Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)

Thematic Strategy Paper 2014-2020

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Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2014-2017
(Annex)

In accordance with Article 8(1) of the Regulation establishing an Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)\(^1\), this Thematic Strategy Paper and its accompanying Multi-annual Indicative Programme only apply to assistance under Articles 4 and 5 of said Regulation, i.e. “assistance for conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness” and “assistance in addressing global, trans-regional and emerging threats”. IcSP assistance in response to crises or emerging crises under Article 3 of said Regulation is not covered by these documents, due to its non-programmable nature.

\(^1\) EU Regulation No. 230/2014 of 11/03/2014. OJEU No. L77/1 of 15/03/2014.
LIST OF ACRONYMS

ARF  ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN Association of South-East Asia Nations
AU  African Union
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CERTs Computer Emergency Response Teams
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDN Civil Society Dialogue Network
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
CSO Civil Society Organisation
DCI Development Cooperation Instrument
EDF European Development Fund
EEAS European External Action Service
EIDHR European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
ENVSEC Environmental Security Initiative
ESF Expert Support Facility
FAFT Financial Action Task Force
GCTF Global Counter Terrorism Forum
GHISI Global Health Security Initiative
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
IcSP Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
IfS Instrument for Stability
IMO International Maritime Organisation
INSC Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation
ISPSC International Ship and Port Facility Security Code
ISTC International Science and Technology Centre
MANDPAS Shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles
MIP Multiannual Indicative Programme
ODA Official Development Aid
OJ Official Journal
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
RSMP EU Reference Security Management Plan for Energy Infrastructure
SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons
TEU Treaty on European Union
TFEU Treaty on Functioning of the European Union
THB Trafficking in Human Beings
UN United Nations
UNDP/BCPR UN Development Programme, Bureau Crisis Prevention & Recovery
UN DPA United Nations Department of Political Affairs
UNEP United Nations Environmental Programme
UNODC United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime
UNSC United Nation Disarmament Commission
WCO World Custom Organisation
WHO World Health Organisation
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
1. OVERALL CONTEXT

1.1. The problem and the challenges

Conflicts affect countries worldwide and often pose a risk to global security and stability. UN estimates show that at least 80 countries will face the prospects of prolonged deadlock or potentially violent internal tensions and instability beyond 2014. According to the World Development Report 2011 on Conflict, Security and Development, approximately 1.5 billion people live in countries affected by repeated cycles of political and criminal violence. Conflicts are often linked to state fragility and exacerbated by poverty and weak governance. Other factors such as climate change and natural disasters add to the potential for further global instability. Fast expanding world trade and an ever growing demand for energy and natural resources from emerging economies also pose new security challenges.

Instability, conflict, insecurity, violence, organised crime, corruption, etc., not only deter investment, hinder trade, divert public social expenditure, and hamper access to education, health and other basic services; they also severely weaken democracy, human rights and the rule of law, which are the very core values the EU aims to promote. Beyond development, these phenomena also undermine the joint efforts the EU is making with its neighbouring countries to establish a shared area of prosperity, security and freedom as well as the efforts of candidate and potential candidate countries to become closer to the European Union.

The transition from situations of crisis towards stability, which can provide a basis for wider development goals, requires the strengthening of up-stream capacities of the EU and its partners in order to facilitate rapid and timely interventions, which can contribute to creating conditions for sustainable peace.

Many of the most critical security threats the world faces today (terrorism, illicit trafficking, cybercrime, climate change, pandemics, etc.) are interconnected and increasingly complex, impacting on both developing and industrialised countries alike. Human, environmental and security risks associated with chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear materials (CBRN) also transcend national and regional frontiers. Impressive technological and scientific advances in areas such as information and telecommunication technologies or biology offer significant opportunities for growth, development and improvement of human wellbeing, yet they may also carry with them security threats that need to be better understood and mitigated.

In a multi-polar world, responding to these challenges in an effective manner requires a significant collective effort, based on strong partnerships with other states, civil society actors, multilateral and regional partners. Threats to international peace and security cannot be efficiently tackled by States acting individually. Synergies and cooperation are also increasingly needed at international level, as donors are facing similar problems in terms of scarce resources. In the face of increasingly complex challenges, none of the EU's internal priorities –security, growth and job creation, climate change, access to energy, health and pandemics and migration– will be achieved in isolation from the wider world.
The EU is a major development cooperation donor since its establishment. As a global player, the EU has credibility and a perception of neutrality as an honest broker that provides a comparative advantage to intervene in these areas. Since the mid-1990s, the EU has given itself an increasing number of tools to contribute to preserve peace and strengthen international security. Today, there is a general consensus, inside and outside Europe, that the EU should continue strengthening its role in these areas, including through the provision of capacity building assistance to partner countries.

1.2. EU policy framework

The Lisbon Treaty (2009) explicitly enshrined, for the first time, as one of the objectives of the EU’s external action “to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security [...]”. This is an overarching objective that shall be pursued by all EU external policies, instruments and tools, while respecting their respective primary/specific objectives.

The main external security threats for the EU were first defined in the European Security Strategy (2003), which explicitly mentioned terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation, regional conflicts, State failure, and organised crime. The Strategy proposed to prioritise our wider neighbourhood and called for a strong emphasis on multilateralism. The Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy (2008), ratified the 2003 priorities and approach, but expanded the list of threats in order to include a number of emerging issues, notably cyber-security, energy security, climate change and piracy as well as the proliferation of SALW, cluster munitions and landmines. This Report also highlighted the security and development nexus.

Several other EU strategies provide additional policy guidance in areas such as counter-terrorism, illicit drugs, trafficking in human beings, SALW, cyber security, maritime security, etc. Likewise, various Council conclusions concerning the effectiveness of external action (2004), and on Security and Development (2007) are also part of the EU policy framework in the areas of development, peace and security. Additional guidance was given by the Council conclusions on conflict prevention of 20 June 2011. Climate and security nexus was identified as a key area for further work in the the conclusions of the Council on 18 July 2011.

Similarly, in its 'Agenda for Change’ Communication (2011), the Commission reaffirms its commitment to ensure that EU objectives in the field of development policy, peace-building, conflict prevention and international security are mutually reinforcing. In their joint Communication on "The EU's Comprehensive Approach to External Conflicts and Crises” (2013), the Commission and the High Representative for CFSP, also advocate for addressing conflicts and crises 'comprehensively', using

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2 A detailed list of relevant policy documents in provided in Annex B
3 Article 21(c) TEU.
the different EU external policies and their related instruments in a consistent manner, while respecting their specific objectives and decision-making procedures.

1.3. The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)

The IcSP Regulation is based on both Article 209 ‘Development Cooperation’ and Article 212 ‘Economic, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Third Countries’ (other than developing countries) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, giving a worldwide scope of action to this instrument.

In addition to its worldwide scope, which allows the IcSP to support global and trans-regional actions potentially involving all kind of countries (i.e. fragile, developing, emerging, in-transition, industrialized, candidate or potential candidate countries), the IcSP is not tied to ODA eligibility requirements, which allows for the provision of core counter-terrorism assistance or for the funding of no country-specific actions.

Compared with the IfS Regulation, predecessor of this instrument, the new IcSP Regulation expands into new areas of cooperation (e.g. climate change and security, new forms of illicit trafficking, cybersecurity, SALW, etc.) and incorporates some important innovations in some other fields (e.g. possibility of having counter-terrorism cooperation programmes at country and regional levels), while maintaining much of the focus of the past IfS Regulation as regards pre- and post-crisis capacity building.

The raison d’être of the IcSP is to address those conflict, peace and security issues having an impact on development or other cooperation policies of the EU —and very often on the EU’s own security, too— and which cannot be addressed under any other cooperation instrument of the EU. This is a critical ‘programming principle’ (see point 2.2 below) that will underpin the IcSP Strategy and accompanying MIP.
2. PROGRAMMING FRAMEWORK

2.1 Overall objective and rationale

The primary aim of EU assistance under Articles 4 and 5 of the IcSP Regulation is, on the one hand, to prevent conflicts, build peace and to build crisis preparedness capacities; and, on the other hand, to address specific global, trans-regional and emerging threats having a destabilising effect (e.g., terrorism, organised crime, illicit trafficking, threats to critical infrastructure, climate change, sudden pandemics, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear risks).

These programming documents follow the new IcSP Regulation, which details the objectives, areas of cooperation and scope of assistance. It also builds on past experience and lessons learnt from previous and on-going IfS cooperation (see point 2.3 below). They aim at being specific, but without being too prescriptive in order to allow sufficient flexibility in the future identification of concrete projects under the corresponding Annual Action Programmes.

The strategic cooperation priorities defined in these programming documents have been the subject of a ‘Strategic Dialogue’ with the European Parliament held on 10 March 2014, whose views have been taken into consideration. Both documents will also be submitted to the IcSP Committee. A broad range of consultations have also taken place with EU Delegations and numerous stakeholders, including civil society organisations and think tanks as well as with relevant international organisations (UNDPA, UNDP/BCPR, ICAO, UNEP, UNODC, OSCE, IAEA, IMO, etc.).

These strategic cooperation priorities should not be considered in isolation from each other. A particular effort has been made at developing synergies among them in order to ensure consistency and maximise impact. For instance, counter terrorism objectives will not only be pursued under the specific counter-terrorism priority, but also when addressing other global, trans-regional and emerging threats such as money laundering (terrorist financing), cybercrime and cyber-security (terrorist radicalisation, cyber terrorism), critical infrastructure protection (terrorist threat to aviation security or to energy distribution networks, etc.), CBRN risk mitigation (terrorist proliferation), etc.

In accordance with Article 2(3)(a) of the IcSP Regulation, whenever possible the following cross-cutting issues shall be reflected in the programming: the promotion of democracy, good governance and human rights and humanitarian law, including children’s rights and the rights of indigenous peoples; non-discrimination, gender equality and women empowerment; conflict prevention and climate change.

2.2 Programming principles

7 Including relevant provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
The following programming principles have guided the choice of strategic cooperation priorities under the IcSP. While some of these principles are Treaty obligations or constitute international political commitments (e.g. Paris Declaration) applicable to all external assistance instruments, some others derive from the IcSP Regulation and are therefore specific to this instrument.

**The IcSP as a subsidiary instrument.** The new IcSP Regulation explicitly states that EU assistance under this instrument “shall be provided only to the extent that an adequate and effective response cannot be provided under [other Union external assistance] instruments”. It is therefore a subsidiary instrument, which shall not be used to address issues that could in principle be addressed under other, mainstream geographic or thematic cooperation instruments.

**IcSP added value.** The added value of the IcSP is precisely its ability to address issues that cannot be effectively tackled under other EU cooperation instruments, either because of (a) the global or trans-regional nature of the threat, exceeding the scope of a geographic instrument, e.g. trans-Atlantic drug trafficking; (b) the exclusion of the supported area from funding under ODA-bound development instruments such as the DCI or the EDF, e.g., core counter-terrorism assistance; (c) the non-country specific nature of the support, e.g. actions aimed at developing international standards or policies such as on transparency of minerals supply chains in conflict-affected areas; or (d) the need to pursue an homogenous thematic approach, e.g. building civil society capacities in conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness.

**Security and development nexus.** The EU has acknowledged that there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and that, vice versa, without development and poverty eradication there will be no lasting peace. It has also stated that this “nexus” between development and security should inform EU strategies and policies in order to contribute to the coherence of EU external action. The IcSP is primarily a development and cooperation instrument. This means that it can only address conflict prevention, peace-building and security issues in so far as they hamper development and other cooperation objectives of the EU with non-developing countries. When deciding on strategic cooperation priorities under this instrument, their impact on human security has therefore been a determining factor.

**Complementarity** will notably be ensured with the Development, Neighbourhood, Enlargement and Partnership instruments, as well as with crisis response measures under the IcSP and with other relevant thematic instruments such as the INSC, the EIDHR and the Global Public Goods Programme under the DCI. Whenever appropriate, complementarity with EU activities funded under the CFSP budget and with external actions under the Internal Security Fund should also be ensured. Furthermore, cooperation under the IcSP will be coordinated with relevant bilateral cooperation of EU Member States as well as with that of other major bilateral donors and multilateral organisations. Both complementarity and coordination will be ensured throughout the entire project cycle, from the programming, identification and

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8 The IcSP Regulation is based on TFEU Articles 209 (1) 'Development Cooperation' and 212 (2) 'Economic, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Third Countries (other than developing).
9 DCI and EDF, including the Pan-African Instrument and the African Peace Facility (APF).
formulation stages to the actual implementation and evaluation of the actions, with a view to avoid duplications and overlapping, explore synergies and maximize efficiency in the approach.

**Consistency** will be sought at three levels. Firstly, with regard to **overall EU external action** and in particular with the CFSP, including CSDP crisis management missions and actions in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. Secondly, with regard to development policy, particularly when IcSP programmes will involve or otherwise impact on developing countries, in order to ensure **policy coherence for development**. Thirdly, consistency will also be sought with regard to the internal security policy of the EU, notably the Internal Security Strategy and the EU Policy Cycle on Serious and Organised Crime, in order to make an effective contribution towards enhanced **internal/external security policy consistency**.

**Comprehensive EU approaches.** Whenever applicable, and in line with the Joint Communication on 'The EU's Comprehensive Approach to External Conflicts and Crises', IcSP support should be based on a shared assessment and a common objective, which combines in the most efficient manner all relevant EU external policy instruments and tools, from political dialogues, confidential démarches and international diplomacy, to active mediation, restrictive measures, external assistance and crisis management missions, to name just a few. IcSP actions should be aligned with existing EU policy strategies (e.g. on drugs, trafficking in human beings, cyber-security, SALW, CBRN, etc.) and/or with relevant EU geographic strategies (e.g. Sahel, Horn of Africa, etc.). Furthermore, whenever there is an EU ‘added value’, the involvement of EU Agencies and/or EU Member States’ institutions, public agencies or mandated bodies in the definition and implementation of IcSP programmes should be considered.

**Multilateralism.** Cooperation under the IcSP should also contribute to the overarching EU objective of promoting effective multilateralism. This is particularly relevant for IcSP assistance, since it largely focuses on global and trans-regional threats that can only be effectively addressed through enhanced international cooperation. Whenever there is a multilateral ‘added value’, the implementation of IcSP cooperation in partnership with the UN and/or other relevant international organizations should be considered. Whenever applicable, the IcSP should also contribute to promoting and ensuring compliance with relevant UN and other international instruments and standards in the areas it provides support.

**Dialogue.** The programming of the IcSP shall, in principle, be based on a dialogue of the EU and, where appropriate, the relevant Member States, with the partner country or regions concerned, involving civil society and regional and local authorities, so as to ensure that the country or region concerned takes sufficient ownership of the process. Consultation with relevant international organisations should also be ensured. Dialogue with think tanks and academia might also help intensify informal exchanges between relevant stakeholders.

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10 Joint Communication from the Commission and High Representative of the EU for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. JOIN (2013) 30 final, of 11 December 2013.
2.3 Past achievements and lessons learnt

The Instrument for Stability, predecessor of the IcSP, was found to be ‘a unique Instrument within the EU peace, security and development architecture’, filling ‘an important strategic, funding and capacity gap’, by an external evaluation. The IFS was indeed successful in enabling the EU to fund a broad range of critical conflict-prevention, crisis preparedness and response initiatives as well as in addressing major global and trans-regional threats undermining development and human security, when no other EU cooperation instrument was available or in complementing interventions carried out under other instruments.

In 2009, a stock-taking and scoping study of the IfS crisis preparedness component under former Article 4.3 (the ‘Peace-building Partnership’) recommended to:

i) increase focus on transversal and/or thematic issues relating to both long-term and short-term conflict prevention and peace-building which demonstrate a clear synergy with other EU supported activities and policy priorities;

ii) increase emphasis on organisations working in various geographical contexts in relation to thematic or transversal issues that support capacity building of local partners and generate learning benefits for the peace-building sector as a whole;

iii) foster policy dialogue with non-state actors on peace-building issues.

These recommendations were implemented in subsequent Annual Action Programmes.

With regard to broader conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness activities, overall concerted effort in anticipating, preventing and/or responding to conflict and natural disasters situations requires the further development of common standards and compatible working practices within the EU and with multilateral, international, regional and local partners. This is important to improve aid effectiveness and the speed of operational deployment. Therefore, there is a continuing need to build up the EU’s own capacities in this regard and to both develop concepts and operational models for EU actions in conflict and crisis situations and to ensure their compatibility and inter-operability with those of other relevant actors.

A number of external reviews of programmes under the former Article 4.1 (threats to law and order, to the security and safety of individuals, to critical infrastructure and to public health) have recently been undertaken. The reviews of the Cocaine and Heroin Route Programmes as well as of the Counter Terrorism Sahel Programme have confirmed the general validity and impact of the actions. Ongoing interventions under the former Article 4.1. include programmes fighting organised crime along the cocaine and heroin routes; the proliferation of small arms and light weapons; capacity building in regions afflicted by terrorism and enhancing maritime security and safety along critical maritime routes. These programmes focus on security-related capacity building in close consultation with beneficiary countries.
Evaluations under former Article 4.2 (*Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear materials risk mitigation actions*) showed the importance Member States attached to the EU CBRN risk mitigation Centres of Excellence initiative having its own programme to help build capacity in partner countries to mitigate CBRN risks, either of criminal, natural or accidental nature. It also proved the added value of the IfS in this area, in particular its ability to follow a regional, coordinated and bottom-up approach with a strong EU visibility. A number of practical suggestions made in the evaluation are followed up.
3. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES

Art. 4. Assistance for conflict prevention, crisis preparedness and peace-building

Conflict prevention - both in situations of emerging conflict, as well as where conflict has already broken out - privileges the resolution of underlying tensions and disputes, thereby saving lives, reducing suffering, and avoiding the destruction of infrastructure and the economy. Peace-building provides an important foundation to enable countries in a situation of crisis or emerging crisis to swiftly transition to stability and towards wider development goals, including improved governance and inclusive and sustainable growth. Crisis-preparedness aims at ensuring the development of upstream capacities in order to allow the rapid and timely tackling of conflict and crises situations.

Article 4 of the IcSP envisages support to measures building and strengthening the capacity of the EU and its partners to prevent conflict, build peace and address pre- and post-crisis needs in close co-ordination with international, regional and sub-regional organisations, state and civil society actors. Measures shall include know-how transfer, the exchange of information and best practices (including the use and development of methodologies and/or knowledge products), risk/threat assessment, research and analysis, early warning systems, training and service delivery, as well as financial and technical assistance for the implementation of peace-building and state-building support actions. They will also contribute to the further development of a “Peacebuilding Partnership” with the actors mentioned above.

In providing such support, due attention will need to be given to contribute to building in-country capacities (particularly of civil society actors\textsuperscript{11}), as well as to indirectly bolstering the capacities of the EU and its partners through the funding of relevant activities. It will also be important to encourage a multi-stakeholder approach to activities funded, drawing on the comparative advantage of the various types of actor in a collaborative manner.

In line with the EU comprehensive approach on Women, peace and security\textsuperscript{12}, the G8 Declaration on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict and other relevant policy documents\textsuperscript{13}, a gender perspective, encompassing both women and men, should

\textsuperscript{11} The recent Communication “The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe's engagement with Civil Society in external relations” (2012) specifically mentions in terms of EU renewed response: “an enhanced and more strategic approach in its engagement with local CSOs covering all regions, including developing, neighbourhood and enlargement countries. Due consideration will be given to country-specificities, particularly in highly volatile political contexts.”

\textsuperscript{12} Which, in particular, aims to ensure women's equal involvement in all efforts for the maintenance of peace and security, including post-conflict reconstruction, and address the culture of impunity holding perpetrators to account for acts of sexual violence committed in armed conflict.

\textsuperscript{13} Comprehensive approach to the EU implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on Women, Peace and Security adopted on 8 December 2008 and the first report published on 11 May 2011 on EU progress on the subject of the protection and empowerment of women in conflict settings and in post-conflict situations; the EU Common Position for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (14 November 2011); INCAF paper on gender and state-building issued in May 2013.
inform the actions in order to achieve a gender-balanced and comprehensive response. Moreover, in accordance with the EU commitment to develop indicators for progress regarding the protection and empowerment of women in conflict settings and in post-conflict situations and the subsequent adoption by the Council, in July 2010, of 17 relevant indicators, IcSP actions and their results will continue to feed into this reporting framework through which the progress of the EU and its Member States on Women, Peace and Security is measured.

Overall co-ordination with civil society is well established under this Article, principally through earlier IfS investment in the Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN). In addition, cooperation with the most relevant UN actors (UNDP, DPA) is secured through regular policy meetings supplemented by operational and technical coordination meetings, as necessary. In this regard also, the call on United Nations entities - contained in the 2012 Report of the UN Secretary-General on Peace-building in the Aftermath of Conflict - to collaboratively leverage their respective skills and knowledge to inform natural resource management assistance, could usefully be extended to other areas of conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis-preparedness.

In principle, actions under Article 4 will be funded on a cyclical multi-annual (rather than an annual) basis, so as to avoid a potential over-supply and over-concentration of programmable activities in specific priority areas in any given year.

Within this framework, the following priority areas of support are proposed:

‘a) promoting early warning and conflict-sensitive risk-analysis in policy-making and implementation’

Early Warning

The world is facing more and more complex, multidimensional crises that have political, economic, diplomatic, security, consular, military and humanitarian dimensions. A well-functioning early warning system - underpinning the discussion of risk mitigation efforts and putting forward options for action - enables a culture of responsible risk management, as well as provides greater situational awareness in terms of latent/emerging conflicts and/or crises. Crises have highlighted the need for the EU to strengthen information sharing, situation awareness and early warning systems to better respond to/prevent conflict and to prepare for post-conflict and post-disaster recovery. In this regard, the 2011 Council conclusions on Conflict Prevention mention the further strengthening of early warning capacities as one of four principal objectives, following up on the 2001 EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict (Gothenburg Programme), which specifically underlined the need to improve early warning capacities.

The EU also envisages enhancing its cooperation with international and regional partners in the field of crisis/emergency response and strengthening inter-connectivity among crisis response structures and early-warning/situation awareness entities at regional levels.
Specific measures to build on on-going efforts to develop early warning systems could include:

— ensuring that relevant early warning information from relevant sources is available for early warning tools, including from field based civil society actors and social media;
— putting in place the relevant support capacity (including adequate analysis of input and the early warning decision-making processes which lead to early action).

Early warning systems should focus on overall conflict risk assessment, including long term risks/structural factors and short term risks/potential triggers - such as electoral violence - and place emphasis on the identification of options for early response;
— promoting the early-warning capabilities of partner regional and sub-regional organizations and strengthening the links between the EU and the early warning systems of such actors, including between 24/7 Situation Rooms, as necessary.

Conflict-sensitive risk analysis

Conflict analysis provides a means for all relevant actors to look jointly at a conflict situation and to arrive at a broadly-owned assessment of the situation, which can serve as a common point of departure to explore options to use in an effective way, taking into account the wide range of EU tools available (diplomatic/political dialogue mechanisms; crisis response actions; external assistance measures; stabilization missions, etc.) – thereby ensuring a solid basis for a comprehensive approach. Moreover, such analysis can also help to ensure that actions are implemented in a conflict-sensitive manner and that the results of such actions do not serve to exacerbate the conflict; analysis of the root-causes, drivers and actors in a specific conflict situation may be particularly pertinent in conflict-affected settings characterized by rapidly-moving developments, (e.g. Mali, DRC, Libya, Lebanon, Syria,). The 2011 Council conclusions on Conflict Prevention underline the need for the EU to focus on taking early action, notably through an effective utilization of conflict risk analysis.

Specific measures to build on on-going efforts to mainstream conflict-sensitive risk analysis could include:

— further refinement of methodologies for conflict risk analysis and the further development of ‘light-touch’ conflict risk assessment tools;
— mainstream these methodologies and tools in the political, policy and programming aspects of EU external action while sharing them, as appropriate, with international, regional and sub-regional partners, as well as civil society;
— support to field-based participatory conflict analysis.

‘b) facilitating and building capacity in confidence-building, mediation, dialogue and reconciliation, with particular regard to emerging inter-community tensions’

Mediation and peace-process support

As a global actor committed to the promotion of peace, democracy, human rights and sustainable development, the European Union is generally seen as a credible and
ethical actor in situations of instability and conflict and is thus well placed to mediate, facilitate or support mediation and dialogue processes. While mediation is not a new tool for the EU, a more coordinated and focused approach will enhance the EU’s ability to play a more active international role.

The *Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities* (2009) provides a policy basis for EU engagement in the area of mediation and dialogue. It promotes the use of mediation as a tool of first EU response to emerging or on-going crisis situations, and makes concrete proposals on how to strengthen the Union’s capacity and support to EU-led or EU-supported dialogue and mediation efforts. In addition, it requires the EU to "contribute to promoting women's equal and full participation in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction. Mediation processes must adequately account for sexual violence as well as the need to protect civilians from it and to fight impunity. The EU needs to promote the representation of women and the availability of adequate resources for dedicated mediation gender expertise from an early stage of mediation processes onwards." The 2011 Council conclusions on Conflict Prevention also enumerate enhancing mediation support capacity among their objectives.

Enhanced efforts in this regard should result - inter alia - in more effective support to peace processes by making available trained and deployable EU mediation capacity, and improved coherence of mediation principles, methods and activities within the EU and beyond.

Envisaged mediation support activities could include:

— measures to build on on-going efforts to develop operational mediation support capacity, including the possibility to deploy independent experts, develop relevant guidance and best practice, and improve existing training and coaching activities;
— ensure complementarity and synergy between internal and external efforts to enhance mediation support;
— facilitate bottom-up support to and creating enabling conditions for engagement of third parties in inclusive peace mediation and dialogue processes at the international, regional or local levels.

**Multi-stakeholder dialogue**

Over recent years, the EU has undertaken efforts to develop and enhance its relations with the civil society on peace-building issues, with the objective of establishing a coherent, balanced and transparent dialogue. This dialogue has been materialized in part through the Civil Society Dialogue Network, a project funded under IfS budget which started in 2010 as a European-level dialogue mechanism between civil society and the EU institutions on conflict prevention and peace-building issues, aiming to

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14 DGE Note IX 15779/09
15 In this respect, third parties include – inter alia - all levels of stakeholders in beneficiary countries, ranging from national institutions to grassroots level groupings and non-state actors
contribute to the strengthening of international and regional capacity to anticipate, analyse, prevent and respond to threats to stability and human development posed by violent conflict.

Moreover, this dialogue mechanism has aimed to facilitate the promotion of an EU dimension in the discourse on conflict prevention and peace-building issues at an international level. The maintenance and further development of such a dialogue - inclusive of all interested civil society actors in peace-building related fields - remains a priority. Special emphasis will continue to be placed on engaging with local CSOs as partners in dialogue, so that EU strategies are informed by local voices from conflict-affected countries. This is consistent with the recent Communication on "The roots of Democracy and sustainable development: Europe's engagement with civil society in external relations"16 (2012) which recognizes an essential role for CSOs in the peace and security agenda, particularly on conflict prevention, peace-building and state-building.

In addition to engaging with civil society on conflict prevention and peace-building (including countering violent extremism), it may be also useful to further enhance the dialogue with local civil society and to engage in wider discussions with other actors (private sector, governments, international organizations) on norms and governance issues with a potentially de-stabilizing effect on peace and security – for example on cyberspace.

Envisaged multi-stakeholder dialogue activities could include:

— enhancing channels of exchange with civil society (including local CSOs) on issues relating to conflict prevention, crisis-preparedness and peace-building, building on the model developed at European level under the Civil Society Dialogue Network and exploring the possibilities of applying it at regional level.
— engagement with civil society, private sector, governments and international organizations in global discussions on norms and governance issues, with a potentially de-stabilizing effect on peace and security;

‘c) strengthening capacities for participation and deployment in civilian stabilization missions’

Enhancement of civilian capacities in the conflict cycle

Successful civilian crisis management and stabilization missions rely on the availability of well-prepared individuals, which in turn depend on highly quality and customized training activities designed for such purpose. Taking into account the ongoing discussions at international (EU, UN, etc.) level on supporting the capacity development needs of countries emerging from conflict, continued attention is likely to focus on ways that this can best be achieved by the EU. While within the EU, the Member States have the lead role in training personnel for participation in civilian crisis management missions, over the years, the European Commission has provided significant complementary support for training efforts. Since 2001, EU support has

16 COM(2012) 492 final
helped training activities for civilian crisis management, also including sharing of professional expertise among training actors, the elaboration of standard curricula and the establishment of training certification procedures. The main focus continues to lie on the preparation and training of civilians - who are either going to, or are already working in - crisis management missions worldwide. Such missions include those of the European Union (EU), United Nations (UN), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the African Union (AU).

Important objectives of the previously funded activities have included: operational training at the pre-deployment stage to ensure optimal links between training and actual deployment, as well as the promotion and facilitation of enhanced European and wider international harmonization and standardization of courses and approaches to training, including joint training exercises, in order to enhance the inter-operability of such missions, with the view to create synergies between European and international institutions, such as the UN, AU or the OSCE.

Envisaged activities for pre-deployment training17 for civilian experts to participate in stabilization missions remain a priority, in particular with respect to engaging with international, regional and sub-regional organizations on future training opportunities. The possibility of training in other fields of expertise – for example, rule of law and civilian administration, could also be considered. These trainings will also facilitate the participation of staff from administrations in third countries that will benefit from these missions so as to facilitate ownership and sustainability.

‘d) improving post-conflict recovery, as well as post-disaster recovery with imminent threats to the political and security situation’

Up-stream capacity-building

Reinforcing overall up-stream capacity-building of relevant stakeholders to work with the EU in a number of cluster-areas is of particular relevance and interest - in terms of post-conflict and post-disaster recovery (as well as regards pre-conflict mitigation efforts). These cluster-areas include:

- i) Post-crisis and post-disaster risk assessment; conflict sensitivity of post crisis/post conflict recovery; resilience (including disaster risk reduction);

- ii) Gender-related issues, including women, peace and security; children and conflict; youth and conflict; protection, participation and empowerment of local communities, with particular focus on vulnerable and minority groups;

- iii) Transitional justice; security sector reform; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration;

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17 Including on relevant human rights standards.
Efforts in these areas would also aim to strengthen the links between the programmable (crisis-preparedness) and non-programmable (crisis response) components of the IcSP.

Peace-building/state-building initiatives

In light of recent political initiatives relating to principles of aid effectiveness and sustainable development and, more generally, in order to facilitate addressing situations of instability in third countries, the following areas of activity could be envisaged:

— contribute to the follow-up and implementation of the Busan New Deal, including within the framework of the OECD-DAC International Network on Conflict and Fragility;
— examine the implications of the Busan outcome, in particular with respect to the broader implications of implementing the adopted peace and state-building goals and the suggested “compacts” and fragility assessments;
— more generally, facilitate the transition of countries, where community and/or social conflicts may threaten stability, towards wider development goals including improved governance and inclusive and sustainable growth.

'e) Assistance to curb use of natural resources to finance conflicts and to support compliance by stakeholders with initiatives, such as the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, especially as regards implementation of efficient domestic controls on the production of, and trade in, natural resources'

The legal exploitation and trade of natural mineral resources hold great potential for growth and prosperity. However, natural resources and mineral wealth can also play an important role in the dynamics of violent conflict. Particularly in a context of state fragility and growing insecurity, natural resources such as coltan, wolframite, cassiterite, diamonds, gold, cannabis, palm oil, timber, etc. as well as different forms of illegal taxation (trading routes, labour) constitute an important source of income to many armed groups and criminal networks. In these areas, breaking the nexus between conflict and illegal exploitation of minerals is critical to underpinning peace and stability. The Commission’s "Communication on Growth, Trade and Development"18 (2012) and the "Raw Material Strategy"19 (2011) provide the relevant EU policy framework to contribute to the promotion of responsible sourcing and trading of minerals, thus improving the transparency of the minerals supply chains.

In addition to the potentially deleterious effects of the mismanagement of raw materials, the on-going effects of climate changes have rendered disputes over water rights of increasing importance, while the potential impact of conflict on future energy-sourcing arrangements has been high on the political agenda in recent years.

18 COM(2012) 22 final
19 COM(2011) 25 final
The international community has a key role to play to encourage government authorities to become more engaged in the fight against illegal exploitation and trade of natural resources and to support the national administrations in this regard. The HR and the Commission will continue to support activities in the field of natural resources management and conflict prevention. They will continue to co-operate with other major stake-holders in that respect - notably through – inter alia - : the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, which aims to stem the flow of conflict diamonds; the OECD initiative on Due Diligence for Responsible Mineral Trade from conflict and high risk areas; the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) programme, the EU's response to illegal logging; the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a voluntary mechanism involving a coalition of governments, companies, civil society groups and international organizations and aiming at strengthening governance by improving transparency and accountability in the extractives sector. Efforts focusing on water and energy diplomacy will also continue to be high on the EU’s political agenda. Activities may also build on – and be complementary to – on-going co-operation actions with the UN on natural resources and conflict.

Specific measures under this heading may include:

— supporting compliance with relevant initiatives, especially as regards implementation of efficient domestic controls on the production of, and trade in, natural resources;
— supporting national administrations and civil society to become more engaged in the fight against illegal exploitation and trade of natural resources at national and regional level;
— enhancing co-operation with major stake-holders (including in the private sector) and/or donor co-ordination with regard to the relevant mechanisms;
— promoting relevant standards and guidance as a common global reference for responsible mineral sourcing by stakeholders;
— enhancing awareness and knowledge on implementing tools, challenges and lessons learnt;
- conducting studies/research/technical assessments (including, for example, on the role of EU companies in the supply chain).

Art. 5. Addressing global, trans-regional and emerging threats

5.1. Threats to law and order, to the security and safety of individuals, to critical infrastructure and to public health.

5.1.a. Strengthening the capacity of law enforcement and judicial and civil authorities involved in the fight against terrorism, organised crime and all forms of illicit trafficking.

Priority shall be given to trans-regional cooperation involving two or more third countries which have demonstrated a clear political will to address these problems. (Cooperation in the fight against terrorism may however be also conducted with individual countries, regions or international, regional and sub-regional organisations).
Measures in this area shall place particular emphasis on good governance and shall be in accordance with international law, in particular human rights law\textsuperscript{20} and international humanitarian law.

\textbf{i) Counter terrorism, including countering violent radicalisation}

The number of terrorist incidents worldwide increased over the last decade, rising steeply up to 2007, and holding steady since then. According to the US State Department Country Reports on Terrorism, in 2011 there were over 10,000 terrorist attacks, affecting nearly 45,000 victims in 70 countries and resulting in over 12,500 deaths. The total number of worldwide attacks in 2011, however, dropped by almost 12 percent from 2010 and nearly 29 percent from 2007. The Middle East and South Asia continued to experience the most attacks, incurring just over 75 percent of the 2011 total. In addition, Africa experienced five-year highs in the number of attacks, underling the continued evolution of the terrorist threat\textsuperscript{21}.

Al Qaeda-linked terrorism remains the biggest single terrorist threat worldwide, and this is likely to remain the case over the 2014-2020 period. But there is a significant terrorist threat from a growing number of other organisations, including from groups that are not identified with a particular religion. Terrorists have been adept at finding new vulnerabilities and exploiting modern communications methods to share knowledge and maximise their impact. Terrorist groups are also continuing to exploit weak governance, not only to mount attacks, but also to create new “safe havens” which they can use for training and logistical purposes and from which they can mount attacks elsewhere.

Capacity building assistance under IcSP will concentrate on those countries/regions where the terrorist threat has to be addressed most directly, which is also where the IcSP has an added value over other EU instruments. For the foreseeable future this will continue to mean South Asia (notably Pakistan) and the wider Horn of Africa region (especially Kenya, Somalia and Yemen) as well as the Sahel region. Later on within this programming cycle, activities could include Afghanistan, a wider Sahel approach including West Africa as well as the Maghreb and the Middle East, especially Syria and Iraq. Whenever possible, IcSP support should contribute to the implementation of the EU Sahel Strategy as well as of the counter terrorism Action Plans for the Horn of Africa\textsuperscript{22} and for Pakistan.

The EU’s response to these risks will continue to be framed by the EU Counter Terrorism Strategy and the updated Counter-Terrorism Action Plan\textsuperscript{23}, with internal and external policy and actions in the areas of: prevent, pursue, protect, and respond. The EU CT capacity building assistance is a fundamental part of the implementation of EU country specific CT strategies and Action Plans in particular concerning Horn of Africa/Yemen, Pakistan and Sahel.

\textsuperscript{20} Including the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
\textsuperscript{21} \url{http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195555.htm}
\textsuperscript{22} EU Counter-terrorism Action Plan for the Horn of Africa and Yemen /* JOIN/2012/024 final */
\textsuperscript{23} DG H2 14469/4/05
An increased emphasis will be placed on the prevention of terrorism work to stop individuals from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. As leading terrorists are arrested and brought to justice, it will be increasingly important to ensure that they are not replaced by younger, more sophisticated and more lethal recruits. Lessons will be applied from IfS projects in East Africa and Pakistan, as well as from partners' experiences in this area, to ensure that future work is focussed and effective. EU assistance will support global outreach and dialogue in countering violent extremism and relevant local, regional and multilateral initiatives, expanding beyond the above-mentioned priority regions into Central Asia, South East Asia and other countries confronted to a serious threat of violent radicalisation.

Under 'pursue', EU assistance under the IcSP will actively promote a civilian, criminal justice approach to counter-terrorism based on the rule of law and aimed at strengthening law enforcement through police and judicial cooperation, while ensuring protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Actions will promote in particular closer cooperation of law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities while protecting human rights. To this end, it will also support the development and promotion of human rights guidelines for counter-terrorism cooperation as foreseen in the EU Human Rights Strategic Framework24.

Priority shall be given to supporting measures concerning the establishment, development and implementation of counter-terrorism legislation, national CT strategies, including in the field of countering terrorist financing and illicit money laundering, the development of law enforcement procedures aligned with the highest international standards, the strengthening of democratic control and institutional oversight mechanisms, and the prevention of terrorist radicalisation.

Under 'protect', the main focus will be the terrorist threat to aviation security and to critical energy infrastructure as well as border security. Work under 'respond' will be a relatively small proportion of IcSP work, focussing on providing niche support as appropriate.

This targeted work under IcSP will aim to complement and be complemented by broader work dealing with a wide spectrum of phenomena including social, economic and political exclusion, conflict and lack of good governance. These issues have much wider implications and will be linked with other relevant actions on conflict resolution and prevention under IcSP and also largely addressed under development (DCI, EDF) and other mainstream cooperation instruments (IPA II, ENI, EIDHR).

At the multilateral level, IcSP cooperation in this area will promote the implementation of the UN Global Counter-terrorism Strategy25 and relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. It will also promote a coordinated counter-terrorism approach within the UN. Support to specific counter-terrorism cooperation programmes developed within the UN or other multilateral frameworks such as the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF) may also be considered for IcSP funding.

provided that they have an added value and fit within the above-described counter-terrorism priorities under this Instrument.

Where such strategies exist, IcSP capacity building assistance in the field of counter-terrorism will be provided within the framework of a broader EU political strategy such as those adopted for the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. Such assistance should also be accompanied by a regular political dialogue on counter-terrorism, either “ad hoc” or within broader political and security dialogues/consultations.

ii) Fight against organised crime and illicit trafficking

Globalisation and new technologies have dramatically increased the mobility and profit opportunities for transnational organised crime groups, which by definition do not respect national laws and operate relatively easily across borders, contrary to national law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, technological progress is quickly adopted by these groups, which have access to large financial resources, whereas public administrations face numerous constraints to keep up-to-date. Many international organised criminal groups have evolved into flexible interconnected networks which are hard to detect and prosecute. The degrees of sophistication and threat that these groups represent have thus grown significantly in the last few years. While globalisation and technical progress bring many benefits, there is an urgent need to address the vulnerabilities. Contributing to building specific capacities in these areas and to increasing international cooperation, exchanges of information and best practices would help restoring a level playing field.

The IcSP Regulation will allow for assistance under this Instrument to address “organised crime and all forms of illicit trafficking”. Yet, in order to maximise impact and avoid an excessive dispersion of focal areas, a few specific forms of organised crime-related activities will be prioritised, in particular illicit trafficking (drugs, human beings, falsified medicines, SALW and explosives), money laundering and cybercrime. These phenomena are not only global and/or trans-regional in scope, but also considered to pose the greatest threat to peace, security and stability, to hamper development and to undermine democracy, good governance and human rights.

Notwithstanding, when addressing these specific crimes, flexibility is required in order to maximise synergies with other areas of support under this Instrument and to allow for innovative ways of tackling these issues to be explored. For instance, when addressing ‘money laundering’, the whole spectrum of associated criminal activities (illicit trafficking, terrorism financing, piracy-related financial flows, cyber-fraud, etc.) should be taken into consideration. Likewise, when fighting against trafficking in illicit drugs or in explosives, due attention should also be paid to trafficking in drug precursors. Whenever appropriate, the promotion of the so-called ‘administrative approach’, which aims at making criminal operations harder through specific administrative and good governance measures beyond criminal law (e.g. public ownership registers, tax and licensing regulations, enhancing the integrity of public administrations, etc.) should also be pursued. Civil society and NGOs could and should play an important role in this regard by denouncing corruption and maladministration, by advocating transparency and respect for the rule of law and by supporting a culture of accountability in public policy, through lobbying, awareness
raising and public pressure. A ‘career in crime’ should be made less attractive, financially and socially.

Whenever applicable, IcSP support in the fight against organised crime should be aligned with and promote the principles and objectives of the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (the Palermo Convention)

**Drug trafficking, including synthetic drugs**

Drug trafficking is a trans-regional, multi-dimensional phenomenon that the IcSP can address effectively, by targeting illicit drugs from their production to their consumption countries – this is particularly relevant since criminal profits accrue along these trafficking ‘routes’, rather than in the production countries. Local consumption, corruption and other criminality also thrive along these ‘routes’, endangering health and security there and ultimately in the EU too.

In accordance with the above, the IcSP should continue targeting the so-called heroin and cocaine trafficking routes, adapting further capacity building support to changing circumstances and lessons learnt. For instance, organised crime activities derived from trans-regional cocaine trafficking are having a growing impact on an increasing number of countries along multiple sub-routes on both sides of the Atlantic. This phenomenon not only poses an additional security threat, but may also impact on some of these countries’ stability. Extending the Cocaine Route Programme to these countries will therefore be considered. Likewise, developments along the ‘heroin route’ are also highly complex and uncertain, particularly with the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan, and the appearance of new trafficking patterns along the various sub-routes leading to Europe. Moreover, the emergence of major suppliers of synthetic drugs in Eastern Europe, East and South East Asia represents an additional trans-regional threat, which the IcSP might also help addressing.

Adequately tackling these new challenges in the fight against drug trafficking will require enhanced operational coordination and cooperation among all concerned actors. To this end, the IcSP will contribute to building and strengthening capacities in international coordination, preferably by supporting existing mechanisms.

With regard to assistance relating to the problem of drugs, the IcSP Regulation states that 'due attention shall be given to international cooperation aimed at promoting best practices relating to the reduction of demand, production and harm'. Support in this area under the IcSP will contribute to addressing the external dimensions of the EU 2013-2020 Drug Strategy and its related Action Plans. Complementing initiatives carried out under other EU financial instruments, this might include the promotion of international and European best practices in drug demand and harm reduction, human rights and good governance as well as the involvement and strengthening of civil society.

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There is ample evidence that along major international drug trafficking routes other forms of illicit trafficking also take place (e.g., in human beings, SALW, falsified medicines, etc.), often through the same channels and sometimes using drugs as means for payment (e.g. in exchange of firearms). IcSP support to the fight against drug trafficking should take this into account, ensuring consistency with IcSP support in these other areas, seeking synergies and enhanced overall effectiveness.

**Trafficking in human beings (THB), including people smuggling**

Trafficking in human beings is not only a major form of organised crime, it is also and above all a serious violation of human rights. To a large extent, it is a gender-specific phenomenon, which profits from both the higher vulnerability of women to poverty and economic dependence as well as from persistent social, cultural and political discrimination against women in many countries around the globe. Children too are often victims of THB, notably for the purposes of forced labour or begging, sexual exploitation and sometimes even for participation in armed conflicts as child soldiers/guerrillas.

Support under this Instrument should actively contribute to the global promotion of best practices in (a) prevention of THB, (b) protection and reintegration of THB victims, (c) prosecution of offenders (d) partnerships and international cooperation in this area. Particular emphasis will be put on the fight against trafficking in children for the purpose of sexual abuse and exploitation. It will also include actions tackling smuggling of human beings, in particular when linked to THB.27

Support under the IcSP in this area should be fully consistent with the ‘EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings 2012–2016’28, in particular its external aspects, as well as with the EU Directive 2011/9329 and the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (the Lanzarote Convention)30. Such support should also be aligned with and promote the principles and objectives of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the Palermo Convention)31, including its Protocols to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; and against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air.

**Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and in explosives**

Trafficking in SALW and explosives (including SALW ammunition) is a highly destabilising threat, particularly when the destination countries are fragile or conflict-

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27 However, THB and human smuggling are distinct types of (organised) crime that should not be confounded, even if they are often difficult to distinguish in concrete situations.
30 http://www.coe.int/lanzarote.
prone. The majority of conflict deaths are caused by the use of SALW, and civilian populations bear the brunt of armed conflict more than ever. Also, small arms are the main tools for criminal violence. The rate of firearms-related homicides in post-conflict societies often outnumbers battlefield deaths. More human rights abuses are committed with small arms than with any other weapon. Furthermore, where the use of armed violence becomes a means for resolving grievances and conflicts, legal and peaceful dispute resolution suffers and the rule of law is threatened. Armed violence aggravates poverty, inhibits access to social services and diverts energy and resources away from efforts to improve human development. It also undermines investment climates, hindering economic growth. The impact of SALW on development was also highlighted in the EU SALW Strategy.

Addressing the problem posed by uncontrolled SALW in a given country or region and its impact on their development should primarily be supported under mainstream, geographical cooperation instruments, particularly at the regulatory, governance and awareness-raising levels. When pursuing a mainly CFSP objective, support to SALW control actions can only be provided under the CFSP budget. In accordance with its external assistance nature and global scope, the added value of the IcSP in this area is addressing the trans-regional dimensions of trafficking in SALW and explosives (including SALW ammunition) by building the capacity of third countries’ law enforcement, judicial and civil authorities involved in fighting their illicit trafficking as well as supporting multilateral SALW control efforts for the benefit of third countries with regard to this objective.

The IcSP will continue to contribute to the implementation and further development of the relevant provisions of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (UN SALW PoA) and of the International Tracing Instrument, as well as to the promotion of the Firearms Protocol. Within its remit, the IcSP could also contribute to the effective and capable implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty, actively seeking synergies with related EU actions under other instruments, e.g. CFSP projects financed via Council Decisions, EDF, DCI, etc. In view of the vast capacity building needs on SALW control, a global facility could be considered as well as specific support to civil society organisations advocating for SALW control. New trans-regional actions against SALW trafficking (e.g. from the Arabian Peninsula towards the Horn of Africa) might also be prioritised under this Instrument.

Trafficking in falsified medicines

Falsified medicines are fake medicines that pass themselves off as real, authorised medicines. Falsified medicines might contain ingredients, including active ingredients, which are of bad quality or in the wrong dose – either too high or too low. In some cases they may even contain toxic ingredients. As a result, they can fail to cure, may harm and even kill people.

33 The term ‘falsified’ is used to distinguish the problem from infringements of intellectual property violations, so-called ‘counterfeits’.
Falsified medicines are a major threat to global public health and safety. While no country is protected against this threat, the impact is particularly acute in the developing world. In some West African countries up to 60% of anti-malarial medicines available in the market are ineffective fakes. High levels of ineffective anti-malarial medicines are also found in South East Asia and other African regions. In addition to increased mortality levels due to the ineffectiveness of the treatment, this phenomenon is also creating immune resistances that seriously jeopardise current anti-malaria efforts worldwide. With the spread of the Internet and as falsifications become more sophisticated, the risk that fake medicines reach more patients around the world increases every year. Compounding this public health risk is the fact that the supply chain for medicines operates at the global and trans-regional levels, which requires concerted international cooperation to effectively detect and combat the introduction of fraudulent medicines along this supply chain.

Trafficking in falsified medicines is a multibillion illegal business. The appeal of high financial gains, combined with the perceived low risk of detection and prosecution, and the leniency of the penalties (compared with other forms of illicit trafficking) make the production and trafficking in falsified medicines an attractive commodity to criminal groups. Criminal groups take advantage of gaps in legal and regulatory frameworks, weaknesses in law enforcement capacities and insufficient international cooperation. After sexual enhancement medicines, criminal organisations are now trafficking in fake medicines against serious illnesses such as malaria, diabetes and cancer as well as antibiotics and contraceptive pills. The unstoppable expansion of the Internet pharmaceutical market, difficult to regulate, combined with accessible good-quality printing means, unscrupulous pharmaceutical laboratories, and official corruption also help explain the spreading of the phenomenon. There is also growing evidence of linkages with money laundering and other forms of organised crime.

IcSP assistance in the fight against trafficking in falsified medicines will aim at raising public awareness and build capacities to combat this phenomenon by enhancing legal frameworks, strengthening forensic, enforcement and judicial means, including seizure and confiscation, and fostering international cooperation and exchange of information. IcSP support should be aligned with the principles of the Council of Europe “Medicrime” Convention34 (2011), which seeks to protect public health through criminalising the falsification of medical products and related crimes, including trafficking.

Money laundering

What all organised crime groups have in common is the need to launder their illicit financial profits, either from trafficking, fraud, extortion, piracy or kidnapping/hijacking ransoms. When targeting money laundering the aim is to disrupt the ‘business model’ of criminal organisations. This also contributes to increasing public revenue and to preventing other financial crimes such as embezzlement of

public funds, tax evasion, the financing of terrorism, proliferation and other criminal activities.

The IcSP approach to the fight against money laundering should be balanced between prevention and enforcement. Prevention of money laundering is mainly addressed through legislation, implementing norms, administrative regulations and professional codes of conduct addressed to relevant public institutions (central banks, financial intelligence units, customs administrations, etc.), private entities (commercial banks, money transfer companies and other financial bodies) and non-banking financial businesses and professions (notaries, property registers, etc.).

International standards in this area are defined by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and its associated regional organisations against money laundering, which issue recommendations and monitor the progress of members in implementing relevant measures. Enforcement in the fight against money laundering starts when a suspicious transaction is reported and goes from the investigation to the recovery of assets. In this context, effective international law enforcement and judicial cooperation to effectively detect, seize and confiscate illicit profits from criminal organisations is essential.

IcSP support in this area will aim at addressing the global and trans-regional dimensions of money laundering by building the capacity of relevant third countries’ actors in preventing and fighting against money laundering in a manner that is consistent with FATF recommendations. Support could also be provided to the FAFT and/or its associated regional organisations in their efforts to build third countries’ capacities and to increase trans-regional cooperation, notably by promoting the exchange of information and good practices, the raising of awareness, the enhancement of legislation, the organisation of training programmes targeting practitioners, policy makers, legislators, etc. Supporting international cooperation among financial intelligence units, especially in the areas of information exchange, training and the sharing of expertise, could also be considered.

**Cybercrime**

Most forms of illicit trafficking, money laundering and other financial crimes as well as terrorism and violent radicalisation, they all have an increasingly important ‘cyber’ dimension –to an extent that today it is no longer possible for law enforcement services to effectively combat these threats without addressing their related criminal activities in the cyberspace. Cybercrime should therefore not be seen only as a new form of crime, but also as a new environment where organised crime has expanded. Cybercrime has also efficiently multiplied profit opportunities for serious organised crime organisations, while minimising their physical exposure. The worldwide cost of cybercrime in financial terms is estimated to be in the range of EUR 300 billion/year\(^{35}\), a figure that exceeds the global black market in marijuana, cocaine and heroin combined. Cybercriminals today reap profits from their targets a continent away, without having to travel anywhere. The multi-jurisdictional nature of

\(^{35}\) EUROPOL
cybercrime also complicates its investigation and prosecution by law enforcement authorities.

Concerted international efforts and stronger technical capacities are therefore needed to detect and disrupt organised crime activities in cyberspace. To this end, the IcSP should address the lack of international policy coordination and clearinghouse mechanisms on addressing cybercrime, for instance by supporting the creation of a law-enforcement and judiciary training model and the development of networks to coordinate assistance as well as by assessing existing initiatives in this field and identify needs for further support areas.

In order to effectively fight cybercrime, the police need special knowledge on how to investigate cybercrime networks’ activities, how to collect digital evidence, and how to arrest cybercriminals. Police services also need to protect their investigation data from illegal interference, to have adequate digital forensics capabilities and the necessary technology to carry out their work. These are all areas that could be supported under the IcSP, particularly when addressing them at the global and trans-regional levels, in the form of training, technical, and network building with EU high tech crime units for joint investigations.

When fighting cybercrime it is essential to ensure maximum respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular with regard to privacy rights, freedom of expression, and the protection of personal data. To this end, the IcSP should actively contribute to the promotion of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (“Budapest Convention”)36, which is the most advanced international instrument in this field and is considered in the EU ‘Stockholm Programme’ as “the legal framework of reference for fighting cyber crime at global level”37. Activities could include support to transposition into domestic legislation and subsequent implementation, specialised training for judiciary personnel and prosecutors, and diplomacy actions such as international sensitisation and awareness raising, conferences and expert exchanges to build understanding and consensus.

The proposed IcSP priority areas will be fully consistent with the joint Communication on a “European Strategy for Cyber Security”38, and –whenever possible– actively contribute to the implementation of its external aspects, specifically with regard to the fight against cybercrime. Support in this area should also be fully consistent with applicable fundamental rights standards, in particular with regard to privacy rights, freedom of expression and protection of personal data. In the fight against child sexual abuse online, IcSP support should be guided by the principles of the Global Alliance39.

5.1.b. Addressing threats to critical infrastructure

37 Stockholm Programme, (2010-2014) doc 17024/09 COUNCIL.
Measures adopted in this area shall place particular emphasis on trans-regional cooperation and the implementation of international standards in the fields of risk awareness, vulnerability analysis, emergency preparedness, and alert and consequence management.

i) International transport

Aviation security

Aviation security has become a major area of concern over the past decades as air travel has grown from a small, exclusive service to a massive industry serving billions of people around the globe, creating considerable challenges and new threats. Civil aviation has always carried a risk of exploitation by criminal organisations, mostly for illicit trafficking purposes (drugs, arms, stolen goods, black money, etc.). It is, however, commonly recognised today that the main security threat to aircrafts, airports and passengers are terrorist attacks, notably in the form of hijackings, bombings or MANPADS (shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles). It is in fact the ‘international’ aspect of air travel that has made it an attractive target for terrorist organisations seeking to influence the world’s stage.

Dramatic terrorist attacks against civilian aircrafts and airports, notably since the early 1980s, some of which have resulted in large numbers of casualties, as well as a number of recent foiled terrorist attack attempts, have prompted the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), the EU, the US and several other countries around the world, to raise aviation security standards, including at the operational, supervisory and regulatory levels, and to introduce stricter controls for passengers and cargo. As a consequence, international air traffic originating in a number of developing countries, which due to a lack of institutional, technical and/or material capacity have not been able yet to meet these enhanced aviation security standards, is subject to certain restrictions and additional security controls40.

Assistance under the IcSP in this area will therefore primarily contribute to building the necessary national capacities at the operational, supervisory and regulatory levels. By helping vulnerable countries meet international civil aviation security standards the IcSP will not only address a major trans-regional threat; it would also facilitate trade and development, ensuring internal/external security policy consistency as well as overall policy coherence for development.

Maritime security

Maritime security aims at preventing unlawful intentional acts against shipping and port infrastructure and to protect citizens, commercial entities and their assets from the consequences of such acts. For most countries international maritime shipping is and will remain the main vehicle for importing and exporting goods, including oil and

40 In the case of the EU, this results from the implementation of the EU Common Aviation Security Standards, notably with regard to cargo and mail.
gas. The EU economy also depends on open and safe seas and oceans since around 90% of our external trade is transported by sea. At the same time maritime shipping is also a major channel for most forms of illicit trafficking. In certain maritime areas of the world, sometimes including fluvial waters, the security of commercial, fishing and recreational vessels is also threatened by acts of piracy, kidnapping and armed robbery at sea.

Protecting trans-regional maritime routes and related infrastructure is becoming even more critical as economic development, increased trade and movement of people, and larger dependence on international energy supply all result in increased use of maritime transport means and hence in higher exposure to associated security threats. Growing maritime traffic also means greater saturation of the maritime domain, thus weakening existing capacity to ensure an adequate level of surveillance. Management of such intricate situations requires global respect for international law and compliance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as means for achieving rules based good governance at sea.

Individual countries cannot effectively address maritime security acting unilaterally, not only due to the international scope of the challenge, but also because of the complex and diverse nature of maritime security threats, sometimes highly sophisticated, which requires multilateral responses from States and international and regional organisations able to pool resources and instruments. Such regional and multilateral responses also ensure shared objectives and greater sustainability.

Support to enhanced maritime security has been provided by IfS and other EU cooperation instruments since 2009, in close coordination with related CFSP/CSDP actions in Horn of Africa region. IfS programmes had a particular focus on the maritime zones with the highest incidence of piracy attacks, most notably the Western Indian Ocean. The trans-regional ‘Critical Maritime Routes’ programme, wider in geographical scope, has the specific objectives of fostering trans-regional cooperation, building capacities for the sharing of information and best practices, and promoting international standards and codes of conduct.

Future IcSP support in this area will build on the work already accomplished and could expand to other critical aspects of maritime security such as port control and the security of port facilities and ships, including administrative capacity building. IcSP support in this area will be based on the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) ‘Guide to Maritime Security’ and on its ‘Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Security’, notably the ‘International Ship and Port Facility Security Code’ (ISPSC), which constitute the international standards in this area. Support could also be provided to the eventual development of harmonised audit protocols, ideally mandatory, in order to ensure compliance with the above-mentioned IMO standards.

The proposed IcSP priorities in this area will be fully consistent with the EU Maritime Security Strategy and –whenever possible– actively contribute to the implementation of its external aspects.

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ii) Energy operations and distribution infrastructure

One major failure in critical energy infrastructure today has the potential to bring down multiple systems including emergency services, transport (air traffic control, trains…), public administration, private businesses and industries, financial services, etc. The immediate impact on the safety and security of populations as well as on the economy could be devastating.

Energy operations and distribution infrastructures are increasingly vulnerable to a dangerous mix of traditional and non-traditional types of threats, from equipment failures, human error, weather and other natural causes, to intentional physical damage (terrorism, politically-motivated sabotage, theft, vandalism, etc.) or cyber-attacks. Because of increased network interconnection, the cascading effect caused by single points of failure has the potential to pose dire and far-reaching consequences.

Vulnerabilities are further aggravated by the trans-regional dimension of many of the world’s most critical energy transportation infrastructure such as overland oil and gas pipelines, electrical power lines, etc., often traversing remote, mostly uninhabited areas and covering great distances which make monitoring difficult and whose protection therefore necessitates international cooperation.

EU assistance under the IcSP in this area will therefore aim at strengthening international cooperation, raising risk awareness, promoting information exchange, disseminating best practices\(^{42}\), supporting the development of legal frameworks and technical protocols/standards, and building our partners’ capacities to prevent disruptions, mitigate damages and restore supply under the best conditions. Particular attention should also be paid to fostering networking among public authorities, security technology companies and energy infrastructure owners and operators – to this end, the EU Thematic Network on Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection (TNCEIP) could provide a useful example.

iii) Electronic information and communication networks (cyber-security)

To a large and increasing extent, our daily life, economic vitality, and security depend on a stable, safe, and resilient cyberspace. Today’s world relies on this vast array of interconnected networks to communicate and travel, power homes, run businesses, and hospitals. Information and communication networks underpin all critical services and support the smooth functioning of global economy, as well as providing essential public services. Yet cyber intrusions and attacks have increased dramatically over the last decade, both in number and in sophistication, exposing sensitive personal and business information, disrupting critical operations, and imposing high costs on the economy.

There is an asymmetry to cyber threats and our typically state-centred response. The threat often knows no geographical boundaries and can affect targets across the globe.

whereas our response is largely limited by the legal and political boundaries of states or the boundaries of commercial interests. State- or company-based responses merely are often insufficient to effectively counter the threat, which requires collective work by many public and private sector actors.

The responsibility to increase reliable and interoperable access to the Internet as well as to counter cyber threats jeopardising ICT growth worldwide lies on all stakeholders: private sector, governments, civil society, international and regional organisations, and end-users. Increased global connectivity can bring new security challenges, which should be prevented from the onset by the active engagement of all actors involved.

In recent years, a number of positive developments have fostered international response to cyber threats, yet in comparison to more traditional transnational threats such as terrorism or drug trafficking, we have yet to find adequate, sustainable mechanisms for collective private-sector, political and law enforcement action to protect electronic information and communication networks in general and the Internet in particular.

Traditional donor-recipient models are important but insufficient alone: the demand is too wide. So far, capacity building in cyber security has witnessed modest and not too well-coordinated international efforts. Market forces are addressing some aspects, whereas international organisations and bilateral aid are addressing others. There are a range of good capacity building initiatives underway, but overall there is a growing imbalance between increasing demand and limited supply – the skills and knowledge of leading cyber-security practices are not being shared fast enough and wide enough.

Cyber-security is at an early stage and we are all learning. We therefore need to improve the way we capture and transfer knowledge, skills and best practices. It is crucial that these limited resources are well coordinated, that their impact is measured and strengthened, and that interventions are both sustainable and inclusive of the wide range of stakeholders in cyber issues. To this end, IcSP support should contribute to enhance coordination of international cyber-security support policy and to put into place a clearinghouse mechanism for cyber-security capacity building, involving not only the EU and our Member States, but also our strategic partners.

Many third countries have very limited capacity to monitor and manage incidents in cyberspace. To build this capacity, they need to introduce both technological and organisational measures. Contributing to building these capacities at the national-level could be also supported under the IcSP, particularly in the case of our largest and most vulnerable partners, due to the potential global impact of a major cyber incident. This support could include raising awareness on cyber threats; developing national cyber security strategies; providing for information assurance and resilience; setting up, training and equipping Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs), building early warning, information sharing and analysis capabilities in priority regions etc. In order to guarantee the sustainability of national and regional cyber

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43 These teams of experts identify and analyse malicious activities and assist in the recovery of the affected IT infrastructure. CERTs are interconnected with each other and cooperate in their efforts to counter cyber threats across boundaries.
resilience efforts, it will be crucial that target countries will adopt necessary strategic and policy frameworks that support public-private partnerships and technological measures of cyber resilience. The countries should develop cyber security strategies and policies to build cyber resilience of critical infrastructures, and improve cyber incidence response capacities.

Protection of critical information infrastructures (such as trans-regional undersea cables) represents another area where global response is needed should there be a serious incident, and which could also justify specific IcSP support. The IcSP support could be envisaged for the development of early warning mechanisms and public-private partnerships to prevent major disruption of global critical information infrastructures.

The proposed IcSP priority areas will be fully consistent with the joint Communication on a “European Strategy for Cyber Security”, and –whenever possible– actively contribute to the implementation of its external aspects. Support in this area should also be fully consistent with applicable fundamental rights standards, in particular with regard to privacy rights, freedom of expression and protection of personal data.

5.1.c. Ensuring an adequate response to major threats to public health, including sudden epidemics with a potential trans-national impact.

[NB: This objective will be pursued under the biosafety component of wider the CBRN risk mitigation objective –sudden pandemics (see point 5.2 below); as well as under the fight against organised crime objective –trafficking in falsified medicines (see point 5.1.ii above)]

5.1.d. Addressing global and trans-regional effects of climate change having a potentially destabilising impact

In recent years climate change has been recognised as a core global challenge that carries serious implications for international peace, security and stability. It has moved from being just an environmental problem and an energy challenge to being a matter of economic, social and political concern.

Climate change is a threat multiplier that exacerbates existing trends and tensions related to energy security, food security, human health, water resources, weather patterns and agriculture as well as disruptions to global markets. Failure to successfully adapt to challenges such as increasing floods, drought, coastal erosion, glacial melting and heat waves can not only result in major human disasters, but also in social and political instability. At the trans-regional level, climate change also stresses existing mechanisms for sharing resources like trans-boundary waterways, coastal waters and arable land, increasing conflict risks.

Investment in mitigation, as well as ways to adapt to the unavoidable, should go hand in hand with addressing the international security threats created by climate change; both should be viewed as part of preventive security policy. A drop in agricultural
productivity will lead to food-insecurity in least developed countries. Water shortage has the potential to cause civil unrest and lead to significant economic losses. Desertification could trigger a vicious circle of degradation, migration and conflicts over territory and borders. Where catchment areas of river systems under water stress (through droughts or flash floods) cross borders the potential for conflict is obvious. Sea-level rise poses a serious threat, as well. The consequences will be even more intense in areas under strong demographic pressure. The overall effect is that climate change will fuel existing conflicts over depleting resources, especially where access to those resources is politicised. These impacts are not an expected future risk, but a real threat already today.

All this calls for mainstreaming climate change into the EU’s external action as a whole, including under its external cooperation instruments. There is no doubt that the mitigation of climate change impacts and risks at the country and regional levels can be more effectively supported under the main geographic cooperation instruments (DCI, EDF, ENI, IPA II). Likewise, certain global and international aspects of climate change, particularly those having a primarily developmental dimension, can also be more effectively addressed under the Global Public Goods Programme under the DCI, which has climate change mitigation as one of its main objectives. The IcSP is, however, particularly well-suited to address the security impacts and threats of climate change at the global and trans-regional levels—in doing so, it will perfectly complement the support provided under the above-mentioned instruments.

Assistance under the IcSP in this area should therefore aim at strengthening relevant policies, institutions and capacities at the global and trans-regional levels to address security risks of climate change and develop adaptation strategies; providing support to international dialogue and cooperation in this area, including for the sharing of information and best practices; enhancing the knowledge base of climate change impacts and their interrelation with security (e.g. vulnerability assessments, identification of hotspots, etc.), and facilitating risk communication and raising awareness on security impacts of climate change (information dissemination, establishment of and support to knowledge networks, etc., with a view to—for example—enhancing linkages between climate change adaptation and mitigation of security risks). Specific ‘added-value’ trans-regional support programmes aimed at mitigating security risks of climate change could also be considered under this Instrument.

IcSP support in the climate change and security sector should be provided in close coordination with the EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative (see point 5.2 below).

5.2. Mitigation of and preparedness against risks, either of an intentional, accidental or natural origin, related to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials or agents

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) risks, either natural, accidental or criminal, represent a key threat to the security and the health of human beings, to the environment and to critical infrastructures. Promoting a culture of
CBRN safety and security, from prevention to consequence management, is a prerequisite to development and stability.

The security threat is global, and CBRN risks cannot be dealt with in isolation, given their multi-dimensional nature (health, environment, security, crisis management) as recently demonstrated by the Syrian chemical threat. The UN has established specific requirements to address threats and risks worldwide\(^44\) while supporting countries that need assistance. Disease surveillance, waste management, emergency planning, early warning, civil protection, export control of dual use goods, cross-border trafficking of CBRN materials, retraining and alternative employment of former weapons scientists are areas of concern both the EU and its partner countries. This evolution in the nature of risks and threats calls for a comprehensive approach to CBRN risk mitigation to ensure an adequate response.

The EU promotes a culture of CBRN safety and security within the EU\(^45\) as well as internationally. To this end, the IcSP contributes to international efforts to mitigate CBRN risks, whether of natural, accidental or criminal origin, following a consistent ‘all hazards’ approach. The aim is twofold, on the one hand to prevent CBRN incidents and on the other hand to build partners’ capacities for emergency responses to such incidents, with the objectives of protecting populations, preserving the environment, and safeguarding critical infrastructures.

In order to ensure the necessary consistency in the approach, particularly due to the highly specialised nature of CBRN-related cooperation, IcSP assistance in this area will continue to be primarily (but not exclusively) articulated around, and delivered through, a single, global vehicle: the ‘EU CBRN Centres of Excellence’ – an innovative EU initiative that has been welcomed by the UN Security Council\(^46\) and the G8 Global Partnership\(^47\).

**Building global capacities on CBRN risk mitigation**

The EU CBRN Centres of Excellence initiative provides a platform for voluntary regional cooperation on all CBRN-related hazard issues, be it of criminal (trafficking, terrorism), natural (pandemics, volcanic eruptions) or accidental (e.g. Fukushima) origin. Countries participating in the initiative work together to identify risks, assess gaps and needs assessment and advise on the activities or projects to be taken forward. Developments so far confirm that promoting a bottom-up collaboration is the most effective approach in the CBRN sector. The established Regional Secretariats work towards enhancing this co-operation. Forty-five countries have now volunteered to be part of the initiative, and a further 25 are looking to join. National focal points are in place, with their CBRN teams representing all national governmental stakeholders. Based on the results from the needs assessment exercises,

\(^{45}\) EU CBRN Action Plan (2009)  
\(^{46}\) UNSC Plenary Session Statement of 12 April 2012  
\(^{47}\) G8 Global Partnership Statement. Evian, 2012
they will work on the development of CBRN national plans.

IcSP support through the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence will primarily aim at building partners’ prevention and response capacities through the use of specific tools made available by the EU as well as through the regular organisation of expert meetings allowing regional exchanges, coordination of activities and the definition of regional projects. It will also aim at consolidating this initiative and enhancing our partners’ ownership to make it sustainable, by strengthening the operation of the Secretariats (on a pilot basis in the EU neighbourhood) and by deepening and further strengthening the successful cooperation methodology applied so far, i.e., bottom-up approach, local ownership, regional cooperation.

The links between CBRN risk mitigation and related topics such as counter terrorism, security and climate change, export control of dual use items will be reinforced by making use of the Centres of Excellence network.

CBRN risk mitigation support under the IcSP will also be extended to third countries that are not covered under the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence initiative, but are nevertheless of relevance for the EU’s efforts to promote a global culture of CBRN safety and security. Bilateral or regional projects with these partners will be envisaged, particularly if the addressed risks may pose a wider trans-regional or global threat. Potential candidates for assistance during the period 2014-2020 include Syria, Libya and other possible countries in relation to the destruction of hazardous chemical agents and related precursors. Raising international awareness on chemical agents' safety and security issues and increasing third countries' capacities to meet their obligations under relevant international instruments may also be considered for IcSP support.

Likewise, ‘ad hoc’ CBRN risk mitigation cooperation with relevant international organisations (IAEA, Interpol, ISTC, STCU, OSCE, WHO, WCO, OPCW, etc.) and other multi-country fora (UN 1540 Committee, GHSI, ARF, etc.) could also be undertaken, particularly when their geographical scope of action exceeds that of the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence. This cooperation should aim at associating these organisations in capacity building actions for mitigating CBRN risks, including by disseminating best practices, standards, and recommendations and by providing technical guidance.

Export control and fight against illicit trafficking in dual use technologies and CBRN materials

The EU is committed to strengthening export control policies and practices within the EU borders and beyond, including by providing technical assistance to third countries in the field of export control of dual use goods and technologies, including CBRN materials.

Under the IfS, dual use export control cooperation programmes have involved more than 28 countries around the world, in areas such as legal and regulatory frameworks, institutional capacity-building, import/export licensing, border controls, etc.). This
cooperation should be extended and reinforced under the IcSP, moving from a country-oriented approach towards a wider regional approach.

The fight against illicit trafficking of CBRN materials and deceptive financial practices is also essential and will also be given further attention under the IcSP.

Retraining and alternative employment of scientists having dual-use knowledge

The 2009 G8 Summit acknowledged with respect to the spread of dual-use knowledge that the focus should move away from support to “redirection of scientists” to the development of the concept of “scientists’ engagement”. Since then, the EU approach has been adapted accordingly, taking also into account the emergence of new information and communication tools allowing easier access to sensitive knowledge and know-how by potential proliferators.

The year 2013 was a turning point. A new agreement continuing the activities of the International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC), in which the EU participates, is currently being concluded with a broader geographical scope. The mandate of the STCU was updated. Bilateral activities such as in Iraq continued. Under the IcSP the new strategy for scientists' engagement will be implemented. The new activities would cover all types of sensitive CBRN knowledge, while also contributing to the implementation of relevant aspects of UNSCR 1540.

Biosecurity and biosafety, including sudden pandemics

Preparing countries against cross border microbiological or viral outbreaks, whether they originate from humans (e.g. travellers, migrants) or animals (e.g. cattle, trade) is a major concern for the EU. Sudden pandemics may have dramatic consequences on public health, but also on security and stability.

In the framework of the Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI), the European Union has called for concerted global action to strengthen public health preparedness and response to CBRN-related threats, including the prevention of criminal acts involving the use of dangerous pathogens. In line with this commitment, IcSP assistance in the biosafety/biosecurity area will put a particular emphasis on global disease surveillance, information exchange, risk assessment and management, emergency planning, early warning, alert and reporting systems, disease outbreak containment, management of vaccine and medicine stockpiles and other related activities. Moreover, the IcSP will also continue to support the development of a 'Biosafety and Biosecurity Strategy' already started in the EU Southern Neighbourhood and currently under implementation.

Climate change may also have an impact on biological outbreaks and potentially harm humans or the biosphere (vegetal and animal). These climate change linked outbreaks may be favoured by local natural dissemination (air, water), animal (birds, fishes, insects, mammals) or human migrations. Coordination will therefore be ensured with actions foreseen under point 5.1 d on climate change.
4. OVERALL FINANCIAL ALLOCATIONS 2014-2020

In accordance with the IcSP Regulation, the financial envelope for the implementation of this instrument during the 2014-2020 period will be EUR 2.34 billion, of which 'no less than 70%' shall be allocated to non-programmable crisis response assistance (Article 3) and 'at least 9%' to conflict prevention, peace building and crisis preparedness measures (Article 4), hence leaving a maximum of 21% for measures addressing global, trans-regional and emerging threats (Article 5).

On the basis of the above, a minimum amount of EUR 210.6 million should be allocated to measures under Article 4 and a maximum amount of EUR 491.4 million to measures under Article 5—including their respective proportional share of the administrative support budget line.

Indicative financial allocations under Article 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article 4 - Conflict prevention, crisis preparedness and peacebuilding</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early warning and conflict-sensitive risk analysis in policy making</td>
<td>15-25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence-building, mediation, dialogue and reconciliation</td>
<td>20-25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation and deployment in civilian stabilisation missions</td>
<td>5-10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post conflict and post disaster recovery</td>
<td>20-30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of natural resources to finance conflicts</td>
<td>18-22%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Indicative financial allocations under Article 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article 5 - Addressing global, trans-regional and emerging threats</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Counter-terrorism*</td>
<td>22-30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fight against Organised Crime</td>
<td>22-30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illicit Trafficking (Drugs, Human Beings, SALW…)</td>
<td>17-21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money Laundering</td>
<td>2-4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cybercrime</td>
<td>3-5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Infrastructure Protection</td>
<td>8-12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime Security</td>
<td>5-7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyber Security</td>
<td>3-5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate Change and Security</td>
<td>3-5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN Risk Mitigation</td>
<td>27-35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expert Support Facility**</td>
<td>2-4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Including the terrorist threat to civil aviation and to critical energy infrastructure

** The Expert Support Facility (ESF) is a framework contract arrangement specifically designed by the Commission to facilitate access to EU Member States’ and other experts in the different security policy areas addressed under article 5 of the IcSP Regulation.
ANNEX

IcSP Multiannual Indicative Programme 2014-2017

In accordance with Article 8(3) of the IcSP Regulation, the Thematic Strategy Paper shall be accompanied by a Multiannual Indicative Programme summarising the priority areas selected for Union financing, the specific objectives, the expected results, the performance indicators and the time frame of Union assistance. The multiannual indicative programme shall determine the indicative financial allocations for each programme therein, taking into account the needs and the particular difficulties of the partner countries or regions concerned.

1. GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE RESPONSE STRATEGY

Time-frame and prioritisation

Due to the evolving nature of conflict risks and security threats this Multiannual Indicative Programme only covers the first four years of the Multiannual Financial Framework, i.e., 2014-2017. Specific priorities and objectives for 2018-2020 will be defined at a later stage in the framework of a second Multiannual Indicative Programme (also accompanying the 2014-2020 IcSP Thematic Strategy Paper).

To enhance efficiency, effectiveness and impact of IcSP assistance, as well as to facilitate the management of this Instrument, not all priorities will be targeted every year. Thus, instead of smaller allocations each year for a given priority, a larger allocation every two or three years has generally been preferred.

Types of interventions, implementation modalities and partners involved:

With the exception of budget support and of 'blending', all other implementation modalities foreseen in the Financial Regulation\(^{48}\) may be considered under this Multiannual Indicative Programme. It is thus expected that actions will continue to be implemented through calls for proposals, direct grants for targeted actions, delegation agreements, contribution agreements and public tenders, depending on the specific activity.

Likewise, all types of eligible partners (international organisations, public bodies of EU Member States, non-for profit civil society organisations, private companies, etc.) may be involved in the implementation of this Multiannual Indicative Programme depending on the specific activity.

Monitoring and evaluation:

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Monitoring of all priorities and initiatives should be streamlined, with a view to improving standardised monitoring/evaluation especially for pilot activities to ensure that lessons learned can be effectively disseminated and scaled up. A comprehensive evaluation will take place at the end of the programme, including contacts with a representative selection of partners, external monitors and evaluators, beneficiaries and stakeholders, from the EU, international organisations and local governments, and appropriate non-state actors.

2. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES

Art. 4. Assistance for conflict prevention, crisis preparedness and peace-building

Objective a) Promoting early warning and conflict-sensitive risk analysis in policy making and implementation

Priorities:
- The design and running of early warning systems – including their articulation into early action options.
- The use and development of methodologies for conflict analysis; including from a gender perspective
- Provision of relevant support capacity to EU partners, including the development of guidance, knowledge products, and training.

Expected results:
- Actionable early warning systems are put in place to provide horizon-scanning mechanisms for emerging conflicts/crisis and support early responses
- EU programming, programme implementation and responses to conflicts/crisis are underpinned by structured and gender sensitive conflict analysis tools
- Relevant guidance, knowledge products and training opportunities are available to support early warning/conflict analysis work of the EU and its partners.

Principal indicators:
- Number of emerging conflicts identified by early warning systems; number of early action policy options generated/implemented on the basis of early warning information;
- Number of countries/regions for which accurate and updated early warning information is available
- Number of gender sensitive conflict analyses undertaken to underpin responses to conflict/crisis situations; evolution of the percentage of EU Delegations that systematically undertake such conflict-analysis as part of their programming exercise; level of participation of local stakeholders in conflict analysis.
- Number of guidance documents/knowledge products produced/disseminated; number of countries/situations where the developed guidance is applied; number of relevant training sessions held; held number and diversity (geographic, institutional coverage, gender) of persons trained.
Objective b) Facilitating and building capacity in confidence-building, mediation, dialogue and reconciliation, with particular regard to emerging inter-community tensions

Priorities:

- further development of (gender sensitive) mediation support capacity - including, the possibility to deploy independent experts, develop relevant guidance and best practice and improve existing training and coaching activities;
- ensuring the complementarity of internal and external efforts to enhance mediation support;
- strengthening channels of exchange with civil society, including women's organizations, on issues related to conflict prevention, crisis preparedness and peace-building;
- engagement with relevant stakeholders in global discussions on norms and governance issues, with a potentially de-stabilizing effect on peace and security.

Expected results:

- mechanisms established to allow the rapid deployment of mediation support experts; provision of mediation support guidance documents, including on women's issues; mediation support training/coaching opportunities available, including a gender perspective;
- administrative capacity developed allowing the leveraging of external mediation support actions to complement actions undertaken internally;
- continuation, and expansion, of channels of exchange with both international and local civil society organizations active in the fields of conflict prevention/peace-building,
- reinforced engagement in global discussions on norms and governance issues, with a potentially de-stabilizing effect on peace and security;
- facilitation of the development of norms for responsible behaviour, exploration of the applicability of existing international law, as well as support confidence building, trust and cooperation measures in cyberspace.

Principal indicators:

- number of mediation support experts deployed; number of guidance documents developed; number of training/coaching sessions held; number of mediation activities where women were involved.
- number of external mediation support actions complementing actions undertaken internally;
- number of opportunities created for exchange (meetings, events, consultations, training sessions, etc.) between EU policy-makers and civil society organizations active in the fields of conflict prevention/peace-building, as well as with relevant stakeholders on norms and governance issues, with a potentially de-stabilizing effect on peace and security;
- the number of measures undertaken, aimed at the facilitation of the development of norms for responsible behaviour, exploration of the applicability of existing international law, as well as supporting confidence building, trust and cooperation measures in cyberspace.
Objective c) Strengthening capacities for participation and deployment in civilian stabilisation missions

Priorities:

• pre-deployment training of civilian experts to participate in stabilisation missions

Expected results:

• continuation of pre-deployment training courses for civilian experts participating in stabilisation missions, and consideration of possible training into other fields of expertise: for example, rule of law, civilian administration, with an enhanced participation of local and regional actors/men and women.

Principal indicators:

• number of pre-deployment training courses organised;
• number of experts (m/f) trained and subsequently deployed.

Objective d) Improving post conflict recovery, as well as post disaster recovery with imminent threats to the political and security situation

Priorities:

• reinforcing overall up-stream capacity- of relevant stakeholders to work with the EU in a number of cluster-areas of particular interest;
• strengthening links between the conflict prevention/peace-building/crisis preparedness (programmable) and conflict response (non-programmable) components of the IcSP;
• supporting peace-building/state building initiatives, in particular the implementation and implications of the Busan New Deal;
• facilitating the transition of countries, where community and/or social conflicts may threaten stability, towards wider development goals.

Expected results:

• relevant stakeholders (civil society\textsuperscript{49}, international/regional/sub-regional organizations, EU Member State bodies) have improved overall capacity to work with the EU in a number of specific cluster-areas;
• more IcSP crisis response actions benefit from up-stream capacity-building actions undertaken under the IcSP conflict prevention/crisis preparedness/peace-building component;
• Actions supported under the IcSP conflict prevention/crisis preparedness/peace-building component are aligned with and contribute to the implementation of the Busan New Deal;
• peace-building/state-building initiatives are supported facilitating the transition of countries, where community and/or social conflicts may threaten stability, towards wider development goals, [including improved governance and social conciliation].

\textsuperscript{49} including women’s organisations
Principal indicators:
- the number of specific cluster-areas covered by funding under this heading;
- the number of EU partners/stakeholders including women’s organisations with improved overall capacity to work with the EU in a number of specific cluster-areas;
- the number of crisis response actions benefiting from activities undertaken under the IcSP conflict prevention/crisis preparedness/peace-building component;
- the number of IcSP conflict prevention/crisis preparedness/peace-building actions supporting the implementation of the Busan New Deal;
- the number of peace-building/state-building initiatives supported facilitating the transition of countries, where community and/or social conflicts may threaten stability, towards wider development goals.

Objective e) Assistance to curb use of natural resources to finance conflicts and to support compliance by stakeholders with initiatives, such as the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, especially as regards implementation of efficient domestic controls on the production of, and trade in, natural resources

Priorities:
- assistance to curb use of natural resources to finance conflicts and to curb illegal exploitation of natural resources;
- support compliance by local, regional and international stakeholders with relevant natural resource-related initiatives.

Expected results:
- improved compliance with relevant initiatives, especially as regards implementation of efficient domestic controls on the production of, and trade in, natural resources;
- national administrations become more engaged in the fight against illegal exploitation and trade of natural resources;
- enhanced co-operation with major stakeholders (including in the private sector) and/or donor co-ordination with regard to the relevant mechanisms;
- relevant standards and guidance are used as a common global reference for responsible mineral sourcing by stakeholders;
- enhanced awareness and knowledge on implementing tools, challenges and lessons learnt;
- conduct of studies/research/technical assessments related to natural resources and conflict.

Principal Indicators:
- the increased number of domestic controls on the production of, and trade in, natural resources;
- the increased number of national administrations engaged in the fight against illegal exploitation and trade of natural resources;
- the number of instances of enhanced co-operation with major stakeholders and/or donor co-ordination;
- the number of relevant standards and guidance used as a common global reference by stakeholders;
• the number of guidance, best practice and lessons learnt documents produced and disseminated; the amount of additional input on these aspects publicly available on relevant web-sites;
• the number of studies/research/technical assessments related to natural resources and conflict commissioned.

Art. 5. Addressing global, trans-regional and emerging threats

5.1. Threats to law and order, to the security and safety of individuals, to critical infrastructure and to public health.

Objective: Strengthening the capacity of law enforcement and judicial and civil authorities involved in the fight against terrorism, organised crime and all forms of illicit trafficking.

i) Counter terrorism, including countering violent radicalisation

Priorities:
• Supporting the development of national CT strategies, improving law enforcement and criminal justice cooperation, countering terrorist financing and countering violent extremism (counter-radicalisation and recruitment) in the Horn of Africa/Yemen, South Asia (including neighbouring regions), Sahel and Maghreb/Middle East;
• Supporting the promotion of multilateral CT cooperation in the long-term, in particular at UN and GCTF level, as well as the implementation of global counter-terrorism standards such as the UN Global CT Strategy;
• Supporting global outreach and dialogue on prevention of terrorism, countering violent extremism (counter-radicalisation and recruitment) including multilateral, Governments, CSOs and local communities;
• Addressing interlinked EU internal and external security issues which destabilise security in third countries in particular illicit financial flows, radicalisation and recruitment of terrorists and foreign fighters.

Expected results:
• Contribution to implementation of EU Counter-Terrorism Strategies and Action Plans in the Horn of Africa/Yemen, Pakistan and Sahel, and the Maghreb;
• Promotion of international standards in counter-terrorism especially through the implementation of the UN Global CT Strategy and promotion of the GCTF;
• Improved operational co-ordination between CSOs in third countries and region of all players concerning the need for closer law enforcement, criminal justice cooperation, political will to counter terrorist financing and countering violent extremism;
• Promotion of criminal justice reform on counter-terrorism linked to promotion of human rights while countering terrorism;
• Promotion of political dialogue on counter-terrorism between EU and key third countries concerning prevention and fight against terrorism;
• Creation of global initiatives including governments, CSOs, academics, media, local communities on countering violent extremism.

Principal indicators
• Improvement of effectiveness of criminal justice system in countering terrorism in particular through closer cooperation of law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities. Thus contributing to the reduction of high acquittal rates on counter-terrorism cases in courts due to ineffective criminal justice, and to the protection of the human rights of defendants;
• More effective multi-agency law enforcement cooperation;
• Implementation of national CT strategies in those third countries strongly effected by terrorism;
• Improved cooperation between EU Member States law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities, Europol, Eurojust and those enforcement agencies and judicial authorities in third countries;
• Further implementation of international standards in countering terrorist financing in particular FATF;
• Establishment of long-term CT multilateral initiatives in in the areas of criminal justice, countering terrorist financing and countering violent extremism especially at GCTF level;
• Reduction in radicalization and terrorist recruitment in priority areas;
• Progress in the implementation of UN Global CT Strategy.

ii) Fight against organised crime and illicit trafficking

*Drug trafficking, including synthetic drugs*

Mid-term reviews of the 'cocaine and heroin route' programmes have shown that more synergies between those programmes are to be found. Following this line, every occasion to carry out common actions, exchange knowledge and experience will be used, while maintaining programmes that target the specificities of the cocaine and heroin 'routes'. New psychoactive substances (NPS) increasingly appear on both routes and will also be taken into account.

Close attention will be given to the cross-cutting priority of promoting intelligence-led and evidence-based capacity building, combined with an integrated rights-based approach.

**Priorities:**
• Supporting measures to increase the capacities and cooperation amongst law enforcement and judicial actors to effectively intercept drugs via their main vectors, as well as investigate, prosecute and adjudicate drug trafficking-related cases beyond national borders at regional and trans-regional levels;
• Supporting the introduction of standard operating procedures in the relevant third countries authorities and agencies;
• Promoting synergies with European stakeholders and working models;
• Strengthening existing platforms to foster operational cooperation and donor coordination (such as e.g. the Paris Pact Initiative and/or other similar mechanisms) or create new mechanisms where necessary;
• Enhancing local ownership and consensus building on effective drug policies and operations, in particular through improved sharing of best practices, peer review, embedding operational cooperation in regular political dialogue;
• Promoting transparency and accountability safeguards embedded in capacity building actions, for example through the involvement of civil society actors.
• Enhancing international cooperation aimed at promoting best practices relating to the reduction of demand, production and harm.

Expected results:
• Enhanced analytical knowledge, skills and overall capacity of law enforcement agencies/criminal justice authorities to carry out successful (joint) operations and investigations at regional and trans-regional levels, especially via increased mentoring, on-the-job training, train-the-trainers approach and exchange of best practices;
• Enhanced coordination between justice and police from the beginning of investigations to increase efficiency, accountability and protection of fundamental rights;
• Strengthened inter-agency cooperation, as well as regional and trans-regional cooperation and information exchange amongst law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities in addressing illicit drug trafficking;
• Convergence of views on effective drug policies and operations, including on demand and harm reduction;
• Increased awareness and involvement of civil society in third countries, inter alia as 'watchdogs' to better monitor compliance with human rights principles and the accountability of the criminal justice and law enforcement systems;
• Reduced social tolerance for and increased resilience to bad governance, organised crime and illicit trafficking.

Principal indicators:
• Increased number of successful joint investigations and operations in the target third countries/regions (facilitated through IcSP programmes or by local platform(s) receiving support from it);
• Number of training courses and mentoring activities (train-the-trainers; on the job training; exchange programmes) carried out by EU and third country experts ('North-South' and 'South-South' cooperation);
• Increased number of seizures (in particular cocaine and heroin) in the target third countries/regions;
• Increased number of drug trafficking cases brought to court after a seizure is made and successfully adjudicated in the target third countries/regions;
• Number of cases with intelligence-led and evidence-based practices incorporated in drug policies and applied by law enforcement agencies at national level in the target third countries/regions;
• Successful implementation of formal or informal agreements pertaining to increased multi-agency law enforcement cooperation; sustained involvement and possibly co-funding of European agencies in such agreements and actions;
• Enhanced discussion of drug trafficking / organised crime in political dialogue;
• Enhanced transparency and public discussion on drug trafficking / organised crime in targeted countries and regions (media coverage, blogs etc.), including on demand and harm reduction.

*Trafficking in human beings (THB)*

**Priorities:**
• Contributing to the implementation of the ‘EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings 2012–2016’;
• Focussing on priority countries and regions;
• Contributing to effective cooperation and coordination with priority third countries / regions and other relevant stakeholders including civil society and authorities of EU Member States;
• Paying particular attention to trafficking in children for the purpose of sexual abuse and exploitation;
• Including actions tackling smuggling of human beings, in particular when this is linked to THB.  

**Expected results:**
• Improved dialogue with authorities and civil society in priority third countries/regions on possible areas for cooperation and donor coordination, involving EU stakeholders, in particular EU Delegations und missions of EU Member States, whenever possible and useful;
• Strengthened legislative, policy and institutional frameworks to address THB and migrant smuggling in targeted third countries/regions;
• Increased awareness and understanding of THB in targeted third countries/regions;
• Better identification of and assistance to trafficked victims;
• Enhanced cooperation to address THB / human smuggling in targeted countries/regions, including between national authorities and civil society.

**Principal indicators:**
• Increased number of countries/regions cooperating with the EU on THB / human smuggling, facilitated through the IcSP programme;
• Increased number of countries whose legislation is aligned with international principles including the Council of Europe’s Lanzarote Convention;

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50 While interrelated, human smuggling (e.g. facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit or residence) and trafficking in human beings should not be confused. In particular, trafficking involves the use of means mentioned in the trafficking definition ("by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person") for the purpose of exploitation of the person, and does not requires the crossing of a border or physically transportation, as in the case of smuggling.
• Increased number and content of (national) action plans agreed and implemented;
• Increased number of trafficking/smuggling cases investigated and prosecuted as well as number of rescued victims, facilitated by the IcSP programme;
• Increased number of actors, including from EU Member States, engaged in actions facilitated through the IcSP programme.

**Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and in explosives**

**Priorities:**
• Contributing to the implementation of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (UN SALW PoA) and of the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), as well as to the promotion of the Firearms Protocol;
• Contributing to the implementation of SALW-related provisions of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT);
• Focussing on actions to improve transparency and intelligence about SALW trafficking;
• Promoting capacity-building actions to address trafficking in SALW on the basis of identified weaknesses;
• Creating an international 'community of practitioners' for regular expert exchanges on SALW, advice to policy-makers and oversight of cooperation activities.

**Expected results:**
• Improved implementation of UN PoA, ITI, Firearms Protocol and the ATT;
• Better situational awareness of trafficking flows and diversion of SALW into illicit channels;
• Improved cooperation, discussion and peer pressure among relevant international stakeholders;
• Enhanced local ownership and sustainability of capacity-building measures.

**Principal indicators:**
• Increased number of countries actively participating in the implementation of the UN PoA, ITI, Firearms Protocol and ATT;
• Improved statistics and evidence-based analyses on international illicit SALW flows;
• Enhanced operational outcomes from stakeholder meetings feeding into capacity-building measures;
• Enhanced international cooperation among SALW experts, including from beneficiary countries, influencing policy-makers and operational outcomes;
• Increased number of illicit SALW seized and appropriately disposed of via facilitation of the programme;
• Diversion from licit into illicit channels made more difficult.

**Trafficking in falsified medicines**

**Priorities:**
• Raising public awareness on the threat posed by falsified medicines on public health;
• Supporting the alignment of relevant third-countries legal frameworks with the principles of the 'Medicrime' Convention;
• Building capacities of relevant actors from law enforcement, justice, and pharmaceutical authorities to the private sector to effectively fight against the production and trafficking in falsified medicines;
• Fostering cooperation at regional and trans-regional levels.

Expected results:
• Increased awareness of the threats posed by falsified medicines on public health and as an issue related to organised crime;
• Increased compliance and harmonisation of relevant legal frameworks with international principles and practices;
• Strengthened forensic, enforcement and judicial capacities;
• Increased international cooperation and exchange of information via joint operations and investigations.

Principal indicators
• Increased number of awareness campaigns on the threats posed by falsified medicines and increased acknowledgement of these threats in national/regional policies and official speeches;
• Increased number of relevant legislations aligned with international principles and best standard practices;
• Increased number of evidence-based investigations led, seizures made and cases brought to court and successfully adjudicated;
• Increased number of joint operations and investigations conducted beyond national borders at regional and trans-regional levels

Money laundering

Priorities:
• Building the capacity of relevant third countries’ actors in preventing and fighting against money laundering in compliance with FATF recommendations, especially in cash-based economies;
• Building the capacity of relevant third countries’ actors to recover assets following adjudication of organised crime and illicit trafficking-related cases, especially in cash-based economies, taking advantage of 'CARIN-like' structures;
• Supporting the FATF and/or its associated regional organisations in their efforts to build third countries’ capacities, the raising of awareness, and the enhancement of legislation, especially in cash based economies and especially as regards Designated Non-Financial Business or Professions (DNFBP);
• Promoting international cooperation among financial intelligence units (FIUs), especially in the areas of information exchange, training and the sharing of expertise, also taking advantage of existing platforms and mechanisms (e.g. Egmont Group, FIU-net and other similar mechanisms).
Expected results:

- Increased capacity of targeted third countries to prevent and fight against money laundering, for instance via increased joint investigations, cross-border operations, and increased recovery of assets, at regional and trans-regional levels;
- Increased exchange of information, expertise, best practices between FATF and/or its associated regional organisations;
- Increased cooperation, exchange of information, expertise between Financial Investigation Units and increased coherence between FATF Recommendations and domestic jurisdictions;
- Increased analytical and investigation capacities of third countries’ Financial Intelligence Units and law enforcement actors to deal with transnational organised crime and illicit trafficking-related cases;
- Increased efficiency of existing CARIN-like systems.

Principal indicators

- Increased number of Suspicious Transaction Reports successfully analysed;
- Increased number of money laundering cases brought to court and successfully adjudicated following cross-border investigations;
- Increased number of assets recovered following successful adjudication of money laundering and related cases;
- Increased information, best practices and expertise exchange between FATF regional associations and between Financial Investigation Units;
- Increased number of countries taken out of FATF black list following IcSP-project support;
- Increased number of countries obtaining access to Egmont/CARIN-like mechanisms.

**Cybercrime**

Priorities:

- Promoting the introduction of minimum national legal frameworks to address cybercrime in line with international standards given that for effective cybercrime investigation and prosecution, the existence of a legal basis for prosecution of cybercriminals is fundamental;
- Supporting initiatives that contribute to building capacities of target third countries/regions to establish and implement operational strategies and legislation to address cybercrime, focusing in particular on the training of judiciary and law enforcement personnel so that they would acquire and successfully apply the special technical knowledge in investigating and prosecuting cybercrime offences;
- Contributing to the establishment and/or further development of high-tech crime units in the target countries/regions so that they have at least minimal digital forensics capabilities and basic technology for carrying out their routine work in cybercrime investigations.
- Paying particular attention to the fight against child sexual abuse and exploitation online.
Expected results:
- Target regions and countries have at least a minimum national legal framework aligned with international standards to address cybercrime;
- Capacity exists in the judicial and law enforcement authorities of the third countries/regions to investigate and prosecute cybercrime;
- High-tech crime units exist in targeted third countries/regions, are properly resourced and trained. A system is set in place for the minimum protection of investigation data, for digital forensics capabilities, and other technological capabilities to investigate cybercrime.

Principal indicators
- Increased number of countries with adequate legislation for addressing cybercrime;
- Increased abilities of competent authorities (judiciary, law enforcement) in target countries/regions to collect electronic evidence, compatible with the principles of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, as well as enhanced capacity to investigate and prosecute cybercrime;
- Increased number of countries where legislative and policy reforms have taken place with the support of the IcSP programme involving high-level decision-makers to ensure sustainability of the reform efforts;
- Increased number of cybercrime cases reported, investigated and adjudicated in the target third countries/regions;
- Increased awareness of the decision-makers on the challenges of cybercrime;
- Global online resource on cybercrime legislation, best practices and global assessment reports is made openly available;
- Establishment/existence of at least one specialized cybercrime unit per country in a target region.
- Increased number of operational multi-agency law enforcement cooperation projects in following fields: a) development of strategy disrupting criminal infrastructure (botnets) and guidelines for implementing this strategy in a specific region; b) developing a mechanism of e-evidence retention and exchange in target regions, with establishment of the relevant legal framework and electronic platform; c) Joint Investigation Teams with EU Member State police authorities.

Objective: Addressing threats to critical infrastructure

i) International transport

Civil aviation security

Priorities:
- Addressing key aviation security vulnerabilities in priority countries with a focus on counter terrorism;
- Ensuring appropriate legislative framework in place;
- Ensuring sustainable implementation of appropriate oversight mechanisms.
**Expected results:**
- Creation of viable and self-sustaining aviation security culture in priority countries, allowing efficient operation of aviation security systems and readily adaptable to emerging threats;
- Review and adjustment of aviation security legislation and regulations at national level;
- Viable and self-sustaining quality assurance systems developed and implemented;
- Compliance with international aviation security standards.

**Principal indicators**
- Reduced risk of successful terrorist attack against civil aviation in priority countries;
- Legislative framework meets international standards;
- Effective and efficient quality assurance systems in place;
- Aviation security regime is self-sustaining, and is adaptable to new and evolving threats.

**Maritime security**

**Priorities:**
- Promoting rules-based good governance at sea that enables safe and secure maritime passages for maritime transport and for conduct of economic activities;
- Continuing support to enhanced maritime situational awareness addressing maritime crimes at large;
- Supporting global compliance to ISPS Code and promotion of EU's know-how in concrete areas of its implementation;
- Supporting regional and trans-regional maritime security cooperation activities, which will foster local ownership and in turn contribute to lasting and sustainable results;
- Continuing work together with other international partners most notably International Maritime Organization;
- Involving likeminded countries in joint maritime security capacity building actions;
- Supporting coordination mechanisms for multilateral maritime security initiatives and actions;
- Increasing involvement of private sector actors where possible.
- Focussing on the train-the-trainer approach, or if not, balancing it with train-the-operator courses;
- Mentoring activities should promote the "South-South" approach in as much as possible.

**Expected results:**
- Increased and locally driven trans-regional cooperation;
- Improved sustainable regional maritime situational awareness information sharing capabilities.
Principal indicators

- Reduced maritime crime incidents;
- National and regional maritime information sharing capacities are increased to facilitate trans-regional links;
- Likeminded countries support and coordinate with IcSP-supported programmes;
- Training activities favour train-the-trainer approach.

ii) Energy operations and distribution infrastructure

Priorities:

- Enhancing international cooperation to address the terrorist threat to energy operations and distribution infrastructure by raising risk awareness, promoting information exchange, and disseminating best practices (e.g. OSCE Good Practices Guide).

Expected results:

- Greater risk awareness;
- Information exchange has been strengthened;
- Best practices have been disseminated.

Principal indicators

- Number of countries, energy operators, institutions involved;
- Number of seminars, workshops and other awareness-raising and best practices events organised and of tools (guides, information platforms) disseminated.

iii) Electronic information and communication networks (cyber-security)

Priorities:

- Promoting the introduction of technological and organisational measures to protect the national critical information infrastructures and the electronic networks supporting the critical services in the target countries/regions;
- Supporting the development of necessary national cyber-security strategies and policies in the target countries/regions;
- Putting in place effective national cyber protection systems, both at policy and operational levels, following the multi-stakeholder approach;
- Increasing capability of the national Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs), including specialised training, acquiring equipment and exchange of best practices within the international professional CERT networks.

Expected results:

- Adoption and/or enhancement of national cyber strategies in target countries with necessary coordination structures between the private and the public sector, both at policy and operational levels;
Functioning Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) are in place to successfully facilitate the overall national coordination capacity building process;

Reinforced coordination amongst key stakeholders of target countries/regions to increase cyber resilience, to develop public-private partnerships, identify the right interlocutors in critical organisations and team up with civil society partners;

Clear ownership and long-term investment by local authorities in target countries.

Creation of regional cyber incident coordination networks that facilitate information sharing and early warning, as well as assist to mitigate serious cyber incidents.

Principal indicators

- Increased number of national cyber strategies and Critical Information Infrastructure Protection policies adopted in the target countries/regions;
- Incident response capacity and national Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) are created and/or developed in the target countries, and are recognized by the private sector and key government agencies as national and international focal points for cyber incidents;
- National computer emergency response teams (CERTs) have minimum incidence monitoring and response capacity;
- Cyber incident information sharing networks and early warning networks are established and/or enhanced in targeted countries/regions, with an involvement of the CERTs, the private sector and law enforcement actors;
- National incident response organization or CERT have a training programme in place and are part of the international professional cyber associations (e.g. FIRST) to guarantee the quality of cyber security personnel;
- The national incident response organizations or CERTs are organizationally linked to the country’s Critical Infrastructure Protection system, and there is an elected/political/democratic oversight on the activities of this technical organization.

Objective: Ensuring and adequate response to major threats to public health

[NB: This objective will be pursued under the biosafety component of wider the CBRN risk mitigation objective –sudden pandemics (see below); as well as under the fight against organised crime objective –trafficking in falsified medicines and in drugs, including infectious diseases linked with the use of drugs (see above)]

Objective: Addressing global and trans-regional effects of climate change having a potentially destabilising impact

Priorities:
- Strengthening relevant policies, institutions and capacities at the global and trans-regional levels to address security risks of climate change and develop adaptation strategies; providing support to international dialogue and
cooperation in this area, including for the sharing of information and best practices;

- Enhancing the knowledge base of climate change impacts and their interrelation with security (e.g. vulnerability assessments, identification of hotspots, risk mapping and modelling, etc.);
- Facilitating risk communication and raising awareness on security impacts of climate change (information dissemination, establishment and support to knowledge networks, etc.);
- Specific ‘added-value’ trans-regional support programmes aimed at mitigating security risks of climate change.

**Expected results:**

- Relevant policies, institutions and capacities at the global and trans-regional levels have been strengthened;
- The knowledge base of climate change impacts and their interrelation with security have been enhanced;
- Risk communication and raising awareness on security impacts of climate change has been promoted.

**Principal indicators**

- Number of countries and institutions whose capacities have been strengthened;
- Number of studies on climate change impacts and their interrelation with security that have been conducted;
- Number of awareness raising and risk communication activities that have been supported.

**Objective:** Mitigation of and preparedness against risks, either of an intentional, accidental or natural origin, related to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials or agents

**Global capacity building**

**Priorities:**

- Developing defences against global and trans-regional CBRN threats and risks;
- Promoting EU norms and standards as a reference abroad;
- Raising early warning and early action systems for better prevention;
- Facilitating third state implementation of relevant international instruments and policies (e.g. UNSCR 1540, G8 Global Partnership, WHO and GICNT);
- Increasing technical capacity in regional Centre of Excellence Secretariats;
- Increasing numbers of CoE projects are implemented not only on criminal aspects but also natural and industrial issues;
- Promoting international recourse to EU expertise on CBRN risk mitigation and management;
• Further involving EU delegations and EU Member States in setting new priorities and supporting implementation.

Expected results:
• Regional CoEs secretariats are better able to formulate CBRN projects, planning inputs and national action plans;
• Existing projects are completed and implementation of new projects is more efficient;
• A broader EU Member State expertise is accessed;
• Third state CBRN strategies and policy to mitigate CBRN risks and threats are developed in due time.

Principal indicators
• Increased implementation of relevant international instruments is reported by the respective Secretariats/Reporting bodies;
• Project proposals emerging from regional secretariats require less screening and input from the Commission;
• Tailored toolkits for each CoE are developed;
• A wider spectrum of EU experts and operators are involved in project implementation.

Chemical risks

Priorities:
• Raising third party awareness on high-risk chemical agents safety and security issues;
• Increasing third countries' capacities to meet their obligations under relevant international instruments;
• Expanding EU support to key international chemical risk mitigation initiatives.

Expected results:
• Enhanced third state signature, ratification and compliance with relevant international instruments
• Raised awareness on industrial safety, waste management and dual use chemicals;
• Enhanced EU involvement in key chemical risk mitigation initiatives.

Principal indicators
• Increased implementation of relevant international instruments is reported by the respective Secretariats/Reporting bodies;
• Increased EU visibility regarding the implementation of relevant international instruments;
• Number of drills and table tops exercises related to chemical risk management carried out in regions of concern.

Export control for dual use items, fight against trafficking
Priorities:
- Preventing and detecting at the earliest possible stage the illicit trafficking in CBRN materials and for dual use items;
- Developing sound regulations at regional level;
- Increasing participation of countries in the initiative;
- Increasing coordination with other donors (US and Japan).

Expected results:
- Improved administrative capacity to exercise control in exports of dual-use items;
- Greater participation of countries;
- Trade facilitation including modernised administrative - and smoother procedures;
- Improved border security;
- Improved safe transport of CBRN materials and dual use items.

Principal indicators
- Number of participating countries and breadth of participants background;
- Number of trainings and workshops;
- Number of adopted upgraded legal frameworks;
- Number of borders assisted;
- Number of equipment items bought;
- Number of trainings/workshops/drills;
- Number of illegal trafficking cases detected.

Scientists redirection

Priorities:
- Consolidating the work of STCU including increased co-financing of projects;
- Supporting the successful transfer of ISTC (from Russia to Kazakhstan);
- Targeting dual-use knowledge;
- Promoting geographic expansion of the activities and extended membership.

Expected results:
- Increased number of project participants with dual-use knowledge in different regions;
- Increased number of countries participating in the programme.

Principal indicators
- Number of participating countries, institutes and scientists involved;
- Number of projects financed;
- Number of trainings and workshops held.

Pandemics, Biosecurity, Biosafety

Priorities:
• Enhancing the capabilities of third countries for global disease surveillance, risk assessment, emergency planning and early warning systems;
• Protecting sensitive research and training institutes against attacks;
• Preventing insider smuggling of dangerous pathogen collection;
• Expanding EU support to key international biological risk mitigation initiatives;
• Raising third party awareness of biological agents and security issues.

Expected results:
• Better preparedness of third countries for outbreak detection and containment, identification, alert and eradication;
• Safer storage of dangerous pathogen collections;
• Installation of relevant safety and security measures to ensure biosafety and biosecurity;
• Staff working in laboratories better protected and their risk management skills upgraded;

Principal indicators
• Number of regional meetings for information exchange and best practice sharing on bio safety and security;
• Number of safety and security equipment items supplied;
• Number of trainings/workshops held;
• Number of installations / laboratories assisted.
### 3. INDICATIVE FINANCIAL ALLOCATIONS 2014-2017 in MEUR (±20% per priority/year)

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* Including the terrorist threat to civil aviation and to critical energy infrastructure