

SDG 10 - Reduced inequalities

Statistics Explained

Reduce inequality within and among countries

Data extracted in April 2025.

Planned article update: June 2026.

Highlights



EU trend of SDG 10 on reduced inequalities

This article is a part of a [set of statistical articles](#) , which are based on the Eurostat publication 'Sustainable development in the European Union — Monitoring report on progress towards the SDGs in an EU context — 2025 edition' . This report is the ninth edition of Eurostat's series of monitoring reports on sustainable development, which provide a quantitative assessment of progress of the EU towards the SDGs in an EU context.

SDG 10 addresses inequalities within and among countries. It calls for nations to reduce inequalities in income as well as those based on age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion, or economic or other status within a country. The goal also addresses inequalities among countries and calls for support for safe migration and mobility of people.

Reduced inequalities in the EU: overview and key trends

It is widely agreed that economic prosperity at aggregated levels alone will not achieve social progress. High levels of inequality risk leaving much human potential unrealised, damage social cohesion, hinder economic activity and undermine democratic participation. Leaving no one behind is thus a crucial part of achieving the SDGs. Monitoring SDG 10 in an EU context thus focuses on inequalities within countries, inequalities between countries, and migration and social inclusion. The EU made significant progress on income inequalities within countries over the five-year period assessed. Additionally, the trends in economic disparities between EU countries show a long-term convergence of Member States in terms of GDP and income. The picture is also positive in the area of social inclusion of people with a migrant background, where the EU has made progress in reducing differences in social and labour-market inclusion between home-country nationals and non-EU citizens.

Indicator	Period	Annual growth rate	Assessment
Inequalities within countries			
Income <u>quintile</u> share ratio	2010–2023	– 0.3 %	↗
	2018–2023	– 1.3 %	↑
Income share of the bottom 40 % of the population	2010–2023	0.1 %	→
	2018–2023	0.5 %	↗
Relative median at-risk-of-poverty gap	2010–2023	0.0 %	→
	2018–2023	– 1.3 %	↑
Urban–rural gap for risk of poverty or social exclusion (*)	Time series too short for long-term assessment		✘
	2018–2023	– 41.0 % ⁽¹⁾	↑
Inequalities between countries			
Disparities in GDP per capita	2009–2024	– 1.1 % ⁽²⁾	↑
	2019–2024	– 0.8 % ⁽²⁾	↗
Disparities in household income per capita	2008–2023	– 2.7 % ⁽²⁾	↑
	2018–2023	– 4.2 % ⁽²⁾	↑
Migration, asylum and social inclusion			
Asylum applications	No assessment due to lack of policy targets		✘
Citizenship gap for risk of monetary poverty after social transfers (*)	2010–2023	– 0.2 % ⁽³⁾	↗
	2018–2023	– 1.0 % ⁽³⁾	↑
Citizenship gap for early leavers from education and training (*)	2009–2024	– 3.2 % ⁽³⁾	↑
	2019–2024	– 3.0 % ⁽³⁾	↑
Citizenship gap for young people neither in employment nor in education and training (NEET) (*)	2009–2024	– 2.3 % ⁽³⁾	↑
	2019–2024	– 4.4 % ⁽³⁾	↑
Citizenship gap for employment rate (*)	2009–2024	1.2 % ⁽³⁾	↓
	2019–2024	– 2.0 % ⁽³⁾	↑

Note: See Annex II for a description of the methodology used for the compound annual growth rate calculation and the trend assessment. For indicators without a target, the growth rates observed over the specified periods are given. For indicators with a quantified EU target (marked with a target sign ) , both the observed growth rates and the growth rates that would have been required in the specified periods for meeting the target are given. See Table A.1 in Annex I for the full list of EU policy targets considered for monitoring in this report.

(*) Multi-purpose indicator.

⁽¹⁾ Assessment based on evolution of gap between cities and rural areas.

⁽²⁾ Assessment based on coefficient of variation.

⁽³⁾ Assessment based on evolution of gap between citizens of reporting EU countries and non-EU citizens.

Table 1: Indicators measuring progress towards SDG 10, EU

Symbol	With quantitative target	Without quantitative target
	Indicators marked with this 'target' symbol are assessed against an official and quantified EU policy target. In this case the arrow symbols should be interpreted according to the left-hand column below. All other indicator assessments should be interpreted according to the right-hand column below.	
	On track to reach the EU target	Significant progress towards SD objectives
	Moderate progress towards the EU target	Moderate progress towards SD objectives
	[Category not applicable]	No progress towards nor movement away from SD objectives
	Insufficient progress towards the EU target	Moderate movement away from SD objectives
	Movement away from the EU target	Significant movement away from SD objectives
	Assessment not possible (for example, time series too short or break in time series)	

Table 2: Explanation of symbols for indicating progress towards SD objectives and targets

Inequalities within countries

A high level of inequality can harm society in many ways. It can hamper social cohesion, result in lost opportunities for many, hinder economic activity, reduce social trust in institutions, lead to disproportionate exposure to adverse environmental impacts such as climate change and pollution, and undermine democratic participation¹. Technological innovation and financial globalisation are some of the many factors driving inequality within countries by favouring people with specific skills or accumulated wealth². Similarly, the transition to a climate-neutral society will have to be managed well to prevent rising inequality.

The income gap between high-income and low-income households in the EU has narrowed over the past few years

Analysing income distribution is one of the ways inequality within EU countries can be measured. The [income quintile share ratio](#) compares the income received by the 20% of the population who have the highest [equivalised disposable income](#) with the income of the 20% with the lowest [equivalised disposable income](#). The higher this ratio, the bigger the income inequality between the bottom and the top ends of the income distribution. In the EU, this ratio had been decreasing in recent years, falling from 5.22 in the income year 2013 to 4.89 in the income year 2019³. After a reversal of this trend in the income year 2020, when the ratio rose to 4.99 owing to the impacts of

¹OECD (2017), [Understanding the socio-economic divide in Europe. Background report](#) .

²Darvas, Z. and Wolff, B. (2016), [An Anatomy of Inclusive Growth in Europe](#) , pp.14–15.

³The term 'income year' is used here to emphasize that the income data collected for EU-SILC in a given year refer to the income situation of the previous year. The EU-SILC indicators provide insights on the economic well-being and other living conditions on EU residents based on data collected during a specific year, denoted as N. This data encompasses both the characteristics of households for that year (N) and the income from the preceding year, N-1. The income for year N-1 is an estimate for income of year N within EU-SILC. Income data collected for

COVID-19, the decline resumed in the income year 2022 with the ratio falling to 4.72. This means that the income of the richest 20% of the EU households was 4.72 times as much as the income of the poorest 20%.

Reflecting the trend in the income quintile share ratio, the income share of the bottom 40% of the population in the total equivalised disposable income had been increasing between the income years 2013 and 2018, followed by a stagnation and a slight decline in the next two years. However, this has also been a temporary reversal, as the income year 2021 saw a marked increase of this share to 21.7%, and it remained at this level in the income year 2022. This represents a 0.5 percentage point improvement relative to the income year 2017. It needs to be noted that recent trends in the two income inequality indicators analysed in this report are affected by methodological changes in data collection from 2020 (referring to the income year 2019) onwards in a few Member States⁴.

Economic inequality affects children's long-term opportunities

Inequality is also particularly concerning for the long-term outcomes and opportunities of children. It puts those affected at a disadvantage from the start and has long-lasting consequences in areas such as education and physical and mental health, thus undermining their development and human potential. To evaluate these disadvantages, indicators on several dimensions of childhood inequality of opportunity, such as income⁵ and education⁶, have been developed. Circumstances outside individual control, particularly parental background, lead to unequal outcomes in employment opportunities and disposable income. Adults who experienced socioeconomic disadvantage in their childhood tend to have 20% lower earnings than those from privileged backgrounds⁷.

Moreover, there are wide variations between EU Member States regarding the childcare gap, which refers to a period in which families with young children are unable to benefit from childcare leave or a guaranteed place in early childhood care. While some Member States experience no childcare gap (for example, Denmark and Slovenia), others offer a relatively short period of childcare leave and guarantee a place in early childhood care only relatively late in the child's life, at around five years of age (for example, the Netherlands and Ireland). In addition, childcare affordability remains an issue, especially for parents with multiple children or on low incomes⁸. Children from socioeconomically disadvantaged backgrounds are also less likely to participate in early childhood education and care, despite the observed positive benefits this has for such groups. This is particularly the case for children under the age of three years who are at risk of poverty and social exclusion, whose parents do not hold tertiary qualifications, and who live in large families⁹.

The poverty gap and the at-risk-of-poverty-or-social-exclusion gap between urban and rural areas have both narrowed in recent years

Inequality and poverty are closely interrelated. The poverty gap, defined as the distance between the median (equivalised disposable) income of people at risk of poverty and the [poverty threshold](#) (set at 60% of the national

SILC refer to the situation in the previous year, meaning that data labelled as 2022 refer to people's incomes in 2021. To emphasise this aspect, the analysis of SILC income data in this chapter uses the term 'income year', thereby highlighting that the data describe the situation in the year N-1 rather than in the year N when they were collected.

⁴In 2020, the German EU-SILC survey was integrated into the newly designed German microcensus, leading to a substantial break in the time series between 2019 and 2020, with income variables being the most affected by the break. For more information see the [related information note](#). Additionally, further countries such as France also reported methodological changes in 2020, which also affected the EU total.

⁵European Commission, [EU social indicators dataset: Inequality of opportunity — income dimension](#).

⁶European Commission, [EU social indicators dataset: Inequality of opportunity — education dimension](#).

⁷European Commission (2024), [Employment and social developments in Europe 2024](#), Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.

⁸European Platform for Investing in Children (EPIC) (2020), [The Childcare Gap in EU Member States](#), Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.

⁹European Commission (2024), [Employment and social developments in Europe 2024](#), Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.

median equivalised disposable income after social transfers), has decreased since 2018¹⁰, showing significant progress in the short run. In 2023, this gap amounted to 23.0% in the EU, which means the median income of those below the poverty threshold was 23.0% lower than the poverty threshold itself. This is a 1.5 percentage point narrowing of the gap since 2018, representing a significant short-term improvement in the 'depth' of monetary poverty in the EU. The long-term trend is characterised by an increase in the gap between 2010 and 2016, followed by a decrease that resulted in the poverty gap in 2022 and 2023 falling back to the levels seen in 2010.

In 2023, 21.3% of the EU population were at risk of poverty or social exclusion¹¹. However, this rate differs between cities and rural areas. At the EU level, people living in rural areas used to have a higher at-risk rate than those living in cities. However, due to a strong decrease in the risk of poverty or social exclusion in rural areas, the urban-rural gap has narrowed in recent years and the situation even reversed in 2023, with the rate for cities being slightly higher than for rural areas. In this year, the urban-rural gap in the at-risk-of-poverty-or-social-exclusion rate amounted to 0.2 percentage points, with 21.6% of people living in cities being in this situation, compared with 21.4% of people in rural areas. This represents a 2.6 percentage point decrease in the gap compared with 2018, which is the result of a 2.8 percentage point decrease in the rate for rural areas combined with a 0.2 percentage point increase for cities. Overall, at the EU level, the lowest share of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion was observed in towns and suburbs, with 21.0% of people at risk in 2023.

However, the overall EU figures mask the full scope of the broad variations in gaps among Member States. Rural poverty remains extremely high in some European countries, such as Bulgaria and Romania, where 39.3% and 45.1% of the rural population were at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2023. This amounted to an urban-rural gap of 17.3 and 26.6 percentage points in these two countries, respectively. However, while rural areas generally tend to be at a higher risk of poverty due to out-migration and limited access to services, infrastructure, labour markets and educational opportunities¹², this is not the case in all Member States. A total of 11 Member States reported higher poverty rates in cities than in rural areas in 2023, of which Austria, Belgium, Germany and France reported a gap higher than five percentage points.

There also exist large regional variations within the Member States, with more than 30 % of the population in numerous regions in Spain, Italy, Greece, Romania and Bulgaria being at risk of poverty¹³. Specifically, certain minorities such as Roma are at a much higher risk of monetary poverty. As of 2021, 80% of Roma were at risk of monetary poverty, with their situation remaining unchanged since 2016. Moreover, 48% of Roma were living in severe material deprivation in 2021, a reduction of 14 percentage points compared with 2016. Roma children under the age of 18 are particularly affected by poverty, with 83% of those being at risk of poverty and 54% living in households with severe material deprivation in 2021. This further adds to the vulnerability of the Roma population¹⁴.

The gap between high-income and low-income population groups extends to their carbon and environmental footprints

In recent years, research has increasingly pointed to an inequality in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions between high-income and low-income population groups, highlighting that poorer population groups contribute less to overall GHG emissions and thus to the climate crisis. As such, several studies have tried to quantify the amount of CO₂ emitted by individuals in order to compare the shares emitted by different income groups. The Oxfam [Carbon Inequality in 2030](#) report, for instance, makes rough estimates based on the [World Inequality Database](#) and national consumption emissions assuming an income-dependent consumption behaviour. The researchers call on the EU to address carbon inequality while striving to reach the 2030 GHG emission target. The European Commission Joint Research Centre developed a [methodology](#) to convert household expenditures to consumption

¹⁰Similar to the two indicators on income inequality above, the data for the at-risk of poverty gap refer to the income of the previous year, meaning data for 2018 refer to the income year 2017.

¹¹Source: Eurostat ([sdg_01_10](#)).

¹²Volonteurop (2016), [Rural isolation of citizens in Europe](#).

¹³European Commission (2022), [Cohesion in Europe towards 2050 – Eighth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion](#), Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.

¹⁴European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2022), [Roma in 10 European Countries. Main results](#), Vienna.

(carbon and other environmental) footprints. The study finds that the consumption footprint of high-income households is mainly driven by the consumption of food, mobility and housing, whereas for lower income groups the consumption footprint for food and housing prevails with mobility playing a much smaller role.

Inequalities between countries

We live in an interconnected world, where problems and challenges — such as poverty, climate change or migration — are rarely confined to one country or region. Therefore, reducing inequalities between countries is important, not only from a social cohesion perspective, but also as a prerequisite for solving many interdependent problems. Cohesion between Member States is one of the EU's objectives, as mentioned in the [Treaty on European Union](#) (article 3.3).

Economic disparities between EU countries in terms of GDP and household income have fallen notably in recent years

Not only have economic performance, incomes and living standards improved across the EU as a whole over time, they have also converged between countries. A way to measure such convergence is by looking at the coefficient of variation, expressed as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean (in %). A lower coefficient of variation indicates less disparities between Member States. The two indicators used to measure this convergence show that inequalities between EU countries have decreased over the 15-year period assessed.

The coefficient of variation in [gross domestic product \(GDP\)](#) per capita — expressed in [purchasing power standards](#) (PPS) — shows that economic disparities between Member States have narrowed since 2000, reaching 38.0% in 2024. Most of this convergence took place in the period leading up to the 2008 economic crisis and between 2015 and 2019. The development since 2019 has been less clear, showing an increase in economic disparities between countries during the COVID-19 crisis in 2020 and 2021, followed by a decrease in 2022 and 2023 and a stagnation in 2024. Overall, the EU coefficient of variation fell slightly by 1.6 percentage points between 2019 and 2024, reaching 38.0% in 2024. The long-term trend has been more favourable, showing a 6.6 percentage point reduction in the EU coefficient of variation. At Member State level, purchasing power adjusted GDP per capita ranged from 66% of the EU average in Bulgaria to 241% in Luxembourg in 2023.

While GDP per capita is used to measure a country's economic performance, adjusted gross [household disposable income](#) provides an indication of the average material well-being of people. Gross household disposable income reflects households' purchasing power and ability to invest in goods and services or save for the future, by taking into account taxes, social contributions and in-kind social benefits. The coefficient of variation in gross household disposable income between Member States has fallen significantly over time, reaching 21.2% in 2023. This figure is 5.1 percentage points lower than in 2018 and a 11.0 percentage point improvement since 2008.

However, a clear north–south and west–east divide is evident when looking at the geographical distribution of GDP per capita and household income (from national accounts) in the EU. Citizens living in northern and western European countries with above average GDP per capita levels had the highest gross disposable income per capita. At the other end of the scale were eastern and southern EU countries, which displayed gross household disposable incomes and GDP per capita levels below the EU average.

Migration, asylum and social inclusion

The Syrian conflict, unstable situations in Afghanistan and some African countries, crises in several Latin American countries such as Venezuela, Colombia, Honduras and Nicaragua, and the war in Iraq have contributed to an unprecedented surge of [migration](#) into the EU over the past few years. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has led to a mass movement of people fleeing the war to seek [temporary protection](#) in the EU. The successful integration of migrants is decisive for the future well-being, prosperity and cohesion of European societies. To ensure the social inclusion of immigrants and their children, it is essential to strengthen the conditions that will enable their participation in society, including their active participation in education and training and their integration into the labour market. Successful integration of migrants into the EU labour force has the potential to slow the ongoing trend of population ageing and to address skills shortages.

The number of asylum applications in the EU fell in 2024

The urge to seek international protection is one of the main reasons why people cross borders. In 2024, the EU received 911 940 first-time [asylum applications](#), which is 13% lower than in 2023 but still more than twice as high as the pandemic-related low in 2020¹⁵. Around 387 600 people were granted protection status in the first instance in the EU in 2024, which is 8% more than in 2023¹⁶. In relation to population size, these numbers equal 2 030 first-time asylum applications and 863 positive first-instance decisions per million EU inhabitants in 2024. Cyprus and Greece received the highest numbers of asylum applications relative to population size across Member States, with around 7 000 and 6 600 applications per million inhabitants in 2024, respectively. Overall, of the 911 940 first-time asylum applications the EU received in 2024, around 16% were lodged by Syrians, and 8% each by asylum seekers from Venezuela and Afghanistan¹⁷.

In addition to asylum applications, the [Council Decision of March 2022](#) enabled non-EU citizens fleeing Ukraine as a consequence of the Russian invasion on 24 February 2022 to receive immediate and temporary protection. At the end of January 2025, nearly 4.3 million displaced people were still beneficiaries of this temporary protection in the EU. Germany and Poland hosted the highest absolute number of beneficiaries, providing temporary protection to around half of all beneficiaries in the EU¹⁸.

Despite some improvements in recent years, the social inclusion of non-EU citizens remains a challenge

The social integration of migrants is monitored here by comparing the situation of non-EU citizens with citizens of EU countries that reside in their home country — referred to as 'home-country nationals' in this publication — in the areas of poverty, education and the labour market. In all these areas, people from outside the EU fare less well than EU nationals. However, short-term trends have been clearly favourable, with the gap between home-country nationals and non-EU citizens narrowing strongly in all areas monitored here.

Trends in the citizenship gap for people at risk of [monetary poverty](#) after social transfers show that between 2018 and 2023, poverty rates have moderately improved for EU home-country nationals with a 1.2 percentage point improvement compared with 2018, while a stronger improvement of 2.3 percentage points was observed for non-EU citizens over the same period. This has contributed to the narrowing of the gap between the two groups by 1.1 percentage points since 2018. Still, this gap remains large, with 36.6% of non-EU citizens being at risk of monetary poverty (after social transfers) in 2023, compared with 14.1% of home-country nationals.

Between 2019 and 2024, the employment rate for EU home-country nationals aged 20 to 64 increased by 2.9 percentage points, while the rate for non-EU citizens grew by 4.2 percentage points. As a result, the gap between the two groups has narrowed by 1.3 percentage points since 2019. While 76.7% of EU home-country nationals were employed in 2024, the rate for non-EU citizens stood at 64.2%. Thus, despite the stronger improvement for non-EU citizens since 2019, the gap remained considerable, at 12.5 percentage points in 2024.

The gaps between home-country nationals and non-EU citizens in the area of education and training have similarly narrowed in recent years. The shares of young people not in employment nor in education and training (NEET) decreased for both groups between 2019 and 2024. The NEET rate for 15- to 29-year old non-EU citizens fell by 4.0 percentage points, reaching 20.1% in 2024. For home-country nationals of the same age, the NEET rate decreased by 1.5 percentage points in the same period, amounting to 10.2% in 2024. Thus, a narrowing of the gap by 2.5 percentage points has been visible since 2019. Despite these improvements, the citizenship gap between the two groups still amounted to 9.9 percentage points in 2024.

The most striking difference between non-EU citizens and EU home-country nationals is visible for 18- to 24-year-old early leavers from education and training. The early leaving rate of home-country nationals has fallen continuously since 2019, reaching 8.0% in 2024. The early leaving rate for non-EU citizens evolved less steadily but still fell by 3.3 percentage points compared with 2019, reaching 23.4% in 2024. As a result, the citizenship gap has

¹⁵Source: Eurostat ([migr_asyappctza](#)).

¹⁶Source: Eurostat ([migr_asydcfsta](#)).

¹⁷Source: Eurostat ([migr_asyappctza](#)).

¹⁸Source: Eurostat ([migr_asytspm](#)) and Eurostat (2025), [Temporary protection for persons fleeing Ukraine — monthly statistics](#).

narrowed by 2.5 percentage points since 2019, reaching 15.4 percentage points in 2024. Because early school leaving and unemployment both have an impact on people's future job opportunities and their lives in general, further efforts are needed to fully integrate young migrants into European societies.

Main indicators

Income quintile share ratio

LONG TERM
2010-2023




SHORT TERM
2018-2023



The distribution of income can be measured by using, among others¹⁹the ratio of total equivalised disposable income received by the 20% of the population with the highest income (top quintile) to that received by the 20% of the population with the lowest income (lowest quintile). Equivalised disposable income is a household's total income (after taxes and other deductions) that is available for spending or saving, divided by the number of household members converted into [equiv-alised adults](#) . Data presented in this section stem from the [EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions](#) (EU-SILC).

¹⁹The income quintile share ratio looks at the two ends of the income distribution. Other indicators, such as the Gini index, measure total inequality along the whole income distribution.

Income quintile share ratio, EU, 2010-2023 (ratio)



Note: 2014–2019 data are estimated; break in time series in 2020. The data are presented according to the year of the data collection but refer to the income of the previous year (for example, the data for 2023 refer to the income in 2022).


Source: Eurostat (online data code: sdg_10_41)



Figure 1: Income quintile share ratio, EU, 2010–2023 (ratio) Note: y-axis does not start at 0. Source: Eurostat (sdg_10_41)

Income quintile share ratio, by country, 2018 and 2023

(ratio)



Note: The data are presented according to the year of the data collection but refer to the income of the previous year (meaning that the data for 2023 refer to the income in the year 2022).

(*) Break(s) in time series between the two years shown.

(*) No data for 2023.

(*) 2022 data (instead of 2023).

(*) 2021 data (instead of 2023).

(*) This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.

Source: Eurostat (online data code: sdg_10_41)

eurostat

Figure 2: Income quintile share ratio, by country, 2018 and 2023 (ratio) Source: Eurostat (sdg_10_41)

Income share of the bottom 40% of the population

LONG TERM
2010-2023




SHORT TERM
2018-2023



This indicator measures the income share received by the bottom 40% of the population (in terms of income). The income concept used is the total disposable household income, which is a households' total income (after taxes and other deductions) that is available for spending or saving. Data presented in this section stem from the [EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions](#) (EU-SILC).

Income share of the bottom 40 % of the population, EU, 2010-2023 (% of income)




Note: 2014–2019 data are estimated; break in time series in 2020. The data are presented according to the year of the data collection but refer to the income of the previous year (for example, the data for 2023 refer to the income in 2022).

Source: Eurostat (online data code: sdg_10_50)



Figure 3: Income share of the bottom 40 % of the population, EU, 2010–2023 (% of income) Note: y-axis does not start at 0. Source: Eurostat (sdg_10_50)

Income share of the bottom 40 % of the population, by country, 2018 and 2023 (% of income)



Note: The data are presented according to the year of the data collection but refer to the income of the previous year (meaning that the data for 2023 refer to the income in the year 2022).

(1) Break(s) in time series between the two years shown.

(2) No data for 2023.

(3) 2022 data (instead of 2023).

(4) 2021 data (instead of 2023).

(*) This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.

Source: Eurostat (online data code: sdg_10_50)

eurostat 

Figure 4: Income share of the bottom 40 % of the population, by country, 2018 and 2023 (% of income)
Source: Eurostat (sdg_10_50)

Relative median at-risk-of-poverty gap

LONG TERM
2010-2023




SHORT TERM
2018-2023



The relative median at-risk-of-poverty gap helps to quantify how poor the poor are by showing the distance between the median income of people living below the poverty threshold and the threshold itself, expressed in relation to the poverty threshold. The poverty threshold is set at 60% of the national median equivalised disposable income of all people in a country and not for the EU as a whole. Data presented in this section stem from the [EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions](#) (EU-SILC).

Relative median at-risk-of-poverty gap, EU, 2010-2023 (% distance to poverty threshold)




Note: 2014–2019 data are estimated. The data are presented according to the year of the data collection but refer to the income of the previous year (for example, the data for 2023 refer to the income in 2022).

Source: Eurostat (online data code: [sdg_10_30](#))



Figure 5: Relative median at-risk-of-poverty gap, EU, 2010–2023 (% distance to poverty threshold) Note: y-axis does not start at 0. Source: Eurostat ([sdg_10_30](#))

Relative median at-risk-of-poverty gap, by country, 2018 and 2023 (% distance to poverty threshold)



Note: The data are presented according to the year of the data collection but refer to the income of the previous year (meaning that the data for 2023 refer to the income in 2022).

(1) Break(s) in time series between the two years shown.

(2) No data for 2023.

(3) 2021 data (instead of 2023).

(4) 2022 data (instead of 2023).

(*) This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.

Source: Eurostat (online data code: sdg_10_30)

eurostat 

Figure 6: Relative median at-risk-of-poverty gap, by country, 2018 and 2023 (% distance to poverty threshold)
Source: Eurostat (sdg_10_30)

Disparities in GDP per capita

LONG TERM
2009-2024




SHORT TERM
2019-2024



GDP per capita is calculated as the ratio of GDP to the average population in a specific year. Basic figures are expressed in [purchasing power standards \(PPS\)](#) which represent a common currency that eliminates differences in price levels between countries to allow meaningful volume comparisons of GDP. The disparities indicator for the EU is calculated as the coefficient of variation of the national figures.

Disparities in purchasing power adjusted GDP per capita, EU, 2000-2024

(coefficient of variation, in %)




Note: 2024 data are provisional.

Source: Eurostat (online data code: sdg_10_10)

eurostat 

Figure 7: Disparities in purchasing power adjusted GDP per capita, EU, 2000–2024 (coefficient of variation, in %) Note: y-axis does not start at 0. Source: Eurostat (sdg_10_10)

Purchasing power adjusted GDP per capita, by country, 2024 (index EU = 100)



Note: Provisional data for most countries.
 (*) 2023 data.
 Source: Eurostat (online data code: sdg_10_10)



Figure 8: Purchasing power adjusted GDP per capita, by country, 2024 (index EU = 100) Source: Eurostat (sdg_10_10)

Disparities in household income per capita

LONG TERM
2008-2023




SHORT TERM
2018-2023



The adjusted gross disposable income of households reflects the purchasing power of households, after taxes and social contributions, and including social benefits in kind. The disparities indicator for the EU is calculated as the coefficient of variation of the national income data for households and non-profit institutions serving households in PPS per capita.

Disparities in adjusted gross disposable income of households per capita, EU, 2000-2023
(coefficient of variation, in %)




Note: 2023 data are imputed.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: sdg_10_20)



Figure 9: Disparities in adjusted gross disposable income of households per capita, EU, 2000–2023 (coefficient of variation, in %) Note: y-axis does not start at 0. Source: Eurostat (sdg_10_20)

Adjusted gross disposable income of households per capita, by country, 2023
(index EU = 100)



(¹) Provisional or estimated data.
(²) 2022 data.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: sdg_10_20)



Figure 10: Adjusted gross disposable income of households per capita, by country, 2023 (index EU = 100)
Source: Eurostat (nasa_10_nf_tr)

Asylum applications



Assessment of progress not applicable due to lack of policy targets

This indicator shows the number of first-time asylum applicants per million inhabitants and the number of positive first-instance decisions per million inhabitants. A first-time applicant for international protection is a person who

lodged an application for asylum for the first time in a given Member State. First-instance decisions are decisions granted by the respective authority acting as a first instance of the administrative or judicial asylum procedure in the receiving country. The source data are supplied to Eurostat by the national ministries of interior and related official agencies.





Figure 11: Asylum applications and decisions, EU, 2014–2024 (number per million inhabitants) Source: Eurostat (sdg_10_60)

First-time asylum applications, by country, 2019 and 2024 (number per million inhabitants)



Note: 2024 data are provisional estimates.

(*) Break(s) in population data time series between the two years shown.

Source: Eurostat (online data code: sdg_10_60)



Figure 12: First-time asylum applications, by country, 2019 and 2024 (number per million inhabitants)
Source: Eurostat (sdg_10_60)

Presentation of additional multi-purpose indicators

Urban–rural gap for risk of poverty or social exclusion

LONG TERM



Time series too
short


SHORT TERM

2018-2023



Statistics on the [degree of urbanisation](#) classify local administrative units as 'cities', 'towns and suburbs' or 'rural areas' depending on population density and the total number of inhabitants. This classification is used to determine the difference in the shares of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion between cities and rural areas. Data presented in this section stem from the [EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions](#) (EU-SILC).

People at risk of poverty or social exclusion, by degree of urbanisation, EU, 2015-2023 (% of population)




Note: Break in time series in 2020.

Source: Eurostat (online data code: sdg_01_10a)

eurostat 

Figure 13: People at risk of poverty or social exclusion, by degree of urbanisation, EU, 2015–2023 (% of population) Note: y-axis does not start at 0. Source: Eurostat (sdg_01_10a)

People at risk of poverty or social exclusion, by degree of urbanisation, by country, 2023 (% of population)



(*) 2021 data (instead of 2023).

Source: Eurostat (online data code: sdg_01_10a)

eurostat

Figure 14: People at risk of poverty or social exclusion, by degree of urbanisation, by country, 2023 (% of population) Source: Eurostat (sdg_01_10a)

Citizenship gaps between non-EU citizens and citizens of reporting EU countries

This section provides data for different indicators by [citizenship](#). Data are shown for non-EU citizens, referring to citizens of non-EU Member States, and for citizens of the reporting countries, referring to citizens of EU Member States that reside in their home country. Data presented in this section stem from the [EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions](#) (EU-SILC) and from the [EU Labour Force Survey](#) (EU-LFS).


LONG TERM
2010-2023



SHORT TERM
2018-2023



People at risk of monetary poverty after social transfers, by citizenship, EU, 2010-2023
(% of population aged 18 years or more)



Note: 2010–2019 data are estimated; 2010–2011 data for non-EU citizens have low reliability.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: sdg_01_20a)

Figure 15: People at risk of monetary poverty after social transfers, by citizenship, EU, 2010–2023 (% of population aged 18 or over) Source: Eurostat (sdg_01_20a)

LONG TERM
2009-2024




SHORT TERM
2019-2024



Early leavers from education and training, by citizenship, EU, 2006-2024

(% of population aged 18 to 24)



Note: Breaks in time series in 2014 and 2021.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: sdg_04_10a)

eurostat

Figure 16: Early leavers from education and training, by citizenship, EU, 2006–2024 (% of population aged 18–24) Source: Eurostat (sdg_04_10a)


LONG TERM
2009-2024



SHORT TERM
2019-2024



Young people neither in employment nor in education and training (NEET), by citizenship, EU, 2006-2024
(% of population aged 15 to 29)



Note: Break in time series in 2021.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: sdg_08_20a)



Figure 17: Young people neither in employment nor in education and training (NEET), by citizenship, EU, 2006–2024 (% of population aged 15–29) Source: Eurostat (sdg_08_20a)


LONG TERM
2009-2024



SHORT TERM
2019-2024



Employment rate, by citizenship, EU, 2006-2024
(% of population aged 20 to 64)



Note: Break in time series in 2021.

Source: Eurostat (online data code: sgd_08_30a)

eurostat

Figure 18: Employment rate, by citizenship, EU, 2006–2024 (% of population aged 20–64) Note: y-axis does not start at 0. Source: Eurostat (sgd_08_30a)

Footnotes

Explore further

Other articles

- [All articles on sustainable development goals](#)
- [Living conditions in Europe](#)

Database

- [Sustainable development indicators](#)

Thematic section

- [Sustainable development indicators](#)

Publications

Further reading on inequalities

- Eurofound (2021), [Monitoring convergence in the European Union: Looking backwards to move forward – Upward convergence through crises, Challenges and prospects in the EU series](#), Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
- European Migration Network (2023), [Annual report on Migration and Asylum](#), European Commission.
- European Commission (2024), [Atlas of Migration 2024](#), Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
- European Commission (2024), [Employment and Social Developments in Europe \(ESDE\) 2024](#).
- European Commission, [Asylum in the EU](#).
- OECD (2024), [How's Life? 2024 – Well-being and Resilience in Times of Crisis](#).
- OECD (2024), [International Migration Outlook 2024](#).
- OECD (2021), [Does Inequality Matter? How People Perceive Economic Disparities and Social Mobility](#), OECD Publishing, Paris.
- World Inequality Lab (2022), [World Inequality Report 2022](#).

Methodology

More detailed information on EU SDG indicators for monitoring of progress towards the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), such as indicator relevance, definitions, methodological notes, background and potential linkages can be found in the [introduction](#) as well as in Annex II of the publication '[Sustainable development in the European Union — Monitoring report on progress towards the SDGs in an EU context — 2025 edition](#)' .

External links

Further data sources on inequalities

- [Eurofound, EU convergence monitoring hub](#).
- [Eurostat, Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income \(online data code: ilc_di12\)](#) .
- [European Border and Coast Guard Agency \(Frontex\) \(2024\), Annual Risk Analysis 2024/2025](#) .
- [OECD, Income and wealth distribution databases](#).
- [OECD \(2023\), Settling in — Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2023](#).
- [World Inequality Database](#).