
Final Report - Annex

June 2017

Evaluation carried out on behalf of the European Commission
## Annex 1: Evidence-base for findings

### 1.1. Evidence-base matrix

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<th>Cross-cutting indicators/Evidence-Base</th>
<th>Article-specific indicators/Evidence-Base</th>
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<td><strong>Judgment Criteria</strong></td>
<td>JCT1.1: The objectives and implementation of the IcSP in 2014, when the instrument was adopted, were and remain today aligned with the evolving EU priorities, strategies and external action policy.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>11.1.1 Rate of IcSP Decisions that served to fulfill the (evolving) EU external action priorities and objectives.</strong></td>
<td>Article 3: Findings and Evidence-base</td>
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<td><strong>Findings:</strong></td>
<td>100% of decisions reviewed refer directly and are aligned to EU external action priorities and objectives.</td>
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<td><strong>Evidence-base:</strong></td>
<td>A statistically significant sample of 56 Article 3 projects (5% margin of error, and 95% confidence interval) from 2014-2016 was selected. The sample was stratified to ensure balanced regional coverage, a spread in budget allocations, diversity in implementing agencies (including direct management), and coverage of focus sectors (CT/CVE, migration, transitional justice, and DDR). Related action and decision documents, and (where available) end of year reports were used to assess this indicator.</td>
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1 Commission decision adopting the IcSP Thematic Strategy Paper 2014-2027, MIP 2014-2020, and Annex (only applies to Arts. 4 and 5)
11.2 Evidence of misalignment between IcSP objectives in theory and practice.

Article 3: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:
AGAMI project in Niger can be considered one example of misalignment as a result of political pressure that deviates the instrument from its core focus areas and objectives, albeit responding to EU political direction and objectives as per the EU Council Conclusions of 23 April 2015 and the European Agenda on Migration of May 2015. EU's focus on migration is bringing differences in priorities and interests between national/local actors in Niger to the forefront. As a result, responsiveness of AGAMI project, which emanates from the EU approach to countering illegal migration flows in Niger, is contested at best. Migration project (AGAMI) stands as responsive mainly to EU priorities on migration that are not shared in the same way by the GoN, or by local authorities. The haste with which the AGAMI project was set up was at the detriment of a better communication and engagement with local stakeholders in the Agadez region. Niger is a transit country, not (at least for the time being) a country of origin of illegal migration to Europe. The common ground between the EU and the GoN are the security risks emanating from the illicit activities connected to the illegal migration networks. The negative impact of punitive policies by the GoN, infused by EU’s push for addressing illegal migration flows and the web of illicit traffics associated with it, are exposing (if not generating) these programme activities to the illegal migration networks. The negative impacts of the programme activities to the illegal migration networks. The negative impacts of the programme activities to the illegal migration networks. The negative impacts of the programme activities to the illegal migration networks. The negative impacts of the programme activities to the illegal migration networks. The negative impacts of the programme activities to the illegal migration networks.

Evidence-Base:

Article 4: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:
No new evidence found of misalignments in theory and practice of article 4 interventions

Evidence-Base:
EU Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council (2013) The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises
EU Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council (2014). ‘Responsable sourcing of minerals originating in conflict-affected and high-risk areas Towards an integrated EU approach’
Commission decision adopting the iCSP Thematic Strategy Paper 2014-2027, MIP 2014-2020, and Annex (only applies to Arts. 4 and 5)
EU Global Strategy (2016)
Field mission reports

Article 5: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:
By and large, iCSP objectives in theory and practical implementation measures to achieve them are well aligned. There remain some conceptual tensions in certain areas (maintaining an overall strategy, ensuring the transregional nature of activities, coping with limited absorption capacity of partner countries, applying a lessons learnt approach throughout) but efforts are being made to mitigate them. There remain challenges that may negatively affect the relevance of the Article 5 actions:
- Maintaining a strategic direction that meets both EU and global objectives, in a ‘bottom-up’ approach as pursued under the CoE, requires a robust needs assessment and action planning approach that is linked to agreed global objectives. There remains a certain disconnect, however, between the NAC/NAP process and the projects delivered under the CoE. There are mitigation strategies in place (Governance Team, coaching by the JRC with regard to national needs assessment and action plans; support for Regional Secretariat and National Focal Points by a newly established On-Site Assistance team) and the trend is positive but more needs to be done.
- A risk that rather than addressing trans-regional problems and solutions, actions in the area of counter-terrorism and organised crime may fragment into bilateral or disconnected multi-country interventions. However, actions in these areas are highly sensitive and require a medium-long engagement with individual countries to create the mutual trust necessary to enter into deeper collaborations in these areas.
- In certain cases, there have been signs for “technical assistance overload” with local partners struggling to absorb the offers coming from different donors – that indicates issues related to coordination but it also negatively affects relevance of the packages offered under the iCSP.
- There also were indications that in certain thematic areas with respect to OC, recipient countries had different opinions about the scale and configuration of the threat (in this case drugs trafficking along certain routes) and as a consequence perceptions about the relevance of certain programmes differed.
- STRIVE (HoA) used pilot activities for both results delivery and learning about which CVE approaches would actually work.

Evidence-Base:
Past evaluation reports (as above)
DEVCO interview 12 October
STRIVE evaluation report 2016
Field Missions Morocco and Georgia

As per EU Council commitments, it had to be in place before the end of 2015.

Discussions on the AGAMI project at the Steering Committee meeting in Niamey, 15/11/2016.
11.2.1 Evidence of participation of local stakeholders in IcSP decisions (broken down by types of stakeholders, articles, and project cycle stages (i.e. preparation, implementation; M&E)).

Article 3: Findings and Evidence-Bas

Findings: Actions surveyed involve a number of participatory approaches. They may follow identification missions that consult broadly with government and public sector actors; proposals made by contractors that are based on consultations with key stakeholders; requests received from beneficiary governments for support; and CSDP requests, which involve liaison with IcSP partners. In Niger: IcSP Art 3 interventions are generally informed by local knowledge and the participation of local actors (HACP, local authorities and community actors) in the analysis of the context, needs, interests, inputs and monitoring of implementation. Stakeholders from Diffa were generally positive, but highlighted differences: local and smaller NGOs implementing partners clearly appear to be better at communicating and maintaining the engagement with local actors. Bigger/international IPs have better entry points within the GoN/Line Ministries, thus complementing the strengths of smaller IPs, but need to invest more in communicating with local actors.


Article 4: Findings and Evidence-Bas

Findings: In IcSP, Article 4 interventions there is consultation and participation of local stakeholders where there are activities on the ground (UN WOMEN). Article 4 interventions are also centrally controlled and rely on UN Agencies/ international organisations (CSDN/OECD) to communicate with the base. It is harder to determine to what extent local stakeholders are involved in the project cycle stages although there is some evidence to suggest that participation is on-going. Article 4 interventions tend to use a lot of international or regional bodies to extend the reach of the programmes (UN Agencies/World Bank/ Global initiatives and working groups. There is no evidence of non-performing programmes.


Article 5: Findings and Evidence-Bas

Findings: Local Stakeholders are involved in all Article 5 interventions. This includes relevant government bodies and related institutions (such as research institutions). In the CT/CVE area, there is strong engagement with civil society actors and target groups such as youth, women, local leaders, religious leaders, and prisoner populations at risk of radicalisation. In CBRN long-term capacity building including the CoE Initiative, the trend is to engage more strongly with local experts early in the design phase, and increasingly also in end-of-project ex post evaluations. Art. 5 interventions involve and build on a detailed contextual analysis of requirements, needs and conditions in the partner countries, and which involve partner countries in programme activities from the design phase on. The programmes have developed a range of methodologies and tools to assess the local context, identify and validate the needs of partner countries and their respective conditions for how the requirements and priorities identified in the programmes can best be met, and how interventions will be adapted and further tailored to partner country needs during the implementation process. All programmes depend on, and make considerable efforts to involve, local stakeholders in the project design and implementation.

A review of evaluation reports as well as available programme and project reports and descriptions confirm that such early involvement of local stakeholders is indeed common practice in Article 5 programming. This was also apparent from interviews at DEVCO and a review of the documents related to Annual CoE conferences and NFP meetings, and confirmed in the field missions.


For Article 4 and EQ 1, as part of our interviews with key informants in the EU, United Nations (UN), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), African Union (AU) and other regional organisations, we will draw out perceptions on key threats in the global peace and security architecture and how the EU addresses those with its external action policy and the IcSP. We will use this as a tool to assess relevance of Article 4 thematic priorities and actions.

The indicators specific to Article 5 for EQ 1 will involve the review of EU strategies and objectives in relation to global, trans-regional and emerging threats to peace and security, as well as broader global strategy documents on the topic, and assessment of relevance also on the basis of emerging good practice approaches (All Hazards Approach, regional approaches, interventions based on assessments driven by needs assessment and contextual understanding).

11.2.2 All I3 Rate of IcSP decisions under Article 3 that are based on context analysis (which also looks at the root causes of crisis) and the continuous monitoring of context evolution.

Article 3: Findings and Evidence-Bas

Findings: There is some evidence from decisions that shows these (75% of them) are based on with a fairly clear context analysis, however others (25%) are based on more weak context based analysis. Field visit Kils flagged that in cases where actions were based on identification missions, they had not seen context assessments. Also, given changes in CSDP staffing, context assessments had been lost in filing. Continuous context monitoring, however, was broadly evident and contractors followed developments carefully. No formal context/conflict analysis i. i. in Niger, but several IcSP actions are contributing to context knowledge (e.g. analysis of migration flows and migrants’ profiles; studies on driving factors of radicalization in Diffa) and feeding into the fine-tuning/adaptation of actions, as well as policy design and action beyond IcSP actions (example of “plan de sortie de crise” for Diffa by the HACP and provincial and community level authorities; the strategy for mainstreaming minimum education standards onto koranic schools).

Evidence-Based: A statistically significant sample of 56 Article 3 projects (5% margin of error, and 95% confidence interval) from 2014-2016 was selected. The sample was stratified to ensure balanced coverage, a spread in budget allocations, diversity in implementing agencies (including direct management), and coverage of focus sectors (CT/CVE, migration, transitional justice, and DDR). Related action and decision documents, and (where available) end of year reports were used to assess this indicator. Field missions: Kenya/Somalia, Niger and Jordan.

11.2.3 All Percentage of Article 4 IcSP interventions analysed that are based on national needs assessment or action plans for long-term capacity building, including the degree of involvement of local stakeholders in the development and implementation of those assessments or plans.

Article 4: Findings and Evidence-Bas

Findings: A portfolio analysis shows that Article 4 interventions focus almost exclusively on long-term capacity building, which helps prepare for evolving and future challenges. To add: Mechanisms such as the PDNA/PCNA/UNDPA/UNDP/A ENP/ EUPST (some are in second or third phases) show the commitment of Article 4 to this area.


11.2.4 All I5 Evidence of mechanisms in place for IcSP interventions to respond to the actual needs and conditions of PCs (based on national needs assessments and action plans, all stakeholders, evolution of regional risk mitigation strategies, involvement of local stakeholders).

Article 5: Findings and Evidence-Bas

Findings: Article 5 interventions are based on assessments of the needs and conditions of the partner countries. The tools being used for such needs assessments (national needs assessments at programme level leading to national action plans; needs assessments at project level) are being refined but more can be done to involve local stakeholders in these assessments, make needs assessments more robust, and link the resulting priorities more clearly to the context of individual projects.

The CoE system is increasingly anchored in the systematic application of national needs assessments and action plans. A voluntary undertaking by PCs, the tools (NAQ and NAP template) is increasingly being used, in some cases all the way to formal government approval. This system works best where National Teams established under the CBRN Initiative are fully representative of the stakeholders concerned, well connected with other relevant focal points and government actors, and fully empowered within the government.
11.2.2 Rate of IcSP decisions in alignment with partner country needs as identified through context-analysis by the EU (e.g. conflict analysis; early warning assessments, scoping missions, etc.).

**Article 3: Findings and Evidence-Base**

**Findings:***

As above in 11.2.2.

Longer presence of instrument in country contributing to knowledge and building local networks that are key for understanding the context, designing actions in a conflict-sensitive manner and adapting actions.

Niger example: The IcSP capitalize on the contextual knowledge, local network and trust it gained through previous IiS actions, engagement and regular consultations with local actors. This allowed the EU to respond quickly when the security situation and socio-economic conditions of the local populations deteriorated as a result of Boko Haram attacks. It also allowed for a more robust and consistent action, concentrating its actions (with the exception of AGAM) in a crisis area that has so far not seen longer-term investment, as well as boost coordination and dialogue (e.g. decentralized coordination meetings of the IcSP programme in Diffa, greater engagement with local actors), more visible EU and GoN efforts in the region (EUD; HACP).

**Evidence-Base:**

A statistically significant sample of 56 Article 3 projects (5% margin of error, and 95% confidence interval) from 2014-2016 was selected. The sample was stratified to ensure balanced regional coverage, a spread in budget allocations, diversity in implementing agencies (including direct management), and coverage of focus sectors (CT/CVE, migration, transitional justice, and DDR). Related action and decision documents, and (where available) end of year reports were used to assess this indicator.

Ukraine IcSP 2014/24: DG ECHO Humanitarian Assessment
Sudan IcSP 2014/14: Ukraine IcSP 2015/15:
Nepal IcSP 2015/25: PDNA with EU contribution
Myanmar IcSP 2016/07: UN ‘Whole of Rakhine strategy’
Field visits: Niger and Turkey; Niger FD 38655 documentation

**Article 4: Findings and Evidence-Base**

**Findings:**

All interventions under Article 4 are closely aligned with partner country needs (where applicable) through alignment with the National Action Plans and country strategy (based on conflict analysis, etc.).

Could add: the long term nature and traditional decision-making process for AAPs make alignment a priority. Verified in field missions.

**Evidence-Base:**

AAPs: Commission Implementing Decisions 2014/2015/2016 (II.1.2 & 2)
Kilis: FP/UN Agencies/International NGO’s/UN WOMEN Colombia
EU Evaluation of Article 4.3 Peace-building Partnership (2014)
Commission decision adopting the IcSP Thematic Strategy Paper 2014-2027, MEP 2014-2020, and Annex (only applies to Arts. 4 and 5)
Field mission reports

**Article 5: Findings and Evidence-Base**

**Findings:**

Alignment of Article 5 actions with partner country needs is done at programme rather than decision level. In the CT/OC area, context analysis forms part of the initial phase of engaging with partner countries on specific projects. In the CBRN area, this alignment builds on long-term relationships between DEVCO (as well as the Science Centres in Kyiv and Astana) and the participating partner countries as well as uses formal mechanisms (that involve the partner countries as well as expertise from the EU). In the CT/OC area, context analysis is an integral part of the initial engagement with the partner countries selected for particular projects. The process is now supported by Security Attachés posted at EUDELS. An example was the development of a Security Strategy and Action Plan in Morocco that provided such context analysis and formed to basis for formulating priorities and possible action areas. The Expert Facility is being used to provide / improve context understanding by expert field visits and coaching to partner countries.

In the CBRN area, contextual understanding is at the heart of programming. In the Science Centres, this is the result of more than 20 years of engagement with the partner countries participating in the two centres and links that have evolved between the centres and scientific institutions as well as individual experts in these countries. Measures in the area of dual use export control include several elements of contextual analysis, including initial country visits, national seminars and training sessions, and legal review workshops (the latter aim at analysing existing legal frameworks and drafting legislation as required in the local context). These long-term engagements, the Implementers build contextual understanding for each partner country over time.

The CoE system involves the setting up of National Teams, National Focal Points and Regional Secretariats, and is today complemented by an active process of conducting national needs assessments by partner countries and by them developing and adopting National CBRN Action Plans (supported by JRC). These tools ensure a thorough, multi-disciplinary and multi-stakeholder analysis of requirements, existing capabilities, gaps, conditions and actionable targets in each of the participating partner countries in the field of CBRN risk mitigation. At this moment, of the 58 partner countries that participate in the CoE initiative or are considering joining it and have participated in some of the activities, 33 have completed national needs assessments and 12 have adopted national action plans. Taking into account the voluntary nature of these undertakings, and compared with the experience from other (global) needs assessments and action plans, such as UNSC Res 1540, this is a good level of participation. CoE Implementers are often not aware of the NAP content, however, and a closer link between the NAP/NAP process and the project design, programming and implementation systems are needed.

**Evidence-Base:**

Status table of NAO/NAP process (made available informally by JRC Ispra)
Final Evaluation IIF Art. 4.2
Annual Reports of the STCU and ISTC
P2P website
CT-MORSE website
Field Missions Morocco, Georgia (incl. OSA Team)
### Article 3: Findings and Evidence-Base

**Findings:**
Although most IcSP Article 3 actions are aligned to TEU principles and policy objectives (specifically in relation to Chapter 1/Article 21), there are some IcSP action areas where there is a risk of misalignment. These relate to actions that address CT/CVE, migration, and stabilisation; as well as action in areas where EU Member States or its allies are active militarily (Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Somalia). Such misalignment typically occurs when actions involve close engagement with beneficiary countries in these sectors. The direct or indirect support of IcSP actions to beneficiary governments may have negative knock-on effects on human rights, rule of law, democracy, and international law.

**Evidence-Base:**

- Treaty on the European Union (Article 21)
- A statistically significant sample of 56 Article 3 projects (5% margin of error, and 95% confidence interval) from 2014-2016 was selected. The sample was stratified to ensure balanced regional coverage, a spread in budget allocations, diversity in implementing agencies (including direct management), and coverage of focus sectors (CT/CVE, migration, transitional justice, and DDR). Related action and decision documents, and (where available) end of year reports were used to assess this indicator. Field visits and KIIs in Kenya (Somalia), Niger and Jordan.

### Article 4: Findings and Evidence-Base

**Findings:**
In the AAPs there is confirmation that IcSP Article 4 interventions are in line with the EU commitments in Title V and Article 21 of the TEU. The broad nature of the IcSP (and its predecessor the Instrument for Stability (IfS) Regulation) allow for Article 4 interventions to emphasise the prevention and peace-building aspects of the TEU. There is no evidence of any non-alignment in this Article.

**Evidence-Base:**

- Treaty on the European Union (Article 21)
- EU Evaluation of Article 4.3 Peace-building Partnership (2013)

### Article 5: Findings and Evidence-Base

**Findings:**
No such evidence under Art.5

**Evidence-Base:**

- Treaty on the European Union (Article 21)
- AAPs 2014-2016
- Activity report IcSP Article 5 2007-2017
Judgment Criteria: JC2.1: The IcSP has delivered on the commitments set out for the Instrument and contributed to advance EU political priorities.

Evidence: Base: General source: EC Working programme statements. Heading 4: Global Europe – IcSP, DB 2017

Article: Findings and Evidence Base

Findings:
Alignment of Article 3 actions has in some cases meant greater EUD engagement to ensure deepened political/policy dialogue with beneficiary governments. This has enhanced both the effectiveness and impacts of these actions. In other cases, political commitments to spend in particular countries or on some issues have led to difficulties in identifying suitable actions. There is no evidence to suggest that compromises have been made on the quality of subsequent actions, although pressure to comply with timing of EU political deliverables has in at least one case led to limited time for IP to engage local stakeholders in the preparation and set up of the action. Example: AGAMI project in Niger was a quick response to EU political objectives under the European Agenda on Migration. But this also meant it was put together in haste, under political pressure to deliver within the timeframe set by the Council of the EU, to some extent at the expense of a more thoughtful approach, inclusive design of the action and communication with local authorities in the Agadez region. Negative immediate impacts of Niger authorities’ application of legislation countering illegal migration and illigal trafficking (e.g. on local economy which has found a lucrative alternative to the loss of revenue from tourism; greater danger/risks to migrants as smugglers take alternative less safe routes to avoid control posts).

Although those negative immediate impacts are not attributable to the AGAMI project, they have affected perceptions on the project, especially as actions in support of a ‘reorientation’ of local economies/alternative livelihoods were not put in place at the same time, generating grievances among the local communities (e.g. AGAMI worked only for migrants and did nothing for the local populations; criticism of local authorities).

Findings: Niger and Turkey with regard to the hypothesis 5:
- Niger. EU priorities with regard to migration have deviated IcSP resources and staff attention from its focus area (Diffa). Whether this has affected the effectiveness of the IcSP program in Diffa, it is not evident. It has certainly reduced in 10% the level of funding to the initial programme in a region that has immense needs and where most of the aid is humanitarian. The consequences of EU political priority on migration appear, however, more significant for the GoN itself, having added new priorities that will be competing for resources and political attention from the State, and generating new tensions. This could, in the future, indirectly affect the IcSP in Diffa. Its exit strategy is dependent on the commitment of the GoN to allocate budget resources (from the EU budget support) to the strategy and initiatives supported by the IcSP. New competing priorities alongside EU pressure to address illegal migration could have some impact on budget allocation, despite EU assistance to this policy area, namely via the EU Trust Fund and MS support.
- Turkey. Political responsiveness of IcSP actions to EU priorities and to needs of the GoT does not appear to be impacting negatively on effectiveness of actions. Instead, effectiveness of some actions appears to be negatively affected by central/hierarchical decision-making processes in the Turkish state and the internal political situation in Turkey, especially after the coup attempt (e.g. reshuffling of staff and insecurity that does not incentivize officials to take responsibility or ownership of actions, loss of know-how and institutional memory).

Evidence Base:
Field visits and Kils in Jordan, Niger, Turkey and Somalia (Kenya),
Report of the joint Monitoring mission of AGAMI project; Country visit report
Contract 361304: IOM Community centres project report (Turkey)
Contract 361889: UNDP project report (Turkey)

Article: Findings and Evidence Base

Findings:
There is no evidence under Article 4 that political priorities have affected the effectiveness of IcSP programmes.

Hypotheses: Colombia CIP’s revealed strong alignment with the government Rapid Response plan for the implementation of the Peace Accords (for work with women and children affected by conflict in demobilization and reintegration). Positively affected.

Evidence Base:
AAPS: Annexes 2014/2015/2016
Kil: FPUIED Colombia, UN

Article: Findings and Evidence Base

Findings:
There is no direct evidence that suggests a strong impact of political decisions or priority settings in the EU on Article 5 programme effectiveness, in one direction or the other. There is interview evidence, however, that political priority setting as translated into budget allocations has affected the programme (at least potentially) negatively – the capacity in terms of human resources as well as financially is limited under Article 5 (and in fact the human resources available at DEVCO BS for the IcSP have shrunk by 1/3 over recent years; a similar trends was observed at JRC that supports the CoE Initiative with regard to project design, implementation and evaluation, and with regard to networking and the NAGNAP process). A good number of Article 5 projects have opened up opportunities (for example in relation to programmes on critical infrastructure protection or CT/CVE) but as other EFIs/TF or external donors follow into these thematic or geographical areas, there are questions about whether the IcSP Art. 5 engagements should continue, or be re-defined, or in fact stop.
Also, there is a certain risk of a “Christmas tree” approach when MS push activities in areas (thematic, geographical) of particular interest to them (e.g., in the CT area), with a risk of losing focus and impact, and thinning out capacity too far.

Evidence Base:
DEVCO interviews 29 Sept and 12 Oct 2016

Judgment Criteria: JC2.2: IcSP decisions mainstream policy priorities of the EU (e.g. gender, human rights, governance, etc.) and other cross-cutting issues highlighted in the IcSP Regulation and the CIR

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1 JC2.2 and Indicators reflect the CIR Questionnaire and will inform the CIR annex in the IcSP Evaluation report.
I2.2.1 Rate of IcSP decisions that include the promotion of democracy and good governance in its stated objectives (data disaggregated by article).

Good Governance Marker IcSP 2015: 307 M€ out 334 M€, i.e. 89% of the 2015 commitments (used as indicative of the level of IcSP funding also for other years)¹.

**Article 4: Findings and Evidence-Base**

**Findings:**
From the total 18 programmes across the AAPs 2014/15, and 16 programmes in the area of democracy and good governance account for over 50%. In 2014, this sector was weaker but programmes have significantly increased in 2015 and 2016.

**Evidence-Base:**
AAPs: Annexes 2014/2015/2016

I2.2.2 Rate of IcSP decisions that include conflict prevention as an objective/guiding principle (data disaggregated by article)

**Article 3: Findings and Evidence-Base**

**Findings:**
79% of actions reviewed included explicit conflict prevention objectives/guiding principles. These covered topics such as reconciliation, conflict mitigation, and dialogue. In 21% there were no explicit conflict prevention objectives/guiding principles.

**Evidence-Base:**
A statistically significant sample of 56 Article 3 projects (5% margin of error, and 95% confidence interval) from 2014-2016 was selected. The sample was stratified to ensure balanced regional coverage, a spread in budget allocations, diversity in implementing agencies (including direct management), and coverage of focus sectors (CT/CVE, migration, transitional justice, and DDR). Related action and decision documents, and (where available) end of year reports were used to assess this indicator.

EC Working programme statements. Heading 4: Global Europe – IcSP, DB 2017

**Article 4: Findings and Evidence-Base**

**Findings:**
Verified: All are orientated to conflict prevention. It is a core objective of Article 4.

**Evidence-Base:**
AAPs: Annexes 2014/2015/2016
Kil: EEAS/FPI

I2.2.3 Rate of IcSP decisions that have as main sector of focus or mainstream human rights and fundamental freedoms (e.g. in the design of actions or that take rights-based approach to implementation).

¹ Data in Dashboard not disaggregated by article and limited to 2014-2015
Data is from the overall contracts, all articles included, from 2014-2015, coded under Human Rights DAC code. It can be disaggregated by article, but does not seem relevant given the overall amounts. To be noted that the DAC coding does not include actions that may be considered under mainstreaming human rights but which have other sector as the main sector of focus.

### Article 3: Findings and Evidence - Base

**Findings:**

Five IcSP contracts from 2014-2016, under the sector code 'Human Rights' (DAC code), for a total of approximately 8.6 M€ out of a total of 828.328 M€ committed for the same period.

From field visits to Niger and Turkey:
- Mainstreaming of human rights and gender equality across IcSP relevant actions noticeable since formulation phase (i.e. log frame), in reporting of actions and key informants’ feedback.
- Provision of equipment to the Turkish Coast Guard (boats for search and rescue at sea) includes training of Coast Guards on human rights and legal protection frameworks/legislation.
- Protection (e.g. information on rights, legal counselling) included in actions in Turkey (e.g. by ASAM, IOM) and Niger (e.g. IOM/Agami project).

**Evidence-Base:**

CRIS – IcSP contracts 2014-2016
Niger and Turkey actions documentation and KIIs in country

### Article 4: Findings and Evidence - Base

**Findings:**

While there are no dedicated programmes exclusively for human rights, a rights-based approach crosscuts the programme.

**Evidence-Base:**

AAPs: Annexes 2014/2015/2016

### Article 5: Findings and Evidence - Base

**Findings:**

None of the Article 5 programmes list mainstreaming human rights as their main or significant objective. However, DEVCO B5 is acutely aware of the potential HR implications of actions in the areas of CT and OC, and has adopted a set of principles and procedures to integrate a HR based approach into its programmes in these areas. A review of programming documents and material on projects implemented under the CT/OC segment of the Article 5 portfolio confirms that these principles are being integrated into the design of projects. A recent final evaluation of a CT programme (East and Southeast Asia Partnership on Criminal Justice Response to Terrorism) co-funded by the EU that predates the IcSP (running from 2011 through 2016), implemented against similar principles, has concluded that the project was fully aligned with international human rights frameworks.

**Evidence-Base:**

AAP 2015-2016-12-02
DEVCO Interview 12 October 2016-12-02
UNODA Final Independent Evaluation of the Sub-programme on Counter-Terrorism: East and Southeast Asia Partnership on Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism (2016)

**II.2.4 Rate of IcSP decisions and actions that have as main sector of focus or mainstream gender equality/empowerment of women (data disaggregated by article and focus sector)**

From the Dashboard, gender equality marker (IcSP, 2015):
57 M€ out of 334 M€ (i.e.: 16,6% of overall IcSP commitments in 2015)

**Article 3: Findings and Evidence - Base**

**Findings:**

Same as II.2.3

From Turkey and Niger missions:
- Gender and youth focus, and gender disaggregated data in several actions (e.g. Niger Espoir, UNICEF, Karkara, IOM/Agami in Niger; non equipment related actions implemented by IOM, UNDP and ASAM in Turkey).

Although not clear if it is article-specific, CIR Survey replies to related question: a) The two on-going projects funded from IcSP relate to ammunition disposal and support to networks of women victim of crimes: Worksheet: II-IcSP Cell: B37); b) To attend complicated situations with human rights defenders and women detained with children (Worksheet: II-IcSP cell: B38).

**Evidence-Base:**

Data in Dashboard is not disaggregated by article and limited to 2014-2015
Niger and Turkey actions documentation and KIIs in country
CIR Survey [not clear if article specific]

**Article 4: Findings and Evidence - Base**

**Findings:**

Only 2 or 11% of the programmes tackle gender equality and empowerment of women directly but all programmes contain elements of these area.

Add Gender mainstreaming is found in all AAP interventions.

**Evidence-Base:**

AAPs: Annexes 2014/2015/2016

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*Data is from the overall contracts, all articles included, from 2014-2015, coded under Human Rights DAC code. It can be disaggregated by article, but does not seem relevant given the overall amounts. To be noted that the DAC coding does not include actions that may be considered under mainstreaming human rights but which have other sector as the main sector of focus.*
I2.2.5 Rate of IcSP decisions and actions that mainstream climate change and environment, where relevant (data disaggregated by article)

Total of 65.6 M € of climate relevant commitments of the IcSP in 2015, of which:
- Aid to environment: 22 M EUR
- Climate Change Adaptation commitments: 25 M EUR (38% of climate relevant commitments)
- Climate Change Mitigation: 8 M EUR

Article 3: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:
- From field visits to Turkey and Niger:
  - Turkey ex: UNDP implemented action — waste management component — supports local authorities in addressing environmental impact of the influx of refugees.
  - Niger: two actions in particular (UNHCR and Karkara) include objectives of environmental protection while aimed also at improving social conditions and livelihoods.

Evidence-Base:
Note on mainstreaming of climate change and environment into development cooperation and tracking and reporting of climate finance in the context of the EU’s external action expenditure (15/09/2016), page 3-5.

I2.3.1 Number of times IcSP decision making and programming processes have not been followed in the identification of effective interventions.

General source: EC Working programme statements. Heading 4: Global Europe — IcSP, DB 2017

No article-specific indicators are considered for JC2.3.
objectives and EU political interests. Working in crisis situations and in sensitive policy domains requires a much more 'hands on' approach, greater accompaniment and capacity to guide/influence the operational course of the actions. Working through contracted IPs often does not allow it: difficult to influence the design and course of actions when IP is a large IO or UN agency; or IPs have limited capacity or clout to access or influence at higher levels, which may be critical for the very objective of the actions [A point raised also in evaluations of IfS and IcSP signalling the need for more political backup and involvement of EUD/EU actors at higher level – Nigeria (Niger Delta); Sudan,...] .

Evidence-Based:
140917 Nigeria Plateau Final Report IfS project
150114 Niger Delta Report
60727 Revised EUTANs Evaluation Report
374463 Final Report Ukraine Confidence building measures
Turky country visit notes/debriefing
Niger country visit notes/ debriefing
CIR survey

Article 4: Findings and Evidence-Based

Findings:
Article 4 procedures all follow the same process of developing programmes under the AAPs.

Evidence-Based:
Klls: FP/VEAS
EU Evaluation of Article 4.3 Peace-building Partnership (2014)
Commission decision adopting the IcSP Thematic Strategy Paper 2014-2027, MIP 2014-2020, and Annex (only applies to Arts. 4 and 5)

Article 5: Findings and Evidence-Based

Findings:
No such evidence for Article 5

Evidence-Based:
DECVO interview 12 October
Interview OPCW 16 October
AAPs 2014-16
Field Missions Morocco, Georgia
Review of CoE Portal (Project section)

12.3.2 Evidence of negative assessment of IcSP decision-making/programming.

Article 3: Findings and Evidence-Based

Findings: See 12.3.1.

Evidence-Based:
140917 Nigeria Plateau Final Report IfS project
150114 Niger Delta Report
60727 Revised EUTANs Evaluation Report
374463 Final Report Ukraine Confidence building measures

Article 4: Findings and Evidence-Based

Findings:
There is no evidence of negative assessment of IcSP decision-making/programming.

Evidence-Based:
Klls: FP
EU Evaluation of Article 4.3 Peace-building Partnership (2014)
Commission decision adopting the IcSP Thematic Strategy Paper 2014-2027, MIP 2014-2020, and Annex (only applies to Arts. 4 and 5)

Article 5: Findings and Evidence-Based

Findings:
The overall assessment of Article 5 programmes has been positive throughout. That includes past evaluations in all programming areas (CT, OC, CI, CC, CBRN) at both programme and project levels, as well as statements made at relevant conferences (CoE annual meetings of NFPs and HoS meetings, international conferences in strategic trade controls - concerning export controls of dual use goods, conferences in the CT/CVE area, etc.), and feedback from participating PC as well as of other donors. Critical issues that have been flagged in documents and field trips with regard to decision making and programming include speed of intervention, quality of context analysis and involvement of local stakeholders. There have been past complaints about the slow pace of decision making in some of the programme areas. Decision-making is of course related, amongst others, to the time needed for context analysis, and the quality and timeliness of the information available to decision makers – some of which depends on the willingness and capacity of the partners to engage in the programming process. An observation in this respect was that the time required for project inception under the CoE system and some other centrally managed Article 5 programmes and projects often exceeds the normal 6 months. This is not in itself a negative assessment, if the reason was a more extensive context analysis (in the case of CoE projects, for example, there is a need to assess the situation and needs in multiple countries that participate in a new trans-regional project,
and there is the additional challenge of linking project targets and content to priorities identified by the partner countries in their national needs analyses and action plans – creating a level of complexity that differs from traditional technical assistance projects. Field missions have also confirmed that the quality of the initial context and needs analysis in CoE projects needs to be improved. In the CT/CVE area, it has been observed that integrated, multi-stakeholder analysis and planning is critically important, but judging by the evidence so far, more of an exception than the rule. Such efforts are rare, oftentimes frustrated by existing institutional (dis-) incentive systems, conflicting interests and priorities, as well as prevailing organisational cultures (CT-MORSE CVE conference June 2016).

Similar observations have been made in regard to the other programme areas under Article 5. In short, as far as interventions are concerned that began after the baseline for this MTR, the documents consulted as well as the data collected in Field Missions do not show any particular negative assessments regarding programming and decision making, but improvements can be made with regard to speed and quality of context analysis and needs assessment, and involvement of all relevant stakeholders in these processes.

Discrepancies (in terms of times and possible delays) between service contracts (e.g., training delivery) and equipment delivery (under EU procurement rules).

Evidence Base:
Past IIS Evaluations
Field trips Morocco, Georgia
Documents available from CoE conferences
CT-MORSE Conference “Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism in a development context” organized by DEVCO B5 in cooperation with the Netherlands Council presidency
Chatham House seminars 1 and 2
Past IIS P1 Art. 4.2 evaluations

I2.3.3 Rate of IcSP interventions analysed that demonstrate a clearly formulated intervention logic, and effective programme management that have contributed to results and outcomes.

Article 3: Findings and Evidence Base

Findings:
No Article 3 actions reviewed had an explicit theory of change; although all include an intervention logic. Effective programme management is evidenced at field level through EUD oversight of actions. In terms of intervention logic, 80% of actions reviewed were assessed as having clearly thought-through intervention logics. A total of 20% was seen as having weak intervention logics. One action in Niger (on CVE) includes a study to help formulate a ToC for a specific region in Niger (Maradi) where the project is active.

Evidence Base:
A statistically significant sample of 56 Article 3 projects (5% margin of error, and 95% confidence interval) from 2014-2016 was selected. The sample was stratified to ensure balanced regional coverage, a spread in budget allocations, diversity in implementing agencies (including direct management), and coverage of focus sectors (CT/CVE, migration, transitional justice, and DDR). Related action and decision documents, and (where available) end of year reports were used to assess this indicator.

Field visits: Jordan, Niger and Somalia (Kenya) and Kilis.
FD 367853- Niger Espoir action document; Rapport semestriel n° 1, Assistance technique de l’Union Européenne auprès de la Haute Autorité à la Consolidation de la Paix (HACP) (12/2015 – 06/2016)

Article 4: Findings and Evidence Base

Findings:
In relation to the Call for Proposals (CIP) system at the EUD level there are questions about the political relevance of the interventions that have been raised in Kilis9. The priorities are set by AAP’s (country and themes) and based on the IcSP strategy paper and Multi-annual Indicative Programming in consultation with EUDs.

In the field mission the evaluators have seen that CIP are integrated into the EUD road maps for the country and they help to address gaps in key areas (gender equality/women peace and security etc. Overall there is a majority (90%) use of the log-frames and the AAP’s that help to make the interventions effective and able to reach their results and objectives.

In the 18 programmes reviewed, Theories of Change (ToC) are clearly formulated and monitoring is on-going at HQ level. In terms of risk management, all of the programmes have reasonable risk management matrices, monitoring and management plans and mid-term evaluations built into the design.

Monitoring and evaluation is the responsibility of the implementers and the EC or EUD can also monitor projects to see if there are on track.

Evidence Base:
End of year reports
Kilis: FP/EUD Colombia/UN WOMEN
EU Evaluation of Article 4.3 Peace-building Partnership (2014)
Commission decision adopting the IcSP Thematic Strategy Paper 2014-2027, MIP 2014-2020, and Annex (only applies to Arts. 4 and 5)

Article 5: Findings and Evidence Base

Findings:
At the programme level, the interventions under Article 5 in all programming areas use intervention logics that are built against the programme objectives and that are based on context analysis and include lessons-learnt. Indicators are typically a mix of qualitative and quantitative parameters, and there is a trend towards emphasising quantitative indicators, some of which however seem to have limitations with regard to assessing whether the objectives have been achieved. But there are also some quantitative indicators (e.g., numbers of legislation enacted, number of ISO certifications, or numbers of Action Plans adopted) that link to processes with in-built quality assurance methodologies that add weight to the indicators used.

There is a notable weakness in the inclusion and use of indicators that could help assessing impact and sustainability.

At project level, past evaluations and feedback from current activities such as the CoE seminars organised by Chatham House or studies undertaken in the CT/CVE area show the importance of thorough context analysis – also as the basis for defining realistic and clear intervention logics including the use of impact indicators in a multi-stakeholder process involving partner countries experts and institutions.

In the field of cybercrime, GLACY is an example for a well-constructed intervention logic combined with thorough context analysis and an array of interlocking practical activities (awareness raising and policy development, legislation, judicial training, evidence and investigation training, setting up Computer Emergency Response Teams, SOPs, guidance documents and good practice studies, international networking that crate a comprehensive framework for addressing cybercrimes.

Evidence Base:
Annexes to AAP 2014-16
Field Missions Morocco, Georgia
Past evaluation reports

9 Kilis with FP 12/13 & 14 October
12.3.4 Evidence of IcSP interventions (disaggregated by Article) that have been modified/adjusted to adapt to changing contexts.

Article 3: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:
In 2014, 7 IcSP interventions noted modifications: 37418 Ukraine; 37506 CAR; 37666 Syria; 37830 Iraq; 37837 DRC; 37857 Yemen; 37 865 Libya
In 2015, 4 IcSP interventions noted modifications: 38573 Ukraine; 38648 Libya; 38719 Iraq and 38806 Somalia
In 2016 there have been no modifications.

Contractors noted that, during the validation phase, when there are delays in approving programmes (beyond 6 months) that adjusting actions to new circumstances is challenging and affects effectiveness. In Niger and in Turkey, the security situation is the main obstacle to effectiveness of actions (and the main reason for "no cost" extensions), which lie beyond the influence of actions or EUD. Several KIIs interviewed during field visits and comments from EUD in the CIR Survey also indicate that cumbersome and lengthy negotiations with partner countries’ authorities over tax exemption were in some cases responsible for delays and the need to request no-cost extensions. However, the CIR Survey indicates that the IcSP is the third most used EU ERI among EUDs.

Evidence-Base:

CIR Survey

Article 4: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:
Difficult to find concrete information related to Article 4, as these are long term-planned interventions. However a concrete example in the case of UN Women TJ action pilot project in Colombia some minor changes were considered (i.e. after the Referendum result) to revaluate aspects of the action to accommodate the "NO" campaign religious conservative concerns about women’s rights eroding family values.

Evidence-Base:
End of year reports
KIIs: FP/EUD Colombia/UN Women NY/Brussels and Colombia.

Article 5: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:
There is significant evidence that the management systems used to programme and implement Article 5 interventions, as well as the corresponding project content and delivery, are being adapted to respond to contextual changes. Context analysis is critical for all these programmes, and in most cases long-term relationships with local stakeholders in partner countries are being used to gain an accurate understanding of local conditions and requirements, and to respond to changes. There remain weaknesses in projects that depend on contracted implementers (such as in the CoE system where projects cover a significant number of partner countries from one or more regions) who at times lack detailed understanding of the local context, and discussions are under way for finding solutions to this issue through a stronger involvement of local experts.

There are multiple examples of programme adaptations to changing context. A striking example in the way in which adaptation can be built into the programme design from the start was, under the CT programme STRIVE, the intervention in the Horn of Africa (Kenya, Somalia). The initial definition phase of this project use the standard DEVCO approach but given the volatility on the ground, one could not at this stage be certain that the actors selected as partners would in fact be the appropriate ones, or whether the specific activities planned would even be implementable and meaningful. The project went therefore through a pilot test phase on the ground, including validating or adjusting some of the underlying assumptions with regard to vulnerability to radicalization, before it committed to specific implementation measures and partners for the subsequent 2 years of implementation. A lessons-learned workshop on this project has been held in November 2016.

The programming and decision making processes under the CoE initiative also have undergone multiple adaptations as the overall methodology of the initiative and its programming and implementing mechanisms have matured. The CoE programme structure and design are fairly complex and involve multiple actors both within the EU and outside. Roles of actors have significantly changed over time. With regard to the design and implementation of projects, the CoE system/methodology today includes:
- Project proposals coming from PCs through regional roundtables and coordinated between the regions through the RS, leading to ToR developed with the support of JRC and the OSA team and approved eventually by DEVCO B5 and contracted through tendering to implementers;
- The development of national needs assessments (NAQ process) and action plans (NAP) by an increasing number of PCs that at least in theory should form the basis of defining project objectives, baselines and allow impact assessment;
- An M&E system supported by JRC, which undertakes mid-term, end-term and ex-post evaluations of CoE projects and is increasingly looking at impact and sustainability issues.

Also, the management system has been gradually expanded in recent years to strengthen the technical competence of Regional Secretariats (technical experts from OSA teams are now working in 4 Regional Secretariats, and another contract to dispatch three more has been approved).

There remains a distinct disconnect, however, between the NAQ/NAP process and the definition of project objectives. Implementers are often unaware of the NAQ/NAP outcomes and their context analysis is often weak; that makes adaptation to changes in context difficult at project level (even though adaptations at the level of national needs assessment may have taken place). Proposals for changing the methodology of project inception have been tabled by some RS, aiming at giving local experts a much stronger role in the initial context analysis in the participating PCs.

Evidence-Base:
DEVCO interview 12 October
JRC interviews 13 October
Field Mission Morocco, Georgia
AAP 2014-16 and programme descriptions
Material available at the CoE Web Portal (CoE conferences, RS statute, guidelines for implementers and RS, NFP profile, guidelines for national teams, CoE conference documents)
STRIVE for development (2016)
STRIVE evaluation report 2016
Article 3: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:
Risk identification and management is clearly visible in 59% of actions reviewed. In 32% of actions, it is limited; and in 9% it is assessed as weak. Risk monitoring appears to be less common on ground; although it is facilitated by strong contractor/EUD interfaces. There is some concern that the restructuring into Regional Hubs will reduce risk identification and monitoring capacity.

Evidence-Base:
A statistically significant sample of 56 Article 3 projects (5% margin of error, and 95% confidence interval) from 2014-2016 was selected. The sample was stratified to ensure balanced regional coverage, a spread in budget allocations, diversity in implementing agencies (including direct management), and coverage of focus sectors (CT/CVE, migration, transitional justice, and DDR). Related action and decision documents, and (where available) end of year reports were used to assess this indicator.
Field visits: Jordan and Somalia (Kenya) and Kils.

Article 4: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:
In terms of risk management, all of the programmes have reasonable risk management matrices, monitoring and management plans and mid-term evaluations built into the design.

Evidence-Base:
End of year reports
Kils: FPI/EUD Colombia/ERMES/UN WOMEN (NY/Brussels /Colombia)
Follow up in the field necessary for CIP projects (Colombia)

Article 5: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:
At decision/programme level, all Article 5 programming documents include an assessment of risks and a delineation of risk mitigation strategies. These interventions are being programmed in accordance with the standard DEVCO procedures.
Risk assessments are also done at individual project levels. These are particularly important when projects move into new thematic areas (e.g., cyber security) and in the context of CT/OC interventions (involving reputational and financial risks but also security risks to implementers, partners and participants in activities), and despite good contextual understanding in these projects more can be done to make risk assessments and mitigation strategies more explicit and better communicate them to those involved.
There are also examples for risk assessments concerning factors that could impede sustainability – taking account of the need for and resistance to structural change, or factors that affect the willingness and speed of partner countries to legislate.

Evidence-Base:
AAP 2014-2016
STRIVE evaluation report 2016
STRIVE HoA briefing paper Nov. 2016
GLACY+ Action Description 2016
12.4.3: Evidence of IcSP Article 3 funded interventions in programme countries showing positive effects in terms of reduction in conflict potential, and increase in stability and other related EU policy objectives.

Article 3: Findings and Evidence-Basis

Findings:
Difficult to prove the impact of short-term actions in terms of reduction of conflict or potential for conflict. In one case, at least, local and external KI or stakeholders have expressed the conviction that the Instrument has played an important role in the stabilization of the country, including through its support to local capacities and the development of a national policy of conflict prevention and peacebuilding throughout several cycles of IcSP funding, building on learning and acquis from previous actions (e.g. in Niger, “it helped prevent that Niger would follow on the footsteps of Mali or Libya”).

Example from field:
- Sudan: JCP supported some 20 peace processes in the southern border areas of Sudan most of which were still enduring one year after the peace agreement. Those peace agreements are said to have had a direct impact on the reduction of conflict levels and flashpoints in those communities. “Overall, there seems to be a direct correlation between the peace agreements and the decrease of violent incidents as reported locally” (p. 13, JCP mid-term review report).

- Turkey: Actions are attaining the targets/results set (e.g. number of beneficiaries assisted by IOM, ASAM, UNDP), but sustained impact is constantly challenged by the volatility of the situation in border areas and the evolving internal political context. Addressing root causes of the crisis situation is beyond the instrument action in country. If one considers more immediate objectives of reducing migration flows to Europe and increased numbers of migrants/refugees supported, IcSP appears to be having some impact. As a key informant (KI) put it: “we’ll never know if it was because of the closure of the Balkan route or the EU-Turkey deal”.

- Colombia: The IcSP supported the pilot project implementing the 7 March 2015 agreement on demining in the framework of the Peace Dialogues between the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP) prior to the global peace agreement at the end of 2016. This highly political project succeeded in generating confidence among the parties involved and de-escalates the tension. In addition, it had significant impacts on technical and policy aspects of humanitarian demining in Colombia and elevated EU’s visibility and credibility as a political partner in the region.

Evidence-Basis:
- 140917 Nigeria Plateau Final Report
- Sudan RTE report mission 2 final
- Field visits: Colombia, Jordan, Niger, Georgia, Turkey and Somalia (Kenya) and KfIs.
- Project IcSP/2016/375-762: Desmindo Humanitario para la Paz

Article 4: Findings and Evidence-Basis

Findings:
- The UN Women TJ project in Colombia is an early stage intervention that helps support the participation of women in the peace process and continues to ensure their participation in implementation of the newly signed Peace Accords.

Evidence-Basis:
- Annexes: Commission Implementing Decisions 2014/2015/2016 End of year reports
- KfIs: FP/I UN WOMEN (NY, Brussels & Colombia)/EUD Colombia
- FD: 37838 CAD Colombia Mission Report

Article 5: Findings and Evidence-Basis

Findings:
Under the CT programme STRIVE, the IcSP supports the Global Community Engagement and resilience Fund (GCERF) which, amongst others, provides for an accelerated funding mechanism to facilitate swift international response to violent extremism. The mechanism provides micro, small and medium size grants to support local projects by non-governmental organisations. STRIVE also implements certain regional programmes (Horn of Africa, Sahel/Maghreb, and MENA) as well as country programmes that aim at strengthening CSOs and certain government capacities, including involving women and youths, which have direct impact on CVE. These programmes are examples for activities that respond to emerging opportunities to advance developments towards peace.

Evidence-Basis:
- AAP 2014-2-16
- STRIVE 2016 report
- STRIVE 2016 evaluation report
- STRIVE 140917 IcSP Project

12.4.3: Evidence of IcSP Article 3 funded interventions in programme countries showing positive effects in terms of reduction in conflict potential, and increase in stability and other related EU policy objectives.

Article 3: Findings and Evidence-Basis

Findings:
- There is insufficient evidence to ascertain whether there have been direct impacts on conflict reduction and stability. However, anecdotal evidence would suggest that such impacts may be visible in very local level actions, focused on micro-conflict systems.

Evidence-Basis:
- Field visits: Jordan, Niger, Turkey and Somalia (Kenya) and KfIs.

12.4.4: Evidence of IcSP Article 4 funded interventions in programme countries contributing to better capacities and preparedness of partner countries to address pre- and post-conflict situations.

Article 4: Findings and Evidence-Basis

Findings:
- Approximately all Article 4 programmes for 2014-2016 are focused on capacity building, directly or indirectly. The interventions such as PDNA/PCNA/UNDP/UNFPA specifically address the issue of strengthening fragile and conflict States local capacity.

Evidence-Basis:
- KfIs: FP/I Implementers

12.4.5: Evidence of IcSP Article 4 funded interventions in programme countries that were able to respond to major (trans-regional) Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear type of incidents, and/or other global and trans-regional threats to peace and security.

Article 5: Findings and Evidence-Basis

Findings:
- There are a number of examples where IcSP Article 5 activities that were planned and implemented as long-term capacity building measures have resulted in outcomes / capacities that could be redeployed on short notice for responses to emerging crisis situations. These were also examples where decision-making processes and management processes used were sufficiently fast and adaptable to enable the Commission to seize opportunities as they emerged. However, more needs to be done in certain regions to ensure that PCAs have operational response teams and protocols in place to respond to such incidents. The primary example is the EU support emanating from previous IcSP capacity building activities for the international response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa. This in particular included the use of EU sponsored high-security (BSL-4 comparable) mobile laboratories in support of rapid in-country diagnosis of suspected outbreak victims. The mobile laboratory capacity had originally been developed together with Kenya and was technically directed at work with Lassa virus. When the outbreak happened, the three mobile units already deployed were redeployed to Sierra Leone and Guinea to help with virus detection and training of local health workers. A fourths mobile laboratory was deployed in March 2015. Another IcSP Article 5 project that was active in the region at the time also supported the outbreak response, with respect to the management and disposal of hospital waste. The post-crisis strategy adopted included the use of CoE assets as well as the transfer of expertise form other projects such as the pandemics project implemented in the AAF countries. Follow-up activities under the CoE system to maintain this capability are planned but it will be important to ensure that capacities and expertise developed and used during the epidemic is not lost before new projects in this thematic area and regional setting take ground.
I2.4.2 Evidence of cumulative impact per IcSP Articles.

**Article 3: Findings and Evidence-Base**

Same as I2.1 Ali

**Findings:**
There is significant variation on how joined up actions are across IcSP articles. In some cases (Jordan and Somalia), there is little synergy and therefore no cumulative impacts to see. Within Article 3 actions, there are a number of cases where one action has led to another.

From field visits to Niger and Turkey:
- Niger. Successive Instrument interventions have strengthened the role and capacity of the HACP as an interlocutor on peacebuilding matters within the State structures (Presidency, sector ministries), among national actors (e.g. CSO, local authorities), and with international partners. Recognition of the role and legitimacy of the HACP, which it had acquired from its role in the mediation and implementation of the peace accords in Niger, was significantly boosted by Instrument support over three consecutive programs. Effective ownership of the conflict prevention and peacebuilding agenda by the GoN is seen as the result of the HACP influence and recognition of its role in the amid security and development sectors of the Government, and an indirect impact of the national police and donors build on input and implementation of the peace accords in Niger, was significantly boosted by Instrument (i.e. sharing) role in setting up community policing structures that are being integrated into the national framework (status yet to be approved) under the supervision of the national police and decentralized authorities (although sustainability remains an issue given the low budgetary resources of the State); (ii) IcSP support to the work the NGO Eirini has been undertaking in Niger since 10 years to bring formal education into koranic schools – the approach is now taken to the Difara region and the Ministry of Education strategy is now of regulating the koranic schools and connecting them to the formal education system.
- Turkey. Where the Instrument has been used mainly as a bridging instrument, previous IIS actions (e.g. UNICEF project on Child Friendly Spaces) and current ones (e.g. multi-service community centers for refugees; waste management) under the IcSP are being replicated by other EPiEU mechanisms (IPA II, Madad Fund) and other donors (e.g. DE/GIZ, US). Potential for cumulative impact is therefore higher as other instruments/donors build on inputs; experience and replicate or expand IcSP actions (e.g. Madad TF, IPA II, GIZ, US; DGMUNHCR verification/registration, incl. in provinces).

**Evidence-Base:**
Field visits: Jordan, Niger and Somalia (Kenya) and KIIs

**Article 4: Findings and Evidence-Base**

**Findings:**
No evidence found to draw a conclusion.

No examples of cumulative impact between art 4 and art 3 could be found, which is partly due to the fact that Art 4 interventions aim at pre and post conflict prevention and a significant number of the actions are implemented through international and multi-lateral organisations (e.g. Capacity building).

**Evidence-Base:**
End of year reports
Country mission reports
KIIs: FPI

**Article 5: Findings and Evidence-Base**

**Findings:**
Programming of Article 5 interventions involve sequencing of certain projects in the CTOC/CI areas, which creates cumulative effects. The same is true for the work under the CoE CBRN approach, which has developed standing structures at national and regional levels (NFPs, NTs, RPs) and toolkits (NAQ, NAP, regional roundtables) that are meant to ensure that over time, results in key areas will build on past achievements. Similarly, the engagements in scientists redirection through the Science Centres, and in the area of dual use export controls through the P2P programme are designed to enable long-term partnerships and the development of stable links between participating experts/institutions and EU partners, creating platforms for collaboration that allow accumulative impact over time.

**Evidence-Base:**
AAP 2014-2016
CoE Portal
ISTC/STCU Annual Reports
P2P Web Portal

**Judgment Criteria**: JC2.5: IcSP decisions contribute to the building of capacity in the EU and of organisations engaged in crisis response and peace building in partner countries/regions

**I2.5.1 Rate of IcSP decisions that contain capacity-building measures.**

**Article 3: Findings and Evidence-Base**

**Findings:**
Capacity-building elements are prevalent in Article 3 actions, with 86% of actions reviewed containing capacity-building activities. 14% of actions reviewed had none.

**Evidence-Base:**
A statistically significant sample of 56 Article 3 projects (5% margin of error, and 95% confidence interval) from 2014-2016 was selected. The sample was stratified to ensure balanced regional coverage, a spread in budget allocations, diversity in implementing agencies (including direct management), and coverage of focus sectors (CT/CVE, migration, transitional justice, and DDR). Related action and decision documents, and (where available) end of year reports were used to assess...
Article 4: Findings and Evidence - Base

Findings:
100% of all Article 4 interventions contain capacity building. This is the core strength of Article 4.

Evidence - Base:
End of year reports
Kit: FP/EEAS/ER/ES/UN WOMEN

Article 5: Findings and Evidence - Base

Findings:
Contribution to capacity building is the core mission of interventions under Article 5. That applies to all thematic and geographical programming areas. Programmes implemented under the CTO/CICCC portfolio are centrally managed or implemented b/with other partners such as Interpol, and the funding goes directly into projects that aim at capacity building. Centrally managed programme areas in the CBRN risk mitigation field, equally, show a direct link between financing decisions, programme content and the stated intent to help strengthening national and regional capacity in the respective area in partner countries. As an example, here is detail on 1 programme line (CoE Initiative): Under the CoE Initiative, capacity building with respect to risks emanating from CBRN agents and materials is the central theme, but there are also plans to use the methodology and platform developed by the initiative to deliver capacity building projects in other thematic areas. The CoE Portal implemented by JRC identifies the following technical areas where activities are currently being carried out: border control and monitoring, crisis management, denying support for misuse and terrorism, first responders, illicit trafficking, import/export control, investigation and prosecution, legal frameworks, post incident recovery, public health impact mitigation, safeguarding information distribution, (CBRN) safety and security, transfer and transhipment controls, and waste management. The activities conducted under the CoE system can be classified as assessments/ analysis/reviews, equipment, expert and technical support, IT support and tools, and training. Essentially all these activities and technical support areas make contributions to capacity building in the field of CBRN risk mitigation.

An area of particular relevance is crisis management capacity. A search at the CoE Portal under all 59 CoE Projects returns 19 Projects that aim at building capacity in crisis management (7 completed, 11 ongoing, one approved) – amounting to 32 % of all CoE projects. If one only accounts for CoE projects started on or after 1 January 2014, there are 10 ongoing and one approved CoE projects in this thematic area out of a total of 24 CoE projects, or 42 %. This increase of programme directions towards strengthening crisis response capacity (with respect to CBRN risks) is a reflection of an overall trend in the CoE project portfolio from general awareness raising and networking towards more focused training and equipment delivery in recent years. This shift goes along with initiatives coming from the Regional Secretariats and partner countries, which are proposing to develop these regional structures towards (or complementing them with) regional training centres or regional networks of training and research centres in CBRN risk mitigation.

The analysis of ongoing CoE projects also shows that the majority of these projects aim at a more generic, integrated crisis management capacity, rather than being directed at specific (chemical, biological, or radiological/nuclear) threats. 7 of the 11 projects listed since 1 January 2014 addresses all four risk categories (CBRN). Furthermore, the amounts allocated to these projects are significantly larger that was typical for early CoE projects. When in early years (2010-2013) project allocations would typically measure between €150,000 and €500,000 (with a few exceptions which reached €2 mio), recent project allocations typically vary between €2,5 mio and €5 mio (with only 2 projects showing budget allocations of less than €2mio). At that funding level, projects can deliver outcomes that are more likely to leave an impact in the national systems of the partner countries.

Similar results are achieved when the CoE project database is queried for outputs in the thematic areas of first response. When queried for projects in the area of post incident recovery, it becomes apparent that this has not been a primary focus of the CoE project system; whilst the on-site technical assistance projects in the thematic area of post incident recovery in their technical support capacity, only three other CoE Projects (2 of which with a particular focus on chemical incidents) address post incident recovery. This is a weakness, but at the same time it reflects the priority setting as it comes through the regional roundtable system of the CoE Initiative, thus reflecting regional and partner country priority settings. There are some interventions under the CoE system contributing to capacity building in an indirect rather than direct way: they are needed to maintain the system itself, ensure its technical competence and responsiveness. Examples are the governance team and the on-site technical assistance team (the latter also delivers direct outputs to capacity building), as well as the technical support rendered by the JRC to project design and evaluation. There is no easy way of segregating the data of direct versus indirect contribution to capacity building from the CoE Portal project database but an attempt will be made to extract some specific data for the Final MTR Report.

Evidence - Base
AAPs: 2014/2015
CoE Documentation and project database at CoE Portal
Past Evaluation Reports:
MTR SALW Programme June 2016
MTR Cocaine Route Programme June 2013
FR CT Sahel Project December 2015
MTR Heroin Route Programme 2013
Special Report # 17 by the ECA on the CoE Initiative (2014)

II.5.2 Rate of relevant IcSP evaluations that favourably assess IcSP capacity-building interventions.

Article 3: Findings and Evidence - Base

Findings:
Few evaluations available; insufficient evidence.
Sudan: Project ICSP/2015/356-515 - JCRP mid-term review (p. 23) indicates positive assessment and outcomes of capacity-building interventions of key actors, which, along with increased awareness around peaceful coexistence, are credited to “have contributed to the development of an environment more conducive to reconciliation and social cohesion” in the areas of coverage of the instrument (at community/provincial level).
Evidence-Based:
140917 Niger Plateau Final Report
150114 Niger Delta Report
FD 37913 - Sudan RTE Report Mission 2 Final
Project ICSP/2015/356-515 JCRP mid-term review report 2015

Article 4: Findings and Evidence-Based

Findings:
There are some indications through KIIs that strengthened capacities at the regional level (e.g. OECD, OSCE, and League of Arab States) offers the EU important leverage, which in itself is an impact. Similarly, the links with various UN agencies such as UN WOMEN, UNDP, and UNDP is seen by interviewees as a way for the EU strengthen its position within the global peace and security architecture.

Evidence-Based:

Article 5: Findings and Evidence-Based

Findings:
A review of past evaluation reports shows a large and positive feedback with regard to the contribution to capacity building, with markedly positive feedback given to the CoE system in general, to the measures implemented in CBRN risk mitigation areas other than those covered by CoE (Science Centres, illicit trafficking and border controls, export controls, biosecurity), and for certain projects in the CT/OC/CI thematic areas, in particular CT Sahel and SALW (ARMS, CASAC). Other CT/OC/CI project also received positive feedback with regard to their contribution to capacity building in their respective areas and there were no evaluation reports that indicated that the programmes did not contribute to capacity building.

Evidence-Based:
Past Evaluation Reports:
Final Evaluation IfS Article 4.1/4.2 (4 Parts) (2016);
MTR SALW Programme June 2016
MTR Cocaine Route Programme June 2013
FR CT Sahel Project December 2015
MTR Heroin Route Programme 2013
Special Report # 17 by the ECA on the CoE Initiative (2014)

II.5.3 Evidence of IcSP interventions assessed as contributing to strengthened capacities for peace of the EU and its partners (disaggregated by Article and type of actor).

Article 3: Findings and Evidence-Based

Findings:
Contract no: 367-850 (Niger), a follow-up action from the previous IfS decision that provides TA to the HACP, has had a clear impact in advancing the conflict prevention and PB impact in the GoN priorities, and strengthened the role of HACP as an interlocutor for other donors involved in this policy area.

Accidental evidence. (Namely because of sustainability of some of those efforts, monitoring and attribution challenges)

Evidence-Based:
KI (civil society actors, FPI and EEAS)
Technical Survey Summary Note
Contract no: 367-850 (Niger)
Sudan RTE evaluation report, 2015
Project ICSP/2015/356-515: UNDP annual reports; JCRP mid-term review report, 2015

Article 4: Findings and Evidence-Based

Findings:
The strength of Article 4 interventions is that it gives the EU on-going entry points, which it can activate to facilitate peace efforts especially through global and regional organizations/EPLO.

Evidence-Based:
End of year reports
KI: FPI EUD COLOMBIA/UN WOMEN/ERMES/EPLO
Colombia Mission Report

Article 5: Findings and Evidence-Based

Findings:
Strengthening capacity for peace is not an explicit focus of Article 5 interventions. Interventions in the CT/CVE area such as STRIVE; however, will have an effect on capacity for peace as they strengthen certain capacities that may help avoiding conflict outbreak or aggravation.

Evidence-Based


II.6.1 Evidence of past short-term and long-term instrument interventions where results have outlived funding, and key factors contributing to sustainability have been identified.

**Article 3: Findings and Evidence-BASE**

**Findings:**

There is adequate evidence to suggest that measures with strong capacity building elements have a greater likelihood of outliving funding. Anecdotal evidence has flagged other types of interventions (e.g. civilian oversight of security forces; or preparation of national CVE plans) as outliving funding. A key challenge identified is in measuring sustainability for such actions (e.g. how do you measure civilian oversight of security forces?) and over ambitious metrics in the design of actions.

- **Niger:** Contract no: 367-850 (Niger, TA to the HACP) – strong ownership from the GoN and the HACP is identified as a key factor for the positive impact of the action, but financial sustainability remains an issue in a country where needs are immense. IcSP ‘exit strategy’: continuation of support via the EUTF and the EDF through Budget Support to the GoN, which is allocating funding to the HACP in the State budget. Other donors are also supporting HACP and likely to continue to do so in light of the strong ownership of Niger authorities.

- **Turkey:** Immediate sustainability likely, due to the very nature of gap filling/bridging role of IcSP in Turkey and the EU/international actors commitment for supporting refugees and host communities in Turkey. Bridging role of IcSP action in Turkey thus ensures continuity of actions and approaches (e.g. continuity of support/extension of community centres, multi-service centres, other EU and donor actions building on registration systems and equipment, waste management, etc.). Capacity development of local partners under IcSP actions (key objective in some) as a measure to promote sustainability.

Key factors identified that contribute to sustainability, beyond capacity building, are when actions are implemented within broader multi-stakeholder response frameworks; are co-financed; ownership of actions by key local stakeholders; or build upon previous actions/longer-term support.

Sudan: JCRP supported peace agreements that were still holding 12 months after the end of activities.

**Evidence-BASE:**

- **Project ICP2015/356-515:** 2015 End of Year report; RTE Final Report
- **Kill (civil society actors, FPI and EEAS)**
- **Contract no: 367-850 (Niger, TA to the HACP)**
- **Field visits:** Jordan, Niger, Turkey and Somalia (Kenya) and Kils.
- **Project ICP2015/356-515:** JCRP mid-term review report, 2015

**Article 4: Findings and Evidence-base**

**Findings:**

No change in Desk Review Findings

The evaluators find that in long-term capacity building programmes such as ENTRI and the European Union Police Services Training Programme II (EUPST II), there is evidence to suggest that trained experts provide sustainable outputs and outlive funding.

**Evidence-BASE:**

- **AAsPs): Commission Implementing Decisions 2014/2015/2016**
- **Annexes: Commission Implementing Decisions 2014/2015/2016**
- **End of year reports**
- **Kill: FPI**

**Article 5: Findings and Evidence-BASE**

**Findings:**

All of the programmes and projects that started after 1 January 2014 are still on-going so it is premature to comment on the sustainability of the outcomes of these on-going projects/programmes. There is however evidence from previous programme activities (under the IfS) that points towards results that have outlived funding or found subsequent alternative funding. Some Article 5 programmes (CTOC/CI, expert support facility, some of the CBRN programmes including the CoE system) are delivered in phases/sequence and the outcomes of previous activities are usually preserved and absorbed by partner countries into their systems / by their competent authorities. Also, some previous activities have resulted in setting up permanent structures co-funded by the host countries and/or other donors, which continue to work but no longer depend on EU funding.

Factors for sustainability include: ownership and buy-in, involvement of local experts in needs analysis, mainstreaming of results into PC systems (institutions, protocols, etc.), and long-term engagement.

Past evidence of sustainable results does exist in all Article 5 programme areas, in the form of for example installed border control equipment, the CSS established under the CT Sahel programme, legislation adopted by a number of countries in areas such as CWC or BWC implementation or export controls, or the mobile biosafety laboratories in Africa. Some of the evidence for this comes from programme reporting and past evaluations, but there is also external evidence for global initiatives to which the IcSP interventions have contributed although the results were achieved also by others contributing, and by the partner countries involved committing to maintaining the results.

With regard to the sustainability of CoE work at project level, JRC has been expanding its effort to undertake ex post evaluations of CoE projects. At this stage, 10 CoE projects have undergone six-months ex post evaluation, 3 more are planned for 2017, 9 for 2018 and one for 2020. The ex post evaluation reports have not been reviewed as yet but a sample has been received from JRC.

**Evidence-BASE:**

- **Evaluation status table made available by JRC/HQ**
- **Past Evaluation Reports:**
- **Final Evaluation IfS Article 4.1/4.2 (4 Parts) (2016);**
- **MTR SALW Programme June 2016**
The design stage through to implementation, included capacity development and financing of terrorism. Past interventions involved local stakeholders at some stage during the project cycle, normally in the early phases of needs assessment and agreement. This approach depends on otherwise adopt a ‘bottom-up’ approach that encourages local ownership, involvement of local experts and institutions from the design phase through implementation and all the way to the evaluation of project outcomes and their long-term sustainability. The evaluation system of the CoE is beginning to use ex post evaluations to systematically check on sustainability 6 month after project completion, and there are discussions about also using longer-term ex post evaluations at some future point in time depending, amongst others, on the available evaluation capacity.

The CoE management has consistently addressed sustainability issues from the project design and programme management to the implementation phase, as is evident from previous CoE Annual Conferences. DEVCO also has commissioned dedicated studies on how to enhance the sustainability of CoE project outcomes.

There are areas where things can be further improved:
- The quality and authority of the National Focal Points (empowerment) and the correct composition of the National CBRN Teams selected/nominated by partner countries can be enhanced further.
- The technical and administrative competence and capacity of the Regional Secretariats has already been strengthened by OSA team member but more needs to be done in terms of strengthening their capacity.
- The support that EU and EEAS/DEVCO dedicated staff render to the CoE Regional Secretariats has improved but there remain missed opportunities.
- There remain opportunities for DGs other than DEVCO (ECHO, NEAR, SANTE) to use the CoE systems more systematically for their outreach to PCs, for promoting best practices in their respective fields of activity in PCs, and for exploiting synergies.
- The quality of the links to other external actors, and in particular the US, other countries with outreach programmes including EU MS, the UNSC 1540 Committee, IAEA, OCPW, WHO, the BWC-ISU, Interpol, WCO, can be improved.

Finally, with regard to the CoE approach, it should be noted that there is considerable buy-in by partner countries. The political support (in many but not all of the...
PCs at high levels) for the initiative, the goodwill that has been generated, the regional connections and networks that have evolved under the initiative, and the national networks in the form of the National Teams are all strong indicators for the creation of ownership in partner countries and regions and the development of partnerships between them and the EU. The CoE system has also been accepted (and is increasingly being used) by other global actors as a platform for coordination and joint programming. All these elements point towards a methodology that should have reasonably good chances of ensuring sustainability.

Evidence Base:
- Field Missions Georgia and Morocco
- DEVCO interview 12 October
- JRC interviews 13 October
- Past Evaluation Reports:
  - Final Evaluation IFs Article 4.1.4.2 (4 Parts) (2016);
  - MTR SALW Programme June 2016
  - MTR Cocaine Route Programme June 2013
  - FR CT Sahel Project December 2015
  - MTR Heroin Route Programme 2013
  - Special Report # 17 by the ECA on the CoE Initiative (2014)
  - CoE Portal (CoE conferences, reports from regional roundtable meetings)
  - ENCYSSEC final report 2016
  - STRIVE evaluation report 2016

I2.6.3 Number of IcSP interventions that have a sustainability strategy (disaggregated per Article).

Article 2: Findings and Evidence Base

Findings:
The need for a sustainability strategy in Article 3 actions is often questioned. KIIs indicate that a more appropriate approach is to ensure they have an exit or transition strategy. The review of actions found that only 9% made mention of a sustainability, exit or transition strategy. This notable absence is partly down to no requirements for such strategies in the design stage. When interventions are gap-filling, it is part of the logic (transition) of the action.

Evidence Base:
A statistically significant sample of 56 Article 3 projects (5% margin of error, and 95% confidence interval) from 2014-2016 was selected. The sample was stratified to ensure balanced regional coverage, a spread in budget allocations, diverse implementing agencies (including direct management), and coverage of focus sectors (CT/CVE, migration, transitional justice, and DDR). Related action and decision documents, and (where available) end of year reports were used to assess this indicator.
- Field visits: Jordan, Turkey, and Somalia (Kenya) and KIIs.

Article 4: Findings and Evidence Base

Findings:
No change from Desk Review
- In Article 4 programmes, over 50% contain elements that address sustainability, however a sustainability strategy is not always explicit.

Evidence Base:
- KIIs: EEAS/FPI

Article 5: Findings and Evidence Base

Findings:
All Article 5 programmes address sustainability in their overall design. For example: in the CT/OC thematic area, sequencing is used to ensure continuity, and the projects are designed to create local ownership and help PCs integrate the results into their structures and practices. The programme activities in the area of export control of dual use goods are in continuity with similar activities dating back to 2004, build on well-established partnerships, and involve casting results into legislation and regulations to ensure long-term impact.

However, there is a need for a transition strategy to other instruments and TFs (e.g., critical infrastructure, CT actions) when IcSP funding ends or is insufficient to result in significant results at the national level of PC (often the case where equipment is involved).

In the CoE system, CoE Conferences in recent years have focused much on developing concepts for and enhancing conditions for sustainability (developing strategic relationships, construction of an archive of deliverables (training material, presentations, templates and the like) for by partner countries and implementers of future CoE projects, DEVCO also has commissioned dedicated studies on how to enhance the sustainability of CoE project outcomes).

Evidence Base:
- DEVCO interview 12 October
- Past Evaluation Reports:
  - Final Evaluation IFs Article 4.1.4.2 (4 Parts) (2016);
  - MTR SALW Programme June 2016
  - MTR Cocaine Route Programme June 2013
  - FR CT Sahel Project December 2015
  - MTR Heroin Route Programme 2013
  - Special Report # 17 by the ECA on the CoE Initiative (2014)
  - CoE Portal (CoE conferences Genval 2015 and La Hulpe 2016)

Judgment Criteria: JC2.7: IcSP interventions (Articles 3, 4, and 5) promote some principles of aid effectiveness more than others (i.e. partnership, ownership, coordination, harmonisation)

I2.7.1 Evidence of impact (if any) of CIR rules for the promotion of aid effectiveness principles in IcSP interventions.

I2.7 A3i: Number of interventions funded under art. 3 that have originated from local stakeholders and/or promote partnerships for peace between local and international actors
Article 3: Findings and Evidence Base

Findings:

Interview evidence suggests that the adoption of the CIR had no effect on the promotion of aid effectiveness principles under article 3.

Evidence Base:

- KII: FPI, DEVCO B5

Article 4: Findings and Evidence Base

Findings:

No significant information found to answer the question.

Evidence Base:

- DEVCO interview 12 October

I2.7.2 Evidence on cases where IcSP interventions faced considerable challenges to apply which principles of aid effectiveness (disaggregated per Article).

Article 3: Findings and Evidence Base

Findings:

From field visits to Niger and Turkey:

- Niger. AGAMI project in Niger, to the extent that it responds primarily to EU migration priorities and political commitment it is prone to limited ownership (if any) by local stakeholders. In addition, because it was set up in haste and there was little time to consult more widely with local stakeholders due to time pressure to meet EU political commitments, there was lesser consultation and communication with those actors.

- Turkey. Centralized/hierarchical decision-making in the Turkish state and the internal political situation, especially after the coup attempt (e.g. reshuffling of staff, job insecurity, loss of capacities and of institutional memory, do not incentivize officials to take responsibility) are a challenge to ownership of actions, despite the advantage point of working with a strong State.

Evidence Base:

Niger and Turkey field visits

Article 4: Findings and Evidence Base

Findings:

No evidence found.

Article 5: Findings and Evidence Base

Findings:

No evidence found.

Article 4: Findings and Evidence Base

Findings:

CfP will bring in some new actors for IcSP, but not necessarily new to the EUD. As yet these are not 100% approved so weak evidence to base this on.

Evidence Base:


KII: FPI/EEAS/EUD Colombia

I2.7 A5: Mechanisms in place and applied at DEVCO, at the Centres of Excellence (CoE) regional secretariats as well as project implementers, and the Science Centres supported under IcSP Article 5, that are monitoring, analysing and promoting sustainability.

Article 5: Findings and Evidence Base

Findings:

Sustainability has been a key objective of the CoE system ever since its inception, and CoE annual conferences as well as workshops have devoted significant amounts of time to discuss how it can be enhanced/ensured. The same holds true for the work of the Science Centres. Formal M&E mechanisms are in place but need to be further developed with regard to impact and sustainability.

In the CoE context, mechanisms to promote sustainability through increased ownership and embedding of work processes and results into national systems include, amongst others, the promotion of stronger empowerment of NFPs and NTs in their respective countries, a stronger linkage of NAG/NAP processes to mainstream mechanisms and actors in PCs, the work of the Governance team to promote the role of the NFPs and NTs, and the exchange of experience between PCs in regional roundtables and global CoE conferences and meetings. Sustainability is a constant factor in the evaluation of project results and part of the on-going ex-post evaluations conducted by the JRC.

Both Science Centres (ISTC, STCU) include sustainability in their internal evaluation processes and reports, and their programme architecture pays attention to commercialisation of results as well as promotes the engagement of the scientists covered under their programmes with advanced centres of science and technology in Europe and other countries – in an attempt to improve conditions to promote sustainable results.

Evidence Base:

CoE Portal, documents from CoE Conferences La Hulpe and Genval

Sustainability study for the CoE

JRC interview 13 October and evaluation status matrix made available by JRC

ISTC and STCU annual reports, evaluation reports and highlights as presented on their respective websites

Final Evaluation Report IIS Art. 4.2 (2016)
13.1.1 Evidence of administrative delays between Decision and contracting that affect IcSP ability to respond adequately or seize opportunities for action.

Article 3: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:
Delays between decision and contracting are due to a number of factors: protracted budget negotiations with the contractor; slow political decision-making; slow deployment of identification missions; and sometimes a mix of multiple factors. There are a number of examples where such delays have affected response adequacy (Somalia, Jordan).

Evidence-Base:
Contracts number: 364541; 354271; 356318; 367492
Field visits: Jordan, Turkey, Niger and Somalia (Kenya) and Kils.

13.1.2 Rate of interventions exceeding the implementation period foreseen in the contract (by 6 months).

Article 3: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:
A review of actions showed 28% as exceeding anticipated implementation periods. However, this picture may be inaccurate. There was no data on this for 72% of actions. Field visits would suggest that extensions of the implementation period are widespread. For the Somalia portfolio, for example, all actions had been extended. This can only be evidence with actions that are now finished (in Niger, two of four).

Evidence-Base:
A statistically significant sample of 56 Article 3 projects (5% margin of error, and 95% confidence interval) from 2014-2016 was selected. The sample was stratified to ensure balanced regional coverage, a spread in budget allocations, diversity in implementing agencies (including direct management), and coverage of focus sectors (CT/CVE, migration, transitional justice, and DDR). Related action and decision documents, and (where available) end of year reports were used to assess this indicator.

Field visits: Jordan and Somalia (Kenya) and Kils.

13.1.3 Average time between the political statement of the EU Council or HRVP Declaration and the consequent IcSP Decision in focus sectors.

Article 3: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:
It is not possible to clearly draw timelines between EU Council or HRVP statements and Article 3 actions. In general, Instrument has been very responsive to political priorities on migration alongside other EFIs’ funding mechanisms (e.g. Madad Trust Fund; Trust Fund for Africa; other EFIs that are contributing to the Facility for Refugees in Turkey):
- Turkey, EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan (15 Oct 2015) includes a commitment to upgrading equipment in order to strengthen Turkish Coast Guard capacity for search and rescue. FD 374782, responding to that deliverable of the AP, was adopted 6 months after 23/5/2016, namely because IPA II funding would take too long. To be noted also that the kISP in Turkey was already responding to political priorities stated in the Joint AP through the FD 37981 from December 2014 (e.g. on migration management through supplies to Turkey’s Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM) for registration of refugees, migrants, asylum seekers)
- Niger: AGAMI project in Agadez (FD 367982, of 11/11/2015) responds to a political commitment and deliverable of the European Agenda on Migration (13/5/2015), which states in p. 5 what the AGAMI project is: “a pilot multi-purpose centre will be set up in Niger by the end of the year. Working with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the UNHCR and the Niger authorities, the centre will combine the provision of information, local protection and resettlement opportunities for those in need. Such centres in countries of origin or transit will help to provide a realistic picture of the likely success of migrants’ journeys, and offer assisted voluntary return options for irregular migrants.” Examples are there for Turkey, Colombia, and Niger.
Weak evidence interventions as many are still on-going. It is not possible to draw conclusions across all interventions.

Evidence Base:
KII: EEAS/ERMES/UN WOMEN

Article 5: Findings and Evidence Base

Findings:
The majority of CT/OIC/Ci projects are phased projects so the issue of overrunning implementation time doesn’t really come up. The projects within these programmes move from phase to phase and are strategic long-term engagements between the EU and the partner countries involved. With regard to CoE project implementation, all projects adopted under the IcSP are still ongoing and within their programmed duration (typically 36 months). Past evaluation reports of the IFS P1 programmes indicates that there have been frequent cases where projects have exceeded the planned delivery times. A review of the data available at the CoE Portal suggests, however, that for recently completed projects the planned delivery times have been met. The dataset is somewhat inconsistent however, as some projects dating back to January 2013 are shown as ongoing without an extension but an end date or December 2016. However, what is perhaps equally important is that the database shows that many projects have failed to deliver all (or even any) of the required deliverables to JRC for inclusion in the CoE deliverables archive. That hampers both evaluation progress and the re-use of these materials by other partner countries or implementers. It also begs the question of how decisions of project completion are taken when the deliverables are not available to DEVCO/JRC/the CoE partners as assumed in the terms of reference.

Evidence Base:
Past Evaluation Reports:
Final Evaluation IFS Article 4.1/4.2 (4 Parts) (2016);
MTR SALW Programme June 2016
MTR Cocoa Route Programme June 2013
FR CT Sahel Project December 2015
MTR Heroin Route Programme 2013
Special Report # 17 by the ECA on the CoE Initiative (2014)
CoE Portal project database

I3.1.3 Percentage of administrative costs as share of overall budget.

Articles 3, 4, and 5: Findings and Evidence Base

Findings:
Administrative costs under Articles 3 and 4 for the period 2014-2016 (and %): 5, 8 M €, i.e. 0, 98% of overall commitments Note: administrative costs for art. 3 and 4 come under the same budget code in the excel file (code containing “190104”; for art. 5 it’s the code containing “210104”). Admin costs (at least for art. 3 and 4) do not include costs with data systems (CRIS, etc), which would be about 1, 2 M € more.

Evidence Base:
CRIS

Judgment Criteria: JC3.2 CIR and IcSP regulations facilitate the adaptation of IcSP management systems whenever necessary to achieve efficiency gains.

I3.2.1 Evidence of efficiency gains in interventions through the use of CIR and IcSP regulations (distinguish between short- and long-term IcSP interventions). [CIR Survey data, i.e.]

- No impact on efficiency of actions that derived from new IcSP regulation or from the use of the Common Implementing Regulation. Not much awareness in general of CIR outside Finance and Contracts sections in EUDs (applies to all articles)
- IcSP advantage of using flexible procedures not always exploited (whether by EUD/FAC) or by IPs (e.g. UNICIF in Niger) and hindering EU’s ability to respond fast: “As recently seen with El Niño response – although the instrument chosen was perhaps not the fastest (EUTF). The ICSP should provide this flexibility but does not in reality as it is managed by usual procedures which are not designed to be fast.” (CIR Survey, part 1, section 3, Qs. 3.1.)

Article 3: Findings and Evidence Base

Findings:
Possibility under the IcSP regulation to extend IcSP actions up to 6 + 6 months through no-cost extensions helps to cope with implementation delays and backlogs, but does not contribute to financial efficiency as additional staff/organizational costs of extension are compensated by lesser investment on activities. KII quote: “it’s illusionary to think that no-cost extensions will not impact on activities” Several interviewed stakeholders expressed the view that 18 months is often a too short period for working in crisis/emerging contexts and for the type of intended changes. The possibility of a follow-up through a second Exceptional Assistance Measure (EAM) was welcomed as it allows for continuity of actions all. The IcSP is fully aligned to the Common Implementing Regulation (CIR).

Evidence Base:
CIR Survey; IFS Regulation; IcSP Regulation;
KIlS FPI, DEVCO B5, Implementing Partners (civil society)
Turkey and Niger country visits notes/debriefing; KIs with finance and contract sections of EUDs

Article 4: Findings and Evidence Base

Findings:
Article 4 has flexibility to choose who it wants to work with, which allows for strategic selection of partners.

Evidence Base:
Assessment of this JC will draw mainly on results of the CIR Survey (in particular Qs. 4 and IcSP specific questions), as well as on interviews with EUDs, FP1/DEVCO B5 and implementing partners.

CIR Survey question
Article 5: Finding and Evidence - Base
Findings:
There appear not to have been any efficiency gains from the CIR adoption.
Evidence Base:
DEVCO interview 12 October

13.2.2 Evidence of greater flexibility to adapt IcSP interventions with the new implementing rules of the CIR and the IcSP regulation. [CIR Survey data, i.e.].

Findings:
IcSP flexibility and speed is cited in 23% of EUD responses to the CIR survey as an important contribution. This is also substantiated in KIs during the validation phase. These KIs have also flagged that more peace and stability actions are implemented (than before) through other instruments; notably EDF, DCI, EIDHR, and ENI, and Trust Funds. New regulation requires greater specification; it may limit flexibility. In addition, flexibility and speed is sometimes hampered by arbitrary interpretation of IcSP rules or simply the non-use of the flexible procedures allowed by the IcSP Regulation; lack of recognition by DEVCO or NEAR of the work Finance and Contracts sections in EUDs do for the IcSP; tendency by legal services of the EC, EP and/or CoA audits to follow the stricter interpretation of rules. In some cases, working with UN agencies as implementing partners can cancel IcSP value-added in this regard, as these organisations tend to abide by their own rules and may be less willing to take risks (e.g. UNICEF in Niger opted for a tendering process for small infrastructures resulting in implementation delays and limiting synergies between project components).

KII: the Regulation still poses constraints to whom the Instrument can work with (linked to the issue of working modalities) and what it can fund (e.g. the proposal regarding Capacity Building for Security and Development).
Evidence Base:
CIR survey
Field visits: Jordan, Niger, Turkey and Somalia (Kenya) and KIs.

Article 4: Findings and Evidence - Base

Findings:
No evidence found.

Article 5: Findings and Evidence - Base

Findings:
There appear not to have been any efficiency gains from the CIR adoption.
Evidence Base:
DEVCO interview 12 October

Judgment Criteria: JC3.3: The CIR has allowed the EU to respond more rapidly through the IcSP than would have been possible through other EFIs.

13.3.1 Number of EUDs (CIR Survey) that indicate they have used IcSP as an instrument of last resort to provide timely support and/or bridge interventions from other EFIs. (disaggregated by article)

Note: CIR Survey does not provide data disaggregated by Article. However, it indicates that 40 of 81 EUDs surveyed used the IcSP. See additional data on value added in I3.3.2.

Of the EUDs using the IcSP (to be noted that the CIR Survey results indicate here a total number of 30 EUDs using the IcSP, while in the spreadsheet of Instruments used, the figure is 33. The percentage figures below relates to a total of 30 EUDs):
- 16 (or 53%) indicated they have used it as a last resort instrument to provide timely support and/or bridge interventions from other instruments;
- 23 (or 77%) indicate they have used is as a precursor to engage in specific policy areas (e.g. peacebuilding; mediation; global/transregional), and
- 20 (or 67%) to engage with specific stakeholders.

This seems to indicate the IcSP is valued more for the possibility it offers to experiment innovative approaches, and engage in specific policy areas and with specific stakeholders than as gap filler/bridging instrument.

13.3.2 Evidence that IcSP has allowed the EU to respond in a timely manner than it would have been otherwise possible through other EFIs. [CIR Survey data, i.e.]

Article 3: Findings and Evidence - Base
Findings:
See I3.2.2. IcSP allowed for rapid response in Turkey; Niger, Georgia and Colombia.

No article-specific indicators are considered for JC3.3.
According to the results of the CIR online survey to the Question in part 1, section 3 on mix of instruments and flexibility, EUDs that include the IcSP in their mix of instruments indicate they are able to be more flexible and respond pro-actively to unexpected changes in context/crises.

Rate by all EUDs/all Instruments considered vs. rate by EUDs using the IcSP with regard to the ability to respond in a flexible and pro-active manner to the following cases:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All EUD/all mix:</th>
<th>EUDs using the IcSP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>a) Unforeseen demands from partner countries/regions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Answer</strong></td>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All EUD/all mix:</th>
<th>EUDs using the IcSP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>b) Unforeseen demands from new international commitments</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Answer</strong></td>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All EUD/all mix:</th>
<th>EUDs using the IcSP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>c) Unforeseen demands emerging from changes in emphasis in EU agenda</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Answer</strong></td>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indications that the IcSP enables more flexible and pro-active responses to unexpected changes in context/crises. (see also EQ5 – I5.2.1)

Ex: "L’instrument contribuant à la Stabilité et la Paix (IcSP) permet la flexibilité en matière de sécurité, en autres dans le cadre de l’accompagnement d’un processus politique."

Mal: “Du fait de la nécessité de fournir aux forces de sécurité la protection des équipements de protection, l’instrument IS a été mobilisé en 2013”

Somalia/Kenya: “EDF programme (SHARE - Supporting the Horn of Africa’s Resilience) addresses cross border issues such as livestock, diseases; CSP addresses migration such as closure of Dadaab in Kenya and security related issues”

**Evidence Base:**

CIR survey: part 1, section 3
Field visits: Jordan and Somalia (Kenya) and KIIs.

**Article 4: Findings and Evidence Base**

Findings:

ON WOMEN TJ pilot project in Colombia has allowed the EUD to intervene at an early stage in the Colombian Peace process (EUD in Colombia initiated the request to Brussels for inclusion). It was an opportunity to engage (but EEAS Colombia desk was unaware of it when contacted during pre-mission interviews).

Evidence Base:

KII: EUD Colombia/UN WOMEN (NY/Brussels and Colombia)/EEAS

KII: FPI

Further information to answer this question will need to be gathered during the field phase.

**Article 5: Findings and Evidence Base**

Findings:

Article 5 interventions are programmed interventions and whilst timelines is important, they do not have a particular advantage over other EFIs in this respect. They use the standard programming approach that DEVCO also uses in other EFIs.

Note that the IcSP provides a capability to implement pilot projects to test or prepare the ground for longer-term engagements (first-mover advantage), including by other (bigger) instruments of TFs.

Evidence Base:

DEVCO interview 12 October 2016
CT Sahel
### Article 3: Findings and Evidence-Base

#### Findings:

**I4.1.1 Evidence that EU staff exploits the IcSP mandate and interface role with regard to Member States or other donor interventions (disaggregated per article).**

- **Evidence-Base:**
  
  - **KIL (IcEAS)** mentioned Mali as an example of the use of the IcSP in support of MS actions in country, but to what extent there it is a result of EU staff exploiting the IcSP mandate, or the other way round is less clear. Several KIs refer to the increasing interest of MS in the Instrument and a more proactive role and greater capacity of MS to influence IcSP actions at the design stage. Kils during the field phase also indicate some co-financing and parallel financing between the IcSP and MS and other donor interventions. However, KILs also raise the value of IcSP as ‘venture projects’ that don’t necessarily need interfaces.

- **Findings:**
  
  - Very little evidence for Article 4 (more under Art 3) from Colombia. Article 4 interventions are largely managed by HQ so exploitation is the other way e.g. Delegations lobby Brussels to be included in various activities (see 3.3.2).

**Evidence-Base:**

- Weak evidence from Colombia mission.

**Findings:**

Article 5 programmes interface with MS and other donor activities in several ways, and in all programming areas. This includes coordination and information sharing, mapping of activities and projects, use of EU experts and institutions I programme delivery and planning.

There also is increasing complementarity between IcSP programme activities and Joint Actions decided by the Council in such areas as support for international organisations in the CERN sector and CoE activities in the same thematic area. In some cases, there are examples for joint programming where certain CoE projects are directly related to the implementation of global action plans (UNSC Res 1540, IHR2005).

Possible quote from GLACY progress report Jan-Dec 2015: “GLACY has become a synonym for capacity building on cybercrime and is evidence that the approach of the European Union and the Council of Europe to promote implementation of existing standards such as the Budapest Convention backed up by capacity building is functioning in practice. GLACY has triggered much interested among other countries in joining the Budapest Convention”.

**Evidence-Base:**

- In the CT/OC thematic area, the use of exert facilities in different sectors to support assessments in potential partner countries; CT-MORSE as a tool to strengthen the global delivery, coordination and coherence among the various CT projects financed by the European Union, as well as to reinforce the EU engagement within the Global Counter Terrorism Forum framework; CT-MORSE also acts as a platform for international actors in the CVE field to exchange views and experience and to further the conceptual basis of CVE.
- Under CT-Morse, the preparation of a study (including detailed mapping) on global and regional coordination bodies in the area of CVE and related CVE research.
- GLACY (cybercrime) as an example of effective joint programming with the Council of Europe and supported by other partners (EUROPOL, Romania, France, and Turkey).
- In Dual use export controls, the P2P approach which links EU experts and institutions directly into partnerships with partner countries (study visits, exchanges and workshops), as well as the coordination with the US in the export control working group at both strategic and programming levels.
- The support facility.
- The use of the CoE platform by other partners for a basis for needs assessment and programme definition, or for programme delivery.

**Findings:**

- Both Science Centres have a long history of close collaboration between the funding partners (US, Canada, EU and others) and the partner countries as well as host countries (Ukraine for the STCU, Russia and now Kazakhstan for the ISTC), and the role of each of the partner is duly reflected in their outputs, materials, structures, decision making processes and spread of projects. The EU contribution is highly visible at the websites of the two centres, showing both the financial contribution and the substantive and political input that the Union provides.

**Evidence-Base:**

- ISTC and STCU websites (Annual Reports ISTC 2013-2015, STCU 2014)

### Article 4: Findings and Evidence-Base

#### Findings:

**I4.1.2 Evidence of cases where IcSP comparative strengths or added value (per article) was questioned, including weaknesses of the Instrument that failed to add value.**

**Evidence-Base:**

**Findings:**

- I4.1.2 Evidence of cases where IcSP comparative strengths or added value was questioned, including weaknesses of the Instrument that failed to add value.

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**Cross-cutting indicators**

| Judgment Criteria 3C4.1: The IcSP contributes to or complements actions of other donors, particularly Member States, in terms of financial inputs, speed of delivery, policy areas, stakeholders’ engagement, expertise, impacts on stability and peace, and political influence. |

**Article-specific indicators**

| EQ4 – Value Added |
| --- | --- |
| Article 3: Findings and Evidence-Base |
| Findings: |
| I4.1 A3i Number of opportunities seized by the EU as a dialogue partner under IcSP to engage beneficiary governments on issues related to stability and peace. |
| Findings: |
| Although it is difficult to ascertain from documentation whether IcSP actions have enabled greater EU-beneficiary country dialogue, a review of Article 3 actions shows that 28 (48%) have the potential for it. The CIR survey offers further nuance to this; 50% of respondents note that IcSP actions have helped relations with beneficiary countries, while 45% indicate they have been unhelpful, largely because they don’t (Article 3 in particular) require beneficiary government consultation. |
| Evidence-Base: |
| A statistically significant sample of 56 Article 3 projects (5% margin of error, and 95% confidence interval) from 2014-2016 was selected. The sample was stratified to ensure balanced regional coverage, a spread in budget allocations, diversity in implementing agencies (including direct management), and coverage of focus sectors (CT/CVE, migration, transitional justice, and DDR). Related action and decision documents, and (where available) end of year reports were used to assess this indicator. |
| GRI Survey |
| Field visits: Jordan and Somalia (Kenya) and KILs. |

**Findings:**

- Both Science Centres have a long history of close collaboration between the funding partners (US, Canada, EU and others) and the partner countries as well as host countries (Ukraine for the STCU, Russia and now Kazakhstan for the ISTC), and the role of each of the partner is duly reflected in their outputs, materials, structures, decision making processes and spread of projects. The EU contribution is highly visible at the websites of the two centres, showing both the financial contribution and the substantive and political input that the Union provides.

**Evidence-Base:**

- ISTC and STCU websites (Annual Reports ISTC 2013-2015, STCU 2014)

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### ISTC and STCU websites (Annual Reports ISTC 2013-2015, STCU 2014)
The Article 3 cases where the IcSP comparative strengths are questioned are normally those where speed and flexibility have failed. This has been seen in several Article 3 actions in Somalia (and Kenya). There is also a sense that increasingly other EUs are usefully programming peace and stability actions and provide longer programming windows than under Article 3. The CoE survey flags EUD difficulties with the use of the IcSP in Zimbabwe and Afghanistan. Some Kilis question whether the IcSP should continue to fund migration in Africa when there is a TF to cover that.

[Not clear which EUDs or which article]:
- "The IcSP does not have any of the above virtues in our delegation (see I4.3.1). In practice, we use as something rather similar to other thematic lines. One exception might be the theme of migration, which we do not yet cover with other programmes, but might in the future."
- "Only one questionable project to support the revision of the constitution. It was the idea of one particular programme manager who of course had disappeared when difficulties started to arise."
- Kirgizstan: "ISF was successfully used to support the Constitutional Chamber at a critical point in time, right after the 2010 revolution and the subsequent 2011 elections. The Delegation failed to get a proposal approved as a last resort to quickly assist the Kyrgyz government in the 2015 election exercise but managed instead to get a SRC (budget support) for electoral reform funded from DCI approved and made the first disbursement in 2016."
- Pakistan: "Flexibility and speed of the instrument. But lack of consultation with Government of Pakistan in some cases."

Evidence Base:
- 145917 Nigeria Plateau Report
- 150114 Niger Delta Report
- 160727 Revised EUTANS Evaluation Report
- 374463 Final Report Ukraine Confidence building measures
- CoE Survey
- Field visits: Jordan and Somalia (Kenya) and Kilis.

Article 4: Findings and Evidence Base

Findings:
The evaluators note that documentation and Kilis suggest that a key added value of Article 4 is the capacity for peace-building. It builds, promotes the development of a regional and global peace and security architecture, and promotes good practice through research, partnerships, and policy dialogue. Technical support is provided for early warning, conflict analysis, PCNA and PDNA; there is also technical support of experts for gender mainstreaming (and the soon to be established technical facility for Security Sector Reform - SSR); and programmes with regional and international bodies enables the EU to shape the global peace and security architecture, while also strengthen rapid crisis response.

Evidence Base:
- Kil: FPI /EEAS /UN WOMEN (Colombia) / EUD
- Analysis of 13 End of Year project reports 2015
- EU Evaluation of Article 4.3 Peace-building Partnership (2014)

Article 5: Findings and Evidence Base

Findings:
From a perspective of partners (both beneficiaries and partner countries), past evaluations as well as reports of workshops and meetings with partners under Article 5 (in all areas) consistently point to the added value of IcSP interventions, and they tend to emphasise the instrument’s and more generally speaking the EU’s strengths – soft measures, tailored to partner country needs and context, technically competent, high quality of deliverables.

There are challenges, notably in certain areas of activity in regard to CT/OC/CI, where other instruments including Trust Funds have been moving into areas that in recent years had been taken on by the IcSP – essentially the IcSP in these cases assumed a pilot role and it needs to be considered whether IcSP activities should continue (and if so, what their specific niche function would be when other instruments can address security issues as well), or transitioned to other (bigger) instruments.

Discussions at recent CoE conferences have pointed to a number of possible improvements that could be implemented in the system to further strengthen local ownership and increase the impact of interventions – proposals included regional training centres or regional networks of training and research institutions. Also, two seminars have been conducted as part of an effort to take the CoE initiative further, by Chatham House and partners, to brainstorm how the system can be further improved in terms of thematic coverage and methodology. The second of these seminars undertook a “reality check” which included a selected number of Commission staff, partner countries, Regional Secretariats and implementers, to make sure that the initial recommendations can in fact be adopted in practice under the conditions in partner countries and within the framework of Commission procedures and rules. The final results have yet to be reported and discussed in a workshop at the Commission in November 2016 but the provisional conclusions have already resulted in a number of forward-looking recommendations (see EO 8 and 9), but the discussions clearly underlined the external perception that there is significant added value emanating from the IcSP for partner countries as well as other donors.

Evidence Base:
- Reports of Chatham House workshops on the CoE Initiative (2016)
- Interview DECOVO 12 October
- Field Missions Morocco, Georgia
- Past Evaluation Reports:
  - Final Evaluation FY Article 4.1.4.2 (4 Parts) (2016)
  - MTR SALW Programme June 2016
  - MTR Cocaine Route Programme June 2013
- FR-CT Sahel Project December 2015
I4.1.3 Rate of EUDs using the Instrument that observe an added value of the IcSP – data disaggregated by article and type of added-value noted (CIR Survey – IcSP specific question)

Article 3: Findings and Evidence-Based

CIR Question (general question to all instruments):
“Which of the following instruments adds value to the EU's external action compared to interventions by EU Member States or other donors/actors?”

R: Out of 33 EUDs, 31 responded it adds value, i.e. 94% (all articles included).

The value added of the IcSP is seen in its: bridging capability; focus on stability and peace or on niches areas not covered by other EFIs; rapid deployment; flexibility and adaptability to changing circumstances; possibility to engage with specific stakeholders (“To attend complicated situations with human rights defenders and women detained with children” – CIR Survey reply - Worksheet: II-IcSP cell:B38);

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace</th>
<th>EUDs using component</th>
<th>EUDs stating component adds value</th>
<th>% EUDs stating component adds value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crisis response or short-term component (Art 3)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis preparedness and conflict prevention component (Art 4)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>105%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global and trans-regional threats and emerging threats or long-term components (CBRN, etc.) (Art 5)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>114%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Disaggregated per component:

Findings: The CIR survey (not disaggregated by article) finds that 49% of surveyed EUDs use the IcSP and that it is the third most used EFI (number of EUDs stating they use it compared to other EFIs). Speed and flexibility, as well as focus on peace and stability are the most mentioned value added elements of the IcSP. 56% of EUD respondents note that Article 3 actions have helped relations with beneficiary countries.

Evidence-Based: CIR survey

Article 4: Findings and Evidence-Based

Findings: End of Year Reports11 for Article 4 flag comparative IcSP value added to be for funding where no other EFIs can be deployed, and where important peace-building/disaster management initiatives (such as the PCNA and PDNA) are progressed.12 Some projects selected under the CIP system were identified as ones where other EU budget lines could have come into play (see projects: 309253; 309860). Around two thirds of the projects covered by End of Year Reports are internally evaluated to have high added value and one third average or low added value. 67% of EUD respondents note that Article 4 programmes have helped relations with beneficiary countries;

Evidence-Based: KII: FPI
No new evidence from Colombia mission
Analysis of 13 End of Year project reports 2015
EU Evaluation of Article 4.3 Peace-building Partnership (2014)
EU Council conclusions on the EU’s comprehensive approach
CIR survey

Article 5: Findings and Evidence-Based

Findings: See survey data.
With regard to CT and other activities that involve the security sector of partner countries, note that the posting of Security Attachés at certain EUD is expected to strengthen the ability of EUD to utilise the IcSP and its long-term programmes under Article 5. This may also create opportunities to address issues that are sensitive on a bilateral basis but can be more easily addressed within the broader package of a regional measure.
With regard to CBRN risk mitigation, EUD in the past have shown limited enthusiasm, which was a reflection of priority settings and capacity (see previous evaluation reports). With regard to the CoE system, much depends on individuals and DEVCO as well as EEAS have now deployed / designated officers in certain EUD to coordinate between EUD of a CoE region and support the CoE Regional Secretariats. The initial response, at least in some cases, has been rather positive as is evident from interviews conducted with JRC and DEVCO. This also coincides with the feedback from Regional Secretariats that the Commission did not.

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11 13 IfS projects are reported on but only one for the IcSP. In addition, the template was only introduced in 2015 so no systematized information before this.
12 See, for example, projects 319543; 319000; 355056; 353003; 328885) and projects: 319000; 319642; 356247.
receive in CoE Conferences and the Chatham House seminars. But generally speaking, the links between the EUD and the CoE system remain weak. 38% of EUD respondents note that Article 5 programmes have helped relations with beneficiary countries.

Evidence Base:
Field Mission Morocco, Georgia (incl. OSA Team)
Past Evaluation Reports:
Final Evaluation IF Article 4.1/4.2 (4 Parts) (2016);
MTR SALW Programme June 2016
MTR Cocaine Route Programme June 2013
FR CT Sahel Project December 2015
MTR Heroin Route Programme 2013
Special Report # 17 by the ECA on the CoE Initiative (2014)

Judgment Criteria: JC4.2: The IcSP promotes European approaches and values in contributing to:
- Building capacity of organisations engaged in crisis response and peace-building
- Addressing specific global and trans-regional threats to peace, international security and stability

I4.2.1 Evidence of IcSP interventions (per article) promoting European values in policy approaches.

Article 3: Findings and Evidence Base
Findings:
Reviewed Article 3 actions show commitments across the board to EU cross-cutting priorities (and values stated in the TEU). However, some sectors (CT/CVE, migration, and stabilisation) and actions in countries with EU military interests are affected by tensions between values and the actions themselves. See I4.2.2.
Interviews indicate that EU values are a particular value added in an increasingly securitised sector.

Evidence Base:
A statistically significant sample of 56 Article 3 projects (5% margin of error, and 95% confidence interval) from 2014-2016 was selected. The sample was stratified to ensure balanced regional coverage, a spread in budget allocations, diversity in implementing agencies (including direct management), and coverage of focus sectors (CT/CVE, migration, transitional justice, and DDR). Related action and decision documents, and (where available) end of year reports were used to assess this indicator.
See I5.2. All – AGAMI project in Niger is one example of a quick response to a political commitment and of the bridging role of the IcSP while activities under the EU Trust Fund were being prepared. Interviewed stakeholders contested, however, whether the action is really at the core of what the IcSP should be doing in Niger, nor is it clear if it brings any added value to the EU political dialogue on migration with the Niger authorities. It will be taken over by the EUTF as planned from the onset, but the project has struggled with additional demands and capacity issues as migration become a ‘crowded scene’ in Niger and demand on the IP soared.
Field visits: Jordan and Somalia (Kenya) and KIIs.
KIIs (New York and Brussels)

Article 4: Findings and Evidence Base
Findings:
For Article 4, the evaluators found evidence to suggest that European values are well integrated in programmes, particularly those that strengthen capacity for pre-and post-crisis needs. The linkages that are being created, and have been created, appear to contribute to a peace and security architecture that favours EU values and policy approaches and promotes these in the UN system and other regional structures (OECD, OSCE, Arab League). Article 4 programmes also reflect Council Conclusions on the EU's comprehensive approach. See FPI AAR 2016 for description of CSDN contributions to better joint analysis and response strategies.
In Colombia there is evidence to confirm that Article 4 interventions strongly promote European values and principles.

Evidence Base:
KII: FPI/UN WOMEN Colombia/EUD Colombia
Colombia mission report
Further information to answer this question will need to be gathered during the field phase
EU Evaluation of Article 4.3 Peace-building Partnership (2014)

Article 5: Findings and Evidence Base
Findings:
Past evaluations as well as current feedback from regional partners have consistently over recent years made a link between the engagement through the IcSP and European values in policy approaches, with emphasis on multilateral approaches and solutions, respect for democracy, partnership and a rule-based international approach to security issues. This, in fact, has been a constant factor over the IfS and now IcSP period that has helped engage with partner countries, and that on occasion has been highlighted by them as an advantage over interventions by other donors.

Evidence Base:
Past evaluations
Field Missions Morocco, Georgia
Chatham house seminars on the CoE system

I4.2.2 Number and type of IcSP interventions (per article and focus sector) and the extent to which they experience inherent tensions between programme approaches and EU priorities and cross-cutting issues.
Article 3: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:
A review of Article 3 actions shows that 28% are likely to experience inherent tensions between programme approaches and EU values/cross-cutting priorities. These are particularly visible in actions related to CT/CVE, migration, and stabilisation, and in countries where the EU (and allies) have ongoing military activities. Tensions play themselves out in several ways: (a) actions supporting beneficiary governments that are involved in military or counter-terrorism operations may have indirect knock-on effects on human rights, rule of law, and/or good governance; (b) actions on sensitive topics may draw interest from intelligence services at beneficiary governments and expose project participants to risks; (c) actions may have negative knock on effects on other in-country IcSP dialogue efforts by creating room for perceptions among some stakeholders that these dialogue efforts are aligned to security operations; and (d) greater controls on border crossings means that migrants are seeking other (more dangerous) routes.

To be noted that other instruments are experiencing similar tensions, as visible from a comment by one EUD in the CIR Survey, not referring specifically to the IcSP: “new, politically motivated international initiatives lead to a political reshuffle of priorities and a depletion of reserves to the detriment of effective needs driven flexibility”. (CIR Survey, part 1, section 3, Qs 3.2)

Evidence-Base:
A statistically significant sample of 56 Article 3 projects (5% margin of error, and 95% confidence interval) from 2014-2016 was selected. The sample was stratified to ensure balanced regional coverage, a spread in budget allocations, diversity in implementing agencies (including direct management), and coverage of focus sectors (CT/CVE, migration, transitional justice, and DGR). Related action and decision documents, and (where available) end of year reports, KII during field visits were used to assess this indicator.

Field visits: Jordan and Somalia (Kenya) and Kifs
Kifs (New York and Brussels)
CIR Survey (part 1, section 3, Qs 3.2)

Article 4: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:
No information about inherent tensions in the projects

Evidence-Base:
Kil: FP/EEAS/ERMES/UNWOMEN

Article 5: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:
There is an inevitable potential for tension between certain Article 5 programmes that address CT/OC/cyber security issues, and crosscutting issues in the areas of human rights. Measures have been taken to ensure that capacity building in these areas, therefore, takes full account of these risks and takes a rights-based approach. Evaluations of projects with a strong CVE component have generally concluded that there is a high degree of conformity between them and the good practice papers emerging from the international community engaged on CVE activity, and that the projects (STRIVE, CT-MORSE) is also contributing to the latter.

Programming documents note that capacity building in partner countries in these areas under Article 5 is generally in line with EU policies, strategies and principles, and cannot be effectively done without engaging with law enforcement, judicial and in some cases military institutions and actors. The can happen even in programme areas that at first glance do not show any particular association with law enforcement to military structures – an example in case was the response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa which in its initial phase got seriously hampered (amongst other reasons) because some actors did not want to engage with the military and law enforcement. Yet given the size of the outbreak, the logistical demands, the complexity of operations an effective outbreak response was only possible if the military and the police and border control force were closely integrated into the response. That brought programmes such as the CoE project on waste management or health controls at country points of entry/exit in direct relationships with law enforcement as well as local and US military forces, as the only way of delivering incinerators to medical facilities involved in the treatment of Ebola patients or the management of transfers of people in the region.

Evidence-Base:
Strive report 2016-12-04 CT-MORSE conference on P/CVE in a development context (2015)
Operational HR guidance for EU external cooperation actions addressing terrorism, organised crime and cyber security
Past Evaluation Reports:
Final Evaluation IFS Article 4.1/4.2 (4 Parts) (2016); MTR SALW Programme June 2016 MTR Cocaine Route Programme June 2013 FR CT Sahel Project December 2015 MTR Heroin Route Programme 2013 STRIVE evaluation report 2016-12-08 CT-MORSE website CT-MORSE report on advancing CVE research, 2016 CT-MORSE conference proceedings “Preventing/countering VE (P/CVE) in a development context” 2016

14.2.3 Evidence of IcSP interventions (per article and focus sector) that managed the effects of the securitisation of aid in programmes and interventions.

Article 3: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:
There are examples where IcSP implementers have applied a ‘do no harm’ approach when implementing Article 3 actions related to CT/CVE in particular. For example, in Jordan, GIZ plans to apply good FGD practice by filming these, then transcribing discussions without content attribution, and destroying footage to avoid putting participants at risk. Turkey support package has also factored in the need for human rights training to coast guards.
Number of Article 3 actions and funding allocated to CT/CVE and Stabilization in:

- 2014:
  CT/CVE: 1 action; 2,409,751 €
  Stabilisation: 8 actions; 19,365,004 €

- 2015:
  CT/CVE: 7 actions; 1,193,065 € (NB: contracted amount not available on 1 (provisional action) out of 7 actions)
  Stabilisation: 7 actions; 23,035,916 €

- 2016:
  Stabilisation: 2 actions; 2,080,000 €

Percentage of total funding to a.m. securitised sectors compared to total funding allocations for Article 3 in:
- 2014: 4.26%
- 2015: 10.8%
- 2016: 1.77%

Percentage of the total number of actions in a.m. securitised sectors compared to total number of actions for Article 3 in:
- 2014: 8.98%
- 2015: 12.06%
- 2016: 7.69%

Evidence Base:
Field visit: Jordan and KIIs.
CRIS data extraction

Article 4: Findings and Evidence Base

Findings:
The main thrust of Article 4 interventions is peacebuilding and crisis preparedness so it tends to be the softer skills capacity building, adherence to international standards/monitoring as well as providing important entry points.

There were no Article 4 actions/programmes and funding allocated to CT/CVE and Stabilization from 2014 to 2016.

Evidence Base:
EU Evaluation of Article 4.3 Peace-building Partnership (2014)
CRIS data extraction

Article 5: Findings and Evidence Base

Findings:
See I4.2.2.

Number of Article 5 actions/programmes and funding allocated to CT/CVE and Stabilization in:

- 2014:
  CT/CVE: 9 actions; 11,508,380 €
  Stabilisation: 2 actions; 3,249,450 €

- 2015:
  CT/CVE: 2 actions; 13,299,724 €
  - 2016: 0 actions; 0 €

Percentage of total funding to securitised sectors compared to total funding allocations for Article 5 in:
- 2014: 17.67 %
- 2015: 45.36 %
- 2016: 0%

Percentage of the total number of actions in securitised sectors compared to total number of actions for Article 5 in:
- 2014: 34.37 %
- 2015: 11.11 %
- 2016: 0 %

Evidence Base:
See I4.2.2.
CRIS data extraction
### 14.3.1 Evidence of the most recurrently mentioned comparative strengths of IcSP (per article) compared to other interventions (by other EU financial instruments, including Trust Funds or by other donors). (CIR Survey – IcSP specific question)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Findings:</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>% of EUDs using the component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size of engagement</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particular expertise</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political influence/leverage</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed of mobilizing or engaging funds</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other comparative advantages/value of the IcSP (art. 3) indicated by EUDs:
- "Allows us to be engaged in conflict areas, on peace building areas, that EU would normally not have been present in and where no / very few other donors operate."
- Flexibility and ability to respond quickly to contextual changes
- Innovation/testing of interventions
- Full control by the Delegation; complements the EDF which is co-managed
- Enabling LRRD/Kicking off development approaches: "Possibilité de tester des approches susceptibles d’aboutir à des projets de développement ultérieurement"

Other evidence (CIR Survey):
The IcSP (Art. 3 & 5) has been used as a precursor for an innovative approach to DDR in Casamance (with no prior peace agreement) and for the fight against drug trafficking.
The IcSP (Art.3) has been used to engage with specific stakeholders for the return of refugees & IDPs in Casamance (since the ICRC, usually refraining itself from requesting EU funding outside Humanitarian Aid, received IcSP funds for this project, and has just concluded a new agreement under the EU TF).

The IcSP has been used as a fast and flexible response to crisis or fragility situations (e.g. addressing expressions of violence and root causes of insecurity and violent conflict in Guinée forestière, through Article 3 interventions). Sudan: IcSP is seen as a "fast resort" but not to bridge interventions from other instruments, but to allow us to engage in issues which we would not otherwise be able to be engaged in. It is a very useful instrument given lack of EDF (and other development partner) resources available in Sudan.

Niger: Art. 3 IcSP used to address specific crisis situations (after Libyan crisis, Boko Haram, Mali war) and as precursor to engage in some new priority sectors as countering violent extremism, community security, border management and migration.

Lebanon: "Delegation in Lebanon has intervened on all three articles. We supported the Health Sector in the context of the Syrian crisis. We funded precursor programmes in counter terrorism. And for peace building we funded Capacity building for the Sunni High Council, Dar el Fatwa, to address the root causes of Islamic radicalism and to promote religious tolerance" Mal: « L’instrument IS a été déterminant en 2013 suite à des attentats ultérieurement”

### 14.3.2 Degree to which the CoE initiative is used by other partners including international organisations as a platform for promoting their objectives in risk mitigation and capacity building.

### Article 5: Findings and Evidence-Based

**Findings:**
A range of international organisations and global as well as regional initiatives use the CoE platform (its project system, its NAP/NAP process) to promote their objectives, or to undertake specific activities in support thereof. That includes the UNSC 1540 committee, the IAEA, WHO, and to a degree also the BWC-ISU and the OPCW. There remain certain disconnects and opportunities are being missed, but over time the CoE system has evolved into a platform for a better-integrated approach towards CBRN risk mitigation.

**Evidence-Based:**
Field Mission Georgia (including OSA Team), Jordan Interviews OPCW 3 Nov, DEVCO 12 Dec Past evaluations of IS Art 4.2 Chatham house seminars

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1 Taking into account that experience with Trust Funds is still relatively recent and information on advantages and impact may still be limited.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of engagement</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>% of EUDs using the component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Particular expertise</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political influence/leverage</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed of mobilizing or engaging funds</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other comparative advantages/value of the IcSP (art. 4) indicated by EUDs:
- Full control by the Delegation; complements the EDF which is co-managed
- in addition it would be recommended to reduce or limit use of CfP’s in the contracting process as this impedes the speed of mobilising or creation of action documents
- flexibility
- “Possibilité de tester des approches susceptibles d’aboutir à des projets de développement ultérieurement”
- Article 4 thematic specificity rates higher (56%) in terms of value added than Article 3

Evidence Base
KII: FPI/EEAS/ERMES/UNWOMEN
Analysis of 13 End of Year project reports 2015
EU Evaluation of Article 4.3 Peace-building Partnership (2014)
CIR Survey

Article 5: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:
See survey
Past feedback emphasised the strength in context analysis, needs assessments, ownership and participatory approach, and flexibility applicable to all programme lines but with a particular caveat regarding the CoE system with its ‘bottom-up’ approach.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of engagement</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>% of EUDs using the component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Particular expertise</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political influence/leverage</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed of mobilizing or engaging funds</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other advantage indicated: Transregional/Global approach
Other evidence (CIR Survey):
The IcSP (Art. 5) has been used for the fight against drug trafficking (West Africa).

Evidence Base:
Special Report #17 by the ECA on the CoE Initiative (2014)
Past feedback from external partners (US in particular – see previous evaluation reports)
CIR Survey

14.3.2 Evidence of cases in which the IcSP has proven to be the only viable instrument for intervention. (CIR Survey – IcSP specific question)

Article 3: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:
KII’s indicate that there is growing mainstreaming of peace and stability actions in other EFIs (ENI, EDF, EIDHR, and DCI). No incidents of overlap or duplication have been noted; although there are some interface issues to be addressed between the IcSP and some of the EU Trust Funds. The IcSP remains, however, an important instrument for crisis response. Speed and flexibility are cited widely in the CIR survey.

The CIR survey flags that other significant comparative advantages of Article 3 include: (a) access to local actors and mobilisation of civil society capacities, allowing the IcSP to implement actions in conflict areas and countries under sanctions where other EU EFIs are absent; and (b) a peace-building lens and conflict-sensitive approaches to security, humanitarian and development activities.

Evidence Base:
Contract 356072: IcSP support to the Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CJA) focusing on Syria war crimes is an example of an innovative approach to TJ.
Field visits: Jordan and Somalia (Kenya) and KII’s.
### Article 4: Findings and Evidence-Base

**Findings:**
Article 4 interventions help to allow the EU to have entry points in key areas where it want to have influence over issues (e.g., UN WOMEN – Gender and TJ/LAS conflict prevention in the MENA region.)

**Evidence-Base:**
- KII: FPDE/EAS
- Analysis of 13 End of Year project reports 2015
- EU Evaluation of Article 4.3 Peace-building Partnership (2014)

### Article 5: Findings and Evidence-Base

**Findings:**
In particular in the CT/OIC/CI area, there have been a number of cases where the IcSP was able to play a forerunner role and create a first-mover advantage for the EU. Whilst today other EFIs can support activities in the security sector or in counter-terrorism, the IcSP still has the advantage of relative speed, and ability to take risks and act as a pilot venture to explore the feasibility of certain interventions.

A recurring themes has been that the IcSP allows non-DACable interventions (affecting the security sector), including interventions in the areas of CT/CVE, fighting organised crime, as well as certain programme directions in the field of CBRN risk mitigation, and in particular export controls, border controls, scientists redirection and the creation of infrastructure and capacity for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction capabilities. These are areas that other instruments cannot move into (or could not in the past) and where the IcSP retains its niche function and relevance over other development instruments.

Other areas such as the protection of critical infrastructure represent areas where the IcSP had an initial advantage by moving into geographical zones where other donors were absent, but as other donors move in the IcSP interventions lose their comparative advantage and the Commission should seriously consider phasing the IcSP interventions out, for example by handing them over to other instruments, or by redefining programme directions and focus to make IcSP interventions more clearly distinct from other interventions.

**Evidence-Base:**
- Field missions Morocco, Georgia, Niger
- Interview Devco 12 October
- Past Evaluation Reports:
  - Final Evaluation IFS Article 4.1/4.2 (4 Parts) (2016);
  - MTR SALW Programme June 2016
  - MTR Cocaine Route Programme June 2013
  - FR CT Sahel Project December 2015
  - MTR Heroin Route Programme 2013
- Special Report # 17 by the ECA on the CoE Initiative (2014)
For instance, IcSP decisions that are constructed as a coherent set of diverse, but interconnected interventions, and are creating synergies with other IcSP interventions running in parallel; crisis response actions that benefitted from up-stream capacity-building actions undertaken under article 4; etc.
Field visits: Jordan and Somalia (Kenya) and KII.

Article 4: Findings and Evidence

Findings:
Building technical capacity is at the core of Article 4 on topics such as mediation, early warning and conflict sensitivity. These areas are also highly complementary to crisis response interventions, but a clear articulation of links to Article 3 actions has not been formally established through mechanisms to facilitate such links within FPI.

The Kimberly Diamond Process – Conflict Prevention and governance in the Diamond Sector does build on an action funded under the sixth facility of PAMF (a facility for urgent actions involving technical assistance for mediation and reconciliation. The UN WOMEN TJ intervention in Colombia may provide a base for upstream interventions but weak evidence base to suggest this.

Evidence Base:
KII: FP/EUD Colombia
EU Evaluation of Article 4.3 Peace-building Partnership (2014)

Article 5: Findings and Evidence

Findings:
There are very few such “hand-overs”, and the logic may not necessarily be that Article 3 interventions by default lead into follow-up under Article 5 – it is often more effective to follow up by other instruments to cement situations where Article 3 interventions have resulted in some degree of stabilisation.

There is a degree of complementarity between Articles 3 and 5, however. Examples include the removal of chemical weapons (from Syria under Article 5, form Libya under Article 3); the response to the Ebola outbreak (which combined Article 3 interventions with redeployment of capacities developed under Article 5) and certain projects in the CT/CVE area (for example STRIVE in Somalia). This complementarity of Article 3 and 5 interventions should be further explored and developed, as there is potential for increasing effectiveness and efficiency. Also, such complementary interventions can be extremely useful to seize opportunities – Article 3 interventions can be brought to the field without much delay and stabilise certain conditions while Article 5 (or Article 4) interventions are being programmed to then deliver longer-term interventions to stabilise the situation and where necessary build capacity. Such a complementary approach would of course call for IcSP Article 3 interventions to become more than responsive to emerging crises, but also be used to seize opportunities as they present themselves – a shift from crisis response to a more preventive approach that strengthens resilience in partner countries.

Evidence Base:
DEVCO interviews
IcSP decision table as extracted from CRIS
Field Mission Georgia

15.1.3 Evidence of formal and informal mechanisms in place and operating that facilitated coordination and synergies within the IcSP (in HQs, in country/region and across articles)

Article 3: Findings and Evidence

Findings:
The decision-making process for Article 3 involves adequate consultation and coordination mechanisms for synergies within the IcSP at HQ level. At EUD level, coordination is more variable. With some EUDs reporting limited coordination across Article 3, 4, and 5 – and others effective coordination. The restructuring into regional hubs is likely to enable greater coherence in coordination at a regional level.

Evidence Base:
FD 38655 (Niger) – HACP as oversight and coordinating body of IcSP actions
FD 37913 (Sudan)
KII EU internal stakeholders believed that there were formal or informal mechanisms in place to facilitate coordination.
Field visits: Jordan, Niger and Somalia (Kenya) and KII.

Article 4: Findings and Evidence

Findings:
UN WOMEN TJ project in Colombia was not known by EEAS Colombia desk officer. All staff are relatively new on Colombia so they are not aware of projects planned prior to arrival (AAP 2014). This raises a question about handovers particularly where long-term activities are planned in advance and new staff may not be aware of pre-discussions. There do not appear to be any formal or informal mechanisms in place to ensure cross article coordination between HQ level and EUD level.

Evidence Base:
KII: FP/EUD Colombia/EEAS Colombia desk/EEAS
EU Evaluation of Article 4.3 Peace-building Partnership (2014)
There are regular top-level coordination meetings and, at least as important, frequent working level informal contacts between the different units involved in IcSP interventions, as well as with related non-IcSP activities in complementary instruments / working areas. There are also regular working level contacts with DGs that have primarily mandates within the EU but where activities and approaches can usefully be mirrored into external assistance programmes (e.g., DG HOME, SANTE, ECHO, NEAR). There is significant scope for improvement with regard to the latter. Such contacts have been called for over several past IFS Article 4 evaluations, e.g. with reference to opportunities such as a stronger link between the work under the EU’s CBRN Action Plan and the external CBRN activities under the IIF. The EU’s internal base in terms of technical knowledge, process expertise and human resources can be used very effectively in providing technical assistance and support to partner countries. This is increasingly being implemented through the different expert facilities developed under Article 5 (CBRN, export control, CT/OC), and it also creates synergism between the programme activities under Article 5 and programmes of individual Member States.

Evidence Base:

Past Evaluation Reports:
- Final Evaluation IFS Article 4.1/4.2 (4 Parts) (2016);
- MTR SALW Programme June 2016
- MTR Cocaine Route Programme June 2013
- FR GT Sahel Project December 2015
- MTR Heroin Route Programme 2013
- Special Report #17 by the ECA on the CoE Initiative (2014)
- DEVCO Interview 12 October
- OPCW interview 16 October
- Reports on Chatham House seminars

Judgment Criteria: JCS-2: The IcSP promotes complementarity and synergy between IcSP programmes and the interventions of other EU EFIs (including EDF and Trust Funds)

I5.2.1 Evidence of sequencing and/or complementarity of IcSP scope (per article) compared to other EU financial instruments (including EU trust Funds).

Article 3: Findings and Evidence Base

Findings:
84% show evidence of complementarity with other instruments/16% show intent, but evidence limited.

EUD comments in the CIR Survey note also the difficulties to ensure continuity of some type of actions because of aid effectiveness principles/Agenda for Change of concentration of aid in a limited number of focal sectors (max 3. up to 4 for fragile States); and the lack of flexibility of other instruments that makes it more difficult to link short- and long-term support and approaches initiated by the IcSP.

Evidence Base:

A statistically significant sample of 56 Article 3 projects (5% margin of error, and 95% confidence interval) from 2014-2016 was selected. The sample was stratified to ensure balanced regional coverage, a spread in budget allocations, diversity in implementing agencies (including direct management), and coverage of focus sectors (CT/CVE, migration, transitional justice, and DDR). Related action and decision documents, and (where available) end of year reports were used to assess this indicator.

CIR Survey

Article 4: Findings and Evidence Base

Findings:
There is evidence in the AAPS 2014-2016 that complementarity and synergies are planned for, although these are most often synergies in the area of intervention and related to other initiatives within the portfolio. There is some evidence that the interventions funded under the OIP system have bridged gaps and been funded by other instruments.

Evidence Base:

Kil: FP7/EEAS/DEVCO

Article 5: Findings and Evidence Base

Findings:
Sequencing IcSP interventions with follow-up measures by Trust Funds has been pointed out by DEVCO as something that is becoming reality and should be further pursued. An example was the work in the field of protection critical infrastructure (maritime routes) where the IcSP can set in motion certain activities but the follow up and expansion of such measures goes beyond the capacity of the IcSP. Other thematic areas where Trust Funds have moved into areas initially opened up by IcSP interventions include activities in the CT/OC areas.

IcSP Article 5 interventions in the area of nuclear security are complementary to activities in nuclear safety under the Instrument for Nuclear Safety (thematic overlap and both are being implemented by DEVCO BS). The IcSP activities in the field of dual use export controls (P2P programme) show synergies with other Commission policy initiatives (DG TRADE, TAXUD, ECFIN, NEAR) and P2P has established a regular dialogue with other donors (USA, Japan) and partner countries. There also appears to be an increase in working level contacts with DGs that have primarily mandates within the Union but where activities and experience can usefully be mirrored into external assistance programmes (such as with DG HOME, SANTE, ECHO, and NEAR).

Evidence Base:

A statistically significant sample of 56 Article 3 projects (5% margin of error, and 95% confidence interval) from 2014-2016 was selected. The sample was stratified to ensure balanced regional coverage, a spread in budget allocations, diversity in implementing agencies (including direct management), and coverage of focus sectors (CT/CVE, migration, transitional justice, and DDR). Related action and decision documents, and (where available) end of year reports were used to assess this indicator.

I5.2. A3ii Evidence of IcSP crisis response interventions contributing to subsequent post-crisis programmatic opportunities for systemic change at a national and/or global level

Article 3: Findings and Evidence Base

Findings:
- FD 38655 (Niger) – EU Trust Fund on Migration (Sahel window) continuing IcSP actions on migration, and support to the High Authority for Consolidation of Peace (HACP), the Niger body charged with coordinating PB activities in country and which has been instrumental to push conflict prevention and PB as a state priority.
- Examples from CIR Survey*:
  - “ICSP allowed to provide quick response to the crisis situation in the East of Ukraine; as conditions allow ENI instrument steps in to provide assistance on a longer-term basis. DCI and EIDHR ensure complementarity to ENI in supporting the civil society involvement in reforms and social and economic development.”
- “ICSP allowed to provide quick response to crisis situation; ENI and EIDHR were flexible enough to provide assistance after the government change in 2014 and unstable political situation in the mode of Special Measures (ENI) and direct awards (ENI, EIDHR)”

Evidence Base:
- Kil in FPI
- CIR Survey (comments by EUDs)

I5.2. A3iii Evidence of integration of IcSP crisis response interventions into broader EU multi-actor response.

Article 3: Findings and Evidence Base

Findings:
34% show integration into EU multi-actor response frameworks/66% of actions, EU response frameworks are not relevant

Evidence Base:
A statistically significant sample of 56 Article 3 projects (5% margin of error, and 95% confidence interval) from 2014-2016 was selected. The sample was stratified to ensure balanced regional coverage, a spread in budget allocations, diversity in implementing agencies (including direct management), and coverage of focus sectors (CT/CVE, migration, transitional justice, and DDR). Related action and decision documents, and (where available) end of year reports were used to assess this indicator.

I5.2. A5i Number of IcSP components that have developed joint programming with other EU EFIs (including EDF and Trust Funds)
Evidence-Based: 
DEVCO interview 12 October

I5.2.2 Evidence of IcSP actions that have bridged gaps or sought complementarity with other EU financial instruments and Trust Funds in the relevant areas. [CIR Survey]

CIR Survey (not article specific):
- 55% of the EUDs using the IcSP noted complementarities or duplication with other EU external action Instruments (part 1, section 7)14.

Article 3: Findings and Evidence-Based

Findings:
Selected examples available on the bridge funding role of IcSP. CIR survey indicates it is relatively widespread value added.

Examples:
Turkey: “In the case of Turkey, the mix of EFIs has been used in response to the Syrian crisis as well as the migration crisis. The added-value of the IcSP as non-programmable instrument flexible enough to reply promptly to unexpected changes in context/crisis has been used in conjunction with other instruments such as ECHO and IPA Special Measures (more flexible and pro-active to respond to unexpected changes). Some examples: 1) Following the massive influx of Syrians into Turkey in Summer 2014, the IcSP was deployed to respond to a sudden request by the Turkish Government, the Directorate-General for Migration Management (DG MM), and was able to deliver supplies for the registration of Syrian refugees. Other complementary supplies to DG MM were delivered under IPA; 2) a grant agreement with IOM under IcSP for the set-up of multi-service community centres for the provision of basic services to refugees. This IOM project paved the way to similar interventions (i.e. community centres) funded under the EU Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crisis.” (CIR Survey). Information triangulated and confirmed with KIlS in NEAR, ECHO, FPI and during the field visit to Ankara.

Niger: IcSP bridging gaps on actions on migration until the EU Trust Fund on Migration was set up and operational. Handover of migration projects from IcSP to EU TF planned from the start (e.g. support to HACP, …) – but also evidence of ‘competition’, as EU TF is under pressure to commit its large sums of money and in search of projects to fund (Kilts at FPI, DEVCO, EUDs)

Evidence-Based: 
FD 38655 / Kilts (Niger): IcSP bridging gaps on actions on migration until the EU Trust Fund on Migration was set up and operational. Handover of migration projects from IcSP to EU TF planned from the start (e.g. support to HACP, …).

But also evidence of ‘competition’, as EU TF is under pressure to commit its large sums of money and in search of projects to fund (Kilts at FPI, DEVCO, and EUDs).

Evidence of failed complementarities due to competing political priorities: FD 38655 (Niger) – ex of IcSP and EUCAP Niger in the Diffa region (EUCAP had planned to deploy to the Diffa region and IcSP was planning complementary actions, coordinated with EUCAP, but with EU migration Agenda focus on Agadez, EUCAP deployed instead to Agadez, although the Diffa region, due to Boko Haram area of operations and destabilising influence, remains one of the most unstable and insecure areas of Niger. IcSP decided to stay in Diffa, where there are already too few donors involved.

Article 4: Findings and Evidence-Based

Findings:
Inter-service consultations at HQ level under Article 4 help to facilitate coordination and synergies, for example by linking humanitarian assistance through DG ECHO to the PONA programme.

Evidence-Based:
Thematic Budget Line Reports 2016
Kil: FPI/EEAS/DEVCO
Further information required from the field for CIP EUD: Kil

Article 5: Findings and Evidence-Based

Findings:
Bridging / complementarity functions can be identified in several IcSP Article 5 actions:

- With INSC: there is a strong synergistic relationship between the two instruments, with significant thematic overlap (CBRN Centres of Excellence covering both natural and man-made risks related to RN materials) and overlapping geographical coverage (e.g., U mining and related transports in Central Africa – CoE project 60 and INSC activities in the same region / mining areas related to safeguards and N safety); also note that both instruments are managed by the same unit (DEVCO BS) – from a technical and managerial perspective, suggestions to merge both instruments into one single instrument appear sound.
- ENI: Complementarity between CT/OC/CS activities and ENI programmes in areas related to human rights and security sector reform / good governance and confidence building (more related to Article 4 activities); complementarity of Article 5 activities in export controls and CBRN risk mitigation with regard to ENI activities related to integration into the EU internal market etc. (EU acquis as motivation for participation and mainstreaming of results by PCs)
- IPA: see ENI with regard to ENI
- EIDHR: thematic synergies with regard to CT/OC activities
- Trust Funds: there is some evidence for transition of action from IcSP Article 5 programmes in the areas of CT/OC (CT-SAHEL, Critical Infrastructure – maritime transport lines) to Trust Funds.

The comparative advantage of the IcSP is its ability to respond quickly and absorb certain risks – it thus can act as a forerunner for interventions by other (larger) actors.

Evidence-Based:
It is not possible to find any evidence for joint programming with other EU actors in Article Interventions. Programmes in the CT area (STRIVE, CT-SAHEL, etc.) are closely coordinated with MS that implement CT/CVE activities in the same regions/countries; Article 5 project CT-MORSE has been set up as a tool to strengthen the global delivery, coordination and coherence among the various CT projects financed by the European Union, as well as to reinforce the EU engagement within the Global Counter Terrorism Forum framework.
There is also close coordination in programming and implementation between IcSP Article 5 programmes and EUMS interventions in other areas, in particular with respect to export controls of dual use goods (P2P approach), CBRN risk mitigation (with NFPs now nominated to the CoE system by all EUMS) and activities in OCC.

Evidence-Based:
CT-MORSE website
CoE conferences and website
P2P website

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14The way the CIR Survey question is formulated – “Please indicate which of the instruments used in your Delegation complement or duplicate actions of other EU external action instruments” – does not allow for clarity of the results. It asks respondents to “indicate which of the instruments used in your Delegation complement or duplicate actions of other EU external action instruments”, but the response does not distinguish between ‘complementarity’ or ‘duplication’.
Another difference (and in some cases advantage) is its regional orientation, which can facilitate partner country participation in projects that may be too sensitive at a bilateral level.

Evidence Base:
DEVCO interview 12 October, 21 November
Past Evaluation Reports:
Final Evaluation IFS Article 4.1/4.2 (4 Parts) (2016);
MTR SALW Programme June 2016
MTR Cocaine Route Programme June 2013
FR CT Sahel Project December 2015
MTR Heroin Route Programme 2013
Special Report # 17 by the ECA on the CoE Initiative (2014)

I5.2.3 Evidence of processes and formal and informal mechanisms in place (and frequency of use) facilitating inter-service coordination and synergies with other EFIs, including EU Trust Funds (per article).

Article 3: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:
Formal mechanisms enable inter-service coordination.

Evidence Base:
See Article 3 decision-making diagram.

Article 4: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:
Evidence from interviews and documentation suggests that Article 4 interventions in support of EEAS capabilities enable synergy between the IcSP and EU CFSP activities. This takes a number of forms, such as through the ENTRI programme, where staff are trained for the CSDP missions. Thematicaly, Article 4 funding of women, peace and security, PCNA/PCDA, natural resources and conflict in the AAPs 2014-2016 promote thematic multi-actor response frameworks.

Evidence Base:
KII: FP/EES/INGOs/UN agencies
Further information required from the field EUDs: KII
End of year reports

Article 5: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:
With regard to Article 5 activities, there are regular top-level coordination meetings and, more frequently, working level informal contacts with other DGs/units working in complementary thematic areas. This includes increasingly also contacts with DGs that have primarily mandates within the Union but where activities and approaches can usefully be mirrored into external assistance programmes (e.g., DG HOME, SANTE, ECHO, NEAR). This is evidenced in interviews with DEVCO staff and apparent also from more recent evaluation reports, in particular those in the CT/OC domain. Such contacts have been called for over several past IFS Article 4.2 evaluations, with reference to opportunities such as a stronger link between the work under the EU’s CBWN Action Plan and the external CBWN activities under the IFS. The EU’s internal base in terms of technical knowledge, process expertise and human resources can be used more effectively in providing technical assistance and support to partner countries. This is increasingly being implemented through the different expert facilities developed under Article 5 (CBWN, export control, CT/OC), and it also creates synergism between the programme activities under Article 5 and programmes of individual Member States.

Evidence Base:
DEVCO interview 12 October
Past evaluations
CT/MORSE
CoE website
PSP website

Judgment Criteria: JC5.3: The IcSP promotes complementarity and synergy between IcSP programmes and interventions and EU foreign and security policy activities.

I5.3.1 Evidence of existence of coordination mechanisms between IcSP programmes/interventions and EU foreign and security policy activities and actors (e.g. CFSP/CSDP structures in the EEAS, Council groups/PSC, EUSRs).

Article 2: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:
CSDP structures in some countries show ongoing coordination (Somalia); in others less so (Niger).

Evidence Base:
Field visits: Somalia and Niger; and KII

Article 4: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:
There are informal consultations with relevant stakeholders IcSP stakeholders and MS at the initial phase of designing an intervention.

I5.3 All Number of IcSP Article 4 and 5 components (disaggregated) that have developed joint planning with CFSP initiatives

Article 4: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:
There are two main programmes that involve planning with CFSP initiatives firstly the “European Union Police Services Training Programme II (EUPST II)” aims to strengthen the capacity of police and gendarmerie services from EU Member States, non-EU CSDP contributing countries, and third countries. Secondly Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (ENTRi) aims at better enabling staff in the European Union to participate in CSDP missions. However overall all of the programmes reflect the EU Global Strategy, particularly by supporting the aims of cooperative regional orders and global governance for the 21st century.

Evidence Base:
AAPs 2014/2015 & 2016
Once designated the formal decision making process of Article 4 includes consultation with EEAS; civil society/Inter-service consultation/ MS/EP and the IcSP management committee.

Evidence Base:
KI: FP/EAS
Further information from the field EU’s: KII

Article 5: Finding and Evidence Base

Findings:

C-MORSE is an example for such coordination in the area of CT/OC.

All programming areas have regular links to Council working groups (CBRN, export controls, CT, CI). Past IIS P-1 evaluations have consistently pointed out that there were lost opportunities and that Member States continued complaining about a lack of information, and poor accessibility and user-friendliness with regard to the information provided. There were in the past few interactions between the IcSP actors and the relevant Council working groups. This has improved since the designation of NFMs by EUMS to the CoE system.

Evidence Base:
Past Evaluation Reports:
Final Evaluation IRS Article 4.1/4.2 (4 Parts) (2016);
MTR SALW Programme June 2016
MTR Cocaine Route Programme June 2013
FR CT Sahel Project December 2015
MTR Heroin Route Programme 2013
Special Report # 17 by the ECA on the CoE Initiative (2014)
DEVCO interview 12 October
Field Missions Morocco, Georgia,
CoE web Portal

I5.3.2 Number of IcSP interventions that are integrated into broader EU multi-actor response frameworks in order to enhance results.

Article 3: Findings and Evidence Base

Findings:

34% show integration into EU multi-actor response frameworks/66% of actions, EU response frameworks are not relevant

Evidence Base:
A statistically significant sample of 56 Article 3 projects (5% margin of error, and 95% confidence interval) from 2014-2016 was selected. The sample was stratified to ensure balanced regional coverage, a spread in budget allocations, diversity in implementing agencies (including direct management), and coverage of focus sectors (CT/CVE, migration, transitional justice, and DDR). Related action and decision documents, and (where available) end of year reports were used to assess this indicator.


Article 4: Findings and Evidence Base

Findings:

Article 4 interventions are in the majority integrated into broader EU and multi-actor frameworks. These range from gender frameworks (UNSCR 1325 and 1820 and Violence against Women); Kimberly Process certification scheme (PRRAD); Due diligence guidance for responsible supply chains of minerals from conflict affected and high-risk areas; or Sendi framework for disaster risk reduction (PDNA).

Evidence Base:
KI: FP/EAS/INGOs/UN agencies

Article 5: Findings and Evidence Base

Findings:

At decision level / programme level, that applies to all Article 5 interventions.

Evidence Base:
DEVCO interview 12 October
AAP 2014/2016
CoE web Portal
P2P web Portal
CT-MORSE website

Judgment Criteria: JCS.4: The IcSP promotes complementarity and synergy between IcSP programmes and interventions and other actors/donors (including Member States).

I5.4.1 Evidence of sequencing and/or complementarity of IcSP programmes and interventions seeking complementarity with relevant EU MS bilateral cooperation or with other major bilateral donors and multilateral organisations cooperation. [CIR Survey]

CIR Survey (all articles): 

I5.4.2 All number of IcSP interventions in validation phase countries that are integrated into regional (e.g. AU) or international (e.g. UN) strategies or initiatives (e.g. UN missions).

Article 3: Findings and Evidence Base
66% of the EUDs using the IcSP noted complementarities or duplication with other EU or non-EU actors/donors (CIR Survey) 4

Article 2: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:

6.6.5.3.1: DF 38655 (Niger). Evidence that other donors’ interventions build/capitalise on the instrument actions. In the case of Niger this regards IIS actions from the previous decision (e.g. PBSO in Agadez: “Sur le plan géographique, il s’agit de stabiliser et de capitaliser les interventions en matière de consolidation de la paix des programmes comme l’Instrument de Stabilité à Agadez et Tillabély…” PBSO Niger Priority Plan 2015-2018, p. 19).

Evidence:

EU TF
Niger and Turkey country visit and KIl
CIR Survey

Article 4: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:

Under Article 4 the interventions all have wide consultation with MS to create synergies and coordinate. In many of the interventions such as USAID are partners with PRAAD for supporting the Kimberly Process certification scheme. The World Bank/EU and UN combine forces for PDNA and PCNA actions. OSCE and the AU are part of the ENTRI III programme. The World Bank and OECD are also involved in the “Promoting responsible mineral supply chains in conflict affected high risk areas II”.

The UN WOMEN TJ project seeks synergies with MS and other donors interested in gender and TJ in Colombia.

Evidence-Base:

Kil: FPTEEAS/NGOs/UN agencies/UN WOMEN (Colombia/EUD Colombia/USAID Colombia/Norwegian Embassy in Colombia
Further information required from the field EUD: Kilts
End of Year reports

Article 5: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:

Essentially all Article 5 programmes seek and where possible develop synergism with the activities of relevant EU MS and other donors.

There are close ties with key Member States that implement bilateral programmes, and this has helped coordinating activities in programme areas including CT, OC, export controls, and to use specialized expertise as well as regional connections that these MS have in certain geographical areas (different regions in Africa, for example). There is also close coordination with the US in many thematic areas at both strategic and working levels – examples are the coordination through the export control and border monitoring working groups which link back to the respective US outreach programmes in these fields (USEXBS and other initiatives) as well as through the G7 / Global Partnership mechanisms in such areas as chemical and biosecurity.

With regard to UN and International Organisations, the programmes in the field of CT and OC are closely coordinated with and in part implemented by ICs such as UNODC or Interpol, as is evident from programming decisions and programme descriptions as well as past evaluations. In the CBRN risk mitigation field, the CoE provides a by-now well-accepted and effective platform that involves a number of ICs as partners at the programming as well as implementing ends – examples include IAEA, WHO, OPCW, Interpol, BWC-ISIS.

Evidence-Base:

AAP 2014-2016
Past Evaluation Reports:
Final Evaluation IRS Article 4.1/4.2 (4 Parts) (2016);
MTR SALW Programme June 2016
MTR Cocaine Route Programme June 2013
FR CT Sahel Project December 2015
MTR Heroin Route Programme 2013
Special Report # 17 by the ECA on the CoE Initiative (2014)
DEVCO Interview 1 October 2016
AAPs 2014-2015 and project lists available from CRIS
CoE Portal, Export Control Portal
Interviews OPCW
Field Missions Morocco, Georgia

I5.4.2 Evidence on inconsistencies between IcSP programmes/ interventions and the interventions of other donors (including Member States).

Article 3: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:

63% show integration into broader response strategies/27% show none/10% such integration is not possible

Evidence-Base:

A statistically significant sample of 56 Article 3 projects (5% margin of error, and 95% confidence interval) from 2014-2016 was selected. The sample was stratified to ensure balanced regional coverage, a spread in budget allocations, diversity in implementing agencies (including direct management), and coverage of focus sectors (CT/CVE, migration, transitional justice, and DDR). Related action and decision documents, and (where available) end of year reports were used to assess this indicator.

I5.4 A4i / A5i Number of Article components that have developed joint programming with EU MS and/or non-EU actors/donors.

Article 4: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:

No statistical data, but some programmes do demonstrate some evidence of joint programming. The “Development of Post-Conflict and Post-Disaster Needs Assessments (PCNA/PDNA) capacities and tools” programme has developed a strong working methodology with the UN and World Bank through the continued commitment to renewing the programme. Another example is the programme “Support to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme and the Regional Approach to Kimberley Process (KP) Compliance in the Mano River Union”, which aims to support compliance with the KP Certification Scheme Property Rights and Artisanal Diamond Development Programme (PRADD II). The EU programmes in this area have helped to strengthen the unique stakeholder process to monitor compliance in the area of conflict minerals.

Evidence Base

AAPs 2014/2015 & 2016
Kilts: FPI

Article 5: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:

No statistical data but there are examples for joint programming in all areas;

The CoE system is a form of joint programming as it is an open platform for other donors, and there is evidence that it has been used by the US as well as IAEA in the nuclear security area, and by WHO with regard to certain aspects of NAP implementation.

GLACY is an example in the cyber security area of joint programming with the Council of Europe and involving other partners. Equally, ENCYSSEC has developed strong partnerships with important international partners in the CS field.

CT-MORSE has the potential of evolving into a platform for joint programming in the CT/CVE area.

Evidence-Base:

Past Evaluation Reports:
Final Evaluation IRS Article 4.1/4.2 (4 Parts) (2016);
MTR SALW Programme June 2016
MTR Cocaine Route Programme June 2013
FR CT Sahel Project December 2015
MTR Heroin Route Programme 2013
Special Report # 17 by the ECA on the CoE Initiative (2014)
Field Mission Georgia
GLACY progress reports 2014 and 2015
GLACY+ Action Description 2016
ENCYSSEC Final Report 2016

4Like for the question regarding complementarity with other EFIs, the CIR Survey question does not allow for clarity of the results, which do not distinguish between ‘complementarity’ or ‘duplication’. 
Interviews indicate some inconsistencies in securitised areas; particularly CT/CVE. These relate most often to priorities and objectives, which for some donors is strongly focused on bolstering beneficiary government capacity to execute CT operations, while EU interventions in this space may focus on softer issues (e.g. national CT/CVE action plans, etc.)

Evidence Base:
KII: FPI
Field visits: Jordan and Somalia and KII

**Article 4: Findings and Evidence Base**

**Findings:**
Calls for proposals in Colombia and for Somalia seem consistent with other interventions EU and MS.

**Evidence Base:**
KII: FPI/EEAS/INGOs/UN AGENCIES
Colombia and Somalia mission reports

**Article 5: Findings and Evidence Base**

**Findings:**
There is no direct evidence of inconsistencies but there remains space for closer coordination and synchronization of action. The general impression is that donor coordination has improved at the strategic level but there clearly remain deficiencies in information sharing about on-going and planned programme activities, activities and timetables. As an example, there have been situations (before IcSP) in the implementation of CT programmes where local capacity was limited and there was a risk of undesirable competition for local resources and access between CT programme activities and other donors. A comprehensive and regularly maintained mapping of programme activities by different actors in the thematic areas and geographical zones covered by the IcSP Article 5 (although it has improved) remains to be accomplished. In the CVE area, progress towards such mapping has recently been made. Mapping is also improved in the CBRN sector, by the work of the Regional Secretariats of the CoE initiative.

Note that in recent years, a number of steps have been taken to improve cooperation and avoid inconsistency of action, in all programming areas (CT-MORSE, mechanisms established under STRIVE, NFP designation under CoE system, Expert Facilities, mechanisms under the P2P programme in dual use export control programme involving MS agencies).

**Evidence Base:**
Past evaluation reports
DEVCO interview 12 October
Field Missions Morocco, Georgia
CoE Portal, P2P Portal, CT-MORSE website, STRIVE 2016 report
CT MORSE report on advancing CVE research – the roles of global and regional coordination bodies (June 2016)
### 16.1 Evidence of cases in which the ICSP has contributed to reinforce political and policy dialogue [CIR Survey Qs 3, i.e.]

#### Article 3: Findings and Evidence-Base

**Findings:**
27 actions are likely to have led to greater EU policy dialogue/29 no data available

Respondents to the CIR Survey indicate political influence/leverage (56%)

Pre-requisites for the ICSP to generate opportunity for strategic engagement that are raised in the CIR survey include rapid funding, flexibility, advocacy, engagement in actions by senior EUD staff, consultation and coordination with development partners, timeliness of actions, technical expertise at EUD-level, size of action, coordination with other EFIs, and alignment with beneficiary country needs.

**Evidence-Base:**

**Technical Survey Summary Note**
A statistically significant sample of 56 Article 3 projects (5% margin of error, and 95% confidence interval) from 2014-2016 was selected. The sample was stratified to ensure balanced regional coverage, a spread in budget allocations, diversity in implementing agencies (including direct management), and coverage of focus sectors (CT/CVE, migration, transitional justice, and DDR). Related action and decision documents, and (where available) end of year reports were used to assess this indicator.

CIR Survey

**Article 4: Findings and Evidence-Base**

**Findings:**
CIR Survey: Article 4 rates higher than the other ICSP components in terms of political influence/leverage (67%).

The evaluators note that Article 4 programmes generate a variety of leverage opportunities for the EU:
- Programmes such as support for the Kimberly Process and OECD due diligence initiative on conflict minerals promote EU influence on this agenda.
- ERMES allows the EU to deploy and train its own mediators and provides support to the UN Mediation Services Unit, which in turn offers insight and leverage of dialogue/mediation processes.
- Support to the League of Arab States (LAS) crisis response capability enables dialogue on crisis issues and management with the League.

Article 4 also allows widespread influence within the international institutional framework such as the UN system, the World Bank, OECD/OECD as well as regional bodies such as the AU, ASEAN, CARICOM, REDLAC.

UN WOMEN TJ project is allowing EUD to be able to follow closely gender participation in the peace process, which gives it a chance to influence debates about the implementation of gender issues.

**Evidence-Base:**

CIR Survey: EU Council conclusions on the EU's comprehensive approach
Kil: FP/EAS/INGOs/UN agencies/UN WOMEN (NY/Colombia and Brussels)/EUD Colombia

**Article 5: Findings and Evidence-Base**

**Findings:**
CIR Survey: political influence/leverage rated 38%

Examples to this end can be found in several ICSP programme lines. These programmes rely on voluntary participation of the partner countries, and creating the willingness and support to participate in the programmes involves political dialogue. This opens opportunities for a broader political exchange and the discussion of policy objectives, and the creation and deepening of relationship between the EU and key actors in partner countries.

Perhaps the most striking example is process under the CoE methodology of setting up National Teams by/in the partner countries. This process depends on stimulating and steering inter-ministerial consultations and exchanges between actors that in many cases had little or no contact in the past (public health, first responders such as fire brigade, environmental agencies, regulatory authorities in the fields of chemicals management, biological safety and security, and NN safety and security, ministries of trade and industry, finance and customs, border controls etc.). The experience of European countries after 9/11 has been that establishing these links and dialogue is complicated and takes considerable commitment and effort. The very fact that some 50 partner countries have gone through this same process and established national teams is a strong indicator for how the ICSP has promoted policy and political dialogue within partner countries. But this was only possible given the assistance and guidance that the EU provided through the CoE system (governance team, DEVCO/JRC/EEEAS in national and regional workshops promoting the concept of National Teams and helping on the ground; involvement of UNICRI; several guidance documents were also prepared for the benefit of partner countries). In this way, the CoE methodology also promoted political and policy dialogue between the EU and partner countries.

Note that more needs to be done at the practical level to reinforce these developments at the political and policy level, and to ensure that the capabilities on the ground (including incident response teams) are effective and have adequate capacity (training, equipment, protocols).

There is also evidence that Article 5 interventions can provide a point of entry for EU Deis to take up issues with partner countries and forge new strategic alliances (e.g., port/policy authorities).

**Evidence-Base:**

CIR Survey
CoE Portal (CoE conferences etc.)
6.1.2 Evidence of IcSP interventions having generated opportunities/opened space for the EU to engage strategically in fragile and difficult contexts, strengthening EU’s role as a credible political actor or partner (vis-à-vis other donors or governments either at a national or international level). [CIR Survey]

Article 3: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:
See I6.1A3i

Evidence-Base:
See Colombia mission report – demining
Field visits Somalia, Niger, Colombia, Turkey, and Kilis

Article 4: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:
Article 4 interventions in the areas of gender and conflict natural resources monitoring have been areas where the EU has been able to get a seat at the table. This has enhanced the EU’s ability to be part of these debates that are key issues for the EU. In terms of mediation and track I, ii and iii the ERMES facility is a very strong complementary action to the Mediation Support Unit of UNDPA that Article 4 also supports which allows the EU unique access at times to intervene diplomatically and take advantage of windows of opportunity. 

UN WOMEN TJ project in Colombia is a good example of being able to engage in an important, fragile and complex area and link to current developments in the peace process. It is an important entry point.

Evidence-Base:
KII: FP/EEAS/NGOs/EUD Colombia/ UN WOMEN (NY/Brussels/Colombia)

Article 5: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:
The geographical expansion of the CoE system has over time opened up opportunities in countries on the periphery of the system. Some of them are not formally part of the system but participate in some of the project activities (Pakistan is a current example). Also, the expansion of the system to countries in the Middle East (NOT in the traditional sense beneficiary countries) – the GCC countries for example have formed their own Regional Secretariat and collaborate through it with the EU on security-sensitive issues; this has opened opportunities to promote certain policies for example in respect to building up an export control culture in this region, but perhaps more importantly it has created in-ways into structures and policy domains in the Middle East that are of strategic relevance to the EU well beyond the CBRN context. Contacts have also intensified with other countries in the ME such as Egypt.

Examples in the CT area include the activities under CT-SAHEL which has opened up space for the EU to explore CT and CVE collaborations in an area critical to the EU (CSS as a vehicle for EUMS to engage with a regional body on CT issues; has become institutionalised part of GS Sahel), or the different support activities under STRIVE. Also under CT, activities with respect to capacity development in forensics have created new opportunities for the development of a partnership with Pakistan (programme CAPRI).

Other examples can be found in the context of the drug routes programme where the engagement along the heroin route and with regional players in ECO has opened up additional avenues for interactions with Iran. There are also indications that ran maybe interested in getting involved with the GBNR initiative.

Evidence-Base:
Programming documents of the CoE initiatives at the CoE Portal
DEVCO interviews 12 October
Final evaluation IFS Art. 4.1 (2016)
CT-MORSE website
CT SAHEL final evaluation report 2016
STRIVE report 2016

Judgment Criteria: JC6.2: The IcSP funds have catalysed additional resources – from government, inter-national organisations, and other donors.

No article-specific indicators are considered for JC6.2.

6.2.1 Number of IcSP actions and programmes that have attracted additional funding from Member States and other donors, or that has provided complementary funding of synchronised interventions.

Article 3: Findings and Evidence-Base

Findings:
20 actions (35%) are likely to have seen parallel financing/1 (2%) action has been co-financed/35 (63%) actions there is no data available

Evidence-Base:
A statistically significant sample of 56 Article 3 projects (5% margin of error, and 95% confidence interval) from 2014-2016 was selected. The sample was stratified to ensure balanced regional coverage, a spread in budget allocations, diversity in implementing agencies (including direct management), and coverage of focus sectors (CT/CVE, migration, transitional justice, and DDR). Related action and decision documents, and (where available) end of year reports were used to assess this indicator.
Article 4: Findings and Evidence

**Findings:**
There is not much evidence of additional resources being leveraged by Article 4 programmes from MS, with the exception of MS engagement (e.g. Germany) in follow-up to the early warning programme. However, end of year reports indicate that under the CfP system, projects are occasionally able to attract new donor money.

**Evidence Base:**
- KII: FPI/EEAS/INGOs/UN agencies

Article 5: Findings and Evidence

**Findings:**
The programmes under Article 5 involve in-kind co-funding or parallel funding by other donors including Member States, as well as financial commitments by partner countries. To that extend, they have indeed leveraged additional resources or provided frameworks within which other donors could contribute both financially and in-kind. The CoE system, furthermore, has the potential to function as a platform for multi-donor collaborations and has leveraged (albeit limited) financial commitments and in-kind support (facilities) by the partner countries hosting Regional Secretariats. The Science Centres (ISTC, STCU) similarly depend on that form of commitment by the Host Countries, are well-established platforms for multiple donor programme activities, and have standing programme lines that are designed to attract external additional funding through partner projects. Examples in the CT/CVE area include the CSS (CT Sahel), and under programme STRIVE the cofounding arrangements for the Hedayah International Centre of Excellence for CVE, the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, the EU-Kofi Annan Foundation Initiative on Countering Violent Extremism and the World Leadership Alliance-Club de Madrid.

**Evidence Base:**
- AAPs 2014-2016
- CoE Portal, documents on the methodology and the functioning of Regional Secretariats
- ISTC and STCU websites (Annual reports, project databases)

16.2.2 Evidence of IcSP interventions that triggered/contributed to new engagement and financing from MS or other donors.

Article 3: Findings and Evidence

**Findings:**
See 6.2.1.

**Evidence Base:**
See End of Year Report – example of pilot that was continued by another donor.

Article 4: Findings and Evidence

**Findings:**
No evidence from Article 4 interventions.

**Evidence Base:**
- KII: FPI/EEAS/INGOs/UN agencies
- Further information required from the field EUD: KII

Article 5: Findings and Evidence

**Findings:**
No specific finding
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Selected web resources

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<td>Peace Direct: Insight on Conflict, 276 projects in 74 countries are funded by the EU’s Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace.</td>
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<td>PREPARE: Virtual Library on (re-)emerging Diseases</td>
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Press Releases and Fact Sheets


# Annex 3: List of Interviewees

## List of KIIs

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<th>Surname</th>
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<td>Babaud</td>
<td>Sebastien</td>
<td>EC - Service for Foreign Policy Instruments 2 (FPI2)</td>
<td>PbP Programme Manager</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barholme</td>
<td>Philippe</td>
<td>EC - Service for Foreign Policy Instruments 2 (FPI2)</td>
<td>CRPO - West Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baaser</td>
<td>Sharif</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Programme Specialist Fragility and Peacebuilding</td>
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<tr>
<td>Biscaldi</td>
<td>Chiara</td>
<td>EU - International Crisis Group</td>
<td>Head of External Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brinkman</td>
<td>Henk-Jan</td>
<td>UN PBSO</td>
<td>Chief of the Policy in the Planning and Application Branch at UN PBSO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chan</td>
<td>Christine</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Policy and Partnerships Specialist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dean</td>
<td>Homa</td>
<td>EC - DEVCO</td>
<td>International Aid / Cooperation Assistant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Doe</td>
<td>Samuel</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Policy Adviser for Crisis, Fragility and Resilience</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fearweather</td>
<td>Bob</td>
<td>Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)</td>
<td>Chief of Cabinet, Office of the Director-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>Friedrich</td>
<td>Marc</td>
<td>EC - Service for Foreign Policy Instruments 2 (FPI2)</td>
<td>Deputy Head of Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gherman</td>
<td>Catalin</td>
<td>EC - Service for Foreign Policy Instruments 2 (FPI2)</td>
<td>CRPO - Asia, Horn of Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gill</td>
<td>Amy</td>
<td>UNDP - Bureau for Policy and Programme Support</td>
<td>Local Governance Policy Specialist</td>
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<td>Gillois</td>
<td>Laurence</td>
<td>UN Women</td>
<td>Programme and Partnership Specialist at UN Women</td>
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<td>Goulart</td>
<td>Margarida</td>
<td>EC - Joint Research Centre (JRC)</td>
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<td>Canan</td>
<td>EEAS SEC POL 2</td>
<td>Policy Officer - Mediation Advisor</td>
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<td>Heath</td>
<td>Timothy</td>
<td>EEAS SEC POL 2</td>
<td>Conflict Adviser</td>
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<td>Holm-Lundbye</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>EEAS SECPOL 5 – Counter Terrorism</td>
<td>Policy Officer</td>
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<td>Kalinauckas</td>
<td>Josephine</td>
<td>EC - Service for Foreign Policy Instruments 2 (FPI2)</td>
<td>CRPO - Asia, Middle East</td>
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<tr>
<td>Keane</td>
<td>Rory</td>
<td>UN Liaison Office for Peace and Security (DPKO, DPA, DFS)</td>
<td>Head of UN Office in Brussels</td>
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<td>LeMarquis</td>
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<td>Deputy Director/Crisis Preparedness and Response Advisor</td>
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<td>Lewis</td>
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<td>Luyckx</td>
<td>Olivier</td>
<td>EC - DEVCO B5</td>
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<td>MacAongusa</td>
<td>Ronan</td>
<td>EC - Service for Foreign Policy Instruments 1 (FPI1)</td>
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<td>Marvovic</td>
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<td>EC - Joint Research Centre (JRC)</td>
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<td>European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO)</td>
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<td>Nette</td>
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<td>Pedersen</td>
<td>Jesper Steen</td>
<td>EC - DEVCO B5</td>
<td>Head of Sector Global and Trans-regional Threats</td>
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<td>Popa Sorin</td>
<td>Programme Manager</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pirotte Charles</td>
<td>Deputy Head Policy Coordination, International and Multilateral Relations, Legal Affairs, currently Acting Head of Unit</td>
<td>EC - European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO)</td>
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<td>Rinaldi Sarah</td>
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<td>Robles Monsalve Santiago</td>
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<td>CRPO - Latin America &amp; Caribbean</td>
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<td>Rinaldi Sarah</td>
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<td>Rinaldi Sarah</td>
<td>International Aid/Cooperation Officer</td>
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<td>Rinaldi Sarah</td>
<td>Team Leader - Peace-building Partnership</td>
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<td>Scuppa Gianmarco</td>
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<td>Senzanonna Daniel</td>
<td>PbP Programme Manager in charge of Mediation and Natural Resources &amp; Conflicts</td>
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<td>Simonart Tristan</td>
<td>Planning and Programming Officer - Programme Officer - Instrument for Stability-Priority</td>
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<td>Squadrito Giovanni</td>
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<td>Team leader CBRN</td>
<td>DG JRC Ispra</td>
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<td>Tricot Kloe</td>
<td>EU Coordinator</td>
<td>Saferworld</td>
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<td>Tomat Stefano</td>
<td>Head of Division (Acting)</td>
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<td>Valente Corinna</td>
<td>(Former) PbP Programme Manager in charge of WPS</td>
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<td>van der Meer Adrian</td>
<td>Head of Unit</td>
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### List of KIIs – Jordan (Pilot) Mission

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<tr>
<td>Gonzalo</td>
<td>JORRO MARTINEZ</td>
<td>EU Delegation</td>
<td>Programme Manager - Governance, Peace and Stability</td>
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<td>Sihamene</td>
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<td>Koenrad</td>
<td>DASSEN</td>
<td>EU Delegation</td>
<td>Minister Counsellor</td>
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<td>TOMEH</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration (IOM)</td>
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<td>Adil</td>
<td>RADOINI</td>
<td>United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI)</td>
<td>Regional Coordinator – Middle East, CBRN Risk Mitigation and Security Governance Programme</td>
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<td>Al-Sharif Nasser</td>
<td>BIN NASSER</td>
<td>Middle East Scientific Institute for Security (MESIS)</td>
<td>Managing Director</td>
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<td>Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany</td>
<td>Development Counsellor</td>
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<td>Christoph W.</td>
<td>von HARSZDORF</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)</td>
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<td>Director Counter Extremism &amp; Violence</td>
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<td>Morgan</td>
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<td>United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)</td>
<td>Project Development &amp; Coordination Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nisreen J.</td>
<td>SHUNNAR</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)</td>
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**List of KII – Somalia and Kenya Mission**

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<td>IcSP Focal Point r</td>
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<td>CARBONI</td>
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<td>Baines</td>
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<td>EUD/Somalia</td>
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<td>Habers</td>
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<td>Head of Development</td>
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<td>Head of Section Contracts and Finance</td>
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<td>Max</td>
<td>Palma</td>
<td>FCA</td>
<td>Country Manager</td>
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<tr>
<td>Karen</td>
<td>Mahy</td>
<td>Somalia Stability Fund</td>
<td>Fund Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marieke</td>
<td>Denissans</td>
<td>Somalia Stability Fund</td>
<td>Expert</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dorothy</td>
<td>Ndungu</td>
<td>HDC</td>
<td>Programme Officer</td>
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<td>Simona</td>
<td>EU Delegation</td>
<td>Head of Cooperation</td>
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<td>Head of Political Section</td>
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<td>Deputy Head of Fundamental Rights, Judiciary and Home Affairs section</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ozaydin</td>
<td>Banur</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ari</td>
<td>Burce</td>
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<td>Naucodie</td>
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<td>Political officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bergenholtz</td>
<td>Tomas</td>
<td>Embassy of Sweden</td>
<td>Counsellor</td>
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<td>Horne</td>
<td>Nick</td>
<td>DFID representation in Turkey</td>
<td>Lead Humanitarian Adviser</td>
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<tr>
<td>Albers</td>
<td>Sandra</td>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Senior Portfolio Coordinator Turkey &amp; Iraq</td>
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<td>Frühauf</td>
<td>Urs</td>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deputy Country Coordinator</td>
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<td>Çadirci,</td>
<td>Melih</td>
<td>KFW (German bank)</td>
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<td>Hosn</td>
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<td>Alper Kemal</td>
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<td>Project Manager</td>
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<td>Bayazit</td>
<td>Berna</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Portfolio Manager</td>
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<td>van de Wiel</td>
<td>Lieke</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Deputy Country Representative</td>
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<td>Blackledge</td>
<td>Rebecca</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>EU project manager</td>
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<td>Gönul</td>
<td>Haldun</td>
<td>Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM, Ministry of Interior)</td>
<td>project coordinator, projects department</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aksoy</td>
<td>Ayşegül Kandaş</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs – EU department</td>
<td>Head of EU department</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arslan</td>
<td>Ezgi</td>
<td>ASAM - Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants (national NGO)</td>
<td>Deputy General Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>O’Connor</td>
<td>Steve</td>
<td>IPA II Evaluation team</td>
<td>Senior Expert</td>
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### List of KII’s – Niger Mission

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<tr>
<td>Ponsard</td>
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<td>IcSP officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chacón</td>
<td>Juan José Villa</td>
<td>EU Delegation</td>
<td>Head of economic, trade and governance section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friedling</td>
<td>Bernard</td>
<td>EU Delegation</td>
<td>Head of political section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berckmans</td>
<td>Patrick</td>
<td>EU Delegation</td>
<td>Head of Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nieto Rey</td>
<td>Jorge</td>
<td>EU Delegation</td>
<td>Head of Contracts &amp; Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abou Tarka</td>
<td>Mahamadou</td>
<td>HACP - Haute Authorité à la Consolidation de la Paix</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdou</td>
<td>Ibrahim Boukary</td>
<td>HACP - Haute Authorité à la Consolidation de la Paix</td>
<td>Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adji</td>
<td>Marie</td>
<td>Swisscontact*, Fondation Suisse pour la Coopération Technique</td>
<td>Programme manager (PM) of “Plateformes Orientation-Jeunesse”, Diffa region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schramm</td>
<td>Jeroen</td>
<td>Eirene Int. Sahel</td>
<td>Régional Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfazaz</td>
<td>Akasser</td>
<td>CARE DK – IcSP project “Niger Espoir” team**</td>
<td>PM, Intra- and inter-religious dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Institution</td>
<td>Function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inza Zakari</td>
<td>M&amp;E Officer</td>
<td>CARE DK – IcSP project “Niger Espoir” team**</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hamza Habibou</td>
<td>Zone supervisor</td>
<td>CARE DK – IcSP project “Niger Espoir” team**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Issoufou Ingay</td>
<td>PM, Youth and community action</td>
<td>CARE DK – IcSP project “Niger Espoir” team**</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Authorities of Diffa region</td>
<td>President of Diffa Regional Council and 9 ‘Maires’ or representatives from Bosso, Kablewa, Toundou, Chelmari, Fouléati, Gueskerou, Goudoumaria, Mainé–Soroa, N’guel–Beyli</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hervé Jacques</td>
<td>Head of TA team</td>
<td>EU Technical assistance (TA) to HACP</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ackebo Felix</td>
<td>Deputy representative</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Collet Emmanuelle</td>
<td>Reports &amp; knowledge management specialist</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chevalier Dominique</td>
<td>Head of Operations</td>
<td>EUCAP Sahel Niger</td>
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<tr>
<td>Montanari Marco</td>
<td>Political Adviser</td>
<td>EUCAP Sahel Niger</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zono Abdoulaye</td>
<td>Technical Adviser, “Renforcement des Capacités de la Police Nationale du Niger” (RECAP) Project</td>
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**List of KIIs – Georgia Mission**

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Miorin</td>
<td>Francesco</td>
<td>CoE RS Tbilisi</td>
<td>UNICRI regional coordinator of CoE Regional Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamasakhlisi</td>
<td>Jumber</td>
<td>CoE RS Tbilisi</td>
<td>OSA team member of RS Tbilisi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stampfer</td>
<td>Caroline</td>
<td>EUD Tbilisi</td>
<td>DHoD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gherman</td>
<td>Calin</td>
<td>EUD Tbilisi</td>
<td>FPI.2 at the EUD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Khutsishvili</td>
<td>Keti</td>
<td>EUD Tbilisi</td>
<td>Gender Focal Point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liczek</td>
<td>Irina</td>
<td>UN House of COBERM</td>
<td>Staff member COBERM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freeman</td>
<td>Martha</td>
<td>EPNK-3</td>
<td>Staff member EPNK-3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Billa</td>
<td>Frank</td>
<td>EUD</td>
<td>Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frieh-Chevalier</td>
<td>Caroline</td>
<td>EUD</td>
<td>Justice and Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hureit</td>
<td>Stephane</td>
<td>CBRN Centre of Excellence</td>
<td>Key Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salami</td>
<td>Mohamed</td>
<td>CBRN Centre of Excellence</td>
<td>Regional Office Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micucci</td>
<td>Stefania</td>
<td>CBRN Centre of Excellence</td>
<td>Regional Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Es Said</td>
<td>Hamza</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>Magistrat</td>
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## List of KII – Colombia Mission

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<td>Cibrian Gon</td>
<td>Lucrecia</td>
<td>EUD</td>
<td>IcSP focal point</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zacarias</td>
<td>Ana Paula</td>
<td>EUD</td>
<td>Ambassador, Head of Delegation</td>
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<td>Garcia</td>
<td>Francisco</td>
<td>EUD</td>
<td>Head of Cooperation Section,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazier</td>
<td>Rachel</td>
<td>EUD</td>
<td>Head of the Political Section,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contreras</td>
<td>Tito</td>
<td>EUD</td>
<td>Gender and Transitional Justice,</td>
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<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Valerie</td>
<td>EUD</td>
<td>Manos a la Paz</td>
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<td>Ospina</td>
<td>Gloria</td>
<td>Office of the Minister</td>
<td>Counsellor for Post Conflict</td>
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<td>Bueno</td>
<td>Sergio</td>
<td>Directorate for Comprehensive Action Against Mines (DAICMA)</td>
<td>Staff Member of DAICMA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marisol</td>
<td>Diana</td>
<td>DAICMA</td>
<td>Staff Member of DAICMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finsson</td>
<td>Vanessa</td>
<td>Norwegian People's Aid – NPA</td>
<td>Director for Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ince</td>
<td>Chris</td>
<td>The HaloTrust</td>
<td>Director for Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pombo</td>
<td>Jorge Sanin</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice (part of the support to the Rapid Response Strategy)</td>
<td>Director for International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pineda</td>
<td>Cesar</td>
<td>Directorate Alternative Methods for Conflict Resolution</td>
<td>Director</td>
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<td>Tovar</td>
<td>Jorge</td>
<td>Redprodepaz</td>
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<td>Acevedo</td>
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<td>Argemiro</td>
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<td>Director de Comunicación</td>
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<td>Responsable Relaciones Externas</td>
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<td>Sanz</td>
<td>Belen</td>
<td>UN WOMEN</td>
<td>Director in Colombia</td>
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Annex 4: Summary of OPC

Introduction to the OPC Process

The objective of the Open Public Consultation (OPC) of the evaluation of all European Financing Instruments (EFIs) was twofold:

- to gather feedback from the broadest possible range of stakeholders, including those in beneficiary countries and in the EU Member States, on the emerging conclusions from the evaluations;

- to gather preliminary ideas on the design of the future external financing instruments after the current ones have expired by 31 December 2020.

The OPC was conducted from 01/02/2017 to 05/05/2017 and invited all stakeholders in beneficiary and European countries to participate i.e. public national and local authorities, non-governmental organisations, academics, development agencies and bodies, think tanks, consultancies, private sector organisations, development banks and citizens.

Guiding questions had been designed specifically for each Instrument and were accessible via a web-link provided by the EC\(^\text{19}\). For the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), the following guiding questions were provided in English and French:

"How well do you think the IcSP has addressed its objectives? The main assessment criteria for the evaluation are: relevance; effectiveness, impact and sustainability; efficiency; EU added value; coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies; and leverage. Feel free to comment on the findings, conclusions or recommendations for any/all of the criteria.

Do you think the IcSP is able in its current format to work on crisis response, address global threats to peace and to seize windows of opportunities to build peace? Please give reasons for your views.

To what extent have the means provided by the IcSP to-date proven effective in strengthening civil society and international organisations in their capacity to contribute to global peace and security?

Responding to security concerns that affect both third countries and the EU may imply working with authorities whose human rights approach can be challenged. Funding support to them, even after due precautions have been taken, implies certain risks. Can the EU still add value in such circumstances by the ICSP being more proactively engaged in sectors such as counter-terrorism, organised crime, and cybersecurity or should the IcSP rather limit its engagement? Please give reasons for your views.

Do you think that the focus of dialogues between the IcSP and other relevant donors has been appropriate to improve the global donor approach to stability and peace? Please give reasons for your views and/or suggestions.

If you have any other views on the IcSP you would like to share, they are welcome here."

The participation in the public consultation process for the IcSP and comments received are described in Section 2 below.

\(^{19}\) https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/runner/OPCEFI
Overview of Comments Received

2.1 Participation in the online survey

124 online submissions received from 71 institutions/organisations and individuals for 44 countries and territories both EU and non-EU. Participants represented research/academia, private business, CSOs and public authorities. Further details are provided in the table below. The public authorities were represented by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, Finland, Austria, Belgium, Mexico, and the Czech Republic; the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation and the UK Department for International Development; and sub-national entities from Belgium and Morocco.

> this group provided mostly quantitative results/responses to guiding questions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Organisation</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private individuals</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultancies</td>
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<td>3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU networks/association</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Business/Private Sector</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organisations/associations</td>
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<td>Public authorities</td>
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<td>35%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Research/academia</td>
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<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>71</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

2.2 Written submissions to the EU

3 written submissions were delivered by the following institutions/organisations:


> this group provided qualitative comments/partially responses to guiding questions.

2.3 Public presentations of Consultants involved

3 public presentations were organised allowing face-to-face meetings with the Consultants in Brussels in March (see details in Section 4). These events saw interactions with 18 organisations and 8 governments representing a wide range of stakeholders (EU government/European Parliament officials; civil society organisations; member states agencies; implementing organisations).

> this group provided qualitative comments/discussions on guiding questions.
Direct Feedback received on the IcSP Guiding Questions

The Feedback received is presented in the chapter below following each guiding question. Quantitative data from the online submissions is supplemented by qualitative responses/narratives delivered separately in written format. As the public presentations, and subsequent Q&A sessions, did not follow a format that allows for ‘question specific results’—minutes and notes from these sessions are given in the following section instead.

3.1 Question 1: Addressing IcSP Objectives

How well do you think the IcSP has addressed its objectives? The main assessment criteria for the evaluation are: relevance; effectiveness, impact and sustainability; efficiency; EU added value; coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies; and leverage. Feel free to comment on the findings, conclusions or recommendations for any/all of the criteria.

1. Summary of quantitative results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total replies</th>
<th>1 – Poorly</th>
<th>Adequately</th>
<th>3 – Well</th>
<th>4 – Very well</th>
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<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
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</table>

2. On-line survey Feedback

The IcSP could be better and more effectively exploited in response to the emerging hybrid threats, terrorism and violent extremism.

At the same time, we see some restrictions on the use of IcSP to prevent and combat hybrid and cyber threats that are the main contemporary challenges for international security, including the EU and the Member States. Bearing in mind the growing interdependence of development and security issues, we point out the need to adapt EU instruments to improve the effectiveness of EU support and action towards partner countries. In this context, we recognise the need to implement the Capacity Building for Security and Development (CBSD) Initiative, including in the immediate vicinity of the EU, and to identify sources of funding.

We anticipate that, due to the proliferation of conventional and unconventional threats, the importance of a rapid and effective response from the EU and therefore the role of the IcSP will increase, so it is important to consider resolving problematic issues and, possibly, allocating more appropriately the budget. We are aware that this would require additional efforts, including ensuring coherence and complementarity with other external EU financial instruments.

Human security must be at the heart of EU interventions if they are to have positive and sustainable results on the ground. It is crucial to keep this in mind as today’s geopolitical challenges and security threats, such as those defined as stemming from terrorism and migration, are pushing donors to prioritise short-term and security-focused interventions over long-term and people-centred approaches.

There is a need for context-specific analysis, programming criteria and calls for proposals. There are inherent problems and contradictions in PVE/CVE thinking and practice in the Horn of Africa (HOA). Initiatives on PVE/CVE are based on theories of change (TOCs) and models derived/developed in other contexts, from what the Life and Peace Institute (LPI) has observed of such programmes/projects in Kenya and Somalia. These TOCs and models assume that a process of ‘radicalisation’ invariably precedes ‘political violence’, emphasise the ‘ideological’ aspect at the expense of context, power relations and structural dynamics, are
based on a very flimsy and flawed data and evidence base. These TOCs and models are themselves based on problematic conceptual premises such as radicalisation, extremism etc. Already PVE/CVE thinking and practice are in conventional thinking in some countries of the region associated with counter terrorism (CT) and counter insurgency (CI) thinking and imperatives.

The present uncertain security environment both in our Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods and the emergence of various new security threats and challenges underscores the political relevance of the IcSP, as it provides the Union with an instrument that can promptly respond to various needs and requirements in crisis and conflict contexts. Engagement and the ability to address these situations are crucial for our credibility, both internally with regard to our citizens as well as externally vis-à-vis our partners. The real added-value of the instrument is embedded in its speed, flexibility and adaptability, providing means for active and responsive measures in support of peace and stability. The IcSP can, and should, also complement other Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) measures (e.g. crisis management missions) within the framework of the EU’s comprehensive approach.

The Instrument, however, faces challenges in its capacity to address the rise of hybrid conflicts and threats. In order for the IcSP to fulfil its tasks effectively whilst acting in harmony with both humanitarian assistance and long-term development cooperation, the IcSP needs to remain politically driven. The IcSP needs to be integrated in a political strategy, considering all instruments and actions in a specific context.

The relevance of the IcSP as a funding instrument should not be questioned in a context where funding for peace and stability has otherwise undergone major cuts. Even if its budget allocation is limited compared to other EU External Financing Instruments, the IcSP is a critical source of funding for CSOs which contribute to peacebuilding efforts in fragile and conflict-affected partner countries.

Conciliation Resources have received IcSP funding in a variety of contexts including: South Asia; the Caucasus; West Africa; CAR; and DRC. It is the instrument most closely aligned with our organisational strategic objectives. Our funded projects under IcSP have been able to contribute to some extent to stability and peace in the contexts in which they have taken place and met the assessment criteria through the projects. Programme teams have also commented that EU engagement has often been positive and that has helped to navigate politics and relationships with host governments. What we have not been able to do so effectively is to link from IcSP to other instruments for continued funding.

In a long-term perspective, the new CBSD component may set a precedent for the next MFF which could lead to the IcSP and Heading IV becoming an open house for all kinds of military funding purposes and the related risks for CSO working with the EU being perceived as parties in armed conflicts.

We welcome the flexibility of the EU staff in Headquarters and Delegations for allowing implementing partners to adapt the project based on the dynamics on the ground thus, showing understanding of the security challenges and obstacles they face. As the IcSP is a quick and responsive tool reflecting the global needs to increase investments in conflict-affected countries, it has been one of the main drivers in keeping conflict prevention on the EU’s agenda in spite of the turbulent political environment. With a globally accepted and well-recognised instrument that also plays a crucial role in promoting civil society, the EU needs to leverage this role in its political discussions and diplomacy for peace and security.

3. **Separate written contributions:**

La gouvernance de l’instrument, la régularité et la qualité des échanges entre les gestionnaires et les partenaires de mise en œuvre est très positive. La coordination avec les agences des Etats members peut être améliorée dans la phase de préparation sans remettre en cause la valeur ajoutée de l’instrument par la mise en place de mécanismes de prévention ou de consultation rapides et informels. Une correspondance plus étroite avec les praticiens, notamment via le Practitioners Network et le groupe de travail Crises, Fragilité et migrations est recommandée.
Response of the evaluation team

The evaluation team finds submissions on this question to be in line with its conclusions; that the IcSP has addressed its objectives largely well (80% of OPC online responses range from appropriate to very well).

Much feedback from online submissions center around the changing nature of conflict and new/emerged threats, and the need for the IcSP to better equip itself to respond to these. Feedback also substantiates the conclusions drawn in the evaluation on the value added of the IcSP, ranging from both its speed and flexibility, ability to take risks, as an important source of funding in a period of funding cuts, to its multilateral nature and promotion of European values. In addition, several respondents call for the IcSP to better leverage its strategic position as one of the largest dedicated funding instruments in the sector, and engage with other funds/donors on key policy issues.

Several submissions were around the CBSD. This is beyond the scope of the IcSP MTE and has not been incorporated in the MTE.

3.2 Question 2: IcSP Ability to Work

Do you think the IcSP is able in its current format to work on crisis response, address global threats to peace and to seize windows of opportunities to build peace? Please give reasons for your views.

4. Summary of quantitative results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total replies</th>
<th>1 – Poorly</th>
<th>2 – Adequately</th>
<th>3 – Well</th>
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5. Qualitative contributions (online survey and written contributions)

6. On-line survey feedback

Sí es capaz de hacerlo pero sus medios son escasos por lo que necesitaría aumentar sus recursos en general y los destinados a Colombia en particular. En el momento coyuntural actual, con un acuerdo de paz con las FARC recién firmado y unas negociaciones en proceso con el ELN, es muy necesario apostar a las iniciativas de construcción de paz para reintegrar a esos grupos armados a la sociedad civil. Sin embargo, es tanto o más necesario combatir a los grupos paramilitares que representan la mayor amenaza para la paz en Colombia. La UE debe invertir a través de este instrumento en medio materiales (y no sólo técnicos) para que la justicia y la fuerza pública hagan frente de manera decidida a esta amenaza y contribuyan a consolidar la posibilidad de la paz que se abre en el país.

IcSP should work on finding ways to be more responsive and fast in administrative procedures to avoid missing windows of opportunities as well as delay implementation. EU internal coordination and communication e.g. regarding proposals should be enhanced in order to smoothen application and reporting processes. Currently it takes a significant amount of time to turn a proposal into actual activity implementation, much due to EU administrative processes.

As recommended in the IcSP mid-term evaluation, it would be advisable to create a facility under the IcSP to fund small actions without a formal decision-making procedure. Currently even the so called rapid response instruments / tools (such as ERMES) can be rather stiff in their administration.

As demonstrated in the evaluation conflicts are increasingly fragmented, and wars have become highly localised, often involving local communities within a country. In this respect, it will be essential that the IcSP
also contribute to strengthening local and regional governments’ capacities as vector of stability and as peace keepers or mediators.

We believe that it has to an extent but that it could be more flexible in doing so both in its responsiveness to changing situations and in dealing with varied partners. The work we have undertaken with IcSP funding has contributed to addressing global threats to peace and to seizing windows of opportunities to build peace. This has been achieved through giving us flexibility in project implementation to take projects in the relevant direction and make the most of opportunities according to the contextual needs. Nonetheless, as an instrument, considering the slow timeframes for approving projects and the bureaucratic nature of decision-making, the instruments’ current format is not conducive to supporting crisis response and seizing windows of opportunity, particularly as funding is only for a maximum of 18 months.

To better work on crisis response, address global threats to peace and seize windows of opportunities to build peace, the IcSP needs to be better coordinated with other funding streams and instruments. Currently there is a lack of strategic oversight and complementarity between the EU’s thematic and geographic instruments e.g., DCI, ENI, IPAII, EIDHR, EDF and EUTFs. This limits the instrument’s effectiveness and can sustainability. There is also a need for other instruments to better mainstream conflict sensitivity, with IcSP playing a role as technical consultant.

The IcSP is effective in addressing crisis response but could be expanded to seize windows of opportunities to build peace in the longer-term. By expanding the conflict prevention component and thinking of ways to mainstream conflict prevention throughout all EFIs the instrument could be even more effective.

Yes but the IcSP has to improve some content of its work, like for example a better contextual and conflict analysis.

7. **Separate written contributions:**

Ces dernières années, l’IcSP a permis de répondre à des problématiques nouvelles, comme l’appui à la prévention et à la lutte contre la radicalisation. Si l’IcSP n’a pas vocation à « construire la paix », il vise en revanche à favoriser les conditions permettant la stabilisation et la paix.

Par ailleurs, « l’IcSP plus » qui intégrera le concept CBSD (dans l’attente de la création d’un instrument dédié à l’horizon 2020), devra être l’occasion d’élargir, de manière ambitieuse, les projets de l’IcSP vers un soutien plus direct aux forces de sécurité des pays partenaires.

**Response of the evaluation team**

This question was relatively broad; and hence there is variation in responses – with several non-applicable ones. Among those responses that looked specifically at the balance between crisis response (reactive) and seizing windows of opportunity for peace (pro-active), almost 60% felt that this balance was struck adequately or well – but not very well.

An important pre-condition for such a balance to be struck is effective context and conflict analysis; better coordination with other EFIs; continued flexibility in allowing implementing partners to adjust to contexts; and continued to work ensure speedy decision-making. There is also a recommendation to re-establish a PAMPF like facility within the IcSP.

Again, the comment on the integration of CBSD was found to be beyond the scope of the IcSP MTE. All other elements remain and have been brought forward by the evaluation team in the revised IcSP report.
3.3 Question 3: IcSP and Civil Society/International Organisations

To what extent have the means provided by the IcSP to-date proven effective in strengthening civil society and international organisations in their capacity to contribute to global peace and security?

8. Summary of quantitative results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total replies</th>
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<th>2 – Adequately</th>
<th>3 – Well</th>
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9. Qualitative contributions (online survey and written contributions)

10. On-line survey feedback

As has come out of the draft mid-term review report (Landell Mills, January 2017), strengthened capacities at the regional level (e.g. OECD, OSCE, and League of Arab States) offers the EU important leverage, which in itself is an impact. The report also states that support under Article 4 to regional and UN agencies (such as UN WOMEN, UNDPA and UNDP) is seen as a useful contribution to the global peace and security architecture.

Strengthening these partnerships and supporting actors at all levels will contribute to international peace and security as root causes of conflict can be local, regional or global and therefore should be addressed in such a way. Ensuring that this support is non-military and supports long-term solutions to conflict will ensure the EU places itself as a strategic ally for the long-term.

IcSP provides important opportunities to civil society and international organisations to contribute to global peace and security. Nevertheless, many funds seem to go directly to international organisations, like the UN, without giving opportunities to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to apply for certain calls for proposals. In addition, given the complex nature of EC calls and proposals, it is quite difficult for local NGOs to apply for funding.

Under the IcSP, assistance to CSO has been and will be critical. While IOs can also access other programs, particularly geographic programs, support to CSO, both national and international is paramount in the midst of funding reduction at national European level, stigmatisation of CSO globally, and systematic threats to fundamental values and rights.

The IcSP has proven effective in enabling the requisite relationship between local civil society and international organisations, for example by enabling us lead on capacity building of local organisations by providing accompaniment, exposure and mentoring to local partner organisations, in some cases allowing us to award small grants to reach out to and build the capacities of local organisations, and by supporting a flexible approach throughout projects (such as allowing minimal visibility of the EU’s support to projects which can be difficult in more sensitive contexts and providing training opportunities to civil society and international organisations). This process of skills and capacity building is key if we are to empower local civil society to lead on peacebuilding and crisis prevention efforts themselves. In a global context of increased conflict more funding is undoubtedly needed to contribute to peace and security, particularly as ICSP’s budget is approximately 10% of DCI’s for example. Extending the maximum grant period from 18 months to 3 years would make the instrument more effective in achieving impact and results.

Prior to the IFS and IcSP there were very few dedicated EU resources available to civil society and international organisations to respond to challenges of global peace and security and these were complicated to access. The IFS and IcSP have significantly increased the resources available, the focus of these resources and these resources have facilitated dialogue and joint working. Despite the relatively small amounts
(compared to other instruments) involved to civil society organisations and certain specialized units of international organisations the IcSP is a very important tool to enable response. Even though international organisations and civil society have additional EU resources from other EFIs to work on conflict issues, the benefit of IcSP is the focus on development of capacity and the specific direction on global peace and security (rather than on humanitarian or development response). The necessity for the EU to support the long-term development of capacity and thinking of international organisations and civil society is particularly important as instruments of other donors are increasingly focused on short-term crises responses. An appropriate balance not deviating significantly from the current split should be kept between the longer and short term aspects of the IcSP as both are important and complement each other.

11. **Written contributions**

Le renforcement de la résilience des acteurs de la société civile est un facteur clé pour la paix et la stabilité. Des projets intéressants ont été mis en oeuvre pour renforcer les capacités des communautés à lutter contre les logiques de radicalisation. Il importe toutefois de pouvoir faire régulièrement le bilan des programmes financés, afin d’en tirer des enseignements pour l’avenir.

Outre le renforcement nécessaire des acteurs de la société civile et des organisations internationales, il importe de réfléchir à une meilleure visibilité de l’aide européenne dans le secteur de la paix et de la sécurité et de faire valoir la valeur ajoutée de l’expertise européenne en ayant recours aux agences des Etats membres et en faisant appel aux modalités existantes et futures de mise en œuvre conjointe.

**Response of the evaluation team**

There is a spread among respondents on how well the IcSP has strengthened civil society and international organisations (the ‘global peace and security architecture’). Continued work on this is encouraged, but respondents call for greater investments in this kind of support. There are concerns that the balance is currently tilted towards international organisations (UN and the like) at the expense of civil society organisations. Respondents confirm that the IcSP is an important source of funding for organisations working in this sector.

The evaluation team finds that a recommendation to set up a specific fund within Article 4 for core funding to civil society organisations should be considered.
3.4 Question 4: Human Rights Challenges

Responding to security concerns that affect both third countries and the EU may imply working with authorities whose human rights approach can be challenged. Funding support to them, even after due precautions have been taken, implies certain risks. Can the EU still add value in such circumstances by the ICSP being more proactively engaged in sectors such as counter-terrorism, organised crime, and cybersecurity or should the ICSP rather limit its engagement? Please give reasons for your views.

12. Summary of quantitative results

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13. Qualitative contributions (online survey and written contributions)

14. Online Survey feedback

La UE puede tener un importantísimo valor añadido en el caso de Colombia para combatir el paramilitarismo. La Unión debe ser capaz de comprometer al Estado colombiano en esta lucha y de hacer un seguimiento cercano a sus recursos desembolsados para esta tarea con el objetivo de evitar su despilfarro, su utilización para otros asuntos o su pérdida fruto de la corrupción o de la presunta complicidad de funcionarios estatales con grupos paramilitares. Por tanto, la condicionalidad de la ayuda del instrumento por parte de la UE debe ser fuerte y dirigirse a favorecer una paz verdadera y sostenible en Colombia.

A Government that is guilty of crimes against humanity and / or human rights should not benefit from the financial support of the EU or the EU risks making itself guilty of these actions by extension. However, the population that is the victim of such crimes and abuse should benefit from EU support; thus, alternative channels of support should be sought, be it through support to local civil society, international NGOs on the ground or a regional organisation that is better placed than the EU to push for policies or activities that protect civilians and prevent human rights violations. The ICSP therefore has a role to play in such circumstances through its ability to work with alternative actors. However, thorough analysis of the situation and assessing who to partner and work with and through which tool and methodology should be sought in advance of any action.

The strength of the EU is its support of norms and values. Art. 21 TEU subordinate all EU external actions to the principles of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, equality, solidarity and compliance with the UN Charter and international law. Also ICSP is subject to these standards. However, bearing in mind the dynamic changes in international security and the emergence of new threats, as well as the growing interdependence of development and security issues, we see the need for realistic EU attitudes and the adaptation of EU instruments based on conditionality to improve the speed and effectiveness of EU support and action. […] When it comes to security, a sober, pragmatic assessment of the protection of the EU interest should be a factor as important in the decision-making process as the issue of human rights.

The problem with programmes that are designed to ‘counter terrorism’ or ‘violent extremism’, or to ‘fight’ organised crime is that they risk leading to crucial drivers of conflict being overlooked. Specifically, given the nature of these security challenges, the EU may look to build the capacity of governments regardless of whether they are responsible for creating or failing to address the conditions that have led to insecurity or instability in the first place. However, such programmes may very well backfire if all relevant drivers of violence are not addressed, such as abuse and corrupt practices committed by the security sector. It is dangerous for the EU to be building states’ coercive capacities in the absence of commitment for reform or space for public engagement. In addition, it is counter-productive to support civil society on the one hand,
while providing repressive and abusive regimes with a cloak of international legitimacy at a time when more scrutiny on their domestic policies is needed. These blind spots risk in turn allowing grievances to fester, violence to grow and conflicts to escalate.

E’ importante non restringere il campo di azione, trattandosi di problematiche complesse a cui concorrono vari e diversi fattori

Crisis prevention and stabilization by necessity require international actors to work with governments and non-state actors who do not necessarily live up to the EU’s high standards regarding democracy and human rights. While due diligence needs to be applied the IcSP’s flexibility and responsiveness must be maintained. High risk tolerance is an essential ingredient for any instrument that is meant to contribute to stabilization.

The IcSP should apply a strict a Rights Based Approach in supporting themes and countries related to peacebuilding and conflict prevention. In the current deteriorating situations, where human rights and democracy are systematically challenged, the IcSP should ensure a consistent respect of the EU fundamental values in its programming and actions.

The EU IcSP instrument would benefit from maintaining a more exclusive focus on human security and peace, and civil society capacity building, and avoid working on militarised approaches to security and stability, which could undermine the instrument’s objectives and credibility. The EU should maintain its independence vis-à-vis authorities whose human rights approach can be challenged, and working with such authorities should occur within an ethical framework which recognises the importance of respect for human rights in order to support stability and peace.

A cautious approach is necessary vis-à-vis countries with poor human rights records. However IcSP has been created to address also difficult cases, when potential benefits are substantial, but associated with higher risks of not attaining the intended results. It goes without saying that those human rights deficits are addressed when working with such authorities.

IcSP should be an instrument where a degree of risk is taken in engaging relevant actors who may not share EU values or to support engagement with authorities or armed groups that may be crucial to peace processes or addressing human rights abuses. A robust ‘conflict sensitive approach’ when applied should assist in making appropriate decisions throughout the implementation process on whether that risk is worth taking and whether this risk is being effectively managed. Such initiatives often also need to be complemented by a robust political dialogue beyond the level of the EU institutions and also involving the EU member states with particular leverage. There also have to be a level of overall coherence between IcSP actions and those of other instruments and political dialogues where there is a high risk of human rights abuses.

Peace and security landscape is fast evolving and characterized by nearly emerged threats and trends that challenge increasingly weakened global governance structures and cooperative regional orders. It’s important for the instrument to find the right balance between non-securitised and securitised actions/programmes in its contribution to EU security priorities and global commitments. We think that IcSP shouldn’t rather limit its engagement: but the design of its actions and programmes need to be revisited.

15. **Written contributions**

L’ICSP s’insère dans une action extérieure de l’UE qui articule projets concrets de soutien, de formation ou de renforcement de capacités et dialogues politiques. Il doit intervenir le plus souvent possible en complément ou en soutien des autres actions de l’UE, y compris sur les sujets liés au crime-organisé, à la cybersécurité. C’est également le cas pour ce qui relève des mesures de soutien dans le domaine du contre-terrorisme : elles s’insèrent dans un cadre de coopération qui comporte un volet de dialogue technique et politique. Elles déclinent, dans le champ opérationnel, les orientations qui sont prises au niveau politique, dans le respect des valeurs défendues par l’Union. Dans ces conditions, le risque que prend l’IcSP est implicitement accepté par l’Union au nom des nécessités de la gestion de crise.
Response of the evaluation team

The evaluators note that the topic of managing tensions between human rights commitments and engagement with countries that have a challenged human rights record received a number of comments. Overall, there is a sense among respondents that engagement on security issues in human rights challenged contexts should take place, but that there need to have safeguards in place (42%). 15% of respondents saw no need for safeguards; while 26% called for limited or no IcSP engagement in such contexts. The evaluators have opted for a line of IcSP engagement on security issues in human rights challenged context, but with safeguards.

3.5 Question 5: Dialogue between IcSP and other donors

Do you think that the focus of dialogues between the IcSP and other relevant donors has been appropriate to improve the global donor approach to stability and peace? Please give reasons for your views and/or suggestions.

16. Summary of quantitative results

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17. Qualitative contributions (online survey and written contributions)

18. Online survey feedback

We agree with the assessment by the authors of the IcSP evaluation report that the issue of contributing to stability and peace is a field for more intense and strategic cooperation with other global actors / donors. This should help to better communicate the EU's priorities and increase the visibility of EU support, as well as to multiply funding and better disseminate funds to fight threats to international peace and security.

The dialogue among donors has been effective to a certain extent. Coordination however should not preclude the possibility of providing funding to issues which might have been or are being already supported by another donor.

In some contexts where we work, the impact of the IcSP’s dialogues with other relevant donors has contributed little to improving the regional donor approach to stability and peace. Nonetheless, this is also due to the constraints of bilateral donors / governments, which are not willing to take risks vis-à-vis working on particular contexts (and potentially compromising relations with governments).

There is a need for improved coordination between the multitude of actors working to address peace and security issues, particularly at national level.

Response of the evaluation team

Most respondents understood this question as a call for greater donor coordination; rather than a question about IcSP engagement at a global level on systemic peace and security challenges. Those who did interpret the question as intended, supported such a greater role for the IcSP. Many respondents saw deficits at the level of in-country coordination. The evaluation team has nuanced the final report to call for IcSP strategic engagement with other funds on systemic peace and security challenges.
3.6 Final Question - Other views on the IcSP

If you have any other views on the IcSP you would like to share, they are welcome here.

19. Qualitative contributions (online survey and written contributions)

30 submissions were received on this question.

20. Contributions

There are limited sources of funding for mediation and conflict prevention, and the IcSP is, for the work that HD carries out, an essential and unique funding partner. (note 1: that the multilateral nature of the EU makes an EC instrument more accepted with parties to conflict) (note 2 on scale: there is more that needs to be done to seize windows of opportunity and developments such as with hybrid threats and the increasing complexity of conflicts and peace processes)

Several recommendations in the report point to sensible actions concerning concept definitions and M&E: ‘Require explicit theories of change…’ and ‘discourage over-ambitious metrics’

We also refer to the transfer of funds from ENI to IcSP. In our opinion, there is a risk that such actions may contribute indirectly to the compromise agreed by the compromise on the financing of the Eastern and Southern Neighborhood dimension and redirecting a large proportion of the Eastern funds to the Southern programs

We understand that under the proposal, EU assistance is not to be used to finance recurrent military expenditure, the procurement of arms and ammunitions, or training to improve the fighting capacity of armed forces. However, we urge the EC to continue supporting long-term peace-building efforts stricto sensu. It should also closely monitor how this new CBSD component will work in practice and ensure that CSOs are engaged in this exercise.

We would generally urge the EU to take into account the following recommendations:

Ensure the security-development nexus is always based on human and not state security.

Short-term and especially securitised approaches aimed simply at stemming immediate forced displacement may siphon resources from, and even harm, the long-term investment in peace and development necessary to reduce fragility and mitigate against drivers of conflict.

Prioritize long-term conflict-sensitive development and peace-building interventions. Economic resilience, social cohesion and peaceful conflict resolution are mutually reinforceable and together can address the root causes of conflict and instability.

Do not use ODA in support of military or quasi-military expenditures, or channel aid through military actors. Any misuse of aid in this area can have extremely serious consequences, both for affected people in recipient countries, but also for the credibility and public support for ODA.

La paix n’est plus seulement une question interétatique, mais un enjeu à l’échelle des territoires, notamment des territoires urbains.

The IcSP like other EFIs has to represent a balance between narrow short-term EU interests and longer-term values led actions. Yet an increased ‘securitisation’ to more narrow short-term EU security interests to fund engagements that are unproven in terms of impact risks undermining not only EU values by the past success of the instrument.

The evaluation should focus on how to make our external action more effective, pragmatic and coherent in the remaining part of the funding period, with more emphasis on evaluation of results of our external action. Evaluation should take into account the evolving EU policy framework, notably the implementation of the EU Global Strategy that sets out EU’s strategic objectives. Thus mid-term and long-term future of External Financing Instruments should complement and be coherent with those goals, e.g. strengthening resilience,
strategic communication, internal and external security of the EU, assist in stabilization of EU’s immediate neighbourhood and regions in EU’s close vicinity (neighbours of our neighbours), and rise the EU visibility in this context.

**Response of the evaluation team**

The evaluation team notes concerns among some respondents related to securitised actions and programmes. These concerns are reflected in the final report; however, the evaluators see a need for the IcSP to engage in securitised sectors, albeit with adequate safeguards. Another area of controversy is around the CBSD, which is not in the scope of the MTE. There is some resistance to the transfer of funds from ENI to the IcSP; this has been noted and addressed in the final recommendations.
Notes on IcSP Public Presentations

4.1 Session with CSOs and Implementing Agencies (21 March 2017)

The merits of flexibility, velocity and context sensitivity of this instrument was overwhelmingly praised by the audience; any measure of change in the future should be checked in as much it might have repercussions of these advantage (that goes in particular for the set-up of an overall strategic framework).

Many echoed the finding that coherence and coordination could be improved, and so is the visibility and 'marketing' that the Commission could or should do, especially implementing agencies have the feeling that results achieved at project level are not communicated widely.

The role of the IcSP for opening doors (esp. article 3) and seizing windows of opportunity should not be underestimated, it is in fact often a unique opportunity for the Commission to enter into political dialogue with state (and non-state) actors - this can be considered as substantial leverage.

There was a call for improved interaction with CSDP mission, recognising at the same time the differences in scope and mandate.

With regard to funding activities involving military organisations under certain conditions, the tone was essentially along the lines of: not whether or not the EU/IcSP should engage with military/security forces, but how.

The CSO voiced their particular appreciation of the fact that IcSP is funded by a multi-lateral body, which helps with acceptance and adds political weight, as it would be perceived much more neutral than programmes funded by bilateral institutions (often perceived as following the political interest of the funding agent).

The IcSP is seen as very important as it enables space for CSO to engage in times where this space is shrinking.

They also emphasised the value of the direct contracting option under the IcSP. In addition, there were calls for "something like the PAMF" but with a sound legal basis.

4.2 The Policy Forum on Development (PFD) conference (23 March 2017)

The PFD was broadly representative of regional and some national CSO of beneficiary countries on a fairly global basis, with representatives from Africa, South East and Eastern Asia including the Pacific, South America, Eastern and South-eastern Europe, the Middle East and maybe other regions. The session on the MTE of all EFIs was held on the last day of the forum, and although cast as a feedback session to the evaluators was mostly an exercise of sharing information about the different MTEs, raising general issues, and for the CSO present to get feedback from the Commission about process issues concerning the OPC process (calendar, feedback opportunities etc.).

There was one specific question addressed to the IcSP, which related to the support for local CSO in Colombia during and after the peace negotiations between the government and the FARC. The other points brought up in the discussions were often addressed to the other EFI evaluation teams, some noteworthy, more general comments applying for the IcSP as well are given below:

More emphasis should be placed by the Commission/donors on gender equality issues and the role of women (relevant to crisis mitigation, confidence building and post-crisis stabilisation)

More emphasis on decentralising power and developing local infrastructure (relevant to IcSP work on such issues as migration and CVE, and also crisis mitigation and stabilisation); a related question was whether
there should be a clearer separation between political actions and development actions - that may be of some relevance with regard to how do-no-harm is applied

A strong call for coherence in EU interventions across the board - the point was made with reference to human rights but it is also relevant amongst others to work in securitised sectors

A suggestion that there should be a dedicated envelope for CSO support in the instruments to support local CSO (including those lacking capacity or experience in dealing with EU admin requirements; also a suggestion to allocate some funding for larger, international NGOs in the hope that this will trickle down to local CSO and help them deal with EU admin requirements - something like this is done in Georgia under Art. 3)

The EU as a "safe haven" with regard to funding for CSO in areas where a principled approach is called for

More attention to the impact of climate change on such issues as migration, and a call that development funding in this respect should also be available to CSO (as a side remark, the Art. 5 funding on security challenges of climate change goes to UNEP and is thus likely to end up funding, at least initially, predominantly government actors)

Evidence for development additionality, and in more general terms what should be the role of the private sector, of investment institutions, blending etc. - it was discussed in the context of human rights issues

4.3 Public Session with Member State and European Parliament Officials (27 and 28 March 2017)

1. Comments made

Importance of linkage between ICSP and human rights/gender and stronger links with EIDHR was stressed.

The level of integration between the African Peace Facility (APF) and IcSP and their relationship for establishing the peace and security architecture was questioned.

The ICSP and DCI are welcomed to support the transition of a presence of the EU (politically/ SSR) in Afghanistan.

The ICSP is appreciated because of its flexibility and the manner in which the three articles complement one another.

The idea to reinforce the ICSP and its short term measures is supported.

The ICSP should contextualise its work more closely with political parallels in some areas of its work.

Emphasis of the need for a stabilisation/resilience building narrative, based on a common identification of drivers of conflict in country, which should be built into the instrument.

There is a key need for stronger and closer linkages with the other instruments, which can then come in with a longer term approach.

It would be useful to better define the ICSP framework in relation to other instruments to avoid overlapping (CS support etc).

Provision of the example of the Turkish Facility for Refugees highlights that there could be synergies for the ICSP to be complementary but not part of other instruments.

It would be better to involve more Member States and MS embassies and encourage their contribution to the design of ICSP projects in country.

A number of comments provided on the need for more cooperation on the ground with Member States.

A legislative procedure for ICSP is to be achieved as soon as possible – in order to elaborate on the projects to be implemented in the field of actions for reinforcing military actors in third countries
2. Questions raised

In relation to the second recommendation question of the MTE, what would the stronger political focus for the future IcSP entail?

Intervention are mainly triggered by EUD’s, is this the most effective way to use the instrument or would it be better to involve the MS embassies to a greater level on the ground?

Clarification on the selection of implementing partners for IcSP, including private sector countries and UN contractors. Are they the most effective?

Question raised as to how the APF and IcSP could be brought closer together? Also raised the question of synergies between other approaches, including CFSF, APSA etc.

Given the changing global context and the particular growth of hybrid conflicts, should the IcSP grow/change? What does the post 2020 nature of the instrument look like?

Could the double purpose/proposal of the ICSP long term and short term approaches be a problem – is this difficult to manage?

Should the IcSP consider a different direction now that the Trust Funds can react as fast or even faster than the IcSP?

Can the coordination with Embassies and Delegations on the ground be increased and made more transparent in terms of design/implementing partners?

Additional Comments submitted in written

From the above mentioned three organisations’ written comments, the evaluation team notes the following:

Calls from all submitters for the continuation of the IcSP beyond 2020 and appreciation of its increased relevance

The need for greater coordination with Member States and other EFIs reiterated by governmental submitters (UK and France), including on expertise sharing and forward planning on key topics (migration, etc.).

Continued alignment and responsiveness of IcSP actions and programmes to EU strategies and policies (e.g. Global Strategy)

A pragmatic approach in rights-challenged contexts to build into actions and programmes adequate safeguards (do no harm and conflict sensitivity)

Support to the CBSD reiterated by governmental submitters

Articulation of principles to guide IcSP actions and principles (e.g. “a comprehensive approach”, greater attention to building resilience, etc.)

The need for continued learning to inform IcSP actions and programmes, particularly through the implementation of conflict analysis exercises

Consolidated response of the evaluation team

The evaluation team welcomed the wealth of feedback and questions received during the face to face meetings during public presentations. The team noted:

Calls for greater IcSP coordination with Member States and other EFIs

Affirmation of the value added of the IcSP when it comes to its speed, flexibility, multilateral nature, and promotion of EU values
Calls for a greater IcSP role in addressing global funding cuts for peace and security at the same time, an overarching strategic framework appears especially suited for the programmable actions under Articles 4 and 5

Greater need for a bolstered analytical base of IcSP funded interventions; including more strategic thinking on the implications of hybrid conflicts on IcSP actions/programmes

Better articulation of how to integrate conflict-sensitivity and do no harm approaches in actions and programmes that can have negative knock-on effects on cross-cutting priorities

The definition and concept of hybrid threat (as opposed to hybrid conflict) should be sharpened in the report

Calls for better mainstreaming of EU cross-cutting priorities within the IcSP; particularly gender and climate change

The team has reflected calls for better coordination with Member States and EFIs in the revised report, and adjusted the recommendations to be more manageable for implementation. This has meant, for example, not re-iterating in recommendations areas of work where progress is being made (e.g. mainstreaming cross-cutting priorities) and the provision of practical recommendations on measures to strengthen the value added of the instrument (e.g. the re-creation of a PAMF like facility for the IcSP). Comments related to the CBSD, however, remain outside of the scope of this MTE – and should be included in the Final IcSP evaluation instead.
# OPC List of Participants and Contributing Organisations

<table>
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<th>Entity/Person</th>
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<td>Christian Kennes, Bel V subsidiary of the Belgian Federal Agency for Nuclear Control</td>
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<td>Chris Rotas at the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue</td>
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<td>Maeve McLynn, Climate Action Network Europe</td>
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## Participation in OPC events organised in Brussels (March 2017)

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<th>Country/ Institution/ Organisation</th>
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<td>Center for Humanitarian Dialogue</td>
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<td>Crown Agents</td>
<td>James Blair</td>
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<td>Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (ZIF)</td>
<td>Silvia Laufer</td>
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<td>Viv Davies</td>
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<td>Expertise France</td>
<td>Anne Budai/Benjamin Hauville/Claire Lautier</td>
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<td>UN Liaison Office</td>
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<td>UN Women</td>
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<td>World Vision</td>
<td>Alexandra Matei/Pamela Thiebaut</td>
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Written contributions were received from:

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (United Kingdom)
Secrétariat Général Des Affaires Européennes (France)
CSOs: Search for Common Ground and World Vision
Case Study on Migration

A short case-study based on KIs and documentation reviewed in conjunction with the country-visits during the validation phase of the Midterm Evaluation. It contains the collective observations of the evaluation team and constitutes a ‘think piece’ on the topic. The case-study informs the interpretation of related issues in the Draft Final Report.

Migration originating from and into fragile states is both a consequence and a possible cause of conflict and fragility and presents an opportunity, as well as a challenge for the EU.

Broadly, the EU Agenda on Migration is focused on looking at developing structural actions that go beyond dealing with immediate crises and emergencies and help EU Member States to better manage all aspects of migration. In essence, the Agenda seeks to: a) Reduce the incentives for irregular migration by addressing the roots causes of migration; b) Undertake life-saving activities and secure external borders through solidarity with Member States; c) Strengthen common asylum policies and apply common rules and systematic monitoring; and d) Develop new policies on legal migration in view of future demographic challenges to meet the needs of the EU economy. The EU has set up dedicated funding (e.g. Trust Fund for Africa) and mechanisms (e.g. Facility for Refugees in Turkey – FRT) to address migration challenges in external actions policies, in a coordinated manner. The IcSP is, however, intervening in the migration area, as a contributor to EU external action and/or in filling gaps while dedicated funding mechanisms become fully functional.

The spectrum of migration/refugee related actions by the IcSP observed at the country level and an analysis of where resources are invested in that spectrum

The IcSP works within a broad spectrum of migration issues at the country level and in-depth policy and programming is undertaken in countries that are specifically dealing with migration issues and challenges. The IcSP, through Article 3, is specifically tasked to tackle the following issues contributing to the prevention, management and integration of migrants through the spectrum of the following activities: (a) the prevention of migration/addressing root causes; (b) migration/refugee flow management; (c) integration of migrants/refugees into host countries; (d) prevention of host-refugee/migrant tensions or instability; and (e) resettlement/preparing for return.

In Jordan the emphasis is on migration and refugee flow management, integration of migrants/refugees into host countries and prevention of host-refugee/migrant tensions or instability. The IcSP also works on the interface between the migration issue and Counter Terrorism (CT) and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) as well as other security sectors that involve the likely presence of extremists/criminals/smugglers among the refugee populations. Important work is also being done on the ‘softer’ side of terrorism/criminality through reducing the risk of radicalization of refugee and host communities and the risk of terror attacks and/or conflicts between refugees and host communities.

Migration has become a core issue in EU-Niger relations alongside stabilization/security and development, as Niger is one of the priority countries in new Partnership Framework under the European Agenda on Migration (EAM). The spectrum of activities in Niger (of the IcSP and other EFIs/EU actors) include: a) border management (IcSP; EUCAP) and action against criminal networks (EUCAP; TF); b) addressing the root causes of irregular migration and support to refugees/displaced and host communities (e.g. livelihood, rural development, job creation and professional training) (IcSP; TF); c) transit centres for migrants (e.g. AGAMI project in Agadez financed by the IcSP to be followed up by the EUTF), which includes studying the profile of migrants, assist those in need, sensitization on the risks of illegal migration and assist voluntary return, namely with training skills and micro-projects in their countries of origin; d) dialogue and support to local mechanisms and actors to prevent and manage impacts and tensions arising from migration flows, as well as from the negative impact on local efforts to counter illegal migration (e.g. the Migrant Resource and Response Mechanism under the EU TF).

The IcSP is one of the contributing instruments to the Partnership Framework, but its role has been mainly as gap filler for the EU Trust Fund for Africa until the latter was operational and projects launched. The IcSP allowed the EU to respond to a political commitment and timeframe set by the Council. This, however, diverted both the focus and funds - 10% of the IcSP financial envelope- from the Diffa region to Agadez. 1, 5 M€ (out of 15M€ of the overall IcSP envelope in Niger) was allocated to the funding of the pilot phase of an IOM implemented project for the creation of multiservice centers for migrants in transit, and assist the return of those willing to go back to their countries of origin (travels, reintegration assistance and supportive actions in the countries of origin).

In Turkey, the focus is on the entire spectrum of migration related interventions of the IcSP. These include: a) border and migration management; improving the socio-economic situation of refugees through multi-service refugee support centers (e.g. primary health, informal education, psycho-social counselling, vocational education and language courses); b) strengthening the resilience of host communities (e.g. livelihood) and social services’ capacities; c) protection (e.g. legal assistance to refugees, asylum seekers); awareness raising activities (e.g. community/cultural events); and d) interaction between host communities and refugees, promoting integration and social cohesion.

55% of the IcSP in Turkey (25M€ out of 45,5M€) is invested on 'hardware' (boats) and training for migration management (including capacities for search & rescue and human rights compliance). 43% is allocated to protection and social services for Syrian and non-Syrian refugees and asylum seekers. The remainder is planned for foreign fighters’ related activities. Supplies and equipment represent a high share of the overall IcSP funding in Turkey mainly because the IPA II was slow to deliver on EU political agreement on migration control and assistance to refugees (EU-Turkey Action Plan).

Gap filling and bridging while other Instruments took over provided an opportunity for using the IcSP, but as migration/assistance to refugees becomes a crowded field and substantial funding is now available through flexible procedures, the space for use of the IcSP is shrinking. Opportunities to intervene in IcSP niche areas are limited, namely due to resistance of the Government of Turkey, that is not willing to have external actors engaging in sensitive areas, and the difficult relationship with the EU, especially after the coup attempt.

An assessment of how the migration/refugee issues is seen as connected to peace and stability issues

While Colombia is not dealing with a migrant situation per say it does face extraordinary numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs) -approximately 5.7m- due to longstanding internal conflict. Previously, IFS actions were aimed at land restitution through deeds and property identification in an attempt to return people to their communities. Indirectly the IcSP continues to work on facilitating the return of IDPs through an element of community/transitional justice in key municipalities and through humanitarian demining. The current peace process also has a strong focus on rural development that also encourages the return of people. However, a much larger and sustained response is required during the implementation of the peace accords to deal with the problem of internal displacement that is managed by the Victims Unit within the Ministry of the Interior.

Migration/refuges issues can have a significant impact on the stability of a country/region. The IcSP has been used for immediate stabilisation needs to help local communities and the State cope with the influx of refugees, support refugees, and prevent rising tensions between host and refugee communities (e.g. in Diffa/Niger or in eastern provinces of Turkey). But some actions responded primarily to EU security concerns and political interests or commitments (e.g. Agami in Niger; Support to the TCG in Turkey).

Perceptions on the value added of IcSP investment on this topic

In some cases, the IcSP has been used as an important mechanism to fill gaps and respond quickly to political commitments where other EU instruments would not have the flexibility or the rapidity of response. The value of the IcSP is, however, time bound in rapidly changing contexts and therefore its deployment needs to be carefully considered.

For example in Niger, a dedicated EU fund for migration is in place with substantial financial capacity and a longer timeframe than the IcSP, in addition to the EUCAP Sahel. Therefore, there is little advantage for the IcSP to engage on the migration issue, especially since that was not its initial focus. The presence of the EUTF thus frees the IcSP from responding to those political priorities to focus on policy areas that are its ‘niche’ and not covered by other Instruments.
The ability of the IcSP to respond rapidly has both positive and negative implications. While it allows a proactive response that can demonstrate political will, it can also be deployed too quickly at the expense of proper analysis and planning. For example, the AGAMI project was a quick response to EU political objectives under the European Agenda on Migration. However, it was put together in haste, under political pressure to deliver within the timeframe set by the Council of the EU and, to some extent, at the expense of a more thoughtful approach and better communication with local authorities in the Agadez region. EU pressure to show it was acting on migration and commit funding increased pressure on implementers’ capacity to respond quickly, forcing them to take on more than they could manage at the time, thus negatively impacting the design and implementation of actions.

In Kenya it was noted that while the response has been positive in regards to the necessity of engaging in migration issues, there were comments that the strong focus on migration in some regions meant retrofitting all policies and priorities to be seen through a migration lens. There was some cynicism expressed that currently migration was the flavour of EU engagement and that it would soon be surpassed by another agenda therefore questioning the sustainability of interventions. The question was posed again as to whether or not using the IcSP provided value to a shifting policy landscape.

**Risks and opportunities in IcSP involvement on the refugee/migration issue**

“A restrictive approach to migration with the aim of realising the EU’s unilateral economic objectives prevails. Instead of furthering the development potential of migrants by considering development implications and human rights requirements, the EU puts a strong focus on border management and combating illegal migration. Migration is an integral part of broader processes of social and economic change and should therefore be considered as an almost inevitable outgrowth of nations’ incorporation into the global economy”.

IcSP engagement on migration issues in Turkey, Niger or Jordan shows the Instrument is integrating a human rights based approach. However, continued attention to human rights compliance is needed in border management and combating illegal migration, while keeping a migrant-centred focus if actions are to continue to be relevant, effective and sustainable. Vulnerable migrants including unaccompanied minors, asylum seekers, stateless persons and victims of trafficking require special attention. In Turkey, as the IcSP phases out, EU/EFIs approaches should integrate ‘do no harm’ and conflict sensitive considerations and focus on potential risks of social conflict as a consequence also of EU priorities and policy (e.g. ECHO’s social safety net for refugees).

Potential risks associated with working on migration/refugee issues also need to be carefully considered. Care needs to be taken when developing migration policies as some offshoots could be rising discontent/tension due to the application of legislation countering illegal migration; overall negative impact on or disruption to on the local economy; greater danger/risks to migrants as smugglers take other routes to avoid control posts; and an increase of armed banditry (as is the case in Niger).

This accepted, more impetus must be placed on managing the inevitable social and economic changes that migration has both locally and globally. More proactive and inclusive policies that focus on skill building and integration may yield more benefits in the long term instead of focusing on restrictive integration policies and returns. Effective interventions include: capacity building and consultation for diaspora organisations; human rights protection of migrants; authorisation of dual citizenship; inclusion of migrants in policymaking; promoting research and development. Therefore synergies are needed between migration and trade, migration and security, migration and development and migration and justice policies and should be the focus of the work of the EEAS in coordination with other EU services. Coordination meetings between IPs of IcSP actions at regional level are important to share analysis, planning and increase synergies. More attention needs to be paid also at defining and communicating a coherent and consistent strategy, and make clear its ways of operating. Considering extending programming timeframe (possibility to plan implementation) of crisis actions to 24 months would be more realistic to realise the goals of most migration interventions. Administrative and technical support should be considered on a case-by-case basis as needed to support large EU delegations in crisis-affected areas.

Migration and mobility are embedded in the broader political, economic, social and security context. A broad understanding of security means that irregular migration must be considered in connection with organised crime and lack of rule of law and justice, corruption and inadequate regulation. More connections should be made between the EU CT Strategy that focuses on preventing people from turning to terrorism; protecting citizens and infrastructure; and pursuing and investigating terrorists across EU borders and globally. The EU CT Strategy thus makes the connection between internal and external security, acknowledging that security in Europe goes beyond EU borders and needs to be integrated with policy and programming on migration where feasible.

Case Study on inter-instrumental synergies

A short case-study based on KIIIs and documentation reviewed in conjunction with the country-visits during the validation phase of the Midterm Evaluation. It contains the collective observations of the evaluation team and constitutes a 'think piece' on the topic. The case-study informs the interpretation of related issues in the Draft Final Report.

Typical Instrument synergies between EFIs and other EU mechanisms and donors

In terms of synergies between Instruments, the IcSP has proven flexible in its ability to bridge to and link with other EU Instruments. The evaluation mission highlighted verifiable synergies between the IcSP and Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI); European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI); Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II); European Development Fund (EDF); European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR); Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); EU Trust Funds (TF) and European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO).

In specific areas managed by DEVCO B5 under Article 5, such as interventions in the area of nuclear security, there is complementarity with activities under the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC). There is a strong synergistic relationship and some overlap between the two Instruments both thematically and in their geographical coverage. The CBRN Centres of Excellence cover both natural and manmade risks related to radioactive/nuclear materials like the Uranium mining and related transports in Central Africa, and the INSC has activities in the same region / mining areas related to safeguards and nuclear safety. Historically the INSC was based on the EURATOM treaty whilst the IcSP (previously IfS) emerged after the end of the Cold War as part of the evolving EU security strategy and related Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) strategies. Differing legal bases have prevented Member States from accepting previous proposals to merge the Instruments. However, under both the IfS and the IcSP, several programming areas have dealt with issues that come close to or overlap with activities under the INSC, i.e.: with regard to nuclear safeguards (IfS funding for IAEA laboratory in Seibersdorf as well as Nuclear Material Assurance programme), nuclear forensics and now issues related to Uranium mines and transports in Africa. There are also some projects in the area of nuclear safety/security implemented by the Science Centres in Moscow/Astana and Kyiv as well as a substantive relationship between nuclear safeguarding and the export control measures promoted under the P2P export control programme funded in part under the IcSP.

Complementarity has also been shown between activities and ENI programmes in areas related to human rights and security reform, good governance and confidence building, as well as between Article 5 in export controls and CBRN risk mitigation with ENI activities related to integration into the EU internal market. IcSP interventions related to Counter Terrorism are well coordinated with the activities of Member States at country level leading to a more coherent approach of EU interventions on the ground. In Morocco, areas of synergies include the EurMed Justice and Police programmes run under the Neighbourhood Instrument using as their point of entry the delegation’s Security Attaché. This ensures coordination within European Union Delegation (EUD) and also the Steering Committees.

In Jordan, concerted efforts were made to link the IcSP with ECHO to support on-ground efforts and political dialogue. In Colombia, Article 3 IcSP interventions build on former DCI funded projects (Peace Laboratories; Community radios), which encourage consistency between projects and ensures coordination and synergy with former and existing projects like justice, demining, and community radios. Indeed the Colombia projects exhibit synergies with other donor initiatives especially in regards to gender equity and coherence with the EUTF.
Inter-Instrument synergies are not globally consistent. For example, it was found that within one EUD, the management of the IcSP portfolio was spread across many people limiting effective coordination and the opportunity to exploit linkages of IcSP interventions across Articles, despite identified synergies between the IcSP and EDF. The activities of different instruments can also overlap, especially where dedicated funding mechanisms have been put in place (e.g. EU TF on migration).

The reasons why the IcSP is used, as opposed to other Instruments

“...IcSP fills in the gaps, it is quicker, and more flexible. ECHO intervenes on first hand response, then IcSP is there to bridge to the next phase, it works as a “transition” Instrument”. (Interviewee response)

The evaluation found that the IcSP was appreciated as a useful tool for programmatic and policy response due to its relative speed, flexibility, thematic focus on peace and security as a niche area, its ability to fill gaps and bridge interventions and funding. The IcSP plays a catalysing role and facilitates strategic partnerships creating further entry points for engagement. The comparative advantage of the IcSP is its ability to respond quickly and absorb certain risks – it thus can act as a forerunner for interventions by other larger and longer term Instruments. Another difference, and in some cases advantage, is its regional orientation, which can facilitate partner country participation in projects that may be too sensitive to undertake at a bilateral level.

EUDs and beneficiaries on the ground also make a distinction between funding that is channelled through governments, and IcSP funding that can be contracted directly in a more targeted way. Thus, the IcSP is seen as a ‘confidence building mechanism’ and for ‘political leverage’ in post-conflict situations.

Examples of projects where synergies have taken place

When the IcSP is sequenced effectively with other EFIs, the synergies that follow can create additional impact.

For example, in Niger, the IFS had financed a project on health of migrants, which was previously funded by ECHO. The IcSP took up this dimension under AGAMI, the migration project in Agadez that will be continued under the EU TF, whose core mandate and focus is on migration. The sequencing between IcSP and EUTF was planned from the onset and the ability to transition was the very reason why IcSP funds were used for the action in the first place. The CSDP civilian mission EUCAP Sahel Niger is also engaged through border management and training on counter terrorism and capacity building of Niger security forces in these areas. EDF and several Member States (Denmark, France, and Luxembourg) are also present in this thematic sector and implement activities through the EUTF. Similarly, in Turkey the Instrument has been used to fill funding gaps and bridge longer-term interventions by other Instruments. Articulation with ECHO, the Madad TF and IPA II has been planned across EC services and at the EUD-level and transition into the Madad and IPA II has been working as planned. Some actions have been expanded or replicated by EU MS and other donors.

Helpful management arrangements that make synergies happen

Instruments managed by people sitting in the same unit ideally help realise synergies, ensure effective coordination as well as encourage better mainstreaming of key issues like conflict sensitivity and gender equity. There are other additional benefits for ensuring effective management of the IcSP, for instance when the same person manages the IcSP and regional EFIs portfolios/projects (e.g. in Jordan, Colombia), or the IcSP officer is embedded within sections managing longer-term EFIs in similar policy areas (e.g. in DRC, and Turkey when the 2014 decision was adopted).

In some regions, INSC and IcSP are managed within the same unit in DEVCO. Ideally, merging Instrument management where there are complementarities could yield cost benefits from pooled resources. Ensuring dedicated points of contact in member state delegations in Brussels and at regional level at certain EUDels (CoE system) was also highlighted as important.

Information and cooperation platforms using the Internet and other arrangements in counter-terrorism and P2P export control, which also covers arms exports and the arms trade treaty, have also yielded coordination...
benefits and should, ideally, produce better synergies\textsuperscript{22}. The IcSP funds the dual use component export controls\textsuperscript{23}, but the approach is to bring all the different external actions in support of promoting export control culture and practical measures together under one roof – hence the P2P programme. In the Counter Terrorism field\textsuperscript{24}, Project CT-MORSE has a combined reporting and monitoring mechanism that also allows a degree of joint programming. Although funded under the IcSP and implemented by an international consortium, it also links to other EU actors, including Member States, and to activities in justice sector reform.

The interface between the IcSP and the Trust Funds

“On a general note, IcSP is seen as a tool that can pilot potential projects (and take the risks) and if things seem to work out, TF are happy to take over (and then have much more capacity). The same applies to ENI along similar lines” (interviewee response).

Generally, it is felt that there is value in regards to having both the IcSP as well as the Trust Fund mechanism although there needs to be a delineation of areas of synergy to ensure that both are used to their maximum benefit. As the EU Trust Funds tend to be slower, having the ability to use the IcSP allows for a quick response, which the TF can then continue. This is the case in Niger, where the IcSP is one of the contributing instruments to the Partnership Framework on Migration. Its role has been mainly as gap filler for the EU Trust Fund for Africa, until the latter was operational and projects launched. It allowed the EU to respond to a political commitment and timeframe set by the Council. However, with a dedicated EU TF for migration in place (with substantial financial capacity and a longer timeframe than the IcSP), in addition to EUCAP Sahel role, there is no longer an advantage to use the IcSP for migration issues. The presence of the EUTF in particular thus frees the IcSP from responding to those political priorities and focus instead on policy areas that are its ‘niche’ and not covered by other Instruments.

To exploit maximum synergies, Trust funds and IcSP should coordinate/pool information on specific topics or thematic issues. For example, there is some evidence for transition of action from IcSP Article 5 programmes in the areas of CT/OC (CT-SAHEL, Critical Infrastructure – maritime transport lines) to Trust Funds. Building an interface between programmatic response mechanisms within thematic areas of convergence will realize better synergies between the IcSP and the TFs.

Risks and opportunities for the IcSP in relation to other EFIs, EU mechanisms and donors

The inherent flexibility of the IcSP can create synergies with other EFIs, EU mechanisms and donor if appropriate partners are identified and a clearly delineated programme is developed. Moreover, while there is evidence that IcSP actions can promote synergies, the actual coordination of actions/programmes among different Instruments is what yields results.

If there is a concerted effort to understand the value added of the IcSP and the rationale for linking to other Instruments, the IcSP can play a catalytic role in providing momentum and rapidly responding to priority needs. Potential opportunities for linking the IcSP and other EFI are: a) mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity and gender equity; b) ability to accept a higher degree of risk; c) rapid response; and d) competent management with access to good expertise in Member States.

To balance potential opportunities, risks must also be assessed in order to avoid forcing a fit between the IcSP and other instruments. Potential risks include: a) limited financial and human resources for fund management; b) an undefined exit/transition strategy to larger Instruments/donor programmes; c) risk of being spread too thin in regards to IcSP value added, and political pressure from Member States potentially pushing the IcSP to respond in too many diverse areas with too many activities; c) overlapping mandates and potential duplication of efforts, especially in regards to Trust Funds.

\textsuperscript{22}see \url{http://ct-morse.eu/about/ct-morse/}, P2P export control Portal \url{https://export-control.jrc.ec.europa.eu/}

\textsuperscript{23}https://export-control.jrc.ec.europa.eu/Home/Dual-use-trade-control

\textsuperscript{24}see project CT-MORSE (website: \url{http://ct-morse.eu/}}
ARTICLE 3
Decision-making / Consultation process

Concept Note Phase

Identification Mission

FPI 2

Regular Info Note

EEAS Management Board

HR/VP

Political and Security Committee (for information)

FPI 2 drafts full Proposal for each Action

FPI/IcSP proposal documents finalised

FPI2/FPI.1 Finance (Review)

Detailed Proposal /Financing Decision Phase

Decision Adopted

Commission Decision Process

Financing Decision (incl. Technical Annex)

Inter-Service Consultation

> 2m €

Exceptional Assistance Measure (EAM)

Interim response PG. (IRP)

Comitology
ARTICLE 4
Decision making/Consultation process

1. Upstream internal consultation
   1a. Internal Meetings ICSP
   1b. Consultation with relevant EEAS services and EC DGs
   1c. Consultation with Civil Society
   1d. Informal Consultation with Member States

2. Action Documents’ drafting
   2a. First Draft AAP
   2b. Internal Validation of AAP
   2b. Consultation with EEAS

3. Inter-service consultation (ISC) - Cisnet
   Replies to ISC comments and integration of comments

4. Translation into six languages

5. Transmission to Member States and EP

6. ICSP Management Committee

7. Integrate ICSP Comments

8. Written Procedure

9. Commission Decision / Final AAP

Closure
ARTICLE 5
Decision-making/Consultation process

Thematic Paper 2014 - 2017

Inter-service Consultation
Replies to ISC comments and integration of comments

AAPs with Annexes

CT/OC/CI/CC:
Annual WPs / Action Fiches

CBRN (CoE):
Restricted call to MS

ISTC/STCU
Calls for Proposals

(Trans-)Regional Projects

Publication and tendering
CoE CBRN: Regional Roundtables develop project proposals and ToR (supported by JRC, OSA)
Annex 7: Global peace & security trends

A short desk study of key documents on global peace and security trends (e.g. securitization, conflict-induced migrations, etc.) that includes findings from a review of selected literature and KII feedback on perceptions on deficits in the global peace and security architecture. The study makes explicit the team’s thinking on the substantive context that the IcSP addresses and is likely to have to address in the future. The desk study is used to nuance IcSP MTR findings on relevance, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability, and added value.

1. Introduction

The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) is implemented in a context of evolving peace and security trends and a developing global peace and security architecture. Much, of course, has been written on both evolving trends and the global architecture, and it is not the purpose here to provide a comprehensive literature review. Rather, this desk study is based on a select number of well-cited documents and draws on interviews with EU, UN, and civil society experts to identify key emerged threats, peace and security trends, and draw insights on the global peace and security architecture.

The desk study is a baseline output for the IcSP Midterm Review (MTR). Its purpose is ultimately to provide contextual analysis that will assist in the evaluation team to nuance IcSP MTR findings. The study is structured in three main chapters: peace and security trends; global peace and security architecture; and conclusions for the IcSP MTR.

2. Peace and security trends

2.1. Introduction

Much is written about emerged (and emerging) threats, and peace and security trends. The best summary, perhaps, is that the causes of war and instability are old and recognisable, but their dynamics today are new. In a reflection on recent conflicts in Syria, Mali, and Libya, a 2014 Clingendael research paper notes, “The main problems for the international community emerging from this most recent wave of conflicts – their intractability, the risk of an unpredictable spill-over of organized violence and the limited relevance of existing global security institutions – derive in large part from the evolutionary dynamic of modern organized violence, rather than the initial causes.”

This evolutionary dynamic is best understood by talking about ‘emerged threats’, which are described below. However, it is also an evolutionary dynamic that is fuelled by several over-arching peace and security trends that relate to hybrid conflicts, securitisation, and mass displacement.

2.2. Emerged threats


There is a growing consensus both in the literature and from key informant interviews that emerged peace and security threats today include fragmented conflicts, criminalised conflict, extremism and terrorism, and climate change.27

The fragmentation of violent conflict has two main (and interlinked) dimensions. The first is that today’s ‘new wars’ are highly localized. For example, the conflict in North-eastern Nigeria is often interpreted as between Boko Haram and the Nigerian state. However, it is rooted in conflict fault-lines within communities and towns, between ethnicities, and groups within ethnicities. The second relates to the fragmentation of armed groups. This can be seen in the proliferation of non-state armed groups, the engagement of criminal and extremist groups in conflict, and consequently “in the decentralized multiplication of fronts and factions engaged in conflict.”28

The notion of criminalised conflict gained traction in 2004 with Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler’s research on “greed and grievance in civil war”29. They (and others that followed) argued that one (greed) reinforces the other (grievance), and that the political economy of violence entrenches conflict. “Armed violence”, defined by the OECD/DAC as “the use or threatened use of weapons to inflict injury, death, or psychosocial harm which undermines development”30 and characterised by the widespread availability of small arms, is a related concept. In practice, the difference between the two is illustrated by conflicts in the DRC or Somalia (criminalized conflict) and violence in Jamaica or parts of Mexico (armed violence situations). Consequently, a definition of criminalised conflict is, “a violent conflict situation characterised by the widespread use by armed groups of illicit economic activities to fund insurgent activities or otherwise derive personal gain”31. There are a number of countries affected by such conflicts, including South Sudan, DR Congo, Nigeria (Niger Delta and Northeast), Afghanistan, Yemen, Colombia, Syria, and Iraq – to mention some.

Extremism and terrorism is often framed in terms of events seen unfolding in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, and Palestine; but also more recently in attacks in Norway, Turkey, France, the United Kingdom, and Belgium. Definitions of extremism and terrorism (but terrorism in particular) are contentious, and definitions used will either serve to extend or contract the list of countries seen as affected by it. Two definitions are offered here; one related to ‘terrorism’ and one to ‘conflict terrorism’.

“A political, ideological or religious act that is meant to inflict dramatic and deadly injury on civilians and to create an atmosphere of acute fear and despair.”32

“The deliberate, politically motivated use of, or threat to use, violence against civilians or civilian targets by a weaker side in an asymmetrical conflict.”33

Situations where terrorist acts (e.g. mass atrocities, symbolic killings, such as public beheadings, etc.) or violence is used against civilians or civilian targets by armed groups are numerous – and span currently or in the recent past Africa (Sudan, Somalia, Sudan, Nigeria, etc.), Asia (Afghanistan, Thailand (South), Pakistan, etc.), Europe (Russia (North Caucasus)), Central and Latin America (Mexico and Colombia), and the MENA region (Iraq, Syria, Yemen).

Climate change is seen as a conflict and security threat multiplier and magnifier, although how it does so (and will in the future) is subject to debate. Research by Sol Hsiang and Marshall Burke (2014), which reviews a variety of case studies and types of conflict concludes that “it seems likely that climatic changes influence conflict through multiple pathways that may differ between contexts” [and] “there is considerable suggestive evidence that economic factors are important mechanisms, especially in low income settings where extreme climate often quite directly affects economic conditions through agriculture.”

Key impacts beyond environmental and resource conflicts are forecast to be seen in: (a) loss of territory and border disputes from receding coastlines; (b) conflicts associated to environmentally-induced migration; (c) increased state fragility as government capacities in some countries will be stretched; and (d) greater competition for energy to manage climate change.

2.3. Key peace and security trends

Three key peace and security trends are identified from the literature and interviews:

The first trend, which in part flows from the emerged threats, is the rise of hybrid conflicts, defined as “violent conflicts or situations of widespread violence where elements of grievance, greed, and/or extremism are intertwined – and where climate changes may play a role,” but also that involve a mix of internal country and cross-border dynamics. The prevalence of hybrid conflicts in many countries (e.g. North-eastern Nigeria; Syria/Iraq; Mali; Somalia; Afghanistan/Pakistan; etc.) has important implications for assumptions that underpin our understanding of violent conflict (i.e. the grievance prism) and geo-spatial considerations.

The second trend is the securitisation of development and peace. There was significant disagreement, however, among interviewees on how important this trend is and its impacts on the sector. Part of this disagreement boils down to different understandings of what ‘the securitisation of development and peace’ means in practice. Four interpretations (along a spectrum) can be identified: (a) greater attention in development to insecurity, which is in line with thinking on the need to build peace in order to promote development; (b) debates around “DAC-able” development spending on security; (c) a shift in development (and peace-building) from a pro-poor focus, to alignment with national security interests (e.g. the alignment of development spending to the priorities of the National Security Council in the UK); and (d) active use of development and peace-building approaches to stabilise localities as part of military campaigns (e.g. USAID’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan). Some interviewees argued that the securitisation trend is towards the harder end of the spectrum ((c) and (d)), and that this has an “unwelcome and negative impact on key development areas, such as social development, human rights and governance reform.”

The third trend relates to refugee and migration flows. According to UNHCR data, the number of refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs, returnees, and stateless persons are the highest in recorded history (see Figure 1 below). Refugee and migration flows to Europe have received a great deal of political attention, but these numbers are dwarfed by population movements in source regions. As explained in an EU Trust Fund study on migration in the Horn of Africa, “[t]hey move across what are often short

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38 See [https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_publication_docs/INTA91_1_08_Fisher_Ander son_0.pdf](https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_publication_docs/INTA91_1_08_Fisher_Ander son_0.pdf)
distances, and many remain displaced and in conditions of political and economic insecurity for decades. Mass displacement itself can be a trigger for further instability, creating a spiral in which people become trapped.\textsuperscript{39} The impact of mass displacement on stability, of course, is not new. However, what is recent is the size of the issue, the complexity of its drivers, and the greater potential of mass displacement to impact stability in different parts of the world.

Figure 1: Global displacement trends\textsuperscript{40}

2.4. Implications for the IcSP

There are four implications of the above for the IcSP midterm review, which are framed here, as questions to be considered:

- **How aligned are IcSP actions to emerged threats?** What percentage of IcSP funds are allocated to address emerged threats, and is there clear alignment of relevant actions with countries facing these threats?

- **Are IcSP actions based on a context understanding that is sufficiently robust to capture the complexity of hybrid conflicts?** Are analytical methods used to evidence IcSP actions nuanced enough to inform the design of such actions?

- **Where in the spectrum of securitisation is the IcSP; and has the instrument proactively addressed unwelcome and negative impacts of securitisation?** What is the implicit (or explicit) approach in the IcSP to global securitisation trends, and how do IcSP actions manage any related negative impacts?

- **How has the IcSP addressed the potential destabilising effects of mass displacement in source regions?** What role has the IcSP played in addressing mass displacement drivers and consequences in source regions?

3. The global peace and security architecture

3.1. Introduction

The last three years has seen greater attention given to the global peace and security architecture. The United Nations launched the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) on 2014, the “Global study on the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security” in 2015, and the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) also in 2015, which undertook a review of the UN’s peacebuilding architecture.

The UN-EU partnership is perhaps the most institutionalised cooperative arrangement that exists between the UN and a regional organization. The UN-EU Steering Committee on Crisis Management set up in 2003, and the UN Liaison Office for Peace and Security in Brussels in 2011, are some of the...
important drivers of a culture of cooperation between the two institutions; and a critical value added in the context of international peace and security. Significant coordination is also seen between the EU and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); EU and the African Union (AU), and between the AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs; such as ECOWAS, IGAD, etc.).

There is much literature on the global peace and security architecture, and this literature is not summarised here. Rather, four key observations (or perceptions) are provided made by interviewees (largely EU and UN officials, and European civil society groups) are given, along with related evidence from the literature.

3.2. Key observations

The 20th and 21st century divide a critical weakness in the global peace and security architecture noted in the literature and by interviewees is the use of 20th century methods of peace-making and peace-building in the 21st century context of hybrid conflicts. The challenges for the EU that follow are described in the 2016 report of the Berlin Report of the Human Security Study Group:

“EU policies are mostly directed at stabilisation on classic peace-making lines; they involve the provision of humanitarian assistance, mediation among the warring parties, and ‘post-conflict’ reconstruction. Where the warring parties are extremist criminalised groups, such policies are easily subverted. Humanitarian assistance is channelled into a predatory war economy; top-down mediation ends up entrenching the positions of the warring parties; and reconstruction provides further opportunities for those parties to enrich themselves at the expense of ordinary citizens.”

The key message is that there is a methodological deficit in the global architecture and an urgent need to ‘kit up’ in order to meet 21st century challenges.

More instruments, less coherence? Funding commitments for conflict, peace and security work from all sources (OECD members and other countries) has averaged USD3.66 billion a year in the period 2007-2014; with peaks in 2011 (USD4.05 billion) and lows in 2014 (USD3.26 billion) (see Figure 2 below). Large parts of this finance flows from funding instruments focused on this sector; the largest instruments being the UK’s Conflict Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), the IcSP, and the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF) (see Box 1 for a description of selection instruments).

![Figure 2: Funding for conflict, peace, and security since 2003](http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/london/12373.pdf)

However, significant finance for conflict, peace, and security work has not necessarily translated into greater impact. Interviewees and studies show that funding is hampered by a number of factors, including challenges associated to: multiple institutional mandates and budget lines, thus complicating efforts to ensure joined-up approaches; a focus on risk avoidance rather than context-specific risk management, which address donor fiduciary and reputational risks rather than the risks of state failure and a return to conflict; few agreed upon crisis-specific strategies, and when these are in place, they

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often lack clear prioritization; and incoherence across instruments, where instrument designs “are often based on specific institutional mandates and operating procedures rather than on effective delivery approaches. This has resulted in both duplication and a fragmentation of efforts.”

**Box 1: Funding instruments for peace, conflict and security**

The Conflict Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) replaced the conflict pool in April 2015, as part of a new, strategic approach to enhancing the delivery of UK national security interests. For 2015-2016, CSSF funding increased to GBP1.127 billion and will increase by a further 19%, reaching £1.322 billion a year by 2019. The CSSF is one of the world’s largest mechanisms for addressing conflict and instability. Its programmes deliver against over 40 cross-UK government strategies set by the National Security Council.  

The Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF) was established under the 2010-2014 Danish Defence Agreement as a cross-government funding pool to support stabilisation and conflict prevention initiatives at the nexus of security and development. Between 2010 and 2014, the Fund was allocated DKK 941.4 million.

The Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) is the funding envelope for Canadian government engagement in complex political-security crises in fragile and conflict-affected states. The ultimate shared outcome is peace, security and the safety and well-being of those living in priority fragile or conflict-affected states, through effective stabilization and reconstruction programming. Since its start in 2007, spending under the GPSF has amounted to CAD1.13 billion.

The United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) is currently supporting more than 120 projects in 25 countries by delivering fast, flexible and relevant funding. Since its creation to the end of 2015, PBF has allocated $623 million to 33 countries to help prevent (re)lapse into conflict and sustain peace.

The European Union established the African Peace Facility (APF) in December 2003 to respond to an African request to support its peace and security agenda based on the recognition that peace is a necessary precondition for sustainable development. The APF has become one of the key instruments for implementing the Africa-EU cooperation on Peace and Security. A total amount of €1.45 billion have been contracted and more than €1.3 billion have been paid through this instrument until the end of 2014.

The World Bank’s State and Peacebuilding Fund (SPF) is designed to explore innovative approaches to peace- and state-building in a range of difficult fragile and conflict-affected environments. The SPF is administered by the World Bank with funds from Australia, Denmark, Germany, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Total World Bank contributions to the SPF in 2014 were USD 167 million.

**A more regionalised architecture** the dominant ‘architectural approach’ to peace and security is regional. It takes a variety of forms, ranging from support to the development of regional peace and security architectures (e.g. the AU’s African Peace and Security Architecture), to the development of

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44 See [https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/stabilisation-unit/about](https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/stabilisation-unit/about)
47 See [http://www.unpbf.org/](http://www.unpbf.org/)
49 See [http://icr.unwto.org/content/state-and-peacebuilding-fund-spf-world-bank-group](http://icr.unwto.org/content/state-and-peacebuilding-fund-spf-world-bank-group)
early warning and response systems (e.g. the Arab Leagues Crisis Response System\textsuperscript{51}), and addressing thematic peace and security issues at a regional level (e.g. the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa focused on migration\textsuperscript{52}).

There appears to be consensus among key informants and in the literature that a regionalised architecture is appropriate, and that the most effective principle for addressing peace and security issues globally is one of subsidiarity (i.e. tackling issues as close to the ‘ground’ as possible). Among the challenges identified to the development of such regional architectures is the capacity-burden gap (e.g. multiple and highly complex crisis, limited institutional capacity), external financing dependency, conflicting political agendas and approaches to crisis management by regional member states, and an evolving clarification of roles and responsibilities between regional organisations and the UN, or among multiple regional organisations in a given region.\textsuperscript{53}

**Increased, but still limited in-country coordination** There have been significant advances in in-country coordination in fragile states through initiatives such as the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, collaboration between the UN, EU, and World Bank on Post Conflict and Post Disaster Needs Assessments (PCNAs and PDNAs), as well as other national-level coordination frameworks/mechanisms. Most interviewees, however, agreed that a fundamental weakness in the global peace and security architecture remains limited in-country coordination between development partners, host governments, and civil society groups.

Basic in-country coordination requirements for better engagement in fragile states include good context analysis, strategic coordination and consistency among key actors, shared strategic planning frameworks, standing arrangements for strategic coordination and coherence, and robust monitoring, assessment, and evaluation arrangements.\textsuperscript{54} These are seen by several interviewees as limited in a number of pre, conflict, and post-conflict settings.

### 3.3. Implications for the IcSP

There are four implications of the above for the IcSP midterm review, which are framed here, as questions to be considered:

- **How methodologically ‘up to date’ in terms of analysis and programming are IcSP actions?** Is there an understanding within FPI of what is required to effectively address the mix of old causes and new dynamics?

- **How proactive have FPI been in instrument level coordination with other non-EU institutions?** Is there an ongoing policy dialogue with other financing instruments on crisis response, longer-term peace-building, and addressing transnational threats?

- **What is the de facto contribution (or investment) of the IcSP towards the strengthening of regional peace and security architectures?** And is there coherence across EU instruments (such as with the APF) and a strategy to strengthen this architecture?

- **How aligned are IcSP actions to relevant in-country coordination frameworks?** And for what IcSP actions is such in-country coordination most important?

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\textsuperscript{51} See http://www.arabstates.undp.org/content/rbas/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2015/11/29/arab-countries-to-boost-regional-coordination-for-effective-crisis-mitigation.html\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{52} See http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/eu-emergency-trust-fund-africa_en


\textsuperscript{54} See https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/kilde/ud/rap/2004/0044/ddd/pdfv/210673-rapp104.pdf
4. Conclusions

This desk study has provided findings from the literature and key informant interviews on emerged threats, key peace and security trends, and ‘architectural’ observations that are relevant to the IcSP. As a baseline output, its purpose is to provide contextual analysis that will assist in the nuancing of IcSP MTR findings.

Four key conclusions drawn for the IcSP MTR are the following:

- The peace and security landscape has changed significantly over the last decade or so. We are looking at emerged threats, hybrid conflicts, and new dynamics in crises. There is a contextual complexity today that is likely to be affecting IcSP actions to a greater extent than before. There is not adequate thinking ‘out there’ on the required methods to be dealing with this new complexity and this is likely to have implications for the relevance, effectiveness, and impact of IcSP actions.

- The hard end of securitisation of development and peace is likely to have impacted the IcSP. Many IcSP actions probably have faced related operational and value dilemmas as a consequence. There may be IcSP actions that have had negative impacts on social development, human rights and governance reform.

- With a multiplicity of funding instruments out there, and as a large (but not the largest) financial instrument, it will be difficult (if not impossible) to clearly define IcSP macro-level and in-country impacts. As we look at macro-level impacts (global architecture-wide), we must consider not only whether the IcSP has reached out to other instruments, but whether these instruments have ‘reached in’ to the IcSP. We must also factor in ‘inter-instrumental’ competition, and the implications of such competition for the IcSP’s space to operate and its value added in different crisis contexts/on different themes.

- In a context of emerged threats, hybrid conflicts, and new dynamics in crises, the sustainability of IcSP actions is in part determined by the strength of the global and regional peace and security architecture. We must therefore consider sustainability in this light. In practice, this means we must place greater value on IcSP actions that are ‘architectural’ in their focus (macro-level and in-country levels), and nuance conclusions related to sustainability with an understanding that if the architecture is weak, it will reduce the sustainability of IcSP actions.

Good practice notes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CVE/CT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relevance considerations i.e. meeting beneficiary needs, and evolution of the EU peace and security strategy (EQ1)</strong></td>
<td>CVE interventions must be context sensitive. There are a variety of entry points and could include: education, livelihoods, human rights, governance, social services, sports and culture, justice and rule of law. CVE falls squarely into the development/security nexus. CVE programming must be proactive, identify threats early on and prevent mobilization to violence. Interventions must minimize negative effects such as fueling more radicalization, human rights violations, or conflict. Good programming should consider: Preventative activities that aim to mitigate specific push factors and anticipatory measures that involve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness in resolving issues through feasible interventions (EQ2)</td>
<td>Small caseloads based on lessons learned from DDR processes that are applicable to CVE de-radicalisation. Focus on individual not large organized groups. The inclusion of CVE programming, with its focus on individual-level understanding of recruitment and radicalization pathways, requires a far greater level of specific and contextual knowledge than ever before.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flexibility to respond to needs and appropriate processes (EQ2)</td>
<td>CVE efforts can range from broad economic development efforts of socially marginalized areas, to individual psychological re-education or alternative religious and propaganda messaging. CVE strategies need to identify and focus on specific individuals and communities at risk and take account of the specific recruitment tactics used by the extremist groups concerned. Empirical studies on CVE and not desk reviews are needed to better understand appropriate interventions and processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution to results and impacts (EQ2)</td>
<td>EU engagement should: strengthen national capabilities, facilitate European cooperation, develop collective capability, and promote international partnership. Intelligence on CT/CVE must be exchanged in an operational way despite security challenges. EU should develop targeted strategic communications projects to promote a counter narrative to extremist group messaging about the work on CVE, the EU partners and values.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Addressing root causes of conflict and creating structures for peace (EQ2)</td>
<td>CVE interventions should consider: the role of families and communities; education and vocational training; post release support (material, social and spiritual); interlocutor credibility on matters of faith and politics; prison conditions and detainee handling; contextually tailored programming that reflects local national and regional dynamics and conditions on the ground.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strengthening capacity (EQ2)</td>
<td>Develop internal mission capacities or relevant partnerships in CT/CVE. CSOs working on CT/CVE need to be engaged as genuine partners with room to manoeuvre and autonomy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ensuring sustainability (EQ2)</td>
<td>Effective CVE requires long-term investment (between 5-15 years). National capacity must be strengthened. Greater CT specific expertise is needed in EU delegations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Efficiency measurements (EQ3)</td>
<td>Enhanced cooperation between the EC and EEAS is needed, as there are turf wars. Restrictive CT measures in terms of financing can limit transfers of funds for NGOs working on CT/CVE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and evaluation processes (EQ3)</td>
<td>Empirical assessment at the programme and cross-programme level, effective cost evaluation, and the monitoring of beneficiary treatment is necessary. The development of a mobile, scalable case-management system, drawing on good practice from rehabilitation, reintegration, and reinsertion programming and other fields, could help ensure effective monitoring of beneficiary treatment and cost-effective evaluations.</td>
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</table>
A multi-programme data platform that will help underpin comparative research and analysis, further driving innovation and effective programming is needed for CVE.
A unified set of metrics could be elaborated and applied across programmes or at least across programme types to assist in M&E.

**Complementarity of initiatives (EQ4)**
CVE benefits from a whole of government approach given its location in the peace and security nexus.
Improved coordination and coherence between the EU’s internal and external CT policies and fostering better communication between the EU and third countries is needed.
EU programmes must be effectively implemented and coordinated with member states.

**Validity of European approaches (EQ 4)**
CVE initiatives sit best within stabilisation programmes that make use of a mix of ODA and non-ODA funds.
The EU’s Counterterrorism strategy broadly focuses on pursues, prevent, protect and prepare similar to the UK and Danish approach.
Four added values of the EU are identified in relation to CVE/CT: strengthening national capabilities; facilitating European cooperation; developing collective capability; and promoting international partnership.

**Ensuring complementarity and synergy internally/externally (EQ5)**
Create a multi-stakeholder platform for understanding the DDR-CVE intersection
The EU’s approach to counter-terrorism at the global level is multi-layered.
The EU CT strategy acknowledges that security in Europe goes beyond EU borders.
Strategic partnerships between Countries are important for the exchange of information.

**Strategic use of policy and political dialogue for leveraging (EQ6)**
Political sensitivities, restricted access to data, programmes, and participants, and a consequent reliance on government figures have made an independent assessment of CVE and rehabilitation programmes difficult.
Engagement at the political/diplomatic level is critical especially where local grievances become apparent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DDR</th>
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| **Relevance considerations i.e. meeting beneficiary needs, and evolution of the EU peace and security strategy (EQ1)** | DDR must develop processes that are relevant to dealing with many different types of Armed Non-statutory Actors (ANAs) as there is no uniformity across the board.
DDR reflects asymmetrical warfare with sophisticated arsenal of guided light weapons that pose a threat to international security.
DDR must be reframed according to context and conflict analysis.
DDR is a social, political and economic process. |
| **Effectiveness in resolving issues through feasible interventions (EQ2)** | Proven effective depending on context are: disarming and dismantling militias; transforming and providing exit options for youth; flexible sequencing i.e. RDD.
Maintain the leadership of the ANA (organisational capital) for reintegration initiatives if necessary.
Second generation DDR looks to decrease violence and build trust in conflict areas before, during and after peace negotiations. ‘Second Generation DDR’, or ‘Interim Stabilisation’, is increasingly undertaken in volatile environments in the absence of an inclusive peace agreement. It recognizes the importance of on-going analysis of local political dynamics and emerging security threats. Its scope has broadened to include regional |
considerations, such as cross-border arms flows, and the regulation of weapons held by civilians. It also seeks to address longer-term issues in returnees' communities, such as the lack of employment opportunities. Consider different forms of violence management involving the ANAs rather than focusing on their elimination through DDR.

<p>| Flexibility to respond to needs and appropriate processes (EQ2) | DDR processes demand considerable and sustained human and financial resources to be planned, implemented and monitored and it is important that the EU as a whole is able to priorities support to DDR and ensure sufficient resources to the process. The EU can use rapid and flexible EC instruments such as the Stability Instrument and, under specific conditions, the Humanitarian Aid instrument. Financing under short term instruments will need to be closely linked to any Member States' bi-lateral funding, and longer-term financing under the Community's geographic and, when appropriate, thematic programmes. From as early a stage as possible funding for DDR needs to be linked with national development plans and the PRSP process, where it is in place. The EU should continue to use multi-donor trust funds, when applicable and considered the best option, when providing support to DDR, in order to ensure that the whole process is sufficiently funded. Concerning all those activities that are not eligible for ODA, the EU needs to examine, based on existing treaties and related financial instruments and in cooperation with partner countries and regions, the possibility to finance such activities. |
| Contribution to results and impacts (EQ2) | EU should aim to strengthen local, national and regional ownership of DDR processes. EU support should be carried out within a broad peacebuilding strategy. EU should ensure respect for Human Rights and carry out DDR support in relation to efforts in the area of reconciliation and transitional justice. EU support should be carried out in the context of the political dialogue. Gender sensitive approaches should be applied to EU support. EU support should effectively address issues related to children and armed conflict. EU should ensure that its DDR support is carried out in a coherent and integrated way, ensuring complementarity between activities supported under different instruments. As DDR in most cases requires long-term involvement, various EU activities should be timed carefully taking into account the particular circumstances on the ground in the country and region in question. All actions initiated should build on already existing activities of the Member states, the EC and CFSP/ESDP. |
| Addressing root causes of conflict and creating structures for peace (EQ2) | A peace agreement must provide the details of the DDR process from the outset and should include a timetable, flexible target dates, early collection of weapons where appropriate, sufficient and appropriate cantonment sites, building of solid institutions to implement DDR and ensure it’s linked to SSR. Warring parties must commit to uphold the terms of the peace treaty and assume national ownership of the DDR process. The international community must support the peace agreement in a coordinated approach to meet the political, military, social, economic and financial needs of the DDR programme. Integrated technical missions that effectively pool resources have proven successful. Regional approaches to disarmament should be considered. Provide a strong public information programme. |
| Strengthening | Links need to be made to other reform programmes like SSR and Justice |
| capacity (EQ2) | reform where possible and if applicable. Note: many scholars have recently questioned the feasibility of linking DDR with SSR or any other reform given the state of flux of institutions in which it usually is undertaken. |
| Ensuring sustainability (EQ2) | Need to look at the internal organization of ANAs to predict challenges and possible pathways for post-conflict DDR trajectory. One of the recommendations that came out of the Stockholm Initiative on DDR was that serious consideration should be given to channeling DDR funding through a multi-donor Trust Fund Mechanism with pre-committed financing. In this context, it was proposed to have two different windows for different components of the DDR process, one for long-term reintegration of ex-combatants and one for support to affected communities. Confidence building needs to be ongoing and progressing between parties to the agreement for DDR to succeed. |
| Efficiency measurements (EQ3) | EU can give support for the overall process, by engaging early in the process, by integrating DDR aspects in the political dialogue with the country, by providing advice and support to enable proper planning and analysis as well as support to the establishment of regional, national and local structures for carrying out the different stages of the process. This also includes active participation in the overall donor coordination and steering of trust funds and programmes. EU should be involved at the earliest stages of peace or cease-fire negotiations, in close coordination and cooperation with other actors such as the UN Peacebuilding Commission, as well as in supporting the assessment and early planning phases of DDR programmes. This could facilitate the definition of its future involvement and enhance budgetary planning. |
| Monitoring and evaluation processes (EQ 3) | EU can undertake to monitor and give support to the reception, screening, registration, discharge of ex-combatants, building or maintaining and/or managing a cantonment sites, assembly area or barracks as well as sensitization (AIDS awareness etc.) and provide assistance in terms of clothing, food, psychosocial, medical and immediate physical assistance. Impact assessments, monitoring and evaluation should systematically be built into DDR programmes and missions to enable an accurate assessment of their effectiveness. Although success of disarmament and demobilization is key for the next phase, final appreciation of DDR processes should be linked to the success of their reintegration component. Since reintegration needs to happen in the communities, DDR programmes should be planned and delivered within the framework of community level development and include communities in all stages of the process. Appropriate methods should be defined in order to assess regularly the success of the DDR process and the efficiency of the support given by the EU. |
| Complementarity of initiatives (EQ4) | DDR should be composed of discreet time-bound programmes with rapid results to build confidence in peace processes as well as a goal to which a wide range of other external assistance activities are relevant and important. Early exchange of information as well as joint security assessment and joint assessments regarding DDR needs in the partner country should also be sought. Any joint assessments on the democratic governance situation where available should also be taken into account. |
| Validity of European | DDR requires: early planning ideally during negotiations; bottom up and top down approaches; a good idea of who needs what that looks at gender, |
| Approaches (EQ 4) | Age, origins and experience during the conflict; two way channels of communication with a feedback mechanism; a participatory process that focuses on the how more than the what; linking DDR with measures that target ANAs with longer term initiatives that identify and address the needs and concerns of the communities especially through governance, livelihoods and justice and reconciliation; avoidance of duplication and structures; link DDR and SSR; create hope for the future and find ways to sustain it through engagement of society; Combine a range of instruments (i.e. EC and Council); Coherent and flexible approach needed within the EU institutions and with member states, the UN and the World Bank. The EU brings added value in the field of DDR by being able to bring together a wide range of instruments for security, stability, development, democratic governance and the promotion of human rights. It also possesses a whole bandwidth of capabilities in order to support the assessment, conception, planning, implementation and funding of DDR programmes and can thus effectively contribute to multi-lateral efforts or undertake bilateral support in relation to third countries. The European Community, in the framework of its external action, is able to support all the DDR phases with a focus on demobilisation and reintegration, through short term humanitarian assistance, under certain conditions, rapid response through the Stability Instrument and through long-term external support of the overall DDR process. EC support is also provided to the wider recovery and development efforts, notably by applying conflict sensitive approaches, which can contribute to long term reintegration needs, including support to democratic governance processes and institution building, respect for human rights, consolidation of the social and economic development of the country including health and education programs. |
| Ensuring complementarity and synergy internally/externally (EQ5) | Avoid duplication. Exploit linkages between DDR and other programs to support strategic planning. It is especially important for the EU to use its existing presence on the ground, including EC delegations, EUSRs and member states’ embassies as well as ongoing programmes and missions when engaging in a DDR process. Close coordination, e.g. through early sharing of information and joint assessments, are also necessary to ensure that the EU action is coherent. Parameters setup in the framework of Civil-Military Co-ordination (CMCO) for the coordination of civilian and military ESDP activities are particularly relevant. |
| Strategic use of policy and political dialogue for leveraging (EQ6) | Political dialogue is key to creating and protecting a space for strategic engagement and it should be combined with external assistance. The involvement of the EU in DDR programmes will vary considerably according to context. The EU’s role as both a donor and a political actor can be of great significance also when the UN and/or World Bank are the key actors for management and delivery of DDR programmes. At the same time, The EU's involvement in supporting DDR is mainly linked to the added value that can be brought by the EU in comparison to other actors, and the EU may, in some situations, be asked to take on a specific task in the area of DDR. DDR considerations should more systematically be integrated into the political dialogue with relevant partner country, in relation to democratic principles, rule of law, human rights, end of impunity, reconciliation, development and security issues. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relevance considerations i.e. meeting beneficiary needs, and evolution of the EU peace and security strategy (EQ1)</th>
<th>Policy and programming need to have human rights based approach at the core instead of only focusing on border management and combating illegal migration. Special attention paid to vulnerable migrants (unaccompanied minors, asylum seekers, stateless persons and victim of trafficking). All policies need to be migrant-centred to be relevant, effective and sustainable.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness in resolving issues through feasible interventions (EQ2)</td>
<td>Effective interventions include: Capacity building and consultation for diaspora organisations; Human rights protection of migrants; Authorisation of dual citizenship; Inclusion of migrants in policymaking; Promote research and development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility to respond to needs and appropriate processes (EQ2)</td>
<td>Modelling irregular migration through data tracking helps to assess the factors that underlie decisions to migrate and help develop flexible response plans and processes to mitigate the flow of people. Early warning system for refugee flows serves two functions: 1) the alleviation of the causes of refugee flows; 2) the provision of more adequate and timely refugee relief. Successful implementation of the Global Approach (GAMM) depends on adequate funding. Geographical and thematic financial instruments remain of key importance for external cooperation and will have to be used in a comprehensive and coherent way. Future programming and allocation modalities of EU external instruments should continue to contribute to the goals of the Global Approach, while respecting the overall objectives of these instruments and in accordance with their rules.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution to results and impacts (EQ2)</td>
<td>For impact to be noted, migration policies also have to work in coordination with well-functioning border controls, lower levels of irregular migration and an effective return policy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Addressing root causes of conflict and creating structures for peace (EQ2)</td>
<td>Diasporas and migrant organisations have the potential to contribute to poverty reduction, development and economic growth as well as peacebuilding. Push factors: conflict, political repression, persecution, economic constraints, unemployment and precarious/unsafe working conditions and climate change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening capacity (EQ2)</td>
<td>Capacity strengthening, transfer of knowledge, entrepreneurship awareness raising, hometown association initiatives that use the diaspora have been proven effective for extending the reach of migration support initiatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensuring sustainability (EQ2)</td>
<td>Migration and mobility are embedded in the broader political, economic, social and security context. A broad understanding of security means that irregular migration also needs to be considered in connection with organised crime and lack of rule of law and justice, corruption and inadequate regulation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency measurements (EQ3)</td>
<td>Strong links needed between relevant EU policy areas and between external and internal dimensions of those policies (i.e. mobility of third country nationals). Synergy needed between migration and trade, migration and security, migration and development and migration and justice policies and should be the focus of the work of the EEAS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and evaluation processes (EQ 3)</td>
<td>Sufficient funds should be available and dedicated.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Complementarity of initiatives (EQ4)

Migration and mobility in the context of the Europe 2020 Strategy aims to contribute to the vitality and competitiveness of the EU. Securing an adaptable workforce with the necessary skills that can cope successfully with the evolving demographic and economic changes is a strategic priority for Europe.

### Validity of European approaches (EQ 4)

Policies aimed at improving the effectiveness of integration of migrants into the labour market urgently require improvement. Policies in place need to be reviewed and strengthened as the EU faces pressing labour market challenges, particularly shortfalls in skill levels and serious labour mismatches.

### Ensuring complementarity and synergy internally/externally (EQ5)

GAMM is to be defined in the widest possible context as the overarching framework of EU external migration policy, complementary to other, broader, objectives that are served by EU foreign policy and development cooperation. Major progress has been made in this direction since 2005, but more efforts are needed in order to harness fully all potential synergies between these policies and with trade policy.

The EU and its Member States should develop strategies and programmes that address migration and mobility, foreign policy and development objectives in a coherent and integrated way. The creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) should facilitate the use of the variety of policies and instruments at the EU's disposal in a coherent manner.

Migration and Mobility Dialogues are the drivers of the GAMM and should be standardised as much as possible. They will be carried out as part of the broader frameworks for bilateral relations and dialogue (e.g. Strategic Partnerships, Association Agreements or Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, Joint Cooperation Councils or JLS Subcommittees).

### Strategic use of policy and political dialogue for leveraging (EQ6)

Partnerships to be set up with non-EU countries to address issues related to migration and mobility to make cooperation mutually beneficial. Dialogues are to be pursued both by regional processes and at bilateral/national level with key partner countries. Where relevant, they should be undertaken according to the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Dialogues will build on regular political steering, through high-level and senior officials meetings, action plans, co-operation instruments and monitoring mechanisms, where relevant. In addition, they should also be pursued at local level, notably in the framework of policy/political dialogue, through the EU Delegations.

### Transitional Justice

#### Relevance considerations i.e. meeting beneficiary needs, and evolution of the EU peace and security strategy (EQ1)

TJ encompasses peacebuilding, human rights protection, crisis management, Statebuilding and development. Institutional reform is an integral part of TJ. Openings offered by transitional periods should be used to address key human rights issues. TJ should focus on: criminal justice, truth, reparations, and guarantees of non-recurrence, institutional reform. Civil society must be engaged on politically charged issues and not just reconstruction and service delivery. Gender and child sensitive approaches necessary.

#### Effectiveness in resolving issues through feasible interventions (EQ2)

Interventions are increasingly regional and transnational in character. Justice instruments need to reflect the challenge that in today’s conflicts perpetrators, victims, witnesses and evidence are scattered across state borders. Early engagement is desirable as it provides a signal against impunity.
| Flexibility to respond to needs and appropriate processes (EQ2) | Tailored approach to specific circumstances is needed but in accordance with human rights norms. Top down and bottom up approaches are needed to engage elites but to also reflect locally embedded understanding of justice and to address needs and issues neglected in formal processes. |
| Contribution to results and impacts (EQ2) | Linkages to development as well as SSR must be explored. |
| Addressing root causes of conflict and creating structures for peace (EQ2) | Balance prosecution and transition needs. Foster clarity and dialogue about past abuse. Promote victim reparations. Reform the most abusive institutions. |
| Strengthening capacity (EQ2) | Process of TJ must be nationally owned, participative, consultative and include outreach. IcSP component on conflict prevention, peacebuilding and crisis preparedness, an opportunity now presents itself to build overall capacity of relevant stakeholders in transitional justice in the areas of mediation, dialogue and reconciliation, of civilian stabilisation missions and of post-conflict recovery activities. |
| Ensuring sustainability (EQ2) | Trust funds and long-term strategies are critical. |
| Efficiency measurements (EQ3) | EEAS should facilitate a comprehensive and holistic approach to TJ by ensuring coordination between all relevant EU institutions and member states. |
| Monitoring and evaluation processes (EQ 3) | Consider Theory-based evaluations explore successes and failures and are appropriate for transitional justice given long term impacts of transitional justice interventions are still in their infancy. Empirical research is needed to shed light on social change processes and theories. Prioritize both stakeholder and donor accountability. A large part of transitional justice programming is about repairing broken relationships therefore evaluations should seek to include and empower disadvantaged groups including victims. |
| Complementarity of initiatives (EQ4) | A range of tools available should be used like compliance with Humanitarian Law to collect information for war crimes, support to DDR processes to prosecute perpetrators of serious crimes, SSR, as well as geographical instruments. |
| Validity of European approaches (EQ 4) | Rights based approach that considers human rights principles and standards is both a means and as a goal of development cooperation. |
| Ensuring complementarity and synergy internally/externally (EQ5) | Compliance with international norms and standards. The EEAS, Commission Services, EU Member States and EU Missions share information on projects financed in partner countries in the field of transitional justice to allow better coordination and efficient use of resources. |
| Strategic use of policy and political dialogue for leveraging (EQ6) | Political engagement alongside technical assistance is key due to political sensitivities inherent in resistance from people who stand to lose wealth, influence and freedom through a successful TJ process. TJ should form a part of any peace negotiations that the EU supports. |