Instrument for Stability
Thematic Strategy Paper 2012-2013

Assistance in the context of stable conditions for cooperation
(Article 4 IfS Regulation)

Summary


The IfS Regulation provides for the implementation of innovative approaches and building connecting bridges between the security and development agendas. As emphasised in 2007 Council Conclusions³, the nexus between security and development is at the heart of the EU’s foreign policy. In this regard, the Instrument for Stability represents a flexible and dynamic instrument addressing both crisis response (Article 3) and longer-term threats and crisis preparedness (Article 4), with a view to create favourable conditions for sustainable development. The present proposed Strategy only applies to the long-term component of IfS (Article 4).

This Strategy Paper covers a relatively short two-year (2012-2013) period and builds principally on lessons learned and on-going actions supported during the 2007-2011 period. The main aim of this Strategy is therefore to ensure the consolidation, continuity and sustainability of actions, rather than aiming at a major overhaul. In line with the major objectives and support priorities set out in the previous Strategy Paper the focus of this new Strategy will remain:

(1) To support international efforts to mitigate Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) risks, whether natural, accidental or criminal.

CBRN disasters represent a key threat to the security and the health of people, to the environment and infrastructures as identified in the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), updated in 2008, and the 2009 EU CBRN Action Plan. The recent nuclear disaster in Japan has reminded us of the incipient risks. Promoting a culture

³ Conclusion of the Council and Representatives of Governments and Member States meeting within the Council on Security and Development (15097/07) of 20 November 2007.
of CBRN safety and security, from prevention to consequence management, is now a prerequisite to development and stability.

(2) To support global and trans-regional efforts to address the threats posed by terrorism and organised crime, including illicit trafficking of human beings, drugs, firearms and explosive materials.

Terrorism and organised crime, including illicit traffic king of human beings, drugs etc., have become more diverse and multi-dimensional. The terrorism threat involves many different aspects, such as transport security, spread of terrorist networks in different regions (including franchising of Al-Qaida brand and other terrorist organisations), linked terrorist travel, financing of terrorism, recruitment and radicalisation. The trafficking and illicit accumulation of firearms and their ammunition also pose a serious threat to peace, security and development. They contribute to increase the level of armed violence, both in conflict and non-conflict areas, and to hinder social and economic development. The illicit trafficking of explosive material and of their chemical precursors constitutes another factor of instability within and between regions and entails high social, economic and human costs.

A number of infrastructure and transport routes which link the EU with key partner countries and regions are essential for the prosperity and security of both the EU and its partner countries. Cooperation and capacity building to address vulnerabilities of these critical routes, both from a security and safety standpoint, are of common interest. In particular, further efforts to address vulnerabilities of critical maritime routes will be required in combination with geographical instruments addressing the conditions conducive to piracy.

(3) To build and strengthen international capacities for conflict prevention and in crisis preparedness.

With regard to building capacity for effective crisis response, EU institutions have traditionally relied on implementing capacity, expertise and field experience in conflict prevention, peace-building and early recovery lying with a wide range of partners, including non-state entities, international organisations, regional organisations, and relevant bodies in the EU Member States. In this regard, up-stream investment in the response capacity of these implementing partners continues to be of importance in order to address the perceived capacity gap in the pre-crisis and early recovery phases of the conflict cycle.

Only two new significant priority areas are proposed for support in this present Strategy: cyber-crime/cyber-security, which has only recently become a major security threat, and the fight against trafficking in falsified medicines, a growing trans-regional threat of serious concern. Some innovative approaches are also proposed under this new Strategy in the field of crisis preparedness.
The guiding principles for the implementation of IfS actions during the period 2012-2013 will build upon relevant policy documents and integrate relevant lessons learnt from the previous period:

- **Added value** by providing worldwide coverage and not being bound to ODA-eligibility criteria that enables the EU to properly address global security threats and risks, across and between regions involving all kind of countries;
- **Complementarity** with all other external assistance instruments in addressing the security and development nexus and wider security challenges;
- **Coherence** with Development Policy and the Common Foreign and Security Policy, in accordance with the Treaties;
- **Linkages** between internal and external dimensions of security policy;
- **Coordination** with international partners and organisations;
- **Regional and trans-regional cooperation**;
- **Enhanced integration between cooperation instruments and political actions**;
- IfS will continue to focus on capacity-building measures which have the potential to enhance and reinforce capacities of third countries to prevent crises and address long-term security threats;
- **Involvement of the Member States, relevant Commission services and EU Delegations** will continue to be a key element for the programming and implementation of IfS actions. In this regard, the **Expert Support Facility (ESF)**, which facilitates access to EU Member States’ experts, will play an important role.

The Lisbon Treaty has, for the first time, set up common overarching principles and objectives of the EU’s external action, among which “to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN charter […]”

These objectives apply to all external policies and instruments of the Union, including its development cooperation as well as its economic, technical and financial cooperation with third countries, which are the two Treaty legal bases of the IfS Regulation.

The primary aim of IfS assistance in the context of stable conditions for cooperation is “to help build capacity both to address specific global and trans-regional threats having a destabilising effect” (i.e., terrorism, illicit trafficking, organised crime, CBRN risks…) and “to ensure preparedness to address pre- and post-crisis situations”. Thus IfS assistance under this Strategy targets the so-called security and development “nexus”, where the EU’s development and security policy frameworks converge.

The IfS Multi-annual Indicative Programme (MIP) for the 2012-2013 period which shall accompany this Strategy, will be submitted for adoption at a later stage, following the conclusion of the Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the IfS Regulation, which will determine the new financial ceiling, in percentage terms, allocated to measures under Article 4(1) of the IfS Regulation.

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5 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, articles 209 and 212.
In accordance with Article 9(3) of Council Decision 2010/427/EU, this draft Strategy has been prepared by the European External Action Service, in consultation with relevant Commission services.

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6 Council Decision 2010/472/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service (OJ L 201, 03.08.2010, p. 30)
ANNEX

Instrument for Stability
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EXPLANATORY NOTE

The current 2007-2011 Strategy Paper for the Instrument for Stability\(^7\) (IfS) expires at the end of 2011. Since the Regulation creating this Instrument\(^8\) was however established for the full seven years of the 2007-2013 Financial Perspectives, it is necessary to adopt a new IfS Thematic Strategy to bridge this two-year gap until the end of 2013.

This Strategy only applies to the long-term component of IfS i.e. “assistance in the context of stable conditions for cooperation” (Article 4 of the IfS Regulation), which represents roughly a quarter of the overall IfS financial allocation (€1.8 billion). The much larger, short-term “crisis response” component of the IfS (article 3 of the IfS Regulation) is not covered by this Strategy, due to its non-programmable nature.

The IfS Multi-annual Indicative Programme (MIP) for the 2012-2013 period, which shall accompany this Strategy, will be submitted for adoption at a later stage.

In accordance with Article 9(3) of Council Decision 2010/427/EU\(^9\), this Strategy has been prepared by the European External Action Service (EEAS), in consultation with relevant Commission services.

The adoption of this Strategy does not entail a Financing Decision.

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\(^9\) Council Decision 2010/472/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service (OJ L 201, 03.08.2010, p. 30)
I. Introduction

“The European Security Strategy identified a range of threats and challenges to our security interests. Five years on, these have not gone away: some have become more significant and all more complex”

The 2008 Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy (ESS) underlined the relevance of the threats identified in 2003, pointed out increasing risks attached to them and identified new challenges to our security. This guiding document is illustrative of the evolution of threats and challenges the EU is facing in the 21st century. The spread of conflicts in different regions, the collapse of governments and weaknesses in State institutions constitute conditions conducive to terrorism, radicalism, criminality and trafficking which undermine good governance. These threats are characterised by their multi-dimensional nature, their inter-connectivity and their trans-regional scope. In this new environment, in which internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly intertwined, the EU must respond with concerted and innovative measures.

The IfS Regulation provides for the implementation of innovative approaches and building connecting bridges between the security and development agendas. As emphasised in 2007 Council Conclusions, the nexus between security and development is at the heart of the EU’s foreign policy. In this regard, the IfS represents a flexible and dynamic instrument addressing both crisis response (Article 3) and longer-term threats and crisis preparedness (Article 4), with a view to create favourable conditions for sustainable development.

This Strategy Paper covers a relatively short two-year (2012-2013) period and builds principally on lessons learned and on-going actions supported during the 2007-2011 period. Consequently – and awaiting also the outcome of the currently on-going discussions with respect to the Multi-annual Financial Framework, which will determine the shape of EU external action instruments after 2013 – the main aim of this Strategy is to ensure the consolidation, continuity and sustainability of actions, rather than aiming at a major overhaul.

The major objectives and support priorities set out in the previous 2007-2011 Strategy Paper for the Instrument for Stability would remain therefore broadly unchanged under this new Strategy, to wit:

(1) To support international efforts to mitigate Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) risks, whether natural, accidental or criminal.

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11 Conclusion of the Council and Representatives of Governments and Member States meeting within the Council on Security and Development (15097/07) of 20 November 2007.
(2) To support global and trans-regional efforts to address the threats posed by terrorism and organised crime, including trafficking of human beings, illicit drugs, firearms and explosive materials.

(3) To build and strengthen international capacities in conflict prevention and crisis preparedness

Only two new priority areas for support are set out in this Strategy: cybercrime/cybersecurity, which is increasing as a major security threat, and the fight against trafficking in falsified medicines, a growing trans-regional threat of serious concern.

Some innovative approaches are also proposed under this new Strategy in the field of conflict prevention and crisis preparedness.

2. Analytical and policy framework

2.1 Strategic context

Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) disasters, either natural, accidental or criminal, represent a key threat to the security and the health of people, to the environment and infrastructures as identified in the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) and the 2009 EU CBRN Action Plan.

Promoting a culture of CBRN safety and security, from prevention to consequence management, is now a prerequisite to development and stability. The security threat is global, and CBRN risks cannot be dealt with in isolation, given their multi-dimensional nature (health, environment, security, crisis management). With UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1373 (2001), there are new requirements to address threats and risks worldwide while supporting countries that need assistance. Disease surveillance, waste management, emergency planning, civil protection or training represent new areas of concern both for the EU and for partner countries. This evolution in the nature of risks and threats calls for sustaining a comprehensive approach to CBRN risk mitigation to ensure leadership and a high level of cooperation and coordination among different authorities inside the EU, including civil society, as well as with other regions and international organisations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the World Health Organisation (WHO) or the World Customs Organisation (WCO). The EU has already started to broaden the scope of its cooperation programmes by promoting a culture of safety and security not only at national but also at transnational level.

Terrorism and organised crime, including trafficking of human beings, illicit drugs etc., have become more diverse and multi-dimensional. The terrorism threat involves many different aspects, such as transport security, spread of terrorist networks in different regions (including franchising of Al-Qaeda brand and other terrorist organisations), linked terrorist travel, financing of terrorism, recruitment and radicalisation. Besides the
promotion of law enforcement and criminal justice, recruitment and radicalisation require a more cross-cutting approach including preventive measures such as education, employment, confidence building measures, media, human rights. Additionally, the response to terrorism includes sanctions, asset freezing, critical infrastructure protection, etc. Likewise, the fight against drugs also requires a more balanced and comprehensive approach including measures addressing drug demand reduction such as prevention, harm reduction and social reintegration.

UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), which addresses the terrorist threat and risks worldwide, requires national and international responses and calls to supporting countries that need assistance. The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy remains the overarching approach agreed by all UN members (2006) to jointly address the protection of human rights, support law enforcement and judicial cooperation and provide technical assistance to countries in need.

Criminal networks amass profits from all kinds of trafficking, ignoring borders and contributing to instability in the weakest countries. Concerted efforts are needed to detect organised crime activities and disrupt illicit flows of goods, information, money and trafficking in human beings. **Cyber crime** is used in criminal and terrorist activities which affect EU internal and external security.

The **trafficking and illicit accumulation of firearms and their ammunition** also pose a serious threat to peace, security and development. They contribute to increase the level of armed violence, both in conflict and non-conflict areas, and to hinder social and economic development. The links to transnational organised crime and terrorism are increasingly evident, arms being often exchanged with other illicit goods. The majority of firearms originally comes from licit trade but are diverted into illicit channels. Fighting illicit flows of arms therefore requires designing adequate multi-dimensional responses to tackle the roots of production and diversion. The **illicit trafficking of explosive material and of their chemical precursors** constitutes another factor of instability within and between regions and entails high social, economic and human costs.

A number of **infrastructure and transport routes**, including maritime, which link the EU with key partner countries and regions are essential for the prosperity and security of both the EU and its partner countries. Cooperation and capacity building to address vulnerabilities of these critical routes, both from a security and safety standpoint, are of common interest. In particular, further efforts to address vulnerabilities of critical maritime routes will be required in combination with geographical instruments addressing the conditions conducive to piracy.

With regard to **building capacity for effective conflict prevention and crisis response**, EU institutions have traditionally relied on implementing capacity, expertise and field experience in conflict prevention, peace-building and early recovery which lie with a wide range of partners, including non-state entities, international organisations (notably the UN and World Bank) and regional organisations (such as the African Union), and relevant bodies in the EU Member States. In this regard, up-stream investment in the
response capacity of these implementing partners continues to be of importance in order to address the perceived capacity gap in the pre-crisis and early recovery phases of the conflict cycle. This investment – both in terms of policy dialogue and of funding - will continue to be addressed in 2012-2013 by the IfS crisis preparedness component, also known as the Peace-building Partnership.

2.2 Overarching guiding principles

The guiding principles for the implementation of IfS actions during the period 2012-2013 will build upon relevant policy documents (see Annex) and will also integrate relevant lessons learnt from the period 2007-2011. In this context, the following guiding principles should be mentioned:

- **Added value.** Two of the key features of the IfS are its worldwide coverage and the fact that it is not bound to eligibility criteria for official development assistance (ODA). This enables the EU to properly address global security threats and risks, across and between regions involving all kind of countries, i.e., fragile, developing, emerging, in-transition, industrialised, candidate or potential candidate countries. Its added value is precisely its ability to tackle issues that cannot be effectively addressed under development or other geographical instruments, either because of the global or trans-regional nature of the problem, exceeding the scope of a geographic instrument; the exclusion of the supported area from funding under ODA-bound instruments (e.g., counter-terrorism); or the non-country specific nature of the assistance (e.g. actions aimed at developing international standards or policies in the field of conflict prevention and peace-building).

- **Complementarity** in addressing the security and development nexus and wider security challenges will notably be sought with the development cooperation and other geographic instruments as well as with the crisis response component of the Instrument for Stability. EU Delegations have a particular role to play in this regard. Synergies with other thematic instruments such as the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) will be reinforced at strategic level, for instance through the mainstreaming of human rights in counter-terrorism assistance. Links with relevant internal EU policies and programmes, including in the research field, would also be promoted. When applicable, complementarity with the bilateral cooperation of EU Member States and other donors would also be sought. The comprehensive strategy for the Sahel, recently adopted by the Council, is a good example in this respect.

- **Coherence** with development policy will continue be ensured, in accordance with the Treaties, particularly in those actions carried out in developing countries. Moreover, coherence with the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and actions in the
field of non-proliferation will remain a priority. This will contribute to sustain comprehensive approaches and to avoid duplication of existing mechanisms and structures. Close cooperation between the work of Commission services and the European External Action Service (EEAS) already facilitates this coordination and coherence as well as informal exchanges of views with relevant Council working groups dealing with internal and external aspects of EU security.

- **Linkages** between internal and external dimensions of security policy need to be reinforced as called for by the *Stockholm Programme* 2010-2014 and in the EU Internal Security Strategy (adopted by the Council in February 2010), and as highlighted in the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS and reiterated in the Council Conclusions on enhancing the links between internal and external aspects of counter-terrorism. Synergies will also be developed among the relevant components of the long term part of the IfS with the particular aim to increase the capacity of the international community to adapt to the rapidly changing criminal flows and strategies as well as to emerging threats and risks.

- **Coordination** with main donor partners (US, Canada, Australia, Japan…) and international organisations such as United Nations, G20, G8 Global Partnership and Roma/Lyon Working Groups, CTAG, FATF, INTERPOL, IAEA, World Bank, IOM, WCO, or the recently established Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF), as well as with NGOs specialised in conflict prevention and peace-building will be pursued, including with regard to practical coordination between assistance actions in order to achieve shared goals and avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts.

- **Regional and trans-regional cooperation** will remain a key feature of the IfS in the light of the need to tackle today’s threats and challenges through collective efforts. Such cooperation can contribute to establish a culture of shared responsibilities and to reinforce internal and external networks as well as regional dynamics of integration that will be supported by a closer involvement of EU Delegations and the IfS crisis-response planners' network.

- **Enhanced integration between cooperation instruments and political actions.** The ESS calls for using “a mixture of instruments” and insists on the fact that political, diplomatic, development, trade and environmental policies and instruments should be integrated for better efficiency and coherence when facing security threats.

- **Capacity-building measures** which have the potential to enhance and reinforce capacities of third countries to prevent crises and address long-term security threats will continue to be a focus of the IfS. It is only through full involvement of partner countries and other relevant implementing partners that IfS measures could yield sustainable results. The objective will be to move away from an “ad hoc” fragmented approach towards promoting integrated regional networks or platforms — including with regard to crisis preparedness actions and public
diplomacy – in order to improve sustainability and effectiveness of EU actions combining prevention and enforcement measures. As a driver for sustainability the advantage for beneficiaries to participate in individual actions relating to global and trans-regional security threats and to the mitigation of CBRN risks will be clearly indicated.

- **Involvement of the Member States, relevant Commission services and EU Delegations** will continue to be a key element for the programming and implementation of IfS actions, including at the project identification and formulation stages. In this regard, an important role will be played by the **Expert Support Facility (ESF)**, which facilitates access to expertise from the EU Member States. Enhanced involvement of Member States in a wider range of activities under the IfS crisis preparedness component should also be encouraged. In particular, co-operation with EU Delegations and Member State’s Embassies in countries where actions are carried out will be systematically sought. Moreover, - and with particular respect to the IfS crisis preparedness component – the potential to implement actions at local level is of considerable importance. Cooperation with Member States will be pursued in multilateral (UN, IAEA, INTERPOL, WHO) - as well as in intergovernmental - cooperation fora (G8, G20, Global Initiative to Combat Illicit Trafficking (GICIT), Global CT Initiative (GCTI), Nuclear Security Summit).

2.3. Policy framework

The Lisbon Treaty has, for the first time, set up common overarching principles and objectives of the EU’s external action, among which “to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN charter […]”\(^\text{13}\). These objectives apply to all external policies and instruments of the Union, including its development cooperation as well as its economic, technical and financial cooperation with third countries, which are the two Treaty legal basis \(^\text{14}\) of the IfS Regulation.

Taking also into account that the primary aim of IfS assistance in the context of stable conditions for cooperation is “to help build capacity both to address specific global and trans-regional threats having a destabilising effect” (i.e., terrorism, illicit trafficking, organised crime, CBRN risks…) and “to ensure preparedness to address pre- and post-crisis situations”, it can be concluded that IfS assistance under this Strategy targets the so-called security and development “nexus”, where the EU’s development and security policy frameworks converge.

In 2006, when the IfS Regulation was drafted and adopted, the two key policy documents addressing development and security were the European Consensus on Development (2005) and the European Security Strategy (2003), respectively. Both policy documents

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\(^{12}\) See Annex B for a full list, including references, of all policy documents mentioned under this point.

\(^{13}\) Treaty on the European Union, article 21.

\(^{14}\) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, articles 209 and 212.
acknowledged the link between security and development, i.e., the proven fact that there cannot be lasting peace without development and vice versa that there cannot be sustainable development without peace. This security and development “nexus” was later the subject of specific Council Conclusions (2007) and was further emphasised on the Report on the Implementation of the ESS (2008).

Specific EU policies in the broad area of conflict prevention and peace -building such as the so-called Gothenburg programme (2001), the EU SSR Support concept (2006), the EU Concept for DDR Support (2006), the Council Conclusions on Fragility (2007), the EU Comprehensive approach to Women, Peace and Security (2008), the Concept Paper on EU Mediation and Dialogue (2009), and the recent Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention (2011), provide the specific policy framework for pre - and post-crisis capacity building under Art. 4(3) of the IfS Regulation.

Likewise, specific EU external securities (sub)-strategies such as the EU Counter-terrorism Strategy (2005), the EU Non-proliferation Strategy (2003), and the EU Strategy on SALW (2004), as well relevant EU internal policies with an important external dimension such as the EU Drugs Strategy (2005), the so-called Stockholm Programme (2009), the EU CBRN Action Plan (2009), the EU Internal Security Strategy (2010), and the recent Council Conclusions on internal and external aspects of counter-terrorism (2011), inform the policy framework of activities under arts. 4(1) and 4(2) of the IFS Regulation, addressing global and trans-regional threats.

3. Response Strategy

3.1. Priority 1 - CBRN risk mitigation

3.1.1. Background and past EU actions

CBRN risk mitigation has been an area of great concern for the EU, both internally and externally, because of the security, human, economic and environmental consequences of a potential CBRN attack, an accident or a natural catastrophe.

Until 2007, the focus was on tackling CBRN illicit trafficking and securing dangerous nuclear and chemical materials in the Former Soviet Union (FSU), through the TACIS Program. Under the 2007-2011 IfS Strategy, the EU aimed at broadening its sphere of activity in order to include other regions of concern, namely North Africa, the Atlantic Façade, the Middle East, Central Asia, the Southern Caucasus and South East Asia.

Several projects were carried out under the IfS, including the fight against illicit CBRN trafficking and related financial practices, by supporting the development of Knowledge Management Systems on CBRN trafficking in South East Europe, Southern Caucasus and in North Africa; by improving detection of radioactive materials at borders or other nodal points in the FSU, Morocco, Algeria and ASEAN countries; by carrying out border monitoring activities in Georgia, Central Asia countries and North Africa.
Unintentional exposure to pathogens and toxins, or their accidental release may cause mass contaminations and the spread of pandemics, undermining public health, the environment and economic development. Relevant actions have been supported to promote bio-safety and bio-security in different countries of concern – Central Asia, Mediterranean basin, South East Asia, Southern Caucasus or Africa, providing training and required equipment for improving the scientific and technical skills of the personnel working at or supervising relevant laboratories.

The EU also invested resources in counteracting the illicit spread of CBRN technologies, material, agents, and their means of delivery, with activities such as the redirection of weapon-related scientists’ and engineers’ knowledge to peaceful activities in FSU and Iraq or the enhancement of safety practices at civilian facilities where sensitive CBRN materials are stored or handled. Export control of dual-use goods has also been a key priority with cooperation programmes to provide training and assistance in the Western Balkan countries, Georgia, Moldova, Morocco, Ukraine and the United Arab Emirates.

The Instrument for Stability 2007-2011 has therefore played an important role for the strengthening of institutional civilian capacity to prevent and mitigate the CBRN risk, in particular through:

- establishing or reviewing the legal and regulatory framework;
- reinforcing the police and judiciary authorities by supporting more effective criminal law enforcement;
- building trust and confidence among relevant stakeholders, including civil society;
- developing scientific and industrial vigilance;
- ensuring effective export control of dual-use goods as well as border monitoring to facilitate responsible economic development.

The first three years of the 2007-2011 programming were still a testing period for a new way of providing assistance and engaging new partners in balanced cooperation. The EU has privileged a multidimensional and integrated approach. A comprehensive network has been put into place in 2009 through the development of regional CBRN Centres of Excellence, with the first becoming operational by mid-2011.

The rapid diffusion of biotechnologies, the renewed interest for nuclear energy and applications (health and food), and the risk of intentional or accidental manipulation of dangerous agents have shown preparedness deficiencies of national and regional authorities in case of a major CBRN disaster. Insufficient preparedness at national level, absence of emergency planning at regional level and competition among donors may aggravate the consequences of any CBRN incident from intentional, accidental or natural origin. The approach proposed by the EU is therefore to mobilise national, regional and international resources to develop and implement a coherent CBRN policy planning. Regional ownership, leadership, confidence building measures and national accountability will ensure the necessary capabilities.
Promoting a culture of safety and security in partner regions is the EU first line of defence against such threats and risks. Strengthening the institutional capacities of third countries is mutually beneficial as it reinforces regional integration, public diplomacy and good governance and contributes to stabilize the EU geopolitical environment.

The Centres of Excellence have been designed to reinforce existing mechanisms of cooperation among key countries in the region and help them identify shortfalls and possible solutions. Collecting and analyzing available data will be the first step toward a better understanding of the regional needs. Managing knowledge will be the basis for reshaping their institutional capacity and implement a coherent and coordinated policy planning.

3.1.2. Objectives

The overall objective during 2012-2013 will be to enhance capacities of national and regional civilian authorities in working together across national boundaries and mitigating CBRN risks and threats (technologies, materials, agents, knowledge). This implies:

- Complete the assessment of the current needs at national and regional level in eight priority regions (South East Asia, the Middle East, South East Europe-Southern Caucasus, Central Asia, North Africa, Atlantic Façade and Sub-Saharan Africa);
- Finalise the establishment of the Permanent Secretariats in the host country for each region and make them fully effective;
- Engage the concerned countries in order to support the Permanent Secretariat in its mission of coordination and policy planning. Training on team building and leadership will be of the essence;
- Develop further the regional network of CBRN expertise among relevant communities, i.e. police, judges, officers with technical and academic background, law enforcers, first responders, military, civil society and diplomats;
- Seek concrete involvement of the EU and Member States institutions for short term and long term cooperation in the regions. Synergies with EU internal policies and instruments, such as the EU Strategy against WMD Proliferation, the EU CBRN action plan or the EU's R&D Framework Program will also be sought. Coordination with Member States action programmes will be ensured as well as overall coherence with non proliferation activities undertaken by the EU under its CFSP;
- Ensure close cooperation with international donors and organisations (US, Canada, Australia, Japan, IAEA, OPCW), in particular in the context of the G8 Global Partnership, the UNSCR 1540 Committee and the ARF, in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts. Cooperation may be sought with other partners as any country may be victim of a CBRN disaster.
3.1.3. Possible areas for support

Measures to achieve these objectives may include:

- Defining a comprehensive CBRN policy planning on prevention, detection and response.
- Strengthening civilian capacity in the field of CBRN risk mitigation.
- Addressing the increasing links between terrorism, organised crime and proliferation.
- Focusing on disaster-preparedness measures by national policies, legal and regulatory frameworks and possibly joint exercises and training.
- Complementing CFSP activities in the non-proliferation area in line with the evolving international legal framework (e.g., promotion of the IAEA Additional Protocol, resuming negotiation on Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty) and supporting verification systems.
- CBRN issues are closely linked with R&D activities; increased exchange of information with academia and NGOs; participation of R&D institutions from partner countries and industrial cooperation for applications in bio- and nuclear technologies should be explored.

3.2. Priority 2 – Trans-regional threats

3.2.1. Background and past EU actions

Terrorism, organised crime, illicit trafficking of drugs and their precursors, trafficking in human beings, medicines, firearms or explosive material, piracy and armed robbery at sea, threats to critical infrastructures and public health are recognized as trans-regional threats, grouped together under priority 2 of the IfS Strategy Paper 2007-2011. Interconnected, multiple and diverse, ignoring State borders, the impact that these threats have on our societies often reveals the urgent need to adapt the traditional arsenal of legislation and law enforcement to their global nature.

Experts and practitioners have indicated several conditions conducive to these phenomena such as extreme poverty, State inability to ensure basic services and protection, bad governance, lack of a rule of law, corruption and lack of democracy as they usually lead to violation of human rights, marginalisation, radicalisation, socio-economic exclusion and conflicts in parts of Africa, Eastern Europe, the FSU and Asia. It is important to emphasise here the irreplaceable role played by development and human rights assistance in addressing these underlying phenomena. In such countries, law enforcement agencies often lack capacities and means enabling them to carry out their missions.

As the Stockholm Program 2010-2014 pointed out, the EU efforts should tackle the conditions conducive to terrorism, recruitment and radicalisation, both internally and externally, by involving experts from national security systems, promoting confidence-building between EU Member States, enhancing cooperation with international partners.
and strengthening capacity-building in third countries. In this respect, the progress achieved inside the EU with the creation of EUROPOL, EUROJUST and FRONTEX and decisions on the European arrest warrant and the joint investigation teams should be promoted as EU blueprints for international assistance.

Strong links between government agents and crime, widespread corruption and limited law enforcement capacity in a number of countries represent the tip of the iceberg of criminal networks involved in smuggling of narcotics, trafficking in human beings, illicit trade, trafficking of firearms etc.

The 2003 ESS identifies terrorism as a key threat to European internal and external security. The law enforcement and criminal justice approach based on the full respect of human rights represents the core strategy for the EU in the fight against terrorism. Fighting recruitment, radicalisation and terrorist financing requires concerted efforts to detect illicit activities and disrupt illicit flows. The 2011 Council Conclusions on enhancing the links between internal and external aspects of counter-terrorism calls on the HRVP and the Commission to give proper consideration to strengthening the capacity of the competent authorities involved in the fight against terrorism in third countries. Capacity-building projects should support overall counter-terrorism efforts, promote international CT standards, the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as police and judicial cooperation. Several projects have been implemented under the IFS to support national law enforcement capacity and to strengthen regional cooperation. The main focus has been the Sahel region (Mali, Mauritania and Niger), Yemen and Pakistan.

As the IFS long-term CT programmes mainly focused on the Sahel region, future programming needs to address the key CT priorities in particular to support counter-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan/Pakistan and in Yemen and the Horn of Africa. Current work on law enforcement cooperation and criminal justice initiated with crisis response measures needs to be continued under the IFS long-term part. The IFS will need to take account of initiatives on internal security with potential impacts in third countries such as the forthcoming regulation on air cargo security (AVSEC), which will require the EU to work with a number of third countries to improve security standards. The IFS will also assist third countries in implementing international CT standards, in particular the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy which covers prevention and the fight against terrorism while protecting human rights. Support will also be provided to counter-radicalisation efforts and measures addressing terrorist financing. Activities in these areas may extend to other regions such as Central and South East Asia or North Africa. Links with cargo security, CBRN and cyber-security need to be addressed. The promotion of regional cooperation in platforms (e.g. Centres of Excellence) could be supported. Cooperation with international donors and organisations (the UN in particular CTIF, UN CTED, G8 Roma/Lyon and CTAG, Friends of Pakistan, Friends of Yemen, the new US GCTF initiative) will continue as well as support to the implementation of international CT standards.
Organised crime is another major threat identified in the ESS to which a coherent and coordinated EU response between internal and external efforts is fundamental. Organised crime is multi-faceted and quickly adapting to obstacles, thus requires appropriate responses to prevent and disrupt illicit flows along the main trafficking routes and the dismantling of networks. Trafficking of drugs, weapons and human beings and money-laundering are often intertwined and linked with other forms of organised crime in the global chain of illicit economy.

Trafficking of illicit drugs and drug precursors is a major criminal activity worldwide; Europe has become a large drug market. Traffickers challenge State authority, where governments are the weakest, by the use of violence and corruption while at the same time the availability of illicit drugs in those markets translates into growing numbers of those abusing drugs thus creating serious social and health problems. With regard to the cocaine supply chain there has been in recent years a marked increase in trafficking from Latin America through the Caribbean’s to Western Africa as a transiting and even processing base towards Europe. These issues were confirmed at the Transatlantic Symposium on Dismantling Transnational Illicit Networks, which took place last May in Lisbon. The EU has taken actions to strengthen international cooperation and law enforcement authorities in the regions concerned. The setting up of MAOC-N\textsuperscript{15} and the CECLAD\textsuperscript{16} as well as the liaison officers’ coordination platforms established in Dakar and Accra under the auspices of the Fontanot Group reinforces the EU interdiction capacity for trafficking into its territory. Weakening the capacity of organised crime groups active in West Africa to traffic cocaine and heroin to the EU has also been endorsed by the Council as one of the EU's crime priorities.

Projects carried out under the IfS focused on fighting against organised crime networks and reinforcing anti-drug capacities of selected airports and seaports in West Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean’s along the “coca ine route”, gradually establishing trans-regional frameworks for information sharing, training and joint operations.

A component of the program is devoted to anti-money laundering initiatives in Latin America and West Africa and to the support to regional cooperation platforms such as GIABA, AMERIPOL and the GAFISUD. This is part of the framework of developing a comprehensive and global approach to drug trafficking focusing on a critical reduction of the heavy demand and drugs supply. Where appropriate, the capacities of national authorities to evaluate the drugs situation should be reinforced and the focus on other transiting regions such as Central America and the Caribbean expanded.

A parallel program has been developed to fight illicit trafficking from and to Afghanistan along the “heroin route”. Despite the sharp decrease of opium production in 2009 Afghanistan remains the most important producer of heroin. The country is involved in the full narcotics production cycle, from cultivation to finished heroin. Drug traffickers trade in all forms of opiates. Though opium production is currently limited to six provinces in the South and West of the country, more efforts are required to reduce the

\textsuperscript{15} Maritime Analysis and Operation Centre- Narcotics, based in Lisbon
\textsuperscript{16} Centre de Coordination de la Lutte Anti Drogue
opium distribution nationwide. Illicit traffickers take advantage of the lack of regional cooperation and weak law enforcement capacity. The impact of the Customs Union between Russia and Kazakhstan should also be considered. The EU is promoting a comprehensive approach in order to disrupt trafficking through the Caucasus, the Black Sea basin and the Western Balkans. Central Asian countries, especially Tajikistan, have long and porous borders with Afghanistan and are massively affected by trafficking. Regional cooperation among the Central Asian countries and capacity building are needed in order to effectively address the security challenges.

When applicable, cooperation with UNODC and WCO’s efforts in the fight against trafficking in illicit drugs should be sought.

It appears that the same organised crime networks are also involved in trafficking in human beings. Every year thousands of men, women and children fall into the hands of traffickers. Trafficking in human beings is a grave violation of human rights. To a large extent, it is a gender-specific phenomenon and it is often Poverty and lack of economic opportunities that makes people potential victims of traffickers. Recruited as soldiers and sold into prostitution and forced labour, children aged between 12 and 16 are the main victims of human trafficking in Africa, spurred by poverty, armed conflict, and instability and need to be protected. Due to lack of reliable data on the routes of trafficking, governments and international organisation face difficulties to effectively fight human trafficking. and connected activities such as money -laundering, the smuggling of migrants, or trafficking in precious natural resources (e.g., diamonds).

**Trafficking in falsified medicines** and their chemical precursors represent a growing threat to health security, affecting massively the poorest and most vulnerable populations, most frequently marketed through Internet. According to recent estimates, half of the anti-malarial drugs currently sold in Africa would be fakes. This form of organised crime is highly lucrative. Benefits for criminals from pharmaceutical falsifications are estimated at 200 billion USD. Only a multidisciplinary approach, associating public and private sectors, promoting the know-how available in the EU, in close partnership with international partners such as the UN (WHO, UNODC), INTERPOL, WCO would allow reinforcing the response capacities of the most exposed regions.

In conjunction with organised crime, terrorism, and trafficking, **the illicit accumulation and trafficking of firearms and their ammunition** represents a key threat to state and human security as well as a main obstacle for sustainable development, as highlighted in the 2005 EU Small Arms and Light Weapons Strategy.

According to estimates, there are about 650 million civilians holding firearms in the world. Easy to transport, firearms can be handled by untrained rebel soldiers, non –state entities or individuals and poured into conflict and non conflict areas. The majority of

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firearms originally come from the licit trade but is then diverted into illicit channels; diversion is facilitated by state collapse, porous borders, leakages from national stockpiles and support to foreign armed groups. Fighting against illicit flows of arms therefore requires enhanced control of borders, intelligence sharing mechanisms, marking and tracing of arms and better regulation of the licit trade.

Actions under the IfS will need to address specifically the regions most affected by the illicit accumulation and trafficking of firearms, mainly in North Africa and the Sahel, Central America and the Caribbean. Building on existing efforts, a basic objective should be to enhance capacities of law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, the issue of maritime arms trafficking should deserve special attention since this is a major avenue to supply and disseminate arms on the African continent.

As underlined in the 2003 ESS, updated in 2008, piracy and armed robbery at sea represent major threats to security and international trade. The bulk of world trade by volume is transported through maritime routes which are more and more sensitive to a variety of threats.

Despite the deployment of the EU NAVFOR operation ATALANTA, the number of piracy attacks is still increasing. While the maritime space and infrastructures cannot be fully protected, risk awareness and preparedness should be improved through regional coastguard cooperation. The EU developed several projects aimed at consolidating the capacity of coastal States to ensure security and safety along critical maritime routes, and this in coordination with other EU instruments, notably with CSDP actions, including the new EUCAP mission.

The overall program addressed the “hot spots” in the Malacca and Singapore Straits and Western Indian Ocean. An important component of the program has been supporting the implementation of the Djibouti Code of Conduct, which provided a framework for cooperation among coastal and user states, in particular for the repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. The implementation of the Djibouti Code of Conduct entails the establishment of a regional training centre in Djibouti, and of a regional information sharing centre in Yemen, networked with the Dar el Salam and Mombasa MSRCCs. The extension of the program to the Gulf of Guinea is envisaged and currently under preparation with the assistance of EU Member States’ experts. Furthermore, the link between piracy and the commercial viability of ports should be emphasised to entice countries in the region to actively take part in anti-piracy efforts, including in the prosecution of pirates.

The protection of critical infrastructures refers to processes, systems, facilities, technologies, networks, assets and services essential to the health, safety, security or economic well-being. Disruptions of critical infrastructure could result in catastrophic loss of life, adverse economic effects and significant harm to public confidence. Attacks or accidents on critical infrastructure could significantly disrupt the functioning of

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19 Maritime Search and Rescue Coordination Centres
government and business alike and produce cascading effects far beyond the targeted sector and physical location of the incident.

A wide number of facilities and sectors are concerned such as communications, energy, water, food distribution, defence industrial base, emergency services, nuclear reactors, material and waste, transportation system, healthcare and public health, government facilities. The damage or a loss of a piece of infrastructure in one member state may have a severe impact on partner countries and on the European economy as a whole. This is becoming increasingly likely as new technologies (e.g. the Internet) and market liberalisation (e.g. electricity and gas supply) show that certain infrastructures are part of a larger network. Protection measures are only as strong as the weakest element of the network. Thus, cooperation with third countries is essential for increasing the security of infrastructure in the EU. Major energy transport routes have specific security management systems, but cooperation among public authorities of the countries concerned is only just beginning (e.g. early warning system between the EU and Russia).

As part of an increasingly interconnected world, critical infrastructures depend on the reliable functioning of information and communication networks. The growing interconnection via the cyberspace, boosted in particular by the Internet, has opened new possibilities for the development of activities unimagined years ago, but it has at the same time created new dependencies and vulnerabilities.

Vulnerabilities are increasingly exploited by criminals, including by crime organisations. World-wide, the cost of cybercrime is estimated at several hundred billions EUR. Furthermore, attacks on the communications infrastructure of states have been used as a political weapon to intimidate and destabilize states. In the EU, cyber-security and the fight against cybercrime, have received great attention. The 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Strategy identified cyber-security as an important concern and called for more work, to develop a comprehensive EU approach, raise awareness and enhance international cooperation.

The Council of Europe Convention on Cyber Crime (“Budapest Convention”) is the main international instrument in this field. The Stockholm Programme considers the Budapest Convention as “the legal framework of reference for fighting cyber crime at global level.” Support to interested and suitable partners to create the legal and practical preconditions for the accession to and the implementation of the Budapest Convention will be an important step in translating ESS into action.

An important element of EU policy in critical information infrastructure protection is the creation of Computer Emergency Response Teams (“CERTs”)\(^{20}\). These teams of experts identify and analyse malicious activities and assist in the recovery of the affected IT infrastructure. CERTs are interconnected with each other and cooperate in their efforts to counter cyber threats across boundaries.

3.2.2. Objectives

The overall objective is to reduce threats to law and order, to the security and safety of individuals, to critical infrastructure and to public health.

The specific objectives are (a) strengthening the capacity of law enforcement and judicial and civil authorities involved in the fight against terrorism and organised crime, including trafficking in human beings, illicit drugs, firearms and explosive materials, and in the effective control of illegal trade and transit, (b) building capacities for the protection of critical infrastructure, including in the field of cyber-security; and (c) contributing to ensuring an adequate response to the production of and trafficking in falsified medicines, which poses a major threat to public health.

3.2.3 Possible areas for support

Measures to achieve the above mentioned objectives may include:

a) In the field of counter-terrorism

— Promoting law enforcement and judicial cooperation on prevention and fight against terrorism, including technical support for the development of policies and strategies; strengthening cooperation between the police, the prosecution and the courts; building capacity in relation to investigation techniques, crime scene and case management, border control (terrorist travel) and terrorist financing. Key geographical focus will be on Horn of Africa region including Somalia and Yemen as well as Pakistan.

— Assisting countries in their efforts to fully implement the UN Global CT Strategy, which combines protection the of human rights, the promotion of the rule of law and of a criminal justice approach, law enforcement cooperation, capacity building etc. And supporting UN efforts to strengthen CT coordination and cooperation world-wide.

— Countering violent extremism by supporting most vulnerable countries (e.g. Pakistan) in their efforts to counter radicalisation, tackle terrorist recruitment and promoting counter-narratives to terrorist ideologies. Support could be provided to governmental initiatives, academic research, work of civil society organizations, relevant education and media programmes.

— With regard to assistance to authorities involved in the fight against terrorism, priority shall be given to supporting measures concerning the development and strengthening of counter-terrorism legislation, the implementation and practice of financial law, of customs law and of immigration law and the development of international procedures for law enforcement.
b) In the fight against organised crime, including cybercrime and illicit trafficking

- Reinforcing the capacities of law enforcement agencies, judicial and prosecuting authorities to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate serious crimes. This approach includes: improving information sharing, judicial cooperation and mutual legal assistance as well as promoting best practices in fighting organised crime.
- Promoting cooperation between law enforcement agencies, including information sharing and joint risk assessments as well as trans-regional coordination in order to establish common standards and *modus operandi* in preventing and counteracting organised crime and all forms of trafficking.
- With regard to assistance relating to the problem of drugs, due attention shall be given to supporting measures aimed at promoting and sharing best practices to reduce drug demand and drug-related public health and social harms.

c) In the protection of critical infrastructure

- Building the capacities of relevant authorities to protect critical maritime routes as well as information and communication networks, including through regional cooperation, information sharing, joint risk assessments, mutual legal assistance and technical support.

d) In all of the above-mentioned areas:

- Priority shall be given to trans-regional cooperation involving third countries which have demonstrated a clear political will to address these problems (ownership) and supporting regional platforms. Triangular cooperation initiatives with other donors could also be considered.
- Measures in these areas shall place particular emphasis on good governance and shall be in accordance with international law, in particular human rights law and international humanitarian law, as well as on the promotion of UN and other relevant international standards.
- Synergies between external assistance in these areas and internal policies and instruments should be sought whenever appropriate as well as coordination and cooperation with EU member States providing support in these areas. When acting in developing countries, particular emphasis will be given to ensuring policy coherence for development.
- The diffusion of lessons learned and best practices.

**3.3. Priority 3 – Building capacity for effective conflict prevention and crisis response**
3.3.1. Background and past EU actions

The 2007-2011 IfS Strategy Paper recognized both the need to develop civilian capacity for crisis response and – moreover - that much of the capacity, expertise and field experience in conflict prevention, peace-building and post-crisis/conflict recovery lies with non-state entities, with international organisations (notably the UN and World Bank) and regional organisations (such as the African Union). It also underlined that the enhanced sharing of expertise with and between EU Member States is important in this respect. Furthermore, given the traditional reliance of the EU institutions on this implementing capacity, it argued for up-stream investment in the response capacity of these implementing partners in order to address the perceived capacity gap in the pre-crisis and early recovery phases of the crisis/conflict cycle. In this regard, the provision of a funding source was envisaged - which would not be dependent on responding to a specific crisis in a third country - but which rather would focus on enhancing the general crisis preparedness capacity of relevant players.

Since 2007, the crisis preparedness component of the IfS (Article 4.3) – also known as the Peace-building Partnership - has both provided funding for conflict prevention and peace-building actions implemented by non-state entities, international and regional organisations, and relevant Member State bodies, and fostered dialogue on peace-building issues - notably with civil society organisations.

In 2009, a scoping and stock-taking study of the Peace-building Partnership made a series of recommendations with particular regard to the funding of capacity-building actions carried out by non-state entities. These recommendations have been integrated into successive programming documents of IfS crisis preparedness component, as well into this strategy paper.

More generally, in preparing the strategic options relating to the IfS crisis preparedness component, we have drawn extensively both from past experience in managing the activities under the Peace-building Partnership and from contacts with relevant stakeholders – either in the setting of the Civil Society Dialogue Network (including the specific consultation meeting, held in January 2011, to discuss the issues relating to the 2012-2013 IfS Strategy Paper); the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee Working Group on Conflict, Security and Development; the IfS Management Committee; or with the EEAS and relevant Commission services (including within the framework of the IfS Inter-service Co-ordinating Group) and with international partners, such as the UN.

Between 2007 and 2010, forty-five actions have been funded under the Peace-building Partnership for a total of €40 million. These actions focus on i) building the general capacity of non-state entities to prevent conflict and to respond to crisis situations (49%); ii) co-operating with international organisations and with regional organisations 21 (28%);

21 For example, funding has been provided for building the early warning capacity of the African Union in complement to efforts under the EU’s African Peace Facility
and iii) working with relevant Member State bodies on the training of police and civilian experts to participate in stabilisation missions (23%).

By way of example, in 2010, €20 million was committed for actions under the crisis preparedness component, working in the main with civil society partners (within the framework of the Civil Society Dialogue Network and local calls for proposals implemented by Delegations); with UN organisations (on natural resources and conflict; on disaster risk reduction; and on disarmament, de-mobilisation and re-integration); and with Member State bodies (on training civilian and police experts to participate in stabilisation missions).

Currently, the IfS Regulation 22 caps the crisis preparedness component at a maximum of the 5% of the total funding for the current financial envelope (2007 -2013) representing a total of nearly €100 million for crisis preparedness over the seven -year period. In the context of the Mid Term Review of the IfS, the European Parliament proposed, inter alia, to increase the maximum percentage devoted to the crisis preparedness component to 10%, provided that the increase is in line with the 2009 review of EU Peace-building Partnership and internal resources. However - even under the current 5% scenario - funding for the crisis preparedness component should rise to an approximate average of €20 million per year in 2011 -2013 (from €10 million per year in 2007-2010). In the event that the proposal is adopted, substantial adjustment with regard to the scope and/or size of the actions funded under the crisis preparedness component may be required.

3.3.2. Objectives

This Strategy Paper covers a relatively short (two -year) period and builds principally on on-going actions supported during the period 2007-2011. In this respect, the objectives and priority areas for support set out in the previous Strategy Paper with regard to the Peace-building Partnership are largely on track in terms of implementation.

Consequently, focus should remain therefore on ensuring the consolidation, continuity and sustainability of actions. The major priority set out in the IfS Strategy Paper 2007 -2011 23 - namely: “to strengthen the international and regional capacity to anticipate, analyze, prevent and respond to the threat to stability and human development posed by violent conflict and natural disasters, as well as to improve post-conflict and post-disaster recovery” - remains valid.

Moreover, the majority of the specific objectives set out in the previous Strategy Paper also remain valid, notably:


– building the capacity of non-state entities, international, regional and sub-regional organisations engaged in the prevention of violent conflict and early recovery after a crisis;
– strengthening capacities for providing early warning of potential crisis situations; and
– building close cooperation between the EU and relevant UN bodies and other international, regional and sub-regional organisations in the above areas.

In addition to the specific objectives mentioned above, it may be useful to include a further specific objective for 2012-2013 in line with the requirement under IfS Article 4.3 to build the capacity also of state entities in pre- and post-crisis scenarios, namely: the enhanced sharing of relevant expertise on conflict prevention and peace-building issues with and between the relevant authorities of EU Member States, in particular at country/local level.

More particularly, the implementation and development of the Civil Society Dialogue Network - launched in 2010 as a forum to engage principally with civil society entities on conflict prevention and peace-building issues - will continue during 2012-2013. It is envisaged that its objectives will be further developed over this period to include – as well as the policy meetings and meetings in EU Member States which have already taken place - also ‘geographic’ meetings addressing specific crisis situations and ‘in-country’ meetings exploring possible civil society contributions to the objectives of, inter alia, stabilisation missions.

3.3.3. Possible areas for support

During 2012-2013, the crisis preparedness component of the IfS should continue to focus on pre-crisis and early recovery phase and to work with non-state entities, international, regional and sub-regional organizations, and relevant bodies of EU Member States. Eventually, the possibility of working also with relevant private sector entities could be explored and – while activities under this component do not generally have a pre-defined geographic scope – due attention should be given in the implementation of the Strategy Paper to areas where the EU has devised and adopted comprehensive approaches (Horn of Africa, Sahel, etc.).

It may also be useful to explore the feasibility of a multi-stakeholder thematic approach to peace-building, whereby actions could be designed on thematic lines and implemented with the participation of several types of stakeholders.

Also with regard to capacity-building activities for non-state entities, due emphasis should be placed on supporting in-country actors on a thematic basis with local or regional scope and, in particular, examining the possibilities of increasing (in cooperation with EU Delegations and international and/or regional-level organisations as appropriate) the capacity of in-country beneficiaries to apply for and absorb EU funding for conflict prevention and peace-building activities.
Furthermore, given the initial positive results of the Civil Society Dialogue Network, consideration should be given to exploring the possibilities of applying the model of the Network on a regional basis. In this regard, co-operation on a solid basis with existing networks will be important, as well as anchoring the work of such regional networks firmly into that of EU policy-makers at both regional and HQ level.

Further efforts may also be needed to ensure that actions undertaken under the IfS crisis preparedness component should be appropriately linked with other components of the Instrument (Article 4.1 and 4.2, and Article 3 – including funds under the relevant facilities) and that - more generally - conflict prevention and peace-building issues should be better integrated into other EU instruments. In that sense, support could be envisaged for enhancing policy analysis and assessments for early warning and programming in order to increase EU capacities to effectively pre-empt and respond to crisis.

Another element of potential work during 2012-2013 relates to the policy dialogue with relevant parts of the international community as well as with EU Member States, and the need to increase the mutual understanding of the different mandates and international and regional operational realities in order to allow the EU to continue to contribute substantively to the development of policy and practice on conflict prevention and peace-building issues at international level. Enhanced focus could also be placed on ensuring that the overlap of strategies across and within institutions, agencies and programmes in a crisis situation is avoided, and that relevant strategies are informed, to the extent possible, by joint assessments and include both response and prevention dimensions. Actions undertaken in this regard should encourage the establishment of inclusive partnerships. Moreover, consideration may need to be given to making resources, tools and processes available more widely (across agencies and EU relevant stakeholders especially at regional and country/local level). Particular attention should be paid to explore ways to further facilitate co-operation with EU Member States in order to develop EU approaches to preventing, and responding to, crisis situations.

Finally, relevant themes that the Peacebuilding Partnership could usefully take into consideration include i.a. mediation and reconciliation; natural resources, climate change and conflict; youth engagement (including youth employment issues), media and cultural relations as useful conflict prevention tools; responsibility to protect in order to help transform the principle into a cause for action in the face of mass atrocities; transitional justice; state fragility; and gender mainstreaming and women’s participation in peace processes and other activities that reduce the vulnerability of those most affected by crisis..
ANNEX A – LIST OF REFERENCE POLICY DOCUMENTS

Among the relevant EU strategies and key policy documents which will constitute the main reference for the implementation of the Instrument for Stability 2012 -2013 are:


- *The European Consensus on Development*, which commits the EU to develop a comprehensive prevention approach to state fragility, conflict, natural disasters and other types of crises;

- *The EU Policy Coherence for Development*, where the EU commits to treat security and development as complementary agendas;

- *The European Council Declaration on Combating Terrorism*, which calls for counter-terrorist objectives to be integrated into external assistance programmes; and the *Council Conclusions on enhancing the links between internal and external aspects of counter-terrorism*.

- *The Council Conclusions on Security and Development* (as well as the *Council Conclusions on an EU response to situations of fragility*), which emphasise that the nexus between development and security should inform EU strategies and policies in order to contribute to the coherence of EU external action;

- The Communication from the Commission on *Conflict Prevention*, together with the *EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts (Gothenburg Programme)*, which defines conflict prevention as one of the major objectives of EU external relations and underlines both the need to address the conditions conducive to conflict

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26 OJ C 46 of 24/02/2006, p. 1
and to adopt a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention within the EU and with partners;

- The Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform (as well as the Council Conclusions on a Policy framework for Security sector reform), which sets out principles and norms for the EU’s engagement in SSR, based on support in different countries and regional settings, the relevant policy frameworks under which the EU supports SSR, and the rationale for SSR as an important part of EU support;

- The Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities, which provides a policy basis for the EU’s engagement in international peace mediation and dialogue and provides recommendations on how EU capacity to mediate can be strengthened;

- The EU CBRN Action Plan which develops a coherent EU internal approach in order to minimise the threats and damages to the public deriving from CBRN attacks or incidents.

- The Stockholm Programme, An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens, a five-year plan which includes guidelines for the EU Member States in the area of justice, freedom and security.

- The Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: “Towards a European Security Model”, which lays out a European security model, integrating, among others, action on law enforcement and judicial cooperation, border management and civil protection, with due respect for shared European values and fundamental rights.


34 COM(2006)253 final of 24/05/2006
The EU Comprehensive approach to the EU implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security, which recognizes the close links between peace, security, development and gender equality and outlines common definitions and principles to promote the participation and protection of women in conflict situations and peace building.

In addition, implementation will be guided by other key documents which developed a comprehensive EU response to different global threats:

- *The EU Strategy against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction*;

- *The EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition*;

- *The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy*;

- *The 2005-2012 EU Drugs Strategy, including the EU Drugs Action Plan 2009 -2012*

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41 Council document 15671/1/08 REV 1 of 01/12/08
44 30/11/2005
### ANNEX B – LIST OF ACCRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMERIPOL</td>
<td>American Police Community</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South-East Asian Nations</td>
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<td>AVSEC</td>
<td>Aviation Security Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear risks</td>
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<td>CECLAD</td>
<td>Coordination Centre for the Fight against Drugs</td>
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<td>CERTs</td>
<td>Computer Emergency Response teams</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>CTAG</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism Action Group</td>
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<td>CTED</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate</td>
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<td>CTITF</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force</td>
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<td>EIDHR</td>
<td>European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights</td>
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<td>ESF</td>
<td>Expert Support Facility</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>EU NAVFOR-ATALANTA</td>
<td>European Union Naval Force Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUROJUST</td>
<td>The European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit</td>
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<td>EUROPOL</td>
<td>European Police Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>FATF</td>
<td>Financial Action Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRONTEX</td>
<td>European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders</td>
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<td>FSU</td>
<td>Former Soviet Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAFISUD</td>
<td>Financial Action Task Force of South America</td>
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<td>GCTF</td>
<td>Global Counter-Terrorism Forum</td>
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<td>GTI</td>
<td>Global Counter-Terrorism Initiative</td>
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<td>GIABA</td>
<td>Inter Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa</td>
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<td>GICIT</td>
<td>Global Initiative to combat Illicit Trafficking</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>IIS</td>
<td>Instrument for Stability</td>
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<td>INSC</td>
<td>Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
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<td>JRC</td>
<td>Joint Research Centre</td>
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<td>MAOC-N</td>
<td>The Maritime Analysis and Operation Centre – Narcotics</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIP</td>
<td>Multi-annual Indicative Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSRCCs</td>
<td>Maritime Search and Rescue Coordination Centres</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPCW</td>
<td>Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>TACIS</td>
<td>Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICRI</td>
<td>United Nations Interregional Crime and Just Research Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>WCO</td>
<td>World Customs Organisation</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
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