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Veröffentlichte Ergebnisse: non-performing-loans...

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Frage 1: Stellen die aktuelle Größe, Liquidität und Struktur der Sekundärmärkte für notleidende Kredite in der EU aus Ihrer Sicht ein Hindernis für die Verwaltung und Abwicklung notleidender Kredite in der EU dar? Wenn ja, halten Sie dieses Hindernis für erheblich?(q1)
Frage 2:  Was sind die wichtigsten Kriterien, anhand deren Banken entscheiden, ob Kreditverkäufe wesentlicher Bestandteil ihrer Strategie zum Umgang mit notleidenden Krediten sein sollen? Geben Sie in Ihrer Antwort bitte Folgendes an: bankinterne Faktoren (d. h. Faktoren innerhalb der Bank, u. a. Art und Merkmale des Portfolios notleidender Kredite, Verwaltungskapazitäten) externe Faktoren (d. h. jegliche Faktoren außerhalb der Bank, die in diesem Zusammenhang eine wichtige Rolle spielen)(q2)
Frage 3: Auf welche Weise(n) könnten Sekundärmärkte für Kredite – insbesondere notleidende Kredite – für einen größeren Anlegerkreis attraktiver gemacht werden?(q3)
Welche(r) Anreiz(e) sollte(n) gesetzt werden?(q4a)
Bestehen bestimmte Hindernisse, die zur Vergrößerung des Anlegerkreises beseitigt werden sollten?(q4b)
Frage 5: Worin bestehen die konkreten Vorteile des Aufbaus von Sekundärmärkten, wenn es sich beim erwerbenden Anleger um eine Bank, einen Investmentfonds oder eine andere Art von Einrichtung handelt? Sehen Sie insbesondere konkrete Vorteile im Hinblick auf die Unterstützung von Banken beim Abbau von Altlasten? die Schaffung von Anlagemöglichkeiten für spezialisierte Anleger?(q5)
Frage 6: Wo liegen bei diesen Arten von Anlegern jeweils die größten Schwierigkeiten?(q6)
Frage 7: Mit welchen potenziellen Chancen und Risiken im Hinblick auf die öffentlichen Interessen ist die Gestaltung eines geeigneten Rechtsrahmens für Sekundärmärkte für Kredite – insbesondere notleidende Kredite – verbunden? Bitte legen Sie eine Rangfolge der folgenden Dimensionen (nach Wichtigkeit) fest: Schuldnerschutz Schutz der Privatsphäre Datenschutz Steigerung der Marktgröße und -tiefe sowie Förderung der Gleichbehandlung von Anlegern(q7)
Frage 8: Wie lässt sich am besten ein Gleichgewicht zwischen diesen Dimensionen erreichen?(q8)
Frage 9: Rechtfertigen Unterschiede bei diesen Chancen und Risiken in den einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten nationale Unterschiede beim Rechtsrahmen für Sekundärmärkte für Kredite?(q9)
Wenn ja, inwiefern?(q9ans)
Frage 10: Stellen die in den Mitgliedstaaten geltenden aktuellen Vorschriften zu Sekundärmärkten für notleidende Kredite in der EU aus Ihrer Sicht ein erhebliches Hindernis für die Weiterentwicklung dieser Märkte dar?(q10)
Frage 11: Auf welche Weise kann der Schuldner bei der Übertragung eines Kredits und/oder einer Sicherheit durch den Gläubiger auf einen Dritten am besten geschützt werden?(q11)
Frage 12: Was sind die (potenziellen) Vorteile einer Spezialisierung auf bestimmte Länder oder Aktivaklassen?(q12)
Frage 13: Sind Ihnen Hindernisse bei Sekundärmarktgeschäften bekannt, die über Ländergrenzen hinweg getätigt werden? Halten Sie diese Hindernisse für erheblich und/oder beeinflussen sie die geografische Reichweite Ihrer Geschäftstätigkeit?(q13)
Frage 14: Wäre aus Ihrer Sicht ein EU-Regulierungsrahmen (Richtlinie oder Verordnung) sinnvoll, in dem bestimmte Aspekte der Übertragung von Krediten geregelt werden? Was sind Ihrer Auffassung nach die wichtigsten Punkte, auf die in einem solchen Regelwerk eingegangen werden sollte?(q14)
Frage 15: Hier können Sie weitere Anmerkungen zum Thema dieses Abschnitts machen:(q15)
Frage 16:  Welche Vorteile bietet die Verfügbarkeit externer Kreditservicer im Hinblick auf die Effizienz der Sekundärmärkte für Kredite? Sehen Sie insbesondere konkrete Vorteile im Hinblick auf die Unterstützung von Banken beim Abbau von Altlasten? die Schaffung von Anlagemöglichkeiten für spezialisierte Anleger?(q16)
Frage 17: Bestehen für Banken und Anleger außerhalb des Bankensektors Hindernisse bei der Inanspruchnahme externer Kreditservicer?(q17)
Wenn ja, geben Sie bitte die Art der Hindernisse an, d. h. regulatorisch, rechtlich usw.(q17ans)
Frage 18: Worin bestehen die Vorteile und Risiken der Auslagerung bestimmter Tätigkeiten an externe Kreditservicer gegenüber der internen Kreditabwicklung? Bitte beschreiben Sie die ausgelagerten Tätigkeiten und die Gründe, weshalb sich die Auslagerung als sinnvoll erwiesen hat oder nicht, so konkret wie möglich.(q18)
Frage 19: Welche Hauptrisiken bestehen in Bezug auf den Schutz der Schuldner, insbesondere der Privathaushalte mit finanziellen Schwierigkeiten, die (direkt oder indirekt) mit den Vorgehensweisen der externen Kreditservicer zusammenhängen?(q19)
Frage 20: Liegt an den Märkten und in den Ländern, die für Sie relevant sind, der Hauptschwerpunkt der Tätigkeit externer Kreditservicer auf werthaltigen Krediten, notleidenden Krediten oder beidem? Bitte beschreiben Sie die Vor- und Nachteile beider Fälle.(q20)
Frage 21: Konzentrieren sich externe Kreditservicer Ihrer Erfahrung nach auf eine bestimmte Vermögensklasse oder decken sie eher ein breiteres Spektrum an Vermögenswerten ab? Bitte beschreiben Sie die Vor- und Nachteile beider Fälle.(q21)
Frage 22: Welche konkreten Dienstleistungen bieten externe Kreditservicer an den Märkten und in den Ländern an, die für Sie relevant sind? (Darunter können z. B. fallen: Inkassoleistungen; Überwachung des Schuldendiensts; Zahlungs- und Rechnungsstellungsleistungen; Informationserhebung und -aufbereitung; einzige Anlaufstelle; gesamtes Leistungsspektrum während der Laufzeit von Krediten, u. a. Beschaffung und Strukturierung von Fremd- und Eigenkapital, Emissionsübernahme und Sorgfaltsprüfungen.) Welche Dienstleistungen sind aus Ihrer Sicht im Hinblick auf die Markteffizienz die hilfreichsten? Bitte antworten Sie so konkret wir möglich.(q22)
Frage 23: Wäre aus Ihrer Sicht ein EU-Regulierungsrahmen (Richtlinie oder Verordnung) mit Vorschriften zu externen Kreditservicern sinnvoll?(q23)
Wenn ja, sollte dieser Rechtsrahmen Vorschriften enthalten zu(q23iy)
Gibt es weitere Punkte, die in einem solchen Rechtsrahmen geregelt werden sollten?(q23iyc)
Frage 24: Hier können Sie weitere Anmerkungen zum Thema dieses Abschnitts machen:(q24)
Frage 25: Sind Ihnen erhebliche Unterschiede bei den Geschäftsmethoden an unterschiedlichen Märkten bzw. in unterschiedlichen Ländern bekannt, z. B. aufgrund von freiwilligen Verhaltenskodizes, Branchenstandards usw.?(q25)
Wenn ja, (inwiefern) stellen diese ein Hindernis für Ihre Geschäftstätigkeit dar?(q25ans)
Frage 26: Sind Sie als Marktteilnehmer auf mehreren nationalen Märkten aktiv?(q26)
Wenn ja, gibt es Hindernisse, aufgrund deren Sie international nicht effizient arbeiten können? Bitte näher erläutern.(q26ans)
a) den Verkauf von Kreditportfolios, auch an Einrichtungen außerhalb des Bankensektors? Bitte machen Sie nähere Angaben zu diesen Beschränkungen und ihren Folgen:(q27a)
b) Banken, die das Kreditservicing teilweise oder vollständig an externe Dienstleister – auch an Einrichtungen außerhalb des Bankensektors – auslagern wollen? Bitte erläutern Sie diese Beschränkungen und ihre Folgen näher:(q27b)
Unverhältnismäßige Beschränkungen können z. B. in den Bereichen Schuldnerschutz, Schutz der Privatsphäre, Datenschutz oder Gleichbehandlung von Anlegern vorliegen.(q27)
Wenn ja, ist eine Beseitigung dieser unverhältnismäßigen Vorschriften denkbar? Bitte erläutern sie näher, wo ein solcher Ansatz in Betracht gezogen werden könnte, und beschreiben Sie die damit verbundenen Vor- und Nachteile.(q27ans)
Frage 28: Welche konkreten Aspekte könnten verbessert werden, um bestehende grenzüberschreitende Tätigkeiten und/oder den Eintritt in neue Märkte zu erleichtern? Was würde, wenn man über das Erleichtern noch hinausgeht, die Abwicklung notleidender Kredite beschleunigen?(q28)
Frage 29: Welche konkreten Aspekte könnten verbessert werden, um bestehende grenzüberschreitende Tätigkeiten und/oder den Eintritt in neue Märkte zu erleichtern? Was würde, wenn man über das Erleichtern noch hinausgeht, die Abwicklung notleidender Kredite beschleunigen?(q29)
Wenn ja, auf welche bislang durch nationales Recht geregelten Bereiche sollten sich die Harmonisierungsmaßnahmen konzentrieren? Mögliche Schwerpunkte sind die Zulassungsvorschriften für externe Dienstleister, Eigenkapitalanforderungen, die Wahrung von Geschäftsgeheimnissen und der Verbraucherschutz.(q29ans)
Gibt es weitere Maßnahmen, die auf EU-Ebene ergriffen werden könnten und im Hinblick auf die Markteffizienz einen erheblichen Nutzen hätten (z. B. EU-Leitlinien oder -Empfehlungen, Einrichtung eines zentralen Kreditservicer-Registers usw.)?(q29o)
Frage 30: Hier können Sie weitere Anmerkungen zum Thema dieses Abschnitts machen:(q30)
Frage 31: Gibt es in Ihrem Land ähnliche Arten der außergerichtlichen Durchsetzung, über die Banken gesicherte Kredite beitreiben können?(q31)
Wenn ja, beschreiben Sie diese bitte:(q31a)
Wenn ja, welche Vorteile haben die entsprechenden Vorschriften für Banken hinsichtlich der Durchsetzung und Forderungsbeitreibung im Zusammenhang mit notleidenden Krediten?(q31b)
Wenn ja, welche Hauptrisiken und -schwierigkeiten bergen diese Arten außergerichtlicher Durchsetzungsinstrumente?(q31c)
Frage 32: Wäre es aus Ihrer Sicht von Vorteil, wenn sichergestellt würde, dass alle Mitgliedstaaten ein Instrument zur Verfügung stellen, das der „beschleunigten Darlehensgarantie“ entspricht?(q32)
Frage 33: Stellt die beschleunigte Darlehensgarantie aus Ihrer Sicht ein sinnvolles Instrument dar, um künftig die Ansammlung notleidender Kredite in den Bankbilanzen zu verhindern?(q33)
Frage 34: Sind die oben beschriebenen möglichen Hauptmerkmale einer beschleunigten Darlehensgarantie aus Ihrer Sicht sinnvoll?(q34)
Wenn nicht, welche der Merkmale halten Sie nicht für sinnvoll und warum?(q34ans)
Frage 35: Über welche (zusätzlichen) Merkmale sollte eine beschleunigte Darlehensgarantie im Hinblick auf ihre Funktionsweise verfügen, um ihre Wirksamkeit dahin gehend zu erhöhen, dass sie die Belastung von Bankbilanzen mit weiteren notleidenden Krediten verhindert?(q35)
Frage 36: Sind die vorgeschlagene Beschränkung des Anwendungsbereichs eines möglichen Instruments der beschleunigten Darlehensgarantie auf Kredite an Betriebe und Unternehmen sowie die Ausnahme der Erstwohnung des Kreditnehmers auch bei diesen Krediten aus Ihrer Sicht sinnvoll?(q36)
Bitte begründen Sie Ihre Antwort.(q36ans)
Frage 37: Wie könnte eine beschleunigte Darlehensgarantie möglichst vorteilhaft für Kreditnehmer gestaltet werden, damit diese das neue Instrument bereitwilliger akzeptieren (z. B. mögliche Zahlungsbefreiung der Schuldner in dem Fall, dass der Wert der Vermögenswerte unter den geschuldeten Betrag sinkt)?(q37)
Frage 38: Wie sollte ein Instrument der beschleunigten Darlehensgarantie konzipiert sein, damit es mit dem präventiven Restrukturierungsrahmen und dem Insolvenzrecht Ihres Landes vereinbar ist (z. B. Aussetzung von Durchsetzungsmaßnahmen, Cram-down gegen Minderheit von Gläubigern, Insolvenzanfechtungsklagen, Gläubigerrangfolge)? Was sind aus Ihrer Sicht bei der Gewährleistung der Vereinbarkeit die größten Hindernisse?(q38)
Frage 39: Wie sollte ein Instrument der beschleunigten Darlehensgarantie konzipiert sein, damit es mit den Vorschriften und Grundsätzen des öffentlichen und des privaten Rechts (z. B. des Sachenrechts, öffentlichen und privaten Rechts) Ihres Landes vereinbar ist? Was sind aus Ihrer Sicht bei der Gewährleistung der Vereinbarkeit die größten Hindernisse?(q39)
Frage 40: Wie sollte ein Instrument der beschleunigten Darlehensgarantie konzipiert sein, damit es mit den bestehenden nationalen Rechtsvorschriften zu Sicherheiten vereinbar ist?(q40)
Sollten Sie weitere Informationen (z. B. Positionspapier, Bericht) übermitteln oder auf Aspekte hinweisen wollen, die nicht vom Fragebogen abgedeckt sind, können Sie Ihre Dokumente hier hochladen:(file-upload)
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Ja, ich stimme der Veröffentlichung meines Beitrags unter dem von mir angegebenen Namen zu (Name Ihrer Organisation/Ihres Unternehmens/Ihrer Behörde bzw. Ihr Name, wenn Sie als Einzelperson antworten)
Nein, ich möchte nicht, dass mein Beitrag veröffentlicht wird
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Ja
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den Zulassungsvoraussetzungen für entsprechende Dienstleister?
der Aufsicht über entsprechende Dienstleister?
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Verkauf und Übertragung von Krediten?
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Organisation oder Unternehmen(organisation-replying-as)
 
China Chamber of International Commerce EU Representative Office
 
Ja(yes-transparency-register)
782743119565-49
Nichtregierungsorganisation (NRO)([ID15])
Nichtregierungsorganisation([ID11])
 
 
 
Belgien([ID22])
 
 
Ja, ich stimme der Veröffentlichung meines Beitrags unter dem von mir angegebenen Namen zu (Name Ihrer Organisation/Ihres Unternehmens/Ihrer Behörde bzw. Ihr Name, wenn Sie als Einzelperson antworten)(yes-contributions-publication)
Yes. Sure.
Both internal and external factors. The latter includes the emergence of some new situations that haven't shown up when granting a said loan.
more and more reliable information about the NPL, more exactly focusing on targeted investors.
legal liability placed on the original creditor and debtor, even punitive damage imposition. the government's or EU commission's budget and actual presence of information service, or even registration and auditing.
worldwide promotion, i.e., OBOR investors from China.
breaking the bad-debt chains which poison all enterprises, especially SMEs, in their confidence and ability to further their business, avoiding pandemic chain reaction and potential systematic economic recession.
the profitability of a deal
 
 
Nein(q9n)
 
no
 
 
 
Yes. Removal of cross-border barriers of investment.
 
Yes, there are such advantages.
Nein(q17n)
 
 
 
non-performing loans
concentrate
debt collection, gathering and developing information, one-stop-shop, underwriting and due diligence services
Ja(q23y)
den Zulassungsvoraussetzungen für entsprechende Dienstleister?(q23iya)
der Aufsicht über entsprechende Dienstleister?(q23iyb)
code of ethics
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nein(q31n)
 
 
 
Yes.
Yes.
Ja(q34y)
 
 
Ja(q36y)
They could help to maintain basic social stability.
and interrupting the further interests burden
ranking of creditors is always the most difficult and controversial part in such performance.
 
 
 
Privatperson(public-replying-as)
Kay Günzel
 
 
 
 
Rechnungswesen([ID4])
Sonstiges([ID8])
 
 
 
 
Deutschland([ID31])
 
Verpackungs
Ja, ich stimme der Veröffentlichung meines Beitrags unter dem von mir angegebenen Namen zu (Name Ihrer Organisation/Ihres Unternehmens/Ihrer Behörde bzw. Ihr Name, wenn Sie als Einzelperson antworten)(yes-contributions-publication)
Diese Frage kann man eindeutig mit ja beantworten. Derzeit ist das Rechtssystem auf Insolvenz-Anmeldung und Bestraffung ausgelegt. Die Gründe für mangelnde Liquidität werden meist ausser acht gelassen. BASEL-kreterien der Banken,haben diesen Zustand noch verschlimmert. Die starre Fixierung auf Zins und Tilgung der Institutionen führte daher immer mehr Unternehmen und private Haushalte in Notlagen, die zu beheben gewesen wären, wenn Sie die Möglichkeit haben Schulden zu verbriefen oder zu verkaufen an Unternehmen, welche flexibler im Umgang mit Schulden sind.
Derzeit sind es wohl die BASEL-Kriterien, wonach das Institut ein internes Ranking vornimmt und so über Kredite / Kreditwürdigkeit und Risiko entscheidet. Dabei nehmen regionale Banken mehr Rücksicht als überregionale Banken ob der mögliche Weiterverkauf von Forderungen durchgeführt werden sollte. Bei Faktoren außerhalb der Banken sind entscheidend Factoring, Lesinggesellschaften, Veröffentlichungen, Wirtschaftsauskünfte und Marketing sowie Ansehen des Unternehmens oder der Person. Am Ende entscheiden aber der Mitarbeiter, mir persönlichen Kontakt mit Fialleiter, was auch zu Spannungen führt. Ich denke daher das sowohl das Ansehen, als auch bisherige Kennzahlen aus BWA und Bilanz für Unternehmen die wichtigsten Kriterien sind und bei privaten Haushalten die Gesamteinkünfte wie man Sie aus der Steuererklärung entnehmen kann.
Wenn eine geregelte Verbriefung statt findet, die EU-Weit einheitlich, auf das Insolvenzrecht abgestimmt und geregelt ist. Danach sollte die Insolvenz nicht mehr als 3 Jahre dauern, und alle bilanzierbare Werte zu verkaufen möglich sein. Hintergrund: Eine Sache bekommt erst dann einen Wert in € wenn ein Gebot also Interesse dafür da ist. Solange dies nicht vorliegt ist die Sache "wertlos" aber Bilanzwertig, da ein Preis zu ermitteln ist. Wenn es eine Tabelle gibt, welche die Schätzung möglich macht haben wir eine unabhängige Grundlage. Bsp.: Marken und Patente im Gegensatz Häuser und Grundstücke. Das Problem für den Schuldner ist meist, das er das Angebot die Schulden zu verbriefen und verkaufen zu können mit unkalkulierbaren Risiken für Ihm verbunden ist. Diese Risiken müssen eingeschrenkt werden. Bsp.: Hypotek Haus, der Schuldner muss entscheiden können, ob der Weiterverkauf eine echte Hilfe ist. Was sonst passiert sind ähnliche Zustände wie in den USA, das Menschen die ein Haus besitzen und es mit einer Bank finanziert haben, dieses für einen viel geringeren Wert als am Markt üblich, los werden. Sie sind das Haus und ihre Schulden los!
Es sollte der Anreitz enstehen, das der Schuldner seine Schuld in angemessener Zeit geregelt bekommt. Das heißt, wenn der Schuldner zum Beispiel die Insolvenz anmeldet, sollte er Hilfe bei der Verwertung erhalten müssen, die vom Insolvenzverwalter abgekoppelt ist, in deutschland vom gerichtsvollzieher. Die Schuldnerberatung, welche in Deutschland bei privater Insolvenz vorgeschrieben ist, sollte für alle Insolvenzen gelten und Verwerter sollten zum zulässigen Personenkreis gehören.
Es sollte nicht jeden erlaubt sein, um Missbrauch auszuschließen, Schulden zu verbriefen. Mindestanforderungen sollten sein, wie beim Versicherungsmarkler.
Der größte Vorteil kann darin bestehen, das man eine bessere Verzinsung und flexiblere Laufzeiten möglich macht. Das Verbessern der verzinsung heist auch, das Schuldner potenziell weniger Zinsen bezahlen müssen, während die Gläubiger durchschnittlich mehr Zinsen erhalten werden. Banken können dadurch ihre Eigenkapitaldecke anheben. - Die Schaffung von Anlagemöglichkeiten ist jetzt schon möglich, wenn die Auflagen der BAFIN gerecht werden. Dies ist in Ordnung, da Käufer von Risikopapieren ja wissen, das ein Totalausfall möglich ist.
Vertrauen aufzubauen. Käufer und Verkäufer kennen sich in der Regel nicht.
Schuldnerschutz muss die oberste Prioität haben, dann Datenschutz , dann schutz der Privatsphäre und dann Steigerung der Marktgröße und -tiefe... Anmerkung: wenn der Gläubiger dem Schuldner eine echte Chance gibt, bekommt er sein Geld zurück und Zinsen. Durch Schaffung von Spielräumen in zeitlichem Raum und Anpassung der Zinsen an die wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse des Schuldners kann es überhaupt dazu kommen, das die Schulden regulierbar sind. Werden dagegen dem Schuldner zusätzliche Kosten aufgedrückt (Gerichtskosten, Mahnkoste u.s.w. wie jetzt üblich, kommt der Schuldner in der Regel in die resignation, giebt auf und es entsteht der Verlust.
- Feste Regeln, welche einhaltbar sind und sowohl die wirtschaftliche Realität als auch das tatsächlich mögliche Vermögen berücksichtigen. Beispiel: Eine 4-Köpfige Familie mit 2000,-€ Monatseinkommen in Deutschland kann keine Schulden tilgen! Also wäre hier zwangsläufig der beste Weg - die Insolvenz.. Nun ist aber die Frau in der Ausbildung zu einer Doktorantin, kann also das Einkommen der Familie auf 5000,- € gesteigert werden, so ist es ratsam eine zeitliche Brücke zu bauen. Im Insolvenzrecht heißt das "positive Aussichten". Hier ist also vom Gerichtsvollzieher eine Aufnahme zu machen, der eine Bewertung der Schulden und Vermögen möglich macht. Dann kann die Schuld verbrieft werden und somit am Markt auch angeboten werden. Ist keine Bewertung möglich, so muss er Schuldenkäufer sowohl die Schulden als auch die dazugehörigen Waren erhalten können. Die Warenwerte müssen nach anerkannten Preisen des Marktes ermittelt werden.
Nein(q9n)
 
ja.
durch den Notar und Gerichtsvollzieher, welcher als Amsperson unbedingt berücksichtigt werden sollte. Er sollte innerhalb der EU immer die Befugnise haben mindestens den Vermögensbestand feststellen zu dürfen. Bei jeder Übertragung von Schulden sollte ein Notar oder Gerichtsvollzieher pflicht sein. Die Kosten für den Gerichtsvollzieher sollte grundsätzlich auch der Käufer der Schulden übernehmen. Dieser darf Sie dann nach Abwicklung wieder dem Schuldner in Rechnung stellen.
die mögliche Sicherheit - bsp. Hypotek - Pfandbrief hat eine höhere rechtliche Sicherheit als der Wechsel, weil sie noch eine Prüfung duch den Notar oder Amtsperson erfahren haben. Um Rechtssicherheit zu schaffen, sollte auch bei den Auskunftdatein es Pflicht sein, das Sie sich beim Schuldner über das Bestehen der Verpflichtung informieren müssen. Notare und Gerichtsvollzieher sollten im Gegenzug auch verpflichtet sein dies in "Foren" (ähnlich des Bundesanzeiger) Vollstreckungsanträge "öffentlich" machen zu müssen.
Versuchen Sie mal als Ausländer aus Deutschland einen Kredit in einen anderen EU-Staat zu bekommen. Genau die gleichen Hürden sind es welche die Verbriefung unmöglich machen. Das Meldewesen in Deutschland macht es Einfacher als in anderen Ländern. Schlussfolgerung: es wäre sinnvoll ein einheitliches Vollstreckungswesen, was als Grundlage ein praktikables Meldewesen erhält, zu schaffen.
Folgende Fragen sollten mit dem Regelwerk sicher beantwortet werden: Wie erkenne ich den Schuldner? Wie erkenne ich den Verschuldungsgrad? (Bilanz) Wer ist für die Aufnahme der Bilanz zusztändig? (Notar oder und Gerichtsvollzieher) Wer ist der bisherige Gläubiger? Bank oder Anderer Wer soll der zukünftige Gläubiger sein und wer vertritt ihm? Übergangsfristen und Wartezeiten: aus meiner Sicht ist bei kleinen Schulden bis 5-fache des Monatseinkommen eine Wartezeit von 3 Monaten sinnvoll. Bei größeren Schulden bis zu einen Jahr. Welcher Erfolg wird vom zukünftigen Gläubiger versprochen? Mehr Zeit oder und weniger Zinsen? Ab wann muss oder darf die Verwertung von Sicherheiten statt finden? Wer trägt wann welche Kosten? Es ist klar, das man mit dem Kauf notleidender Kredite einen Gewinn machen muss, dabei gibt es aber auch die Fragestellung: Wie hoch darf der Gewinn sein? Moralische Werte (Wucher) Unter welchen Bedingungen (Insolvenzverfahren) muss ein Schuldenerlass erfolgen! Darf der neue Gläubiger den Schuldenerlass verweigern?
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ja(q31y)
Durch Notarerklärung kann aussergerichtlich festgestellt werden, das der Gläubiger pfänden darf.Dazu muss der Schuldner einen vertrag zustimmen, der dies feststellt. Die Kosten werden derzeit noch dem Schuldner auferlegt.
Sie können damit Gerichtskosten und Anwaltskosten verringern. Eine Sicherheit das Sie dadurch schneller an Ihr Geld kommen gibt es nicht.
Das Risiko, das der Schuldner diesen Vertrag zustimmt, ihn aber nicht einhält ist immer noch sehr hoch.
Nein, dem Schuldner wird dadurch nicht geholfen. Der Gläubiger hat nicht mehr Sicherheit, es ist aus einer Sicht eine Augenwischerei. Besser wäre das "verkürzte Verfahren, Mahnbescheid - Vollstrechungsbescheid" weiter und international verfügbar zu machen.
Nein, der bessere Weg ist der echte Verkauf an Spezialisten welche die Schulden verbriefen dürfen.
Nein(q34n)
die Beschleunigung hilft den Schuldner nicht. Alles weitere sollte sowieso im normalen Insolvenzrecht öglich sein.
Notar-Regelung bzw. staatliche Aufsicht wie Gerichtsvollzieher sollten dies überwachen.
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q36d)
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organisation oder Unternehmen(organisation-replying-as)
 
Finaxium
 
Nein(no-transparency-register)
 
Sonstiges([ID8])
Beratungsunternehmen, Anwaltskanzlei([ID7])
 
 
 
Frankreich([ID30])
 
Conseil aux institutions financières
Ja, ich stimme der Veröffentlichung meines Beitrags unter dem von mir angegebenen Namen zu (Name Ihrer Organisation/Ihres Unternehmens/Ihrer Behörde bzw. Ihr Name, wenn Sie als Einzelperson antworten)(yes-contributions-publication)
No, there is no direct link between secondary markets and the resolution of NPL in the EU. Resolution of NPL is a long term process which starts by improvement of risk management. NPL are rarely improved by being sold to non-originating parties, and the rare cases are not enough to pose a size problem.
If bad loan sales became a significant part of banks strategy, the direct consequence would be to reduce the quality of risk management at origination. Indeed, if the decision to originate a loan is based on its expected reward, the expected sale price would be a more important factor than the risk held by the loan. Banks would then use NPL sales to get rid of bad loans created by their own lack of risk management. The multiplication of this behaviour in many banks in EU would result in an overall increase of risk, less traceable than in banks assets, and in time to an equivalent of the US subprime crisis. -------- The main incentive to put NPL sales as the center of a bank's strategy is the ability to sell bad loans at an interesting price. Underlying factors to the above may be, among others : - the inability of buyers to identify efficiently the credit and operational risks in the portfolio of bad loans they want to buy - market reasons, i.e. higher demand than offer Both these factors may keep the price of bad loans above their real value, therefore encouraging banks to sell them. Howevert they will last only until the bubble has become too big and buyers realize that the price/reward was not profitable, and then it will collapse
Investing in an NPL secondary market without sufficient history and knowledge to evaluate the risk can come from three factors : - lack of more interesting products to invest in - more demand than offer in the overall market, leaving institutional investors with the need to find new products - lack of sufficient knowledge to understant that the increase of secondary market will create an increase of risk, and then a devaluation of the portfolios Therefore, the best way to attract investors to a secondary market of NPL would be to keep them ignorant of the underlying risks
Widening the investor base is not desirable for the abovementioned reasons
preferably not
When it is a bank specialised in the specific type of bad loans involved, it may be expected that the management of collections, in particular in terms of legal, compliance, operational and image risk, may be correctly managed. In the case of other investors, the obligation to have the bad loans managed (i.e. serviced) by an expert should be be a go/no go condition. If this is the case, it may be expected that the problems stated above (too high prices for bad portfolios with unidentified underlying risks) may be reduceed. But at the same time, it is expected that experts, if asked for advice, will not advice for too high prices, thus reducing the number of potential buyers, or the attractivity of sale prices for banks. ------------ The main adantage would be a better specialization of small banks ------------ The main advantage would be the creation of a new activity for banks as specialized servicers
The main concerns for non-expert investors is the lack of knowledge of the complex reasons why loans may be non performing, and the inability to grasp the bigger consequences of the development of the market with less regulated entities
An appropriate legal framework for secondary markets of NPL would contain - the mandatory use of expertise in evaluation before sale and management after sale of NPL portfolios - a mandatory review by the regulators of the levels of NPL and associated LGD, both in banks and on the secondary markets, in orde to detect early any increasing tendency. This review should be at least annual and should be based on strict NPL and LGD definitions. --------------------- - debtor protection, - privacy, - data secrecy, - promoting increased market size and depth and equal treatment of investors
By requiring expertise in NPL management/servicing
Ja(q9y)
in order no to contagion countries in which the strong legal framework prevented the over-development of bad loans, By maintaining the legal framework surrounding the loans even after sale, whatever the country where they are sold, and by preventing a loan sale from generating a change of legal framework for the borrowers
If these rules have for consequence to avoid further deviations in the creation of NPL, the obstacles are justified.
Maintain the legal framework in which the loan has been originated
Expertise in the management of legal, compliance, operational and image risk. And ultimately market protection.
Yes, knowledge of local laws. ----------- They are significant enough to encourage a better understanding of the loan practices in the different countries, instead of considering them similar across Europe.
As long as it does not override local law in terms of origination or collection/repossession proactices --------------- It should ensure not to encourage a lowering of origination practices, nor override local law in terms of collection/repossession proactices.
 
Access to local expertise of loan services, in terms of law, compliance and consumer protection --------------------- Not really. The main concern should be to leave legacy assets as they are, and not try to spread problems elsewhere by selling them to less knowleadgeable actors ------------------ NPL secondary markets should not become investment opportunities for specialized investors. Indeed, if in the short term such investments appeared as financial opportunities, it would create further demand, without a real economic reason behind. The consequence would be an unbalance between offer and demand, therefore creating an opportunity for banks to more easily get rid of NPL at a good price, driven by the market and not by real economic value. The undue prices and easy sale of NPL would in term lead banks to consider loan sale price instead of risk as a criteria for origination, leading to operational risk, further NPL and in term market collapse.
Ja(q17y)
That may depend on local law, but also other operational details. In terms of legal obstacles : local law and contractual framework. In terms of operational obstacles : language, time zone, consumers sensitivity and knowlege
Knowledge of local laws and compliance practices, in particular in terms of collection, repossession, consumer protection, data protection, banking secrecy, AML, AFT ------------------ Three examples of difficulties in the outsourcing of bad loans to a non-bank specialized servicer : - One, without knowledge of local law, was willing to repossess assets which were not available for repossession before a legal delay - One, without regard for time zone, lead collections calls to be received at night and generating a jurisprudence of harrassment - One, without subjection to AML requirements, lead to accepting collected price and fees without any control of the origin of funds
The main risk would be an override of local laws in terms of consumer protection Another risk would be the lack of knowledge of the borrowers, who would not always know their rights and the fact that a non-knowledgeable collection servicer would not respect local law. The latter would generally lead to unlawful practices spreading until consumer associations and media react, which would lead to a serious image risk for the original lenders, the loan buyer and the collection servicer, in addition to numerous trials
Ther servicing of loans in securitizations is mainly focused on performing loans. The servicing of non securitized loans is generally focused on bad loans and centered on collection services ---------------------- The servicing of securitized loans, when not performed by the bank which originated the loans, generally goes well as long as there is no need for managing options, customer services or special requests. Whenever there is a need for specific intervention, the servicer becomes unable to manage the specificities originated by the bank. The servicing of bad loans by collections specialists only works when these specialists are located in the country and experts in local law. Any other case leads to unlawful actions in both collections and consumer protection
This depends on portfolios. Servicers of retail portfolios tend to be specialized, while servicers of corporate loans may me more generalists among loan types. ------------- The advantage of specialization is a better understanding of the economic situation of borrowers, law, compliance, consumer protection, markets for repossessed assets
Management of operational systems, payments and direct debits, accounting and reporting, collections, sending legal mail (e.g. guarantees), liaising with lawyers and following legal actions --------------------- Legal and compliance
Ja(q23y)
den Zulassungsvoraussetzungen für entsprechende Dienstleister?(q23iya)
der Aufsicht über entsprechende Dienstleister?(q23iyb)
It should create minimum standards in terms of knowledge and practice, loan types expertise and service quality Licensing and supervision would be mandatory because subjection to AML / CFT and other cross-industry requirements could no longer be performed by the seller and could hardly be achieved by the buyer is the loan management is outsourced Agreement should be local, in order to ensure expertise in local law and compliance practices Supervision should include reporting of assets situation in order to allow a whole picture of bad loans, and not only of those detained by banks
 
Ja(q25y)
industry standards in France and Germany in terms of collection fees for example. The amounts invoiced in Germany would be unreasonable in France.
Ja(q26y)
not regarding loan portfolios, because of carefulness not to operate internationally on topics where the differences are too big, and proactivity in communications and explanations to consumers on any international operation
No. There may be restrictions, but they aim at keeping loans within the regulated world and within respect of risk management, legal and compliance requirements Sale of loan portfolios to non-bank entities are limited to SPV and specialized lending entities. As SPV are usually serviced by the originating bank, there is no loan sale to entities outside of the financial world, where actors know their job Restrictions are higher for consumer loans than for professional loans, which is in line with the aim.
This is limited by regulatory requirements in terms of externalization of key functions, which is good because ut prevents externalized services from going completely out of the regulated world.
Ja(q27y)
Only for corporate loans (excluding SMEs), where no consideration of consumer protection or SME protection is at stake, and only if risk and compliance requirements are passed along
Facilitate cross-border activities only for loans where there is little compliance impact, i.e. corporate loans, and equilibrate requirements in terms of risk management at the highest level in all countries -------------------- Selling portfolios will never accelerate the resolution of NPL. It may, in the short term, appear to lower the level of NPL in selling banks, but within the economy it will only move the ownership of the NPL elsewhere and create more operational risks, and more opportunities for banks to grant riskier loans. With time it will rather increase the problem of NPL, because they will be more diffuse and therefore less traceable. Accelerating the resolution of NPLs can be done only through better risk management within banks, better understanding of the economy and of the consequences of collection vs mediation vs repossession vs restructuration
Verkauf und Übertragung von Krediten?(q29a)
Kreditservicing durch externe Dienstleister?(q29b)
It should increase the requirements in terms of risk management, legal and compliance for the transferred loans in the countries where it is most lacking, without decreasing the level in the others ------------ Banks and local law should not be impacted. The effort should be put on less regulated areas, such as specialized lending and securitization assets
Risk management requirements, risk and compliance reporting. This would allow a follow-up of the consequences of the initiative if NPL transfer should become an increasing practice. It w<ould also highlight national discrepancies and areas of new risks, which could be taken care of before becoming too big
 
Ja(q31y)
Only mediation is out of court, and the goal is not enforcement but a two-party solution, which ensures a better issue for both lender and borrower, and prevents a worsening of the borrowers situation
The best value is rarely attained by forcing the repossession of asset. Forced repossession leaves the bank with an asset which does not provide any productivity between repossession and sale. This, plus the urgency of sale, leads the bank to sell the repossessed asset below its real value. As a result, the part of the outstanding loan not covered by the sale of the asset remains high. The result of this is, for the bank, a higher LGD than it would have been with a more proper solution, and for the borrower a worsening economic situation. However, in some specific cases, quick repossession and immediate sale may ensure that the asset generates the best possible value. It is very important to target these cases and ensure quick repossession only in these cases where benefit is higher in quickness than in economic analysis.
The main risk of an out-of-court enforcement is a worsening of economic risks for both parties, plus higher compliance and legal risks. It must be limited to very specific cases where immediate resale at good price is guaranteed
Only in the very specific case where an asset is already unused and when early repossession, with the guarantee of an early and efficient sale, is the best way to preserve its value, and therefore the economic benefit for both parties
No. The only way to avoid future accumulation of NPLs in banks’ balance sheets is to improve risk management at origination, product knowledge and portfolio management afterwards. Accelerated repossession may rather worsen the economic situation of the borrower, and leave no other solution to the bank for solving the bad loan than by selling the asset at all cost, which will lower the sale value. From a risk/accounting point of view, the pure number of NPL will decrease, but the LGD and the cost of risk will increase. This is a much worse situation than good management of NPLs.
Nein(q34n)
The problem is not the features but the goal of the exercise, because the facilitation of an accelerated loan security would ultimately serve to lower credit risk analysis at origination, by relying too heavily on security sale to ensure the value of the loan. This would facilitate granting loans to risky borrowers, therefore increasing inherent risk in the portfolio. With time, the mechanism would be the same as for the subprime crisis : when you repossess too fast with the aim of selling for pure short term financial consideration, if all other actors act the same way the market collapses.
Given that the cost of risk is more driven by LGD than by PD, instead of trying to "avoid the encumbrance of bank balance sheets with further NPLs", the focus should be to manage NPLs and reduce LGD, rather than accelerate repossession procedures. Therefore, the key feature of repossession should concentrate on operational / economic factors. In particular, repossession should be prohibited whenever these conditions are met : - mediation is possible - the asset is in use, resale is not immediately available, and the absence of the asset would worsen the situation of the borrower with no advantage for the lender - the market for resale is insufficient to ensure that the repossession will be more profitable that a more operational solution
Ja(q36y)
Yes, except that - SMEs should be protected as consumers - even for loans to businesses, if the repossession is less efficient than a more operational solution, the operational solution should be considered first ------------------------- The exclusion of primary residence is likely proposed because of the experience of the subprime crisis, but the same could happen in many areas : secondary residences, professional premises, professional devices, utilities, … The mass repossession of the working premises or tools of a given profession could have as bad consequences as the subprime crisis.
Through mediation, in order to ensure that the time of reposession is not critical for the activity of the borowwer, and to ensure that the best price is achieved, which is best for both the lender and the borrower
A floor price should be set. If there is no hint of possible sale above that floor price, the repossession should not be the preferred solution. This would be consistent with local law and jurispredence which prefer recovery to bankruptcy plans --------------------- The main obstacle would be habits of quick repossession for immediate financial figures, rather than seeing the benefits of a more economically logical approach
same as above
In terms of collateral under the form of a financial product, the national framework is already efficient regarding activation of the security. Any measure in this area would probably not change anything compared to the current practice.
 
Behörde oder internationale Organisation(citizen-replying-as)
 
 
Austrian Federal Ministery of Finance, Financial Market Authority, Oesterreichische Nationalbank. In the respective field of competence the Federal Ministery of Justice contributed to the the questions.
 
 
Sonstiges([ID8])
 
 
Regierung oder Ministerium([ID7])
 
Österreich([ID21])
 
Financial Markets
Ja, ich stimme der Veröffentlichung meines Beitrags unter dem von mir angegebenen Namen zu (Name Ihrer Organisation/Ihres Unternehmens/Ihrer Behörde bzw. Ihr Name, wenn Sie als Einzelperson antworten)(yes-contributions-publication)
We advocate a nuanced approach towards NPL markets: regulatory intervention to foster NPL markets on a European level is welcome as long as it does not disrupt or even dry out existing functioning markets. We see the current size, liquidity and structure of the secondary markets for NPLs in the EU generally as an obstacle to the management and resolution of NPLs. A crucial factor limiting the size of secondary markets for NPL at current price levels is the amount of capital that market participation requires from banks due to financial reporting rules. Secondary markets remain shallow in some countries and are sometimes even non-existent. Most EU secondary markets for NPLs are characterized by a small pool of active investors, high information asymmetries, lack of transparency, an uneven power balance between buyer and seller as well as a large bid-ask-spreads. Different levels of risk aversion, different access to or assessment of data, and differing perceptions about the upside in case of improving economic conditions are additional obstacles for the sale of NPLs. In Austria we have some legal impediments to the sale of loans, e.g. credit loan business licensing, data protection, and civil law. However, speaking from an Austrian perspective, some functioning NPL markets exist: Our national market is rather small, which mainly derives from the fact that the domestic stock of NPLs is low (most portfolios of Austrian banks with higher rates of NPLs are primarily located abroad (i.e. in CESEE subsidiaries). In spite of the small size of the Austrian secondary market, 2016 was still the most active year to date for NPL transactions in Austria and Central Eastern Europe (CEE), with over €10 billion of completed or on-going NPL-deals. By the end of 2017, we even expect further reductions of the NPL ratio.
The following factors are, inter alia, key for banks when deciding on the inclusion of loan sales in their NPL management strategy. Internal factors: • NPL levels, NPL ratio and emergency measure to deleverage; as well as management expectations on the level of the NPL ratio; • Characteristics of the NPL portfolio (age structure, collateral, repayments by the debtors, etc.); especially homogeneity of the NPL portfolio. A set of homogenous loans (e.g. in terms of geographic exposure or borrower type) is easier to sell, since it facilitates the servicing and creates scale effects for the potential buyer; • Expectations regarding the future performance of NPL like the recovery potential vs. capacity, and time and effort for the liquidation of the collateral vs. market price for NPLs; • Internal processing capacities and related costs for the NPLs in-house workout; • Data availability having a significant impact on the price. External factors: • Investor appetite and market liquidity; • Reputational risk; • Legal environment & enforcement possibilities, applicable legal framework especially for selling off NPLs; • Tax implications; • Existence of a functional and liquid secondary market for NPLs – interest, prices etc.; • Supervisory expectations on level of NPL ratio; • Data protection issues/consumer protection/whether or not the consent of the borrower is necessary to sell the loan/other transfer restrictions; • Competitors’ behavior – perception of the market / reputational risk.
On the supply side certain factors could attract a wider investor base: • Breaching the information asymmetry gap between seller and buyer is probably one of the most important steps for attracting a wider investor base; • Incentives not to hold, but rather to dispose of provisioned loans as banks use to keep them on the balance sheet to boost their coverage ratios; • Incentives for non-viable companies to exit the market; • Increased data quality of NPL subject to sale, development and availability of national data bases with granular information about real estate market transactions; standardization of NPL sale legal documentation • Overcome fragmentation; portfolio transactions may become larger and more transparent and this could allow various investment structures that would fit the risk-return profile of additional investor types; • Development of electronic information/trading platform(s) for retail NPLs sale processes. On the demand side the following factors might be important: • Increasing the quality of completeness of the data tapes; • A clear and simple transferability of loans and its security; • Decrease the due diligence complexity - partly caused by the multi-jurisdiction situation: i.e. convergence of the legal framework for NPL resolutions, clear tax regime and predictability for its changes; convergence of the legal documentation for new loans.
In order to widen the investor base, the following incentives should be given: • A stable legal environment (legal certainty); • Enforceability of the rights by the creditors; • Private Asset Management companies and restructuring vehicles; • A wider national or EU NPL information/sales platform to create transparency in the market; • Banks need to have proper NPL data and segregated portfolios in order to attract investors; hence a proper implementation of the NPL strategy (ECB guidance) is necessary, which should be rolled out for all banks under the principle of proportionality; • In addition, clear rules specifying the potential buyer and type of non-performing assets would be helpful. In this regard, it has to be born in mind that though from a supervisory perspective, the current high stock of NPLs on a European level – and not in particular in Austria - is problematic and needs to be addressed urgently; just selling off NPLs from banks balance sheets should not be a goal in itself, since the underlying risk does not disappear. It is therefore important that only those institutions buy NPLs, which are able to manage the risk accordingly. Shifting risks via NPL sell offs to less regulated or supervised parts of the financial sector, where risk accumulation might occur, should be prevented.
 
 
 
Data protection may hinder potential investors from conducting deep and appropriate due diligence to assess the potential NPL portfolio. However, there are cases where it is possible to share loan data based on certain conditions, i.e. if the customer grants his/her express written consent to the disclosure of personal data. In the context of debtor protection, it should be clarified that from a civil law perspective the transfer does not impose any substantive modifications with respect to the payment conditions. Data secrecy issues are most challenging because they might constitute serious obstacles on the one hand, on the other hand they are important especially for consumer protection. Taking into account that there is a data protection law on European level and additional regulations on member state level, we consider that this is a priority issue for thorough considerations. We will not rank the rest of the dimensions, because all are important.
 
 
 
Current rules applicable to the Austrian secondary market for NPLs are not considered to constitute a barrier to the further development of these markets. The currently small size of the Austrian secondary market derives from the fact that the domestic NPL stock is low and portfolios with higher NPLs rates are mainly located outside of Austria (i.e. in CESEE subsidiaries).
To be able to protect the debtor in a suitable manner a distinction between corporate and consumer debtors needs to be carried out. From an Austrian civil law perspective there is generally no approval needed from the debtor when transferring receivables from the present to a new creditor – this also applies for receivables on repayments from a loan contract. Only when the creditor transfers the whole contractual relationship to a new creditor/third party an approval of the debtor would be required. Nevertheless, it is still important to make distinctions in certain cases as, for example when an assignment prohibition has been agreed on by contract, a (irregular) performed transfer should only be valid for a corporate debtor, but not for a transaction with a consumer. There is no notification needed in case of transferring a receivable. Still the debtor needs to have the right to pay the original creditor until he is notified of a change in contract. A compulsory notification may resolve this problem. In the case of real estate collateral, the Austrian judiciary requires the registration in the land register when transferring a receivable as well as a mortgage. When transferring collateral of the debtor in form of commercial real estate, privately used real estate or the primary residence, a registration in the land register has to be conducted as well. The main principle of debtor protection is that the debtor needs to be assured that with the transfer of the loan to a new creditor no substantive modification will appear with respect to his obligations.
Specialization allows scale effects when managing NPLs, since potential investors become familiar with certain exposure types or legal systems and languages. However, on the other hand specialization leads to concentration risk for the potential investor.
 
See question 29, in general we have an open position. An Impact Assessment should be carried out. Our domestic market is rather small, therefore we would like to have more information from other markets.
 
Specialised NPL servicers could be essential, since widespread NPL resolution creates a large demand for corporate restructuring, foreclosure, collateral sales and other relevant skills. Such skills are often in short supply and represent a major bottleneck for a sustainable NPL resolution. Third-party loan servicers are generally equipped with more expertise, experience and greater capacities to resolve NPLs. Recourse to third-party loan servicers can be seen as a specific solution for banks to overcome legacy assets, especially for smaller banks without the appropriate capacity and experience to service and manage NPLs. Generally, the internal workout of NPLs conducted by banks is quite slow and therefore a third-party servicer might be part of a faster solution. Unfavourable macroeconomic conditions in the past have made it difficult for banks to work out NPLs smoothly on their own. Third party loan servicers might be more effective in recovering value due to their better management skills and expertise. They can provide a more coherent timetable and reduce planning uncertainties. Furthermore, they could also be a good solution for healthy banks that want to manage their NPLs properly. Third party servicers could be advantageous for specialized investors, provided that data protection is assured. NPLs are complex and therefore not suitable for all retail investors. The MiFID suitability test, for instance, could include a prohibition to sell NPLs to unsuitable investors. Furthermore, it should be ensured that individual investors with sufficient financial sophistication and/or ability to bear losses have the possibility to invest in this market.
Ja(q17y)
In Austria, if a banking transaction is performed as listed in Art. 1 Federal Banking Act (BWG), a banking license is required. Therefore it depends on the activities performed; in case of mere outsourcing, a banking license is not required. If third party loan servicers act as credit intermediaries according to Art. 1 (1) Number 18 lit b Federal Banking Act (BWG), a banking license would be required. In general, data protection rules constitute a legal obstacle in case of lack of customer consent.
Banking supervision currently lacks clear rules for outsourcing; guidelines on outsourcing are currently under revision by EBA. Advantages: • Third-party loan servicers have deeper knowledge as it is more focused (ie. collection agencies); • Economies of scale; • Less “emotionally” influenced as there is no direct client relationship; • Reduction of FTE in the bank (cost issue). Risks: • Reduction of FTE (loss of knowledge); • Data protection issues; • Legal restriction.
 
In Austria, third-party loan servicers are mainly focused on the management of NPLs. Austria’s banking groups use third party providers mainly on the retail side for NPL management. The servicing of NPLs on the corporate side is mainly carried out internally. Lately, third-party loan servicers have started to cover the entire NPLs range - even standalone individual tickets.
 
In Retail Risk Management – Collections, the following services are utilized: • mainly debt collection and • gathering and developing information in skip accounts activities.
Ja(q23y)
den Zulassungsvoraussetzungen für entsprechende Dienstleister?(q23iya)
der Aufsicht über entsprechende Dienstleister?(q23iyb)
See question 29, in general we have an open position. An Impact Assessment should be carried out. Our domestic market is rather small, therefore we would like to have more information from other markets.
 
Ja(q25y)
Certain jurisdictions allow a sale of NPLs only to financial institutions, which is too restrictive. An overall NPL framework should include the possibility to sell to non-banks and SPVs, but exclude retail investors. There are different tax regulations and different tax treatments across the member states of the NPL sellers which hinder an effective disposal process of NPLs and increases cost for NPL sellers.
Ja(q26y)
One of Austria’s biggest banking group, operating in 14 markets, sells its NPL across multiple international jurisdictions ranging from Asia to the US and Europe. Each subsidiary handles its own domestic NPL sales and operates locally with domestic and international investors. Other banks answered this question in the affirmative as well.
In general, we have no direct information on significant legal restrictions in place in the markets and jurisdictions that are relevant to Austria. However, the Austrian federal economic chamber (WKO) gave us the following information regarding national legal restrictions: In one country, only losses arising from an NPL sale can be set off against the profit of the bank if the NPL was enforced or declared insolvent. In another country, in case an NPL portfolio with a nominal value of more than 300 million in the local currency is being sold, the federal central bank has to approve the transaction. In a third country, for selling NPL consumer loans licensing of third parties for loan purchase is necessary. For the sale of NPL corporate loans, there is a restriction in providing information, whereas the consent of debtor is necessary. In a fourth country, the NPL buyer must have a license of the federal National Bank for loan-buying activities. Ina fifth country, the existing restrictions refer to: (i) For retail loans there are provisions, which limit the sale of receivables only to banks or non-banking financial institutions, except for cases where the loans are qualified as NPLs and accelerated or under enforcement; (ii) For corporate loans, according to the federal National Bank guidance, only loans qualified as “loss” may be assigned to non-licensed entities. In some EU markets, consumer loan protection is very strict.
 
 
 
 
Verkauf und Übertragung von Krediten?(q29a)
Kreditservicing durch externe Dienstleister?(q29b)
 
Banks are increasingly transferring their claims e.g. securitization, financing etc., so the sale and transfer of loans can also be regarded as customary. That´s why a common harmonized EU approach could have added value for the sale and transfer of loans, because many banks hold NPLs not only in their home country, but also in the countries of their subsidiaries. We welcome this European initiative to improve transparency of secondary markets of NPLs. However, we would caution against regulatory intervention which would disrupt or even dry out existing functioning markets. A common approach for the servicing of loans by third parties might be challenging, because the servicing and management of NPLs has to be tailored to different portfolios and asset classes, the structure and governance of the banks as well as national legal systems.
 
Ja(q31y)
In Austria, a legal framework does exist for out-of-court procedures regarding debt recovery for movable tangible objects as well as for bearer and order instruments (§§ 466a to 466e Austrian general civil law, Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch ABGB). The pledgee can either auction the pledged asset publicly or sell it privately if the object holds an official market or stock price. Upon maturity the pledgee must notify his intention to sell the pledged asset to the pledgor as well as state the amount of the remaining claim. Subsequently, the pledgee has to wait for a month to give the pledgor the possibility to repay and prevent the realization of the sale. However, the statutory waiting period is reduced to one week if the pledge is a corporate transaction for the pledgee and the pledgor (§ 368 Abs. 1 Unternehmensgesetzbuch). Time and place of the auction have to be made public and be communicated to the pledgor and third parties that have a right on the pledged asset. Objects with a stock or market price can be sold privately by the pledgee, as an alternative to the auction. Bonds and other pledged securities which are listed on the stock exchange or have a market price, as well as saving certificates (Sparurkunde) that have a market price are not to be auctioned and can only be sold on the free market. If the pledged asset is a bearer or order instrument, the pledgee is entitled to collect the asset. Even in the scope of these regulations pledgees and pledgors can agree on deviating terms on-out-of-court settlements and usage of the pledged asset (§ 466a Abs. 3 ABGB). The legal provisions of § 1371 ABGB have to be respected: An agreement where the asset goes to the creditor after the maturity is invalid and void, as is one where the creditor sells the object at a predetermined price or just keeps it. In general (outside the scope of §§ 466a ff ABGB and especially for immovable objects), the person providing the collateral and the one receiving it can agree on an-out-of court usage or sale. Nevertheless, the legal provisions given by § 1371 ABGB are to be considered: Discretion over the pledged asset granted to the pledgee is already arbitrary (Supreme Court of Justice: RIS-Justiz RS0032391). Furthermore, the agreement on only the best possible sale of the pledge is considered invalid and void, but not the sale at an assessed price (Supreme Court of Justice: RIS-Justiz RS0032402).
See above
See above
It is questionable if such an instrument will bring the anticipated results. Current foreclosure procedures carried out by Austrian courts are already being handled in a short period of time. Therefore, we are doubtful that the instrument can significantly accelerate the general processing. This especially has to be seen with respect to the needed protection mechanisms for the debtor if an accelerated loan security applies. The protection mechanism would surely need some time - for example in order to obtain an up to date expert valuation of the asset price. Additionally, if a debtor is in an (pre-) insolvency proceeding (even in the case of an impending insolvency), an out-of-court utilization or sale of the asset by the creditor is forbidden in most cases. During insolvency, the insolvency manager is responsible for the utilization or sale of the asset. An out-of-court deal is only possible if the court or the insolvency manager decides so.
See Question 32
Nein(q34n)
The determination of the value of the collateral is crucial. One has to consider that the utilizing creditor is only interested in a deal that covers his/her claims, whereas the owner of the collateral is trying to obtain the highest price in order to keep the difference between cover and achieved price to him/herself. This creates tension between creditor and owner and can only be resolved by an objective determination of the present value of the collateral (e.g. real estate) by a third party. The allocated value must be the benchmark for further deals. It is not sufficient to establish the price in advance. The determination of the price must be established in timely relation to the sale or utilization. Thus, it has to be considered that starting from the point of the initial delivery of the collateral, the price might change significantly over the term of the loan. Furthermore, it is not clear if contractual securities should, in addition to movable and immovable assets, also include security rights on receivables and bonds. It might be exaggerated to transfer the ownership to the bank in case of an effective realisation of the collateral. If the bank sells the pledged asset, it can transfer the ownership to the purchaser solely with a right to dispose of the asset. Hence, it is not necessary for the bank to become the owner itself. It must be clarified whether an asset with a high value can be used as collateral for a second time for an additional creditor and how the right of this second creditor is protected. Special protection is also required for senior pledged rights.
See Question 34
Ja(q36y)
Restricting the scope to entrepreneurs would be appropriate, especially since the bank should be able to sell the collateral without court involvement. In case the outstanding claim’s amount is in dispute, the debtor would need to act and avail him/herself of judicial help. Such a reversal of the plaintiff’s role can be more reasonably borne by entrepreneurs. It is desirable to exclude the primary residence of the borrower as collateral, although such a concept is not known in Austrian law. The definition and design of such an exemption clause would be interesting, due to the fact that it also has to include owner’s relatives and deal with shared real estate in a proper way. The tight applicable framework and the possible exceptions (together with restrictions in the event of insolvency) raise doubts about whether such an instrument would be of great relevance in practice. Furthermore, it needs to be considered that the privately used property might be the only asset owned by SME that would qualify as collateral.
It can be assumed that a small debtor will not have the freedom to decide if the accelerated loan security would be applicable, since the loan will only be granted under specific conditions. In practical terms, it seems unnecessary to make accelerated loan securities attractive for debtors. The mentioned possible debtors’ full discharge from further repayment of the outstanding loan is not common in Austria. A bank is obligated to repay the recovered value from the sale of asset if it is higher than the value of the outstanding loan. Only pawnshops are exempted from this requirement with regards to pledged and movable property.
No specific rules for insolvency should be introduced. The accelerated loan security instrument should rather fall under existing national law regulating national insolvency or EU law with respect to the treatment of collateral in case of insolvency or pre-insolvency. It is important to have the possibility to suspend utilization to provide continuation of business. Special rules for appeal or similar claims should not be introduced.
It is important that the preconditions for effectively grounding security rights remain within the framework of national law (as is the case, for instance, with the registration in the land register for real estate). Legislation at EU-level should be limited to define the circumstances under which an accelerated loan security instrument can be applied, like the scope of application and the explicit approval of the security provider. Additionally, EU legislation should determine which protective measures should apply in case of utilization or sale.
See Question 39.
 
Privatperson(public-replying-as)
PETER CASSAR TORREGGIANI
 
 
 
 
Sonstiges([ID8])
 
 
 
 
Malta([ID41])
 
in retirement
Ja, ich stimme der Veröffentlichung meines Beitrags unter dem von mir angegebenen Namen zu (Name Ihrer Organisation/Ihres Unternehmens/Ihrer Behörde bzw. Ihr Name, wenn Sie als Einzelperson antworten)(yes-contributions-publication)
don't know
Internally,whether the banks loan policy is in sync with the common good by creating credit on work to facilitate both creation of wealth and its simultaneous distribution in the digital economy. Externally, whether government and central banks are following the same objectives towards the realization of this common good
Digitization and micronization, but with fully digital, internal taracability on derivative instrument reflecting the parameters in Reply 2. This could involve refinancing to longer term.
the above could provide a market incentive with higher risk offering the possibility of a greater return, as in the tranching and secularization in the US before the recession, but with proper transparency related both to design of instruments and their marketing.
if it can be done to promote the common good transparently. The key here is reflecting on derivative finance as having caused the reaction of popularism, and it being harnessed with enterprise, for instance through application to macrocirculation analysis economic theory of Bernard Lonergan. This can best be done experimentally through Malta, because of its laboratory dimensions, and the constitutional case on the National Bank of Malta, in an out of court resolution at Parliamentary level based on the application of the EU restoration and reconstruction iniative for bank reconstruction.
both are possible, especially if terms are lengthened for pension fund attractiveness. However the relevance of Bernard Lonergan's insight to the causes of fluctionational instability from innovation as the economic driver needs interested study, reflection, and application
in both cases science through digital ecomonic perspectives impact fiduciary culture which calls for virtious prudence on the personal level. This is much deeper than banki8ng legislation at EU level has gone so far. However the Malta "experiment" long postulated to the EU Commission and Parliament by the undersigned, both on behalf of the Malta Council of the European Movement in the FP7 consultation and personally in the 2020 Innovation Union launch can provide the deepening quite rapidly i the context of the resolution of the question of the true nature of the family.
promoting market size...... debtor protection, data protection privacy
working through the Malta experiment to renew the civilization by promoting ethical value in seeking tom advance man's future, with a faith that takes in the planetary dimension and all its issues, in the spirit of Lonergan's vision of Cosmopolis
Nein(q9n)
 
am not familiar with the rules
Obviously with his consent. This makes senses if there is refinincing in the initiative. Remember recent studies show the sub-prime crisis in the US was not caused by "poor buyers" but by speculators dealing in additional properties with house loans. Bank's in Malta are doing just this because of a boom in the rental market.
Clarity for investors, and a renewal for borrowers, and a better balancing of cycles by governments
If the insight of Prime minister Edwared Fenech Adami of Malkta in 1987 is studied you will see that the Euro itself is the key to the future of the Union at the popular level to countact both popularism and Brezit, on condition that the vEU sees the Malta Experiment as a test bed for deliverables into the rest of the world across the Middle East and African migratory conundrums, as far as China's urban migration.
they have to be directed to delivering the promise of the preamble to the Treaty of Rome that the Union will benefit its citizens. Here is an opportunity staring the institutions in the face. We can demonstrate it microcosmically in Malta at the levelel of a Parliamentary resolution with the EP of the mysterious saga of the National Bank of Malta.
Money is a good servant, but a bad master. Governments cannot continue in our civilization to idolize money for their populations. So stimulae need to be redirected to the real economy in order to reach greater personal creativity in enterprise and in distribution of real extramental property as a guarantee of personal dignity.. Pope Francis has some goid passages on this in Evangelium Nuntiandi. Malta can do it for Europe.
specialization in work can bring progress, but only if the professionals remember that ethics willserve the future est for all men
Ja(q17y)
they are not yet engineered as "products" that are safe for marketing to investors.
Too many cooks spoil the broth? In NY buying and selling tranched derivatives lost touch with the values of good truth and decency. Europe can and must do betrer. We in Malta can help you do it, on condition that you can understand what it means for the underprivilideged in th global civiluzation of love, which Bernard Lonergan, a Jesuit , code named COSMOPOLIS
The lack of Central bank care or concern about the basic dignity of human work. The objective of price stability is not enough on its own, unless cycles are modulated as to flucuations. Integrative economics can do it. So the Malta experiment should be about this and must be done quite soon.
Both, Speculators can gofor more non performing loans if they are recycled as indicated above. Others can get access to higher returns with out excessive speculative engagement.
so long as there is clarity and simplicity to flee over-complexity they can be judiciously mixed as optional products in both market segments
debt collection is done in Malta in a small way, even informally with court marshals after judgements in court.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I don't believe debts can be sold on without debtor's consenting, unless bills of exchange have been integrated into debt contracts. There is an interesting question of embedded b/e in hypoticary contracts about the transferability of the hypoticary rights with the sale of the instrument
 
 
 
The cross border aspewct needs to be built up from the creation of credit on work itself from the micro level up to corporate levels. It has to be raised out of the euro's reconciliatory roots being considered as a hidden reserve of the common good. The property aspect follows, but must not be seen to substitute the dignity of the person's work.
 
 
Expression of motivation at the service of the man in the street and his community of work (employers) 0
Integrative economic governance in response to popularist dis-enchantement with the European ideal can be aussaged by your secondary market activity if microfinance is kept in mind. It may be that FINTECH distruptive creativity has a role to play. Can boxchain type software help you and create personal value, eg by mobilizing bonus entitlements as derivatives in mini instruments whose secondary market values may reflect not only percieved future maturity value but also allow encompass "mining"
Nein(q31n)
 
 
 
yes, but only if the rights of debtors in trouble are valso enhanced, maybe by a chapter 11 provision to facilitate restructuring dynamically as in the USA
it depends on wherhere professional ethics are encouraged to stretch out for the future of man.
Ja(q34y)
 
better balancing with enhanced debtor rights based on the dignity of work, which is dynamic in living structures.
Ja(q36y)
absolutely immoral to let business men ruin their families through such an instrument.
i don't understand the relation postulated between borrowers and debtors. Are they the same parties? But in any case who will value the asset? This is trick perception.
Lack of dialogue between the affected parties.
The lack of integrative economic and political policies and processes
By being careful nt to skirt around constitutional property protection rights on the assumption that the debtor's bad work has brought on the crisis.
Organisation oder Unternehmen(organisation-replying-as)
 
Raiffeisen Banking Group
 
Ja(yes-transparency-register)
33858106461-10
Bankwesen([ID7])
Unternehmen, KMU, Kleinstunternehmen, Einzelunternehmer([ID6])
 
 
 
Österreich([ID21])
 
 
Ja, ich stimme der Veröffentlichung meines Beitrags unter dem von mir angegebenen Namen zu (Name Ihrer Organisation/Ihres Unternehmens/Ihrer Behörde bzw. Ihr Name, wenn Sie als Einzelperson antworten)(yes-contributions-publication)
Of course, when measured in relative terms, the secondary market is small. Depending on the asset type and the available collateral, the liquidity level is different. The main obstacle currently is the non-unified structure of secondary markets and the lack of common rules in the European Union. The obstacles relate to loss recognition, licensing (both for buyers and servicers) and the amount of financing that is available for the buyers.
- bank internal factors (i.e. any factors inside the bank including the type and characteristics of the NPL portfolio, management capacity etc.) There could be more standardised key performance indicators (KPIs) available in the banking industry, which measure and challenge expected recoveries vs. expected sale price. This includes the possibility of benchmarking the recoveries after the sales have been concluded (both prior to sale and when back-testing). The recoveries used by the banks are possibly overstated and the sale price is shown conservatively (by the buyer due to high return expectations). Further, certain banks do not have dedicated sales desks that sell NPLs. Certain banks manage the sale process directly in work-out. - external factors (i.e. any factors outside of the bank that are important con-siderations in this context. The overall NPL target and budget should be part of the global strategy of individual banking groups. Banks that are not publicly listed have less shareholder pressure to get rid of non-performing loans compared to banks which are publicly listed and rated. The rating agencies also measure the banks based on non-performing ratios, which may trigger more sales.
Supply Factors: • Incentives not to hold and rather to dispose of provisioned loans as banks currently keep them on the balance sheet to boost their coverage ratios • Incentives to exit non-viable companies • Reliance on collateral limits/values in order to incentivise write-offs or sales • Tax disincentives to provisioning and write-offs • Disposing of loans based on long standing relationships poses reputational risks – this topic needs to be tackled Demand Factors: • Changes in the judicial process: Lengthy inefficient judicial process can raise the cost of foreclosure and lower the returns on NPLs (which results in less incentives for investors to enter the market) • Incentives for equity capital to enter a market for distressed loans • Increasing the quality of completeness of the data tapes • Transferability of loans and its security can be cumbersome – this issue needs to be solved
• Facilitation of KYC (Know Your Customer) and boarding of the debt purchasers • Financing/Leverage possibilities for the debt purchasers • Incentivising earn out solutions • New framework for NPL (Non-performing Loans) securitisation • Private Asset Management companies and restructuring vehicles • Data protection releases after Non-Disclosure Agreements are signed • Creating a wider national or EU NPL sales platform to create transparency in the market
 
From the perspective of the seller, we do not see advantages related to a specific type of investor. Moreover, creating investment opportunities for the specialised investor should be irrelevant. The main aim for a sale/non-sale decision of a bank is capital preservation vs. P/L impact. A complete write-off should help engage the sale process. But in most cases written-off legacy assets remain on the balance sheet as these are usually the worst assets and banks want to still recover something above the write-off levels. The main advantage of the development of the secondary market is to close the gap between offering levels and bid levels, bringing more supply, easier settlement and closing as well as a standardised sales approach.
The main concern for the investment fund is the KYC (Know Your Customer), as most of the funds are non-EU regulated funds. A further concern for this type of investor is the minimum ticket size they have to bid on and the possibility of needed financing. In addition, the recovery concerns related usually to the individual jurisdiction play a role. Investment banks usually prop only part of the NPL they acquire and they are ear-marked for being marketed to further investors. Therefore, they are required to skim on the NPL purchases.
The privacy aspect is important as in most cases the NPL sales are advertised by the buyer (in order to induce further sales to other parties) and are not kept confidential. The data secrecy is very much respected and makes sales in certain jurisdictions difficult as the data is only available in very late bidding stage. The equal treatment of investors is very important and consequentially there is a need for a policy. By treating investors equally one creates fair competition. 1. promoting increased market size and depth and equal treatment of investors 2. data secrecy 3. privacy 4. debtor protection
Having a fair regulation would be the best solution to this problem.
Nein(q9n)
 
Definitively yes.
In case of default there should not be any protection. In case of going concern the transferability will be done according to the loan agreement. In our view there is no need for additional protection.
Access to historical recoveries and experience in the recovery of the debt.
The obstacles are: • Tax treatment • KYC requirements • Transferability of loans and/or collateral • Difficulty of the enforcement
Yes, see question 13.
No further comments.
In the retail part of our debt collections activities we utilise external collections agen-cies and external legal service providers in different stages of the collection cycle. This helps us to utilise all potential collections tools towards customers and clients in order to strengthen communication, accelerate and emphasise communication with customers. From the short term perspective, a 3rd party involvement could also bridge the shortage of own resources for collections activities and could serve as a point of reference for internal performance comparison.
Ja(q17y)
In some of the countries in which we operate we have observed some obstacles for banks to have a direct and operation free access to the 3rd party loan servicers. Those obstacles are based on the national legislation bases in the form of mandatory licensing (eg. Albania, Slovakia).
For the advantages, we can include the flexibility regarding the capacity for collection resources, access to the customer data which could be utilised in the bank’s favour, in terms of contacting customers. The possibility of the escalation of message from the internal (bank) towards external side (3rd party) plays an important role. In addition, 3rd party can provide updated customer contact information. Risk of outsourcing specific activities are similar to all types of outsourcing. Those risks need to be carefully assessed and mitigated.
We do not see any risks towards debtor protection (households) in case the 3rd party provider is acting within the legal framework and regulation of the respective country of its operation, in line with agreed terms and conditions and under diligent observa-tion of the regulator. In many countries, 3rd parties also follow their own Code of Conduct.
• We use third party providers mainly on the retail side for NPL management. • Servicing of NPLs on the corporate side is mainly done internally.
In retail there is specialisation driven by product type – secured/unsecured, geographical location occurs for large countries
In “Retail Risk Management – collections” the following services are utilised: • debt collection • gathering and developing information in skip accounts activities
Ja(q23y)
den Zulassungsvoraussetzungen für entsprechende Dienstleister?(q23iya)
der Aufsicht über entsprechende Dienstleister?(q23iyb)
Yes, still in order to answer this question impartially and objectively a deep analysis of legal frameworks in all countries would be required.
No comments.
Ja(q25y)
Certain jurisdictions allow a sale only to financial institutions. A sale to non-banks such as Special Purpose vehicles or funds is cumbersome. Certain countries allow the sale to jointly invested vehicles with an upside sharing: the obstacles should be eliminated.
Ja(q26y)
RBI, e.g. operates in 14 markets, but NPL sales are across multiple international jurisdic-tions ranging from Asia to the US and Europe. Each local country handles its own domestic NPL sales and operates locally with domestic and international investors.
Poland is an example where only losses arising from the NPL sale can be offset against the profit of the bank if the Non-performing loan was enforced or declared insolvent.
 
 
 
• EU wide licenses for the investors • Faster recognition of losses for the banks • Initiatives, tax credits for NPL sales • No more bank levy in certain countries
Verkauf und Übertragung von Krediten?(q29a)
Continue to harmonise the legal framework and not rely on private initiatives such as the LMA (loan market association) initiatives to have a unified approach.
 
No further comments.
Ja(q31y)
Financial collateral pursuant to Financial Collateral Directive 2002/47/EC as imple-mented in Austria in Finanzsicherheitengesetz BGBl I 2010/90 as amended. Pledged movable goods, which have a market price or are listed on an exchange, in particular securities, may be sold by the pledgee at such market price. The pledgee has to follow some formalities (Para 466a seq Austrian Civil Code).
Court auctions are not the right place to find buyers and to obtain offers which are at market level. The free hand sale by a bank in the appropriate market place ensures recoveries at actual market value.
Non-compliance with formalities may result in liability of pledgee. A sale by the pledgee below market price to a good faith purchaser will be valid against the pledg-or, but result in a damage claim against the pledgee only.
Yes. It will help to sell the pledged goods (in particular real estate) in the market and to obtain recoveries at market levels. Court auctions normally result in heavy discounts from market level. If the debtor is co-operative, already now, the standard procedure for the enforcement of mortgages on business real estate is a sale by the creditor at market price under a power of attorney granted by the mortgager.
Yes. It will help to obtain better recoveries in shorter periods of time.
Nein(q34n)
We do not fully agree. We prefer not to become owner of the pledged assets, in particular in case of mortgaged real estate, because of the potential inherent risks of the assets. We prefer to be granted authority to sell without becoming owner of the asset before.
Creditor’s authority to sell the pledged asset shall be upheld in insolvency proceedings. Sale by insolvency administrators will create additional costs and – because of the formal court proceedings – less market interest and consequently less recoveries. Furthermore, the accelerated loan security shall be extended to collateral granted by third party collateral providers. There is no difference between collateral granted by the debtor itself and any third party collateral provider.
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q36d)
 
The potential discharge of debtors as described in your question is not feasible. It will be to the detriment of the debtors, as it will force the bank to fix lower value thresholds for acceleration of the loan. It is a valuable benefit for debtors that the new collateral will result in better recoveries at market level. Already now, most corporate mortgagors are prepared to grant powers of attorney to the creditor for the sale of the mortgaged property in case of default under the loan agreement.
It will be of essence that the authority to sell will remain with the pledgee and will not be transferred to the insolvency administrator. A stay of the enforcement shall only be granted if the mortgaged asset is necessary for the business of the insolvent debtor to be continued.
The accelerated loan security shall be registered in the land and mortgage registry (Grundbuch) in case of real estate. A new register for such security on movable goods should be implemented.
Please refer to answer to question 39.
 
Organisation oder Unternehmen(organisation-replying-as)
 
CBA Studio Legale e Tributario
 
Nein(no-transparency-register)
 
Recht([ID16])
Beratungsunternehmen, Anwaltskanzlei([ID7])
 
 
 
Italien([ID36])
 
 
Ja, ich stimme der Veröffentlichung meines Beitrags unter dem von mir angegebenen Namen zu (Name Ihrer Organisation/Ihres Unternehmens/Ihrer Behörde bzw. Ihr Name, wenn Sie als Einzelperson antworten)(yes-contributions-publication)
\
 
 
 
 
Con riguardo ai vantaggi specifici per lo sviluppo dei mercati secondari si ritiene che meriti una precisa analisi la modalità, tra quelle di gestione di NPL, consistente nel trasferimento/apporto di NPL ad asset management company (AMC) o a fondi di ristrutturazione [a tale modalità di gestione accennano anche (i) il documento della BCE “Stocktake of national supervisory practices and legal frameworks related to NPLs” nel Capitolo 2, Sezione 2.2.1; (ii) il Discussion Paper dell’EBA “On the Significant Risk Transfer in Securitisation” paragrafi 240 e 250 oltreché (iii) il “FSI Insights on policy implementation” n. 3 del Financial Stability Institute riguardo al “Resolution of non-performing loans policy options” p. 3, 14, 20. Per l’inquadramento dell’innovativa fattispecie del fondo di ristrutturazione si veda Paolo Carrière “I “fondi comuni di ristrutturazione”: ricostruzione tipologica e inquadramento sistematico di una nuova fattispecie di OICR” in Diritto Bancario, 2016 nonché Paolo Carrière “i “fondi comuni di ristrutturazione” tra investimento, finanziamento e cartolarizzazione”, in Rivista delle Società n. 4/2016.]; modalità che presenta, in tutti i suoi molteplici risvolti, notevoli peculiarità. Tale modalità di gestione di NPL presenta e comporta, infatti, profili organizzativi, regolamentari, contabili, ecc. ...del tutto peculiari e diversi da quelli normalmente considerati in relazione ai due modelli operativi di gestione di NPL classicamente considerati: la forbearance e la foreclosure. Il modello operativo in questione vede normalmente la cessione/l’apporto di NPL da parte delle banche ad un veicolo (che può essere un fondo comune, un AMC o anche un corporate recovery vehicle [CRV]) a fronte dell’attribuzione in contropartita di quote-units del veicolo stesso; quote-units che quindi verranno detenute in portafoglio dalle banche al posto degli NPL apportati. Il veicolo procederà, dunque, alla gestione attiva “in pool” degli NPL oggetto di apporto, con una diversificazione pertanto del rischio di credito facente capo originariamente a ciascuna banca conferente e con una politica gestoria caratterizzata da una finalità non tanto di mero recupero/incasso di NPL, ma piuttosto di “ristrutturazione” dell’impresa debitrice che si trovi in stato di crisi, avvalendosi normalmente di strumenti di composizione della crisi di impresa. L’andamento del valore e dei flussi connessi alle quote-units del veicolo è, quindi, strettamente collegato al successo delle operazioni di ristrutturazione aziendali che vengono così affidate all’esterno delle banche, in capo a soggetti professionalmente attrezzati e dedicati proprio a tale attività di ristrutturazione aziendale. Lo schema persegue e consente, dunque, una enorme estrazione di valore rispetto ai tradizionali processi di ristrutturazione che vengano seguiti direttamente dalle banche attraverso i loro uffici interni; e ciò sia a causa di una più evidente e marcata specializzazione, professionalizzazione ed efficientamento degli interventi necessari, sia e soprattutto perché lo schema consente di ottenere un benefico e fondamentale effetto di concentrazione di posizioni creditorie bancarie inizialmente polverizzate su una platea normalmente molto ampia di interlocutori bancari, portatori di interessi quantitativamente e qualitativamente molto diversificati e talora conflittuali. La conseguenza principale ed evidente, per ogni operatore delle “ristrutturazioni”, di tale polverizzazione è quella di un “avvitamento” dei processi di ristrutturazione in una dialettica (banche-debitore e interbancaria) assai complessa, lunga e farraginosa che li rende spesso inefficienti e inefficaci, pregiudicando ogni possibilità di uscita dalla crisi. Lo schema in esame, dunque, oltre ad abbattere i costi operativi delle banche relativi alla gestione interna di complessi processi di ristrutturazione, velocizza e accresce le possibilità di successo dei processi di ristrutturazione delle imprese debitrici, risolvendosi in un incremento del recovery rate. Al contempo, atteso che tali processi di ristrutturazione delle imprese debitrici passano spesso e fisiologicamente attraverso operazioni di conversione di NPL in strumenti di equity/quasi-equity (debt to equity swap), tale schema operativo consente una più agile ed efficiente gestione anche di tale fase nel migliore rispetto di quello che rimane il principio di separatezza banca-industria. Con particolare riguardo alla evenienza, tutt’affatto fisiologica, come visto, che i veicoli AMC ovvero i fondi di ristrutturazione, nell’ambito della loro gestione attiva di NPL conferiti dalle banche, procedano a operazioni di conversione in capitale delle imprese debitrici occorre correttamente analizzare la posizione regolamentare delle banche conferenti/detentrici delle quote-units del veicolo, alla luce del principio di separatezza banca-industria, quale recepito nei vari ordinamenti.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nell'ordinamento italiano il legislatore ha recentemente introdotto (D.L. n. 50 del 2017 convertito con modificazioni dalla L. n. 96 del 2017) un nuovo articolo 7.1 nella legge n. 130 del 1999 (c.d. “legge sulla cartolarizzazione”) al fine di (i) consentire alle c.d. SPV (Special Purpose Vehicle) di “acquisire o sottoscrivere azioni, quote e altri titoli e strumenti partecipativi derivanti dalla conversione di parte dei crediti”; (ii) chiarire che la SPV può “concedere finanziamenti al fine di migliorare le prospettive di recupero dei crediti oggetto di cessione e di favorire il ritorno in bonis del debitore ceduto” prevedendosi poi che, in questo caso, “non si applicano in questo caso le disposizioni di cui agli articoli 2467 e 2497-quinquies del codice civile” (disciplina della postergazione dei finanziamenti soci); (iii) consentire, indirettamente, alla SPV una più efficiente gestione degli immobili sottostanti ai crediti oggetto di cartolarizzazione. Si evidenzia come l’ambito di applicazione del nuovo articolo 7.1 della L. n. 130 del 1999 è ristretto al comma 1 del citato articolo come segue: “Alle cessioni di crediti, qualificati come deteriorati in base alle disposizioni dell'autorità competente, ceduti da banche e intermediari finanziari iscritti nell'albo di cui all'articolo 106 del testo unico bancario aventi sede legale in Italia, si applicano altresì le disposizioni del presente articolo.”. Tale limitazione ai soli soggetti “aventi sede legale in Italia” comporta un’indebita restrizione in quanto esclude i soggetti autorizzati a svolgere attività bancaria o finanziaria in Italia ma aventi sede legale al di fuori del territorio Italiano.
Si evidenzia come nella prassi si riscontrano frequentemente, nei modelli negoziali degli atti da cui originano i crediti deteriorati (contratti di finanziamento, etc…), dei limiti alla cedibilità dei contratti, e conseguentemente dei crediti, se non a determinati soggetti, solitamente a banche. Questi limiti negoziali alla cedibilità restringono e limitano la circolazione dei crediti pregiudicando lo sviluppo di un mercato secondario più efficiente. Alla luce di ciò appare opportuna una previsione normativa che equipari, ai soli fini della cedibilità dei crediti, qualunque altro soggetto autorizzato all’acquisto e alla gestione di crediti deteriorati (quali, società di cartolarizzazioni, OICR etc...), alle banche.
Un obiettivo che potrebbe essere perseguito a livello legislativo è quello di accelerare e fluidificare i percorsi di risanamento; ma ciò può solo avvenire agevolando la concentrazione delle posizioni creditorie oggi diffuse tra una moltitudine di banche (spesso litigiose tra loro) in capo ad un unico interlocutore professionale dell’impresa. In tal senso – e spingendosi oltre sulla strada già intrapresa dal legislatore italiano con la recente introduzione della adesione obbligatoria ad un accordo di ristrutturazione ovvero ad una moratoria ex art. 182 septies, l.f. (introdotto dall’art. 9 del d.l. 27 giugno 2015, n.83, convertito con modificazioni dalla legge 6 agosto 2015, n.132) – occorrerebbe introdurre un meccanismo legale di “creditor drag along”: un obbligo cioè in capo alle banche che siedono attorno ad un tavolo di ristrutturazione nell’ambito di una procedura stragiudiziale di conferire i propri crediti ad un operatore specializzato (AMC o fondo di ristrutturazione), ove così decida la maggioranza delle banche. Si vedano altresì le osservazioni contenute nella risposta alla domanda n. 5.
 
 
 
Si veda la risposta alla domanda n. 5.
 
Si veda la risposta alla domanda n. 5.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nell'ordinamento italiano il legislatore ha recentemente introdotto (D.L. n. 50 del 2017 convertito con modificazioni dalla L. n. 96 del 2017) un nuovo articolo 7.1 nella legge n. 130 del 1999 (c.d. “legge sulla cartolarizzazione”) al fine di (i) consentire alle c.d. SPV (Special Purpose Vehicle) di “acquisire o sottoscrivere azioni, quote e altri titoli e strumenti partecipativi derivanti dalla conversione di parte dei crediti”; (ii) chiarire che la SPV può “concedere finanziamenti al fine di migliorare le prospettive di recupero dei crediti oggetto di cessione e di favorire il ritorno in bonis del debitore ceduto” prevedendosi poi che, in questo caso, “non si applicano in questo caso le disposizioni di cui agli articoli 2467 e 2497-quinquies del codice civile” (disciplina della postergazione dei finanziamenti soci); (iii) consentire, indirettamente, alla SPV una più efficiente gestione degli immobili sottostanti ai crediti oggetto di cartolarizzazione. Si evidenzia come l’ambito di applicazione del nuovo articolo 7.1 della L. n. 130 del 1999 è ristretto al comma 1 del citato articolo come segue: “Alle cessioni di crediti, qualificati come deteriorati in base alle disposizioni dell'autorità competente, ceduti da banche e intermediari finanziari iscritti nell'albo di cui all'articolo 106 del testo unico bancario aventi sede legale in Italia, si applicano altresì le disposizioni del presente articolo.”. Tale limitazione ai soli soggetti “aventi sede legale in Italia” comporta un’indebita restrizione in quanto esclude i soggetti autorizzati a svolgere attività bancaria o finanziaria in Italia ma aventi sede legale al di fuori del territorio Italiano.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organisation oder Unternehmen(organisation-replying-as)
 
Finance Denmark
 
Ja(yes-transparency-register)
20705158207-35
Bankwesen([ID7])
Wirtschaftsverband([ID9])
 
 
 
Dänemark([ID27])
 
 
Ja, ich stimme der Veröffentlichung meines Beitrags unter dem von mir angegebenen Namen zu (Name Ihrer Organisation/Ihres Unternehmens/Ihrer Behörde bzw. Ihr Name, wenn Sie als Einzelperson antworten)(yes-contributions-publication)
While tackling the accumulation of high levels of NPLs on the balance sheet of banks is important for the overall financial stability in the EU, it is our assessment that this issue is not particularly pertinent to Danish banks. Finance Denmark generally does not see NPLs as a limiting factor for the ability of our members to fi-nance businesses.
Time for recovery of debts and in house loan management capacity are amongst the most relevant internal factors. Regulatory obstacles as well as reputational and customer relations risks are relevant external factors.
Removing regulatory barriers for the sale of NPL portfolios in national legislation is a prerequisite (please refer to the answer to Question 10 below).
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
1. Debtor protection, 2. privacy, 3. data secrecy, 4. promoting increased market size and depth and equal treatment of investors.
Please refer to the answer to Question 11 below regarding licensing requirements for buyers of NPLs.
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q9d)
 
There are certain national rules which currently make it difficult for Danish banks to sell NPLs on a secondary market, and these impediments would have to be addressed if such a secondary market was to be introduced. Specifically, according to the Danish Financial Business Act banks may not without due cause divulge or use confidential information obtained during the performance of their duties. All customer information is considered confidential unless it is already public knowledge, and the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority is highly restrictive in its interpretation of what constitutes due cause. The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority has previously rejected requests from a bank to sell portfolios of NPLs to a third party. The result is that unless the borrower has consented, a Danish bank is generally not allowed to sell NPLs to third parties.
In Denmark, buyers of NPLs must be licensed debt collectors in accordance with the Danish Debt Collection Act and must adhere to a code of conduct for debt collection. In our experience, this requirement ensures debtor protection from aggressive debt collection methods.
N/A
N/A
We are not certain that a legislative initiative is needed, or indeed the best course of action. A Commission recommendation promoting best practices from Member States could be sufficient and perhaps more desirable at this time.
N/A
N/A
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q17d)
 
Outsourcing loan management services means that the bank does not need to scale up and down its in house management facilities according to the financial cycle.
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q23d)
 
 
N/A
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q25d)
 
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q26d)
 
Please refer to the answer to Question 10 above.
 
Ja(q27y)
Please refer to the answer to Question 10 above.
N/A
Verkauf und Übertragung von Krediten?(q29a)
Please refer to the answer to Question 14 above.
Please refer to the answer to Question 14 above.
N/A
Nein(q31n)
 
 
 
Yes. If such a type of instrument was available as an option to post as collateral for businesses seeking funding from a bank, it could lead to increased access to capital and would also support the stability of the financial sector. A harmonized approach which respects national systems that work well would also encourage further cross-border lending.
While the accelerated loan security does not tackle the issue of NPLs already on banks’ balance sheets, quicker access to out-of-court enforcement could potentially mean that future loans would be less likely to accumulate on the balance sheets of banks in jurisdictions with suboptimal in-court enforcement procedures. However, certain features of the accelerated loan security would have to be amended for the instrument to be a viable option for banks (please refer to the answer to Questions 34 and 35 below).
Ja(q34y)
 
We agree with the overall concept as described with two main caveats: 1) Ownership of the pledged asset As described in the consultation document, the bank would have the right to retain or acquire ownership of the encumbered assets with a view to satisfying the secured claims through a sale or by simply keeping the asset. This could mean that the bank would have to consolidate newly acquired assets on their balance sheets to the detriment of e.g. capital allocation requirements. A different option could be that the ownership of the encumbered asset was not transferred, but rather that the asset was sold either through a private sale or an auction with proceeds going directly to the lender. In this way, the lender would be satisfied while keeping the assets off the balance sheet. 2) Debtors’ full discharge The debtors' full discharge from further repayment obligations, when the recovered value from the sale of assets is lower than the value of the outstanding loan, could encourage borrowers to act irresponsibly and increase speculative behavior among borrowers, especially when asset values decrease. While any proceeds from a sale of pledged assets should be subtracted from the outstanding debts, the debtor should still be responsible for remaining payments. The bank must also be able to mitigate the potential risks for liability in connection with the enforcement of the accelerated loan security through the terms of the agreement.
Ja(q36y)
Yes. The overall objective of the Capital Markets Union is to create better access to finance for businesses and corporates in the EU. Therefore, the focus should be on these entities rather than consumers and home owners. This is also in line with the Commission proposal on preventive restructuring frameworks and second chance, which focusses on businesses and entrepreneurs.
The accelerated loan security should be advantageous to borrowers in and of itself due to the reduced risk for banks holding this kind of security. Less risk and easier access to quick enforcement for lenders should lead to lower interest rates and better terms overall for borrowers. This effect would be further enhanced if loans secured by the accelerated loan security positively affected the capital requirements of banks, i.e. through reduced risk weights for such loans.
According to the consultation document, national rules and principles of pre-insolvency and insolvency proceedings would prevail over the accelerated loan security, meaning that the contractual security right for the bank would only be enforceable as long as the debtor is not in financial distress. This aspect would significantly weaken the value of the security and would discourage banks holding such security from supporting restructuring efforts for a debtor’s potentially viable business. Furthermore, it would likely limit the viability, effectiveness and relevance of the accelerated loan security severely, since such collateral is generally most relevant in times of financial distress for the borrower. If the full effect of the collateral is to be realized, the accelerated loan security should be enforceable even when a debtor enters into an insolvency or preventive restructuring proceeding. Avoidance actions should still apply to this type of collateral in order to safeguard the rights of other creditors.
The accelerated loan security as described is a contractual right and would have to be tailored by each Member State in order to accommodate existing legal frameworks of private law, which are highly diversified within the EU. The Commission proposal could outline the basic aspects of the accelerated loan security, but leave the details to Member States in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity.
The accelerated loan security should supplement the existing options for collateral that debtors currently have at their disposal. The option to use this new security right for banks should be used only when agreed upon by the contracting parties (lender and borrower) and should not impose restrictions on the use of other forms of collateral that are currently available in Member States.
 
Privatperson(public-replying-as)
Avv. Antonio Castro
 
 
 
 
Bankwesen([ID7])
Recht([ID16])
Kreditservicing/Inkassowesen([ID17])
 
 
 
 
Italien([ID36])
 
 
Ja, ich stimme der Veröffentlichung meines Beitrags unter dem von mir angegebenen Namen zu (Name Ihrer Organisation/Ihres Unternehmens/Ihrer Behörde bzw. Ihr Name, wenn Sie als Einzelperson antworten)(yes-contributions-publication)
Si. Soprattutto la ”struttura” dei mercati secondari costituisce un ostacolo allo sviluppo del mercato dei crediti deteriorati. I principali acquirenti di NPL sono fondi finanziari che per procurarsi la dotazione sul mercato collocano azioni da rivendere ai risparmiatori. Le regole internazionali sul collocamento sono più o meno calibrate sulla difesa del risparmi e ciò determina una serie di limitazioni derivanti dalla stretta relazione tra “profilatura del rischio” del risparmiatore e e margine di rischio sotteso agli asset di NPL da acquistare. Tale relazione è il maggiore responsabile del gap tra domanda e offerta. Per mitigare tale gap strutturale del mercato è necessario che le regole sulla pulizia del bilancio valevo per la cessione pro soluto, siano estese anche alla cessione pro solvendo ovvero ad una nuova forma “mista” di cessione che preveda non un unico corrispettivo fisso e a corpo, ma un corrispettivo appunto misto che preveda una parte fissa (che costituisca il margine massimo di rischio che il risparmiatore in relazione alla sua propria profilatura può sopportare) e una parte variabile (in success fee)
Il principale incentivo è costituito dal prezzo della cessione costituito dalla percentuale di credito iscritto al bilancio (book value) ricavabile dalla cessione L’altro incentivo interno è costituito dalla capacità tramite la cessione di creare nuovi impieghi invertendo i parametri del rapporto tra risorse ed impieghi fattori esterni (ossia fattori al di fuori della banca importanti in questo contesto). La capacità di compliance de soggetti acquirenti e dei loro servicer rispetto alla tutela sia dei debitori ceduti sia dei risparmiatori sottoscrittori dei titoli emessi per finanziare lì’acquisto.
La previsione nella transazione per acquisto e cessione dei crediti, non un unico corrispettivo fisso e a corpo, ma un corrispettivo appunto misto che preveda una parte fissa (che costituisca il margine massimo di rischio che il risparmiatore in relazione alla sua propria profilatura può sopportare) e una parte variabile (in success fee) parametrato ai risultati della gestione che i servicer dei mercati secondari riescono a performare
La previsione nella transazione per acquisto e cessione dei crediti, non un unico corrispettivo fisso e a corpo, ma un corrispettivo appunto misto che preveda una parte fissa (che costituisca il margine massimo di rischio che il risparmiatore in relazione alla sua propria profilatura può sopportare) e una parte variabile (in success fee) parametrato ai risultati della gestione che i servicer dei mercati secondari riescono a performare.
 
Si, il decommissionamento delle strutture di recupero interne che essendo vincolate ai contratti di lavoro subordinato a salari poco flessibile non riescono a mettere sotto controllo il grado di produttività delle attività di recupero creare opportunità d'investimento per gli investitori specializzati? Si la possibilità di standardizzare i processi di recupero in modalità innovativa e flessibile che riescono ad assorbire le continue trasformazioni del quadro socio economico trasformandole in continue innovazioni nelle strategie di recupero
Per le banche la principale preoccupazione è costituita dalla impossibilità tecnica di creare modelli di previsione delle performance di recupero attendibili a causa della molteplicità e complessità delle variabili indipendenti legate agli andamenti dei sistemi macroeconomici e alle innovazioni nei modelli di consumo socialmente accettati come desiderabili. Per gli investitori specializzati le maggiori preoccupazioni da una parte derivano dalle caratteristiche fisse dei prezzi di acquisto e dall’altra dalla estrema flessibilità dei costi di gestione e recupero.
RISCHI: nessuno in quanto dalla cessione del credito non può in alcun modo determinarsi una modifica peggiorativa della posizione originaria del debitore ceduto a seguito della cessione, a cui non ha partecipato. Ed infatti non è necessario, ai fini dell’attuazione del passaggio del credito, che il debitore presti il suo consenso, essendo per il debitore indifferente la persona del creditore, dal momento che deve ugualmente pagare all’uno o all’altro. Iil debitore ceduto può opporre al cessionario le medesime eccezioni che poteva opporre al cedente. BENEFICI: una maggiore customerizzazione delle attività esplicate dai soggetti specializzati nei suoi confronti che spesso lo aiutano fornendogli incentivi di consulenza sulle modalità di rientro che alle banche risulterebbero impossibli riservatezza, RISCHI e BENEFICI: nessuno laddove i sogetti acquirenti appicano pienamente la compliance segretezza dei dati, RISCHI e BENEFICI: nessuno laddove i sogetti acquirenti appicano pienamente la compliance
 
 
 
Si, se non si cambiano le regola di bilancio in materia di cessione pro solvendo
Tramite una informazione tempestiva e completa sia dell’avvenuta cessione sia e soprattutto delle offerte e degli incentivi forniti dal nuovo titolare del credito
Il maggiore vantaggio costituisce dal continuo aggiornamento sulle modifiche legislative e sulle opportunità di mercato offerte ai debitori per la remissione in bonis.
Il maggiore ostacolo (almeno in Italia) è costituito dalla scarsa specializzazione degli operatori istituzionali. MAGISTRATI Da una parte, l’ordinamento giudiziario obbliga i magistrati a ruolo ad un continuo e obbligatorio turn over che immette continuamente nelle sezioni esecutive magistrati inesperti perché provenienti da sezioni che curano contenziosi diversi. AUSILIARI Dall’altra parte il mito del rapporto di fiducia tra magistrato e ausiliario tende ad annullare le specializzazioni dai requisiti richiesti per ottenere l’incarico specifico nella sezione esecutiva. Non esiste nessun sanziona per un magistrato che nomini Consulente Tecnico d’Ufficio o Professionista delegato un perfetto incompetente che però è suo amico (mentre la stessa attività esplicata da un politico prevede sanzioni gravissime che arrivano fino alla detenzione personale in carcere)
 
 
Evitare la diseconomia interna derivante dalla rigidità dei costi aziendali di mantenimento di struttura al servizio del credito e la estrema flessibilità dei rendimenti delle attività di recupero del credito.
Ja(q17y)
la garanzia sull’adempimento degli obblighi di compliance
L’esternalizzazione di qualunque servizio rapportato al parametro tempo/qualità rappresenta indubbiamente un vantaggio di tipo economico. La struttura esterna infatti, ha quale core business l’attività specifica richiesta e su questa investe grossi capitali in consulenza tecnica, tecnologica e rapidità di esecuzione e più l’attività specifica è complessa più l’ipotesi di rinegoziazione interna è costosa. Un outsourcer, dispone di una struttura operativa organizzata e ben formata capace ad assorbire qualunque volume lavorativo ed affidarsi a questa porta inevitabilmente diversi benefici: Risparmio sui costi fissi; Utilizzo di competenze specifiche; avere a disposizione esperienze, metodologie, strumenti consolidati; usufruire di processi e procedure sperimentate e testate; Eventuale capacità di sviluppo di procedure dedicate alle esigenze richieste. Certo ci sono dei rischi che potrebbero essere sintetizzati in una eventuale demotivazione del personale che si vede smobilizzare il lavoro interno; Comportamento opportunista del fornitore di servizi; difficoltà di controllo del fornitore dei servizi; graduale perdita interna del Know how; perdita del contatto diretto con il cliente finale; Eccessivo ribasso dei prezzi dell’outsourcer gravando a sua volta sulle eccellenze interne
Solo rischi di sicurezza personale connessi alle attività di door to door collection
La gestione dei crediti in bonis (attivi) è una operazione prettamente neutrale che a volte può interessare la sfera finanziaria della Banca tramite operazioni mirate di cartolarizzazione o di fattorizzazione. La gestione dei crediti deteriorati invece è una operazione di erogazione di un servizio economico in cui il rischio di gestione deve essere ben perimetrato in quanto erronee valutazioni possono portare a perdite, non solo sul valore dei crediti ma anche sui costi di gestione
Vi sono due categorie di operatori anche se a volte alcuni operatori vanno considerati misti. Quelli che preferiscono gestire i crediti chirografari hanno il vantaggi di sostenere costi minori in quanto normalmente si tratta di lavorare su asset di NPL abbastanza omogenei all’interno dei quali una buona percentuale dei crediti alla fine del ciclo produttivo risulterà irrecuperabile. Quelli che preferiscono gestire i crediti secured hanno lo svantaggio di dover sostenere costi notevoli per le procedure giudiziarie ma alla fine del ciclo produttivo (normalmente molto lungo) la probabilità di risultati di irrecuperabilità è molto bassa a causa delle garanzie da cui sono assistiti i crediti.
 
Ja(q23y)
den Zulassungsvoraussetzungen für entsprechende Dienstleister?(q23iya)
der Aufsicht über entsprechende Dienstleister?(q23iyb)
 
- Modifica normativa che consenta: La cancellazione dalla centrale rischi e/o banche dati assimilabili dei soggetti che pagano in transazione a stralcio solamente una parte del debito e non tutto l’intera esposizione esposta in bilancio, permettendo loro di reintrodursi nel circuito bancario normale. - Modifica normativa che estenda il diritto (art. 155 sexies cpc) già concesso al l curatore, il commissario e il liquidatore giudiziale ai fini del recupero o della cessione dei crediti, i quali possono accedere ai dati relativi ai soggetti nei cui confronti la procedura ha ragioni di credito, anche in mancanza di titolo esecutivo nei loro confronti. Quando di tali disposizioni ci si avvale nell'ambito di procedure concorsuali e di procedimenti in materia di famiglia, l'autorizzazione spetta al giudice del procedimento10 . - Estensione dei diritti e delle facoltà di recupero crediti assicurate a Agenzia Riscossione (ex Equitalia) ai service specializzati del mercato secondario.
 
 
 
 
Le banche possono cedere i crediti solo a soggetti Vigilati iscritti al 106 TU Bancario e non ad altri soggetti che potenzialmente potrebbero essere interessati b) sulle banche che intendono affidare a terzi alcune o tutte le funzioni di servizio del debito, anche a soggetti non bancari. Specificare le restrizioni e le relative conseguenze: Le banche preferiscono esternalizzare le funzioni di recupero crediti solo a soggetti Vigilati iscritti al 106 TU Bancario e non ad altri soggetti che potenzialmente potrebbero essere interessati
 
Nein(q27n)
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ja(q31y)
il Finanziamento alle imprese garantito da trasferimento di bene immobile sospensivamente condizionato di cui all’art. Art. 48 bis d.lgs. 385/1993 (TUB) come modificato dalla legge 119/2016
Pegno mobiliare non possessorio (anche su crediti) di cui all’art. 1 d.l. 59/16 come modificato dalla legge 119/2016
quelle di non essere esattamente efficacia agli scopi preposti
 
NO se adottato nelle forme di cui alla legge 119/2016
Nein(q34n)
No perché, con tutte queste limitazioni a tutela dei consumatori e delle famiglie, il grossoo dei beni da portare in garanzia (es. per mutui di acquisto prima casa) sarebbero fuori dal meccanismo e resterebbero fuori dalla riforma), mentre per i soggetti ammessi, impresa, i beni offerti (beni aziendali) non sarebbero in grado di garantire veramente i finanziamenti (a parte eccezioni non statisticamente apprezzabili).
L’estensione dei meccanismi di garanzia a tutti i sogetti debitori e a tutti i tipi di beni (ivi comprese prime case)
Ja(q36y)
Sì – ma in tal caso il sistema non risolverebbe neanche parzialmente il problema degli NPL che appesantiscono i bilanci delle Banche e contemporaneamente il problema del credit crunch (blocco dei finanziamenti alle famiglie per l’acquisto prima casa e blocco del mercato immobiliare e del settore edilizia)
Abbassando notevolmente il tasso di interesse richiesto per la restituzione in piano di ammortamento. Liberando eventuali fidejussori o altri immobili di proprietà dal rischio dal rischio di essere sottoposti a esecuzione a causa dell’inadempienza all’obbligo di restituzione delle somme prestate con la garanzia accelerata.
La garanzia di prestito accelerata deve poter essere svincola da procedure concorsuali in qualsiasi modo introdotte. Pertanto il creditore dovrebbe essere in grado di escutere il bene concesso in garanzia accelerata anche se il debitore è sottoposto a procedure concorsuali. E’ necessaria una deroga precisa al principio della par condicio creditorum.
Il bene concesso in garanzia dovrebbe essere separato dal patrimonio del debitore e costituire un fondo a se come centro di imputazione di interessi giuridici regolati dal contratto di finanziamento
Secondo le norme della sospensione condizionale dell’acquisto e le normali norme sulla trascrizione delle pregiudizievoli.
 
Organisation oder Unternehmen(organisation-replying-as)
 
Dutch Banking organisation
 
Ja(yes-transparency-register)
51894741860-19
Bankwesen([ID7])
Wirtschaftsverband([ID9])
 
 
 
Niederlande([ID51])
 
 
Ja, ich stimme der Veröffentlichung meines Beitrags unter dem von mir angegebenen Namen zu (Name Ihrer Organisation/Ihres Unternehmens/Ihrer Behörde bzw. Ihr Name, wenn Sie als Einzelperson antworten)(yes-contributions-publication)
Please see for all questions the input given by the European Banking Association (EBF) EXCEPT with respect to question 31. Wiith respect to question 32 please see our additional input.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please see the input of the European banking association
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ja(q31y)
Netherlands law rights of pledge and mortgage entitle the holder to enforce out-of-court, i.e. without court approval. However, public sale is in principle the prescribed procedure. Appropriation by the pledgee or mortgagee requires either court approval (mortgage) or agreement with the pledgor. Such an agreement is only effective if made once the pledgee is entitled to enforce the pledge, i.e. in principle once the debtor of the secured debt is in default. In addition, the Netherlands have implemented the Collateral Directive (2002/47/EC, as amended). The title transfer financial collateral arrangement and security financial collateral arrangement as implemented in Netherlands law entitle the collateral taker to enforce out of court and appropriation under certain conditions but without court approval or an agreement as set out above.
It accelerates enforcement and so, by reducing cost, increases the recovered value of NPLs.
The main risk is that the entitlement to enforce is contested by the collateral pledgor or mortgagor. The pledgor or mortgagor can for example request a court injunction forbidding the pledgee or mortgagee to enforce on the basis that the pledgee or mortgagee has failed to exercise reasonable forbearance. Challenges are how to realise an efficient liquidation value (ideally close to the market value) especially if this requires cooperation of a bankruptcy trustee.
We generally supports the EBF input noting that NPL market growth should be sustainable for all stakeholders and subject to the following comments in relation this question: • Dutch banks see merit in the accelerated loan security provided it is enforceable in insolvency proceedings. • As holders of Netherlands law governed rights of pledge or mortgage Dutch banks generally have good experience with being able to conduct an adequately structured private sale or an auction with proceeds going directly to the lender. The accelerated loan security should in their view preferably have that feature. • Dutch banks do not see major obstacles or unsurmountable risks in banks becoming the owner of the collateral (neither from a balance sheet nor operational perspective). They can themselves on a case-by-case basis decide to take on that risk after balancing it against the benefits of being able to enforce by becoming the owner of the collateral.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organisation oder Unternehmen(organisation-replying-as)
 
KRUK ITALIA S.r.l, part of the international KRUK Group and subject to direction and coordination of mother company KRUK S.A.
 
Nein(no-transparency-register)
 
Kreditservicing/Inkassowesen([ID17])
Unternehmen, KMU, Kleinstunternehmen, Einzelunternehmer([ID6])
 
 
 
Italien([ID36])
 
 
Ja, ich stimme der Veröffentlichung meines Beitrags unter dem von mir angegebenen Namen zu (Name Ihrer Organisation/Ihres Unternehmens/Ihrer Behörde bzw. Ihr Name, wenn Sie als Einzelperson antworten)(yes-contributions-publication)
We do not observe significant obstacles to the management and resolution of NPLs in terms of the current size, liquidity and structure, although it can be observed relatively small secondary market for retail secured portfolios on some EU markets. Based on our experience, we believe that that the local conditions on secondary markets for NPL are in a good shape. The local situation enabled to create very competitive environment. The existing demand of investors results in prices of NPLs that are in most of cases satisfactory for original creditors because the large number of loans are being transferred to the assignee on these markets. In terms of structure it is worth to mention that some legislations across EU in some aspects (such as data protection, consumer credit rights regulations, etc.) put real obstacles to the standardization of management and resolution of NPLs. Additionally, courts of justice do not show/have an unified criteria when interpreting the applicable regulations which does not contribute to have/gain legal certainty: pro-consumer interpretations go beyond general rules of positive legislation in force, impose obligations that are not standard neither should be requested to non-credit entities and, essentially, put a real constrain to the investing decisions.
Bank internal factors: • improvement of financial condition of the bank; • cost cutting connected with inefficient internal debt collection; • internal resources of the originators that often are not enough and skilled to manage effectively the internal collection process; • the price for NPL portfolio versus increasing costs of internal NPL management (improvement of liquidity of the bank); External factors: • mature secondary NPL market (the more mature the market is- a lot of transactions, competition, favorable for debt collection agencies legal environment- the easier decision for loan sales) • long lasting judicial proceedings in the legal collection; • reputation of the investors in the local market; • social and political understanding of debt collection; • fiscal factors; • consumer protection litigations affecting reputation of the bank; • good, stable to growing macroeconomics
Ways of attracting a wider investor base could be: • European legal framework for secondary markets for NPLs regulating the market standards including the model Contract on Assignment of Receivables applicable in Member States; • focus on improvement of conditions for amicable debt collection including access of the creditors to contact data of the debtors, e.g. addresses processed by public authorities • statutory responsibility of the original creditor for some aspects of the quality of the NPLs, e.g. the original contracts do not include abusive clauses; • tax advantages; • simplification of judicial proceedings, and strengthen the structure (with human and material resources) and IT systems to be used by the Administration of Justice; • abolition of legal obstacles in legal dunning proceedings to allow a wider use of automated processes; • digitalization of legal proceedings (e-courts); • creating across the EU courts for small claims (to improve the efficiency of the legal procedures for credit recovery shortening the collection term and cost); • improvement of securitization framework (in some countries the securitization process is quite “bureaucratic” and expensive because it involves a lot of agents and requires determined requisites and procedures, which can make an investor reluctant to enter in the secondary markets of NPLs- these factors affect the investment itself because each player must take into account further costs not foreseen in other countries where NPL is a relevant business); • simplification of legal restrictions related to servicing of claims, such as permit conditions, possibilities and conditions of outsourcing; • improving the quality of the data and information upon clients/debtors owed by the banks which could ease the process of credit recovery and increase the investors’ appetite for a particular portfolio. Creating legal framework for disclosure of data in the process of biding which could have very positive effect upon the credit evaluation done by the investors: if the data and information received from the Banks are updated and complete, the credit evaluation would be easier and less prudent on the necessary time to recover the debts; the more data are disclosed the more accurate and better pricing can be achieved by the banks making process of NPL sale more competitive; • balanced legislation regarding consumer protection and creditors’ rights during recovery process; • creating positive PR and picture of debt collection agencies (the DCAs), underlying their role in modern economy, importance in their role of bringing balance between creditors and debtors- consumers; fighting with negative campaigns against DCAs, underlying moral obligation of borrower to repay the debt. Additionally, it shall be stressed out that investment funds/ the debt collection agencies as investors are mainly concerned about: • sufficient scope of data necessary for proper evaluation of portfolios of NPLs during due diligence process, • proper contact data of the debtors received from the seller of NPLs; • representation and warranties in the Contracts on Assignment of Receivables providing minimum level of security for the investor; • not being obliged, after purchase of the receivables, in full by as same banking regulation, which is demanding and strict (accounting regulations apply in a different manner) as the seller; • obstacles arising out of “legal uncertainty” explained above and, on the other hand, regarding the lack of background/information on NPLs to be acquired (about the previous collection activity which was carried out, market practices/standards that were followed, the local know-how that was applied, the applicable regional regulations and local court rulings, etc).
please see answer to question 3.
We would consider removing licensing requirements for investors in the area of consumer credits on some markets (Slovakia) or establishment of a special license for investors in such assets only. The current legal regulation imposes on investors in such assets an obligation to obtain license for providing consumer credits.
We do not observe any specific advantages when acquiring entity is a bank, whose mine objective is to be focus on pure banking activities, looking for new clients and developing new products; bank- assignee is still bound by specific legislation regarding bank activities including limitations on outsourcing etc.; Assigning banking NPLs to specialized investors gives the banks possibility to overcome legacy aspects, concentrate on their core business and improve their financial conditions. At the same time investment found, by cooperating with specialized debt collection agencies are more effective and faster in terms of recoveries, not being afraid also of risk of moral hazard- banks are limited in offering to the debtors- borrowers reduction of debt due to this aspect. A professional investor also guarantees a higher level of asset security as well as higher level of personal and financial data security.
DCAs, as a general rule, take a long-term investment horizon so are ready to offer to the debtors more comfortable conditions. In the case of other investors, the investment horizon is generally much shorter and more focused on maximizing the rate of return, which may translate into a way of dealing with debtors.
Potential benefits: • increased resistance of secondary NPL market to political, populist initiatives hitting badly the market; • increased awareness of importance of NPL secondary market in society; • social acceptance of assignment of receivable and debt collection practices; • transparent, stable market; • unified legal framework; • elimination of players who are not willing to adopt to new rules The appropriate legal framework for secondary markets for loans shall first take in consideration debtor protection if a debtor is a consumer, then equal treatment of investors, which shall promote increased market size and depth. As far as data secrecy and privacy is concerned, the framework shall take into consideration the right of investor to gain the most up-to-date contact data and payment history of the debtor. Rank the following dimensions (in order of importance) is: • debtor protection: 1st risk • privacy: 2nd risk • data secrecy: 3rd risk • promoting increased market size and depth and equal treatment of investors: 1st benefit
The compromise between the dimensions could be established by looking for a balance between consumers’ privileges and creditors’ right to collect claims: • the investors often receive data, which were not updated by assignor and the debtor had no interest in informing on change in this respect as well. Since in mostly EU countries only state institutions and courts have access to Population Register, debt collecting agencies encounter obstacles for the amicable way of collecting debts because they are often not successful in reaching the debtor. Thus, sometimes they have no other option than to start expensive (also for the Debtors) court collection. • the management of receivables shall be promoted and seen as legitimate professional activity which strongly advises the approval of specific changes in law, in order to get them adapted to fight delinquency as a social need: data protection regulation must not stimulate debtor to play unfair or should not encourage to moral hazard. • pressure shall be also put on stopping an excessive pro-consumer regulations and on discouraging politicians against populist initiatives (critics of debt collection and NPL market is always good target for gaining additional voices)
Nein(q9n)
 
Yes, because of national legislation/boundaries (bureaucracy of procedures) and unbalanced consumer protection legislation versus creditors/debt collection agencies ‘rights. The best environment for further development of the market is resigning at least from limitation based on similar criteria as required for banking/financial institutions. Special focus shall be on the possibility of continuation by an assignee of enforcement proceedings started by an assignor before assignment and the removal of obstacles arising from the scope of the provisions of professional secrecy (banking and investment funds) and restrictions on outsourcing of debt management.
There is no reason for extra special protection of a debtor in the case of transfer of a loan and/or collateral by the creditor to a third party; in vast majority of cases situation of indebt person can be improved quite fast compering with his previous position towards originator of the loan- bank/financial institution being bound by many regulations not allowing for forgiveness of significant part of the debt or for creating comfortable installment plan etc. Protection is needed in terms of: • improving the conditions for the efficient amicable collection avoiding court collection and enforcement proceedings, e.g. statutory regulation of the remuneration model for out-of-court collection (collection fee paid by the debtor); • exactness of personal address and contact data, (which shall be accessible through a public data base for purposes of a professional collection activity) which allows focusing on amicable operations and helps avoiding of undertaking legal actions which are not so necessary; • improving debtors’ situation towards other/new creditors in the future by creating framework for the right of current creditor to report to the credit bureau type of entities positive information on re-paid debt/installments Obligation to formally serve a notification to debtors about assignment and identity of new creditor, mentioning all applicable rights is (and shall be) a standard.
Specialization across jurisdictions or asset classes can help to develop specialized know-how and simplify access of investors to secondary markets for NPL’s in different Member States.
Yes. In some member states the investors are able to invest in NPL portfolios only if having local vehicle and entities supervised by national authorities (like in our country Italy). Within some national jurisdictions itself, there can be find a different regulation for each Region, which places a strong obstacle to the collection activity (e.g. Spain).
EU regulatory framework for transfer of loans may be beneficial by unifying regulations and creating “legal certainty” for investors, consumers, and during the bidding processes until business transactions of NPLs are closed. It would harmonize and ease the purchase of receivables by entities operating in several markets or wishing to enter a new market- it would allow certain predictability (legal, tax) and legal (tax) effects on debts acquisition, including transactions in different jurisdictions, foreseeable sales tax effects. The key elements of such a framework may be: • minimum requirements in purchase agreements in terms of representation and warranties and their proper duration according to the real size of the portfolio; • setting up standards of bids and process of selling the portfolio; • tax exemptions; • specific rules to be respected by the originators in order to allow a proper due diligence of the portfolio; • quality of data transfer to the assignee (especially regarding contact data of assigned debtors and accuracy of debt components); • the free right of resale the portfolio inside the member states; • not reducing responsibility of the assignors for the defects of receivables assigned; • establishing assignor’s obligation to support assignee in handling with consumers’ complaints
A unified regulation must balance obligations between sellers and buyers
For banks third party loan servicers as specialized market players with sophisticated tools and unique know-how may contribute to the development of secondary market for NPLs especially by relieving banking institutions from efforts going beyond their core business, being more effective in collection than banks and helping banks reducing their costs. For investors third party loan servicers allow investors to gain a deeper knowledge of the assets in a portfolio and, mainly, to predict their prospect of recovery and specific behavior of every portfolio of receivables, as well as provide knowledge on the type of expert or professionals that would be needed to manage them in the most effective way.
Nein(q17n)
 
The main advantage is that specialized external companies can perform more efficiently using their know-how. Usage of external companies allows making comparisons between different methods that are used to collect receivables and, therefore, to improve own proceedings, promotes competition to create specific IT tools and management proceedings (that may even be tailor made), and it could also contribute to as to save costs, relieve valuable resources that are need for other purposes, as well as to protect consumers, and reduce delinquency indeed. See also answer on the question no. 16. The main concern arising from outsourcing services for banking sector is ensuring compliance with banking secrecy.
There is at least one important topic connected with conducting activities by third-party loan servicers with respect to debtor protection – remuneration for the service. As it is not regulated on some markets, the practice is that the creditor offers the servicer possibility to add its remunerations to the original amount of debt to be collected. The agreement between the creditor and the servicer does not regulate remuneration from the creditor, the cost of the service is though transferred to the debtor. As there is no cap for the amount of the servicer’s remuneration, the excessive remunerations may be observed on the market. Additionally, it could be that too big pressure for results, in some cases, may be translated into too aggressive behavior towards debtor, this is why it is so important to set up the frame in which such services can be provided. But as general comment it can be observed a constant implementation of specific regulations addressed to credit collection (codes of conduct) with related fines and reputational impacts in case of no respect. For this reason, the tendency – fortunately – is to be compliant to these regulations which have the first purpose of protecting properly debtors.
In EU countries, third-party loan servicing it is mainly focused in NPLs, but it is also rendered for PLs. This allows collection agencies a diversification of risks. When working for PLs, a collection agency can get a good knowledge of the portfolio of receivables, and have access to useful information to properly determine the solvency y borrowers. Naturally, the collection on performing loans is easier because of fresh aging of credits, data and documents, which permit to reach the debtors faster and to collect in a shorter time. The nonperforming loans, on the contrary, require a more focused skip tracing activity which slows down the whole collection process with impacts on the investment itself.
The debt collection agencies manage different clusters and kind of receivables, splitting them in different departments with specific knowledge and processes. If there is any specialization it relates to the management of mortgage censured loans/receivables.
The competitiveness of local environment extends the range of services offered. The most instrumental in terms of market efficiency are: • legal debt collection; • amicable debt collection; • due diligence services; • detective services; • field collection; • correspondence collection (via post, e-mails); • collection processes using call centers including predictive dialers, and their management, together with connectivity services to telecommunications; • document management; • text messages platforms.
Ja(q23y)
den Zulassungsvoraussetzungen für entsprechende Dienstleister?(q23iya)
der Aufsicht über entsprechende Dienstleister?(q23iyb)
A EU regulatory Framework could be useful but with a previous and accurate analysis of local legislation and markets (considering also best practices).
No additional comments.
Ja(q25y)
the significant difference is created by the fact that from on hand there are countries within UE where debts sale and debts collection are not regulated at all (beside existing general rules of civil law) and countries where sale of debt is allowed only to special domestic SPV (like in Italy) or where debt collection activity is treated equally as granting loans and rendering other financial services (which requires DCAs to be under the same law as professional lenders and financial entities). Other differences are coming from the facts like: • existing debt collection law in domestic legislation (Romania, Slovakia, Greece) vs. lack of specific regulation in this regard, and working based on civil law rules only (Czech, Spain); • requirement of license (Slovakia, Germany) vs. freedom of activity in another jurisdiction (Spain); • supervised activity (Romania) vs. lack of regulatory body in some countries (Germany, Spain); • impossibility to purchase of the portfolio by foreign investor (Italy) vs. possibility of foreign entities to acquire the underlying assets (Romania, Spain); • disclosing personal data in due diligence process vs data secrecy; • loan agreement being executor title even after sale of receivable (Romania) vs. loan agreement losing this quality after assignment (Italy) Obstacle to the business as Capital Group: • need of creating different structures depending on the market; • challenge for having unified processes; • significant different costs of operating on different EU markets; • need of careful assessments of all boundaries before entering on the new market;
Ja(q26y)
Obstacles to operate internationally in an efficient manner are: transfer of personal data, international enforcement, licensing to operate in each country without recognition of Group mother license.
In our market (Italy), the securitization law strictly requires the establishment of a local SPV which affects costs of managing it, together with the consequent obligations about compliance and relationships with authorities. Moreover, the assignee as SPV cannot perform directly the collection activity and the reporting ones managed exclusively by Master Servicer as financial intermediary, with the consequent effect about having several agents in the whole process.
not known restrictions to be listed
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q27d)
 
In order to facilitate existing cross-border activities and/or entry into new markets there is need of: • development of all points mentioned in answer for question no. 3 • transparency in transfers of loan portfolios; • creating cross border system with offers for investors together with the abovementioned aspects mentioned in the answer for the question no. 14; • harmonization of the rules of the transaction, including securitization transactions and the requirements of external DCAs, which would allow spreading of investors’ activities for the whole EU market. • unifying regulations for legal proceedings to claim debts
 
 
• Highlighting the importance of amicable stage of debt collection, which can be realized in any Member State based on the common EU rules. Simplification and unification of procedures for amicable debt collection can attract investors; • Growing number of qualified human resources (with a minimum professional standard); • Unification of some rules of processing personal data only accessible for purposes of collecting receivables in a professional manner; • Building social and political understanding of debt collection; • Creating social acceptance of assignment of receivable and debt collection practices together with limitation of debtor’s moral hazard and awareness that debts shall be repaid; • Digitalization of court and enforcement procedure
No additional comments.
Nein(q31n)
 
 
 
It shall have positive impact on banks functioning. However, this security should be transferable to the investor. Otherwise, it would create an obstacle for the secondary market.
Yes, it could help, but always that it be implemented together with other relevant changes in law that are needed to make it enforceable and practicable (please remember the rule that all debtors are entitled to as same legal protection independent of the enforcement is extra-judicial or at court, which might prejudice this type of enforcement).
Nein(q34n)
we agree partially, because: • managing of real estates is not the core business of a financial institution; • ‘title transfer by way of security’ is not allowed under some domestic laws; • Considering significant impact on debtors it is needed a balance between a minor breach of the loan agreement repayment in view of its total length, the trigger events for enforcing such security shall be very well and precisely established, including giving to the debtor second chance for compliance with the payment schedule; its also worth to consider type of receivables which shall be secure by such security
This security should be transferrable to the assignee in case of assignment of receivables.
Ja(q36y)
Yes, we agree. The weaker parties need special protection
Yes, the additional proposal to the possibility of discharging of debtors in case the value of the assets becomes less than the debt would be potentially advantageous to borrowers could be Deed in lieu (swap collateral by debt), or agreeing a right of debtor to stay in the living for a limited period of time after enforcement of this security (in both cases with total exclusion of debtor from delinquency data bases), perhaps could stimulate potential borrowers, as well as information on possible smaller costs of enforcement compering with standard security. Each time an effective information about these possibilities will be needed, explaining all the advantages and consequences and the timing.
An accelerated loan security instrument is described very briefly. However, in case of insolvency proceedings in many EU countries for example, the creditor with an accelerated loan security instrument would submit application for the registration of the secured receivable. The underlying assets would be sold by the bankruptcy trustee and the secured creditor would be satisfied preferentially. In case of enforcement proceedings commenced by another creditor, the creditor with an accelerated loan security instrument would apply for excluding the underlying assets from the debtors’ assets by submitting the action to the court against it.
To be consistent with local private law, the instrument shall be preferably regulated by the Civil Code as a new security instrument to be established by an agreement between some categories of creditors and debtors. As regards public law, an accelerated loan security instrument concerning the immovable assets should be registered in the Land Registry. These creditors should have the right to register this security instrument concerning the movable assets in the notaries register
The statutory provisions should specify the content of the agreement establishing an accelerated loan security instrument, the moment of its establishment (agreement or subsequent registration), categories of the parties who may establish it, ways of realization, termination, insolvency and enforcement law aspects, etc. This instrument should not create discrimination of the weaker party.
 
Organisation oder Unternehmen(organisation-replying-as)
 
DECO
 
Ja(yes-transparency-register)
005887421809-56
Nichtregierungsorganisation (NRO)([ID15])
Verbraucherverband([ID8])
 
 
 
Portugal([ID44])
 
 
Ja, ich stimme der Veröffentlichung meines Beitrags unter dem von mir angegebenen Namen zu (Name Ihrer Organisation/Ihres Unternehmens/Ihrer Behörde bzw. Ihr Name, wenn Sie als Einzelperson antworten)(yes-contributions-publication)
 
 
 
 
 
 
The major concerns related to consumer protection are linked with the assurance of borrowers’ right to fair treatment and to the privacy and proportionality in the interactions with the creditors. Prior to the offloading of individual borrowers’ loans (whether they are mortgages or other type of loans) original creditors should follow the necessary steps towards a reasonable and respectful collection of the debt. There is significant guidance available in several forms, such as the EBA Guidelines on arrears and foreclosure , which outline how financial institutions should relate with individual borrowers facing difficulties, the type of information and assistance to provide, and options to deal with the payments. While banks are under some scrutiny and have this guidance, other entities are not subject to these requirements. We are concerned that non-bank entities might take on debt collection practices which do not respect consumers’ rights and might enter into the so called aggressive collection practices. We have seen some of these issues in Portugal with companies who are acting as external debt collection units for financial institutions. Several cases of abusive practices have been reported by individual borrowers facing difficulties in repayments.
From our point of view, debtor protection is the major concern and the risks associated should be dealt with from the start. Data secrecy and privacy go hand in hand as relevant risks. For borrowers, their concerns relate to several issues: • loans being sold to a third party with whom they have no existing commercial relationship, and with whom they would not have chosen to have a lender/borrower relationship; • the acquirer may have a significantly different interest or strategy in dealing with these loans. Investment funds may have a view of making a long term investment, or have a strategy of moving towards enforcement actions in order to make a profit on the assets securing the loans; • the acquirer may not have an interest in renegotiating loan terms and conditions, leaving borrowers in a scenario where there is no option to draw up a recovery plan.
A balanced approach must take into account that consumers and SMEs are significantly different from corporations and large companies. Therefore, safeguards should be in place to ensure high standards in protecting consumers and SMEs. These safeguards must ensure that consumers will not be facing lower standards then those agreed under the original contract.
 
 
 
As mentioned, in the case of individuals’ loans being transferred to a third party it is crucial that the same rules and safeguards are maintained in what relates to fair treatment, assistance, information, and redress.
 
 
On the back of all the aspects mentioned above, it is our view that an EU wide framework would be beneficial for consumers as it would ensure their rights are protected.
 
 
 
 
Please see our response to question 6 and 7.
Please see our response to question 6 and 7.
 
 
 
Ja(q23y)
den Zulassungsvoraussetzungen für entsprechende Dienstleister?(q23iya)
der Aufsicht über entsprechende Dienstleister?(q23iyb)
On the basis of our concerns regarding consumer protection issues, we support that rules are put in place to ensure fair treatment of individuals, ensure their privacy and protect their data. To that end, an EU wide framework that extends rules and guidance already existing for banks to third party loan servicers would be essential.
 
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q25d)
 
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q26d)
 
 
 
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q27d)
 
 
 
 
As a consumer association we would encourage that consumer protection matters are dealt with in an EU wide approach, harmonising safeguards and procedures.
 
 
 
 
 
In theory, this seems to be an additional guarantee and therefore may have a positive impact on financing in the EU.
As mentioned, in theory, yes.
Nein(q34n)
We support the restriction of the application of these instruments to individuals acting as consumers, and when the primary residence of borrowers is at stake. Nevertheless, looking at the functioning features, it stands out that there should be a compulsory setting of a a (minimum) value of the assets in advance by an independent expert, following the criteria that could be set out in the security right or in the loan contract. In addition, there should be a mandatory duty to pay back the difference to the borrower once the asset is sold whenever the evaluation of the asset leads to a value higher than the debt amount.
 
Ja(q36y)
We fully support this restriction. As mentioned in the early sections, we are very much concerned about individual borrowers’ rights to fair treatment and protection. Including them in this early stage of a new instrument that will bring a direct benefit only to banks could result in consumer detriment. This is especially relevant when it comes to primary residences of individuals. To that end, we would encourage that the restriction is applied allowing for an assessment of the feasibility and impact of the usage of such instrument. If, I the future, it is verified that there is a positive effect and with explicit results in terms of the objectives of increasing access to finance and providing an additional security for banks, there might be room to adopt specific rules under which this instrument may be applied for individual borrowers.
 
 
 
 
 
Organisation oder Unternehmen(organisation-replying-as)
 
Bundesarbeitskammer Österreich
 
Ja(yes-transparency-register)
23869471911-54
Sonstiges([ID8])
Sonstiges([ID14])
Die Bundesarbeitskammer (BAK) ist die gesetzliche Interessenvertretung von rund 3,2 Millionen ArbeitnehmerInnen und KonsumentInnen in Österreich. Sie vertritt ihre Mitglieder in allen sozial-, bildungs-, wirtschafts- und verbraucherpolitischen Angelegenheiten auf nationaler als auch auf der EU-Ebene. Darüber hinaus ist die BAK Teil der österreichischen Sozialpartnerschaft. Die BAK bildet die Dachorganisation von neun Arbeiterkammern auf Bundesländerebene, die gemeinsam den gesetzlichen Auftrag haben, die Interessen ihrer Mitglieder zu vertreten.
 
 
Österreich([ID21])
 
Interessenvertretung
Ja, ich stimme der Veröffentlichung meines Beitrags unter dem von mir angegebenen Namen zu (Name Ihrer Organisation/Ihres Unternehmens/Ihrer Behörde bzw. Ihr Name, wenn Sie als Einzelperson antworten)(yes-contributions-publication)
Nein.
Keine Angabe
Das grundlegende Problem liegt in der Informationsasymmetrie und dem Verlust der Granularität der Information. Aus Sicht der Bundesarbeitskammer (BAK) besteht bei einer Ausweitung des Anlegerkreises das nicht unerhebliche Risiko, ureigenes Bankgeschäft, das aus gutem Grund einer eigenen, spezialisierten Regulierung und Aufsicht unterliegt, zu Schattenbanken zu verschieben. Ein an der Finanzmarktstabilität der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Stabilität orientierte Gesetzgeber sollte eigentlich genau auf das Gegenteil hinwirken. Schon jetzt zählt das Eurogebiet zu den Regionen mit der stärksten Expansion des Schattenbankensystems. Dies stellt auch laut EZB einen hohen Risikofaktor für die Stabilität des Finanzsystems im Euroraum da und ist genau zu beobachten.
Keine
Nein
Der Abbau von Altlasten bei Banken ist zweifelsohne ein wichtiges Thema. Es sollten jedoch keine Anreize gesetzt werden, die genau jenes Verhalten verstärken, welche mit ein wesentlicher Grund für den Aufbau der Lasten und der Entstehung der Krise war. Wo die Entscheidung der Kreditvergabe und die Tragung des Letztrisikos auseinanderfallen, wird der Anreiz zur gewissenhafte Risikoprüfung verkleinert. Darüber hinaus ist der Zugang zu Finanzierungsmöglichkeiten laut EZB-Survey "Access to finance" nicht nur eines der geringeren Probleme von Unternehmen, darunter auch KMU, es ist auch jenes, das am stärksten sinkt, im Gegensatz zum wachsenden Problem des Findens neuer Kunden. Aus Sicht der Bundesarbeitskammer sollte daher über den bestehenden Rahmen hinaus vor allem institutionellen Anleger, die Kundengelder verwalten, (z. B. Investmentfonds, die sich an ein breites Publikum richten oder Lebensversicherer) nicht vom Gesetzgeber dazu ermuntert werden, sich auf diesen hoch spezialisierten Sekundärmärkten stärker zu engagieren.
Sowohl bei Investmentfonds als auch bei Lebensversicherungen ist davon auszugehen, dass sie nicht über die selbe Expertise im Kreditmanagement verfügen wie Banken. Insbesondere das Kreditmanagement zählt zu Geschäftsbereichen mit signifikanten Lernkurveneffekten. Darüber hinaus ist das Problem asymmetrischer Information, adverser Selektion und der Verlust granularer Information auf Sekundärmärkten für notleidenden Kredite nicht trivial zu lösen.
• Schuldnerschutz • Datenschutz • Schutz der Privatsphäre • Gleichbehandlung von Anlegern
Durch sorgfältige Interessensabwägung im Legislativprozess, vor allem aber auch durch eine sorgfältige Interessensabwägung in der ordentlichen Gerichtsbarkeit.
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q9d)
 
Keine Angaben
Bei der Übertragung von Krediten und Sicherheit ist das Risiko sehr hoch, dass aufgrund des Verwertungsinteresses des übernehmenden Gläubigers, aus einem Liquiditätsproblem eines Unternehmens rasch ein Solvenzproblem wird bzw. die Fortführung der Produktion gefährdet wird, wenn dingliche Sicherheiten der Produktion entzogen werden.
Keine Angaben
Nein
Nein.
 
dass mit allfälligen Initiativen auch tatsächlich dieser erreicht wird, und nicht gleichzeitig Anreize geschaffen werden, die ein "originate and distribute" Modell der Kreditvergabe wieder erleichtern. Bei kleineren Banken im mehrstufigen Sektor ließe sich der Größennachteil durch Kooperationen im Verbund ausgleichen. Bezüglich der Schaffung von Anlagemöglichkeiten für spezialisierte Anleger ist vor allem darauf zu achten, dass keine Anreize gesetzt werden, Bankaktivitäten in den Schattenbankbereich zu verlagern. Schon jetzt zählt das Eurogebiet zu den Regionen mit der stärksten Expansion des Schattenbankensystems. Dies stellt auch laut EZB einen hohen Risikofaktor für die Stabilität des Finanzsystems im Euroraum und ist genau zu beobachten.
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q17d)
 
Es besteht das Risiko, dass Anreize gesetzt werden, Bankaktivitäten in den Schattenbereich zu verlagern. Schon jetzt zählt das Eurogebiet zu den Regionen mit der stärksten Expansion des Schattenbankensystems. Dies stellt auch laut EZB einen hohen Risikofaktor für die Stabilität des Finanzsystems im Euroraum und ist genau zu beobachten. Bei der Übertragung von Krediten und Sicherheit ist das Risiko sehr hoch, dass aufgrund des Verwertungsinteresses des übernehmenden Gläubigers aus einem Liquiditätsproblem eines Unternehmens rasch ein Solvenzproblem wird bzw. die Fortführung der Produktion gefährdet wird, wenn eine dingliche Sicherheit der Produktion entzogen werden.
Aufgrund des Verwertungsinteresses des übernehmenden Gläubigers kann ein Liquiditätsproblem eines, insbesondere privaten Haushalts schnell zum Verlust des Eigenheims führen und zu einer Verschärfung der finanziellen Schwierigkeiten bis hin zur Obdachlosigkeit.
Keine Angaben.
Keine Angaben.
Keine Angaben.
Nein(q23n)
 
 
 
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q25d)
 
Nein(q26n)
 
Nein.
Nein.
 
 
Die Ausschüttungspolitik der Banken sollte dahingehend überprüft werden, verstärkt die Verlusttragungskapazitäten insbesondere bei hohen Quoten notleidender Kredite auszubauen. Wo Quoten notleidender Kredite hoch sind, gilt es, die Eigenkapitalstärkung gegenüber Ausschüttungen zu priorisieren.
 
 
Nein.
Eine Anlassgesetzgebung, die aufgrund der Altlasten bei Banken aus der Finanzkrise, in den Schutz von Schuldnern, den Schutz der Privatsphäre, den Datenschutz oder in Gleichbehandlung von Gläubigern und Anlegern eingreifen ist strikt abzulehnen, weil es auch Anreizstrukturen bei der Kreditvergabe hin zum „originate and distribute“ Modell der Kreditvergabe verschiebt, und dadurch schützenswerte Rechtsgüter wie die oben genannte, nicht für ein neues Geschäftsmodell ausgehöhlt werden sollten.
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q31d)
 
 
 
Nein.
Nein. Solche Verfahren stellen aus Sicht der Bundesarbeiskammer eine nicht unproblematische Bevorzugung von Gläubigern dar. Sofern solche Sicherheiten auf Produktionsmittel gewährt würden, könnten sie zudem dazu beitragen, aus einem Liquiditätsproblem ein Solvenzproblem zu machen, und unter Umständen die Fortführung des Produktionsprozesses gefährden, bzw zu einer Verkürzung der verwertbaren Aktiva für die anderen Gläubiger führen, wenn aus einem Liquiditätsproblem ein Solvenzproblem wird.
Nein(q34n)
Insbesondere der Vorschlag, solche Verfahren der ordentlichen Gerichtsbarkeit zu entziehen, da zu befürchten ist, dass es nicht zu einer angemessenen Abwägung der Interessen kommt.
In erster Linie sollte die Belastung von Bankbilanzen mit weiteren notleidenden Krediten durch eine gewissenhafte Risikoprüfung und geeignete makroprudentielle Vorgaben durch Kapitalpuffer und/oder bestimmte Ratios bei der Kreditvergabe verhindert werden.
Nein(q36n)
Aus Sicht der Bundesarbeitskammer ist ein mögliches Instrument der beschleunigten Darlehensgarantie aus Gründen des Schutzes von Schuldnern, des Schutzes der Privatsphäre, des Datenschutzes und der Gleichbehandlung von Gläubigern und Anlegern generell abzulehnen. Abzulehnen ist auch, solche Verfahren der ordentlichen Gerichtsbarkeit zu entziehen.
Keine Angaben, das Instrument wird abgelehnt.
Keine Angaben, das Instrument wird abgelehnt.
Keine Angaben, das Instrument wird abgelehnt.
Keine Angaben, das Instrument wird abgelehnt.
 
Organisation oder Unternehmen(organisation-replying-as)
 
Bundesvereinigung Kreditankauf und Servicing e.V.
 
Nein(no-transparency-register)
 
Kreditservicing/Inkassowesen([ID17])
Sonstiges([ID8])
Wirtschaftsverband([ID9])
 
 
 
Deutschland([ID31])
 
Interessenvertretung von Kreditkäufern und Servicern
Ja, ich stimme der Veröffentlichung meines Beitrags unter dem von mir angegebenen Namen zu (Name Ihrer Organisation/Ihres Unternehmens/Ihrer Behörde bzw. Ihr Name, wenn Sie als Einzelperson antworten)(yes-contributions-publication)
Das größte strukturelle Hindernis für die effiziente Verwaltung und Abwicklung notleidender Kredite in der EU stellt aus Sicht der BKS die inkonsistente Rechtsordnung dar. Investoren und Servicer sollten in die Lage versetzt werden, rechtssicher Forderungen in allen EU-Mitgliedsstaaten erwerben und bearbeiten zu können. Die Realität ist geprägt von landesspezifischen und oftmals aufwändigen und damit markthemmenden rechtlichen Konstrukten für den Kauf und die Abwicklung notleidender Kredite, die von spezifischen Zweckgesellschaften bis hin zur Erfordernis einer Banklizenz reichen können.
Bankintern: • Entlastung des Eigenkapitals und Liquiditätssteigerung • Verbesserung des Ratings • Bindungsdauer, d.h. voraussichtliche weitere Bearbeitungszeit • Personelle Kapazitäten • Konzentration auf Kernmärkte, d.h. Veräußerung von Länderrisiken bzw. Non-Core Aktivitäten/Darlehensnehmer • Zukünftige geschäftliche Beziehung zu dem betroffenen Kreditnehmer • EU-Auflagen Externe Faktoren: • Marktpreisgefüge • Änderung der rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen (Basel III, MaRisk) • Änderung der politischen Rahmenbedingungen
Ein größerer Anlegerkreis könnte durch eine Harmonisierung der Rechtsordnungen (Insolvenzrecht, Zwangsvollstreckungsrecht) erreicht werden. Zudem sollten auch etwaige Hindernisse beim Kreditverkauf abgebaut werden, die beispielsweise den Informationsfluss vor einem Kreditverkauf beschränken. Informationen könnten darüber hinaus standardisiert werden. Zudem sollten Banken bei ihrer Risikovorsorge NPLs zu Marktpreisen ansetzen müssen. Dieses würde die Preiserwartungen der Verkäufer und der potenziellen Käufer angleichen.
- Vereinheitlichung der Rechtsordnungen (Insolvenzrecht, Zwangsvollstreckungsrecht) - Verbesserung der Kreditinformationen - Rechtssicherheit in Bezug auf Steuerthemen, Übertragung der Darlehen
- Informationen zum Kredit (Kreditnehmerdaten) müssen bei und vor dem Verkauf ausgetauscht werden können. - Unterschiedliche Insolvenz- und Zwangsvollstreckungsregime behindern oft das Abgeben von Angeboten über Landesgrenzen hinweg. - Reduzierung des administrativen Aufwandes, der zu einer Schlechterstellung des Forderungskäufers führt (z.B. Titelumschreibungen) durch geeignete Verfahren.
- Der Kauf erfolgt durch spezialisierte Investoren, die Personal und Know-how für den Abbau vorhalten bzw. bereits geschäftliche Beziehungen zu Servicern pflegen, die dies leisten können. - Die Altlasten verschwinden aus den Büchern der verkaufenden Bank und belasten das Eigenkapital nicht mehr. Es wird zudem frisches Kapital für die Neukreditvergabe zur Verfügung gestellt. - Die verkaufende Bank kann sich auf die Kreditvergabe konzentrieren. - Investoren bekommen die Möglichkeit, in Kreditengagements zu investieren, die durch ein sorgfältiges Servicing mit mittel- bis langfristigem Zeithorizont Potenziale versprechen. - Banken sind nicht darauf spezialisiert, notleidende Kredite zu bearbeiten. Durch die Spezialisierung der Investoren und Servicer ergibt sich für alle Beteiligten eine bessere Ressourcenallokation. - Der Kreis spezialisierter Anleger ist seit Jahren recht begrenzt, da eine Investition in ein Darlehen auf Grund der rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen mit mehr Unsicherheit behaftet ist als eine Investition in andere Assetklassen, wie z.B. Anleihen oder Immobilien.
Es handelt sich hierbei um Risikoinvestitionen, da die Kredite bereits notleidend sind. Entsprechend risikoadjustiert sind auch die Renditeanforderungen der Investoren. Vereinzelt könnten unseriöse Anbieter auftreten. Hierzu ist es wichtig zu wissen, welche Anbieter auf dem Markt professionell und verantwortlich handeln. In Deutschland sind dies beispielweise die Mitglieder der Bundesvereinigung Kreditankauf und Servicing e.V.
- Schuldnerschutz, Schutz der Privatsphäre, Datenschutz (gleichwertig) - Steigerung der Marktgröße und -tiefe sowie Förderung der Gleichbehandlung von Anlegern Hierzu sei ergänzt, dass der Datenschutz bzw. der Schutz der Privatsphäre nicht die vertragsgemäße Erfüllung von offenen Forderungen behindern dürfen, da dies zu Rechtsunsicherheit bei der Bearbeitung bis hin zur Kreditneuvergabe führen würde.
Solange Schuldnerdaten für die Anbahnung einer Transaktion und die Beitreibung von offenen Forderungen genutzt werden, besteht kein Widerspruch zwischen diesen Dimensionen. Sollte es nicht zu einem Verkauf kommen, müssen Schuldnerdaten gelöscht werden. Sollte es zu einem Kauf kommen, müssen die Schuldnerdaten zumindest solange genutzt und weitergegeben werden können, wie die Forderung besteht bzw. abgeschrieben ist. Eine Harmonisierung bedeutet auch keinen Angriff auf den Schuldnerschutz. In Deutschland wird beispielsweise der Schuldner geschützt und gleichzeitig ein funktionierender Kreditmarkt gewährleistet.
Nein(q9n)
 
In Deutschland wurden die Sekundärmärkte für notleidende Kredite mit dem Risikobegrenzungsgesetz reguliert. Dieses Gesetz hat bei Investoren und Schuldnern zu einer Verbesserung der Rechtssicherheit beigetragen. In manchen Ländern ist der Verkauf gekündigter, besicherter Forderungen (True Sale) noch nicht vollständig bzw. nur mit Zustimmung des Schuldners möglich (z.B. in Österreich).
Der Schuldner kann beim Verkauf von notleidenden Forderungen am besten geschützt werden, wenn sich seine Rechtsposition nicht ändert und er gegenüber dem neuen Gläubiger dieselben Rechte geltend machen kann. Die Nutzung seiner Daten muss an die Realisierung der Forderungen bzw. den Weiterverkauf geknüpft sein.
Vorteile einer Spezialisierung auf bestimmte Länder bestehen für die Investoren in einem Wettbewerbsvorteil gegenüber anderen Anbietern durch ein besseres Verständnis der jeweiligen gesetzlichen Rahmenbedingungen, der Verwertungszeiten, der Verwertungswahrscheinlichkeit und der Realisierungsquoten. Die Spezialisierung auf bestimmte Aktivaklassen wiederum verschafft Investoren Wettbewerbsvorteile durch Know-how in diesem Segment. In beiden Fällen können dadurch die tatsächlich zu realisierenden Forderungen und damit der Kaufpreis besser bestimmt werden. Für Verkäufer ergibt sich der Vorteil, dass er spezifische Kompetenzen und Referenzen für diese Länder bzw. Assetklassen erwarten kann.
• Die rechtlichen Unterschiede beim Workout von Forderungen und beim Forderungsverkauf über Ländergrenzen hinweg sind erheblich (Unterschiede beim Zwangsversteigerungsrecht, Insolvenzrecht, bei der Verwertung von Sicherheiten). • Die Konsultation von Experten in den jeweiligen Ländern ist kosten- und zeitintensiv. • Die Eintrittsbarrieren für die Erschließung neuer Märkte sind daher sehr hoch. • Diese Unterschiede führen oft dazu, dass die Geschäftstätigkeit auf das Heimatland und/oder einige wenige Länder, auf die man sich spezialisiert, beschränkt wird. • Eine Harmonisierung der rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen gestaltet sich zwar auf Grund der jahrzehntelangen Rechtspraxis, unterschiedlicher Sicherungsinstrumente und Verwertungsvoraussetzungen und/oder der Durchsetzung von Forderungen als schwierig, sollte aber zumindest in Teilbereichen erfolgen, um somit die Eintrittsbarrieren zu verringern. • Eine Vereinheitlichung der Lizenzierung wäre vorteilhaft, damit Servicer nicht für jedes Land bestimmte Lizenzen beantragen muss, war mit Zeitverlust und hohen Beratungskosten einhergeht.
• Ein EU-Regulierungsrahmen wäre unbedingt sinnvoll • Diese wichtigsten Punkte sind dabei: o Generell die Steigerung der Rechtssicherheit o Regelungen zur Weitergabe von Schuldnerdaten (Datenschutz) zur Bewertung der Forderungen im Rahmen des Forderungsverkaufs o Art und Weise der Übertragung der Darlehen, der Sicherheiten und der Schuldnerdaten vom Käufer auf den Verkäufer o Beschränkung der Widerspruchsmöglichkeiten/ der Einwilligungspflichten für Schuldner, insbesondere bei gekündigten Krediten o Regelungen zur Legitimation des Käufers gegenüber den Schuldnern des Portfolios ggf. durch eine gesonderte Urkunde o Steuerliche Behandlung
keine Antwort
Die Verfügbarkeit von Kreditservicern trägt in besonderem Maße zur Effizienz der NPL-Märkte bei: - Sie halten Personal und Wissen zum Abbau von notleidenden Forderungen vor. Banken können durch die Nutzung externer Kreditservicer unterstützt werden, da sich der Servicer auf den Abbau von notleidenden Forderungen spezialisiert hat, womit in der Regel eine schnellere Bearbeitungszeit einhergeht. Besonders kleinere Kreditinstitute können und sollten sich auf die Kreditvergabe spezialisieren. Banken benötigen somit weniger Personal und können eventuell kostengünstiger einen externen Servicer mit den Aufgaben betreuen. - Spezialisierte Anleger können mit Servicern, die sich auf die verschiedenen Assetklassen (besichert/unbesichert, Immobilienkredite/Ratenkredite/Unternehmenskredite) spezialisiert haben, gezieltere Strategie- oder Anlageentscheidung treffen, da sie sich sicher sein können, dass die gekauften Forderungen adäquat beigetrieben werden können. Für Investoren bietet ein großes Angebot von Servicern den Vorteil, gekaufte Forderungen effizient und seriös bearbeiten zu lassen. - Für Schuldner ergeben sich Vorteile durch die größere Bereitschaft, Zahlungsvereinbarungen abzuschließen oder auf Teile der Forderung zu verzichten. Zudem werden die Instrumente der Forderungsbeitreibung sehr gezielt eingesetzt. Unnötige Zwangsvollstreckungsmaßnahmen werden in der Regel vermieden. Ein Servicer sucht in erster Linie den Dialog mit dem Schuldner, da ein gemeinsames Vorgehen in der Regel schneller und kosteneffizienter zu einer Lösung führt. Zwangsvollstreckungsmaßnahmen sind in der Regel der letzte Ausweg, wenn der Schuldner nicht bereit ist an der Lösung mitzuarbeiten.
Nein(q17n)
 
Vorteile: - Kreditserver halten Personal und Wissen zum Abbau von notleidenden Forderungen vor. Banken können durch die Nutzung externer Kreditservicer unterstützt werden, da sich der Servicer auf den Abbau von notleidenden Forderungen spezialisiert hat, womit in der Regel eine schnellere Bearbeitungszeit einhergeht. Besonders kleinere Kreditinstitute können und sollten sich auf die Kreditvergabe spezialisieren. Banken benötigen somit weniger Personal und können eventuell kostengünstiger einen externen Servicer mit den Aufgaben betreuen. - Banken können durch ein Outsourcing des Servicings Personal und damit Kosten einsparen (insbesondere dann, wenn eine größere Zahl von Forderungen notleidend geworden ist und die Kapazitäten der internen Kreditabwicklung überfordern würden). - In vielen Fällen realisieren spezialisierte Kreditserver größere Quoten in kürzerer Zeit als interne Kreditabwicklungen. Nachteile: - Banken könnten Reputationsrisiken befürchten. Die Bundesvereinigung Kreditankauf und Servicing e.V. vertritt jedoch ausschließlich Servicer, die sich ihrem Code of Conduct angeschlossen haben und sich damit zu einem verantwortungsvollen Umgang mit Schuldnern verpflichtet haben.
Es können vereinzelt unprofessionelle Marktteilnehmer auftreten, die mit unredlichen Methoden Schuldner unter Druck setzen. Die Bundesvereinigung Kreditankauf und Servicing vertritt jedoch ausdrücklich nur seriöse und professionelle Marktteilnehmer, die sich ihrem Code of Conduct verschrieben haben, und setzt sich dafür ein, unprofessionelle Marktteilnehmer durch eine starke Aufsicht vom Markt zu nehmen. In der Marktpraxis wurden folgende Fehlverhalten beobachtet, die bei Nicht-Mitgliedern der BKS aufgetreten sind: • Der Druck auf den Schuldner wird extrem erhöht, obwohl die finanzielle Leistungsfähigkeit sehr gering ist, d.h. der Schuldner würde gerne einen Beitrag leisten, ist dazu aber gar nicht in der Lage und wird dennoch unter Druck gesetzt, Zahlungen zu leisten. • Falsche Berechnung der Forderung oder der Verzugszinsen, um die Forderung in die Höhe zu treiben oder weil die Daten der abgebenden Bank unvollständig sind • Vollstreckungsmaßnahmen, obwohl Einigungswille besteht • Torpedierung der Kreditwürdigkeit
Die Mitglieder der Bundesvereinigung Kreditankauf und Servicing spezialisieren sich mehrheitlich auf notleidende Kredite und verfügen in diesem Segment über besonderes Know-how. Es gibt nur wenige Servicer, die in der Lage sind, sowohl laufende als auch notleidende Kredite zu verwalten. Allerdings sind auch notleidende Kredite werthaltig. Es liegt an dem Servicer, das volle Potenzial zu heben. Generell sind aber Kreditinvestoren auf notleidende Kredite spezialisiert, da hier die größeren Renditechancen liegen. Daher haben sich auch die meisten Servicer auf notleidende Kredite spezialisiert. Vorteile • Der Servicer verfügt über spezielles Know-How • In der Regel ist der Servicer wesentlich effizienter organisiert • Der Servicer ist mitunter frei von speziellen regulatorischen Schranken, die für Banken gelten • Die Bank wird kostentechnisch, regulatorisch und organisatorisch entlastet Nachteile • Mit der Auslagerung der Darlehensverwaltung gibt die Bank eine ihrer Kernkompetenzen ab. Sollte diese irgendwann wieder in die Bank integriert werden (müssen), stellt dies einen hohen organisatorischen Aufwand dar
In der Regel spezialisieren sich Kreditservicer auf bestimmte Vermögensklassen. Der Vorteil besteht in den unterschiedlichen Ansätzen beim Workout der Forderungen. Während unbesicherte Konsumentenforderungen über Einigungen mit dem Schuldner realisiert werden und ein besonderes Wissen auf diesem Gebiet erfordern, müssen beispielsweise gewerbliche Immobilienforderungen mit einem Spezialwissen im Immobilienmarkt betreut werden, sodass die Personalstruktur und das Wissen bei den unterschiedlichen Servicern sich völlig voneinander unterscheiden.
Laufende Darlehen (Primary Servicing) • Überwachung der Zins- und Tilgungsleistungen • Zahlungs- und Rechnungsstellung, Zinsberechnungen • Überwachung der vertraglichen Pflichten, Kontrolle der Werthaltigkeit der zugrundeliegenden Sicherheiten (u.a. regelmäßige Immobilienbegutachtung und -bewertung, Bilanzprüfungen) • Informationserhebung, -aufbereitung und -aufbewahrung Notleidende Darlehen (Special Servicing) • Führen von Verhandlungen mit Schuldnern, Zwangsverwaltern, Insolvenzverwaltern, Nachlassverwaltern • Schließen von Rückzahlungsvereinbarungen • Schließen von Verwertungsvereinbarungen • Verwertung von Sicherheiten auch durch Zwangsmaßnahmen • Freigabe von Sicherheiten • Inkasso Sonstige Dienstleistungen • Beschaffung von Eigen- oder Fremdkapital • Strukturierung von Darlehensforderungen für die Bank • Ankaufsberatung für Investoren • Verkaufsberatung für Banken • Durchführung von Kreditverkäufen Am hilfreichsten für die Markteffizienz ist das Zusammenbringen von Verkäufern und Käufern, das Managen der Erwartungshaltung beider Seiten und letztendlich die Durchführung von Transaktionen. Die Darlehensverwaltung sowohl von laufenden als auch notleidenden Krediten birgt durch die Nutzung von Skaleneffekten ein großes Potenzial die Banken von Verwaltungsarbeit und Personal zu entlasten.
Ja(q23y)
den Zulassungsvoraussetzungen für entsprechende Dienstleister?(q23iya)
Die BKS befürwortet einen EU-Regulierungsrahmen mit Vorschriften zu den Zulassungsvoraussetzungen für Servicer nur dann, wenn dies dazu führt, dass bürokratische Hürden bei der grenzüberschreitenden Lizenzierung abgebaut werden.
 
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q25d)
 
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q26d)
 
Der Verkauf von Kreditportfolios an Einrichtungen außerhalb des Bankensektors ist in Deutschland nur bei gekündigten Krediten erlaubt. Der „echte“ Verkauf (True Sale) von Kreditportfolios an Einrichtungen außerhalb des Bankensektors ist in Deutschland u.a. durch das Benötigen einer Banklizenz geregelt und daher in der Regel auf gekündigte Kredite beschränkt. Gleichwohl ist es jedoch möglich, das wirtschaftliche Risiko an Forderungen zu verkaufen/zu kaufen, während die Rechtsverhältnisse unverändert bleiben und somit weiterhin bei der abgebenden Bank bleiben. Darüber hinaus bestehen keine gesonderten Vorschriften an den eigentlich Kauf, wohl aber an das Servicing notleidender Kredite (z.B. Inkassolizenz).
In einigen Ländern ist das Servicing bestimmter Arten von Krediten an gesonderte Lizenzen gebunden, die insbesondere die Fähigkeit, die Seriosität und die Verlässlichkeit des Servicers sicherstellen sollen. Ob dies unverhältnismäßig ist, lässt sich nicht eindeutig sagen. Unverhältnismäßig ist es sicherlich, wenn die Lizenz an die Nationalität gebunden sein sollte.
Ja(q27y)
In manchen Ländern ist der Verkauf gekündigter, besicherter Forderungen (True Sale) noch nicht vollständig bzw. nur mit Zustimmung des Schuldners möglich (z.B. in Österreich).
• Die nationalen Insolvenz- und Zwangsvollstreckungsregime müssen harmonisiert werden. • Grenzüberschreitende Vollstreckungen müssen einfacher gemacht werden. Immer noch können sich Schuldner hinter ihrer Landesgrenze verstecken, da es kein einheitliches Prozedere oder Einredemöglichkeiten gibt, die die Vollstreckung enorm erschweren. • Wenn ein Schuldner ins Ausland zieht, in dem es keine Melderegister gibt, ist die Zustellung eines Titels extrem erschwert. Daher sollte es möglich sein, dass die letzte bekannte Adresse im Ausland als Zustelladresse ausreicht, auch wenn der Schuldner verzogen ist, so dass eine öffentliche Zustellung erfolgen kann. Es kann nicht die Pflicht des Kreditgebers sein, nachzuweisen, wo der Schuldner wohnt bzw. nicht mehr wohnt. Daher ist auch eine Verkürzung der öffentlichen Zustellung angebracht, da die Versäumnisse des Schuldners vollständig zu Lasten des Kreditgebers gehen.
Verkauf und Übertragung von Krediten?(q29a)
Kreditservicing durch externe Dienstleister?(q29b)
Lizenzierung von Kreditservicern
Die Einrichtung eines zentralen Kreditservicer-Registers sowie die Vereinheitlichung der Lizenzierungen (Stichwort Passporting) können dazu beitragen, die Markteffizienz zu verbessern.
keine Antwort
Ja(q31y)
In Deutschland gibt es viele Sicherungsformen, z.B.: Sicherungsübereignung: Wenn der Schuldner seinen Verpflichtungen nicht nachkommt, darf die Bank den beweglichen Gegenstand herausverlangen und verwerten. Die Sicherungsübereignung hat die Funktion eines besitzlosen Pfandrechts und ist nur in Bezug auf bewegliche Sachen möglich. Die Sicherungsübereignung muss nicht in einem (öffentlichen) Register eingetragen werden. Sicherungsabtretung: Darunter versteht man die als vorübergehend gedachte Abtretung einer Forderung gegen einen Dritten oder eines sonstigen Rechts durch den Sicherungsgeber an den Sicherungsnehmer zur Sicherung von Forderungen. Der Sicherungsnehmer darf nur in zweiter Linie auf die Forderung bzw. deren Erlös zur Deckung seiner Ansprüche zurückgreifen; in erster Linie ist eine Tilgung durch seinen Schuldner (Sicherungsgeber, Zedenten) vorgesehen. Als Sicherungsmittel kommen grundsätzlich alle Forderungen und sonstigen Rechte in Betracht. Sicherungsgrundschuld: Sie ist eine Grundschuld, die zur Sicherung eines Anspruchs verschafft worden ist. Die Bank als Gläubiger erwirbt ein Verwertungsrecht an dem belasteten Grundstück. Bei Fälligkeit der Grundschuld kann dieser nun in voller Höhe der bestellten Grundschuld in das Grundstück vollstrecken und sich dadurch befriedigen.
• einheitliche Rahmenbedingungen für grenzüberschreitende Bankgeschäfte bzw. NPL-Geschäfte • Schnellere Forderungsbeitreibung, da direkt auf den Gegenstand zugegriffen und verwertet werden kann, ohne dass das Gericht eingeschaltet werden muss. • Die Sicherungsübereignung die Sicherungsabtretung müssen nicht in einem (öffentlichen) Register eingetragen werden. • Die Grundschuld ist verkehrsfähig. Sie kann, wenn sie einmal dinglich bestellt ist, kostensparend durch einfache schuldrechtliche Vereinbarung im Rahmen der Zweckbestimmungserklärung oder deren Änderung eingesetzt werden, ohne an das Grundbuchamt herantreten zu müssen. Sie ermöglicht die Unterwerfung unter die sofortige Zwangsvollstreckung wegen Kapital und Grundschuldzinsen. Diese Unterwerfungsklausel verschafft den Banken einen Vollstreckungstitel ohne Einschaltung eines Gerichts. • Die Verfügungen (Übereignung und Abtretung) lassen sich weitgehend nach den individuellen Bedürfnissen der Parteien gestalten und sind nicht mit formalen Erfordernissen (Anzeigepflichten unter Beteiligung von Amtspersonen, sicheres Datum) belastet.
Teilweise langwierig in der Durchsetzung
Ja, zur Ermöglichung eines zügigen außergerichtlichen Verfahrens in alle EU-Staaten. Die Vereinheitlichung von Sicherungsrechten fördert auch die Rechtssicherheit und ggf. auch die Kreditvergabe durch Banken an viele EU-Bürger.
Ja, weil die Banken schneller auf das Sicherungsgut zurückgreifen und verwerten können.
Ja(q34y)
 
• Beschränkung der Einredemöglichkeiten • Einfache Abtretbarkeit
Nein(q36n)
Teilweise nein. Es soll keine vollständige Befreiung des Schuldners von weiteren Rückzahlungspflichten geben, wenn der mit dem Verkauf von Vermögenswerten erzielte Erlös geringer ist als der Wert des ausstehenden Kredits. Die Bank kann ihre Forderung stunden und /oder eine Ratenzahlungsvereinbarung mit dem Schuldner treffen. Denn sonst bestünde für die Bank trotz der Einführung einer „beschleunigten Darlehensgarantie“ die Gefahr der geringen Beitreibungsquote, die gerade durch die Einführung dieser neuen Art von Kreditsicherheit eigentlich erhöht werden soll.
Es bedarf keiner für den Schuldner günstige Gestaltung der beschleunigten Darlehensgarantie. Denn das Instrument greift auch nur ein, wenn der Schuldner mit der Rückzahlung des Darlehens in Zahlungsverzug ist. Insbesondere die Bewertung der Vermögenswerte ist ein großes Streitthema, da z.B. der Wert einer Immobilie nicht eindeutig bestimmbar ist und unterschiedliche Gutachter zu unterschiedlichen Bewertungen kommen. Zudem müsste man sich vor der Vollstreckung aus der Garantie dann zuerst darüber einigen, ob die Vermögenswerte weniger wert sind als der offene Forderungsbetrag. Damit würde die erwünschte Wirkung der beschleunigten Vollstreckung konterkariert.
• In erster Linie ist dies eine Frage des Absonderungsrechtes bzw. der Rangfolge. • Sollte eine Garantie als absonderungsberechtigtes Sicherungselement ähnlich einer Grundschuld gelten, könnte der Gläubiger damit ins gesamte Vermögen vollstrecken und die anderen Gläubiger gingen leer aus. • Eine Verteilung des Verwertungserlöses (auch im Nachhinein) an die Masse geht aber ebenso zu Lasten des Garantienehmers, der keinen Vorteil mehr gegenüber den anderen Gläubigern hat. • Eine Garantie macht daher nur Sinn, wenn sie als absonderungsberechtigte Sicherheit vor einem nachträglichen Insolvenzverfahren geschützt ist
Der deutsche Gesetzgeber hat beispielsweise die Sicherungsübereignung als zulässige Sicherungsalternative akzeptiert. Sie ist mit dem geltenden Recht vereinbar. In Deutschland gilt grds. die Vertragsautonomie, sodass es in der Regel keine großen Hindernisse geben wird.
keine Antwort
 
Organisation oder Unternehmen(organisation-replying-as)
 
Loan Market Association
 
Ja(yes-transparency-register)
566455411423-81
Bankwesen([ID7])
Wirtschaftsverband([ID9])
 
 
 
Vereinigtes Königreich([ID52])
 
 
Ja, ich stimme der Veröffentlichung meines Beitrags unter dem von mir angegebenen Namen zu (Name Ihrer Organisation/Ihres Unternehmens/Ihrer Behörde bzw. Ihr Name, wenn Sie als Einzelperson antworten)(yes-contributions-publication)
NPL markets are jurisdictional in nature and vary considerably as a consequence. That said we do not believe there to be significant obstacles in the management and resolution of NPLs across the EU. In our view, the current size of the NPL market is a consequence of the financial crisis of 2007 - 2009. However, there has been a steady reduction in the level of NPLs across the EU, thanks in part to the specialised asset management companies set up to assist with the sale and management of NPLs. The successful NPL management by UKAR, NAMA, SAREB and BMAC underlines the liquidity available for NPL assets in particular jurisdictions. In each of 2015 and 2016, over €100 billion of non-core and NPL portfolios were sold across Europe (source: Deloitte), the vast majority of which were comprised of real estate assets. In 2017, the pace of asset sales has been tempered somewhat by the new ECB guidelines on NPL recognition and disposal strategy, also preparatory work for the implementation of IFRS 9. NPL sales in the first half of 2017 amounted to €42 billion, with some €87 billion in an extended pipeline (source: Deloitte). It should be noted that the secondary market for individual performing and distressed corporate loan assets has been thriving for over 20 years, with annual trading turnover of ca. €60-70 billion over the last 5 years (source: Thomson Reuters). The obstacles hindering the management and resolution of NPLs in the EU revolve around due diligence, and the availability and sufficiency of loan-level data (or lack of). Increasing the transparency of data around NPLs would be likely to increase liquidity in this market, better enabling banks to off-load legacy assets from their balance sheet via secondary markets for credit. Knowledge regarding jurisdictional issues, such as security and enforceability, play a large role in the liquidity available in each market, and the effective resolution of the NPLs therein. Secondary market investors need to educate themselves on local issues, including the state of the prevailing economy, before deciding whether or not to invest in any available NPL assets.
- bank internal factors (i.e. any factors inside the bank including the type and characteristics of the NPL portfolio, management capacity etc.) NPL sales are often dictated by provisions already set against the underlying assets. In addition, administrative costs will significantly impact the extent to which NPLs form part of their strategy, with banks having to consider whether or not they have the appropriate capacity and expertise to manage the work out of large NPL portfolios internally. Historical financial information and other data maintained by the bank may on occasion be incomplete, rendering sales significantly more difficult, although banks may be required to sell NPL portfolios as part of their strategy to manage the composition of their balance sheet. - external factors (i.e. any factors outside of the bank) Regulatory requirements, primarily derived from regulatory capital issues, place particular pressures on banks. For example, in the Spanish market, lenders typically opt to sell NPLs portfolios as a consequence of regulations on capital requirements (rather than lack of management capacity). Taking another example, in the German market, banks have been selling portfolios of NPLs recently in circumstances where it has been decided to close a particular business or branch. Another key factor is the level of knowledge available for any one particular market. More developed NPL markets, such as those in the UK and Ireland, allow for relative value comparisons, whereas less developed markets are more likely to see pricing driven by the internal rate of return requirements of investment funds, together with the quality of loan-level data available.
One way in which to attract a wider investor base to secondary loan markets would be to make it easier and less costly to transfer debt and security in NPLs. Across the EU, particular types of security require registration that is costly and time consuming. For example, in Spain the transfer of the benefit of a mortgage triggers stamp duty taxes and involves a lengthy documentation process. The automatic transfer of a perfected security interest to a new lender would significantly aid the market in attracting new investors. In addition, increased certainty that ancillary arrangements, such as hedging, account bank and letter of credit providers, will not be prejudiced by NPL transfers will further strengthen the attractiveness of the product. Reducing settlement times for the secondary loan market would also increase the attractiveness of the product to additional investors, particularly those currently operating in the bond and equity markets. This could in part be achieved by streamlining know your customer (KYC) requirements. KYC is identified as the foremost reason for delays in secondary loan settlement, with the median secondary settlement times in Europe currently standing at 29.4 business days as at Q2 2017. This is in contrast to the US, where settlement times stand at 13 business days as at Q2 2017. One, and potentially the primary, reason for this is the US recognises investors in the secondary market as counterparties (as opposed to customers), allowing for a low risk approach to be adopted in respect of KYC checks. This approach is not adopted in European markets, due to a difference in regulatory approach. Finally, clarity across Europe that the acquisition of a fully funded term facility is not an activity requiring a banking licence would open the investor pool to non-bank investors, such as debt and equity funds.
Regulatory capital relief would be a significant incentive, promoting liquidity in the secondary NPL market. NPLs, particularly distressed NPLs, can substantially affect the risk weighting of an investor's balance sheet, reducing or negating the commercial benefit of the transaction.
As set out in our response to Question 3, obstacles surrounding the transfer of debt and security in NPLs should be removed to widen the investor base. There should be an automatic transfer of a perfected security interest to a new lender, which should be recognised under the insolvency law of each EU state. In addition, better guidance surrounding KYC requirements, with a view to reducing secondary settlement times, would attract more investors to the syndicated loan market as a whole. Changes like these would help speed up the NPL market, to allow quick transfers (and market participants as participants would be more confident as their insolvency risk to the grantor would be reduced), reduce costs and facilitate securitisations. In addition, the removal of local licensing arrangements on who may own loans would assist in broadening the market.
The ability to sell non-core assets to a third party investor frees up capital for the original lender to more efficiently deploy elsewhere. Furthermore, the acquiring entity may be more specialised in the monetisation of the underlying receivables, the realisation of security or workout in general (these assets are more likely to be non-performing). This could increase the likelihood of a successful workout, enabling a greater repayment of debt owed to creditors. An acquiring bank is more likely to purchase performing loans, with a view to building/developing its franchise in the sector by virtue of the purchase.
Where the acquirer is another bank, then the borrower may get some comfort that the loan relationship will be continued in the same way as with the original lender. When other participants purchase the loan, they may have other motivations that do not involve the continuation of the relationship. For example, in the distressed arena it is not unusual for the purchaser to have a "loan to own strategy" or be driven by a quick realisation process, with little sympathy for the borrower's state of distress, but reflecting the acquirers valid commercial strategy.
The priorities are really dependent upon the different stakeholder interests. From the lenders' perspective the duty of confidentiality is paramount, from the investors' perspective they want enough information to be able to assess the transaction and ensure they get the pricing correct. Prices may be influenced by the ease and amount of information available. From the debtor's perspective, protection of their business takes priority. Looking at each in turn:- (1) debtor protection, Debtor protection is vital for a fully functioning secondary loan market. (2) privacy, Privacy is a fundamental principle of the syndicated loan market. It is a key characteristic in attracting borrowers to the syndicated loan market as against other financial products. (3) data secrecy, As stated above, better availability of loan-level data would be likely to attract more investors to the secondary loan market. However, the provision of this data needs to be careful balanced against the private nature of the market. (4) promoting increased market size and depth and equal treatment of investors The extent to which the promotion of the market would benefit the secondary market for loans would depend on what form such promotion would take. Ensuring equal treatment, and more importantly protection, of investors would aid in the expansion of the investor base.
Currently we promote the use of confidentiality agreements that seek to address issues relating to privacy and data secrecy, and balance the different perspectives. In terms of who may acquire the loans, contractual limits or restrictions may apply to protect the debtor, so that consents to transfer must be sought.
Nein(q9n)
 
As mentioned above, ownership limitations in certain jurisdictions can be restrictive.
In the context of an NPL, the relationship between debtor and creditor is complex. The debtors often look to preserve concessions that existing lenders may provide, or begin to explore transgressions that the existing lender (or its servicer) may have done in order to get out of payment, or delay or otherwise minimise payment. New lenders typically acquire loans with a view towards enhanced servicing and, where needed, enforcement. The balance has to be addressed so that the transfer is neutral – borrowers should not be prejudiced by a new lender, but at the same time new lenders are often looking not only at the quality of the loan / security for repayment, but how to address and minimise the risks of the existing lender (and its servicer) on the loan recovery. Failing to suitably balance the competing interests would make NPLs less appealing or could otherwise fail to generate suitably competitive bids for NPL transfers. At present, contractual consent mechanisms work well.
The more standardised the market becomes, with specialisms across jurisdictions or asset classes, the more efficient the process of transfer becomes from a time and costs perspective.
The current lack of an automatic transfer of a perfected security interest across national jurisdictions, as mentioned above, acts as a significant barrier to the geographical scope of business operations. Clarity across the EU, recognising that a designated party (such as a security agent / trustee) may hold security and other rights and benefits for a group of lenders, is strongly desired. In addition, those jurisdictions that impose limitations on the identity of the owner, as mentioned above, can influence the scope of business.
We do not consider that regulation of the transfer of loans would be useful or desirable. The secondary market for both performing and non-performing individual corporate loan assets in Europe is well established. Together with NPL and non-core portfolio sales (mainly real estate in nature), over €1 trillion has been sold in the European secondary market since the advent of the financial crisis (source: Thomson Reuters, Deloitte).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q25d)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The adoption of market standard documentation, such as that provided by the LMA, could facilitate cross border transactions and lower barriers to entry in new markets.
Verkauf und Übertragung von Krediten?(q29a)
A standard approach to the sale and transfer of single loan sales already exists in the European market. Standard form trade documentation and market practice guidance was established in 1997 by the Loan Market Association, and is widely used across the market. However, standard form documentation has yet to be developed specifically for loan portfolio transactions, with documentation being negotiated on a case-by-case basis. This is time consuming and costly for investors. The development of a common EU approach to the sale and transfer of loan portfolio transactions, and specifically the creation of a standard form of sale document for NPLs, would likely speed up settlement of NPL transactions and help create liquidity in the market.
(See above)
 
Ja(q31y)
As mentioned above, we represent members from a number of different jurisdictions. The ability to rely upon out-of-court enforcement varies from relatively sophisticated out-of-court procedures in England to court driven enforcement in a number of other European member states. There are obvious costs and time efficiencies that are derived from an out-of-court process which can lead to better recoveries. It is worth noting that banks in Europe also benefit from the European Financial Collateral Directive, which allows financial collateral arrangements to be enforced by way of appropriation and no court involvement. The Directive has been implemented in different ways and is dependent upon an arrangement falling within a specified category. Generally speaking the Directive has been welcomed by lenders who have benefitted from its application, and have as a consequence avoided the need to resort to the courts. Of course part of its effectiveness relied upon the fact that it switches off the debtor protections derived from insolvency laws, which is not what is envisaged here. As a result of which we consider that practically the enforcement mechanism being promoted here may not get much traction.
(See above)
(See above)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organisation oder Unternehmen(organisation-replying-as)
 
European Financial Congress
 
Nein(no-transparency-register)
 
Sonstiges([ID8])
Denkfabrik([ID12])
 
 
 
Polen([ID43])
 
stabilność systemu finansowego, rozwój rynków finansowych
Ja, ich stimme der Veröffentlichung meines Beitrags unter dem von mir angegebenen Namen zu (Name Ihrer Organisation/Ihres Unternehmens/Ihrer Behörde bzw. Ihr Name, wenn Sie als Einzelperson antworten)(yes-contributions-publication)
Wprowadzenie Problemy ograniczeń w sprzedaży i przenoszeniu kredytów zagrożonych należy rozpatrywać inaczej w odniesieniu do kredytów detalicznych dla ludności i inaczej w odniesieniu do kredytów korporacyjnych. Przesłane prze nas odpowiedzi dotyczą głównie wtórnego rynku zagrożonych kredytów detalicznych. Rozwiązanie problemu zagrożonych kredytów korporacyjnych wydaje się bardziej skomplikowane co najmniej z kilku powodów: 1. Wiele banków uniwersalnych realizuje strategię długoterminowych relacji lojalnościowych z klientami korporacyjnymi i zakłada, że ich udział w kapitale kredytowanych firm nie podlega obrotowi. 2. W strukturach wielu banków doskonalone są kompetencje z zakresu restrukturyzacji finansowej przedsiębiorstw. Trudno wówczas oczekiwać, że działania windykacyjne prowadzone przez zewnętrzne podmioty będą efektywniejsze od dobrze zorganizowanej restrukturyzacji i egzekucji przez struktury wewnętrzne banku. 3. Sprzedaż wierzytelności przedsiębiorstw, szczególnie tych które maja przejściowe kłopoty finansowe, nie służy budowaniu wizerunku banku jako instytucji zaufania publicznego. 4. Inne podejście do windykacji i restrukturyzacji kredytów korporacyjnych wynika w pewnej mierze z doświadczeń różnych krajów związanych z przebytymi kryzysami bankowymi. Model scentralizowany zakładał transfer trudnych wierzytelności z banków komercyjnych do tzw. banku złych długów. Ich windykacja i restrukturyzowanie były scentralizowane, a banki komercyjne wyzbywały się złych aktywów. Tak było np. w Szwecji w latach 90-tych. W tym samym okresie w Polsce realizowany był model zdecentralizowany. Banki komercyjne zostały dokapitalizowane, ale restrukturyzacja i windykacja trudnych kredytów odbywały się w wydzielonych wewnątrz banków strukturach. Pozwoliło to niektórym bankom na osiągnięcie wysokiego poziomu kompetencji w obszarze restrukturyzacji i windykacji kredytów komercyjnych i trudno byłoby oczekiwać, że zewnętrzne firmy windykacyjne miałyby na tyle istotną przewagę konkurencyjną, aby skłonić te banki do sprzedaży wierzytelności. Odpowiedź na pyt.1 Obecna wielkość, płynność i struktura wtórnych rynków kredytów zagrożonych w naszej ocenie nie stanowi przeszkody dla zarządzania kredytami zagrożonymi i rozwiązania kwestii tych kredytów w większości krajów należących do UE. Niemniej rynki europejskie mogłyby funkcjonować efektywniej gdyby ujednoliceniu uległy zasady i regulacje wpływające na ten rynek. Znalazłoby to odzwierciedlenie w zwiększonym poziomie bezpieczeństwa zarówno wierzycieli, inwestorów, jak i kredytobiorców (dłużników). Natomiast jest szereg krajów należących do UE gdzie brak jest niezbędnych do funkcjonowania tego rynku regulacji. Sytuacja te wprost przekłada się na wzrost ryzyka kumulacji problemu tzw. złych długów w bankach, co w sytuacji spowolnienia gospodarczego może wydatnie zwiększać ryzyko systemowe dla banków. Ponadto, gdyby doszło do ujednolicenia standardów i zasad klasyfikacji NPL, dałoby się w obiektywny sposób porównać sytuację rynku w poszczególnych krajach.
Sektor bankowy w najbliższy latach zmierzyć się musi z co najmniej czterema wyzwaniami: - niską rentownością w połączeniu z najpewniej wzrostem stóp procentowych, - zapewnieniem zgodności z wymaganiami płynącymi z różnorodnych przepisów (wymogi kapitałowe, podatki, raportowanie itp.), - zarządzaniem ryzykiem, - konkurencją pojawiającą się ze strony firm FinTech. Główną zaletą sprzedaży zagrożonych kredytów jest uzyskanie pozytywnego, jednorazowego wpływu na wskaźniki efektywności zarządzania (np. udział kredytów NPL w portfelu kredytów, rotacja kredytów NPL, ograniczenie wymogu kapitałowego) oraz długotrwałego efektu w postaci obniżenia kosztów zarządzania portfelem kredytów zagrożonych (koszty osobowe, prawne, sądowe). Sprzedaż wierzytelności jednocześnie eliminuje przyszłe ryzyko obniżania ich wartości w bilansie banku w wyniku możliwego pogorszenia ich jakości. Biorąc powyższe pod uwagę banki powinny rozważyć rezygnację z rozwoju funkcji nie wnoszących do wartości dodanej do ich działalności. Jednym z takim obszarów jest zarządzanie kredytami i pożyczkami nieregularnymi. Należy wówczas rozważyć czy korzystniejsze jest sprzedanie za akceptowalną cenę portfela NPL do firmy specjalizującej się w odzyskiwaniu należności straconych czy budowa tego typu kompetencji i całej struktury w ramach banku. Z drugiej jednak strony, zarządzanie tymi portfelami przez bank zwiększa jego szanse na identyfikacje zagrożonych kredytów na wcześniejszym etapie i nie dopuszczenie do przekształcenie się nich w NPL. Dlatego sprzedaż powinna dotyczyć tych kredytów, których nie udało się zrestrukturyzować, a działania windykacyjne okazały się nieskuteczne. Wśród czynników wpływających na decyzje banków w zakresie stopnia włączenia sprzedaży w strategię zarządzania ryzykiem kredytowym oraz kredytami zagrożonymi wymienić należy: 1. Czynniki wewnętrzne: - Posiadanie wyspecjalizowanych wewnętrznych zasobów pozwalających na efektywny sposób zarządzania kredytami zagrożonymi w kolejnych fazach ich cyklu życia. - Rodzaj, wielkość i różnorodność zarządzanych portfeli kredytowych w tym segment klienta i produkty kredytowe istniejące w ramach portfela oraz stopień pokrycia ich rezerwami - Jakość i uporządkowanie danych portfeli kredytów rozważanych do sprzedaży - Doświadczenie banku w podobnych procesach i historia współpracy z firmami zarządzającymi wierzytelnościami. - Sytuacja banku w obszarze płynności, kapitałowym oraz rentowności. Istotną przyczyną dla której banki najczęściej nie decydują się na sprzedaż portfeli NPL jest duża rozbieżność pomiędzy wartością netto portfela a oferowaną ceną za portfel. W głównej mierze przyczyną jest niski poziom pokrycia rezerwami portfela NPL, co jest pochodną przepisów obowiązujących w danych kraju lub braku podjęcia decyzji o podziale strat z tego tytułu pomiędzy poszczególnych interesariuszy (akcjonariuszy, wierzycieli, sektor publiczny itp.). 2. Czynniki zewnętrzne krajowe: - Wymogi regulacyjne (w zakresie wymogów kapitałowych oraz standardów księgowych), w tym zasady wyceny portfeli kredytowych w bilansie banków a możliwe do osiągnięcia na rynku ceny. - Polityka podatkowa w odniesieniu do zasad tworzenia rezerw oraz sprzedaży kredytów nieregularnych. Obecne polskie regulacje prawne pozwalają skorzystać z tarczy podatkowej jedynie w sytuacji sprzedaży kredytów objętych postępowaniami windykacyjnymi na etapie egzekucyjnym. Takie ukształtowanie przepisów prowadzi do sytuacji, że banki nie mogą sprzedać wierzytelności kredytowych na wcześniejszym etapie, nawet jeśli widzą ku temu przesłanki ekonomiczne, lecz czekają na moment uprawdopodobnienia nieściągalności, który pozwoli na zaliczenie straty do kosztów uzyskania przychodów. - Brak tarczy podatkowej dla sprzedaży produktów innych niż kredytowe. Banki posiadają w bilansie różne wierzytelności o charakterze dłużnym (wierzytelności z tytułu udzielonych kredytów i pożyczek, wierzytelności z tytułu gwarancji, wierzytelności z tytułu faktoringu). Przepisy podatkowe dotyczące możliwości zaliczenia straty na sprzedaży do kosztów podatkowych odnoszą się natomiast wyłącznie do wierzytelności z tytułu kredytów i pożyczek - Regulacje prawne wpływające na efektywność dochodzenia wierzytelności przez banki. Aktualnie obserwowany jest trend w polskim prawodawstwie do poprawy pozycji prawnej dłużnika w relacji z wierzycielem, co wpływa na spodziewany czas i koszt postępowań windykacyjnych - Rozwój rynku w zakresie rozwiązań formalno-prawnych wpływających na efektywność procedur sądowych i pozasądowych dot. odzyskiwania należności i realizacji zabezpieczeń 3. Czynniki zewnętrzne na rynku europejskim: - ustanowienie na szczeblu europejskim zbliżonych do siebie w poszczególnych krajach i transparentnych zasad obrotu należnościami nieregularnymi wspierających rozwój rynku sekurytyzacji należności ... Pełna odpowiedź z wyliczeniem czynników jest zamieszczona w załączonym pliku.
Aktywność inwestorów oraz ich liczba na wtórnym rynku kredytów zagrożonych determinowana jest przede wszystkim przez istnienie stabilnego systemu prawnego. Przez stabilność systemu prawnego rozumieć należy nie tylko podstawowe gwarancje, lecz istotne dla możliwości dochodzenia wierzytelności przepisy prawa cywilnego związane z instytucją przedawnienia, przebiegiem postępowania sądowego, upadłości oraz trybem postępowania w jakim dochodzi się wierzytelności czy też wysokością opłat sadowych i egzekucyjnych. Inwestor podejmujący decyzję wycenia inwestycję w horyzontach długoterminowych, czasami nawet w perspektywie 10 lub nawet 15-letnim, a niepewność co do przepisów prawa powoduje, że ryzyko dyskontowane jest w cenie, przez co może nie dochodzić do transakcji. Ta sama przyczyna może być czynnikiem hamującym rynek w znaczeniu ogólnym, czyli firmy nie będą podejmowały decyzji inwestycyjnych w kierunku rynku obrotu wierzytelnościami. Drugim aspektem mogącym powodować zwiększenie atrakcyjności rynku jest system podatkowy zarówno dla zbywców jak i nabywców wierzytelności. Z jednej strony można poprawić regulację związaną z kosztami uzyskania przychodu, z drugiej z podatkami dochodowymi, co pozwoliłoby traktować ten rynek jako rynek inwestycyjny z lepszymi stopami zwrotu, a więc ciekawszy dla inwestorów. Dodatkowo na przyciągnięcie szerszego grona inwestorów na wtórne rynki mogą mieć wpływ następujące kwestie: - przeniesienie uprawnień pierwotnego wierzyciela na wierzyciela wtórnego; - zwiększenie korzyści dla wierzyciela pierwotnego w różnych obszarach – niekoniecznie podatkowych ale na tyle istotnych, aby wierzyciel rozważał sprzedaż wierzytelności na wcześniejszych etapach niż egzekucja - zwiększenie świadomości społecznej, iż sprzedaż wierzytelności nie jest czymś z założenia złym, a może się okazać rozwiązaniem problemu, gdyż mamy ponownie możliwość podjęcia rozmów z nowym wierzycielem; - obsługa end to end i nabycie portfeli tylko przez licencjonowane podmioty tak aby zminimalizowanie ryzyka obsługi w sposób wykraczający poza granice prawa lub etyki. W przypadku rynku polskiego wydaje się, że problem nie leży w braku inwestorów, a raczej w wielkości oferowanych portfeli do sprzedaży. Istotni inwestorzy oczekują dużych portfeli aby zainteresować się Polskim rynkiem. Konieczne jest więc działanie które będzie usuwać kwestie negatywnie wpływające na decyzje o sprzedaży.
- niższe koszty dochodzenia wierzytelności (korzyści zarówno dla inwestora jak i dla kredytobiorcy – dłużnika, bo to on ostatecznie ponosi koszt opłat sądowych i egzekucyjnych); - atrakcyjniejszy system podatkowy; - ustalenie spójnych zasad udzielania zezwoleń dla podmiotów biorących udział w obrocie należności; ograniczenie możliwości uporczywego, celowego utrudniania postępowania przez dłużników (np. nieuzasadnione, uporczywe skargi obliczone jedynie na utrudnianie postępowania);
- niepewne i niespójne w ramach rynków unijnych przepisy prawa co do podstawowych instytucji prawnych wpływających na możliwość i rentowność dochodzenia wierzytelności; - ograniczenie możliwości uporczywego, celowego utrudniania postępowania przez dłużników (np. nieuzasadnione, uporczywe skargi obliczone jedynie na utrudnianie postępowania). Ponadto odpowiedź zawarta w odpowiedziach na poprzednie pytania np. konieczna jest zmiana przepisów podatkowych, czyniąca konstrukcje przenoszenia tax-deductible.
Dla wierzyciela pierwotnego ważne jest kto jest nabywcą wierzytelnością. Jeżeli nabywcy podlegają pewnym obowiązkom prawnym lub nadzorowi (jak np. bank czy fundusz inwestycyjny), stają się bardziej wiarygodnym partnerem dla zbywcy portfeli wierzytelności. Dzięki funkcjonowaniu rynku wtórnego obrotu wierzytelnościami, banki mogą zmniejszyć zaangażowanie zasobów w czynności windykacyjne, skupiając się na swojej podstawowej działalności operacyjnej. Pozwala to na optymalizację kosztową i podatkową, jak również na poprawę oceny jakości portfela kredytowego oraz poprawę płynności. Jeżeli nabywcą jest fundusz inwestycyjny, niejednokrotnie powiązany z wyspecjalizowanym podmiotem windykacyjnym, transakcja jest ściśle regulowana i bezpieczna. Co więcej, wyspecjalizowane podmioty windykacyjne posiadają większe możliwości w zakresie windykacji polubownej. Wspieranie specjalistycznych podmiotów funkcjonujących na rynku obrotu wierzytelnościami pozostaje zatem uzasadnione i to właśnie ten kierunek może spowodować dalszy rozwój rynku. W Polsce powszechne są transakcje sprzedaży z inwestorami specjalistycznymi, a nie bankami (które mają inne cele i uwarunkowania systemowe, nawet jeżeli weźmiemy pod uwagę działania pośrednie jak zakup jednostek uczestnictwa w funduszach angażujących się w finansowanie wykupu wierzytelności celem ich dochodzenia, czy też możliwe prawnie przejmowanie kredytów z innych banków). Dojrzałość polskiego rynku wierzytelności pozwala komfortowo przeprowadzać przetargi na sprzedaż wierzytelności bankowych bez większego ryzyka, że zgłaszana przez bank transakcja sprzedaży wierzytelności nie znajdzie odzwierciedlenia w realnym zainteresowaniu ze strony potencjalnych inwestorów.
Każdy z inwestorów obawia się ryzyka związanego z portfelem ogniskującego się tak w sferze poszczególnych wierzytelności (windykacja), jak i w sferze regulacyjnej (np. pomysły odnośnie do normatywnego rozwiązania problemu zadłużenia). Dla banków obawy budzą kwestie związane z ryzykiem utraty reputacji. Istotne jest, aby nabywca wierzytelności podejmował czynności windykacyjne zgodne z etyką oraz przepisami obowiązującego prawa. Ważne są również kwestie z dotrzymaniem warunków umownych, zwłaszcza zapłaty całości ceny w umówionym terminie. W Polsce bank nabywając wierzytelności na rynku wtórnym nie może zaliczyć do kosztów uzyskania przychodów strat na tej wierzytelności, co może powodować nieefektywność i zniechęca banki do brania udziału w zakupach na rynku wtórnym. Dla funduszy inwestycyjnych obawy wywołują przede wszystkim niepewność co do stabilności prawa w zakresie odzyskiwania wierzytelności, prawa podatkowego (zwłaszcza ryzyko opodatkowania podatkiem dochodowym) czy prawa ochrony konsumenta (zbyt duża ochrona konsumenta i jego danych osobowych może uniemożliwić skuteczne dochodzenie długów, np. utrudnić telefoniczną identyfikację dłużnika czy ustalenie aktualnego adresu zamieszkania/korespondencyjnego dłużnika). Obawy budzą również kosztowne i czasochłonne procedury sądowe i komornicze. Obawy całego rynku może budzić nabywanie wierzytelności przez podmioty inne niż banki czy fundusze inwestycyjne. Podmioty te, często nieposiadające odpowiedniego zezwolenia regulatora regulatora (tj. Komisji Nadzoru Finansowego), mogą świadczyć niskiej jakości usługi windykacyjne, których negatywne skutki odczują zarówno zbywcy, jak i inni nabywcy wierzytelności (ryzyko reputacyjne
Jedną z istotniejszych kwestii związanych z wtórnym obrotem wierzytelnościami jest zapewnienie odpowiedniej ochrony dłużnikom. W aktualnie obowiązującym stanie prawnym w Polsce wierzytelności mogą być zbywane przez banki praktycznie bez ograniczeń i bez zgody dłużnika. Powyższe powoduje, iż dłużnik nie ma żadnego wpływu na to komu taka wierzytelność będzie przysługiwała. Co do zasady, zgodnie z odpowiednimi przepisami Kodeksu cywilnego przelew wierzytelności nie może pogarszać sytuacji dłużnika wobec wierzyciela, bez względu na to, że przymiot ten uzyskała inna osoba. Stąd dłużnik ma prawo podnosić przeciwko cesjonariuszowi wszelkie zarzuty, które w chwili powzięcia wiadomości o przelewie przysługiwały mu względem cedenta. W praktyce jednak zdarza się, iż cesjonariusze nie dysponują pełną dokumentacją dotyczącą wierzytelności. Nadto w ramach cesji nie dochodzi do przejścia na cesjonariusza obowiązków banku związanych z daną umową kredytu czy pożyczki, a jedynie prawa do przelanej wierzytelności oraz praw akcesoryjnych. Powyższe może powodować trudności dla dłużnika w zakresie podnoszenia oraz wykazywania zarzutów, które mu przysługiwały wobec cedenta. Stąd tak istotne jest, aby we wtórnym obrocie wierzytelnościami brały udział podmioty wyspecjalizowane, pozostające pod nadzorem odpowiednich organów krajowych (w Polsce: Komisji Nadzoru Finansowego), które podlegałyby w tym zakresie pod szczególne regulacje, tak jak to ma miejsce w przypadku funduszy sekurytyzacyjnych. Kolejnym ważnym aspektem jest ochrona danych osobowych. Należy bowiem wskazać, iż w wyniku obrotu wierzytelnościami dochodzi do przekazania milionowych rekordów danych dłużników, w tym konsumentów. Powyższe dane są chronione prawem w sposób szczególny zarówno na szczeblu krajowym jak i unijnym. Istotne zatem jest, aby w przypadku poszerzenia kręgu podmiotów, które mogłyby nabywać wierzytelności od banków podmioty te były zobowiązane do zachowania tajemnicy zawodowej, w tym przestrzegania przepisów szczególnych odnoście przetwarzania danych osobowych, w zakresie co najmniej tożsamym z regulacjami, którymi podlegają fundusze sekurytyzacyjne. Pozostałe aspekty wiążą się ściśle z wytypowanymi przez nas kluczowymi zagadnieniami. Prawo ochrony danych osobowych jest nierozerwalnie związane z poszanowaniem prywatności, zaś wszystkie wymienione aspekty, tj. ochrona dłużnika, poufność danych oraz prywatność powinny być uwzględnione przy promowaniu zwiększonej wielkości i głębokości rynku i równego traktowania inwestorów.
Aby najlepiej osiągnąć równowagę między tymi aspektami uczestnicy wtórnego rynku obrotu wierzytelnościami powinni podlegać takim samym regulacjom prawnym związanym z nabywaniem oraz zarządzeniem wierzytelnościami a także podlegać pod ten sam organ nadzoru. Zapewnienie równego traktowania podmiotów zaangażowanych na tym rynku wobec prawa powinno mieć zatem kluczowe znaczenie przy tworzeniu ewentualnych regulacji w tym zakresie w ramach Unii Europejskiej. W szczególności istotne jest zapewnienie, iż wszystkie te podmioty będą podlegały tym samym wymogom dotyczącym warunków tworzenia takich podmiotów i prowadzenia przez nie działalności w tym zakresie, obowiązku uzyskania zezwolenia na prowadzenie takiej działalności oraz wpisów do odpowiednich rejestrów, zasad prowadzenia działalności w tym zakresie, w tym w szczególności obowiązków związanych z zachowaniem tajemnicy zawodowej, przetwarzaniem danych osobowych, rozpatrywaniem reklamacji dłużników, a wreszcie sankcji za działanie niezgodne z przepisami prawa. W związku z powyższym jedynie zapewnienie wspólnych zasad funkcjonowania tych podmiotów na wtórnym rynku obrotu wierzytelnościami może pozwolić na osiągnięcie równowagi między tymi aspektami.
Ja(q9y)
Ramy prawne funkcjonowania rynków są ściśle powiązane z celami (w tym wypadku korzyściami) realizowanej polityki. Tak jak sygnalizowano w odpowiedziach na wcześniejsze pytania, jedne z głównych różnic pomiędzy ramami prawnymi dla funkcjonowania rynku kredytów wtórnych, są kwestie właśnie dotyczące ochrony dłużnika oraz ochrony danych osobowych.
W ramach problemu, którego dotyczy pytanie, można zidentyfikować trzy obszary: proces przetargowy, nabycie oraz obsługa wierzytelności. W zakresie procesów przetargowych dotyczących sprzedaży wierzytelności na rynku wtórnym, na przykładzie krajów członkowskich takich jak: Włochy i Niemcy trudności wynikających z regulacji nie występują. Można uznać nawet, że procesy sprzedażowe, niezależnie od kraju, są bardzo zbliżone od strony procedur postępowania. Wynika to z faktu, że uczestnikami tych postępowań są międzynarodowe grupy inwestycyjne a organizatorami międzynarodowe grupy bankowe i doradcze, które na swój sposób wystandaryzowały postępowania. W zakresie nabycia wierzytelności najbardziej problematyczna jest kwestia transferu zabezpieczeń. Rozwojowi rynku, w szczególności segmentu wierzytelności zabezpieczonych, sprzyjałyby rozwiązania zapewniające efektywny transfer pod względem kosztowym i czasowym, umożliwiający działanie masowe (działanie na portfelach bardzo licznych wierzytelności). W zakresie obsługi wierzytelności, rozwiązania prawne zapewniające nadmierną ochronę dla konsumentów, będą ograniczać popyt ze strony inwestorów (spadek rentowności w związku z ograniczeniami działań). To samo dotyczy rozwiązań, zwłaszcza nowych, w zakresie ochrony danych osobowych.
Na ochronę dłużnika składa się cały system gwarancji, na który składają się: - przepisy o ochronie danych osobowych, - obowiązek zachowanie poufności informacji o stosunku zobowiązaniowym, - zagwarantowanie dłużnikowi co najmniej takiego samego poziomu ochrony, jaki miał w stosunku do wierzyciela pierwotnego, - przysługiwanie dłużnikowi przeciwko wierzycielowi wtórnemu wszelkich zarzutów, jakie miał przeciwko wierzycielowi pierwotnemu, - zapewnienie należytej staranności przy obsłudze wierzytelności klientów detalicznych (w przypadku projektów sekurytyzacji wierzytelności detalicznych niezbędnym atrybutem każdego serwisera obsługującego portfele klientów detalicznych banku jest posiadanie zezwolenia KNF), - odpowiednie procedowanie reklamacji, - zapewnienie braku wyłączenia działań wierzyciela oraz uprawnień i obowiązków dłużnika z jurysdykcji krajowej w celu rzeczywistej realizacji prawa do ochrony sądowej każdej ze stron (jurysdykcja krajowa nie powinna generować dodatkowych uprawnień dłużników z punktu widzenia zmiany osoby wierzyciela, poza przysługującymi prawami na zasadach ogólnych), - przepisy w zakresie ochrony praw konsumentów, - obowiązki informacyjne wobec dłużnika (informowanie dłużnika o zamiarze zbycia długu przez pierwotnego wierzyciela), - określenie okresu przedawnia długu, - procedury restrukturyzacyjne, upadłościowe, odwoławcze
Specjalizacja umożliwia maksymalizowanie efektywności działań windykacyjnych przez spółki zarządzające wierzytelnościami. Poprzez budowanie unikalnego know-how, stosowanie odpowiednio dostosowanych narządzi (w szczególności informatycznych) i wykorzystywanie masowego charakteru procesów. Z punktu widzenia sprzedającego, wyspecjalizowane firmy, dzięki własnej wyższej efektywności, są w stanie zaoferować wyższe ceny za aktywa określonej klasy (będące przedmiotem specjalizacji).
Poszczególne rynki posiadają własne rozwiązania regulujące takie kwestie jak: - określenia jakie podmioty mogą nabywać portfele wierzytelności nieregularnych, - określenia jakie podmioty mogą prowadzić obsługę portfeli wierzytelności. Przed rozpoczęciem działalności na danym rynku, należy ustanowić właściwą strukturę pozwalającą spełnić te wymagani i funkcjonować na danym rynku. Optymalnym rozwiązaniem byłaby możliwość funkcjonowania w różnych jurysdykcjach w oparciu o już działające struktury kraju macierzystego. Ponadto różnice w podejściu do ochrony konsumenta, ochrony danych osobowych oraz inne możliwości prowadzenia działań z tzw. procesami masowymi powodują, że firmy budujące własne know-how i standard działania w ramach jednej jurysdykcji nie jest w stanie w pełni zaaplikować swoich rozwiązań w innej.
Regulacje na poziomie dyrektywy są najbardziej efektywnym rozwiązaniem. Jednak miałyby to sens gdyby ujednolicały one przepisy we wszystkich państwach członkowskich UE. Jednocześnie rynki poszczególnych krajów członkowskich różnią się znacznie pod względem rozwiązań szczegółowych, przede wszystkim praktyki, kultury, podejścia do ryzyka i postrzegania go. Dlatego, zanim podjęte by były dalej idące działania, niezbędne byłoby dokonanie analizy istniejących rozwiązań. Ujednolicone mogłyby zostać przepisy z zakresu: - możliwości dochodzenia roszczeń - przedawnienia wierzytelności, - zasad prowadzenia egzekucji komorniczych, - maksymalnych wysokości opłat sądowych i egzekucyjnych, - rejestracji, funkcjonowania i nadzoru SPV dedykowanych nabywaniu wierzytelności, - opodatkowania transakcji kupna/sprzedaży wierzytelności. Ujednolicenie zasad umożliwiłoby dostęp inwestorom z innych jurysdykcji do rynków lokalnych poprzez usunięcie barier wynikających z nieznajomości przepisów lokalnych lub ograniczyło koszty obsługi prawnej transakcji transgranicznych.
 
Przy dobrze prowadzonej polityce ryzyka kredytowego oraz wysokich kompetencjach banków w obszarze restrukturyzacji i windykacji można oczekiwać, że korzystniejszym rozwiązaniem dla banku jest odzyskiwanie kredytów trudnych własnymi siłami. Nie ma bowiem argumentów jednoznacznie wskazujących, że działania realizowane przez zewnętrzne firmy windykacyjne są bardziej efektywne od dobrze zorganizowanej struktury wewnętrznej. Decyzja, czy restrukturyzować i windykować własnymi siłami, czy transferować trudne aktywa do wyspecjalizowanych firm zewnętrznych zależy od wielu czynników o charakterze strategicznym, ale głównie od oceny, czy bank ma i będzie miał w przyszłości przewagę konkurencyjną nad zewnętrzną firmą windykacyjną. Nie zmienia to faktu, że swobodny dostęp do zewnętrznych jednostek obsługujących kredyty stanowi jeden z kluczowych elementów rozwoju rynku obrotu wierzytelnościami w danej jurysdykcji. Restrukturyzacja, windykacja, wymagają specjalistycznej wiedzy. Dlatego W przypadku banków nieposiadających w swoich strukturach wewnętrznych sprawnych i skutecznych jednostek restrukturyzacyjno-windykacyjnych istotne jest, by wierzyciele pierwotni mieli dostęp do odpowiedniego know-how, które oferowane jest przez zewnętrzne jednostki obsługujące kredyty. Związane jest to z większą wiedzą tych jednostek zakresie dochodzenia wierzytelności co z kolei pozwala na bardziej precyzyjną ich wycenę rynkową. Korzyści płynące ze współpracy z takimi podmiotami to przede wszystkim: - zwiększenie skuteczności procesu windykacyjnego; - wydajniejsze zarządzanie kredytami zagrożonymi; - zredukowanie kosztów operacyjnych prowadzonej działalności przy jednoczesnym zapewnieniu jakości obsługi zarówno w relacji bank – serwiser, jak i w relacji serwiser – dłużnik; - ograniczenie kosztów administracyjnych; - poprawa płynności; - weryfikacji skuteczności własnych procesów; - możliwość dzielenia wybranych rodzajów ryzyka np. ze w względu na koncentrację bez utraty kontakty z klientem; - masowa obsługa wierzytelności na etapie polubownym, sądowym i egzekucyjnym; - zaawansowane rozwiązania informatyczne; - wysokie standardy obsługi klienta - pozytywny wpływ na transakcje zawierane na wtórnym rynku kredytów. Ponadto wyspecjalizowane jednostki zewnętrzne stanowią pomost pomiędzy zlecającymi im obsługę wierzycielami pierwotnymi a inwestorami, dla których te wyspecjalizowane jednostki oferują usługi zakupu wierzytelności. Obsługa portfeli przez zewnętrzne jednostki pozwala na ich stały monitoring i niezależną wycenę. Posiadając taką wiedzę jednostka zewnętrzna może być atrakcyjnym partnerem dla podmiotu sprzedającego wierzytelności zapewniając korzystne warunki zakupu wierzytelności. Tworzy to możliwości inwestycyjne dla inwestorów finansowych, a w szczególności dla inwestorów z innych jurysdykcji. Daje im możliwość zarządzania takim portfelem bez budowania struktur lokalnych.
Nein(q17n)
 
Korzyści płynące ze współpracy z zewnętrznymi jednostkami: - szerszy wachlarz czynności wykonywanych przez zewnętrzne podmioty; - specjalizacja prowadzonych postępowań; - ograniczenie kosztów organizacyjnych własnych jednostek; - elastyczność zarządzania procesem (w przypadku większego wolumenu spraw podział pomiędzy kilka podmiotów współpracujących); - wyższa skuteczność obsługi zewnętrznych podmiotów (dla których jest to działalność podstawowa); - przekazanie wierzytelności do zewnętrznej obsługi uwalnia zasoby banku, pozwalając im skupić się na działalności podstawowej. Ryzyka na które warto zwrócić uwagę to przede wszystkim ryzyko reputacyjne. Trzeba jednak zauważyć, że na większości rynków europejskich czynności wykonywane są przed grupy kapitałowe, które nie pozwalają na jakiekolwiek uszczerbek reputacji, a wymogi banków jako wierzycieli (zleceniodawców) co do jakości wykonywanych czynności są takie same jak wymogi co do jakości czynności wykonywanych bezpośrednio przez jednostki własne banku. Innym istotnym ryzykiem jest możliwe naruszenie zasad bezpieczeństwa informacji chronionych, w tym udostępnienie danych objętych tajemnicą bankową osobom trzecim przez podmiot zewnętrzny, prowadzenie powierzonych czynności przez podmiot zewnętrzny w sposób sprzeczny z dobrymi obyczajami i zasadami współżycia społecznego czy też możliwość nagłego zaprzestania prowadzenia czynności. Kolejnym istotnym ryzykiem może okazać się również ryzyko zaprzestania działalności przez firmę windykacyjną.
Czynności wykonywane przez zewnętrzne jednostki obsługujące kredyty mogą skutkować ryzykiem naruszeń praw dłużnika, tj. - nieprzestrzeganiem zasad dotyczących ochrony danych osobowych dłużnika; - naruszeniem zbiorowych interesów konsumentów; - naliczaniem pozaumownych kosztów i opłat; - nieetycznym zachowaniem wobec dłużnika (konsumenta). Na zdecydowanej większości rynków europejskich, w tym na rynku polskim, przepisy prawa cywilnego chronią dłużnika przed jakimkolwiek nieuprawnionym działaniem czy wprost działaniem na szkodę dłużnika, czy to bezpośrednio przez wierzyciela, czy też przez podmioty zewnętrzne obsługujące wierzytelności. Ryzyka są zatem zminimalizowane. Brak jest podstaw by sądzić, że w/w ryzyka wymagają kolejnych uregulowań.
W Polsce dominuje obsługa kredytów zagrożonych. Projekty obsługi kredytów niezagrożonych mają charakter incydentalny. Korzyści i wady zostały wskazane w odpowiedzi na pytania 18 i 19.
Większość znaczących podmiotów wykonujących usługi na rynku obsługi kredytów zagrożonych oferuje obsługę zróżnicowanych aktywów, niemniej jednak, na rynku funkcjonują również podmioty zawężające spektrum działania, bazujące na obsłudze określonych typów aktywów. Można jednak zauważyć, że zazwyczaj za zawężeniem klas aktywów idzie najczęściej zwiększenie skuteczności i efektywności w tym zakresie, w związku z naturalną większą specjalizacją. Zależy to jednak każdorazowo od wielkości i organizacji zewnętrznych jednostek, które nierzadko są w stanie należycie obsługiwać kredyty koncentrując się na kilku aktywach. Na rynku polskim dominuje obsługa portfeli niezabezpieczonych (portfelami zabezpieczonymi, np. hipotecznie, specjalizuje się wąska grupa podmiotów).
Rynek Polski: 1. zarządzanie wierzytelnościami (windykacja wierzytelności przez zewnętrzny podmiot mający do tego specjalne uprawnienia): Servicer: - windykacja polubowna wierzytelności; - windykacja sądowo-egzekucyjna wierzytelności; - monitorowanie spłat wierzytelności; - due diligence portfela wierzytelności 2. skip-tracking: pozyskiwanie danych teleadresowych do dalszej obsługi wierzytelności; Rynek Włoski: 3. zarządzanie podmiotem przeznaczonym do transakcji sekurytyzacyjnych (administracja, raportowanie do odpowiednich organów, nadzór zgodności z przepisami prawa) – Corporate Master Servicer, 4. zarządzanie wierzytelnościami (windykacja wierzytelności przez zewnętrzny podmiot mający do tego specjalne uprawnienia): – Sub-Servicer, 5. depozytariusz – czuwający nad odpowiednimi rozliczeniami, transferami, dokumentacją, wiarygodnością podmiotów uczestniczących w sekurytyzacji – Paying Agent, Account Bank, 6. doradztwo prawne, 7. doradztwo w zakresie wycen portfeli, 8. doradztwo w zakresie pozyskiwania transakcji. Najprzydatniejsze usługi to usługa monitoringu i windykacji polubownej, wsparcie procesu sądowo-komorniczego.
Ja(q23y)
den Zulassungsvoraussetzungen für entsprechende Dienstleister?(q23iya)
der Aufsicht über entsprechende Dienstleister?(q23iyb)
Ramy prawne powinny zawierać przepisy dotyczące: - wymogów udzielania zezwoleń dla takich jednostek obsługujących – proces licencjonowania pozwala wymagać odpowiednich procedur, - nadzoru nad takimi jednostkami obsługującymi – daje szanse na porządkowanie i kontrolowanie relacji z dłużnikiem; ze względu ma formę działalności windykatorów właściwy byłby tu nadzór o charakterze konsumenckim, a nie finansowym.
 
Nein(q25n)
 
Ja(q26y)
Podstawowym utrudnieniem pozostaje podleganie pod kilku nadzorców i funkcjonowanie w kliku systemach prawnych zawierających odmienne uregulowania co do podstawowych instytucji prawnych. Na rynkach znajdujących się na wstępnym etapie rozwoju rynku obrotu wierzytelnościami krajowe przepisy prawa często są w fazie dostosowywania do wymogów UE i jednocześnie oczekiwań lokalnych uczestników tych rynków, stąd natknąć się można na ich różne interpretacje. Dlatego dla podmiotów rozpoczynających dopiero działalność poznanie lokalnych przepisów stanowi istotną trudność. Uczestnicy transakcji są bardzo zachowawczy, z dystansem podchodzą do przyjmowania nowych rozwiązań, w tym technologicznych czy operacyjnych. Utrudnieniem jest np. to, że w poszczególnych krajach nie ma pełnej gamy produktów bankowych do masowej obsługi wierzytelności takich jak np. mass payments.
Z perspektywy sprzedawcy. Utrudnieniem dla banku jest, że wierzytelność przed sprzedażą musi przejść proces egzekucji, w celu uprawdopodobnienia ściągalności. Dopiero po tych czynnościach, może zostać sprzedana. Umożliwienie rezygnacji z tych wymogów skróciło by proces i zapewniło większa efektywność procesu zarządzania wierzytelnościami: wyspecjalizowane firmy nabywałyby przeterminowane aktywa na wczesnym etapie. Z perspektywy nabywcy. W części krajów sprzedaż portfeli kredytów jest realizowana przez specjalne podmioty sekurytyzacyjne (fundusze inwestycyjne lub SPV). Te podmioty są nadzorowane przez organy finansowe pośrednio lub bezpośrednio, co jest to związane z koniecznością spełnienia szeregu wymogów, w szczególności raportowych
W krajach, w których prowadzimy działalność obsługa portfeli wierzytelności jest licencjonowana. Jest to z pewnością utrudnienie dla prowadzenia tego typu działalności, nie mniej wydaje się ono być uzasadnione.
Ja(q27y)
Zbyt duża ochrona dłużnika oraz ochrona danych osobowych ogranicza możliwości działań windykacyjnych. Czego skutkiem jest zmniejszenie atrakcyjności inwestycji w portfele wierzytelności i zmniejszenie możliwości sprzedaży aktywów przeterminowanych przez banki.
Rozwiązaniem byłoby zharmonizowanie rozwiązań w zakresie funkcjonowania rynku sprzedaży wierzytelności, czyli: - zbliżenie zasady tworzenia rezerw i unifikacja podatkowego traktowania strat na sprzedaży NPL u zbywców wierzytelności nieregularnych - uznanie krajowego tytułu wykonawczego za ważny w całej UE, bez konieczności uzyskiwania Europejskiego Nakazu Zapłaty - zgromadzenie najbardziej istotnych aktów prawnych dotyczących sprzedaży i obsługi kredytów zagrożonych z obowiązującego prawa lokalnego przez wyznaczoną instytucję państwową, która obwieszczałaby to prawo w języku lokalnym jak i angielskim. Dodatkowo w przyszłości ujednolicenie tego prawa (bądź ogólnych ram). - ujednolicenie przepisów w zakresie dochodzenia należności tak aby prowadzenie windykacji sądowej i egzekucyjne nie wymagało specjalistycznej wiedzy specyficznej dla każdego z osobna kraju członkowskiego - możliwość prowadzenia działań egzekucyjnych na terenie wszystkich państw członkowskich na podstawie orzeczenia sądowego wydanego w jednym kraju członkowskim bez konieczności dodatkowych akcji prawnych oraz przez jeden organ egzekucyjny - usprawnienie upadłości transgranicznych poprzez przepisy ułatwiające zbywanie aktywów położnych poza granicami państwa, w którym ogłoszono upadłość oraz ułatwiających wierzycielom aktywny udział w ramach postępowań upadłościowych
Verkauf und Übertragung von Krediten?(q29a)
Prowadzenie działalności transgranicznej ułatwiłoby przyjęcie zasady podlegania jednemu zamiast kilku nadzorcom oraz zwiększenie konwergencji systemów prawnych, które obecnie zawierają odmienne uregulowania co do podstawowych instytucji prawnych. Dla podmiotów rozpoczynających dopiero działalność poznanie lokalnych przepisów stanowi istotną trudność. Główne obszary jakie powinny zostać ujednolicone w celu ułatwienia prowadzenia działalności transgranicznej to: - prawo restrukturyzacyjne i upadłościowe - prawo spadkowe - kwestie podatkowe (szczególnie w części dotyczącej zakupu/sprzedaży zagrożonych aktywów) - umożliwienie dostępu do baz dłużników prowadzonych w poszczególnych krajach UE - stworzenie centralnego rejestru ludności UE z możliwością uzyskiwania informacji adresowych
Odpowiedź jak w pyt. 28: Należy podjąć działania harmonizujące rozwiązania w zakresie funkcjonowania rynku sprzedaży wierzytelności, czyli: - wdrożenie instrumentu zabezpieczenia kredytu o przyśpieszonym trybie egzekucji, - zbliżenie zasady tworzenia rezerw i unifikacja podatkowego traktowania strat na sprzedaży NPL u zbywców wierzytelności nieregularnych - uznanie krajowego tytułu wykonawczego za ważny w całej UE, bez konieczności uzyskiwania Europejskiego Nakazu Zapłaty - zgromadzenie najbardziej istotnych aktów prawnych dotyczących sprzedaży i obsługi kredytów zagrożonych z obowiązującego prawa lokalnego przez wyznaczoną instytucję państwową, która obwieszczałaby to prawo w języku lokalnym jak i angielskim. Dodatkowo w przyszłości ujednolicenie tego prawa (bądź ogólnych ram). - ujednolicenie przepisów w zakresie dochodzenia należności tak aby prowadzenie windykacji sądowej i egzekucyjne nie wymagało specjalistycznej wiedzy specyficznej dla każdego z osobna kraju członkowskiego - możliwość prowadzenia działań egzekucyjnych na terenie wszystkich państw członkowskich na podstawie orzeczenia sądowego wydanego w jednym kraju członkowskim bez konieczności dodatkowych akcji prawnych oraz przez jeden organ egzekucyjny - usprawnienie upadłości transgranicznych poprzez przepisy ułatwiające zbywanie aktywów położnych poza granicami państwa, w którym ogłoszono upadłość oraz ułatwiających wierzycielom aktywny udział w ramach postępowań upadłościowych - stworzenie rejestru jednostek obsługujących kredyty w UE - wypracowanie i wdrożenie jednolitego sposobu sprawozdawczości i prezentowania wyników umożliwiającego porównanie i ocenę sytuacji finansowej podmiotu i jego efektywności jego działań - stworzenie systemu ostrzeżeń / alertów przed podmiotami nienależycie, nieetycznie prowadzącymi swoją działalność
 
Ja(q31y)
Obecnie w polskim porządku prawnym brak jest instrumentu pozwalającego bankom na egzekwowanie kredytów zabezpieczonych w sposób ekonomiczny oraz efektywny oraz bez udziału sądu. Do dnia 25 września 2015 roku w istniały przepisy zapewniające bankom możliwość wystawiania bankowych tytułów egzekucyjnych (BTE) na podstawie ksiąg banków lub innych dokumentów związanych z dokonywaniem czynności bankowych. W BTE należało oznaczyć bank, który go wystawił i na rzecz którego egzekucja miała być prowadzona, dłużnika zobowiązanego do zapłaty, wysokość zobowiązań dłużnika wraz z odsetkami i terminami ich płatności, datę wystawienia BTE, jak również oznaczyć czynność bankową, z której wynikały dochodzone roszczenia, oraz wzmiankę o wymagalności dochodzonego roszczenia. BTE musiał być nadto opatrzony pieczęcią banku wystawiającego tytuł oraz podpisami osób uprawnionych do działania w imieniu banku. Tak wystawiony BTE mógł być podstawą egzekucji prowadzonej według przepisów kodeksu postępowania cywilnego po nadaniu mu przez sąd klauzuli wykonalności wyłącznie przeciwko osobie, która bezpośrednio z bankiem dokonywała czynności bankowej albo była dłużnikiem banku z tytułu zabezpieczenia wierzytelności banku wynikającej z czynności bankowej i złożyła pisemne oświadczenie o poddaniu się egzekucji oraz gdy roszczenie objęte tytułem wynikało bezpośrednio z tej czynności bankowej lub jej zabezpieczenia. Przy czym w toku postępowania w przedmiocie nadania klauzuli wymagalności BTE sąd ograniczony był jedynie do weryfikacji formalnej tego tytułu w terminie 3 dni od złożenia wniosku. Jednakże, w dniu 14 kwietnia 2015 roku Trybunał Konstytucyjny wydał wyrok, w którym orzekł o niezgodności art. 96-98 Prawa Bankowego z art. 32 Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej, poprzez naruszenie zasady równości stron wobec prawa oraz o utracie mocy tych przepisów z dniem 15 sierpnia 2016 roku. W uzasadnieniu przedmiotowego wyroku Trybunał Konstytucyjny wskazał między innymi, iż bank i jego klient mają wspólną cechę istotną – są stronami prywatnoprawnego stosunku zobowiązaniowego, który jest oparty na zasadzie prawnej (formalnej) równości i autonomii woli stron. Powinny mieć więc równe, co do zasady, możliwości obrony swych praw i interesów wynikających z zawartej umowy. Tymczasem bank sam wydawał tytuł egzekucyjny, zastępujący orzeczenie sądu, z pominięciem merytorycznego rozpoznania sprawy, w czasie którego klient mógłby podnieść merytoryczne zarzuty. Klient mógł bowiem bronić się przed BTE tylko wytaczając powództwo przeciwegzekucyjne (art. 840 k.p.c.), czyli powództwo, które przysługuje dopiero na etapie postępowania egzekucyjnego podnosząc w związku z tym pełną opłatę stosunkową (5 % od wartości roszczenia) i cały ciężar dowodzenia – w warunkach prowadzenia przeciwko niemu egzekucji wiążącej się z zajęciem majątku (w tym czasie mogło już dojść do licznych zajęć komorniczych np. z rachunku bankowego czy wynagrodzenia za pracę). W chwili obecnej bankom przysługuje prawo dochodzenia roszczeń w egzekucji bez uprzedniego prowadzenia procesu sądowego, jedynie w przypadku, gdy dłużnik w akcie notarialnym podda się dobrowolnej egzekucji („Dobrowolne poddanie się egzekucji”). Przedmiotowy akt notarialny musi obok powyższego oświadczenia określać ponadto (i) obowiązek zapłaty sumy pieniężnej do wysokości w akcie wprost określonej albo oznaczonej za pomocą klauzuli waloryzacyjnej, (ii) zdarzenie, od którego uzależnione jest wykonanie obowiązku, jak również (iii) termin, do którego wierzyciel może wystąpić o nadanie temu aktowi klauzuli wykonalności. W takiej sytuacji, w przypadku ziszczenia się określonego w akcie notarialnym zdarzenia, wierzyciel uprawniony jest do wystąpienia do sądu o nadania klauzuli wykonalności na ten akt, co podobnie, jak w przypadku BTE, ogranicza się do formalnej weryfikacji przez sąd spełnienia przesłanek do nadania klauzuli wykonalności w terminie 3 dni. W praktyce jednak powyższa instytucja jest bardzo rzadko wykorzystywana z uwagi na wysokie koszty związane ze sporządzeniem aktu notarialnego, gdyż taksa notarialna uzależniona jest od kwoty objętej tym aktem (kwoty pożyczki/kredytu) i może nawet wynieść kilka tysięcy złotych. Koszt ten musiałby zostać poniesiony przez którąś albo obie strony, co powoduje, że żadna ze stron umowy pożyczki czy kredytu nie jest zainteresowana tym rozwiązaniem. W polskim porządku prawnym istnieją instytucje, które w pewnych aspektach mogą przypominać instrument zabezpieczenia kredytu o przyśpieszonym trybie egzekucji. Należą do nich: 1. tzw. przewłaszczenie na zabezpieczenie, 2. zastaw rejestrowy, 3. kaucja bankowa. Pełna odpowiedź z opisem ww instrumentów jest zamieszczona w załączonym pliku.
Główna korzyść płynąca z instytucji dobrowolnego poddania się egzekucji wynika z braku konieczności wszczynania odrębnego postępowania przed sądem powszechnym w celu dochodzenia kwoty, co do której dłużnik dobrowolnie poddał się egzekucji. Takie oświadczenie posiada moc tytułu egzekucyjnego, rodzi zatem skutki identyczne jak np. wyrok sądowy. Wyeliminowanie tego etapu dochodzenia wierzytelności wpływa znacznie na skrócenie czasu odzyskiwania należności przez bank. Jednakże, jak to zostało wyżej wskazane, instytucja ta jest rzadko wykorzystywana z uwagi na koszty sporządzenia aktu notarialnego. Ponadto, korzystanie z funkcjonujących w polskim porządku prawnym instytucji, o których mowa powyżej (tj. przewłaszczenie na zabezpieczenie, zastaw rejestrowy, kaucja bankowa) może wpływać korzystnie na: - obniżenie nakładów finansowych na postępowanie sądowe oraz egzekucyjne, - skrócenie czasu koniecznego na odzyskanie wierzytelności oraz uzyskanie stosunkowo wyższego odzysku z realizacji zabezpieczenia, - udzielenie wierzycielowi uprawnienia do zaspokojenia swoich wymagalnych wierzytelności, bez konieczności uwzględnienia innych wierzycieli, - elastyczność w ustanawianiu zabezpieczenia oraz w jego realizacji.
Główną wada instytucji dobrowolnego poddania się egzekucji jest konieczność określenia terminu, w którym banki mogą żądać nadania klauzuli wykonalności na taki akt notarialny. Jeśli chodzi o termin to obecnie w polskim porządku prawnym co do zasady przedawnienie roszczeń pieniężnych związanych z prowadzoną przez banki działalnością wynosi 3 lata, jednakże po upływie tego terminu roszczenie nie przestaje istnieć a jedynie przekształca się w zobowiązanie naturalne. Powyższe oznacza, że wierzyciel może po upływie tego terminu nadal żądać zapłaty, jednakże dłużnik może się od tego obowiązku uchylić podnosząc zarzut przedawnienia (zarzut ten można podnieść tylko w toku postepowania przed sądem). W akcie notarialnym zaś należy wskazać konkretny termin, do którego wierzyciel może żądać nadania klauzuli wykonalności, podczas gdy teoretycznie może żądać od dłużnika zapłaty nawet po okresie przedawnienia. Kolejną wadą omawianej instytucji, jak to zostało już zasygnalizowane jest wysoki koszt sporządzenia aktu notarialnego oraz sam fakt obowiązku dokonania tego przed notariuszem, co powoduje, iż instrument ten nie jest w praktyce wykorzystywany. Odnosząc się zaś do głównych ryzyk i wyzwań związanych ze stosowaniem instytucji przewłaszczenia na zabezpieczenie należy w szczególności wymienić: - konieczność poniesienia kosztów związanych z odbiorem, przechowaniem, wyceną i sprzedażą rzeczy, - ustalenie cen zbycia, - negatywne działania dłużników zmierzające do przeciwdziałania sprzedaży majątku, - konieczność wszczęcia postępowania sądowego w przypadku braku wydania przedmiotu zabezpieczenia przez dłużnika, - ustalenie wysokości spłaty zobowiązania, - obniżenie wartości przedmiotu zabezpieczenia skutkujące niemożnością zaspokojenia całości dochodzonej wierzytelności, - wyłączenie zbywalności przedmiotu zabezpieczenia w drodze ustawy, statutu, umowy lub też obciążenie przedmiotu zabezpieczenia użytkowaniem, zastawem rejestrowym lub skarbowym, - brak transparentności postanowień regulujących omawiane instytucje, skutkujący kwestionowaniem przez dłużnika będącego konsumentem skuteczności zabezpieczenia wobec jego osoby, - ryzyko długotrwałego administrowania przejętym aktywem (w przypadku aktywów trudnych do zbycia), - w przypadku zbycia przejętego aktywa istnieje ryzyko uzyskania kwoty niższej niż wartość z przejęcia tego aktywa. Natomiast zasadnicze ryzyka i wyzwania związane ze stosowaniem instytucji zastawu rejestrowego są następujące: - ograniczenie zabezpieczenia do rzeczy ruchomych i zbywalnych praw majątkowych (wyłączone są nieruchomości, a w konsekwencji przedsiębiorstwa i gospodarstwa rolne), - realizacja zabezpieczenia poprzez przejęcie rzeczy jest wyłączona w sytuacji zajęcia przedmiotu przez komornika (w tym z wniosku innych wierzycieli), - utrudniona realizacja z uwagi na brak przepisów wykonawczych dla niektórych form zaspokojenia (sprzedaż w drodze przetargu publicznego).
Zapewnienie instrumentów zbliżonych do instrumentu „zabezpieczenia kredytu o przyśpieszonym trybie egzekucji” mogłoby pozwolić na: - rozwój jednolitego rynku transferu kredytów, bez potrzeby prowadzenia analiz dotyczących możliwości i skuteczności windykacji, - podniesienie konkurencyjności ofert kredytowych (w obliczu wchodzenia banków w kredytowanie obywateli pracujących i mieszkających za granicą, lub też posiadających zabezpieczenia w innych krajach), - usprawnienie procesu egzekucji, a jednocześnie zwiększenie bezpieczeństwa banków, co w konsekwencji powinno obniżyć koszty kredytu i zwiększyć dostępność w pozyskiwaniu kredytów, - harmonizację sposobu windykacji i egzekucji należności (przez ustalenie wzajemnych uznanych standardów w tym zakresie), - zwiększenie pewności odzyskania należności bez potrzeby inicjowania postępowania sądowego (mającego różny przebieg w każdym państwie członkowskim), co może skutkować m.in. podejmowaniem działań i inwestycji finansowych, które będą obarczone mniejszym ryzykiem, - skrócenie czas odzysku, a tym samych zmniejszenie poziomu zaangażowania kapitału na zabezpieczenie „bezwartościowych” aktywów, - minimalizację kosztów sądowo – egzekucyjnych, - prewencyjne oddziaływanie na dłużnika banku (kredytobiorca musiałby brać pod uwagę realną perspektywę skutecznej i szybkiej egzekucji długów). Jednak niezależnie od powyższego należy mieć na uwadze, że: - wprowadzenie instrumentu „zabezpieczenia kredytu o przyśpieszonym trybie egzekucji” w państwach, w których istnieje już możliwość stosowania podobnych instrumentów, które z ekonomicznego punktu widzenia są zbliżone do proponowanego instrumentu może okazać się niecelowe, - instrument „zabezpieczenia kredytu o przyśpieszonym trybie egzekucji” powinien pozwalać na podjęcie stosownych czynności przez wierzyciela, ale za uprzednią obopólną zgodą stron (dłużnika i wierzyciela), - instrument powinien pozwalać na jego zastosowania także w przypadku ewentualnego przelewu wierzytelności przez bank na inny podmiot, - konieczność unikania rozwiązań, prowadzących do automatycznego zwolnienia dłużnika z długu w przypadku, gdy kwota ze sprzedaży zabezpieczenia o przyspieszonym trybie egzekucji i pozostałych zabezpieczeń nie pokrywa kwoty długu, - konieczność unikania ewentualnych dolegliwości dla wierzyciela, - posiadając skuteczny sposób na odzyskanie długów, także w przypadku niewypłacalności dłużników, banki mogą być mniej skłonne do uczestniczenia w postępowaniach o restrukturyzację przedsiębiorstw.
Z jednej strony zabezpieczenie kredytu o przyspieszonym trybie egzekucji mogłoby pozwolić na uniknięcie akumulacji kredytów zagrożonych w bilansie m.in. przez ujednolicenie sposobu zabezpieczenia i jego realizacji w krajach UE (co umożliwi swobodniejszy przepływ transgraniczny kredytów na rynku wtórnym), usprawnienie procesu windykacji (skrócenie postępowań), zwiększenie determinacji kredytobiorców w spłacie zobowiązań (ze względu na nieuchronność egzekucji) lub zwiększenie atrakcyjności portfeli będących przedmiotem obrotu. Z drugiej jednak strony należy mieć na uwadze, że instrument ten będzie miał znaczenie wyłącznie dla banków i to w krótkim horyzoncie czasowym. Należy mieć bowiem na uwadze, że część aktywów, która nie może znaleźć nabywców w procesie egzekucji nie znajdzie nabywców także jeżeli szybko przejmie je bank i to bank szybciej będzie taką sprzedaż oferował. Instrument ten może mieć wpływ w ograniczonym stopniu, tj. przede wszystkim w przypadku, w którym kredytobiorca może dokonać zabezpieczeń o dużej wartości, przewyższającej wartość zabezpieczanej wierzytelności. Ponadto, jeżeli w wyniku przejęcia zabezpieczenia kredytu nie nastąpiłoby pełne zaspokojenie wierzyciela, to w przypadku pozbawienia dłużnika składnika majątku niezbędnego w prowadzonej działalności gospodarczej mogłoby dość do pogorszenia jego zdolności do spłaty pozostałej części wierzytelności, jak i zdolności do obsługi zadłużenia wobec innych wierzycieli.
Nein(q34n)
Należy pozytywnie ocenić opisane, główne właściwości zabezpieczenia kredytu o przyspieszonym trybie egzekucji. W tym miejscu na uwagę zasługuje, że ograniczenia stosowania tak zdefiniowanego instrumentu w sposób istotny nie poprawią płynności rynku oraz nie zimniejszą akumulacji kredytów zagrożonych. Wydaje się, że instytucja powinna mieć zastosowanie również do osób fizycznych (konsumentów), oczywiście na ściśle określonych zasadach znanych w dniu udzielania kredytu i z pewnymi gwarancjami alternatywnych rozwiązań na rzecz konsumentów. Ponadto, należy zwrócić uwagę, że właściwości zabezpieczenia kredytu o przyśpieszonym trybie egzekucji powodują brak równości uprawnień stron zobowiązania, a co za tym idzie istnieje duże ryzyko, że okażą się niemożliwe do przeprowadzenia. Dodatkowo, z uwagi na różnice w uregulowaniach prawnych dotyczących obrotu i egzekucji z ruchomości i nieruchomości, wskazane byłyby oddzielne uregulowanie przedmiotowego instrumentu dla obu typów aktywów.
Instytucja zabezpieczenia kredytu o przyśpieszonym trybie egzekucji powinna: - posiadać priorytetową pozycję w stosunku do innych form zaspakajania w celu uniknięcia ryzyka jej blokowania przez postępowania wszczynane przez innych wierzycieli, przy czym jednocześnie należy uwzględnić prawa innych wierzycieli oraz dłużnika do rzetelnej oceny wartości zabezpieczenia i możliwości zaspokojenia z ewentualnej nadwyżki wartości nad kwotą zobowiązania w stosunku do banku, - zawierać uregulowania w zakresie opuszczenia nieruchomości przez dotychczasowego właściciela, tzn. w przypadku przejęcia nieruchomości powinna stanowić zobowiązanie dłużnika do opuszczenia lokalu, - ograniczać konieczność utworzenia odpisów/rezerw z tytułu kredytów trudnych, - kwalifikować zabezpieczenie tak, aby nie figurowało w bilansie banku jako aktywo lecz przez możliwie najdłuższy okres mogło być wykazywane jako aktywo do zbycia nie podlegające opodatkowaniu podatkiem od aktywów bankowych; ponadto sama skuteczna realizacja uprawnienia w postaci przejęcia zabezpieczenia powinna stwarzać możliwości rozwiązania odpisu w kwocie zależnej od szacunkowej wartości takiego zabezpieczenia, - być jednolita we wszystkich krajach UE, aby krąg możliwych zainteresowanych/nabywców był jak najszerszy, przez co bardziej konkurencyjny i rynkowy.
Nein(q36n)
Proponowane ograniczenie do kredytów czy pożyczek zaciąganych w związku z prowadzoną działalnością gospodarczą stanowi przejaw wzmocnienia ochrony dłużników będących konsumentami, która na tle obowiązujących przepisów Unii Europejskiej jest i tak silna. Z badań przeprowadzonych przez Biuro Informacji Kredytowej wynika, iż w Polsce w bazach dłużników znajdowali się do roku 2017: klienci indywidualni (23,6 mln osób), przedsiębiorcy (974 tys. przedsiębiorców). Natomiast z Rejestru Dłużników wynika, iż w bazie tej znajdowało się aż 3,6 mln konsumentów i 714 tys. przedsiębiorstw. W portfelach zawierających wierzytelności określane jako NPL przeważają wierzytelności konsumenckie. Zatem ograniczenie tego instrumentu tylko do obrotu podwójnie profesjonalnego nie przyniesie znacznej poprawy sytuacji banków w zakresie wierzytelności określanych jako NPL. Warto rozważyć czy zasadne jest wyłączenie głównego mieszkania kredytobiorcy z katalogu aktywów mogących być zabezpieczeniem kredytu o przyspieszonym trybie egzekucji. Jeśli kredytobiorca jest podmiotem profesjonalnym, prowadzącym działalność gospodarczą, to zaciągając kredyty gospodarcze nie powinien mieć możliwości pozostawienia głównego miejsca zamieszkania poza katalogiem zabezpieczeń. Uzyskanie zabezpieczenia o przyspieszonym trybie egzekucji na głównym miejscu zamieszkania może działać istotnie dyscyplinująco na dłużnika pod kątem jakości regulowania zobowiązań wobec banku oraz, w przypadku problemów ekonomiczno-finansowych, dyscyplinująco pod kątem negocjacji i porozumienia co do ewentualnej restrukturyzacji zadłużenia. Dodatkowo, ograniczenie wobec konsumentów i małych przedsiębiorców mogłoby jedynie polegać na zagwarantowaniu dłużnikowi drogi sądowej w postaci skargi/sprzeciwu. Trzeba zauważyć, że wierzycielem egzekwującym będzie bank, tj. instytucja w pełni wypłacalna. Wziąwszy to pod uwagę, wystąpienie nieprawidłowości w prowadzeniu egzekucji z użyciem „zabezpieczenia kredytu o przyśpieszonym trybie egzekucji” nie byłoby nieodwracalne. Bank byłby przecież zobowiązany do naprawienia szkody wyrządzonej dłużnikowi nieprawidłowym/niecelowym skorzystaniem z zabezpieczenia. Z całą pewnością pokrzywdzonemu dłużnikowi przysługiwałyby roszczenia z tytułu bezpodstawnego wzbogacenia, naruszenia dóbr osobistych w postaci np. naruszenia prawa do niezakłóconego zamieszkiwania, etc. Poza tym warto rozważyć w projektowanej instytucji postępowania naprawczego w razie bezpodstawnego skorzystania banku ze swoich uprawnień. Z drugiej jednak strony proponowane ograniczenia zakresu ewentualnego instrumentu zabezpieczenia kredytu o przyśpieszonym trybie egzekucji do kredytów udzielanych przedsiębiorstwom i korporacjom oraz z wyłączeniem głównego miejsca zamieszkania kredytobiorcy nawet w przypadku tych kredytów może być uznane za zasadne z tego względu na: - uniknięcie ewentualnych sporów co do ingerencji w prawa konsumenta, - złożoność procesu przejęcia na własność nieruchomości zamieszkiwanej przez dłużnika będącego osobą fizyczną i związanej z tym eksmisji, - ryzyko utraty sądowej ochrony praw i swobód obywatelskich przez kredytobiorców (procedura eksmisyjna jako postępowanie o szczególnym charakterze powinna pozostać w gestii sądownictwa powszechnego), - trudności w praktycznym ustaleniu katalogu wyłączeń, jeżeli nie miałoby jednocześnie dojść do ograniczenia zakresu funkcjonowania proponowanego instrumentu; w dokumencie nie opisano w jasny sposób jakiego typu aktywów miałyby dotyczyć wyłączenia. Nie jest jasne dlaczego jako przykład została tu zaproponowana główna siedziba kredytobiorcy. Główna siedziba może obejmować np. nieruchomość o wyłącznie funkcjach administracyjnych, jak i wszystkie nieruchomości produkcyjne dłużnika. W obu przypadkach skutki wyłączenia głównej siedziby dłużnika z zakresu stosowania nowego instrumentu byłyby różne.
Zwolnienia z długu w przypadku spadku wartości aktywów względem pozostałego długu nie wydaje się właściwym kierunkiem budowania zachęt do korzystania z rozwiązania. Ewentualne umorzenie pozostałej części długu nie jest korzystne dla banków, które będą zmuszone ponieść stratę. Ponadto, proponowany mechanizm nie zawsze może dotyczyć całości aktywów dłużnika. W konsekwencji przejęcie jedynie części aktywów nie spowoduje zakończenia postępowania windykacyjnego. W szczególnych jednak przypadkach, gdy brak innego majątku lub strony będą chciały ograniczyć odpowiedzialność tylko do przedmiotu zabezpieczenia winno być rozważone usunięcie przeszkód natury podatkowej przy rozliczeniu (możliwość zaliczenia nierozliczonej części zadłużenia w koszty podatkowe banku przy jednoczesnym braku kwalifikacji umorzenia jako przychodu dłużnika). Instrument przyśpieszonego trybu egzekucji może być korzystny dla kredytobiorców ze względu na: - niższe koszty uzyskania kredytu zabezpieczonego w przedmiotowy sposób, co będzie skutkowało zwiększeniem dostępności kredytów, - mniejszą sumę naliczonych odsetek za zwłokę, - zmniejszenie formalności po stronie dłużnika do niezbędnego minimum, - pozostawienie przedmiotu zabezpieczenia do dyspozycji dłużnika w ściśle określonych okolicznościach, - brak kosztów ewentualnych postępowań sądowych czy egzekucyjnych, stanowiących na różnych rynkach europejskich nawet ponad 20% dochodzonych roszczeń. Samo postępowanie uproszczone ma mieć również charakter dyscyplinujący w zakresie wspólnej dbałości o aktywo kredytowe – zarówno po stronie banku, ale również, a nawet przede wszystkim – kredytobiorcy. Dla zmniejszenia obaw dłużników przed korzystaniem z instrumentu wskazane byłoby uwzględnienie w konstrukcji instrumentu zabezpieczeń dla dłużnika przed korzystaniem przez wierzycieli z niego w złej wierze. Dlatego dłużnik powinien mieć możliwość skutecznego zablokowania przejęcia przedmiotu zabezpieczenia przez wierzyciela np. w przypadku dla niewymagalnych czy nieistniejących wierzytelności. Przykładem takiego zabezpieczenia w polskim prawie jest możliwość wystąpienia w ciągu 7 dni od zawiadomienia zastawnika o zamierzeniu przejęcia przedmiotu zastawu do sądu z powództwem o ustalenie, że wierzytelność nie istnieje albo nie jest wymagalna w całości lub w części.
Instrument zabezpieczenia kredytu o przyśpieszonym trybie egzekucji, aby był spójny z ramami prawnymi krajowego prawa upadłościowego, winien stanowić zabezpieczenie na równi dla kredytów zabezpieczonych np. hipoteką czy zastawem, a co za tym idzie winien być wierzytelnością uprzywilejowywaną w postępowaniu upadłościowym. Taki stan rzeczy powodowałyby w chwili ogłoszenia upadłości wskazany przedmiot wchodziłby do masy upadłości, jednakże wierzyciel posiadający to prawo mógłby za zgodą sędziego nadzorującego proces upadłości na wniosek wierzyciela pozwolić na sprzedaż przedmiotu z wolnej ręki, z tym zastrzeżeniem, iż postanowienie sędziego nie podlegałoby zaskarżeniu ze strony rady wierzycieli/wierzycieli. Środki z uzyskanej sprzedaż byłby przekazywane do masy upadłości jednakże sędzia nadzorujący wydawałby postanowienie o zatwierdzeniu dokonanej czynności i przekazaniu środków w kwocie przysługującej wierzycielowi bez konieczności oczekiwania na końcowe postanowienie o zakończeniu procesu upadłościowego (odrębny plan podziału). Koszty sprzedaży przedmiotu zabezpieczenia uprzywilejowanego stanowiłyby koszty postępowania upadłościowego i byłyby zaspokajane w pierwszej kolejności. Odnośnie prawa restrukturyzacyjnego prawo wierzyciela do skorzystania z przyspieszonego trybu egzekucji byłoby zawieszone na czas toczącego się postępowania restrukturyzacyjnego (za wyjątkiem przypadków gdy przedmiot zabezpieczenia nie stanowiłby majątku niezbędnego do dalszego prowadzenia przedsiębiorstwa). Zawieszenie przyspieszonego trybu egzekucji nie miałoby wpływu na prowadzenie egzekucji zgodnie z przepisami prawa restrukturyzacyjnego. W postępowaniu sanacyjnym natomiast wszelkie odrębne postępowania egzekucyjne są wyłączone, i jak się wydaje, również uprawnienie wierzyciela do przejęcia przedmiotu zabezpieczenia (przynajmniej tej części, od której uzależniona jest realizacja celu postępowania). Aktualnie przejęcie majątku możliwe jest w formie układu (wydłużona procedura, ryzyko nabycia obciążeń) lub zakupu części składowych majątku sprzedawanych przez zarządcę w trybie indywidualnym. Minimalnym postulatem byłoby umożliwienie wierzycielowi zaliczenia wierzytelności na poczet ceny oraz co najmniej uprawnienia do wystąpienia do zarządcy o nabycie przedmiotu za wierzytelność.
W pierwszej kolejności wskazać należy, iż w polskim porządku prawnym nie jest możliwe zobowiązanie się w umowie do przeniesienia własności nieruchomości w inny sposób niż na mocy aktu notarialnego. Jest to główna zasada Kodeksu cywilnego, mająca na celu ochronę obrotu prawnego. Stąd w tym zakresie niezbędne byłyby zmiany do przepisów prawa polskiego, w szczególności Prawa Bankowego. Zmiany prawa mogłyby okazać się konieczne również ze względu na obowiązującą w polskim prawie zasadę, że własność nieruchomości nie może być przeniesiona pod warunkiem ani z zastrzeżeniem terminu. Co więcej w opisie właściwości zabezpieczenia nie uwzględniono ochrony dłużnika przed nieuprawnionym korzystaniem z tego zabezpieczenia, w szczególności, w przypadku gdy nie wystąpiły warunki, od których uzależnione jest skorzystanie z tego prawa przez banki. Tymczasem głównymi zasadami Unii Europejskiej są zasada równości i zasada niedyskryminacji w prawie Unii Europejskiej. Zasady te nie są już wyłącznie elementem funkcjonowania rynku wewnętrznego (Konstytucji Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej) czy obywatelstwa europejskiego, ale stanowią podstawę ochrony praw jednostek w ramach Unii Europejskiej. W powyższym kontekście projekt instrumentu zabezpieczenia kredytu o przyśpieszonym trybie egzekucji powinien zawierać ograniczenia wynikające z ochrony podstawowych praw dłużnika dotyczących zapewnienia minimum egzystencji jak również wyłączenia, tj. wyłączenie pewnych typów nieruchomości np. jedynego miejsca zamieszkania dłużnika. Przedmiotowe ograniczenia powinny być uregulowane systemowo. Zabezpieczenie potrzeb mieszkaniowych konsumentów nie powinno obciążać wierzycieli, którzy nie powinni ponosić odpowiedzialności za działania poszczególnych konsumentów. Ponadto, należałoby zwrócić uwagę na problem przeniesienia własności na rzecz wierzyciela i związane z tym koszty zarządzania taką ruchomością/nieruchomością jak również należności podatkowe wynikające z takiej czynności cywilno – prawnej. W związku z powyższym konieczne może okazać się ukształtowanie instytucji, jako stosowanej w oparciu o porozumienie stron, w celu przeciwdziałania zarzutowi o zbyt uprzywilejowanej pozycji banku. Być może koniecznym okaże się także określenie stosunku tak projektowanego zabezpieczenia, możliwego do ustanowienia zarówno na rzeczach ruchomych jak i nieruchomościach, do istniejącej już instytucji hipoteki. Ponadto istotne byłoby określenie w przepisach prawa warunków, po spełnieniu których bank wchodziłby w posiadanie majątku dłużnika. W opisie głównych właściwości brak ujęcia kwestii kosztów postępowania w przedmiocie wyceny. W praktyce bowiem wszelkie koszty związane z zaciąganym zobowiązaniem przenoszone są na kredytobiorcę. Dodatkowe koszty mogłyby wpływać na brak zainteresowania przez strony umowy takim zabezpieczeniem. Z drugiej zaś strony koszty te nie powinny być ponoszone przez kredytodawcę, który nie powinien ponosić dodatkowej straty w związku z brakiem spłaty kredytu. Powyższe wymaga uregulowania systemowego. Istotne byłoby też uregulowanie kwestii dotyczących wykorzystania takiego instrumentu w przypadku, gdy co do przedsiębiorcy, będącego dłużnikiem toczyłoby się postępowanie upadłościowe. W przypadku bowiem tych postępowań dokonuje się likwidacji masy upadłości przez sprzedaż jej składników w postaci przedsiębiorstwa, ruchomości bądź nieruchomości. Ponadto postępowanie egzekucyjne skierowane do majątku wchodzącego w skład masy upadłości, wszczęte przed dniem ogłoszenia upadłości, ulega zawieszeniu z mocy prawa z dniem ogłoszenia upadłości. Postępowanie to umarza się z mocy prawa po uprawomocnieniu się postanowienia o ogłoszeniu upadłości. Zatem należałoby wprowadzić zmiany do odpowiednich przepisów regulujących postępowanie upadłościowe, które regulowałyby kwestie zgłaszania wierzytelności zabezpieczonych accelerated loan security instrument, w tym ich ewentualnego pierwszeństwa przy podziale kwot po sprzedaży nieruchomości. Wreszcie, istotne byłoby ustalenie pierwszeństwa zabezpieczeń obciążających daną rzecz oraz możliwości dalszego jej obciążania (np. ustanawiania hipoteki na nieruchomości, co której bankowi przysługiwałby accelerated loan security instrument na gruncie prawa rzeczowego czy zastawu). Dodatkowo dla nowego instrumentu zabezpieczenia powinien być stworzony centralny rejestr podobnie jak dla hipotek i zastawów, który korzystałby z wszelkich praw analogicznych dla hipotek i zastawów. Przeszkodą we wprowadzeniu nowej instytucji mogłyby stanowić przepisy prawa podatkowego. Ewentualne zwolnienie dłużnika z długu stanowiłoby uszczuplenie przychodu Skarbu Państwa. Pełna odpowiedź ze szczegółami koncepcji jest zamieszczona w załączonym pliku.
W celu uzyskania spójności, pewności i efektywności, instrument zabezpieczenia kredytu o przyśpieszonym trybie egzekucji powinien stanowić osobny rodzaj zabezpieczenia (podobnie jak hipoteka lub zastaw). Regulacja dotycząca instrumentu powinna m.in.: - mieć na celu szybkość realizacji zabezpieczenia poprzez np. umożliwienie realizacji zabezpieczeń pomimo ogłoszenia upadłości likwidacyjnej – wierzyciel, który ma pierwszeństwo zaspokojenia mógłby rozpocząć postępowanie uproszczone, które pozwoliłby na skrócenie postępowania i obniżenie jego kosztów, - zapewniać akcesoryjność zabezpieczenia wyłącznie z zabezpieczoną wierzytelnością, - zapewniać jawność informacji o zabezpieczeniu (np. poprzez jego ujawnienie w publicznym rejestrze), - określać zasady pierwszeństwa zaspokojenia wierzyciela, dopuszczalności zbycia zabezpieczenia, przeniesienia zabezpieczeni na rzecz innego podmiotu oraz ponownego obciążenia przedmiotu zabezpieczenia.
Organisation oder Unternehmen(organisation-replying-as)
 
Bundesverband Deutscher Inkasso-Unternehmen e.V.
 
Ja(yes-transparency-register)
439517518445-17
Kreditservicing/Inkassowesen([ID17])
Wirtschaftsverband([ID9])
 
 
 
Deutschland([ID31])
 
 
Ja, ich stimme der Veröffentlichung meines Beitrags unter dem von mir angegebenen Namen zu (Name Ihrer Organisation/Ihres Unternehmens/Ihrer Behörde bzw. Ihr Name, wenn Sie als Einzelperson antworten)(yes-contributions-publication)
Das größte strukturelle Hindernis für die effiziente Verwaltung und Abwicklung notleidender Kredite in der EU stellt aus Sicht des Bundesverbands Deutscher Inkasso-Unternehmen e.V. (BDIU) die inkonsistente Rechtsordnung dar. Investoren und Servicer sollten in die Lage versetzt werden, rechtssicher Forderungen in allen EU-Mitgliedsstaaten erwerben und bearbeiten zu können. Die Realität ist geprägt von landesspezifischen und oftmals aufwändigen und damit markthemmenden rechtlichen Konstrukten für den Kauf und die Abwicklung notleidender Kredite, die von spezifischen Zweckgesellschaften bis hin zur Erfordernis einer Banklizenz reichen können.
Bankintern: - Entlastung des Eigenkapitals und Liquiditätssteigerung - Verbesserung des Ratings - Bindungsdauer, d.h. voraussichtliche weitere Bearbeitungszeit - Personelle Kapazitäten - Konzentration auf Kernmärkte, d.h. Veräußerung von Länderrisiken bzw. Non-Core Aktivitäten/Darlehensnehmer - Zukünftige geschäftliche Beziehung zu dem betroffenen Kreditnehmer - EU-Auflagen Externe Faktoren: - Marktpreisgefüge - Änderung der rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen (Basel III, MaRisk) - Änderung der politischen Rahmenbedingungen
Ein größerer Anlegerkreis könnte durch eine Harmonisierung der Rechtsordnungen (Insolvenzrecht, Zwangsvollstreckungsrecht) erreicht werden. Zudem sollten auch etwaige Hindernisse beim Kreditverkauf abgebaut werden, die beispielsweise den Informationsfluss vor einem Kreditverkauf beschränken. Informationen könnten darüber hinaus standardisiert werden. Zudem sollten Banken bei ihrer Risikovorsorge NPLs zu Marktpreisen ansetzen müssen. Dieses würde die Preiserwartungen der Verkäufer und der potenziellen Käufer angleichen.
- Vereinheitlichung der Rechtsordnungen (Insolvenzrecht, Zwangsvollstreckungsrecht) - Verbesserung der Kreditinformationen - Rechtssicherheit in Bezug auf Steuerthemen, Übertragung der Darlehen
- Informationen zum Kredit (Kreditnehmerdaten) müssen bei und vor dem Verkauf ausgetauscht werden können. - Unterschiedliche Insolvenz- und Zwangsvollstreckungsregime behindern oft das Abgeben von Angeboten über Landesgrenzen hinweg. - Reduzierung des administrativen Aufwandes, der zu einer Schlechterstellung des Forderungskäufers führt (z.B. Titelumschreibungen) durch geeignete Verfahren.
- Der Kauf erfolgt durch spezialisierte Investoren, die Personal und Know-how für den Abbau vorhalten bzw. bereits geschäftliche Beziehungen zu Servicern pflegen, die dies leisten können. - Die Altlasten verschwinden aus den Büchern der verkaufenden Bank und belasten das Eigenkapital nicht mehr. Es wird zudem frisches Kapital für die Neukreditvergabe zur Verfügung gestellt. - Die verkaufende Bank kann sich auf die Kreditvergabe konzentrieren. - Investoren bekommen die Möglichkeit, in Kreditengagements zu investieren, die durch ein sorgfältiges Servicing mit mittel- bis langfristigem Zeithorizont Potenziale versprechen. - Banken sind nicht darauf spezialisiert, notleidende Kredite zu bearbeiten. Durch die Spezialisierung der Investoren und Servicer ergibt sich für alle Beteiligten eine bessere Ressourcenallokation. - Der Kreis spezialisierter Anleger ist seit Jahren recht begrenzt, da eine Investition in ein Darlehen auf Grund der rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen mit mehr Unsicherheit behaftet ist als eine Investition in andere Assetklassen, wie z.B. Anleihen oder Immobilien.
Es handelt sich hierbei um Risikoinvestitionen, da die Kredite bereits notleidend sind. Entsprechend risikoadjustiert sind auch die Renditeanforderungen der Investoren. Vereinzelt könnten unseriöse Anbieter auftreten. Hierzu ist es wichtig zu wissen, welche Anbieter auf dem Markt professionell und verantwortlich handeln. In Deutschland sind dies beispielweise die Mitglieder der Bundesvereinigung Kreditankauf und Servicing e.V. (BKS).
- Schuldnerschutz, Schutz der Privatsphäre, Datenschutz (gleichwertig) - Steigerung der Marktgröße und -tiefe sowie Förderung der Gleichbehandlung von Anlegern Hierzu sei ergänzt, dass der Datenschutz bzw. der Schutz der Privatsphäre nicht die vertragsgemäße Erfüllung von offenen Forderungen behindern dürfen, da dies zu Rechtsunsicherheit bei der Bearbeitung bis hin zur Kreditneuvergabe führen würde.
Solange Schuldnerdaten für die Anbahnung einer Transaktion und die Beitreibung von offenen Forderungen genutzt werden, besteht kein Widerspruch zwischen diesen Dimensionen. Sollte es nicht zu einem Verkauf kommen, müssen Schuldnerdaten gelöscht werden. Sollte es zu einem Kauf kommen, müssen die Schuldnerdaten zumindest solange genutzt und weitergegeben werden können, wie die Forderung besteht bzw. abgeschrieben ist. Eine Harmonisierung bedeutet auch keinen Angriff auf den Schuldnerschutz. In Deutschland wird beispielsweise der Schuldner geschützt und gleichzeitig ein funktionierender Kreditmarkt gewährleistet.
Nein(q9n)
 
In Deutschland wurden die Sekundarmärkte für notleidende Kredite mit dem Risikobegrenzungsgesetz reguliert. Dieses Gesetz hat bei Investoren und Schuldnern zu einer Verbesserung der Rechtssicherheit beigetragen. In manchen Ländern ist der Verkauf gekündigter, besicherter Forderungen (True Sale) noch nicht vollständig bzw. nur mit Zustimmung des Schuldners möglich (z.B. in Österreich).
Der Schuldner kann beim Verkauf von notleidenden Forderungen am besten geschützt werden, wenn sich seine Rechtsposition nicht ändert und er gegenüber dem neuen Gläubiger dieselben Rechte geltend machen kann. Die Nutzung seiner Daten muss an die Realisierung der Forderungen bzw. den Weiterverkauf geknüpft sein.
Vorteile einer Spezialisierung auf bestimmte Länder bestehen für die Investoren in einem Wettbewerbsvorteil gegenüber anderen Anbietern durch ein besseres Verständnis der jeweiligen gesetzlichen Rahmenbedingungen, der Verwertungszeiten, der Verwertungswahrscheinlichkeit und der Realisierungsquoten. Die Spezialisierung auf bestimmte Aktivaklassen wiederum verschafft Investoren Wettbewerbsvorteile durch Know-how in diesem Segment. In beiden Fällen können dadurch die tatsächlich zu realisierenden Forderungen und damit der Kaufpreis besser bestimmt werden. Für Verkäufer ergibt sich der Vorteil, dass er spezifische Kompetenzen und Referenzen für diese Länder bzw. Assetklassen erwarten kann.
- Die rechtlichen Unterschiede beim Workout von Forderungen und beim Forderungsverkauf über Ländergrenzen hinweg sind erheblich (Unterschiede beim Zwangsversteigerungsrecht, Insolvenzrecht, bei der Verwertung von Sicherheiten). - Die Konsultation von Experten in den jeweiligen Ländern ist kosten- und zeitintensiv. - Die Eintrittsbarrieren für die Erschließung neuer Märkte sind daher sehr hoch. - Diese Unterschiede führen oft dazu, dass die Geschäftstätigkeit auf das Heimatland und/oder einige wenige Länder, auf die man sich spezialisiert, beschränkt wird. - Eine Harmonisierung der rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen gestaltet sich zwar auf Grund der jahrzehntelangen Rechtspraxis, unterschiedlicher Sicherungsinstrumente und Verwertungsvoraussetzungen und/oder der Durchsetzung von Forderungen als schwierig, sollte aber zumindest in Teilbereichen erfolgen, um somit die Eintrittsbarrieren zu verringern. - Eine Vereinheitlichung der Lizenzierung wäre vorteilhaft, damit Servicer nicht für jedes Land bestimmte Lizenzen beantragen muss, war mit Zeitverlust und hohen Beratungskosten einhergeht.
Ein EU-Regulierungsrahmen wäre unbedingt sinnvoll Diese wichtigsten Punkte sind dabei: - Generell die Steigerung der Rechtssicherheit - Regelungen zur Weitergabe von Schuldnerdaten (Datenschutz) zur Bewertung der Forderungen im Rahmen des Forderungsverkaufs - Art und Weise der Übertragung der Darlehen, der Sicherheiten und der Schuldnerdaten vom Käufer auf den Verkäufer - Beschränkung der Widerspruchsmöglichkeiten/ der Einwilligungspflichten für Schuldner, insbesondere bei gekündigten Krediten - Regelungen zur Legitimation des Käufers gegenüber den Schuldnern des Portfolios ggf. durch eine gesonderte Urkunde - Steuerliche Behandlung
 
Die Verfügbarkeit von Kreditservicern trägt in besonderem Maße zur Effizienz der NPL-Märkte bei: - Sie halten Personal und Wissen zum Abbau von notleidenden Forderungen vor. Banken können durch die Nutzung externer Kreditservicer unterstützt werden, da sich der Servicer auf den Abbau von notleidenden Forderungen spezialisiert hat, womit in der Regel eine schnellere Bearbeitungszeit einhergeht. Besonders kleinere Kreditinstitute können und sollten sich auf die Kreditvergabe spezialisieren. Banken benötigen somit weniger Personal und können eventuell kostengünstiger einen externen Servicer mit den Aufgaben betreuen. - Spezialisierte Anleger können mit Servicern, die sich auf die verschiedenen Assetklassen (besichert/unbesichert, Immobilienkredite/Ratenkredite/Unternehmenskredite) spezialisiert haben, gezieltere Strategie- oder Anlageentscheidung treffen, da sie sich sicher sein können, dass die gekauften Forderungen adäquat beigetrieben werden können. Für Investoren bietet ein großes Angebot von Servicern den Vorteil, gekaufte Forderungen effizient und seriös bearbeiten zu lassen. - Für Schuldner ergeben sich Vorteile durch die größere Bereitschaft, Zahlungsvereinbarungen abzuschließen oder auf Teile der Forderung zu verzichten. Zudem werden die Instrumente der Forderungsbeitreibung sehr gezielt eingesetzt. Unnötige Zwangsvollstreckungsmaßnahmen werden in der Regel vermieden. Ein Servicer sucht in erster Linie den Dialog mit dem Schuldner, da ein gemeinsames Vorgehen in der Regel schneller und kosteneffizienter zu einer Lösung führt. Zwangsvollstreckungsmaßnahmen sind in der Regel der letzte Ausweg, wenn der Schuldner nicht bereit ist an der Lösung mitzuarbeiten.
Nein(q17n)
 
- Kreditserver halten Personal und Wissen zum Abbau von notleidenden Forderungen vor. Banken können durch die Nutzung externer Kreditservicer unterstützt werden, da sich der Servicer auf den Abbau von notleidenden Forderungen spezialisiert hat, womit in der Regel eine schnellere Bearbeitungszeit einhergeht. Besonders kleinere Kreditinstitute können und sollten sich auf die Kreditvergabe spezialisieren. Banken benötigen somit weniger Personal und können eventuell kostengünstiger einen externen Servicer mit den Aufgaben betreuen. - Banken können durch ein Outsourcing des Servicings Personal und damit Kosten einsparen (insbesondere dann, wenn eine größere Zahl von Forderungen notleidend geworden ist und die Kapazitäten der internen Kreditabwicklung überfordern würden). - In vielen Fällen realisieren spezialisierte Kreditserver größere Quoten in kürzerer Zeit als interne Kreditabwicklungen. Nachteile: - Banken könnten Reputationsrisiken befürchten. Der Bundesverband Deutscher Inkasso-Unternehmen e.V. vertritt jedoch ausschließlich Mitglieder, die sich verpflichtet haben, die in der Satzung des BDIU verankerten berufsrechtlichen Pflichten zu beachten und damit einen verantwortungsvollen Umgang mit Schuldnern gewährleisten.
Es können vereinzelt unprofessionelle Marktteilnehmer auftreten, die mit unredlichen Methoden Schuldner unter Druck setzen. Der Bundesverband Deutscher Inkasso-Unternehmen e.V. vertritt jedoch ausdrücklich nur seriöse und professionelle Marktteilnehmer, die sich den in der Satzung des BDIU verankerten berufsrechtlichen Pflichten verschrieben haben, und setzt sich dafür ein, unprofessionelle Marktteilnehmer durch eine starke Aufsicht vom Markt zu nehmen. In der Marktpraxis wurden folgende Fehlverhalten beobachtet, die bei Nicht-Mitgliedern des BDIU aufgetreten sind: - Der Druck auf den Schuldner wird extrem erhöht, obwohl die finanzielle Leistungsfähigkeit sehr gering ist, d.h. der Schuldner würde gern einen Beitrag leisten, ist dazu aber gar nicht in der Lage und wird dennoch unter Druck gesetzt, Zahlungen zu leisten - Falsche Berechnung der Forderung oder der Verzugszinsen, um die Forderung in die Höhe zu treiben oder weil die Daten der abgebenden Bank unvollständig sind - Vollstreckungsmaßnahmen obwohl Einigungswille besteht - Torpedierung der Kreditwürdigkeit
Mitglieder des Bundesverbands Deutscher Inkasso-Unternehmen e.V. spezialisieren sich mehrheitlich auf notleidende Kredite und verfügen in diesem Segment über besonderes Know-how. Es gibt nur wenige Servicer, die in der Lage sind, sowohl laufende als auch notleidende Kredite zu verwalten. Allerdings sind auch notleidende Kredite werthaltig. Es liegt an dem Servicer, das volle Potenzial zu heben. Generell sind aber Kreditinvestoren auf notleidende Kredite spezialisiert, da hier die größeren Renditechancen liegen. Daher haben sich auch die meisten Servicer auf notleidende Kredite spezialisiert. Vorteile - Der Servicer verfügt über spezielles Know-How - In der Regel ist der Servicer wesentlich effizienter organisiert - Der Servicer ist mitunter frei von speziellen regulatorischen Schranken, die für Banken gelten - Die Bank wird kostentechnisch, regulatorisch und organisatorisch entlastet Nachteile - Mit der Auslagerung der Darlehensverwaltung gibt die Bank eine ihrer Kernkompetenzen ab. Sollte diese irgendwann wieder in die Bank integriert werden (müssen), stellt dies einen hohen organisatorischen Aufwand dar
In der Regel spezialisieren sich Kreditservicer auf bestimmte Vermögensklassen. Der Vorteil besteht in den unterschiedlichen Ansätzen beim Workout der Forderungen. Während unbesicherte Konsumentenforderungen über Einigungen mit dem Schuldner realisiert werden und ein besonderes Wissen auf diesem Gebiet erfordern, müssen beispielsweise gewerbliche Immobilienforderungen mit einem Spezialwissen im Immobilienmarkt betreut werden, sodass die Personalstruktur und das Wissen bei den unterschiedlichen Servicern sich völlig voneinander unterscheiden.
Laufende Darlehen (Primary Servicing) - Überwachung der Zins- und Tilgungsleistungen - Zahlungs- und Rechnungsstellung, Zinsberechnungen - Überwachung der vertraglichen Pflichten, Kontrolle der Werthaltigkeit der zugrundeliegenden Sicherheiten (u.a. regelmäßige Immobilienbegutachtung und -bewertung, Bilanzprüfungen) - Informationserhebung, -aufbereitung und -aufbewahrung Notleidende Darlehen (Special Servicing) - Führen von Verhandlungen mit Schuldnern, Zwangsverwaltern, Insolvenzverwaltern, Nachlassverwaltern - Schließen von Rückzahlungsvereinbarungen - Schließen von Verwertungsvereinbarungen - Verwertung von Sicherheiten auch durch Zwangsmaßnahmen - Freigabe von Sicherheiten - Inkasso Sonstige Dienstleistungen - Beschaffung von Eigen- oder Fremdkapital - Strukturierung von Darlehensforderungen für die Bank - Ankaufsberatung für Investoren - Verkaufsberatung für Banken - Durchführung von Kreditverkäufen Am hilfreichsten für die Markteffizienz ist das Zusammenbringen von Verkäufern und Käufern, das Managen der Erwartungshaltung beider Seiten und letztendlich die Durchführung von Transaktionen. Die Darlehensverwaltung sowohl von laufenden als auch notleidenden Krediten birgt durch die Nutzung von Skaleneffekten ein großes Potenzial die Banken von Verwaltungsarbeit und Personal zu entlasten.
Ja(q23y)
den Zulassungsvoraussetzungen für entsprechende Dienstleister?(q23iya)
 
Der BDIU befürwortet einen EU-Regulierungsrahmen mit Vorschriften zu den Zulassungsvoraussetzungen für Servicer nur dann, wenn dies dazu führt, dass bürokratische Hürden bei der grenzüberschreitenden Lizenzierung abgebaut werden.
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q25d)
 
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q26d)
 
Der Verkauf von Kreditportfolios an Einrichtungen außerhalb des Bankensektors ist in Deutschland nur bei gekündigten Krediten erlaubt. Der „echte“ Verkauf (True Sale) von Kreditportfolios an Einrichtungen außerhalb des Bankensektors ist in Deutschland u.a. durch das Benötigen einer Banklizenz geregelt und daher in der Regel auf gekündigte Kredite beschränkt. Gleichwohl ist es jedoch möglich, das wirtschaftliche Risiko an Forderungen zu verkaufen/zu kaufen, während die Rechtsverhältnisse unverändert bleiben und somit weiterhin bei der abgebenden Bank bleiben. Darüber hinaus bestehen keine gesonderten Vorschriften an den eigentlichen Kauf, wohl aber an das Servicing notleidender Kredite (z.B. ist Inkasso als geschäftsmäßige Dienstleistung ist nach §§ 2 Abs. 2, 10 Abs. 1 Nr. 1 Rechtsdienstleistungsgesetz erlaubnispflichtig).
In einigen Ländern ist das Servicing bestimmter Arten von Krediten an gesonderte Lizenzen gebunden, die insbesondere die Fähigkeit, die Seriosität und die Verlässlichkeit des Servicers sicherstellen sollen. Ob dies unverhältnismäßig ist, lässt sich nicht eindeutig sagen. Unverhältnismäßig ist es sicherlich, wenn die Lizenz an die Nationalität gebunden sein sollte.
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q27d)
 
- Die nationalen Insolvenz- und Zwangsvollstreckungsregime müssen harmonisiert werden. - Grenzüberschreitende Vollstreckungen müssen einfacher gemacht werden. Immer noch können sich Schuldner hinter ihrer Landesgrenze verstecken, da es kein einheitliches Prozedere oder Einredemöglichkeiten gibt, die die Vollstreckung enorm erschweren. - Wenn ein Schuldner ins Ausland zieht, in dem es keine Melderegister gibt, ist die Zustellung eines Titels extrem erschwert. Daher sollte es möglich sein, dass die letzte bekannte Adresse im Ausland als Zustelladresse ausreicht, auch wenn der Schuldner verzogen ist, so dass eine öffentliche Zustellung erfolgen kann. Es kann nicht die Pflicht des Kreditgebers sein, nachzuweisen, wo der Schuldner wohnt bzw. nicht mehr wohnt. Daher ist auch eine Verkürzung der öffentlichen Zustellung angebracht, da die Versäumnisse des Schuldners vollständig zu Lasten des Kreditgebers gehen.
Verkauf und Übertragung von Krediten?(q29a)
Kreditservicing durch externe Dienstleister?(q29b)
 
Die Einrichtung eines zentralen Kreditservicer-Registers sowie die Vereinheitlichung der Lizenzierungen (Stichwort Passporting) können dazu beitragen, die Markteffizienz zu verbessern.
 
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q31d)
 
 
 
 
 
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q34d)
 
 
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q36d)
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organisation oder Unternehmen(organisation-replying-as)
 
KRUK ESPAÑA, S.L. unipersonal
 
Nein(no-transparency-register)
 
Kreditservicing/Inkassowesen([ID17])
Unternehmen, KMU, Kleinstunternehmen, Einzelunternehmer([ID6])
 
 
 
Spanien([ID48])
 
 
Ja, ich stimme der Veröffentlichung meines Beitrags unter dem von mir angegebenen Namen zu (Name Ihrer Organisation/Ihres Unternehmens/Ihrer Behörde bzw. Ihr Name, wenn Sie als Einzelperson antworten)(yes-contributions-publication)
We do not observe significant obstacles to the management and resolution of NPLs in terms of the current size, liquidity and structure, although it can be observed relatively small secondary market for retail secured portfolios on some EU markets. Based on our experience we believe that that the local conditions on secondary markets for NPL are in a good shape. The local situation enabled to create very competitive environment. The existing demand of investors results in prices of NPLs that are in most of cases satisfactory for original creditors because the large number of loans are being transferred to the assignee on these markets. An important exception is Greece, where the market has not been established and the lack of securitization transactions in the Romanian market. In terms of structure it is worth to mention that some legislations across EU in some aspects (such as data protection, consumer credit rights regulations, etc.) put real obstacles to the standardization of management and resolution of NPLs. Additionally, courts of justice do not show/have a unified criterion when interpreting the applicable regulations which does not contribute to have/gain legal certainty: pro-consumer interpretations go beyond general rules of positive legislation in force, impose obligations that are not standard neither should be requested to non-credit entities and, essentially, put a real constrain to the investing decisions.
Bank internal factors: - improvement of financial condition of the bank; - cost cutting connected with inefficient internal debt collection; - internal resources of the originators that often are not enough and skilled to manage effectively the internal collection process; - the price for NPL portfolio versus increasing costs of internal NPL management (improvement of liquidity of the bank); External factors: - mature secondary NPL market (the more mature the market is- a lot of transactions, competition, favorable for debt collection agencies legal environment- the easier decision for loan sales) - long lasting judicial proceedings in the legal collection; - reputation of the investors in the local market; - social and political understanding of debt collection; - fiscal factors; - consumer protection litigations affecting reputation of the bank; - good, stable to growing macroeconomics
Ways of attracting a wider investor base could be: - European legal framework for secondary markets for NPLs regulating the market standards including the model Contract on Assignment of Receivables applicable in Member States; - focus on improvement of conditions for amicable debt collection including access of the creditors to contact data of the debtors, e.g. addresses processed by public authorities - statutory responsibility of the original creditor for some aspects of the quality of the NPLs, e.g. the original contracts do not include abusive clauses; - tax advantages; - simplification of judicial proceedings, and strengthen the structure (with human and material resources) and IT systems to be used by the Administration of Justice; - abolition of legal obstacles in legal dunning proceedings to allow a wider use of automated processes; - digitalization of legal proceedings (e-courts); - creating across the EU courts for small claims (to improve the efficiency of the legal procedures for credit recovery shortening the collection term and cost); -improvement of securitization framework (in some countries the securitization process is quite “bureaucratic” and expensive because it involves a lot of agents and requires determined requisites and procedures, which can make an investor reluctant to enter in the secondary markets of NPLs- these factors affect the investment itself because each player must take into account further costs not foreseen in other countries where NPL is a relevant business); - simplification of legal restrictions related to servicing of claims, such as permit conditions, possibilities and conditions of outsourcing; - improving the quality of the data and information upon clients/debtors owed by the banks which could ease the process of credit recovery and increase the investors’ appetite for a particular portfolio. Creating legal framework for disclosure of data in the process of biding which could have very positive effect upon the credit evaluation done by the investors: if the data and information received from the Banks are updated and complete, the credit evaluation would be easier and less prudent on the necessary time to recover the debts; the more data are disclosed the more accurate and better pricing can be achieved by the banks making process of NPL sale more competitive; - balanced legislation regarding consumer protection and creditors’ rights during recovery process; - creating positive PR and picture of debt collection agencies (the DCAs), underlying their role in modern economy, importance in their role of bringing balance between creditors and debtors- consumers; fighting with negative campaigns against DCAs, underlying moral obligation of borrower to repay the debt. Additionally, it shall be stressed out that investment funds/ the debt collection agencies as investors are mainly concerned about: - sufficient scope of data necessary for proper evaluation of portfolios of NPLs during due diligence process, - proper contact data of the debtors received from the seller of NPLs; - representation and warranties in the Contracts on Assignment of Receivables providing minimum level of security for the investor; - not being obliged, after purchase of the receivables, in full by as same banking regulation, which is demanding and strict (accounting regulations apply in a different manner) as the seller; - obstacles arising out of “legal uncertainty” explained above and, on the other hand, regarding the lack of background/information on NPLs to be acquired (about the previous collection activity which was carried out, market practices/standards that were followed, the local know-how that was applied, the applicable regional regulations and local court rulings, etc).
Which incentive(s) should be given: please see answer to question 3.
We would consider removing licensing requirements for investors in the area of consumer credits on some markets (Slovakia) or establishment of a special license for investors in such assets only. The current legal regulation imposes on investors in such assets an obligation to obtain license for providing consumer credits.
We do not observe any specific advantages when acquiring entity is a bank, whose mine objective is to be focus on pure banking activities, looking for new clients and developing new products; bank- assignee is still bound by specific legislation regarding bank activities including limitations on outsourcing etc.; Assigning banking NPLs to specialized investors gives the banks possibility to overcome legacy aspects, concentrate on their core business and improve their financial conditions. At the same time investment found, by cooperating with specialized debt collection agencies are more effective and faster in terms of recoveries, not being afraid also of risk of moral hazard- banks are limited in offering to the debtors- borrowers reduction of debt due to this aspect. A professional investor also guarantee a higher level of asset security as well as higher level of personal and financial data security.
DCAs, as a general rule, take a long-term investment horizon so are ready to offer to the debtors more comfortable conditions. In the case of other investors, the investment horizon is generally much shorter and more focused on maximizing the rate of return, which may translate into a way of dealing with debtors.
Potential benefits: - increased resistance of secondary NPL market to political, populist initiatives hitting badly the market; - increased awareness of importance of NPL secondary market in society; - social acceptance of assignment of receivable and debt collection practices; - transparent, stable market; - unified legal framework; - elimination of players who are not willing to adopt to new rules The appropriate legal framework for secondary markets for loans shall first take in consideration debtor protection if a debtor is a consumer, then equal treatment of investors, which shall promote increased market size and depth. As far as data secrecy and privacy is concerned, the framework shall take into consideration the right of investor to gain the most up-to-date contact data and payment history of the debtor. Rank the following dimensions (in order of importance) is: - debtor protection: 1st risk - privacy: 2nd risk - data secrecy: 3rd risk - promoting increased market size and depth and equal treatment of investors: 1st benefit
The compromise between the dimensions could be established by looking for a balance between consumers’ privileges and creditors’ right to collect claims: - the investors often receive data, which were not updated by assignor and the debtor had no interest in informing on change in this respect as well. Since in mostly EU countries only state institutions and courts have access to Population Register, debt collecting agencies encounter obstacles for the amicable way of collecting debts because they are often not successful in reaching the debtor. Thus, sometimes they have no other option than to start expensive (also for the Debtors) court collection. - the management of receivables shall be promoted and seen as legitimate professional activity which strongly advises the approval of specific changes in law, in order to get them adapted to fight delinquency as a social need: data protection regulation must not stimulate debtor to play unfair or should not encourage to moral hazard. - pressure shall be also put on stopping an excessive pro-consumer regulations and on discouraging politicians against populist initiatives (critics of debt collection and NPL market is always good target for gaining additional voices)
Nein(q9n)
 
Yes, because of national legislation/boundaries (bureaucracy of procedures) and unbalanced consumer protection legislation versus creditors/debt collection agencies ‘rights. The best environment for further development of the market is resigning at least from limitation based on similar criteria as required for banking/financial institutions, e.g. licensing of NPLs market in the area of consumer credits (for example: Slovakia). Special focus shall be on the possibility of continuation by an assignee of enforcement proceedings started by an assignor before assignment and the removal of obstacles arising from the scope of the provisions of professional secrecy (banking and investment funds) and restrictions on outsourcing of debt management.
There is no reason for extra special protection of a debtor in the case of transfer of a loan and/or collateral by the creditor to a third party; in vast majority of cases situation of indebt person can be improved quite fast compering with his previous position towards originator of the loan- bank/financial institution being bound by many regulations not allowing for forgiveness of significant part of the debt or for creating comfortable installment plan etc. Protection is needed in terms of: - improving the conditions for the efficient amicable collection avoiding court collection and enforcement proceedings, e.g. statutory regulation of the remuneration model for out-of-court collection (collection fee paid by the debtor); - exactness of personal address and contact data, (which shall be accessible through a public data base for purposes of a professional collection activity) which allows focusing on amicable operations and helps avoiding of undertaking legal actions which are not so necessary; - improving debtors’ situation towards other/new creditors in the future by creating framework for the right of current creditor to report to the credit bureau type of entities positive information on re-paid debt/installments Obligation to formally serve a notification to debtors about assignment and identity of new creditor, mentioning all applicable rights is (and shall be) a standard.
Specialization across jurisdictions or asset classes can help to develop specialized know-how and simplify access of investors to secondary markets for NPL’s in different Member States.
Yes. In some member states the investors are able to invest in NPL portfolios only if having local vehicle and entities supervised by national authorities (e.g. Italy, Slovakia). Within some national jurisdictions, itself it can be find a different regulation for each Region, which places a strong obstacle to the collection activity (e.g. Spain).
EU regulatory framework for transfer of loans may be beneficial by unifying regulations and creating “legal certainty” for investors, consumers, and during the bidding processes until business transactions of NPLs are closed. It would harmonize and ease the purchase of receivables by entities operating in several markets or wishing to enter a new market- it would allow certain predictability (legal, tax) and legal (tax) effects on debts acquisition, including transactions in different jurisdictions, foreseeable sales tax effects. The key elements of such a framework may be: - minimum requirements in purchase agreements in terms of representation and warranties and their proper duration according to the real size of the portfolio; - setting up standards of bids and process of selling the portfolio; - tax exemptions; - specific rules to be respected by the originators in order to allow a proper due diligence of the portfolio; - quality of data transfer to the assignee (especially regarding contact data of assigned debtors and accuracy of debt components); - the free right of resale the portfolio inside the member states; - not reducing responsibility of the assignors for the defects of receivables assigned; - establishing assignor’s obligation to support assignee in handling with consumers’ complaints
A unified regulation must balance obligations between sellers and buyers
For banks third party loan servicers as specialized market players with sophisticated tools and unique know-how may contribute to the development of secondary market for NPLs especially by relieving banking institutions from efforts going beyond their core business, being more effective in collection than banks and helping banks reducing their costs. For investors third party loan servicers allow investors to gain a deeper knowledge of the assets in a portfolio and, mainly, to predict their prospect of recovery and specific behavior of every portfolio of receivables, as well as provide knowledge on the type of expert or professionals that would be needed to manage them in the most effective way.
Nein(q17n)
 
The main advantage is that specialized external companies can perform more efficiently using their know-how. Usage of external companies allows making comparisons between different methods that are used to collect receivables and, therefore, to improve own proceedings, promotes competition to create specific IT tools and management proceedings (that may even be tailor made), and it could also contribute to as to save costs, relieve valuable resources that are need for other purposes, as well as to protect consumers, and reduce delinquency indeed. See also answer on the question no. 16. The main concern arising from outsourcing services for banking sector is ensuring compliance with banking secrecy.
There is at least one important topic connected with conducting activities by third-party loan servicers with respect to debtor protection – remuneration for the service. As it is not regulated on some markets, for example in Czech and Slovak, the practice is that the creditor offers the servicer possibility to add its remunerations to the original amount of debt to be collected. The agreement between the creditor and the servicer does not regulate remuneration from the creditor, the cost of the service is though transferred to the debtor. As there is no cap for the amount of the servicer’s remuneration, the excessive remunerations may be observed on the market. Additionally, it could be that too big pressure for results, in some cases, may be translated into too aggressive behavior towards debtor, this is why it is so important to set up the frame in which such services can be provided. But as general comment it can be observed a constant implementation of specific regulations addressed to credit collection (codes of conduct) with related fines and reputational impacts in case of no respect. For this reason, the tendency – fortunately – is to be compliant to these regulations which have the first purpose of protecting properly debtors.
In EU countries, third-party loan servicing it is mainly focused in NPLs, but it is also rendered for PLs. This allows collection agencies a diversification of risks. When working for PLs, a collection agency can get a good knowledge of the portfolio of receivables, and have access to useful information to properly determine the solvency y borrowers. Naturally, the collection on performing loans is easier because of fresh aging of credits, data and documents, which permit to reach the debtors faster and to collect in a shorter time. The nonperforming loans, on the contrary, require a more focused skip tracing activity which slows down the whole collection process with impacts on the investment itself.
The debt collection agencies manage different clusters and kind of receivables, splitting them in different departments with specific knowledge and processes. If there is any specialization it relates to the management of mortgage censured loans/receivables.
The competitiveness of local environment extends the range of services offered. The most instrumental in terms of market efficiency are: - legal debt collection; - amicable debt collection; - due diligence services; - detective services; - field collection; - correspondence collection (via post, e-mails); - collection processes using call centers including predictive dialers, and their management, together with connectivity services to telecommunications; - document management; - text messages platforms.
Ja(q23y)
den Zulassungsvoraussetzungen für entsprechende Dienstleister?(q23iya)
der Aufsicht über entsprechende Dienstleister?(q23iyb)
Yes, it could be useful but with a previous and accurate analysis of local legislation and markets (also best practices). It should include both: licensing requirements for such servicers and the supervision of such servicers
No additional comments.
Ja(q25y)
Yes, the significant difference is created by the fact that from on hand there are countries within UE where debts sale and debts collection are not regulated at all (beside existing general rules of civil law) and countries where sale of debt is allowed only to special domestic SPV (Italy) or where debt collection activity is treated equally as granting loans and rendering other financial services (which requires DCAs to be under the same law as professional lenders and financial entities) Other differences are coming from the facts like: - existing debt collection law in domestic legislation (Romania, Slovakia, Greece) vs. lack of specific regulation in this regard, and working based on civil law rules only (Czech, Spain); - requirement of license (Slovakia, Germany) vs. freedom of activity in another jurisdiction (Spain); - supervised activity (Romania) vs. lack of regulatory body in some countries (Germany, Spain); - impossibility to purchase of the portfolio by foreign investor (Italy) vs. possibility of foreign entities to acquire the underlying assets (Romania, Spain); - disclosing personal data in due diligence process versus data secrecy; - loan agreement being executive title even after sale of receivable (Romania) vs. loan agreement losing this quality after assignment (Italy) Obstacle to the business as Capital Group: - need of creating different structures depending on the market; - challenge for having unified processes; - significant different costs of operating on different EU markets; - need of careful assessments of all boundaries before entering on the new market;
Ja(q26y)
Obstacles to operate internationally in an efficient manner are: transfer of personal data, international enforcement, licensing to operate in each country without recognition of Group mother license
- Slovakia: licenses for acquiring credit loan portfolios. Although the entity intending to buy loan portfolios does not intend to be consumer credit provider, it has to obtain a license from the National Bank of Slovakia for consumer credits providers to be able to purchase the loan portfolio. The impact relates to the significant time needed for obtaining the license, significant costs of running activity due to the burocreacy connected with supervising body and law requirements which are adjusted to the loan lenders, not to debt collection agencies; limited possibilities of operations. - Italy: the securitization law strictly requires the establishment of a local SPV which affects costs of managing it, together with the consequent obligations about compliance and relationships with authorities. Moreover, the assignee as SPV cannot perform directly the collection activity and the reporting ones managed exclusively by Master Servicer as financial intermediary, with the consequent effect about having several agents in the whole process. - Romania: the buyer of receivables has to be on the list of debt collection entities authorized by domestic consumer Protection Authority;
- In Czech, Slovakia, Spain- no known restrictions to be listed; - In Romania, Poland- banks have National Bank restrictions to outsource (significant) risks
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q27d)
 
In order to facilitate existing cross-border activities and/or entry into new markets there is need of: - development of all points mentioned in answer for question no. 3 - transparency in transfers of loan portfolios; - creating cross border system with offers for investors together with the abovementioned aspects mentioned in the answer for the question no. 14; - harmonization of the rules of the transaction, including securitization transactions and the requirements of external DCAs, which would allow spreading of investors’ activities for the whole EU market. - unifying regulations for legal proceedings to claim debts
Verkauf und Übertragung von Krediten?(q29a)
Kreditservicing durch externe Dienstleister?(q29b)
Development of a common EU approach would have an added value in: - Highlighting the importance of amicable stage of debt collection, which can be realized in any Member State based on the common EU rules. Simplification and unification of procedures for amicable debt collection can attract investors; - Growing number of qualified human resources (with a minimum professional standard); - Unification of some rules of processing personal data only accessible for purposes of collecting receivables in a professional manner; - Building social and political understanding of debt collection; - Creating social acceptance of assignment of receivable and debt collection practices together with limitation of debtor’s moral hazard and awareness that debts shall be repaid; - Digitalization of court and enforcement procedure
Creation of a central register of collection agencies
No additional comments
Ja(q31y)
- In Spain, there is a possibility to enforce mortgages out-of-court (always providing that it was agreed in advance by lender and borrower). This type of enforcement is much faster but could be more expensive than a judicial one. Nowadays, debtors are entitled to as same protection as in a judicial enforcement (depending on features of the specific debtor, and type of real estate), which somehow impairs the hypothetical advantages of this form of enforcement. This enforcement is out-of-court, but requests the intervention of a Notary Public, and debtor is always entitled to the standard legal protection, so that we do not consider that there are risks neither challenges different than in a judicial proceeding. - In Poland exist out-of-court settlement modes for the registered pledges and the transfer of movable property as security.
This type of enforcement is much faster but could be more expensive than a judicial one. Nowadays, debtors are entitled to as same protection as in a judicial enforcement (depending on features of the specific debtor, and type of real estate), which somehow impairs the hypothetical advantages of this form of enforcement.
This enforcement is out-of-court, but requests the intervention of a Notary Public, and debtor is always entitled to the standard legal protection, so that we do not consider that there are risks neither challenges different than in a judicial proceeding.
It shall have positive impact on banks functioning. However, this security should be transferable to the investor. Otherwise, it would create an obstacle for the secondary market.
Yes, it could help, but always that it be implemented together with other relevant changes in law that are needed to make it enforceable and practicable (please remember the rule that all debtors are entitled to as same legal protection independent of the enforcement is extra-judicial or at court, which might prejudice this type of enforcement).
Nein(q34n)
Partially, because: - managing of real estates is not the core business of a financial institution; - ‘title transfer by way of security’ is not allowed under some domestic laws; - Considering significant impact on debtors it is needed a balance between a minor breach of the loan agreement repayment in view of its total length, the trigger events for enforcing such security shall be very well and precisely established, including giving to the debtor second chance for compliance with the payment schedule; it’s also worth to consider type of receivables which shall be secure by such security
This security should be transferrable to the assignee in case of assignment of receivables
Ja(q36y)
Yes, we agree. The weaker parties need special protection.
Yes, the additional proposal to the possibility of discharging of debtors in case the value of the assets becomes less than the debt would be potentially advantageous to borrowers could be Deed in lieu (swap collateral by debt), or agreeing a right of debtor to stay in the living for a limited period of time after enforcement of this security (in both cases with total exclusion of debtor from delinquency data bases), perhaps could stimulate potential borrowers, as well as information on possible smaller costs of enforcement compering with standard security. Each time an effective information about these possibilities will be needed, explaining all the advantages and consequences and the timing.
An accelerated loan security instrument is described very briefly. However, in case of insolvency proceedings in many EU countries for example, the creditor with an accelerated loan security instrument would submit application for the registration of the secured receivable. The underlying assets would be sold by the bankruptcy trustee and the secured creditor would be satisfied preferentially. In case of enforcement proceedings commenced by another creditor, the creditor with an accelerated loan security instrument would apply for excluding the underlying assets from the debtors’ assets by submitting the action to the court against it.
To be consistent with local private law, the instrument shall be preferably regulated by the Civil Code as a new security instrument to be established by an agreement between some categories of creditors and debtors. As regards public law, an accelerated loan security instrument concerning the immovable assets should be registered in the Land Registry. These creditors should have the right to register this security instrument concerning the movable assets in the notaries register.
The statutory provisions should specify the content of the agreement establishing an accelerated loan security instrument, the moment of its establishment (agreement or subsequent registration), categories of the parties who may establish it, ways of realization, termination, insolvency and enforcement law aspects, etc. This instrument should not create discrimination of the weaker party.
 
Organisation oder Unternehmen(organisation-replying-as)
 
European Banking Federation
 
Ja(yes-transparency-register)
4722660838-23
Bankwesen([ID7])
Wirtschaftsverband([ID9])
 
 
 
Belgien([ID22])
 
 
Ja, ich stimme der Veröffentlichung meines Beitrags unter dem von mir angegebenen Namen zu (Name Ihrer Organisation/Ihres Unternehmens/Ihrer Behörde bzw. Ihr Name, wenn Sie als Einzelperson antworten)(yes-contributions-publication)
An increase of the current size of secondary markets for NPLs, as well as an improvement in its liquidity should be positive for the NPL secondary market and for the reduction of the NPL stocks. However, significant portfolio sales of NPLs have been completed during the last 2-3 years, especially in certain jurisdictions. For this reason we consider that while improvements could be made, there are no significant obstacles in the secondary market that cannot be overcome to sell NPL portfolios. Moreover, in our view in answering this question the regional and jurisdictional approach should be considered as the level of NPLs and the relevant legal framework varies significantly from country to country. Hence, secondary market for NPLs has a different development requirement from jurisdiction to jurisdiction depending on local legislation and other factors. Thus size, liquidity and structure thereof at EU level may have a limited impact at regional / country level. Thus, analysis of size, liquidity and structure of the secondary market at country / regional level needs to be performed.
Bank internal factors considered when including the NPL sales in the resolution strategies include inter alia: o expected price vs. provision coverage level (more exactly if the sale is cash-positive or cash negative for the seller); o in-house management capacity; o recovery rates (historical vs. sale); o NPL ratio and pressure thereof on the bank balance-sheet; o reputational and commercial impact of selling the customer relationship to a third party given the investment that may have already been put into that relationship; o portfolio size – is the portfolio large enough to justify the cost of sale. External factors considered include inter alia: o availability of relevant information; o provision of sufficient time for due diligence; o buyer universe (existence of investors, number thereof); o funding capacity of potential investors; o servicing capacity existing in the market; o regulatory & legislative constraints (primarily the ones limiting in any manner the transfer of receivables); o reputational and customer relations risks. Loan sales are only one potential strategy, which banks have, to manage their NPLs. It is not the first strategy that banks will turn to in addressing NPLs as the majority of NPLs recoveries are made through ordinary management of customers, restructuring, etc. NPLs sales do represent an opportunity for an acceleration of NPL reduction but they also pose significant challenges to banks: - it cannot apply to every customer (a portfolio sale can end the relationship with the customer and the bank may not want to end its relationship with all NPL customers, particularly those who have been working with the bank to overcome their financial distress and have the potential to have a better [and performing] relationship in the future); - it forces the bank to recognize impacts in P&L at the moment of the sale. Furthermore, loan sales is the accelerator that can allow entities to achieve the desired speed of divestments that cannot be achieved through regular operations
The most important way is to enhance creditors’ recovery tools, reducing the complexity, time and cost of recovery procedures. Giving investors an efficient and stable recovery framework reduces uncertainty and, consequently, the risk premium incorporated in the price. Prices and depth of secondary markets for NPLs could be significantly higher if these kinds of measures are introduced. In particular, in some cases costs such as taxes and notary and registry fees should be reduced. Recovery tools should include both judicial and extrajudicial procedures. Furthermore, the tax system of some countries should be amended in order to avoid elevated tax charges in the event of a transfer of loans. Reduction of the information asymmetries between buyers and sellers is another important requirement. The reduction of these asymmetries would reduce the bid and ask spread and increase the number of transactions in the secondary market. Therefore, it would be very desirable to develop a common standard on data capture to facilitate NPL movement (for example like those introduced by the ECB Guidelines on NPLs). Moreover, development of the servicing capacity in the relevant market is another important element in attracting investors. However, it is important that any servicing agent taking on the responsibility of customer engagement operates to the same standards that were applicable to the selling bank given the potential for reputational and regulatory impacts.
No particular incentives should be given; rather, current obstacles consisting of barriers to entry applied to servicing entities or investors (e.g., capital requirements), legal & regulatory limitations to transfer of loans or clarification and predictability of tax treatment (e.g., certain populist legislative initiatives seeking to increase either corporate income tax or limit the recovery rate at servicer / investor level) should be either lifted, reduced or otherwise closed. Measures to reduce lengthy judicial procedures are also important to incentivise investors.
 
The most important advantage is to support banks in cleaning up their balance-sheet and freeing up capacity for lending. This is supported primarily by the funding capacity of such type of buyers (primarily banks / investment funds) which enable lager volumes being traded with less time to close, thus speeding up the whole process. Larger volumes imply need for dedicated servicing capacity (creating thus the premises for market development) and trigger a swifter return of the assets in the market (faster asset sales at lower prices than average which creates room for additional money being invested into other type of investments).
A concern with certain types of specialised investment funds is that they will normally not have the same ability (including further financing ability) as a bank NPL seller to support different types of workout strategies, including by further financing. This may adversely affect debtors. It might also be that, once they purchase a portfolio, they will apply aggressive / unethical recovery strategies, posing a reputational risk for the selling banks. Growth of the secondary market and improving liquidity should be sustainable. This requires the right balance being struck between various interests at stake, including those NPLs debtors who are owed a duty of care. Especially, as NPLs portfolio transactions can be publicly criticized if the debtors’ interests are not seen to be taken into account. This could in turn adversely affect NPL market participants and the development of a sustainable NPL market.
Benefits: o promoting increased market size and depth and equal treatment of investors; o support banks in solving legacy assets; o swifter return of the assets (owed by distressed / bankrupt debtors) into the economy; o Homogenizing tax systems. Risks: o debtor protection; o data protection & privacy o reputational and regulatory risk. The above risks are present primarily in case of consumers and small businesses and less visible in case of larger corporate debtors. Measures should aim at improving economic benefit for all involved stakeholders by resolving NPLs and not only at focusing on transfer of NPLs out of banks (aiming only at reducing NPLs in banks’ balance sheets leads to transfer of value from banks to 3rd parties with no visible gain to other stakeholders and the economy as a whole).
Emergence of NPLs within banks, and the secondary market of NPLs, put the banks and investors in NPLs into an “ecosystem” type of approach. Throughout the EU, there are consumer protection authorities and data protection authorities that cover or should cover matters related to data & consumer protection irrespective of the “owner” of a consumer loan. Thus the risks identified above (see question 7) may be further mitigated by actions such as: a. recommending the set-up of professional association/s; b. recommendation to develop “best practices” in the industry followed by efficient “complaint” mechanisms available to debtors (other mechanisms than the ones provided by courts which should be last resort, for example mediation) and consequence management tools applicable to investors / servicers once such practices are breached. Such tools would, where market growth is needed, be best used in case of consumers. In other jurisdictions, the state of the NPL market is sufficient and these tools do not appear necessary and resources may be better allocated to other policy matters (see also our answer to question 9 below).
Ja(q9y)
The differences in the framework for secondary markets for NPLs across the EU Member States are justified to a certain extent by the differences in the risks and benefits, as well as the different legal framework in the EU Member States. The maturity of a particular market is probably also a driver for existing differences. An example may be in the one related to the maturity of the market; e.g., more mature markets have probably already created certain tools for regulating the industry (at various levels) while others are less regulated. Another example may be related to the size and depth of the secondary market of NPLs. In more mature markets, the buyer universe of NPLs is more developed (both investors and servicers are properly represented in the market) while in others, such a type of market is still developing.
A best practices exercise across all European countries in order to identify success factors would be relevant to identify legislation gaps and barriers with the purpose of developing those markets.
The transfer of a loan and/or collateral to a third party should be neutral to the debtor, in what concerns his legal obligations and the duty of care, if applicable. Aggressive or unethical recovery procedures by a third party should be strictly forbidden.
Specialisation across jurisdictions may be less of an advantage in creating or developing investment opportunities; it may in fact create limitations to business models which may impact the overall value chain within secondary market of NPLs. Specialisation across asset classes is desirable, though, as it may bring more value to investors by: a. building predictable business models, b. increased value extraction out of each asset class etc. In addition, specialisation probably makes a difference on the servicing i.e. could potentially lead to economies of scale and lower servicing costs/better quality of service.
Please refer to Annex 1 of the EBF’s response for an overview of national barriers.
We are not certain that measures at the EU level (Directive or Regulation) are the most efficient tools to help reduce the significant levels of NPLs some banks in several member states have on their balance sheet. The implementation of reforms needed to promote the development of secondary markets should aim at the level of the Member States. However, the EU could play an important role in the process of identification of significant obstacles and in ensuring that those EU Member States, which do not have a workable framework for the development of the secondary market for NPLs, implement necessary reforms, if that is considered needed due to the high level of NPLs in those Member States. Supportive economic, legal and political frameworks from countries with mature secondary markets can be used as a model for less developed markets. As during the sales process of NPL portfolios, many national laws need to be considered, we believe that a solution at a national level might be more targeted and hence more efficient than a solution at European level.
NPLs sales tend to have positive but also several negative impacts on banks. A negative effect that arises on banks that use the advanced internal ratings-based method (A-IRB) comes from the higher Loss Given Default (LGD) induced by the NPLs quick sale or from banks’ mergers and acquisitions, especially when a stable and sound bank buy a troubled bank with a troubled portfolio and is therefore forced to sell portfolios of NPLs quickly. There is a specific EBF proposal for the amendment to Art. 181 CRR on PD/LGD that tries to fix this issue and we encourage the Commission and co-legislators to implement it. Moreover, in any secondary market transaction it is important to ensure the “effective transfer of risks”. Otherwise, the upcoming IFRS 9 accounting regulation could impose additional loan loss provisioning related to the expected losses of the transferred exposure. Detailed and transparent information about the assets to be sold is needed. Using a standard set of data tapes on the assets could be useful, for example, those introduced by the ECB Guidelines on NPLs.
Third party specialized servicers are key to foster the NPL market dynamics helping investors to price and operate portfolios. They provide specific, local and independent know-how to potential investors that would not consider committing money to a specific market if having to go alone. They are able to provide the infrastructure and staff needed to operate a portfolio that an investment fund cannot do on their own, typically allowed to deploy capital but not to have employees or local presence. For banks, third party servicers are very useful to manage legacy assets efficiently without incurring fixed costs.
Ja(q17y)
Please refer to Annex 1 of the EBF’s response for an overview of national barriers.
The main advantages may relate to i) improvement of recovery curves through champion/challenge strategies comparing internal and external results for comparable portfolios, ii) reduction of collection costs through utilization of more efficient models, iii) specialization of some third parties for some portfolio characteristics leading to better results. Reluctance towards outsourcing is based primarily on: a. complexity in addressing outsourcing from an internal process point of view (more in the case of small businesses & corporates and less in the case of retail); b. retention of risks on the bank (both credit risk but also reputational risk); c. loss of control of the relationship with the debtor and a potential reduction in the quality of the service provided to the debtor; d. a conflict of interest might be also considered; e. regulatory requirements in relation to servicing the loan and any sanctions that may be attributable in the event of a breach of these requirements.
Having no relationship to protect for the future and not necessarily having the ability to support different types of workout strategies (including by further financing), debtors may be adversely affected. A third party servicer may be aggressive in any recovery actions. In addition, considering that the performance of the third party servicer is measured against the price of the relevant NPLs and not against the total exposure (as in case of banks), a third party servicer may not seek to wait / obtain the best price in the market for the relevant collateral. Thus, there would be the following risks to consider: a. less diverse workout strategies, e.g. through lack of further finance abilities; b. highly aggressive recovery actions that may hinge on the privacy of the debtor (e.g., calling at inappropriate hours, disturbing neighbours etc.); c. low sale price for assets which translates into high value tails which may be further enforced for longer time periods thus affecting the quality of life of the debtor; d. possible distortion of the market prices for the enforced collateral (typically real estate assets), due to a larger number of real estate assets being put on the market by the servicers with a lower recovery expectation if they have negotiated a significant haircut to the value in the sale price.
N/A
N/A
N/A
Nein(q23n)
 
 
N/A
Ja(q25y)
There are jurisdictions where there are voluntary or compulsory codes of conduct / professional associations / industry standards etc. These are in principle more mature markets with a history of such services. The difference may be eventually ascertained by comparing legal proceedings, complaints procedures and recovery rates throughout EU after identifying the jurisdictions where such elements (codes of conduct, industry standards) are implemented.
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q26d)
 
Please refer to Annex 1 of the EBF’s response for an overview of national barriers.
Please refer to Annex 1 of the EBF’s response for an overview of national barriers.
 
 
The following may be considered among the most important “facilitators” of faster NPL resolution tools: a. more efficient enforcement & insolvency legislation; b. clearer tax treatment both for sellers of NPLs and also for buyers; c. NPL data standardization.
 
 
Please refer to our answer to the question 14 above.
N/A
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q31d)
 
 
 
There would be benefits in creating such a form of collateral / security primarily in the case that such s type of collateral remains valid / enforceable in the insolvency / pre-insolvency processes. In case it is not valid / enforceable and insolvency may be opened in a swifter manner at the request of the debtor / third parties, such an “accelerated loan security” becomes a common type of collateral without additional practical use. In addition, such a type of instrument may need to be transferable in the event it is intended to benefit the full value chain of NPLs (from originator to buyer of NPLs). Moreover, the benefits mentioned above could be better achieved if the bank’s organizations are adequately structured to sell assets in the real estate market. However, it is rather unlikely that such an advantage for secured creditors can be integrated into the national insolvency regimes of most Member States without disruptions.
Yes, provided that such an instrument remains valid / enforceable in insolvency / pre-insolvency processes. While the accelerated loan security does not tackle the issue of NPLs already on banks’ balance sheets, quicker access to out-of-court enforcement would mean that future loans would be less likely to accumulate on the balance sheets of banks, particularly in jurisdictions with suboptimal in-court enforcement procedures. However, this measure alone is not able to facilitate the recovery of non-performing loans. For this to happen, it is necessary to reduce the timing for recovery of credits in dispute, streamlining credit recovery procedures. Moreover, as mentioned previously, it is rather unlikely that such an advantage for secured creditors can be integrated into the national insolvency regimes of most Member States without disruptions.
Nein(q34n)
We agree with the overall concept as described with the following caveats: - As described in the consultation document, the bank would have the right to retain or acquire ownership of the encumbered assets with a view to satisfying the secured claims through a sale or by simply keeping the asset. This could mean that the bank would have to consolidate newly acquired assets on their balance sheets to the detriment of e.g. capital allocation requirements. A different option could be that the ownership of the encumbered asset was not transferred, but rather that the asset was sold either through a private sale or an auction with proceeds going directly to the lender. In this way, the lender would be satisfied while keeping the assets off the balance sheet. - The debtors full discharge from further repayment obligations, when the recovered value from the sale of assets is lower than the value of the outstanding loan, could encourage borrowers to act irresponsibly and increase speculative behaviour among borrowers, especially when asset values decrease. While any proceeds from a sale of pledged assets should be subtracted from the outstanding debts, the debtor should still be responsible for remaining payments. Furthermore, full debt discharge may result in being counterproductive, since it does not promote a responsible entrepreneurship model (moral hazard which may also drive up the price of credit, to compensate for this risk). With regards to such a provision, the debtor should remain responsible for the outstanding payments. - Creation of such a security by borrowers should not be more expensive or more cumbersome in terms of publicity and registry costs than other securities /collaterals while the sale thereof, after transfer of ownership in the case of default should be in a commercial manner (with prior valuation, with proper publicity in advance etc.) to derive the best value. - Finally, we would like to underline that tax impact of such an operation needs to be addressed/clarified (e.g., VAT treatment) as well as additional aspects including partial execution, costs of valuation (if applicable), auction conditions etc.
In addition to answers to questions 32 and 34 above, the accelerated loan security could have also the following features: - Banks shall have the possibility to raise objections to the estimate of the property carried out by the expert appraiser. - Banks should pay the borrower the difference between the realised value and the amount of the debt due when it recovers the value from the sale of asset (not when the property of the real estate is transferred). - The property of the real estate could be transferred not only to creditors but also to other third parties. - Banks should have the possibility to disregard the accelerated loan security clause even if this clause was agreed with the borrower in the credit contract and to decide to activate the traditional enforcement procedures. This would allow banks to decide, from time to time, whether to use the accelerated loan security clause or the traditional enforcement procedures. The borrower should not have any option to choose which of the possible remedies the lender will use. - If certain conditions exist, banks should have the possibility to way out of the accelerated clause that has been already activated and activate the traditional enforcement procedures. - The transfer of immovable assets to banks should ensure the exclusion from liabilities and the automatic cancellation of mortgages and other transcriptions made after the transcript of the accelerated loan security, as is the case of sale of immovable assets in the traditional enforcement procedures. - In addition, lenders should be allowed access to all public and private data registers (Chambers of Commerce, cadastral offices, mortgage registries, credit registries, real estate transactions, length of foreclosures from PST Justice database, etc.), so that banks can perform a proper due diligence before deciding to activate the “private” foreclosure process. Moreover, it could be appropriate to specify that the accelerated loan security includes movable assets registered in public offices (such as ships and aircrafts).
Ja(q36y)
Generally speaking, we think that accelerated loan security instruments should be considered for all the categories of credit, in order to create a better access and reduce arrears and loss for lenders. Nevertheless, we consider that this Commission proposal should be limited to businesses and corporates. Indeed, the proposal responds to the overall objective of the Capital Markets Union, which is to create better access to finance for businesses and corporates in the EU. Therefore, the focus should be on these entities rather than consumers and home owners. This is also in line with the Commission proposal on preventive restructuring frameworks and second chance, which focusses on businesses and entrepreneurs. Without prejudice to what has been said above, we would like to remark that when the Commission proposal considers the exclusion of some categories of movable (i.e. main residence) or of collateral givers (i.e. consumers or non-professional borrowers, etc.), it seems to do it based on reasons (i.e. necessity to “protect” some categories of collateral, etc.) that are not aligned with some recently approved European legislation that goes in different directions. In particular, we would like to recall that the recently implemented Mortgage Credit Directive (MCD – Dir. 2014/17/CE) has introduced principles regarding “Arrears and foreclosure” (art. 28) that have also been developed in the EBA Guidelines on arrears and foreclosure. Art. 28 of the MCD provides, inter alia, that “Member States shall not prevent the parties to a credit agreement from expressly agreeing that return or transfer to the creditor of the security or proceeds from the sale of the security is sufficient to repay the credit”. This means that the Directive - whose main aim is consumer protection – not only seems to take for granted the possibility that, based on the parties will, the credit agreement can provide the return or the transfer of the security to the creditor or the possibility for the creditor to proceed to the sale, but does not see any preclusion related to the nature of the collateral or to the category of borrower for this possibility, but considers the clause an added value for both parties. When the Commission proposal on “accelerated loan security” tackles the household exclusion, it does not consider the MCD, the Art. 28 provision as well as the fact that these clauses exist in Member States. Therefore, in order to respond to your question: we think that accelerated loans security instruments should be considered for all the categories of credit, but we believe that this Commission Proposal should be limited to businesses and corporates because it is in the context of the CMU and because “accelerated loan securities mechanisms” are already in place in Member States – on a contractual basis - with regard to the loans covered by MCD.
The accelerated loan security should be advantageous to borrowers in and of itself due to the reduced risk for banks holding this kind of security. If it was really suitable to ensure less risk and easier and more efficient access to quick enforcement for lenders, it could lead to easier access to credit. This effect would be further enhanced if loans secured by the accelerated loan security positively affected the capital requirements of banks, i.e. through reduced risk weights for such loans. However, a possible discharge of debts in case the value of the asset becomes less than the debt “giving in payment” cannot be supported as this would delete the efficiency of the security. The lender’s claim would no longer be guaranteed. Therefore the lender’s position would be even worse than without security as long as a part of the debt would be automatically erased. The lender’s risk would increase entailing an increase in interest rates and/or restrictions in credit distribution. Introducing a “giving in payment” option to the benefit of mortgage holders (which could give collateralised property back to banks in exchange for final termination of their contract with no further penalty), would introduce the risk of causing instability and uncertainty for past contracts. Moreover, for banks it would translate in systemic risk increase and for the borrowers it would stimulate moral hazard amongst them. For future contracts it would lead to a change from “Lending based on credit risk” to “Asset Financing” with the following negative effects for the lending practices: - Until now, a bank grants a loan to a person and that person is obliged to repay the full value of the loan and interest. The borrower is personally liable and if he/she does not pay, his/her creditor can gain access to his/her assets through legal procedures. Before granting a loan the bank will analyse the financial situation and history of the borrower and assess the risk of non-payment. On the basis of this credit risk analysis the bank will be willing to lend to the borrower. - Under “giving in payment” this all may change. The borrower can at any time repay the loan by transferring the ownership of the house to the bank. So, when assessing the risk, the bank needs to look at the risk that the borrower will stop repaying and “send the keys to the bank”. This risk depends mainly on the value of the house in relationship to the outstanding of the loan and less if the borrower can pay or not. - Simply put, the bank doesn’t grant a loan to an individual anymore, but finances an asset, and the main risk is not the individual borrower and his financial situation, but the value of the asset. - In order to assess this risk, the bank will look especially at the value of the financed house and make an assessment of the potential fluctuations in value and the discount that needs to be applied if the bank would have to sell the asset, once given in payment.
According to the consultation document, national rules and principles of pre-insolvency and insolvency proceedings would prevail over the accelerated loan security, meaning that the contractual security right for the bank would only be enforceable as long as the debtor is not in financial distress. This aspect would significantly weaken the value of the security and would discourage banks holding such security from supporting restructuring efforts for a debtor’s potentially viable business. Furthermore, it would likely limit the viability, effectiveness and relevance of the accelerated loan security severely, since such collateral is generally most relevant in times of financial distress for the borrower. If the full effect of the collateral is to be realised, the accelerated loan security should be enforceable even when a debtor enters into an insolvency or preventive restructuring proceeding. Avoidance actions should still apply to this type of collateral in order to safeguard the rights of other creditors. However, it is rather unlikely that such an advantage for secured creditors can be integrated into the national insolvency regimes of most Member States without disruptions.
The accelerated loan security as described is a contractual right and would have to be tailored to each Member State in order to accommodate existing legal frameworks of private law, which are highly diversified within the EU. The Commission proposal could outline the basic aspects of the accelerated loan security, but leave the details to Member States in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. We would encourage that the instrument should allow for an efficient, i.e. faster collateral disposal, in a fair and transparent way, which will also be sustainable in insolvency procedures (and not null and void, when the client files for insolvency). Moreover, in our view, in certain EU Member States, one of the main obstacles to efficient enforcement of collateral are the current privileges granted to the debtor, as the weakest party, which tend to weaken negotiations for its future possibility of opposition or revocation. Bankruptcy laws and excessive discretion of the judiciary could undermine the instrument. The whole ranking of privileges needs to be clarified by law since it is not entirely clear nor definitive, and many times it has been defined by court decisions and not by law.
The accelerated loan security would have to provide for specific rules in terms of its relationship with the other collaterals provided by the law of different countries (e.g. mortgages, pledges). Moreover, the accelerated loan security should supplement the existing options for collateral that debtors currently have at their disposal. The option to use this new security right for banks should be used only when agreed upon by the contracting parties (lender and borrower) and should not impose restrictions on the use of other forms of collateral that are currently available in Member States.
Privatperson(public-replying-as)
Renato CHAHINIAN
 
 
 
 
Wirtschaftsprüfung([ID6])
Sonstiges([ID8])
 
 
 
 
Italien([ID36])
 
Consulente - ricercatore in economia e finanza dello sviluppo
Ja, ich stimme der Veröffentlichung meines Beitrags unter dem von mir angegebenen Namen zu (Name Ihrer Organisation/Ihres Unternehmens/Ihrer Behörde bzw. Ihr Name, wenn Sie als Einzelperson antworten)(yes-contributions-publication)
I mercati secondari dei crediti deteriorati sono assolutamente insufficienti rispetto ai fabbisogni attuali delle banche, ma anche dei creditori commerciali.
Una strategia di crediti deteriorati non è mai esistita in generale nelle banche. Soltanto ora si sta prendendo in considerazione il fenomeno.
Una più ampia base di investitori sarà attratta quando vi saranno maggiori competenze nella valutazione di tali crediti e maggiore trasparenza informativa sui crediti oggetto di contrattazione.
Il maggiore incentivo dovrebbe riguardare l'affinamento delle competenze degli operatori del settore ed una più ampia diffusione degli elementi di valutazione dei crediti medesimi.
 
Anche qui c'è un problema di competenze. Ogni banca dovrebbe avere al proprio interno almeno una piccola struttura specializzata in valutazione dei crediti e poi ricorrere a professionisti esterni soltanto per gestire singole partite particolarmente complesse. Le banche maggiori potrebbero essere autosufficienti in questo campo, conseguendo così significativi vantaggi interni, mentre potrebbero dare un servizio esterno agli istituti minori ed ai fondi d'investimento. In altri termini si aprirebbero opportunità per un nuovo tipo di attività.
 
In ordine d'importanza il beneficio maggiore è quello dell'aumento delle dimensioni e della profondità del mercato. Per gli altri, invece, è da considerare che tutela del debitore, riservatezza e segretezza dei dati vanno salvaguardati nei confronti dei terzi, ma di fronte ad un credito non onorato a scadenza occorrerebbe assegnare un maggior potere almeno informativo del creditore sulla reale situazione economico-finanziaria del debitore.
 
Nein(q9n)
 
Sì, perchè sono per lo più insufficienti per la risoluzione del problema dei crediti deteriorati.
Salvo eventuali pratiche scorrette, il debitore è già ampiamente tutelato in caso di crediti deteriorati, per il semplice motivo che non ha ancora pagato quanto avrebbe dovuto. Semmai bisogna tutelare meglio l'acquirente del credito, che può non conoscere tutte le eccezioni che possono essere sollevate dal debitore sulla validità del credito trasferito.
 
 
Sì perchè il problema è comune, seppur con intensità e modalità differenti.
 
Entrambi i vantaggi specifici sono importanti. Ma, come ho accennato, occorre una più incisiva gestione del credito da parte dei terzi specializzati con la possibilità di entrare nella reale situazione economico-finanziaria del debitore e pure una capacità più ampia delle banche a gestire i propri crediti.
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q17d)
 
Il vantaggio dell'esternalizzazione è quello di delegare ad altri un'attività tanto delicata e complessa. Il rischio più diffuso è quello di pagarla eccessivamente.
Il rischio principale, sia per le famiglie che per le imprese, risiede a monte nelle difficoltà finanziarie che hanno causato l'inadempimento. Il fatto che il terzo sia più efficace nel recupero del credito non annulla il rischio a monte. Semmai una valutazione del grave danno finanziario nei casi effettivamente accertati spetta al giudice e comunque il debitore ha la facoltà di ricorrervi.
 
 
 
Ja(q23y)
den Zulassungsvoraussetzungen für entsprechende Dienstleister?(q23iya)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Linee guida, raccomandazioni e creazione di un registro centrale aiuterebbero non solo la trasparenza, ma anche l'efficacia di questa importante e delicata attività.
 
Nein(q31n)
 
 
 
I vantaggi sono indubbi per le banche. Non so per gli altri creditori, soprattutto di imprese, in cui sono numerosi i fornitori e gli stessi dipendenti per gli stipendi maturati.
Certamente sì per i bilanci bancari.
Ja(q34y)
 
L'attivazione dei meccanismi di funzionamento della garanzia accelerata dovrebbe però essere subordinata ad una preventiva richiesta della banca di un piano di ristrutturazione finanziaria e/o di risanamento economico da parte del debitore inadempiente. Soltanto in assenza di questo o se lo stesso fosse insoddisfacente. la banca dovrebbe essere autorizzata a procedere. Ciò per lasciare all'impresa debitrice un'ultima via di uscita, per non aggravare la propria situazione di difficoltà e per non coinvolgere i rapporti con tutti gli altri creditori, e pure al fine di stimolare l'imprenditore ad un estremo tentativo di risanamento, che, se positivo, può riequilibrare le sorti dell'impresa ed anche assicurare il pagamento dell'intero credito bancario.
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q36d)
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organisation oder Unternehmen(organisation-replying-as)
 
KRUK Česká a Slovenská republika s.r.o.
 
Nein(no-transparency-register)
 
Kreditservicing/Inkassowesen([ID17])
Unternehmen, KMU, Kleinstunternehmen, Einzelunternehmer([ID6])
 
 
 
Tschechische Republik([ID26])
 
 
Ja, ich stimme der Veröffentlichung meines Beitrags unter dem von mir angegebenen Namen zu (Name Ihrer Organisation/Ihres Unternehmens/Ihrer Behörde bzw. Ihr Name, wenn Sie als Einzelperson antworten)(yes-contributions-publication)
We do not observe significant obstacles to the management and resolution of NPLs in terms of the current size, liquidity and structure, although it can be observed relatively small secondary market for retail secured portfolios on some EU markets. Based on our experience we believe that that the local conditions on secondary markets for NPL are in a good shape. The local situation enabled to create very competitive environment. The existing demand of investors results in prices of NPLs that are in most of cases satisfactory for original creditors because the large number of loans are being transferred to the assignee on these markets. An important exception is Greece, where the market has not been established and the lack of securitization transactions in the Romanian market. In terms of structure it is worth to mention that some legislations across EU in some aspects (such as data protection, consumer credit rights regulations, etc.) put real obstacles to the standardization of management and resolution of NPLs. Additionally courts of justice do not show/have an unified criteria when interpreting the applicable regulations which does not contribute to have/gain legal certainty: pro-consumer interpretations go beyond general rules of positive legislation in force, impose obligations that are not standard neither should be requested to non-credit entities and, essentially, put a real constrain to the investing decisions.
Bank internal factors: • improvement of financial condition of the bank; • cost cutting connected with inefficient internal debt collection; • internal resources of the originators that often are not enough and skilled to manage effectively the internal collection process; • the price for NPL portfolio versus increasing costs of internal NPL management (improvement of liquidity of the bank); External factors: • mature secondary NPL market (the more mature the market is- a lot of transactions, competition, favorable for debt collection agencies legal environment- the easier decision for loan sales) • long lasting judicial proceedings in the legal collection; • reputation of the investors in the local market; • social and political understanding of debt collection; • fiscal factors; • consumer protection litigations affecting reputation of the bank; • good, stable to growing macroeconomics
Ways of attracting a wider investor base could be: • European legal framework for secondary markets for NPLs regulating the market standards including the model Contract on Assignment of Receivables applicable in Member States; • focus on improvement of conditions for amicable debt collection including access of the creditors to contact data of the debtors, e.g. addresses processed by public authorities • statutory responsibility of the original creditor for some aspects of the quality of the NPLs, e.g. the original contracts do not include abusive clauses; • tax advantages; • simplification of judicial proceedings, and strengthen the structure (with human and material resources) and IT systems to be used by the Administration of Justice; • abolition of legal obstacles in legal dunning proceedings to allow a wider use of automated processes; • digitalization of legal proceedings (e-courts); • creating across the EU courts for small claims (to improve the efficiency of the legal procedures for credit recovery shortening the collection term and cost); • • improvement of securitization framework (in some countries the securitization process is quite “bureaucratic” and expensive because it involves a lot of agents and requires determined requisites and procedures, which can make an investor reluctant to enter in the secondary markets of NPLs- these factors affect the investment itself because each player must take into account further costs not foreseen in other countries where NPL is a relevant business); • simplification of legal restrictions related to servicing of claims, such as permit conditions, possibilities and conditions of outsourcing; • improving the quality of the data and information upon clients/debtors owed by the banks which could ease the process of credit recovery and increase the investors’ appetite for a particular portfolio. Creating legal framework for disclosure of data in the process of biding which could have very positive effect upon the credit evaluation done by the investors: if the data and information received from the Banks are updated and complete, the credit evaluation would be easier and less prudent on the necessary time to recover the debts; the more data are disclosed the more accurate and better pricing can be achieved by the banks making process of NPL sale more competitive; • balanced legislation regarding consumer protection and creditors’ rights during recovery process; • creating positive PR and picture of debt collection agencies (the DCAs), underlying their role in modern economy, importance in their role of bringing balance between creditors and debtors- consumers; fighting with negative campaigns against DCAs, underlying moral obligation of borrower to repay the debt. Additionally, it shall be stressed out that investment funds/ the debt collection agencies as investors are mainly concerned about: • sufficient scope of data necessary for proper evaluation of portfolios of NPLs during due diligence process, • proper contact data of the debtors received from the seller of NPLs; • representation and warranties in the Contracts on Assignment of Receivables providing minimum level of security for the investor; • not being obliged, after purchase of the receivables, in full by as same banking regulation, which is demanding and strict (accounting regulations apply in a different manner) as the seller; • obstacles arising out of “legal uncertainty” explained above and, on the other hand, regarding the lack of background/information on NPLs to be acquired (about the previous collection activity which was carried out, market practices/standards that were followed, the local know-how that was applied, the applicable regional regulations and local court rulings, etc).
please see answer to question 3.
We would consider removing licensing requirements for investors in the area of consumer credits on some markets (Slovakia) or establishment of a special license for investors in such assets only. The current legal regulation imposes on investors in such assets an obligation to obtain license for providing consumer credits.
We do not observe any specific advantages when acquiring entity is a bank, whose mine objective is to be focus on pure banking activities, looking for new clients and developing new products; bank- assignee is still bound by specific legislation regarding bank activities including limitations on outsourcing etc.; Assigning banking NPLs to specialized investors gives the banks possibility to overcome legacy aspects, concentrate on their core business and improve their financial conditions. At the same time investment found, by cooperating with specialized debt collection agencies are more effective and faster in terms of recoveries, not being afraid also of risk of moral hazard- banks are limited in offering to the debtors- borrowers reduction of debt due to this aspect. A professional investor also guarantee a higher level of asset security as well as higher level of personal and financial data security.
DCAs, as a general rule, take a long-term investment horizon so are ready to offer to the debtors more comfortable conditions. In the case of other investors, the investment horizon is generally much shorter and more focused on maximizing the rate of return, which may translate into a way of dealing with debtors.
Potential benefits: • increased resistance of secondary NPL market to political, populist initiatives hitting badly the market; • increased awareness of importance of NPL secondary market in society; • social acceptance of assignment of receivable and debt collection practices; • transparent, stable market; • unified legal framework; • elimination of players who are not willing to adopt to new rules The appropriate legal framework for secondary markets for loans shall first take in consideration debtor protection if a debtor is a consumer, then equal treatment of investors, which shall promote increased market size and depth. As far as data secrecy and privacy is concerned, the framework shall take into consideration the right of investor to gain the most up-to-date contact data and payment history of the debtor. Rank the following dimensions (in order of importance) is: • debtor protection: 1st risk • privacy: 2nd risk • data secrecy: 3rd risk • promoting increased market size and depth and equal treatment of investors: 1st benefit
The compromise between the dimensions could be established by looking for a balance between consumers’ privileges and creditors’ right to collect claims: • the investors often receive data, which were not updated by assignor and the debtor had no interest in informing on change in this respect as well. Since in mostly EU countries only state institutions and courts have access to Population Register, debt collecting agencies encounter obstacles for the amicable way of collecting debts because they are often not successful in reaching the debtor. Thus, sometimes they have no other option than to start expensive (also for the Debtors) court collection. • the management of receivables shall be promoted and seen as legitimate professional activity which strongly advises the approval of specific changes in law, in order to get them adapted to fight delinquency as a social need: data protection regulation must not stimulate debtor to play unfair or should not encourage to moral hazard. • pressure shall be also put on stopping an excessive pro-consumer regulations and on discouraging politicians against populist initiatives (critics of debt collection and NPL market is always good target for gaining additional voices)
Nein(q9n)
 
Yes, because of national legislation/boundaries (bureaucracy of procedures) and unbalanced consumer protection legislation versus creditors/debt collection agencies ‘rights. The best environment for further development of the market is resigning at least from limitation based on similar criteria as required for banking/financial institutions, e.g. licensing of NPLs market in the area of consumer credits (for example: Slovakia). Special focus shall be on the possibility of continuation by an assignee of enforcement proceedings started by an assignor before assignment and the removal of obstacles arising from the scope of the provisions of professional secrecy (banking and investment funds) and restrictions on outsourcing of debt management.
There is no reason for extra special protection of a debtor in the case of transfer of a loan and/or collateral by the creditor to a third party; in vast majority of cases situation of indebt person can be improved quite fast compering with his previous position towards originator of the loan- bank/financial institution being bound by many regulations not allowing for forgiveness of significant part of the debt or for creating comfortable installment plan etc. Protection is needed in terms of: • improving the conditions for the efficient amicable collection avoiding court collection and enforcement proceedings, e.g. statutory regulation of the remuneration model for out-of-court collection (collection fee paid by the debtor); • exactness of personal address and contact data, (which shall be accessible through a public data base for purposes of a professional collection activity) which allows focusing on amicable operations and helps avoiding of undertaking legal actions which are not so necessary; • improving debtors’ situation towards other/new creditors in the future by creating framework for the right of current creditor to report to the credit bureau type of entities positive information on re-paid debt/installments Obligation to formally serve a notification to debtors about assignment and identity of new creditor, mentioning all applicable rights is (and shall be) a standard.
Specialization across jurisdictions or asset classes can help to develop specialized know-how and simplify access of investors to secondary markets for NPL’s in different Member States.
Yes. In some member states the investors are able to invest in NPL portfolios only if having local vehicle and entities supervised by national authorities (e.g. Italy, Slovakia) Within some national jurisdictions, itself it can be find a different regulation for each Region, which places a strong obstacle to the collection activity (e.g. Spain).
EU regulatory framework for transfer of loans may be beneficial by unifying regulations and creating “legal certainty” for investors, consumers, and during the bidding processes until business transactions of NPLs are closed. It would harmonize and ease the purchase of receivables by entities operating in several markets or wishing to enter a new market- it would allow certain predictability (legal, tax) and legal (tax) effects on debts acquisition, including transactions in different jurisdictions, foreseeable sales tax effects. The key elements of such a framework may be: • minimum requirements in purchase agreements in terms of representation and warranties and their proper duration according to the real size of the portfolio; • setting up standards of bids and process of selling the portfolio; • tax exemptions; • specific rules to be respected by the originators in order to allow a proper due diligence of the portfolio; • quality of data transfer to the assignee (especially regarding contact data of assigned debtors and accuracy of debt components); • the free right of resale the portfolio inside the member states; • not reducing responsibility of the assignors for the defects of receivables assigned; • establishing assignor’s obligation to support assignee in handling with consumers’ complaints
A unified regulation must balance obligations between sellers and buyers;
For banks third party loan servicers as specialized market players with sophisticated tools and unique know-how may contribute to the development of secondary market for NPLs especially by relieving banking institutions from efforts going beyond their core business, being more effective in collection than banks and helping banks reducing their costs. For investors third party loan servicers allow investors to gain a deeper knowledge of the assets in a portfolio and, mainly, to predict their prospect of recovery and specific behavior of every portfolio of receivables, as well as provide knowledge on the type of expert or professionals that would be needed to manage them in the most effective way.
Nein(q17n)
 
The main advantage is that specialized external companies can perform more efficiently using their know-how. Usage of external companies allows making comparisons between different methods that are used to collect receivables and, therefore, to improve own proceedings, promotes competition to create specific IT tools and management proceedings (that may even be tailor made), and it could also contribute to as to save costs, relieve valuable resources that are need for other purposes, as well as to protect consumers, and reduce delinquency indeed. See also answer on the question no. 16. The main concern arising from outsourcing services for banking sector is ensuring compliance with banking secrecy.
There is at least one important topic connected with conducting activities by third-party loan servicers with respect to debtor protection – remuneration for the service. As it is not regulated on some markets, for example in Czech and Slovak, the practice is that the creditor offers the servicer possibility to add its remunerations to the original amount of debt to be collected. The agreement between the creditor and the servicer does not regulate remuneration from the creditor, the cost of the service is though transferred to the debtor. As there is no cap for the amount of the servicer’s remuneration, the excessive remunerations may be observed on the market. Additionally, it could be that too big pressure for results, in some cases, may be translated into too aggressive behavior towards debtor, this is why it is so important to set up the frame in which such services can be provided. But as general comment it can be observed a constant implementation of specific regulations addressed to credit collection (codes of conduct) with related fines and reputational impacts in case of no respect. For this reason, the tendency – fortunately – is to be compliant to these regulations which have the first purpose of protecting properly debtors.
In EU countries, third-party loan servicing it is mainly focused in NPLs, but it is also rendered for PLs. This allows collection agencies a diversification of risks. When working for PLs, a collection agency can get a good knowledge of the portfolio of receivables, and have access to useful information to properly determine the solvency y borrowers. Naturally, the collection on performing loans is easier because of fresh aging of credits, data and documents, which permit to reach the debtors faster and to collect in a shorter time. The nonperforming loans, on the contrary, require a more focused skip tracing activity which slows down the whole collection process with impacts on the investment itself.
The debt collection agencies manage different clusters and kind of receivables, splitting them in different departments with specific knowledge and processes. If there is any specialization it relates to the management of mortgage censured loans/receivables.
The competitiveness of local environment extends the range of services offered. The most instrumental in terms of market efficiency are: • legal debt collection; • amicable debt collection; • due diligence services; • detective services; • field collection; • correspondence collection (via post, e-mails); • collection processes using call centers including predictive dialers, and their management, together with connectivity services to telecommunications; • document management; • text messages platforms.
Ja(q23y)
den Zulassungsvoraussetzungen für entsprechende Dienstleister?(q23iya)
der Aufsicht über entsprechende Dienstleister?(q23iyb)
Yes, it could be useful but with a previous and accurate analysis of local legislation and markets (also best practices). It should include both: licensing requirements for such servicers and the supervision of such servicers
No additional comments.
Ja(q25y)
Yes, the significant difference is created by the fact that from on hand there are countries within UE where debts sale and debts collection are not regulated at all (beside existing general rules of civil law) and countries where sale of debt is allowed only to special domestic SPV (Italy) or where debt collection activity is treated equally as granting loans and rendering other financial services (which requires DCAs to be under the same law as professional lenders and financial entities) Other differences are coming from the facts like: • existing debt collection law in domestic legislation (Romania, Slovakia, Greece) vs. lack of specific regulation in this regard, and working based on civil law rules only (Czech, Spain); • requirement of license (Slovakia, Germany) vs. freedom of activity in another jurisdiction (Spain); • supervised activity (Romania) vs. lack of regulatory body in some countries (Germany, Spain); • impossibility to purchase of the portfolio by foreign investor (Italy) vs. possibility of foreign entities to acquire the underlying assets (Romania, Spain); • disclosing personal data in due dilligance process vs data secrecy; • loan agreement being executory title even after sale of receivable (Romania) vs. loan agreement losing this quality after assignment (Italy) Obstacle to the business as Capital Group: • need of creating different structures depending on the market; • challenge for having unified processes; • significant diffrent costs of operating on diffrent EU markets; • need of carefull assesments of all boudries befor entering on the new market;
Ja(q26y)
Yes, as Capital Group. Obstacles to operate internationally in an efficient manner are: transfer of personal data, international enforcement, licensing to operate in each country without recognition of Group mother license
• Slovakia: licenses for acquiring credit loan portfolios. Although the entity intending to buy loan portfolios does not intend to be consumer credit provider, it has to obtain a license from the National Bank of Slovakia for consumer credits providers to be able to purchase the loan portfolio. The impact relates to the significant time needed for obtaining the license, significant costs of running activity due to the burocreacy connected with supervising body and law requirements which are adjusted to the loan lenders, not to debt collection agencies; limited possibilities of operations. • Italy: the securitization law strictly requires the establishment of a local SPV which affects costs of managing it, together with the consequent obligations about compliance and relationships with authorities. Moreover, the assignee as SPV cannot perform directly the collection activity and the reporting ones managed exclusively by Master Servicer as financial intermediary, with the consequent effect about having several agents in the whole process. • Romania: the buyer of receivables has to be on the list of debt collection entities authorized by domestic consumer Protection Authority;
• In Czech, Slovakia, Spain- no known restrictions to be listed; • In Romania, Poland- banks have National Bank restrictions to outsource (significant) risks
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q27d)
 
In order to facilitate existing cross-border activities and/or entry into new markets there is need of: • development of all points mentioned in answer for question no. 3 • transparency in transfers of loan portfolios; • creating cross border system with offers for investors together with the abovementioned aspects mentioned in the answer for the question no. 14; • harmonization of the rules of the transaction, including securitization transactions and the requirements of external DCAs, which would allow spreading of investors’ activities for the whole EU market. • unifying regulations for legal proceedings to claim debts
 
 
Development of a common EU approach would have an added value in: • Highlighting the importance of amicable stage of debt collection, which can be realized in any Member State based on the common EU rules. Simplification and unification of procedures for amicable debt collection can attract investors; • Growing number of qualified human resources (with a minimum professional standard); • Unification of some rules of processing personal data only accessible for purposes of collecting receivables in a professional manner; • Building social and political understanding of debt collection; • Creating social acceptance of assignment of receivable and debt collection practices together with limitation of debtor’s moral hazard and awareness that debts shall be repaid; • Digitalization of court and enforcement procedure
No additional comments.
Nein(q31n)
 
 
 
It shall have positive impact on banks functioning. However, this security should be transferable to the investor. Otherwise, it would create an obstacle for the secondary market.
Yes, it could help, but always that it be implemented together with other relevant changes in law that are needed to make it enforceable and practicable (please remember the rule that all debtors are entitled to as same legal protection independent of the enforcement is extra-judicial or at court, which might prejudice this type of enforcement).
 
 
This security should be transferrable to the assignee in case of assignment of receivables.
Ja(q36y)
Yes, we agree. The weaker parties need special protection.
Yes, the additional proposal to the possibility of discharging of debtors in case the value of the assets becomes less than the debt would be potentially advantageous to borrowers could be Deed in lieu (swap collateral by debt), or agreeing a right of debtor to stay in the living for a limited period of time after enforcement of this security (in both cases with total exclusion of debtor from delinquency data bases), perhaps could stimulate potential borrowers, as well as information on possible smaller costs of enforcement compering with standard security. Each time an effective information about these possibilities will be needed, explaining all the advantages and consequences and the timing.
An accelerated loan security instrument is described very briefly. However, in case of insolvency proceedings in many EU countries for example, the creditor with an accelerated loan security instrument would submit application for the registration of the secured receivable. The underlying assets would be sold by the bankruptcy trustee and the secured creditor would be satisfied preferentially. In case of enforcement proceedings commenced by another creditor, the creditor with an accelerated loan security instrument would apply for excluding the underlying assets from the debtors’ assets by submitting the action to the court against it.
To be consistent with local private law, the instrument shall be preferably regulated by the Civil Code as a new security instrument to be established by an agreement between some categories of creditors and debtors. As regards public law, an accelerated loan security instrument concerning the immovable assets should be registered in the Land Registry. These creditors should have the right to register this security instrument concerning the movable assets in the notaries register.
The statutory provisions should specify the content of the agreement establishing an accelerated loan security instrument, the moment of its establishment (agreement or subsequent registration), categories of the parties who may establish it, ways of realization, termination, insolvency and enforcement law aspects, etc. This instrument should not create discrimination of the weaker party.
 
Organisation oder Unternehmen(organisation-replying-as)
 
Konferencja Przedsiębiorstw Finansowych w Polsce
 
Nein(no-transparency-register)
 
Bankwesen([ID7])
Versicherungswesen([ID9])
Recht([ID16])
Kreditservicing/Inkassowesen([ID17])
Wirtschaftsverband([ID9])
 
 
 
Polen([ID43])
 
 
Ja, ich stimme der Veröffentlichung meines Beitrags unter dem von mir angegebenen Namen zu (Name Ihrer Organisation/Ihres Unternehmens/Ihrer Behörde bzw. Ihr Name, wenn Sie als Einzelperson antworten)(yes-contributions-publication)
We do not observe significant obstacles to the management and resolution of NPLs in terms of the current size, liquidity and structure, although it can be observed relatively small secondary market for retail secured portfolios on some EU markets. Based on our experience we believe that that the local conditions on secondary markets for NPL are in a good shape. The local situation enabled to create very competitive environment. The existing demand of investors results in prices of NPLs that are in most of cases satisfactory for original creditors because the large number of loans are being transferred to the assignee on these markets. An important exception is Greece, where the market has not been established and the lack of securitization transactions in the Romanian market. In terms of structure it is worth to mentione that some legislations across EU in some aspects (such as data protection, consumer credit rights regulations, etc.) put real obstacles to the standardization of management and resolution of NPLs. Additionaly courts of justice do not show/have an unified criteria when interpreting the applicable regulations which does not contribute to have/gain legal certainty: pro-consumer interpretations go beyond general rules of positive legislation in force, impose obligations that are not standard neither should be requested to non-credit entities and, essentially, put a real constrain to the investing decisions.
Bank internal factors: • improvement of financial condition of the bank; • cost cutting connected with inefficient internal debt collection; • internal resources of the originators that often are not enough and skilled to manage effectively the internal collection process; • the price for NPL portfolio versus increasing costs of internal NPL management (improvement of liquidity of the bank). External factors: • mature secondary NPL market (the more mature the market is- a lot of transactions, competition, favorable for debt collection agencies legal environment- the easier decision for loan sales) • long lasting judicial proceedings in the legal collection; • reputation of the investors in the local market; • social and political understanding of debt collection; • fiscal factors; • consumer protection litigations affecting reputation of the bank; • good, stable to growing macroeconomics.
Ways of attracting a wider investor base could be: • European legal framework for secondary markets for NPLs regulating the market standards including the model Contract on Assignment of Receivables applicable in Member States; • focus on improvement of conditions for amicable debt collection including access of the creditors to contact data of the debtors, e.g. addresses processed by public authorities; • statutory responsibility of the original creditor for some aspects of the quality of the NPLs, e.g. the original contracts do not include abusive clauses; • tax advantages; • simplification of judicial proceedings, and strengthen the structure (with human and material resources) and IT systems to be used by the Administration of Justice; • creating across the EU courts for small claims (to improve the efficiency of the legal procedures for credit recovery shortening the collection term and cost); • digitalization of legal proceedings (e-courts); • improvement of securitization framework (in some countries the securitization process is quite “burocratic” and expensive because it involves a lot of agents and requires determined requisites and procedures, which can make an investor reluctant to enter in the secondary markets of NPLs- these factors affect the investment itself because each player must take into account further costs not foreseen in other countries where NPL is a relevant business); • ssimplification of legal restrictions related to servicing of claims, such as permit conditions, possibilities and conditions of outsourcing; • improving the quality of the data and information upon clients/debtors owed by the banks which could ease the process of credit recovery and increase the investors’ appetite for a particular portfolio. Creating legal framework for disclosure of data in the process of biding which could have very positive effect upon the credit evaluation done by the investors: if the data and information received from the Banks are updated and complete, the credit evaluation would be easier and less prudent on the necessary time to recover the debts; the more data are disclosed the more accurate and better pricing can be achieved by the banks making process of NPL sale more competitive; • balanced legislation regarding consumer protection and creditors’ rights during recovery process; • creating positive PR and picture of debt collection agencies (the DCAs), underlying their role in modern economy, importance in their role of bringing balance between creditors and debtors- consumers; fighting with negative campaigns against DCAs, underlying moral obligation of borrower to repay the debt. Additionally it shall be mentioned that investment funds/ the debt collection agencies as investors are mainly concerned about: • sufficient scope of data necessary for proper evaluation of portfolios of NPLs during due diligence process, • proper contact data of the debtors received from the seller of NPLs; • representation and warranties in the Contracts on Assignment of Receivables providing minimum level of security for the investor; • not being obliged, after purchase of the receivables, in full by as same banking regulation, which is demanding and strict (accounting regulations apply in a different manner) as the seller; • obstacles arising out of “legal uncertainty” explained above and, on the other hand, regarding the lack of background/information on NPLs to be acquired (about the previous collection activity which was carried out, market practices/standards that were followed, the local know-how that was applied, the applicable regional regulations and local court rulings, etc).
Please see answer to question 3.
We would consider removing licensing requirements for investors in the area of consumer credits on some markets (Slovakia) or establishment of a special license for investors in such assets only. The current legal regulation imposes on investors in such assets an obligation to obtain license for providing consumer credits.
We do not observe any specific advantages when acquiring entity is a bank, whose mine objective is to be focus on pure banking activities, looking for new clients and developing new products; bank- assignee is still bound by specific legislation regarding bank activities including limitations on outsourcing etc. Assigning banking NPLs to specialized investors gives the banks possibility to overcome legacy aspects, concentrate on their core business and improve their financial conditions. At the same time investment found, by cooperating with specialized debt collection agencies are more effective and faster in terms of recoveries, not being afraid also of risk of moral hazard- banks are limited in offering to the debtors- borrowers reduction of debt due to this aspect. A professional investor also guarantee a higher level of asset security as well as higher level of personal and financial data security.
DCAs, as a general rule, take a long-term investment horizon so are ready to offer to the debtors more comfortable conditions. In the case of other investors, the investment horizon is generally much shorter and more focused on maximizing the rate of return, which may translate into a way of dealing with debtors.
Potential benefits: • increased resistance of secondary NPL market to political, populist initiatives hitting badly the market; • increased awareness of importance of NPL secondary market in society; • social acceptance of assignment of receivable and debt collection practices; • transparent, stable market; • unified legal framework; • elimination of players who are not willing to adopt to new rules. The appropriate legal framework for secondary markets for loans shall first take in consideration debtor protection if a debtor is a consumer, then equal treatment of investors, which shall promote increased market size and depth. As far as data secrecy and privacy is concerned, the framework shall take into consideration the right of investor to gain the most up-to-date contact data and payment history of the debtor. Rank the following dimensions (in order of importance) is: • debtor protection: 1st risk, • privacy: 2nd risk, • data secrecy: 3rd risk, • promoting increased market size and depth and equal treatment of investors: 1st benefit.
The compromise between the dimensions could be established by looking for a balance between consumers’ privileges and creditors’ right to get back their money: • the investors often receive data, which were not updated by assignor and the debtor had no interest in informing on change in this respect as well. Since in mostly EU countries only state institutions and courts have access to Population Register, debt collecting agencies encounter obstacles for the amicable way of collecting debts because they are often not successful in reaching the debtor. Thus, sometimes they have no other option than to start court collection. • the management of receivables shall be promoted and seen as legitimate professional activity which strongly advises the approval of specific changes in law, in order to get them adapted to fight delinquency as a social need: data protection regulation must not stimulate debtor to play unfair or should not encourage to moral hazard. • pressure shall be also put on stopping an excessive pro-consumer regulations and on discouraging politicians against populist initiatives (critics of debt collection and NPL market is always good target for gaining additional voices)
Nein(q9n)
 
Yes, because of national legislation/boundaries (burocracy of procedures) and unbalanced consumer protection legislation versus creditors/debt collection agencies ‘rights. The best environment for further development of the market is resigning at least from limitation based on similar criteria as required for banking/financial institutions, e.g. licensing of NPLs market in the area of consumer credits (for example: Slovakia). Special focus shall be on the possibility of continuation by an assignee of enforcement proceedings started by an assignor before assignment and the removal of obstacles arising from the scope of the provisions of professional secrecy (banking and investment funds) and restrictions on outsourcing of debt management.
There is no reason for extra special protection of a debtor in the case of transfer of a loan and/or collateral by the creditor to a third party; in vast majority of cases situation of indebt person can be improved quite fast compering with his previous position towards originator of the loan- bank/financial institution being bound by many regulations not allowing for forgiveness of significant part of the debt or for creating comfortable installment plan etc. Protection is needed in terms of: • improving the conditions for the efficient amicable collection avoiding court collection and enforcement proceedings, e.g. statutory regulation of the remuneration model for out-of-court collection (collection fee paid by the debtor); • exactness of personal address and contact data, (which shall be accessible through a public data base for purposes of a professional collection activity) which allows focusing on amicable operations and helps avoiding of undertaking legal actions which are not so necessary; • improving debtors’ situation towards other/new creditors in the future by creating framework for the right of current creditor to report to the credit bureau type of entities positive information on re-paid debt/installments Obligation to formally serve a notification to debtors about assignment and identity of new creditor, mentioning all applicable rights is (and shall be) a standard.
Specialization across jurisdictions or asset classes can help to develop specialized know-how and simplify access of investors to secondary markets for NPL’s in different Member States.
Yes. In some member states the investors are able to invest in NPL portfolios only if having local vehicle and entities supervised by national authorities (e.g. Italy, Slovakia) Within some national jurisdictions itself it can be find a different regulation for each Region, which places a strong obstacle to the collection activity (e.g. Spain).
EU regulatory framework for transfer of loans may be beneficial by unifying regulations and creating “legal certainty” for investors, consumers, and during the bidding processes until business transactions of NPLs are closed. It would harmonize and ease the purchase of receivables by entities operating in several markets or wishing to enter a new market- it would allow certain predictability (legal, tax) and legal (tax) effects on debts acquisition, including transactions in different jurisdictions, foreseeable sales tax effects. The key elements of such a framework may be: • minimum requirements in purchase agreements in terms of representation and warranties and their proper duration according to the real size of the portfolio; • setting up standards of bids and process of selling the portfolio; • tax exemptions; • specific rules to be respected by the originators in order to allow a proper due diligence of the portfolio; • quality of data transfer to the assignee (especially regarding contact data of assigned debtors and accuracy of debt components); • the free right of resale the portfolio inside the member states; • not reducing responsibility of the assignors for the defects of receivables assigned; • establishing assignor’s obligation to support assignee in handling with consumers’ complaints.
A unified regulation must balance obligations between sellers and buyers.
For banks third party loan servicers as specialized market players with sophisticated tools and unique know-how may contribute to the development of secondary market for NPLs especially by relieving banking institutions from efforts going beyond their core business, being more effective in collection than banks and helping banks reducing their costs. For investors third party loan servicers allow investors to gain a deeper knowledge of the assets in a portfolio and, mainly, to predict their prospect of recovery and specific behavior of every portfolio of receivables, as well as provide knowledge on the type of expert or professionals that would be needed to manage them in the most effective way.
Nein(q17n)
 
The main advantage is that specialized external companies can perform more efficiently using their know-how. Usage of external companies allows making comparisons between different methods that are used to collect receivables and, therefore, to improve own proceedings, promotes competition to create specific IT tools and management proceedings (that may even be tailor made), and it could also contribute to as to save costs, relieve valuable resources that are need for other purposes, as well as to protect consumers, and reduce delinquency indeed. See also answer on the question no. 16. The main concern arising from outsourcing services for banking sector is ensuring compliance with banking secrecy.
There is at least one important topic connected with conducting activities by third-party loan servicers with respect to debtor protection – remuneration for the service. As it is not regulated on some markets, for example in Czech and Slovak, the practice is that the creditor offers the servicer possibility to add its remunerations to the original amount of debt to be collected. The agreement between the creditor and the servicer does not regulate remuneration from the creditor, the cost of the service is though transferred to the debtor. As there is no cap for the amount of the servicer’s remuneration, the excessive remunerations may be observed on the market. Additionally, it could be that too big pressure for results, in some cases, may be translated into too aggressive behavior towards debtor, this is why it is so important to set up the frame in which such services can be provided. But as general comment it can be observed a constant implementation of specific regulations addressed to credit collection (codes of conduct) with related fines and reputational impacts in case of no respect. For this reason, the tendency – fortunately – is to be compliant to these regulations which have the first purpose of protecting properly debtors.
In EU countries, third-party loan servicing it is mainly focused in NPLs, but it is also rendered for PLs. This allows collection agencies a diversification of risks. When working for PLs, a collection agency can get a good knowledge of the portfolio of receivables, and have access to useful information to properly determine the solvency y borrowers. Naturally, the collection on performing loans is easier because of fresh aging of credits, data and documents, which permit to reach the debtors faster and to collect in a shorter time. The nonperforming loans, on the contrary, require a more focused skip tracing activity which slows down the whole collection process with impacts on the investment itself.
The debt collection agencies manage different clusters and kind of receivables, splitting them in different departments with specific knowledge and processes. If there is any specialization it relates to the management of mortgage censured loans/receivables.
The competitiveness of local environment extends the range of services offered. The most instrumental in terms of market efficiency are: • legal debt collection; • amicable debt collection; • due diligence services; • detective services; • field collection; • correspondence collection (via post, e-mails); • collection processes using call centers including predictive dialers, and their management, together with connectivity services to telecommunications; • document management; • text messages platforms.
Ja(q23y)
den Zulassungsvoraussetzungen für entsprechende Dienstleister?(q23iya)
der Aufsicht über entsprechende Dienstleister?(q23iyb)
 
No additional comments.
Ja(q25y)
Yes, the significant difference is created by the fact that from on hand there are countries within UE where debts sale and debts collection are not regulated at all (beside existing general rules of civil law) and countries where sale of debt is allowed only to special domestic SPV (Italy) or where debt collection activity is treated equally as granting loans and rendering other financial services (which requires DCAs to be under the same law as professional lenders and financial entities). Other differences are coming from the facts like: • existing debt collection law in domestic legislation (Romania, Slovakia, Greece) vs. lack of specific regulation in this regard, and working based on civil law rules only (Czech, Spain); • requirement of license (Slovakia, Germany) vs. freedom of activity in another jurisdiction (Spain); • supervised activity (Romania) vs. lack of regulatory body in some countries (Germany, Spain); • impossibility to purchase of the portfolio by foreign investor (Italy) vs. possibility of foreign entities to acquire the underlying assets (Romania, Spain); • disclosing personal data in due dilligance process vs data secrecy; • loan agreement being executory title even after sale of receivable (Romania) vs. loan agreement losing this quality after assignment (Italy). Obstacle to the business as a capital group: • need of creating different structures depending on the market; • challenge for having unified processes; • significant diffrent costs of operating on diffrent EU markets; • need of carefull assesments of all boudries befor entering on the new market.
Ja(q26y)
Obstacles to operate internationally in an efficient manner are: transfer of personal data, international enforcement, licensing to operate in each country without recognition of Group mother license
• Slovakia: licenses for acquiring credit loan portfolios. Although the entity intending to buy loan portfolios does not intend to be consumer credit provider, it has to obtain a license from the National Bank of Slovakia for consumer credits providers to be able to purchase the loan portfolio. The impact relates to the significant time needed for obtaining the license, significant costs of running activity due to the burocreacy connected with supervising body and law requirements which are adjusted to the loan lenders, not to debt collection agencies; limited possibilities of operations. • Italy: the securitization law strictly requires the establishment of a local SPV which affects costs of managing it, together with the consequent obligations about compliance and relationships with authorities. Moreover, the assignee as SPV cannot perform directly the collection activity and the reporting ones managed exclusively by Master Servicer as financial intermediary, with the consequent effect about having several agents in the whole process. • Romania: the buyer of receivables has to be on the list of debt collection entities authorized by domestic consumer Protection Authority.
• In Czech, Slovakia, Spain - no known restrictions to be listed; • In Romania, Poland - banks have National Bank restrictions to outsource (significant) risks.
 
 
In order to facilitate existing cross-border activities and/or entry into new markets there is need of: • development of all points mentioned in answer for question no. 3; • transparency in transfers of loan portfolios; • creating cross border system with offers for investors together with the abovementioned aspects mentioned in the answer for the question no. 14; • harmonization of the rules of the transaction, including securitization transactions and the requirements of external DCAs, which would allow spreading of investors’ activities for the whole EU market; • unifying regulations for legal proceedings to claim debts.
 
 
Development of a common EU approach would have an added value in: • Highlighting the importance of amicable stage of debt collection, which can be realized in any Member State based on the common EU rules. Simplification and unification of procedures for amicable debt collection can attract investors; • Growing number of qualified human resources (with a minimum professional standard); • Unification of some rules of processing personal data only accessible for purposes of collecting receivables in a professional manner; • Building social and political understanding of debt collection; • Creating social acceptance of assignment of receivable and debt collection practices together with limitation of debtor’s moral hazard and awareness that debts shall be repaid; • Digitalization of court and enforcement procedure
No additional comments.
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q31d)
 
 
 
It shall have positive impact on banks functioning. However, this security should be transferable to the investor. Otherwise, it would create an obstacle for the secondary market.
Yes, it could help, but always that it be implemented together with other relevant changes in law that are needed to make it enforceable and practicable (please remember the rule that all debtors are entitled to as same legal protection independent of the enforcement is extra-judicial or at court, which might prejudice this type of enforcement).
Ja(q34y)
 
This security should be transferrable to the assignee in case of assignment of receivables.
Ja(q36y)
The weaker parties need special protection.
Yes, the additional proposal to the possibility of discharging of debtors in case the value of the assets becomes less than the debt would be potentially advantageous to borrowers could be Deed in lieu (swap collateral by debt), or agreeing a right of debtor to stay in the living for a limited period of time after enforcement of this security (in both cases with total exclusion of debtor from delinquency data bases), perhaps could stimulate potential borrowers, as well as information on possible smaller costs of enforcement compering with standard security. Each time an effective information about these possibilities will be needed, explaining all the advantages and consequences and the timing.
An accelerated loan security instrument is described very briefly. However, in case of insolvency proceedings in many EU countries for example, the creditor with an accelerated loan security instrument would submit application for the registration of the secured receivable. The underlying assets would be sold by the bankruptcy trustee and the secured creditor would be satisfied preferentially. In case of enforcement proceedings commenced by another creditor, the creditor with an accelerated loan security instrument would apply for excluding the underlying assets from the debtors’ assets by submitting the action to the court against it.
To be consistent with local private law, the instrument shall be preferably regulated by the Civil Code as a new security instrument to be established by an agreement between some categories of creditors and debtors. As regards public law, an accelerated loan security instrument concerning the immovable assets should be registered in the Land Registry. These creditors should have the right to register this security instrument concerning the movable assets in the notaries register.
The statutory provisions should specify the content of the agreement establishing an accelerated loan security instrument, the moment of its establishment (agreement or subsequent registration), categories of the parties who may establish it, ways of realization, termination, insolvency and enforcement law aspects, etc. This instrument should not create discrimination of the weaker party.
 
Organisation oder Unternehmen(organisation-replying-as)
 
Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A.
 
Ja(yes-transparency-register)
24037141789-48
Bankwesen([ID7])
Unternehmen, KMU, Kleinstunternehmen, Einzelunternehmer([ID6])
 
 
 
Italien([ID36])
 
 
Ja, ich stimme der Veröffentlichung meines Beitrags unter dem von mir angegebenen Namen zu (Name Ihrer Organisation/Ihres Unternehmens/Ihrer Behörde bzw. Ihr Name, wenn Sie als Einzelperson antworten)(yes-contributions-publication)
In our view, market conditions are improving in terms of size and liquidity, but there is still large room for improvements. For bigger deals, market still maintains some characteristics of an oligopoly (few bidders for the major deals); in addition non-specialized investors are still almost absent, which can limit funding availability for the most senior tranches of the investments. In terms of size, the Gross Book Value (GBV) and the Net Book Value NBV on Italian banks’ balance sheets is still quite relevant compared to the GBV traded so far (in 2016 banks had almost €200 bn of GBV of NPLs, while less than €14 bn GBV of NPLs have traded). In 2017, and most likely also in 2018, the amount of GBV traded will increase significantly, in part due to specific reforms introduced in Italy (i.e.: GACS) and the potential increase in size and liquidity is still significant. So far significant obstacles have prevented size, liquidity and structure of the market to evolve, namely the bid-ask spread in the pricing the portfolios, this is due to different well known reasons, that prevented the banks to considering selling the NPLs, due to the impact on p/ls.
Defining the optimal operational approach to address the NPL issue has become a key strategic debate in which different lenders have adopted different approaches. The process of selecting an appropriate strategy on non-performing loan management includes the following key internal and external factors. Internal factors: • Detailed internal assessment of the portfolio (to test data availability and quality), its segmentation and definition of an optimal servicing strategy; • Definition of core decision-making principles (e.g., CET1 impact, RWA reduction, LGD impact); • Market and regulatory pressure to clean the balance sheet. External factors: • Understanding of the potential market for a NPLs disposal (in particular, the range of potential buyer population, depth of liquidity, market sizing, preferences in terms of asset type and transaction style, and comparable transactions); • Pricing gap lies in the different valuation criteria where, on one hand, banks use a discount rate in accordance with the effective interest rate on the loans (as required by IAS 39) and, on the other, investors use required returns typically exceeding 15%; Competitive environment and simplification of the legal regime favoring banks selling secured credits. On a general level, the main factor determining the NPL management strategy is the ability of a bank to set-up a well organised and efficient work-out machine. Even in this case, which allows the bank to maintain focus and control on the recovery activity, disposals can play a significant role especially if applied to the type of portfolio where the recovery activity of the bank (due to loan characteristics and specific skills available) could be less productive.
Fostering NPLs securitization, which transforms an illiquid asset in a tradable security, could help widening the investor base. Less restrictions on loan sales (such as privacy laws, regulatory issues on status of the buyers and retention rules, legal issues in selling the loans (such as block sales), could also help in attracting investors. Information (or adequate SPAs - sale and purchase agreements) would help in giving confidence to investors, reducing their IRR expectations. Furthermore, also a segmentation/breakdown of loans by clusters (i.e. a) economic sector - Real Estate, shipping, … b) size – single names, portfolio, … c) type of loan - secured, unsecured … etc.) could increase market efficiency, allowing investors to focus on their specific capabilities/targets. Finally, with specific regard to Italy, a clearer legislative framework reducing the length recovery activities, would definitely attract a wider investors base, other than the usual investors that already invest in these assets. Also specifically for Italy, a more developed servicing market would help in attracting investors that need servicers support to perform recovery activities.
The incentives should be given addressing the issues raised in question 3. In particular, making the legislative framework for recovery activities working in a way that more certainty in particular on timing could be given to investors. Incentives could be also provided in such a way that the real estate market does not depress as a consequence of foreclosure activities on real estate that collateralize NPLs. Also, fiscal advantages, especially at the advantage of the potential collateral buyers, could be beneficiary.
 
When the investor is a bank, the structuring of the selling would be easier and cheaper, considering that the bank could buy on its balance sheet. Banks have also lower IRR expectations (given by a lower cost of capital) compared to the investors that are now looking at NPLs. When the investor is a fund, advantages are given by a potentially more liquid market. In particular, would you see specific advantages for - helping banks overcome legacy assets; In the case of a bank that has cheaper IRR/funding expectations, the selling bank would obtain a better pricing, reducing the bid-ask spread - creating investment opportunities for specialised investors? A higher liquidity obtained by widening the investor base and the involvement of funds interested in investment opportunities in securities, would help increasing the price for selling banks, reducing directly the bid-ask spread. Moreover, efforts should also be dedicated to create investment opportunities for non-specialized investors, this could significantly enlarge the potential secondary market of NPLs and improve offering conditions from specialized investors.
Banks: the possibility for a bank to invest in NPLs, given the high cost of own capital and the impact on asset quality. Banks should invest in a securitization, covering the senior portion and thus providing financing to the real investor in the junior tranche. Investors: current IRRs are still too high, considering asymmetric information, lack of leverage and poor competition. More specifically the concerns for investors are: • For specialized investors: data base reliability and information asymmetry • For non-specialized investors: lack of track record for this specific asset class.
Benefits: 1. Promoting increased market size and depth; 2. Equal treatment of investors. Risks: 1. Debtor protection; 2. Privacy; 3. Data secrecy, in particular for retail borrowers. Apart from the positive effects on banks’ balance sheet, a clear-cut and transparent market field can bring benefits in terms of confidence and transparent environment in which financial institutions can better design their future strategies.
A level playing field should be established, taking into consideration the reasons of both lenders and borrowers. A problem solving approach, based on operational and managerial competences and not purely bureaucratic, allowing players to recover in an orderly way from the consequences of a global financial and economic crisis. As far as Italy is concerned, priority should be given to improving the legislative framework for recovery activities, giving certainty to the procedures and reducing timing; supporting the development of a wider servicing market.
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q9d)
 
The Italian secondary market shows to be less developed in particular due to the differences existing in the legislative framework for recoveries activities and to the lack of capacity of the existing servicing companies. On the current rules: it depends on the specific situations, but generally not. Some benchmarking to identify best practices can however be useful, i.e. on rules limiting the transfer of loans and similar. It would be useful to perform a gap analysis between the different legislative frameworks, in order to identify the existing deficiencies and select the best in class solutions in order to apply them to each market.
As far as Italy is concerned, debtors’ rights are definitely well protected, even in the case of disposals. In general, protection should be granted by preventing an aggressive loan management and by preventing information on the debtor to be used to his detriment. Please note that aggressive or unethical recoveries procedures by a third party should be mitigated by an accurate selection of the buyer, which should possibly be a primary and specialized operator well known to the market.
In practical terms, the main advantage should be a reduction of the IRR due to the deep knowledge of the asset class of the investor. Also, a better understanding of the asset class should lead investor to input in pricing recoveries with high degree of likelihood of becoming real leading to higher pricing and reducing bid-ask spread. Nevertheless, even if specialization on specific segments or assets classes can allow a better management of the positions, the issue of the minimal size must be taken into consideration, being clearly a typical scale business.
No specific obstacle in the Italian jurisdiction, just the need to improve the legal framework. In terms of cross-border activity, for the time being NPL management does not seem yet to operate within an international framework.
According to what specified above, it could be useful but not decisive. A coherent framework could help, i.e. in situations as the recently debated issues on securitizations (former art. 17 of the draft STS regulation) when there is a risk of introducing additional constraints limiting the grow capacity of the market.
 
The issue is particularly relevant for banks that do not have the capability to build up an internal work-out structure. From the point of view of the investors, ownership of servicing units can improve the asset valuation capability. Development of pure independent servicers is still to be implemented on an adequate scale.
Ja(q17y)
The major issue is operational, namely the physical transfer of files. No other major difficulties.
See question n°16, it mainly depends on the quality of internal units. In general, outsourcers could profit from a higher level of specialization, higher investments, higher flexibility in people management/incentive schemes). On the other end, costs (even if fixed) can in certain cases be higher and there is less control from the bank on an issue which is much more critical than it used to be. Please note that in certain cases banks have made high investments to build up internal servicing internal units, leading to an internal high degree of specialization and effective work-out results.
A prudent banking activity must ensure debtor data protection. In case of outsourcing of the servicing activity the attitude of third-party servicers may be more aggressive, but at least in the Italian jurisdiction debtors rights are well protected. In addition, the use of such aggressive third party servicers may become a reputational risks for the bank. Therefore a great attention must be paid to the choice of the external servicer.
Definitely more focused on NPL, which is consistent with market conditions and requirements.
The situation is mixed. In our opinion major servicers should be in a condition to deal with different asset classes in order to take advantage from size, adapting their internal structure to properly deal with diversity. The value brought by major servicers should therefore be providing their customers with a high level specialized service. The economies of scale resulting from high volumes of asset under management may reduce their costs – although this may be assessed on a case by case basis. We think that there is also room for smaller and more specialized servicers, in order to cover the present excess of demand.
Today, on the Italian market, the offer is mainly concentrated on pure recovery. Additional services could be useful (even if not vital), mainly in the field of Real Estate management support; also invoice management and advisory on disposals and structuring can be considered. Such activities are likely to be carried out by large servicing companies.
 
 
 
We are not sure that a strict EU regulatory framework is required as it could introduce an excess of rigidity, though it could help in ensuring a level playing field at EU scale. The decision to establish a regulated type of legal unit could represent by itself a potential competitive advantage for a servicer with respect to its potential clients.
Ja(q25y)
The Italian market of NPL servicing is by and large still quite immature, so we can’t state that there is a globally defined standardized approach. We don’t see it as a major element of bad functioning, even if general standards could be in perspective beneficial. In general terms we believe that any such code should be developed through an intelligent “learning by doing” and not through imposed rules.
Ja(q26y)
The ISP Group is actively participating in the Italian market, as advisors mainly, and sometimes as financing providers. Our international participation is sometimes impacted by the lack of knowledge on specific issues related to specific markets. If the markets were more harmonized, it would be easier to actively participate in different markets.
In general, in Italy debtor protection is very strong. In this view, enhancing the capability of the creditor to repossess secured assets and limiting the debtor faculty to oppose the legal actions even when there is absolutely no ground (prolonging the length of the settlement practically at no cost) should be the two main areas of intervention. a. on the sale of loan portfolios, including to non-bank entities? Please specify these restrictions and their impact. According to the Italian banking law, the assignee must be listed in the special register provided for in Legislative Decree 385/1993 or any other bank belonging to the same banking group of the assigning bank. Therefore, these restrictions would require the use of securitisation techniques in order for banks to be able to dispose of the NPL assets. In question 30 we provide more insight on the latest improvements in the Italian securitisation law for the recovery of NPL exposures.
To our knowledge, as long as the third party servicer is authorized, there are not specific restrictions.
Ja(q27y)
Less restrictions of this kind would surely help in widening the investor base and so the market size, reducing bid-ask pricing.
Going international should be one of the servicers possible strategies, provided that enough synergies could be identified. In this direction, some sort of harmonization of the rules (with particular regard to the recovery framework and the real estate market) and of standardization in the deals process (data tapes, information gathering) could help. Stronger servicers and stronger investors could facilitate in general NPL resolution.
 
 
See also questions n°14 and 28. Harmonization of data base, share of information, benchmarks, central register of servicers disclosing specific structures, skills, public performances could be helpful, but over-regulation should be avoided in a phase in which new players on the market (provided that properly organized) must be welcomed. Moreover, a minimum harmonization in the recovery framework would help cross-border operations.
In this context, as anticipated in our answer 27, it is worth noting that Decree 50/2017, converted into Law on 21 June 2017, has amended the Italian Securitization Law No. 130 of 1999 and has introduced provisions aimed at supporting the recovery of securitised non-performing receivables: • the special purpose vehicle (SPV) is now allowed to purchase or subscribe equity and quasi-equity instruments arising from the conversion of the relevant receivable; • the SPV is now allowed to grant new financings to the securitised borrowers and these financing will not be subject to the standard rules on subordination applicable to shareholders loans; • a dedicated corporate vehicle (ReoCo) may be set up to purchase and hold the real estate assets securing the securitised receivables with the aim to maximize their value; • with regard to leasing portfolios, in addition to the acquisition of the underlying leased assets, a ReoCo, which needs to meet specific requirements, is now allowed to step into the leasing contracts replacing the seller in its capacity as lessor under the leasing contracts; • assignments of portfolios of NPLS may also be made not as a block and the notifications duties has been simplified.
Ja(q31y)
Recently (Article 2 of the Law Decree no. 59/2016, converted in Law no. 119/2016, entered into force on July 3, 2016) the Italian Legislator introduced Article 48-bis of the Italian Consolidated Bank Act no. 385/1993, which gives the parties (banks, or other authorized financial subjects, and businesses) the faculty to guarantee a loan granting the transfer in favor of the creditor (or of a company controlled by the latter) of the debtor’s (or other people’s) property or other property rights (“Patto Marciano”). Such transfer is subject to the condition precedent of the debtor’s default at certain conditions. This measure is not an out-of-court enforcement proceeding. Once the creditor has notified the decision to avail itself of the mentioned clause (Patto Marciano), the same shall file a petition before the competent Court and request the appointment by the President of a technical expert for the estimate of the collateral property. Once appointed, the expert shall issue the estimate within 60 days and notify it to the debtor, to the third party owner of the collateral property and to the creditor. According to the provisions of the Legislative Decree 72/2016, the Italian banking law has been modified, introducing the new article 120 quinquies decies, only suitable for consumers. By this law, the Bank has now the possibility of transferring or selling the mortgaged property in case of default of the consumer debtor. As we shall describe in the following paragraphs, the Patto Marciano is a positive measure for lenders, however it should be improved in different aspects.
Such measure should reduce the timing vis-a-vis a judicial enforcement proceeding for the foreclosure of the guaranteed assets.
According to our experience, the main issues connected with the new measure are (i) the conditions of the “default”, (ii) the fact that the law does not regulate the relationship between such collateral and the other existing collaterals (in particular, with the mortgage), and (iii) the lack of incentives for borrowers to accept such clause in a loan agreement. (i) The condition for the execution of such clause (the “default”) is represented by the non-payment of instalments for at least 9 consecutive months, starting from the 3rd unpaid installment; should the payment obligation have a monthly frequency, the non-payment shall take place for 9 months, but even if non-consecutive. With reference to the requirement of the 9 consecutive months, the recovery appears to be rather difficult, taking into account that the payment of a single instalment interrupts the mentioned period. With reference to the other hypothesis, the non-payment of 9 installments is considered in any case a very long period, also taking into account the period that occurs between the petition filed before the Court and the issuance of the expert’s report. An even higher timing can be considered when the debtor challenges the petition and/or asks for a revision of the estimate. Even if illegitimate, as not provided by the law, such challenge has to be declared not acceptable in order for the bank to proceed with the transfer of the property. The timing is further rendered uncertain in the interval between the date in which the petition is filed before the Court and the appointment of the technical expert by the President of the latter. Such timings can be extremely long when the petition is filed before bigger local Courts. (ii) The other issue concerns the lack of a clear regulation on the relationship between the so called Patto Marciano and the other available collaterals. In particular, the problem arose with mortgages granted on the same property. The lack of such regulated relationship does not permit the granting of more than one collateral on the same property, hence reducing the available collaterals. (iii) The last issue concerns the lack of incentives for borrowers to accept such clause in a loan agreement. According to our experience, such measure has not been particularly well accepted by the market. The new loans are not providing for such measure and the old ones are not being renegotiated, therefore producing a limited application de facto of the measure. Moreover, the Bank is obliged to reimburse immediately to the debtor any sum exceeding the debt towards the Bank itself soon after the estimate of the mortgaged property if the evaluation shows a positive difference for the debtor and this obligation stands on behalf of the Bank whether the real property is sold or not; Related to this procedure, the bank must be organized to keep and manage these transferred real estate properties. Another issue concerning Law 119/2016 and the related Patto Marciano is that it’s only suitable and enforceable on real estate property, without any possibility to create any different collateral which encumbers on different goods i.e. Airplane, Ships, etc. On the other hand, the main issue related to the provisions of Legislative Decree 72/2016 above mentioned is that the debtor (consumer), by this procedure, is fully discharged from his obligations towards the Bank, even if he has not repaid in full his debt.
Yes, an accelerated out-of-court loan security would certainly be well-accepted by the business in order to reduce the timing connected with the judicial enforcement proceedings.
It could reduce some future accumulation, but does not really permit a reduction of NPLs already on balance sheets.
Nein(q34n)
We agree with the main features described in the assessment, but please notice that: - the provision according to which “debtors' full discharge from further repayment obligations, when the recovered value from the sale of assets is lower than the value of the outstanding loan” could push borrowers to act irresponsibly and increase speculative behaviors, especially when asset values decrease. With regards to such provision, we suggest that the debtor remains responsible for the outstanding payments; - the value of the collateral would necessarily have to be established after the debtor’s default as, for example, the moment in which the asset’s ownership is transferred to the bank. This is the only way in which risks of objection of such transfer can be limited (e.g. risks of inconsistency between the value determined by the expert and the amounts lent, probably issued on the basis of values that were not consistent with the “minimum” value established at the time of the granting of the loan); - the limitation of the execution in respect to the main residence of the borrower and other owner’s relatives, without any exceptions, would produce a limited application de facto of the measure vis-à-vis all the borrower’s residential assets. We believe that the regulation should exclude from the enforcement scope only the borrower’s main residence, identified at the time the credit was granted. This would be the only way to limit borrowers’ elusive and speculative behaviors. In addition, we believe that such limitation shall be excluded anyway in case the borrower’s residential asset falls within the categories of villa, castle, luxury property, and other comparable assets. In addition to the above, we would suggest to take into account even the possibility to imagine the “accelerated loan security” as an alternative method of execution of the mortgage granted, being the mortgage’s regulation well known and accepted by the borrowers in the Italian market.
We point out the following aspects: - the characteristics of the “debtor’s default” should be better defined; - the tax impact (inter alia, VAT treatment, register fees) connected with (a) the automatic transfer of the ownership from the borrower to the bank and (b) the possible sale between the bank and a third party, should be addressed specifically, in order to understand and evaluate the economic value of such collateral; - the measure should expressly provide for the expert’s report to be unchallengeable. This would be the only way to avoid the neutralization de facto of the measure.
Ja(q36y)
It is in line with the recent EU policies to create better access to finance for businesses and corporates.
The following measures could be taken into consideration in order to stimulate borrowers to accept such collateral: - fiscal incentives; - facilitation regarding the interest rates/costs connected with the loan.
According to the features highlighted in the document, the accelerated loan security appears to be consistent with the Italian insolvency law. The most important element to be taken into consideration when drawing the mentioned instrument is the general principle of the “par condicio creditorum”, represented by the “stay” of individual enforcement actions and, consequently, the exclusive satisfaction of all the creditors with the insolvency proceeding’s assets. Moreover, in order to benefit from the relevant bankruptcy provisions regarding mortgages and pledges, the accelerated loan security should be expressly equalized to the other collateral securities.
The accelerated loan security instrument and, in particular, the out-of-court proceeding provided for the selling of the encumbered asset, could present profiles of inconsistency with Italian private law. Please note that according to Article 2744 of the Italian Civil Code, the agreement which provides for the transfer of the borrower’s asset (covered by mortgage or pledge) in favour of the lender, in case of default of payment, is considered null and void (so called, “patto commissorio”). The difference between “patto commissorio” (null and void) and the recent “Patto Marciano”, consists in the lender’s obligation to correspond to the borrower the difference between the value of the asset and the credit (Patto Marciano). Taken into consideration the above, in order for the accelerated loan security instrument to be considered valid and legal, the instrument needs to provide for a preventive estimate of the asset and for the lender’s obligation to correspond the difference between the value of the asset and the credit. Such estimate shall hence be issued by an independent technical expert.
It would have to provide for specific rules in terms of its relationship with the other collaterals provided by the Italian law (mortgages, pledges). Moreover, the collateral at inception should not impose restrictions on the use of other forms of collaterals that are currently available.
 
Organisation oder Unternehmen(organisation-replying-as)
 
German Banking Industry Committee - Die Deutsche Kreditwirtschaft
 
Ja(yes-transparency-register)
52646912360-95
Bankwesen([ID7])
Wirtschaftsverband([ID9])
 
 
 
Deutschland([ID31])
 
 
Ja, ich stimme der Veröffentlichung meines Beitrags unter dem von mir angegebenen Namen zu (Name Ihrer Organisation/Ihres Unternehmens/Ihrer Behörde bzw. Ihr Name, wenn Sie als Einzelperson antworten)(yes-contributions-publication)
Bei den sogenannten Sekundärmärkten für notleidenden Kredite sollte zwischen Forderungen gegen Privatkunden und Forderungen gegen Geschäftskunden unterschieden werden. Forderungen gegen Geschäftskunden sind häufiger Gegenstand von Veräußerungen als Forderungen gegen Privatkunden. Eine Veräußerung von notleidenden Forderungen gegen Privatkunden resultiert häufig aus Baufinanzierungen, wobei die Darlehensforderungen durch Grundpfandrechte gesichert sind. Eine Veräußerung von notleidenden Forderungen gegen Geschäftskunden resultiert häufig aus Unternehmensfinanzierungen und aus dem Interbankengeschäft.
Die genannten Beispiele für bankinterne Faktoren sind zutreffend. Notleidende Kreditforderungen bringen gegenüber nicht notleidenden Kreditforderungen einen erhöhten Verwaltungsaufwand für das Kreditinstitut mit sich. Daher können Gründe für den Verkauf die Vermeidung dieses erhöhten Verwaltungsaufwandes, eine nicht ausreichende Kapazität innerhalb der Bank für die Bearbeitung oder eine fehlende Möglichkeit zur wirtschaftlichen Verwaltung der Kreditforderungen sein. Hinzukommen können geschäftspolitische Erwägungen beispielsweise zur (regionalen) Umstrukturierung und der Schließung eines Sanierungsstandortes. Gegenstand von Forderungsverkäufen sind aber nicht nur notleidende Kreditforderungen. Ein wichtiger Grund für einen Forderungsverkauf können Erwägungen des Portfoliomanagements sein, etwa weil ein Kreditinstitut das Engagement in einem bestimmten, sich wirtschaftlich nachteilig entwickelnden Branchenbereich stufenweise verringern will. Damit beugt das Kreditinstitut vor und versucht zu verhindern, dass in seinem eigenen Bestand notleidende Forderungen entstehen. In diesem Fall treffen interne Faktoren und externe Faktoren zusammen.
Aus unserer Sicht ist der Anlegerkreis, der in notleidende Kreditforderungen investiert, groß genug. Weiterer Maßnahmen seitens der EU-Kommission bedarf es unserer Meinung nach nicht. Mögliche Käufer von notleidenden Kreditforderungen sind beispielsweise andere Kreditinstitute, insbesondere auch Investmentbanken, institutionelle Anleger und Investmentfonds aller Art (Distressed-Fonds, Direct-Lending-Fonds, Pensionsfons, Versorgungswerke), sonstige Vermögensverwaltungsgesellschaften und schließlich Versicherer. Sofern diese Anleger nicht selbst einen direkten Kontakt zum Sekundärmarkt haben, lassen sie sich wiederum durch Vermögensberater, Broker und andere vertreten. Auch der Dokumentationsstandard ist ausgereift. Hier sorgt der Standard der Loan Markets Association (LMA-Standard) für eine weltweit anerkannte, marktübliche, unproblematische Dokumentationsgrundlage, die die Fungibilität der gehandelten Kreditforderungen sicherstellt. Derzeit spielen aufgrund der guten gesamtwirtschaftlichen Lage Sekundärmarktverkäufe kaum eine Rolle, da kaum Forderungen verkauft werden.
Siehe unsere Antwort zu Frage 3.
Siehe unsere Antwort zu Frage 3.
Aus Sicht der Kreditwirtschaft geht es beim Forderungsverkauf nicht nur um „Altlasten“, sondern oft um geschäftspolitische und wirtschaftliche Erwägungen (siehe unsere Antwort zu Frage 2). Für spezialisierte Anleger ist der Erwerb von Sanierungskrediten und ausfallgefährdeten oder ausgefallenen Forderungen wegen des Preis-Gewinnchancen-Verhältnisses besonders lohnenswert, insbesondere in Zeiten eines dauerhaft niedrigen Zinsumfeldes.
Spezialisierte Anleger sind institutionelle Anleger wie Kreditinstitute einschließlich Investmentbanken, Versicherer, Vermögensbildungs-/ Pensionsfonds, Distressed-Fonds und Direct-Lending-Fonds. Es handelt sich um professionelle Anleger, denen die Geschäftsusancen des Sekundärmarktgeschäftes geläufig sind, insofern gibt es keine besonderen Schwierigkeiten. Benennen lassen sich eher Unterschiede in der Geschäftsanbahnung und Abwicklung. Vor allem große Kreditinstitute und Investmentbanken haben als Käufer von Kreditforderungen oft keinerlei Einschränkung in Bezug auf Branchen und sind recht flexibel in Bezug auf Forderungsvolumina. Sie schließen kaum Branchen, Länder und Forderungsgrößen aus, da sie über das notwendige Personal und die Abwicklungsstrukturen verfügen. Fonds hingegen sind oftmals begrenzt in Bezug auf Branchen, Länder oder Forderungsgrößen. Grund hierfür sind limitierte Personalkapazitäten und erhöhte Anforderungen der Fondsanleger an die Profitabilität.
Die derzeitigen Rahmenbedingungen sind aus unserer Sicht ausreichend. Insbesondere im Hinblick auf die Dokumentation bietet der LMA-Standard (s. Antwort zu Frage 3) eine ausreichende Rechtsgrundlage, die aufgrund der Rückmeldungen der Marktakteure fortwährend weiterentwickelt wird. Datenschutz und Schutz der Privatsphäre, die bei Krediten an Privatpersonen eine übergeordnete Rolle spielen, treten bei Unternehmenskrediten in den Hintergrund. Wie bezweifeln, dass ein (europäischer) Rechtsrahmen dazu beitragen könnte, in dem derzeit sehr gut funktionierenden Markt zu Verbesserungen zu führen.
Handlungsbedarf besteht unserer Auffassung nach nicht.
Nein(q9n)
 
Nein.
Die aktuellen rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen gewähren dem Schuldner ausreichenden Schutz.
Für den Verkäufer ergibt sich aus einer Spezialisierung kein Vorteil. Ein Kreditinstitut muss im Umgang mit notleidenden Kreditforderungen größtmögliche Flexibilität wahren, um jederzeit ein Engagement aus geschäftspolitischen oder wirtschaftlichen Gründen verkaufen zu können. Für den Käufer führt eine Spezialisierung vermutlich eher zu einer Risikobegrenzung und möglicherweise auch zu Profitabilitätssteigerung. Zum einen kann er durch spezielles Branchen- und Länder-Know-How von Mitarbeitern (Analysten) Risiken besser einschätzen, aber auch den für das jeweilige Engagement zutreffenden Kaufpreis besser abschätzen.
Nein. Hindernisse sind nicht bekannt, die nicht auch in anderen Geschäftsbereichen bestehen würden und sich aus verschiedenen gesetzlichen und aufsichtsrechtlichen Vorgaben einerseits (Geldwäschebekämpfung, Anforderungen an die Kundenidentifikation (KYC) aufsichtsrechtliche Begrenzungen) und Länderrisiken andererseits ergeben.
Nein. Der Sekundärmarkthandel ist weder national noch europäisch begrenzt. Der weltweite Sekundärmarkthandel würde durch einen EU-Regulierungsrahmen eher begrenzt. Im übrigen verweisen wir auch auf unsere Antwort zu Frage 7.
./.
Wir verstehen unter Kreditservicern externe Dienstleister, die die Realisierung von Forderungen mit hoher Fachkenntnis betreiben. Allerdings werden die Forderungen nicht auf die Kreditservicer übertragen, so dass die Bilanz der Bank zunächst nicht entlastet wird. Kreditservicer haben aber für den wirtschaftlichen Erfolg eines Forderungsverkaufes wichtige Funktionen.
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q17d)
 
Vorteile sind die personelle Entlastung und die erfolgreichere Forderungsrealisierung infolge größerer Spezialisierung. Dem stehen aber auch Nachteile entgegen wie längere Informations- und Entscheidungswege, Vorhaltung von personellen Resourcen zur internen Bearbeitung aufgetretener Fragen und Probleme, zusätzliche Kosten, je nach Gestaltung auch Imageprobleme und eine nicht gleich wirksame Bilanzentlastung.
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Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q23d)
 
 
./.
Nein(q25n)
 
Ja(q26y)
Hindernisse in Form zunehmender Komplexität ergeben sich aus den stetig wachsenden regulatorischen Anforderungen im Kreditgeschäft weltweit. Bisher hat dies allerdings noch nicht zu einem Scheitern einer Sekundärmarkttransaktion geführt. Allerdings führt es zu erhöhtem bürokratischen Aufwand und zu einer verminderten Profitabilität.
Nicht bekannt.
Nicht bekannt.
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q27d)
 
Der Sekundärmarkt funktioniert sehr gut. Abgesehen von den allgemein im Kreditgeschäft bestehenden regulatorischen Hemmnissen erkennen wir keine speziell auf den Sekundärmarkt bezogenen Hemmnisse. Daher sehen wir keinen Bedarf für eine EU-Regulierung.
 
 
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Ja(q31y)
Ja. Die außergerichtliche Durchsetzung hängt dabei von der Art der Kreditsicherheit ab. Für die am häufigsten vorkommenden Sicherheiten gilt Folgendes: Immobilien (Grundpfandrechte): Aufgrund der üblichen Unterwerfung unter die sofortige Zwangsvollstreckung kann eine Verwertung in angemessener Zeit eingeleitet werden. Zwar findet die Verwertung selbst im Rahmen eines (gerichtlichen) Zwangsvollstreckungsverfahrens statt. Aber Bedarf für eine außergerichtliche Verwertung ist nicht erkennbar, zumal die Möglichkeit besteht, während des Zwangsvollstreckungsverfahren eine außergerichtliche („freihändige“) Veräußerung vorzunehmen, sofern der Sicherungsgeber daran mitwirkt. Sachsicherheiten (Sicherungsübereignungen): Hier findet der im Konsultationsdokument einleitend in Abschnitt II, Ziffer 6 als Vorteil der vorgeschlagenen „beschleunigten Darlehensgarantie“ beschriebene Eigentumsübergang auf die Bank aufgrund der vertraglichen Ausgestaltung bereits statt. Der Sicherungsgeber überträgt das Eigentum an der Sache auf das Kreditinstitut und dieses verpflichtet sich, das Eigentum zurückzuübertragen, wenn der Sicherungszweck erfüllt ist, also wenn die Darlehensforderung beglichen worden ist. Damit ist die Bank in der Lage, die Sicherheit ohne gerichtliches Verfahren zu verwerten. Bedarf für eine zusätzliche von der EU-Kommission vorgeschlagene „beschleunigte Darlehensgarantie“ besteht daher nicht. Wertpapiere (Verpfändungen): Aufgrund der üblichen vertraglichen Ausgestaltung von Pfandrechten kann eine Verwertung im Wege der Versteigerung oder des freihändigen Verkaufs ohne vollstreckbaren Titel und damit außerhalb eines gerichtlichen Verfahrens vorgenommen werden. Forderungen, z.B. Bankguthaben, Lebensversicherungen, Abtretungen (einschließlich Globalzessionen): Aufgrund einer Abtretung wird die Bank Gläubigerin der abgetretenen Forderungen und kann diese im Verwertungsfall ohne weiteres, insbesondere ohne gerichtliches Verfahren, beim Drittschuldner einziehen. Garantien: Garantien können ohne gerichtliches Verfahren durch Inanspruchnahme des Garantiegebers „verwertet“ werden. Eines gerichtlichen Verfahrens mit dem Ziel der Zwangsvollstreckung in das Vermögen des Garantiegebers ist aber dann erforderlich, wenn dieser zahlungsunwillig oder zahlungsunfähig ist. Allerdings besteht hier die Möglichkeit, im Urkundenprozess vorzugehen und somit schnell zu einem Urteil und einen Vollstreckungstitel zu gelangen. Insgesamt besteht unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Vollstreckungsbeschleunigung zumindest nach den gemäß der deutschen Rechtsordnung bestehenden und praktizierten Möglichkeiten kein Bedarf an einem zusätzlichen europarechtlichen Sicherungsinstrument „beschleunigte Darlehensgarantie“.
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Soweit deutsches Recht anwendbar ist, besteht kein Bedarf für ein solches zusätzliches Instrument. Es ließe sich auch wohl kaum sinnvoll in das bereits bestehende, bewährte und gut funktionierende System des Kreditsicherungsrechts und des Insolvenzrechts integrieren. Gleiches dürfte wohl auch für andere Mitgliedstaaten mit etablierten und funktionierenden Insolvenzrechtsregimes gelten. Gleichwohl dürften mangelhafte rechtliche und tatsächliche Möglichkeiten für eine schnelle Verwertung von Kreditsicherheiten in anderen Mitgliedstaaten einen Standortnachteil darstellen und die Finanzierung von Unternehmen, aber auch die Kreditaufnahme durch Verbraucher, behindern. Das ist aber keine Rechtfertigung für eine europarechtliche Harmonisierung des Kreditsicherungsrechts. Sofern gleichwohl eine „beschleunigte Darlehensgarantie“ eingeführt werden sollte, ist diese insolvenzfest auszugestalten, damit sie auch im Falle einer Insolvenz Bestand hat. Auch wenn die „beschleunigte Darlehnsgarantie“, wie es in dem Konsultationsdokument heißt, „mittels außergerichtlicher Durchsetzung“ vollstreckt werden können soll, wird doch eine Möglichkeit der gerichtlichen Kontrolle und eine Möglichkeit des Rechtsschutzes für den Schuldner/ Sicherungsgeber vorgesehen werden müssen. Solange das Justizwesen eines Landes nicht effektiv und zügig arbeitet, werden Rechtsmittel gegen die „außergerichtliche Durchsetzung“ die Verwertung der Kreditsicherheit verzögern. Die Einführung einer „beschleunigten Darlehensgarantie“ kann also das Ziel einer beschleunigten Verwertung von Kreditsicherungsmitteln ohne ein effizientes Justizwesen nicht erreichen. Ein Verzicht auf Rechtsmittel des Schuldners/ Sicherungsgebers erscheint unter rechtsstaatlichen Gesichtspunkten fragwürdig. Mögliche Defizite bei der Verwertung von Kreditsicherheiten in Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union, die zu hohen Beständen an notleidenden Krediten in den Bankbilanzen führen, müssen in erster Linie durch eine bessere Organisation der Justiz beseitigt werden. Das ist aber originäre Aufgabe des jeweiligen Mitgliedstaates. Ohne eine funktionierende und effizient arbeitende Justiz in den Mitgliedstaaten wird das Problem, das die EU-Kommission mit der Einführung einer „beschleunigten Darlehensgarantie“ lösen will, nicht zu lösen sein.
Nein.
Nein(q34n)
In unserer Antwort zu Frage 31 haben wir bereits darauf hingewiesen, dass einige Kreditsicherungsmittel nach deutschem Recht die Übertragung des Eigentums an den Sicherungsgegenständen an die Bank bereits bei der Bestellung der Kreditsicherheit vorsehen. Bei Immobilien mag die Übertragung des Eigentums an der Immobilie auf das Kreditinstitut als Sicherungsnehmer zwar hilfreich für eine zügige Verwertung sein, weil das Kreditinstitut den Prozess der Verwertung selbst organisieren kann, die Übertragung wirft aber auch zahlreiche Folgefragen und -probleme auf: - Hinsichtlich Betreiberimmobilien führt dies zu einem Eigentümerwechsel, ohne dass die zum Betrieb der Immobilie notwendigen Rechtsverhältnisse oder Genehmigungen ebenfalls an den Sicherungsnehmer übergehen (z.B. Managementverträge, Arbeitsverträge, öffentlich-rechtliche Betriebsgenehmigungen, etc.). - Ein Eigentumsübergang kann möglichweise mit für die Bank unkalkulierbaren weiteren (Rechts-) Folgen einhergehen: Z.B. laufende Kosten, Haftung für offene Abgaben- oder Steuerverbindlichkeiten des Voreigentümers, Betriebsübergang bezogen auf mit dem Voreigentümer bestehende Arbeitsverhältnisse, Beseitigung von bestehenden Altlasten (Umweltschäden) usw. - Regelmäßig ist die Übertragung von Grundstücken mit Steuern und Abgaben verbunden. Folglich wäre die Verwertung mittels „beschleunigter Darlehensgarantie“ kostenträchtiger als die Übertragung im Wege eines gerichtlichen Vollstreckungsverfahrens. - Umgang mit Nachranggläubigern: Ein Eigentümerwechsel (unter Erlöschen des ursprünglichen Sicherungsrechts sowie der ursprünglich besicherten Forderungen) wirft unmittelbar Fragen im Hinblick auf die Position von Nachranggläubigern auf. Deren Position wird typischerweise zugleich in einem Vollstreckungsverfahren geklärt. Sie erlischt vielfach dann, wenn für sie kein Erlösanteil übrig bleibt. Müsste die Bank nach Eigentümerwechsel im Rahmen der Weiterveräußerung nunmehr eine Einigung auf vergleichsweiser Basis suchen, wäre sie dem Wohlwollen der nachrangig Berechtigten ausgeliefert. - Umgang mit „beschleunigter Darlehensgarantie“ in Konsortien: Im Fall von Konsortialfinanzierungen wird üblicherweise die Bildung von Gemeinschaften oder gesamthänderisch gebundenen Rechtspositionen ausgeschlossen. Bei der Verwertung durch Übertragung der Immobilie würde es aber vermutlich zur Bildung von Eigentümergemeinschaften, bestehend aus den Konsorten, kommen. Die in diesem Zusammenhang auftretenden Fragestellungen, angefangen von der zivilrechtlichen Zuordnung, über die Bewirtschaftung der Immobilie bis zur weiteren Verwertung, sind vielfältig und wären im weiteren Verlauf des Vorhabens noch zu erörtern. Jedenfalls für die Verwertung von Immobiliarsicherheiten sehen wir in dem Vorschlag der EU-Kommission keine Verbesserung zur Rechtslage in Deutschland. Außerdem kann man aus den vorstehenden Gründen keinem Kreditinstitut raten, eine Kreditsicherheit zu vereinbaren, die aufgrund einer gesetzlichen „Beschleunigungsklausel“ dazu führt, dass im Falle der Zahlungsunfähigkeit das Eigentum an einer Immobilie ohne weiteres („automatisch“) an die Bank übergeht. Ein ergänzender Hinweis: Für das deutsche Recht haben wir vor einiger Zeit vorgeschlagen, in das Recht der Zwangsversteigerung von Immobilien einen neuen Verfahrensabschnitt „Veräußerung durch einen Verwerter“ einzuführen. Dieser Verfahrensabschnitt sollte im Hinblick auf ein mit einem Grundpfandrecht belastetes Grundstück eine Verwertungsart regeln, die alternativ zur öffentlichen Versteigerung durchgeführt werden kann. Der „Verwerter“ soll mit Übertragung des Amtes die Verfügungsbefugnis über das Grundstück erhalten, das Eigentum an dem Grundstück verbleibt aber bis zur Veräußerung durch den Verwerter beim Sicherungsgeber. Ziel der Veräußerung durch einen Verwerter ist es, im Verfahren das bestmögliche Verwertungsergebnis zu erreichen. Dazu bedarf es der weitest möglichen Integration der im Immobilienmarkt etablierten Mechanismen eines freihändigen Verkaufs. Mit der Möglichkeit der Veräußerung des Grundstückes durch einen Verwerter im Immobilienmarkt sollen die Fallkonstellationen gefördert werden, in welchen die Verwertung durch freihändigen Verkauf an der mangelnden Mitwirkungsbereitschaft und Mitwirkungsfähigkeit des Schuldners scheitert. Um den Schuldner zu schützen, haben wir vorgeschlagen, dass auch für die freihändige Veräußerung – wie für die Verwertung mittels Zwangsversteigerung nach deutschem Recht – die Wertfestsetzung durch das Gericht erfolgt und eine Veräußerung unterhalb von 5/10 des Verkehrswertes nicht möglich ist.
Um die Wirksamkeit der Kreditsicherheiten spürbar zu erhöhen, müssten die Merkmale der „beschleunigten Darlehensgarantie“ den Kreditinstituten über die bestehende Rechtslage hinaus weitere Vorteile bei der Bestellung und bei der Verwertung von Kreditsicherheiten bieten. Bei der Bestellung von Kreditsicherheiten, könnte eine rechtsbegründende Eintragung der Kreditsicherheit in ein staatliches Register eine rechtssichere und kostengünstige Methode zur Bestellung einer Kreditsicherheit darstellen. Dies ist jedoch mit Aufwand für staatliche Stellen durch die Einrichtung und den Betrieb eines solchen Registers verbunden. Die Wirksamkeit einer solchen Kreditsicherheit könnte weiter erhöht werden, wenn sie Vorrang vor anderen Kreditsicherheiten genösse. Soweit deutsche Recht anwendbar ist, sehen wir jedoch keinen Handlungsbedarf.
Ja(q36y)
Wegen der unterschiedlichen Bedürfnisse und Interessen der beiden Gruppen von Kreditnehmern halten wir eine Beschränkung des Anwendungsbereiches auf Betriebe und Unternehmen für sachgerecht. Notleidende Kredite gehen jedoch oft auch auf die Darlehensverbindlichkeiten von natürlichen Personen und insbesondere Verbrauchern zurück. Wir betonen aber nochmals, dass wir für den Geltungsbereich der deutschen Rechtsordnung keinen Bedarf für eine „beschleunigte Darlehensgarantie“ sehen.
Eine Zahlungsbefreiung für den Fall, dass der Wert der Gegenstände, die als Kreditsicherheit gewährt worden sind, unter den aus dem Darlehensvertrag geschuldeten Betrag sinkt, ist absurd: Die Kreditsicherheit dient dazu, dass der Darlehensgeber seinen Anspruch auf Rückzahlung des ausgereichten Darlehens durchsetzen kann, auch wenn der Darlehensgeber nicht mehr willens oder nicht mehr in der Lage ist, den Rückzahlungsanspruch zu erfüllen. Nach dem Vorschlag der EU-Kommission würde die Wertentwicklung der Kreditsicherheit den Rückzahlungsanspruch zunichtemachen können, anstatt ihn zu sichern. Der Sicherungsnehmer stünde also schlechter da als er ohne Kreditsicherheit dasteht. Sinkt der Wert der Kreditsicherheit, erhöht sich das Risiko des Darlehensgebers, weil er für einen Teil des Rückzahlungsanspruches gegen den Darlehensnehmer nicht mehr gesichert ist. Nach den üblichen vertraglichen Vereinbarungen in Deutschland steht dem Darlehensgeber dann ein Nachbesicherungsanspruch zu. Das heißt, dass der Darlehensgeber den Darlehensnehmer auffordern kann, weitere Sicherheiten zu stellen. Warum nach Auffassung der EU-Kommission stattdessen der Rückzahlungsanspruch des Darlehensgebers verringert werden soll und wie das mit dem erklärten Ziel der Entlastung der Bankbilanzen von notleidenden Krediten vereinbar sein soll, ist nicht erkennbar. Die Bewertung einer Kreditsicherheit richtet sich regelmäßig nach dem Marktwert zur Zeit der Bestellung der Kreditsicherheit. Insbesondere bei der Immobilienfinanzierung und einer Besicherung mittels Grundpfandrechten ist festzustellen, dass der in einer Zwangsversteigerung zu erzielende Erlös oft deutlich unter dem Marktwert liegt. Der Grund hierfür ist ein vom sonstigen Marktgeschehen abweichendes Verhalten der Bieter in einem Zwangsversteigerungstermin.
Eine „beschleunigte Darlehensgarantie“ müsste von der Wirkung von Restrukturierungsplänen und Insolvenzplänen ausgenommen werden, um die größtmögliche Wirkung im Sinne des Zieles der EU-Kommission zu erzielen. Allerdings ist fraglich, ob eine solche Bevorzugung von Kreditinstituten sachgerecht und rechtspolitische gewünscht und durchsetzbar ist.
Siehe unsere Antworten zu Fragen 34 und 38.
./.
 
Organisation oder Unternehmen(organisation-replying-as)
 
DLA Piper
 
Ja(yes-transparency-register)
038826514581-56
Recht([ID16])
Beratungsunternehmen, Anwaltskanzlei([ID7])
 
 
 
Anderes Land([ID53])
DLA Piper is a global firm and this response has been prepared by lawyers across various jurisdictions within the firm.
 
Ja, ich stimme der Veröffentlichung meines Beitrags unter dem von mir angegebenen Namen zu (Name Ihrer Organisation/Ihres Unternehmens/Ihrer Behörde bzw. Ihr Name, wenn Sie als Einzelperson antworten)(yes-contributions-publication)
Please see section 2 of the attached paper for our comments on the key factors contributing to NPLs remaining at high levels.
Please see our comments at sections 2 and 3 of the attached paper.
Please see our comments at sections 3 and 4 of the attached paper.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please see our comments at sections 3 and 4 of the attached paper.
 
 
Please see our comments at section 3 of the attached paper.
 
Please see the attached paper.
Please see section 4.3 of the attached paper.
Ja(q17y)
Please see section 4.3 of the attached paper.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please see the attached paper.
 
 
 
 
Please see section 3 of the attached paper.
Please see section 4.3 of the attached paper.
 
 
Please see our comments at sections 3 and 4 of the attached paper.
 
 
 
Please see the attached paper.
Ja(q31y)
Please see section 5 of the attached paper.
Please see section 5 of the attached paper.
Please see section 5 of the attached paper.
Please see section 5 of the attached paper.
Please see section 5 of the attached paper.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please see section 5 of the attached paper.
 
Please see section 5 of the attached paper.
Organisation oder Unternehmen(organisation-replying-as)
 
KRUK ROMANIA SRL
 
Nein(no-transparency-register)
 
Kreditservicing/Inkassowesen([ID17])
Unternehmen, KMU, Kleinstunternehmen, Einzelunternehmer([ID6])
 
 
 
Rumänien([ID45])
 
 
Ja, ich stimme der Veröffentlichung meines Beitrags unter dem von mir angegebenen Namen zu (Name Ihrer Organisation/Ihres Unternehmens/Ihrer Behörde bzw. Ihr Name, wenn Sie als Einzelperson antworten)(yes-contributions-publication)
We do not observe significant obstacles to the management and resolution of NPLs in terms of the current size, liquidity and structure, although it can be observed relatively small secondary market for retail secured portfolios on some EU markets. Based on our experience we believe that that the local conditions on secondary markets for NPL are in a good shape. The local situation enabled to create very competitive environment. The existing demand of investors results in prices of NPLs that are in most of cases satisfactory for original creditors because the large number of loans are being transferred to the assignee on these markets. An important exception is Greece, where the market has not been established and the lack of securitization transactions in the Romanian market. In terms of structure it is worth to mention that some legislations across EU in some aspects (such as data protection, consumer credit rights regulations, etc.) put real obstacles to the standardization of management and resolution of NPLs. Additionally courts of justice do not show/have an unified criteria when interpreting the applicable regulations which does not contribute to have/gain legal certainty: pro-consumer interpretations go beyond general rules of positive legislation in force, impose obligations that are not standard neither should be requested to non-credit entities and, essentially, put a real constrain to the investing decisions.
Bank internal factors: • improvement of financial condition of the bank; • cost cutting connected with inefficient internal debt collection; • internal resources of the originators that often are not enough and skilled to manage effectively the internal collection process; • the price for NPL portfolio versus increasing costs of internal NPL management (improvement of liquidity of the bank); External factors: • mature secondary NPL market (the more mature the market is- a lot of transactions, competition, favorable for debt collection agencies legal environment- the easier decision for loan sales) • long lasting judicial proceedings in the legal collection; • reputation of the investors in the local market; • social and political understanding of debt collection; • fiscal factors; • consumer protection litigations affecting reputation of the bank; • good, stable to growing macroeconomics
Ways of attracting a wider investor base could be: • European legal framework for secondary markets for NPLs regulating the market standards including the model Contract on Assignment of Receivables applicable in Member States; • focus on improvement of conditions for amicable debt collection including access of the creditors to contact data of the debtors, e.g. addresses processed by public authorities • statutory responsibility of the original creditor for some aspects of the quality of the NPLs, e.g. the original contracts do not include abusive clauses; • tax advantages; • simplification of judicial proceedings, and strengthen the structure (with human and material resources) and IT systems to be used by the Administration of Justice; • abolition of legal obstacles in legal dunning proceedings to allow a wider use of automated processes; • digitalization of legal proceedings (e-courts); • creating across the EU courts for small claims (to improve the efficiency of the legal procedures for credit recovery shortening the collection term and cost); • • improvement of securitization framework (in some countries the securitization process is quite “bureaucratic” and expensive because it involves a lot of agents and requires determined requisites and procedures, which can make an investor reluctant to enter in the secondary markets of NPLs- these factors affect the investment itself because each player must take into account further costs not foreseen in other countries where NPL is a relevant business); • simplification of legal restrictions related to servicing of claims, such as permit conditions, possibilities and conditions of outsourcing; • improving the quality of the data and information upon clients/debtors owed by the banks which could ease the process of credit recovery and increase the investors’ appetite for a particular portfolio. Creating legal framework for disclosure of data in the process of biding which could have very positive effect upon the credit evaluation done by the investors: if the data and information received from the Banks are updated and complete, the credit evaluation would be easier and less prudent on the necessary time to recover the debts; the more data are disclosed the more accurate and better pricing can be achieved by the banks making process of NPL sale more competitive; • balanced legislation regarding consumer protection and creditors’ rights during recovery process; • creating positive PR and picture of debt collection agencies (the DCAs), underlying their role in modern economy, importance in their role of bringing balance between creditors and debtors- consumers; fighting with negative campaigns against DCAs, underlying moral obligation of borrower to repay the debt. Additionally, it shall be stressed out that investment funds/ the debt collection agencies as investors are mainly concerned about: • sufficient scope of data necessary for proper evaluation of portfolios of NPLs during due diligence process, • proper contact data of the debtors received from the seller of NPLs; • representation and warranties in the Contracts on Assignment of Receivables providing minimum level of security for the investor; • not being obliged, after purchase of the receivables, in full by as same banking regulation, which is demanding and strict (accounting regulations apply in a different manner) as the seller; • obstacles arising out of “legal uncertainty” explained above and, on the other hand, regarding the lack of background/information on NPLs to be acquired (about the previous collection activity which was carried out, market practices/standards that were followed, the local know-how that was applied, the applicable regional regulations and local court rulings, etc).
please see answer to question 3.
We would consider removing licensing requirements for investors in the area of consumer credits on some markets (Slovakia) or establishment of a special license for investors in such assets only. The current legal regulation imposes on investors in such assets an obligation to obtain license for providing consumer credits.
We do not observe any specific advantages when acquiring entity is a bank, whose mine objective is to be focus on pure banking activities, looking for new clients and developing new products; bank- assignee is still bound by specific legislation regarding bank activities including limitations on outsourcing etc.; Assigning banking NPLs to specialized investors gives the banks possibility to overcome legacy aspects, concentrate on their core business and improve their financial conditions. At the same time investment found, by cooperating with specialized debt collection agencies are more effective and faster in terms of recoveries, not being afraid also of risk of moral hazard- banks are limited in offering to the debtors- borrowers reduction of debt due to this aspect. A professional investor also guarantee a higher level of asset security as well as higher level of personal and financial data security.
DCAs, as a general rule, take a long-term investment horizon so are ready to offer to the debtors more comfortable conditions. In the case of other investors, the investment horizon is generally much shorter and more focused on maximizing the rate of return, which may translate into a way of dealing with debtors.
Potential benefits: • increased resistance of secondary NPL market to political, populist initiatives hitting badly the market; • increased awareness of importance of NPL secondary market in society; • social acceptance of assignment of receivable and debt collection practices; • transparent, stable market; • unified legal framework; • elimination of players who are not willing to adopt to new rules The appropriate legal framework for secondary markets for loans shall first take in consideration debtor protection if a debtor is a consumer, then equal treatment of investors, which shall promote increased market size and depth. As far as data secrecy and privacy is concerned, the framework shall take into consideration the right of investor to gain the most up-to-date contact data and payment history of the debtor. Rank the following dimensions (in order of importance) is: • debtor protection: 1st risk • privacy: 2nd risk • data secrecy: 3rd risk • promoting increased market size and depth and equal treatment of investors: 1st benefit
The compromise between the dimensions could be established by looking for a balance between consumers’ privileges and creditors’ right to collect claims: • the investors often receive data, which were not updated by assignor and the debtor had no interest in informing on change in this respect as well. Since in mostly EU countries only state institutions and courts have access to Population Register, debt collecting agencies encounter obstacles for the amicable way of collecting debts because they are often not successful in reaching the debtor. Thus, sometimes they have no other option than to start expensive (also for the Debtors) court collection. • the management of receivables shall be promoted and seen as legitimate professional activity which strongly advises the approval of specific changes in law, in order to get them adapted to fight delinquency as a social need: data protection regulation must not stimulate debtor to play unfair or should not encourage to moral hazard. • pressure shall be also put on stopping an excessive pro-consumer regulations and on discouraging politicians against populist initiatives (critics of debt collection and NPL market is always good target for gaining additional voices)
Nein(q9n)
 
Yes, because of national legislation/boundaries (bureaucracy of procedures) and unbalanced consumer protection legislation versus creditors/debt collection agencies ‘rights. The best environment for further development of the market is resigning at least from limitation based on similar criteria as required for banking/financial institutions, e.g. licensing of NPLs market in the area of consumer credits (for example: Slovakia). Special focus shall be on the possibility of continuation by an assignee of enforcement proceedings started by an assignor before assignment and the removal of obstacles arising from the scope of the provisions of professional secrecy (banking and investment funds) and restrictions on outsourcing of debt management.
There is no reason for extra special protection of a debtor in the case of transfer of a loan and/or collateral by the creditor to a third party; in vast majority of cases situation of indebt person can be improved quite fast compering with his previous position towards originator of the loan- bank/financial institution being bound by many regulations not allowing for forgiveness of significant part of the debt or for creating comfortable installment plan etc. Protection is needed in terms of: • improving the conditions for the efficient amicable collection avoiding court collection and enforcement proceedings, e.g. statutory regulation of the remuneration model for out-of-court collection (collection fee paid by the debtor); • exactness of personal address and contact data, (which shall be accessible through a public data base for purposes of a professional collection activity) which allows focusing on amicable operations and helps avoiding of undertaking legal actions which are not so necessary; • improving debtors’ situation towards other/new creditors in the future by creating framework for the right of current creditor to report to the credit bureau type of entities positive information on re-paid debt/installments Obligation to formally serve a notification to debtors about assignment and identity of new creditor, mentioning all applicable rights is (and shall be) a standard.
Specialization across jurisdictions or asset classes can help to develop specialized know-how and simplify access of investors to secondary markets for NPL’s in different Member States.
Yes. In some member states the investors are able to invest in NPL portfolios only if having local vehicle and entities supervised by national authorities (e.g. Italy, Slovakia) Within some national jurisdictions, itself it can be find a different regulation for each Region, which places a strong obstacle to the collection activity (e.g. Spain).
EU regulatory framework for transfer of loans may be beneficial by unifying regulations and creating “legal certainty” for investors, consumers, and during the bidding processes until business transactions of NPLs are closed. It would harmonize and ease the purchase of receivables by entities operating in several markets or wishing to enter a new market- it would allow certain predictability (legal, tax) and legal (tax) effects on debts acquisition, including transactions in different jurisdictions, foreseeable sales tax effects. The key elements of such a framework may be: • minimum requirements in purchase agreements in terms of representation and warranties and their proper duration according to the real size of the portfolio; • setting up standards of bids and process of selling the portfolio; • tax exemptions; • specific rules to be respected by the originators in order to allow a proper due diligence of the portfolio; • quality of data transfer to the assignee (especially regarding contact data of assigned debtors and accuracy of debt components); • the free right of resale the portfolio inside the member states; • not reducing responsibility of the assignors for the defects of receivables assigned; • establishing assignor’s obligation to support assignee in handling with consumers’ complaints
A unified regulation must balance obligations between sellers and buyers;
For banks third party loan servicers as specialized market players with sophisticated tools and unique know-how may contribute to the development of secondary market for NPLs especially by relieving banking institutions from efforts going beyond their core business, being more effective in collection than banks and helping banks reducing their costs. For investors third party loan servicers allow investors to gain a deeper knowledge of the assets in a portfolio and, mainly, to predict their prospect of recovery and specific behavior of every portfolio of receivables, as well as provide knowledge on the type of expert or professionals that would be needed to manage them in the most effective way.
Nein(q17n)
 
The main advantage is that specialized external companies can perform more efficiently using their know-how. Usage of external companies allows making comparisons between different methods that are used to collect receivables and, therefore, to improve own proceedings, promotes competition to create specific IT tools and management proceedings (that may even be tailor made), and it could also contribute to as to save costs, relieve valuable resources that are need for other purposes, as well as to protect consumers, and reduce delinquency indeed. See also answer on the question no. 16. The main concern arising from outsourcing services for banking sector is ensuring compliance with banking secrecy.
There is at least one important topic connected with conducting activities by third-party loan servicers with respect to debtor protection – remuneration for the service. As it is not regulated on some markets, for example in Czech and Slovak, the practice is that the creditor offers the servicer possibility to add its remunerations to the original amount of debt to be collected. The agreement between the creditor and the servicer does not regulate remuneration from the creditor, the cost of the service is though transferred to the debtor. As there is no cap for the amount of the servicer’s remuneration, the excessive remunerations may be observed on the market. Additionally, it could be that too big pressure for results, in some cases, may be translated into too aggressive behavior towards debtor, this is why it is so important to set up the frame in which such services can be provided. But as general comment it can be observed a constant implementation of specific regulations addressed to credit collection (codes of conduct) with related fines and reputational impacts in case of no respect. For this reason, the tendency – fortunately – is to be compliant to these regulations which have the first purpose of protecting properly debtors.
In EU countries, third-party loan servicing it is mainly focused in NPLs, but it is also rendered for PLs. This allows collection agencies a diversification of risks. When working for PLs, a collection agency can get a good knowledge of the portfolio of receivables, and have access to useful information to properly determine the solvency y borrowers. Naturally, the collection on performing loans is easier because of fresh aging of credits, data and documents, which permit to reach the debtors faster and to collect in a shorter time. The nonperforming loans, on the contrary, require a more focused skip tracing activity which slows down the whole collection process with impacts on the investment itself.
The debt collection agencies manage different clusters and kind of receivables, splitting them in different departments with specific knowledge and processes. If there is any specialization it relates to the management of mortgage censured loans/receivables.
The competitiveness of local environment extends the range of services offered. The most instrumental in terms of market efficiency are: • legal debt collection; • amicable debt collection; • due diligence services; • detective services; • field collection; • correspondence collection (via post, e-mails); • collection processes using call centers including predictive dialers, and their management, together with connectivity services to telecommunications; • document management; • text messages platforms.
Ja(q23y)
den Zulassungsvoraussetzungen für entsprechende Dienstleister?(q23iya)
Yes, it could be useful but with a previous and accurate analysis of local legislation and markets (also best practices). It should include both: licensing requirements for such servicers and the supervision of such servicers
No additional comments.
Ja(q25y)
Yes, the significant difference is created by the fact that from on hand there are countries within UE where debts sale and debts collection are not regulated at all (beside existing general rules of civil law) and countries where sale of debt is allowed only to special domestic SPV (Italy) or where debt collection activity is treated equally as granting loans and rendering other financial services (which requires DCAs to be under the same law as professional lenders and financial entities) Other differences are coming from the facts like: • existing debt collection law in domestic legislation (Romania, Slovakia, Greece) vs. lack of specific regulation in this regard, and working based on civil law rules only (Czech, Spain); • requirement of license (Slovakia, Germany) vs. freedom of activity in another jurisdiction (Spain); • supervised activity (Romania) vs. lack of regulatory body in some countries (Germany, Spain); • impossibility to purchase of the portfolio by foreign investor (Italy) vs. possibility of foreign entities to acquire the underlying assets (Romania, Spain); • disclosing personal data in due dilligance process vs data secrecy; • loan agreement being executory title even after sale of receivable (Romania) vs. loan agreement losing this quality after assignment (Italy) Obstacle to the business as Capital Group: • need of creating different structures depending on the market; • challenge for having unified processes; • significant diffrent costs of operating on diffrent EU markets; • need of carefull assesments of all boudries befor entering on the new market;
Ja(q26y)
Yes, as Capital Group. Obstacles to operate internationally in an efficient manner are: transfer of personal data, international enforcement, licensing to operate in each country without recognition of Group mother license
a) the sale of loan portfolios: • Slovakia: licenses for acquiring credit loan portfolios. Although the entity intending to buy loan portfolios does not intend to be consumer credit provider, it has to obtain a license from the National Bank of Slovakia for consumer credits providers to be able to purchase the loan portfolio. The impact relates to the significant time needed for obtaining the license, significant costs of running activity due to the burocreacy connected with supervising body and law requirements which are adjusted to the loan lenders, not to debt collection agencies; limited possibilities of operations. • Italy: the securitization law strictly requires the establishment of a local SPV which affects costs of managing it, together with the consequent obligations about compliance and relationships with authorities. Moreover, the assignee as SPV cannot perform directly the collection activity and the reporting ones managed exclusively by Master Servicer as financial intermediary, with the consequent effect about having several agents in the whole process. • Romania: the buyer of receivables has to be on the list of debt collection entities authorized by domestic consumer Protection Authority;
In Czech, Slovakia, Spain- no known restrictions to be listed; • In Romania, Poland- banks have National Bank restrictions to outsource (significant) risks
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q27d)
 
In order to facilitate existing cross-border activities and/or entry into new markets there is need of: • development of all points mentioned in answer for question no. 3 • transparency in transfers of loan portfolios; • creating cross border system with offers for investors together with the abovementioned aspects mentioned in the answer for the question no. 14; • harmonization of the rules of the transaction, including securitization transactions and the requirements of external DCAs, which would allow spreading of investors’ activities for the whole EU market. • unifying regulations for legal proceedings to claim debts
 
 
Development of a common EU approach would have an added value in: • Highlighting the importance of amicable stage of debt collection, which can be realized in any Member State based on the common EU rules. Simplification and unification of procedures for amicable debt collection can attract investors; • Growing number of qualified human resources (with a minimum professional standard); • Unification of some rules of processing personal data only accessible for purposes of collecting receivables in a professional manner; • Building social and political understanding of debt collection; • Creating social acceptance of assignment of receivable and debt collection practices together with limitation of debtor’s moral hazard and awareness that debts shall be repaid; • Digitalization of court and enforcement procedure
No additional comments
Nein(q31n)
 
 
 
It shall have positive impact on banks functioning. However, this security should be transferable to the investor. Otherwise, it would create an obstacle for the secondary market.
Yes, it could help, but always that it be implemented together with other relevant changes in law that are needed to make it enforceable and practicable (please remember the rule that all debtors are entitled to as same legal protection independent of the enforcement is extra-judicial or at court, which might prejudice this type of enforcement).
Nein(q34n)
Partially, because: • managing of real estates is not the core business of a financial institution; • ‘title transfer by way of security’ is not allowed under some domestic laws; • Considering significant impact on debtors it is needed a balance between a minor breach of the loan agreement repayment in view of its total length, the trigger events for enforcing such security shall be very well and precisely established, including giving to the debtor second chance for compliance with the payment schedule; its also worth to consider type of receivables which shall be secure by such security
This security should be transferrable to the assignee in case of assignment of receivables.
Ja(q36y)
The weaker parties need special protection.
Yes, the additional proposal to the possibility of discharging of debtors in case the value of the assets becomes less than the debt would be potentially advantageous to borrowers could be Deed in lieu (swap collateral by debt), or agreeing a right of debtor to stay in the living for a limited period of time after enforcement of this security (in both cases with total exclusion of debtor from delinquency data bases), perhaps could stimulate potential borrowers, as well as information on possible smaller costs of enforcement compering with standard security. Each time an effective information about these possibilities will be needed, explaining all the advantages and consequences and the timing.
An accelerated loan security instrument is described very briefly. However, in case of insolvency proceedings in many EU countries for example, the creditor with an accelerated loan security instrument would submit application for the registration of the secured receivable. The underlying assets would be sold by the bankruptcy trustee and the secured creditor would be satisfied preferentially. In case of enforcement proceedings commenced by another creditor, the creditor with an accelerated loan security instrument would apply for excluding the underlying assets from the debtors’ assets by submitting the action to the court against it.
To be consistent with local private law, the instrument shall be preferably regulated by the Civil Code as a new security instrument to be established by an agreement between some categories of creditors and debtors. As regards public law, an accelerated loan security instrument concerning the immovable assets should be registered in the Land Registry. These creditors should have the right to register this security instrument concerning the movable assets in the notaries register.
The statutory provisions should specify the content of the agreement establishing an accelerated loan security instrument, the moment of its establishment (agreement or subsequent registration), categories of the parties who may establish it, ways of realization, termination, insolvency and enforcement law aspects, etc. This instrument should not create discrimination of the weaker party.
 
Organisation oder Unternehmen(organisation-replying-as)
 
Scope Ratings AG
 
Ja(yes-transparency-register)
386945216502-25
Ratingagenturen([ID8])
Unternehmen, KMU, Kleinstunternehmen, Einzelunternehmer([ID6])
 
 
 
Deutschland([ID31])
 
 
Ja, ich stimme der Veröffentlichung meines Beitrags unter dem von mir angegebenen Namen zu (Name Ihrer Organisation/Ihres Unternehmens/Ihrer Behörde bzw. Ihr Name, wenn Sie als Einzelperson antworten)(yes-contributions-publication)
 
 
Scope Ratings AG (Scope) aims to provide the consultation with its perspective, as the largest European credit rating agency, on the main impediments to the development of secondary NPL markets. Scope has a track record in rating securitisation transactions of NPL portfolios such as Elrond NPL S.r.l., the second public Italian securitisation of NPLs originated by Credito Valtellinese, S.p.A. Scope has also analysed special servicing markets across Europe and conducted interviews with various Italian special servicers. This has given Scope the critical insight needed to contribute to this consultation, in particular regarding securitisation structures. Scope highlights below the main credit risks factors faced by investors exposed to the performance or NPL portfolios, including in the context of securitisations. Scope has been registered as credit rating agency in accordance with the EU rating regulation since 2012 and an ECAI (External Credit Assessment Institution) since 2013. Scope operates internationally with 180 employees and offices in Berlin (headquarters), Frankfurt, London, Madrid, Milan, Oslo and Paris. Scope provides ratings on financial institutions, corporates, structured finance, project finance and public finance. For years, Scope has been active in the analysis of NPL markets, particularly in three main areas: a) the publication of topical research; b) public-rating assignments for financial institutions; and more recently, c) the public-rating assignment of NPL securitisations. In Scope’s view, the large bid-ask spreads of secondary NPL markets are driven mainly by the following risk drivers (ordered by relevance): 1. Inefficient enforcement frameworks 2. Collateral valuation uncertainty 3. Asymmetric information 4. Diverging real estate market expectations In questions 4 and 15 of this consultation we elaborate on these risk drivers, key obstacles to a wider NPL investor base.
 
1. Inefficient enforcement frameworks: This is currently the most important risk driver for European NPL securitisations. Lengthy and uncertain enforcement frameworks erode the net present value of expected recovery proceeds. This is due to various factors which feed off each other: a) the time-value-of-money effect, b) an increase of investors’ required rate of return, and c) the build-up of procedural and legal expenses. Another relevant consequence of lengthy enforcement processes is the substantial increase of collateral obsolescence risk, particularly for secured NPL portfolios backed by highly illiquid assets such as industrial plants or industrial warehouses. Those assets will generally deteriorate and lose value during a long enforcement procedure, leaving the asset without maintenance. Several aspects would enable market participants to extract more value out of secured NPL loans and increase investor demand: supporting legal initiatives aimed at reducing the duration and costs of enforcement; improving legal certainty; promoting out-of-court settlements; and improving the range of insolvency work-out options. In addition to legal initiatives, Scope believes the improvement of judicial capacity could help improve recovery expectations in certain regions. Public data shows that the efficiency of bankruptcy and foreclosure proceedings differ widely across the various courts, illustrated by the heterogeneity of observed average timing of proceedings. For instance, bankruptcy proceedings in Italy may range from less than four years to over fifteen years depending on the assigned court. This suggests that court under-capacity, lack of means or other idiosyncratic factors are as relevant to performance as the adequacy of the legal framework. Accelerated enforcement frameworks are credit-positive, although such an improvement could be challenging to implement against the backdrop of national pre-insolvency and insolvency frameworks. 2. Collateral valuation uncertainty: Property appraisals conducted in the context of secured NPL securitisations are characterised by high levels of uncertainty. Valuation uncertainty is driven partly by the illiquid nature of the assets securing the loans. This uncertainty is exacerbated by lengthy recovery procedures. In addition, in Scope’s view, two further key elements drive valuation uncertainty: a) The capacity to extract value from an asset is highly dependent on local expertise. For instance, special servicers may play a critical role in enhancing property values by a) leveraging in local agency networks; b) proposing value-enhancing strategies such as changing the intended use of a property; or c) scouting potential purchasers or local entrepreneurs. A deep and well-functioning special servicer market significantly improves recovery prospects, since it contributes to market liquidity and procedural efficiency. The Italian special servicing market is an example of a well-developed servicer market. Other jurisdictions, such as Spain, have a less developed servicer market, but are rapidly catching up. Initiatives to promote underdeveloped special servicing markets would be credit-positive. Also, initiatives aimed at promoting comparability across special servicer’s capabilities, such as rating assessments, would help investors select the most adequate servicer and may contribute to reduce valuation haircuts. b) Further elements which typically drive significant haircuts to reported valuations are the perceived limitations or inadequacy of valuation techniques. For instance, Scope observes that appraisals are often based on very limited offer-based comparables of limited reliability. Also, special servicers cannot always provide robust historical performance data on sales against which to benchmark appraisal values. There is significant room for improvement regarding a) the quality and transparency of the appraisal process and b) the amount and quality of historical servicer performance data. Initiatives to enhance these aspects could help reduce valuation uncertainty and compress bid-ask spreads. For instance, the use of standardised automated valuation methods to complement servicer-specific valuations could enhance comparability across sellers and increase market transparency. Also, an independent review of special servicer processes and reporting quality could contribute to widen the NPL investor base; this is currently limited to a narrow base of specialised investors capable of assessing servicer abilities on their own. Other key obstacles are explained under question 15
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Asymmetric information: In Scope’s view, large bid-ask spreads may be only partially attributable to information asymmetries between seller and buyer. Scope has found when rating Italian securitisations that originators are willing to share detailed line-by-line information on the assets, including one-by-one valuation reports. Also, property tours may be organised on selected exposures (for instance, concentrated borrower positions) to conduct an onsite review of their underlying assets. During the rating process, originators are highly scrutinised. This highlights the merits of securitisation as an excellent way to increase market transparency. In addition, the ratings on senior and mezzanine tranches widen the investor base, as opposed to private sales, which target a small universe of specialised investors. An increase in the investor base would be very positive and would help drive up bid prices. In securitisation structures, this would be achieved ideally throughout the capital stack, rather than only on the senior piece as promoted currently by the Italian GACS guarantee scheme. Public support in the form of co-investment strategies throughout the capital stack would be beneficial. In addition to incentivising private investments, this would strongly signal the state’s commitment to carry out necessary structural and legal reforms to improve the efficiency of the recovery process. In some instances, ask prices may be driven up by the seller’s endowment biases, leading to divergence in market expectations, rather than by information asymmetries. Another possible explanation is that banks may be reluctant to recognise important losses at the moment of sale and be overvaluing their NPLs by not recognising all collection costs, by charging them to general expenses, or by assuming too short recovery times to estimate net present values. In Scope’s view the argument of information asymmetries has some merit outside of securitisation structures. Indeed, it may be difficult for the wider investor base to get cheap and easy access to qualitative originator NPL data at the borrower, loan, and collateral level. Against this backdrop, initiatives aimed at a) increasing data transparency, b) promoting comparability across originators and jurisdictions, and c) reducing the due diligence costs for investor would be very positive. In particular, a central European data repository that stores standardised NPL data would be welcome. In order to be truly effective, the data repository should include digital access to third-party valuation reports. 4. Long-term real estate market expectations: Large bid-ask spreads may be also driven by diverging market expectations between sellers and buyers. While, in Scope’s view, sellers are exposed to a degree of endowment bias, reflected in over-optimistic market expectations, it is also true that investors – especially international investors – may be exposed to a conservatism bias. This may be particularly the case for jurisdictions where the public real estate index is poor or not readily available. The lack of quality data is particularly acute for non-residential assets such as commercial or industrial properties. Regarding residential assets, qualitative public data is only available in a handful of jurisdictions. For instance, in Spain, investors have access to detailed real estate index data from various sources, both at a national and regional level. However, even when public real estate index data is available at a national level, it is a challenge to compare across jurisdictions, for instance because of methodological differences in the index construction. The OECD, and other supranational bodies, provide useful cross-country standardised metrics on residential real estate markets, such as affordability and profitability ratios. However, in Scope’s experience there is an acute lack of standardised cross-country information for non-residential assets. For these reasons, public initiatives to disseminate real estate market information at a national level, and to standardise available information at a European level, would be very positive.
The capacity to extract value from an asset is highly dependent on local expertise. For instance, special servicers may play a critical role in enhancing property values by a) leveraging in local agency networks; b) proposing value-enhancing strategies such as changing the intended use of a property; or c) scouting potential purchasers or local entrepreneurs. A deep and well-functioning special servicer market significantly improves recovery prospects, since it contributes to market liquidity and procedural efficiency. The Italian special servicing market is an example of a well-developed servicer market. Other jurisdictions, such as Spain, have a less developed servicer market, but are rapidly catching up. Initiatives to promote underdeveloped special servicing markets would be credit-positive. Also, initiatives aimed at promoting comparability across special servicer’s capabilities, such as rating assessments, would help investors select the most adequate servicer and may contribute to reduce valuation haircuts.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organisation oder Unternehmen(organisation-replying-as)
 
ASOCIACIÓN ESPAÑOLA DE BANCA
 
Ja(yes-transparency-register)
785157016077-28
Bankwesen([ID7])
Sonstiges([ID14])
Spanish Banking Association
 
 
Spanien([ID48])
 
 
Ja, ich stimme der Veröffentlichung meines Beitrags unter dem von mir angegebenen Namen zu (Name Ihrer Organisation/Ihres Unternehmens/Ihrer Behörde bzw. Ihr Name, wenn Sie als Einzelperson antworten)(yes-contributions-publication)
An increase of the current size of secondary markets for NPL, as well as an improvement of its liquidity should be positive for the NPL secondary market and for the reduction of the NPL stocks. However, significant sales of NPLs portfolios have been done during the last 2-3 years. We acknowledge that secondary markets for NPLs have different development in different jurisdictions depending on local legislation and other factors and thus size, liquidity and structure. Regarding to the second question, in Spain, the main obstacles are costs related to high taxes (i.e. stamp duties which have mainly a tax collection nature without intending to burden the economic capacity, and generating a double charge if the executed asset goes through the balance of the bank prior to be finally sold to a third party) and other administrative costs (i.e. registry). In order to eliminate regulatory uncertainty, European regulation should be introduced so that national and regional regulation become homogeneous. Additionally, Spanish regional regulation contains certain particularities which increase the obstacles to operate in secondary markets on a national basis and influence the geographical scope of business operations (please, for more details see question 13). Regarding to cross border transactions, the biggest obstacles are the ones related to the different legislations existing in the EU.
Loan sales is, among others such as restructuring, enforcing collaterals and so on, one strategy that banks use in order to manage its NPLs. It is not the most important in terms of size (the majority of NPLs recoveries are made through ordinary management of customers, restructuring, etc.) but it does have its importance as it poses significant challenge to banks: - It cannot apply to every customer (with the sale the bank could end its relationship – or at least their relation could be deteriorated - with the customer so it does not apply to customers that the bank wants to keep relationship with, either because the default is circumstantial or because the customer has additional positions within the bank). Furthermore, loan sales are a recovery tool that allows entities to achieve the desired speed of divestments that cannot be achieved through regular operations. The key considerations in deciding whether portfolio loan sales become a significant element in the entities’ strategy depend on different factors such as: - Internal factors: o Capacity to manage a large stock of NPL (in house management capacity); o Necessity of reduction of unprofitable portfolio (NPL ratio and pressure thereof on the bank balance-sheet); o Expected price vs. provision coverage level (more exactly if the sale is cash-positive or cash negative for the seller). In other words, when the recoverable amount in a sale of portfolio is higher than maintaining the asset on balance. - External factors: o Efficiency of the judicial process. Sale of portfolios could be a significant part of the out-of-court strategy when in-court solutions are not cost-efficient and/or very long procedures; o Transparency: A reduction of information asymmetries could impact positively reducing the bid and ask spreads; o Depth and range of the market (number of potential investors, and their potential in funding the operations, servicing capacity of potential investors, etc.); o Regulatory & legislative constraints (primarily the ones limiting in any manner the transfer of loans and/or collaterals); o Taxes and other administrative costs (i.e. registry).
Homogeneous, simple and stable the legal framework: Recovery tools should include both judicial and extrajudicial procedures. Legal frameworks of both tools should be defined by the next features: Firstly, these tools should be ruled by homogeneous and stable regulations and standards; such legal frameworks across geographies will also clear one of the main barriers to entry for investors. Secondly, enhancing creditor´s recovery tools, reducing the complexity, time and cost of recoveries procedures could help to widen the investor base. Giving investors an efficient and stable recovery framework reduces uncertainty and, consequently, the risk premium incorporated in the price. Prices and depth of secondary markets for NPLs could be significantly higher if that kind of measures are introduced. Sale processes and contractual certainty: Having clear and structured sale processes with enough information and documentation that makes investors confident is a good start. Additionally, to attract more investors to the secondary market the information asymmetries between buyers and sellers should be reduced. Furthermore, the reduction of these asymmetries would reduce the bid and ask spread and increase the number of transactions in the secondary market Therefore, it would be very desirable to develop a common standard on data capture to facilitate NPL movement (for example like those introduced by the ECB Guidelines on NPLs). Recovery costs: As it was mentioned in the first question, costs such as taxes and notary and registry fees should be reduced.
We are in favour in giving some incentives [1]. However, it would be preferred that current obstacles should be either lifted, reduced or otherwise removed. As it was mentioned in the previous question, the information asymmetries are a barrier to close NPLs transactions. In this sense, if the information asymmetries are reduced, investors would have more incentives in acquiring NPL portfolios and the price offered would increase allowing more transactions. Another obstacle mentioned is the high recovery costs. Such high costs are generally identified as an important barrier. Regarding to the Spanish market, stamp duties which have a tax collection nature without intending to burden the economic capacity generating a double charge if the executed asset goes through the balance of the bank prior to be finally sold to a third party. They should be eliminated, reduced or, at least, homogenised among MS. Finally, providing legal certainty with simple, stable and homogeneous legal framework might encourage investors to invest in theses class of assets. An EU would be preferable to a Directive. _______________________________________ [1] According to the Financial Stability Review, May 2017 and the Staff Discussion Note (2015) “A strategy for resolving Europe’s problem loans”, the ECB and IMF respectively, among others, have made the following considerations: The ECB has suggested that Member States might promote investors by providing guarantees of junior NPL securitization tranches. For example, the state would guarantee up to 50% of the losses on the junior tranche, in return for any upside due to actual recoveries above initial estimations”. As such, the Junior Guarantee Scheme (JGS) is essentially a synthetic investment in the junior tranches of a securitization, exposing the guarantor – the state – to the same risk/return profile as a private investor. To kick-start and support the securitization market, the IMF also proposed more direct participation of the EIB or the EIF as guarantor of Mezzanine NPL tranches or as investor of senior tranches of NPL securitizations. The IMF considers that this involvement may also foster transparency and homogeneity of NPL securitizations, setting the stage for a pan-European market. Another ECB proposal encompasses a forward purchase scheme whereby the state finances part of the purchase price to be paid by the investor to the seller. This corresponds to the difference (i.e. the forward premium) between a future price that the buyer is willing to pay at the maturity of the scheme (for example, in five to seven years) and the bid price the buyer is willing to pay at the transaction date. The forward purchase scheme (FPS) is effectively a loan provided by the state to NPL buyers, to finance part of the NPL purchase price. The NPL seller receives at time of purchase the full NPL forward purchase price. The private investor pays the bid price component and the government entity pays the forward premium component. The repayment to the state of the forward premium at the maturity of the scheme must be secured by the payment obligation of the private investor (which cannot be a special purpose entity set up for the purpose of this transaction or similar transactions) as well as by a guarantee issued by a highly rated investment-grade entity, which must be a supervised institution with no links to the investor.”
See previous answer.
For banks, as potential sellers of distress assets, the main advantage of an efficient NPL secondary market is that it could help banks with high NPL stocks to reduce their legacy assets. For banks as potential investors of distress assets, an efficient NPL secondary market might be useful because the market could provide certainty about the prices and the legal consequences of the disposals. However, it is important to highlight that banks are not usually investors of these kind of assets. As a conclusion, the existence of an efficient NPL market could increase the competence in this kind of transactions. The more competition has two direct impacts: 1) the prices might represent better the value of the assets; 2) the number of transactions should increase. Thanks to these two impacts, banks could reduce their legacy assets faster.
The main concerns for banks when dealing with potential investors might be mainly: - The reputational risk caused because of the recovery procedures implemented by these investors. - Secondly, they demand high IRRs which puts pressure on prices. Regarding to the first point, we would like to stress that in some jurisdictions where codes of good practices have been launched although they aren´t mandatory for all of the potential buyers. The application of these voluntary codes to potential buyers (if it is not mandatory for the buyer) should be agreed between the parties (in the sale and purchase agreement).
We understand that in the case the debtor is a consumer, there might be legal uncertainties regarding the consumer’s regulation, so the execution of the collateral could face litigation risks. So, a homogeneous legal framework would help to mitigate these risks. In any case, the legal framework of the NPLs secondary market should include the case in which the debtor is a consumer, due to the magnitude of that type of debts in the Spanish current market. In other words, if we do not include consumers, NPLs’ secondary market would be less significant. With respect to the four specific dimensions mentioned above, we believe that they should be ranked as follows: (1) promoting increased market size and depth and equal treatment of investors (2) debtor protection (3) data secrecy (4) privacy. There is almost always a trade-off between these factors but we believe that the first two factors would be most helpful in reducing the level of European NPLs, as well as strengthening European secondary markets for NPLs. Debtor protection should be maintained irrespectively of the owner of the debt.
It could be achieved by promoting a framework where there are equal conditions among countries. In addition to that, throughout EU there are consumers’ protection authorities and data protection authorities –at different levels- that cover, or should cover, matters related to data & consumer protection irrespective of the “owner” of the consumer loan. “Best Practices” in the industry followed by efficient “complaint” mechanism could be also used to balance such dimensions.
Ja(q9y)
We understand two different issues should be taken into account: (i) differences in legal frameworks regarding enforcement of portfolio credits (which exceeds widely the scope of the present consultation) and (ii) differences in NPL transfer regimes. As regards the latter, we believe such differences do not justify the existence of various different frameworks and that a uniform legislation in this area should be enacted. Differences in benefits and risks related to debtor protection, privacy and data secrecy should not justify divergences among national frameworks, as those are topics covered by EU Directives or Regulations generating similar outcomes. Furthermore, the Capital Markets Union requires the uniform legislation to increase efficiency and encourage cross border activities.
Yes, although the following distinction should be drawn: Different portfolio credit enforcement regimes might render investor’s decision more complex as it comes to valuate and compare portfolios. Being aware that such aspect exceeds the consultations’ scope, and focusing exclusively on NPL transfer regime, (i) current rules in some countries might indeed be unfavorable to the goal of fostering the NPL market (tax and registry and Notary Public costs, among others), but most relevant, (ii) the lack of a particular regulation of operational aspects of such transfers with the aim of easing (the flow of information regarding portfolios, for instance) can slow down the further development of these markets.
The notification of the transmission, as well as the establishment of a free public registry, would be the most suitable ways to protect the debtor, although increasing obligations for creditors –different from the abovementioned- might raise the costs of transfer of NPLs. In this sense, some social movements are seeking for an increase of obligations and even the debtor's authorization. This would not have any positive outcome, as it would restrict the possibility to transfer NPLs. Such social movements justify their petitions under the protection of the debtor, forgetting that the debtor’s rights will not change because of the transfer. Therefore, it should be enough with a communication of the identification details of the new lender. Please note that the abovementioned notification is referenced exclusively in relation with the transfers of NPLs; securitizations have their own legal framework clearly established in each MS.
Specialization (of third-party services) across asset classes brings efficiency and can close gaps between valuations of sellers and buyers, therefore it could mean that more transactions can be closed as objectives of buyers and sellers are met. Critical mass is key for efficiency and these specialized players, focused in specific asset classes can achieve that mass in their specific niches. As we stated before, we strongly support the existence of a unique regime in the EU (that allows the abovementioned specialization) in order to foster a cross national market.
Legal frameworks are essentially different across different countries and that prevents a lot of players to expand to other places and increases the cost to operate in several geographies at the same time. We identify some barriers to enter in a new geography: • Customer protection measures; • Low predictability of Judges rulings and; • Changing regulation; Please, take into account that the three elements mentioned are barriers in the sense that they create potential uncertainties which have to be analyzed when entering in a new geography, but they aren´t traditional barriers such as requesting a license to operate. Real estate markets and debtors’ behavior have also a local ingredient that are very important to understand properly in each of the markets. EU countries have unharmonized treatment for transfer taxes on real estate or stamp duty, which can affect the viability of a portfolio acquisition depending on the specific treatment in each jurisdiction. Spanish regional regulation contains certain particularities which increase the obstacles to operating in secondary markets on a national basis and influence the geographical scope of business operations for certain market participants. The most important differences between regional regulations and Spanish common law are: • Notice to the underlying debtors informing them about the transfer: one of the recent modifications of the Catalonian Civil Code, which shall be in force as from January 2018, requires that in case of transfer of Catalonian mortgage loans, the agreed price shall be disclosed to the underlying borrowers; • Litigious credit risk: certain specific territories (such as Navarra) allow the underlying borrower to be released of its repayment obligation by paying the discounted amount in any case, without requiring the litigious credit declaration. Cataluña has a similar regulation (in residential properties only) but its application has been suspended by the Spanish Constitutional Court; and • Enforcement and relevance of the location of the asset. Certain Spanish autonomous regions in Spain (mainly Cataluña, País Vasco, Navarra, Aragón and Andalucía) contain specific regulations in connection with enforcement of assets located there. These are the reasons why we strongly support the creation of a homogeneous regime in the EU in order to foster a cross national market.
Although we consider that measures at EU level are not strictly necessary to enable the transfer of loans (in some MS such measures might play a significant role), a Regulation or Directive at EU level would be recommended to homogenize the markets. In this sense, we strongly support the establishment of a common market regulated by the same EU regulation in all the MS. The main reasons for this proposal are the establishment of a common market regulated by the same law in all the MS, transparency, the subsequent access to credit and the debtors’ protection. One single European NPL market might facilitate flows ensuring that no Administration (even at the regional front) sets up obstacles. We consider that a Regulation would better harmonize the market and that it should establish a clear framework of: - Obligations for the lender - Obligation for the collector - Rights of the debtor - Means of transfer the loans - Taxation
NPLs sales tend to have positive but also several negative impacts on banks. A negative effect that arises on banks that use the advanced internal ratings-based method (A-IRB) comes from the higher Loss Given Default (LGD) induced by the NPLs quick sale or from banks’ merger and acquisitions, especially when a stable and sound bank buy a troubled bank with a troubled portfolio and is therefore forced to quickly sell NPLs portfolios. There is a specific EBF proposal for amendment to Art. 181 CRR on PD/LGD that tries to fix this issue and we encourage the Commission and co-legislators to implement it. In any secondary market transaction, it is important to ensure the “effective transfer of risks”. Otherwise, the upcoming IFRS 9 accounting regulation could impose additional loan loss provisioning related to the expected losses of the transferred exposure. Detailed and transparent information about the assets to be sold is needed. In that sense, using a standard and comprehensive set of data tapes on the assets could be useful, for example like those introduced by the ECB Guidelines on NPLs.
Third party specialized servicers are key to foster the NPL market dynamics helping investors to operate portfolios. They provide specific, local and independent know-how to potential investors that would not consider committing money to a specific market if they would have to go alone. They are able to provide the infrastructure and man power needed to operate a portfolio that an investment fund might not do on their own. For banks, third party servicers are very useful to speed up the management of legacy assets without incurring in fixed costs.
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q17d)
 
The outsourcing of specific activities allows banks to focus on their lending activities. Reluctance towards outsourcing is based primarily on: o Complexity in addressing outsourcing from internal process point of view (more in case of small business & corporate and less in case of retail) since new processes have to be implemented; o Retention of risks on the bank (both credit risk but also reputational risk); o Loss of control of the relationship with the debtor and a potential reduction in the quality of the service provided to the debtor. o A conflict of interest might be also considered.
Servicers are not in every MS under the supervision of any authority so there is a different legal regime to which entities are bounded. Such differences might imply disadvantages for the protection of European consumers. Such disadvantages would be overcome if consumer’s debt is subject to the same standards of protection, regardless the creditor or collector. A fully developed legal framework on consumer protection would bring also legal certainty across Member States. We understand that a Regulation on financial consumer protection could solve these issues. In the event that supervision of the servicers is required, each Member State should consider enough including this servicing activities under the supervision of its current supervisory authorities not being needed any new supervisors created for that purpose.
There are specialized funds in the purchasing of debts and in the management of both performing and non-performing loans. The transfer of mixed portfolios is the most frequent, but NPL predominate. There are also recovery companies and loan servicers.
Most of the servicers are focused on NPLs and real estate assets, which are the assets local banks are usually more willing to sell.
Third-party loan servicers offer a wide range of services, as they offer a complete management of the asset.
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q23d)
 
 
In answer to question 23 please see our answer to question 14
Ja(q25y)
The biggest difference comes from the different types of non-performing loans. For example, in Spain the bulk of these assets are related to the real estate market, while in other countries loans to SMEs are more important.
Ja(q26y)
The biggest obstacles are the ones related to the different legislations existing in the EU. In that sense, there are jurisdictions where there are voluntary codes of conduct / professional associations / industry standards etc. These are in principle more mature markets with a history of such services. The difference may be eventually ascertained by comparing recovery rates throughout EU after identifying the jurisdictions where such elements (codes of conduct, industry standards) are implemented.
There are certain legal restrictions (i.e. the fact that non-bank entities cannot benefit from floating mortgages and, in some cases, from financial collateral), however there are several obstacles in Spain, that can be mentioned, such as: (a) stamp duty for mortgage loans; (b) registration procedure and costs for NPLs secured with registered securities; and (c) notarial costs.
 
 
 
- Removing the legal restrictions and obstacles mentioned in question 27 a) would be very useful. - A common unique legal framework in the EU will entail a more efficient protection of debtors. - A bigger transparency in the operations related to the NPL market will facilitate cross-border activities with all the implied benefits those operations may have. - A legal regime in which a collector irrespectively of the country of origin of the NPL feels encouraged to collect debts. The achievement of all those goals should be completed with the setting-up of a NPL market/platform that could enable all the interested entities to be aware of the negotiations that are taking place as well as of the characteristics of the assets on sale on the market.
Verkauf und Übertragung von Krediten?(q29a)
Kreditservicing durch externe Dienstleister?(q29b)
The most important areas in which harmonization should be focused are taxation, transparency and publicity.
 
 
Ja(q31y)
Yes. Out-of-court enforcement procedures exist under Spanish law. Please note that the options described below are ways to enforce certain assets, but not a type of security per se.  Extra judicial sale (an auction carried out by a notary). - Assets that can be covered by this security: everything (including real estate properties) [art. 129LH (Spanish Mortgage Law); 234RH (Spanish Mortgage Regulation) and 1.858CC (Spanish Civil Code)]. This type of execution of securities can be included in pledges, mortgages, etc. - After an event of default (or after acceleration –depending on the threshold determined in the security document-) the creditor can initiate a procedure through which the assets are sold in an auction carried out by the notary. - Appropriation is not possible [art. 1.859CC] - If the debtor opposes to the execution, it might end up in a judicial process (lengthening the terms). The experience shows that there is not an important difference on timing. If there is no dispute, it could be a fast process. This procedure does not exclude consumers nor household debtors.  Art. 322 Código de Comercio (“CdC”) (Spanish Commercial Code) - Assets that can be given in security: only listed shares [a very limited scope]. In this sense, this type of execution of securities can only be included in pledges over listed shares. - The procedure is relatively simple; however, only a few companies give listed shares as collateral. Appropriation is not possible. [art. 1.859CC]  RDL 5/2005 (Spanish regulation that transposes the Directive 2002/47/CE on financial collateral agreements) - Assets that can be given in security: cash collaterals, shares, and some types of credit rights. This type of execution of securities can only be included in pledges. - In order to appropriate the assets (if it is not cash) a valuation of an independent third party is needed, provided that no other mechanism to obtain the market value of the asset has been agreed between the parties. - Offset of amounts. It can only be done with cash and collateral cash-assimilated (i.e. deposits) held by the debtor in the creditor (the creditor needs to be a financial entity) -
Apart from the offset, RDL 5/2005 is the “out-of-court” most used enforcement tool. Art. 322 CdC is only used when the asset given in security are listed shares (but it is not usual). The extra judicial sale is not usually used as explained in the next question. The benefits for creditors are a shorter term to execute and a clear procedure with limited recourses for the debtor.
The extra judicial sale (an auction carried out by a notary) is a possibility in the legislation but it is not a fully developed framework [art. 1872 Spanish Civil Code and title VII of the Notarial Law], so it has to be detailed in the security document, which usually entails problems in the execution phase. It requires lengthy notifications through national newspapers, and debtors –even though it is usually limited in the documentation- tend to present different recourses to the execution, ending up in a judicialized process. The RDL 5/2005 out-of-court enforcement need a third party to evaluate the assets (which is an expensive requisite) and this gives a period of time that allows the debtor to try to thwart the execution (i.e. alleging that the valuation is wrong and requesting a new valuation). Since appropriation is not possible in the majority of the enforcements described, there is a need to find a buyer to the asset, requirement that can be difficult to meet, depending on the situation of the debtor or the asset itself.
Yes. However, we understand that not only guidelines should be given, but that also a full clear framework should be created (i.e. what type of asset can be given as collateral; what happens when there is more than one security over the asset –and maybe they are not all “accelerated loan securities”-; how can the security be enforced; etc.). Securities that need to be registered (i.e. mortgages) are expensive due to stamp taxes, so this should also be taken into account and evaluated.
It would depend on how fast and easy-to-execute this accelerated loan security is. It also depends on how this security relates with restructurings and insolvency frameworks (this idea will be developed in point 8 regarding relationship with restructuring and insolvency frameworks). Banking NPLs with business debtors are very relevant in this moment in the EU, so a fast security aiming this target could solve this problem. However, this accelerated loan security might reduce NPLs, but could increase the (appropriated) assets hold by the financial entities in their balances, and this might entail management costs.
Nein(q34n)
We mostly agree with the accelerated loan security proposed. Full discharge of the debtor might discourage banks. The risk of a price reduction on the asset/collateral would be borne by the bank meanwhile. In the other hand, an increase on the price of the asset/collateral will only impact the debtor. We welcome the exclusion of households, consumers or main residence of the borrower and other owner's relatives, taking into account that it is important to avoid litigation and the consumer protection legal framework. However, the following questions arise:  When would the valuation be done? If it has to be done when the asset is going to be executed, who bears those costs?  Why would this security entail the full discharge form further repayment obligations?  Given a valuation, would there be a minimum amount where the auction would have to stop or where the auction would need to start from? If there is no bid in the auction from any third party, can the creditor bid or does it have to appropriate the asset by the valuation value?  Can the creditor partially execute the asset/s?  The execution of the security needs to be flexible (i.e. no obligation to appropriate, the decision to execute this or other security should be taken by the bank, etc) and need to have a clear relationship with other types of securities that could charge the assets.  Costs evaluation is paramount (i.e. if the creditor appropriates the asset and afterwards sells it, there would be two transmissions, so the taxes would be paid twice), so a more permissive tax regulation should be included.
We refer to the features described in our answer to question 34. A crystal-clear procedure with no complex requirements and short periods for assessing the value of the collateral and transfer the property. Once the property has been transferred, it is important to have legal mechanisms to force the illegal occupier to abandon the property as soon as possible. Furthermore, the accelerated loan security should have: - a clear protection against avoidance actions in a potential subsequent insolvency of the debtor; - if there is an appropriation of shares, the creditor should not be considered a “person especially related”, meaning that the remaining creditor’s credits (after the appropriation of shares) should not be considered subordinated (due to the fact that such appropriation occurred); and - the number of recourses to this type of accelerated loan security should be very limited, in order to prevent that every execution ends up in a judicialized process (which is what this proposed accelerated loan security pretends to avoid).
Ja(q36y)
Directive 2014/17/UE on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property as well as the Dumitru Tarcãu ruling (CJEU) already limit the possibilities of which immovable properties can be given in order to secure a loan related with SMEs. Clients that accept to enter into this accelerated loan security instrument, provided that they give an immovable property as guarantee, should not be able to present appeals to it, so if they declare that the immovable property given as security is not a primary residence, it cannot be modified or interpreted differently afterwards. Accelerated loans security instruments should be considered for all categories of credit except for households in those cases where the collateral is the main residence.
Lenders should decide the incentives to be given to the debtors. Borrowers would be very inclined to accept this security if the costs are adjusted. We must not forget that giving an immovable property as security might be very expensive nowadays in certain jurisdictions (costs that are born by the debtor). Therefore, if this security entails lower costs, it would be very much welcomed by the debtors when offered by the lenders.
From our point of view, the use of this instrument should also be limited if there is a stay. When the stay is lifted, the accelerated loan security could be again exercised. The creditor with an accelerated loan security should be treated as the secured creditors (for cram-down, limitations to enforce, etc.)
In our opinion, the most difficult part would be to balance the requisites to execute and the easiness to carry out such execution. In this sense, the most important part is to create a clear and complete regulation at a European level, that afterwards each MS would need to adjust to their national and local jurisdiction.
Creating a full new typology of security that has its specific regulation and that is considered “special law” (so it could be applied even in insolvency situations –if such measure is decided-and does not conflict with “general laws”). It could be transposed in the same way as Directive 2002/47/CE on financial collateral agreements has been transposed.
Behörde oder internationale Organisation(citizen-replying-as)
 
 
Federal Ministry of Finance and Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection on behalf of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany
 
 
Sonstiges([ID8])
 
 
Regierung oder Ministerium([ID7])
 
Deutschland([ID31])
 
Federal Ministry of Finance and Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection on behalf of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany
Ja, ich stimme der Veröffentlichung meines Beitrags unter dem von mir angegebenen Namen zu (Name Ihrer Organisation/Ihres Unternehmens/Ihrer Behörde bzw. Ihr Name, wenn Sie als Einzelperson antworten)(yes-contributions-publication)
High stocks of NPLs can be an impediment to economic growth and financial stability of single countries and potentially of the EU. Secondary markets for NPLs are currently not well developed and probably not big enough to provide banks with a meaningful alternative to manage NPLs on- or off-balance sheets. This problem is particularly relevant for smaller countries, as these have less developed markets than bigger countries. A European-wide market would be broader, deeper and more liquid than national ones. Developed secondary markets for NPLs can be an element of a broader strategy to accelerate balance sheet repair in affected banking sectors. However, while unnecessary barriers to the development of secondary markets should be lifted, simple risk shifting to other parts of the financial system must be avoided since persisting high NPL levels in some jurisdictions call for sustainable solutions. In any case, when dealing with NPLs, taxpayers` money must be protected and solutions must be fully consistent with BRRD, SRMR and state aid rules. The stock of NPLs differs widely across European countries and with economic policy being mostly a national affair, removing any obstacles to resolving the NPL problem is basically related to domestic factors like the institutional framework, administrational processes and legal procedures. Yet a European-wide secondary market for NPLs would facilitate this process and help banks to sort out their respective NPL problems. Several structural impediments need to be addressed in order to narrow bid/ask spreads and thus stipulate the development of secondary markets: Data quality and availability seem to be critical in this context. The “Action plan to tackle non-performing loans” (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/07/11-conclusions-non-performing-loans/) as concluded by the ECOFIN in July 2017 rightly comprises initiatives to strengthen data infrastructure. Besides, other factors play an important role in some jurisdictions and need to be addressed: e.g. inefficient judicial and administrative systems and procedures and their impact on, inter alia, the resolution of non-performing loans, low provisioning levels/unrealistic collateral valuations.
Bank internal factors (i.e. any factors inside the bank including the type and characteristics of the NPL portfolio, management capacity etc.): a) Capital implications and ability to strengthen equity: Conceptionally, banks have to take two logically subsequent decisions when resolving NPLs: First they have to decide whether or not to actively address NPL issues and second, if a bank decides to resolve the issue, in which way to do so, either internally by engaging in active management of NPL portfolios or externally by selling them. The first decision hinges on the capitalization of a bank. A bank with sizeable expected, yet unrecognized losses in their NPL portfolios which exceed its (economic) capital will face the issue of a “debt overhang”. In such a situation, a dominant strategy is “wait and see” instead of actively resolving the NPLs ( e.g. Storz, M., Koetter, M., Setzer, R. und A. Westphal (2017), Do we Want These Two to Tango? On Zombie Firms and Stressed Banks in Europe, IWH Discussion Papers 13/2017, Mai 2017). Therefore, capital levels are important when assessing potential “market failures” on secondary markets for NPLs. b) Customer relations: EU banks generally have strong customer relations. By selling NPLs, banks might jeopardize established relationships. c) Amount of provisions and write-offs: Many banks tend to have relatively low provisions on NPLs. By leaving them on the balance sheet they can smooth the losses for the bank over time, while they have to realize them when selling the loan, at once. d) Composition of NPL portfolio: Depending on the type of exposure (mortgage loan, large corporate loans, SME loans, credit card loans…) NPLs are easier to sell, or not. e) Lacking expertise and resources / capacities in some banks for managing NPLs. - Lack of data on the borrower and quality of assets/collateral: Detailed, comparable and reliable data on NPLs is missing - NPL documentation is poor; - Quality of legal contracts is poor; - Access to information might be restricted. External factors (i.e. any factors outside of the bank that are important considerations in this context: a) Maturity of NPL servicing industry. b) Lack of data on pricing/transaction details (market transparency): c) Lack of standardization hampers price comparison (ex ante transparency) and implies relatively high transaction costs (search costs, due diligence, etc.) d) No market infrastructure in place to provide at least ex post transparency (after deals have been closed), ideally market infrastructures with quotes (ex ante transparency, e.g. stock exchanges) would help boosting markets e) Standardization and proper market infrastructure might lower transaction costs and improve market transparency. f) Weak debt enforcements (collaterals cannot be seized in a timely manner, enforcement of the collateral and the outcome of insolvency proceedings could be considerably delayed and /or unpredictable). g) Accounting standards: banks have the possibility to recognize interest income on NPLs. In the current low-interest environment the interest income of an NPL is probably higher than the one of a sound new loan. h) Public discussions which nourish the expectations of banks that countries or the EU will set up publicly funded or guaranteed asset management companies buying NPLs at higher prices than what can be expected from either active management or sales of NPLs with the consequence of banks’ waiting. i) Macroeconomic environment and expectations of stakeholders or market participants.
As mentioned in Q1, several impediments to the development of secondary markets need to be addressed - especially in order to narrow bid/ask spreads: Besides strengthening data infrastructure, more efficient judicial and administrative systems and procedures as well as risk adequate provisioning levels and more realistic collateral valuations are needed. The “Action plan to tackle non-performing loans” comprises several reasonable recommendations in this regard. In detail: · More detailed, comparable and reliable data on loans: create a common NPL data template, standardized loan contracts and digitalized information on loans. · Establishment of electronic data platforms with price transparency or more detailed and comparable information of loan takers to reduce transaction costs (price finding, due diligence, etc.); lower transaction costs facilitate market access and might improve market liquidity via raising the investor basis. · Make price data available to potential investors (price, return). Also, data on historical default rates and recovery rates should be made available to investors (ideally ratings of loans/pool of loans) in order to facilitate an investment decision. · Address impediments to the development of the servicing industry, including cross-border services, while at the same time maintaining or introducing adequate provisions protecting debtors, especially consumers. · Enhancing the protection of secured creditors.
The most important task is to provide the frameworks and remove remaining obstacles as specified above in Q2 and Q3 by taking at the same time into consideration an adequate level of debtor protection, especially consumer and data protection. Further incentives are not needed.
Unnecessary barriers to the development of secondary markets should be lifted as mentioned in Q1 and Q3. From investor perspective transparency of pricing/transaction details as well the predictability and efficiency of judicial and administrative systems and proceedings seem to be of prime importance.
Division of labour to tackle NPLs: smaller banks might lack the expertise and the capacity to manage NPLs and therefore reduce their management capacity to develop new business. In case the investor is a bank, an advantage could be supervisory transparency; i.e. the supervisory authority keeps the possibility to monitor volume, management and governance with regard to NPLs – at least on entity level. For specialised investment funds/asset managers and other specialised long term investors non-performing loans could be an attractive investment (“search for yield”). However, as specific knowledge of these assets, knowledge of the local market and knowledge of servicing is necessary the number of potential investors will be limited. Access to third-party loan servicers (section 3) could be promotive.
NPLs are risky and sometimes complex assets. Therefore, acquirers of NPL portfolios need to have specific expertise to work out NPLs. Besides, sufficient loss-bearing capacity is essential for acquiring banks. As regards investment funds/asset managers the number of sufficiently specialised investors is limited (see Q5). In case of only few NPL acquirers in the market, there might be a significant increase in concentration risk. Interconnectedness between the above mentioned intermediaries would increase and systemic risk could rise. Risks could also move to other parts of the financial system which are less regulated and supervised than banks.
An appropriate legal framework should support secondary market development in terms of size, depth and equal treatment of investors. In parallel, clarity of rules of debtor protection, privacy and data secrecy is needed.
There is a conflict between promoting an increased market size and depth, equal treatment of investors and debtor protection, privacy and data secrecy. As pre-contractual and contractual standardized information about the terms of the credit agreement are to a great extent being harmonised by recent consumer protection directives (e.g. the directive on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending Directives 2008/48/EC), these provisions should neither be impaired nor be overloaded with more complicated rules. However, when discussing the implementation of data platforms as proposed in Q3, compiling standardized information on NPLs (including NFC-loans) should be considered.
Weiß nicht / Keine Meinung / Nicht relevant(q9d)
 
While obstacles raised by current rules applicable in Member States pertaining specifically to secondary markets (such as rules for transferring credit and restrictions on purchasing of NPLs) should be removed, the key considerations for banks in deciding whether loan sales should be a significant part of their strategy to manage its NPLs (listed under Q2) might have also relevance regarding the development of secondary markets for NPL.
Clear and immediate information to the debtor as well as clear contractual provisions in the loan contract are essential. Therefore, e.g. the directive on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 provides for pre-contractual information on whether a transfer of the loan is permitted under the terms of the loan contract or not. The transfer can be linked to the debtors consent. Under German law, general contractual terms and provisions that allow the transfer of a loan to a third party are invalid unless the third party is expressly mentioned in the initial agreement or the consumer is granted the right to rescind from the contract in case of a transfer. Furthermore, a debtor, who is a consumer, has to be informed immediately about the transfer and the contact dates of the new creditor. It is, in particular, essential that the debtor does not lose any rights or competences against the creditor vested at the time of the assignment and that the assignment does not lead to any loss of rights or to any other detriment to the debtor.
We do not see any fundamental advantages. For the realization of a collateral (e.g. non-property) and NPL workout, knowledge in the local market is the key aspect. On the other hand, specialisation within the value chain can be an advantage, especially in banking systems with small and medium-sized banks, as for those an active management of NPLs is not cost-effective.
See Q2/Q10.
The creation of minimum standards with regard to the transfer of loans raises complex questions with regard to contract law. It should be carefully examined whether and how European Regulations with regard to contract law could contribute to the issue of NPL. In Germany e.g., national regulations on the transfer of loans do not provide unsurmountable legal hurdles, but find a balance between the creditor’s and the debtor’s interests, which should not be impaired. The creation of a common NPL data template with standardized information on existing loan contracts to the extent legally feasible and economically practicable and digitalized information on loans suitable for the exchange of information and cooperation between credit institutions would be very useful (see answer to Q8). From a financial stability perspective only those market participants that are able to properly evaluate the risks from NPLs should be allowed to operate in these markets. Further, MS seem to interpret Article 21 (2) of the Commiss