s external funding instruments. Its creation was intended to enhance the EU’s capacity and tools to undertake both urgent short-term crisis response measures (Article 3 of IFS) and more medium to longer term actions covering crisis preparedness (Article 4(3) of IFS) as well as trans-regional threats and CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons) non-proliferation (Articles 4(1) and 4(2) of IFS)\(^1\).

\(^1\) Activities under Article 4(1) and Article 4(2) of the IFS are not included in the scope of this evaluation.
The IfS is governed by Regulation (EC) 1717/2006 of the European Parliament and by the Council of 15 November 2006 establishing an Instrument for Stability. More than €350 million has been committed so far under the IfS in approximately 100 crisis response actions spread over 48 countries worldwide. An additional €40 million has been mobilised for crisis preparedness under Article 4(3) of the IfS Regulation during 2007-2010.

Substantively, the IfS has a three-pronged focus. First, it ensures rapid, flexible and adequately funded first responses to situations of political crisis or natural disasters, including to initiatives that pre-empt them, in line with Article 3. Second, its crisis preparedness component Article 4(3) seeks to strengthen the pre- and post-crisis capacity of state and non-state actors, international, regional and sub-regional organisations by promoting the development of conflict prevention, peace-building and early recovery capacities. And third, it addresses global and trans-regional threats, while also supporting actions relating to the non-proliferation of CBRNs, consistent with Articles 4(1) and 4(2) – areas that are not included in the scope of this particular evaluation.

Of the €2.062 billion originally allocated to the IfS in 2007-2013, the crisis response component (including conflict prevention measures) was to receive no less than 72% (€1.49 billion), while no more than 5% was to be allocated to the component on crisis preparedness (Article 4(3)), including capacity building. The allocation of funding to the different areas of focus reflects the intention of the Council and European Parliament to make the IfS primarily an instrument for crisis response (including prevention).

Crisis response actions under Article 3, given their typically very urgent nature, are not and indeed cannot be programmed on an annual basis. The IfS regulation has envisaged a fair degree of flexibility in the use of the Instrument and the capacity to address a range of crisis factors. These include actions in response to a crisis or emerging crisis, a situation posing a threat to democracy, law and order, the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the security and safety of individuals, or a situation threatening to escalate into armed conflict or severely destabilise a third country or set of countries.

The preparedness activities are funded under Article 4(3) and constitute the Peace-building Partnership (PbP). They are programmed on an annual basis following the priorities identified under the 2007-2011 IfS Strategy Paper and under the Multiannual Indicative Programmes 2007-2008 and 2009-2011. The three main areas of PbP activities are:

1. Strengthening the capacity of non-state actors active in peace-building, and enhancing dialogue between civil society actors and policy makers at the European-level on peace-building issues;
2. Developing early-warning capabilities, including the development of policy-oriented research and sharing of best operational practice to address and identify the root causes of conflict; and
3. Promoting the development of suitable methodologies and common training standards, and of common operational practices and tools with multilateral agencies, including measures to strengthen operational cooperation between EU programmes.

RESULTS

Main Achievements

The evaluators consider the IfS to be a unique Instrument within the EU peace, security and development architecture. Articles 3 and 4(3), in
particular, fill an important strategic, funding and capacity gap, and allow the EU to support a broad range of critical crisis prevention and response initiatives, as well as capacity building for crisis preparedness. The design and management of actions under the Instrument has led to a significant number of achievements that should be recognised as important contributions to global peace and stability. Initiatives funded by the crisis response and crisis preparedness components have contributed to:

- Expanding and scaling up EU capacity to intervene in crisis situations from a geographic, thematic, funding and time-horizon viewpoint, particularly through Article 3 conflict prevention and crisis response measures;
- Leveraging and enhancing the coherence and effectiveness of the EU peace, security and development instruments and initiatives (including the Common Security and Defense Policy) in support of critical crisis prevention, stabilisation and peace-building objectives;
- Providing relevant policy input to high level EU decision-making and helping to kick-start important reforms, while also providing EU visibility and political leverage in third countries;
- Enhancing the capacities of potential implementing partners to prepare for and respond to crises; and
- Promoting inclusive approaches to crisis prevention and response by involving civil society, regional and other international partner actors.

In addition, the IfS has enabled the EU and key partners (UN, WB and civil society organisations) to support national stakeholders in responding early to crises. Initiatives in this area include the development of tools, capacities and provision of funds to undertake PCNAs and PDNAs, the establishment of policy-oriented dialogues and networks with civil society and multilateral agencies, contributions to the development of international frameworks on policy areas such as Security Sector Reform and Natural Resources and Conflict, as well as field-based research activities.

**Detailed Assessment**

The evaluators found numerous strengths in the management of the IfS. Among these are: (a) the quality of funding decisions and budget management; (b) the approach taken to project conceptualisation and design in relation to Article 3; (c) the management of institutional interfaces by the IfS team; and (d) the quality of data/analysis used for the preparation of IfS actions. In addition, the evaluators concluded that the IfS had been deployed in many instances to maximise EU political leverage in crisis-affected countries.

Within its strengths, however, there are areas where some improvement can be made to further build on the important achievements made to date. These are outlined below.

**Project designs** are clear about outputs and explicit about how these conform to IfS regulation requirements. An analysis of the interventions under Article 3 shows that crisis responses are in line with the scope of the Regulation and that the IfS is enabling the EU to effectively address critical political aspects of crisis response.

However, while assumptions underpinning the aims are clear and the design of projects under both components are well tailored to the objectives and focal areas of the Instrument, the design of projects could be strengthened by a more structured articulation of theories of change, i.e. the links between inputs, the implementation strategy and the intended outputs and outcomes.

**IfS decision-making processes** (as stipulated in
the Regulation and Joint Declaration) are adhered to and managed effectively. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) of EU Member State ambassadors receives well-presented detailed submissions for crisis prevention and response measures, both written and oral, and tailored to context dynamics. In addition, the relatively rapid response to, and turnaround of, proposals is a strength.

An area that could continue to be improved is the capacity in the decision-making process to address political priorities. The positioning of the IfS within the new EU external relations institutional structure provides the potential for a more effective balance between the political and the technical components of the decision-making process.

Whereas the Instrument has provided important leverage in many of the cases examined, if it is to achieve its full potential both in terms of leverage, and, more broadly, impact and results, then clearer strategies and criteria to guide in transitions between the IfS and other EU instruments are critical. Here it would be valuable to see the range of concerned services jointly preparing a better-articulated hand-over strategy from the IfS to other EU instruments. Further, a more flexible timeframe (beyond 18 months to 24 months) for the use of the crisis response component of the Instrument, and an overall increase in available funding, may also be required and would bolster the impact of actions in some contexts, or enable new opportunities to be seized.

The fact that the IfS can finance a broad variety of actors, ranging from multi-lateral organisations, EU Member State agencies to national and local bodies and non-state actors, gives the Instrument a unique reach and the capacity to intervene at different levels, which in turn sets the stage for a comprehensive approach to crisis response.

Until 2009 around half of IfS funding under Article 3 went to UN agencies as implementing partners. Views among stakeholders on the often predominant use of the UN as an implementing body are mixed. Although the UN is often the only reliable and available partner in some contexts, where feasible a more diverse range of partners, particularly local actors (where eligible for EU support), should be explored to capitalise on the full strategic and implementation potential of the Instrument.

Other areas where improvements can be made are in: (a) flexibility and consistency in the speed of deployment; (b) increased human resource allocation to IfS management; (c) monitoring; (d) evaluation; and (e) greater consideration of risk management in project design and documentation.

The flexibility and speed of IfS crisis response deployment is far greater than that of other EU instruments and currently ranges from 2 weeks to 4 months, thanks also to special fast-track processes like the Policy Advice and Mediation and Facility (PAMF). However, the standard Commission decision-making process with regard to deploying the Instrument (i.e. the period leading up to the identification of IfS measures), including the process to pull together concepts and proposals, could be further shortened and speeded up, given the dynamic nature of crisis.

The Regulation could be updated to allow two or more consecutive EAMs to be financed. This would enable faster responses than the current system, where only a single EAM procedure is allowed which may be followed by an Interim Response Programme, involving somewhat heavier and slower procedures.

The human resources allocated to the management of the IfS are inadequate for the workload and budget involved. This inadequacy places a significant strain on the IfS team and can at times lead to delays in the deployment of the Instrument.

Significant efforts have been made to compile and provide comprehensive information through annual reports, interim reports and additional inputs, but the capacity to monitor IfS-funded interventions
in particular crisis response situations does require strengthening. Factors that appear to limit effective monitoring include the at times unclear articulation of expected changes and outcomes against which to monitor progress; the reliance on partners’ monitoring systems, in particular for the significant funds channeled through multi-lateral organisations; and the fact that sufficient human resources and related capacities for systematic monitoring are not always available to EU Delegations, nor to the IfS team at headquarters.

Evaluations of individual IfS actions are carried out but are not publicly available, nor does the Regulation stipulate how regularly evaluations should be done. The main area for improvement is in maximising the value of these evaluations for the IfS team and broader crisis response community. The IfS team should consider how best to make evaluation lessons learned widely available.

While risk assessment and risk management approaches are articulated in decision-making processes and project documents, given the often high risk environments in which the IfS operates, measures for managing risks (i.e. risks to implementation, political, management, and fiduciary risks) could be further strengthened through the development of an overarching risk assessment and management strategy.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The evaluation concludes that the IfS has significantly contributed to enhancing the overall relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of EU crisis response and preparedness actions. It also makes a significant contribution to the coherence of the EU peace, security and development architecture – and to global peace and stability. Critical to its contributions is the IfS’ demonstrated capacity to provide quick, timely and catalytical responses in situations of crisis.

The design and implementation of crisis response and preparedness actions and strategies funded under Articles 3 and 4(3) have been found to be in line with the Regulation, and contribute to achieving the objectives stated therein. Decision-making processes are sufficiently robust and inclusive; they allow an important exchange between the technical and political decision-makers of the EU peace, security and development architecture. The management and disbursement of funding is considered effective and timely once IfS measures have been identified.

The evaluators make the following recommendations to further bolster the already significant impact of the IfS and build on the contributions made by the EU through the Instrument:

1. Increase financial resources for the IfS in order to extend impact to additional crisis contexts;
2. In the Regulation, include further flexibility in the overall timeframe for the use of the IfS for crisis response measures and strengthen linkages with other EU Instruments;
3. Further strengthen the design and focus of interventions;
4. Further balance political and technical aspects of decision-making;
5. Diversify choices of — and specify criteria for — the selection of implementing partners;
6. Bolster monitoring and evaluation processes;
7. Seek to more consistently integrate an enhanced risk management strategy into IfS project design;
8. Increase Service for Foreign Policy Instruments staff resources at HQ and country level.
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. SCOPE

In line with Article 21 of the Regulation of the European Union’s Instrument for Stability (hereafter referred to as the “IfS”), the European Commission authorised an independent evaluation of the IfS’ crisis response and preparedness components — Articles 3 and 4(3) of the IfS Regulation, respectively.4

As the first horizontal appraisal of these components since the IfS inception in 2007, this evaluation assesses the relevance of the two components across various dimensions, with a view to contributing to upcoming decision-making about the future of the IfS after its current legal basis expires in 2012.

The main objective of the evaluation, as per the Terms of Reference (TOR; page 2, objective nr. 1) is "...to ascertain the results to date of the Instrument for Stability crisis response and preparedness components and help enhance IfS approaches towards future crisis response measures and strategies for future preparedness programming."

1.2. METHODOLOGY

The methodology and approach used for the evaluation build directly on the TOR and general evaluation criteria — relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability — endorsed by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

It involved the following diverse methods: (a) a structured literature review covering internal and external documents; (b) in-depth interviews with key respondents and stakeholder groups within EU institutions and outside (including NGOs, experts, beneficiaries of IfS funding); and (c) the use of questionnaires/on-line surveys to capture the views of individuals not interviewed, or of respondents on an anonymous basis. Preliminary findings as the evaluation progressed were discussed extensively with the IfS team, and with team interlocutors when needed.

In order to refine findings, the evaluators elaborated a set of ‘qualifiers’ used to review findings as they emerged from the evaluation process. These include institutional opportunities/constraints (ranging from access to high quality information on crises, to a small team managing a large budget), and comparative perspectives from the management of other crisis response funds in other institutions. Additional qualifiers used include:

- The inherently political nature of the IfS, which enables the EU to play an enhanced role as a foreign and security policy actor;
- The fact that the IfS operates across the nexus between security and development and is designed to complement, and often to prepare the ground for, the EU’s mainstream external action instruments;
- The high risk and highly volatile environments in which crisis response instruments like the IfS operate;
- The complex nature of the international crisis preparedness, response and peace-building architecture; and
- The catalytic and supportive role the IfS can play in strengthening the EU’s effort to address crisis situations.

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4 Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 2006 on establishing an Instrument for Stability. The Regulation states that “The Commission shall regularly evaluate the results and efficiency of policies and programmes and the effectiveness of programming in order to ascertain whether the objectives have been met and enable it to formulate recommendations with a view to improving future operations. ... These results shall feed back into programme design and resource allocation.”
The evaluators also drew on a qualitative ‘scorecard’ system to catalogue and systematically review findings with regard to IfS crisis response measures. This scorecard system assessed the key areas this evaluation was tasked to consider according to their level of difficulty/challenge, the effort put into generating results, and overall results. This approach provides an accessible way to understand IfS results and identify areas for improvement. Fundamentally, however, despite the use of some quantitative methods for the evaluation, scorecard results are based on the combined personal judgment of the evaluation team.

The evaluation took place between late-January to June 2011, and was implemented by a team of three experts (see team biographies in Annex 3).

### 1.3. Caveats

Two main caveats to this evaluation should be considered.

First, while documentation on planning, reporting and other aspects of a selection of projects was reviewed, the scope and process of this programme-level evaluation did not include specific in-depth project-level reviews. Hence this evaluation cannot draw conclusions about the on-the-ground effectiveness and impact of IfS crisis response and preparedness or its capacity-strengthening activities at project level.

Second, further clarification of the evaluation’s scope and objectives with respect to the initial TOR required some adaptations to the methodology while the evaluation was underway. These changes meant that the level of depth and specificity needed to assess an instrument as complex as the IfS may in some places be seen as wanting.

### 1.4. Report Structure

This report has three sections, beyond the introduction:

- **Section 2** provides an overview of the IfS and locates the evaluation exercise within the broader context in which the Instrument operates. It covers the IfS rationale, the Regulation governing the IfS and the Instrument’s focus, the crisis response and crisis preparedness components and total disbursements to date.

- **Section 3** discusses the main achievements of both the crisis response and crisis preparedness components. This section then provides a disaggregated performance review, which highlights areas for improvement in relation to design, implementation and strategy.

- **Section 4** draws broad conclusions and provides high-level and technical recommendations for the evaluated IfS components.
2. OVERVIEW OF THE IFS

2.1 THE IFS RATIONALE

The IfS was launched one year after the 2006 reform of the European Commission’s external funding instruments. Its creation was intended to enhance the EU’s capacity and tools to undertake both urgent short-term crisis response measures (Article 3 of IfS) and more medium to longer term actions covering crisis preparedness (Article 4(3) of IfS) as well as trans-regional threats and CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons) non-proliferation (Articles 4(1) and 4(2) of IfS).5

Compared to the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), a predecessor instrument dealing only with short-term crisis responses, the IfS represented a significant increase in financial resources (€2.062 billion over the period 2007-20136), allowed programmes of a longer duration (18 months instead of 6 months for Article 3 crisis responses), and also included, inter alia, a new and separate crisis preparedness component to assist in building upstream pre- and post-crisis capacities in state and non-state actors and international, regional and sub-regional organisations.

Previously, the EU’s responses to both external political crises and recovery from natural disasters (post humanitarian aid) had to rely on its main development aid instruments, alongside an increasing number of EU Joint Actions related to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), incorporating the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). When the IfS was introduced, it allowed the EU to respond more rapidly to sudden events and support crisis prevention and response measures. This in turn helps with the re-establishment of conditions necessary to restore normal EU cooperation activities in support of the long-term development goals of partner countries.

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5 Activities under Article 4(1) and Article 4(2) of the IfS are not included in the scope of this evaluation.

6 For 2012-13, some additional funds are to be transferred to geographical instruments for MENA countries.

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Box 1: European Commission Policy and EU Strategies and Policies guiding the IfS

- EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts (2001)
- EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition (2004)
- European Consensus on Development (2005)
- The EU Policy Coherence for Development (2005)
- EU Strategy for Africa (2005)
- Council Conclusions on Security and Development (2007)
- Council Conclusions on an EU response to situations of fragility (2007)
- Concept Paper on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities (2009)
- The EU Comprehensive Approach to the EU implementation of the UNSCR 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security (2009)
action instruments (European Development Fund, Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance, European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, Development Cooperation Instrument, European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights). In accordance with the IfS Regulation, it is used when these other instruments cannot offer an appropriate or timely response to a given crisis, or cannot adequately do so without complementary support. The IfS can also be deployed in the context of Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development, where it can support early recovery measures bridging the gap between EU humanitarian aid and more medium to longer term development assistance.

### 2.2 Regulation and Focus

The IfS is governed by Regulation (EC) 1717/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 November 2006 establishing an Instrument for Stability. The implementation of crisis response actions is provided for under Article 3 of the Regulation, and is subject to specific consultation procedures set out in a Joint Council/Commission Declaration adopted alongside the Regulation establishing the IfS. While IfS crisis prevention and response measures cannot by their nature be programmed in advance, the overall implementation of the Instrument is also guided by a series of EU strategies and policies, as well as Commission policy documents (see Box 1).

Substantively, the IfS has a three-pronged focus. First, it ensures rapid, flexible and adequately funded first responses to situations of political crisis or natural disasters, including to initiatives that pre-empt them, in line with Article 3. Second, its crisis preparedness component Article 4(3) seeks to strengthen the pre- and post-crisis capacity of state and non-state actors, international, regional and sub-regional organisations by promoting the development of conflict prevention, peace-building and early recovery capacities. And third, it addresses global and trans-regional threats, while also supporting actions relating to the non-proliferation of CBRNs, consistent with Articles 4(1) and 4(2) – areas that are not included in the scope of this particular evaluation.

The allocation of funding to the different areas of focus reflects the intention of the Council and European Parliament to make the IfS primarily an instrument for crisis response (including prevention). Long-term measures under the IfS should not substitute those that can be better delivered under country and regional strategies funded through the main geographic and thematic financing instruments.

### 2.3 The Crisis Response Component

The initial allocated funding for IfS over 2007-2013 was €2.062 billion, as laid down in Article 24 of the IfS Regulation. However, in order to respond to the crisis created by soaring food prices in developing countries, the Commission decided to create the so-called “Food Facility” in 2009, and endowed it with approximately €1 billion. In a context of zero budget growth, the funding for the new Food Facility had to come from other existing instruments within the external cooperation chapter of the EU budget. IfS contributed €240 million to this facility, making the IfS’ actual available budget for 2007-2013 a maximum of €1.82 billion.

Out of the overall funding envelope, the crisis response component (Article 3) was to receive no less than 72%, while no more than 5% was to be allocated to the crisis preparedness component (Article 4(3)).

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9 Article 24, Regulation. The rest of the financial envelope was allocated as follows: no more than 7% shall be allocated to measures falling under
Evaluation of the Crisis Response and Preparedness Components of the European Union’s Instrument for Stability
Prepared by INCAS Consulting Limited, July 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget items</th>
<th>€ millions (2007-2011)</th>
<th>Percentage of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crisis response</td>
<td>1,487</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis preparedness</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction</td>
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<td>13%</td>
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<td>Trans-regional threats to security</td>
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<td>Administrative expenditure</td>
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<td>4%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,062</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: IfS Budget Allocations

In 2007, the crisis response component was allocated €93 million and in 2008 this figure rose to €129 million.

This corresponds to the reported commitment of €220 million for some 59 ‘actions’ in 2007 and 2008. The following years saw a year-on-year increase in the budget: €130 million in 2009, €136 million in 2010 and €189 million for 2011.

The crisis response component has also adopted a series of global financing decisions, putting in place thematic funding ‘PAMF facilities’ that in turn enable more rapid procedures for financing of smaller actions (under €2 million each) at the sub-delegated level, without the need for further individual full financing decisions. There have been five such ‘Policy Advice and Mediation’, or so-called PAMF facilities so far, totalling €67 million10.

Box 2: Areas for technical and financial assistance under Article 3, on IfS crisis response

a. Confidence building, mediation, dialogue, reconciliation.
b. Functioning of interim administrations.
c. Development of democratic state institutions.
d. Support for transitional justice.
e. Rehabilitation of infrastructure, productive capacity, economic activity, employment.
f. Demobilisation, reintegration of former combatants.
g. Mitigating social effects of restructuring of armed forces.
h. Addressing socio-economic impact on civilian population of land mines, unexploded ordinances.
i. Addressing impact on civilians of the illicit use of and access to firearms.
j. Measures to meet needs of women and children in crisis.
k. Rehabilitation and reintegration of victims of conflict.
l. Promote and defend human rights.
m. Socio-economic measures to promote equitable.
n. Socio-economic measures to address the impact of sudden population movements.
o. Development of civil society and participation in political process.
p. Measures in response to natural or man-made disaster and threats to public health.

Crisis prevention and response actions envisaged under Article 3 are not programmed on an annual basis. The IfS regulation, however, specifies in some detail the scope and themes for the use of Article 3:

“Actions may be undertaken in response to a situation of urgency, crisis or emerging crisis, a situation posing a threat to democracy, law and order, the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, or the security and safety of individuals, or a situation threatening to escalate into armed conflict or severely to destabilise the third country or countries concerned. Such measures may also address situations where the Community has invoked the essential elements clauses of international agreements in order to suspend, partially or totally, cooperation with third countries.”

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The 16 areas for support under Article 3 outlined in the regulation (see Box 2) allow a fair degree of flexibility in the use of the Instrument and its capacity to address a range of crisis factors.

2.4 The crisis preparedness component

Priorities under Article 4 are spelled out in the IfS Strategy Paper (2007-2011) and developed under the Multiannual Indicative Programmes 2007-2008 and 2009-2011. Of these, the priorities that fall under the scope of this evaluation relate to strengthening crisis preparedness capacities under Article 4(3). Specific objectives for this work, as outlined in the strategy paper, include:

- Build the capacity of non-state actors and regional and sub-regional organisations engaged in the prevention of violent conflict, post-conflict political stabilisation and early recovery after a natural disaster;
- Strengthen capacities for providing early warning of potential crisis situations;
- Ensure access to a well-trained body of experts with relevant skills in the fields listed under Article 3(2) of the Instrument for Stability; and
- Build close operational links between the EU and relevant UN agencies and programmes, the World Bank and other multilateral and regional organisations in the above areas.

The activities funded under Article 4(3) are programmed through Annual Action Programmes and constitute the IfS’ so-called Peace-building Partnership (PbP), which was established to build the capacity of, and improve communication with its key partners in pre- and post-crisis situations.

Between 2007 and 2010, 42 actions have already been contracted under the PbP. These actions focus on: (a) building the general capacity of non-state actors to respond to crises situations (49%); (b) co-operating with international organisations and with regional organisations (28%); and (c) working with relevant EU Member State bodies on the training of police and civilian experts to participate in international stabilisation missions (23%). From a thematic point of view, the activities have focused on: situations of fragility and conflict; women, peace and security; security sector reform, including disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; disaster risk reduction and early recovery; natural resources and conflict; mediation and dialogue; and human security.

2.5 Total financial commitments to date

Since its launch more than €350 million has been committed under the IfS in approximately 100 crisis response actions spread over 48 countries worldwide. An additional €40 million has been committed for crisis preparedness under Article 4(3) of the IfS Regulation during 2007-2010.

2.6 IfS Staff Resources

The IfS (articles 3 and 4(3)) was managed by the Commission’s former Directorate-General for External Relations (RELEX), Unit A2 until 31 December 2010. The team included eight Crisis Response Planners, working on all stages from conceptualisation to implementation of IfS Emergency Response Actions (Article 3), four staff working with programming and implementation of the Peace-building Partnership (Article 4(3)) and a contract/financial cell with five staff supporting both these two components of the IfS programme,
including all issues related to contracting, financial implementation/monitoring, etc.

Following the reorganisation of the EU institutions involved in relations with third countries, notably the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), most of these functions were transferred to Unit 2 (FPI.2) of the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), a new service established within the European Commission and to be co-located with the EEAS. To ensure, inter alia, continuing programming functions of the Peace-building Partnership, three members of staff of the former RELEX A2 were transferred to the EEAS.

The FPI.2 Unit’s headquarters team is also assisted by nine IfS-funded Regional Crisis Response Planning Officers (RCRPOs) based in nine EU Delegations around the world. Following political developments in their assigned geographical area (normally between 10 and 30 countries, though only some of these are likely to be crisis-prone at any time), they assist headquarters with the identification and preparation of IfS actions, as well as follow-up/implementation-related issues, including regular reporting to headquarters.

In countries with major IfS projects, some 15 Project Managers (contract agents funded under the IfS administrative budget line, as with the RCRPOs) assist the EU Delegations where they are based with all issues linked to implementation. In other Delegations, the regular cooperation staff manages IfS implementation.
3. RESULTS

3.1 SUMMARY OF MAIN ACHIEVEMENTS

The evaluators consider the Instrument to be a unique Instrument within the EU peace, security and development architecture. Articles 3 and 4(3), in particular, fill an important strategic, funding and capacity gap, and allow the EU to support a broad range of critical crisis preparedness and response initiatives. The design and management of actions under the Instrument has led to a significant number of achievements that should be recognised as important contributions to global peace and stability. Initiatives funded by the two components examined by the evaluation team, have allowed the EU to play a critical role in contributing to crisis prevention, and to respond effectively and speedily to early recovery, stabilisation and peace-building opportunities. In particular, they have contributed to:

- Expanding and scaling up EU capacity to intervene in crisis situations from a geographic, thematic, funding and time-horizon viewpoint, particularly through Article 3;
- Leveraging and enhancing the coherence and effectiveness of the EU peace, security and development instruments and initiatives in support of critical crisis prevention, stabilisation and peace-building initiatives;
- Enhancing the capacities of partners to prepare for and respond to crisis; and
- Providing relevant policy input to high level EU decision-making and helping to kick-start important reforms, while highlighting EU visibility and political leverage in third countries.

Several cases are given below that illustrate the value of Instrument measures. Examples of the greater role played by the EU in preventing and responding to crises and contributing to peace-building include the contributions to confidence-building, mediation and dialogue initiatives (under Article 3) in countries like Georgia, Honduras, Nepal, the Philippines and Uganda. The Instrument has also contributed to enhancing civilian capacities to support crisis mananagement and stabilisation operations (under Article 4(3)) by funding the training of civilian and police experts to participate in international missions under the EU’s CFSP/CSDP, the UN, Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), African Union (AU), to mention some.

In South Sudan, the IfS support to the political transition (i.e. referenda and related processes) contributed to retaining stability in the Southern provinces and in the Transitional Areas. At the same time support to basic services, undertaken jointly with the bilateral aid efforts of a number of EU Member States, contributed to bringing peace dividends to war-affected communities. Both interventions were aimed at establishing confidence in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the referendum process and the Government of South Sudan; the lack of such confidence had been identified as a key area of risk five years after the CPA. Support to the referenda process was core to the EU’s strategic objectives and formed part of strong support from the EU to UN/ AU-led mediation efforts. The Instrument support included the provision of EU experts to support the implementation of a sound referendum process, and to join the AU-led mediation team to address post-referendum issues such as citizenship, security and border related issues; which in turn was expected to give the EU an inside track in the negotiation process. This latter sub-component was at times difficult to deliver on, partly because the AU panel required a lot of time to process the offers of experts and partly because the processing of contracts, administered by the International Organisation for Migration, was often delayed due to visa processing difficulties in Sudan.
and flexible interventions and providing a bridge between various EU instruments, it is relatively clear that the IfS (following on its RRM predecessor) has contributed to the success of the Aceh peace agreement, and to supporting the delicate transition in South Sudan (see Box 3).

**Box 4: A comprehensive EU response in Georgia**

The mobilisation of IfS funding in response to a Flash Appeal following a Joint Needs Assessment carried out in 2009 in Georgia enabled the EU to enhance the coherence of its response and that of other partners to the crisis. Actions under the IfS complemented and catalysed other EU financial instruments (budget support, humanitarian funds), and increased the rapidity and flexibility of responses across a range of critical areas for stabilisation.

IfS Exceptional Assistance Measures enabled confidence-building across the conflict divide between Georgia proper and the contested entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and supported political reform in Georgia. The support to civil society in Abkhazia and early recovery for IDPs and returnees, whose difficult situation was a challenge to political stability and complicating diplomatic attempts at solving the crisis, proved critical.

With a clearly responsive EU Delegation in Tbilisi, and in complementarity with CSDP through the EU Special Representative (EUSR) and the later deployment of the EU Monitoring Mission in October 2008, full advantage could be made of the flexibility provided by the IfS; critical stabilisation and peace-building initiatives were funded through the IfS to be used in highly sensitive regions, where no other funding was available; and an effort was made to work with local partners despite the high risk associated.

The IfS intervention in Georgia can be considered as quite an effective response to help preserve the conditions essential to the proper implementation of the EU’s development and cooperation policies, in accordance with Article 1(2)(a) of the IfS Regulation.

Examples of where initiatives under Article 3 have contributed policy input to reforms and enhanced EU visibility and political leverage include: Armenia (Reform Advisory Team); the Central African Republic (Security Sector Reform (SSR) team of experts and related SSR support, including the implementation of two joint sector reviews); Zimbabwe, where the IfS intervention has helped the European Commission transitional framework strategy for 2010-2011 to materialise; and Kyrgyzstan, where the EU has become a key actor in conflict transformation.

The IfS has enabled the EU and key partners (UN, WB and civil society organisations) to support national stakeholders in responding early to crises. Initiatives in this area include the development of tools, capacities and provision of funds to undertake Post Conflict and Post Disaster Needs Assessments (PCNA/PDNA). The development of tools was funded under the IfS longer term crisis preparedness component (Article 4(3)), while the Article 3 crisis response component subsequently funded PCNA and PDNA missions in a number of countries. These include Pakistan, Bangladesh and Haiti. The Haiti PDNA is to date the biggest exercise of this kind organised under the UN-WB-EU umbrella, and involved the participation of several experts from both EU institutions and EU Member States. It led to the Haitian recovery plan being presented to the pledging conference in New York, and has been the basis for the joint EU reprogramming of development funds. PCNAs funded by the IfS are increasingly used as analytical tools to inform planning processes in crisis-affected contexts.

Georgia (see Box 4) provides an example of a flexible and timely intervention that improved coherence and effectiveness of the EU response to the crisis in the country, filling critical funding gaps and supporting key stabilisation and reconciliation objectives.

Through the Peace-building Partnership (PbP), the IfS has contributed to strengthening the capacities of non-state actors and regional and sub-regional organisations on early warning. An example of this is the support to the AU’s Continental Early Warning System. The creation of the Civil Society Dialogue Network on peace-building issues, managed by the European Peace-building Liaison Office (EPLO, a platform of NGOs) but open to all civil society organisations active in the field of peace-building
is also considered as important as it has created a platform for dialogue and policy exchange among non-state actors involved in peace-building, and between them and the EU.

The evaluators also conclude that the IfS has had a catalytic effect in attracting contributions from other donors by, for instance, enabling the setting up of Multi-Donor Trust funds in Haiti and Nepal. Further, there is clear evidence that it has bolstered EU coherence via complementary measures to CFSP/CSDP actions. An example of this is the IfS support to police training within the UN Mission in Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) policing operation in eastern Chad, which worked in tandem with the EU’s military CSDP operation EUFOR Chad/CAR. The EU Naval Force (EU-NAVFOR) Atalanta naval operation to combat Somali pirates is considered another important example where an EU mission would have been less effective without complementary EU support under the IfS (see Box 5).

Box 5: IfS support as an essential complement to the EU-NAVFOR CSDP Atalanta naval operation

IfS support helped ensure the quality of trial processes, including improvements to detention and trial facilities, which proved important in gaining initial cooperation from the Government of Kenya to handle trials of alleged pirates captured by the EU’s CSDP naval operation, known as EU-NAVFOR Atalanta. Without such support and cooperation, the piracy suspects would have had to be released, thus reducing the efficacy and deterrent effect of the Atalanta operation. Following Kenya’s lead, the Seychelles entered into a similar agreement shortly afterwards, which illustrates the IfS’ leverage effect. Meanwhile, the availability of similar IfS support was critical in securing the agreement of Mauritius to receive piracy suspects detained by Atalanta – and thus helping ensure the continued success of the EU’s naval operation.

The comprehensiveness of the EU response and the IfS’ contribution was also enhanced by the fact that the EU, together with a number of its Member States and other international partners, are members of the Contact Group on Somalia which supported the efforts of the fledgling Transitional Federal Government, the UN Political Office on Somalia and the African Union military mission, AMISOM, towards the establishment of a peaceful environment.

Key contributing factors to the achievements of the IfS components reviewed by the evaluation team include: (a) the broad scope of the Instrument as outlined in the Regulation; (b) the streamlined (compared to other EU instruments) yet robust decision-making process of the IfS; (c) increased capacities and expertise in the area of crisis response and preparedness available to the EU at HQ level and in the field (i.e. planners); and (d) the capacity for effective and quick disbursement of funds. The ability of the IfS to quickly mobilise funding under Article 3 to a broad range of actors across the crisis response spectrum (i.e. national stakeholders, NGOs, EU Member State agencies, multi-lateral and regional organisations) deserves special mention as a feature of the Instrument that significantly contributes to its achievements.

3.2 Disaggregated Performance Assessment

The evaluation team has assessed the performance of the short term crisis response and the longer-term crisis preparedness components at different levels, although evaluation emphasis was placed on crisis response. The performance is assessed in regard to the extent to which initiatives under Articles 3 and 4(3) were designed in line with the Regulation, were implemented effectively, and were strategic, including by addressing relevant key cross-cutting issues such as gender.

Scorecards disaggregate the performance in relation to:

1. Design This refers to the pre-implementation phase and looks at alignment of initiatives (i.e. project concepts) with the IfS regulation, the identification process and the decision-making processes, including funding decisions, the management of institutional interfaces, the choice of implementing bodies, and the quality of data and analysis underpinning decisions on the
use of the Instrument.

2. **Implementation** This refers to key aspects of the implementation of the initiatives and focuses on the performance in budget management, monitoring and evaluation, the effectiveness of the Instrument in leveraging other instruments, and its political leverage.

3. **Strategic and cross-cutting issues** This refers to whether the IfS strategic framework allows for strategic use of IfS funds under the two components covered by this evaluation, addresses cross-cutting issues, and enables better management of risk.

Scorecards provide the evaluators’ assessment of the typical level of challenge or difficulty presented; the corresponding effort put in by those responsible for management and implementation; and attainment in relation to key evaluation questions.

- The level of **challenge** refers to the complexity and challenge typically presented by specific tasks. A distinction is made between tasks that are of a ‘high’ (a very complex and challenging task), ‘medium’ (complex and challenging) and ‘low’ (fairly uncomplicated and easy) level of challenge.

- The level of **effort** gives an appreciation of the amount of work put into a specific task. A ‘high’ effort score means that a significant amount of work has been put into a task and denotes that the task has been prioritised. A ‘medium’ effort score means that the amount of work put into a task is commensurate with its level of difficulty; while a ‘low’ score implies that work put into a task may be insufficient or inadequate.

- The **attainment** (or achievement) rating is provided with an A, B, C scoring; where ‘A’ denotes achievement above expected levels; ‘B’ is achievement at expected levels; and ‘C’ is achievement below expected levels.

The scorecards aim to identify where efforts need to be adjusted to tackle different levels of challenge associated with deliverables, where work has been commensurate with needs or surpassed expectations, and what key challenges require attention. The explanatory text that follows each scorecard addresses the issues where attainment scores may be B or below. The scoring is based on research findings and the evaluation criteria is outlined in the inception report.
## 3.3 Scorecard — Design of IfS Crisis Response Interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DESIGN</th>
<th>LEVEL OF CHALLENGE</th>
<th>EFFORT</th>
<th>ATTAINMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project concepts in line with Regulation</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic decision-making:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-making process</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>A-B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of funding decisions</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management of institutional interfaces between IfS and:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic services at HQ</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Delegations</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice of implementing bodies</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>A-B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of data/analysis used for preparation of IfS actions:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self generated</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External-independent/with UN, WB</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Level of challenge: From low, medium, to high; Effort: From low, medium, to high;
Attainment: A= above expected level; B= at expected level; and C= below expected level

### Project concepts in line with IfS Regulation

As mentioned in Chapter 2, Article 3 of the Regulation outlines 16 thematic areas that allow the Instrument the flexibility to intervene across a broad range of sectors. The evaluators found the concepts and designs of IfS crisis response projects to be in line with these thematic priorities.

An analysis of the interventions under Article 3\textsuperscript{11} shows that the majority of crisis prevention and response measures are in the areas of confidence building, mediation, dialogue and reconciliation, and democratisation processes, including support to interim administrations and transitional justice. This suggests that interventions are in line with the scope of the Regulation, and that through the IfS, the EU is effectively addressing critical political aspects of

\textsuperscript{11} 2008 and 2009 annual reports.
Initiatives under Article 4(3) are in line with the Regulation and with the Strategy Paper (2007-2011) that outlines the specific objectives for the Article. Proposals are largely based on sound assumptions underpinning the aims and objectives. In addition, the design of projects under both components are well tailored to the objectives and focal areas of the Instrument.

The design of projects (Article 3), and the programme and planning documents (Article 4(3)), however, could be improved by including a more structured articulation of the links between the objectives and the inputs, the implementation strategy and the intended outputs and outcomes. This is what is known as “theories of change”.

For measures funded under the PbP, the obligatory logical framework requires inputs relating to implementation risks and their management to be elaborated. Financing decision documents for crisis response measures typically include an “Assumptions and Risks” section. Here the risks to implementation could also be made more explicit, as could risk management measures.

Further strengthening the project design or programme logic, i.e. the causal links between projected actions and expected results would contribute to enhancing the overall effectiveness of IfS funded actions and will enable a better demonstration of impact. It would also increase accountability and help develop a better understanding of what works and what doesn’t.

Efforts in this direction should take into account that IfS initiatives often come in at a stage when “theories of desired changes” in a country are still being developed at country level, and that the actions of the IfS contribute towards the real-time development and implementation of these. The trade-off between developing desirable levels of detail and the speed in responding is also a factor that influences the design of projects.

### IfS crisis response decision-making process

IfS decision-making processes (as stipulated in the Regulation and Joint Declaration) are adhered to and managed effectively. The process seeks to involve all key players and be quicker than other decision-making processes within the EU. The open and alert approach of staff has certainly contributed to a good level of responsiveness and to seizing important opportunities to intervene. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) of EU Member State ambassadors receive well-presented detailed submissions, both written and oral, and tailored to context dynamics. Apart from being consulted on new proposals, the PSC is also provided with updates on the implementation of ongoing measures.

The European Parliament is kept informed through the Working Group on Conflict, Security and Development of the Foreign Affairs committee. This Working Group was established in the framework of facilitating democratic scrutiny of the IfS.

There are two areas where further improvement can be made – on timing and the balance between technical and political decision-making.

**Timing** The current IfS action approval process typically takes 2-6 weeks at a bureaucratic level, though where urgency has necessitated the speedy approval of funding for measures under the PAMF facility, these have been processed in even shorter...
periods. Approval procedures of course cannot be launched until the necessary identification, definition and selection of implementation modalities are undertaken, which can take a variable amount of time. Hence, and in practice, this means that crisis response by the IfS can take on average between two to four months from the initial idea stage through full definition, before implementation starts.

While in some circumstances time is needed to define, mature and gain stakeholders’ buy-in of an intervention, the implications of an average two- to four-month ‘defined measures-to-implementation start’ is significant in crisis contexts. In some settings this turnaround time can work, but in others the situation on the ground may be evolving substantially while the preparation and adoption of the measure is being processed. The design of IfS actions has often had to be dynamic in such circumstances, and the incorporation of some flexibility has proved important. The introduction of retroactive funding in some particular crisis situations, the capacity to process PAMF measures in two weeks, and flexibility clauses in some decisions also partly address these challenges.

The Regulation could be updated to allow two or more consecutive EAMs to be financed. This would enable faster responses than the current system, where only a single EAM procedure is allowed which may be followed by an Interim Response Programme, involving heavier and slower procedures.

**Technical-political balance** Fundamentally, IfS crisis response actions are based on proposals. In some cases proposals are requested following a political statement (i.e. Council Decision, Article 96 consultations, peace agreement, policy seminars). In these cases, an identification mission is followed by a detailed concept note and the inclusion of the

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**Figure 1: Consultation and Decision-making Process on Crisis Response Proposals**

![Diagram of consultation and decision-making process]

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proposal into the IfS Monthly Note. This process appears to balance technical aspects of decisions in the proposals with political decisions on priority actions (see Figure 1).

In other cases, EU Country Delegations will request an IfS identification mission or proposals are submitted directly by IGOs or NGOs. This leads to proposals that benefit from substantial IfS team engagement on how measures can best be adjusted to address a particular crisis and possible on-ground realities once implementation begins. Much political decision-making is made at this technical level, which provides a technical robustness to proposed measures. The political approval of proposed measures then takes place in the decision-making processes stipulated in the Regulation and Joint Declaration – allowing political priorities to determine whether proposals are accepted or not.

When proposals emerge from an identification mission or are submitted by external agencies, the IfS team determines how to best align proposed measures to EU political priorities. This will have benefitted from consultations by EU Delegations with EU Member States embassies in the particular country. However, given the deeply political nature of the IfS actions, a deeper and more systematic analysis of EU political priorities related to specific crisis situations could be beneficial. Clearly integrating these priorities into proposals would ensure the decision-making on IfS actions reflects and addresses political priorities.

The positioning of the IfS within the new EU external relations’ institutional structure may set the stage for a greater degree of political inputs into the decision-making process related to IfS funded actions – and has to be followed carefully.

IfS crisis response implementing partners

Measures to be funded under Article 3 are allowed to derogate from standard EU procedures, particularly when it comes to the choice of implementing bodies. Unlike funding under the Peace-building Partnership (PbP) of the crisis preparedness component, crisis response initiatives do not have to go through the lengthy process of Calls for Proposals.

The fact that the IfS can finance a broad variety of actors, ranging from multi-lateral organisations, EU Member State agencies to national and local bodies and non-state actors gives the Instrument a unique reach, even when compared to other global funds for crisis prevention and response. This also gives the Instrument the capacity to intervene at different levels, thus enabling a more comprehensive approach to crisis response, as illustrated above in the case of Georgia.

However, until 2009 around half of IfS funding under Article 3 went to UN agencies as implementing partners (see Figure 2). This appears to be largely due to the reality that in the majority of contexts in which the IfS operates, there are not many partners with the capacity, expertise, field presence, accountability mechanisms, track record and political relations of UN agencies.

The extensive use of implementing partners like the UN can sometimes be at odds with the ‘fast
action’ value the IfS contributes given often slow UN mobilisation, unless support is being given to ongoing programmes. Further, implementation through the UN in many instances means delegating a whole set of functions and roles to UN agencies, with often more limited control by the EU than with other actors. In some cases, limited EU oversight has been mitigated by an enhanced role of EU Delegations on steering committees of UN projects, as in Georgia, Honduras, Solomon Islands and Kyrgyzstan.

High-reliance on the UN as implementing partner may also lead to missing important opportunities for building capacities for crisis prevention and recovery of a broader range of actors, especially national actors, who are clearly listed in the Regulation among the beneficiaries and implementing partners for the IfS. The significant support by the PbP to large EU-based NGOs should also be re-assessed to ensure that the best approach is pursued. This exercise should, however, consider that: (a) in general, crisis preparedness actions are encouraged to not be country-specific; (b) many PbP actions which have an international NGO as the main beneficiary have local NGOs as partners; and (c) civil society funding is increasingly devolved via the Delegations, with a view to funding locally-based actors.

Views among stakeholders on the predominant use of the UN as an implementing body are mixed, and suggest that possibilities for a choice of a more diverse range of partners, particularly local actors, should be further explored in some situations to develop the full strategic and implementation potential of the Instrument. This will of course depend on several issues. First is existing financial and implementation capacities, the lack of which in many crisis contexts is a real constraining factor. Second is the urgency of interventions, which limits the time available to go through processes of identification and selection of partners. And third is the highly political nature of some interventions, which make the use of a partner like the UN ‘safer’.

Fundamentally, the issue in the choice of implementing partners for the IfS is the need to ensure that the process for selection (contextual, political and procedural) articulates more clearly the criteria used and enables considering a variety of options with regard to implementing partners, while also maintaining close attention to a timely selection process. Also, the rationale for the selection of partners needs to be clearly articulated.¹⁵

3.4 Critical aspects of IfS crisis response implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION</th>
<th>LEVEL OF CHALLENGE</th>
<th>EFFORT</th>
<th>ATTAINMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Budget management for implementation</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leverage of other instruments</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>A/B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political leverage</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LEVEL OF CHALLENGE: From low, medium, to high; Effort: From low, medium, to high; Attainment: A= above expected level; B= at expected level; and C= below expected level

Monitoring

Monitoring (and evaluation) requirements are outlined in the Regulation. The main monitoring requirement is the Annual Report, as per Article 23:

“The Commission shall examine progress achieved in implementing the measures undertaken pursuant to this Regulation and shall submit to the European Parliament and the Council an annual report on the implementation of the assistance. The report shall also be addressed to the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. The report shall contain information relating to the previous year on the measures financed and information on the results of monitoring and evaluation exercises and the implementation of budget commitments and payments, broken down by country, region and cooperation sector”.

Annual report and progress reports, including the financial information, are indeed an important source of information on the implementation of projects under the crisis response and preparedness component. Annual reports are comprehensive, submitted regularly and have been improving over the years.

Interim internal monitoring reports on specific IfS actions are prepared by Delegations and shared with headquarters in Brussels. The template for regular reports from Delegations is included in the IfS Guidance note of 2010. The format and examples examined by the evaluation team suggest that with some modifications (see Table 2) the current interim monitoring reports could be enhanced monitoring tools. The information in these reports can be further analysed to inform decisions in regard to the continuation or adaptation of the measures. While keeping in mind IfS specificities, it may also be useful to consider applying more mainstream Commission reporting guidance and frequency, if this could help ease and streamline the reporting tasks of Delegations.

During the project life cycle, EU Delegations may also be occasionally requested to provide further specific inputs for the Commission’s information, updates and other reports to Council (including to the Political and Security Committee (PSC)) and Parliament. This is in

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compliance with Article 6(6) of the IfS Regulation, which states:

“At as early a stage as possible, following the adoption of Exceptional Assistance Measures, and in any case within seven months of doing so, the Commission shall report to the European Parliament and the Council by giving an overview of the existing and planned Community response, including the contribution to be made from other Community financing instruments, the status of existing Country and Multi-Country Strategy Papers, and the Community’s role within the broader international and multilateral response. This report shall also indicate whether and, if so, for how long the Commission intends to continue the Exceptional Assistance Measures.”

Despite these provisions and the significant efforts to compile and provide information through annual reports, interim reports and additional inputs, the capacity to monitor IfS-funded interventions, in particular crisis response ones, is affected by a number of factors. These include: (a) the not always clear articulation in project design of expected changes and outcomes, against which to monitor progress; (b) the reliance on partners’ monitoring systems, in particular for the significant funds channeled through multi-lateral organisations; and (c) the fact that sufficient human resources and related capacities for systematic monitoring are not always available to EU Delegations, nor to the IfS team at headquarters level.

Evaluations of individual IfS actions are carried out and to date these have not been published. Useful reports on specific components of the IfS include the Stocktaking Study on the Peace-building Partnership (2009), which the evaluators consider an example of good practice, and a number of independent studies.\(^1\)

Beyond an accountability function, evaluations have important practice- and lessons-learned implications for the IfS team and broader crisis response community. It would, therefore, be advisable to ensure evaluations are publicly available when appropriate and uploaded to the IfS website. An annual or bi-annual synthesis report of IfS evaluations could also enable easier access to critical information regarding the performance of the IfS overall, and of its specific interventions. It would also facilitate lessons learning across the crisis response and peace-building communities.

### Leverage effect

The strategic position of IfS within the EU’s peace, security and development architecture, and particularly the areas where it can intervene, allows the Instrument to play a significant leverage effect at four main levels: (a) in facilitating policy and operational coherence; (b) in relation to other EU instruments; (c) in supporting and deploying capacities; and (d) in bolstering existing, and ‘breaking ground’ for new interventions.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HEADINGS</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>COMMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Description of project and objectives</td>
<td>These come from the Commission Decision.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Actual implementation status and major developments in the project</td>
<td>This is where project progress and achievements, and any setbacks, since the last report are highlighted. As a footnote to this section, the Project Manager “should take into account how the project is meeting objectives and provide qualitative analysis on efficiency, effectiveness and outputs/outcomes (contributing towards impact) to date.”</td>
<td>Unless the objectives in the Decision are “SMART” and based on a theory of change, or the assumptions underpinning the objectives are made explicit, then it is hard to provide this type of analysis. Also appropriate resources in country are required to do this properly. This part is a footnote, so easily overlooked. The tendency would be to report as a narrative against the progress of activities, rather than against outputs and outcomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Issues for attention of Head of Delegation and HQ</td>
<td>“Factors contributing to success and/or lack of success of project components, problems encountered – i.e. political/legal/capacity/budgetary/timeframe constraints. Also highlight key recent developments in the evolution of the political and crisis contexts, having potential implications for this IfS project. Identify and assess any risks to success of the IfS action. Report on results of on-the-spot controls, audits and evaluation.”</td>
<td>The information required is listed comprehensively. The way it is set out, however, makes it easy to overlook or ignore. There is scope to break this down in separate sections: (a) analysis of context; (b) risks – not just assessment but potentially impact on project and, crucially, how these risks are to be managed; and (c) actual implementation management – includes budget, reporting from partners, operational issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Highlight any specific developments with regard to linkages to other EC/EU actions</td>
<td>“Assess progress in the reporting period quarter and identify opportunities for further coherence/synergies with other strategies (e.g. CSPs and actions of the Commission, wider EU and other multilateral and national actors).”</td>
<td>There is room here to ask for reporting on complementarities and coherence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Length of report</td>
<td>Length of report should normally NOT exceed two pages.</td>
<td>This restriction may lead to over-simplification and/or abstraction of information, whereas monitoring requires detailed information and analysis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Template for Interim Reports from Delegations to HQ – Suggested modifications
The EU CSDP naval operation Atalanta discussed above illustrates how the IfS was instrumental in helping to leverage agreement between the High Representative /Vice President and the Government of Mauritius on a Transfer Agreement for piracy suspects detained by Atalanta, thus significantly increasing the potential for success of the entire Atalanta operation.

In relation to Article 4(3), there is also evidence to suggest that longer-term support to policy and capacity development has helped leverage capacities of key partners, including the UN, regional organisations and non-state actors. Here notable examples are political and financial support to the Africa Security and Peace architecture of the African Union, through the strengthening of the AU Continental Early Warning System, and the support to the UN Department of Political Affairs’ Mediation Support Unit.

The leverage capacity of the IfS depends largely on the context (often non-linear and long transitions) and on the capacity of other instruments to take over. In South Sudan, for instance, the particular context, lack of timely availability of European Development Fund (EDF) funds in 2010 and the comparatively high risk of operations was not conducive to the use of regular instruments, leaving the IfS as the only option for support. In Zimbabwe, following the suspension of normal cooperation activities under the EDF (Article 96 of Cotonou agreement), the IfS was almost the only available instrument to support essential actions, including support to civil society.

Key features that enable the Instrument to play this role include:

- The speed and relative flexibility of decision-making and deployment of resources;
- The ability to fund immediate responses, and also to build capacities for longer-term engagement;
- The emphasis on supporting key sectors for stabilisation, including confidence building measures, mediation and dialogue, functioning of interim administrations and support to transitional justice;
- The essential complementarity with other EU financial instruments which the IfS can ensure;
- The relatively close coordination with EU Member States’ bilateral actions, notably in the PSC, which makes the IfS more immediately politically responsive than other instruments; and
- The fact that no Financing Agreement with the beneficiary state is needed for IfS measures (as opposed to the normal practice in development cooperation programmes), which allows IfS to intervene in areas where other instruments cannot due to the need to obtain the formal agreement of the concerned government (e.g. supporting civil society in some “rogue” states).

However, for the Instrument to achieve its full potential both in terms of leverage effect, and, more broadly, ensure even greater impact and results, all concerned EU actors need to ensure together that there are clearer strategies and criteria to guide the transition from one instrument to another. Such strategies should be reflected to the extent possible in the decision-making process and in the design of projects. Further, a more flexible timeframe for the use of the Instrument to allow EAMs beyond 18 months in order to help link them more effectively to other EU cooperation instruments should also be considered, as should the possibility for the Regulation to permit two or more consecutive EAMs to be adopted in response to an evolving crisis context (without the requirement to go through a slower IRP procedure).

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18 AU capacities have also been supported through Article 3 measures; €4.7 million support to the creation of the Strategic Management and Planning Unit in relation to AMISOM-AU peace keeping operation in Somalia, deployment of four EU planners to this Unit, support to AU electoral observation capacities (€1 million.)
3.5 Strategic and Cross-Cutting Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic and Cross-Cutting Issues</th>
<th>Level of Challenge</th>
<th>Effort</th>
<th>Attainment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic framework</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>A-B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management of Risk</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of gender sensitivity</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(assessment, outputs)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Level of challenge: From low, medium, to high; Effort: From low, medium, to high;
Attainment: A= above expected level; B= at expected level; and C= below expected level

Strategic framework

The overall guiding strategic framework for the use of the IfS is set out by the Regulation. According to Article 5 of the Regulation, IfS assistance under the Regulation shall be implemented through: (a) EAMs and IRPs for Article 3; (b) Multi-country Strategy Papers, Thematic Strategy Papers and Multiannual Indicative Programmes for Article 4; (c) associated Annual Action Programmes setting out measures to be adopted on the basis of the Multi-country and Thematic Strategy Papers and Multiannual Indicative Programmes; and (d) Special Measures that may be adopted in the event of unforeseen needs or circumstances which cannot be covered in the Multi-country and Thematic Strategy Papers and Multiannual Indicative Programmes.

By outlining the characteristics of the various measures, when they can be used, the financial characteristics, as well as the requirements in terms of ensuring transparency and accountability in the use of resources, in particular for EAMs the Regulation provides an effective framework to guide the strategic use of the IfS.

However, the process that guides the use of IfS funding does not spell out how to ensure complementarity between IfS funding and other instruments, thematic and geographic strategies or between long- and short-term strategies.

In practice, this strategic deficit goes beyond the IfS and is in some instances filled through initiatives such as EU joint task forces and missions, typically leading to joint options or strategic papers (covering the full array of EU instruments) for specific crisis contexts (for example Burundi, Guinea Bissau). A joint Commission-European External Action Service (EEAS) mission to Sudan in early 2011, along with previous inter-service missions to Guinea-Bissau and Zimbabwe provided effective means to link short-term crisis management and long-term instruments linked to conflict, security and development as part of coherent overall EU responses. These are examples of good practice that can be built upon.

In relation to the IfS Strategy Paper (2007-2011), which sets out the strategic and policy framework within which Article 4(3) is to be implemented, the analytical and policy contexts in the strategy paper are limited in detail and definition of some key concepts (i.e. post-conflict, conflict prevention, post-conflict political stabilisation). This affects the design of interventions under Article 4(3) and its strategic use

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19 IfS Regulation, Article 6(4) and 6(5)

20 IfS Strategy paper 2007-2011, paragraph 3.4.2 “Post-conflict political stabilisation” is a specific objective to build the capacity of non-state actors etc that are engaged in post-conflict political stabilisation.”
– as a lack of clarity on detail and definition leads to broad and differing interpretations, and a consequent lack of focus and coherence.

**Funding**

As highlighted throughout this report, the IfS supports critical areas and phases of crisis response and preparedness, which either cannot be funded by other instruments or are traditionally under-funded both by the EU and other key partners. It also funds interventions that are in many instances high-cost and often occur in particularly difficult operational environments. While funding allocation under Article 3 is based on an assessment of the necessary resources for interventions and of absorption capacities in a specific crisis context, availability of additional funding could enhance IfS’ capacity to provide more comprehensive responses in some crisis situations, or to address additional situations as they emerge. Likewise, initiatives under Article 4(3) could benefit from greater funding availability, bearing in mind limitations in relation to absorption capacities of partners.

Furthermore, the global economic crisis has meant that other crisis response funds (such as those managed by UNDP/Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery) have suffered cut-backs due to funding shortages. From a global peace and security architecture perspective, this increases the importance of funding available through the IfS. As mentioned above in Section 2, IfS funds have been reduced – a decision that should be reconsidered by the EU budgetary authority.

**Box 6: Elements of a risk management strategy**

Risk management is the identification, assessment and prioritisation of risks. It involves working systematically through higher level strategic risk analysis of a given programme to define the broader risk framework for individual projects. Higher level risks, for example, may include general insecurity or the non-spending of budgets.

Lower level project-specific risks specifically affect the success of a project. At the project level, higher and lower level risks need to be monitored. This entails tracking higher/lower level risks in terms of their likelihood and impact.

Tracking is followed by updating risk management and mitigation measures. The management of risks at project level involves appointing a dedicated “risk owner” for each project.

**Management of Risk**

The operating context of the IfS is high risk for two main reasons. First, there is a high political and reputational risk for the EU because of the particular challenges of operating in crisis and conflict contexts. And second, there is a range of project-specific delivery risks associated with implementing activities in crisis and conflict settings.

When working on potentially high risk environments there can be a natural tendency towards risk aversion. Risk in IfS interventions is assessed through various means. Key stakeholders are consulted during decision-making at political and technical levels, which enables some elements of risk assessment. This is complemented by internal monitoring by project managers who, through regular reports, are required to identify and highlight potential problems.

There are considerable efforts made by the IfS team to ensure risks are assessed and measures to mitigate risks are taken. This process is integrated in the decision-making process, in particular through consultation at the highest level, and in the project documents. There are also written agreements in project documentation with implementing partners on how risk will be managed.
While existing risk management efforts are significant, there is value in further systematising risk assessments and management in the IfS. This could be done through more capacity-building of staff to manage risk, ensuring that the assessment and management of risk at different levels and stages is clearly set out and systematically applied, and that project proposals explicitly state detailed risk management strategies (see Box 6). The recognition and increased prioritisation of risk management from the outset and the engagement of those responsible to formally scrutinise risks at an early stage may enhance the capacity to take and manage risks in IfS resource allocation and implementation of measures.

**Quality of gender sensitivity**

A significant effort has gone into strengthening the IfS capacity to address gender issues through both crisis response and preparedness measures. Gender is one of the priority thematic areas of focus within the team, and the IfS is also represented in the joint Council-Commission Informal Women Peace and Security Task Force on UNSCRs 1325 and 1820 that aims to increase inter-institutional coordination and to promote a coherent approach to gender-related issues.

An increasing number of crisis response initiatives specifically address gender with 12 actions targeting or mainstreaming gender launched between 2007 and 2010 under the short-term component of the IfS (Article 3). These actions include measures to enhance the role of women in political and peace processes, support to women’s rights, women’s organisations’ capacity building and addressing women’s specific needs in crisis situations. Table 3 below provides some examples.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Gender Perspective of Project</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Cash-for-work, with special focus on improving livelihoods of women</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support to women’s participation in the electoral process</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Improve gender perspective in recovery and reconstructions efforts</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promote women’s involvement and decision-making in income-generating projects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Support to women’s rights and political participation</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monitoring the implementation of UNSCR 1325</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provision of free air-time on radio and TV with a special focus on female candidates for elections</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Aim to ensure specific needs of women in conflict situations taken into account</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Specific focus on victims of gender-based violence and on women in high-risk situations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Promote accountability for past human rights violations as a critical part of building a more sustainable peace</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Ensure security sector reform processes account for the specific security needs of both women and men</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promote women’s inclusion in institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inclusion of women in capacity-building activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Focus on support to women as part of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enabling women’s participation in women’s associations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthening gender awareness in institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Emphasis on gender empowerment through civil society initiatives promoting dialogue and participation</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3: Examples of IfS Crisis Response Initiatives Specifically Addressing Gender**

Under the long-term component of the IfS (Article 4(3)), five gender-related actions have been funded to date. These included a three-year trans-regional project on ‘Political Participation of women from Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Liberia in Peace and Security Policy’. The aim is to empower women activists, NGO staff and women’s organisations in these countries to take an active role in decision-making at civil society and state levels on issues related to human security and engagement in political processes.

An action in the DRC was funded in 2009 to facilitate church-based actors in preventing the re-emergence of conflict through enhanced field-based political analysis and systems for early warning. More specifically, the project gathers data relating to women’s vulnerability and sexual violence, livelihood opportunities and access to family health services, the role of women in elections and local democracy, and the economic status of women-headed households.

The two centrally managed PbP Calls for Proposals under the Annual Action Programme 2010 — “Training of civilian experts for crisis management and stabilisation missions” (launched in July 2010) and “European Union Police Services Training” (launched in October 2010) addressed gender issues. Specifically, training activities would need to “ensure

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21 Five more are expected to be funded under the 2011 Annual Action Programme, two of them with a specific gender target and three integrating some gender elements.
that proper attention is given to gender with regard to the selection of course participants and also training facilitators. Assurances as to effective gender mainstreaming in course content and delivery will also be critical.” These funding criteria were included in both the text of the guidelines and the proposals’ evaluation grid.

In addition to the above projects, a one-day meeting of experts on women’s participation in peace processes took place in Brussels within the framework of the Civil Society Dialogue Network funded under the IfS PbP. This meeting aimed at improving EU efforts to enable the participation of women in peace processes and share information with civil society.\(^22\) A second follow-up meeting took place on 21 June 2011.

Despite this progress, the evaluation team feels there is scope for more detailed gender analysis, strategies and approaches underpinning measures funded through the IfS. While annual reports mention project components that address gender, they should report in greater detail the differential impacts on gender of actions supported under the crisis response component. Specific reporting on how IfS interventions have supported the implementation of the UNSCRs 1325 and 1820 should also be considered. The planned introduction of a gender-specific reporting template for Delegations is likely to enable an increased focus on the gender dimensions of projects and is welcomed by the evaluators.

The evaluators also call for greater attention to gender issues in the design, implementation and monitoring of measures funded under the IfS Article 3. This will significantly contribute to enhancing the quality of gender sensitivity of the Instrument, as can the inclusion of the new thematic area ‘Women, peace and security’ under the call for PbP proposals 2010-2011.

\(^{22}\) November 2010
4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1. SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS

The evaluation concludes that the IfS has significantly contributed to enhancing the overall relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of EU crisis response and preparedness actions. It also makes an important contribution to the coherence of the EU peace, security and development architecture – and, most importantly, to peace and security globally.

Critical to its contributions is the IfS’ demonstrated capacity to provide quick, timely and catalytic responses in situations of crisis. The broad scope of the IfS, and the range of implementing partners the IfS can work through allows the EU to address a range of areas critical for crisis response, stabilisation and peace-building and to support key partners in situations of crisis.

The evaluators also conclude that the design and implementation of crisis response and preparedness actions and strategies funded under Articles 3 and 4(3) are in line with the Regulation, and contribute to achieving the objectives stated therein. Decision-making processes are sufficiently robust and inclusive; they allow an important exchange between the technical and political decision-makers of the EU peace, security and development architecture. The management and disbursement of funding is considered effective and timely once IfS measures have been identified.

4.2. RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations are divided broadly into high-level and technical recommendations. Comments are also made on good practices that should be maintained and strengthened. Where appropriate, distinct recommendations are made for Article 3 and Article 4(3).

High-level recommendations

Recommendation 1: Increase financial resources for the IfS in order to extend impact to additional crisis contexts

The IfS supports critical areas and phases of crisis prevention/response and preparedness, which are traditionally under-funded both by the EU and by other key partners. It also funds interventions that are in many instances high-cost and occurring in particularly difficult operational environments.

As the IfS is a key element in the EU and global peace and security architecture, and in view of its good performance and value added to date, Member States should consider an increase in the overall budget of the IfS, along with an appropriate increase in staff resources and capacities. This is important if the IfS is to continue to play its strategic and facilitating role in all the crisis contexts where the EU should be intervening.

An increase in funds will help to bolster impact and enable the IfS to respond to likely increasing demands for both crisis response and preparedness. However, the continued efficient and effective spending of these funds requires the implementation of the other recommendations made here.

If increases in funding are not possible, a further review will be needed of how measures are prioritised. To enable this, criteria for prioritisation should be developed and used to inform decisions.

In addition to increasing headquarters staff resources for management of the IfS, EU Member States could also be encouraged to consider fixed
period detachments to the FPI/IfS of personnel with expertise in stabilisation matters relevant to the IfS. Such personnel detachments could also help foster exchanges of experience and enhanced cooperation between actions implemented at EU level and by Member States at the bilateral level.

**Recommendation 2: Include in the Regulation further flexibility in the overall timeframe for the use of the IfS and strengthen linkages with other EU instruments**

When reviewing the Regulation, Member States should consider extending the timeframes within which the IfS operates and to adjust the Regulation to allow consecutive Exceptional Assistance Measures (EAMs). Given the nature of crises and frequent setbacks in stabilisation efforts, there is a need for both more flexibility in the IfS timeframes (currently set at an 18-month limit) and for more attention to monitoring and linking the IfS to other EU instruments, so that informed decisions can be taken on transitions from one instrument to another.

Although the rationale for the IfS is rooted in helping address, and as far as possible stabilise a crisis until other instruments can come into play, it is often unrealistic to expect other instruments to be programmed until a degree of stability (and predictability) is reached. This can take a varying amount of time, in most instances more than a year. This suggests the need for greater flexibility in implementation timeframes – and a clearer articulation of criteria within the IfS decision-making process on how and when to move from the IfS to other EU Instruments.

Adjusting the Regulation to allow the possibility of consecutive Exceptional Assistance Measures (EAMs), with associated faster procedures than for Interim Response Programmes (IRPs) is necessary. Whenever a second or further IfS intervention builds on an initial EAM, demonstrating the rationale and need for the continuation of the intervention, more stream-lined procedures could be followed and the adoption of IRPs should not be a requirement, except perhaps for more structural and programmable types of interventions.

In order to strengthen the linkages between the IfS and other EU instruments, the European External Action Service (EEAS) should define a process that enables the transition from the IfS to longer term development instruments. Commensurate with this approach is the recognition that the IfS is fundamentally an instrument of the EU and therefore should be widely owned.

It will be important that the Country and Regional Strategy Papers, and corresponding Multiannual Indicative Programmes for EU mainstream geographic instruments, consistently include a focus on tackling drivers of conflict and the consolidation of stabilisation and peace processes, wherever relevant to the countries/regions concerned.

**Technical Recommendations**

**Recommendation 3: Strengthen the design and focus of interventions**

Interventions under Article 3 and 4(3) of the IfS must continue to benefit from the broad scope of action outlined and permitted in the Regulation; and for Article 4(3) in the Strategy Paper (2007-2011). This appears to be one of the strengths of the IfS and a feature that enables the Instrument to seize opportunities for crisis response and preparedness in a way that other EU instruments cannot.

In order to increase understanding of the connection between inputs and expected results, the design of any intervention (project concepts for Article 3, and strategies and planning documents for Article 4(3)) can be further strengthened by a clearer explanation of how and why a set of activities will bring about the expected changes (i.e. “theories of change”).
It is important to note that often theories of change are implicit in the design of projects. They already guide engagement, but need to be made explicit. For crisis response initiatives, this involves advancing what is already good practice at the project level. The FPI team should consider including a workshop on theory of change approaches to conflict prevention and peace-building as part of their training programme.

The design of interventions should also include an assessment of the resources and timeframe required to achieve the expected results (whether they are within or outside of the IfS timeframe) and a more comprehensive assessment of the risks to implementation and risk management strategies. Article 3 actions in particular should integrate, where possible, a clear exit strategy in their design.

Recommendation 4: Balance political and technical aspects of decision-making

The process that underpins decisions on the allocation of IfS resources (Article 3) is robust, consultative and relatively streamlined. This must be maintained and is likely to be strengthened by the new roles of EU Delegations.

However, given the deeply political nature of the IfS actions, a more systematic analysis of EU political priorities related to specific crisis situations would be beneficial, and could be systematically integrated into proposals. This would contribute to ensuring and/or demonstrating that decision-making on IfS actions, and the actions themselves are strategic through a clear reflection of political priorities in a given context.

The Member States (and the High Representative) need to set the political framework within which the FPI can implement the EU’s political priorities. Similarly, the EEAS needs to set the strategic framework for the FPI to enable the IfS to coherently align with regional and country strategies.

Further, Member States’ political priorities as set at capital level should in some cases be more effectively reflected at the embassy level in countries where IfS measures are implemented. The potential impact of IfS crisis response initiatives, in particular, can be hampered by a lack of coherence between political priorities in capitals and those being followed by officials in the field.

Recommendation 5: Diversify choices of — and enhance transparency about — the selection of implementing partners

The capacity of the IfS to work with a broad range of partners is significant and a great asset for the Instrument and for the EU. While the challenges of working in some crisis contexts may leave few partner options, in some circumstances new opportunities to work with and reach a diverse range of critical partners, including local actors can be created.

Reaching a broader range of implementing partners, including both international and national NGOs, civil society organisations and local actors, as appropriate, could enhance the effectiveness of the IfS and its value as a unique funding mechanism. This could be achieved through more country-level consultations and through the development and use of specific criteria for choosing implementing partners.

In order to further increase transparency, the rationale for selecting implementing partners must be specified, and information about the other options considered should be systematically included in documents related to decisions and available in regular reporting. Mechanisms for funding allocations (the PbP Call for Proposal mechanism, and decisions under Article 3) should promote the allocation of a greater proportion of funds to local partners, to the extent possible, and through regional organisations where possible, bearing in mind that in some contexts the neutrality of implementing actors is important.
Recommendation 6: Bolster monitoring and evaluation processes

Monitoring of IfS actions, particularly those related to crisis response, is critical for several reasons. Most importantly from a strategic point of view, monitoring serves as a tool as a crisis unfolds to adjust responses for enhanced impact. It is therefore necessary both to bolster monitoring within projects, as well as to adjust existing monitoring measures.

The recommendation made above on incorporating theories of change at the project level will enhance monitoring. Monitoring and evaluation in conflict-related programming requires knowing what changes one expects to monitor and how these are expected to develop over the course of a project. The theory of change enables monitoring and evaluation exercises to focus on the key outputs, outcomes, and impacts of a programme.

In addition, the suggestions made above on modifications to the Template for Interim Reports should be considered.

With regard to evaluations, independent reviews of the crisis response and preparedness components, such as the Stocktaking Study undertaken for the PbP in 2009, should be regularised. Some evaluations may need to remain internal for reasons of political sensitivity, but wherever possible evaluations need to be publicly available and uploaded to the IfS website. An annual or bi-annual synthesis report of IfS evaluations could also enable easier access to critical information regarding the performance of the IfS overall. A more strategic use of unpublished external evaluations of crisis actions should also be considered to increase dialogue and lesson sharing with implementing partner agencies and other members of the crisis response and peace-building community.

Recommendation 7: Seek to more consistently integrate an enhanced risk management strategy into IfS project design

IfS crisis actions are generally implemented in high-risk environments. While this necessitates a higher tolerance of risk taking, it also requires a robust approach to the way risk is managed. It is recommended that a more systematic risk management strategy is developed that further recognises and prioritises risks from the outset, guides risk management efforts at project level, and better engages those responsible for formally scrutinising risks at an early stage.

Given the complexity and uniqueness of the management and implementation of the IfS, the IfS unit should consider developing a tailor-made risk management strategy that covers the assessment, analysis and management of risk from the proposal to implementation stage.

Such a risk management strategy should involve the development of a standard risk register (with likelihood of risk, impact if risk materialises and mitigation strategies), which is developed early at the proposal stage and where ‘risk owners’ are clearly identified. The risk analysis should then be reflected throughout the project life cycle — from assessment to delivery and on to the post-implementation phase.

Recommendation 8 – Increase FPI staff resources at HQ and country level

The FPI team is under-resourced in comparison to the very substantial workload associated with timely and effective management of the IfS cycle. Staff are under considerable pressure to manage the IfS and respond in both a timely and effective manner. In order to maintain high levels of management and implementation of the IfS over time, staff resources need to be increased. This is particularly important at headquarters level, and also for EU Delegations that supervise the implementation of IfS measures.

Management of the annually increasing financial resources allocated to the IfS, and the implementation of the recommendations made here will require additional human resources.
### ANNEX 1: INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED

#### EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE (EEAS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title and Other Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Marc Colombani</td>
<td>Assistant to Pierre Vimont, Executive Secretary General, EEAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Wright</td>
<td>Director, Conflict Prevention and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marc van Bellinghem</td>
<td>Deputy and Acting Head of Division, Conflict Prevention, Peace-building and Mediation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Byrne</td>
<td>Principal Administrator, Conflict Prevention, Peace-building and Mediation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeremy Lester</td>
<td>Head of Division for the countries and the regions of the Horn of Africa, Eastern Africa and Indian Ocean, EEAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heino Marius</td>
<td>Political Adviser/Dep Head of Unit (including Afghanistan, Pakistan), EEAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frederick Coene</td>
<td>Desk Tajikistan, EEAS (formerly Ifs Project Manager, Georgia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlos Freitas Da Silva</td>
<td>International Relations Officer, Central Asia, EEAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dilarde Teilane</td>
<td>Seconded National Expert, Policy Officer, Security Policy, EEAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosalind Marsden</td>
<td>EU Special Representative (EUSR) for Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander Richard</td>
<td>Commander, Royal Navy</td>
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<td>Lintern</td>
<td>Principal Staff Officer to the DG of EU Military Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lt. Col. Neil Robertson</td>
<td>EU-NAVFOR Somalia Liaison Officer to EU</td>
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#### EUROPEAN COMMISSION

##### Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI)

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<td>Genoveva Ruiz</td>
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<td>Deputy Head of Unit</td>
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<td>Claes Andersson</td>
<td>Ifs Crisis Response Planner and focal point on PCNA/PDNA</td>
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<td>Mirko Puig</td>
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<td>Gladys Evangelista</td>
<td>Ifs Peace-building Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corinna Valente</td>
<td>Acting focal point on Women in Peace and Security</td>
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#### Directorate General for Development and Cooperation — EuropeAid (DEVCO)

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<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>Oliver Blake</td>
<td>International Aid/Cooperation Officer - Fragile States – DEVCO C2</td>
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<td>Susanne Wille</td>
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Martin Albini Assistant to Ms. Brantner
Tobias Heider Greens/EFA Advisor on Security and Defence
Gerrard Quille Counsellor Thematique
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ENTRI – Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (IFS programme implemented by a consortium of 13 EU training bodies)

CONSULTANTS
Catriona Gourlay
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Annex 2: Documents

Key EU-Documents and References


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Annex 3: Evaluation Team Biographies

Deborah Duncan

Debi is the Team Leader for the evaluation. She is an expert in conflict assessment, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. Now an INCAS Senior Associate, she served as a senior conflict adviser in DFID for six years until 2006, working on corporate policy, Asia and the Middle East. While at DFID, she also worked extensively on conflict analysis and conflict sensitive development in Asia. Prior to DFID, Debi worked on post-conflict reconstruction and humanitarian assistance for Oxfam in the Balkans and Horn of Africa. As an INCAS Associate, Debi has undertaken numerous assignments – including serving as Team Leader for an evaluation of the Trust Fund set up to support Nepal’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Debi holds MAs in Development Studies and International Peacekeeping.

Donata Garrasi

Donata is a political scientist who specialises in policy and programme design to address the drivers of conflict and support peace-building in crisis affected and fragile contexts. She is currently a Senior Associate in INCAS. Donata has worked over the last 15 years with leading international organisations, including the UN, DFID and the World Bank in transition countries in Africa and Asia. Her key expertise and interest are conflict and governance analysis, peace-building and state-building approaches, and the new drivers of conflict and peace. Donata started consulting in 2008. She is fluent in English, French, Spanish, and Italian.

David Nyheim

David is the Chief Executive of INCAS. He has extensive experience in dialogue process design and facilitation, stabilisation strategy development, early warning and risk assessment, and armed violence reduction. Prior to joining INCAS, he served for six years as the Director of the Forum for Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) and held several policy and research positions in the European Commission and universities (Belgium and United Kingdom). As a consultant, David has worked for governments, United Nations agencies and corporations in the North Caucasus, West Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and the Pacific. He is trained in political science (McGill), public health (Louvain and LSHTM), and economics (London School of Economics). David is fluent in English, French, Norwegian and Italian.

About International Conflict and Security (INCAS) Consulting Ltd.

Founded in 2003, INCAS Consulting Ltd. works at the intersection of security, development and corporate investment. It provides services in climate risk management, armed violence reduction, forecasting and prevention, corporate security and training in war-torn and fragile countries. See www.incasconsulting.com for more information.

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