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Contract No EVA 2011
Multi-country thematic and regional / country-level strategy evaluation studies
and synthesis in the area of external co-operation

Lot 4 – Evaluations of EC geographic cooperation strategies for Asia,
Latin America, and the Neighbouring Countries

Request for Services Nr 2013 / 31997 – Version 1

This evaluation was commissioned by
the Evaluation Unit of the
Directorate General for Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid
(European Commission)

The opinions expressed in this document represent the authors’ points of view
which are not necessarily shared by the European Commission.
The approved and official version of the report is the English one.
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 C’s</td>
<td>Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 E’s</td>
<td>Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness (Performance Management)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Association Agreement (EU-Jordan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAP</td>
<td>Annual Action Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACA</td>
<td>Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Action Plan (ENP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOO</td>
<td>Build-Own-Operate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOT</td>
<td>Build-Operate-Transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td>Budget Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Cancelled (CRIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (defense)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Cross-cutting (issue)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Cooperation on Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL</td>
<td>Closed (CRIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLE</td>
<td>Country Level Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRIS</td>
<td>Common Relex Information System (EC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Creditor Reporting System (Code – DAC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>Country Strategy Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (OECD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAG</td>
<td>Development Assistance Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCFTA</td>
<td>Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>Development Cooperation Instrument (EU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>Decision (CRIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEVCO</td>
<td>Directorate General for Development and Cooperation (EuropeAid)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFI</td>
<td>Direct Foreign Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNJP</td>
<td>Development of Northern Jordan Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Development Partner</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRI</td>
<td>Democracy Reporting International</td>
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<tr>
<td>DWH</td>
<td>Data Warehouse</td>
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<td>EA</td>
<td>European Accreditation Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAMR</td>
<td>External Assistance Management Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBRD</td>
<td>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>Ongoing (CRIS)</td>
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<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<td>EDP</td>
<td>Executive Development Programme (Jordan – 2011-2013)</td>
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<td>EE</td>
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<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>European Financial Institution</td>
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<td>EG</td>
<td>Committed (CRIS)</td>
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<td>EIB</td>
<td>European Investment Bank</td>
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<td>EIDHR</td>
<td>European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMIS</td>
<td>Education Management Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPI</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOM</td>
<td>Election Observation Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>Executive Privatization Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPFI</td>
<td>European Public Finance Institution</td>
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<td>EPP</td>
<td>Export Parity Price</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ</td>
<td>Evaluation Question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ-JC-KPI</td>
<td>Evaluation Questions, Judgement Criteria and Key Performance Indicators (Matrix)</td>
</tr>
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<td>ERC</td>
<td>Electricity Regulatory Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERIKE</td>
<td>Education Reform for Knowledge Economy (project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETF</td>
<td>European Training Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-TVET</td>
<td>Employment - Technical and Vocational Education and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
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<td>EUD</td>
<td>European Union Delegation</td>
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</table>
Evaluation of the European Union’s Cooperation with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2007-2013)
- Country Level Evaluation -

EUR  Euro
FA  Financing Agreement
FD  Financing Decision
FD  Field District
FDC  Final Date for Contracting / for Concluding the FAD
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment
FEMIP  Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership
FES  Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
FIG  Financial Institutions Group
FY  Financial / Fiscal Year
GBS  General Budget Support
GCC  Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GoHKoJ  Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
HQ  Headquarters
HR  Human Resources
HRD  Human Resources Development
HSPU  Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Partially satisfactory, Unsatisfactory (Indicator)
IBRD  International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICLN  International Criminal Law Network
ICT  Information and Communication Technology
IDEA  International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IEC  Independent Election Committee
IIS  Instrument for Stability
IKRS  Internally Known Reference Source (CLE)
IL  Intervention Logic
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IPP  Import Parity Price
JAED  Jordan Agency for Enterprise Development
JAIMS  Jordan Aid Information Management System
JC  Judgement Criterion
JD  Jordanian Dinar (also: JOD)
JEDCO  Jordan Export Development and Commercial Centers Corporation
JIB  Jordan Investment Board
JISM  Jordan Institution for Standards and Metrology
JF  Jordan
JSMP  Jordan Services Modernisation Programme
KPI  Key Performance Indicator
KRA  Key Result Area
LA  Local Authority
LED  Local Economic Development
LF  Logical Framework / LogFrame
LGU  Local Government Unit
M&E  Monitoring and Evaluation
MDG  Millennium Development Goal
MENA  Middle East and Northern Africa (countries)
MFA  Macro-Financial Assistance
MFN  Most Favoured Nation
MIC  Middle Income Country
MoE  Ministry of Education
MoE  Ministry of Environment
MoEMR  Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources
MoF  Ministry of Finance
MoFA  Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoHESR  Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research
MoITS  Ministry of Industry and Trade and Supplies
MoJ  Ministry of Justice
MoL  Ministry of Labour
MoL-DET  Ministry of Labour – Directorate of Employment and Training
MoMA  Ministry of Municipal Affairs
MoPIC  Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation
MoWl  Ministry of Water and Irrigation
MS  Member State
MSME  Micro, Small and Medium Size Enterprise
MTEF  Medium Term Expenditures Framework
Evaluation of the European Union's Cooperation with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2007-2013)
- Country Level Evaluation -

NDCP  Northern Border Clearance Project
NDI  National Democratic Institute
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation
NIF  Neighbourhood Investment Facility
NIP  National Indicative Programme
NSA  Non-State Actor
NSI  Nuclear Safety Instrument
ODA  Official Development Assistance
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PA  Portfolio Analysis
PA  Project Approach
PAF  Performance Assessment Framework
PAO  Programme Administration Office / Project Administrative Office
PCM  Project / Programme Cycle Management
PD  Paris Declaration (on Aid Effectiveness)
PEFA  Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
PFG  Project Financiers Group
PFM  Public Finance Management
PLEDJ  Promoting Local Economic Development in Jordan
PME  Performance Monitoring and Evaluation
PO  Provisional (CRIS)
POMED  Project on Middle East Democracy
PPP  Public – Private Partnership
PSD  Private Sector Development
R&D  Research and Development
RAC  Reste à Contracter
RAL  Reste à Liquider
RE  Renewable Energy
RIP  Regional Indicative Programme
ROM  Results Oriented Monitoring
RSP  Regional Strategy Paper
SAAP  Support to the Implementation of the Association Agreement
SBS  Sector Budget Support
SME  Small and Medium Enterprise
SMED  Southern and Eastern Mediterranean
SMP  Services Modernisation Programme
SPRING  Support to Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth
SPS  Sanitary and Phytosanitary
SPSP  Sector Policy Support Programme (Sector Budget Support)
SRRP  Support for Regulatory Reform and Privatisation
SS  Social Security
SSC  Social Security Corporation
TA  Technical Assistance
TAIEX  Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (instrument)
TAPs  Technical and Administrative Provisions
TBT  Technical Barriers to Trade
TI  Transparency International (index)
TOT  Training of Trainers
TU  Trade Union
T-VET  Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UMI  Union for the Mediterranean
UMI  Upper Middle Income (Country)
UN  United Nations
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNRWA  United Nations Relief and Works Agency
UoM  Unit of Measurement
USD  United States Dollar
VTC  Vocational Training Corporation
WB  World Bank
WCO  World Customs Organisation
WTO  World Trade Organisation
Y/N  Yes / No (logical indicator)
# Table of Contents of Final Report Volume II: EQ Information Matrices EQs 1 to 9 (Abridged)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vol. II Page</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Acronyms and Abbreviations</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Validated Evaluation Questions</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Matrix of Evaluation Questions, Judgement Criteria and Indicators</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The EQ Information Matrices, by Evaluation Question</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.0. The EQ - Information Matrix (IM) Template</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1. EQ-1 IM on Strategic Alignment and Flexibility</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-1.1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-1.2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-1.3</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-1.4</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-1.5</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2. EQ-2 IM on Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-2.1</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-2.2</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-2.3</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-2.4</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-2.5</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3. EQ-3 IM on Democratic Governance</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-3.1</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-3.2</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-3.3</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-3.4</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-3.5</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-3.6</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4. EQ-4 IM on public institutions strengthening</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-4.1</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-4.2</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-4.3</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-4.4</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-4.5</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-4.6</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-4.7</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.5. EQ-5 IM on Aid Modalities Mix ................................................................. 261
   JC-5.1 .............................................................................................................. 261
   JC-5.2 .............................................................................................................. 266
   JC-5.3 .............................................................................................................. 271
   JC-5.4 .............................................................................................................. 279
   JC-5.5 .............................................................................................................. 285
   JC-5.6 .............................................................................................................. 298
3.6. EQ-6 IM on Sustainable Private Sector Development ..................................... 303
   JC-6.1 .............................................................................................................. 303
   JC-6.2 .............................................................................................................. 315
   JC-6.3 .............................................................................................................. 321
   JC-6.4 .............................................................................................................. 327
   JC-6.5 .............................................................................................................. 332
   JC-6.6 .............................................................................................................. 344
3.7. EQ-7 IM on Trade, Transport and Investment Facilitation .............................. 348
   JC-7.1 .............................................................................................................. 348
   JC-7.2 .............................................................................................................. 357
   JC-7.3 .............................................................................................................. 363
   JC-7.4 .............................................................................................................. 369
   JC-7.5 .............................................................................................................. 374
3.8. EQ-8 IM on Education and Employment ....................................................... 387
   JC-8.1 .............................................................................................................. 387
   JC-8.2 .............................................................................................................. 396
   JC-8.3 .............................................................................................................. 402
   JC-8.4 .............................................................................................................. 410
   JC-8.5 .............................................................................................................. 414
   JC-8.6 .............................................................................................................. 419
3.9. EQ-9 IM on Sustainable, Environment Friendly Energy and Water Solutions ... 432
   JC-9.1 .............................................................................................................. 432
   JC-9.2 .............................................................................................................. 442
   JC-9.3 .............................................................................................................. 448
   JC-9.4 .............................................................................................................. 453
   JC-9.5 .............................................................................................................. 458
   JC-9.6 .............................................................................................................. 462
   JC-9.7 .............................................................................................................. 465
4. Bibliography, List of References and Consulted Documents by Subject and Evaluation Question ................................................. 481
List of Tables ¹

1. List of evaluation questions (EQs)........................................................................................................... 2
2. Cross-tabulation of evaluation questions and standard evaluation criteria................................. 4
3. Table of evaluation questions (EQs) with judgement criteria (JC)s) ............................................... 6
4. Evaluation questions and evaluation team responsibilities ............................................................. 12

List of Figures ²

1. Reconstructed EU-Jordan country strategy intervention logic effects diagram and draft CLE evaluation questions .................................................................................................................. 3
2. Standard structure of the EQs information matrices ........................................................................ 10

¹ This list of tables only concerns the tables included in the introductory chapters 1 and 2 to the EQs information matrices chapters 3.1 to 3.9 and thus not the tables which are part of the information matrices themselves based on different primary or secondary sources.

² This list of figures only concerns the figures that are included in the introductory chapters 1 and 2 to the EQs information matrices chapters 3.1 to 3.9 and thus not the figures which are part of the information matrices themselves based on different primary or secondary sources.
1. The Validated Evaluation Questions

The participatory, iterative process of EQs development as core evaluation tool

In accordance with the country level evaluation methodology prescribed by the EC-DEVCO Evaluation Unit, the set of validated Evaluation Questions (EQs) is the core tool around which the evaluation is built. Their answering is an inductive empirical process building up from measuring / assessing Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) as basis for the assessment / verification of Judgement Criteria (JCs), in turn at the basis of the answering of the Evaluation Questions themselves. For the current Country Level Evaluation of Jordan, this development and ultimate selection of the Evaluation Questions has been a highly participatory exercise and iterative process with different reactions and feedback loops. The final set of nine Evaluation Questions also closely involved the responsible officials at the DEVCO Evaluation Unit (both the evaluation manager and co-manager) and the members of the CLE Reference Group (RG) with representatives from both DEVCO-EuropeAid and EEAS (the European External Action Service).

The set of nine evaluation questions

Table 1 on the next page shows the list of nine evaluation questions to be answered by the present country level evaluation of the EU – Jordan cooperation covering the 2007-2013 period. For each of the questions is provided its code number (format: EQ-x), its short title in maximum seven words and its full description / operational definition. Also provided for each question are its related standard OECD-DAC and/or additional EU evaluation criteria, both those of primary and of secondary importance (the most important / relevant criterion is listed first). Furthermore included in the overview table are the number of Judgement Criteria (JCs) to be assessed/verified/validated for each of the respective questions, and ultimately the number of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) to be measured / assessed as basis for the verification / assessment of the JCs.

EQ-1 on strategic alignment and flexibility and EQ-2 on coordination, complementarity and coherence (the 3C’s) are two “umbrella” questions pertaining to the whole strategy and programme and are situated at the highest strategic analytical level, covering all cooperation sectors and both the political/policy dialogue and cooperation interventions dimensions. The aid modalities mix EQ-5 also is a strategy and programme wide question and looks more at operational aspects of strategy and programme implementation and especially at the efficiency, suitability and complementarity of the different aid modalities and financing instruments. Special attention under this EQ-5 on aid modalities is given Budget Support (BS) in accordance with the DEVCO Evaluation Unit prescribed evaluation approach for step 1 analysis of Budget Support covering the first three level (of a total of five) of the comprehensive BS evaluation framework. The EQ-4 on public institutions strengthening actually also is a crosscutting question as it covers the institutional reform and capacity strengthening interventions but also those dimensions / components integrated into other projects. The question is basically related to economic governance in the public sector with a special focus on Public Finance Management (PFM). Private sector economic governance issues are covered under EQ-6 on sustainable private sector development. The other five questions are more specific thematic or sectoral, however all analysed in the broader, overall country strategy perspective, with: EQ-3 on democratic governance (covering the different areas understood under the concept, including civil society strengthening), EQ-6 on sustainable private sector development, EQ-7 on trade, transport and investment facilitation, EQ-8 on education and employment with special focus on education reform, on E-TVET and the link of education to employment, and EQ-9 on sustainable energy and water solutions with special attention for environmental aspects.

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1 Originally it was thought to have two separate questions, one for water and energy each, but in the end it was decided to combine both under the common denominator of sustainable access and use in a broader environmental protection context.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Short Title</th>
<th>Full Question</th>
<th>Number of JCs</th>
<th>Number of KPIs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EQ-1</td>
<td>Strategic alignment and flexibility</td>
<td>How well has the EU response strategy been aligned over time with the development objectives and priorities of the Government of Jordan and shown responsiveness in flexibly adapting to changes in the broader regional context affecting Jordan?</td>
<td>Relevance, Impact, Sustainability</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ-2</td>
<td>Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence</td>
<td>To what extent is the EU-Jordan cooperation well-coordinated with and complementary to the actions of EU Member States and other EU Institutions, and to those of other Development Partners, and coherent with other EU policies?</td>
<td>3 C's, Value added Sustainability, Efficiency</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ-3</td>
<td>Democratic governance</td>
<td>To what extent has the EU-Jordan cooperation been successful in bringing about enhanced democratic governance?</td>
<td>Effectiveness Impact, Added Value, Efficiency</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ-4</td>
<td>Public institutions strengthening</td>
<td>To what extent has the EU support contributed to institutional reform and capacity strengthening of Jordan public institutions, including management of public resources, for enhanced delivery of public services to the citizens?</td>
<td>Effectiveness Impact, Sustainability</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ-5</td>
<td>Aid modalities mix and efficiency</td>
<td>To what extent has the EU aid modalities mix been appropriate for the national context and the EU development strategy in efficiently bringing about the targeted reform and development results?</td>
<td>Efficiency Effectiveness, Impact</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ-6</td>
<td>Sustainable private sector development</td>
<td>To what extent has EU's support in the area of private sector development (PSD) contributed to the process of sustainable and value added modernisation of the Jordan economy and to more sustainable, inclusive and equitable economic growth?</td>
<td>Effectiveness Relevance, Sustainability, Value added, 3 C's</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ-7</td>
<td>Trade, transport and investment facilitation</td>
<td>To what extent has EU's support in the area of trade, transport and investment facilitation contributed to improving the balance of trade and the investment relations between EU and Jordan?</td>
<td>Impact Effectiveness, Sustainability, Value added, 3 C's</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ-8</td>
<td>Education and employment</td>
<td>To what extent has EU's support to Education Reform and to the Employment and Technical and Vocational Education and Training (E-TVET) sector contributed to enhanced education quality and to improved employment?</td>
<td>Impact Effectiveness, Relevance</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ-9</td>
<td>Sustainable environment friendly energy and water solutions</td>
<td>How successful has the EU cooperation with Jordan been in contributing to the promotion of environment friendly, climate change mitigating and adapting, and sustainable solutions in the energy and water sectors?</td>
<td>Sustainability Effectiveness, Impact, Efficiency</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Totals for the 9 Evaluations Questions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Short Title</th>
<th>Full Question</th>
<th>Number of JCs</th>
<th>Number of KPIs</th>
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<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>53</td>
<td>239</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The EQs rooting in the reconstructed CSP intervention logic diagram

The evaluation questions are rooted in the reconstructed country strategy intervention logic diagrams developed during the evaluation inception phase. They are related to those elements of the actual, faithful country strategy effects diagram which are questioned / contested as being based on assumptions / hypotheses which need to be further investigated for further validation (or rejection) during the field and synthesis phases of the evaluation process. The questions thus are directly related to the reconstructed elements of the intervention logic, as included in the reconstructed effects diagram on the preceding page in different colour and with dotted lines. The associated location of the evaluation questions in the intervention logic diagram is indicated with a numbered EQ button. As a country level evaluation is a strategic evaluation, most evaluation questions are situated at the outcome – intermediate impacts effects level. EQ-5 on aid modalities is cross-cutting and assesses interventions and aid modalities mix efficiency and thus is located at the cause-effects link between the interventions areas - direct results /outputs levels. Strategic questions EQ-1 and 2 relate to all intervention logic levels and integrate into the cause-effects relations the broader enabling / disabling environment aspects possibly / actually affecting country strategy and programme results oriented performance.

Table 2: Cross-Tabulation of Evaluation Questions (EQs) and Standard Evaluation Criteria (OECD-DAC, EU and PD) 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Question (EQ)</th>
<th>OECD-DAC Standard Criteria</th>
<th>Additional EU Standard Criteria</th>
<th>EU Cross-Cutting Issues</th>
<th>Paris Declaration Principles</th>
<th>Total Number of Primary Criteria per EQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EQ-1 Strategic alignment and flexibility</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ-2 Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ-3 Democratic governance</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ-4 Public institutions strengthening</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ-5 Aid modalities mix and efficiency</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ-6 Sustainable private sector development</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ-7 Trade, transport and investment facilitation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ-8 Education and employment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ-9 Sustainable environment friendly energy and water solutions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: OECD-DAC and EU additional standard evaluation criteria of prime importance to the evaluation question are indicated with an “X” mark, secondary importance criteria are indicated with a figure two “2”.

Totals Number of Questions with Primary Criteria: 1 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 8 8 2 3 1 4 1 5 5 5 55
The evaluation questions and the standard evaluation criteria

In accordance with the DEVCO Evaluation Unit prescribed evaluation methodology and broader analytical framework, the following clusters of evaluation criteria are at the basis of the Jordan Country Level Evaluation:

1. DAC - Standard OECD-DAC evaluation criteria: (1.1) Relevance, (1.2) Effectiveness, (1.3) Efficiency, (1.4) Impact, and (1.5) Sustainability;
2. EU - Standard additional EU evaluation criteria: (2.1) Value added, and Three "C's" of (2.2) Coordination, (2.3) Complementarity, and (2.4) Coherence;
3. CC - EU cross-cutting issues: (3.1) Governance (democratic, economic, local, etc.), (3.2) Institutional capacity, (3.3) Human rights, (3.4) Gender, and (3.5) Environment;
4. PD - Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness criteria: (4.1) Alignment, (4.2) Harmonization, (4.3) Managing for results, (4.4) Mutual accountability, and (4.5) Ownership.

The above table 2 on the previous page is a cross-tabulation of the nine evaluation questions and the above four sets of evaluation criteria. For the OECD-DAC standard criteria and the additional EU standard criteria, a further indication is given if the criterion is of primary or secondary importance / relevance to the respective evaluation questions. The cross-tabulation shows a total of 55 cross-links between the 9 evaluation questions and the four sets of evaluation criteria consisting of a total of 19 individual criteria. The additional EU standard “three C’s” criterion is split into three (sub-)criteria of coordination, complementarity and coherence.

2. The Matrix of Evaluation Questions, Judgement Criteria and Indicators

The EQ-JC-KPIs matrix

The summary table of evaluation questions with for each its corresponding set of judgement criteria is presented on the next three pages hereafter. The complete final matrix of evaluation questions, judgement criteria and key performance indicators (EQ-JC-KPIs matrices) is included in the next chapter 3 presented as a series of sub-matrices for each of the nine evaluation questions. These EQ-JC-KPIs matrices per evaluation question have been approved at the inception phase as basis for the next phases of the evaluation process (desk, field and synthesis phases).

The EQ-JC-KPIs matrix architecture and methodological notes

The matrix presentation of the EQs-JCs-KPIs is based on the agreement of a maximum of 10 Evaluation Questions (EQs) for the entire Country Level Evaluation in order to keep the evaluation focused and manageable. These EQs are directly derived from the Intervention Logic (IL) analysis of the EU-Jordan Country Strategy 2007-2013 and the 2007-2010 and 2011-2013 National Indicative Programmes (NIPs), their broader policy and strategic framework formed by the 2007 Lisbon Treaty on the Union’s External Action and Specific Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the 2005 European Consensus on Development, the EU - Southern Neighbourhood Regional Strategy and Programme (ENPI-South RSP and RIPv) and the EU - Jordan Association Agreement (AA) and EU-Jordan ENP Action Plans. This Intervention Logic analysis at the basis of the EQs pertains to both the actual, faithful as-is IL strategy and programmes and the reconstructed intervention logic highlighting key underlying assumptions of the cause-effects logic at the basis of the country strategy and as such an important source of hypotheses to be tested by the evaluation.
The EU support contributed to enhanced access to justice, law and order, the rule of law and human rights. The EU-Jordan cooperation response strategy is coherent with the overall strategic objectives and priorities of the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (GoHKoJ) reflecting the needs of the population.

The EU-Jordan cooperation effectively contributed to enhanced political participation and open and fair elections. Within the concerted action of the international community, the EU-Jordan cooperation effectively contributed to enhanced political participation and open and fair elections.

The EU-Jordan cooperation on democratic governance (including development policy and political dialogue) gained strength and depth in bringing about reform through strengthened coordination and institutionalized dialogue mechanisms.

The EU-Jordan cooperation has shown responsiveness in flexibly adapting and proactively adjusting to the evolving regional (i.e. Arab Spring, Iraqi and Syrian crises, Palestinian issues), global (e.g. financial and economic crisis) and national contexts (e.g. Upper Middle Income country status).

The EU-Jordan cooperation is well coordinated, coherent and complementary to other EU policies and strategies.

The EU-Jordan cooperation is well coordinated, coherent and complementary to the strategies and programmes of the EU Member States and of the European Financial Institutions.

The EU-Jordan cooperation response strategy is coherent with the other EU policies and strategies.

The EU-Jordan cooperation is well coordinated, coherent and complementary to the strategies and programmes of other multi-lateral and bilateral Development Partners (DPs).

The EU-Jordan cooperation well-coordinated and complementary to the actions of EU Member States and other EU Institutions, and to those of other Development Partners, and coherent with other EU policies.

The EU-Jordan cooperation response strategy is consistent, timely, complementary and mutually reinforcing.

The overall objectives and result areas of the EU response strategy are aligned with the national policy and development objectives and priorities of the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (GoHKoJ) reflecting the needs of the population.

The EU-Jordan cooperation strategy components of the EU-Jordan cooperation are consistent, timely, complementary and mutually reinforcing within the overall ENP framework.

The overall objectives and result areas of the EU response strategy are aligned and mutually reinforcing within the overall ENP framework of the EU-Jordan cooperation.

The EU-Jordan cooperation effectively contributed to enhanced democratic governance. The EU-Jordan cooperation effectively contributed to enhanced democratic governance.

The EU-Jordan cooperation contributed to the further strengthening of Civil Society Organisations as empowered partners in the policy/political dialogue and the national and local development processes.

The EU-Jordan cooperation effectively contributed to enhanced political participation and open and fair elections.

The policy/political dialogue and the development cooperation strategy components of the EU-Jordan cooperation are consistent, timely, complementary and mutually reinforcing.

The EU-Jordan cooperation strategy components of the EU-Jordan cooperation are consistent, timely, complementary and mutually reinforcing within the overall ENP framework.

The overall objectives and result areas of the EU response strategy are aligned and mutually reinforcing within the overall ENP framework of the EU-Jordan cooperation.

The EU response strategy has shown responsiveness in flexibly adapting and proactively adjusting to the evolving regional (i.e. Arab Spring, Iraqi and Syrian crises, Palestinian issues), global (e.g. financial and economic crisis) and national contexts (e.g. Upper Middle Income country status).

The EU-Jordan cooperation on democratic governance (including development policy and political dialogue) gained strength and depth in bringing about reform through strengthened coordination and institutionalized dialogue mechanisms.

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The EU-Jordan cooperation well-coordinated and complementary to the actions of EU Member States and other EU Institutions, and to those of other Development Partners, and coherent with other EU policies.

The overall objectives and result areas of the EU response strategy are aligned and mutually reinforcing within the overall ENP framework of the EU-Jordan cooperation.

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The EU-Jordan cooperation effectively contributed to enhanced political participation and open and fair elections.

The overall objectives and result areas of the EU response strategy are aligned and mutually reinforcing within the overall ENP framework of the EU-Jordan cooperation.
### Evaluation Question (EQ)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Short Title</th>
<th>Full Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EQ-4</td>
<td>Public institutions strengthening</td>
<td>To what extent has the EU support contributed to institutional reform and capacity strengthening of Jordan public institutions, including management of public resources, for enhanced delivery of public services to the citizens?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ-5</td>
<td>Aid modalities mix and efficiency</td>
<td>To what extent has the EU aid modalities mix been appropriate for the national context and the EU development strategy in efficiently bringing about the targeted reform and development results?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ-6</td>
<td>Sustainable private sector development</td>
<td>To what extent has EU’s support in the area of private sector development (PSD) contributed to the process of sustainable and value added modernisation of the Jordan economy and to more sustainable, inclusive and equitable economic growth?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Primary & Secondary DAC / EU Criterion(a) 1st: Effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description of Judgement Criterion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>EU support contributed to institutional reform and capacity development in public institutions at central level for more transparent, efficient, effective and inclusive delivery of public services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>EU support contributed to institutional reform and capacity development of public institutions at local government level (in Governorates and municipalities) for more transparent, efficient, effective and inclusive delivery of public services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Judgement Criteria (JCs), by Evaluation Question

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Key Performance Indicators (N° per JC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
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<td>4.6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Evaluation Question (EQ)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Short Title</th>
<th>Full Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EQ-6</td>
<td>Sustainable private sector development</td>
<td>To what extent has EU’s support in the area of private sector development (PSD) contributed to the process of sustainable and value added modernisation of the Jordan economy and to more sustainable, inclusive and equitable economic growth?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Primary & Secondary DAC / EU Criterion(a) 1st: Effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description of Judgement Criterion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>The capacity of the Ministry of Industry and Trade and Supplies and related specialized institutions (public, private and public-private) is sustainably strengthened for SMES development and modernisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Jordan enterprises, particularly SMEs, are better able to compete regionally and internationally and have better access to technology and new markets, through fostered enterprise competitiveness at both individual firm and sector level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>EU Private Sector Development support contributed to facilitating the generation of sustainable employment, both decent and gainful self-employment and wage employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>The EU Private Sector Development support contributed to more inclusive and equitable national and local economic development and growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>The choice and the combination of the EU aid modalities (BS and project approach) for PSD are the consequence of the search for efficiency and cost/effectiveness in line with Jordan Government objectives and complementary to other DP support to the sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>The EU interventions for PSD explicitly incorporate aspects related to crosscutting issues as environment, social standards, human rights, rule of law, women participation, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Judgement Criteria (JCs), by Evaluation Question

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Key Performance Indicators (N° per JC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation Question (EQ)</td>
<td>Primary &amp; Secondary DAC / EU Criterion(a) (b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ-7 Trade, transport and investment facilitation</td>
<td>To what extent has EU’s support in the area of trade, transport and investment facilitation contributed to improving the balance of trade and the investment relations between EU and Jordan?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ-8 Education and employment</td>
<td>To what extent has EU’s support to education reform and to the Employment and Technical and Vocational Education and Training (E-TVET) sector contributed to enhanced education quality and to improved employment?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ-9 Sustainable, environment friendly energy and water solutions</td>
<td>How successful is the EU cooperation with Jordan in contributing to the promotion of environment friendly, climate change mitigating and adapting, sustainable solutions in the energy and water sectors?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals for the 9 Evaluations Questions: 53

239
A standardized EQ-JC-KPIs matrix presentation for each of the 9 Evaluation Questions has been worked out, with for each EQ a (in principle maximum) standard of five Judgement Criteria (JCs) and in turn for each of these JCs a (in principle maximum) standard of four Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). With the more prominent featuring of Budget Support (BS) and Public Finance Management (PFM) evaluation aspects cutting across the different focal sectors / thematic areas, this number of KPIs in the process substantially increased (from 203 to 239). As such, for the whole Country Level Evaluation a total of about 240 Key Performance Indicators is arrived at (this includes possible composite indicators). Actually, in this final version of the EQ-JC-KPIs matrix of 17 February 2014, there are a total of 239 KPIs for 53 JCs, thus with an average of 4.5 KPIs per JC, and with the number of KPIs per EQ varying between 20 KPIs in the case of EQs 1, 2 and 7 to 33 KPIs for (composite) EQ 9 on water and energy.

The Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) in the EQ-JC-KPIs matrix

It is important to note that the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) are formulated in the perspective of their enabling / their facilitation of the completion of the Evaluation Questions (EQs) Information Matrices (IMs) as presented under the next chapter 3 of this final report volume II on the EQs Information Matrices. These information matrices contain the empirical evidence (both primary and secondary data and information) for the actual indicator assessment/measurement and score, in turn forming the basis for the statements on the respective judgement criteria, which in turn ultimately are at the basis of the (preliminary and final) answer to the evaluation question. Thus, the relevance and quality of the CLE key performance indicators lies in their ability to facilitate empirical evidence based and inductive, hierarchically structured answering of the evaluation questions.

3. The EQ Information Matrices, by Evaluation Question

3.0. The EQ - Information Matrix (IM) Template

The EQ-JC-KPIs matrices and particularly also the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) therein have been designed and formulated in the perspective of their enabling / facilitation of the completion of the Evaluation Questions (EQs) Information Matrices (IMs). One such information matrix per EQ is foreseen. These Information Matrices have a standard format and facilitate the gradual, logical compilation of the EQ answers based on the consolidation of the collected and processed information and data during the desk and fields phases of the evaluation process. These information matrices contain the empirical evidence (both primary and secondary data and information) for the assessment/measurement of actual performance / achievements along the indicators and their scoring, in turn forming the basis for the statements on the respective judgement criteria, which in turn ultimately are at the basis of the answers to the evaluation questions. Thus, the relevance and quality of the CLE key performance indicators lies in their ability to facilitate empirical evidence based and inductive, hierarchically structured answering of the evaluation questions.

Herein also lies the preferred choice for key performance indicators of a higher statistical hierarchical level as discussed in the methodological notes included in the previous chapter 2 on the EQ-JC-KPIs matrices, rather than opting for a deceptively simple yes/no logical indicator or benchmark. The latter not only do not make it possible to adequately express more refined assessments but also in many instances result in considerable underreporting of actual achievements (particularly in the case of support to institutional and human capacity development processes, as is the very subject of a considerable number is not the majority of the EU-Jordan cooperation interventions in the period under review).

The standard structure of the EQ information matrices is a major tool for facilitating structured and systematic collection, reflection and processing of key data and information necessary for the gradual, multi-tiered evidence based answering of the evaluation questions. The IM proactively guides structured information collection and processing in the perspective of answering these evaluation questions. The below Figure 2 on the next page provides a summary overview structure of these standard EQ Information matrices.

---

Final Report - Vol. II: Evaluation Questions Information Matrices (Abridged)
February 2015 – GFA-led Consortium

Evaluation of the European Union’s Cooperation with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2007-2013) - Country Level Evaluation -

Chapter 3

Page 9
The completion of the EQ information matrices consists of three main steps as part of the inductive, three-tiered process of answering the evaluation questions via the judgement criteria and key performance indicators at the basis, as follows:

1. **Step 1: The drafting of the main findings per Key Performance Indicator (KPI) under the JC with performance scoring on the KPI.** This elaboration of the main findings is based on the result of three sub-processes / sub-types of information / data collection and processing compiled in KPI sub-sections on:

   - **1a** Basis / evidence for main findings per KPI: (i) Data, figures and tables (with explicit source referencing)
   - **1b** Basis / evidence for main findings per KPI: (ii) Key extracts from documents (with explicit source referencing)
   - **1c** Basis / evidence for main findings per KPI: (iii) Additional info from field phase - primary & secondary (with explicit source referencing)

2. **Assessment / statement on the Judgement Criterion**, based on the KPIs main findings, with JC consolidated performance scoring.

3. **(Preliminary) Answer to the Evaluation Question** based on the statements on the Judgement Criteria and EQ performance index scoring (preliminary answer at end of desk phase as introduction to the evaluation field phase and as basis for hypothesis formulation for further validation during the field phase through additional information collection [primary and secondary] and then in turn as basis for the final answer during the synthesis phase)

---

**Figure 2: Standard Structure of EQs Information Matrices, by Evaluation Question**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Evaluation Question (code and title)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. List of Judgement Criteria (JCs) under the EQ (code and title)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. For each of the EQ Judgement Criteria, a table containing:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1. List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under the JC (codes and definition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.1-3.2.x Main findings per KPI under the JC, with KPI performance scoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.1-3.3.x Basis / evidence for main findings per KPI: (i) Data, figures and tables (with explicit source referencing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.1-3.4.x Basis / evidence for main findings per KPI: (ii) Key extracts from documents (with explicit source referencing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.1-3.5.x Basis / evidence for main findings per KPI: (iii) Additional info from field phase - primary &amp; secondary (with explicit source referencing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6. Assessment / statement on the Judgement Criterion, based on the KPIs main findings, with JC consolidated performance scoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. (Preliminary) Answer to the Evaluation Question based on the statements on the Judgement Criteria and EQ performance index scoring (preliminary answer at end of desk phase as introduction to the evaluation field phase and as basis for hypothesis formulation for further validation during the field phase through additional information collection [primary and secondary] and then in turn as basis for the final answer during the synthesis phase)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Structured steps in the inductive, multi-tiered process of answering the evaluation questions via the judgement criteria and key performance indicators at the basis.
a. KPI related (hard) data, figures and tables
b. Key extracts from documents
c. Additional information collection primarily during the field phase, both from primary and secondary sources

2. Step 2: The drafting of the assessment / statement on the judgement criterion based on the KPIs main findings, with automated JC consolidated performance scoring and rating based on the KPIs scores (scoring is done during the early synthesis phase);

3. Step 3: The drafting of the (preliminary) answer to the Evaluation Question based on the statements on the Judgement Criteria with automated EQ consolidated performance scoring and rating, based on the JCs scores (automated score calculation done during the early synthesis phase).

Referencing to documents / sources in the Information Matrix

The abridged references to the sources of information of the figures or documents excerpts under the KPIs are of the following format (in italic bolt font):

[Abridged name of document or other source] [(Mmm yyyy)], [page number(s)].

Two examples just by way of illustration:

EAMR (Dec 2011), pp. 17-18:

FA 23471 Support to Justice Reform (Jul 2012), p. 8:
standing for: Financing Agreement of decision 23741 Support to Justice Reform in Jordan of July 2012 on page 8

Bibliography – List of References and Consulted Documents

The bibliography (list of references and consulted documents) by subject and evaluation question is included under the last chapter 4 of this Final Report Volume II on the EQ Information Matrices.

Evaluation Team Composition and Responsibilities for Evaluation Questions

The below table 4 has the distribution of key responsibilities of the six member team in relation to the nine evaluation questions.

Main responsibilities are indicated with a bold “MR”, supportive co-responsibilities are indicated with a “CR” indication. Each of the “CR” co-responsibilities are further detailed in notes to the table.
## Table 4: Evaluation Questions and Evaluation Team Responsibilities / Division of Labour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Question (EQ)</th>
<th>Responsible Evaluation Team Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EQ-1 Strategic alignment and flexibility</td>
<td>R. Vaes (TL), F. Badioli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ-2 Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence</td>
<td>C. Valmarana (R), N. El-Saies (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ-3 Democratic governance</td>
<td>M. Yagan (R), L. Hidmi (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ-4 Public institutions strengthening</td>
<td>CR (R), MR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ-5 Aid modalities mix and efficiency</td>
<td>CR (R), CR (R), MR, CR (R), CR (R), CR (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ-6 Sustainable private sector development</td>
<td>MR, CR (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ-7 Trade, transport and investment facilitation</td>
<td>MR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ-8 Education and employment</td>
<td>CR (R), MR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ-9 Sustainable, environment friendly energy and water solutions</td>
<td>CR (R), MR (R), MR (R)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Shot Title</th>
<th>Full Question</th>
<th>R. Vaes (TL)</th>
<th>F. Badioli</th>
<th>C. Valmarana (R)</th>
<th>N. El-Saies (R)</th>
<th>M. Yagan (R)</th>
<th>L. Hidmi (R)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EQ-1</td>
<td>Strategic alignment and flexibility</td>
<td>How well has the EU response strategy been aligned over time with the development objectives and priorities of the Government of Jordan and shown responsiveness in flexibly adapting to changes in the broader regional context affecting Jordan?</td>
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<tr>
<td>EQ-2</td>
<td>Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence</td>
<td>To what extent is the EU-Jordan cooperation well-coordinated with and complementary to the actions of EU Member States and other EU Institutions, and to those of other Development Partners, and coherent with other EU policies?</td>
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<tr>
<td>EQ-3</td>
<td>Democratic governance</td>
<td>To what extent has the EU-Jordan cooperation been successful in bringing about enhanced democratic governance? (R)</td>
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<td>EQ-4</td>
<td>Public institutions strengthening</td>
<td>To what extent has the EU support contributed to institutional reform and capacity strengthening of Jordan public institutions, including management of public resources, for enhanced delivery of public services to the citizens?</td>
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<td>EQ-5</td>
<td>Aid modalities mix and efficiency</td>
<td>To what extent has the EU aid modalities mix been appropriate for the national context and the EU development strategy in efficiently bringing about the targeted reform and development results? (R)</td>
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<td>EQ-6</td>
<td>Sustainable private sector development</td>
<td>To what extent has EU's support in the area of private sector development (PSD) contributed to the process of sustainable and value added modernisation of the Jordan economy and to more sustainable, inclusive and equitable economic growth?</td>
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<td>EQ-7</td>
<td>Trade, transport and investment facilitation</td>
<td>To what extent has EU's support in the area of trade, transport and investment facilitation contributed to improving the balance of trade and the investment relations between EU and Jordan?</td>
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<td>EQ-8</td>
<td>Education and employment</td>
<td>To what extent has EU's support to Education Reform and to the Employment and Technical and Vocational Education and Training (E-TVET) sector contributed to enhanced education quality and to improved employment?</td>
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<tr>
<td>EQ-9</td>
<td>Sustainable, environment friendly energy and water solutions</td>
<td>How successful has the EU cooperation with Jordan been in contributing to the promotion of environment friendly, climate change mitigating and adapting, and sustainable solutions in the energy and water sectors?</td>
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**Notes:**

(1) Based on the list of evaluation questions as an outcome of the EC Reference Group meetings of 21 October 2013 and of 25 November 2013. The changes in team composition as of the end of January 2014 and of mid-April 2014 are reflected in the above table of team responsibilities and division of labour.

(2) Coding: MR = Main responsibility CR = Co-responsibility

Mr. T. Welte as evaluation director is responsible for evaluation overall coordination and strategic management. Mr. M. Pfaehler-Lücher as evaluation coordinator takes on evaluation operational coordination and management. Mr. J. Toulemonde as evaluation quality manager is responsible for overall quality support, control and assurance.

(3) Mr. H. Olama had been overall responsible for the EQ-9 and for the water & environmental protection components therein until mid April 2014. Since then, Mr. M. Yagan as responsible team member for the energy, renewable energy and energy efficiency components of the EQ-9, has taken over overall responsibilities for EQ-9. The aid modalities mix JC 9.7 is a shared responsibility between Mr. Yagan and Mr. Hidmi under the EQ-9, under overall guidance of Ms. Camilla Valmarana (responsible for EQ-9 aid modalities with special focus on budget support, incl. link to sectoral / thematic questions). Since May 2014, Mr. Hidmi is the responsible team member for water within EQ-9 and for the overall environment dimension.

(4) Ms. Camilla Valmarana is the responsible expert for EQ-4 (public institutions strengthening incl. Public Finance Management) and EQ-5 (aid modalities mix and efficiency, with special focus on budget support level 1 analysis) and is co-responsible for the aid modalities mix JC 3.6, 6.5, 8.6 and 9.7 under respectively EQs 3, 6, 8 and 9). She also pertains to the Public Finance Management (PFM) KPIS included under this aid modalities JC.

(5) Mr. Loay Hidmi has co-responsibility for the local governance / capacity strengthening evaluation components under EQ-4 on public institutions strengthening. Mr. M. Yagan has co-responsibility for the local economic development components under EQ-6 on private sector development and for the local democratic governance components under EQ-9 on democratic governance.

(6) Under the guidance of Ms. Valmarana, the respective team members are responsible for the special aid modalities mix JC in the sectoral / thematic questions for which they have main responsibility, as inputs to the overall evaluation question EQ-5 on aid modalities mix and efficiency. The EQ-5 on aid modalities mix and efficiency will especially focus on budget support (level 1 analysis) as main aid modality applied in the EU-Jordan cooperation programme. Ms. Valmarana has overall coordination responsibilities for all budget support matters under this EQ-5 vis-a-vis the sector / thematic Evaluation Questions concerned (EQs 3, 6, 8 and 9).

(7) Mr. R. Vaes assumes co-responsibility support services on the umbrella Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence (SCs) EQ-2 in relation to the coherence with other EU policies.
The Information Matrices by Individual Evaluation Question

Starting on the next page are the respective Information Matrices for the nine evaluation questions, consisting of the assessments of the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and of the Judgement Criteria (JCs) for each of the nine Evaluation Questions, with for each of the KPIs assessments the reference list of sources of data, figures and tables, of key extracts from documents, and of additional information sources from the field phase. Exceptionally, also excerpts from documents or tables are included.
3.1. EQ-1 IM on Strategic Alignment and Flexibility

### Information Matrix EQ-1: Strategic alignment and flexibility

#### Evaluation Question (code and title)

**EQ-1:** How well has the EU response strategy been aligned over time with the development objectives and priorities of the Government of Jordan and shown responsiveness in flexibly adapting to changes in the broader regional context affecting Jordan?

#### List of Judgement Criteria (JCs) under the EQ (codes and titles)

- **JC-1.1** The overall objectives and result areas of the EU response strategy are aligned with the national policy and development objectives and priorities of the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (GoHKoJ) reflecting the needs of the population
- **JC-1.2** The regional and national components of the EU response strategy are aligned and mutually reinforcing within the overall ENP framework of the EU-Jordan cooperation
- **JC-1.3** The EU response strategy has shown responsiveness in flexibly adapting and proactively adjusting to the evolving regional (i.e. Arab Spring, Iraqi and Syrian crises, Palestinian issues), global (e.g. financial and economic crisis) and national contexts (e.g. Upper Middle Income country status)
- **JC-1.4** The policy/political dialogue and the development cooperation strategy components of the EU-Jordan cooperation are consistent, timely, complementary and mutually reinforcing
- **JC-1.5** Actual programme implementation and operations are strategically aligned with the overall strategic objectives and priorities of the response strategy, as updated

#### JC-1.1

The overall objectives and result areas of the EU response strategy are aligned with the national policy and development objectives and priorities of the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (GoHKoJ) reflecting the needs of the population

#### List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 1.1 (codes and definition)

- **KPI-1.1.1** Level of alignment of the EU response strategy overall objectives and result areas (especially the 2007-2013 CSP and NIPs and the EU-Jordan ENP Action Plan) with the key national policy dialogue and development objectives and priorities included in the GoH KoJ policy and strategy documents concerned
- **KPI-1.1.2** Overall quality and intensity of the consultation and participatory processes with Government and civil society at the basis of the EC response strategy preparation and formulation documents
- **KPI-1.1.3** Extent to which the Logical Frameworks / Results Frameworks of the key strategy and programming documents and their updates are based on adequate and reliable information and analyses of the national situation and needs and their changes over time
- **KPI-1.1.4** Level of evidence that Civil Society / Non State Actors have been actively involved in the policy dialogue and consultation processes leading to the formulation of the response strategy and programmes and their updating, as for example evidenced by significant changes (thematic, target areas or groups, etc.) brought about by their participation in public debates / policy dialogue forums or other consultation mechanisms
KPI-1.1.1: Level of alignment of the EU response strategy overall objectives and result areas (especially the 2007-2013 CSP and NIPs and the EU-Jordan ENP Action Plan) with the key national policy dialogue and development objectives and priorities included in the GoHKOJ policy and strategy documents concerned

Main Findings on KPI-1.1.1:

The overall objectives and result areas of the Jordan response strategy covering the 2007-2013 period under review as enshrined in the Country Strategy Paper (CSP) and National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) and in the umbrella EU-Jordan European Neighbourhood Partnership (ENP) Action Plan are fully aligned with the key national policy dialogue and development objectives and priorities included in the key Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (GoHKOJ) policy and strategy documents concerned. In this way, the EU-Jordan cooperation is fully compliant with the criteria of alignment of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The main GoHKOJ overall national political and socio-economic development policy, strategic and programming documents covering this EU-Jordan country level evaluation period 2007 – 2013 are the following three: (i) The National Agenda 2006 -2015 – Kuluna al Urdun / The Jordan We Strive For of 2005; (ii) The Executive Programme 2007-2009 for the Kuluna al Urdun / National Agenda by the Government of Jordan’s Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC) of 2007, and its successor (iii) The Executive Development Programme 2011-2013 also by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation of 2011. The same alignment with the national policy dialogue and development objectives and priorities pertains to the successor EU-Jordan cooperation Single Support Framework covering the period 2014-2020.

The Jordan National Agenda lists eight “themes” of which “seven pillars” are described in detail in the Executive Programmes (both the 2007-2009 and the 2011-2013 programme) whereas the first item on Political Development and Inclusion is covered under the heading "Kuluna al Urdun – We Are All Jordan” Initiative in the Executive Programme preceding the detailed seven thematic/sector pillars. Although the comprehensive nature of the approach adopted involves considering all the different sectors and their interrelations, some priorities emerge. For each of these, the National Agenda develops recommended strategies and reforms and includes specific targets to be achieved: (i) Political reform and good governance are given a high priority; (ii) The economic reforms will be continued. Macroeconomic stability and reduction of fiscal imbalances remain a priority; (iii) The Agenda also sets up objectives for developing small businesses, improving the investment environment and the competitiveness of some specific sectors; (iv) Improving access to infrastructure and basic services is a clear objective, and (iv) A particular emphasis on addressing the key challenge of job creation, by reforming the vocational training system.

The EU-Jordan CSP/NIP of 2007-2013 explicitly mentions that EU’s strategic response to challenges must be both linked to Jordanian’s priorities and fully consistent with other EU policies: "The EU’s strategy is therefore to contribute to a successful implementation of the reforms planned in the National Agenda and Kuluna al Urdun, which are in line with the content of the Action Plan. These documents can clearly reinforce each other, as the National Agenda articulates the priorities and the necessary specific reforms to be undertaken to achieve some of the key objectives jointly agreed in the Action Plan." This consistency is ensured by the European Neighbourhood Partnership (ENP) policy framework. Indeed, the Action Plan represents a single framework for EU relations with Jordan, and the results of the EU-Jordan dialogue on implementing the ENP Action Plan - which involved the different services of the Commission - have guided the selection of priorities. The six priorities for action of the ENP Action Plan are: (i) Enhanced political dialogue and reform; (ii) economic and social reform and development; (iii) trade related issues, market and regulatory reform; (iv) cooperation in justice and home affairs; (v) transport, energy, information society and environment; and (6) people-to-people contacts, including education.

In this ultimate analysis of the convergence of the Jordanian and EU political/policy and strategic framework priorities lies the rationale of the EU-Jordan cooperation strategy under the ENPI-CSP 2007-2013, as is explicitly stated in the ENPI Jordan Strategy Paper 2007-2013. The ensuing priorities of the EU-Jordan Country Strategy Paper for the 2007-2013 can be clustered as follows: (i) Supporting Jordan’s reform in the areas of democracy, good governance, human rights, media and justice and fight against extremism, (ii) Enterprise, trade and investment development, (iii) Sustainability of the growth process (covering education and employment, development of renewable or alternative energy sources, local development and water management), and (iv) Institution building, financial stability and support for regulatory approximation (including Public Finance Management and Support to the implementation of the Action Plan Programme (SAPP). The total ENP envelope for the two NIPs is respectively EUR 265 and EUR 223 million, or a total of
EUR 488 million for the 2007-2013 (to which need to be added the substantive support through other EU financing instruments (SPRING, Special Measures for Syria, DCI Thematic Programmes, Instrument for Stability, Neighbourhood Investment Facility, ECHO, etc.).

At mid-term by 2010, in preparation of the 2nd NIP the continued validity and relevance of the original strategic objectives and components of the CSP which started in 2010 were reconfirmed, however without further justification and not based on assessment reports of evolving situation in the meantime. In the recent 2013 External Assistance Management Report the continued validity of the Jordan national or sectoral development strategy was also confirmed, however, noting that domestic stability (including impact of refugees inflows from neighbouring countries) and focus on immediate economic challenges have had some impact of the capacity of GOJ to deal with medium and longer term development strategy updates.

The Support to the Association Agreement Programme (SAAP) was initially developed in 2002 to enhance Jordan's capacities to take full advantage of the EU-Jordan Association Agreement in the area of trade. The demand-driven approach has broadened the programme objectives in the design of SAAP II, moving from economic and technical issues related to trade, to other areas of cooperation identified in the Action Plan and to new priorities emerging from the subcommittee dialogue. The availability for the Government of Jordan of an Operational Fund to be utilised in a flexible and dynamic way to support the implementation of the Association Agreement and the Action Plan has proved to be a key instrument in upgrading the Jordanian public institutions and in the approximation of policies and regulations in the sectors concerned. In the same way, outlining challenges and opportunities regarding the deconcentration, delegation, and devolution of responsibilities, development work in governorates and municipalities got recognized as a prerequisite for any implementation of decentralisation strategies in the future. The National Agenda contains broad strategies, policies and quantifiable objectives, which provide general action guidelines for the Government of Jordan (GoJ) in the years to come and as such provide a solid basis for the Public Finance Management (PFM) support package, the largest programme in the EU portfolio under the 2007-2013 period. Budget Support macro conditionalities in principle ensure alignment of EU support to the reform agenda with the overall strategic directions as laid down in the National Agenda and other key development policies, plans and strategies of the Government of Jordan.

Just recently, in the preparation of the follow-up EU-Jordan Single Support Framework (SSF) covering the subsequent strategic planning period from 2014 to 2020, the validity of the National Agenda got reconfirmed as strategic reference basis for the EU-Jordan cooperation framework and programme.

Also at the more specific levels of EU-Jordan sectoral, thematic, programme and projects cooperation this necessary alignment with GoHKoJ policy and strategic priorities and of the EU-Jordan Association Action Plan is emphasized. An example in this case are the interventions financed under the Support to the Implementation of the Action Plan (SAPP – series I to IV). These programmes have continued to be designed as demand-driven with a linkage to the other assistance programmes and to the deliberations and conclusions of the EU-Jordan Association Agreement Committee and ten Thematic Sub-Committees, which meet annually to review progress and priorities. This linkage offers a practical way to continuously keep the Programme well oriented towards its overall objective and thus ensuring its continued development relevance. The Support to the Employment and TVET Strategy programme for example is fully aligned with the National Agenda in strategically linking education and employment and in addition foreseeing a substantial social inclusion dimension by targeting people living with special needs and poorer social groups.

KPI-1.1.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- CSP 2007-2013, pp. 12-13
- CSP/NIP 2007-2010 - Necessary alignment EU response to GoJ
- NIP 2011-2013, p.6
- EAMR 2012, 15/09/2013, p.15
- TAPs 024-775Support to the implementation of the Action Plan IV – SAPP IV (2013), p. 4
- TAPs 019-571 Support to the implementation of the Action Plan – SAPP (2008), pp.4-5
- Action Fiche, Building Development Capacities of Jordanian Municipalities (2009), p.34
- Financing Agreement TAPs - ENP 2007 / 19214 Support to Public Finance Reform Programme
(iii) Additional information from field phase:


KPI-1.1.2: Overall quality and intensity of the consultation and participatory processes with Government and civil society at the basis of the EC response strategy preparation and formulation documents

Main Findings on KPI-1.1.2:

The consultation and participatory processes with Government and civil society at the basis of the EC response strategy preparation and formulation documents are generally at a satisfactory level based on the available documents studied in relation to the ENP Action Plans, the CSP and the NIPs. The enhanced degree of involvement and responsibilities of Civil Society Organisations in the design and implementation of EU cooperation strategies and action plans is analysed in more detail in relation to KPI 3.3.3 under EQ-3 on democratic governance.

There are indications that Civil Society Organisations have been duly involved in the design of the EU-Jordan cooperation strategy and programme. The European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) mid-term review mentions in connection with the Jordan CSP National Indicative Programme 2011-2013 preparation that both Brussels and Amman-based CSOs were consulted. A first programming mission took place in Amman in February 2009. A large number of local and international civil society organisations were invited to a roundtable discussion on the EC’s assistance strategy and possible avenues for future cooperation. A further strengthened and structured consultation process was confirmed by the contacted CSOs during the evaluation field phase on the occasion of the interviews and focus group discussions and also in the replies to the mini-survey on democratic governance. CSOs expressed their relative satisfaction with their involvement in the design of EU cooperation strategies and programmes with Jordan. A somewhat less positive overall reply was received with regard to their involvement in the actual implementation and monitoring of EU cooperation strategies and programmes. At the same time, improvements in this over time are also reported.

A somehow detailed account of the preparatory consultations with Government and CSOs is included in the NIP 2011-2013 document itself. An initial programming mission for the drafting of the current NIP took place in Amman in February 2009. Consultations took place with 12 Jordanian ministries and agencies (MoPIC, Jordan Enterprise, Jordan Investment Board, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Municipal Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Education, Executive Privatisation Commission, National Energy Research Centre, Ministry of Political Development, Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Labour ), USAID and the Member States. Member States were offered the possibility of joint programming. During that mission, local and international civil society organisations were also invited to a roundtable discussion on the EU’s assistance strategy, including possible avenues for future cooperation. Around 20 representatives reportedly participated in a lively discussion. The Commission subsequently drafted a concept note outlining the envisaged priorities for EU assistance in the period 2001-2013. This concept note was discussed with MoPIC during a second programming mission in March 2009. In April 2009 the concept note was published on the EC Delegation’s website and the different stakeholders, including the EIB and civil society organisations, were invited to comment. Five CSOs (local, regional and international) provided contributions.
that were taken into consideration in preparing the indicative programme.

As with regard to the development process of the National Executive Plans to implement the National Agenda / Kuluna al Urdun, based on the assessment of aid coordination and effectiveness in Jordan of February 2013, this is firmly led by the Government and reflects a strong national leadership. Donors do not contribute to this process and their involvement starts when the NEP is in place and the areas for external financing have been identified. At this stage, the donors are requested to align their assistance in support of the NEP – according to the identified areas and following the 3-years NEP cycle. The absence of a structured dialogue and exchange during the national planning process between the Government and the donors makes it challenging for the donors to align their assistance with the national development priorities and programming timetables as well as to harmonise planning with the national systems and to programme and plan external contributions accordingly. It also makes it challenging for the Government to anticipate and plan external funding and so to take the best possible advantage of these funding possibilities. At the programming level the process seems to become focused on the matching/approval process and the individual development projects for which funding is sought from donors – usually by approaching donors bilaterally.

The importance of due consultations with the key stakeholders, both government and civil society, to ensure ownership, relevance and thus sustainability of the interventions, has been underscored in different programme / project reviews and evaluations, and was reconfirmed to the evaluation team during different meetings. The SAPP I/II final evaluation in this regard observed that the experience with the initially selected pilot PPPs suggest that insufficient coordination at project inception and a lack of understanding of the nature of PPP among Government stakeholders can cause significant disruptions and even failure in the later stages of project implementation. Examples referred to are the tourism PPP projects and the waste water treatment plant Built-Own-Transfer (BOT) project. The same is reported in relation to the Trade and Transport Facilitation (TTF) Programme.

In the process, consultations with Government and Civil Society gradually got more structured and more solidly institutionalised. With regard to the new Single Support Framework development processes in the ENP region and thus also in Jordan, the EUDs are requested to seek the feedback of relevant national authorities, but also that of national civil society organisations, Member States of the European Union and key donors. These consultations are to be documented and their salient elements incorporated in the final version of the document as per the new Standard Operating Procedures.

KPI-1.1.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - Mid Term Review of ENPI (2009), p.4
   - NIP 2011-2013, pp. 20-21
   - Assessment of Aid Coordination and Effectiveness in Jordan, February 2013, different pages
   - SAPP 1/II final evaluation
   - EU New Response Strategy (2011), p.4
   - The Executive Programme 2007-2009 for the Kuluna al Urdun/National Agenda, p.19
   - Action Fiche, Local Development Programme, Dec 11
   - JC 7.1 – KPI 7.1.3
   - EQ-7 JC 7.5

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
**KPI-1.1.3: Extent to which the Logical Frameworks / Results Frameworks of the key strategy and programming documents and their updates are based on adequate and reliable information and analyses of the national situation and needs and their changes over time**

**Main Findings on KPI-1.1.3:**

In accordance with the prescribed PPCM guidelines, each intervention should have a Logical Framework / results framework to ensure the logic of the intervention, its results orientation and to make possible results management, monitoring and evaluation. An interlocking / solid alignment of the interventions LogFrames with the CSP/NIP and national development plans results framework (e.g. through common / shared key result indicators, ensure that the inventions stay results oriented in line with the strategic objectives and priorities of the broader sectoral / thematic area and national development objectives. Hence the rationale for a special CLE indicator on the overall quality, relevance and anchoring / alignment of the results frameworks.

Of the total of 43 key interventions / Financing Decisions benefiting Jordan interventions related to the 2007-2013 period, a Logical Framework could be retrieved for 24 of them through a search of the CRIS database attached documents and from EC sources (55.8% of all cases). For none of the 10 Budget Support programmes and none of the 22 Programme Estimates type of Project Approaches such LogFrame / Results Frameworks could be found at contract level. The above is based on search results including the documents that became additionally available during the late desk, field and draft synthesis phases of the evaluation, and thus may be assumed to be representing a reliable picture of the actual situation. For the sake of completeness, it must be mentioned that the above results / logical framework do not include the Performance Assessment Frameworks or PAFs for the Budget Support interventions, forming the basis for target setting for decision making on tranche releases which are performance related is as much as based on the key indicators from the PAFs. Different ROM monitoring and evaluation reports have alerted to the fact that for the Programme Estimates Project Approach interventions there is no overall logframe, ensuring unity and strategic orientation of the different sub-programmes implemented by different implementing agencies under different twinning arrangements. While this PE project approach makes SAPP a strongly demand driven and flexible programme, the lack of an overall programme LogFrame also impacts on the overall direction of the programme, in as much that an overall, common strategic direction is lacking harmonized overall public sector strengthening. On the other hand it is acknowledged that at the individual projects level, as is documented, specific LogFrames need to be developed for each of the projects complete with targeted indicators in conformity with the PPCM methodology. In SAPP II programme estimate 1 it is also clarified that the twinning and long-term technical assistance agreements will have LogFrames, while the supplies, works and framework contracts will have these LF elements detailed throughout the articles of the relevant agreements.

There is no firm evidence that the LogFrames once developed in order to facilitate project/programme approval for funding are also actively used thereafter for internal programme management and monitoring purposes. There are no indications in so far that targeted implementation plans are developed based on the approved LogFrames, nor of their updating as strategic and operational management tools. In relation to this, as evidenced by ROM and evaluation reports, one of the main concerns is the absence or low quality of performance monitoring systems and the absence of or the inadequate staffing or function of M&E units in the partner agencies implementing the EU-Jordan cooperation interventions. The 2013 Private Sector Development evaluation reported that there is not one case where a final evaluation of the preceding phase was completed before the approval of the next phase and the finalisation of the financing decision. As far as the CSP and the NIPs are concerned, there is no conclusive evidence that they themselves are designed along a results framework as was validated during the field phase based on interviews and requests for documents concerned.

**KPI-1.1.3 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- SAPP II, Programme Estimate 1, 2011, p.10
- IKRS 2012 (15 Sep 2013)
- ROM report on SAAP, MR-141402.01, Sept 28, 2011
(iii) Additional information from field phase:

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KPI-1.1.4: Level of evidence that Civil Society / Non State Actors have been actively involved in the policy dialogue and consultation processes leading to the formulation of the response strategy and programmes and their updating, as for example evidenced by significant changes (thematic, target areas or groups, etc.) brought about by their participation in public debates / policy dialogue forums or other consultation mechanisms

Main Findings on KPI-1.1.4:

As asserted before already in relation to KPI-1.1.2, there is evidence that Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have been duly involved in the design of the EU-Jordan cooperation strategy and programme. The European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) mid-term review mentions in connection with the Jordan CSP National Indicative Programme 2011-2013 preparation that both Brussels and Amman-based CSOs were consulted. A first programming mission took place in Amman in February 2009. A large number of local and international civil society organisations were invited to a roundtable discussion on the EC’s assistance strategy and possible avenues for future cooperation. Around 20 representatives reportedly participated in a lively discussion. The Commission subsequently drafted a concept note outlining the envisaged priorities for EC assistance in the period 2008-2013. The concept note was posted on the EC Delegation’s website with an invitation to comment. Five CSOs (local, regional and international) provided contributions. Their main recommendations stressed the need to: (i) Attach more importance to the first CSP-NIP priority of political reform and good governance, (ii) Attach more importance to sustainable development of the agricultural sector, (iii) Support capacity-building of CSOs and conduct a needs assessment survey, and (iv) Promote participation of women in political and economic life.

There likewise is documentary evidence of an enhanced degree of involvement and responsibilities of CSOs in the design and implementation of EU cooperation strategies and action programmes. The identification and programming tools of EU interventions foresee a standard screening of the active involvement and responsibilities of CSOs in the different phases of the integrated project/programme cycle, and this particularly in the wake of the new EU response strategy for the Southern Neighbourhood of 2011 calling for strengthened partnerships with civil society. The 2011-2013 NIP in this regard explicitly foresees that CSOs will be consulted on the design of the measures to be implemented under the programme and might be involved in the monitoring process. On the other hand, as covered in the assessments of the other indicators under the specific JC-3.3 on Civil Society Organisations hereafter, there equally appears to be a need for CSO capacity strengthening to enable assumption of these roles and responsibilities in a more effective and qualitative manner. Moreover, projects with CSOs/NGOs may be negatively affected by the new Societies law imposing stricter control over civil society activities, and concerns over this issue has been at the core of CSO dialogue for quite some time.

Policy dialogue consultations with Civil Society Organisations are organised on a fairly regular basis as reported by the EU Delegation in for example its External Assistance Management Reports. These EAMRs contain a special section on formal consultations involving CSOs. In 2011 a total of 11 such formal
consultations took place in comparison to 6 in the preceding year 2010. Main topics of the consultations in 2012 included Energy policy, human rights and democratisation, transparency, education and vocational training policy, culture, and feedback on policy implementation and aid impact. In addition, 3 information sessions in relation to calls for proposals were held. Consultations linked to completion of EU programmes and related dialogue on policy issues amounted to 6. A total of 175 CSO representatives attended these meetings. There were 4 ongoing CSO projects, of which 2 ongoing projects on CSO capacity strengthening.

As reported in the EU Delegation 2012 EAMR, “civil society dialogue is a constant feature of EUD work in Jordan. Consultations on various topics, mainly political (elections) but also with broader scope such as programming (this year) are well attended and a platform for substantial exchanges. The EU Jordan Task Force in February offered another such high level and visible opportunity. Instruments towards reinforcing CSO capacity are trusted. As in past years the ENP subcommittee on human rights was accompanied by CSO dialogue and debriefing. CSO involvement in dialogue on policies supported through Budget Support is encouraged in sectors such as energy. GGDC features a special envelope for a civil society action to improve interaction with GOJ on policy making. SSF focal identification took account of CSO consultation.” Reported advantages: Consultations contribute: (i) to quality and substance of policy dialogue; (ii) to broader understanding of EU policies; (iii) better visibility; (iv) moreover they increase the level of expected accountability of the ENP partnership’s results particularly through cooperation; (v) provide opportunities to highlight new needs. The dialogue reportedly has over time become increasingly open, including constructive criticism. Increased accountability, transparency, participation are prominent objectives of Jordan’s reform agenda and it is acknowledged that this requires capacity building on both sides. Support to this end is available through programmes. Around elections, very active dialogue, through mobilisation of domestic observer coalitions and in particular very good interaction with the Independent Election Committee (IEC).

For the design and development of the new Single Support Framework / Multi-Annual Indicative Programme covering the period 2014-2020 as a successor to the completed 2007-2013 CSP, the structured consultation of Civil Society is formally part of the standard operating procedures for preparing such national SSFs/MIPs. In the case of Jordan, in October of last year 2013 the EUD invited CSOs to participate in a comprehensive consultation process with proceeding documented and salient elements incorporated in the final version of the document. The CSO consultations are part and parcel of a broader package of consultations including the relevant national authorities, the EU Member States and key donors. The strengthening of CSOs involvement and ownership programmes and projects throughout the integrated programme/project cycle is also emphasized and proactively pursued with regard to both the ENI Regional Southern Mediterranean Strategy (2014-2020) and Multiannual Indicative Programme (2014-2017).

This CSO involvement in EU-Jordan cooperation strategy and programme design was confirmed by the contacted CSOs during the evaluation field phase on the occasion of the interviews and focus group discussions and also in the replies to the mini-survey on democratic governance. CSOs expressed their relative satisfaction about their involvement in the design of EU cooperation strategies and programmes with Jordan. A somewhat less positive overall appreciation was given by the responding CSOs with regard to their involvement in the actual implementation and monitoring of EU cooperation strategies and programmes. At the same time, improvements in this over time are also reported.

Non-state actors expressed their satisfaction at the increasing quantity and quality of contacts with the Delegation over the period from 2008 until the present. Consultations do not merely take place on matters relating to funding, but the Delegation has made a conscientious effort over the period to involve CSOs on a much wider basis of policy-related issues, e.g. prior to meetings of the EU-Jordan Sub-committee on Human rights and in the preparation of the Annual Progress Report. However, despite assurances of a commitment to reform and greater democratisation on the part of the Government, the operating environment for non-state actors in Jordan, particularly for those involved in advocacy and human rights, continues to be a difficult one. Despite insistence from the Government that it is more receptive to dialogue with civil society organisations after the Arab Spring, the organisations present felt that progress was marginal and too dependent on the good or ill will of individual ministers. CSOs believe that the official channels of communication (Association Agreement Sub-Committees) are not working and that MoPIC will be highly resistant to any move for a greater role of civil society organisations in establishing and reviewing priorities under the Action Plan. There was widespread criticism of the government’s media policy, particularly with regard to the interference related to web sites, and criticism of the EU for continuing to issue declarations of support for the Jordanian authorities’ commitment to reform which CSOs feel does not correspond to the reality of the situation.
KPI-1.1.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Number of formal consultations involving Civil Society Organisations in 2012 (EAMR KPI 3): 11
- Number of formal consultations involving Civil Society Organisations in 2011 (EAMR KPI 3): 6

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- IKRS 2012, (2012), p.5 - Dialogue with CSOs and LAs
- Mid-Term Review of ENPI (2009), pp. 4 & 7
- NIP 2011-2013, p.8
- NIP 2011-2013 – Preparatory consultations, KPI-2.2.1
- CSP 2007-2013 - Chap. 4
- IKRS 2010 (2011), p.4
- Assessment of Aid Coordination and Effectiveness in Jordan, February 2013
- Action Fiche 19569, Support to Justice Reform and Good Governance in Jordan (2008), p.36
- Memo 11/638 on the Civil Society Facility 2011-2013, p.2
- JC-6.5 assessment
- JC-6.6 assessment

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- IKRS-2 (2014), p.6 - on links with non-state actors

JC-1.1: The overall objectives and result areas of the EU response strategy are aligned with the national policy and development objectives and priorities of the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (GoHKoJ) reflecting the needs of the population

Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-1.1 (based on the KPIs main findings)

The overall objectives and result areas of the Jordan response strategy covering the 2007-2013 period under review as enshrined in the Country Strategy Paper (CSP) and National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) and in the umbrella EU-Jordan European Neighbourhood Partnership (ENP) Action Plan are fully aligned with the key national policy dialogue and development objectives and priorities included in the key Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (GoHKoJ) policy and strategy documents concerned. In this way, the EU-Jordan cooperation is in full compliance with the base criteria concerned at the basis of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The main GoHKoJ overall national political and socio-economic development policy, strategic and programming documents covering this EU-Jordan country level evaluation period 2007–2013 are the following three: (i) The National Agenda 2006-2015 – Kuluna al Urdun / The Jordan We Strive For of 2005; (ii) The Executive Programme 2007-2009 for the Kuluna al Urdun / National Agenda by the Government of Jordan’s Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC) of 2007, and its successor (iii) The Executive Development Programme 2011-2013 also by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation of 2011. The same alignment with the national policy dialogue and development objectives and priorities pertains to the successor EU-Jordan cooperation Single Support Framework covering the period 2014-2020.

The EU-Jordan CSP/NIP of 2007-2013 explicitly mentions that EU’s strategic response to challenges must be both linked to Jordan’s priorities and fully consistent with other EU policies: “The EU’s strategy is therefore to contribute to a successful implementation of the reforms planned in the National Agenda and Kuluna al Urdun, which are in line with the content of the Action Plan. These documents can clearly reinforce each other, as the National Agenda articulates the priorities and the necessary specific reforms to be undertaken to achieve some of the key objectives jointly agreed in the Action Plan.” This consistency is ensured by the European Neighbourhood Partnership (ENP) policy framework.

In this ultimate analysis about the convergence of the Jordanian and EU political/policy and strategic framework priorities lies the rationale of the EU-Jordan cooperation strategy under the ENPI-CSP 2007-2013, as it is explicitly stated in the ENPI Jordan Strategy Paper 2007-2013. The total ENP envelope for the two NIPs is respectively EUR 265 million and EUR 223 million or a total of EUR 488 million for the 2007-2013 (to which need to be added the substantive support through other EU financing instruments (SPRING,
Special Measures for Syria, DCI Thematic Programmes, Instrument for Stability, Neighbourhood Investment Facility, ECHO, etc.).

At mid-term by 2010, in preparation of the 2nd NIP the continued validity and relevance of the original strategic objectives and components of the CSP which started in 2010 were reconfirmed, however without further justification and not based on assessment reports of evolving situation in the meantime. In the recent 2013 External Assistance Management Report also the continued validity of the Jordan national or sectoral development strategy was confirmed, however noting that domestic stability (including impact of refugees inflows from neighbouring countries) and focus on immediate economic challenges have had some impact of the capacity of GOJ to deal with medium and longer term development strategy updates.

The National Agenda contains broad strategies, policies and quantifiable objectives, which provide general action guidelines for the Government of Jordan (GoJ) in the years to come and as such provide a solid basis for the Public Finance Management (PFM) support package, the largest programme in the EU portfolio under the 2007-2013 period. Budget Support macro conditionalities in principle ensure alignment of EU support to the reform agenda with the overall strategic directions as laid down in the National Agenda and other key development policies, plans and strategies of the Government of Jordan.

Just recently, in the preparation of the follow-up EU-Jordan Single Support Framework (SSF) covering the subsequent strategic planning period from 2014 to 2020, the validity of the National Agenda got reconfirmed as strategic reference basis for the EU-Jordan cooperation framework and programme. Also at the more specific levels of EU-Jordan sectoral, thematic, programme and projects cooperation this necessary alignment with GoHKoJ policy and strategic priorities and of the EU-Jordan Association Action Plan is emphasized. (KPI-1.1.1)

The consultation and participatory processes with Government and civil society at the basis of the EC response strategy preparation and formulation documents generally are at a satisfactory level based on the available documents studied in relation to the ENP Action Plans, the CSP and the NIPs. A rather detailed account of the preparatory consultations with Government and CSOs is included in the NIP 2011-2013 document itself. There indeed are indications that Civil Society Organisations have been duly involved in the design of the EU-Jordan cooperation strategy and programme. A further strengthening and structuring of the consultation process was confirmed by the contacted CSOs during the evaluation field phase on the occasion of the interviews and focus group discussions and also in the replies to the mini-survey on democratic governance. CSOs expressed their relative satisfaction about their involvement in the design of EU cooperation strategies and programmes with Jordan. A somewhat less positive overall reply was received with regard to their involvement in the actual implementation and monitoring of EU cooperation strategies and programmes. At the same time, improvements in this over time are also reported. The enhanced degree of involvement and responsibilities of Civil Society Organisations in the design and implementation of EU cooperation strategies and action plans is analysed in more detail in relation to KPI 3.3.3 under EQ-3 on democratic governance.

The importance of due consultations with the key stakeholders, both government and civil society, to secure ownership, relevance and thus sustainability of the interventions, has been underscored in different programme / project reviews and evaluations, and was reconfirmed to the evaluation team during different meetings. The SAPP I/II final evaluation in this regard observed that the experience with the initially selected pilot PPPs suggest that insufficient coordination at project inception and a lack of understanding of the nature of PPP among Government stakeholders can cause significant disruptions and even failure in the later stages of project implementation. Examples referred to are the tourism PPP projects and the waste water treatment plant Built-Own-Transfer (BOT) project. The same is reported in relation to the Trade and Transport Facilitation (TTF) Programme.

In the process, consultations with Government and Civil Society gradually got more structured and more solidly institutionalised. With regard to the new Single Support Framework development processes in the ENP region and thus also in Jordan, the EUDs are requested to seek the feedback of relevant national authorities, but also that of national civil society organisations, Member States of the European Union and key donors. These consultations are to be documented and their salient elements incorporated in the final version of the document as per the new Standard Operating Procedures. (KPI-1.1.2)

Non-state actors expressed their satisfaction at the increasing quantity and quality of contacts with the Delegation over the period from 2008 until the present. Consultations do not merely take place on matters relating to funding, but the Delegation has made a conscientious effort over the period to involve CSOs on a much wider basis of policy-related issues, e.g. prior to meetings of the EU-Jordan Sub-committee on Human
In accordance with the prescribed PPCM guidelines, each intervention should have a Logical Framework / results framework to ensure the logic of the intervention, its results orientation and to make possible results management, monitoring and evaluation. An interlocking / solid alignment of the interventions LogFrames with the CSP/NIP and national development plans results framework (e.g. through common / shared key result indicators, ensure that the inventions stay results oriented in line with the strategic objectives and priorities of the broader sectoral / thematic area and national development objectives. Hence the rationale for a special indicator on the overall quality, relevance and anchoring / alignment of the results frameworks.

Of the total of 43 key interventions / Financing Decisions benefiting Jordan interventions related to the 2007-2013 period, a Logical Framework could be retrieved for 24 of them through a search of the CRIS database attached documents and from EC sources (55.8% of all cases). For the sake of completeness it must be mentioned that the above results / logical framework do not include the Performance Assessment Frameworks or PAFs for the Budget Support interventions, forming the basis for target setting for decision making on tranche releases which are performance related is as much as based on the key indicators from the PAFs. Different ROM monitoring and evaluation reports have alerted to the fact that for the Programme Estimates Project Approach interventions there is no overall logframe, ensuring unity and strategic orientation of the different sub-programmes implemented by different implementing agencies under different twinning arrangements. While this PE project approach makes SAPP a strongly demand driven and flexible programme, the lack of an overall programme LogFrame also impacts on the overall direction of the programme, in as much that an overall, common strategic direction is lacking for harmonized overall public sector strengthening. It on the other hand is acknowledged that at the individual projects level, as is documented, specific LogFrames need to developed for each of the projects complete with targeted indicators conform with the PPCM methodology. In SAPP II programme estimate 1 it also is clarified that the twinning and long-term technical assistance agreements will have LogFrames, while the supplies, works and framework contracts will have these LF elements detailed throughout the articles of the relevant agreements.

There is no firm evidence that the LogFrames once developed in order to facilitate project/programme approval for funding are also actively used thereafter for internal programme management and monitoring purposes. There are no indications so far that targeted implementation plans are developed based on the approved LogFrames, nor of their updating as strategic and operational management tools. In relation to this, as evidenced by ROM and evaluation reports, one of the main concerns is the absence or low quality of performance monitoring systems and the absence of or inadequate staffing or function of M&E units in the partner agencies implementing the EU-Jordan cooperation interventions. The 2013 Private Sector Development evaluation reported that there is not one case where a final evaluation of the preceding phase was completed before the approval of the next phase and the finalisation of the financing decision. As far as the CSP and the NIPs are concerned, there is no conclusive evidence that they themselves are designed along a results framework as was validated during the field phase based on interviews and requests for documents concerned.
The regional and national components of the EU response strategy are aligned and mutually reinforcing within the overall ENP framework of the EU-Jordan cooperation

List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 1.2 *(codes and definition)*

| KPI-1.2.1 | Level of internal consistency of the EU Southern Neighbourhood regional strategy and programmes (RSP-RIPs), the EU-Jordan Association Agreement and ENP Action Plans (AA and APs) and the EU ENPI Jordan country strategy and programmes (CSP-NIPs) |
| KPI-1.2.2 | Evidence level of EU programming and implementation documents on strategic and operational links (identification and formulation missions, TA missions, co-financed projects or events, etc.) between regional (RIP and APs) and national (NIP) strategic and programmatic responses |
| KPI-1.2.3 | Level of synchronization of outputs timing from regional programmes facilitating implementation of national support operations and vice versa |
| KPI-1.2.4 | Overall quality and intensity of the coordination and complementarity between EC staff, project managers, twinning and TA missions from thematically / sector related regional and national programmes and interventions |

**KPI-1.2.1:** Level of internal consistency of the EU Southern Neighbourhood regional strategy and programmes (RSP-RIPs), the EU-Jordan Association Agreement and ENP Action Plans (AA and APs) and the EU ENPI Jordan country strategy and programmes (CSP-NIPs)

**Main Findings on KPI-1.2.1:**

Regional co-operation has a strategic impact as it deals with issues that different Mediterranean Partners have in common, while complementing national policies and promoting south-south cooperation and integration. Above all, the Regional Programmes function as a forum for dialogue. The regional approach contributes to defining and implementing policies in fields ranging from energy, environment and transport, to gender, youth, education and culture. One of the aims in EU policies today is the strengthening of regional markets. The portfolio of regional projects in the EU Neighbourhood is impressive. A total of 58 regional projects for Southern Neighbourhood Countries are listed at present on the EU Neighbourhood Info Centre website with hyperlinks to more detailed information. A majority of these are also implemented and/or directly affecting Jordan.

Based on the substantive additional documents and information which became available during the evaluation field visit, a generally high level of consistency among the EU Southern Neighbourhood regional strategy and programmes in general, the EU-Jordan Association Agreement, the ENP Action Plans and the EU ENPI Jordan country strategy and programmes (CSP-NIPs) in the period under review can be concluded. In fact, the former two regional strategies/programmes provide the broader policy, strategic and programming framework for the EU-Jordan Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programmes. This confirmation of general consistency between the regional and national levels also pertains to the more operational level of the concrete interventions, although for this operational level quite some knowledge sharing and coordination issues were shared during the evaluation visit. An example is EUD officers learning about ENP regional initiatives in the country through the national media.

Another finding from the evaluation field visit interviews with different key stakeholders in relation to synergies and alignment between regional and national cooperation levels to the benefit of the Kingdom at the level of actual interventions is that there is a rather mixed appreciation of regional initiatives. In a number of cases, regional programmes not only were well appreciated but also came out more positive and visible in relation to the national programmes/interventions in the sector / thematic area. This was more particularly pointed at in relation to the sectors of water, energy and transport.

At the overall strategic level, already before the EU-Jordan CSP 2007-2013 there has been a common strategic approach guided by the general EU policies and strategies in line with the European dimension of the Barcelona process and the ENP strategy. The objective of the EU strategy for Jordan has been to prepare a privileged partnership going beyond cooperation to a new level of deepened political cooperation and economic integration. As outlined in the CSP document, the strategic response must be both linked to Jordan’s priorities and fully consistent with other EU policies. This consistency is ensured by the ENP policy.
The ENP Action Plan represents a single framework for EU relations with Jordan, and the results of the EU-Jordan dialogue on implementing the ENP Action Plan - which involved the different services of the Commission - have guided the selection of CSP/NIPs 2007-2013 priorities. In addition to targeted technical and financial assistance, the ENP offers a number of opportunities to support the implementation of the Action Plan, such as trade openings, a stake in the internal market, participation in some Community programmes, and the opportunity to benefit from TAIEX seminars. As the time of CSP design in 2005-2005, these elements introduced an innovation to EU cooperation with its neighbouring countries and represented another step towards integration with EU policies. The practical implication is that new forms of support are put at Jordan’s disposal. In order to fully benefit from the different types of support, one of the challenges ever since has been to enhance the synergies between the financial assistance and the other “ENP incentives”.

In support of the ENP, the EU decided to create a single European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). The overall objective of the ENPI is to provide assistance aimed at promoting enhanced cooperation and progressive economic integration between the EU and its neighbouring countries and, in particular, supporting the implementation of partnership and cooperation agreements, association agreements or other existing and future agreements. As such, the ENPI provides financial support for the objectives of the Barcelona Process, the Association Agreements, the ENP and the ENP Action Plans. The Barcelona Declaration, the AAs and the ENP Action Plans are jointly agreed policy documents between the EU and its Mediterranean partners, with fully shared ownership. As such, they constitute a joint strategy to address the policy issues in the region, both at bilateral and at regional levels. In reply to the profound transformation process in the region, on 8 March 2011 a Joint Communication to the European Council, the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions was issued on “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”. The Joint Communication states that this Partnership should be built on the following three elements: (i) Democratic transformation and institution-building, with a particular focus on fundamental freedoms, constitutional reforms, reform of the judiciary and the fight against corruption; (ii) A stronger partnership with the people, with specific emphasis on support to civil society and on enhanced opportunities for exchanges and people-to-people contacts with a particular focus on the young, and; (iii) Sustainable and inclusive growth and economic development especially support to Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), vocational and educational training, improving health and education systems and development of the poorer regions.

A Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) for the period 2007-2013 was drawn up, with two Regional Indicative Programmes (2007-2010 and 2011-2013), thus synchronized with the country CSP and NIPs as in the case of Jordan. Covering the same period 2007-2013, under the European Neighbourhood & Partnership Instrument (ENPI), another regional strategy and programme got approved entitled “Cross-Border Cooperation Strategy”.

Both the 1997 Association Agreement (which entered into force in May 2002) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Action Plan, adopted in 2005, contributed significantly to developing the bilateral relations. This 2005 Action Plan originally covered a timeframe of three to five years and aimed at helping to fulfil the provisions in the Association Agreement (AA) and to encourage and support Jordan’s national reform objectives and further integration into European economic and social structures. The 2005 Action plan explicitly aimed at supporting Jordan’s political reform agenda as set out in its “National Plan for Political Development”. This National Plan has been developed to progress with political reform designed to consolidate democracy, accountability, transparency and justice in Jordan, and to build a model for a modern, knowledge-based Islamic and Arab country. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Action Plan also responds to the Government of Jordan’s National Social and Economic Action Plan (2004-2006), which aims to develop a sustainable socio-economic reform process.

In October 2010, Jordan and the EU reached an agreement on a new EU-Jordan ENP Action Plan. The document gives concrete substance to the “advanced status” relationship between Jordan and the EU. “Advanced status” partnership means closer cooperation in a large number of areas, and specific commitments on both sides. The new Action Plan succeeds the one of 2005 and spells out the EU-Jordan agenda for the next five years. The Association Agreement (AA) remains the framework for cooperation while the Action Plan (AP) represents a declaration of mutual objectives and commitments. The Second EU-Jordan ENP Action Plan was formally adopted in 2012. In the same year 2012, the EU and Jordan signed the Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement on the general principles for the participation of Jordan in EU programmes.
KPI-1.2.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Barcelona Agreement plus ENP strategy as broader framework
- Please see below

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- CSP-NIP, 2007-2013, pp. 16-17
- CSP-NIP, 2007-2013, pp. 21-22
- NIP 2011-2013, pp. 5-6
- NIP 2011-2013, p.4
- Executive Programme 2007-2009, p.4
- KPI 6.5.4
- JC-7.2 assessment
- CLE Jordan IR, 2014, Chapter 3.2: The European Union Cooperation Policy and Strategic Framework, pp. 31-38 based on various European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) regional policy, strategy and programming documents of direct relevance to / directly affecting Jordan

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- EU Neighbourhood Info Centre website – EuroMed Regional Project List
### KPI-1.2.1 (iii) Additional information from field phase:


The total of 58 regional projects for Southern Neighbourhood Countries listed on the EU Neighbourhood Info Centre website with hyperlinks to more detailed information, are the following:

- Addressing climate change in the Middle East and North-Africa (MENA) region
- Anna Lindh Foundation for Inter-Cultural Dialogue
- Cleaner energy-saving Mediterranean cities
- Clima South: Support for Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation in the ENPI South region
- Development of a Mediterranean marine and coastal protected areas network (MedPAN)
- EAMGM II – Euro-Arab Mashreq Gas Market Project
- Enhancing the capacity of civil society organisations in promoting and protecting the rights of migrants in the Southern Mediterranean region
- ENPI Shared Environment Information System (SEIS)
- Erasmus+
- eTwinning Plus
- EU Border Assistance Mission to Libya (EUBAM Libya)
- EUMEDRegNet II – Information society cooperation
- Euro-Med Migration III
- Euro-Mediterranean Trade and Investment Facilitation Mechanism (Euro-Med TIFM)
- Euromed Audiovisual III
- Euromed Aviation II
- EUROMED INVEST (EU Support to business and investment partnerships in Southern Mediterranean)
- Euromed Justice III, Euromed Police III
- Euromed programme for the prevention, preparedness and response to natural and man-made disasters (PPRD) South II
- EuroMed Road, Rail and Urban Transport regional programme
- Euromed Satellite Navigation: GNSS II
- EuroMed Youth IV
- FEMISE – Socio-economic research
- GEMM: Governance for Employability in the Mediterranean
- Horizon 2020 Capacity Building/Mediterranean Environment Programme (H2020 CB/MEP)
- Information and training seminars for Euro-Mediterranean diplomats
- Integrated Maritime Policy for the Mediterranean (IMP-MED)
- Investment Security in the Mediterranean (ISMED) Support Programme
- MED-ENEC II - Energy efficiency in construction
- MED-REG II – Energy regulators
- Media and culture for development in the Southern Mediterranean region
- Mediterranean Motorways of the Sea – Maritime transport connections
- MEDSTAT III - Statistical cooperation
- Middle East Peace Projects (EU Partnership for Peace - EUPiP)
- Multi-country cooperation instruments: CBC, NIF, TWINNING, TAIEX, SIGMA
- Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility
- Networks of Mediterranean Youth (NET-MED Youth)
- Paving the Way for the Mediterranean Solar Plan
- Preparing staff for EU-ENP related jobs
- Private sector development in the Southern Mediterranean
- Promoting participation of ENP partners in the work of EU agencies
- Rail, Road and Urban Transport – Road Safety programme
- Regional Communication Programme
- SAFEMED III – Maritime Safety and Pollution Prevention
- Social and ecological resilience in the face of climate change in the Mediterranean Region
- Spring forward for women
- Stabilising at-risk communities and enhancing migration management to enable smooth transitions in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya (START)
- Strengthening democratic reform in the southern Neighbourhood
- Support for partnership, reforms and inclusive growth (SPRING)
- Support to FEMIP
- Support to the European Endowment for Democracy
- Supporting the Union for the Mediterranean Secretariat
- Sustainable Urban Demonstration Projects (SUDeP) – South
- Sustainable Water Management and De-pollution of the Mediterranean
- SWITCH-Med: Switching to more sustainable consumption and production in the Mediterranean
- Training and Information Course on Euro-Arab diplomacy
- TRESMED 4 – Civil society dialogue
The Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) for the period 2007-2013 also in the governance and institutional capacity strengthening programmes through the cross-transnational routes, etc. The regional dimension in fact pervades the whole national response programme, the EU, development of motorways of the Sea links in the region, development of main multimodal transport facilities, safety and security, launching of sub-regional cooperation initiatives, conference of aviation agreements with the EU, development of motorways of the Sea links in the region, development of main multimodal transnational routes, etc. The regional dimension in fact pervades the whole national response programme. The answer already partially lies in the structure itself of the EU neighbourhood cooperation as the national level is directly linked to, if not integral part of the ENP regional strategic level.

This for example is explicitly confirmed in the 2011-2013 NIP where it states that the EU is not only involved on the bilateral level but also on the regional level and that the ENP builds on the achievements of the Euro Mediterranean Partnership. With the NIP 2011-2013 the EU aims to anchor national developments in the regional context and create links between EU activities on the national level and EU activities on the regional level. Resources for enhanced sector cooperation between relevant EU agencies and programmes and interested public bodies and authorities in Jordan are provided as appropriate under the ENPI Inter-Regional Programme 2011-13. This regional dimension, for example, is very prominently present in the deepening trade and transport interventions. The interventions addressed at deepening trade and economic relations should have provided the conditions for increasing investment from EU side and increased exports from Jordan side to reduce the very large trade deficit. These expected results coincide with the regional ENP strategy, of which trade and transport are large components. The 2011 regional programme indicators, in effect, stress: Transport sector reforms, convergence with EU rules and standards, especially in the field of safety and security, launching of sub-regional cooperation initiatives, conclusion of aviation agreements with the EU, development of motorways of the Sea links in the region, development of main multimodal transnational routes, etc. The regional dimension in fact pervades the whole national response programme, also in the governance and institutional capacity strengthening programmes through the cross-border exchanges of good/best practices and lessons learnt amongst others.

The Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) for the period 2007-2013 has been drawn up, with two Regional
Indicative Programmes (2007-2010 and 2011-2013), thus synchronized with the country CSP and NIPs as in the case of Jordan. This Regional Strategy Paper also respects the principles and objectives of the EU’s unilateral declaration on Community development policy (joint Council and Commission declaration on development cooperation of 2005) and the cooperation objectives also take into consideration the objectives and principles of the European Consensus on Development adopted on 22 November 2005. The reduction and eventual eradication of poverty through support for sustainable development, the gradual integration of partner countries into the world economy, the combating of inequality, all of these are consistent with the goals of the BP and ENP, as repeated in the Barcelona Summit conclusions.

The ENPI Regional Strategy Paper 2007-2013 has 8 strategic objectives in relation to the following: (i) monitoring and impact assessments, (ii) higher education cooperation, (iii) economic governance reforms, (iii) regulatory harmonisation with EU standards in the SPS field, (iv) implementation of maritime policy, (v) justice, security and migration cooperation, (vi) sustainable economic development, (vii) social development and (viii) cultural exchanges. RIP-1 for the period 2007-10 has an overall envelope of EUR 343.3 million for three priority areas: (i) Political, justice, security and migration cooperation, (ii) Sustainable economic development, and (iii) Social development and cultural exchanges. RIP-2 covering the period 2011-2013 has a total budget of EUR 757.5 million along 5 priority areas: (i) Reform through EU advice and expertise, (ii) Higher education modernisation and student mobility, (iii) Cooperation between local actors in the EU and in partner countries, (iii) Investment projects in partner countries (e.g. through the Neighbourhood Investment Facility - NIF); (iv) Cooperation between ENP partners and EU agencies, and (v) Inter-regional cultural action.

There is thus a strong synergy between the strategic objectives and thematic areas included in the ENP Regional Strategy Paper 2007-2013 and the thematic focus areas included in the national EU-Jordan CSP 2007-2013 and the two NIP programmes resorting thereunder (resp. 2007-2010 and 2011-2013). The same pertains to the Cross-Border Cooperation Strategy. In this connection and with the regional cooperation strategies, programmes and their concrete operational projects and activities, it was stressed on different occasions during the field visit that the South-South cooperation and exchanges dimension should be more prominent. Ideas were also shared on further strengthening of “North-South-South networks with more prominent roles for best practices and centres of excellence in Neighbourhood countries as Jordan (hub networking).

Covering the same period 2007-2013, under the European Neighbourhood & Partnership Instrument (ENPI), this other regional strategy and programme got approved entitled “Cross-Border Cooperation Strategy” got approved, also with special relevance to the EU-Jordan national response strategy. The core policy objectives of CBC on the external borders of the Union are to support sustainable development alongside both sides of the EU’s external borders, to help ameliorate differences in living standards across these borders, and to address the challenges and opportunities following on EU enlargement or otherwise arising from the proximity between regions across our land and sea borders. In particular, CBC is intended to help: (i) Promote economic and social development in regions on both sides of common borders; (ii) Address common challenges, in fields such as environment, public health and the prevention of and fight against organised crime; (iii) Ensure efficient and secure borders, and; (iv) Promote local cross-border “people-to-people” actions. The ENPI Cross-Border Cooperation programme 2007-2013 has a total indicative budget of EUR 1,118 million, of which EUR 173 million for the Mediterranean programme. Jordan is also eligible for cooperation activities financed under the ENPI Inter-regional Programme.

In conclusion, there thus overall is evidence of an (attempted) alignment between the regional (RIP and APs) and the national (NIP) strategic and programmatic responses. As learnt from key stakeholders there at the same time are major areas for improvement still at the operational level for also enhancing the coherence and complementarity of the actions on the ground of the two cooperation / response levels. Especially as the operational level, the consistency between the regional and national components of the EU response strategy within the overall ENP framework is not always evident. The challenges for example relate to identification and formulation missions of regional interventions having a special bearing at the Jordan national level, of TA missions, co-financed projects or events, and the like. They also pertain to the level of synchronization of outputs timing from regional programmes facilitating implementation of national support operations and vice versa, in order to strengthen complementarity and mutually reinforcing effects (“the whole is greater than the sum of the parts”). It thereto necessarily implies an enhancement of the overall quality and intensity of the coordination and complementarity between EC staff, project managers, twinning and TA missions from thematically / sector related regional and national programmes and interventions (KPIs 1.2.3 and 1.2.4).
The above were shared and confirmed in various interviews with key stakeholders at both the Delegation and the Government of Jordan concerned during the evaluation field visit. Knowledge sharing and learning from each other (from both good / best practices and from challenges / lessons learnt) at the regional level was indicated as an area with much potential but only slightly explored yet for effective operationalisation. This all may benefit from a stronger institutionalisation of the coordination of the regional cooperation strategy with the national response level, both in the EU Delegation and at the level of the Government of Jordan, as was acknowledged on different occasions by key parties concerned during the evaluation field visit. Key assumption, if not precondition, is that the key challenges identified in the evaluation of the European Union’s Support to two European Neighbourhood Policy Regions (East and South) over the period 2004-2010 published in June 2013, as outlined above, are duly taken into consideration and acted upon.

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### KPI-1.2.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) **Data, figures and tables:**
- -/-

(ii) **Key extracts from documents:**
- NIP 2011-2013, p.19
- AF 020-478Support to the implementation of the Action Plan II – SAPP II (2008), pp.4-5
- TAPs 019-571 Support to the implementation of the Action Plan – SAPP (2008), pp.4-5
- EQ-7: Trade liberalisation as main objective of the Association Agreement and symptomatic of regional context of Jordan programme.

(iii) **Additional information from field phase**

### KPI-1.2.3: Level of synchronization of outputs timing from regional programmes facilitating implementation of national support operations and vice versa

**Main Findings on KPI-1.2.3:**

Salient points are captured and main findings covered in the discussion of the previous indicators, KPIs 1.2.1 and especially 1.2.2.

### KPI-1.2.3 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) **Data, figures and tables:**
- The ENPI Regional Strategy Paper and Indicative Programmes

(ii) **Key extracts from documents:**
- -/-

(iii) **Additional information from field phase**
- -/-
KPI-1.2.4: Overall quality and intensity of the coordination and complementarity between EC staff, project managers, twinning and TA missions from thematically / sector related regional and national programmes and interventions

Main Findings on KPI-1.2.4:

Salient points are captured and main findings covered in the discussion of the previous indicators, KPIs 1.2.1 and especially 1.2.2.

KPI-1.2.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - EAMR 2012 (15/09/2013), pp.3-4

(iii) Additional information from field phase
   - /-

JC-1.2: The regional and national components of the EU response strategy are aligned and mutually reinforcing within the overall ENP framework of the EU-Jordan cooperation

Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-1.2 (based on the KPIs main findings)

Based on the substantive additional documents and information which became available during the evaluation field phase, a generally high level of consistency between the EU Southern Neighbourhood regional strategy and programmes in general, the EU-Jordan Association Agreement, the ENP Action Plans and the EU ENPI Jordan country strategy and programmes (CSP-NIPs) in the period under review can be concluded. In fact, the former two regional strategies/programmes provide the broader policy, strategic and programming framework for the EU-Jordan Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programmes. This confirmation of general consistency between the regional and national levels also pertains to the more operational level of the concrete interventions, although for this operational level quite some knowledge sharing and coordination challenges and issues still to be addressed were shared during the evaluation visit. An example in this case is EUD officers not exceptionally learning about ENP regional initiatives in the country through the national media rather than through the internal EC networks.

At the overall strategic level, already before the EU-Jordan CSP 2007-2013 there has been a common strategic approach guided by the general EU policies and strategies in line with the European dimension of the Barcelona process and the ENP strategy. The objective of the EU strategy for Jordan has been to prepare a privileged partnership going beyond cooperation to a new level of deepened political cooperation and economic integration. As outlined in the CSP document, the strategic response must be both linked to Jordan’s priorities and fully consistent with other EU policies. This consistency is ensured by the ENP policy framework. Indeed, the Action Plan represents a single framework for EU relations with Jordan, and the results of the EU-Jordan dialogue on implementing the ENP Action Plan - which involved the different services of the Commission - have guided the selection of CSP/NIPs 2007-2013 priorities. In addition to targeted technical and financial assistance, the ENP offers a number of opportunities to support the implementation of the Action Plan, such as trade openings, a stake in the internal market, participation in some Community programmes, and the opportunity to benefit from TAIEX seminars. At the time of CSP design in 2005-2005, these elements introduced an innovation to EU cooperation with its neighbouring countries and represented another step towards integration with EU policies. The practical implication is that new forms of support are put at Jordan’s disposal. In order to fully benefit from the different types of participation, one of the challenges ever since has been to enhance the synergies between the financial assistance and the other ENP instruments.

In support of the ENP, the EU decided to create a single European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). The overall objective of the ENPI is to provide assistance aimed at promoting enhanced cooperation and progressive economic integration between the EU and its neighbouring countries, including
Jordan, and, in particular, supporting the implementation of partnership and cooperation agreements, association agreements or other existing and future agreements. As such, the ENPI provides financial support for the objectives of the Barcelona Process, the Association Agreements, the ENP and the ENP Action Plans. The Barcelona Declaration, the AAs and the ENP Action Plans are jointly agreed policy documents between the EU and its Mediterranean partners, with fully shared ownership. They constitute a joint strategy to address the policy issues in the region, both at bilateral and at regional levels. A Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) for the period 2007-2013 was drawn up, with two Regional Indicative Programmes (2007-2010 and 2011-2013), thus synchronized with the country CSP and NIPs as in the case of Jordan.

Both the 1997 Association Agreement (which entered into force in May 2002) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Action Plan, adopted in 2005, contributed significantly to developing the bilateral relations with Jordan. This 2005 Action Plan originally covered a timeframe of three to five years and aimed at helping to fulfill the provisions in the Association Agreement (AA) and to encourage and support Jordan’s national reform objectives and further integration into European economic and social structures. The 2005 Action plan explicitly aimed at supporting Jordan’s political reform agenda as set out in its “National Plan for Political Development”. This National Plan has been developed to progress with political reform designed to consolidate democracy, accountability, transparency and justice in Jordan, and to build a model for a modern, knowledge-based Islamic and Arab country. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Action Plan also responds to the Government of Jordan’s National Social and Economic Action Plan (2004-2006), which aims to develop a sustainable socio-economic reform process.

Jordan and the EU reached an agreement on a new EU-Jordan ENP Action Plan in October 2010. The document gives concrete substance to the “advanced status” relationship between Jordan and the EU. “Advanced status” partnership means closer cooperation in a large number of areas, and specific commitments on both sides. The new Action Plan succeeds the one of 2005 and sets out the EU-Jordan agenda for the next five years. The Association Agreement (AA) remains the framework for cooperation while the Action Plan (AP) represents a declaration of mutual objectives and commitments. The Second EU-Jordan ENP Action Plan was formally adopted in 2012. In the same year 2012, the EU and Jordan signed the Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement on the general principles for the participation of Jordan in EU programmes. (KPI-1.2.1)

The different evaluations and monitoring of the European Neighbourhood Regional programmes have confirmed the high relevance of regional interventions for achieving ENP objectives and regional priorities. Positive achievements include: The adaptation of the intervention strategies in meeting the needs of the partner countries; the stimulation of regional policy dialogue and the contribution to regional stability despite the major challenges in this regards as witness by the current volatile situation; the creation of regional capacities and cooperation mechanisms in different areas; regional cooperation, especially through the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) acting as a catalyst for the mobilisation of other financial resources (e.g. EIB, EBRD, KfW, AFD, etc.) and the attraction of foreign investment. However, a series of key challenges are also emanating from these evaluations which will need to be addressed in a more vigorous and consistent manner, including the following: (i) need to improve the degree of commitment by the partner countries, which strongly impacts on the ownership and sustainability of regional activities, as well as on their effectiveness and efficiency; (ii) need to enhance the coordination, complementarity and synergy with bilateral interventions to address the perception of a disparity among the actions put in place in the Southern region; (iii) need to raise awareness on regional integration and trade liberalisation efforts in services and investments in the framework of the Agadir agreement and to enlarge the scope of support made available to private sector; and (iv) regarding relations with civil society, need to build a new dialogue encompassing partnerships with organisations that are independent from the State.

The enhancement of the relevance of the regional programmes to the specific context and relations of each partner country with the EU calls for a tailor-made approach is also one of the main themes of the new 2014-2017 Multiannual Indicative Programme based on lessons learnt from past cooperation.

A study of the available documents has led to a confirmation of the strategic links between the regional and national strategic and programmatic responses. Based on the feedback from the main stakeholders concerned at the EU Delegation and confirmed by the key Jordan parties involved there is also evidence of the intensified and concerted efforts at the different levels concerned to further strengthen the operational links between regional and national programmatic responses. In fact, the answer already partially lies in the structure itself of the EU neighbourhood cooperation as the national level is directly linked to, if not integral part of the ENP regional strategic level.

There is thus a strong synergy between the strategic objectives and thematic areas included in the ENP.
Regional Strategy Paper 2007-2013 and the thematic focus areas included in the national EU-Jordan CSP 2007-2013 and the two NIP programmes resorting thereunder (resp. 2007-2010 and 2011-2013). The same pertains to the Cross-Border Cooperation Strategy. In this connection and for the regional cooperation strategies, programmes and their concrete operational projects and activities alike, it was stressed on different occasions during the field visit that the South-South cooperation and exchanges dimension should be more prominent. Ideas were also shared on further strengthening of “North-South-South” networks with more prominent roles for best practices and centres of excellence in Neighbourhood countries as Jordan (hub networking).

In conclusion, there is evidence of an (at least attempted) alignment between the regional (RIP and APs) and the national (NIP) strategic and programmatic responses. As learnt from key stakeholders, there are at the same time major areas for for improvement still at the operational level for also enhancing the coherence and complementarity of the regional and national actions at the operational level. Especially at the operational level, the consistency between the regional and national components of the EU response strategy within the overall ENP framework is not always evident. The challenges, for example, relate to identification and formulation missions of regional interventions having a special bearing on the Jordan national level, of TA missions, co-financed projects or events, and the like. They also pertain to the level of synchronization of outputs timing from regional programmes facilitating implementation of national support operations and vice versa, in order to strengthen complementarity and mutually reinforcing effects (“the whole is greater than the sum of the parts”). It thereto necessarily implies an enhancement of the overall quality and intensity of the coordination and complementarity between EC staff, project managers, twinning and TA missions from thematically / sector related regional and national programmes and interventions (KPIs 1.2.3 and 1.2.4).

The issues above were shared and confirmed in various interviews with key stakeholders in both the Delegation and the Government of Jordan concerned during the evaluation field visit. Knowledge sharing and learning from each other (from both good / best practices and from challenges / lessons learnt) at the regional level was indicated as an area with much potential but only slightly explored yet for effective operationalisation. All of this may benefit from a stronger institutionalisation of the coordination of the regional cooperation strategy with the national response level, both in the EU Delegation and at the level of the Government of Jordan, as was acknowledged on different occasions by key parties concerned during the evaluation field visit. Key assumption, if not precondition, is that the key challenges identified in the evaluation of the European Union’s Support to two European Neighbourhood Policy Regions (East and South) over the period 2004-2010 published in June 2013, as outlined above are duly taken into consideration and acted upon.
The EU response strategy has shown responsiveness in flexibly adapting and proactively adjusting to the evolving regional (i.e. Arab Spring, Iraqi and Syrian crises, Palestinian issues), global (e.g. financial and economic crisis) and national contexts (e.g. Upper Middle Income country status)

**List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 1.3 (codes and definition)**

| KPI-1.3.1 | Level of responsiveness of the EU support to initiatives in Jordan (from both Government and civil society) to take up the impulse of "Arab Spring" democratisation in the region |
| KPI-1.3.2 | Levels of flexibility, promptness and adequacy of the EU response strategy in adapting to and proactively supporting Jordan in the wake of the regional acute crisis situations in neighbouring countries (e.g. Iraq and Syria) directly affecting the country, especially with regard to the refugees situation |
| KPI-1.3.3 | Degree to which the EU - Jordan response strategy and programme has been supportive to / contributed to the efforts of Jordan to strive for lasting peace and cooperation in the region |
| KPI-1.3.4 | Degree to which the EU support strategy and programme to Jordan effectively, flexibly and adequately reacted to the impact of the global economic and financial crises on the Country, and with for Jordan specifically to its gradual evolvement over time and ultimately its actual upgrading to Upper Middle Income (UMI) country status |

**KPI-1.3.1:** Level of responsiveness of the EU support to initiatives in Jordan (from both Government and civil society) to take up the impulse of "Arab Spring" democratisation in the region

**Main Findings on KPI-1.3.1:**

Proactive and adequate levels of responsiveness may be concluded to with regard to the EU support to initiatives in Jordan (from both Government and civil society) to take up the impulse of the "Arab Spring" democratisation in the region, both in terms of policy / political dialogue and of substantially increased and partner country specific / customized cooperation resources and interventions.

The thorough transformation process in the region started in December 2010 / January 2011 in Tunisia. Support to civil society, to human rights and the media since 2011 can be termed as support to take up the impulses of the Arab Spring. After a substantial assistance in 2007 of nearly EUR 7 million (covering activities up to the end of 2010), with relative limited approvals thereafter, the support of the EU in the sectors increased remarkably from 2012 onwards. The CLE inventory and portfolio analysis tables show that the assistance to these sectors got a very substantially boost in 2012, with five EU financing decisions in that year totalling EUR 87 million. These five Financing Decisions in the year 2012 on democratic governance are: (i) Support to the justice reform in Jordan: EUR 30 million – DAC code 15130: Legal and judicial development; (ii) Support to civil society and media in Jordan: EUR 10 million – DAC code 15153: Media and free flow of information; (iii) Support to the electoral process in Jordan: EUR 2 million – DAC code 15151 Elections; Support to the security sector in applying the rule of law: EUR 5 million – DAC code 15210: Security system management and reform; Good governance and development contract Jordan – EUR 40 million – DAC code 51010: Research / scientific institutions. These figures attest to the robustness of the EU responsiveness towards Jordan also in operational terms, triggered off by the democratisation wave in the region which started early 2011.

At the overall policy/political and strategic level, the same level of EU responsiveness is noted in reply to signals and demands from its southern neighbours. In response to the "Arab Spring" the European Commission and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy adopted two Joint Communications "A partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the southern Mediterranean" and "A new response to a changing Neighbourhood". These Joint Communications called for a qualitative step forward in the relations between the EU and its Southern neighbours that should be rooted unambiguously in a joint commitment to common values. More flexible and tailored answers that differentiate between each partner country are to be offered in order for the partnership to develop with each neighbour on the basis of its needs, capacities and reform objectives. Supporting sustainable inclusive growth and economic development with a particular emphasis on Small and Medium-size Enterprises is one of the key objectives laid out in these Joint Communications. The project "Support to Research and Technological
Development and Innovation in Jordan” has been designed as an immediate response to the regional situation in line with the above commitments.

At the operational level, the EUR 10 million support to democratisation, civil society and media programme (FD 23849 of 2012) was explicitly designed as a reaction to the democratisation wave. The GoHKoJ had started a National dialogue process in March 2011 including representatives of civil society with the purpose of discussing the political reform of the country. The King initiated the development of a media strategy that has been drafted by a national commission mainly consisting of ministerial representatives who also invited the stakeholders in the media sector to provide input. In this regard, the Joint Communication of the European Commission and of the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy entitled “A new response to changing Neighbourhood” of 25 May 2011 as a reaction to events unfolding in the EU's Southern Neighbourhood including Jordan proposes "to provide greater support to partners engaged in building deep democracy and strengthen further its support to civil society". The Communication stresses EUs support to deep and sustainable democracy through freedom of association, expression and assembly as well as a free press and media.

Also the creation of the Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility is a direct response to the events of 2011. Acknowledging civil society’s role to contribute to policy-making and hold governments to account, the Civil Society Facility Communication commits to supporting a greater role for them through a partnership with societies, helping non-state actors develop their advocacy capacity their ability to monitor reform and their role in implementing, monitoring and evaluating of EU programmes.

The EU Support to Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth, the SPRING Programme of 2011 directly responded to the events of the Arab Spring. SPRING’s main aim is to respond to the pressing socio-economic challenges that partner countries of the southern Mediterranean region are facing and to support them in their transition to democracy. Support is tailored to the needs of each country, based on an assessment of the country's progress in building democracy and applying the 'more for more' principle: the more a country progresses in its democratic reforms and institutional building, the more support it can expect from the SPRING programme. Implementation initiatives supported through the SPRING programme complement already ongoing activities in partner countries, supported at EU level or bilaterally by EU Member States, as well as by other Development Partners. Initiatives are identified by EU Delegations working closely with partner governments, EU Member States and international stakeholders. All Southern Neighbourhood partners’ countries benefit from the programme. Jordan was in the first batch to benefit from initial support in 2011 together with Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco. In addition to its bilateral co-operation envelope of EUR 265 million for the period from 2011-2013, Jordan received a EUR 101 million allocation from “SPRING” funds in 2012 and 2013, EUR 85 million of which was dedicated to a "Good Governance and Development Contract", based on political and economic reform commitments proposed by the authorities.

All of the above are attestations of the responsiveness of the EU support to initiatives in Jordan (from both Government and civil society) to take up the impulse of “Arab Spring” democratisation in the region, both at the overall policy and strategic level and at the operational level on the ground. This was further attested to during the evaluation field visit in the numerous meetings with the main stakeholders and partners concerned in Jordan, both from Government and Civil Society, and got further confirmation during the focus group discussion and mini-survey with CSOs on democratic governance issues. At the same time, it was indicated on different occasions that the democratic space actually is shrinking again ever since these events, partially under pressure of the regional crises also affecting the Country's own security situation.

An analysis of the CSP-NIP 2011-2013 budget re-allocations based on the original and modified NIP allocations tables, learns that there has been no modification in total allocations for the NIP priority 1 on support to Jordan’s reform in the areas of democracy, human rights, media and justice. There only has been a splitting of the original allocation for the justice, home affairs and security programme over two separate programmes (justice reform and support to the security sector). This at first sight is somehow remarkable in view of the regional developments of democratisation which occurred in this period. But when looking at the broader EU-Jordan response strategy, this is only illustrative for the fact that these developments were responded to through other financing instruments (e.g. SPRING programme). The most outspoken budget change is related to the trade enterprise and investment development NIP priority area 2, which saw its resources reduced to half (from EUR 40 to 20 million). The reallocated amounts went to priority area 3 “Sustainability of the growth process” and more particularly to renewable and alternative energy development (plus EUR 9 million) and to priority area 4 “Support to the implementation of the action plan” (plus EUR 11 million) Remarkably within this priority area 4, actual support to the Implementation of the Action Plan Programme (SAPP) concentration particularly on institutional reform and capacity building (e.g.
through twinnings and other modalities) was reduced by almost half (44%, minus EUR 20 million), whereas the bulk of the re-allocated resources (EUR 31 million) went to an increase of the allocation of the 2010 Public Financial Management (PFM) reform programme. There are no further details available which GOJ budget lines were the main destination of these additional PFM resources. In conclusion, the regional events which shook the region in 2010-2011 and also affecting Jordan were reacted to in a timely and comprehensive manner, both at political policy dialogue level and at the operational level of cooperation interventions and support. This prompt EU reaction affected the EU-Jordan national response strategy by facilitation of new financing decision, but was especially and promptly attended to by other, complementary EU cooperation modalities and financing mechanisms (e.g. regional and thematic programmes) of which some especially created for that purpose (e.g. SPRING).

In preparing for the new Single Support Framework as successor of the 2007-2013 CSP, it was confirmed that in line with popular expectations towards further steps to consolidate democratic practices, the EU together with the international donor community is supportive of the Jordanian efforts to keep the pace of domestic reforms on the political, economic and social fronts. It at the same time is also conscious of the high risk associated to the overspill of neighbouring crisis that may affect the course of reforms in the country and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.

### KPI-1.3.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Please see below

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Action Fiche(2010), 21931 Support to Democratic Governance, p.2
- Action Fiche (2012) Support to civil society and media in Jordan, p.1
- EU response to the Arab Spring: the Civil Society Facility, memo 11/638, p.1

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- Support for partnership, reforms and inclusive growth (SPRING) website -
- Please see below

### KPI-1.3.1 (i) Data, figures and tables:

**CRIS based CLE Jordan Database EU interventions in Jordan – Financing Decisions (Nov 2013)**

The Arab Spring started in December 2010 / January 2011 in Tunisia. Support to Civil Society, the media and to human rights since 2011 can be termed as support to take up the impulses of the Arab Spring. After a substantial assistance in 2007 of nearly 7 million Euro (covering activities up to the end of 2010), with relative limited approvals thereafter, the support of the EU in the sectors increased remarkably from 2012 onwards. As the below CLE inventory and portfolio analysis tables EQ-3 IM-01a and b show, the assistance to these sectors got a very substantial boost in 2012, with five EU financing decisions in that year totalling 87 million EUR.

These five Financing Decisions in the year 2012 on democratic governance are:
- Support to the justice reform in Jordan (30 million EUR ) – DAC code 15130: Legal and judicial development
- Support to civil society and media in Jordan (10 million EUR ) – DAC code 15153: Media and free flow of information
- Support to the electoral process in Jordan (2 million EUR ) – DAC code 15151 Elections
- Support to the security sector in applying the rule of law – DAC code 15210: Security system management and reform
- Good governance and development contract Jordan (40 million EUR ) – DAC code 51010: Research / scientific institutions
### Table EQ-1 IM-01a: List of EU Financing Decisions Benefitting the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the year 2012 on Civil Society, Media, Human Rights, Justice and Rule of Law (Main Related EQ 3 on Democratic Governance)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Decision year</th>
<th>Decision Number (Full)</th>
<th>Decision Number (Short)</th>
<th>Status (4)</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Commission Decision Date</th>
<th>Allocated (in EUR)</th>
<th>Contracted (EUR)</th>
<th>Paid (EUR)</th>
<th>Commitment type</th>
<th>Title of CRS (Sub-)Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ENPI</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>ENPI/2012/0 23-471</td>
<td>23471</td>
<td>EG</td>
<td>Support to the justice reform in Jordan</td>
<td>30,000,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>GF</td>
<td>Legal and judicial development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPI</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>ENPI/2012/0 23-849</td>
<td>23849</td>
<td>EG</td>
<td>Support to Civil Society and Media in Jordan</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>GF</td>
<td>Media and free flow of information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPI</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>ENPI/2012/0 24-280</td>
<td>24280</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Support to the Electoral Process in Jordan</td>
<td>26/09/2011</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>1,581,157</td>
<td>744,424</td>
<td>GF</td>
<td>Elections</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENPI</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>ENPI/2008/0 19-571</td>
<td>19571</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Support to the implementation of the Action Plan programme (SAPP)</td>
<td>23/10/2008</td>
<td>9,309,060</td>
<td>8,659,004</td>
<td>7,897,845</td>
<td>GF</td>
<td>Multi-sector aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPI</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>ENPI/2009/0 20-478</td>
<td>20478</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Support to the implementation of the Action Plan programme II (SAPP II)</td>
<td>07/10/2009</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
<td>16,705,388</td>
<td>8,950,460</td>
<td>GF</td>
<td>Multi-sector aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPI</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>ENPI/2009/0 21-219</td>
<td>21219</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Building Development Capabilities of Jordanian Municipalities</td>
<td>07/10/2009</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>2,925,000</td>
<td>2,202,750</td>
<td>GF</td>
<td>Decentralisation and support to subnational government</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENPI</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>ENPI/2010/0 21-930</td>
<td>21930</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Promoting Local Economic Development in Jordan (PLED.J.)</td>
<td>07/10/2011</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>2,681,580</td>
<td>699,250</td>
<td>GF</td>
<td>Decentralisation and support to subnational government</td>
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<td>ENPI</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>ENPI/2010/0 21-931</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>Support to Democratic Governance</td>
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<td>Decentralisation and support to subnational government</td>
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<td>ENPI</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>ENPI/2011/0 22-723</td>
<td>22723</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Support to the implementation of the Action Plan programme III (SAPP III)</td>
<td>14/10/2011</td>
<td>13,000,000</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>GF</td>
<td>Public sector policy and administrative management</td>
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<td>ENPI</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>ENPI/2012/0 23-533</td>
<td>23533</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Support to the security sector in applying the rule of law</td>
<td>15/09/2012</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>GF</td>
<td>Security system management and reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENPI</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>ENPI/2012/0 24-396</td>
<td>24396</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Good Governance and Development Contract Jordan</td>
<td>26/09/2011</td>
<td>40,000,000</td>
<td>39,700,000</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
<td>GF</td>
<td>Research/scientific institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPI</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>ENPI/2013/0 24-775</td>
<td>24775</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Support to the Action Plan Programme N</td>
<td>26/09/2011</td>
<td>12,000,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>GF</td>
<td>Public sector policy and administrative management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Totals for All Interventions / Financing Decisions related to EQ-3 Democratic Governance (primary link):**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
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<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,730,265</td>
<td>10,930,897</td>
<td>7,664,188</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Totals for All Interventions / Financing Decisions related to EQ-3 Democratic Governance (primary or secondary link):**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
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<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
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<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>169,039,325</td>
<td>81,601,869</td>
<td>47,414,493</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table EQ-1 IM-01b: List of EU Financing Decisions Benefitting the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the year 2012 on Civil Society, Media, Human Rights, Justice and Rule of Law (Main Related EQ 3 on Democratic Governance)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Decision year</th>
<th>Decision Number (Full)</th>
<th>Decision Number (Short)</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Commission Decision Date</th>
<th>Allocated (in EUR)</th>
<th>Contracted (EUR)</th>
<th>Paid (EUR)</th>
<th>Commitment type</th>
<th>CRIS (Sub-)Sector</th>
<th>Title of CRIS (Sub-Sector)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ENPI</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>ENPI/2012/02-471</td>
<td>23471</td>
<td>EG</td>
<td>Support to the justice reform in Jordan</td>
<td>26/09/2011</td>
<td>30,000,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>GE</td>
<td>15130</td>
<td>Legal and judicial development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPI</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>ENPI/2012/02-489</td>
<td>23849</td>
<td>EG</td>
<td>Support to Society and Media in Jordan</td>
<td>15/09/2012</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>GE</td>
<td>15153</td>
<td>Media and free flow of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPI</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>ENPI/2012/02-290</td>
<td>24290</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Support to the Electoral Process in Jordan</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>1,581,157</td>
<td>744,424</td>
<td>GF</td>
<td>15151</td>
<td>Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPI</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>ENPI/2012/02-533</td>
<td>23533</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Support to the security sector in applying the rule of law</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>GF</td>
<td>15210</td>
<td>Security system management and reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPI</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>ENPI/2012/02-396</td>
<td>24596</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Good Governance and Development Contract Jordan</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>40,000,000</td>
<td>39,700,000</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
<td>GF</td>
<td>51010</td>
<td>Research/scientific institutions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Totals for All Interventions / Financing Decisions related to EQ-3 Democratic Governance** (primary or secondary link)

| 5 | 9 | 3 | 87,000,000 | 41,281,157 | 20,744,424 | 5 | 5 | 5 |

**KPI-1.3.1 (iii) Additional information from field phase:**

Analysis of CSP-NIP 2011-2013 re-allocations (original – modified allocations), based on the NIP allocation tables provided to the evaluation team during a field visit meeting with MoPIC, June 2014.
An analysis of the CSP-NIP 2011-2013 budget re-allocations based on the original and modified NIP allocations tables, learns that there has been no modification in total allocations for the NIP priority 1 on support to Jordan’s reform in the areas of democracy, human rights, media and justice. There only has been a splitting of the original allocation for the justice, home affairs and security programme over two separate programmes (justice reform and support to the security sector). This is somehow remarkable in view of the regional developments of democratisation which occurred in this period, but on the other hand is illustrative for the fact that these development were responded to through other financing instruments (e.g. SPRING programme). Most outspoken budget change is related to the trade enterprise and investment development NIP priority area 2, which saw its resources reduced to half (from EUR 40 to 20 million). The reallocated amounts went to priority area 3 “Sustainability of the growth process” and more particularly to renewable and alternative energy development (plus EUR 9 million) and to priority area 4 “Support to the implementation of the action plan” (plus EUR 11 million). Remarkably within this priority area 4, actual support to the Implementation of the Action Plan Programme (SAPP) concentration particularly on institutional reform and capacity building (e.g. through twinnings and other modalities) was reduced by almost half (44%, minus EUR 20 million), whereas the bulk of the re-allocated resources (EUR 31 million) went to an increase of the allocation of the 2010 Public Financial Management (PFM) reform programme. There are no further details available which GOJ budget lines were the main destination of these additional PFM resources.

**KPI-1.3.2:** Levels of flexibility, promptness and adequacy of the EU response strategy in adapting to and proactively supporting Jordan in the wake of the regional acute crisis situations in neighbouring countries (e.g. Iraq and Syria) directly affecting the country, especially with regard to the refugees situation

**Main Findings on KPI-1.3.2:**

The evaluation field visit interviews with the main key stakeholder categories concerned (Government of Jordan, Member States and other development partners, civil society, local government, beneficiaries) provided further evidence to earlier preliminary findings based on documents study in enabling to confirm the flexibility, promptness and adequacy of the EU response strategy in adapting to and proactively supporting Jordan in the wake of the regional acute crisis situations in neighbouring countries (e.g. Iraq and Syria) directly affecting the country, especially with regard to the refugees situation.

Jordan kept an open-door policy towards refugees fleeing Syria. Jordan continued to accommodate a large number of Syrian refugees, in addition to large communities of refugees from the occupied Palestinian territory and Iraq. Although Jordan is not a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention, by December 2012 over 173,000 Syrian refugees registered or were awaiting registration with the UNHCR. Based on the last update as of 09 September 2014 published on the official UNHCR website there are a total of 615,792 registered Syrian Refugees in Jordan, more than 3.5 more compared to less than 2 years before, or an increase of almost half a million (442,792) persons.

In July 2013, Jordan opened the Za'atari camp for Syrian refugees near Mafraq in northern Jordan. In October, Jordan selected Marjeeb Al Fahood near Zarqa as the second refugee camp. The latest UNHCR figure on the total number of persons of concern regarding the Syria Regional Refugee Response in Jordan as of 31 December 2013 stands at 576,354, or more than 3.3 times higher compared to the end of the preceding year. Some other recent figures of this massive influx of Syrian refugees into Jordan as of 17 October 2013 include the following: about 350,000 individuals received food assistance through food vouchers in Jordanian communities, about 83,000 Syrian children are registered in public schools and 69,000 vulnerable Syrian and Jordanian children receive education supplies, about 151,000 children (6 month to <15 years) received vaccinations against measles and 749 received life-saving and essential tertiary health care.

Acknowledging the severe impact of the crisis, the EU has provided more than EUR 225 million of humanitarian and development aid to Jordan over the last two years. This financial assistance is intended to support both the refugees and the host communities. Despite an unstable and extremely volatile neighbourhood, Jordan has managed to preserve its domestic stability and has shown great resilience in the face of regional turmoil. In response to the Syrian crisis, the EU has created a special EC cooperation instrument to finance different types of programmes and project known as “Special Measures for Syria”. Just recently, on 12 December 2013, another EU grant contract in the amount of EUR 30 million has been signed with the Government of Jordan to deal with the consequences of the influx of Syrian refugees in the field of education.” Jordan’s health system faced additional demands for medical services from refugees having fled the crisis in Syria. The EU provided humanitarian assistance to help meet the refugees’ health needs, and also provided EUR 10 million to help finance improvements to wastewater services and sanitation in communities hosting Syrian refugees.

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**Information Matrix**

**Final Report - Vol. II: Evaluation Questions Information Matrices (Abridged)**

February 2015 – GFA-led Consortium

EQ-1 Information Matrix

Page 41
To this must be added a new wave of refugees from Iraq caused by the renewed war in Iraq and by the advances of radical Islamist groups. UNHCR estimates the total number of refugees in Jordan at present at 641,915 persons.

A CLE database search of CRIS on key words as refugee, Syria, Iraq, Palestine and regional crisis revealed three Financing Decisions in the database of 43 key interventions with a total allocation of EUR 43.5 million (in 2007 – EUR 26.5 million, education, Iraqi refugees; in 2012 – EUR 2.0 million, UNRWA – Jerash Camp, Palestinian refugees, and in 2012 – EUR 15.0 million education, Syrian refugees). A total of 8 contracts in the 2007-2013 CSP period have one the above key words explicitly in their title with a total planned amount of EUR 65.5 million, spread over the whole 2007-2013 period.

The actual allocations under the CSP-NIPs bilateral cooperation in relation / response to the regional crises in fact are much higher since for example as part of the comprehensive response to the Syrian Crisis, the “Development of Northern Jordan Programme” (DNJP) aims at enhancing the growth prospects of Jordanian Northern Governorates and improving the overall welfare of the population caused by the Syrian crisis. The proposed programme therefore responds to the Joint Communication “Towards a comprehensive EU approach to the Syrian Crisis” and falls in the priority 2 of the Jordan Country Strategy 2007-2013, “Support to Trade, Enterprises and Investment Development”. It is fully in line with the SPRING communication and priorities, which set as one of the key objectives “supporting sustainable inclusive growth and economic development with a particular emphasis on Small and Medium-sized Enterprises”. It also complements other EU on-going programmes aimed at supporting the development of the Jordanian private sector.

Other regional crises further aggravate the situation while having a direct or at least indirect impact on Jordan. Despite the difficult fiscal situation of the country, largely attributable to a massive increase in fuel prices as a result of attacks on the Egyptian gas pipeline in Sinai, the country has managed to maintain macro-economic stability and Public Financial Management has improved, partly at least due to the successful Budget Support interventions in this area. The impact of the recent Israeli-Palestinian conflict on Jordan society, with a majority Palestinian population, and its economy cannot be underestimated.

The Single Support Framework (SSF) which will be the successor EU-Jordan cooperation strategy and programme for the following seven years (2014-2020) foresees restricting development co-operation to three focal areas, which have been agreed with MoPIC in addressing the country's needs. These are: (i) Rule of law, enhanced accountability and equity in public service delivery; (ii) Employment and private sector development, and; (iii) Renewable energy & energy efficiency. Nevertheless, the effects of the Syrian crisis, particularly the influx of refugees mainly (but far from exclusively) to the Northern governorates of Irbid and Mafraq, has forced the Delegation to return to two sectors which it had been intended to leave, namely water and education.

The core elements of the 2010 ENP Action Plan include strides towards political and institutional modernisation, including relevant legislation to anchor democratic processes and practices in Jordan that answer citizens' expectations towards transparency, accountability and justice, civic participation and respect for human rights. This will also involve intensified cooperation in the security field in a regional perspective.

**KPI-1.3.2 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Municipalities on the Frontline (2013). P 19
- UNHCR, Official Website – Syria Regional Refugee Response – Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal
- Please see below

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Memo 13/248, p.1
- GoJ Response Plan (2013), p.5
- ENP Jordan Annual Report 2008 (2009), P. 6


(iii) Additional information from field phase:

- Please see below

### KPI-1.3.2 (i) Data, figures and tables:

**CRIS based CLE Jordan Database EU interventions in Jordan – Contracts (Nov 2013)**

CLE financing decisions database query keywords in database: Refugee, Syria, Iraq, Palestine, regional crisis. Three interventions in the database of 43 key interventions responded with a volume of EUR 43.488.000


Of the 401 contracts benefiting the HKo J concluded in the CSP period 2007-2013, a total of eight (8) have one of the above key words explicitly in their title. These are listed in the below table. The total planned amount is EUR 65.469.384

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>CRIS</th>
<th>DAC Code</th>
<th>Decision No.</th>
<th>Volume</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Support to Jordan’s Education system to respond to the increasing educational needs of displaced Iraqi people</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>147969</td>
<td>26.480.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Technical assistance to support implementation of a project: Water Loss Reduction in Zarqa: Managing Jordan scarce water resources in areas of concentrations of Iraq</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>14020</td>
<td>256634</td>
<td>1.310.265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Contribution to UNRWA for Improvement of Living Conditions of Vulnerable Palestine Refugees in Jerash Camp</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>309238</td>
<td>2.000.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Emergency Education Response for displaced Syrian Children and Host community in Jordan</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>297963</td>
<td>10.000.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Emergency Education Response for displaced Syrian Children and Host community in Jordan</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>321020</td>
<td>5.500.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Support for the Emergency Education Response for Displaced Syrian Children and Host Communities in Jordan</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>328928</td>
<td>5.171.119</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Emergency Education Response for displaced Syrian Children and Host Community in Jordan</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>321638</td>
<td>10.671.119</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>65.469.384</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KPI-1.3.2 (iii) Additional information from field phase**


The present crisis comes at a difficult time for Jordan. While the country is pressed with popular demands for social equity and increased standards of life, it is also struggling with a combination of slow global economic recovery and regional unrest. The economy has been on a path of gradual progressive recovery, with performance in main sectors (mining, construction, tourism) varying year on year. The Arab transition since 2011 has had a major impact on public finances; spending commitments and subsidies rose substantially as a result of increased public unrest and proved to be...
beyond the capacity to finance within a constrained budget. When coupled with the increased energy bill arising from unstable natural gas imports from Egypt and the additional cost due to the hosting of an increasing number of Syrian refugees, increased budget deficits and public debt threatened stability. Jordan is thus faced with financial challenges that include a mounting debt, high fiscal and external deficits, strained public finances, declining external receipts and expected foreign aid, and a widening trade deficit. However, these trends have started to moderate as a result of commitments taken under the USD 2 billion IMF Stand-By Arrangement agreed in 2012. Foreign reserves level improved considerably and growth picked up to some extent in 2013. However, some commitments also decreased the government's margin of flexibility. The agreement includes structural reforms and fiscal consolidation measures, including lifting of subsidies, raising electricity tariffs and diversifying energy sources which the government started to pursue in November 2012. This has resulted in popular protests throughout the country as fuel prices, gas prices and energy prices went up, yet difficult reforms were nonetheless adopted by the government.

KPI-1.3.3: Degree to which the EU - Jordan response strategy and programme has been supportive to / contributed to the efforts of Jordan to strive for lasting peace and cooperation in the region

Main Findings on KPI-1.3.3:

The EU-Jordan response strategy and programme have been supportive and (pro-)actively contributed to the efforts of Jordan to strive for lasting peace and cooperation in the region, as a concerted effort both in terms of political dialogue and of cooperation interventions. This for example is evidenced in the European Neighbourhood Partnership (ENP) annual reports on Jordan which contain an explicit section on cooperation on foreign and security policy (CFSP), regional and international issues, conflict prevention and crisis. The recently issued ENP Jordan annual report for 2013 includes that Jordan and the EU remained aligned on a number of foreign and security policy related issues. Jordan continued to advocate both a political solution to the ongoing civil war in Syria and, with regard to the Middle East peace process, direct negotiations between the parties to resolve the conflict. Implementation of two EU projects relating to conflict prevention and crisis management began in spring 2013. The objective of the projects is to tackle violence at universities by equipping and educating selected local youth CSOs so as to deal with this problem and to reduce tensions between host communities and Syrian refugees using measures based on conflict sensitivity and prevention and peace-building. Measures for improving security conditions relating to the refugees, funded with EUR 22.9 million of EU support, have begun to be implemented by the UNHCR and IOM.

Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon strengthened the basis of their trilateral cooperation and expressed willingness to exchange best practices with the EU in the field of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) disaster prevention, preparedness and response. The EU made plans for the implementation of a project with the three countries to improve the countries’ respective national teams’ competence in dealing with HAZMAT (Hazardous Materials). On 25 June, the EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centre of Excellence Regional Secretariat for the Middle East officially opened in Amman. It aims to mitigate CBRN risks of criminal, accidental or natural origin by promoting a coherent policy, improving coordination and preparedness at national and regional levels and offering a comprehensive approach.

In principle Jordan maintained an open-border policy towards refugees fleeing Syria, but there were areas where restrictions were applied. As of 31 December 2013 there were more than 576,000 registered Syrian refugees in Jordan, of which around 124,000 are living in the Za'atari camp, 3,700 in the Emirati camp and 448,300 in local communities, according to UNHCR figures. As per the last update as of 9 September 2014, this figures stands at 615,792. The EU continued to support Jordan by alleviating the burden placed on the country by the Syrian refugee crisis. More than EUR 225 million of EU funds had been allocated to Jordan by December 2013, excluding bilateral aid from Member States.

According to UNRWA, Jordan was home to 1,951,603 Palestinian refugees in 2008, most of them Jordanian citizens. 338,000 of them were living in UNRWA refugee camps. The latest figure as published on the UNWRA website shows more than 2 million registered Palestine refugees. Most but not all have full citizenship. Jordan revoked the citizenship of thousands of Palestinians to thwart any attempt to resettle West Bank residents in Jordan. West Bank Palestinians with family in Jordan or Jordanian citizenship were issued yellow cards guaranteeing them all the rights of Jordanian citizenship. Palestinians living in Jordan with family in the West Bank were also issued yellow cards. All other Palestinians wishing such Jordanian papers were issued green cards to facilitate travel into Jordan. There are ten recognized Palestine refugees camps scattered around the country which accommodate about 370,000 Palestinian refugees which is about one fifth (18%) of the country total.

The Annual Reports throughout the 2007-2013 period under review confirm that the EU kept a regular
dialogue with Jordan on Cooperation on Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) related matters, regional and international issues. In the 2011 ENP Jordan report for example is stated that the EU-Jordan dialogue on foreign and security matters has further developed notably at the most senior level, with a frequency never achieved before. Jordan remains a strong supporter of a comprehensive solution to the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) and pursues efforts to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict on the basis of the two-state solution. Jordan played a constructive role in promoting the stability of the region, especially regarding the Holy Sites in Jerusalem. The 2010 report indicated Jordan to be the seventh largest contributor of military and police personnel to UN international peacekeeping operations worldwide, continuing to participate in various operations notably by deploying its forces in Congo, Liberia, the Ivory Coast and Haiti.

**KPI-1.3.3 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) **Data, figures and tables:**
- /

(ii) **Key extracts from documents:**
- ENP Progress Report Jordan 2010 (2011), pp.5-6
- ENP-PPJ (2009), p. 5
- Memo, PPJ (2010) pp. 5-6
- NIP 2011-2013, p.4
- HKoJ Executive Programme 2007-2009, p.4
- Memo, 13/248, p.2
- Memo, 10/178, p.2
- ENP Progress Report Jordan 2008 (2009), p.6
- JC-7.5 assessment
- CLE Jordan, IR, 2014, Chapter 2.4 The Regional Context, pp. 25-26

(iii) **Additional information from field phase:**
- Please see below

**KPI-1.3.3 (iii) Additional information from field phase**


**Impact of regional situation**

The present crisis comes at a difficult time for Jordan. While the country is pressed with popular demands for social equity and increased standards of life, it is also struggling with a combination of slow global economic recovery and regional unrest. The economy has been on a path of gradual progressive recovery, with performance in main sectors (mining, construction, tourism) varying year on year. The Arab transition since 2011 has had a major impact on public finances; spending commitments and subsidies rose substantially as a result of increased public unrest and proved to be beyond the capacity to finance within a constrained budget. When coupled with the increased energy bill arising from unstable natural gas imports from Egypt and the additional cost due to the hosting of an increasing number of Syrian refugees, increased budget deficits and public debt threatened stability. Jordan is thus faced with financial challenges that include a mounting debt, high fiscal and external deficits, strained public finances, declining external receipts and expected foreign aid, and a widening trade deficit. However, these trends have started to moderate as a result of commitments taken under the USD 2 billion IMF Stand-By Arrangement agreed in 2012. Foreign reserves level improved considerably and growth picked up to some extent in 2013. However, some commitments also decreased the government's margin of flexibility. The agreement includes structural reforms and fiscal consolidation measures, including lifting of subsidies, raising electricity tariffs and diversifying energy sources which the government started to pursue in November 2012. This has resulted in popular protests throughout the country as fuel prices, gas prices and energy prices went up, yet difficult reforms were nonetheless adopted by the government.
### KPI-1.3.4: Degree to which the EU support strategy and programme to Jordan effectively, flexibly and adequately reacted to the impact of the global economic and financial crises on the Country, and with for Jordan specifically to its gradual evolvement over time and ultimately its actual upgrading to Upper Middle Income (UMI) country status

#### Main Findings on KPI-1.3.4:

From the evaluation field visit to Jordan, limited evidence was obtained that the EU support strategy and programme to Jordan reacted to the impact of the global economic and financial crises on the country. There are no indications that the response strategy took into consideration Jordan’s gradual evolvement over time and ultimately its actual upgrading to Upper Middle Income (UMI) country status. There are no indications that the EU has adjusted its response strategy accordingly, for example, on the occasion of the development of the second National Indicative Programme (NIP) covering the 2011-2013 period under the 2007-2013 CSP. Most likely, the regional crises have overshadowed these macro-economic developments which in principle invite for updating of response strategies. The assumption was positively tested during the field phase. The potentials provided by upper-middle income status for a country in terms of more systematically tapping available domestic resources for more sustainable, inclusive and equitable economic growth and development to combat inequality have not been explored in a systematic way, if at all. This is quite remarkable for a country portfolio in which Public Finance Management (PFM) takes centre stage with explicit sustainable development objectives and the methodological and budgetary means at its disposal to effectively pursue (re-)distributive policies and programmes for social safety and social inclusion purposes. Elsewhere in this evaluation, particularly in relation to EQ-8 on education and employment (and indirectly also on social protection, social inclusion and social dialogue), these crucial social cohesion aspects underpinning the complex, precarious and precious social fabric that Jordanian society is, are further investigated. Meanwhile, inequality in Jordan is rising, as evidenced by: (i) deteriorating Gini coefficient and other income distribution indicators; (ii) growing socio-economic disparities and unequal access to basic social services; (iii) local development geographical differences; (iv) ethnicity based opportunities (e.g. in public and private sectors); (v) rising resident-refugee population tensions. The coming together of these different phenomena brings about a gradual erosion of the social fabric and a potentially explosive situation, further nurtured by the regional crises and a fragile regional security and stability situation. In summary, in relation to the above, it appears that the social contract between the state and its citizens cannot be sustainably financed from external sources, but should be more strongly and more inclusively based on further strengthened internal structural solidarity mechanisms. On different occasions during the evaluation field visit, discussions tended in this direction with on the same occasion fundamental challenges raised in this connection for the next EU-Jordan strategic cooperation framework.

In addition to the risks originating from the domestic political realm, there are risks that stem from the strong links Jordan’s economy has with the other countries in the region as well as with the global economy. The popular uprisings in the region have shaken the political stability of the region as a whole and have increased the risk premium as perceived by investors. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as well as tourism receipts fell dramatically in 2011 by 32 percent and 16 percent respectively in the first half of the year, despite high oil prices. Since February 2011, repeated disruptions in the Egypt gas pipeline, which supplies 70 percent of Jordan’s gas, have resulted in a four-fold increase in Jordan’s energy bill due to the need to substitute costly heavy fuel for gas. If there is a prolonged transition period in surrounding countries, the risk of slower growth resulting from these factors will persist.

Jordan’s heavy reliance on imported energy and food (98 percent of the country’s energy and 90 percent of its food supply is imported) make it vulnerable to increases in international commodity prices. As long as food and fuel prices continue to rise, this risk will also persist. While in the past the adverse impact of high commodity prices on the current account deficit has been mitigated by cyclically higher FDI and sustained remittances from the Gulf, this has not been the case in 2011, and Jordan has had to rely heavily on foreign grants. The reliability of foreign aid flows is affected by downturns in the global economy as well as by changes in geopolitics, and as such, dependence on this source of financing is inherently risky. The Government of Jordan is determined to minimize Jordan’s vulnerability to external shocks and to lessen its reliance on foreign grants by building up fiscal space and by setting the stage for endogenous, private sector led growth. The macroeconomic situation in Jordan is closely tied to that of other countries in the Middle East. Remittances from Jordanians working in other states, especially in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, are an important source of national income, equivalent to 15–20 percent of GDP. The Persian Gulf region is also the primary destination for Jordanian exports and in turn supplies most of its energy.
requirements. Additionally, the country receives substantial grants and foreign direct investments from other countries in the region, most notably from the GCC. As a result, the country is very vulnerable to sudden stops or reversals of external income flows.

In addition to the growing influx of refugees which has placed considerable strain on the country, Jordan’s economy has also been severely affected over the last couple of years by the repeated disruptions to the flow of natural gas from Egypt, which forced the government to replace cheap gas imports with more expensive fuels. Against this background and in response to a request for financial assistance submitted by the Jordanian government, in December 2013 the European Council accepted a proposal from the Commission for Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) to provide up to EUR 180 million (in the form of a medium-term loan). Jordan is the first partner country in the Southern Neighbourhood to benefit from this exceptional financial instrument. The MFA is expected to provide some relief from the adverse spill-over effects of the Syrian conflict and complements other humanitarian and development assistance provided to Jordan by the EU.

One of the main areas of concern regarding poverty in Jordan is raising income inequality. This is a particularly important issue and poses direct challenges to the country in terms of inclusive and equitable development policies and strategies, the more since as per the WB-OECD categorization Jordan graduated from a “Lower Middle Income Country” to an “Upper Middle Income Country” in the period 2005 – 2010. The richest 20% of households accounted for 35% of total household expenditures in 2006. The share of the poorest 10% of households was about 3.4% of total household expenditures in 2008. The share of the richest 10% of households was 29.5% of total household expenditures in 2008, up from 25.1% in 2002. In the period between 2006 and 2008 real income dropped in Jordan by 0.9%. For the poorest quartile, the real income dropped by 8.5%, accompanied by a drop of only 0.8% for the richest quartile. In short, the poor became poorer. There are no indications of fiscal systems in place contributing to more inclusive and more egalitarian sustainable development.

Reforms to the social insurance system were introduced in Social Security Law Number 7 of 2010, and work is underway to improve the targeting of the social safety net programmes. But there is scope to further improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the system, with a view to putting in place fiscally affordable safety nets that are designed flexibly to be deployed in the event of an economic shock and phased out after the end of a crisis. The recent shocks that have impacted Jordan so heavily have demonstrated the need to combine: (i) income support to the unemployed with (ii) social assistance targeted to the chronically poor. Income support in the form of unemployment benefits helps laid-off workers and could also have macroeconomic benefits through stabilizing aggregate demand. It moreover is essential to have vertical mobility systems in place for socially mobile persons that want to sustainably escape the poverty trap through decent, gainful wage employment and/or entrepreneurial self-employment and in such way can integrate in mainstream society.

Using an international measure of social safety net spending as a share of GDP, Jordan at about 1.4 percent of GDP ranks somewhere close to the middle of 73 countries surveyed. In the region, Jordan ranks lower on spending than the Middle East / North African regional average (about 2.2% of GDP) which ranks third highest as a region on social safety net spending in the world and just slightly lower than OECD countries (about 2.5%). Spending on social assistance over the past decade has averaged about 3% of government spending annually. Social assistance spending as compared to growth has been quite variable over time, rising and falling with changing conditions, as opposed to meeting specific obligations / targets. Basically, social assistance spending, along with general capital spending, is probably about the most discretionary of all government spending categories.

Progressive improvements are recorded over time in relation to the institutionalisation of the social dialogue between the economic NSA in a tripartite setting more in line with the ILO convention on tripartite consultation and related provisions concerned, however, major challenges remain. The modified Labour Law of 2008 foresaw the creation of a consultative committee in the Ministry of Labour, regrouping the authorities, employers and workers. The legislation establishing a tripartite committee dealing with the approval of labour unions entered into force in May 2010. In terms of social rights, Jordan established a National Pay Equity Committee in July 2011, co-chaired by the Ministry of Labour and the Jordanian National Women’s Commission.

Social dialogue is included under Article 80.1 of the EU-Jordan Association Agreement stipulating that a regular dialogue shall be established between the Parties on all social issues of mutual interest. There are indications that the EU has been proactively supporting this social dialogue, social security and social protection processes and programmes more aligned with Jordan’s upgraded status as Upper Middle Income
Country, both at the political dialogue and at the operational interventions levels. But this was rather the result of scattered, if not piecemeal initiatives, which lacked the interlinkages (and the resources) to effectively make the difference. As during the 2007-2013 CSP these issues have not been addressed in a comprehensive, integrated and systematic matter, it was learnt during the field visit that the Single Support Framework being developed for the next strategic EU-Jordan cooperation period 2014-2020 would include emancipatory social protection as a main thematic focal area.

KPI-1.3.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- CLE Jordan, IR, 2014, Chapter 2.4 The Regional Context, pp. 25-26
- JC-7.2 assessment: impact of external chocks on Jordan economy

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- GoHKJ Executive Development Programme 2011-2013, p.2
- GoHKJ Executive Development Programme 2011-2013, p.81
- GoHKJ Executive Development Programme 2011-2013, p. 142-143
- PEFA report (2011) and World Bank study (2013), p. 204

(iii) Additional information from field phase:

JC-1.3: The EU response strategy has shown responsiveness in flexibly adapting and proactively adjusting to the evolving regional (i.e. Arab Spring, Iraqi and Syrian crises, Palestinian issues), global (e.g. financial and economic crisis) and national contexts (e.g. Upper Middle Income country status)

Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-1.3 (based on the KPIs main findings)

The EU response strategy generally has shown responsiveness in flexibly adapting and proactively adjusting to the evolving regional (i.e. Arab Spring, Iraqi and Syrian crises, Palestinian issues), global (e.g. financial and economic crisis) and national contexts (e.g. Upper Middle Income country status), be it for the latter to a lesser extent.

The thorough transformation process in the region started in December 2010 / January 2011 in Tunisia. Support to civil society, to human rights and the media since 2011 can be termed as support to take up the impulses of the Arab Spring. After a substantial assistance in 2007 of nearly EUR 7 million (covering activities up to the end of 2010), with relative limited approvals thereafter, the support of the EU in the sectors increased remarkably from 2012 onwards. The CLE inventory and portfolio analysis tables show that the assistance to these sectors got a very substantially boost in 2012, with five EU financing decisions in that year totalling EUR 87 million. The figures attest to the robustness of the EU responsiveness towards Jordan also in operational terms, triggered off by the democratisation wave in the region which started early 2011. At the overall policy/political and strategic level, the same level of EU responsiveness is noted in reply to signals and demands from its southern neighbours. In response to the "Arab Spring" the European Commission and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy adopted two Joint Communications "A partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the southern Mediterranean" and "A new response to a changing Neighbourhood". Special response initiatives to the 2011 events include the creation of the Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility and especially of SPRING, the EU Support to Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth programme which is aimed at responding to the pressing socio-economic challenges that partner countries of the southern Mediterranean region are facing and supporting them in their transition to democracy. Support is tailored to the needs of each country, based on an assessment of the country's progress in building democracy and applying the 'more for more' principle. In addition to its bilateral co-operation envelope of EUR 265 million for the period from 2011-2013, Jordan received a EUR 101 million allocation from "SPRING" funds in 2012 and 2013, EUR 85 million of which were dedicated to a “Good Governance and Development Contract”, based on political and economic reform commitments proposed by the authorities. General satisfaction with the speed, the depth and types of EU
responsiveness in those years were observed with the Jordan key stakeholders from both the Government and non-government sectors during the evaluation field visit, but at the same time it was indicated on different occasions that the democratic space actually is shrinking again ever since these events, partially under pressure of the regional crises also affecting the Country’s own security situation. (KPI-1.3.1)

In the same way, and even more outspokenly so, the flexibility, promptness and adequacy of the EU response strategy in adapting to and proactively supporting Jordan in the wake of the regional acute crisis situations in neighbouring countries (e.g. Iraq and Syria) directly affecting the country, especially with regard to the refugees situation, were very much lauded by all stakeholders concerned (Government of Jordan, Member States and other development partners, civil society, local government, beneficiaries) during the evaluation field visit mission to Jordan.

Jordan kept an open-door policy towards refugees fleeing Syria. Jordan continued to accommodate a large number of Syrian refugees, in addition to large communities of refugees from the occupied Palestinian territory and Iraq. Although Jordan is not a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention, by December 2012 over 173,000 Syrian refugees registered or were awaiting registration with the UNHCR. Based on the last update as of 09 September 2014 published on the official UNHCR website there are a total of 615,792 registered Syrian Refugees in Jordan, more than 3.5 more compared to less than 2 years before, or an increase of almost half a million (442,792) persons. Acknowledging the severe impact of the crisis, the EU has provided more than EUR 225 million of humanitarian and development aid to Jordan over the last two years. This financial assistance is intended to support both the refugees and the host communities. Despite an unstable and extremely volatile neighbourhood, Jordan has managed to preserve its domestic stability and has shown great resilience in the face of regional turmoil.

In response to the Syrian crisis, the EU has created a special EC cooperation instrument to finance different types of programmes and projects known as “Special Measures for Syria”. Just recently, on 12 December 2013, another EU grant contract in the amount of EUR 30 million was signed with the Government of Jordan to deal with the consequences of the influx of Syrian refugees in the field of education. Jordan’s health system faced additional demands for medical services from refugees having fled the crisis in Syria. The EU provided humanitarian assistance to help meet the refugees’ health needs, and also provided EUR 10 million to help finance improvements to wastewater services and sanitation in communities hosting Syrian refugees.

To this need to be added a new wave of refugees from Iraq caused by the renewed war in Iraq and by the advances of radical Islamist groups. UNHCR estimates the total number of refugees in Jordan at present at 641,915 persons. According to UNRWA, Jordan was home to 1,951,603 Palestinian refugees in 2008, most of them Jordanian citizens. 338,000 of them were living in UNRWA refugee camps. The latest figure as published on the UNWRA website shows more than 2 million registered Palestine refugees. Most but not all have full citizenship. Other regional crises further aggravate the situation while having a direct or at least indirect impact on Jordan. Despite the difficult fiscal situation of the country, largely attributable to a massive increase in fuel prices as a result of attacks on the Egyptian gas pipeline in Sinai, the country has managed to maintain macro-economic stability and Public Financial Management has improved, partly at least due to the successful Budget Support interventions in this area. The impact of the recent Israeli–Palestine conflict on Jordan society, with a majority Palestinian population, and its economy cannot be underestimated. (KPI-1.3.2)

The EU-Jordan response strategy and programme have been supportive and (pro-)actively contributed to the efforts of Jordan to strive for lasting peace and cooperation in the region, as a concerted effort both in terms of political dialogue and of cooperation interventions. This for example is evidenced in the European Neighbourhood Partnership (ENP) annual reports on Jordan which contain an explicit section on cooperation on foreign and security policy (CFSP), regional and international issues, conflict prevention and crisis.

Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon strengthened the basis of their trilateral cooperation and expressed willingness to exchange best practices with the EU in the field of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) disaster prevention, preparedness and response. On 25 June of last year, the EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centre of Excellence Regional Secretariat for the Middle East officially opened in Amman. The Annual Reports throughout the 2007-2013 period under review confirm that the EU kept a regular dialogue with Jordan on Cooperation on Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) related matters, regional and international issues. (KPI-1.3.3)

From the evaluation field visit to Jordan, limited evidence was obtained that the EU support strategy and programme to Jordan reacted to the impact of the global economic and financial crises on the Country. There are no indications that the response strategy took into consideration Jordan’s gradual evolution over
time and ultimately its actual upgrading to Upper Middle Income (UMI) country status. There are no indications that the EU has adjusted its response strategy accordingly, for example, on the occasion of the development of the second National Indicative Programme (NIP) covering the 2011–2013 period under the 2007–2013 CSP. Most likely, the regional crises have overshadowed these macro-economic developments which in principle invite for updating of response strategies. The assumption was positively tested during the field phase. The potentials provided by upper-middle income status for a country in terms of more systematically tapping available domestic resources for more sustainable, inclusive and equitable economic growth and development to combat inequality have not been explored in a systematic way, if at all. This is quite remarkable for a country portfolio in which Public Finance Management (PFM) takes centre stage with explicit sustainable development objectives and the methodological and budgetary means at its disposal to effectively pursue (re-)distributive policies and programmes for social safety and social inclusion purposes.

Elsewhere in this evaluation, particularly in relation to EQ-8 on education and employment (and indirectly also on social protection, social inclusion and social dialogue), these crucial social cohesion aspects underpinning the complex, precarious and precious social fabric that Jordan society is, are further investigated. Meanwhile inequality in Jordan is rising, as evidenced by: (i) deteriorating Gini coefficient and other income distribution indicators; (ii) growing socio-economic disparities and unequal access to basic social services; (iii) local development geographical differences; (iv) ethnicity based opportunities (e.g. in public and private sectors); (v) rising resident-refugee population tensions. The coming together of these different phenomena brings about a gradual erosion of the social fabric and a potentially explosive situation, further nurtured by the regional crises and a fragile regional security and stability situation. In summary, in relation to the above, it appears that the social contract between the state and its citizens cannot be sustainably financed from external sources, but should be more strongly and more inclusively based on further strengthened internal structural solidarity mechanisms. On different occasions during the evaluation field visit, discussions tended in this direction with on the same occasion fundamental challenges raised in this connection for the next EU-Jordan strategic cooperation framework.

In addition to the risks originating from the domestic political realm, there are risks that stem from the strong links Jordan’s economy has with the other countries in the region as well as with the global economy. The popular uprisings in the region have shaken the political stability of the region as a whole and have increased the risk premium as perceived by investors. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), as well as tourism receipts, fell dramatically in 2011 by 32 percent and 16 percent respectively in the first half of the year, despite high oil prices. Since February 2011, repeated disruptions in the Egypt gas pipeline, which supplies 70 percent of Jordan’s gas, have resulted in a four-fold increase in Jordan’s energy bill due to the need to substitute costly heavy fuel for gas. If there is a prolonged transition period in surrounding countries, the risk of slower growth resulting from these factors will persist.

Jordan’s heavy reliance on imported energy and food (98 percent of the country’s energy and 90 percent of its food supply is imported) make it vulnerable to increases in international commodity prices. As long as food and fuel prices continue to rise, this risk will also persist. While in the past the adverse impact of high commodity prices on the current account deficit has been mitigated by cyclically higher FDI and sustained remittances from the Gulf, this has not been the case in 2011, and Jordan has had to rely heavily on foreign grants. The reliability of foreign aid flows is affected by downturns in the global economy as well as by changes in geopolitics, and as such, dependence on this source of financing is inherently risky. The Government of Jordan is determined to minimize Jordan’s vulnerability to external shocks and to lessen its reliance on foreign grants by building up fiscal space and by setting the stage for endogenous, private sector led growth. The macroeconomic situation in Jordan is closely tied to that of other countries in the Middle East. Remittances from Jordanians working in other states, especially in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, are an important source of national income, equivalent to 15–20 percent of GDP. The Persian Gulf region is also the primary destination for Jordanian exports and in turn supplies most of its energy requirements. Additionally, the country receives substantial grants and foreign direct investments from other countries in the region, most notably from the GCC. As a result, the country is very vulnerability to sudden stops or reversals of external income flows. Against this background and in response to a request for financial assistance submitted by the Jordanian government, in December 2013 the European Council accepted a proposal from the Commission for Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) to provide up to EUR 180 million (in the form of a medium-term loan). Jordan is the first partner country in the Southern Neighbourhood to benefit from this exceptional financial instrument. The MFA is expected to provide some relief from the adverse spill-over effects of the Syrian conflict and complements other humanitarian and development assistance provided to Jordan by the EU.

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### JC-1.4

The policy/political dialogue and the development cooperation strategy components of the EU-Jordan cooperation are consistent, timely, complementary and mutually reinforcing

#### List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 1.4 (codes and definition)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPI-1.4.1</th>
<th>Level of qualitative improvement of EU's cooperation with Jordan as combined policy/political dialogue and development cooperation interventions brought about by the change in the EUD institutional set-up</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPI-1.4.2</td>
<td>Level of enhanced strategic and programmatic synergy, consistency, complementarity and intended effects reinforcing one another between on the one hand the policy/political dialogue and on the other development cooperation strategies and interventions, in line with the provisions concerned in the 2007 Lisbon Treaty on the European Union (e.g. title 5 - article 21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-1.4.3</td>
<td>Level of institutional anchoring of the internal dialogue and coordination within the EU Delegation regarding policy/political dialogue and development operations aspects of the EU cooperation with Jordan (e.g. as evidenced by regular joint meetings, in procedures, function descriptions, job descriptions, joint strategies and reports, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-1.4.4</td>
<td>Overall balance in the EU Jordan interventions portfolio between interventions mainly supporting higher level policy / political dialogue and capacity strengthening on the one hand and interventions targeting the local levels and implementation on the ground on the other (if info available: in number and amounts)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KPI-1.4.1:** Level of qualitative improvement of EU's cooperation with Jordan as combined policy/political dialogue and development cooperation interventions, amongst others brought about by the change in the EUD institutional set-up

**Main Findings on KPI-1.4.1:**

Note: In the process, the scope of indicator KPI-1.4.1 got broadened and is no longer confined to the EUD institutional set-up and the changes therein only. As assessed in relation to the Judgement Criteria on the overall objectives and results areas of the EU response strategy alignment with the national policy and development objectives and priorities of the Government of Jordan (JC-1.1) and based on the analysis and assessment of the alignment and mutually reinforcing strengths of the regional and national components within the overall ENP framework of the EU-Jordan Cooperation and how these have been further strengthened over time (JC-1-2), there are ample reasons to come to the conclusion of a qualitative improvement of EU's cooperation with Jordan as a synergetic combination of policy/political dialogue and development cooperation interventions. The extent to which these improvements are the result of the institutional changes in the EUD institutional set-up following the 2007 Lisbon Treaty on the European Union and its general provisions on the Union’s External Action and Specific Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy, is a dimension which was further looked at during the field phase through consultations at the Delegation. This particularly pertains to the Union assurance of consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and other policies as provided for under article 21 of the Treaty. The combined response strategy consisting of political/policy dialogue and development interventions brings together the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the EC Directorate General Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid in the pursuit of the common objectives of the Union’s external action as included in the Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty and in its wake the creation of EEAS also had important repercussions for the EU Delegations upgrading to de facto Embassies of the European Union. This, in combination with the de-concentration drive of the development cooperation, signified a major increase in responsibilities of the Delegations and special challenges in terms of coordinating the different tasks and responsibilities.

Through direct feedback from the EUD parties concerned during the field visit was learnt that the enhancement of the complementarity of those two major components of the cooperation with Jordan has been a main objective of the Delegation and is also getting more solidly institutionalized via regular and ad hoc meetings involving the different Sections concerned. This particularly pertains to the coordination, consultation and knowledge sharing between, on the one hand, the Operations and the Economic and Trade Sections as far as cooperation interventions are concerned, and the Political Section on the other hand as
far as the broader overall political / policy dialogue is concerned. Obviously, this delineation is not strict, since, as regards the policy/political dialogue, important responsibilities are also vested in the Operations section, and particularly in the units dealing with democratic governance issues (however, not limited to these since as per the Budget Support aid modality all such interventions should have a political / policy dialogue component). The quality of the coordination and the balancing between the broader political and security issues and the development dimension of the cooperation are especially tested in the tense current and earlier regional security situation impacting on Jordan. In these moments, it was acknowledged by the parties concerned that the former priorities prevail and tend to overshadow the sustainable development agenda, pushing it more to the background due to the issues categorized as more pressing and urgent. In the meeting with the European Desk at the Ministry of Foreign affairs, cooperation in the field of security and rule of law was explicitly referred to as highest on the priorities list of EU-Jordan relations and cooperation. It was learnt from the responsible sector / thematic areas officers that such “higher interests” concerns prevail and are ultimate arguments for course of action to be taken.

According to the EUD Amman organisational chart, the Delegation to Jordan consists of five sections: Politics, Press and Information Section, Trade and Economic Section, Operations Section (development and regional cooperation), and Contracts and Finance. In addition, it hosts the Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Iraq and the ECHO Amman Regional Support Office. The current emergency situation caused by the massive influx of refugees from neighbouring countries puts a heavy burden on personnel, overwhelmed by extra tasks and responsibilities related to the substantially increased size of the interventions portfolios they manage and are responsible for and by the emergency situations they are expected to attend to with urgency. Also, it has been observed by Headquarters that the Commission staff of the Delegation to Jordan is stretched in the present context of the Syrian crisis and its substantial spill-over in Jordan. While in most such situations, the crisis would have normally led to a decline or a halt in “normal” bi-lateral co-operation, this is not the case in the present instance as the Jordanian government continues to function as normal, with the full range of projects, programming and follow-up in place, but supplemented by a heavy workload as a result of the Syrian crisis. This means not only additional projects and programmes to manage, but additional meetings, reporting and missions from HQ. The annual External Assistance Management Reports (EAMRs) provide that consideration of additional support in relation to the Syria response in Jordan, at least on temporary basis, would be highly welcome. In this regard, it is also mentioned in the 2012 EAMR that given the amount of additional funding and programmes to be managed, the consolidation of the Delegation’s staff situation in operational teams has been worked out, as per WLAD.

As regards the coordination with the Member States, there are the monthly coordination meetings under EUD chair through the Development Assistance Group (DAG) and the Trade and Economic Counsellors meetings. Specific coordination, through sector leads in the DAG, focusses on the following themes: Justice / governance, Civil society, Energy / environment, Decentralisation / local development, and Water. Employment and education are coordinated in a broader donor framework, the EU being the only donor with substantial involvement in this area. The DAG is the platform through which EUD shares updated information on its new programmes, in preparation of the ENPI committee. As was learnt during the evaluation field mission, DAG meetings have been discontinued for some time now since in their present format they are not perceived as optimal coordination and even information sharing venues. EUD felt that information sharing in the process got actually reduced to one-way information sharing from their part with the other stakeholders. At the overall development partners level, as far as the field of democratic governance is concerned, EU presently has the lead in the donors group on human rights and also on justice reform.

The high level political dialogue between senior officials on foreign and security matters continued (and intensified); in the last year 2013, for example, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the Commission visited Jordan frequently. The Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood visited the country in early June while HM King Abdullah made an official visit to the European institutions in December.

KPI-1.4.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- -/-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- EU – Jordan Association Agreement 2002, p.20
In general, the policy/political dialogue component of the EU-Jordan cooperation in the 2007-2013 period got a substantive boost in the wake of the profound transition the region went through in the years 2010-2011 and also strongly affected Jordan. The EUD annual report on the 2010 cooperation still mentioned that the policy dialogue with Jordanian authorities needed stepping up as there were no regular, open discussions over concerns pertaining to governance, human rights and basic freedoms in particular, and there was no or at least insufficient follow-up dialogue at local level to association council or sub-committees meetings. There also was a need for Budget Support reviews to be carried out more frequently and in a way to ensure substantial exchanges on policy break-throughs which such instruments ultimately aim to encourage. The recommendation even was that the future approach to such instruments needed to be reflected upon in this light. The assessment of the quality and intensity of the policy/political dialogue in the years thereafter changed dramatically and was generally described as smooth in most if not all sectors. Special efforts were made to ensure a close interlinkage between the dialogue maintained at programme implementation level and in the framework of the ENP sub-committee dialogue, which had proved effective in deepening the mutual understanding of the issues at stake, as well as the strategies for EU support in this respect. Up towards the present, the policy/political dialogue component of the cooperation kept being substantive particularly in support of / complementary to development interventions funded via Budget Support financial instruments. As such a mutually reinforcing, symbiotic relationship emerged and got stronger in the process between the policy / political dialogue and the other development cooperation strategies and interventions. Just by way of illustration, of the list of thirteen draft laws / bylaws discussed for enactment by the Parliament in its June 2014 Extra-Parliamentary session, the majority represented an explicit conditionality for facilitating the release of EU (sectoral) Budget Support variable tranches, as evidenced by the respective SBS Performance Assessment Frameworks (PAF) and their monitoring. As such there can be concluded to the effective materialisation of the intended policy / political dialogue results contributed to by the supported development interventions. The contents, quality, sustainability and ultimate impact of these political dialogue outcomes are other concerns and the field visit was to learn that these cannot be taken just for granted, as the formal passing of legislation of course does not automatically brings with it their effective implementation, let alone lasting impact on the ground. It on different occasions was brought to the attention of the evaluation team, that in the effective bringing about of the reform on the ground lies another round of challenges for the political dialogue – development interventions symbiosis within the EU-Jordan cooperation. A direct appeal for the Single Support Framework for the next strategic cooperation period 2014-2020. The major challenges in this regard were also confirmed in the focus group discussion and in the mini-survey with CSO on various democratic governance issues. CSOs generally were very pleased with the extent and the quality of the support received from the EU, especially also in relation to...
their own institutional and human capacity building, but were generally negative in their assessment of their actual impact on political dialogue and agenda setting at present in Jordan. Some of them referred to involvement as mere formal window dressing within impact.

On a more practical level of linking policy dialogue and development interventions, a lesson learnt is that when passing the necessary legislative and regulatory reforms is aimed for, specific and well-focused support is needed in order to avoid any implementation delays. From different interviews during the field visit emanated that it is essential to have a strategic approach developed first towards the legislative process and also to understand what processes are required to get the reform in place and have it actually implemented. Great effort and commitment is still required from all involved parties to reinforce the capacity of the existing Institutions and to promote the required legislative reforms. This pertains to all thematic areas of cooperation regardless the sector. Another crucial factor for enhanced synergy amongst policy dialogue and development interventions is the need for strong leadership and ownership of the processes. In certain cases of weak or fragmented institutional responsibilities, a lack of coherent sector strategies and operational coordination has often resulted in fragmented donor assistance, activities within inappropriate policy or institutional frameworks, weak ability to select and scale up successes, and ultimately little on-the-ground impact. This appears to have been the case for instance in the areas of private sector development, social protection, and financial management reform. In contrast, the experience of the education programme has been a good example of donors’ coordination at both the strategic and operational level through leadership by the Ministry of Education.

A good illustration of a successful linking of policy dialogue and development interventions is as a concerted effort of the EUD and the EU Member States relates to the joint EUD-MS Human Rights Country strategy for Jordan and the monitoring of its implementation. On the occasion of the second round of the Universal Periodic Review for Jordan in October 2013 for example, the EU and Member States took the opportunity to engage with the authorities as well as the civil society, including through the Human Rights Working Group. EU Member States were among the most active countries at the Universal Periodic Review round in Geneva. The ENP progress reports also provide for appropriate opportunities to share clear messages with the Jordanian authorities, including recommendations most of which are related to human rights, rule of law and good governance. These ENP progress reports give an account of the objectives to be achieved and the actual accomplishments related to the two main cooperation instruments of political dialogue and cooperation interventions, stressing their synergy and mutually reinforcing character. Also public diplomacy as third instrument is included in the reporting. The report (which covers both the EU and the Member States) on the implementation of the Human Rights Country Strategy covers eight sub-areas, to wit: (i) Political rights, (ii) Freedom of assembly, (iii) Freedom of association / civil society, (iv) Freedom of expression and media, (v) Rule of law / rights based society / torture, (vi) Gender equality, (vii) Death penalty, (viii) Children’s rights and (viii) Public diplomacy. Issues related to human rights, including as regards public diplomacy and conveying messages to the authorities, are regularly discussed with Member States at the regular meetings chaired by the EU Delegation, including at the level of Heads of Missions (HoMs). The Human Rights Country Strategy has been used as a basis for the elaboration of EU and Member States joint messages to the authorities and civil society.

From different sources is learnt, as attested to by interviews with key stakeholders during the evaluation field visit, that relations between the Delegation and the Ministry are good and contacts are frequent and at all levels, from Minister down to Task Manager. Nevertheless, dialogue is referred to as still overly mechanical (e.g. related to disbursements, contracting, BS tranches releases, etc.) rather than policy-oriented. While MoPIC has traditionally shown rather limited enthusiasm for donor co-ordination, but this is improving, largely as a result of the necessities imposed on it by the Syrian crisis. The improvement has however not really been felt that much yet at the level of the “normal” bi-lateral co-operation with the country.

KPI-1.4.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- NIP 2011-2013, pp 16-18
- ENP Jordan Annual Report, 2008, p.2
- KPI 7.1.1 findings: EC-GoJ policy dialogue and legislation on trade
- Jonasson: Common Values?, 2011 - Common values underlying EU-Jordan dialogue questioned as
it is security and stability that matters not so much democracy.
- JC-7.1 assessment: Necessity of political dialogue and legislation as basis for cooperation

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- /-

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- IKRS-2 (2014). p.2

KPI-1.4.3:  Level of institutional anchoring of the internal dialogue and coordination within the EU Delegation regarding policy/political dialogue and development operations aspects of the EU cooperation with Jordan (e.g. as evidenced by regular joint meetings, in procedures, function descriptions, job descriptions, joint strategies and reports, etc.)

Main Findings on KPI-1.4.3:

Note: As the evaluation progressed, the original KPI-1.4.3 has been generalised to cover not only the internal dialogue and coordination within the EU Delegation regarding policy/political dialogue and development operations aspects of the EU cooperation with Jordan, but the whole EU-Jordan cooperation.

Already at the onset of the 2007-2013 period under review, the government-donor co-ordination working groups were created (at a technical level) in 10 priority sectors, explicitly to encourage dialogue between the government and donors, and to ensure that donor funded projects are complementary and in line with Jordan’s development priorities. In 2009, an eleventh group was created to focus on public financial management. The OECD 2011 aid effectiveness report on Jordan pointed out that in addition the Government of Jordan maintains regular dialogue with donors, either through donors’ meetings chaired by the Ministry of Planning and International Co-operation (MoPIC), or through structured bilateral dialogues. These address donor assistance programmes and priorities for support that align with the government’s plans and with the country’s key developmental needs.

However, on different other occasions it has been reported, as was also shared in interviews during the evaluation field visit, that there is no sufficiently strong body within the Jordanian administration to impose a degree of harmonisation on Ministries. An example quoted by MoPIC was a letter drafted by the Ministry and sent by the Prime Minister to all line ministries requesting details of reforms in the pipeline which could be used as potential benchmarks for payments on the “good governance and development Contract”. Despite, two months having passed, no replies were received. Some of the alternative options circulating include the Ministry of Public Sector Development (MoPSD), which is the duly mandated public administration tasked with public sector reform and is eager to assume this task based on a strategic plan further substantiated in operational plans for each of the main reform strategy components. Its “Government Performance Development Plan” consists of six pillars, each of which a number of concrete projects are identified complete with targeted project performance indicators and with indication of main responsible parties. These six pillars are: (i) Human Resources Development; (ii) Government streamlining; (iii) Developing government services and simplifying procedures; (iv) Strengthening supervision, regulation, accountability and transparency; (v) Support the policy and decision-making process, and; (vi) Reinforcing a culture of excellence. EU supports some scattered initiatives and considers more systematic collaboration with the Ministry, as was learnt during the evaluation team’s field visit.

Therefore, although the dialogue between the Delegation and MoPIC takes place regularly and relations are good, the quality of the dialogue can be questioned. Discussions usually remain at a mechanical level – over how much and when the next payment will be and when it will be made, rather than on substantive policy matters. Policy dialogue is still quite difficult to obtain at the level of the line ministries, albeit the Ministry of Education constitutes a positive exception. One path which could be explored is the use of SAPP funds to provide training for MoPIC staff in this area. For example, notwithstanding its importance to the country as a major source of revenue loss, poverty and debt the authorities do not seem to place energy high on the reform agenda. JICA (Japanese International Co-operation Agency), AFD, KfW, USAID and the EU meet 4 times per year to exchange information, but the host country has not participated for over a year. The other path, as indicated, above is the option to choose for another institutional proponent of public sector reform.
and enhanced results oriented performance management in the public sector.

Political dialogue and cooperation take centre stage in the updated EU-Jordan ENP Action Plan with special focus on enhanced political and strategic dialogue and cooperation on foreign and security policy. The EU and Jordan are committed to achieve closer political cooperation and dialogue on these on the basis of their shared values, including the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and good governance. The enhanced political dialogue and cooperation takes place at different levels and in the framework of different fora: EU-Jordan summits on an ad-hoc basis, reflecting the specific nature of the partnership and the importance they attach to their relations; Meetings on an ad-hoc basis between the Jordan Minister of Foreign Affairs and his European counterparts; Jordan sectoral ministers engaging in consultations with their relevant European counterparts, on an ad-hoc-basis, in the margin of the regular meetings of the EU Council of Ministers; Development of an enhanced political dialogue and regular exchange of information on Common Foreign Security and Defense Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP); Invitation of Senior Jordan officials, official representatives or leading figures from the academic and research communities on an ad-hoc-basis, to EU Council working groups’ meetings and further development of the political dialogue between the European Parliament and the Jordan Parliament.

Both the EU and Jordanian authorities and other key parties interviewed recognise the need for more inclusive consultation on policy making and the implementation of reform. This necessarily involves business associations, trade unions, employers, employees and other civil society actors (in principle) eager / prepared to fully participate in a socio-economic dialogue. Over time substantive improvement are noted in terms of an institutionalisation of this social dialogue, but one is far from being able to say that such socio-economic dialogue takes places in a tripartite environment. Different consulted parties pointed at a need to further strengthen and institutionalise this tripartite social dialogue with the social partners as a key priority area for the next period of cooperation under the SSF, in line with Jordan’s status as Upper-Middle Income Country, but marked with huge inequalities affecting the very fabric and cohesion of the Jordan society.

In Jordan, the Donor/Lender Consultation Group (DLCG) process was initiated in 2000, before the Accra commitments. It was aimed to facilitate dialogue on priorities and programmes reviewing assistance to the country and improving the harmonisation of operational activities with a view to maximizing their effectiveness and efficiency. This mechanism thus was supposed to ensure coordination between the active donors. The DLCG established six thematic groups: education, social development, private sector reform, environment, water, governance and public-sector reform. Presently 4 thematic groups – on Water, Energy, Education and Governance – are active. This mechanism, which generally includes only resident donors, focuses on harmonisation particularly concentrating on division of labour, coordination of implementation and exchange of information. The mechanism has been loosely structured whereby the coordination responsibility has been rotating between the participating donors.

As far as the political dialogue cum portfolio management situation at the EU Delegation is concerned, a recent HQ review mission recognized that the Delegation is experiencing some difficulties in finding time to monitor ongoing projects. The difficulties it faces are particularly due to the added workload imposed by the Syrian crisis. At the same time it is observed and acknowledged to be essential that a realistic monitoring plan be established and adhered to. The audit plan is assessed credible and well prepared. It furthermore was recommended that risk assessment is established on all projects. The audit plan is assessed credible and well prepared. It furthermore was recommended that risk assessment is established on all projects. Within this broader framework, the monitoring mission plan, evaluation plan, ROM planning and audit plan could cover various complementary aspects of the project portfolio.

As per the feedback from different discussions with key stakeholders (EUD internal and external third parties) during the CLE field visit, the lack of a well-established and standardized internal monitoring and reporting system retrieving results-oriented performance information from the interventions for further (automated) processing, consolidation and aggregation is one of the key reasons for this limited actual monitoring capacity and activities affecting the overall quality and performance of the portfolio.

On different occasions, reports refer to the too weak involvement of EUDs at the moment of the pipeline and early PCM cycle to leverage for policy dialogue. As for example the 2013 Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) Mid-Term Evaluation points out, EU Delegations are often weakly or perfunctorily involved in the early phase of the pipeline development and of the project cycle, when the maximum leverage could be obtained in terms of negotiations and policy dialogue. These conditions of limited participation may affect Delegations’ level of commitment and ownership of NIF projects. The consultation process on project proposals is broad but shallow. Project development has limited interactions with Delegations and geographical coordination services, limiting contributions to EC objectives. On the other hand, it is pointed out that coordination with EU
Delegations has been steadily improving over the past two years. Civil society and beneficiaries are more systematically consulted during project preparation and appraisal, but still this consultation deserves to be strengthened. The effectiveness of the consultation of EC services and project verification is hampered by i) the limited quantity and quality of information provided by the Project Fiches and ii) limited availability of human resources. The evaluation recommends to significantly strengthen the verification of project proposals and that adequate resources should be allocated to that effect. As far as EUD involvement in the actual steering, management and monitoring of individual interventions, programmes and projects is concerned, the evaluation team intended to use the frequency and quality of the holding of Steering Committee Meetings as proxy indicators. However, only little information was available from MoPIC not enabling to make a solid analysis of the issues at stake.

**KPI-1.4.3 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) **Data, figures and tables:**
- -/-

(ii) **Key extracts from documents:**
- NIF Mid Term Evaluation, 2013
- EU-Jordan Action Plan 2010, p.4-5
- CSP 2007-2013, p.15
- NIP 2007-2010, p.35
- KPI 2.1.2 findings on EU DoL and preparations for CSP and NIP:
- KPI 2.1.4: Donor/Lender Consultation Group (DLCG) to ensure strategic directions and alignment
- Memorandum of Understanding EC-EIB-IBRD, 2004

(iii) **Additional information from field phase:**
- IKRS-2 (2014). p.2
- IKRS-2 (2014). p.2
- IKRS-2 (2014). p.3

**KPI-1.4.4: Overall balance in the EU Jordan interventions portfolio between interventions mainly supporting higher level policy / political dialogue and capacity strengthening on the one hand and interventions targeting the local levels and implementation on the ground on the other (if info available: in number and amounts)**

**Main Findings on KPI-1.4.4:**

Overall a balance in the EU Jordan interventions portfolio between interventions mainly supporting higher level policy / political dialogue and capacity strengthening on the one hand and interventions targeting the local levels and implementation on the ground on the other maybe concluded to in general terms based on the feedback from the different meetings and interviews held during the field visit. There however is an appalling lack of interventions outcome and impact data on the ground making it impossible to further substantiate the assessment in quantitative terms. On different other occasions in this report is argued that one of the main weaknesses of overall portfolio management is its lack of internal monitoring, depriving policy makers and operational managers alike to make strategic and operational corrective actions if and where needed. Any consolidation of what has been achieved as a result of the combined, integrated and mutually reinforcing policy dialogue and development interventions strategy in the next programming cycle would appear needing to be given priority to ensure further strengthened and broadened actual results on the ground. It would also invite for revisiting the lists / configuration of Budget Support conditionalities, de-emphasising the formal, legalistic conditionalities in favour of outputs and outcome indicators on the ground, at the level of the ultimate target groups and beneficiaries. It is about “giving more teeth to the paper tigers” as it was mentioned in one of the interviews during the field phase by one of the interlocutors. This includes ensuring actual execution of the often formalistic, legal provisions, formal compliance with which is sought basically for BS conditionalities compliance reasons (only) to just enable release of BS variable tranches. As reported elsewhere, a relative ignorance at the level of the line ministries was noted with regard to the aid modalities which should be at their proposal, pointed at transparency, visibility knowledge sharing and...
related issues. Results based planning, management, measurement, monitoring and reporting on the ground is referred to as one of the major tools in first instance with the aim of further enhancing internal results based management and secondly (only) for enhancing external accountability. Capacity building, both institutional and human, is an essential component of any sustainable, duly owned strategy to squarely face these challenges on the ground.

To further substantiate the above, it is preferred to more broadly capture here an excerpt from an EU headquarters mission report focusing on the delivery of results, also in relation to the design of the next cycle of EU-Jordan cooperation under the Single Support Framework covering the 2014-2020 period.”

MoPIC nevertheless insists that not only is the EU funding important for Jordan in revenue terms but also politically as, without this incentive, it would be very hard to push a reform agenda on reluctant ministries. To this end, the understanding of the nature of Budget Support has significantly improved on the part of the Ministry of Finance and MoPIC. Both these ministries, in the “front line” of the instrument have come to realise that Budget Support, far from being “free money”, actually obliges the partner country to make substantial efforts in order to receive the full amounts on offer. The MoF criticised line Ministries for proposing benchmarks which are difficult to achieve. The Ministries however defend themselves by saying that if the MoF gave them the resources required, then the benchmarks were/are realistic. The MoF has given instructions to line ministries to prioritise EU projects, realising that this is essential to obtain payment.

The SBS on Public Financial Management has achieved a number of demonstrable results, not the least being increasing financial and budgetary transparency (publication of the budget, summary budget, establishment of internal audit and internal control instances) as well as a greater willingness on the part of the MoF to discuss frankly with donors, including DG ECFIN, in charge of the management of a Macro-Financial Assistance programme of EUR 180 million.

Funds for the Ministry of Education to pay the salaries of the additional teachers hired to teach Syrian refugee children are being transferred on a monthly basis. The discussions with the representative of the Ministry on education policy relating to our Budget Support for reform, Syrian refugees and TVET indicated that there is a demonstrable link between our funding and the policy of the Ministry, albeit that the Ministry were frank that the influx of refugees was submitting the school system to a great degree of stress which was resulting in the education reform programme being largely halted. Since the indicators are largely quantitative (number of teachers trained, number of schools built etc.), they do not foresee the need to change the Financing Agreement.

In the case of other Ministries, the picture is not so clear. Despite having a significant amount of funding foreseen under the new SSF, the Ministry of Energy did not seem to have a clear strategy on how to use EU funds for energy efficiency and renewable energy, and in particular of the potential for blending with other types of funding, for example soft loans. In other cases, it became apparent in discussions with beneficiaries that the demands of the SBS were over-ambitious. This is in particular the case with support to the Ministry of Transport and Trade, who are expected to institute a series of measures which effectively depend on other ministries and bodies – Ministry of Public Works and Housing, Customs Authority, Aqaba Special economic Zone Authority etc. The result is complicated steering committees where finding ways to block progress is easier than finding ways to bring it about. Reforms often run against resistance from interest groups and there does not appear to be a sufficiently strong force within the government to overcome these. The situation with regard to the Ministry of Justice, is somewhat worrying, with policy dialogue needing to be improved, despite the Minister emphasising his personal commitment to the substantial Budget Support programme due to begin shortly.”

KPI-1.4.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
-  -/-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
-  -/-

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
-  IKRS-2 (2014). pp. 3-4
### JC-1.4 The policy/political dialogue and the development cooperation strategy components of the EU-Jordan cooperation are consistent, timely, complementary and mutually reinforcing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-1.4 (based on the KPIs main findings)</th>
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| There are ample reasons to come to the conclusion of a qualitative improvement of EU's cooperation with Jordan as a synergetic combination of policy/political dialogue and development cooperation interventions. Through direct feedback from the EUD parties concerned during the field visit is was learnt that the enhancement of the complementarity of those two major components of the cooperation with Jordan has been a main objective of the Delegation and also is getting more solidly institutionalized via regular and ad hoc meetings involving the different Sections concerned. This particularly pertains to the coordination, consultation and knowledge sharing between on the one hand the Operations and the Economic and Trade Section as far as cooperation interventions are concerned and the political section on the other hand as far as the broader overall political / policy dialogue is concerned. Obviously this delineation is not strict, since as far as the policy/political dialogue is concerned also important responsibilities are vested in the Operations section, and particularly in the units therein dealing with democratic governance issues (however not limited to these since as per the Budget Support aid modality all such interventions should have a political / policy dialogue component). The quality of the coordination and the balancing between the broader political and security issues and the development dimension of the cooperation are especially tested in the current and earlier tense regional security situation impacting on Jordan. In these moments, it was acknowledged by the parties concerned that the former priorities prevail and tend to overshadow the sustainable development agenda and pushing it more to the background because of the issues categorized as more pressing and urgent. In the meeting with the European Desk at the Ministry of Foreign affairs, cooperation in the field of security and rule of law situation was referred to explicitly as highest on the priorities list of EU-Jordan relations and cooperation. It was learnt from the responsible sector / thematic areas officers that such “higher interests” concerns prevail and are ultimate arguments for course of action to be taken. Also, it has been observed by Headquarters that the Commission staff of the Delegation to Jordan is stretched in the present context of the Syrian crisis and its substantial spill-over in Jordan. While in most such situations, the crisis would have normally led to a decline or a halt in "normal" bi-lateral co-operation, this is not the case in the present instance as the Jordanian government continues to function as normal, with the full range of projects, programming and follow-up in place, but supplemented by a heavy workload as a result of the Syrian crisis. This means not only additional projects and programmes to manage, but additional meetings, reporting and missions from HQ. As regards to coordination with the Member States, there are the monthly coordination meetings under EUD chair through the Development Assistance Group (DAG) and the Trade and Economic Counsellors meetings. DAG meetings have been discontinued for some time now since in their present format they are not perceived as optimal coordination and even information sharing venues. EUD felt information sharing in the process got actually reduced to one-way information sharing from their part with the other stakeholders. At the overall development partners level, as far as the field of democratic governance is concerned, EU presently has the lead in the donors group on human rights and also on justice reform. (KPI-1.4.1) In general, the policy/political dialogue component of the EU-Jordan cooperation in the 2007-2013 period got a substantive boost in the wake of the profound transition the region went through in the years 2010-2011 and also strongly affected Jordan. The EUD annual report on the 2010 cooperation still mentioned that the policy dialogue with Jordanian authorities needed stepping up as there were no regular, open discussions over concerns pertaining to governance, human rights and basic freedoms in particular, and there was no or at least insufficient follow-up dialogue at local level to association council or sub-committees meetings. The assessment of the quality and intensity of the policy/political dialogue in the years thereafter changed dramatically and was generally described as smooth in most if not all sectors. Special efforts were made to ensure a close inter-linkage between the dialogue maintained at programme implementation level and in the framework of the ENP sub-committee dialogue, which had proved effective in deepening the mutual understanding of the issues at stake, as well as the strategies for EU support in this respect. Up towards the present, the policy/political dialogue component of the cooperation kept being substantive particularly in support of / complementary to development interventions funded via Budget Support financial instruments. As such a mutually reinforcing, symbiotic relationship emerged and got stronger in the process between the policy / political dialogue and the other development cooperation strategies and interventions. Just by way of illustration, of the list of thirteen draft laws / bylaws discussed for enactment by the Parliament in its June
2014 Extra-Parliamentary session, the majority represented an explicit conditionality for facilitating the release of EU (sectoral) Budget Support variable tranches, as evidenced by the respective SBS Performance Assessment Frameworks (PAF) and their monitoring.

As such, it can be concluded that the supported development interventions contributed to the effective materialisation of the intended policy / political dialogue results. The contents, quality, sustainability and ultimate impact of these political dialogue outcomes are other concerns and the field visit was to learn that these cannot be taken just for granted, as the formal passing of legislation of course does not automatically brings with it their effective implementation, let alone lasting impact on the ground. A good illustration of a successful linking of policy dialogue and development interventions as a concerted effort of the EUD and the EU Member States relates to the joint EUD-MS Human Rights Country strategy for Jordan and the monitoring of its implementation. The Human Rights Country Strategy has been used as a basis for the elaboration of EU and Member States joint messages to the authorities and civil society.

From different sources is learnt, as attested to by interviews with key stakeholders during the evaluation field visit, that relations between the Delegation and the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation are good and contacts are frequent and at all levels, from Minister down to Task Manager. Nevertheless, dialogue is referred to as still overly mechanical (e.g. related to disbursements, contracting, BS tranches releases, etc.) rather than policy-oriented. While MoPIC has traditionally shown rather limited enthusiasm for donor co-ordination, but this is improving, largely as a result of the necessities imposed on it by the Syrian crisis. The improvement has however not really been felt that much yet at the level of the “normal” bi-lateral co-operation with the country. (KPI-1.4.2)

Political dialogue and cooperation take centre stage in the updated EU-Jordan ENP Action Plan with special focus on enhanced political and strategic dialogue and cooperation on foreign and security policy. The EU and Jordan are committed to achieve closer political cooperation and dialogue on these on the basis of their shared values, including the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and good governance. The enhanced political dialogue and cooperation takes place at different levels and in the framework of different fora: EU-Jordan summits on an ad-hoc basis, reflecting the specific nature of the partnership and the importance they attach to their relations; Meetings on an ad-hoc basis between the Jordan Minister of Foreign Affairs and his European counterparts; Jordan sectoral ministers engaging in consultations with their relevant European counterparts, on an ad-hoc-basis, in the margin of the regular meetings of the EU Council of Ministers; Development of an enhanced political dialogue and regular exchange of information on Common Foreign Security and Defense Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP); Invitation of Senior Jordan officials, official representatives or leading figures from the academic and research communities on an ad-hoc-basis, to EU Council working groups’ meetings and further development of the political dialogue between the European Parliament and the Jordan Parliament.

Both the EU and Jordanian authorities and other key parties interviewed recognise the need for more inclusive consultation on policy making and the implementation of reform. This necessarily involves business associations, trade unions, employers, employees and other civil society actors (in principle) eager / prepared to fully participate in a socio-economic dialogue. Over time substantive improvement are noted in terms of an institutionalisation of this social dialogue, but one is far from being able to say that such socio-economic dialogue takes places in a tripartite environment. Different consulted parties pointed at a need to further strengthen and institutionalise this tripartite social dialogue with the social partners as a key priority area for the next period of cooperation under the SSF, in line with Jordan’s status as Upper-Middle Income Country, but marked with huge inequalities affecting the very fabric and cohesion of the Jordan society.

As per the feedback from different discussions with key stakeholders (EUD internal and external third parties) during the CLE field visit, the lack of a well-established and standardized internal monitoring and reporting system retrieving results-oriented performance information from the interventions for further (automated) processing, consolidation and aggregation is one of the key reasons for this limited actual monitoring capacity and activities affecting the overall quality and performance of the portfolio.

On different occasions, reports refer to the too weak involvement of EUDs at the moment of the pipeline and early PCM cycle to leverage for policy dialogue. As for example the 2013 Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) Mid-Term Evaluation points out, EU Delegations are often weakly or perfunctorily involved in the early phase of the pipeline development and of the project cycle, when the maximum leverage could be obtained in terms of negotiations and policy dialogue. These conditions of limited participation may affect Delegations’ level of commitment and ownership of NIF projects. The consultation process on project proposals is broad but shallow. Project development has limited interactions with Delegations and geographical coordination.
services, limiting contributions to EC objectives. On the other hand, it is pointed out that coordination with EU Delegations has been steadily improving over the past two years. Civil society and beneficiaries are more systematically consulted during project preparation and appraisal, but still this consultation deserves to be strengthened. The effectiveness of the consultation of EC services and project verification is hampered by i) the limited quantity and quality of information provided by the Project Fiches and ii) limited availability of human resources. The evaluation recommends to significantly strengthen the verification of project proposals and that adequate resources should be allocated to that effect. As far as EUD involvement in the actual steering, management and monitoring of individual interventions, programmes and projects is concerned, the evaluation team intended to use the frequency and quality of the holding of Steering Committee Meetings as proxy indicators. However, only piecemeal information was available from MoPIC not enabling to make a solid analysis of the issues at stake. (KPI-1.4.3)

Overall a balance in the EU Jordan interventions portfolio between interventions mainly supporting higher level policy / political dialogue and capacity strengthening on the one hand and interventions targeting the local levels and implementation on the ground on the other maybe concluded to in general terms based on the feedback from the different meetings and interviews held during the field visit. There however is an appalling lack of interventions outcome and impact data on the ground making it impossible to further substantiate the assessment in quantitative terms. On different other occasions in this report is argued that one of the main weaknesses of overall portfolio management is its lack of internal monitoring, depriving policy makers and operational managers alike to make strategic and operational corrective actions if and where needed. Any consolidation of what has been achieved as a result of the combined, integrated and mutually reinforcing policy dialogue and development interventions strategy in the next programming cycle would appear needing to be given priority to ensure further strengthened and broadened actual results on the ground. It would also invite for revisiting the lists / configuration of Budget Support conditionalities, de-emphasising the formal, legalistic conditionalities in favour of outputs and outcome indicators on the ground, at the level of the ultimate target groups and beneficiaries. It is about “giving more teeth to the paper tigers” as it was mentioned in one of the interviews during the field phase by one of the interlocutors. This includes ensuring actual execution of the often formalistic, legal provisions, formal compliance with which is sought basically for BS conditionalities compliance reasons (only) to just enable release of BS variable tranches. As reported elsewhere, a relative ignorance at the level of the line ministries was noted with regard to the aid modalities which should be at their proposal, pointed at transparency, visibility knowledge sharing and related issues. Results based planning, management, measurement, monitoring and reporting on the ground is referred to as one of the major tools in first instance with the aim of further enhancing internal results based management and secondly (only) for enhancing external accountability. Capacity building, both institutional and human, is an essential component of any sustainable, duly owned strategy to squarely face these challenges on the ground.

MoPIC nevertheless insists that not only is the EU funding important for Jordan in revenue terms but also politically as, without this incentive, it would be very hard to push a reform agenda on reluctant ministries. To this end, the understanding of the nature of Budget Support has significantly improved on the part of the Ministry of Finance and MoPIC. Both these ministries, in the “front line” of the instrument, have come to realise that Budget Support, far from being “free money”, actually obliges the partner country to make substantial efforts in order to receive the full amounts on offer. The MoF criticised line Ministries for proposing benchmarks which are difficult to achieve. The Ministries however defend themselves by saying that if the MoF gave them the resources required, then the benchmarks were/are realistic. The MoF has given instructions to line ministries to prioritise EU projects, realising that this is essential to obtain payment.
JC-1.5

Actual programme implementation and operations are strategically aligned with the overall strategic objectives and priorities of the response strategy, as updated

List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 1.5 (codes and definition)

| KPI-1.5.1 | Degree to which the EU Jordan national portfolio of interventions (allocations and expenditures) is in line with the strategic objectives and priority areas as included in the CSP and NIPs documents as updated / amended (if info available: in number and amounts) |
| KPI-1.5.2 | Degree to which the regional portfolio of interventions (allocations and expenditures) benefiting Jordan and those financed through the ENP Association Agreement Action Plan are in line with the strategic objectives and priority areas as included in the AA-AP and RSP-RIP documents as updated / amended and in the CSP and NIPs documents (if info available: in number and amounts) |
| KPI-1.5.3 | Degree to which the EU Jordan portfolio of horizontal / thematic interventions (allocations and expenditures) is in line with the CSP-NIPs configuration of priority sectors and thematic areas, covering both the policy/political dialogue and development cooperation main components (if info available: in number and amounts) |
| KPI-1.5.4 | Degree to which the changed strategic priorities over time are also matched by a changed composition over time of the interventions portfolio (if info available: in numbers and amounts) |

KPI-1.5.1: Degree to which the EU Jordan national portfolio of interventions (allocations and expenditures) is in line with the strategic objectives and priority areas as included in the CSP and NIPs documents as updated / amended (if info available: in number and amounts)

Main Findings on KPI-1.5.1:

The different tables and figures included under this Final Report Volume III Annex 4 “Quantitative interventions portfolio analysis of the EU-Jordan cooperation in the period 2007-2013” give ample evidence of the alignment of the interventions portfolio (at both Financing Decisions and decisions Contracting levels) with the strategic objectives and the priority areas / focal sectors as included in the 2007-2013 Country Strategy Paper and the two subsequent NIPs covering the periods 2007-2010 and 2011 – 2013 respectively. This also pertains to the evolution of the portfolio over time as marked by the differences between the first and the second NIP under the CSP. Despite this strategic longer term alignment, still the necessary flexibility was maintained to accommodate the necessary immediate / rapid responses in reply to regional conflict and emergency situations This portfolio synchronization with the strategic objectives and identified sectoral and thematic focal areas included in the CSP and NIPs is for example illustrated by the below synthesis table of a sectoral / thematic clustering of the interventions by DAC 5 codes, as classification probably closest to the list / configuration of focal areas identified in the CSP-NIPs.

Figure 5.2: Distribution of Contracted Amounts by Sector

Source: CRIS and own analysis
There are two major tools to monitor and report on the synchronization of policies/strategy and the operational level of interventions: (1) The ENP Jordan Progress Reports / Annual Reports, with as full title “Joint Staff Working Document – Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Jordan Progress in Year X and Recommendations for Action, Accompanying the Document Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Delivering on a new European Neighbourhood Policy”, and (2) the External Assistance Management Report (EAMRs), also on an annual basis by the Ambassador / Head of Delegation and the EUD Head of Cooperation to the Directorate-General Development and Cooperation (DG DEVCO) on the EuropeAid achievements in the past year.

There is however no evidence of any kind of joint or mutually verified annual reporting by the EU Delegation and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the style of the Joint Annual Report (JARs) in quite a number of EU partner countries (the ACP Countries) benefiting from European Development Fund (EDF) financing. In both debriefings with the EUD and the MoPIC on behalf of the Government of Jordan at the end of the evaluation field visit, this was acknowledged as a missed opportunity for jointly assessing overall implementation progress as against the broader strategic objectives as enshrined in the CSP and NIP documents.

In none of the ENP Jordan Annual Reports or of the EAMRs covering the period 2007-2013, there is any mentioning of any substantive deviation from programme execution vis-à-vis the original policy or strategic directions. As such, it can be confidently averred that the EU Jordan national portfolio of interventions (allocations and expenditures) is in line with the strategic objectives and priority areas as included in the CSP and NIPs documents as updated/amended. Just by way of illustration, in the EAMR for cooperation year 2012 continued good performance in contracting and payments on the on-going portfolio is reported. As a result the end year contracting and payment figures largely exceeded the forecast (contracts 110M / forecast 63M; payments 94.5M / forecast 53M). The overall positive results are in line with those of last year, the exceeding amount being due to SPRING and the Syria response. Rhythm of payments is steady throughout the year; hike in payments at the end of the year due to Budget Support programmes (55% of total payments), which account for 42% of the contracts.

However, some words of reservation and apprehension can be found in the 2013 Aid Coordination and Effectiveness report on Jordan. It is asserted that the absence of a structured dialogue and exchange during the national planning process between the Government and the donors makes it challenging for the donors to align their assistance with the national development priorities and programming timetables as well as to harmonise planning with the national systems and to programme and plan external contributions accordingly. It also makes it challenging for the Government to anticipate and plan external funding and so to take the best possible advantage of these funding possibilities. Also here some observations can be made in terms of aid effectiveness. At the programming level the process seems to become focused on the matching/approval process and the individual development projects for which funding is sought from donors – usually by approaching donors bilaterally. From the donors’ perspective, the process lacks transparency and many donors perceive that this project-based approach has resulted in “shopping” among donors for the best deal causing additional workload for donor agencies and confusion among the donor community, not to speak about the lack of overall strategic focus.

As a proxy for alignment with government priorities and effective mainstreaming of aid within the national systems, Paris Declaration indicator 3 measures the percentage of aid disbursed by donors for the government sector that is included in the annual budget for the same fiscal year. The indicator reflects two components: the degree to which aid is aligned with government priorities, and the extent to which aid is captured in government’s budget preparation process. For Jordan, the 2010 target was to halve the proportion of aid flows that are not currently reported on government budgets, with at least 85% of aid reflected in the budget. In 2010, 60% of aid to Jordan was accurately estimated in the budget. This proportion is the same as was reported in 2007, and below the 2010 target of 85%. The two largest contributors to Jordan are the United States and the EU Institutions, the latter of which has substantially increased the accuracy of disbursements since 2007 from 45% in 2007 to 89% in 2010 latest year monitored, while the former has registered roughly a 20 percentage point decrease.

As of 2008, all Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDA) started preparing sector strategies that need to be consistent with priorities included in the national strategies of the National Agenda 2006-2015 and the Kuluna Al Urdun (“We are all Jordan”) initiative of 2006. Strategies which are also in line with the results-oriented budgeting framework adopted in Jordan in 2008 that include key performance indicators for programmes, thereby strengthening the relationship between planning and spending according to sectoral
priorities.

But again, in the absence of a performance planning and M&E system, it is quite hard to measure impact on the ground and thus to make the ultimate judgement on the effective alignment of the portfolio of interventions (or individual interventions) with the strategic objectives. Even with regard to the education reform Budget Support programme, widely recognized as an exemplary BS programme, the words of the external evaluators to assess the conditionalities for BS tranche release are quite harsh in putting forward the urgent need for strengthened monitoring and evaluation of programme implementation, both in terms of internal monitoring and evaluation and external formative and summative evaluation. The main changes that needed to be introduced are: (i) a stronger institutionalization of an internal M&E function in the programme design, so that internal M&E are more systematically incorporated into the management system; (ii) clearer delineation between internal and external evaluation, so that the independence of the external evaluation is not compromised by internal dynamics within MoE; and (iii) clearer institutional location within the MoE of the policy and strategic planning function, so that policy analysis conducted as part of the M&E activities will be incorporated more systematically into policy development within the MoE. In addition, more resources will have to be directed to support institutional development and capacity-building in the MoE to ensure that the MoE develops the professional expertise and capacity.

KPI-1.5.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Please see below

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- EAMR 2012 (15 Sep 2013), p. 2
- National Agenda 2006-2015, p.30
- National Agenda 2006-2015, p.10
- OECD (2012), Aid Effectiveness 2011: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration, p.6
- AF 019-571 Support to the implementation of the Action Plan – SAPP (xx), p.4 & pp.8-9
- ROM mission, Trade and Transport Facilitation Programme, FD19568, 9/2013
- Experts Report Evaluation of conditionalities of the 2 EC programmes in support to Jordan’s education reform – end of 2009, p.77
- Experts Report Evaluation of conditionalities of the 2 EC programmes in support to Jordan’s education reform – end of 2009, p.77
- ENP Jordan Annual Report (2010), p.15
- PEFA (2011) pp. 70-71
- EQ-7 re JC 7.3 - Demand driven via SAAP/SAPP but too incremental and no strategic directions
- KPI 6.4.1 – Impact of PSD on local development – institutional aspects
- JC 4.5 assessment - Major improvements PFM but not yet clear if also reflected in budget spending for poverty alleviation etc.

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- /-

KPI-1.5.1 (i) Data, figures and tables:
CLE Jordan Reports Chapter on Portfolio Analysis. For DR, pp. 23-42
The different tables and figures under report volume III Annex 4 “Quantitative interventions portfolio analysis of the EU-Jordan cooperation in the period 2007-2013” give ample evidence of the alignment of the interventions portfolio (at both Financing Decisions and decisions Contracting levels) with the strategic objectives and the priority areas / focal sectors as included in the 2007-2013 Country Strategy Paper and the two subsequent NIPs covering the periods 2007-2010 and 2011 – 2013 respectively. This also pertains to the evolution of the portfolio over time as marked by the differences between the first and the second NIP under the CSP. Despite this strategic longer term alignment, still the necessary flexibility was maintained to accommodate the necessary immediate / rapid responses in reply to regional conflict and emergency situations This portfolio synchronization with the strategic objectives and identified sectoral and thematic focal areas included in the CSP and NIPs is for example illustrated by the below synthesis table of a sectoral / thematic clustering of the interventions by DAC 5 codes, as classification probably closest to the list / configuration of focal areas identified in the CSP-NIPs.
There are two major tools to monitor and report on the synchronization of policies/strategy and the operational level of interventions: (1) The ENP Jordan Progress Reports / Annual Reports, with as full title “Joint Staff Working Document – Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Jordan Progress in Year X and Recommendations for Action, Accompanying the Document Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Delivering on a new European Neighbourhood Policy”; and (2) the External Assistance Management Report (EAMRs), also on an annual basis by the Ambassador / Head of Delegation and the EUD Head of Cooperation to the Directorate-General Development and Cooperation (DG DEVCO) on the EuropeAid achievements in the past year. There is no evidence of a kind joint annual reporting by the EU Delegation and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the style of the Joint Annual Report (JARs) in quite a number of EU partner countries (the ACP Countries) benefiting from European Development Fund (EDF) financing.

KPI-1.5.2: **Degree to which the regional portfolio of interventions (allocations and expenditures) benefiting Jordan and those financed through the ENP Association Agreement Action Plan are in line with the strategic objectives and priority areas as included in the AA-AP and RSP-RIP documents as updated/amended and in the CSP and NIPs documents (if info available: in number and amounts)**

Main Findings on KPI-1.5.2:

See KPI 1.2.3 and by extension the whole JC 1.2 “The regional and national components of the EU response strategy are aligned and mutually reinforcing within the overall ENP framework of the EU-Jordan cooperation. The discussion under this JC 1.2 on the regional programming and implementation also includes a detailed list of all regional projects benefiting Jordan (amongst others) and it was asserted that this list of regional projects generally is relevant for/aligned with the EU-Jordan geographical policy directives, strategic priorities and actual programming. On the other hand, it will be recalled that strong reservations were made regarding the actual quality and intensity of coordination between these two programming levels, also pointing at serious knowledge sharing issues. It is not exceptional, in fact rather common, that alignment issues are noted between the base geographical country programme (CSP, MIP/NIP, SSF) and the thematic (e.g. EIDHR, NSA-LA, …) and regional programmes. This appears to be needing decision making and action taken at the higher overall programming levels. Also procedurally and tools-wise, quite some practical thinking and initiatives can be undertaken/encouraged so better align these three main types of programming and make them more complementary to the benefit of individual partner countries in the broader (sub-)regional context, in this case Jordan.

The 2012 EAMR devoted a special paragraph to these issues of complementarity of instruments (national, regional, thematic). Jordan benefits from several regional projects and programmes including with its immediate neighbours. Practical difficulties linked to the political situation have been unavoidable. Moreover, Syria crisis has halted activities. Complementarity with bilateral interventions is ensured, sometimes retroactively. Communication with/on regional programmes has been improved. However SSF preparation locally has yet to take into account regional programming orientations. Thematic instruments such as EIDHR...
and NSA LA continue to be useful complements to the bilateral programmes and well received in country notably on politically sensitive issues.

**KPI-1.5.2 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- ENP Jordan Annual Report, 2009, p.18
- EAMR 2012 (15/09/2013): Complementarity of instruments (Regional – National):
- AF 019-571 Support to the implementation of the Action Plan – SAPP (2008), p.4 & pp.8-9

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- /-

**KPI-1.5.3:** Degree to which the EU Jordan portfolio of horizontal / thematic interventions (allocations and expenditures) is in line with the CSP-NIPs configuration of priority sectors and thematic areas, covering both the policy/political dialogue and development cooperation main components (if info available: in number and amounts)

**Main Findings on KPI-1.5.3:**

A recent synthetic annual report on the EU-Jordan cooperation especially zeroed in on thematic programmes, such as Non-State Actors and Local Authorities (NSA-LA) and the European Instrument for Human Rights and Democracy (EIDHR) and pointed at some relevant and pressing issues. The overall assessment was that these are integrated into the OPS Section’s work and are managed in a way which is coherent with the Delegation’s priority areas, at least for those projects where the calls for tender are managed from Amman. For calls managed from Brussels, the situation can sometimes be more complicated and information concerning the activities of regional projects is not always optimal. This is particularly acute in the present context where Amman is frequently chosen as the host city for regional seminars, training sessions etc. and Delegation participation is sought, often at short notice. As also attested to during the focus group discussion on democratic governance by the participants, the EU-Jordan portfolio of horizontal / thematic interventions (allocations and expenditures) is in line with the CSP-NIPs configuration of priority sectors and thematic areas, covering both the policy/political dialogue and development cooperation main components.

The importance of thematic budget lines in the overall country portfolio already is apparent from the sheer size of the contracted amounts under the thematic BLs. In the period 2007-2013 these amounted to almost EUR 50 million which is about 10% of the whole portfolio. Of the “classical” thematic budget lines, EIDHR is the largest with a total of EUR 3.3 million representing 6.67% of the whole thematic contracting. (The high 73.99% for DCI-MED gives a distorted picture as this has been largely allocated to the FD on Special Measures to Support Jordan Education System.” Other substantive horizontal programmes benefiting Jordan are: Gender, the Nuclear Safety Instrument, the Human Rights Instrument, amongst other.

In addition to the bilateral and regional budgets, two new programmes became available under the CSP-NIP of 2007-2013. The ENPI interregional programme which includes activities implemented in the same way for all the neighbouring countries. This programme mainly finances TEMPUS and the new Scholarship Programme, as well as TAIEX activities. In addition, the new thematic programmes include in particular the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), which supports non-governmental organisations working on human rights and democracy issues. The CSP document included explicit advice to further explore other thematic programmes amongst which: Non-state actors and local authorities in development, investing in people, environment and sustainable management of natural resources, food security and migration & asylum.

In view of the special importance of democratic governance in the 2007-2013 EU-Jordan Strategy and the central position therein on human rights, the EIDHR thematic programme got extra attention throughout the strategy implementation period. One of the essential features of this EIDHR, also highlighted during the focus group discussions, is that is enables direct funding of CSO and other parties without having to pass...
through government. This feature is very much appreciated by the CSOs enabling them to directly partner with the EU. The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)\textsuperscript{24}, which replaced in 2006 the previous European Initiative, aims at providing support for the promotion of democracy and human rights. Used in non-EU countries it functions according to the regulation/EU statements “with, for and through” civil society organisations. The allocation of EIDHR funds does not require agreement of the government of the country of the beneficiary. The overall EIDHR budget for 2007-2013 amounts to EUR 1,104 billion, allocated as grants to finance projects submitted by civil society and/or international organisations, small grants to human rights defenders, human and material resources for EU election observation missions and grants to support operational costs of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the European Inter-University Centre for Human Rights (EIUC). The corresponding regulations allow for very flexible use of the funds: the EIDHR provides for the possibility to finance non-legal entities and, through re-granting, allows for the award of small grants to local organisations and to individual human rights defenders. In practice, however, the bulk of the EIDHR funds which reach civil society do so through projects chosen after “Calls for proposals” based on a number of priorities selected locally. As for the NSA-LA programme, this procedure requires a high organisational and technical level of competence from the CSOs, which often conflicts with the objective of engaging with the widest spectrum of actors active in the field.

KPI-1.5.3 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Please see below

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- CSP 2007-2013; pp. 21-22
- NIP 2011-2013,
- ENP Jordan Annual Report, 2009, p.18
- IRIS EU Support for CSOs, 2012, p.15
- KPI 1.5.3 – cross-cutting issues in PSD interventions formulation
- KPI 1.5.3 – Cross-cutting issues in PSD interventions
- Please see below

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- IKRS-2 (2014). p.2
### KPI-1.5.3 (i) Data, figures and tables:

**Financing of EU - Jordan Cooperation 2007-2013**
- EU Financing Instrument, Contracted Amounts
- EU Geographic and Thematic / Horizontal Budget Lines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financing Instrument</th>
<th>Contracted Amounts 2007-2013</th>
<th>% of All Contracts</th>
<th>% of Thematic Contracts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>All</td>
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(*) Includes one specific contract falling under the FD ‘Special Measure to support Jordan education system given the large influx of Iraqi refugees’ of 2007 accounting for over 25 M €. (FD 19517)

Source: Own calculations based on CRIS data

**Distribution of contracted amounts per geographic and thematic financing instrument**

![Distribution of contracted amounts per geographic and thematic financing instrument](image)
### Financing of EU - Jordan Cooperation 2007-2013 by EU Financing Instrument

**Geographic and Thematic / Horizontal Programmes, Planned Amounts by Sector**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financing instrument by sector (Geographic and Thematic / Horizontal)</th>
<th>Planned amounts, 2007-2013</th>
<th>In % of Sector Total Planned</th>
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<td>Thematic</td>
<td>49,439,127</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic</td>
<td>450,110,375</td>
<td>90.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>499,549,502</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**KPI-1.5.3 (ii) Key extracts from documents:**

**Distribution of funds per financing instruments (CLE Jordan Portfolio Analysis – based on own calculations)**

The EU support to Jordan was funded through a variety of financing instruments. The figure below shows that the bilateral cooperation via the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) remains the main tool for providing assistance with approximately EUR 425 million provided throughout the 2007-2013 period. Just above EUR 49 million were provided through thematic budget lines. Looking more closely at the thematic instruments, it appears that EUR 37 were contracted under DCI-MED with one specific contract falling under the FD ‘Special Measure to support Jordan education system given the large influx of Iraqi refugees’ of 2007 accounting for over EUR 25 million. This is followed in order of importance by the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Right (EIDHR), the Nuclear Safety Instrument (NSI) and the DDH instrument.

Zooming in to the geographic and thematic financing instruments for the focal sectors of the evaluation, the dominance of the geographic instrument in general, and the ENPI in particular becomes obvious.

**KPI-1.5.4: Degree to which the changed strategic priorities over time are also matched by a changed composition over time of the interventions portfolio (if info available: in numbers and amounts)**

**Main Findings on KPI-1.5.4:**

The contents and assessment of this indicator KPI-1.5.4 is already to a large extend covered under the preceding JC 1.3 which reads: “The EU response strategy has shown responsiveness in flexibly adapting and proactively adjusting to the evolving regional (i.e. Arab Spring, Iraqi and Syrian crises, Palestinian issues), global (e.g. financial and economic crisis) and national contexts (e.g. Upper Middle Income country status), and thus does not need further elaboration. The JC 1.3 judgement criterion has been confirmed except for the crucial element of the EU response strategy failing to adapt / take action vis-à-vis the gradually shifting overall position and status of Jordan to high middle income country and thus in principle able to generate sufficient resources to combat the rising inequality through redistribution and related measures. On the other hand, the EU / EUDs instant, targeted and massive responsiveness to regional crises affecting Jordan (especially with the huge influx of refugees) is generally lauded.

In addition to the growing influx of refugees which has placed considerable strain on the country, Jordan’s economy has also been severely affected over the last couple of years by the repeated disruptions to the flow of natural gas from Egypt, which forced the government to replace cheap gas imports with more expensive fuels. Against this background and in response to a request for financial assistance submitted by the Jordanian government, in December 2013 the European Council accepted a proposal from the Commission for Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) to provide up to EUR 180 million (in the form of a medium-term loan). Jordan will be the first partner country in the Southern Neighbourhood to benefit from this exceptional financial instrument. The MFA will provide some relief from the adverse spill-over effects of the Syrian conflict and will complement other humanitarian and development assistance given to Jordan by EU.
In connection with the preparation of the second NIP (2011-2013) building on the first NIP (2007-2009) within the CSP, it was mentioned that the general approach underpinning the EU assistance to Jordan, with a mix of interventions remains in line with the National Agenda, considered adequate and relevant, in spite of its relatively modest scale (compared to US or Arab donors in particular). The announced Mid-Term Review (MTR) should provide a timely opportunity to review the priorities of the CSP/NIP in the light of recent developments in the country and in the region. Among these could be noted: the impact of the latest crisis in Gaza as well as the continued impact of Iraqi refugees inflows; the consequences of the world financial crisis; the perspective of an advanced status of closer EU/Jordan ties; on the internal front, a tensioning of State positions over civil society operation, freedom of expression or media – much in contradiction with popular demand and expectations; a positive trend towards decentralisation and local development, bearing high political potential both in view of improved governance and of future programming; innovative policy developments in areas such as environment or energy and water. Despite different follow-ups, it has not been possible to get hold of this MTR report neither of any other similar document at the basis of the updating of the CSP and the elaboration of the second NIP.

One of the sub-priorities in the NIP 2007-2010 was support to the water sector. However, given the overwhelming presence of other donors, the Millennium Challenge Corporation in particular, it was argued in connection with the preparation of the 2nd NIP that there is no need for a large EU programme in this sector. The support to improved management of the water sector could be continued on a smaller scale under priority area four (Support to Implementation of the Action Plan programme). At the end of the current NIP and in preparation of the Single Support Framework, the water sector was picked up again and reinstated as proposed special attention sector (together with also education) in view of the extreme pressure on public utilities and services caused by the massive influx of Syrian refugees and from other conflict areas in the region.

KPI-1.5.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Please see below
(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- NIP 2011-2013, pp. 6-7
- BCS to the MR- SAPP 141402.01, 2011
- NIP 2011-13: Discontinuation support to water sector
- TAPs 019-571 Support to the implementation of the Action Plan – SAPP (2008), pp.4-5
(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- Please see below
KPI-1.5.4 (i) Data, figures and tables:

IL Figure 2d: Evolution in Priority Areas between the First 2007-2010 National Indicative Programme (NIP-1) and the Second 2011-2013 NIP (NIP-2) under the Country Strategy

Priority 1: Political reform, democracy, human rights, good governance, justice and co-operation in the fight against extremism - m€ 17

Priority 2: Trade and investment development - m€ 78

2.1 Support for modernization of the services sector - m€ 30
2.2 Enterprise and exports development - m€ 15
2.3 Trade and transport facilitation - m€ 33

Priority 3: Sustainability of the development process - m€ 63

3.1 Support to education and employment policy - m€ 63
3.2 Development of renewable or alternative energy sources - m€ 10
3.3 Water management programme - m€ 10

Priority 4: Institution building, financial stability and support for regulatory approximation - m€ 107

4.1 Support to the reform of public finance and public administration - m€ 77
4.2 Support to the implementation of the Action Plan Programme (SAPP) - m€ 30

Priority 1: Supporting Jordan’s reform in the areas of democracy, human rights, media and justice - m€ 45

1.1 Democratisation, civil society and media - m€ 10
1.2 Justice, Home Affairs and Security - m€ 35

Priority 2: Trade, enterprise and investment development - m€ 40

Priority 3: Sustainability of the growth process - m€ 93

3.1 Human resources development and employment - m€ 23
3.2 Development of renewable or alternative energy sources - m€ 35
3.3 Local development - m€ 35

Priority 4: Support to the Implementation of the Action Plan Programme (SAPP) - m€ 45

Notes: changes in priority setting NIP-2 vis-à-vis NIP-1
Continuity, concentration or further specification
An analysis of the CSP-NIP 2011-2013 budget re-allocations based on the original and modified NIP allocations tables, learns that there has been no modification in total allocations for the NIP priority 1 on support to Jordan’s reform in the areas of democracy, human rights, media and justice. There only has been a splitting of the original allocation for the justice, home affairs and security programme over two separate programmes (justice reform and support to the security sector). This is somehow remarkable in view of the regional developments of democratisation which occurred in this period, but on the other hand is illustrative for the fact that these development were responded to through other financing instruments (e.g. SPRING programme). Most outspoken budget change is related to the trade enterprise and investment development NIP priority area 2, which saw its resources reduced to half (from EUR 40 to 20 million). The reallocated amounts went to priority area 3 “Sustainability of the growth process” and more particularly to renewable and alternative energy development (plus EUR 9 million) and to priority area 4 “Support to the implementation of the action plan” (plus EUR 11 million). Remarkably within this priority area 4, actual support to the implementation of the Action Plan Programme (SAPP) concentration particularly on institutional reform and capacity building (e.g. through twinnings and other modalities) was reduced by almost half (44%, minus EUR 20 million), whereas the bulk of the re-allocated resources (EUR 31 million) went to an increase of the allocation of the 2010 Public Financial Management Reform Programme. There are no further details available which GOJ budget lines were the main destination of these additional PFM resources.

CRIS based CLE Jordan Database EU interventions in Jordan – Financing Decisions (Nov 2013)

The Arab Spring started in December 2010 / January 2011 in Tunisia. Support to Civil Society, the media and to human rights since 2011 can be termed as support to take up the impulses of the Arab Spring. After a substantial assistance in 2007 of nearly 7 million Euro (covering activities up to the end of 2010), with relative limited approvals thereafter, the support of the EU in the sectors increased remarkably from 2012 onwards. As the below CLE inventory and portfolio analysis tables EQ-3 IM-01a and b show, the assistance to these sectors got a very substantial boost in 2012, with five EU financing decisions in that year totalling EUR 87 million.
## Evaluation of the European Union’s Cooperation with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2007-2013) - Country Level Evaluation -

### Table EQ-1 IM-01a: List of EU Financing Decisions Benefitting the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the year 2012 on Civil Society, Media, Human Rights, Justice and Rule of Law (Main Related EQ 3 on Democratic Governance)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Decision year</th>
<th>Decision Number (Full)</th>
<th>Decision Number (Short)</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Allocated (in EUR)</th>
<th>Contracted (EUR)</th>
<th>Paid (EUR)</th>
<th>Commitment type</th>
<th>CRS Code</th>
<th>Title of CRS/ (Sub-)Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ENPI 2012</td>
<td>ENPI/2012/02-33-471</td>
<td>23471</td>
<td>EG</td>
<td>Support to the justice reform in Jordan</td>
<td>30,000,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>GF</td>
<td>15130</td>
<td>Legal and judicial development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPI 2012</td>
<td>ENPI/2012/02-849</td>
<td>23849</td>
<td>EG</td>
<td>Support to Civil Society and Media in Jordan</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>GF</td>
<td>15153</td>
<td>Media and free flow of information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPI 2012</td>
<td>ENPI/2012/04-290</td>
<td>24290</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Support to the Electoral Process in Jordan</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>1,581,157</td>
<td>744,424</td>
<td>GF</td>
<td>15151</td>
<td>Elections</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Totals for All Interventions / Financing Decisions related to EQ-3 Democratic Governance (primary link):**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title of Financing Decisions related to EQ-3 Democratic Governance (primary or secondary link)</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ENPI 2008</td>
<td>19-571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPI 2009</td>
<td>20-478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPI 2009</td>
<td>21-219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPI 2010</td>
<td>21-930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPI 2010</td>
<td>21-931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPI 2011</td>
<td>22-723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPI 2012</td>
<td>23-533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPI 2012</td>
<td>24-296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPI 2013</td>
<td>24-775</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Totals for All Interventions / Financing Decisions related to EQ-3 Democratic Governance (primary or secondary link):**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These five Financing Decisions in the year 2012 on democratic governance are:
- Support to the justice reform in Jordan (EUR 30 million) – DAC code 15130: Legal and judicial development
- Support to civil society and media in Jordan (EUR 10 million) – DAC code 15153: Media and free flow of information
- Support to the electoral process in Jordan (EUR 2 million) – DAC code 15151 Elections
- Support to the security sector in applying the rule of law – DAC code 15210: Security system management and reform
- Good governance and development contract Jordan (EUR 40 million) – DAC code 51010: Research / scientific institutions
JC-1.5 Actual programme implementation and operations are strategically aligned with the overall strategic objectives and priorities of the response strategy, as updated

Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-1.5 (based on the KPIs main findings)

The different tables and figures under report volume III Annex 4 “Quantitative interventions portfolio analysis of the EU-Jordan cooperation in the period 2007-2013” give ample evidence of the alignment of the interventions portfolio with the strategic objectives and the priority areas/focal sectors as included in the 2007-2013 Country Strategy Paper and the two subsequent NIPs covering the periods 2007-2010 and 2011 – 2013 respectively.

This also pertains to the evolution of the portfolio over time as marked by the differences between the first and the second NIP under the CSP. Despite this strategic longer term alignment, still the necessary flexibility was maintained to accommodate the necessary immediate/rapid responses in reply to regional conflict and emergency situations. This portfolio synchronization with the strategic objectives and identified sectoral and thematic focal areas included in the CSP and NIPs is for example illustrated by the below synthesis table of a sectoral/thematic clustering of the interventions by DAC 5 codes, as classification probably closest to the list/configuration of focal areas identified in the CSP-NIPs.

**Figure 5.2: Distribution of Contracted Amounts by Sector**

There are two major tools to monitor and report on the synchronization of policies/strategy and the operational level of interventions: (1) The ENP Jordan Progress Reports/Annual Reports, with as full title “Joint Staff Working Document – Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Jordan Progress in Year X and Recommendations for Action, Accompanying the Document Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Delivering on a new European Neighbourhood Policy”, and (2) the External Assistance Management Reports (EAMRs), also on an annual basis by the Ambassador/Head of Delegation and the EUD Head of Cooperation to the Directorate-General Development and Cooperation (DG DEVCO) on the EuropeAid achievements in the past year.

There is no evidence of any kind of joint or mutually verified annual reporting by the EU Delegation and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the style of the Joint Annual Report (JARs) in quite a number of EU partner countries (the ACP Countries) benefiting from European Development Fund (EDF) financing. In both debriefings with the EU Delegation and the MoPIC on behalf of the Government of Jordan at the end of the evaluation field visit, this was acknowledged as a missed opportunity for jointly assessing overall implementation progress as against the broader strategic objectives as enshrined in the CSP and NIP documents.
In none of the ENP Jordan Annual Reports or of the EAMRs covering the period 2007-2013, there is any mentioning of any substantive deviation from programme execution vis-à-vis the original policy or strategic directions.

As a proxy for alignment with government priorities and effective mainstreaming of aid within the national systems, Paris Declaration indicator 3 measures the percentage of aid disbursed by donors for the government sector that is included in the annual budget for the same fiscal year. The indicator reflects two components: the degree to which aid is aligned with government priorities, and the extent to which aid is captured in government's budget preparation process. For Jordan, the 2010 target was to halve the proportion of aid flows that are not currently reported on government budgets, with at least 85% of aid reflected in the budget. In 2010, 60% of aid to Jordan was accurately estimated in the budget. This proportion is the same as was reported in 2007, and below the 2010 target of 85%. The two largest contributors to Jordan are the United States and the EU Institutions, the latter of which has substantially increased the accuracy of disbursements since 2007 from 45% in 2007 to 89% in 2010 latest year monitored, while the former has registered roughly a 20 percentage point decrease.

As of 2008, all Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDA) started preparing sector strategies that need to be consistent with priorities included in the national strategies of the National Agenda 2006-2015 and the Kuluna Al Urdun (“We are all Jordan”) initiative of 2006. Strategies which are also in line with the results-oriented budgeting framework adopted in Jordan since 2008 that include key performance indicators for programs thereby strengthening the relationship between planning and spending according to sectoral priorities.

But again, in the absence of a performance planning and M&E system, it is quite hard to measure impact on the ground and thus to make the ultimate judgement on the effective alignment of the portfolio of interventions (or individual interventions) with the strategic objectives. Even with regard to the education reform Budget Support programme, widely recognized as an exemplary BS programme, the words of the external evaluators to assess the conditionalities for BS tranche release are quite harsh in putting forward the urgent need for strengthened monitoring and evaluation of programme implementation, both in terms of internal monitoring and evaluation and external formative and summative evaluation. (KPI-1.5.1)

In relation to earlier JC 1.2 it already was assessed that the regional and national components of the EU response strategy are aligned and mutually reinforcing within the overall ENP framework of the EU-Jordan cooperation. It was also asserted that extensive list of regional projects generally is relevant for / aligned with the EU-Jordan geographical policy directives, strategic priorities and actual programming. On the other hand, it will be recalled that strong reservations were made regarding the actual quality and intensity of coordination between these two programming levels, also pointing at serious knowledge sharing issues. It is not exceptional, in fact rather common, that alignment issues are noted between the base geographical country programme (CSP, MIP/NIP, SSF) and the thematic (e.g. EIDHR, NSA-LA, …) and regional programmes. This appears to be needing decision making and action taken at the higher overall programming levels. Also procedurally and tools-wise, quite some practical thinking and initiatives can be undertaken / encouraged so better align these three main types of programming and make them more complementary to the benefit of individual partner countries in the broader (sub-)regional context, in this case Jordan. (KPI-1.5.2)

A recent synthetic annual report on the EU-Jordan cooperation especially zeroed in on thematic programmes, such as Non-State Actors and Local Authorities (NSA-LA) and European Instrument for Human Rights and Democracy (EIHRD) and pointed at some relevant and pressing issues. The overall assessment was that these integrated into the OPS Section's work and are managed in a way which is coherent with the Delegation’s priority areas, at least for those projects where the calls for tender are managed from Amman. For calls managed from Brussels, the situation can sometimes be more complicated and information concerning the activities of regional projects is not always optimal. This is particularly acute in the present context where Amman is frequently chosen as the host city for regional seminars, training sessions etc. and Delegation participation is sought, often at short notice. As also attested to during the focus group discussion on democratic government by the participants, the EU-Jordan portfolio of horizontal / thematic interventions (allocations and expenditures) is in line with the CSP-NIPs configuration of priority sectors and thematic areas, covering both the policy/political dialogue and development cooperation main components

The importance of thematic budget lines in the overall country portfolio already is apparent from the sheer size of the contracted amounts under the thematic BLs. In the period 2007-2013 these amounted to almost EUR 50 million which is about 10% of the whole portfolio. Of the “classical” thematic budget lines, EIDHR is the largest with a total of EUR 3.3 million representing 6.67% of the whole thematic contracting. (The high
73.99% for DCI-MED gives a distorted picture as this has been largely allocated to the FD on Special Measures to Support Jordan Education System." Other substantive horizontal programmes benefiting Jordan are: Gender, the Nuclear Safety Instrument, the Human Rights Instrument, amongst other. (KPI-1.5.3)

The earlier JC 1.3 judgement criterion about the level of responsiveness of the EU response strategy in flexibly adapting and proactively adjusting to the evolving regional context has been positively assessed, except for the crucial element of the EU response strategy failing to adapt / take action vis-à-vis the gradually shifting overall position and status of Jordan to high middle income country and thus in principle able to generate sufficient resources to combat the rising inequality through redistribution and related measures. In the same way, the extent to which the changed strategic priorities over time are also matched by a changed composition over time of the interventions portfolio can be positively assessed, as in general the EU-Jordan cooperation portfolio appears well matched with the country strategy and the Jordan component of the ENP. As part of this, the EU / EUD's instant, targeted and massive responsiveness to regional crises affecting Jordan (especially with the huge influx of refugees) is generally lauded by all parties, both in Jordan and in the wider region.

One of the sub-priorities in the NIP 2007-2010 was support to the water sector. However, given the overwhelming presence of other donors, the Millennium Challenge Corporation in particular, it was argued in connection with the preparation of the 2nd NIP that there is no need for a large EU programme in this sector. The support to improved management of the water sector could be continued on a smaller scale under priority area four (Support to Implementation of the Action Plan programme). At the end of the current NIP and in preparation of the Single Support Framework, the water sector was picked up again and re instituted as proposed special attention sector (together with also education) in view of the extreme pressure on public utilities and services caused by the massive influx of Syrian refugees and from other conflict areas in the region. (KPI-1.5.4)
3.2. EQ-2 IM on Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence

### Information Matrix EQ-2:
**Coordination, complementarity and coherence**

#### Evaluation Question (code and title)

**EQ-2:** To what extent is the EU-Jordan cooperation well-coordinated with and complementary to the actions of EU Member States and other EU Institutions, and to those of other Development Partners, and coherent with other EU policies?

#### List of Judgement Criteria (JCs) under the EQ (codes and titles)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JC</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JC-2.1</td>
<td>The EU-Jordan cooperation is well coordinated, coherent and complementary to the strategies and programmes of the EU Member States and of the European Financial Institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-2.2</td>
<td>The EU-Jordan cooperation is well coordinated, coherent and complementary to the strategies and programmes of other multilateral and bilateral Development Partners (DPs)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-2.3</td>
<td>The EU-Jordan cooperation strategy and programme is coherent with the other EU policies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-2.4</td>
<td>The EU has actively sought Government advice when setting its own priorities in terms of Division of Labour (DOL) between Development Partners (DPs)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-2.5</td>
<td>The coordination implemented by Central Government of Jordan agencies vis-à-vis the implementing agencies both at national and local levels positively contributes to the EU-Jordan cooperation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### JC-2.1

**The EU-Jordan cooperation is well coordinated, coherent and complementary to the strategies and programmes of the EU Member States and of the European Financial Institutions and Member States Agencies**

#### List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 2.1 (codes and definition)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPI</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPI-2.1.1</td>
<td>Overall quality and trends in the implementation of the 2007 EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour in Development Policy in the EU cooperation with Jordan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-2.1.2</td>
<td>The degree to which the provisions of the EU DoL code are adhered to in developing the EU's strategic response and programming documents (CSP, NIPs, AAPs, APs, etc.) complementary to those of the EU Member States, as based on demonstrated comparative advantages and added value</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-2.1.3</td>
<td>Number of EU Development Assistance Group (DAG) meetings of the EUD with EU Member States and European Financial Institutions / Member States Agencies conducted per year with proceedings and/or recommendations documented</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-2.1.4</td>
<td>Overall quality of policy/political dialogue coordination between the EU and EU Member States and level of harmonized dialogue outcomes on key policy / political dialogue issues, with trends over time</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KPI-2.1.1:** Overall quality and trends in the implementation of the 2007 EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour in Development Policy in the EU cooperation with Jordan

#### Main Findings on KPI-2.1.1:

The Paris Summit in July 2008 when the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was officially launched was also the occasion to re-compact the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, also known as the Barcelona process. Jordan is one of the 16 partners across the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East, which together
with the EU 27 Member States form this partnership. The UfM is supposed to give a new impulse to the partnership by upgrading the political level of the EU’s relationship with its Mediterranean partners, as it is aims to provide more co-ownership to the multilateral relations while making these relations more concrete and visible through additional regional and sub-regional projects.

Since before the EU CSP 2007 there has been a common strategic approach guided by the general policy and strategy following the European dimension of the Barcelona process and the ENP strategy that marked the overall framework for each EU MS operations. This can be seen as the consequence of the common acknowledgement of the relevance of Jordan in the region context for the European interests and of the related awareness of the large needs in financial and technical commitments that the implementation of the strategy demanded. The application of some “division of labour” can be then seen as a search for more efficiency and effectiveness to face appropriately the amount of the problems identified, an effort consistent with the aid effectiveness agenda.

As the cooperation activities of the EU and its Member States generally target some common areas, a regular dialogue is ensured. Co-operation between EU Member States in Jordan is effected through meetings chaired by the European Commission and the EU Presidency. Heads of Mission meet monthly, with a special emphasis on taking forward the previously agreed ‘EU road map for donor harmonisation and alignment’ and the ‘Matrix of EU Development Assistance’. Regular meetings of Development Assistance group ensure coordination on financial assistance matters.

In addition, Member States are involved in the EU dialogue with Jordan on the ENP in the different sub-committees and can therefore be regularly informed about Jordan’s progress in implementing the ENP Action Plan.

The search for coordination has been a specific feature of EU CSP/NIP: these documents always report the overall status of donors’ engagements and activities, stressing the importance of the shared information and supporting then the main strategic options foreseen, that is the focal sectors where the main support effort will be addressed.

According to the officers of EU MS met in the country, it appears that the DoL is not formally established as criterion but is in reality the outcome of the process of exchange of information between the EU donors thanks to the “official” meetings organized by the EU and mostly through the informal network each officer is able to set up.

### KPI-2.1.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- “The financial assistance can be maximised by supporting a limited number of objectives, by prioritising strategic sectors in which the EU has developed good co-operation with Jordan”.
- CSPNIP2007-2010 p
- CSP 2007
- NIF mid term evaluation 2013
- SAAP I/II final evaluation
- NIP 2011-13

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- /-

### KPI-2.1.2: The degree to which the provisions of the EU DoL code are adhered to in developing the EU’s strategic response and programming documents (CSP, NIPs, AAPs, APs, etc.) complementary to those of the EU Member States, as based on demonstrated comparative advantages and added value

Main Findings on KPI-2.1.2:

We do not dispose of the complete documentation showing the preparatory phase in the production of the CSP and NIP.

Even though it is not explicitly mentioned in any document, the guidelines of the 2007 EU Code of Conduct...
on Division of Labour in Development Policy appear to be practically followed. The concentration in a limited number of sectors is consistently followed not only by the EC but also by the major EU MS. There are at the moment no indications for any specific case for lead donor arrangements, except for UN agencies. There are areas where partnerships actions have been developed, especially in relation to public sector management reform, civil society support, water management, educations and security. The case of water (priority in NIP 2007-10 not anymore in NIP 2011-13) shows the acknowledgement of the "division of labour" principle, as many other donors are investing in the sector. The information collected during the meetings with the EC, the EU donors (France, Germany, Netherland) and the international donors (USAID, UNDP, JICA) permit to confirm that there is from the donors side some sort of "division of interest" that, although not formally established, allow for a credible division of labour.

KPI-2.1.2 Main References and Sources of Information:
(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - -/
(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - NIF Mid Term Evaluation 2013
   - Action Fiche Northern Corridor 2012
   - Action Fiche SAPP II
   - NIP 2011-13
(iii) Additional information from field phase:
   - -/

KPI-2.1.3: Number of EU Development Assistance Group (DAG) meetings of the EUD with EU Member States and European Financial Institutions / Member States Agencies conducted per year with proceedings and/or recommendations documented

Main Findings on KPI-2.1.3:
We did not receive a formal list of the meetings organized by the EU Delegation. However we got confirmation from EU officers and from EU MS officers met, that the DAG meetings are the ones that are operational as well as the monthly EU coordination meeting with MS head of delegations. There is also monthly “EU Economic and Trade Counsellors” meeting, which has been used over the period of time in particular 2010-2012 as the EU coordination for PSD and economic interventions. The relations with EU financial institutions are mostly consequent to the missions of the IFIs in the country. It should be noted that, according to the IFI representatives met and to reports consulted – see “Mid Term Evaluation of NIF 2013 - the consultation process on project proposals is broad but shallow. In general IFIs projects’ development is developed with limited interactions with Delegations, something that could result in reducing the IFIs contributions to EC objectives. However the coordination with EU Delegation according to IFIs interviewed has been steadily improving over the recent years. The effectiveness of the consultation of EC services and project verification apparently is hampered by i) the limited quantity and quality of information provided by the Project Fiches and ii) limited availability of human resources. Very appreciated by EU MS are the meetings organized by EU on sustainable energy.

KPI-2.1.3 Main References and Sources of Information:
(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - -/
(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - -/
## KPI-2.1.4: Overall quality of policy/political dialogue coordination between the EU and EU Member States and level of harmonized dialogue outcomes on key policy/political dialogue issues, with trends over time

### Main Findings on KPI-2.1.4:

The decentralisation process has been a common trend for many donors. The tasks of policy dialogue between the partners for the increased coordination are now developed mostly at country level. The coordination with EU Member States is effected through the standard monthly meetings chaired by the EU, focusing on overall coordination issues, with a special emphasis on establishing a "shared EU road map for donor harmonisation and alignment".

In effect the EU has established an internal Development Cooperation Group (EUDCG), which meets regularly at the EU Delegation to improve common strategies, coherence, information exchange and the visibility of EU and Member State programmes. Over the past years Commission staff and experts have systematically briefed EU Member States at all stages of the project cycle. This forum together with the one managed by MoPIC are the main instrument to ensure good coordination among donors, thus not only avoiding duplication of activities and programming but also offering a guide in the selection of priorities and focal sectors.

The already mentioned case of “water” can be used as indicator. Scarcity of water for human and production sector is surely one of the main problems Jordan needs to face: it is not a focal sector for EU, but is the objective of few EU MS interventions together with the EU IFIs. Division of labour is quite evident, the coordination and synergies should be assessed.

As mentioned in former paragraphs, the level of policy/political dialogue coordination between the EU and EU Member States is adequate due to the efforts by the EU Delegation. Consequently we can talk about a credible level of harmonized dialogue outcomes on key aid and policy issues. In effect it is possible to say that most of the tasks of policy dialogue between the partners for enhanced coordination are now developed mostly at country level.

However it has been remarked by a MS that, the EU and the EU member states being the largest donor, one would have expected more leadership capacity, especially for the most sensitive issues, something that – always according to the same source - is not possible to record. The joint strategy for human rights - based on a committee established by the EC that did meet once per month - has been a positive experience that should be repeated for the road map for civil society. It is true that the agendas of donors in many cases depend on the willingness to reserve some independence together with the objective to achieve some special visibility. However visibility is important but also trying to define how one would like to be seen: this is actually more strategic and will need improvement.

### KPI-2.1.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) **Data, figures and tables:**

   - +/-

(ii) **Key extracts from documents:**

   - +/-

(iii) **Additional information from field phase:**

   - +/-
**JC-2.1: The EU-Jordan cooperation is well coordinated, coherent and complementary to the strategies and programmes of the EU Member States and of the European Financial Institutions and Member States Agencies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-2.1 (based on the KPIs main findings)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Since before the EU CSP 2007 there has been a common strategic approach guided by the general policy and strategy following the European dimension of the Barcelona process and the ENP strategy that marked the overall framework for each EU MS operations. This can be seen as the consequence of the common acknowledgement of the relevance of Jordan in the region context for the European interests and of the related awareness of the large needs in financial and technical commitments that the implementation of the strategy demanded. The application of some “division of labour” can be then seen as a search for more efficiency and effectiveness to face appropriately the amount of the problems identified, an effort consistent with the aid effectiveness agenda.

As the cooperation activities of the EU and its Member States generally target some common areas, a regular dialogue is ensured. Co-operation between EU Member States in Jordan is effected through meetings chaired by the European Commission and the EU Presidency. (KPI 2.1.1) The search for coordination has been a specific feature of EU CSP/NIP: these documents always report the overall status of donors' engagements and activities, stressing the importance of the shared information and supporting then the main strategic options foreseen, that is the focal sectors where the main support effort will be addressed.

Even though it is not explicitly mentioned in any document, the guidelines of the 2007 EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour in Development Policy appear to be practically followed. The concentration in a limited number of sectors is consistently followed not only by the EC but also by the major EU MS. The case of “water” can be used as indicator. Scarcity of water for human and production sector is surely one of the main problems Jordan needs to face: it is not a focal sector for EU, but is the objective of few EU MS interventions together with the EU IFIs. Division of labour is quite evident, the presence of a lead donor in the sector (Germany) is confirmed, even though the coordination and synergies are sufficiently in place especially with the interventions of EU IFIs (KPI 2.1.2).

The decentralisation process has been a common trend for many donors. The tasks of policy dialogue between the partners for the increased coordination are now developed mostly at country level. The coordination with EU Member States is effected through the standard monthly meetings chaired by the EU, focusing on overall coordination issues, with a special emphasis on establishing a “shared EU road map for donor harmonisation and alignment”. In effect the EU has established an internal Development Cooperation Group (EUDCG), which meets regularly at the EU Delegation to improve common strategies, coherence, information exchange and the visibility of EU and Member State programmes.

The level of policy/political dialogue coordination between the EU and EU Member States is adequate due to the efforts by the EC Delegation. Consequently we can talk about a credible level of harmonized dialogue outcomes on key aid and policy issues. In effect it is possible to say that most of the tasks of policy dialogue between the partners for enhanced coordination are now developed mostly at country level.

However it has been remarked by a MS that, the EU and the EU member states being the largest donor (in the period from 200 to 2012 EU – including ME and IFIs – is recorded at 1.940 million JD while US is recorded for 1.300M JD) one would have expected more leadership capacity, especially for the most sensitive issues, something that – always according to the same source - it is not possible to record. The joint strategy for human rights - based on a committee established by the EC that did meet once per month - has been a positive experience that should be repeated for the road map for civil society. It is true that the agenda of each donor in many cases depends on the willingness to reserve some independence together with the objective to achieve some special visibility. However visibility is important but also trying to define how one would be like to be seen: this is actually more strategic and will need improvement. (KPI 2.1.4)
JC-2.2
The EU-Jordan cooperation is well coordinated, coherent and complementary to the strategies and programmes of other multilateral and bilateral Development Partners (DPs)

List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 2.2 (codes and definition)

| KPI-2.2.1 | Overall quality of donor mapping of sectoral / thematic area involvement and their perceived comparative advantages as basis for the design of the EU strategic response and actual programming priorities |
| KPI-2.2.2 | Degree to which donor mapping of sectoral / thematic area involvement and their perceived comparative advantages were used as basis for decision making on preferred aid / cooperation modalities based on shared / common resources inputs and/or joint PCM activities (basket funding, trust funding, joint reviews and evaluations, MTEF, PAFs, etc.) |
| KPI-2.2.3 | Degree of proactive engagement level of the EUD in Development Partners coordination and promotion of Division of Labour |
| KPI-2.2.4 | Number of DP meetings organised / chaired by the EUD in the last year regarding overall development, thematic, sectoral and/or policy / political dialogue key issues |

KPI-2.2.1: Overall quality of donor mapping of sectoral / thematic area involvement and their perceived comparative advantages as basis for the design of the EU strategic response and actual programming priorities

Main Findings on KPI-2.2.1:

In Jordan the Donor/Lender Consultation Group (DLCG) process was initiated in 2000, before the Accra commitments: it was aimed to facilitate dialogue on priorities and programmes reviewing assistance to the country and improving the harmonisation of operational activities with a view to maximizing their effectiveness and efficiency. This mechanism thus was supposed to ensure coordination between the active donors. The DLCG established six thematic groups: education, social development, private sector reform, environment, water, governance and public sector reform.

Presently 4 thematic groups – on Water, Energy, Education and Governance – are active. This mechanism, which generally includes only resident donors, focuses on harmonisation particularly concentrating on division of labour, coordination of implementation and exchange of information. The mechanism has been loosely structured whereby the coordination responsibility has been rotating between the participating donors. It seems that this mechanism has been useful for harmonisation – at least to a certain point. The history and the effectiveness of the mechanism is not confirmed by the donors met that in general says that the coordination implemented through MoPIC is weak. Nonetheless there is a relatively good division of labour in place among the resident donors and donor agencies collaborate well with each other to avoid duplication and to coordinate activities.

The EU and its Member States have been actively involved in the different groups and technical committees, chairing plenary sessions and coordinating meetings with the government. Coordination with the World Bank and EIB is achieved under the Strategic Partnership Agreement between the three institutions, launched in 2004. Jordan was a pilot country for this partnership, which involves dialogue during the different phases of the project cycle, information sharing and defining complementary operations.

The US has been since some time the single major donor in Jordan, notably through massive Budget Support and cooperation embracing technical and political dialogue. In this respect, the US and EU cooperation programmes have common features in that their support encompasses both financial assistance and a wider political and economic partnership given. On a project level, donor coordination and agreement on policies and strategies, and on agreements and technical specifications is strongly required.

Donors’ mapping (see KPI 2.1.2) is a practice normally done by EU both toward EU MS and the other international donors.

USAID in its country strategy 2008/12 produced a general matrix of donors commitments by sector, even though in the contents there are not consequent “claims” on division of work; in the following country strategy 2013/17 such matrix is not present anymore and the text does no contain any reference to other donors’
activities.

WB country strategy papers does contain an extensive (the most complete available) analysis of all donors’ commitments and activities, well articulated by sectors and contents but without any mention of amounts involved by operation but only as total by donor. The text shows also the quality of dialogue and participation developed with Civil Society all along the preparation of the paper.

KPI-2.2.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- NIP 2011-13
- MoU EC EIB IBRD 2004
- CSP 2007
- SAAP II Final Evaluation 11/2013
- PFM monitoring Report 2012
- SAPP I/II final evaluation

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- /-

KPI-2.2.2: Degree to which donor mapping of sectoral / thematic area involvement and their perceived comparative advantages were used as basis for decision making on preferred aid / cooperation modalities based on shared / common resources inputs and/or joint PCM activities (basket funding, trust funding, joint reviews and evaluations, MTEF, PAFs, etc.)

Main Findings on KPI-2.2.2:

The reading of the available documentation shows that in the country the donors are used to produce donors’ mapping and achieved some credible level of coordination in the decision making process on aid modalities.

More difficult is for the moment to say if the decisions have been made based on perceived comparative advantage or on the past history of interventions on the targeted sector, something whose final assessment could be left to the field mission.

In addition, in response to the Syrian crises, coordination has been initiated on the humanitarian front under the leadership of UNHCR as Humanitarian Coordinator (UNHC). A UN Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) was established in March 2013 under the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator to ensure that non-refugee humanitarian matters, such as the situation of vulnerable Jordanians (host communities), also receive adequate attention and coordination.

With the increasing number of funding pledges for support Jordanian communities in the North, the UN Resident Coordinator (RC) has approached the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation to establish the so called "Jordan Host Community Support Platform" that would gather under Government leadership, relevant UN agencies and donors to (i) provide strategic guidance to the elaboration of a Government-led Resilience Plan; (ii) mobilise donors and partners for effective implementation of the plan through technical and financial resource mobilisation (ii) coordinate efforts to contribute to the Plan's execution.

In parallel, UNDP has established end of June two sub-national coordination committees under the umbrella of the Governors of Mafraq and Irbid. These committees will mainly aim at mapping on-going and planned interventions targeting host communities and coordinating the elaboration and implementation of a response plan mobilising Government, humanitarian and development actors.

KPI-2.2.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- /-
Some comments of the DoL are already included in JC2.1. The active engagement of EU for better donor coordination is evident for PFM mentioned in the “PFM Monitoring report 2012”: in this event the EU Del has been able to be pro-active when the weaknesses of GoJ/MoPIC coordination resulted in a fragmented environment.

EU Delegation continues in its efforts to increase a proactive engagement to promote coordination and promotion of Division of Labour mainly for EU Development Partners.

For sustainable energy again we received good comments from EU MS that the EU Delegation has been able to converge the interests through the creation of a special meeting on it.

In effect, besides the DAG meetings already mentioned, special meetings have been organized for human rights, energy.

A special case has been the electoral process. In this case a real partnership has been established – according to UNDP – between EU and UNDP with a close coordination mechanism (hosted by EC and guided by UNDP) that contributed to the success of the process.

We did not receive the list of meetings between the Development Partners organised by the EU Delegation. However we received informal confirmation that such meetings are organized with some periodical constancy and solid participation from Development Partners. However they appears to be focused more on the exchange of information that in promoting any real joint programming.
KPI-2.2.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - -/-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - -/-

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
   - -/-

JC-2.2: The EU-Jordan cooperation is well coordinated, coherent and complementary to the strategies and programmes of other multilateral and bilateral Development Partners (DPs)

Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-2.2 (based on the KPIs main findings)

The reading of the available documentation shows that in the country the donors are used to produce donors’ mapping (showing a credible institutionalization of exchange of information between them) and achieved some credible level of coordination in the decision making process on aid modalities. More difficult is to say if the decisions have been made based on perceived comparative advantage or on the past history of interventions on the targeted sector, something that the field mission has not be able to confirm (KPI 2.2.1 and KPI 2.2.2)

In Jordan the Donor/Lender Consultation Group (DLCG) process was initiated in 2000, before the Accra commitments: it was aimed to facilitate dialogue on priorities and programmes reviewing assistance to the country and improving the harmonisation of operational activities with a view to maximizing their effectiveness and efficiency. This mechanism thus was supposed to ensure coordination between the active donors. The DLCG established six thematic groups: education, social development, private sector reform, environment, water, governance and public-sector reform.

Presently 4 thematic groups – on Water, Energy, Education and Governance – are active. This mechanism, which generally includes only resident donors, focuses on harmonisation particularly concentrating on division of labour, coordination of implementation and exchange of information. The mechanism has been loosely structured whereby the coordination responsibility has been rotating between the participating donors. It seems that this mechanism has been useful for harmonisation – at least to a certain point. The history and the effectiveness of the mechanism is not confirmed by the donors met that in general says that the coordination implemented through MoPIC is weak. Nonetheless there is a relatively good division of labour in place among the resident donors and donor agencies collaborate well with each other to avoid duplication and to coordinate activities..

The EU and its Member States have been actively involved in the different groups and technical committees, chairing plenary sessions and coordinating meetings with the government.

There have been cases where the pro-active engagement of EUD toward development partners for improving coordination and division of labour (besides what found on JC1) can be confirmed: it has been recorded for PFM and, according to ME sources, is now in place for sustainable energy.

The meetings between EU MS are organized with some periodical constancy and solid participation from Development Partners. However they appear to be focused more on the exchange of information than in promoting any real joint programming.
### JC-2.3

**The EU-Jordan cooperation strategy and programme is coherent with the other EU policies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPI-2.3.1</th>
<th>Level of coherence of the EU-Jordan cooperation strategy and programme with the other main sectoral / thematic policies, especially on trade, employment, environment and security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPI-2.3.2</td>
<td>Overall quality of the strategic coordination on these other EU policies with the competent / mandated EU entities concerned including DG Trade, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities and the EEAS entity in charge of the Instrument for Stability (IFS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-2.3.3</td>
<td>Level to which the coordination and contacts with these competent / mandated entities for these other EU policies got intensified / more institutionalized over time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-2.3.4</td>
<td>Intensity and type of cooperation (policy, strategic, programming, TA, ...) with special EU agencies with specific mandates for the European Neighbourhood (e.g. ETF, etc.) on sector / thematic areas of special relevance to the EU-Jordan cooperation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### KPI-2.3.1: Level of coherence of the EU-Jordan cooperation strategy and programme with the other main sectoral / thematic policies, especially on trade, employment, environment and security

The overall coherence of the EU-Jordan cooperation strategy and programme with the other main EU sectoral / thematic policies should be ensured by the general framework built around the Association Agreement, the Action Plan and the general ENP regional policy framework. In the preparation of the Action Plan the different services of the Commission have been deeply involved and have guided the selection of priorities.

Few EC sectoral policies could have an impact on the Jordan interventions: the most relevant are: trade, transport, enterprise in connection with Private sector development and trade / transport facilitation, energy for the presence of many actions in ENP South for interconnection and alternative sources, security.

It should be noted that one priority area of EC internal and external policy – that is climate change and environment – receives less attention in Jordan within the most recent interventions. While the most recent NIP reserves a solid analysis to environmental issues in the country, nevertheless the priorities do not mention it with specific attention (there is however sustainable energy production as focal sector, but without any specific mention to impact on environment). Considering as an example that NIF recently showed the important of climate change in its priorities – establishing a special set of interventions for it (Marked RIO 210), one could suppose that the lower attention given to climate change / environment in Jordan is consequence of the striking importance of the other events affecting the country that weight on the policy dialogue with GoJ.

Nonetheless it is worth mentioning that the relative importance of the regional programmes for Jordan has been very much appreciated during the meeting with local counterparts, also because the results achieved.

At the Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities (MoTA), besides the TA project funded by SAPP through a twinning with Italy/Regione Toscana, they mentioned the participation in two other projects funded through the CBC Initiative – SMILE and MEDROUTES – addressed to sustainable tourism and to re-establishment of ancient routes as tourism attraction: MoTA confirmed their satisfaction and thanked MoPIC from which they received the information on the opportunity and that helped them to finalize their participation.

At the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), they mentioned explicitly EUROMED JUSTICE programme as a source of qualification for their judges: the quality of the training received is considered good and the most recent topic, family law, helped also to re-consider some aspects of the country laws and regulations on the matter.

At the Ministry of Transport (MoT), they started the meeting expressly saying that they are more satisfied with their participation to regional programmes in transport sector that with the large BS support they directly received (the TTF BS). They are working intensively in three regional programmes and they suggested that transport as such is probably better addressed with programmes where the relations with the other countries are facilitated, as in regional programmes.
KPI-2.3.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - CSPNIP2007-2010
   - NIP 2011-13
   - Jordan Country Eval 2007
   - ENPI RIP 2011
   - Action Fiche DNJP
   - EU 7 EAP December 2013
   - EU Climate change declaration
   - EU Tailoring trade and investment policy for those countries most in need, January 2012

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
   - /-

KPI-2.3.2: Overall quality of the strategic coordination on these other EU policies with the competent / mandated EU entities concerned including DG Trade, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities and the EEAS entity in charge of the Instrument for Stability (IFS)

Main Findings on KPI-2.3.2:

The presence in Jordan of other EU DG is well consolidated and the occasions to accumulate synergies are quite often exploited.

Thanks to the project “Support to Research, Technological Development and Innovation in Jordan” – SRTD phase I and II – the presence of Jordanian organization in the DG RESEARCH FP7 started and consolidated in the recent years.

The programme “TEMPUS” DG EDUCATION is already well consolidated in the country: in TEMPUS III and TEMPUS IV 119 Jordanian partners participated in 29 initiatives worth more than 28M euro.

DG ENTERPRISE launched the “European Mediterranean Charter for Enterprise” in 2004. In Jordan the focal point has been since 2008 JEDCO that is also the manager of a number of interventions for private sector support funded by DG DEVCO. Moreover recently DEVCO decided to support with 3 million euro the launch of a large programme to aid the implementation of the Charter all over the Mediterranean region. First meetings in Jordan started already to define together the focus of the activities.

DG ENTERPRISE produced two reports on the situation of the SMEs in the Mediterranean countries with a special section on Jordan. According to the person met at DG ENTERPRISE (Mme Marie Corman), the report presented in 2008 was a good analysis of the situation and indicated a number of priorities for the EU intervention that, according to the same source, were not fully utilised.

“Euromed - innovative entrepreneurs for change: support to cluster cooperation, start-ups, investors and management of intellectual property” is a recent programme launched by DG ENTERPRISE to provide a comprehensive framework facilitating the cooperation between clusters, incubators, business support service providers (in particular those providing support for the management of intellectual property) and seed-investor communities in the EU on the one side and Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Lebanon on the other. The services requested include communication, networking and event organisation activities but also significant training activities related to the management of Intellectual property, and the development of training material related to business culture and intercultural communication with managers of SMEs as the final target group. Furthermore SMEs from the targeted countries and the EU shall be encouraged to test and review the services provided by the extended networks of business support intermediaries. It is foreseen that Jordan can participate in the second phase to start in 2014.

KPI-2.3.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - /-
Even though in recent evaluations (see “NIF Mid Term Evaluation 2013”, “Evaluation of the European Union’s Support to Private Sector Development 2013”, “JSMP Impact Evaluation 2014”) it is pointed out that the consultation process on project proposals is broad but shallow, that IFIs project development has limited interactions with Delegations, with risk of limiting potential contributions to EC objectives, nevertheless it appears that coordination with Jordan EU Delegation has been steadily improving over the past two years. In effect even though interviewees within the EC stated that Commission–EIB cooperation at country level often remained limited and consisted mainly of formalities and exchange of information, in reality the accomplishments of EU IFIs in the country have been quite successful with substantial coherence with the overall EU policy while complementarities and synergies can be improved.

There is one specific case that can be used as indicator for the positive and negative outcomes: the support to private sector development. PSD has always been a priority for EU strategy with Jordan; substantial amount of resources have been targeted to in different aid modalities (SBS and projects) since the signature of the Association Agreement.

PSD and trade facilitation are shared priorities with the EC regional policies and strategies that offer the guidelines for the most important Financial Instruments operating in the region. Blending of different financial instruments should be one of the main modalities to support PSD.

In effect, the most important EU IFIs (EIB and EBRD) in recent years multiplied the interventions in the country and a substantial share has been directed to private sector investments: a quick summary shows that EIB opened loans for more than EUR 280 million to Jordanian Private Investors and EBRD since the opening of the office in Amman at the end of 2012 has already cumulated around 220 million interventions. In the same period (2007-2013), the total cumulated interventions from the two CSP funded with DG DEVCO for private sector reached the EUR 65 million in commitments, but with EUR 35 million disbursements until now: one can conclude that the most solid and effective support to private sector development in the country came from the interventions of EU IFIs, moreover because they use the loan modality, that implies a potential multiplier effect while the DEVCO intervention were confined to “grants”, whose multiplier effect is quite marginal.

There are no assessments for the moment on the effectiveness of the EU IFIs interventions in terms of employment and contribution to the reduction of the trade deficit, but from the list of the projects funded it is possible to say that even from this point of view these interventions should have more impact than the ones within the CSPs. A typical example of the EIB intervention is the loan to establish a fertilizer plant. EIB granted a EUR 120 million loan to the Jordan-India Fertilizer Company (JIFCO) to support the construction of a state-of-the-art phosphoric acid plant for the production of fertilizer in Jordan, which will help boost agricultural productivity and create more than 800 jobs. The plant, to be built in the city of Eshidiya, will play an important role for the global food chain. The new plant is designed with environmental benefits, including highly efficient production technology that allows the local grid to use the plant's excess production of electricity. The plant will also recycle water with high efficiency. Its sponsors, Jordan Phosphate Mines Company (JPMC) and India Farmers Fertilizer Cooperative (IFFCO), are both involved in sustainable efforts to increase the global food supply, and are important players in the economies of Jordan and India. This project is co-financed with IFC (World Bank Group) and a commercial banks consortium.

However, the evidence for some coordination and search for synergies within the above mentioned intervention did not produce results. In the JSMP evaluation it is marked that there is no evidence of any

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- ENPI RIP 2011
- EBRD Country strategy paper 2012
- DG RESEARCH FP 7 presentation

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- The Higher Council for Science and Technology REPORT MAY 2014)
- TEMPUS reports

KPI-2.3.3: Level to which the coordination and contacts with these competent / mandated entities for these other EU policies got intensified / more institutionalized over time

Main Findings on KPI-2.3.3:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPI-2.3.3:</th>
<th>Level to which the coordination and contacts with these competent / mandated entities for these other EU policies got intensified / more institutionalized over time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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However, the evidence for some coordination and search for synergies within the above mentioned intervention did not produce results. In the JSMP evaluation it is marked that there is no evidence of any
coordination to promote the use of different tools within JSMP: the availability of the grants appears to have been the ultimate scope and the unique tool available to support the private sector actors. Some basic coherence could have been developed with EIB in the field of venture capital, as well as on the specific issue of financial sector interventions. The EC Headquarters issued a note during the programme implementation that the structure of collaboration with the EIB had been further developed and that, for the Neighbourhood region, division of labour ensured ‘that financial sector interventions are taken over by the EIB, reducing Commission intervention in the financial markets”. As regards more specifically EC-EIB interaction, the action taken for the creation of venture capital funds was well aligned and could have been example of good coordination and synergies, but it does not appear to have produced clear and solid results.

To support SME activity in Jordan, the EIB is contributing to two private equity funds. In 2012, the EIB provided up to EUR 4 million for the Badia Impact Fund, a closed-end venture capital fund incorporated in the Netherlands. Also in 2012, the Bank invested EUR 5 million in a private equity later-stage fund. This fund will finance the expansion opportunities of established local companies, for which the private equity financing that is critical for the growth of a successful entrepreneurial industry is lacking. The most recent intervention (September 2013 but still to be finalized) refers to a loan, together with SFI, to local financial institutions, where grants should be used to reduce the risks (the actual hypothesis is the first 50% of losses shared with the loaners).

Other major areas of intervention of the EU IFIs are sustainable energy, transport and water, resulting in an increased coherence with the EU policies at large and with the intervention of the EU MS, although in some of these interventions the local beneficiaries are public institutions.

The EBRD investments and current portfolio – around EUR 190 million plus EUR 30 million to be finalized soon with two local banks (InvestBank and CairoAmman Bank) to set up to credit lines for SMEs - are fully allocated to the private sector and concentrated around energy efficiency and sustainability – starting with EBRD’s landmark investment into an independent solar power plant (IPP4) designed to meet the substantial growth in peaking electricity demand. The Bank’s USD 80 million financing of the Abdali shopping and entertainment centre in Amman is equally centred on energy and resource efficiency - with 50% of the financing being utilised for energy efficiency, water recycling and renewable energy measures. The TAFILA wind farm, financed by the EIB with a EUR 53 million loan, is another very special project in the sustainable energy area that has been awarded recently a prize for the conception and the potential results. The project comprises the construction and operation of a greenfield wind farm Independent Power Producer (IPP) to produce 117 MW electricity in Jordan. The wind farm will be located in the Tafila Governorate of Jordan, in an area east of the town of Ghurandil and north of the Lafarge Rashidiya cement plant. The electricity generated will be sold to the National Electricity Power Company (NEPCO). The project will contribute to Jordan's development objective in the energy sector aiming to increase both electricity production and the share of renewable energy in its electricity generation portfolio. It will contribute to climate change mitigation, thereby displacing fossil fuel-based generation and avoiding greenhouse gas emissions. The project also fulfils the government's objective of increasing the participation of the private sector in energy generation.

KPI-2.3.3 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Evaluation of the European Union’s Support to Private Sector Development 2013
- Mid term evaluation of NIF 2013
- NIF mid term evaluation 2012
- ENPI RIP 2011
- Please see below

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- /-
KPI-2.3.3 (ii) Key extracts from documents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Signature date</th>
<th>Signed Amount</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>TAFILA WIND FARM</td>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>27/11/2013</td>
<td>52,958,900</td>
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<td>BADIA IMPACT FUND</td>
<td>Services</td>
<td>21/11/2013</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>BADIA IMPACT FUND</td>
<td>Services</td>
<td>18/12/2012</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JORDAN CAPITAL GROWTH FUND</td>
<td>Services</td>
<td>22/02/2012</td>
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<td>JORDAN INDIA FERTILIZER</td>
<td>Industry</td>
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<td>81,000,000</td>
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<td>73,670,252</td>
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<td>15/05/2009</td>
<td>92,087,815</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMMAN RING ROAD</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>25/11/2008</td>
<td>36,918,138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HBF GLOBAL LOAN</td>
<td>Credit lines</td>
<td>23/12/2007</td>
<td>50,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGIONAL GAS PIPELINE</td>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>05/06/2004</td>
<td>100,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Amount</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>635,331,863</strong></td>
</tr>
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</table>

(EIB projects to Jordan 2004-2013 – from EIB site database)

KPI-2.3.4: Intensity and type of cooperation (policy, strategic, programming, TA, …) with special EU agencies with specific mandates for the European Neighbourhood (e.g. ETF, etc.) on sector / thematic areas of special relevance to the EU-Jordan cooperation

Main Findings on KPI-2.3.4:

There are no official documents on the intensity and type of cooperation with special EU agencies with specific mandates for the European Neighbourhood on sector / thematic areas of special relevance to the EU-Jordan cooperation. As shown in the former paragraph there is however a clear focus on the basic priorities of the ENP strategy and policies shared by all involved institutions.

For the financial sector, the coordination process has been strengthened under the aegis of the Deauville Partnership, which was announced in May 2011 by G8 leaders. The Deauville Partnership has launched several important initiatives, including a Private Sector Development Initiative, led by the IFIs, aimed at fostering a competitive private sector, including developing local capital markets, addressing skills mismatches, and providing technical assistance for public-private partnerships. Under the umbrella of the Private Sector Development Initiative, the EBRD and the AMF are co-leading a joint initiative to comprehensively develop local currency and local capital markets.

Officially launched in May 2008, the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) is an innovative financial instrument of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Its primary objective is to finance key infrastructure projects in the transport, energy, social and environment sectors with a mixture of grants and loans as well as to support private sector development (in particular SMEs) in the Neighbourhood Region. Projects must be located in an ENP partner country that has signed an Action Plan with the EU to be eligible for a grant contribution from the NIF. The NIF is designed to create a partnership, pooling together grant resources from the EU budget and the EU Member States and using them to leverage loans from European Finance Institutions as well as own contributions from the ENP partner countries. The NIF interventions in Jordan for the moment are limited. The only project is Jordan: Electricity Transmission. The NIF grant will fund a feasibility study and environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA) related to future investments in the Jordanian electricity transmission system. The underlying infrastructure project will contribute to strengthen regional interconnections and the integration of renewable energies into the Jordanian grid.

KPI-2.3.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - NIF Presentation 2013
   - EBRD Country strategy 2012
   - FEMIP in Jordan 2012
The overall coherence of the EU-Jordan cooperation strategy and programme with the other main EU sectoral / thematic policies should be ensured by the general framework built around the Association Agreement, the Action Plan and the general ENP regional policy framework. In the preparation of the Action Plan the different services of the Commission have been deeply involved and have guided the selection of priorities.

Few EC sectoral policies could have an impact on the Jordan interventions: the most relevant are: trade, transport, enterprise in connection with Private sector development and trade / transport facilitation, energy for the presence of many actions in ENP South for interconnection and alternative sources, security.

It should be noted that one priority area of EC internal and external policy – that is climate change and environment – receives less attention in Jordan within the most recent interventions. While the most recent NIP reserves a solid analysis to environmental issues in the country, nevertheless the priorities do not mention it with specific attention (there is however sustainable energy production as focal sector, but without any specific mention to impact on environment).

It is worth mentioning that the relative importance of the regional programmes for Jordan has been very much appreciated during the meeting with local counterparts, also because the results achieved: Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Transport mentioned their participation in regional programmes as very satisfactory for the results achieved.

Overall quality of the strategic coordination on these other EU policies with the competent / mandated EU entities (KPI 2.3.2) can be observed with the presence of other EU DGs in the country. The presence in Jordan of other EU DGs is well consolidated and the occasions to accumulate synergies are quite often exploited. Thanks to the project “Support to Research, Technological Development and Innovation in Jordan” – SRTD phase I and II – the presence of Jordanian organization in the DG RESEARCH FP7 started and consolidated in the recent years. The programme “TEMPUS” DG EDUCATION is already well consolidated in the country: in TEMPUS III and TEMPUS IV 119 Jordanian partners participated in 29 initiatives worth more than 28M euro. DG ENTERPRISE launched the “European Mediterranean Charter for Enterprise” in 2004. In Jordan the focal point has been since 2008 JEDCO that is also the manager of a number of interventions for private sector support funded by DG DEVCO. Moreover recently DEVCO decided to support with EUR 3 million the launch of a large programme to aid the implementation of the Charter all over the Mediterranean region. First meetings in Jordan started already to define together the focus of the activities. DG ENTERPRISE produced two reports on the situation of the SMEs in the Mediterranean countries with a special section on Jordan. According to the person met at DG ENTERPRISE, the report presented in 2008 was a good analysis of the situation and indicated a number of priorities for the EU intervention that, according to the same source, were not fully utilised.

Even though in recent evaluations (see “NIF Mid Term Evaluation 2013”, “Evaluation of the European Union’s Support to Private Sector Development 2013”, “JSMP Impact Evaluation 2014”) it is pointed out that the consultation process on project proposals is broad but shallow, that IFIs project development has limited interactions with Delegations, with risk of limiting potential contributions to EC objectives, nevertheless it appears that coordination with Jordan EU Delegation has been steadily improving over the past two years. In effect even though interviewees within the EC stated that Commission–EIB cooperation at country level often remained limited and consisted mainly of formalities and exchange of information, in reality the accomplishments of EU IFIs in the country have been quite successful with substantial coherence with the overall EU policy while complementarities and synergies can be improved.(KPI 2.3.3)

There is one specific case that can be used as indicator for the positive and negative outcomes: the support to private sector development. PSD has always been a priority for EU strategy with Jordan; substantial amount of resources have been targeted to in different aid modalities (SBS and projects) since the signature of the Association Agreement. PSD and trade facilitation are shared priorities with the EC regional policies and strategies that offer the guidelines for the most important Financial Instruments operating in the region. Blending of different financial instruments should be one of the main modalities to support PSD. In effect the most important EU IFIs (EIB and EBRD) in recent years multiplied the interventions in the country and a
substantial share has been directed to private sector investments: a quick summary shows that EIB opened loans for more than EUR 280 million to Jordanian Private Investors and EBRD since the opening of the office in Amman at the end of 2012 has already cumulated around EUR 220 million interventions. In the same period (2007-2013) the total cumulated interventions from the two CSP funded with DG DEVCO for private sector reached the EUR 65 million in commitments, but with EUR 35 million disbursements until now: one can conclude that the most solid and effective support to private sector development in the country came from the interventions of EU IFIs, moreover because they use the loan modality, that implies a potential multiplier effect while the DEVCO intervention were confined to “grants”, whose multiplier effect is quite marginal. (KPI 2.3.3)

There are no official documents on the intensity and type of cooperation with special EU agencies with specific mandates for the European Neighbourhood on sector / thematic areas of special relevance to the EU-Jordan cooperation. As shown in the former paragraph there is however a clear focus on the basic priorities of the ENP strategy and policies shared by all involved institutions. For the financial sector, the coordination process has been strengthened under the aegis of the Deauville Partnership, which was announced in May 2011 by G8 leaders. The Deauville Partnership has launched several important initiatives, including a Private Sector Development Initiative, led by the IFIs, aimed at fostering a competitive private sector, including developing local capital markets, addressing skills mismatches, and providing technical assistance for public-private partnerships. Under the umbrella of the Private Sector Development Initiative, the EBRD and the AMF are co-leading a joint initiative to comprehensively develop local currency and local capital markets. (KPI 2.3.4).

Even tough, according to different external sources, coordination with the major EU IFIs operating in the country does not appear consistent or able to produce the potential expected synergies, it is true that the coherence with the overall EU strategy is well respected: there are however opportunities to create better coordination and synergies not fully exploited: the relative absence of coordination is probably due more than to strategic difference in aid modalities (grants/TA against loans/guarantee), to the different targets and beneficiaries the actions have been addressed and to some over-burdened human resources.
**JC-2.4**

The EU has actively sought Government advice when setting its own priorities in terms of Division of Labour (DOL) between Development Partners (DPs)

### List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 2.4 *(codes and definition)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPI</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPI-2.4.1</td>
<td>Overall quality of the leadership of the Government of Jordan in promoting and managing the actual implementation of Division of Labour (DoL) between the Developing Partners (DPs) and in advancing the policy/political dialogue with them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-2.4.2</td>
<td>Level of institutional, operational and human capacity of the special Units in central ministries MoPIC, MoF and MoFA and in concerned line ministries / agencies to effectively assume DoL and policy/political dialogue leadership functions (with adequate and high level staffing, resources, capacities developed, institutionally anchored, etc.) and extent and quality of support provided to these by the EU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-2.4.3</td>
<td>Extent to which appropriate institutional fora are created and are effectively operational for DoL and PD purposes at both executive policy making and technical, operational levels (with sanctioned mandates, secretarial services, established procedures, etc.) and extent and quality of support provided to these by the EU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-2.4.4</td>
<td>Number of regular (plus possibly ad hoc) meetings held per year (and trends) of these DoL and PD fora as documented by proceedings and recommendations records / reports or based on other documentary evidence, by level and type of meetings and by topic / subject</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Main Findings on KPI-2.4.1:

The central actor in the management of Jordan’s development process is the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC). MoPIC has a broad mandate in planning and implementation of the country’s development policies and directions as well as in monitoring and evaluating development outcomes. It coordinates monetary, financial and trade policies with development strategies and programmes and is in charge of the country’s process towards the MDGs.

In July 2007, the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC) established nine donor coordination working groups. In early 2011, following the approval of the new Executive Development Programme, MoPIC increased the number of donor coordination working groups to eleven. The 11 groups include: Energy; Employment and Vocational Training; Water and Agriculture; Trade and Investment; Good Governance; Health; Gender; Public Financial Management; Local Development, Tourism; and Education. In addition, a coordination mechanism for humanitarian aid is in place under MoPIC’s Humanitarian Relief Coordination Unit. The groups aim at providing a “structured and technical level dialogue with donors on Jordan’s development needs and priorities. As the institution in charge of coordinating and overseeing the implementation of the National Executive Programme (NEP), MoPIC also is the key institution responsible for alignment of external aid with the country’s development priorities and policies – and thus the key stakeholder in ensuring aid effectiveness. MoPIC is the body coordinating between with actors providing development assistance and the Governmental, other public and private institutions receiving foreign assistance.

The development planning process is led by the Government and reflects a strong national ownership. However, the absence of a structured dialogue and exchange during the national planning process between the Government and the donors makes it challenging for the donors to align their assistance with the national development priorities and programming timetables as well as to harmonise planning with the national systems and to programme and plan external contributions accordingly.

The present formal Government-led sector-level coordination mechanism has been in place since 2011 under the leadership of MoPIC and it is composed of 11 sector-level Government-Donor Coordination Working Groups. While attempts have been made by MoPIC to operationalise the mechanism, currently it is...
not working. At the sector-level no working groups are operational and at the sub-sector level 2 working
groups - Education and Microfinance - are active. While neither of these groups display a full sector-wide
coordination mechanism, they represent a programme-based approach at a sub-sector level and have been
effective in coordinating alignment and harmonisation in their respective focus areas and could be singled
out as demonstrations of good practice within the Jordanian aid coordination system.

Meetings with MS representatives (France, Germany, the Netherlands) and with other international donors
(USAID, UNDP, JICA) confirmed the relatively low coordination capacity of MoPIC.

MoPIC / MoF appear to do some sort of arbitrage between loans and grants with a well known preference for
grants (because not only of the limitation due to the overall debt threshold but also for the consolidated
mentality in the country – we deserve grants because of the external problems / shocks affecting us. This
approach, when only at the last possible moment they can choose loans (under IMF constraint) brings a sub-
optimal use of both instruments, loosing good opportunities for easy soft loans addressed to priority projects:
they appear to work mostly on short term pressure.

There is a common feeling between the donors that in certain cases of weak or fragmented institutional
responsibilities, a lack of coherent sector strategies and operational coordination has often resulted in
fragmented donor assistance, activities within inappropriate policy or institutional frameworks, weak ability to
select and scale up successes, and ultimately little on-the-ground impact. This appears to have been the
case for instance in the areas of private sector development, social protection, and for some time in the
financial management reform. In contrast, the experience of the education program has been a good
example of donors’ coordination at both the strategic and operational level through leadership by the
Ministries of Education and MoPIC.

An important actor seems to be missing from the aid coordination system – the civil society and non-
governmental organisations, national and international. There are no structures for collaboration and
consultation with the civil society actors in the aid context. Also the Parliament does not seem to play any
role in the dialogue around aid. Also this may reflect Jordanian specifics, however it is important for
democratic ownership. A useful start for this engagement could be to involve the Parliament into discussions
about aid effectiveness policy as a member of the Government/donor forum.

KPI-2.4.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   -  

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - PLEDJ Action Fiche
   - PFM monitoring report 2012
   - Action Fiche Local Development Programme Dec 11
   - Assessment of Aid Coordination and Effectiveness in Jordan February 2013

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
   -  

### KPI-2.4.2: Level of institutional, operational and human capacity of the special Units in central ministries MoPIC, MoF and MoFA and in concerned line ministries / agencies to effectively assume DoL and policy/political dialogue leadership functions (with adequate and high level staffing, resources, capacities developed, institutionally anchored, etc.) and extent and quality of support provided to these by the EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Findings on KPI-2.4.2:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The level of institutional, operational and human capacity of the special Units in central ministries and in concerned line ministries / agencies to effectively assume DoL and policy/political dialogue leadership functions is in general unequally distributed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At MoPIC at least for the EU Partnership Division the level of staffing and competences appears adequate, probably thanks to the financial support offered by the EC. The unit in charge of SAAP is especially well managed: the unit is in charge to present to the line ministries and other institutions the opportunity offered by the SAAP programme, following the typical demand driven approach. The interested Ministries present their proposals to the Unit, then, after the vetting and prioritization made in collaboration by the Director of the EU Partnership Division and the EC Delegation during the sub-committee meetings, the Unit supports the finalization of the proposals and then during implementation monitors and on a case by case offers assistance in the management. The results in terms of efficiency are acceptable and the beneficiary ministries / organizations expressed their satisfaction for the support they receive. The Unit follows closely the evolving phases of project implementation and intervenes assisting the beneficiary organization in the preparation of the procedures for purchases as well as in the production of technical and financial reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>According to the Unit, the twinning modality used in most of SAAP project is consequence of a certain pressure made by the EC Delegation; even if it is true that – according to the same source – out of the 26 twinning projects until now implemented, there is 90% of successful expected results (in terms of completed activities and used resources), nevertheless some doubts have been expressed on the modality. In general they are convinced that the quality is better with a classic service contract, when the experts’ capacity and effectiveness are considered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twinning is adequate for specific field actions, moreover when technical issues and aspects are the most important ones (see the case of the twinning of the Standard and Metrology Organization with Germany, where substantial results in terms of adaptation of local rules and regulation have been achieved in two phases). In other cases, especially when institutional support in the core issue, the service contracts appear to be more efficient. Twinning has to be used with some caution as in many cases the institutional structure and management of the EU countries is quite different from the Jordanian one (see the case of the twinning at Ministry of Justice where the EU partner was UK while the judiciary system in Jordan is more similar to the French one). Twinning could be a useful instrument if it will be possible to use it for some South-South exchange of experiences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We are now in the 4th generation of SAAP projects: the past experience showed that the projects are more successful when the objectives are not so ambitious – particularly when institutional issues are the matter (i.e. new legislation) – and can focus on practical issues. The capacity to enlarge the contents of SAAP to the delivery of equipment has been much appreciated. However at MoPIC there the feeling that SAAP twinning projects are not able to produce accumulation of results and multiplier towards others institutions. Each time is almost a start from scratch. EU pushes for the use of twinning: in many cases it is complicated and takes a long time to get contracted partners. The use of TAIEX / SIGMA is easier and it has been the tool to fill the gap.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service contacts are less expensive and the quality of support we get is better. Twinning is a good instrument when specific technical issues are the core actions (see the success at Standard and Metrology Institute with twinning from Germany).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| At Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities (MoTA) they have an on-going twinning for capacity building (the EU partners are from Italy). They did not make specific request but got the input from MoPIC to prepare something in the framework of the opportunities offered by EU. They also participate as partners to 2 CBC ENPI projects. They found the twinning procedure a bit long and not clear: they prepared the ToRs with the support of PAO. Got 4 proposals: best one from Austria /Estonia, then France /Germany, then Italy. Selection processes (that involved meeting with candidates having to come down to Amman) give best score to Austria then France then Italy. But EU Del only at this point made the control for eligibility criteria and
found that Austria and France did not comply. So they got the only one left: they suggest that eligibility should be done at the start to avoid useless work and waste of resources. They participate to different regional activities (Heritage, Culture). They see CBC ENPI as a very valid instrument to exchange best practices and to create effective networks for inclusive actions.

### KPI-2.4.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) **Data, figures and tables:**
   - Please see below

(ii) **Key extracts from documents:**
   - PFM monitoring report 2012

(iii) **Additional information from field phase:**
   - /-

### KPI-2.4.2 (i) Data, figures and tables:

**SAAP Meetings 2009-2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programmes</th>
<th># of Steering Committees Meetings</th>
<th>Average # of participants</th>
<th>Key issues for discussion</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trade and Transport Facilitation</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>Specific benchmarks General benchmarks Riders Sector reforms Missions reports TA Component</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support to the Public Finance Management</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>Specific benchmarks General benchmarks Riders Sector reforms Missions reports TA Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Phase of the Education Reform/Second Addendum-Syrians Package</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Specific benchmarks General benchmarks Riders Sector reforms Missions reports TA Component</td>
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<tr>
<td>Second Phase of the Education Reform</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Specific benchmarks General benchmarks Riders Sector reforms Missions reports TA Component</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support to E-TVET the Reforms</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Specific benchmarks General benchmarks Riders Sector reforms Missions reports TA Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRTD II</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Programme Estimate and Implementation Plan for 2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(MoPIC SAAP Unit)
**KPI-2.4.3:** Extent to which appropriate institutional fora are created and are effectively operational for DoL and PD purposes at both executive policy making and technical, operational levels (with sanctioned mandates, secretarial services, established procedures, etc.) and extent and quality of support provided to these by the EU

**Main Findings on KPI-2.4.3:**

The establishment of appropriate institutional spaces for DoL and Partners Development purposes at both executive policy making and technical, operational levels emerges an objective for the moment missed, except for the SAAP support already mentioned. MoPIC appears to be more involved in the implementation of the projects – that is once they are contracted - where it participates actively in the organization of the steering committees (twice per year – probably because they are compulsory part of the technical implementation, to the extreme of 10 steering committees in three years for the TTF BS project); under this aspect MoPIC shows good capacity to join the stakeholders around the table and leading the work (even though in some cases – see the mentioned TTF – without adequate results).

In terms of leading the DoL, MoPIC claims that it organizes multi-donors meetings (even though in the memory of the EU officers no such meetings has been organized in the last year), but the donors met (France, Germany, Nederland, USAID, UNDP, JICA) report a common frustration as the debate rest quite superficial and limited.

**KPI-2.4.3 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - +/-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - +/-

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
   - +/-

**JC-2.4:** The EU has actively sought Government advice when setting its own priorities in terms of Division of Labour (DOL) between Development Partners (DPs)

**Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-2.4 (based on the KPIs main findings)**

The central actor in the management of Jordan’s development process is the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC). MoPIC has a broad mandate in planning and implementation of the country's development policies and directions as well as in monitoring and evaluating development outcomes. It coordinates monetary, financial and trade policies with development strategies and programmes and is in charge of the country’s process towards the MDGs.

In July 2007, the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC) established nine donor coordination working groups. In early 2011, following the approval of the new Executive Development Programme, MoPIC increased the number of donor coordination working groups to eleven. The 11 groups include: Energy; Employment and Vocational Training; Water and Agriculture; Trade and Investment; Good Governance; Health; Gender; Public Financial Management; Local Development, Tourism; and Education. In addition, a coordination mechanism for humanitarian aid is in place under MoPIC’s Humanitarian Relief Coordination Unit. The groups aim at providing a "structured and technical level dialogue with donors on Jordan's development needs and priorities.

As the institution in charge of coordinating and overseeing the implementation of the National Executive Programme (NEP), MoPIC also is the key institution responsible for alignment of external aid with the country’s development priorities and policies – and thus the key stakeholder in ensuring aid effectiveness.

The development planning process is led by the Government and reflects a strong national ownership. However the absence of a structured dialogue and exchange during the national planning process between the Government and the donors makes it challenging for the donors to align their assistance with the national...
development priorities and programming timetables as well as to harmonise planning with the national systems and to programme and plan external contributions accordingly.

The present formal Government-led sector-level coordination mechanism has been in place since 2011 under the leadership of MoPIC and it is composed of 11 sector-level Government-Donor Coordination Working Groups. While attempts have been made by MoPIC to operationalise the mechanism, currently it is not working. Meetings with MS representatives (France, Germany, Nederland) and with other international donors (USAID, UNDP, JICA) confirmed the low coordination capacity of MoPIC; however some doubts have been expressed on this behaviour as being part – if not in all cases at least in some occasions - of an implicit strategy of reduced transparency to be able to cherry picking the best conditions and the best opportunities.

MoPIC / MoF appear to do some sort of arbitrage between loans and grants with a well-known preference for grants (because not only of the limitation due to the overall debt threshold but also for the consolidated mentality in the country – we deserve grants because of the external problems / shocks affecting us. This approach, when only at the last possible moment they can choose loans (under IMF constraint) brings a sub-optimal use of both instruments, loosening good opportunities for easy soft loans addressed to priority projects: they appear to work mostly on short term pressure.

There is a common feeling between the donors that in certain cases of weak or fragmented institutional responsibilities, a lack of coherent sector strategies and operational coordination has often resulted in fragmented donor assistance, activities within inappropriate policy or institutional frameworks, weak ability to select and scale up successes, and ultimately little on-the-ground impact. This appears to have been the case for instance in the areas of private sector development, social protection, and for some time in the financial management reform. In contrast, the experience of the education program has been a good example of donors’ coordination at both the strategic and operational level through leadership by the Ministries of Education and MoPIC.

The civil society and non-governmental organisations, national and international, seem to be missing from the aid coordination system. There are no structures for collaboration and consultation with the civil society actors in the aid context. Also the Parliament does not seem to play any role in the dialogue around aid. Also this may reflect Jordanian specifics, however it is important for democratic ownership. A useful start for this engagement could be to involve the Parliament into discussions about aid effectiveness policy as a member of the Government/donor forum. (KPI 2.4.1).

The available sources state that the aid coordination system in Jordan is not geared towards generating optimal aid effectiveness and does not appear to be able to solicit the full engagement of the key stakeholders – internal and international. All stakeholders seem to agree that there is scope for improvement for most elements and at various levels of the process. There are two positive points. Local public stakeholders – MoPIC and line ministries – did show in a number of cases a clear ownership for aid coordination and are ready to assume leadership for its improvement. The same can be said of the international stakeholders that confirmed in many occasions a clear willingness and interest to address the shortcomings and jointly work towards making the system more effective. There have been good practices in recent past (PFM) where the collaboration between local and international stakeholders facilitated the division of labour and the synergies reaching what according to many stakeholders is satisfactory aid effectiveness.

The level of institutional, operational and human capacity of the special Units in central ministries and in concerned line ministries / agencies to effectively assume DoL and policy/political dialogue leadership functions is in general unequally distributed. (KPI 2.4.2)

At MoPIC at least for the EU Partnership Division the level of staffing and competences appears adequate, probably thanks to the financial support offered by the EC. The unit in charge of SAAP is especially well managed: the unit is in charge to present to the line ministries and other institutions the opportunity offered by the SAAP programme, following the typical demand driven approach.

According to the Unit, the twinning modality used in most of SAAP project is consequence of a certain pressure made by the EC Delegation; even if it is true that – according to the same source – out of the 26 twinning projects until now implemented, there is 90% of successful expected results (in terms of completed activities and used resources), nevertheless some doubts have been expresses on the modality. In general they are convinced that the quality is better with a classic service contract, when the experts’ capacity and effectiveness are considered.

Twinning is adequate for specific field actions, moreover when technical issues and aspects are the most
important ones (see the case of the twinning of the Standard and Metrology Organization with Germany, where substantial results in terms of adaptation of local rules and regulation have been achieved in two phases). In other cases, especially when institutional support in the core issue, the service contracts appear to be more efficient. However at MoPIC there the feeling that SAAP twinning projects are not able to produce accumulation of results and multiplier towards others institutions. Each time is almost a start from scratch. EU pushes for the use of twinning: in many cases it is complicated and takes a long time to get a contracted partners. The use of TAIEX / SIGMA is easier and it has been the tool to fill the gap.

MoPIC appears to be more involved in the implementation of the projects – that is once they are contracted - where it participates actively in the organization of the steering committees (twice per year – probably because they are compulsory part of the technical implementation, to the extreme of 10 steering committees in three years for the TTF BS project): under this aspect MoPIC shows good capacity to join the stakeholders around the table and leading the work (even though in some cases – see the mentioned TTF – without adequate results).(KPI.2.4.3)

In terms of leading the DoL, MoPIC claims that it organizes multi-donors meetings (even though in the memory of the EU officers no such meetings has been organized in the last year), but the donors met (France, Germany, Nederland, USAID, UNDP, JICA) report a common frustration as the debate rest quite superficial and limited. We did not receive any formal information on the regularity of the meetings. According to the interviewed donors, it appears that they are organized more in occasion of specific circumstances. The recent case of Syrian refugees’ crisis is an example. The gravity of the crisis pushed MoPIC together with UN to establish some sort of coordination through the National Resilience Plan, where MoPIC assumed a leading role. For some donors this experience could be a pilot case to be used as possible model, while others find that there have been confused roles and lack of transparency. (KPI 2.4.4)
JC-2.5
The coordination implemented by Central Government of Jordan agencies vis-à-vis the implementing agencies both at national and local levels positively contributes to the EU-Jordan cooperation

List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 2.5 (codes and definition)

| KPI-2.5.1 | Overall quality and extent of the proactive steering and coordination of implementing ministries and agencies by the umbrella central Government entities as MoPIC, MoF and MFA, covering all aspects of the integrated programme cycle from strategizing and planning, over results management, monitoring and reporting, to reviews and evaluations, and feedback / re-programming (particularly also with regard to the BS and PE modalities of aid) |
| KPI-2.5.2 | Extent to which these GoHKoJ internal performance planning, management, monitoring and reporting systems are in place and operational, and their reporting is consolidated and shared with the EUD, e.g. for external reporting, accountability and M&E purposes (e.g. ROM etc.) |
| KPI-2.5.3 | Extent to which these performance planning and monitoring key units in the government entities concerned are mainstreamed, effectively trained / capacitated on performance planning, management, measurement, monitoring, reporting and evaluation (especially in connection with BS and PE progress and results performance reporting based on the PAFs as basis for next, fixed and/or variable tranches releases) |
| KPI-2.5.4 | Percentage and quality of compliance with actual progress and results performance reporting requirements by all covered Government ministries, agencies, public-private sector partnerships and Local Government Units concerned |

KPI-2.5.1: Overall quality and extent of the proactive steering and coordination of implementing ministries and agencies by the umbrella central Government entities as MoPIC, MoF and MFA, covering all aspects of the integrated programme cycle from strategizing and planning, over results management, monitoring and reporting, to reviews and evaluations, and feedback / re-programming (particularly also with regard to the BS and PE modalities of aid)

Main Findings on KPI-2.5.1:
According to the interviewed donors (France, Germany, Nederland, USAID, JICA, UNDP) and also during the meetings with the umbrella central Government entities as MoPIC, MoF and MFA, it appears that the proactive steering and coordination of implementing ministries and agencies is to be refined and in many cases still to be established.

Besides the MoF, where a specific Government-led donor coordination group on PFM issues was formed by MoPIC at the beginning of 2011, the only area where some coordinated arrangement has been arrived at with some success is the education sector.

With reference to the EU programmes, as said before, at MoPICMoPIC the structure in charge of SAPP is the only one granting some overall supervision, mainly concerned with the implementation of activities and reporting and their compliance with the contracts and EU regulations.

The capacity to build synergies and to offer a strategic coordination is quite weak and does not appear to be amongst the real priorities.

KPI-2.5.1 Main References and Sources of Information:
(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Please see below
(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Assessment of Aid Coordination and Effectiveness in Jordan February 2013
- WB country strategy paper 2012
- PFM monitoring report 2012
Additional information from field phase:

KPI-2.5.1 (i) Data, figures and tables:
Number of projects and foreign assistance in Jordan, by donor (2000-2012)

[Graph showing number of projects and donor contributions]

Source: JICA Aid information management system, MOPIC

KPI-2.5.2: Extent to which these GoHKoJ internal performance planning, management, monitoring and reporting systems are in place and operational, and their reporting is consolidated and shared with the EUD, e.g. for external reporting, accountability and M&E purposes (e.g. ROM etc.)

Main Findings on KPI-2.5.2:

As reported in former paragraphs, only for PFM and MoE structures exist that operate internal performance planning, management, monitoring and reporting systems thanks to the large donors’ commitments. The donors then are in a position to receive reports on the advancement of the actions in these sectors, including with regard to the common conditionalities.

At the Ministry of Education (MoE) an active Development Coordination Unit (DCU) was established to implement the Internal Monitoring and Evaluation Progress for ERfKE II Coordination and Management. It is in charge of producing and monitoring the annual work plans for all components with the involvement of all concerned projects and initiatives under ERfKE II. The DCU, which is part of the MoE consists of ten members including the executive director, the financial officer, the procurement officer, the monitoring officer, the components coordinators, the translator and the secretary. The DCU coordinates and manages the implementation of the projects’ components internally and among the donors. It also developed the Operational Manual that is approved as a condition for the World Bank loan effectiveness. It also manages the transition plans for the ERSP project activities to ensure the sustainability of these programmes. The DCU is also developing the annual procurement plans and preparing the required annual budget for ERfKEII, and managing the loan provided by the World Bank. A second structure NCHRD (National Centre for Human Resource Development) provides the External Monitoring and Evaluation System.

It is acknowledged that this good development at the MoE depends mostly on the strong leadership assured by the World Bank, as it is the leader of the multi-donors commitment for the sector. The establishment of the
DCU was one of the conditions for the WB loan ERfKE 1. The staff was then supported by TA for capacity building from CIDA. It should be noted that MoE has the capacity to keep the qualified staff thanks to specific commitments on salaries and careers. MoPIC was aware of the process but never participated directly.

On the other hand, at the Ministry of Labour (MoL) the World Bank started with the same process, created DCU for TVET sector reform within the MoL, then CIDA came to support and develop the capacity of its staff. But later the EU came with a BS to be managed through a TVET Secretariat directly and not through the DCU as the design was to develop a comprehensive lead reform for the sector (that includes many stakeholders): the results appear less effective as the pace of the reform is slower and scattered. The TVET Secretariat has no sufficient staff, moreover they have no capacity for the M&E for the EU support activities. Consequently last year the World bank project closed, CIDA project was closed in 2012 and the DCU was dissolved.

For the energy sector, lack of leadership in the sector by the Ministry (MEMR), lack of knowledge / information among sector entities regarding cooperation with donors and conflicting interests are major obstacles leading to less-than-optimal use of the donors programs and consequent sub-optimal effectiveness. Recently MoPIC delegated one employee to MEMR to be the liaison in matters relating to donor programmes, but still cooperation problems are evident. On the other hand MoPIC is not very effective in coordinating donors’ efforts due to the limited resources within MoPIC (insufficient number of personnel and proper training).

Quite recently, within the framework of the strategy for SMEs / private sector, a new institution has been announced on a decision by the Cabinet on 16 march 2014, the “Higher Council for SMEs Support”: composed of MoPIC (chairperson), MoIT, MoF, Central Bank, Jordan Chamber of Commerce, Jordan Chamber of Industry. It will have two committees, one technical committee that should study the policy measures and one “allocation” committee that should be in charge to assess and distribute the resources coming from the donors addressing the private sector support. Both committees are to be supported by JEDCO as secretary: but for the moment, apart the announcement of the new body, (that should be a substantial novelty in the private sector support environment), there is no trace of real activities.

KPI-2.5.2 Main References and Sources of Information:
(i) Data, figures and tables:
   – ✓
(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   – Junji Wakui, Senior Representative, JICA
(iii) Additional information from field phase:
   – ✓

KPI-2.5.3: Extent to which these performance planning and monitoring key units in the government entities concerned are mainstreamed, effectively trained / capacitated on performance planning, management, measurement, monitoring, reporting and evaluation (especially in connection with BS and PE progress and results performance reporting based on the PAFs as basis for next, fixed and/or variable tranches releases)

Main Findings on KPI-2.5.3:

The Government has embarked on a programme to improve the capacity of financial internal control units in all Ministries, Departments and Agencies that will take a number of years to complete, given the need for a change in the culture of control from one of compliance to a third party (the Audit Bureau) for meeting the requirements of the internal control rules, to one of internal management accountability (via the entity’s Internal Control Unit) for the operation of their internal control systems.

The process is ongoing with satisfactory results, according to the documents consulted.

However, as reported in former paragraphs, the existence of performance planning and monitoring key units in the government entities concerned with the external financing appears to be more the consequence of a specific intervention of the external donors than as an overall policy of the government, even though the
ongoing PFM reform programme produced better results for the monitoring and performance assessment of the national budget.

KPI-2.5.3 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- -

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Monitoring of the Fourth/Fifth Years Trade and Transport Facilitation, September 18th 2013
- Monitoring of the Fourth/Fifth Years Trade and Transport Facilitation, June 2014
- PFM annual monitoring report 2013

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- -

KPI-2.5.4: Percentage and quality of compliance with actual progress and results performance reporting requirements by all covered Government ministries, agencies, public-private sector partnerships and Local Government Units concerned

Main Findings on KPI-2.5.4:

In order to get some concrete details and facts on the past compliance and performance, the expert prepared a “Perception Analysis questionnaire” based on the expected results from the Association Agreement for three priority sectors (Private Sector Development / Trade /Transport). The questionnaire has been distributed to 3 EU Delegation Officers and to 4 MoPIC officers. It should be noted that only one (from an EU Officer) was returned.

JC-2.5: The coordination implemented by Central Government of Jordan agencies vis-à-vis the implementing agencies both at national and local levels positively contributes to the EU-Jordan cooperation

Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-2.5 (based on the KPIs main findings)

From the interviews of donors (France, Germany, Nederland, USAID, JICA, UNDP) and also during the meetings with the umbrella central Government entities as MoPIC, MoF and MFA, it appears that the proactive steering and coordination of implementing ministries and agencies are to be refined and in many cases to be established still. Besides the MoF, where a specific Government-led donor coordination group on PFM issues was formed by MoPIC at the beginning of 2011, the only area where there is some coordinated arrangement has been arrived at with some success is the education sector. With reference to the EU programmes, as said before, at MoPIC the structure in charge of SAPP is the only one granting some overall supervision. It is mainly concerned with the implementation of activities and reporting and their compliance with the contracts and EU regulations. The capacity to build synergies and to ensure strategic coordination is relatively weak and moreover does not appear to be amongst the main priorities. (KPI 2.5.1)

Only for PFM and MoE, structures exist that operate internal performance planning, management, monitoring and reporting systems thanks to the large donors’ commitments. The donors are then in a position to receive reports on the advancement of the actions in these sectors, including in relation to common conditionalities. At the Ministry of Education (MoE), a Development Coordination Unit (DCU) was established to implement the Internal Monitoring and Evaluation Progress for ERIKE II Coordination and Management. It is in charge of producing and monitoring the annual work plans for all components with the involvement of all concerned projects and initiatives under ERIKE II. The DCU, which is part of the MoE, consists of ten members including the executive director, the financial officer, the procurement officer, the monitoring officer, the components coordinators, the translator and the secretary. The DCU coordinates and manages the implementation of the projects’ components internally and among the donors. It is acknowledged that this good development at the MoE depends mostly on the strong leadership assured by the World Bank, as it is the leader of the multi-donors commitment for the sector. The establishment of the DCU was one of the conditions for the WB loan ERIKE 1. TA from CIDA then supported the staff for capacity building. It should be noted that MoE has the capacity to keep the qualified staff thanks to specific
commitments on salaries and careers. MoPIC was aware of the process but has not participated directly.

At the Ministry of Labour (MoL) the World Bank started with the same process. A DCU for TVET sector reform was created within the MoL, then CIDA came to support and develop the capacity of its staff. The TVET Secretariat does not have sufficient staff and does not have the capacity to ensure the monitoring and evaluation of the EU support activities. Last year the World bank project closed, CIDA project was closed in 2012 and the DCU was dissolved.

For the energy sector, lack of leadership in the sector by the Ministry (MEMR), lack of knowledge / information among sector entities regarding cooperation with donors and conflicting interests are major obstacles leading to less-than-optimal use of the donors programmes and consequent sub-optimal effectiveness. Recently, MoPIC delegated one employee to MEMR to be the liaison in matters relating to donor programmes, but still cooperation problems are evident. On the other hand, MoPIC is not very effective in coordinating donors' efforts due to the limited resources within MoPIC (insufficient number of personnel and proper training). (KPI 2..5.2)

The Government has embarked on a programme to improve the capacity of financial internal control units in all Ministries, Departments and Agencies. This will take some years to complete, given the need for a change in the culture of control from one of compliance to a third party (the Audit Bureau) and meeting the requirements of the internal control rules, to one of internal management accountability (via the entity's Internal Control Unit) for the operation of their internal control systems.

However, as reported earlier, the existence of performance planning and monitoring key units in the government entities concerned appears to be more the consequence of specific interventions of the external donors than an overall policy of the government. The ongoing PFM reform programme produced better results for the monitoring and performance assessment of the national budget (KPI 2.5.3)
3.3. EQ-3 IM on Democratic Governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Question (code and title)</th>
<th>Democratic governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EQ-3: To what extent has the EU-Jordan cooperation been successful in bringing about enhanced democratic governance?</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List of Judgement Criteria (JCs) under the EQ (codes and titles)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JC-3.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>JC-3.2</td>
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<td>JC-3.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>JC-3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-3.6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| JC-3.1 |
| The EU-Jordan cooperation on democratic governance (including development policy and political dialogue) gained strength and depth in bringing about reform through strengthened coordination and institutionalized dialogue mechanisms |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 3.1 (codes and definition)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPI-3.1.1</td>
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<td>KPI-3.1.2</td>
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<td>KPI-3.1.3</td>
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<td>KPI-3.1.4</td>
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# Evaluation of the European Union’s Cooperation with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2007-2013)
- Country Level Evaluation -

## Table of Key Interventions / Financing Decisions Benefiting the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan with EQ-3 Democratic Governance as Main Related Evaluation Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>CRIS Seq. No</th>
<th>Domain (Financing Instrument)</th>
<th>Decision Year</th>
<th>Decision Number (Full)</th>
<th>Decision ID (Short)</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Commissioned in Decision Date</th>
<th>Allocated (in EUR)</th>
<th>Contracted (EUR)</th>
<th>Paid (EUR)</th>
<th>Commitment Type</th>
<th>OECD-DAC CRS (Sub-) Sector</th>
<th>Prime EQs</th>
<th>Secondary EQs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
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<td>MED</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>MED/2005/017-261</td>
<td>17260</td>
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<td>Human rights</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>ENPI</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>ENPI/2008/019-589</td>
<td>19593</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Support to Justice Reform and Good Governance in Jordan</td>
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<td>6,481,265</td>
<td>6,050,269</td>
<td>Legal and judicial development</td>
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<td>EQ-4</td>
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<td>ENPI</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>ENPI/2012/023-471</td>
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<td>30,000,000</td>
<td>30,000,000</td>
<td>30,000,000</td>
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<td>GF</td>
<td>EQ-3</td>
<td>EQ-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>ENPI</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>ENPI/2012/023-849</td>
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<td>EG</td>
<td>Support to Civil Society and Media in Jordan</td>
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<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>Media and free flow of information</td>
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**Totals for All Interventions / Financing Decisions related to EQ-3 Democratic Governance (primary link):**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>CRIS Seq. No</th>
<th>Domain (Financing Instrument)</th>
<th>Decision Year</th>
<th>Decision Number (Full)</th>
<th>Decision ID (Short)</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<th>Paid (EUR)</th>
<th>Commitment Type</th>
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<th>Secondary EQs</th>
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<td>31</td>
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<td>ENPI</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>ENPI/2012/025-533</td>
<td>23533</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>ENPI/2008/019-571</td>
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<td>ENPI</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>ENPI/2009/020-478</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>Support to the implementation of the Action Plan programme 5 (SAPP 5)</td>
<td>07/10/2009</td>
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<td>16,705,388</td>
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<td>ENPI</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>ENPI/2009/021-219</td>
<td>21219</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Building Development Capacities of Jordanian Municipalities</td>
<td>07/10/2009</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
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<td>2,925,000</td>
<td>Decentralisation and support to subnational government</td>
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<td>2010</td>
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<td>ENPI</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>ENPI/2011/022-723</td>
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<td>2013</td>
<td>ENPI/2013/024-775</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>Good Governance and Development: Control Jordan</td>
<td>26/09/2011</td>
<td>39,700,000</td>
<td>39,700,000</td>
<td>39,700,000</td>
<td>Research and scientific institutions</td>
<td>GF</td>
<td>EQ-4</td>
<td>EQ-3</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>ENPI</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>ENPI/2010/021-933</td>
<td>21933</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Promoting Local Economic Development in Jordan (PLED Jordan)</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>Decentralisation and support to subnational government</td>
<td>GF</td>
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<td>EQ-3</td>
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</table>

**Totals for All Interventions / Financing Decisions related to EQ-3 Democratic Governance (primary or secondary link):**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>CRIS Seq. No</th>
<th>Domain (Financing Instrument)</th>
<th>Decision Year</th>
<th>Decision Number (Full)</th>
<th>Decision ID (Short)</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Commissioned in Decision Date</th>
<th>Allocated (in EUR)</th>
<th>Contracted (EUR)</th>
<th>Paid (EUR)</th>
<th>Commitment Type</th>
<th>OECD-DAC CRS (Sub-) Sector</th>
<th>Prime EQs</th>
<th>Secondary EQs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
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<td>ENPI</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>ENPI/2008/019-569</td>
<td>19593</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Support to Justice Reform and Good Governance in Jordan</td>
<td>23/10/2008</td>
<td>6,730,265</td>
<td>6,481,265</td>
<td>6,050,269</td>
<td>Legal and judicial development</td>
<td>GF</td>
<td>EQ-3</td>
<td>EQ-4</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>ENPI</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>ENPI/2008/019-569</td>
<td>19593</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Support to Justice Reform and Good Governance in Jordan</td>
<td>23/10/2008</td>
<td>6,730,265</td>
<td>6,481,265</td>
<td>6,050,269</td>
<td>Legal and judicial development</td>
<td>GF</td>
<td>EQ-3</td>
<td>EQ-4</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>ENPI</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>ENPI/2012/023-471</td>
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<td>EG</td>
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<td>30,000,000</td>
<td>30,000,000</td>
<td>Legal and judicial development</td>
<td>GF</td>
<td>EQ-3</td>
<td>EQ-4</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>2012</td>
<td>ENPI/2012/023-849</td>
<td>23849</td>
<td>EG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Decision No.</td>
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<td>Decision Code</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Sector Code</td>
<td>(Sub-)Sector</td>
<td>Budgetary / Financial Totals</td>
<td>Chronology</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In Euro</td>
<td>In % of Total</td>
<td>In Euro</td>
<td>In % of Total</td>
<td>In % of Allocated</td>
<td>Final Date for Concluding the FA (PDC FA)</td>
<td>Final Date for Contracting (PDC LC)</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>EC</td>
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<td>Support to the implementation of the Action Plan programme II (SAPP II)</td>
<td>15110</td>
<td>Public sector policy and administrative management</td>
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<td>0.0%</td>
<td>14/10/2011</td>
<td>31/12/2012</td>
<td>17/12/2015</td>
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<td>41</td>
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<td>Support to the Action Plan Programme IV</td>
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<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>31/12/2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>EC</td>
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<td>Support to the Public Finance Reform Programme</td>
<td>15111</td>
<td>Public finance management</td>
<td>42,500,000</td>
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<td>11.9%</td>
<td>97.6%</td>
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<td>31/12/2008</td>
<td>6/12/2011</td>
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<td>22</td>
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<td>Support to the Public Financial Management Reform Programme</td>
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<td>71.6%</td>
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<td>31/12/2013</td>
<td>17/12/2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>EC</td>
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<td>Building Development Capabilities of Jordanian Municipalities</td>
<td>15112</td>
<td>Decentralisation and support to subnational government</td>
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<td>2,202,750</td>
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<td>73.4%</td>
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<td>13/12/2010</td>
<td>3/15/2013</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Promoting Local Economic Development in Jordan/PLED/J</td>
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<td>Decentralisation and support to subnational government</td>
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<td>0.7%</td>
<td>699,250</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
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<td>31/12/2011</td>
<td>19/12/2014</td>
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<td>21</td>
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<td>Support to Democratic Governance</td>
<td>15112</td>
<td>Decentralisation and support to subnational government</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>MULTI</td>
<td>31/12/2011</td>
<td>20/12/2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>2008</td>
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<td>Support to Justice Reform and Good Governance in Jordan</td>
<td>15130</td>
<td>Legal and judicial development</td>
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<td>4,050,289</td>
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<td>60.2%</td>
<td>23/10/2008</td>
<td>31/12/2009</td>
<td>30/09/2009</td>
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<td>30</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Support to the justice reform in Jordan</td>
<td>15130</td>
<td>Legal and judicial development</td>
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<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>31/12/2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Support to the justice sector in meeting the required criteria for sector budget support</td>
<td>15130</td>
<td>Legal and judicial development</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
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<td>559,741</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
<td>15/09/2011</td>
<td>31/12/2012</td>
<td>20/05/2015</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>34</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Support to the Electoral Process in Jordan</td>
<td>15131</td>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>744,400</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
<td>26/09/2011</td>
<td>31/12/2012</td>
<td>20/09/2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>EG</td>
<td></td>
<td>Support to Civil Society and Media in Jordan</td>
<td>15153</td>
<td>Media and free flow of information</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>31/12/2013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Support to Human Rights and Good Governance</td>
<td>15160</td>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>2,869,475</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>95.6%</td>
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<td>31/12/2006</td>
<td>16/08/2006</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2012</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Support to the security sector in applying the rule of law</td>
<td>15210</td>
<td>Security system management and reform</td>
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<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>15/09/2012</td>
<td>31/12/2013</td>
<td>28/12/2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>CL</td>
<td></td>
<td>Northern Border Clearance Project - NBCP</td>
<td>15220</td>
<td>Removal of land mines and explosive remnants of war</td>
<td>4,493,491</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>4,493,491</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>14/12/2007</td>
<td>31/12/2008</td>
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</table>

**Sub-Totals 150 - Government and Civil Society**

<p>| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td><strong>Totals for All CLE Key Interventions / Financing Decisions</strong></td>
<td><strong>42</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>695,346,622</td>
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</table>

**Note:**
### EQ-3 IM-03: Summary Table on Key EU Interventions / Financing Decisions Benefitting HKo Jordan with Contracted Resources in the Period 2007-2013

#### Clustered by OECD-DAC 5 Code, and with DAC Code 150 "Government and Civil Society" highlighted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OECD-DAC 5 Sectoral / Thematic Code and Name</th>
<th>Number of FDs / Interventions</th>
<th>Budgetary / Financial Totals</th>
<th>Individual Interventions Allocations (in Euro)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>In % of Total</td>
<td>Allocated</td>
<td>Paid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Euro</td>
<td>In % of Total</td>
<td>In Euro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110 Education</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>139,488,000</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>140 Water and Sanitation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23,383,000</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>150 Government and Civil Society</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>225,729,757</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230 Energy Generation and Supply</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>58,200,000</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250 Business and Other Services</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>94,173,215</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>321 Industry</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20,400,000</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>331 Trade Policy and Regulations</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>47,663,591</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>230-250 PSD and trade</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>162,236,806</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>430 Multi-sector / Cross-cutting other than environment protection</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>44,309,060</td>
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<tr>
<td>510 General Budget Support</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>40,000,000</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>730 Reconstruction, relief and rehabilitation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Undetermined</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Totals for All CLE Key Interventions / Financing Decisions</strong></td>
<td>43</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>695,346,622</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

1. CRIS database selection criterion for Financing Decisions: "Zone benefiting from the action = JO".
2. Cut-off date = 04 October 2013 (Date of CRIS Downloading)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention Number</th>
<th>Intervention / Project Title</th>
<th>DAC - CRS Sector</th>
<th>Decision Number</th>
<th>Contract Number</th>
<th>Start Date - Actual</th>
<th>End Date - Actual / Likely</th>
<th>Reference Number</th>
<th>ROM Report Date</th>
<th>ROM Grading Codes by Assessment Criterion</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Support the implementation of the Anti-Corruption Commission's Strategy in Jordan</td>
<td>15113 - Anti-corruption organisations and institutions</td>
<td>276116</td>
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<td>01/11/2011</td>
<td>31/07/2013</td>
<td>MR-145211.01</td>
<td>31/10/2012</td>
<td>PRO-O B B B B B 6.0 18</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Support the implementation of the Anti-Corruption Commission's Strategy in Jordan</td>
<td>15113 - Anti-corruption organisations and institutions</td>
<td>276116</td>
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<td>01/11/2011</td>
<td>31/07/2013</td>
<td>MR-145211.02</td>
<td>21/03/2013</td>
<td>PRO-O C C C C C 2.0 63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Support to the Juvenile Justice System in Jordan</td>
<td>15150 - Legal and judicial development</td>
<td>257208</td>
<td></td>
<td>30/12/2010</td>
<td>29/12/2012</td>
<td>MR-144570.01</td>
<td>05/06/2012</td>
<td>PRO-O B B C B C 4.4 45</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>EuroMed Justice II</td>
<td>15150 - Legal and judicial development</td>
<td>147388</td>
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<td>01/01/2008</td>
<td>01/04/2011</td>
<td>MR-115507.05</td>
<td>06/07/2010</td>
<td>PRO-O B B C B B 5.2 33</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Support to Criminal Justice Reform in Jordan</td>
<td>15150 - Legal and judicial development</td>
<td>277941</td>
<td></td>
<td>01/12/2010</td>
<td>18/06/2014</td>
<td>MR-145162.01</td>
<td>29/10/2012</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Support to Penitentiary Reform in Jordan</td>
<td>15150 - Legal and judicial development</td>
<td>283551</td>
<td></td>
<td>01/02/2012</td>
<td>31/01/2014</td>
<td>MR-145197.01</td>
<td>30/10/2012</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Strengthening the capacities of CSOs in Zarqa Governorate</td>
<td>15150 - Legal and judicial development</td>
<td>277941</td>
<td></td>
<td>07/09/2009</td>
<td>06/03/2010</td>
<td>MR-131660.01</td>
<td>09/11/2010</td>
<td>Project approach Ex-Post B B B A A 7.6 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Support to Criminal Justice Reform in Jordan</td>
<td>15150 - Legal and judicial development</td>
<td>277941</td>
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<td>01/01/2012</td>
<td>18/06/2014</td>
<td>MR-145182.02</td>
<td>27/06/2013</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>EUROMED MIGRATION II</td>
<td>15160 - Government administration</td>
<td>147777</td>
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<td>28/02/2008</td>
<td>04/05/2011</td>
<td>MR-115521.04</td>
<td>25/10/2010</td>
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<td>Towards a Multi-Party Democracy: Strengthening the role of Political Parties in Jordan’s democratic reform process</td>
<td>151511 - Elections</td>
<td>304849</td>
<td></td>
<td>31/12/2012</td>
<td>30/12/2013</td>
<td>MR-146769.01</td>
<td>26/11/2013</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Advocating and enhancing grassroots participation in the political reform process in Jordan: MUSHARIKA</td>
<td>151511 - Elections</td>
<td>304849</td>
<td></td>
<td>13/12/2012</td>
<td>12/06/2015</td>
<td>MR-146738.01</td>
<td>19/11/2013</td>
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<td>Support to the Independent Electoral Commission in Jordan</td>
<td>151511 - Elections</td>
<td>298504</td>
<td></td>
<td>01/12/2012</td>
<td>31/03/2016</td>
<td>MR-146403.01</td>
<td>03/06/2013</td>
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<td>“Enhancing Professional and Accurate Media Reporting on the Electoral process”</td>
<td>151513 - Media and free flow of information</td>
<td>298504</td>
<td></td>
<td>10/10/2012</td>
<td>19/12/2013</td>
<td>MR-146658.01</td>
<td>05/11/2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Strengthening women’s professional capacities to realize Jordan’s compliance with international conventions for gender equality</td>
<td>15160 - Human rights</td>
<td>167606</td>
<td></td>
<td>01/11/2009</td>
<td>16/12/2010</td>
<td>MR-128951.01</td>
<td>15/07/2010</td>
<td>PRO-O C B B B B 5.2 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Changing attitudes towards human rights and democracy for the students of the Vocational Training institutions</td>
<td>15160 - Human rights</td>
<td>167606</td>
<td></td>
<td>16/12/2009</td>
<td>16/12/2010</td>
<td>MR-128952.01</td>
<td>15/07/2010</td>
<td>PRO-O B B C B B 5.2 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Empowering regular and irregular migrant workers and promoting their rights in Jordan</td>
<td>15160 - Human rights</td>
<td>280500</td>
<td></td>
<td>30/12/2011</td>
<td>29/06/2013</td>
<td>MR-145180.01</td>
<td>29/10/2012</td>
<td>PRO-O C B B C B 4.4 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Strengthening the capacities of CSOs in Zarqa Governorate</td>
<td>15160 - Human rights</td>
<td>280500</td>
<td></td>
<td>21/12/2011</td>
<td>20/06/2013</td>
<td>MR-145177.01</td>
<td>29/10/2012</td>
<td>PRO-O A C D B B 4.8 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Hemaya for Girls and Young Women in Jordan</td>
<td>15160 - Human rights</td>
<td>280500</td>
<td></td>
<td>01/01/2012</td>
<td>31/12/2013</td>
<td>MR-145176.01</td>
<td>29/10/2012</td>
<td>PRO-O A C C C B B 5.2 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Promotion of Women in Democracy and Human Rights in Irbid Governorate, Jordan</td>
<td>15160 - Human rights</td>
<td>146669</td>
<td></td>
<td>01/01/2008</td>
<td>31/12/2010</td>
<td>MR-115651.01</td>
<td>23/07/2009</td>
<td>PRO-O B B B B C 5.2 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>The promotion of legal literacy and recourse to legal services for women in the Irbid and Irbid camp areas and surrounding communities</td>
<td>15160 - Human rights</td>
<td>146645</td>
<td></td>
<td>01/04/2008</td>
<td>31/03/2010</td>
<td>MR-115682.01</td>
<td>23/07/2009</td>
<td>PRO-O B C C B B 4.4 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Support to the JWU Shelter to provide: protection; legal, social and psychological counselling; and rehabilitative vocational training vulnerable and abused women in Jordan</td>
<td>15160 - Human rights</td>
<td>151205</td>
<td></td>
<td>09/04/2008</td>
<td>09/04/2010</td>
<td>MR-115687.01</td>
<td>23/07/2009</td>
<td>PRO-O B C C B B 4.4 48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM) Mission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision Number</th>
<th>DAC - CRS Sector</th>
<th>Intervention Time Frame</th>
<th>ROM Report Type</th>
<th>Reference Number</th>
<th>ROM Report Date</th>
<th>ROM Grading Codes by Assessment Criteria (2)</th>
<th>TOT.</th>
<th>Effectiveness to Date</th>
<th>Potential Sustainability</th>
<th>Impact Prospects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>15170 - Women's equality organisations and institutions</td>
<td>27/12/2010 - 26/06/2013</td>
<td>PRO-O</td>
<td>143484.01</td>
<td>25/11/2011</td>
<td>B B B B B 6.0 20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>15170 - Women's equality organisations and institutions</td>
<td>26/12/2010 - 25/06/2013</td>
<td>PRO-O</td>
<td>143486.01</td>
<td>25/11/2011</td>
<td>B B B A B 6.0 13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>15170 - Women's equality organisations and institutions</td>
<td>06/12/2012 - 05/12/2015</td>
<td>PRO-O</td>
<td>146703.01</td>
<td>13/11/2013</td>
<td>B B B B B 6.0 22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>15170 - Women's equality organisations and institutions</td>
<td>01/01/2013 - 31/12/2015</td>
<td>PRO-O</td>
<td>146726.01</td>
<td>15/11/2013</td>
<td>B C C C C 2.8 57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals for the Governance Projects with ROM Missions (4) 28,584,743

Averages for all 70 ROM missions conducted in 2007-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Intervention on 10</th>
<th>Total ROM Gradings by Assessment Criterion for the 28 ROM mission on democratic governance interventions in 2007-2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.86 5.00 4.21 5.86 5.00 5.19</td>
<td>A = very good, B = good, C = problems, D = serious deficiencies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. Type of ROM missions: PRO-O = Project Approach - Ongoing, SEC-O = SPSP (Sector Policy Support Programme) - Ongoing
2. ROM Grading Codes of Assessment Criteria: A = very good, B = good, C = problems, D = serious deficiencies
3. Calculation of ROM total score on 25: A = 5, B = 3, C = 2, D = 0 and then calculated on 10 (sum divided by 2.5)
4. Total primary commitment budget amount corrected for those Decisions and Contract which were covered by multiple ROM missions (contract 276118).
A summary analysis of all Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM) mission reports to Jordan in the period 2007-2013 reveals that there have been an impressive total of 70 ROM missions conducted in this period. Of these, a total of 28 (or 40%) have been in relation to democratic governance interventions. The average ROM grading score (based on all five criteria) of these 70 missions is just above half (5.07 on 10), whereas those of democratic governance interventions are slightly higher on average (5.19 on 10). The governance interventions score best on the relevance and quality of design criterion with an average score of 5.86, which is substantially higher than the other four other criteria. Second best score of 5.43 is for impact prospects which is lower than the overall average score of 5.86 for this criterion. Lowest score is for the criterion of effectiveness to date (4.43%).

The average ROM score (on ten) for all five criteria per the respective DAC-CRS sector code within the overall democratic governance thematic area as follows (with also indication of the number of ROM missions in the 2007-2013 period, from highest to lowest:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>ROMs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 15151-Elections</td>
<td>6.16</td>
<td>5 ROMs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 15170-Women’s equality</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 15130-Legal and judicial development</td>
<td>5.33</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 15160-Human rights</td>
<td>4.98</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 15113-Anti-corruption</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 15140-Government admin.</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Elections have the best core of 6.16, followed by respectively women’s equality (5.52), legal and judicial development (5.33), human rights (4.98), anti-corruption (4.00) and government administration (2.00)

**KPI-3.1.1:** Degree to which the National Agenda and Kulluna al Urdun have served as basis for the EU-Jordan policy/political dialogue and cooperation interventions to achieve the political reform aspired for with regard to democracy, good governance, human rights, civil society, women’s empowerment, freedom of the media, political parties, independent judiciary, etc.)

**Main Findings on KPI-3.1.1:**

Political reform with regard to democracy, good governance, human rights, civil society, women's empowerment, freedom of the media, political parties, independent judiciary and other related issues is the first of eight chapters included in the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan's National Agenda its key planning document for the period 2006-2015, under the title “Political Development and Inclusion”, as further operationalised in its two planning documents, the Executive Programme 2007-2019 and the Executive Development Programme 2011-2013. The EU’s response strategy as included in the Country Strategy Paper (2007-2013) and the two National Indicative Programmes (2007-2010 and 2011-2013) has “Political reform, democracy, human rights, good governance, justice and co-operation in the fight against extremism” as one of the four focus areas of EU-Jordan cooperation under the CSP. At the overall EU-Jordan cooperation level, political reform is a key priority in the EU-Jordan Association Agreement and its Action Plans. The EU has continued the dialogue on political reform with Jordan, both through the sub-committee on human rights and democracy and through cooperation operations in this field throughout the period under review. Of the 43 EU Financing Decisions interventions benefitting Jordan in the 2007-2013 period, 14 are in the political reform area with an overall allocation of EUR 169 million, which is about one quarter (24.3%) of the total committed support of EUR 695 million. Per the DAC-5 sectoral code, about one third of all EU support (EUR 226 million or 32.5% of the total of EUR 695 million) has been allocated to DAC sector 150 “Government and civil society”, of which almost half (49.4% - EUR 348 million) have been actually paid in the period concerned in relation to this thematic area of government and civil society. The CSP priority area 1 on support to human rights, democracy and good governance includes the following six main programme areas: Protecting women's rights; Developing civil society; Developing an independent judicial institutional framework; Promoting the Amman Message; Supporting freedom of the media, and; Cooperation with the parliament. Jordan's development strategy based on the National Agenda 2006-2015 also remains the framework for the 2014-2017 successor EU-Jordan Single Support Framework aiming at further progress in poverty reduction, sustainable growth, social inclusion and democratic governance, although the economic and in particular energy crisis is affecting the government's capacity to plan and prioritise over the longer term. Within the international donor community, the EU is supportive of the Jordanian efforts to keep the pace of domestic reforms on the political, economic and social fronts. It is also conscious of the high risk associated to the overspill of neighbouring crisis that may affect the course of reforms in the country and the achievement of Millennium Developments Goals (MDGs).
KPI-3.1.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- CLE Database of 43 Financing Decisions and 401 Contracts (benefiting Jordan, 2007-2013 period
- Please see below

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- CSP 2007-2013 and NIP 2007-2010; pp 24-26
- Action Fiche 020-478 “Support to the Implementation of the Action Plan Programme II (SAPP II)”, p. 2

(iii) Additional information from field phase:

KPI-3.1.1 (i) Data, figures and tables: (with explicit source referencing)


Sub-Indicator 1: Relations of key concerns as expressed in the respective key planning documents
Sub-Indicator 2: Cooperation interventions related to the key concerns of “democracy, good governance, human rights, civil society, women’s empowerment, freedom of the media, political parties, independent judiciary”.

The HKoJ has structured the three planning documents into eight chapters:

I. Political Development and Inclusion, Kuluna al Urdun Programmes
II. Justice and Legislation
III. Investment Development
IV. Financial Services and Fiscal Reform
V. Employment Support and Vocational Training
VI. Social Welfare
VII. Education, Higher Education, Scientific Research and Innovation
VIII. Infrastructure Upgrade

The eight chapters have been well covered by the four groups of objectives (focus areas) in the 2007-2013 CSP and the two NIPs of the EU-Jordan cooperation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Program 2007-2009</td>
<td>NIP 207-2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Development Program 2011-2013</td>
<td>NIP 2011-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Political Development and Inclusion, Kuluna al Urdun Programmes</td>
<td>Priority Area One: Supporting Jordan’s Reform in the Areas of Democracy, Human Rights Media and Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Justice and Legislation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Investment Development</td>
<td>Priority Area Two: Trade, Enterprise and Investment Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII. Infrastructure Upgrade</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Employment Support and Vocational Training</td>
<td>Priority Area Three: Sustainability of the Growth Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. Education, Higher Education, Scientific Research and Innovation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Social Welfare</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Financial Services and Fiscal Reform</td>
<td>Priority Area Four: Support to the Implementation of the Action Plan (SAPP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**KPI-3.1.2:** Instances of meetings of the EU-Jordan Sub-Committees on democratic governance issues per year (e.g. on Human Rights and Democracy) with documented decisions, resolutions and/or recommendations effectively monitored and followed-up

**Main Findings on KPI-3.1.2:**

Jordan’s commitment to political reform was illustrated by the establishment of the first EU-Jordan sub-committee on human rights and democracy in 2005. This was a step towards an enhanced political dialogue between the EU and Jordan and enabled priorities for cooperation to be identified. The EU has registered a deepening of the mutual understanding of the issues at stake in the democratic governance thematic areas, which is fostered through a close inter-linkage between the dialogue maintained at programme implementation level and in the framework of the ENP sub-committee dialogue. This has led not only to a qualitative improvement of the EU – GoHKoJ cooperation on development interventions, but also to a smoother political/policy dialogue in the different good governance thematic areas and sub-areas. As reported in general in the ENP Jordan annual progress reports and in the External Assistance Management Reports, and also referred to in programme/project PPCM documents, the EU political dialogue on democratic governance issues continues and technical sub-committees are held regularly. This reportedly also includes joint monitoring of progress in implementing priority measures.

In the process, the sub-committee’s title was broadened to Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Governance and Democracy reflecting its actual expanded governance issues coverage (e.g. 7th meeting of 23 May 2012 in Amman and 8th meeting of 9 September in Brussels). The Sub-Committee in principle meets on an annual basis with possibility of special ad hoc meetings. In the 7th meeting for example the four key political reforms-related laws were discussed: The independent Electoral Commission law, the Political Parties Law, the draft Constitutional Court Law, the Electoral Law. There however is no evidence of effective, structured and systematic monitoring systems in place to follow-up on decisions, resolutions and/or recommendations of the Sub-Committee.

**KPI-3.1.2 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) **Data, figures and tables:**  
- Reports of the EU-Jordan Association Agreement Sub-Committees on democratic governance and/or related issues, including decisions, resolutions, recommendations.  
- Copies of SC reports under request. For further study when available

(ii) **Key extracts from documents:**  
- CSP 2007-2013, p.17  
- CSP 2007-2013, p.3  
- OECD, 2012 and Preliminary Answer to EQ-5 - extraction  
- Action fiche, 19569, Support to Justice Reform and Good Governance in Jordan, p.3  
- ENP Sub-Committee meetings reports (2007-2013)

(iii) **Additional information from field phase:**  
- Democracy, the Rule of Law and Good Governance

**KPI-3.1.3:** Percentage of key components of the policy/political dialogue and reform agenda which are effectively institutionalized and supported by cooperation interventions to enable / ensure their effective implementation and monitoring

**Main Findings on KPI-3.1.3:**

Provisions for the institutionalisation of a regular policy/political dialogue on all aspects of the EU-Jordan collaboration, including on democratic governance and human rights issues, are incorporated in the EU Jordan Association Agreement of 2002. Article 5 of the Agreement foresees that the political dialogue takes place at regular intervals and whenever necessary at four levels / channels: ministerial, senior officials, diplomatic representatives and by any other useful means. In addition there is the political dialogue between
the European Parliament and the Jordanian Parliament. As for example reported in the ENP Jordan Annual Progress Report, such policy/political dialogue events cover all key components of the governance reform agenda. As for example reported in the ENP Jordan Annual Progress Report, such policy/political dialogue events cover all key components of the governance reform agenda including on the sub-thematic areas of democracy, good governance, human rights, civil society, women's empowerment, freedom of the media, political parties, independent judiciary. In fact, the first sub-committee established under the EU-Jordan Association Agreement was the SC on human rights and democracy in 2005.

The Court of Auditors report on the MEDA programme in Jordan in this connection highlighted that the success of the reform programmes depends on the existence of a clear commitment and an agenda for implementing reforms, which therefore can be reinforced through capacity building measures and regular political / policy dialogue and that Improving the institutional capacity of the Jordanian administration accelerates the implementation of reforms. Different programming documents emphasize the need for an inclusive political/policy dialogue comprising both state and non-state actors. Through this dialogue also effective government appropriation and leadership of the reform processes is aimed at. The making available of more detailed information in terms of reports and minutes on these political/policy dialogue events and processes would enable a more accurate assessment of the actual institutionalization of these processes and the monitoring of their progress and results. On the other hand, the 2007-2013 interventions portfolio analysis provided ample evidence that the political/policy dialogue on the different aspects of the reform agenda are solidly backed up by cooperation interventions to enable / ensure their effective implementation and monitoring. Of the almost one third (30.5%) of the total contracted amounts in the 2007-2013 period in the Government and Civil Society Sector, by far the largest part (EUR 107.7 million or 70.6% ) went to Public Finance Management (PFM), followed by human rights (EUR 10.0 million or 6.6% ), decentralisation and support to sub-national government (EUR 8.9 million or 5.8%, legal and judicial development EUR 7.0 million or 4.6%) and conflict prevention (EUR 4.0 million or 2.6%). The rest category of other government and civil society contracts amount to EUR 14.9 million or 9.8% of the total.

As such it may be averred that the key components of the EU-Jordan policy/political dialogue and of the reform agenda in general are effectively institutionalized and supported by cooperation interventions to enable / ensure their effective implementation and monitoring. However, the quality of this institutionalisation and of the monitoring of the reform process still leaves room for improvement and further consolidation. This also pertains to the quality of government-led donor coordination and to the quality of the political dialogue on democratic governance and related issues.

KPI-3.1.3 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - Please see below

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - EU-Jordan Association Agreement 2002, pp. 2-3
   - CSP 2007-2013, p.17
   - CSP 2007-2013, p.14
   - New Response COM, 2011, p.5-6
   - PFM ROM report, 2012

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
   - /-
KPI-3.1.3 (i) Data, figures and tables:

Distribution of Contracted Amounts within the Government and Civil Society Sector

Source: CRIS and own analysis

KPI-3.1.4: Average level of political reform progress and results on the main components of the policy/political dialogue and reform process as documented in the authoritative dialogue progress and results reports concerned at regional and/or national level (e.g. Sub-Committee Meetings, Senior Officials Meetings, Ministerial Meetings)

Main Findings on KPI-3.1.4:

The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for 213 economies over the period 1996–2012, for six dimensions of governance: (i) Voice and Accountability; (ii) Political Stability and Absence of Violence; (iii) Government Effectiveness; (iv) Regulatory Quality; (v) Rule of Law, and (vi) Control of Corruption. Jordan ranked on the 86th place in the world in 2000 and 104th in 2010. Of the European Neighbourhood South Countries, Jordan scored second best in 2000 right after Tunisia and scored best in the region in 2010. In the period 2010–2012 it lost ranking for all six dimensions. The 2013 World Economic Forum's Arab World Competitiveness Review shows that Jordan, while a good performer in the region, saw its ratings deteriorate in relative terms from 2005 to 2013, and the country now stands at 64 out of 144 countries worldwide. This decline can be attributed to poorer assessments of public sector institutions, incentive structure in the workplace, transparency of Government policy making and the burden of Government regulation. Scores from the 2010 Open Budget show that Jordan's budget process is relatively transparent. Jordan's score of 50 is the highest in the region and above the worldwide average, but its ranking deteriorated to 57 in 2012, at the same level of Peru and right after Pakistan. The TI Corruption Perceptions Index shows for Jordan a score of 4.7 on 10 for the year 2010 at about the same level as for 2000 but one point lower than the 5.7 score for 2005. With this 4.7 score in 2010, Jordan ranked 50th in the world, whereas in 2005 it scored 37th. In the EU Southern Neighbourhood it ranks 2nd, ahead of Tunisia. In the 2013 TI index it fell back to the 66th place with a 4.5 score, whereas in 2012 it still ranked 48th. The 2010 Arab Democracy Index from the Arab Reform Initiative ranked Jordan first in the state of democratic reforms out of fifteen Arab countries. Civil liberties and political rights scored 5 and 6 respectively in Freedom House's Freedom in the World 2011 report, where 1 is most free and 7 is least free. This earned Jordan "Not Free" status. Jordan ranked ahead of 6, behind 4, and the same as 8 countries in the Middle East and North Africa region. On the Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders Jordan ranked 128 of 179 countries in 2011 down from rank 112 in 2009. The GoKoJ website gives a summary timeline of political reform milestones, of the 15 listed reform highlights, 11 date from the year 2011 and later, hence from after the Arab Spring period. This is the period of the second NIP (2011-2013), with most of the
EU supported democratic governance interventions approved in this period (mostly in 2012).

As far as key issues of the EU-Jordan political dialogue in the fields of democracy and human rights are concerned, Jordan has addressed a number of key recommendations contained in the European Neighbourhood and Partnership (ENP) progress reports. The latest parliamentary elections for the 17th House of Representatives were held on 23 January 2013. The EU Election Observation Mission concluded in its final report that the elections were organised and conducted in a transparent and credible manner. The EU-Jordan political/policy dialogue on the political dialogue process continued on the various levels established by the EU-Jordan Association Agreement (ministerial, senior officials, diplomatic representatives, other channels and parliament). The general reports on the EU-Jordan political / policy dialogue and cooperation (incl. the ENP-Jordan annual progress reports and the EAMRs) report on continued intensive dialogue with concrete outcomes and outputs in terms of enhanced institutional, legal and regulatory frameworks regarding the different aspects of the political reform, governance and human rights.

During the meetings of the joint EU-Jordan Subcommittee on Human Rights, Governance and Democracy, a broad array of democratic governance issues are discussed, including the EU-Jordan cooperation on these. The reports on these Subcommittee meetings do not include an appreciation of the level of political reform progress and results on the main components of the policy/political dialogue and reform process, as these in first instance are proceedings reports on the actual discussions. The discussion cover standard the main dimensions of the democratic governance thematic area which are clustered in 6 main topics: (1) Democracy, the rule of law and good governance; (2) Human rights and fundamental freedoms (incl. death penalty, eradicating torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, freedom of the media and freedom of expression, freedom of religion or belief; (3) Freedom of association and assembly, (4) Equal treatment of women; (5) Enhancing protection of children, and; (7) Cooperation in multilateral for a (incl. ratification of international instruments).

The EU has the lead in the donors group on human rights and successfully brokered a common EU and Member States (MS) Strategy on Human Rights. In this capacity, EUD as secretariat of the MS Heads of Mission (HOMs) group prepares annual updates on the Human Rights Strategy for discussion with the HOMs. The update includes a special annex on past achievements by human rights theme, including: Political rights; Freedom of assembly; Freedom of association; Freedom of expression and media; Rule of law, rights based society, torture; Gender equality; Death penalty; Rights of the child; National Human Rights Framework. The reports also provide an account of the status of ratification of a list of (12) UN Conventions / Covenants by Jordan. Apart from human rights, EUD also leads the donors group on justice reform.

KPI-3.1.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Timeline of Political Reform, GoHK Jordan website (2013)
- http://jordanembassyyus.org/politics/timeline-political-reform
- CLE Jordan IR (2014), Chapter 2 National Background and Context, pp. 20-22
- Please see below

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Action Fiche 23849 Support to Civil Society and Media in Jordan, 2012, p.1
- ENP Jordan Annual Report, 2008, p.3
- Working towards a Stronger Partnership, 2013, p.18, 21 & 22
- FA TAPs Support to the Security Sector in Applying the Rule of Law, 2013, pp. 3-4 (Approval: 25 Nov 13)
- Implementation Report 219231 Support to Democratic Governance, July-Dec 2013, pp 2
- Excerpt CRIS, 04 October 2013
- Action Fiche 21931 Support to Democratic Governance, pp. 6-7
- Expected results and main activities

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- Please see below
### KPI-3.1.4 (i) Data, figures and tables:

#### Comparative table in EU Southern Neighbourhood Countries on the Worldwide Governance Indicators

| Code  | Name        | 2000 (index 2.5 to 2.5) | 2010 (index 2.5 to 2.5) | 2000 (index 2.5 to 2.5) | 2010 (index 2.5 to 2.5) | 2000 (index 2.5 to 2.5) | 2010 (index 2.5 to 2.5) | 2000 (index 2.5 to 2.5) | 2010 (index 2.5 to 2.5) | 2000 (index 2.5 to 2.5) | 2010 (index 2.5 to 2.5) | 2000 (index 2.5 to 2.5) | 2010 (index 2.5 to 2.5) | 2000 (index 2.5 to 2.5) | 2010 (index 2.5 to 2.5) |
|-------|-------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| 8.01  | Algeria     | -1.18                   | -1.59                   | -1.25                   | -0.96                   | -0.56                   | -0.75                   | -1.15                   | -0.95                   | -0.48                   | -0.95                   | -0.48                   | -1.06                   | -0.82                   | 165                     | 169                     |
| 8.05  | Egypt       | -0.38                   | -0.72                   | -0.63                   | -0.80                   | -0.68                   | -0.53                   | -1.15                   | -0.99                   | -0.88                   | -0.99                   | -0.88                   | -0.74                   | -0.75                   | 142                     | 166                     |
| 8.07  | Israel      | -1.99                   | -1.83                   | -2.27                   | -1.87                   | -1.23                   | -2.17                   | -1.07                   | -1.47                   | -1.32                   | -1.47                   | -1.32                   | -1.80                   | -1.38                   | 186                     | 202                     |
| 8.08  | Jordan      | -0.25                   | -0.91                   | -0.11                   | -0.27                   | -0.04                   | -0.88                   | 0.24                    | 0.03                    | 0.04                    | 0.03                    | 0.04                    | -0.02                   | -0.12                   | 86                      | 104                     |
| 8.09  | Lebanon     | -0.28                   | -0.55                   | -1.53                   | -0.14                   | -0.34                   | -0.39                   | 0.04                    | -0.41                   | -0.84                   | -0.41                   | -0.84                   | -0.36                   | -0.64                   | 111                     | 157                     |
| 8.10  | Libya       | -1.62                   | -1.91                   | -0.43                   | -0.06                   | -1.10                   | -1.21                   | -1.80                   | -1.15                   | -0.74                   | -1.26                   | -1.74                   | -1.26                   | -1.07                   | -1.14                   | 168                     | 189                     |
| 8.12  | Morocco     | -0.50                   | -0.77                   | -0.18                   | -0.52                   | -0.03                   | -0.17                   | -0.05                   | -0.11                   | -0.03                   | -0.16                   | -0.03                   | -0.16                   | -0.14                   | -0.31                   | 91                      | 120                     |
| 8.13  | Palestine   | -1.94                   | -1.26                   | -0.42                   | -0.97                   | 0.27                    | -0.97                   | -0.31                   | -0.97                   | -0.31                   | -0.97                   | -0.31                   | -1.04                   | -0.54                   | 174                     | 149                     |
| 8.15  | Syria       | -1.52                   | -1.68                   | -0.27                   | -0.81                   | -0.99                   | -0.55                   | -1.29                   | -0.94                   | -0.91                   | -1.05                   | -0.91                   | -1.05                   | -0.98                   | -1.01                   | 160                     | 184                     |
| 8.16  | Tunisia     | -0.71                   | -1.34                   | 0.21                    | 0.10                    | 0.02                    | 0.19                   | -0.05                   | -0.02                   | -0.03                   | -0.13                   | -0.03                   | -0.13                   | -0.01                   | -0.22                   | 85                      | 111                     |

Source of data: WB Worldwide Governance Indicators project. Table compilation by the CLE evaluation team.

The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for 213 economies over the period 1996–2010, for six dimensions of governance: (i) Voice and Accountability; (ii) Political Stability and Absence of Violence; (iii) Government Effectiveness; (iv) Regulatory Quality; (v) Rule of Law, and (vi) Control of Corruption. The aggregate indicators combine the views of a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. 188 countries were covered by the 2000 WGI indicators increasing to 209 countries by the 2010 WGI indicators. The below table shows Jordan's ranking on the 86th place in the world in 2000 and 104th in 2010. Of the European Neighbourhood South Countries Jordan scored second best in 2000 right after Tunisia and scored best in the region in 2010.

The 2010 World Economic Forum's Arab World Competitiveness Review shows that Jordan, while a good performer in the region, saw its ratings deteriorate in relative terms from 2005 to 2010, and the country now stands at 65 out of 139 countries worldwide. This decline can be attributed to poorer assessments of public sector institutions, incentive structure in the workplace, transparency of Government policy making and the burden of Government regulation. Scores from the...
2010 Open Budget show that Jordan’s budget process is relatively transparent. Jordan’s score of 50 is the highest in the region and above the worldwide average. At the same time, the scores point to the need to strengthen dissemination of related budget and financial activities to the public to include information on outputs and outcomes; budget oversight; and public participation in budget discussions.

The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is produced annually by Transparency International since 1995. The CPI ranks more than 150 countries in terms of perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys. The CPI score is expressed on a 0-10 scale, with a 10 score as highest level of transparency perceptions. Transparency International definition of Corruption: “Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. This is the working definition used by Transparency International (TI), applying to both the public and private sectors. The CPI focuses on corruption in the public sector, or corruption which involves public officials, civil servants or politicians. The data sources used to compile the index include questions relating to the abuse of public power and focus on: bribery of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, embezzlement of public funds, and on questions that probe the strength and effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts in the public sector. As such, it covers both the administrative and political aspects of corruption. In producing the index, the scores of countries/territories for the specific corruption-related questions in the data sources are combined to calculate a single score for each country.”

Table 2.12: Comparative table of EU Southern Neighbourhood Countries on the Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and on the ECP-UAB Human Rights Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Partner Country Name</th>
<th>Corruption Perceptions Index (TI)</th>
<th>Human Rights Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Seq. No.)</td>
<td>(0-10 scale)</td>
<td>(0-10 scale)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.01 Algeria</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.05 Egypt</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.07 Israel</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.08 Jordan</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.09 Lebanon</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.10 Libya</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.12 Morocco</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.13 Palestine</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.15 Syria</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.16 Tunisia</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source of data: Transparency International (TI) and School for a Culture of Peace (Escola de Cultura de Pau) of the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain. Table compilation by the CLE evaluation team.

The TI Corruption Perceptions Index shows for Jordan a score of 4.7 on 10 for the year 2010 at about the same level as for 2000 but one point lower than the 5.7 score for 2005. With this 4.7 score in 2010, Jordan ranks 50th in the world, whereas in 2005 it scores 37th. In the EU Southern Neighbourhood it ranks 2nd ahead of Tunisia. Jordan ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in February 2005 and has been a regional leader in spearheading efforts to promote the UNCAC and its implementation. Last year in 2012 Jordan scored rank 48 on the TI CPI index, hence two ranks down compared to 2010.
### KPI-3.1.4 (iii) Additional information from field phase


**Overview of Past Achievements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Achievements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Political Rights                           | - Political dialogue in 2011 on establishment of and Independent Elections Commission Law (IEC established in 2012)  
- Political and technical level dialogue in 2010-2012 on electoral observation, including offer to send EU EOM (EU EOM invited by IEC for January 2013 early parliamentary elections)                                                                                          |
| Freedom of Assembly                        | - HR dialogue on Public Gathering Law (PGL amended in 2011)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| Freedom of Association                     | - HR dialogue on the application of the 2009 Law on Societies  
- Troika letter in 2008 providing Jordanian authorities EU's opinion on the draft Law on Societies                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| Freedom of expression and media            | - EU support to enhancing professional journalism (Jordan Media Institute)  
- EU support to New Media Tools and Citizenship (7iber project)  
- EU Support to the role of media during the electoral process (UNESCO);                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| Rule of Law, rights based society, torture | - HR dialogue advocating for signature and ratification of OPCAT  
- Ongoing EU twinning project between French and Jordanian Gendarmerie on public-order operations                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| Gender equality                            | - EU funded Study on Reversing the gender bias against Jordanian Women Married To Foreigners  
- An EU regional programme on promoting a common agenda for equality between women and men is being implemented (Istanbul conclusions).  
- Panel discussion on gender equality (Sweden)  
- A conference on women’s rights and gender equality, in view of the Marrakech Euromed ministerial conference on strengthening the role of women in society (Sweden)  
- Arab premiere in Amman of the documentary play SEVEN, based on the stories of seven women rights activists from different parts of the world (Sweden)  
- Regional Program to fight violence against women implemented by UN-Women (2011-2013)                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| Death penalty                              | - Outreach activities in 2012 – seminar for journalists with PRI, debate with law and sharia faculty students at Jordan University on abolition of death penalty (France, Sweden, EUD)  
- Demarche ahead of biannual UN resolution vote on Death Penalty carried out in 2012                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| Rights of the Child                        | - Provision of equipment to 9 juvenile courts and delivery of juvenile curricula for judges and prosecutors;  
- CRC shadow report drafted by a coalition of Jordanian CSOs;  
- Establishment of juvenile police in Amman in 2011;  
- Family Protection Unit established in Amman in 2012;  
- Establishment of committees at the governorate level to report on child abuse.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| National Human Rights Framework            | - Several dialogues held with HR CSOs representatives with Human Rights WG                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
JC-3.1: The EU-Jordan cooperation on democratic governance (including development policy and political dialogue) gained strength and depth in bringing about reform through strengthened coordination and institutionalized dialogue mechanisms

Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-3.1 (based on the KPIs main findings)

Jordan’s National Agenda and Kulluna al Urdun have served throughout the 2007-2013 period under review as solid reference basis for the EU-Jordan policy/political dialogue and cooperation interventions to achieve the political reform aspired for with regard to democracy, good governance, human rights, civil society, women’s empowerment, freedom of the media, political parties, independent judiciary, etc. Political reform with regard to these and other related issues is the first of eight chapters included in the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’s National Agenda, its key planning document for the period 2006-2015, under the title “Political Development and Inclusion”, as further operationalised in its two planning documents, the Executive Programme 2007-2019 and the Executive Development Programme 2011-2013. This National Agenda which served as anchor document for the EU response strategy as included in the Country Strategy Paper (2007-2013) and the two National Indicative Programmes (2007-2010 and 2011-2013) has “Political reform, democracy, human rights, good governance, justice and co-operation in the fight against extremism” as one of the four focus areas of EU-Jordan cooperation under the CSP. At the overall EU-Jordan cooperation level, political reform is a key priority in the EU-Jordan Association Agreement and its Action Plans. The EU has continued the dialogue on political reform with Jordan, both through the Subcommittee on Human Rights and Democracy and through cooperation operations in this field throughout the period under review. Of the 43 EU Financing Decisions interventions benefitting Jordan in the 2007-2013 period, 14 are in the political reform area with an overall allocation of EUR 169 million, which is about one quarter (24.3%) of the total support of EUR 695 million. Per the DAC-5 sectoral code, about one third of all EU support (226 million or 32.1% of the total of EUR 695 million) has been allocated to 150 “Government and civil society”, with almost half (49.4% - EUR 348 million) of all interventions expenditures related to this thematic area of government and civil society. Jordan’s development strategy based on the National Agenda 2006-2015 also remains the framework for the 2014-2017 successor EU-Jordan Single Support Framework, aiming at further progress in poverty reduction, sustainable growth, social inclusion and democratic governance. (KPI 3.1.1)

Jordan’s commitment to political reform was illustrated by the establishment of the first EU-Jordan sub-committee on human rights and democracy in 2005. This was a step towards an enhanced political dialogue between the EU and Jordan and enabled priorities for cooperation to be identified. The Committee was later renamed as Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Governance and Democracy, showing its expanded thematic coverage and authority. The EU has registered a deepening of the mutual understanding of the issues at stake in the democratic governance thematic areas, which is fostered through a close inter-linkage between the dialogue maintained at programme implementation level and in the framework of the ENP sub-committee dialogue. This has led not only to a qualitative improvement of the EU – GoHKoJ cooperation on development interventions, but also to a smoother political/policy dialogue in the different good governance thematic areas and sub-areas. The Sub-Committee in principle meets on an annual basis with possibility of special ad hoc meetings. There however is no evidence of effective, structured and systematic monitoring systems in place to follow-up on decisions, resolutions and/or recommendations of the Sub-Committee. (KPI 3.1.2)

Provisions for the institutionalisation of a regular policy/political dialogue on all aspects of the EU-Jordan collaboration, including on democratic governance and human rights issues, are incorporated in the EU Jordan Association Agreement of 2002. Article 5 of the Agreement foresees that the political dialogue takes place at regular intervals and whenever necessary at four levels / channels: ministerial, senior officials, diplomatic representatives and by any other useful means. In addition there is the political dialogue between the European Parliament and the Jordanian Parliament. As for example reported in the ENP Jordan Annual Progress Report, such policy/political dialogue events cover all key components of the governance reform agenda including on the sub-thematic areas of democracy, good governance, human rights, civil society, women’s empowerment, freedom of the media, political parties, independent judiciary. In fact, the first sub-committee established under the EU-Jordan Association Agreement was the SC on human rights and democracy. Different programming documents emphasize the need for an inclusive political/policy dialogue comprising both state and non-state actors. Through this dialogue also effective government appropriation and leadership of the reform processes is aimed at.

The 2007-2013 interventions portfolio analysis provided ample evidence that the political/policy dialogue on
the different aspects of the reform agenda is solidly backed up by cooperation interventions to enable / ensure their effective implementation and monitoring. Of the almost one third (30.5%) of the total contracted amounts in the 2007-2013 period in the Government and Civil Society Sector, by far the largest part (EUR 107.7 million or 70.6% ) went to Public Finance Management (PFM), followed by human rights (EUR 10.0 million or 6.6% ), decentralisation and support to sub-national government (EUR 8.9 million or 5.8%, legal and judicial development EUR 7.0 million or 4.6%) and conflict prevention (EUR 4.0 million or 2.6%). The rest category of other government and civil society contracts amounts to EUR 14.9 million or 9.8% of the total. As such it may be averred that the key components of the EU-Jordan policy/political dialogue and of the reform agenda in general are effectively institutionalized and supported by cooperation interventions to enable / ensure their effective implementation and monitoring. However, the quality of this institutionalisation and of the monitoring of the reform process still leaves room for improvement and further consolidation. This also pertains to the quality of government-led donor coordination and to the quality of the political dialogue on democratic governance and related issues. (KPI 3.1.3)

Jordan ranked on the 86th place in the world in 2000 and 104th in 2010 on the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) index. Of the European Neighbourhood South Countries Jordan scored second best in 2000 right after Tunisia and scored best in the region in 2010. In the period 2010-2012 it lost ranking for all six dimensions of the WGI index. The GoHKoJ website gives a summary timeline of political reform milestones, of the 15 listed reform highlights, 11 date from the year 2011 and later, hence from after the Arab Spring period. This is the period of the second NIP (2011-2013), with most of the EU supported democratic governance interventions approved in this period (mostly in 2012).

As far as key issues of the EU-Jordan political dialogue in the fields of democracy and human rights are concerned, Jordan has addressed a number of key recommendations contained in the European Neighbourhood and Partnership (ENP) progress reports. The latest parliamentary elections for the 17th House of Representatives were held on 23 January 2013. The EU Election Observation Mission concluded in its final report that the elections were organised and conducted in a transparent and credible manner. The EU-Jordan political dialogue process continued on the various levels established by the EU-Jordan Association Agreement (ministerial, senior officials, diplomatic representatives, other channels and parliament). The general reports on the EU-Jordan political / policy dialogue and cooperation (incl. the ENP-Jordan annual progress reports and the EAMRs) report on continued intensive dialogue with concrete outcomes and outputs in terms of enhanced institutional, legal and regulatory frameworks regarding the different aspects of the political reform, governance and human rights.

During the meetings of the joint EU-Jordan Subcommittee on Human Rights, Governance and Democracy, a broad array of democratic governance issues are discussed, including the EU-Jordan cooperation on these. However, the reports on these Subcommittee meetings do not include an appreciation of the level of political reform progress and results on the main components of the policy/political dialogue and reform process, as these in first instance are proceedings reports on the actual discussions. EUD also has the lead in the donors group on human rights and successfully brokered a common EU and Member States (MS) Strategy on Human Rights. In this capacity, EUD as secretariat of the MS Heads of Mission (HOMs) group prepares annual updates on the Human Rights Strategy for discussion with the HOMs. (KPI 3.1.4)

The above lead to a generally positive assessment of the judgement criteria. It can be concluded that the EU-Jordan cooperation on democratic governance (including development policy and political dialogue) gained strength and depth in bringing about reform through strengthened coordination and institutionalized dialogue mechanisms. This somewhat mixed picture regarding the different sub-processes was confirmed during the different field visit meetings and interviews with key stakeholders on the spot, both government and non-government.
**JC-3.2**
The EU - Jordan policy/political dialogue and cooperation interventions have adequately covered the fields of human rights (particularly women’s rights), fight against corruption and the media

### List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 3.2 (codes and definition)

| KPI-3.2.1 | Overall success of the translation of international human rights instruments (incl. European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights - EIDHR) provisions into domestic laws as a result of EU supported policy/political dialogues, supported by training of relevant professionals and CSOs and by public information campaigns |
| KPI-3.2.2 | Level of operational functioning of the Anti-Corruption Commission and of the Ombudsman Office a measured by submitted cases effectively and satisfactorily handled |
| KPI-3.2.3 | Extent to which women advocacy groups and CSOs are effectively and successfully supported in enhancing their institutional, managerial, operational and human capacities |
| KPI-3.2.4 | Extent and quality of the EU capacity development interventions and programmes of media representatives, journalists and technical staff (gender balanced / sensitive) in support of the media (press, radio, TV, internet) |

**KPI-3.2.1:** Overall success of the translation of international human rights instruments (incl. European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights - EIDHR) provisions into domestic laws as a result of EU supported policy/political dialogues, supported by training of relevant professionals and CSOs and by public information campaigns

### Main Findings on KPI-3.2.1:

As per the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN-HCHR) 2013 report on the Status of ratification of Human Rights Instruments, Jordan has ratified 9 instruments out of the total of 22 HR instruments monitored and with that takes a middle position (8th ranking) out of the total of 15 Arab countries monitored. Jordan has ratified many of the most important international human rights and humanitarian law instruments, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols. It is also party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and to major conventions on terrorism, though it has not ratified major refugee-related treaties. These latter issues are now being addressed in the framework of the EU Dialogue on Migration, Mobility and Security through a series of meetings, the first one having taken place on 25-28 February 2013.

Sub-priority 1 on Democratisation, Civil Society and Media under the 2011-2013 NIP foresees that in line with the 2008 and 2010 projects, this programme has several components with the common goal of helping to achieve one of Jordan’s declared priorities which is the promotion of public participation in decision-making. The NIP indicates that most of the major international human rights instruments are enforceable in court and supersede national legislation. However for that the international instruments need to be translated into domestic laws, relevant professionals trained and public information campaigns need to be organised. The EU-Jordan Association Agreement updated Action Plan of 2010 also stresses that the EU and Jordan are committed to achieve closer political cooperation and dialogue on the basis of their shared values: the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and good governance. This enhanced political dialogue and cooperation takes place at different levels and in the framework of different fora: Summits and sectoral ministerial meetings on an ad hoc basis, enhanced political dialogue and regular exchange of information on Common Foreign Security and Defence Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), senior official meetings, meetings of official representatives or leading figures from the academic and research communities, further developed political dialogue between the European Parliament and the Jordanian Parliament. Also, under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), which in 2006 replaced the previous European Initiative, support has been provided for the promotion of democracy and human rights through grants to finance projects submitted by civil society and/or international organisations and through grants to human rights defenders, amongst others.

As far as key issues of the EU-Jordan political dialogue in the fields of democracy and human rights are concerned, Jordan has addressed a number of key recommendations contained in the ENP progress reports. As regards the implementation of the ENP Action Plan, there were some positive developments in
relation to deep and sustainable democracy, in line with the recommendations set out in the previous Progress Reports. Political reforms continued in the recent years in particular with the establishment of an independent electoral commission, the establishment of the Constitutional Court, the adoption of a new political parties’ law and a new electoral law. The latter law, however, has been strongly criticised by most opposition parties claiming it does not ensure a fair distribution of seats and perpetuates the previous law based on the “one person, one-vote” system (i.e. the single non-transferable vote). Jordan is also expected to step up its fight against corruption, which weakens citizens’ trust in democratic institutions and undermines the country's economic and social development. In a number of instances in 2012, the General Prosecutor continued referring civilians to the State Security Court with offences involving free speech, contrary to the constitutional amendments made in 2011.

Jordan has ratified the 6 major international conventions that the United Nations has adopted to protect human rights. For example, in June 2006 the Jordanian government made the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, In Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT) a binding part of Jordanian law. However, Jordan has not ratified certain optional protocols (in particular the second optional protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that mandates to completely abolish the death penalty, as well as the optional protocol to UNCAT). As per the discussions in the 8th meeting of 9 September 2013 in Brussels of the Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Governance and Democracy Jordan does not foresee to ratify the first optional protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), recognizing competence of the Human Rights Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals, nor to make a declaration under article 22 of the Convention against torture (which recognizes the same right to individuals to submit communications before the Commission against torture). Priority is given to national strategies (institutions, legislation…).

There is a consensus among actors that the political authority is the chief contributor to the advancement of women in Jordan. However, change does not depend merely on political will but also on changing traditional cultural and religious interpretations that perpetrate gender inequalities. Overall, actors acknowledge that the development of gender equality is relatively advanced as evidenced by legal reforms, women’s access to decision-making and leadership positions and increasing economic participation. The adoption of the Protection from Domestic Violence Law and the creation of special wards in the courts for family issues and domestic violence are among the main contributions to combat violence against women. Yet, there is still a need to review existing legislation to eliminate remaining discriminations against women, particularly in personal status matters related to marriage, divorce, child custody, nationality and inheritance rights. The perpetuation of a male-dominant culture still limits the full implementation and enjoyment of women’s rights in society. Jordan has not lifted the remaining reservations under the UN Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), those being articles 9(2) and 16(c, d and g). The EU continued to provide substantial support to the cause of Jordanian women’s rights in various areas such as political participation, economic empowerment and violence against women.

Of the UN Conventions / Covenants listed in the 2013 EU Heads of Mission Human Rights Country Strategy 2012 update three do not have a signature of the optional protocol (torture, civil and political rights, CEDAW) with for two reservations filed (for CEDAW regarding the transmission of nationality to children and inheritance rights, and for the Convention on the Rights of the Child CRC regarding the freedom of choice of religion and adoption not in line with Shariah).

KPI-3.2.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- OHCHR, Status of Ratification of Human Rights Instruments
- Please see below

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- NIP 2011-2013, p.8
- ENP-PPJ (2011), p.10
- EIDHR - EU Support for CSOs (2012), p.15
- New Response COM (2011), p.4
(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- Please see below

KPI-3.2.1 (i) Data, figures and tables:

The 2010 Arab Democracy Index from the Arab Reform Initiative ranked Jordan first in the state of democratic reforms out of fifteen Arab countries. Civil liberties and political rights scored 5 and 6 respectively in Freedom House's Freedom in the World 2011 report, where 1 is most free and 7 is least free. This earned Jordan "Not Free" status. Jordan ranked ahead of 6, behind 4, and the same as 8 countries in the Middle East and North Africa region.

The Human Rights Index (HRI) of the School for a Culture of Peace (Escola de Cultura de Pau) of the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain, measures the degree of vulnerability and non-compliance of the obligations of the states with regard to human rights in 195 countries for a certain period of time and based on different sources. It consists of 22 specific indicators divided into three areas: (i) Non-ratification of the main instruments of International Law on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (IHL); (ii) The violation of International Law on Human Rights and (iii) The violation of IHL. Index scores are on a 0-10 scale with 0 as best and 10 as worst score. As can be seen from the table on the preceding page, with a score of 2.708, Jordan ranks 114th in the world and ranks best of all Southern Mediterranean Neighbourhood countries / territories (2009 figures).

KPI-3.2.1 (iii) Additional information from field phase

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<th>Theme</th>
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Death penalty
- Outreach activities in 2012 – seminar for journalists with PRI, debate with law and sharia faculty students at Jordan University on abolition of death penalty (France, Sweden, EUD)
- Demarche ahead of biannual UN resolution vote on Death Penalty carried out in 2012

Rights of the Child
- Provision of equipment to 9 juvenile courts and delivery of juvenile curricula for judges and prosecutors;
- CRC shadow report drafted by a coalition of Jordanian CSOs;
- Establishment of juvenile police in Amman in 2011;
- Family Protection Unit established in Amman in 2012;
- Establishment of committees at the governorate level to report on child abuse.

National Human Rights Framework
- Several dialogues held with HR CSOs representatives with Human Rights WG

KPI-3.2.2: Level of operational functioning of the Anti-Corruption Commission and of the Ombudsman Office as measured by submitted cases effectively and satisfactory handled

Main Findings on KPI-3.2.2:

Based on the 2012 PFM Annual Monitoring Report, the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) in 2011 handled a total of 1,538 complaints of which 824 (53.6%) where assessed false corruption cases and 714 (46.4%) as corruption cases. Of the latter 36 were sent to the Public Prosecutor (plus 43 from previous years), 3 cases were referred to Parliament and 7 to the State Security Attorney General. 384 were still under investigation. The Ombudsman's Office assessed 2,262 cases in 2011, of which 1,420 (62.8%) were accepted and 842 (37.2%) were declined pro forma. In 197 cases (13.87%), the public administration has erred. Of these 147 (or 74.6%) were officially or amicably resolved. In 242 (or 28.7%) of the pro-forma declined cases, counselling was given to the complainant.

The 2006 Anti-Corruption Law No. 62 established the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) which began its work on 1 January 2008. Its work around six main objectives is guided by the National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2008-2012. In September 2011, the Lower House adopted the Anti-Corruption Commission law. Jordan is a signatory of the United Nations Convention against Corruption and partners with the EU on anti-corruption efforts. It recently benefitted from an EU-sponsored twinning project with Finland which started in November 2011. The ACC is looking at corruption in state-owned-enterprises and corrupt law enforcement. It recently also expanded its activities to the private sector. The ACC’s expertise is recognized in the wider Region, as it also provides capacity building services to other similar institutes in the Region. In 2011, it initiated its “integrity audits” in ministries and departments to assess risks of violation of corruption laws and good practices. It also proposed significant amendments to its organic law which now also have been approved by the Parliament, further strengthening its Mandate and the effective implementation thereof. It however appears that in spite of all these activities, it has not been sufficient to satisfy the public perception of corruption or to reassure the public that the government’s institutions are aggressively pursuing what they see as pervasive corruption. Some mistrust vis-à-vis the ACC seems to persist. To address these, the ACC in in the process of developing and implementing public outreach programmes focusing on corruption prevention, capacity building and awareness raising. This is in line with the objectives of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (2013-2017). The March 2013 ROM mission recommended that the reporting to EUD be conducted in accordance with the norms established by the Twinning Manual and technical assistance projects. Without immediate corrective actions, serious problems would arise at the end of the Project, since it will be impossible to extract useful conclusions on its achievements and lessons learnt.

The Ombudsman Bureau was created by Act No. 11, April 16, 2008. The Bureau examines corruption and related abuses of power or illegal acts. It is designed to defend the rights of the citizen when facing the Government bureaucracy. The bureau reports directly to the Prime Minister and a copy of its annual report is sent directly to the Senate and the Lower House of Parliament. The Ombudsman Bureau, which functioning is supported by the EU, faces a number of challenges to increase its effectiveness particularly in relation to its strategic planning is a much as it tends to treat cases individually rather than trying to fix systemic problems. It recently was able to legally establish its autonomy and to have it recognized as an autonomous body by Parliament after long discussions bringing the case to the Upper House. The Ombudsman Office is
proud on its national complaints filing system, which is decentralised to municipalities level where for example complaints can be filed in post offices for processing at national level. The establishment of Regional Ombudsman Offices is being considered. It was learnt however that in the meantime the interim position of the President is seriously hampering independent and full-scale operation of the Ombudsman Bureau.

As reported in the 2013 Human Rights Country Strategy update for 2012 for the EU Heads of Mission (HOMs), the Diwan al Mathalem (Bureau of the Ombudsman) since February 2009 receives complaints from the public mainly regarding perceived wrongful treatment by public administration, and received 2,400 complaints during the first year of its operations. Of these 800 cases are under investigation and 150 have been resolved. More than 1,000 cases have been rejected for falling outside of the bureau’s jurisdiction). The Ombudsman established a free hotline for complaints.

The ENP Jordan annual progress reports keep indicating that corruption remains an issue of widespread concern in Jordanian society.

KPI-3.2.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Please see below
- Rule of Law Index 2012-13, p.121
- PFM monitoring report, 2012

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- PFM Annual Monitoring Report 2012, pp. 32-33 - 4.4.1 The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC)
- PFM Annual Monitoring Report 2012, pp. 34-35 - 4.4.2 The Ombudsman Bureau
- EUD note to AIDCO A – Request 3rd Tranche Payment “Support for the Public Finance Reform Programme”, 2010
- NACSaIP (2013), p.1
- Anti-Corruption Strategy 2013-2017, p. 3-4
- ENP-PPJ-2009, p.3
- ENP-PPJ-2011, p.4
- ENP Jordan Annual Report 2012 (2013) p.6
- Open Budget Survey 2012, International Budget Partnership (2013), pp.2-4

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- Support the implementation of the Anti-Corruption Commission’s Strategy in Jordan; ROM Monitoring Report MR-15211.02 of 21/03/2013. p.3 - Key observations and recommendations

KPI-3.2.2 (i) Data, figures and tables:

<p>| PFM Annual Monitoring Report 2012, pp. 32-33 - 4.4.1 The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complaints</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012 (till June 30th)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Complaints</td>
<td>1538</td>
<td>443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>False Corruption Cases</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption Cases</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sent to Public Prosecutor</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(plus 43 from previous years)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 cases referred to Parliament</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 cases referred to the State</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Attorney General</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Still under Investigation</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Anti-Corruption Commission
### Ombudsman Annual Report 2011, p.14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Actions taken</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accepted</td>
<td>1420</td>
<td>62.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Public administration is correct</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>54.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Under official follow-up</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>28.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Closed for non-completion of preliminaries</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>3.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Public administration has erred.</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>13.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A officially or amicably resolved</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>74.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B A recommendation has been made but not yet implemented</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Declined Pro Forma¹</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>37.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1- Without given counselling to the complainant | 600 | 71.26 |
2- Counselling is given to complainant | 242 | 28.74 |

### Ombudsman Annual Report 2010, P. 10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Complained against</th>
<th>Grievance against an administrative decision</th>
<th>Appointment or re-appointment request</th>
<th>Request for financial exemption or compensation</th>
<th>Request for services or to improve offered services</th>
<th>Grievance against mistreatment of a public servant or abuse of power</th>
<th>Request for help</th>
<th>Grievance against a court ruling</th>
<th>Grievance against individuals or private parties</th>
<th>Request for financial exemption or compensation</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Service Bureau</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>167</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>144</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>103</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Social Development</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>78</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aqaba Region Authority</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>75</td>
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<td>Ministry of Health</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>74</td>
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<tr>
<td>Directorate of Public Security</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Greater Amman Municipality</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>67</td>
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<td>Jordanian Armed Forces</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>52</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Labour</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Water &amp; Irrigation</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jordanian Judicial Board</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>42</td>
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<td>Private Sector Institutions</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Transport</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Municipal Affairs</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Main Parties</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>929</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KPI-3.2.3:** Extent to which women advocacy groups and CSOs are effectively and successfully supported in enhancing their institutional, managerial, operational and human capacities

**Main Findings on KPI-3.2.3:**

In accordance with the figures from the Ministry of Social Development, the total number of registered CSOs in 2010 in Jordan is 1,197 domestic societies and 49 foreign societies. Approval is required from the Council of Ministers for registration of any society in which a founder is a legal person or non-Jordanian and in case
of registration of a foundation. Societies are restricted from political activity as they may not have any “political goals”. Prior approval is required to receive foreign funding and to collect donations from the public.

The important role of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) including women advocacy groups in relation to democratic governance issues is explicitly recognized in the ENP regional and the bilateral policy and strategy documents on the EU-Jordan Cooperation. The EU New Response strategy of 2011 stresses that civil society plays a pivotal role in advancing women’s rights, greater social justice and respect for minorities as well as environmental protection and resource efficiency. The EU committed to support this greater political role for non-state actors through a partnership with societies, helping CSOs to develop their advocacy capacity, their ability to monitor reform and their role in implementing and evaluating EU programmes. Also in the NIP 2011-2013, the programmes approved thereunder seek to bring government and civil society together in a structured dialogue on key areas of the EU-Jordan co-operation.

All 14 of the 43 democratic governance interventions have either an explicit or implicit focus on CSOs strengthening. In most other sector / thematic interventions, capacity strengthening of CSOs (which also covers economic NSAs in accordance with the EC DEVCO definition) CSO involvement and capacity strengthening is a sort of cross-cutting issue. The EC commissioned mapping study of Non-State Actors in Jordan of 2010 confirmed capacity building amongst the major challenges being faced by NSAs, as identified by themselves. This capacity building for public policy dialogue is necessary for strengthening horizontal and vertical linkages and for encouraging networks and alliances. The partnership between MoPED and the EU, which enables NSAs to implement public policy dialogue projects, is referred to as a model for capacity building.

Most NSAs welcome the opportunity to receive funds to implement projects that promote citizens’ involvement in public policy dialogue. All stakeholders recognize the need for transparency in the allocation of grants, and recommend changes in the registration mechanisms and eligibility criteria in order to enlarge the pool of applicants. The mapping also concludes that CSOs wishing to implement funded projects for public policy dialogue need to commit to achieve the highest standards of good governance, pluralism, networking and alliance building. “Twinning” arrangements whereby well capacitated and established CSOs function as mentor in adopting weaker NGOs and CBOs in order to build their capacity by learning from example are identified as good practice. The mapping study also stressed the importance of EU support programmes to focus on process skills and in particular on the ability of CSOs to network, build alliances, create apex structures and to act collectively. It also appears CSO capacity strengthening support has been focusing (too) strongly on individual human resources development rather than on organisational development and institutional strengthening.

Also the latest ENP Jordan progress report for 2013 mentions that the legal provisions and practices on freedom of association remained unchanged. The law on societies maintains the right of the authorities to reject applications to register an organisation or receive foreign funding. Pending CSO legislative / regulatory initiatives, the Ministry of Social Development has announced an intention to amend the Law on Societies, but as of this writing no information has been made public concerning the content of the amendments.

Progressive improvements are recorded over time in relation to the institutionalisation of the social dialogue between the economic NSA in a tripartite setting more in line with the ILO convention on tripartite consultation and related provisions concerned, however major challenges remain. The modified Labour Law of 2008 foresaw the creation of a consultative committee in the Ministry of Labour, regrouping the authorities, employers and workers. The legislation establishing a tripartite committee dealing with the approval of labour unions entered into force in May 2010. In terms of social rights, Jordan established a National Pay Equity Committee in July 2011, co-chaired by the Ministry of Labour and the Jordanian National Women’s Commission. The Committee aims to promote women’s participation in the labour market, particularly through implementation of international labour standards on equal remuneration and non-discrimination. A substantial package of measures was drawn up to strengthen social rights, provide decent working conditions and ensure that labour standards comply with ILO commitments.

As far as capacity strengthening of local grassroots CSOs is concerned, the Promoting Local Economic Development in Jordan(PLEDJ) project aims to contribute to raising awareness and capacity building of local civil society stakeholders as Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) to enhance their skills in economic development activities at Governorate and Municipalities levels.

Gender equality remains a challenging issue in Jordan with modest but steady developments. The draft Electoral Law (currently at the Lower House) foresees to increase the women’s quota in Parliament up to 15 seats out of 138, while the Municipalities Law, endorsed in July 2011, increased women’s quota from 20% to
25% of each municipal council. The Personal Status Law adopted in September 2010 by the Government giving women freedom of mobility and choice of residence without consent of their husbands or other male family members was eventually rejected by the Parliament in 2011. However, on the other hand just as one concrete illustration of the substantial challenges still to be addressed regarding gender equity and equality, the reservation to Article 9 of CEDAW regarding the right of women to transfer their nationality to their children and husbands has still not been lifted.

Whereas the above are general assessments based on documentary evidence, a finer appreciation of the actual situation of CSO's capacities came out of the CSOs mini-survey and focus group discussion executed during the field phase. The summary results / outcomes with further details are presented under Annex 7.2.2 to this CLE final report. The question regarding the degree to which CSOs institutional / organisational capacities have been strengthened in the 2007-2013 period with EU support received a relatively high 3.60 appreciation score on a 0-5 scale. The same for the human capacities strengthening component of the support. At the same time, the participating CSOs confirmed earlier findings that this capacity strengthening still needs further attention, particularly in relation to networking and association / apex structure building.

Civil society involvement and participation needs to be further strengthened in relation to policy dialogue, monitoring and service delivery for the three Sectors identified above. In particular, dialogue on the progress of political, social and economic reform needs to be continued and stepped up to ensure the participation of a broad range of actors, including Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) from across the country, as well as trade unions, consumer associations, chambers of commerce and industry, religious and professional associations and the Economic and Social Council amongst others.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPI-3.2.3 Main References and Sources of Information:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) <strong>Data, figures and tables:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mapping Study Non-State Actors (2010), p.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Wages according to sex for major occupational groups, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Please see below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) <strong>Key extracts from documents:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ICNL (2013) website</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- NOREF, Jordan's 2013 elections, p.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>- New Response COM (2011), p.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Findings KPI 4.6.2 on CSOs capacity strengthening</td>
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<tr>
<td>- MR-146740.01 - Promoting Local Economic Development in Jordan(PLEDJ), (2013), p.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- KPI 4.6.4 Findings: Economic NSAs and tripartism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- JC 4.6 assessment of support to CSOs and NSA's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- KPI 6.6.3 finding: No cross-cutting issues in PSD formulation of 13 interventions but some gender concerns during implementation (related)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- KPI 6.6.4 PSD: Gender sensitivity and differences regarding salaries and employment (related)</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Additional information from field phase:


KPI-3.2.3 (i) Data, figures and tables:

Level of employment according to sex 1993-2012

KPI-3.2.3 (ii) Key extracts from documents:

Despite Jordan’s ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), with reservations to article 9 and article 16, and NGOs’ efforts to combat all forms of discrimination against women, the implementation of the Convention undoubtedly continues to pose a constant challenge to NGOs in Jordan. Despite the on-going endeavours to advance the principles of equality and non-discrimination, violation of women's rights is still common within families, society and the state. National policies, laws and social practices still do not recognise women’s rights based on the principles that CEDAW was created for, namely substantive equality, non-discrimination, and social justice. Constitutional amendments are key to reinforcing the values for which revolutions and popular movements have broken out. Women regard constitutional amendments as the pathway to a state that safeguards the rights of female and male citizens without discrimination.

Jordan has shown improvements in the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) which examines the achievements of women in the economic and the political arenas, in specific, the extent to which women can influence decision making in these arenas. The GEM rose from 0.220 in 1995 to 0.297 in 2002. In 2009, Jordan’s rank was 96 out of 109 nations. However, the challenges are still substantial. The 2007 ratio of female to male earnings was 0.19, a low figure since a ratio of 1 would indicate absolute equality.
4.6% to 9.9% during the 1995 to 2002 period showing that considerably more progress is being made in this area. However, women in Jordan remain seriously under-represented in public life. The quota in the new Election Law remained the same, 10 per cent (15 seats). The Constitution does not explicitly protect the principles of gender equality and non-discrimination. Gender equality is explicitly covered as Goal 3 under the MDGs as “Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women”. Its component indicators relate to education, employment and political representation. Jordan’s achievements and important challenges ahead still are summarized in the MDGs Jordan country progress snapshot 2013 table here above.

KPI-3.2.3 (iii) Additional information from field phase:

Excerpt from the summary analysis of the June 2014 mini-survey with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) on Democratic Governance – Survey Question 4:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 4</th>
<th>Scores on 0-5 Scale</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>Average Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree to which CSOs institutional / organisational capacities have been strengthened in this period with EU support?</td>
<td>Number of scores</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of narrative comments by respondents (brief explanations / score justifications):

- The support has been made through the EU funded projects given to Jordanian CSOs. These funded projects helped in building the capacities of CSOs in many arenas, starting from adhering to international rules and regulations, followed by financial controlling, and project management.
- The EU funded CSOs capacity strengthening (expansion and extension) in Jordan and helped to form cooperation with European NGOs.
- CSOs institutional capacities have improved a lot whether in cities or in rural and remote areas.

Excerpt from the summary analysis of the June 2014 mini-survey with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) on Democratic Governance – Survey Question 5:

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Question 5</th>
<th>Scores on 0-5 Scale</th>
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<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>Average Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree to which CSOs human capacities have been strengthened in this period with EU support?</td>
<td>Number of scores</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of narrative comments by respondents (brief explanations / score justifications):

- Same as number 4: The EU funded projects gave the chance to the human resources at the funded CSOs to improve their project management skills, financial skills, reporting and follow up skills, in addition to any other skills relevant to the project implementation and goals and objectives.
- Funds from the EU have allowed CSOs to hire skilled people and allow them to be involved in human rights work. Allows the training of people in civil society on human rights issues.
- CSOs human capacities have improved a lot whether in cities or in rural and remote areas.

KPI-3.2.4: Extent and quality of the EU capacity development interventions and programmes of media representatives, journalists and technical staff (gender balanced / sensitive) in support of the media (press, radio, TV, internet)

Main Findings on KPI-3.2.4:

The EU-Jordan cooperation portfolio covering the period 2007-2013 has one intervention with an explicit support focus of the media in Jordan. The FD 23849 entitled “Support to Civil Society and Media in Jordan” with a budget of EUR 10 million got a primary approval in 2012 in the wake of the events that stirred the Southern Neighbourhood region but only got its secondary approval on 25 November 2013, reason why it was not yet included as approved in this Country Level Evaluation interventions portfolio. A cautious
approach was preferred while still awaiting some crucial legislation to guarantee more independence and operational freedom for the media. The programme’s underlying strategic approach based on lessons learnt from previous experiences is that improved quality and independence of the media in Jordan can be achieved more effectively through a dialogue, strategy and action plan between on the one side, the responsible ministers, the legislators and the Royal Court, and on the other side, state and non-state stakeholders in the media sector. It is expected that the outcome of the programme will be a comprehensive strategic action plan for the media sector that is implemented in collaboration with help from European media institutions and offers a significant move towards a free and independent quality based media landscape.

The media component of the programme will be implemented through two inter-linked pillars which will constitute a two-stage approach: The capacity and institution building of the media sector (programme Pillar 7) will only take place after the completion of Pillar 6, which is the development, updating and approval of a strategy and action plan for the media. Lessons learnt also include the mutual agreement on intermediary benchmarks before starting the programme. The capacity and institution building component of the media strategy is expected to be carried out through partnerships with European and other partners like regulatory bodies, public service broadcasters, journalist associations, media councils, media associations, universities, training institutions and the like. Jordan’s ranking on the 141st place on the Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom index (7 ranks down from the preceding year) shows the challenges still confronted by the sector, especially when taking into consideration its worsening position ever since 2009 when it still ranked 112. With a rating of 40.42 Jordan is labelled as “not free” in the World Press Freedom index and occupies rank 8 amongst 19 countries in the wider region. The amendments to the press and publications law, adopted in September 2012, entered into force in early June 2013. The amendments introduced a number of requirements relating to the operation of online news portals, which the media and civil society view as a way of imposing limits on freedom of expression and adding liabilities for the editors in-chief and owners for the content posted on the sites. Access to around 300 news websites was blocked within Jordan in June 2013 under a new media law that drastically restricts online freedom of information. Local and international CSOs referred to the law as an attempt to regulate online communication and publications in violation of the provisions of the Constitution. The Universal Periodic Review published in October 2013 by the UN Human Rights Council made 20 recommendations to Jordan relating to freedom of expression while only one was made in 2009.

The EU-ENP support to civil society and media through the above mentioned “Support to Civil Society and Media in Jordan” intervention (budget: EUR 10 million) aims to develop the skills and infrastructure needed for an independent, quality-based media sector, as well as strengthening the capacity of community-based organisations and non-governmental organisations to build awareness among citizens of the importance of independent media. This programme is a direct offshoot of the Joint Communication of the European Commission and of the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy entitled “A new response to a changing Neighbourhood” of 25 May 2011 as a reaction to events unfolding in the EU’s southern Neighbourhood including Jordan. The EU’s New Response proposes "to provide greater support to partners engaged in building deep democracy and strengthen further its support to civil society". The Communication stresses that EU will support deep and sustainable democracy through freedom of association, expression and assembly as well as a free press and media. The financing agreement of this programme was signed on 25 November 2013, hence it still is too early to assess it progress and results. However, in broad line a two phased approach is pursued for support to independent media based on lessons learnt from the past. The more realistic approach is one of first establishing the regulatory framework and broader enabling environment before engaging in actual media training which would only lead to frustrations in case upgraded skills and capacities cannot be applied in a conducive media environment. On the occasion of the 9th September 2013 8th meeting of the EU-Jordan Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Governance and Democracy, the EU recalled its actions in favour of freedom of expression, stressing that it was one of the EU priorities in the 2012 Human Rights Report and the Cyber Security Strategy adopted in February 2013. Freedom of expression and media were also explicitly featured in the 2014 EU Report on the Implementation of the Human Rights Country Strategy, through a broad range of interventions in the field of political dialogue, public diplomacy and cooperation projects/programmes.

KPI-3.2.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:

- CLE Database of EU Financing Decisions and Contract Benefiting Jordan (2007-2013) - interventions responding to the keyword “media”.
World Press Freedom Index (2007 to 2013)

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Action Fiche, Support to civil society and media in Jordan (ENPI/2012/023-849), p.2
- Action Fiche, Support to civil society and media in Jordan (ENPI/2012/023-849), p.6-8
- Action Fiche, Support to civil society and media in Jordan (ENPI/2012/023-849), p.
- Action Fiche - Support to civil society and media in Jordan (2012) p.5
- Action Fiche - Support to civil society and media in Jordan (2012) p.1
- Reporters without Borders (2013) Website
- World Press Freedom Index (2007 to 2013)-
- New response (2011), p.4
- GoHK of Jordan, National Agenda, p. 11-12

(iii) Additional information from field phase:

JC-3.2: The EU - Jordan policy/political dialogue and cooperation interventions have adequately covered the fields of human rights (particularly women's rights), fight against corruption and the media

Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-3.2 (based on the KPIs main findings)

In the 2007-2013 period under review the EU - Jordan policy/political dialogue and cooperation interventions have strongly focused on the fields of human rights (including women's rights), the fight against corruption and the media, be it with mixed success overall and with major challenges to be addressed still. As per the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN-HCHR) 2013 report on the Status of ratification of Human Rights Instruments, Jordan has ratified 9 instruments out of the total of 22 HR instruments monitored and with that takes a middle position (8th ranking) out of the total of 15 Arab countries monitored. Jordan has ratified many of the most important international human rights and humanitarian law instruments, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols. It also has ratified the 6 major international conventions that the United Nations has adopted to protect human rights.

Most of the major international human rights instruments are enforceable in court and supersede national legislation. However for that the international instruments need to be translated into domestic laws, relevant professionals trained and public information campaigns need to be organised. The EU-Jordan Association Agreement updated Action Plan of 2010 stresses that the EU and Jordan are committed to achieve closer political cooperation and dialogue on the basis of their shared values: the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and good governance. This enhanced political dialogue and cooperation takes place at different levels and in the framework of different fora. Jordan has addressed a number of key recommendations contained in the ENP progress reports. As regards the implementation of the ENP Action Plan, there were some positive developments in relation to deep and sustainable democracy, in line with the recommendations set out in the previous Progress Reports. Political reforms continued in the recent years in particular with the establishment of an independent electoral commission, the establishment of the Constitutional Court, the adoption of a new political parties’ law and a new electoral law. The latter law, however, has been strongly criticised by most opposition parties claiming it does not ensure a fair distribution of seats and perpetuates the previous law based on the “one person, one-vote” system (i.e. the single non-transferable vote). Jordan is also expected to step up its fight against corruption, which weakens citizens’ trust in democratic institutions and undermines the country’s economic and social development. In a number of instances in 2012, the General Prosecutor continued referring civilians to the State Security Court with offences involving free speech, contrary to the constitutional amendments made in 2011. Overall, actors
acknowledge that the development of gender equality is relatively advanced as evidenced by legal reforms, women's access to decision-making and leadership positions and increasing economic participation. The adoption of the Protection from Domestic Violence Law and the creation of special wards in the courts for family issues and domestic violence are among the main contributions to combat violence against women. Yet, there is still a need to review existing legislation to eliminate remaining discriminations against women, particularly in personal status matters related to marriage, divorce, child custody, nationality and inheritance rights.

In June 2006 the Jordanian government made the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT) a binding part of Jordanian law. However, Jordan has not ratified certain optional protocols (in particular the second optional protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that mandates to completely abolish the death penalty, as well as the optional protocol to UNCAT). As per the discussions in the 8th meeting of 9 September 2013 in Brussels of the Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Governance and Democracy, Jordan does not foresee to ratify the first optional protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), recognizing competence of the Human Rights Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals, nor to make a declaration under article 22 of the Convention against torture (which recognizes the same right to individuals to submit communications before the Commission against torture). Priority is given to national strategies (institutions, legislation…). The EU continued to provide substantial support to the cause of Jordanian women’s rights in various areas such as political participation, economic empowerment and violence against women. (KPI 3.2.1)

The ENP Jordan annual progress reports keep indicating that corruption remains an issue of widespread concern in Jordanian society. The level of operational functioning of the Anti-Corruption Commission and of the Ombudsman Office, both supported by the EU, as measured by submitted cases effectively and satisfactory handled improved be it with different levels of success. The Ombudsman Bureau was created by Act No. 11, April 16, 2008. It only recently was able to legally establish its autonomy and to have it recognized as an autonomous body by Parliament after long discussions bringing the case to the Upper House. The Ombudsman Office is proud on its national complaints filing system, which is decentralised to municipalities level where for example complaints can be filed in post offices for processing at national level. The establishment of Regional Ombudsman Offices is being considered. It was learnt however that in the meantime the interim only position of the President is seriously hampering independent and full-scale operation of the Ombudsman Bureau. Since operations started in February 2009, the Ombudsman Bureau receives complaints from the public mainly regarding perceived wrongful treatment by public administration. The Bureau examines corruption and related abuses of power or illegal acts. It is designed to defend the rights of the citizen when facing the Government bureaucracy. The Ombudsman Bureau, which functioning is supported by the EU, faces a number of challenges to increase its effectiveness particularly in relation to its strategic planning is a much as it tends to treat cases individually rather than trying to fix systemic problems. It received 2,400 complaints during the first year of its operations. Of these 800 cases are under investigation and 150 have been resolved.

The 2006 Anti-Corruption Law No. 62 established the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), which began its work on 1 January 2008. Its operations around six main objectives is guided by the National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2008-2012. In September 2011, the Lower House adopted the Anti-Corruption Commission law. The ACC is looking at corruption in state-owned-enterprises and corrupt law enforcement. It recently expanded its activities to the private sector. The ACC’s expertise is recognized in the wider Region, as it also provides capacity building services to other similar institutes in the Region. The ACC’s leadership is assessed as results oriented, but this has not been sufficient to satisfy the public perception of corruption or to reassure the public that the government’s institutions are aggressively pursuing what they see as pervasive corruption. To address these, the ACC in in the process of developing and implementing public outreach programmes. (KPI 3.2.2)

While substantial capacity development and support programmes are in place, there are still substantive challenges to be met in further enhancing the institutional, managerial, operational and human capacities of Civil Society Groups including women advocacy groups. In accordance with the figures from the Ministry of Social Development, the total number of registered CSOs in 2010 in Jordan is 1,197 domestic societies and 49 foreign societies. Approval is required from the Council of Ministers for registration of any society in which a founder is a legal person or non-Jordanian and in case of registration of a foundation. Societies are restricted from political activity as they may not have any “political goals”. Prior approval is required to receive foreign funding and to collect donations from the public. The important role of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) including women advocacy groups in relation to democratic governance issues is explicitly recognized in the ENP regional and the bilateral policy and strategy documents on the EU-Jordan
Cooperation. All 14 democratic governance interventions (of the total of 43) approved in the 2007-2014 period have either an explicit or implicit focus on CSOs strengthening. In most other sector / thematic interventions, capacity strengthening of CSOs (which also covers economic NSAs in accordance with the EC DEVCO definition) is a sort of cross-cutting issue. The EC commissioned mapping study of Non-State Actors in Jordan of 2010 confirmed capacity building amongst the major challenges being faced by NSAs, as identified by themselves, and also confirmed as such by the evaluation’s focus group discussion and through the democratic governance mini-survey with CSOs. The survey question regarding the degree to which CSOs institutional / organisational capacities have been strengthened in the 2007-2013 period with EU support received a relatively high 3.60 appreciation score on a 0-5 scale. The same for the human capacities strengthening component of the support. At the same time, the participating CSOs confirmed earlier findings that this capacity strengthening still needs further attention, particularly in relation to networking and association / apex structure building. CSO capacity strengthening support to date has been focusing (too) strongly on individual human resources development rather than on organisational development and institutional strengthening.

Gender equality remains a challenging issue in Jordan with modest but steady developments. The draft Electoral Law (currently at the Lower House) foresees to increase the women’s quota in Parliament up to 15 seats out of 138, while the Municipalities Law, endorsed in July 2011, increased women’s quota from 20% to 25% of each municipal council. The Personal Status Law adopted in September 2010 by the Government giving women freedom of mobility and choice of residence without consent of their husbands or other male family members was eventually rejected by the Parliament in 2011. However, on the other hand just as one concrete illustration of the substantial challenges still to be addressed regarding gender equity and equality, the reservation to Article 9 of CEDAW regarding the right of women to transfer their nationality to their children and husbands has still not been lifted. (KPI 3.2.3)

Progressive improvements are recorded over time in relation to the institutionalisation of the social dialogue between the economic NSA in a tripartite setting more in line with the ILO convention on tripartite consultation and related provisions concerned, however major challenges remain. The modified Labour Law of 2008 foresaw the creation of a consultative committee in the Ministry of Labour, regrouping the authorities, employers and workers. The legislation establishing a tripartite committee dealing with the approval of labour unions entered into force in May 2010. In terms of social rights, Jordan established a National Pay Equity Committee in July 2011, co-chaired by the Ministry of Labour and the Jordanian National Women’s Commission. As far as capacity strengthening of local grassroots CSOs is concerned, the Promoting Local Economic Development in Jordan (PLEDJ) project aimed at contributing to raising awareness and capacity building of local civil society stakeholders as Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) to enhance their skills in economic development activities at Governorate and Municipalities levels. (KPI 3.2.3)

Jordan’s ranking on the 141st place on the Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom index (7 ranks down from the preceding year) shows the challenges still confronted by the sector, especially when taking into consideration its worsening position ever since 2009 when it still ranked 112th. Access to around 300 news websites was blocked within Jordan in June 2013 under a new media law that drastically restricts online freedom of information. The EU-Jordan cooperation portfolio covering the period 2007-2013 has one intervention with an explicit support focus of the media in Jordan. The FD 23849 entitled “Support to Civil Society and Media in Jordan” with a budget of EUR 10 million got a primary approval in 2012 in the wake of the events that stirred the Southern Neighbourhood region but only got its secondary approval on 25 November 2013. Reason why it was not yet included as approved in this Country Level Evaluation interventions portfolio, and reason also why it still is too early to assess its progress and results. A cautious approach was preferred by the project while still awaiting some crucial legislation to guarantee more independence and operational freedom for the media. The programme’s underlying strategic approach based on lessons learnt from previous experiences is that improved quality and independence of the media in Jordan can be achieved more effectively through a dialogue, strategy and action plan between on the one side, the responsible ministers, the legislators and the Royal Court, and on the other side, state and non-state stakeholders in the media sector. Capacity and institution building of the media sector only takes place after the completion of the pillar on development, updating and approval of a strategy and action plan for the media. This programme is a direct offshoot of the Joint Communication of the European Commission and of the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy entitled “A new response to a changing Neighbourhood” of 25 May 2011 as a reaction to events unfolding in the EU’s southern Neighbourhood including Jordan. (KPI 3.2.4)
JC-3.3
EU support contributed to the further strengthening of Civil Society Organisations as empowered partners in the policy/political dialogue and the national and local development processes

List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 3.3 (codes and definition)

| KPI-3.3.1 | Degree to which the legal framework, the channels and procedures for systematic consultation of civil society on policy dialogue and development matters are effectively strengthened, both at central and local levels |
| KPI-3.3.2 | Degree to which the institutional, managerial, technical and human capacities of independent and representative CSOs are further strengthened, and Apex structures, federations and networks and platforms are starting to get created and operationalised |
| KPI-3.3.3 | Degree to which the political dialogue between government and CSOs is strengthened and institutionalised with civil society effectively impacting on political dialogue agenda setting through lobbying |
| KPI-3.3.4 | Enhanced degree of involvement and responsibilities of Civil Society Organisations in the design and implementation of EU cooperation strategies and action programmes |

**KPI-3.3.1:**

Degree to which the legal framework, the channels and procedures for systematic consultation of civil society on policy dialogue and development matters are effectively strengthened, both at central and local levels

**Main Findings on KPI-3.3.1:**

In the introduction to the 2013 Jordan Poverty Reduction Strategy, His Majesty King Abdullah II Ibn Al Hussein stressed: “Our citizens are our primary asset. They are the engine of development; and their wellbeing is its objective... In this regard, the government will improve the current mechanism for helping the poor, and will seek to enhance the role of civil society organisations and the private sector in providing parallel support programs”. The Strategy continues that there are two major donors supporting civil society sector reform in Jordan, while many donors work with individual CSOs. These are USAD through its Civil Society Programme and the European Union. The EU support in the 2007 to 2010 period concerned the development of civil society and participatory democracy. To achieve this the EU: (i) undertook a mapping of CSOs; (ii) strengthened and established civil society umbrella and networking organisations; and (iii) expanded the capacity of these organizations to engage with CBOs, and government and parliamentary representatives. With regard to the legal framework, the channels and procedures for systematic consultation of civil society, the strategy refers to the Ministry of Social Development’s key programmes with CSOs. The meaningful involvement of CSOs and community members in national strategic planning processes—whether facilitated by MoPIC or other ministries—should be ensured to develop policy that responds better to local realities in Jordan. Not only would such policies benefit from the potential of community participation during implementation and contribute to social inclusion, but the government would also be perceived as better serving the needs of its citizens. This process is to be coordinated by MoPIC, and would ultimately deliver a formalized mechanism by which citizen participation could be guaranteed.

Throughout the EU-Jordan CSP period 2007-2013, support to civil society proactive participation in Jordan’s reform processes in the areas of policy dialogue on democracy, good governance, human rights, media and justice and related development interventions has been prioritized not only in the policy and strategic documents (e.g. CSP-NIPs priority 1) but also through the concrete interventions. A CLE database search on the key words civil society, consultation, central and local learnt that from the 43 financing decisions, four relate to these keywords with a budget of EUR 26 million of which about half has been allocated in the year 2012. Of the 401 contract 34 relate to the above keywords with a volume of EUR 8.5 million. The second EU-Jordan NIP (2011-2013) acknowledges the central role of the Jordanian authorities who recognise the need for more inclusive consultation on policy making and the implementation of reform. It however at the same time adds that business associations, trade unions, employers, employees and other civil society actors must be prepared to fully participate in a socio-economic dialogue. The programming document for that matter spells out that the support could target the Jordanian Economic and Social Committee, created with the support of the European Economic and Social Committee. The EU’s new response strategy with the Southern Neighbourhood of 2011 further expands this support in recognition of civil society playing a
pivotal role in advancing women’s rights, greater social justice and respect for minorities as well as environmental protection and resource efficiency. The EU is supporting this greater political role for non-state actors through a partnership with societies, helping CSOs to develop their advocacy capacity, their ability to monitor reform and their role in implementing and evaluating EU programmes. The EU Delegations seek to bring partner countries’ governments and civil society together in a structured dialogue on key cooperation areas. EU funding for such actions is delivered through the establishment of a dedicated fund, the Civil Society Facility. Furthermore, there are the EU CSO strengthening programmes at both central and local levels through SPRING (Support to Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth) funds or through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), or the NSA-LAs thematic / horizontal programme. For the programmes on human rights and democracy an integrated strategic approach has been adopted, involving a wider governance agenda of dialogue and collaboration between government and civil society.

The CSOs focus group discussion and mini-survey conducted during the Country Level Evaluation field visit to Jordan learnt that Civil Society Organisation have a rather negative appreciation of the way systematic consultation of civil society on policy dialogue and development matters has evolved over time in the 2007-2013. The quality of this systematic consultation was appreciated with a low 1.8 (on 5) score, both for the national and for the local level consultations. CSOs referred to this consultation and dialogue as a façade, not systematic, gender biased, thematic selective and window dressing. Consultations at the local level just started to be introduced in fact. The situation reportedly has worsened in the wake of the Arab Spring, with government now taking back what was built up at that time. The prevailing regional insecurity and its impact on the country reportedly has CSOs closely watched by security agencies, impacting on their independence if not daily operations. In the 8th Meeting of the Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Governance and Democracy on 9 September 2013, it was underlined that the EU considers as crucial the cooperation with civil society in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and intends to give weight and space for NGOs to work in a favourable environment. To this end, the EU enquired whether the Association Law would be modified in order to provide more independence and less restriction to the NGOs in terms of registration and foreign funding. The EU recalled the case of the Jordanian NGO “Tamkeen” that in July 2012 was not allowed (by the Ministry of Political Development) to accept EU funding in the framework of an EIDHR project targeting the rights of migrant workers and refugees.

KPI-3.3.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- CLE Database of 43 EU Financing Decisions and 401 Contracts (benefiting Jordan, 2007-2013 period)
- Mapping Study Non-State Actors (2010), p.20
- Mapping Study Non-State Actors (2010), p.22

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Jordan Poverty Reduction Strategy (2013), p.4
- NIP II - 2007-2010, p.35
- Civil Society Facility for the Neighbourhood. New Response, CN 2011, p.4
- CSP 2007-2013, p.15

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- Please see below
- IKRS-2 (2014). p.6 - on links with non-state actors
**KPI-3.3.1 (iii) Additional information from field phase**

Excerpt from the summary analysis of the June 2014 mini-survey with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) on Democratic Governance – Survey Question 1:

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<th>Question 1</th>
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<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>Average Score</th>
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<td>Number of scores</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td></td>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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Summary of narrative comments by respondents

- There is facade in the way dialogues are conducted. Although there is a promotion that there are several dialogues between the government and the CSOs, still it is only on a pro forma basis.
- Not all relevant stakeholders are invited to the dialogues. CSOs who receive money from the government are mostly invited in order to support government decisions. While some CSOs are excluded to participate in such events intentionally.
- Not systematic, but in some occasions prime ministers meet women rights activists. Some government representatives attend civil society meetings, also participated in civil society activities.
- After the Arab Spring, there was a start of consultations, at the national level, for political reform but it led to nowhere because the implementation of the results of the dialogue was very little. Women were present as a decorative procedure with no impact. 4 women participated out of 54 representatives, but no discussion over women participation in development matters.

Excerpt from the summary analysis of the June 2014 mini-survey with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) on Democratic Governance – Survey Question 2:

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<th>Question 2</th>
<th>Scores on 0-5 Scale</th>
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<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>Average Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To what extent in your opinion has systematic consultation of civil society on policy dialogue and development matters improved in Jordan in the 2007-2013 period – at local level?</td>
<td>Number of scores</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.80</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of narrative comments by respondents

- There are few collaborative advocacy efforts are taking place at the local level, but there is a little chance to amend and change policies at this level, because local governments are linked to the central government directly, therefore; although it might be easier to approach and do some changes, but still it is quite challenging
- No opinion
- Little progress has been introduced as governors at the local level just started to invite representatives of CSOs to periodic meetings. No tangible results.

Excerpt from the summary analysis of the June 2014 mini-survey with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) on Democratic Governance – PART IV.a

PART IV: Summary narrative overview of the CSOs assessments regarding EU-Jordan cooperation on democratic governance overall: main overall challenges, strengths and weaknesses, suggestions

| Main challenges to be addressed still for further strengthening of democratic governance in Jordan overall? |
| List of max. five most important challenges to be addressed, with the most important first, as ranked by the responding CSOs |
| 1st |
| - The interference of the security agency in the civic work. |
| - Lobbying for creation of real political will and to make it a priority. |
| - Women advancement needs a change in the Constitution by adding a “phrase” to forbid discrimination according to “gender”. |
- Judiciary independence.
- CSO’s as key player are not recognised by the government.

2nd
- The legislative framework for NGOs operation in Jordan in general.
- Lack of belief in civil society.
- Women participation in the workforce needs incentives like supporting services to lead to higher participation in the public life.
- Citizenship equality.
- CSO’s visions and point of views towards different issues are not taking into consideration when preparing any strategies.

3rd
- The lack of dialogue between CSOs and the Jordanian Government.
- Bad reputation of some civil society organisations.
- Increase percent of “quota” seats (10%) in Parliament to enable female parliamentarians to form a critical mass that affect change for women’s rights.
- Free and fair elections.
- Lack of confidence in the CSOs’ achievements and their contributions on the national and local level.

4th
- Hiring human resources at local levels that does not adhere to transparent best practices.
- Regional challenges
- Change to Association Law Family Law, Civil Pension Law & Nationality Law is urgently needed to lift tight control on civil society and women’s rights.
- Transparency.

5th
- -
- Lack of people’s involvement in public life because of threats of penalization on the laws governing public freedom.
- There is a need for an Electoral Law without the one-person-one-vote, which harms women participation and a woman quota in the Political Parties Law, especially at the top of the proportional lists.
- Accountability.

KPI-3.3.2: Degree to which the institutional, managerial, technical and human capacities of independent and representative CSOs are further strengthened, and Apex structures, federations and networks and platforms are starting to get created and operationalised

Main Findings on KPI-3.3.2:

Capacity strengthening of CSOs with regard to their institutional, managerial, technical and human capacities is widely recognized as a crucial requirement for their further empowerment as partners in the political / policy dialogue with Government as well as for their efficient and effective functioning with regard to development interventions on the ground. Studies and lessons learnt from previous experiences as in the case of the media also indicate that for such capacity development to bear results, a necessary enabling environment for CSOs to function effectively is required. In the case of the media this pertains to availability of an agreed upon strategic plan for development of the media, in the case of the CSOs in general this in first instance pertains to the legal framework for CSO’s including their registration.

The EU mapping study of Non-State Actors in Jordan of July 2010 highlighted that capacity strengthening of civil society is a requirement for them to play a more effective role in all aspects of sustainable development. At the same time important weaknesses in training / capacity building of CSOs are identified, including: (i) Despite the significant investments in training, there are questionable returns to the end user; (ii) An over-emphasis on training courses and workshops and a lack of alternative learning mechanisms (placements, mentoring, on-the-job training, etc.); (iii) An over-supply of ad hoc courses, not integrated into practice; (iv) Training as a way of spending budgets rather than investing in organisations; (v) No accepted system for quality assurance of training or trainers; (vi) Training of grassroots Community Based Organisations (CBOs) particularly is weak, with a lack of materials in Arabic and adapted to the local context; (vii) A lack of a “ladder of competence” to build skills (individual and organisational).

This same mapping study also concluded that for capacity building of CSOs to be more adequate and effective it is necessary to make such programmes more fit to the specificities and specific roles of the different types of CSOs. For this it presents a hierarchy of CSOs based on scale and mandate with four levels: Grassroots CBOs, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), umbrella organisations, and thematic alliances and coalitions. Each level has its own specific needs and requirements in terms of capacity building, both human and, especially, organisational – institutional. This is confirmed by the December 2012 study of the University of Jordan on the role of civil society organisations in the political reform in Jordan.
When asked what type of obstacles they were facing, significant internal and institutional weaknesses are reported, including (i) Weak networking and coordination between institutions, (ii) Absence of real democracy within the institutions themselves, and (iii) Lack of coordination and joint action between CSOs and civic movements.

In accordance with these observations, more focused attention is given to strategies for the creation and strengthening of national thematic alliances, federations and umbrella organisations. The mapping study in this connection highlights that thematic strategies can involve umbrella organisations whose basic interests may not necessarily appear aligned, such as labour unions and chambers of commerce. In this alliance-building arena, they are able to coordinate around areas of shared interests such as combating child labour, promoting health and safety at work, or enforcing environmental standards. Through united action, public policy development could lead to strategic long term benefits for the common good. Such consensus building interventions strengthen national alliances; the public profile of all actors is raised and citizens see the value of public policy dialogue. In the CSP-NIP priority area of developing civil society and participatory democracy is highlighted that the programme continues support for developing the dialogue between public authorities and non-state actors. This support would help non-state actors strengthen their structure by setting up platforms, networks or umbrella organisations and expanding their capacity to interact with (a) the government and parliamentary representatives and (b) small organisations. Action to facilitate dialogue between civil society and lower levels of government (municipal councils) will be also considered.

EU’s Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility 2011-2013 has as first of three components the strengthening of civil society capacity, through exchanges of good practice and training, to promote national reform and increase public accountability, to enable them to become stronger actors in driving reform at national level and stronger partners in the implementation of ENP objectives.

In the context of the EC-Jordan CSP-NIPs, the action fiche of the support to democratic governance project indicates Jordan to have Jordan has more than 3,000 civil society organisations, with 4 sub-groups identified in accordance with the mapping study. It asserts that while the 1st category of about 1,500 CBOs operates within a given narrow locality and tends not to extend its operations, the other categories are a legitimate and valuable force and among them, a hundred organisations have the potential to accelerate the pace of political reform. On the other hand, the new decentralisation plan will give the opportunity also to CBOs to create or increase their influence towards local policies. The action fiche of the recently (25 November 2013) approved Support to Civil Society and Media in Jordan intervention strongly concentrates on Community Based Organisations at the grassroots level. In the Action Fiche is asserted that capacity building initiatives were over-emphasising training courses and workshops in opulent premises with little attention to community-based organisations. The intervention’s priority is to support community-based organisations, in particular in the rural and remote areas to improve the environment and conditions that enable them to be more involved in policy issues as well as political, social, cultural and economic rights of citizens at the municipal and governorate level.

In reply the question to which degree CSOs’ Apex structures, federations, networks and platforms have been created and strengthened with EU support, the CSOs participating in the Country Level Evaluation’s CSOs survey and focus group discussion expressed their strong appreciation with an average 2.4 score (on a 0-5 scale), pointing at the substantial challenges still to be met in this regard. In the other direction, the relationship of CSOs with grassroots organisations and the extent of CSOs activities and impact on the ground at the level of the ultimate beneficiaries is not always evident. Many of the registered CSOs are traditional, tribal or extended family type organisations with a restricted / selective development agenda in terms of beneficiaries targeting.

KPI-3.3.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- CLE Database of 43 EU Financing Decisions and 401 Contracts (benefiting Jordan, 2007-2013 period)
- Source: EC mapping study of Non-State Actors in Jordan, July 2010, p.11
- Centre of Strategic Studies, University of Jordan (2012); The Role of Civil Society Organizations in the Political Reform in Jordan; Amman, December 2012.
- Society Organizations in the Political Reform in Jordan; Amman, December 2012.
- Please see below

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
Action Fiche 21931 Support to Democratic Governance, 2010, pp. 6-7
Action Fiche (2012) Support to civil society and media in Jordan (ENPI/2012/023-849)
Action Fiche, Support to Civil Society and Media in Jordan (2012), p.4-5
New Response (2011), p.4
NIP 2007-2010, p.25
Centre of Strategic Studies, University of Jordan (2012): The Role of Civil Society Organizations in the Political Reform in Jordan; Amman, December 2012, pp. 58-59

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- Excerpt from the summary analysis of the June 2014 mini-survey with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) on Democratic Governance – Survey Question 6:
- Excerpt from the summary analysis of the June 2014 mini-survey with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) on Democratic Governance – PART IV.b

KPI-3.3.2 (i) Data, figures and tables:
CLE Jordan, IR, 2014, Chapter 2 National Background and Context, pp. 24-25 – Civil Society

When asked what type of obstacles they were facing, the highest type of obstacles reported were of a financial nature or of a bureaucratic nature, followed by security obstacles, internal administrative and legal. Commonly reported were cultural barriers / obstacles voiced about the way CSOs are perceived. When CSOs were surveyed about what they believed ought to take place in order to overcome the challenges facing them, the most frequent responses were for changing the government’s position/attitude towards CSOs (35%); followed by enhancing public awareness (20%); and financial aid and assistance. However, also significant internal and institutional weaknesses are reported including: (i) Weak networking and coordination between institutions; (ii) The absence of real democracy within the institutions themselves, and; (iii) Lack of coordination and joint action between CSOs and civic movements.

KPI-3.3.3: Degree to which the political dialogue between government and CSOs is strengthened and institutionalised with civil society effectively impacting on political dialogue agenda setting through lobbying

Main Findings on KPI-3.3.3:
The EC mapping study of Non-State Actors in Jordan concluded that the policy and institutional framework in Jordan is supportive of an enhanced role for non-state actors in public policy dialogue. Statements by H.M. King Abdullah refer to the vital role that civil society plays in the public policy process. Jordanian civil society emerged from particular social, economic and political contexts. Most NSAs were established by groups of citizens who shared common interests, mainly seeking to improve the socio-economic conditions of their members. More recently NSAs have the opportunity to engage in public policy dialogue. This can deliver strategic benefits by: (a) Conferring legitimacy on public policy decisions, (b) Increasing the pool of policy ideas, (c) Supporting diverse views and promoting pluralism. All NSAs have the potential to engage in such dialogue and to play diverse roles that draw on their particular strengths. Such roles include: (a) Participating in consultation, (b) Exchanging information, (c) Providing up-to-date reliable data, (d) Expressing priorities, (e) Building consensus, (f) Monitoring public policy outcomes and, (g) Assessing impact.

It is recognized that the most potential for broad state / non-state dialogue lies with membership-based NSAs that are organised hierarchically, at local, governorate and national levels. The most important are the umbrella organisations that represent charities, cooperatives, women’s organisations, the business sector, associations and unions. With a combined membership of around three quarters of a million, these organisations can, in theory, represent the diverse interests of significant segments of the population. These umbrella organisations need to continuously strengthen their communication flows within their hierarchy and promote accountability among all their members to ensure that they speak with a mandate. A fruitful area for public policy dialogue at national level is found to be around ‘thematic strategies’ where state and non-state actors engage in consensus building to develop public policy responses to address national challenges such as poverty and unemployment. On the other hand, it is recognized that the process of decentralisation to the governorate level opens up significant opportunity for CBOs to dialogue with local authorities concerning local policies and plans. There is possibility for the government to work closely with NSA partners to develop an integrated ‘bottom-up’ strategy for state / non-state dialogue that addresses
local, municipal, governorate and national decision-making.

The 2007-2013 CSP and NIPs and the operations thereunder acknowledge this dual role and potentials of capacity strengthened CSOs. By way of illustration, the Support to Democratic Governance programme and the recently approved Support to Civil Society and Media in Jordan are supportive to these two approaches, which necessarily need to be complementary and mutually reinforcing. That this not necessarily is a smooth transition process may be illustrated by the difficulties the implementation of the democratic governance programme is facing and by the delayed approval of the support to civil society and media in Jordan programme (a.o. in relation to restrictive CSOs registration legislation). As reported earlier in relation to other indicators under this JC based on the ENP Jordan annual progress reports, important improvements are registered with regard to the regulatory and institutional framework for economic non-state actors in the field of social dialogue and tripartism more in line with the ILO conventions concerned (including ECOSOC, Tripartite Committee, National Pay Equity Committee. There however is no information available to the CLE team with the regard to the channels, the frequency, the participation, the contents and outcomes of these meetings and other elements of the institutionalization of the GoHKoJ – Civil Society political dialogue, neither on the actual lobbying capacity of the CSOs concerned on these matters.

Also during the evaluation field visit, including the field visit interviews and the focus group discussions with main CSO and government stakeholders concerned, it was not possible to get an accurate or even indicative picture of these consultation processes and the (institutional) policy/political dialogue fora through which they are facilitated. There also is a lack of systematic internal dialogue amongst CSOs and an absence of collaborative advocacy efforts, symptomatic for a most diverse CSO scene. On the evaluation mini-survey and CSOs focus group discussion question to what extent CSOs effectively impact on political dialogue and agenda setting at present in Jordan, the lowest of all survey scores of 1.60 (on a 0-5 scale) was given. One of the answers given synthesizes the actual situation as follows: “Very low impact. In Jordan, there are NGOs created by the authorities. These are included in dialogues, if necessary as a decorative measure. But, CSOs are not taken seriously, especially if the leaders are labelled as “opposition”.

KPI-3.3.3 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Jordan Public Expenditure Perspectives, Dec. 2011
- University of Jordan (2013), The Role of Civil Society Organisations in the Political Reform in Jordan

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- University of Jordan, Center for Strategic Studies, The Role of CSOs in the Political Reform in Jordan, 2013, p.39
- Action Fiche, Support to Justice Reform and Good Governance in Jordan (2008), p.9
- Centre of Strategic Studies, University of Jordan (2012); The Role of Civil Society Organizations in the Political Reform in Jordan; Amman, December 2012.
- CLE Jordan, IR, 2014, Chapter 2 National Background and Context, pp. 24-25 – Civil Society
- CLE Jordan, IR (2014), Chapter 2 Social Situation - Social Protection and Social Security, p.11

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- Excerpt from the summary analysis of the June 2014 mini-survey with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) on Democratic Governance – Survey Question 7:
- Excerpt from the summary analysis of the June 2014 mini-survey with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) on Democratic Governance – PART IV.
KPI-3.3.4: Enhanced degree of involvement and responsibilities of Civil Society Organisations in the design and implementation of EU cooperation strategies and action programmes

Main Findings on KPI-3.3.4:

There are indications that Civil Society Organisations have been duly involved in the design of the EU-Jordan cooperation strategy and programme. The European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) mid-term review mentions in connection with the Jordan CSP National Indicative Programme 2011-2013 preparation that both Brussels and Amman-based CSOs were consulted. A first programming mission took place in Amman in February 2009. A large number of local and international civil society organisations were invited to a roundtable discussion on the EC’s assistance strategy and possible avenues for future cooperation. Around 20 representatives reportedly participated in a lively discussion. The Commission subsequently drafted a concept note outlining the envisaged priorities for EC, assistance in the period 2001-2013. The concept note was posted on the EC Delegation’s website with an invitation to comment. Five CSOs (local, regional and international) provided contributions. Their main recommendations stressed the need to: (i) Attach more importance to the first CSP-NIP priority of political reform and good governance, (ii) Attach more importance to sustainable development of the agricultural sector, (iii) Support capacity-building of CSOs and conduct a needs assessment survey, and (iv) Promote participation of women in political and economic life. In the absence of further documentary evidence on the preparation processes of the CSP, the NIPs and the EU-Jordan ENP Action Plans, it is difficult to more firmly confirm the type, the intensity and quality of this involvement.

There is documentary evidence of an enhanced degree of involvement and responsibilities of CSOs in the implementation of EU cooperation strategies and action programmes. The identification and programming tools of EU interventions foresee for a standard screening of the active involvement and responsibilities of CSOs in the different phases of the integrated project/programme cycle, and this particularly in the wake of the new EU response strategy for the Southern Neighbourhood of 2011 calling for strengthened partnerships with civil society (component 3: Promoting an inclusive approach to reforms by increasing the involvement of non-state actors in national policy dialogue and in the implementation of bilateral programmes). The 2011-2013 NIP in this regard explicitly foresees that CSOs will be consulted on the design of the measures to be implemented under the programme and might be involved in the monitoring process. Both the EU NSAs mapping study of 2010 and the University of Jordan 2012 study on the role of CSOs in the political reform in Jordan point out the main remaining challenges regarding a more inclusive involvement of CSO in the design and implementation of donor cooperation strategies and programmes. This particularly pertains to consultations and needs assessments regarding priorities setting and to a closer involvement in civil society in monitoring processes. On the other hand, as covered in the assessments of the other indicators under this JC, there equally is a need for CSO capacity strengthening to enable actual assumption of these roles and responsibilities in a more effective and qualitative manner.

This was confirmed by the contacted CSOs during the evaluation field phase on the occasion of the interviews and focus group discussions and also in the replies to the mini-survey on democratic governance. CSOs expressed their relative satisfaction about their involvement in the design of EU cooperation strategies and programmes with Jordan (average score of 3.00 on a 0-5 scale). A less positive overall reply (average 2.20 score) was received with regard to their involvement in the actual implementation and monitoring of EU cooperation strategies and programmes. At the same time, improvements in this over time are also reported. The strengthening of CSOs involvement and ownership programmes and projects throughout the integrated programme/project cycle is also emphasized and proactively pursued with regard to both the ENI Regional Southern Mediterranean Strategy (2014-2020) and Multiannual Indicative Programme (2014-2017) and in relation to the next EU-Jordan country level geographical strategizing and programming through the Single Support Framework 2014-2017. Delegations of the European Union are now requested to seek the feedback of relevant national authorities, but also that of national civil society organisations, Member States of the European Union and key donors. These consultations are documented and their salient elements incorporated in the final version of the document. For that purpose, the EU Delegation to Jordan organised a meeting on 6 November 2013 with civil society organisations in order to share your opinions on the document.
### KPI-3.3.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) **Data, figures and tables:**
- [ ]

(ii) **Key extracts from documents:**
- Mid Term Review of ENPI (2009), p.7
- NIP 2011-2013, p.18
- New Response (2011), p.4
- IRIS EU Support for CS (2012), p.13
- Memo on the Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility 11/638, p.2
- Mid Term Review of ENPI (2009), p.4
- Mid Term Review of ENPI (2009), p.7
- CSP 2007-2013, p.6
- CLE Jordan, IR, 2014, Chapter 2 National Background and Context, pp. 24-25 – Civil Society
- Centre of Strategic Studies, University of Jordan (2012); The Role of Civil Society Organizations in the Political Reform in Jordan; Amman, December 2012, pp. 58-59

(iii) **Additional information from field phase:**
- Please see below

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### KPI-3.3.4 (iii) Additional information from field phase

**Excerpt from the summary analysis of the June 2014 mini-survey with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) on Democratic Governance – Survey Question 8:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 8</th>
<th>Scores on 0-5 Scale</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>Average Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extent to which in your opinion CSOs have been involved in the design of EU cooperation strategies and programmes with Jordan?</td>
<td>Number of scores</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of narrative comments by respondents (brief explanations / score justifications):**
- It was a few involvement in the design of EU strategies.
- No opinion.
- To a very minor extent, CSOs are summoned to meetings, sometimes to express opinions. But no serious involvement in building strategies for the EU-Jordan cooperation, even in matters related to CSO conditions.

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**Excerpt from the summary analysis of the June 2014 mini-survey with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) on Democratic Governance – Survey Question 9:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 9</th>
<th>Scores on 0-5 Scale</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>Average Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extent to which in your opinion CSOs are actively involved in the implementation and monitoring of EU cooperation strategies and programmes with Jordan?</td>
<td>Number of scores</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EU support contributed to the further strengthening of Civil Society Organisations as empowered partners in the policy/political dialogue and the national and local development processes

Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-3.3 (based on the KPIs main findings)

As acknowledged by both government and civil society key stakeholders concerned, and as further attested to during the evaluation’s field visit focus group discussion with CSOs, EU support substantially contributed to the further strengthening of Civil Society Organisations as empowered partners in the policy/political dialogue and the national and local development processes.

Throughout the EU-Jordan CSP period 2007-2013, support to civil society’s proactive participation in Jordan’s reform processes in the areas of policy dialogue on democracy, good governance, human rights, media and justice and related development interventions has been prioritized not only in the policy and strategic documents (e.g. CSP-NIPs priority 1) but also through concrete interventions. A CLE database search on the key words civil society, consultation, central and local learnt that from the 43 financing decisions, four relate to these keywords with a budget of EUR 26 million of which about half has been allocated in the year 2012. Of the 401 contracts 34 relate to the above keywords with a volume of EUR 8.5 million. The second EU-Jordan NIP (2011-2013) acknowledges the central role of the Jordanian authorities who recognise the need for more inclusive consultation on policy making and the implementation of reform. It however at the same time adds that business associations, trade unions, employers, employees and other civil society actors must be prepared to fully participate in a socio-economic dialogue.

The EU’s new response strategy with the Southern Neighbourhood of 2011 further expands this support in recognition of civil society playing a pivotal role in advancing women’s rights, greater social justice and respect for minorities as well as environmental protection and resource efficiency (e.g. through the Civil Society Facility, SPRING, the EIDHR and NSA-LA thematic/horizontal programme, amongst others).

The EU is supporting this greater political role for non-state actors through a partnership with societies, helping CSOs to develop their advocacy capacity, their ability to monitor reform and their role in implementing and evaluating EU programmes. The EU Delegations seeks to bring partner countries’ governments and civil society together in a structured dialogue on key areas of our co-operation. EU funding for such actions is delivered through the establishment of a dedicated fund, the Civil Society Facility. Furthermore, there are the EU CSO strengthening programmes at both central and local levels through SPRING (Support to Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth) or through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), or the NSA-LAs thematic / horizontal programme. For the programmes on human rights and democracy an integrated strategic approach has been adopted, involving a wider governance agenda of dialogue and collaboration between government and civil society.

The CSOs focus group discussion and mini-survey conducted during the Country Level Evaluation field visit to Jordan learnt that Civil Society Organisations have a rather negative appreciation of the way systematic consultation of civil society on policy dialogue and development matters has evolved over time in the 2007-2013 period. The quality of this systematic consultation was appreciated with a low 1.8 (on 5) score, both for the national and for the local level consultations. CSOs referred to this consultation and dialogue as a façade, not systematic, gender biased, thematic selective and window dressing. Consultations at the local level just started to be introduced in fact. The situation reportedly has worsened in the wake of the Arab Spring, with government now taking back what was built up at that time. The prevailing regional insecurity and its impact on the country reportedly has CSOs closely watched by security agencies, impacting on their independence if not daily operations. In the 8th Meeting of the Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Governance and Democracy on 9 September 2013 for example, it was underlined that the EU considers as crucial the cooperation with civil society in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and intends to give weight and space for NGOs to work in a favourable environment. To this end, the EU enquired whether the Association Law would be modified in order to provide more independence and less restriction to the NGOs in terms of...
registration and foreign funding. The EU recalled the case of the Jordanian NGO "Tamkeen" that in July 2012 was not allowed (by the Ministry of Political Development) to accept EU funding in the framework of an EIDHR project targeting the rights of migrant workers and refugees. (KPI 3.3.1)

Priority attention has been given to and substantive resources have been allocated accordingly to the strengthening of CSO capacities under the EU-Jordan cooperation in the 2007-2013 period. Capacity strengthening of CSOs with regard to their institutional, managerial, technical and human capacities is widely recognized as a crucial requirement for their further empowerment as partners in the political / policy dialogue with Government as well as for their efficient and effective functioning with regard to development interventions on the ground. The EU mapping study of Non-State Actors in Jordan of July 2010 highlighted that capacity strengthening of civil society is a requirement for them to play a more effective role in all aspects of sustainable development. At the same time important weaknesses in training / capacity building of CSOs are identified, including: (i) Despite the significant investments in training, there are questionable returns to the end user; (ii) An over-emphasis on training courses and workshops and a lack of alternative learning mechanisms (placements, mentoring, on-the-job training, etc.); (iii) An over-supply of ad hoc courses, not integrated into practice; (iv) Training as a way of spending budgets rather than investing in organisations; (v) No accepted system for quality assurance of training or trainers; (vi) Training of grassroots Community Based Organisations (CBOs) particularly is weak, with a lack of materials in Arabic and adapted to the local context; (vii) A lack of a “ladder of competence” to build skills (individual and organisational). This same mapping study also concluded that for capacity building of CSOs to be more adequate and effective it is necessary to make such programmes more fit to the specificities and specific roles of the different types of CSOs. In accordance with these observations, more focused attention is given to strategies for the creation and strengthening of national thematic alliances, federations and umbrella organisations. EU's Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility 2011-2013 has as first of three components the strengthening of civil society capacity, through exchanges of good practice and training, to promote national reform and increase public accountability, to enable them to become stronger actors in driving reform at national level and stronger partners in the implementation of ENP objectives. In the context of the EC-Jordan CSP-NIPs, the action fiche of the support to democratic governance project indicates that Jordan has more than 3,000 civil society organisations, with 4 sub-groups identified in accordance with the mapping study. The recently (25 November 2013) approved Support to Civil Society and Media in Jordan intervention strongly concentrates on Community Based Organisations (CBOs) at the grassroots level.

In reply to the question to which degree CSOs’ Apex structures, federations, networks and platforms have been created and strengthened with EU support, the CSOs participating in the Country Level Evaluation's CSOs survey and focus group discussion expressed their strong appreciation with an average 2.4 score (on a 0-5 scale), pointing at the substantial challenges still to be met in this regard. In the other direction, the relationship of CSOs with grassroots organisations and the extent of CSOs activities and impact on the ground at the level of the ultimate beneficiaries is not always evident. Many of the registered CSOs are traditional, tribal or extended family type organisations with a restricted / selective development agenda in terms of beneficiaries targeting. (KPI 3.3.2)

Major challenges remain with regard to the strengthening and institutionalisation of the political dialogue between government and CSOs for civil society to be able to effectively impact on political dialogue agenda setting through lobbying. The EC mapping study of Non-State Actors in Jordan concluded that the policy and institutional framework in Jordan is supportive to an enhanced role for non-state actors in public policy dialogue. Jordanian civil society emerged from particular social, economic and political contexts. Most CSOs were established by groups of citizens who shared common interests, mainly seeking to improve the socio-economic conditions of their members. More recently CSOs have the opportunity to engage in public policy dialogue. It is recognized that the most potential for broad state / non-state dialogue lies with membership-based CSOs that are organised hierarchically, at local, governorate and national levels. The most important are the umbrella organisations that represent charities, cooperatives, women's organisations, the business sector, associations and unions. With a combined membership of around three quarters of a million, these organisations can, in theory, represent the diverse interests of significant segments of the population. On the other hand, it is recognized that the process of decentralisation to the governorate level opens up significant opportunities for Community Based Organisations (CBOs) to dialogue with local authorities concerning local policies and plans. There thus are emerging more opportunities for the government to work closely with NSA partners to develop an integrated ‘bottom-up’ strategy for state / non-state dialogue that addresses local, municipal, governorate and national decision-making.

The 2007-2013 CSP and NIPs and the operations thereunder acknowledge this dual role and potentials of capacity strengthened CSOs. By way of illustration, the Support to Democratic Governance programme and
the recently approved Support to Civil Society and Media in Jordan are supportive to these two approaches, which necessarily need to be complementary and mutually reinforcing. That this not necessarily is a smooth transition process may be illustrated by the difficulties the implementation of the democratic governance programme is facing and by the delayed approval of the support to civil society and media in Jordan programme (a.o. in relation to restrictive CSOs registration legislation). As reported earlier in relation to other indicators under this JC based on the ENP Jordan annual progress reports, important improvements are registered with regard to the regulatory and institutional framework for economic non-state actors in the field of social dialogue and tripartism more in line with the ILO conventions concerned (including ECOSOC, Tripartite Committee, National Pay Equity Committee). There however is no information available to the CLE team with the regard to the channels, the frequency, the participation, the contents and outcomes of these meetings and other elements of the institutionalization of the GoHKoJ – Civil Society political dialogue, neither on the actual lobbying capacity of the CSOs concerned on these matters. It has proven not possible to get this information from the focus group discussions or the field visit interviews with main CSO and government stakeholders concerned, which already by itself may be significant for the level of institutionalization of this tripartite social dialogue. It was not possible to get an accurate or even indicative picture of these consultation processes and the (institutional) policy/political dialogue fora through which they are facilitated. This already in itself is indicative for the level of institutionalization of this tripartite social dialogue. There also is a lack of systematic internal dialogue amongst CSOs and an absence of collaborative advocacy efforts, symptomatic for a most diverse CSO scene. On the evaluation mini-survey and CSOs focus group discussion question to what extent CSOs effectively impact on political dialogue and agenda setting at present in Jordan, the lowest of all survey scores of 1.60 (on a 0-5 scale) was given. One of the answers given synthesizes the actual situation as follows: “Very low impact. In Jordan, there are NGOs created by the authorities. These are included in dialogues, if necessary as a decorative measure. But, CSOs are not taken seriously, especially if the leaders are labelled as “opposition”. (KPI 3.3.3)

There are indications that Civil Society Organisations have been duly involved in the design of the EU-Jordan cooperation strategy and programme. The European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) mid-term review mentions in connection with the Jordan CSP National Indicative Programme 2011-2013 preparation that both Brussels and Amman-based CSOs were consulted. In the absence of further documentary evidence on the preparation processes of the CSP, the NIPs and the EU-Jordan ENP Action Plans, it is difficult to more firmly confirm the type, the intensity and quality of this involvement.

There is documentary evidence of an enhanced degree of involvement and responsibilities of CSOs in the implementation of EU cooperation strategies and action programmes. The identification and programming tools of EU interventions foresee for a standard screening of the active involvement and responsibilities of CSOs in the different phases of the integrated project/programme cycle, and this particularly in the wake of the new EU response strategy for the Southern Neighbourhood of 2011 calling for strengthened partnerships with civil society. The 2011-2013 NIP in this regard explicitly foresees that CSOs need to be consulted on the design of the measures to be implemented under the programme and might be involved in the monitoring process. Both the EU NSAs mapping study of 2010 and the University of Jordan 2012 study on the role of CSOs in the political reform in Jordan point out the main remaining challenges regarding a more inclusive involvement of CSO in the design and implementation of donor cooperation strategies and programmes. This particularly pertains to consultations and needs assessments regarding priorities setting and to a closer involvement in civil society in monitoring processes. On the other hand, as covered in the assessments of the other indicators under this JC, there equality is a need for CSO capacity strengthening to enable assumption of these roles and responsibilities in a more effective and qualitative manner.

This was confirmed by the contacted CSOs during the evaluation field phase on the occasion of the interviews and focus group discussions and also in the replies to the mini-survey on democratic governance. CSOs expressed their relative satisfaction about their involvement in the design of EU cooperation strategies and programmes with Jordan (average score of 3.00 on a 0-5 scale). A less positive overall reply ( average 2.20 score) was received with regard to their involvement in the actual implementation and monitoring of EU cooperation strategies and programmes. At the same time, improvements in this over time are also reported. The strengthening of CSOs involvement and ownership programmes and projects throughout the integrated programme/project cycle is also emphasized and proactively pursued with regard to both the ENI Regional Southern Mediterranean Strategy (2014-2020) and Multiannual Indicative Programme (2014-2017) and in relation to the next EU-Jordan country level geographical strategizing and programming through the Single Support Framework 2014-2017. Delegations of the European Union are now requested to seek the feedback of relevant national authorities, but also that of national civil society organisations, Member States of the European Union and key donors. These consultations are documented and their salient elements incorporated in the final version of the document.
For that purpose, the EU Delegation to Jordan organised a meeting on 6 November 2013 with civil society organisations in order to share your opinions on the document. (KPI 3.3.4)

**JC-3.4**

**Within the concerted action of the international community, the EU-Jordan cooperation effectively contributed to enhanced political participation and open and fair elections**

**List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 3.4 (codes and definition)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPI-3.4.1</th>
<th>Extent to which representative democracy is effectively operational in Jordan, both at national and local levels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPI-3.4.2</td>
<td>Percentage increase in voters registration as a proxy indicator for the successfullness of political awareness raising and voters education campaigns (with breakdown of figures for women and young people, and for both national and local elections)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-3.4.3</td>
<td>Degree of transparency, openness, fairness and representativeness (in terms of voter turnout) of the national and local election processes supported by the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-3.4.4</td>
<td>Degree of timeliness and appropriateness of EU inputs in support of the electoral process, including voters education and preparation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KPI-3.4.1:** Extent to which representative democracy is effectively operational in Jordan, both at national and local levels

**Main Findings on KPI-3.4.1:**

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a constitutional Monarchy (in the Constitution, the political system is referred to as a hereditary monarchy with a parliamentary system) with a strong executive vested in the King and the Council of Ministers and a feeble Parliament. The Parliament consists of an Upper House, the Senate, with members appointed by the King and an elected Lower House, the House of Representatives. The elected Chamber of Deputies can initiate legislation, but it has to pass through the senate and government, which are both appointed by the King. Jordan has multi-party politics. However, political parties contest fewer than a fifth of the seats, while the rest go to independent politicians. Multi-party politics are not yet in a mature stage, while in the opinion of some independent sources the role of political parties still is somehow irrelevant even. Political parties are placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior (MoI). The MoI continues to chair the intergovernmental “Parties Affairs Committee” which registers / rejects new Parties. A new political parties law was enacted in May 2012. It removed the requirement for founding members to obtain security clearance and aimed to limit the interference of state entities in party life, but did not prescribe sanctions for doing so. The required number of founding members (500) remains unchanged. The law also introduced requirements as to the gender balance (a minimum quota of 15 seats allocated to women) and geographical representation from governorates among founders. The law prohibits forming a political party on religious, sectarian, ethnic, or factional basis, or on the basis of discrimination of gender or origin. In 2012, the number of registered political parties increased from 18 to 23. The last parliamentary elections were held on 23 January 2013, with a voter turnout of 56.7 per cent. Voter turnout for the recent local elections of 27 August 2013 was around 30% (with less than 10.5% in the capital Amman).

As is reported under the EU Support to Democratic Governance project, the main problems affecting the Chamber of Deputies include inadequate policy, technical, and organisational skills to perform the respective role of Deputies in a competitive, efficient, and effective manner. Important weaknesses also exist at the level of parliament's committees functioning that have fundamental limited oversight actions. The Chamber of Deputies has been under-involved in checking executive activities and in contributing top public policy formation. Parliament also lacks systems for accessing external information and interaction with stakeholders. Generally, little has been made of specialised groups, external research, and the views of the general public. There is a lack of data on relevant organisations working on committee's respective areas interest. These are the key concerns being addressed by the EU supported programme, be it with mixed results so far as reported.

The relationships between the Members of Parliament and their constituents are somehow non-existent in
terms of gathering citizen's expectations. Therefore, the role of representation of the MPs needs to be strengthened, especially towards citizen's associations, NGOs and Trade Unions. Finally, the expected decentralisation law will have a significant impact on the role of the Deputies which will be more focused on formulation of policies at national level. The newly elected members of Parliament will need to be properly trained on their new role considering the existence of the Local Councils.

Stronger local governance and greater responsiveness to citizen needs are expected to address Jordan's regional disparities and reduce pockets of poverty. With a view to fostering local development, the Government has improved the mechanism for capital investments at the municipal level. Many municipalities (though to a lesser extent the Greater Amman Municipality) still need to improve their municipal management capacity and budgeting. Main challenges include: (i) The increase of local participation in decision making, implementation and monitoring of programmes; (ii) Capacity strengthening of sub-national institutions at governorate and local municipal level to plan, carry out, and manage their development programmes; and (iii) The exploitation of local endowments and assets as a means of catalysing local economic development through tourism and small industries. The EU has been supporting capacity strengthening of local government at the level of the Governorates and the Municipalities. This includes for example capacity strengthening of Municipalities for the participatory development of inclusive Local Development plans in coordination with Civil Society Organisations.

In more critical assessments of democracy in Jordan and international cooperation support thereto, as those by the FRIDE European Think Tank for Global Action, it is asserted that the impact of international democracy assistance to Jordan is weakened by the geostrategic priorities of donors. It is argued that donors are unlikely to pressure for reform if some of their priorities, in the areas of counter-terrorism for example, run counter to democracy promotion. FRIDE argues that recent years have seen serious setbacks in political and civil liberties in Jordan and that these have been justified in terms of a heightened security situation. Obviously, the very tense and fragile regional security situation affecting Jordan obviously also has a major impact on the political agenda and dialogue, and on the political organisation of the country.

Women in Jordan have had the right to vote since 1974. The quota system was introduced in the 2003 elections, reserving six of 110 parliamentary seats for women candidates. The quota was doubled to 12 seats in 2010 and then to 15 seats for the 2013 election. The 60 senators in the Upper House are appointed by the king without a quota for women. In the last parliament, seven women were appointed senators from among 60 members of the Upper House and only one woman was elected to the Lower House outside the quota system. In the 2013 elections 18 women were elected to parliament, 15 through the quota, two as heads of national proportional representation lists, and one elected through the majoritarian system in the districts.

In the Human Rights Country Strategy 2012 update jointly prepared and issued by the EU Delegation and the Heads of Mission of the EU Member States to Jordan, the Chamber of Deputies and the Municipal Councils are referred to as the only political bodies in Jordan elected through direct elections. As part of the reform package the joint report lauded the 2012 Elections Law as expected to improve electoral process providing for more transparent elections, and more representative Chamber of Deputies. Moreover, important changes in voter registration may guarantee fairer elections. On the other hand, the 2012 Elections Law fails to meet certain demands of civil society, and recommendations made by the National Dialogue Committee. Although the 2012 Elections Law is step forward, the one-person, one-vote electoral system limits the representation of political parties, fosters tribalism and nepotism, and may not proportionately reflect voting preferences of the population, often leading to the underrepresentation of urban centres and Jordanians of Palestinian origins. Underrepresentation comes mostly from electoral districting. The national lists will not provide names of the parties that candidates represent, which further decentralizes political scene. The Law does not guarantee a fully anonymous voting, especially for illiterates. There are many limitations on both national suffrage and candidates running for the House of Representatives, including but not limited to a registration fee of 500 JOD for Parliament runners.

On the effectiveness of Parliament, the absence of political programme based political parties is noted, with the number of blocks only partially making up for this absence of political parties in the parliamentary work and most of the Members of Parliament considering themselves independent. Public support for the work of Members of the Parliament is generally very low in Jordan. It goes without saying that parliamentary elections and political parties are as the two sides of the parliamentary democracy coin. One cannot go without the other. The mission noted in some responsible quarters an enthusiasm for democratic elections but a rather lukewarm attitude towards multiparty parliamentary democracy. The Joint EU 2014 Report on the Implementation of the Human Rights Country Strategy in this regard clearly defined the objectives to be
Evaluation of the European Union’s Cooperation with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (2007-2013)
- Country Level Evaluation -

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPI-3.4.1 Main References and Sources of Information:</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>(i) Data, figures and tables:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Carter Center Study Mission Report (2013), P. 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Carter Center Study Mission Report (2013), P. 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Key extracts from documents:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Action Fiche 21931 Support to Democratic Governance, pp. 6-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ENP Jordan Annual Report 2011 (2012), p. 5 - EU support to Constitutional Court and Lower House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ENP - Progress Report Jordan - 2009, p.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>- FRIDE Assessing Democracy (2011, p.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ayoub State of Local Democracy (2010), p. 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- CLE Jordan – IR (2014), p. 17 - The constitutional and political system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Additional information from field phase:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KPI-3.4.2: Percentage increase in voters registration as a proxy indicator for the successfulness of political awareness raising and voters education campaigns (with breakdown of figures for women and young people, and for both national and local elections)

Main Findings on KPI-3.4.2:

Based on International IDEA figures, voter turn-out for the 2012 national elections was 56.50%, which is an increase in comparison to the 2010 elections with 53% and the 2007 elections with 54%. It however is lower than the 57.75% of the 2003 elections. The number of registered voters however decreased over the same period from 2.46 million in 2007 to 2.37 million in 2010 and further down to 2.27 million in 2013 whereas the voting age population in the same period increased from 3.04 million in 2007 over 3.71 million in 2010 to 3.76 million in 2013. This resulted in a relative decline of the voting age population (VAP) turn-out from 43.64% in 2007 down to 33.88% in 2010 and 34.11% in 2013. From these figures, one therefore cannot
conclude to positive trends in terms of voters’ registration neither in terms of voter turn-out. This is further confirmed by comparison to the 2003 elections which scored higher on all the above criteria.

In June, Parliament adopted a new Elections Law that added to the existing single non-transferable vote at Governorate level, a second, proportional vote at the national level. From early August until mid-October 2012, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) compiled a new voters lists, with over 2.3 out of 3.6 million eligible voters registered. For the first time, voters were assigned to specific polling stations. However, in July the Islamic Action Front, Jordan's major political party, and other opposition parties announced their boycott of the electoral process from registration to voting.

The EU Election Observation Mission on the 23 January 2013 parliamentary elections reported that the final voter list was compiled on the basis of a completely new voter registration exercise since 1989, included 2,272,182 voters, of which 51.8 per cent are women and 48.2 per cent men. Some 71 per cent of the eligible voters were registered during this exercise. Most political stakeholders challenged and questioned the accuracy of the final voter list largely due to the extensive use of proxy registration. Domestic observer coalitions had repeatedly stated their disapproval of the extensive proxy voter registration. The abuse of proxy registration legal provisions resulted not only in the registration of eligible citizens against their knowledge or even will, but also in the highly disputed malpractice of possession of multiple voter cards on behalf of others. A rigid implementation of the legal provisions of proxy registration for family relatives of first kind only and only through submission of national ID cards and not of family books or even without any documentation would have contributed to a broad confidence in the integrity of the voter register. On the positive side, the EOM noted that the issuance for the first time of single-use voter cards with safety features of high quality was introduced as an additional preventive measure against multiple voting and impersonation. The effort made by the Independent Election Commission was positive and went in the right direction. However, the Independent Election Commission lacked ownership over the voter registration process as it was not involved in recruiting, training and direct supervision of voter registration officers.

Municipal elections, which had last been held in 2007, took place on 27 August 2013. The elections were administered by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs, while the IEC monitored the process. Official election voter turnout was 37.3 %. The official turnout did not however reflect the approximately 1.25 million members of the armed- and security forces who abstained from participating in the elections following government instructions, despite the fact that, by law, they are eligible to vote in the municipal elections. For the first time in Jordan, thousands of volunteers from local CSOs observed the elections.

With regard to voter education, the EU EOM noted that the election Law does not foresee an explicit mandate for the Independent Election Commission to take on responsibility for voter education. It concluded that overall, voter education was a decisive element in the preparation and conduct of these elections, largely due to a number of factors including: (i) The first-time establishment of an Independent Election Commission, (ii) the introduction of a mixed electoral system, which incorporates proportional representation through a national constituency, (iii) the issuance of voter cards, and (iv) the new concept of pre-designed ballot papers. In the absence of a national voter education policy, the Independent Election Commission produced, displayed and disseminated numerous print products and broadcasted TV and radio spots; whilst civil society organisations mainly focused on outreach activities on district and municipality level. All these efforts were however limited and scattered. EU EOM noticed diverse and sometimes inconsistent, overlapping and diverse voter education activities by various electoral stakeholders.

**KPI-3.4.2 Main References and Sources of Information:**

- **(i) Data, figures and tables:**
  - Please see below

- **(ii) Key extracts from documents:**
  - Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), Jordan's Unfinished Journey (2013), p.6
  - National Democratic Institute (NDI), Preliminary Statement (2013), p.6
  - Ayoub, State of Local Democracy (2010), p.72
  - CLE Jordan, IR, 2014, Chapter 2 National Background and Context, p.22
Additional information from field phase:


KPI-3.4.2 (i) Data, figures and tables:

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), Website

Voter turnout data for Jordan (period 1989 – 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Voter Turn-out</th>
<th>Total vote</th>
<th>Registration</th>
<th>VAP Turn-out</th>
<th>Voting age population</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>56.50%</td>
<td>1,282,550</td>
<td>2,270,000</td>
<td>34.11%</td>
<td>3,759,533</td>
<td>6,508,887</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>1,256,100</td>
<td>2,370,000</td>
<td>33.88%</td>
<td>3,707,634</td>
<td>6,407,085</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>1,326,070</td>
<td>2,455,686</td>
<td>43.64%</td>
<td>3,038,947</td>
<td>5,723,000</td>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>57.75%</td>
<td>1,342,999</td>
<td>2,325,496</td>
<td>44.19%</td>
<td>3,038,947</td>
<td>5,307,470</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>47.45%</td>
<td>702,260</td>
<td>1,480,000</td>
<td>26.56%</td>
<td>2,644,116</td>
<td>5,508,576</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>54.77%</td>
<td>822,294</td>
<td>1,501,279</td>
<td>34.71%</td>
<td>2,369,280</td>
<td>4,936,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>53.06%</td>
<td>541,426</td>
<td>1,020,446</td>
<td>28.47%</td>
<td>1,901,640</td>
<td>4,134,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


KPI-3.4.3: Degree of transparency, openness, fairness and representativeness (in terms of voter turnout) of the national and local election processes supported by the EU

Main Findings on KPI-3.4.3:

The latest parliamentary elections for the 17th House of Representatives were held on 23 January 2013. The legal framework provides for the first time to the judiciary the role to adjudicate complaints for registration, candidacy and election results. The complaint resolution process is under-regulated and lacks detailed procedures and timelines. The quota in the new Election Law for women remained the same, 10 per cent (15 seats). A total of 191 contested, representing 13.4 per cent of the total number of candidates. Only 3 women gained a seat outside the quota system. Election day was calm and peaceful overall. The final results were published in the official Gazette on 29 January 2013. Voter turnout was 56.7 per cent, with about 1.3 million registered voters casting their ballots. The results announced by the Independent Election Commission provided limited information and did not include the number of invalid votes and the election results established at polling station level.

For the first time, a European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) was deployed across the country to assess the whole electoral process. In its preliminary statement released on 25 January, the EU EOM reported that the legislative elections were well organised and administered despite serious inadequacies in the legal framework affecting the universality of voter participation and equality of votes. According to the EU EOM final report, the elections were “organised and conducted in a transparent and credible manner. They were technically well-administered despite serious inadequacies in the legal framework”. It was widely acknowledged that the IEC had performed its tasks in a professional way. On 23 April, the new government of Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour received a vote of confidence in the lower house of Parliament with a majority of 82 votes.

Civil society organizations took an active part in all phases of the electoral process. Some 250 civil society organisations engaged in the electoral process by forming three domestic observation coalitions. Civil society organisations carried out considerable efforts on voter education by disseminating information material, conducting panel discussions and arranging for interactive voter education activities. Domestic observation coalitions deployed 522 long-term observers to assess all stages of the elections, including voter registration, candidate nomination and campaigning. On election day, they accredited 6,990 observers to all 4,069 polling stations throughout the country to observe polling, counting and tabulation of results.

Municipal elections, which had last been held in 2007, took place on 27 August 2013. The elections were
administered by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs, while the IEC monitored the process. Official election voter turnout was 37.3%. The official turnout did not however reflect the approximately 1.25 million members of the armed- and security forces who abstained from participating in the elections following government instructions, despite the fact that, by law, they are eligible to vote in the municipal elections. For the first time in Jordan, thousands of volunteers from local CSOs observed the elections.

On the occasion of the 8th meeting of the Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Governance and Democracy, the EU recalled its substantial support to the electoral process (SPRING – EUR 7 million), mainly through the financing of the Independent Electoral Commission with UNDP as implementing partner. The extra SPRING allocation is on top of the EUR 2 million allocated under the CSP-NIP for the intervention “Support to the Electoral Process in Jordan”.

**KPI-3.4.3 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) **Data, figures and tables:**
- /-

(ii) **Key extracts from documents:**
- EU Election Observation Mission, 2013, p.22
- ENPI/2012/024396 Good Governance, Disbursement Report, p.2
- OPEMAM-AECID, Marx, D., Jordan – Two very different elections took place in Jordan on Wednesday (26.01.2013), p.3-4
- Government of Jordan – Independent Election Committee (IEC), Publication Date: 2/6/2013
- UNDP, Youth Project, (2012), p.4
- ENP – Progress Report Jordan - 2011, p.4
- CLE Jordan, IR, 2014, Chapter 2 National Background and Context, p.22

(iii) **Additional information from field phase:**

**KPI-3.4.4:** Degree of timeliness and appropriateness of EU inputs in support of the electoral process, including voters education and preparation

**Main Findings on KPI-3.4.4:**

Through Financing Decision 24290 of 2012 entitled “Support to the Electoral Process in Jordan” the EU provided timely support in the amount of EUR 2 million, of which at the time of this CLE portfolio inventory making on 4 October 2013 a total amount of EUR 744,424 was recorded as spent.

The four main components of the programme are assessed most relevant to the strengthening of the electoral processes in Jordan: (i) Contribution to the institution building of the Independent Electoral Commission; (ii) Support the establishment of a workable electoral dispute resolution system; (iii) Enhance civic awareness, emergent political actors and engaging in the electoral reform, and; (iv) Enhanced capacity of media to report accurately and comprehensively on the electoral process. Voters education and preparation is especially covered under the third component on civic awareness and includes support to the development of platforms working on civic education, to increased awareness of and participation in the electoral processes by voters. The awareness and professional skills training on electoral processes includes issues pertaining to environmental sustainability, gender mainstreaming, good governance and human rights. The programme has an operational implementation phase of 48 months and a closure phase of 24 months. The budget is split over two sub-periods with in the first 2012-2013 sub-period the bulk of resources allocated to the strengthening of the Independent Electoral Commission and in the 2013-2016 sub-period the component on political parties and civic education getting more weight.

In addition, as mentioned in the ENP Jordan 2012 Annual Report, the EU made an allocation of EUR 70 million available from the SPRING (Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth) programme, doubling its average annual bilateral cooperation, to encourage the consolidation of reforms in the political,
social and economic areas. Part of this support targeted the electoral process in Jordan, including institutional support to the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and to the judiciary.

Voters education and preparation are also mainstreamed in / integral part of the civic education component of CSO support programmes financed from horizontal / thematic budget lines (incl. NSA-LA and EIHRD) and included under CSP-NIP bilateral programmes on democratic governance as for example the support programme to democratic governance, the good governance and development contract, promoting local economic development in Jordan, and the like. It however is difficult, if not impossible to differentiate the exact amounts allocated therein to civic education, let alone to voters’ education specifically. It was not possible to obtain more detailed figures during the field phase from the EUD officer(s) and/or other knowledgeable persons/sources concerned. On the other hand, during the evaluation meeting at the IEC, the newly appointed President stressed that the EU support to elections is not limited to the organisation and management of the elections event itself, but also encompasses voters’ education as part of larger civil education and capacity strengthening of CSOs in voters education and related pre- and post-election activities.

KPI-3.4.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- 24290 TAPs
- Financing Agreement (FA) ENPI/2011/23-559 and 2012/24-290 Support to the Electoral Process in Jordan (Signed on September 2012), pp. 3-4

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- National Democratic Institute (NDI), Preliminary Statement (2013), p.8
- POMED (2013): Jordan’s Unfinished Journey, p.4
- DRI Assessment of the electoral framework (2013), p.21
- NDI Preliminary Statement (2013), pp. 2 & 7
- Ayoub, State of local democracy (2010), p.72

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- -/-

JC-3.4: Within the concerted action of the international community, the EU-Jordan cooperation effectively contributed to enhanced political participation and open and fair elections

Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-3.4 (based on the KPIs main findings)

Generally the EU-Jordan cooperation within the broader framework of the concerted action of the international community effectively contributed to enhanced political participation and open and fair elections, however with reservations for some sub-processes and with substantial challenges ahead still to be met under a trusted political dialogue relationship supported by appropriate development interventions.

As far as representative democracy in Jordan is concerned, as reported under the EU Support to Democratic Governance project, the main problems affecting the Chamber of the Deputies include inadequate policy, technical, and organisational skills to perform the respective role of Deputies in a competitive, efficient, and effective manner. Important weaknesses also exist at the level of Parliament's committees functioning that have fundamental limited oversight actions. The Chamber of Deputies has been under-involved in checking executive activities and in contributing top public policy formation. Parliament also lacks systems for accessing external information and interaction with stakeholders. Generally, little use has been made of specialised groups, external research, and the views of the general public. There is a lack of data on relevant organisations working on committee’s respective areas interest. These are the key concerns being addressed by the EU supported programme, be it with mixed results so far as reported. The relationships between the Members of Parliament and their constituents are somehow non-existent in terms of gathering citizen's expectations. Therefore, the role of representation of the MPs needs to be strengthened, especially towards citizen's associations, NGOs and Trade Unions. Finally, the expected decentralisation law will have a significant impact on the role of the Deputies which will be more
focused on formulation of policies at national level. The newly elected members of Parliament will need to be properly trained on their new role considering the existence of the Local Councils.

Although the 2012 Elections Law is a step forward, the one-person, the one-vote electoral system limits the representation of political parties, fosters tribalism and nepotism, and may not proportionately reflect voting preferences of the population, often leading to the underrepresentation of urban centres and Jordanians of Palestinian origins. Underrepresentation comes mostly from electoral districting. On the effectiveness of Parliament, the absence of political programme based political parties is noted, with the number of blocks only partially making up for this absence of political parties in the parliamentary work and most of the Members of Parliament considering themselves independent. Public support for the work of Members of the Parliament is generally very low in Jordan. It goes without saying that parliamentary elections and political parties are as the two sides of the parliamentary democracy coin. One cannot go without the other. The mission noted in some responsible quarters an enthusiasm for democratic elections but a rather lukewarm attitude towards multiparty parliamentary democracy. In this broader and more fundamental framework, it is noted that the 01 January 2014 update of the implementation report on the November 2013 approved Support to Democratic Governance programme (ENPI/2010/021-931) highlights that the implementation faces fundamental problems that need to be addressed, as no activities have started yet, but that TA contracts for the parliament component would be signed in the forthcoming quarter. (KPI 3.4.1)

Women in Jordan have had the right to vote since 1974. The quota system was introduced in the 2003 elections, reserving six of 110 parliamentary seats for women candidates. The quota was doubled to 12 seats in 2010 and then to 15 seats for the 2013 election. The 60 senators in the Upper House are appointed by the king without a quota for women. In the last parliament, seven women were appointed senators from among 60 members of the Upper House and only one woman was elected to the Lower House outside the quota system. In the 2013 elections 18 women were elected to parliament, 15 through the quota, two as heads of national proportional representation lists, and one elected through the majoritarian system in the districts. The above figures show a hesitant improvement of the gender situation in Jordan’s representative democracy, but show equally outspoken the major strides still to be gone to more equal opportunities. (KPI 3.4.1)

For this evaluation, actual voters registration has been used as a proxy indicator for the successfulness of political awareness raising and voters education campaigns supported by EU, together with other DPs. Based on International IDEA figures (originating from the Independent Electoral Commission – IEC), voter turn-out for the 2012 national elections was 56.50%, which is an increase in comparison to the 2010 elections with 53% and the 2007 elections with 54%. It however is lower than the 57.75% of the 2003 elections. The number of registered voters however decreased over the same period from 2.46 million in 2007 to 2.37 million in 2010 and further down to 2.27 million in 2013 whereas the voting age population in the same period increased from 3.04 million in 2007 over 3.71 million in 2010 to 3.76 million in 2013. This resulted in a relative decline of the voting age population (VAP) turn-out from 43.64% in 2007 down to 33.88% in 2010 and 34.11% in 2013. From these figures, one therefore cannot conclude to positive trends in terms of voters’ registration neither in terms of voter turn-out. This is further confirmed by comparison to the 2003 elections which scored higher on all the above criteria. In June, Parliament adopted a new Elections Law that added to the existing single non-transferable vote at Governorate level, a second, proportional vote at the national level. Most political stakeholders challenged and questioned the accuracy of the final voter list largely due to the extensive use of proxy registration. Domestic observer coalitions had repeatedly stated their disapproval of the extensive proxy voter registration. With regard to voter education, the EU EOM noted that the election Law does not foresee an explicit mandate for the Independent Election Commission to take on responsibility for voter education. It concluded that overall, voter education was a decisive element in the preparation and conduct of these elections, largely due to a number of factors. The EU EOM noticed diverse and sometimes inconsistent, overlapping and diverse voter education activities by various electoral stakeholders.

Municipal elections, which had last been held in 2007, took place on 27 August 2013. The elections were administered by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs, while the IEC monitored the process. Official election voter turnout was 37.3 %. The official turnout did not however reflect the approximately 1.25 million members of the armed- and security forces who abstained from participating in the elections following government instructions, despite the fact that, by law, they are eligible to vote in the municipal elections. For the first time in Jordan, thousands of volunteers from local CSOs observed the elections. (KPI 3.4.2)

As for the degree of transparency, openness, fairness and representativeness of the national and local elections, the latest parliamentary elections for the 17th House of Representatives held on 23 January 2013 signified that for the first time a European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) was deployed
across the country to assess the whole electoral process. In its preliminary statement released on 25 January, the EU EOM reported that the legislative elections were well organised and administered despite serious inadequacies in the legal framework affecting the universality of voter participation and equality of votes. According to the EU EOM final report, the elections were “organised and conducted in a transparent and credible manner. They were technically well-administered despite serious inadequacies in the legal framework”. It was widely acknowledged that the IEC had performed its tasks in a professional way. On 23 April, the new government received a vote of confidence in the lower house of Parliament with a majority of 82 votes. Civil society organizations took an active part in all phases of the electoral process. Some 250 CSOs engaged in the electoral process by forming three domestic observation coalitions. Civil society organisations carried out considerable efforts on voter education by disseminating information material, conducting panel discussions and arranging for interactive voter education activities. Domestic observation coalitions deployed 522 long-term observers to assess all stages of the elections, including voter registration, candidate nomination and campaigning. On election day, they accredited 6,990 observers to all 4,069 polling stations throughout the country to observe polling, counting and tabulation of results.

Municipal elections, which had last been held in 2007, took place on 27 August 2013. The elections were administered by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs, while the IEC monitored the process. Official election voter turnout was 37.3 %. The official turnout did not however reflect the approximately 1.25 million members of the armed- and security 5 forces who abstained from participating in the elections following government instructions, despite the fact that, by law, they are eligible to vote in the municipal elections. For the first time in Jordan, thousands of volunteers from local CSOs observed the elections. (KPI 3.4.3)

EU inputs in support of the electoral process including voters’ education and preparation were timely and appropriate. Through Financing Decision 24290 of 2012 entitled “Support to the Electoral Process in Jordan” the EU provided timely support in the amount of EUR 2 million. An extra SPRING allocation of EUR 7 million has been channelled, mainly through the financing of the Independent Electoral Commission with UNDP as implementing partner. The four main components of the programme are assessed most relevant to the strengthening of the electoral processes in Jordan. Voters’ education and preparation is especially covered under the third component on civic awareness and includes support to the development of platforms working on civic education, to increased awareness of and participation in the electoral processes by voters. The awareness and professional skills training on electoral processes includes issues pertaining to environmental sustainability, gender mainstreaming, good governance and human rights. In addition, the EU made an allocation of EUR 70 million available from the SPRING (Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth) programme, doubling its annual bilateral cooperation, to encourage the consolidation of reforms in the political, social and economic areas. Part of this support targeted the electoral process in Jordan, including institutional support to the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and to the judiciary. Voters education and preparation are also mainstreamed in / integral part of the civic education component of CSO support programmes financed from horizontal / thematic budget lines (incl. NSA-LA and EIHRD) and included under CSP-NIP bilateral programmes on democratic governance as for example the support programme to democratic governance, the good governance and development contract, promoting local economic development in Jordan, and the like. It however is difficult, if not impossible, to differentiate the exact amounts allocated therein to civic education, let alone to voters education specifically. It was not possible to obtain more detailed figures during the field phase from the EUD officer(s) and/or other knowledgeable persons/sources concerned. On the other hand, during the evaluation meeting at the IEC, the newly appointed President stressed that the EU support to elections is not limited to the organisation and management of the elections event itself, but also encompasses voters’ education as part of larger civil education and capacity strengthening of CSOs in voters education and related pre- and post-election activities. (KPI 3.4.4)
JC-3.5
EU support contributed to enhanced access to justice, law enforcement, security and fight against terrorism

List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 3.5 (codes and definition)

| KPI-3.5.1 | Extent to which the EU has contributed to a successful implementation of the Judicial Upgrading Strategy to enhance the capacity and efficiency of the judiciary (incl. mediation, criminal justice, juvenile justice and child protection, penitentiary reform, administrative capacity, training and evaluation of judges, etc.) |
| KPI-3.5.2 | Overall appreciation by the key stakeholders of the EU support provided in the fields of justice, law enforcement and security, particularly in relation to the financing instruments and applied aid modalities |
| KPI-3.5.3 | Extent to which the Amman Message and agenda has been effectively supported, particularly with regard to its institutional development and public education components including support to the dialogue between cultures |
| KPI-3.5.4 | Quality of the complementarity, coherence and overall integration of the actions under the Instrument for Stability (IfS) in support of the overall EU-Jordan policy/political dialogue and response strategy within the broader concerted action of the MS and other DPs |

KPI-3.5.1: Extent to which the EU has contributed to a successful implementation of the Judicial Upgrading Strategy to enhance the capacity and efficiency of the judiciary (incl. mediation, criminal justice, juvenile justice and child protection, penitentiary reform, administrative capacity, training and evaluation of judges, etc.)

Main Findings on KPI-3.5.1:

Throughout the 2007-2013 period under review, EU support to the further enhancement and efficiency of the judiciary system in Jordan has been substantive. Three of the 43 Financing Decisions (19569 of 2008, and 23471 & 24238 of 2012) benefitting Jordan in the 2007-2013 period are explicitly if not fully geared towards supporting Justice reform in Jordan. The total allocated amount is almost EUR 40 million. The 2008 intervention includes justice reform in a broader good governance package. By far the largest intervention is the 2012 FD entitled “Support to the Justice Reform in Jordan” with an allocation of EUR 30 million. The main programme has an accompanying, preparatory intervention approved in the amount of EUR 3 million and aiming at supporting the justice sector in meeting the required criteria for sector Budget Support (SBS). This comprehensive support package covers virtually all, if not all components of the Jordan Judicial Upgrading Strategy to enhance the capacity and efficiency of the judiciary as mentioned in this indicator 3.5.1, including those pertaining to mediation, criminal justice, juvenile justice and child protection, penitentiary reform, administrative capacity, training and evaluation of judges.

In line herewith, the most relevant EU projects in the justice sector include the following geared towards enhancing the capacity and efficiency of the judiciary: (i) Support to the Juvenile Justice System in Jordan aims at strengthening the legislative and institutional capacity of the judiciary to deal more effectively in line with international standards and norms; (ii) Support to criminal justice reform in Jordan aims at developing and supporting the implementation of criminal justice policy and strategy, facilitating the necessary review of the penal code; supporting further progress toward full independence of the judiciary, and increasing the effectiveness of justice services. (iii) Support to the penitentiary reform in Jordan aims at reinforcing the structure and management of the Department of Correctional and Rehabilitation Centers, consolidating inter-institutional co-operation, enhancing partnerships with civil society and private sector on post-care schemes. (iv) Support to the Anti-Corruption Commission aims at strengthening the capacity of the law enforcement agencies to implement Jordan's commitments under the United Nations Convention against Corruption, (v) SPRING programme geared towards institutional strengthening and capacity development, and (vi) Support to the justice sector in meeting the required criteria for sector policy/Budget Support" which constitutes the first step towards successful reform programme implementation.

This EU support is in line with the priorities set out in the 2011-2013 NIP, more particularly with regard to sub-priority 2 on Justice, Home Affairs and Security. The rationale of the assistance is related to the situation
that though the Jordanian constitution provides for the independence of the judiciary, further capacity building is needed so that the judiciary will be increasingly able to play its role as an independent pillar of a democratic society. Under the preceding NIP 2007-2010 the EU had been providing support to the implementation of the Judicial Upgrading Strategy (JUST) to enhance the capacity and efficiency of the judiciary. These reforms by the end of the 1st NIP showed good intermediate results warranting continued EU support. The reforms reportedly had led inter alia to increased administrative capacity, better training of judges, evaluation of judges and the creation of mediation departments. The additional priority challenges in the justice reform process for the EU to contribute to under the NIP 2011-2013 were identified as the support to the upgrading of the criminal justice legal and regulatory framework, penitentiary reform, and the strengthening of the juvenile justice and child protection system. It was also indicated that since a solid sector strategy is available, sector Budget Support could be envisaged.

The ENP Jordan annual progress reports covering the 2nd NIP period gave a quite different and straightforward appreciation of the progress in the justice reform sector: “No progress can be reported in enhancing the effectiveness and independence of the judiciary” (2013 progress report) or No further progress was made towards judicial independence” (2012 progress report). The 2013 progress report provides further details about the lack of progress of the reform pertaining amongst others to: (i) The Judicial Upgrade Strategy has not been revised. (ii) The draft law on judicial independence is still awaiting revision by the Cabinet; (iii) The draft juvenile law has not yet been submitted to Parliament; (iv) An EU-funded project supported the creation of 13 juvenile courts and the drafting of a specialised curriculum to be followed by those wishing to qualify as juvenile judges. (v) Two EU-funded projects continue to provide support for improvements to the criminal justice system; (vi) During 2013, civilians continued to be prosecuted before the SSC on charges relating to speech or demonstrations, as defined in the Penal Code; (vii) No progress has been seen in limiting the use of pre-trial and administrative detention.

Nevertheless, a number of important developments and achievements in the reform process are reported on, be it on a more scattered basis, including: The amendment by Parliament in early January 2014 of the State Security Court (SSC) Law in order to bring it into line with Article 101 of the Constitution, as amended in 2011, which restricts the scope of action of this military court, but does not eliminate the possibility of civilians being tried before it; the establishment of the Electoral Commission and of the Constitutional Court, the adoption of a political parties’ law and an electoral law, all in 2012. The Constitutional Court Law was approved by Royal Decree in June and entered into force in October 2012. The Constitutional Court supersedes the Higher Council for the Interpretation of the Constitution. The constitutionality of laws can be challenged by bodies including the Senate, House of Representatives and the Council of Ministers. In the framework of the Commission financed programme “Strengthening democratic reform in the Southern Mediterranean”, the Council of Europe in 2012 agreed with the Jordanian authorities to cooperate in a number of areas, including justice.

The 2011 constitutional amendments are intended to fortify the role of the Higher Judicial Council (HJC) as the sole jurisdiction to appoint judges, and therefore to strengthen the independence of the judiciary and prevent overlapping of authorities.

The 800 judges and prosecutors who are the current members of the Judiciary of Jordan have been recruited through a competitive process and have been trained by the same Institute, the Judicial Institute of Jordan. The first female trainee graduated in 1995 and since then the number of females trainees has significantly increased to reach to-date a percentage of 8.8% of the Corps. In 2010-2011, out of 60 trainees who graduated, 31 were females. However, the percentage of females in the upper judiciary positions is very low. For instance, there is only one female General Prosecutor.

Based on the above, the assessment of this indicator 3.5.1 on the extent to which the EU has contributed to a successful implementation of the judicial upgrading to enhance the capacity and efficiency of the judiciary is rather mixed, with noticeable achievements but with even more challenges to be met still. That the intended sectoral Budget Support programme has still not commenced based on CRIS records and as confirmed during the evaluation field visit, despite the special intervention to support the justice sector in meeting the required criteria for sector Budget Support, may be a significant indication in this regard. At present a TA is in place within the Ministry of Justice as team leader of the European Union funded project “Support to the Justice Sector in Meeting the Required Criteria for Sector Budget Support”. It was assessed that at the moment of the Evaluation Team’s field visit to Jordan in June 2014, the Ministry of Justice and the justice sector in general were not yet ready for sector Budget Support. On the other hand, progress reportedly is made in gradually establishing the necessary enabling environment for Sector Budget Support (SBS).
KPI-3.5.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- The World Justice Project; Rule of Law Index 2012-13 Report; p.104
- Please see below

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- NIP 2011-2013, pp. 9-10
- ENPI Progress Report Jordan 2012 (2013), pp. 5-6
- EU-Jordan National Indicative Programme (NIP) 2011-2013, p.9
- Action Fiche, Support to Justice Reform (2009), p.1
- Action Fiche, Support to Justice Reform and Good Governance in Jordan (2008) p.9
- MEMO/10/178, p.2
- CLE Jordan IR, 2014, p. 17-18

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- Support to the justice sector reform in Jordan ENPI/2012/023-471 - Action Fiche for Jordan, p. 15 - on main support interventions in the justice sector

KPI-3.5.1 (i) Data, figures and tables:

CLE Interventions Portfolio Database

Query in the CLE interventions databases for key words “penitentiary, judiciary, justice, criminal, juvenile, judge”.
In the database of 43 Financing Decisions, three responded to the key words above with a total allocated amount of EUR 39,730,265.

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</tr>
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</table>

KPI-3.5.2: Overall appreciation by the key stakeholders of the EU support provided in the fields of justice, law enforcement and security, particularly in relation to the financing instruments and applied aid modalities

Main Findings on KPI-3.5.2:

The World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index 2014 places Jordan with an overall score of 0.57 on place 38 of the 99 countries covered globally, and 2nd on 7 in the region. It place Jordan is in the top half of the rankings, among upper-middle income countries, in most dimensions, with relatively high, marks in the areas of order and security (rank 20 of 99 globally and 2 of 7 regionally), civil and, criminal justice, absence of corruption, and effective regulatory enforcement. Property rights are also well protected. Protection of
fundamental rights on the other hand is weak, (ranking seventy-fifth), particularly with regard to discrimination and labour rights. During the evaluation field visit, it on different occasions was pointed out that the general feeling of security has been decreased as a consequence of the massive influx of refugees due to the regional crises (with substantially higher competition for scarce jobs, particularly at the lower end).

One of the key priorities of action under the EU-Jordan ENP Action Plan of 2010 concerns the reinforcement of the EU-Jordan political dialogue and cooperation on foreign and security policy in a range of areas including the Middle East Peace Process, non-proliferation, and disarmament. The main instruments are political dialogue and cooperation on foreign and security policy. The EU and Jordan are committed to achieve closer political cooperation and dialogue on the basis of their shared values: the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and good governance. The enhanced political dialogue and cooperation takes place at different levels and in the framework of different fora (summit, meetings between the Jordanian Minister of Foreign Affairs and his European counterparts, Jordanian – European sectoral ministers and senior officials meetings. Aim is to develop an enhanced political dialogue and regular exchange of information on Common Foreign Security and Defense Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).

The recently released ENP Country Progress Report for 2013 has an explicit chapter on cooperation on foreign and security policy, regional and international issue, conflict prevention and crisis management.

Implementation of two EU projects relating to conflict prevention and crisis management began in spring 2013. The objective of the projects is to tackle violence at universities by equipping and educating selected local youth CSOs to deal with this problem and to reduce tensions between host communities and Syrian refugees using measures based on conflict sensitivity and prevention and peace-building. Measures for improving security conditions relating to the refugees, funded by EUR 22.9 million of EU support, have begun to be implemented by the UNHCR and IOM. Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon strengthened the basis of their trilateral cooperation and expressed willingness to exchange best practices with the EU in the field of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) disaster prevention, preparedness and response. The EU made plans for the implementation of a project with the three countries to improve the countries’ respective national teams’ competence in dealing with HAZMAT (Hazardous Materials). On 25 June, the EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centre of Excellence Regional Secretariat for the Middle East officially opened in Amman. It aims to mitigate CBRN risks of criminal, accidental or natural origin by promoting a coherent policy, improving coordination and preparedness at national and regional levels and offering a comprehensive approach covering legal, scientific, enforcement and technical issues.

Jordan and the EU started a dialogue on the control of exports of dual-use goods. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was designated the national focal point and organised a round-table meeting with all Jordanian stakeholders in October to assess the possible next steps towards further cooperation.

Under the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which remains a cornerstone for the EU’s interaction with its southern neighbours, the Regional Programme is facilitating a dialogue between the Euro-Mediterranean Partner Countries on sensitive political and security issues. This dialogue aims at building a shared understanding and creating a common area of cooperation. Four projects are funded, which seek to achieve change, not only through this dialogue but also via the strengthening of local institutions. The projects are grouped under the policies justice, freedom and security, migration and political dialogue. Issues such as judicial reform and security matters, the fight against terrorism and crime, are acted upon, along with issues related to legal immigration, migration and development and illegal immigration, increase of knowledge on the Partnership and support to the Middle East Peace Process.


The EU support programme to the security sector in applying the rule of law was signed relatively recently on 25 November 2013, with a total budget of EUR 5 million.

In the EU-Jordan Single Support Framework covering the coming cooperation period 2014-2017 a prominent, special chapter is foreseen for reinforcing the rule of law for enhanced accountability and equity in public service delivery (indicatively 25% of total budget). A specific objective thereunder is to support Jordan’s reform process towards consolidation of deep democracy, the application of the rule of law and human rights protection and enforcement. The intervention has two components both aligned to a specific,
well defined public agency: Component 1: Institutional support to the Ministry of Interior, and component 2: Support to the Law Enforcement Agency: the Public Security Directorate with three sub-components: (i) Support to the PSD Juvenile Police Department working methodologies; (ii) Support to the PSD Family Protection Police Department working methodologies, and; (iii) Support to PSD Criminal Investigation Unit working methodologies. The EU QSG screening of the proposal for approval already explicitly stressed the danger of too dispersed responsibilities / multitude of players in the Rule of Law sector and the lack of focus of the project despite it relatively limited budget of 5 million, and made clear warnings. This remark during the appraisal stage of the project proposal early on in the project cycle is even more relevant since also the ROM report on project full implementation pinpoints the same problem issues (indicating that the earlier QSG advice was not acknowledged / followed-up on.

Since this Support to the Security Sector in Applying the Rule of Law programme was approved quite recently (FA signed on 25 Nov 2013), it did not make sense to further enquire about an appreciation of the EUs support in the field of security and law enforcement. Moreover any appreciation of this support would have been strongly biased as a result of the currently heightened regional insecurity and instability following the ISIS-IS attacks, the reignited conflict in Iraq, etc.

KPI-3.5.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Rule of Law Index 2012-13; p.104
- Rule of Law Index 2012-13; p.41

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Assessment Second Phase Education Project (2012), p.32
- EU-Jordan ENP Action Plan 2010, pp. 2, 4 & 5
- EU-Jordan ENP Action Plan, 2010, p.2

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
KPI-3.5.3: Extent to which the Amman Message and agenda has been effectively supported, particularly with regard to its institutional development and public education components including support to the dialogue between cultures

Main Findings on KPI-3.5.3:

What generally became known as the "Amman Message" in origin is a November 2004 Ramadan sermon on tolerance delivered by Chief Justice Sheikh Iz-al-Din al-Tamimi in King Abdullah's presence. The sermon stressed the need to re-emphasize Islam's core values of compassion, mutual respect, tolerance, acceptance and freedom of religion. Likewise, at an Islamic Conference in July 2005, religious leaders representing the eight traditional schools of Islam endorsed fatwas forbidding Muslims from being declared apostates (takfir) and barring unqualified clergy from issuing edicts, and reaffirmed the schools’ agreement on the fundamental principles of Islamic belief and practice.

In order to give more religious authority to the Amman Message and in order to tackle the root problem of misinterpretation in Islam, in 2005 King Abdullah II sent three critical questions to the most senior religious scholars from all around the world representing all the branches and schools of Islam: (i) Who is a Muslim?; (ii) Is it permissible to declare someone an apostate (takfir)?; and (iii) Who has the right to undertake issuing fatwas (legal rulings)? Based on the fatwas provided by these great scholars (who included the Shaykh Al-Azhar; Ayatollah Sistani and Sheikh Qaradawi), in July 2005, King Abdullah convened an international Islamic conference of 200 of the world’s leading Islamic scholars or ‘Ulama’ from 50 countries. These scholars unanimously issued a ruling on the above three fundamental issues, which became known as the ‘Three Points of the Amman Message’.

The three points of the Amman Message against the radicalisation of Islam have been supported throughout the two EU-Jordan CSP-NIPs, the EU-Jordan political dialogue in the framework of the EU-Jordan Association Agreement and in individual interventions, including those on public education in support to the dialogue between cultures. The response on the Jordanian side included for example the incorporation of the messages into the education programme administered by the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs.

The 2007-2013 CSP-NIP in this regard confirmed that Jordan’s objective is to become a modern Arab Islamic state reconciling Islam with modernity. In this context, it is firmly opposed to religious extremism and has been at the forefront of countering extremist interpretations of Islam, incompatible with human rights and democracy, and aims at promoting interfaith dialogue, especially through the Amman Message. It also confirmed Jordan as a valuable partner in the fight against terrorism. Following the terrorist attacks of 9 November 2005, the Jordanian government proved even more determined to develop its cooperation with the EU in the fight against terrorism and to actively promote the Amman Message to counter interpretations of Islam, disrespectful of human rights, in both the country and the region. The 2007-2010 NIP includes a special paragraph on the promotion of the Amman Message which pledges to support a public education initiative to disseminate the content and values of the Amman Message.

The programme includes the selection of priority areas in Jordan where it will help communities and NGOs to organise information campaigns. During the June 2009 Sub-Committee meeting on Justice and Security, Jordan underlined that the EU should capitalize on Jordan’s experience in fighting radicalisation and confirmed its willingness to cooperate with the EU to support the integration of Muslims in EU Member States, including on the dissemination of the ‘Amman Message’ which aims at countering radicalisation by promoting the positive values of Islam. The ‘Amman Message’ also pervades individual EU interventions as for example is illustrated by the Support to Justice Reform programme which highlighted that there is a need to increase public awareness of the content and values of the ‘Amman message’, with the aim of thus reducing the level of religious extremism.

KPI-3.5.3 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- /.

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Action Fiche, Support to Justice Reform (2008), p.3
- CSP 2007-2013, p.6 & 18
### KPI-3.5.4: Quality of the complementarity, coherence and overall integration of the actions under the Instrument for Stability (IfS) in support of the overall EU-Jordan policy/political dialogue and response strategy within the broader concerted action of the MS and other DPs

**Main Findings on KPI-3.5.4:**

There is documentary evidence attesting to the quality of the complementarity, coherence and overall integration of the actions under the Instrument for Stability (IfS) in support of the overall EU-Jordan policy/political dialogue and response strategy. It has not been possible to assess this complementarity, coherence and overall integration within the broader concerted action of the MS and other DPs and it even it doubtful that this can be assessed in the context of this CLE unless a special thematic evaluation or similar systematic assessment has been made of which the report is available.

This overall complementarity and coherence of the IfS actions in support of the EU Jordan policy / political dialogue and response strategy already is evident from the list of on-going IfS projects in Jordan in relation to the IfS policy and strategy document, as was shared with the CLE team on the occasion of its preparatory visit to Jordan in September 2013. Should be mentioned especially in this connection: The IfS responses to situations of crisis or emerging crisis (e.g. with UNHCR and IOM), the strengthening of the capacity of Jordanian CSOs working with Syrian refugees and host communities, the assistance in the context of stable conditions for cooperation (e.g. the contracts under preparation on trafficking of falsified medicines, cybercrime and counter-terrorism, amongst others). The EUD responsible officer has moved for another assignment and henceforth no follow-up could be pursued during the June 2014 field visit of the CLE team.

To be highlighted is that under the IfS, Jordan is engaged in a regional cooperation programme to create Centres of Excellence in CBRN risk mitigation (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents). Over the period 2012–2013 significant funds have been channelled for capacity building in this area. The EU CBRN Centre of Excellence for the Middle East presently has 12 projects / contracts ongoing involving the Middle East and/or Jordan. With such interventions the IfS programme portfolio is in line with the provisions of the EU-Jordan Association Agreement with regard to its title on political dialogue (Art. 3-5), with the EU-Jordan ENP Action Plan for its political dimension and areas of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, and also justice and home affairs. As far as the CSP-NIPs are concerned, IfS programmatic anchoring is in relation to Priority One entitled “Supporting Jordan’s reform in the areas of democracy, good governance, human rights, media and justice, and the fight against extremism”, more particularly in relation to sub-area 1.2 on justice, home affairs and security.

In the case of Jordan, situated as it is in the midst of heightening regional crises, also the third strategic objective on building conflict prevention and crisis response management primarily by supporting in country non-state actors in fragile and conflict-affected situations, as formulated in the IfS Multi-Annual Indicative Programme 2012-2013, is of special importance to Jordan. This programme component particularly aims at strengthening dialogue and cooperation between policy makers and civil society on conflict prevention, crisis preparedness and peace-building; promoting early warning and coherent early action in third countries; and reinforcing cooperation with EU Member States on building pre- and post-crisis capacities in third countries. Art. 4(3)

### KPI-3.5.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

#### (i) Data, figures and tables:

- Summary overview of Instrument for Stability (IfS) ongoing projects in Jordan, September 2013 (source: EUD, CLE preparatory mission to Jordan, September 2013)
- European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), Görtz, S. and Sheriff, A., 1st Among Equals? (2012), P. 4

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- EC Press Release “CBRN Centres of Excellence (CoE) conference defining roles of partners for better coordination and cooperation on risks and threats to start today”, 14 May 2012
- ENP Progress Report Jordan 2008 (2009), p.6
- European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), Görtz, S. and Sheriff, A., 1st Among Equals? (2012), P. 4
- Country Report: Jordan (2010), 2011, p.17
- Echagüe, A., Assessing Democracy Assistance (2011), pp.3 & 8
- Boussac, J., Improving the EU's Support for the Civil Society in its Neighbourhood (2012), p.6
- CLE Jordan, IR, 2014, Chapter 2 National Background and Context, p. 23

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- -/-

**JC-3.5:** EU support contributed to enhanced access to justice, law enforcement, security and fight against terrorism

**Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-3.5 (based on the KPIs main findings)**

Throughout the 2007-2013 period under review, EU support to the further enhancement and efficiency of the judiciary system in Jordan has been substantive. Three of the 43 Financing Decisions (resp. 19569 of 2008, and 23471 & 24238 of 2012) benefiting Jordan in the 2007-2013 period are explicitly if not fully geared towards supporting Justice reform in Jordan. The total allocated amount is almost EUR 40 million. This comprehensive support package covers virtually all, if not all components of the Jordan Judicial Upgrading Strategy to enhance the capacity and efficiency of the judiciary including those pertaining to mediation, criminal justice, juvenile justice and child protection, penitentiary reform, administrative capacity, training and evaluation of judges. Under the preceding NIP 2007-2010 the EU had been providing support to the implementation of the Judicial Upgrading Strategy (JUST) to enhance the capacity and efficiency of the judiciary. These reforms by the end of the 1st NIP showed good intermediate results warranting continued EU support.

The ENP Jordan annual progress reports covering the 2nd NIP period give a quite different and straightforward appreciation of the progress in the justice reform sector, indicating that no progress was achieved in enhancing the effectiveness and independence of the judiciary. The 2013 progress report provides further details about the lack of progress of the reform in relation to seven reform sub-processes/components. On the other hand, a number of important developments and achievements in the reform process are reported on, be it on a more scattered basis, including: The establishment of the Electoral Commission and of the Constitutional Court; the adoption of a political parties’ law and of an electoral law, all in 2012; and the amendment in January 2014 by Parliament of the State Security Court (SSC) Law restricting the scope of action of this military court. The Constitutional Court Law was approved by Royal Decree in June and entered into force in October 2012. The constitutionality of laws can be challenged by bodies including the Senate, House of Representatives and the Council of Ministers. Apart from the NIP based cooperation on justice, in the framework of the Commission financed programme “Strengthening democratic reform in the Southern Mediterranean”, the Council of Europe in 2012 agreed
with the Jordanian authorities to cooperate in a number of areas, including justice.

Based on the above, the assessment of this indicator on the extent to which the EU has contributed to a successful implementation of the judicial upgrading to enhance the capacity and efficiency of the judiciary, is rather mixed, with noticeable achievements but with even more challenges to be met still, as was confirmed during the field visit. At present a TA is in place within the Ministry of Justice as team leader of the European Union funded project “Support to the Justice Sector in Meeting the Required Criteria for Sector Budget Support”. It was assessed that at the moment of the Evaluation Team's field visit to Jordan in June 2014, the Ministry of Justice and the justice sector in general were not yet ready for sector Budget Support. On the other hand, progress reportedly is made in gradually establishing the necessary enabling environment for Sector Budget Support. (KPI 3.5.1)

The World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index 2014 places Jordan with an overall score of 0.57 on place 38 of the 99 countries covered globally, and 2nd on 7 in the region. It places Jordan is in the top half of the rankings, among upper-middle income countries, in most dimensions, with relatively high marks in the areas of order and security (rank 20 of 99 globally and 2 of 7 regionally), civil and criminal justice, absence of corruption, and effective regulatory enforcement. Property rights are also well protected. Protection of fundamental rights on the other hand is weak, (ranking seventy-fifth), particularly with regard to discrimination and labour rights. During the evaluation field visit, it on different occasions was pointed out that the general feeling of security has been decreased as a consequence of the massive influx of refugees due to the regional crises (with substantially higher competition for scarce jobs, particularly at the lower end).

Implementation of two EU projects relating to conflict prevention and crisis management began in spring 2013. The objective of the projects is to tackle violence at universities by equipping and educating selected local youth CSOs to deal with this problem and to reduce tensions between host communities and Syrian refugees using measures based on conflict sensitivity and prevention and peace-building. Measures for improving security conditions relating to the refugees, funded by EUR 22.9 million of EU support, have begun to be implemented by the UNHCR and IOM.

Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon strengthened the basis of their trilateral cooperation and expressed willingness to exchange best practices with the EU in the field of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) disaster prevention, preparedness and response. The EU made plans for the implementation of a project with the three countries to improve the countries' respective national teams' competence in dealing with HAZMAT (Hazardous Materials). On 25 June 2013, the EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centre of Excellence Regional Secretariat for the Middle East officially opened in Amman. It aims to mitigate CBRN risks of criminal, accidental or natural origin by promoting a coherent policy, improving coordination and preparedness at national and regional levels and offering a comprehensive approach covering legal, scientific, enforcement and technical issues. A new EU support programme to the security sector in applying the rule of law with a total budget of EUR 5 million was signed recently on 25 November 2013. In the EU-Jordan Single Support Framework covering the coming cooperation period 2014-2017, the reinforcing the rule of law for enhanced accountability and equity in public service delivery takes a prominent place as one of the focal cooperation thematic areas.

Since this Support to the Security Sector in Applying the Rule of Law programme was approved only recently (FA signed on 25 Nov 2013), it is still too early of course to have impact on the ground. As such, it also did not make sense to further enquire about an appreciation of the EUs support in the field of security and law enforcement. Moreover any appreciation of this support would have been strongly biased as a result of the currently heightened regional insecurity and instability following the ISIS-ISIS attacks, the reignited conflict in Iraq, etc. (KPI 3.5.2).

The Amman Message and agenda has been effectively supported by the EU-Jordan cooperation throughout in the 2007-2013 period under review, particularly with regard to its institutional development and public education components including support to the dialogue between cultures. What generally became known as the "Amman Message" in origin is a November 2004 Ramadan sermon on tolerance delivered by the Chief Justice in King Abdullah's presence. The three points of the Amman Message against the radicalisation of Islam have been supported throughout the two EU-Jordan CSP-NIPs, the EU-Jordan political dialogue in the framework of the EU-Jordan Association Agreement and in individual interventions, including those on public education in support to the dialogue between cultures. The response on the Jordanian side included for example the incorporation of the messages into the education programme administered by the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs. The 2007-2010 NIP includes a special paragraph on the promotion of the Amman Message which pledges to support a public education initiative to disseminate the content and values of the Amman Message. The ‘Amman Message” also pervades individual EU interventions as for example is
illustrated by the Support to Justice Reform programme which highlighted that there is a need to increase public awareness of the content and values of the 'Amman message', with the aim of thus reducing the level of religious extremism. (KPI 3.5.3)

There is documentary evidence attesting to the quality of the complementarity, coherence and overall integration of the actions under the Instrument for Stability (IFS) in support of the overall EU-Jordan policy/political dialogue and response strategy. This already is evident from the list of on-going IFS projects in Jordan in relation to the IFS policy and strategy document. Should be mentioned especially in this connection: The IFS responses to situations of crisis or emerging crisis (e.g. with UNHCR and IOM), the strengthening of the capacity of Jordanian CSOs working with Syrian refugees and host communities, the assistance in the context of stable conditions for cooperation (e.g. the contracts under preparation on trafficking of falsified medicines, cybercrime and counter-terrorism, amongst others). Under the IFS, Jordan is engaged in a regional cooperation programme to create Centres of Excellence in CBRN risk mitigation (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents). At present 12 projects / contracts ongoing involving the Middle East and/or Jordan. Situated as it is in the midst of regional crises, for Jordan also the third strategic objective on building conflict prevention and crisis response management primarily by supporting in country non-state actors in fragile and conflict-afflicted situations, as formulated in the IFS Multi-Annual Indicative Programme 2012-2013, is of special importance to the country. This programme particularly aims at strengthening dialogue and cooperation between policy makers and civil society on conflict prevention, crisis preparedness and peace-building; promoting early warning and coherent early action in third countries; and reinforcing cooperation with EU Member States on building pre- and post-crisis capacities in third countries. It at this stage however has not been possible to assess the complementarity, coherence and overall integration of these IFS actions within the broader concerted action of the MS and other DPs and it even it doubtful that this can be assessed in the context of this CLE, unless a special thematic evaluation or similar systematic assessment has been made of which the report is available. (KPI 3.5.4)

**JC-3.6**

The choice and the combination of the EU aid modalities and financing instruments are the results of the search for efficiency and cost/effectiveness in line with Jordan Government objectives and complementary to other DP support to the sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC-3.6 (codes and definition)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPI-3.6.1 Percentage of programmed democratic interventions which are derived from a credible diagnostic analysis taking into account the existing preconditions (the current stage of policy and reform context)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-3.6.2 Percentage of democratic governance interventions for which the full set of project identification, formulation, key implementation and M&amp;E documents are available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-3.6.3 Extent to which alternative options of democratic governance support are studied and criteria for preference and eligibility are defined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-3.6.4 Percentage of democratic governance interventions for which the overall objectives and project purpose are clearly and correctly differentiated and the assumptions and risk are clearly identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-3.6.5 Degree to which the chronology of changes in frameworks for policy dialogue and coordinated TA / capacity development initiatives for enhanced democratic governance show evidence that BS programmes, projects, programme estimates and/or TA played a critical role (or not) in driving the development of effective frameworks for democratic governance (e.g. for BS, general and specific conditions for the disbursement of BS tranches are defined on the basis of the contents of policy dialogue and promote the development of improved frameworks for policy dialogue, and their monitoring feeds policy dialogue processes) - (Cfr. 5.3.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-3.6.6 Extent to which, in the perception of representatives of the GoHKJ (including sector ministries), EU and other donors’ representatives, BS processes and/or other aid modalities, working independently or as a complement to BS, influence the evolution of frameworks for policy dialogue and coordinated TA/capacity development initiatives. - (Cfr. 5.3.5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
KPI-3.6.7
Degree to which the chronology of changes in policies, policy processes and capacities show evidence that BS programmes, programme estimates and/or TA played a critical role, or not, in furthering democratic governance (e.g. specific conditions for the disbursement of BS tranches address issues of policy processes and capacities; complementary or embedded TA foresees support to the strengthening of capacities; programme estimates enhance institutional capacities,…). (KPI 5.4.4)

KPI-3.6.8
Extent to which, in the perceptions of representatives of the GoHKJ (including sector ministries), EU and other donors' representatives, BS processes and/or other aid modalities, working independently or as a complement to BS, had an influence on the evolution of policies, policy frameworks and capacities (KPI 5.4.5)

KPI-3.6.9
Level of evidence that financing made available through BS has contributed to closing the gap of the justice sector's medium term financing plans [e.g. volume and share of EU's contribution to the financing of reforms in key sectors (e.g. juvenile justice) benefiting from EU BS / Level of evidence of increased sector expenditure in supported sectors (KPI 4.5.4)

KPI-3.6.1: Percentage of programmed democratic interventions which are derived from a credible diagnostic analysis taking into account the existing preconditions (the current stage of policy and reform context)

Main Findings on KPI-3.6.1:

There are five EU interventions / financing decisions benefitting the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the period 2007-2012 which are of direct relevance to this evaluation question on good governance (see table EQ-3 IM-1 included at the beginning of the EQ-3 Information Matrix). The total financing decisions commitments (primary allocations) amount to EUR 51.7 million as of this CLE portfolio cut-off date of 04 October 2013, of which EUR 7.7 million has been actually paid. Two of these interventions are categorized under DAC category 15130 legal and judicial development, one on human rights, one on media and free flow of information and one on elections. Two interventions with a total allocation of EUR 40.0 million were committed but not yet allocated (EG status) at the moment of the CLE interventions inventory. Meanwhile, the FA for the support to civil society and media in Jordan intervention has been signed (on 25 November 2013 – 23471 – EUR 10 million) leaving only the Support to the Justice Sector in Jordan (FD 23471 – EUR 30 million) still shown in CRIS under commitment (EG) status, awaiting signing of the Financing Agreement. It remains difficult if not impossible to ascertain retroactively for these interventions individually if they have been derived from a credible diagnostic analysis taking into account the existing preconditions (the current stage of policy and reform context) since from only one intervention (19569 – Support to Justice Reform and Good Governance in Jordan of 2008) the full set of identification and formulation documents are available.

At the general programming level of the CSP-NIPs rather clear requirements and instructions are incorporated regarding the need for a credible diagnostic analysis taking into account the existing preconditions as a basis for interventions design including decision making on most appropriate aid modalities (mix), also in relation to disbursement and absorptive capacity concerns. In the 2011-2013 NIP in this regard for example is mentioned that as far as the implementation of the financial assistance is concerned, the disbursement level is high, Budget Support has been applied successfully and donor coordination has increased. Budget Support corresponds to 50 % of the total allocation. Both Budget Support and twinning have been applied successfully to the satisfaction of the Government of Jordan. A combination of both could contribute to resolving a problem identified in the 2007 evaluation of the European Commission's (EC) support to Jordan, namely the difficulty of transferring the experience accumulated through programmes and projects to governmental institutions which manage sector Budget Support programmes. The same positive notes are included in the successor 2011-2013 NIP confirming that Jordan generally has good absorption capacity for ENPI funds and there have been very few problems with disbursements. Jordan has received, and successfully managed, sector Budget Support (SBS). Jordan continues to satisfy the eligibility criteria for Budget Support and more than 70 % of NIP 2011-2013 funds is expected to be allocated in the form of SBS. As conditionalities are put up that the design of SBS programmes should be coherent with priorities of the ENP Action Plans and their implementation should be linked with the continuous EU-Jordan policy dialogue. The EU's major sectoral programmes are complemented by a number of project-based initiatives in areas that do not lend themselves to, or do not require, Budget Support operations, such as support for political reform. Jordan has also made good use of the Twinning and Technical Assistance Information Exchange (TAIEX) instruments and is encouraged to
continue doing so.

The available checklists for identification fiches, for example those related to SAPP, give particular attention to problem analyses at the basis of the intervention logframe and implementation strategy, to Paris Declaration aid effectiveness criteria (with particular reference to the “on demand” mobilisation of assistance) and alignment with the EU-Jordan ENP Action Plan, as well as to commitments to reform.

But for the majority of interventions, the quality of the diagnostic analysis could not be ascertained in view of the absence of the necessary base documents. Some sources in this connection refer to a certain pressure to shortcut intervention preparation processes because of a spending / disbursement compulsion. Others refer for the preference of the Budget Support aid modality also to this context. This will need to be further examined during the field and synthesis phase based on additional documentary or other evidence from primary sources.

The NIPs however describe clear conditionalities as to the choice of the aid modalities depending on results of credible diagnostic analysis. In the case of Budget Support these include: the existence of a stable macro-economic management, a national policy reflecting a commitment to convergence with the European economy, a good quality of the public finance management system, as well as the definition of agreed performance indicators to measures and review progress. In addition, following a sector approach supposes the existence of an approved sectoral policy document and overall strategic framework, a sectoral medium term expenditure framework and an annual budget and the definition of a co-ordination process amongst the donors in the sector, led by Government.

The action fiche for the Support to the Justice Sector Reform in Jordan (FD 23471 of 2012) in this respect confirms that the two criteria pertaining to macroeconomic policy and public financial management are fully met, in Jordan, which is the beneficiary of several Budget Support programmes. The AF hereby zeroes in on four criteria: (i) Macroeconomic stability; (ii) PFM eligibility; (iii) Sector reform strategy in place, and (iv) Transparency (basically PFM related criteria).

It in this regard is noted that the four above BS (general) eligibility criteria basically relate to broad, overall macro elements, and not to the sector specifically. Only part of the judicial sectoral legal framework is referred to, to then conclude to its being in place. Regarding the sector specific conditionalities, in a footnote of the Action Fiche is mentioned in relation to their improvement: The main improvements observed by the SBS missions and IMF-WB report of January 2011 as well as the 2011 PFM annual monitoring report include: Strengthened forecasting mechanisms including the adoption of a medium term financial framework, medium term economic framework; results-oriented budgeting; extended application of Treasury Single Account; adoption of Special Data Dissemination Standards; formalised cash-flow mechanism; a new Chart of Accounts applied; and expanded government financial management information system.

There are also indications that there are attempts to duly take in good / best practices and lessons learnt from prior or other similar interventions or prior experiences. An example in case is the recently approved Support to Civil Society and Media Programme which only will prioritize capacity development in the media sector if the necessary regulatory and strategic framework for media development in Jordan is duly established and sanctioned.

A main finding, if not conclusion, of a recent key assessment of the quality of aid delivery, results and outputs, is that the overall impression is a positive one. The report notes that it is apparent, particularly in discussions with the Ministry of Finance and with MoPIC, that significant progress has been made in the understanding of the Sector Budget Support mechanism on the Jordanian side. This understanding has not yet percolated down to all beneficiary line ministries, (albeit the Ministry of Education showed a strong grasp of the tool). The two ministries in question have appreciated that Budget Support is not “free money”, and comes with a series of conditions which it is not always easy to meet. Roughly 60% of development co-operation is delivered in the form of Budget Support, which is by far the preferred method of the government as a whole (albeit an enthusiasm not always shared by individual line ministries). The Jordanian authorities are involved in the preparation of projects and are not just passive beneficiaries. The Delegation is experiencing some difficulties in finding time to monitor ongoing projects. The mission recognises the difficulties they face, particularly due to the added workload imposed by the Syrian crisis. Nevertheless it is essential that a realistic monitoring plan be established and adhered to. The audit plan is however credible and well prepared. The report furthermore recommended that risk assessment is established on all projects, and that then the monitoring mission plan, evaluation plan, ROM planning and audit plan could cover various complementary aspects of the project portfolio.
KPI-3.6.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Please see below

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- NIP 2011-2013, p.6
- NIP 2011-2013, pp. 9-10
- NIP 2011-2013, pp. 18-19
- Action Fiche, Support to Civil Society and Media in Jordan (ENPI/2012/023-849), 2012, p.2
- Action Fiche, Support to Justice Reform in Jordan (ENPI/2012/023-471), 2012, pp. 6-7
- Eligibility criteria for BS met
- Checklist for Identification Fiche SAPP II, p.2
- Identification Fiche, SAPP II, p.3
- NIP 2007-2010, p. 24
- Executive Development Programme 2011-2013, p.67
- AF 020-478Support to the implementation of the Action Plan II – SAPP II (2008), pp.4-5
- Donor coordination.
- TAPs 019-571 Support to the implementation of the Action Plan – SAPP (2008), pp.4-5

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- Support to the justice sector reform in Jordan ENPI/2012/023-471 - Action Fiche for Jordan, p. 5
- Support to the justice sector reform in Jordan ENPI/2012/023-471 - Action Fiche for Jordan, p. 6
- IKRS-2 (2014). p.2
- Please see below

KPI-3.6.1 (i) Data, figures and tables:
CLE Database of 43 EU Financing Decisions and 401 Contracts (benefiting Jordan, 2007-2013 period)

Query of key words for database searches on KPI 3.1.1: democracy, human rights, civil society, women’s empowerment, freedom of the media, political parties, independent judiciary, … Other search criteria: decision between 2007 en 2013 and allocated / planned amount ≥ EUR 800,000. From the 20 interventions, 11 were Financing Decisions. Out of these 20, documents are available for 14 interventions of which 11 are FDs. The volume of the 20 interventions is EUR 215,370.906 and the volume of the 14 interventions with documentation is EUR 207,687.329.

Portfolio database search results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>DAC Code</th>
<th>Decision / Contract No.</th>
<th>Allocated in EUR</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Support to Justice Reform and Good Governance in Jordan</td>
<td>15130</td>
<td>19569</td>
<td>6.730.265</td>
<td>FD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Support to the implementation of the Action Plan programme (SAPP)</td>
<td>43010</td>
<td>19571</td>
<td>9.309.060</td>
<td>FD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Support to the implementation of the Action Plan programme II (SAPP II)</td>
<td>43010</td>
<td>20478</td>
<td>20.000.000</td>
<td>FD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Building Development Capacities of Jordanian Municipalities</td>
<td>15112</td>
<td>21219</td>
<td>3.000.000</td>
<td>FD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Support to the justice reform in Jordan</td>
<td>15130</td>
<td>23471</td>
<td>30.000.000</td>
<td>FD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Support to the security sector in applying the rule of law</td>
<td>15210</td>
<td>23533</td>
<td>5.000.000</td>
<td>FD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Support to Civil Society and Media in Jordan</td>
<td>15153</td>
<td>23849</td>
<td>10.000.000</td>
<td>FD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Support to the justice sector in meeting the required criteria for sector Budget Support</td>
<td>15130</td>
<td>24238</td>
<td>3.000.000</td>
<td>FD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Support to the Electoral Process in Jordan</td>
<td>15151</td>
<td>24290</td>
<td>2.000.000</td>
<td>FD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Good Governance and Development Contract Jordan</td>
<td>51010</td>
<td>24396</td>
<td>40.000.000</td>
<td>FD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Promoting financial inclusion through improved governance and outreach of microfinance in Jordan</td>
<td>24040</td>
<td>24481</td>
<td>35.000.000</td>
<td>FD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Reforming the family laws in Arab countries</td>
<td>15160</td>
<td>118155</td>
<td>803.012</td>
<td>CO</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Human Rights and Good Governance - Decision No. 17260</td>
<td>143367</td>
<td>2.201.450</td>
<td>CO</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Human Rights and Good Governance - Decision 18179</td>
<td>145051</td>
<td>1.746.554</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
CLE Jordan interventions inventory and portfolio analysis; DAC 15130: Legal and judicial development

Evaluation of the European Union’s Cooperation with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Sector Code</th>
<th>Decision Date</th>
<th>Final Date for Contracting (FDC LC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Support to the justice reform in Jordan</td>
<td>10130</td>
<td>31/12/2012</td>
<td>31/12/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Support to the justice sector in meeting the required criteria for sector budget support</td>
<td>10130</td>
<td>15/09/2011</td>
<td>30/05/2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sub-Totals 15130 - Legal and Judicial Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>OECD-DAC CRS Sector</th>
<th>Allocated In Euro</th>
<th>In % of Total</th>
<th>Paid In Euro</th>
<th>In % of Total</th>
<th>In % of Allocated</th>
<th>Commission Decision Date</th>
<th>Final Date for Concluding the FA (FDC FA)</th>
<th>Final Date for Concluding the FA (FDC FA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>38,750,265</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>4,050,289</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>82.2%</td>
<td>23/10/2008</td>
<td>31/12/2009</td>
<td>30/09/2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>30,000,000</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>31/12/2013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>559,741</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
<td>15/09/2011</td>
<td>31/12/2011</td>
<td>2005/2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sub-Totals for All CLE Key Interventions / Financing Decisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>OECD-DAC CRS Sector</th>
<th>Allocated In Euro</th>
<th>In % of Total</th>
<th>Paid In Euro</th>
<th>In % of Total</th>
<th>In % of Allocated</th>
<th>Commission Decision Date</th>
<th>Final Date for Contracting (FDC LC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>SBS / GBS Project approach</td>
<td>695,246,822</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>348,054,429</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>50.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
- CRS database selection criterion for Financing Decisions: “Zone benefitting from the action = JO”.
- Cut-off date = 04 October 2013 (Date of CRS Downloading).

CLE Jordan interventions inventory and portfolio analysis; Figure 5.8: Contracted Amounts per Aid Modality, Key Sectors
KPI-3.6.1 (iii) Additional information from field phase

(3) Downloading of documents from CRIS-DWY between 04 and 31 October 2013, with the original documents downloading status report table PA 2.2 as of 01 November 2013 further completed for the documents received from the EU on CD through the Evaluation Unit on 04 December 2013.

Guidelines / Explanations / Instructions:

(a) All Project/Programme Cycle Management (PPCM) and other crucial documents available with the CLE Evaluation Team as of now per 17 April 2014 for the 43 EU interventions / financing decisions benefiting HKS Jordan for our Country Level Evaluation are reflected in the below table with figures.

(b) The total figures of available types of documents per Financing Decision / Intervention are included under table column 30. The totals of available documents by type of document for all 43 Financing Decisions are under Excel row 61.

(c) The documents which additionally became available during the Desk Phase as a result of the second CRIS search at the DEVCO Evaluation Unit in EC Head Office on 14 April 2014 are reflected in the below table in blue figures.

(d) Indicated with a “X” mark, in the green cells concerned of the below table are the key Project / Programme Cycle Management (PPCM) documents of the interventions related to the respective Evaluation Questions which are still not available, i.e., still needed to be completed your Information Matrix (IM) in order to make an assessment of the Judgement Criteria and to prepare the (preliminary) answer of the Evaluation Questions during the next phase of the evaluation process (field and/or synthesis phases).

The totals of key PPCM and other crucial documents still looked for by Financing Decision are reflected under table column 29. The totals of documents still looked for by type of key document for all 43 interventions are reflected on Excel row 62.

(e) The main related CLE sectional Evaluation Questions for which the information is particularly relevant are included under column H (prime EQs) and column I (secondary EQs).

(f) A detailed list of all documents additionally downloaded from CRIS on 14 April has been worked out and made available to the Evaluation Unit on 17 April. All these documents are uploaded on the Folio Cloud repository for direct access by the Evaluation Team (under common directory 23).

(g) The documents which additionally became available during the Desk Phase as provided to the CLE Evaluation Team on CD on 36 May 2014 following special request after the 2nd CRIS search of 14 April 2014 are reflected in the below table in orange figures.

KPI-3.6.2: Percentage of democratic governance interventions for which the full set of project identification, formulation, key implementation and M&E documents are available

Main Findings on KPI-3.6.2:

The availability of PPCM and other crucial documents of the EU-Jordan cooperation interventions for the period 2007-2013 under review is presented in table format under Annex 8.2. In this chapter a status report is included on the gathering of documents, information and data required for the analysis in relation to the entire portfolio of 43 key interventions (Financing Decisions). In addition, the same summary table also provides an overview of the PPCM and other documents still looked for. A same table has been prepared for the 5 interventions with are of prime relevance to the current EQ-3 democratic governance analysis and the 9 more with secondary links to the EQ-3 (thus with prime links to other questions). The PPCM document types are clustered by PPCM phase (respectively: Identification, formulation and approval, and implementation) with a fourth category on external monitoring and evaluations. Further details and explanations are provided in the table footnotes.

The table speaks for itself in terms of relative scarcity of available documents. This particularly pertains to the documents related to the identification phase (e.g. Identification fiches, checklists QSG-1, Minutes of QSG-1 meetings) with availability percentages varying between 21% and 50%, so in about half of the cases at best. Good availability is noted with regard to the Actions Fiches (86%, or for about three quarters of all interventions) and the Financing Agreements (93%), with TAPs/Descriptions of Action available in 71% and LogFrames in 71% of the cases. For 43% of the interventions ROM external monitoring reports are available. These are just quantitative inventory figures and obviously do not tell the story about their intrinsic quality or about any differences in quality. However, they provide a first proxy impression about the state of PPCM cycle management at both individual interventions, sectoral/thematic and overall country portfolio management. The above summary figures are based on the latest completion of the base table of PPCM documents of the interventions approved in the 2007-2013 period covered by the evaluation. It also covers the documents which were additionally made available to the evaluation on CD-ROM on 27 May 2014. The full table is presented under Annex 8.2 of the Final Report Volume III of Annexes.

A specific case are the LogFrames under the SAPP programme, executed under the Programme Estimates (PE) special project approach aid modality. SAPP is a demand driven programme that uses different EC contracting modalities (particularly for the benefit of several governmental institutions that cover diversified sectors. Therefore, setting a comprehensive and detailed logical framework for this Programme is not a practice application. However as also confirmed in Programme Estimate I, a detailed logical framework approach needs to be designed and developed for each activity “project” within this programme. The projects’ objectives, purposes, expected results, activities, benchmarks, assumptions and risks are to be clearly elaborated throughout the different phases of the project contracting cycle. The winning aid long term technical assistance agreements are having these fundamental elements in a “Log Framework matrix” format, while the supplies, works and framework contracts have these detailed throughout the articles of the relevant agreement.
KPI-3.6.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Action Fiche SAPP II, p.9
- Checklist for Identification Fiche Dec. No. 20478 SAPP II, P. 2
- TAPs of FD 19571 (SAPP II), p.13
- SAPP II (Programme Estimate 1, 2011), p.10
- KPI 3.6.2 on PSD findings – Related

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- /-

KPI-3.6.3: Extent to which alternative options of democratic governance support are studied and criteria for preference and eligibility are defined

Main Findings on KPI-3.6.3:

The assessment of this KPI is covered under additional KPIs 3.6.5 to 3.6.8 which have been added in the process in order to ensure a broader coverage of the aid modalities mix with special attention for Budget Support step 1 analysis issues, and more in general under EQ-4 on aid modalities and efficiency. The assessment is also covered partly already under earlier KPI 3.6.1 on the quality of the diagnostic analysis at the basis of the intervention strategy. From the relatively scarce relevant documents available it may be asserted that in general alternative options of democratic governance support have been studied and criteria for preference and eligibility have been defined. This is particularly the case for the interventions and contracts approved under the second NIP, as by that time also the EC methodological instruments and guidelines got further elaborated, refined and updated based on good/best practices and lessons learnt from prior experiences, and training / capacity development programmes of EU officers and of key partner country officers (or PMU experts) on these subjects further expanded. Only few additional PPCM documents related to the interventions approved in the 2007-2013 period became available during the field and early final draft evaluation phases, and as such did not provide further substantive evidence to assess the indicator. But different interviews with key stakeholders concerned during the field visit to Jordan it was that special attention is given to a more systematic preparation and formulation process of interventions, including the study and consideration of alternative options of aid modalities and financing most suitable for the interventions, including eligibility criteria. On the other hand, it was learnt that a recourse to Budget Support was the line of action taken when faced with time pressures to approve interventions or to strengthen disbursement rates.

A practical example of an EU intervention providing evidence that alternative options of democratic governance support have been studied and criteria for preference and eligibility are defined, is the Support to Justice Reform and Good Governance intervention for which the action fiche stipulates that the project was formulated based on the assessment of the problem(s) and the stakeholder analysis and it takes into consideration lessons learnt from ongoing and past projects. Given the purely "public sector" nature of this project, the AF pointed out that it is desirable to entrust the implementation of its components to EU Member States' public institutions (through grants awarded through a restricted call for proposals and twinning) and to UN Agencies with a clear mandate in the sector (through a direct grant awarded under joint management). Another practical illustration relates to the thematic field of gender equality. During the 8th meeting of the Sub-committee on Human Rights, Governance and Democracy in Brussels on 9 September discussion on the topic of equal treatment on women, due attention was given to the most appropriate mix of aid modalities. The EU in this connection mentioned that substantial support was provided to Jordanian women's protection through the EU thematic budget lines (Gender, EIDHR) and it also paid tribute to the positive results of a regional project which aimed at gathering governments and CSOs of the region for preparing recommendations for the next Union for the Mediterranean Ministerial Conference in Paris. This in addition to the very substantive report provided to gender issues as mainstreamed in different democratic governance interventions funded under the bilateral geographical CSP National Indicative Programme. The EC supports the reform and transition processes underway in the EU’s Neighbouring Partner Countries.
through a number of fully operational and highly complementary cooperation instruments as TAIEX, Twinning and SIGMA. The choice of the most appropriate aid modality and financing instrument in most cases appears determined by the broader enabling environment of the intervention, including preferences and capacities of the partner agency. As such for example, a more flexible TAIEX intervention is not seldom opted for in preparation of a more institutionalized and complex twinning operation for organisational capacity development.

Lessons learnt from the ongoing 'Institutional Strengthening of the Ministry of Justice of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Project confirm that a service contract with a private consulting company is not the best implementation method to support justice reform. Another lesson learnt from the evaluation of Twinning Projects and Calls for Proposals in the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) area funded under the MEDA, PHARE, CARDS Programmes is that EU Member States’ public institutions can bring significant added value to the implementation of public sector reform projects. The assessment of the ongoing EC project 'Short-Term Technical Assistance for the Anti-Corruption Commission' shows that there is full political support from the Government of Jordan to implement the anti-corruption strategy and action plan, and that the Anti-Corruption Commission would welcome the possibility to receive support from an EU Member State (MS) public institution (through a twinning project) to implement the strategy and action plan.

KPI-3.6.3 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- NIP 2011-2013, pp. 9-10
- Action Fiche, FD 19569, Support to Justice Reform and Good Governance in Jordan (2007), p.15
- Findings 6.5.3: On the use of BS and Programme approach in PSD: BS for institutional support and programme for specific action (related)
  - Please see below

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
  - Please see below
KPI-3.6.3 (ii) Key extracts from documents:

**CLE Jordan interventions inventory and portfolio analysis; DAC 15130: Legal and judicial development**

**Evaluation of the European Union’s Cooperation with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table EQ-3 IM-02a</th>
<th>List of Key EU Interventions / Financing Decisions Benefitting the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan with Contracted Resources in the Period 2007-2013 (1), Listed and Totaled by OECD-DAC CRS 15130 Legal and judicial development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLE Financing Decisions / Key Interventions</th>
<th>OECD-DAC CRS Sector</th>
<th>Budgetary / Financial Totals</th>
<th>Chronology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decision year</td>
<td>Decision no</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>19589</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Support to Justice Reform and Good Governance in Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>23471</td>
<td>EG</td>
<td>Support to the justice reform in Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>24238</td>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Support to the justice sector in meeting the required criteria for sector budget support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sub-Totals 15130 - Legal and Judicial Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budgetary / Financial Totals</th>
<th>Allocated</th>
<th>Paid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>38,780,295</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>4,050,269</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Sub-Totals 150 - Government and Civil Society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budgetary / Financial Totals</th>
<th>Allocated</th>
<th>Paid</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>225,729,757</td>
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<td>117,058,059</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals for All CLE Key Interventions / Financing Decisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budgetary / Financial Totals</th>
<th>Allocated</th>
<th>Paid</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>264,509,022</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>346,004,429</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

(1) - CRIS database selection criteria for Financing Decisions: "Zone benefiting from the action = JO ".
- Cut-off date = 04 October 2013 (Date of CRIS Downloading)

(2) - Column 6: Operational Status: CA = Cancelled, CL = Closed, DE = Decision, EC = Ongoing, EG = Committed, PO = Provisional

KPI-3.6.3 (iii) Additional information from field phase


The EC supports the reform and transition processes underway in the EU’s Neighbouring Partner Countries through a number of operational and highly complementary cooperation instruments: TAIEX, Twinning and SIGMA.

**TAIEX**

TAIEX (Technical Assistance and Information Exchange) was introduced to the ENPI region in 2006 to offer short-term assistance and advice to Partner Countries as they implement their ENP Action Plans. It was initially set up in 1996 to provide short-term, targeted technical assistance to the candidate countries. It supports Neighbouring countries in the approximation, application and enforcement of EU legislation. It is mainly demand driven, channels requests for assistance, and contributes to the delivery of appropriate tailor-made expertise to address problems at short notice. Assistance is given through expert missions, workshops or seminars and study visits.

Website http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/overview/taieux_en.htm

**TWINNING**

Twinning is an EC initiative originally designed to help candidate countries acquire the necessary skills and experience to adopt, implement and enforce EU legislation. Since 2004, Twinning has also been available to countries in the ENPI region. On a demand driven base, the projects bring together public sector expertise from EU Member States and partner countries, with the aim of enhancing co-operation activities. Twinning projects are joint projects, shared by the two partner administrations. The partner country retains ownership.

Website http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/overview/twinning_en.htm

**SIGMA**

SIGMA (Support for Improvement in Governance and Management) is a joint European Commission and OECD initiative. Principally financed by the EU, it focuses on strengthening public management in areas such as administrative reform, public procurement, public sector ethics, anti-corruption, and external and internal financial control. On a demand-driven basis, it has been assisting countries in installing governance and administrative systems appropriate to a market economy, functioning under the rule of law in a democratic context.

Website http://www.sigmaweb.org
**KPI-3.6.4: Percentage of democratic governance interventions for which the overall objectives and project purpose are clearly and correctly differentiated and the assumptions and risk are clearly identified**

**Main Findings on KPI-3.6.4:**

As prescribed in the DEVCO PPCM procedures and guidelines, the Action Fiches and the Technical and Administrative Provisions (TAPs) / Descriptions of the interventions are to be in accordance with a standard format, with specific sections on (i) objectives, (ii) expected results and main activities, and (iii) risks and assumptions. These, together with the indicators and their means of verification, are the building blocks of the Logical Framework.

The 14 key interventions (financing decisions) in the Jordan country strategy portfolio 2007-2013 in the thematic area of democratic governance basically are in accordance with this formal requirement, at least for those interventions for which the document concerned (mostly the Technical and Administrative Provisions - TAPs, incl. LogFrame, attached to the Financing Agreement) is available. The objectives are differentiated in overall objectives (goal level) and specific objectives (purpose level). The expected results are differentiated as either results or key results. Main activities are presented by strategy component or by pillar or by a combination of these. It however is not always clear how components and/or pillars relate to the results and in turn how the expected results relate / contributed to the specific objectives as a causal link is not always prominent from the AFs or TAPs. As such, while there is formal compliance with the requirements, content-wise not exceptionally the intervention logics may benefit from stronger quality assurance during the interventions formulation stage (e.g. in relation to QSG screening and endorsement).

Risks and assumptions are presented under a separate section / chapter. Generally there is no differentiation made between the two categories of risks and assumptions, with the chapters concerned mostly concentrating on risks, without explicit elaboration on the assumptions (or even critical assumptions). There are various degrees of risk mitigation strategy coverage in the formulation documents. For the democratic governance projects, these are very much related to the volatile situation in the region impacting on the national situation. Risk chapters therefore tend to be rather comprehensive and more elaborate. During the field phase, during different meetings with EUD officers the need for a stronger and more elaborated risk assessment and risk management/mitigation strategy was raised as crucial to further enhance overall intervention/programme management and intervention/portfolio results orientation. On different occasions, the idea of inclusion of monitorable risk indicators in the TAPs project/programme document was shared as a matter of priority and high importance. Their actual, regular monitoring then should be included in the foreseen monitoring provisions, in relation to both internal and external monitoring. The same was supported by the recent European Commission Verification Mission to Jordan earlier this year.

In conclusion, based on the PPCM documents available there is virtually full compliance with the formal requirements regarding the contents of the formulation documents with regard to objectives (overall and immediate, or goal and purpose levels) and regarding the incorporation of assumptions and risks. Content-wise main challenges are observed with regard to the quality of the results frameworks (e.g. logic of the LogFrames: results-purpose-goal; results-immediate objectives – overall, long-term objectives; outputs-outcomes-impact) and the due coverage of risk factors and their management / mitigation. The latter is especially pressing in a country like Jordan, strongly affected by regional developments and crises situations.

**KPI-3.6.4 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) **Data, figures and tables:**
- Please see below

(ii) **Key extracts from documents:**
- Action Fiche, Support to civil society and media in Jordan (ENPI/2012/023-849), p.8
- Action Fiche SAPP II, p.5
- Identification Fiche, SAPP II, p.3
- Checklist for Identification Fiche,No. 20478 SAPP II, p.2
### (iii) Additional information from field phase:

- Please see below

#### KPI-3.6.4 (i) Data, figures and tables:

As prescribed in the DEVCO PPCM procedures and guidelines, the Action Fiches and the Technical and Administrative Provisions / Descriptions of the interventions are to be in accordance with a standard format, with specific sections on (i) objectives, (ii) expected results and main activities, and (iii) risks and assumptions. These, together with the indicators and their means of verification, are the building blocks of the Logical Framework. The 14 key interventions (financing decisions) in the Jordan country strategy portfolio 2007-2013 in the thematic area of democratic governance are in accordance with this formal requirement. The objectives are differentiated in overall objectives (goal level) and specific objectives (purpose level). The expected results are differentiated as either results or key results. Main activities are presented by strategy component or by pillar or by a combination of these. It is not always clear how components and/or pillars relate to the results and in turn how the expected results relate / contributed to the specific objectives as a causal link is not always prominent from the AFs or TAPs. Risks and assumptions are presented under a separate sections / chapter. Generally there is no differentiation made between the two categories of risks and assumptions, with the chapters concerned mostly concentrating on risks, without explicit elaboration on the assumptions (or even critical assumptions). There are various degrees of risk mitigation strategy coverage in the formulation documents. For the democratic governance projects, these are very much related to the volatile situation in the region impacting on the national situation. Risk chapters therefore tend to be rather comprehensive and more elaborate.

#### KPI-3.6.4 (iii) Additional information from field phase


The following are actions undertaken in Amman during the course of 2013 by the EU Delegation and EU Member States to achieve the objectives set out in the Human Rights Country Strategy:

It is worth noting that the second round of the Universal Periodic Review for Jordan took place in October. The EU and Member States took this opportunity to engage with the authorities as well as the civil society, including through the Human Rights Working Group. EU Member States were among the most active countries at the Universal Periodic Review round in Geneva. While this report refers broadly to the main issues raised there, presenting an exhaustive list of individual contributions on all issues would be beyond the scope of this report.

The 2012 ENP Progress Report, adopted in 2013 also provided an opportunity to convey clear messages to the Jordanian authorities. It includes also a number of specific recommendations, most of which were related to human rights, rule of law and good governance.

The report then gives an account of the objectives to be achieved and the actual accomplishments related to the two main cooperation instruments of political dialogue and cooperation interventions, stressing their synergy and mutually reinforcing character. Also public diplomacy as third instrument is included in the reporting. The report (which covers both the EU and the Member States) on the implementation of the Human Rights Country Strategy covers the following 8 sub-areas:

1. Political rights
2. Freedom of assembly
3. Freedom of association / civil society
4. Freedom of expression and media
5. Rule of law / rights based society / torture
6. Gender equality
7. Death penalty
8. Children’s rights

**Public diplomacy**

Issues related to human rights, including as regards public diplomacy and conveying messages to the authorities, are regularly discussed with Member States at the regular meetings chaired by the EU Delegation, including at the level of HoMs. The Human Rights Country Strategy has been used as a basis for the elaboration of EU and Member States joint messages to the authorities and civil society.

#### KPI-3.6.5: Degree to which the chronology of changes in frameworks for policy dialogue and coordinated TA / capacity development initiatives for enhanced democratic governance show evidence that BS programmes, projects, programme estimates and/or TA played a critical role (or not) in driving the development of effective frameworks for democratic governance (e.g. for BS, general and specific conditions for the disbursement of BS tranches are defined on the basis of the contents of policy dialogue and promote the development of improved frameworks for policy dialogue, and their monitoring feeds policy dialogue processes) - (Cfr. 5.3.4)
Main Findings on KPI-3.6.5:

There is documented evidence, further supported by the interviews and meetings conducted during the evaluation’s field visit to Jordan, that there have been positive developments in the creation, operationalisation and maintenance of effective frameworks for democratic governance, both at the level of the overall democratic governance political dialogue level and at the level of the individual interventions. It at the same time is acknowledge that there are still very substantive challenges to be met for making these framework effectively operational, functioning and bringing about the expected results for a successful pursuit of the overall democratic governance objectives of the EU-Jordan collaboration. This is highlighted on different earlier occasions in relation to the assessment of the indicators and judgement criteria in relation to this evaluation question on democratic governance, both in general with regard to the strengthened coordination and institutionalized dialogue mechanisms for EU-Jordan cooperation on democratic governance (JC 3.1), and to the frameworks for policy/political dialogue with civil society (JC 3.3), and sectoral / thematically in the fields of human rights (incl. women’s rights), fight against corruption (JC 3.2) and the media, of enhanced political participation and open and fair elections (JC 3.4), and of access to justice, law enforcement, security and fight against terrorism.

Over time, the formulation and approval documents of EU-Jordan cooperation interventions (Action Fiches, Technical and Administrative Provisions, specific performance indicators for the disbursement of sector Budget Support variable tranches in the field of democratic governance are getting more pronounced in articulating broader institutional and political framework conditions for facilitating effective, results oriented policy dialogue and development interventions and their monitoring. An example in case is the just recently (25 November 2013) approved Support to the Justice Sector Reform In Jordan BS programme which includes two institutional framework conditionalties for enhanced policy dialogue amongst its eight special conditionalties for Budget Support variable tranches releases, to wit: (1) strengthening of capacities and of co-ordination mechanisms between key-players in the judicial field, and other relevant stakeholders, and; (5) strengthening of sector-wide consultation and participatory process for updating policies/action plans. With the programme just commencing it obviously is still too early to assess effective accomplishments and/or results related to these provisions. Interviews with key stakeholders concerned during the field visits however pointed out the up-hill struggle in effectively establishing, maintaining and further strengthening of such enabling environment frameworks as the different parties concerned in the justice sector tend to maintain and protect this silo set-up and fragmentation. The same goes for the Support to Civil Society and Media in Jordan project (FA signed on 25 November 2013) which even has as 2nd component explicitly spelled out “Strengthen an enabling regulatory and institutional environment and building the capacity of an independent, quality based media sector serving the entire population. There however are also positive developments as reported media 2010 with regard to the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (on 18/04/2010) between the Anti-Corruption Commission and the Audit Bureau and the Office of the Ombudsman. The most recent ROM report on the support to the Criminal Justice Reform component concluded to the necessity of requiring strong commitments for the Budget Support that can be use as leverage for strengthening reform and the policy dialogue framework to make this possible.

On a more general level, the February 2013 assessment report of Aid Coordination and Effectiveness in Jordan concluded to the absence of a structured dialogue and exchanges during the national planning processes and to the non-availability of established structures for collaboration and consultation with the civil society actors. Also the Parliament does not seem to play a significant role in the dialogue around aid.

Also, the scattered responsibilities for the overall coordination and implementation of the programme, consisting of three GoJ entities (MoPIC, MoJ and the Judicial Council) may not comply well with the vision of an integrated framework for policy dialogue and coordinated initiatives for enhanced performance of the justice sector as aspired for. Generally, dialogue between EUD and GoJ through MoPIC takes place regularly, but nevertheless the dialogue not only still is overly mechanical (e.g. related to payments) rather than policy-oriented. Beyond the mechanistic, it is still difficult to to have an open policy dialogue with the authorities and other key parties concerned.

KPI-3.6.5 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- TAPs Support to Civil Society and Media in Jordan 2013, p.5
- EUD note to AIDCO A – Request 3rd Tranche Payment “Support for the Public Finance Reform Programme”, 2010
- Assessment of Aid Coordination and Effectiveness in Jordan, February 2013
- IKRS 2012 (13 Sep2013), p.3
- NIP 2011-2013, p.6
- Key actions on 3. Democracy and Institution Building, pp. 5-6
- Evaluation of conditionalities of the 2 EC programmes – end of 2009, p.52
- PFM ROM Monitoring Report, 2012 – Quality of EU-GOJ dialogue on PFM
- PEFA 2011 as basis for JC.4.5
- ENP Progress Report Jordan, 2007 to 2013, as basis for JC 4.6
- JC 2.2 assessment: Donor / Lender Consultation Group as institutional basis for policy dialogue with GOJ
- KPI 6.4.1 – Impact of PSD on local development – institutional aspects (related)
- Findings KPI 4.4.2

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- IKRS-2 (2014). p.2
- IKRS-2 (2014). p.3
- ROM Report145182.02 – Support to Criminal Justice Reform in Jordan, 27 June 2013

KPI-3.6.6: Extent to which, in the perception of representatives of the GoHKJ (including sector ministries), EU and other donors’ representatives, BS processes and/or other aid modalities, working independently or as a complement to BS, influence the evolution of frameworks for policy dialogue and coordinated TA/capacity development initiatives. - (Cfr. 5.3.5)

Main Findings on KPI-3.6.6:

As illustrated for example in the recent 2013 ENP Country Progress Report for Jordan of March 2014 in the section on cooperation on justice, freedom and security, Budget Support processes in tandem with other aid modalities as Technical Assistance, project approaches, twinning, TAIEX are confirmed to have impacted on the evolution of frameworks for policy dialogue and capacity development initiatives. But the picture is not uniform and effects are more specifically related to specific cases and processes. An example in case is the technical experts mission in the framework of the EU Jordan Dialogue on Migration, Mobility and Security of early 2013 which triggered off a process of negotiations on a joint declaration establishing a Mobility Partnership between the EU and Jordan launched in December of that year. Other recent examples by way of illustration include the development of a new action plan on trafficking in human beings and regular meetings of the National Committee for the Prevention of Trafficking in Human Beings. As confirmed for example in a recent 2013 study of the University of Jordan’s Center for Strategic Studies, since the beginning of the Arab upheavals in Tunisia in December 2010, the EU has been quick to recognise the challenges of the political and economic transition faced by the region as a whole. The EU has engaged politically with a wide range of civil society interlocutors, university professors, students, but also government, opposition, parliamentarians. This instant and concerted response is widely recognized and positively received by the main stakeholders concerned within the evolving framework of further broadened political and policy dialogue. Despite the difficult context, Jordan made an important progress in its political reforms’ process through the adoption of far-reaching constitutional amendments. The latter address a number of priorities agreed in the framework of the new EU-Jordan ENP Action Plan negotiated in 2010, in particular the establishment of an independent electoral commission, greater accountability of the government, the empowerment of political parties through the revision of legislation and the prohibition of
torture. In other cases, the amendments go beyond Jordan’s ENP Action Plan commitments, for example the establishment of the Constitutional Court, limitation of the government’s ability to enact provisional (temporary) law and new, more restrictive, rules on the dissolution of the Parliament. A major push thereto was given by the additional financial envelope of EUR 70 million and technical assistance through the new Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) programme focusing on good governance and economic growth. It at the same time is acknowledged that to ensure more pronounced and sustainable impact on the broader enabling environment and framework for political dialogue on democratic governance issues, more strategic and operational attention should be given in the design and approval process phases of the interventions when reform leverage is highest. More in general, as asserted for example in the February 2013 Assessment of Aid Coordination and Effectiveness in Jordan, the aid coordination system in Jordan is not geared towards generating optimal aid effectiveness. Nevertheless, the report emphasizes that stakeholders in the Government, MoPIC and line ministries, demonstrate not only interest but also a clear ownership for aid coordination and are ready to assume leadership for its improvement.

As confirmed on the occasion of different interviews with key stakeholders, both Government and Non-Government, during the evaluation field visit, when the objective of a Budget Support intervention includes the passing of necessary legislative and regulatory reforms, specific and well-focused support is needed in order to avoid any implementation delays. One lesson learnt is that whenever EU assistance is used to develop regulatory reform, political support from PAO and EUD is required to achieve the results. Different key stakeholders therefore recommended the development of a strategic approach first towards the legislative process and also to understand what processes are required to get the reform in place and have it actually implemented. In cases of weak or fragmented institutional responsibilities, a lack of coherent sector strategies and operational coordination has often resulted in fragmented donor assistance, activities within inappropriate policy or institutional frameworks, a weak ability to select and scale up successes, and ultimately little on-the-ground impact. This a fortiori applies to the area of democratic governance, as is also the case of private sector development, social protection, and financial management reform. This contrasts with the very positive experiences in the education programme.

When asked to which degree EU support has contributed to strengthened consultation of civil society on policy dialogue and development matters in Jordan, the responding CSOs participating in the CLE mini-survey and focus-group discussion gave an average appreciation score of 2.8 (on a 0-5 scale), which is about mid-range of the ten questions answers given. One of the narrative survey comments given was that one of the main strengths of the EU support to civil society was through the role it is playing, being a linkage between government and CSOs through its moderate communication channels, which allows both parties to share their thoughts and recommendations to each other through the EU. Nevertheless, CSOs are aiming for more effective support from the EU on this regard.

Of the ten democratic governance assessment topics in the survey, the overall satisfaction with the EU support the respective organisations have benefited from in the period 2007-2013 got the highest average assessment score (4.4 or 88%), followed by the related (sub)-topics of both institutional / organisational and human capacities strengthening by EU support (both a score of 3.6 or 72%). At the other end of the scale with the lowest overall assessment and satisfaction is the actual impact CSO have on the political dialogue and agenda setting at present in Jordan, despite all the support provided by EU and from other sources (average score of 1.6 or 32%). Amongst the main challenges to be addressed still for further strengthening of democratic governance in Jordan overall, were identified by the CSOs in the mini-survey amongst others: CSOs still not recognized as key players by the government; necessary changes in legal frameworks (e.g. women advancement in the Constitution, Association Law, Family Law, the legislative framework for CSOs operation in Jordan in general, Electoral Law); judiciary independence, non-interference of Government in civic work, the quality of the political dialogue between Government and CSOs. The interviewees pointed out as particularly worrying the Government’s new law for CSOs eliminating the possibility of their free funding and the fact that they are increasingly inspected by the government and the Intelligence Department.

KPI-3.6.6 Main References and Sources of Information:
(i) Data, figures and tables:
- ./-
(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- University of Jordan, Center for Strategic Studies (2013), EU and Jordan: Beyond the ENP Action
Plan - 3.2. EU-Jordan relations after the Arab Spring - pp. 8-9
- JC 7.1 – KPI 7.1.3 Programme estimates (PE) programming as demand driven
- Assessment of Aid Coordination and Effectiveness in Jordan, February 2013
- EQ-7 re JC 7.1: Need for adequate qualitative TA and support services in case of political dialogue with legislation and reform in mind - related
- Action Fiche PLEDJ – Promoting Local Economic Development in Jordan, 2010
- WB country strategy paper, 2012

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- Please see below

KPI-3.6.6 (iii) Additional information from field phase
Excerpt from the summary analysis of the June 2014 mini-survey with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) on Democratic Governance – Survey Question 3:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 3</th>
<th>Scores on 0-5 Scale</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>Average Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree to which EU support has contributed to strengthened consultation of civil society on policy dialogue and development matters in Jordan?</td>
<td>Number of scores</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>% of total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Summary of narrative comments by respondents (brief explanations / score justifications) | | | | | | | | | - The EU support to Civil Society was through the role it is playing, being a linkage between government and CSOs, through its moderate communication channels, which allowed both parties to share their thoughts and recommendations to each other through the EU. Nevertheless, CSOs are aiming for more effective support from the EU on this regard.  
- On several occasions the EU invited NGOs and governmental entities for meetings, like several at the foreign affairs ministry. Also, the EU involves CSOs in the EU work planning.  
- To a certain extent, only. In support of an EU NSA project in Azraq local community, CSOs were able to form a "coordinating committee" for societal dialogue. It succeeded to aggregate the efforts of CSOs, parliamentarian, mayor and the governor, but failed to build systematic consultation with any of the concerned ministries, especially the MoPIC, at the national level. |

Summary quantitative analysis of the June 2014 mini-survey with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) on Democratic Governance
PART III: Summary quantitative analysis of the CSOs assessment scores of the 10 survey questions related to CLE EQ-3 democratic governance issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary scoring table for the 10 Questions</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Q-1</th>
<th>Q-2</th>
<th>Q-3</th>
<th>Q-4</th>
<th>Q-5</th>
<th>Q-6</th>
<th>Q-7</th>
<th>Q-8</th>
<th>Q-9</th>
<th>Q-10</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Av. 0-5 score</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.72</td>
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<tr>
<td>Av. % score</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>54.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Totals for all 10 Questions</th>
<th>Scores on 0-5 Scale</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of scores</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The average assessment score (0-5 scale) of the ten assessment topics of the democratic governance component under the 2007-2012 EU-Jordan cooperation strategy and programme given by the responding Civil Society Organisations in the June 2014 mini-survey conducted in the framework of the Country Level Evaluation (CLE) field phase is a just above average (2.72 or 54.4%). Most of the assessment scores by the CSO respondents indeed tended to the average (22% with a score 2 and 30% scores 3). Only 2 (of the total of 50 or 4%) extreme negative scores 0 were given (one on CSOs actual impact on political dialogue and agenda setting at present in Jordan, and one on CSOs active involvement in the implementation and monitoring of EU cooperation strategies and programmes with Jordan). The 5 highest satisfactory scores (5 on the 0-5 scale) went especially to the overall satisfaction with the EU support given to their respective organisations in the 2007-2013 period (3 cases) plus one 5 excellent score each for CSO human capacity strengthening through EU support and one for involvement in the design of EU cooperation strategies and programmes (the latter topic however was very differently appreciated by the responding CSO with scoring ranging from a low 1 to this high 5.

Summary qualitative/narrative analysis of the June 2014 mini-survey with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) on Democratic Governance

Of the ten democratic governance assessment topics in the survey, the overall satisfaction with the EU support the respective organisations have benefited from in the period 2007-2013 got the highest average assessment score (4.4 or 88%), followed by the related (sub-)topics of both institutional / organisational and human capacities strengthening by EU support (both a score of 3.6 or 72%). At the other end of the scale with the lowest overall assessment and satisfaction is the actual impact CSO have on the political dialogue and agenda setting at present in Jordan, despite all the support provided by EU and from other sources (average score of 1.6 or 32%). This is further confirmed by the negative scores on the related impact topics on the extent to which systematic consultation of civil society on policy dialogue and development matters has improved in Jordan in the 2007-2013 period, at both national and local levels (both got an average score of 1.8 or 36%). The survey results thus show on the one hand an overall satisfaction by the responding CSOs with the support provided by the EU to them in the field of democratic governance, however on the other hand with very limited actual impact yet on the actual enhancement of democratic governance in the country and their actual role therein / contributions thereto, and secondly with limited improvement of the actual frameworks and enabling environment for policy dialogue.

The above summary findings emanating from the survey’s quantitative analysis are confirmed by the narrative assessments provided as the CSOs participating in the survey and were further substantiated during the CSOs focus group discussion on democratic governance organised during the evaluation’s field visit. This confirmation of the quantitative survey findings pertains to the narrative / qualitative assessment of the main overall challenges, the strengths and weaknesses analysis, and the suggestions /priorities for further improvement as identified and ranked by the CSOs themselves.

Amongst the main challenges to be addressed still for further strengthening of democratic governance in Jordan overall, were identified by the CSOs in the mini-survey amongst others: CSOs still not recognized as key players by the government; necessary changes in legal frameworks (e.g. women advancement in the Constitution, Association Law, Family Law, the legislative framework for CSOs operation in Jordan in general, Electoral Law); judiciary independence, non-interference of Government in civic work, the quality of the political dialogue between Government and CSOs.

Concrete suggestions for further strengthening of EU support to Civil Society Organisations as partners in the policy/political dialogue and development processes in Jordan include the following with highest ranking / priority: EU responding to and supporting emerging local issues in the country in a more flexible and prompt way; encouragement of networking between CSOs; CSOs attending the EU-Jordan human rights subcommittee; continuation and increase of EU financial support via Calls for Proposals directed to independent NGOs. Second highest priority rating was given to: The need for local CSOs to be better informed about the progress of discussions, meetings and dialogues between the EU and the Jordanian Government; Technical support to civil society organisations; Automatic endorsement of projects granted by EU delegations to partners without further approval by the cabinet: Priority to the proposals targeting the Southern and Northern governorates. Furthermore also: Encouragement of partnerships between EU CSOs and Jordanian CSOs; More and better coordination between the EU Delegation and independent NGOs; More EU pressure for respecting and liberating civil society.

PART IV: Summary narrative overview of the CSOs assessments regarding EU-Jordan cooperation on democratic governance overall: main overall challenges, strengths and weaknesses, suggestions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Main Strengths / Good Practices</th>
<th>Main Challenges to be Addressed Still</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1st  | - The moderate communication with Jordanian CSOs, through open channels for meeting and communication  
- Financial support  
- Linking demands for local changes with | - NGOs are not actively involved with the EU planned agenda  
- NGO related laws / legislations and implementation.  
- EU needs to support the monitoring of Jordan commitments to UN and regional treaties like the |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Volume</th>
<th>Key Focus Areas</th>
<th>Recommended Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>- We hope that the EU will further respond to and support the emerging local issues in the country in a more flexible way, sudden emerging issues that need quick interference on a local level such as the unrest that is happening in Ma'an for example.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Inviting CSOs to attend EU and Jordan human rights sub-committee.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Continuation and increase of the EU financial support via Calls for Proposals directed to independent NGOs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- To encourage the networking between the CSOs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>- The need for local NGOs to be more involved with the progress of discussions, meetings and dialogues between the EU and the Jordanian Government. NGOs could receive the feedback and updates of these gatherings.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Technical support to civil society organisations, like providing European experts on human rights issues.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Automatic endorsement of projects granted by EU delegation to partners without further approval by the cabinet.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- To give priority to the proposals targeting the Southern and Northern governorates.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>- Informing CSOs about good practices in Europe.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Acceptance to fund only independent NGOs that are accountable and are under administrative and financial supervision.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- To give core funding to CSOs according to adequate criteria.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>- Providing funds to encourage joint projects implemented by both NGOs and the government.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Support the monitoring endeavours on government commitments to UN and regional (Euro-Med) conventions.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- To give priority to the CSOs working to build leadership skills among women and youth.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>- Giving priority to NGO law.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- More coordination between EU Delegation and independent NGOs and more pressure for respecting and liberating civil society.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- To encourage partnerships between EU CSOs and Jordanian CSOs.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Which concrete suggestions do you have for further strengthening of EU support to Civil Society Organisations as partners in the policy/political dialogue and development processes in Jordan?**

[Listing in order of importance, with the most important first by the respective responding CSOs]

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</tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CLE Jordan Field Visit – Focus group discussion of 22 June 2014 with Civil Society Organisations on Democratic Governance: Some of the salient discussion points and outcomes include the following:

- The Government’s new law for CSOs eliminates the possibility of their free funding, and instead restricts to enter into financial agreements. Moreover, the CSOs are inspected by the government and the Intelligence Department.
- The number of women Members of Parliament amount to 15 out of total of 150 members (or 10%). Three women won without the necessary quota. These elected female MPs however generally are not the voice of CSOs. In fact, none of the representatives in parliament can be labelled as reflecting the CSOs voice. A committee of citizens’ rights and public freedoms is in place and active.
- Conflicts between the Government and MPs are not exceptionally solved by inviting them for eating together Mansaf, the famous Jordanian food, leading a famous economist to write an article concerning problem / conflict solving with Mansaf.
- Increasingly more restrictions are imposed by the Government to Non-Profit Organisations.

KPI-3.6.7: Degree to which the chronology of changes in policies, policy processes and capacities show evidence that BS programmes, programme estimates and/or TA played a critical role, or not, in furthering democratic governance (e.g. specific conditions for the disbursement of BS tranches address issues of policy processes and capacities; complementary or embedded TA foresees support to the strengthening of capacities; programme estimates enhance institutional capacities,..) - (Cfr. KPI 5.4.4)

Main Findings on KPI-3.6.7:

There is some empirical evidence that the chronology of changes in policies, policy processes and capacities in the field of democratic governance are affected by the different modalities of EU-Jordan cooperation, whether Budget Support, technical assistance, traditional project approaches, twinning arrangements, TAIEX expertise provision or their combination. There is also evidence that other than these factors at least equality contribute to / stir these developments. As such it is difficult, if not impossible to ascertain a causal relationship between the EU aid modalities and the mix thereof on the one hand and the changes in policies, policy processes and (human and/or institutional) capacities on the other. At best correlations could be established between these phenomena that occur simultaneously or with a slight lag in time. Evidence of other than aid flows impacting on policies, policy processes and capacities is provided by the chronology of major reform events and processes that occurred in the years 2011 and 2012, the height of the political reform processes in the region also impacting on Jordan. The timeline of political reform on the GoJ website for example situate 14 of the 19 listed reform initiatives over the 2002-2013 period exactly in those turbulent years 2011-2012, incorporating Jordan in the stream of regional reform processes. An example in case is the establishment in March 2011 of the National Dialogue Committee to draft a new electoral law in the wake of the major political events / development which took place in that year, which one month later led to the establishment of the Royal Committee with the objective to review the constitution, ultimately leading to 41 constitutional amendments adopted by Parliament redefining the 1952 constitution. The momentum created by this led to the presentation of four key political reforms-related laws: The Independent Electoral Commission law, the Political Parties Law, the draft Constitutional Court law, the Electoral Law.

On the other hand, the EU-Jordan development cooperation and policy dialogue processes over the seven years period (2007-2013) covered by this evaluation undeniably have contributed to the advancing of political reform processes aimed at by this cooperation. This can be gleaned already from the list of thirteen (13) draft laws / bylaws discussed for enactment by the Parliament of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan during the June 2014 Extra-Parliamentary Session, of which by far a majority is related, directly or at least directly, to EU-Jordan cooperation interventions and/or political dialogue. In fact, the approval of quite a number of them is an explicit conditionality for facilitating the release of EU (sectoral) Budget Support variable tranches, as evidence by the respective SBS Performance Assessment Frameworks (PAF) and their monitoring. To mention a few of these: The Administrative Judiciary Bylaw (2014), the Independence of the Judiciary Law (2014), the Political Parties Bylaw (2014), the Amendment of the Civil Service Retirement Bylaw (2013), the Amendment of the Law on Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation Bylaw (2014), the Public Private Partnership Bylaw (2014), the Investment Law (2013), the Parliamentary Code of Conduct Bylaw (2014), the Juvenile Bylaw (2013). The key issue here, however, is not the formal meeting of benchmarks and compliance with targets, but the intrinsic quality of these achievements: mere formal compliance with external requirements (e.g. with conditionality for Budget Support tranches releases) or genuine, authentic and duly owned processes rooted in society. If these milestones are mere paper tigers,
they rather bring with them the danger of providing “democratic facades” for situations which do not change the essence of matters, but must be considered “formal” and superficial. Such window dressing may even have counterproductive consequences alienating formal society from organic society as it in reality is, which is not without danger for the very stability and social fabric itself of society. Moreover, as it came up in one of the interviews during the field visit: Buying reform can never be part of genuine, inclusive and empowering development processes. This would by no means be an argument against cooperation and policy dialogue as tools for bringing about reform. Quite the contrary. MoPIC, for example, insists that not only is the EU funding important for Jordan in revenue terms, but also politically, as without this incentive it would be hard to push a reform agenda on reluctant ministries. To this end, the understanding of the nature of Budget Support has significantly improved on the part of the Ministry of Finance and MoPIC. Both ministries, in the “front line” of the instrument have come to realise that Budget Support, far from being “free money”, actually obliges the partner country to make substantial efforts in order to receive the full amounts on offer. The MoF criticised line Ministries for proposing benchmarks which are difficult to achieve (and vice versa). The Ministries however defend themselves by saying that if the MoF gave them the resources required, then the benchmarks were/are realistic. On a related issue, despite Jordan’s oft-repeated commitment to reform and democratisation, the overall climate for civil society organisations in Jordan is deteriorating rather than improving, particularly for those involved in advocacy and human rights issues, as was clearly articulated by the CSOs participating in the evaluation field visit CSO focus group discussion and mini survey on democratic governance issues.

KPI-3.6.7 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Timeline of Political Reform, GoHK Jordan website (2014)
- http://jordanembassyus.org/politics/timeline-political-reform

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- 2.6. Priority Area Four: Support to the Implementation of the Action Plan (SAPP)
- NIP 2011-2013, pp 16-18
- IKRS (Feb 2010), pp.16-18
- Action Fiche, Support to Justice Reform (2009), p.1
- NIP - National Indicative Programme 2011-2013, p.9
- SAAP II, Final evaluation, 11/2011
- JC 6.4 preliminary assessment: Aid modalities and mix impact on PSD policies and policy frameworks to be further investigated during field phase (related)
- ICLN (2013) website
- Reporters without Borders. (2013) Website
- World Press Freedom Index (2010 + 2013)

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- Democracy, the Rule of Law and Good Governance
- IKRS-2 (2014). p.2
- IKRS-2 (2014). p.3
- Please see below

KPI-3.6.7 (iii) Additional information from field phase
List of thirteen (13) draft laws / bylaws discussed for enactment by the Parliament of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan during the June 2014 Extra-Parliamentary Session (source: MoPIC):
1. Administrative Judiciary Bylaw (2014)
Moreover, a score of 3.6 or 72%). At the other end of the scale the very nature is less tangible and visible. Moreover, as more detailed analysis in relation to other questions has revealed, there are wide variations amongst the sectors / thematic areas regarding the impact the EU aid modalities and their main features and characteristics is noted, including of their potential impact on the evolution of policies, policy frameworks and capacities. This is much less the case at the level of the line ministries and other implementing agencies, as was confirmed during different meetings and interviews during the field visit. There are major remaining challenges not only of bringing Budget Support (and other aid modalities) to their ultimate destination on the ground, but also of raising awareness on these instruments and their leverage to induce / support evolution of policies, policy frameworks and capacities. This particularly pertains to the thematic area of democratic governance, which by its very nature is less tangible and visible. Moreover, as more detailed analysis in relation to other questions has revealed, there are wide variations amongst the sectors / thematic areas regarding the impact the EU aid modalities, and Budget Support in particular, actually entailed with regard to evolutions in policies, policy frameworks and capacities. Positive perceptions of the influence of Budget Support as aid modalities are noted in the education sector, with less evident impact experienced in the area of public finance management and particularly in the sectors / thematic areas of private sector development, of renewable energy / energy efficiency, and of employment and technical and vocational education and training (E-TVET). Democratic governance is situated in the latter group, however with substantive differences amongst sub-areas within this broad area of democratic governance, with on the positive end of the spectrum elections and with justice reform and human rights at the other end. These general perceptions were evidenced in the CSOs consultations during the evaluation field visit, both in the focus group discussion and in the mini-survey.

Of the ten democratic governance assessment topics in the survey, the overall satisfaction with the EU support the respective organisations have benefited from in the period 2007-2013 got the highest average assessment score (4.4 or 88%), followed by the related (sub-)topics of both institutional / organisational and human capacities strengthening by EU support (both a score of 3.6 or 72%). At the other end of the scale with the lowest overall assessment and satisfaction is the actual impact CSO have on the political dialogue and agenda setting at present in Jordan, despite all the support provided by EU and from other sources (average score of 1.6 or 32%). This is further confirmed by the negative scores on the related impact topics on the extent to which systematic consultation of civil society on policy dialogue and development matters has improved in Jordan in the 2007-2013 period, at both national and local levels (both got an average score of 1.8 or 36%). The survey results thus show on the one hand an overall satisfaction by the responding CSOs with the support provided by the EU to them in the field of democratic governance, however on the
other hand with very limited actual impact yet on the actual enhancement of democratic governance in the country and their actual role therein / contributions thereto, and secondly with limited improvement of the actual frameworks and enabling environment for policy dialogue.

Amongst the main challenges to be addressed still for further strengthening of democratic governance in Jordan overall, were identified by the CSOs in the mini-survey, amongst others: CSOs still not recognized as key players by the government; necessary changes in legal frameworks (e.g. women advancement in the Constitution, Association Law, Family Law, the legislative framework for CSOs operation in Jordan in general, Electoral Law); judiciary independence, non-interference of Government in civic work, the quality of the political dialogue between Government and CSOs.

Amongst the main strengths / good practices of EU support in empowering Civil Society Organisations as partners in the policy / political dialogue and development processes in Jordan, particularly in the field of democratic governance, were mentioned by the CSOs: the systematic consultations, the dialogue on civil society related legislations, the EU and Jordan human rights sub-committee, the invitation of CSOs to participate as observers in different meetings of the EU with Jordanian officials, the creation of successful dialogues with parliamentarians, CSOs and local authorities for the promotion of community involvement in development, etc. Amongst the main challenges to be addressed still were listed: NGOs not actively involved with the EU planned agenda; NGO related laws / legislation and their implementation; Systematic consultation with really independent CSOs; More active participation in the preparation of strategies and plans; Further capacity building; Strengthening of the institutional capacity of CSO coalitions and networks; Access to justice issues.

In the latest 2013 ENP Country Progress Report Jordan a number of key achievements are mentioned, including the adoption of an anti-corruption strategy. At the same time, a number of democratic governance issues are listed as remaining to be addressed still: The independence and impartiality of the judiciary and its administrative capacity ("Corruption remained a matter of serious concern. No progress can be reported in enhancing the effectiveness and independence of the judiciary"); Eradication of violence against women and the promotion of further integration of women in politics, economic affairs, education and employment; Ratification of the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; Revisions of the Penal Code to ensure freedom of expression and freedom of the media; Tax reform issues, increase of tax collection and the progressivity of personal income taxation through legislative measures; Modernisation of public finance control institutions and to implement the Anti-Corruption Strategy 2013-2017.

At the more fundamental level of the democratic principles and values at the basis of the EU-Jordan political dialogue in fields of democratic governance, some scholars point out that at the end of the day, emphasis on democracy and common values has primarily been used by the EU as a means to reach the goal of security and stability in Jordan. If is furthermore asserted that “… in this situation, focus on real democratisation and real common values remain but spurious, unless real change comes about.”

**KPI-3.6.8 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- [1]

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Assessment of Aid Coordination and Effectiveness in Jordan, February 2013

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- Excerpt from the summary analysis of the June 2014 mini-survey with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) on Democratic Governance – Survey Question 10
- Excerpt from the summary analysis of the June 2014 mini-survey with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) on Democratic Governance – Survey Question 5
- Excerpt from the summary analysis of the June 2014 mini-survey with Civil Society Organisations
(CSOs) on Democratic Governance – PARTS III and IV

- Summary quantitative analysis of the June 2014 mini-survey with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) on Democratic Governance
- Summary quantitative analysis of the CSOs assessment scores of the 10 survey questions related to CLE EQ-3 democratic governance issues
- Summary quantitative analysis of the June 2014 mini-survey with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) on Democratic Governance
- Summary narrative overview of the CSOs assessments regarding EU-Jordan cooperation on democratic governance overall: main overall challenges, strengths and weaknesses, suggestions
- Summary qualitative/narrative analysis of the June 2014 mini-survey with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) on Democratic Governance
- CLE Jordan Field Visit – Focus group discussion of 22 June 2014 with Civil Society Organisations on Democratic Governance: Some of the salient discussion points and outcomes include the following

**KPI-3.6.9:** Level of evidence that financing made available through BS has contributed to closing the gap of the justice sector’s medium term financing plans [e.g. volume and share of EU’s contribution to the financing of reforms in key sectors (e.g. juvenile justice) benefiting from EU BS / Level of evidence of increased sector expenditure in supported sectors (cfr. KPI 4.5.4)]

**Main Findings on KPI-3.6.9:**

The necessary detailed financial information to make this assessment is not available and has also not been made available to the Evaluation Team despite different attempts and follow-ups. In the absence of this information, the Evaluation Team embarked on preliminary proxy calculation in the absence of firm Ministry of Justice (MoJ) annual budgetary figures.

At the present conversion rate 1 EUR = approx. 0.98 JOD, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) annual budget in 2011 of 51.78 million Jordanian Dinars (as included in the AF 23471 “Support to the Justice Sector Reform in Jordan”) equals about EUR 50.75 million. Based on an extrapolated budget growth of 4.6%, calculated as the average annual budget growth / change in the preceding two years, EU’s contribution of EUR 33 million (through FDs 23471 and 24238 only) over the six financial years period 2013-2018 (66 months execution period or 5.5 years with assumed start 01 Jan 2013 of FD 23471), results in a 13.04% coverage of the estimated total budgetary requirements over this period. In the absence of the justice sector’s medium term financing plan it is not possible to calculate what portion of the financing gap would be filled by this EU contribution. Also, this EUR 33 million financing by the EU of the justice sector only concerns the two above mentioned SBS financing decisions and does not include yet the resources originating from other EU financing instruments (e.g. horizontal / thematic programmes as EIDHR, NSAs-LA, the SPRING project “Support to the justice sector “, etc.) and other aid modalities (e.g. project approach, PA programme estimates, etc.). SAPP-1 (FD 19571) with the Programme Estimates project approach aid modality (budget: EUR 10 million), for example, has largely been a support programme to the justice sector. Warning: Broad estimated proxy figure only for CLE KPI 3.6.9 illustrative purposes only, and to be treated with the necessary caution.

The Financing Agreement FA 23471 of the Support to the Justice Sector Reform in Jordan programme indicates that a total of EUR 30 million has been allocated to this action, indicatively broken down as follows: (1) Untargeted Budget Support (EUR 27 million), (2) Complementary support (EUR 1.8 million), (3) Complementary actions with civil society (EUR 0.2 million), and (4) Other (EUR 1.0 million). From the Identification Fiche for the Sector Budget Support to the “Justice and Security Programme / Justice Programme”, it is learnt that 2011 estimated budget for the Ministry of Justice amounts to JOD 51.78 million, i.e. up 11.7% from 2010 (estimate), but down 2.5% from 2009 (actual). This increase is largely due to the increase for salaries (+ 18.2% compared with 2010, + 23.5% with 2009), which remains the main budget item (64.1% in 2011).
KPI-3.6.9 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Financing Agreement 23471 Support to the justice sector reform in Jordan, Jan 2012, p. 1
- Action Fiche 23471 Support to the justice sector reform in Jordan, AAP 2012, pp. 3-4
- Please see below

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Introductory Note: See also base documents and references under KPI 3.5.1
- NIP 2011-2013, pp. 9-10
- ENPI Progress Report Jordan 2012 (2013), pp. 5-6
- EU-Jordan National Indicative Programme (NIP) 2011-2013, p.9
- Action Fiche, Support to Justice Reform (2009), p.1
- Action Fiche, Support to Justice Reform and Good Governance in Jordan (2008) p.9
- MEMO/10/178, p.2
- Action Fiche 20478 Support to the Implementation of the Action Plan Programme II (SAPP II)
- SWD (2012)116 Final, Delivering on a New European Neighbourhood Policy, p.11

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- Please see below

KPI-3.6.9 (i) Data, figures and tables:
CLE Jordan interventions inventory and portfolio analysis; DAC 15130: Legal and judicial development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLE Financing Decisions / Key Interventions</th>
<th>OECD-DAC CRS Sector</th>
<th>Budgetary / Financial Totals</th>
<th>Chronology</th>
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<td>Decision year</td>
<td>Decision Code (Short)</td>
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<td>EG</td>
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<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>24238</td>
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</table>

Sub-Totals 15130 - Legal and Judicial Development | 3 | 29,730,289 | 5.7% | 4,610,289 | 1.2% | 11.6% | - | - | - |

Sub-Totals 1510 - Government and Civil Society | 15 | 225,729,797 | 22.5% | 171,509,093 | 22.1% | 49.4% | - | - | - |

Totals for All CLE Key Interventions / Financing Decisions | 43 | 695,346,622 | 100.0% | 346,064,429 | 100.0% | 50.1% | - | - | - |
Note: Preliminary proxy calculations in the absence of firm MoJ annual budgetary figures: At the present conversion rate 1 EUR = approx. 0.98 JOD, the MoJ annual budget in 2011 of 51.78 million Jordanian Dinars (as included in the AF 23471 “Support to the Justice Sector Reform in Jordan” equals about 50.75 million euro. Based on an extrapolated budget growth of 4.6%, calculated as the average annual budget growth / change in the preceding two years, EU contribution of EUR 33 million (through FDs 23471 and 24238 only) over the six financial years period 2013-2018 (66 months execution period or 5.5 years with assumed start 01 Jan 2013 of FD 23471), results in a 13.04% coverage of the estimated total budgetary requirements over this period. In the absence of the justice sector's medium term financing plan it is not possible to calculate what portion of the financing gap would be filled by this EU contribution. Also, this 33 million Euro financing by the EU of the justice sector only concerns the two above mentioned SBS financing decisions and does not include yet the resources originating from other EU financing instruments (e.g. horizontal / thematic programmes as EIDHR, NSAs-LA, the SPRING project "Support to the justice sector ", etc.) and other aid modalities (e.g. project approach, PA programme estimates, etc.). SAPP-1 (FD 19571) with the Programme Estimates project approach aid modality (budget: EUR 10 million) for example to a large extent has been a support programme to the justice sector. Warning: Broad estimated proxy figure only for CLE KPI 3.6.9 illustrative purposes only, and to be treated with the necessary caution.

**KPI-3.6.9 (iii) Additional information from field phase**

Support to the justice sector in Jordan ENPI/2012/023-471 - Action Fiche for Jordan, p. 4

(2) Main findings of the assessment of the sector budget and its medium term financial perspectives

In 2008, a law regulating the State budget was enacted, which marked a new era in budget preparation based on result-oriented budgeting, making Jordan the first country in the region to apply this concept. The Ministry of Finance initiated an Overarching Financial Management Reform Strategy 2010-2013, comprising the strategies of the Ministry of Finance General Budget Department, and Income and Sales Tax Department.

The 2011 estimated budget for the Ministry of Justice amounted to JOD 51.78 million, i.e. up 11.7% from 2010's estimates, but down 2.5% from 2009's. This increase was largely due to the increase for salaries (+ 18.2% compared with 2010, + 23.5% with 2009), which remains the main budget item (64.1% in 2011). For 2011, total expenditures were earmarked following three main programmes: Administrative and support services (44.35%; + 6 points compared with 2010); Order and justice (52.8%); and General Administration (13%). For 2012, total expenditures were earmarked following three main programmes: Administrative and support services (44.35%; + 6 points compared with 2011); Order and justice (55.3%); and General Administration (10%). Since 2010, the Ministry of Justice has remained stable in the past years, comprising 0.88% of the State budget for 2009, 0.79% for 2010 and 0.82% for 2011.

**JC-3.6: The choice and the combination of the EU aid modalities and financing instruments are the results of the search for efficiency and cost-effectiveness in line with Jordan Government objectives and complementary to other DP support to the sector**

**Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-3.6 (based on the KPIs main findings)**

There are indications that the choice and the combination of the EU aid modalities and financing instruments are the results of the search for efficiency and cost-effectiveness in line with Jordan Government objectives and complementary to other DP support to the sector as was further confirmed by additional empirical evidence gathered during the field visit.

There are five EU interventions / financing decisions benefitting the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the period 2007-2012 which are of direct relevance to this evaluation question on good governance (see table EQ-3 IM-1 included at the beginning of the EQ-3 Information Matrix). The total financing decisions commitments (primary allocations) amount to EUR 51.7 million as of this CLE portfolio cut-off date of 04 October 2013, of which EUR 7.7 million has been paid. Two of these interventions are categorized under DAC category 15130 legal and judicial development, one on human rights, one on media and free flow of information and one on elections. Two interventions with a total allocation of EUR 40.0 million were committed but not yet allocated (EG status) at the moment of the CLE interventions inventory. Meanwhile, the FA for the support to civil society and media in Jordan intervention has been signed (on 25 November 2013 – 23471 – EUR 10 million) leaving only the Support to the Justice Sector in Jordan (FD 23471 – EUR 30 million) still shown in CRIS under commitment (EG) status, awaiting signing of the Financing Agreement. It has not been possible to conclusively ascertain for these interventions individually if they have been derived from a credible diagnostic analysis taking into account the existing preconditions (the current stage of policy and reform context) since from only one intervention (19569 – Support to Justice Reform and Good
Governance in Jordan of 2008) the full set of identification and formulation documents are available (see overview table EQ-3 IM-5 of the available PPCM and other key documents for the good governance interventions at the beginning of this EQ-3 information matrix).

At the general programming level of the CSP-NIPs rather clear requirements and instructions are incorporated regarding the need for a credible diagnostic analysis taking into account the existing preconditions as a basis for interventions design including decision making on most appropriate aid modalities (mix), also in relation to disbursement and absorptive capacity concerns. The available checklists for identification fiches, for example those related to SAPP, give particular attention to problem analyses at the basis of the intervention logframe and implementation strategy, to Paris Declaration aid effectiveness criteria (with particular reference to the “on demand” mobilisation of assistance) and alignment with the EU-Jordan ENP Action Plan, as well as to commitments to reform. The NIPs describe clear conditionalities as to the choice of the aid modalities depending on results of credible diagnostic analysis.

The action fiche for the Support to the Justice Reform in Jordan (FD 23471 of 2012) in this respect confirms that the two criteria pertaining to macroeconomic policy and public financial management are fully met, in Jordan which is the beneficiary of several Budget Support programmes. The AF hereby zeroes in on four criteria: (i) Macroeconomic stability; (ii) PFM eligibility; (iii) Sector reform strategy in place, and (iv) Transparency (basically PFM related criteria). It in this regard is noted that the four above BS (general) eligibility criteria basically relate to broad, overall macro elements, and not to the sector specifically. Only part of the judicial sectoral legal framework is referred to, to then conclude to its being in place.

There are also indications of attempts to duly take into account good / best practices and lessons learnt from prior or other similar interventions or prior experiences. An example in case is the recently approved Support to Civil Society and Media Programme which only will prioritize capacity development in the media sector if the necessary regulatory and strategic framework for media development in Jordan is duly established and sanctioned. But for the majority of interventions, the quality of the diagnostic analysis could not be ascertained in view of the absence of the necessary base documents. Some sources in this connection refer to a certain pressure to shortcut intervention preparation processes because of a spending / disbursement compulsion. Others refer for the preference of the Budget Support aid modality also to this context, as was also confirmed during field visit interviews.

A main finding, if not conclusion, of a recent key assessment of the quality of aid delivery, results and outputs, is that the overall impression is a positive one. The report notes that it is apparent, particularly in discussions with the Ministry of Finance and with MoPIC, that significant progress has been made in the understanding of the Sector Budget Support mechanism on the Jordanian side. This understanding has not yet percolated down to all beneficiary line ministries, (albeit the Ministry of Education showed a strong grasp of the tool). The two ministries in question have appreciated that Budget Support is not “free money”, and comes with a series of conditions which it is not always easy to meet. Roughly 60% of development cooperation is delivered in the form of Budget Support, which is by far the preferred method of the government as a whole (albeit an enthusiasm not always shared by individual line ministries). The Jordanian authorities are involved in the preparation of projects and are not just passive beneficiaries. The Delegation is experiencing some difficulties in finding time to monitor ongoing projects. The mission recognises the difficulties they face, particularly due to the added workload imposed by the Syrian crisis. Nevertheless it is essential that a realistic monitoring plan be established and adhered to. The audit plan is however credible and well prepared. The report furthermore recommended that risk assessment is established on all projects, and that then the monitoring mission plan, evaluation plan, ROM planning and audit plan could cover various complementary aspects of the project portfolio. (KPI 3.6.1)

The availability of PPCM and other crucial documents of the EU-Jordan cooperation interventions for the period 2007-2013 under review is presented in table format under Annex 8.2. The table speaks for itself in terms of relative scarcity of available documents. This particularly pertains to the documents related to the identification phase (e.g. Identification fiches, checklists QSG-1, Minutes of QSG-1 meetings). (KPI 3.6.2)

Jordan has received, and to a large extent successfully managed, sector Budget Support (SBS). Jordan continues to satisfy the eligibility criteria for Budget Support and more than 70% of NIP 2011-2013 funds is expected to be allocated in the form of SBS. For the current year 2014 Annual Action Programme under the NIP, the estimated Budget Support component goes up to more than 85% of all AAP allocations, and this despite increasing absorptive capacity and/or BS conditionalities compliance issues / problems, as was learnt during the CLE field visit interviews.

From the relatively scarce relevant documents available it may be asserted that in general alternative options
of democratic governance support have been studied and criteria for preference and eligibility have been defined. This is particularly the case for the interventions and contracts approved under the second NIP, as by that time also the EC methodological instruments and guidelines got further elaborated, refined and updated based on good/best practices and lessons learnt from prior experiences, and training / capacity development programmes of EU officers and of key partner country officers (or PMU experts) on these subjects further expanded. Only few additional PPCM documents related to the interventions approved in the 2007-2013 period became available during the field and early draft final evaluation phases, and as such did not provide further substantive evidence to assess the indicator. But different interviews with key stakeholders concerned during the field visit to Jordan it was that special attention is given to a more systematic preparation and formulation process of interventions, including the study and consideration of alternative options of aid modalities and financing most suitable for the interventions, including eligibility criteria. On the other hand, it was learnt that a recourse to Budget Support was the line of action taken when faced with time pressures to approve interventions or to strengthen disbursement rates.

A practical example of an EU intervention providing evidence that alternative options of democratic governance support have been studied and criteria for preference and eligibility are defined, is the Support to Justice Reform and Good Governance intervention. Another practical illustration relates to the thematic field of gender equality. For example, during the 8th meeting of the Sub-committee on Human Rights, Governance and Democracy in Brussels on 9 September 2013 discussion on the topic of equal treatment on women special attention was given to the most appropriate mix of aid modalities. (KPI 3.6.3)

As prescribed in the DEVCO PPCM procedures and guidelines, the Action Fiches and the Technical and Administrative Provisions (TAPs) / Descriptions of the interventions are to be in accordance with a standard format, with specific sections on (i) objectives, (ii) expected results and main activities, and (iii) risks and assumptions. These, together with the indicators and their means of verification, are the building blocks of the Logical Framework. The 14 key interventions (financing decisions) in the Jordan country strategy portfolio 2007-2013 in the thematic area of democratic governance basically are in accordance with this formal requirement, at least for those interventions for which the document is available. The objectives are differentiated in overall objectives (goal level) and specific objectives (purpose level). The expected results are differentiated as either results or key results. Main activities are presented by strategy component or by pillar or by a combination of these. It is not always clear how components and/or pillars relate to the results and in turn how the expected results relate / contributed to the specific objectives as a causal link is not always prominent from the AFs or TAPs. Risks and assumptions are presented under a separate sections / chapter. Generally there is no differentiation made between the two categories of risks and assumptions, with the chapters concerned mostly concentrating on risks, without explicit elaboration on the assumptions (or even critical assumptions). There are various degrees of risk mitigation strategy coverage in the formulation documents. For the democratic governance projects, these are very much related to the volatile situation in the region impacting on the national situation. Risk chapters therefore tend to be rather comprehensive and more elaborate.

On the occasion of different meetings with EUD officers during the evaluation field visit, the need for a stronger and more elaborated risk assessment and risk management/mitigation strategy was raised as crucial to further enhance overall intervention/programme performance management and intervention / portfolio results orientation. On different occasions, the idea of inclusion of monitorable risk indicators in the TAPs project/programme document was shared as a matter of priority and high importance. Their actual, regular monitoring then should be included in the foreseen monitoring provisions, in relation to both internal and external monitoring. The same was supported by the recent European Commission Verification Mission to Jordan earlier this year.

In conclusion, based on the PPCM documents available there is virtually full compliance with the formal requirements regarding the contents of the formulation documents with regard to objectives (overall and immediate, or goal and purpose levels) and regarding the incorporation of assumptions and risks. Content-wise main challenges are observed with regard to the quality of the results frameworks (e.g. logic of the LogFrames: results-purpose-goal; results-immediate objectives – overall, long-term objectives; outputs-outcomes-impact) and the due coverage of risk factors and their management / mitigation. The latter is especially pressing in a country like Jordan, strongly affected by regional developments and crises situations. (KPI 3.6.4)

There is documented evidence, further supported by the interviews and meetings conducted during the evaluation’s field visit to Jordan, that there have been positive developments in the creation, operationalisation and maintenance of effective frameworks for democratic governance, both at the level of the overall democratic governance political dialogue level and at the level of the individual interventions. It at
the same time it is acknowledged that there are still very substantive challenges to be met for making these frameworks effectively operational, functioning and bringing about the expected results for a successful pursuit of the overall democratic governance objectives of the EU-Jordan collaboration. This is highlighted on different earlier occasions in relation to the assessment of the indicators and judgement criteria in relation to this evaluation question on democratic governance, both in general with regard to the strengthened coordination and institutionalized dialogue mechanisms for EU-Jordan cooperation on democratic governance (JC 3.1), and with regard to the frameworks for policy/political dialogue with civil society (JC 3.3), and sectoral / thematically in the fields of human rights (incl. women’s rights), fight against corruption (JC 3.2) and the media, of enhanced political participation and open and fair elections (JC 3.4), and of access to justice, law enforcement, security and fight against terrorism.

Over time, the formulation and approval documents of EU-Jordan cooperation interventions (Action Fiches, Technical and Administrative Provisions, specific performance indicators for the disbursement of sector Budget Support variable tranches in the field of democratic governance) are getting more pronounced in articulating broader institutional and political framework conditions for facilitating effective, results oriented policy dialogue and development interventions and their monitoring. An example in case is the just recently (25 November 2013) approved Support to the Justice Sector Reform in Jordan BS programme which includes two institutional framework conditionalities for enhanced policy dialogue amongst its eight special conditionalities for Budget Support variable tranches releases. The same goes for the Support to Civil Society and Media in Jordan project (FA signed on 25 November 2013) which even has as 2nd component explicitly spelled out “Strengthen an enabling regulatory and institutional environment and building the capacity of an independent, quality based media sector serving the entire population. On a more general level, the February 2013 assessment report of Aid Coordination and Effectiveness in Jordan concluded to the absence of a structured dialogue and exchanges during the national planning processes and to the non-availability of established structures for collaboration and consultation with the civil society actors. Also the Parliament does not seem to play a significant role in the dialogue around aid. (KPI 3.6.5)

As illustrated for example in the recent 2013 ENP Country Progress Report for Jordan of March 2014 in the section on cooperation on justice, freedom and security, Budget Support processes in tandem with other aid modalities as Technical Assistance, project approaches, twinning, TAIEX are confirmed to have impacted on the evolution of frameworks for policy dialogue and capacity development initiatives. But the picture is not uniform and effects are more restrictive related to specific cases and processes, which have the tendency to improve over time. An example in this case is the technical experts mission in the framework of the EU Jordan Dialogue on Migration, Mobility and Security of early 2013 which triggered a process of negotiations on a joint declaration establishing a Mobility Partnership between the EU and Jordan launched in December of that year. Generally, despite the difficult context, Jordan made an important progress in its political reforms’ process through the adoption of far-reaching constitutional amendments. Despite the difficult context, Jordan made an important progress in its political reforms’ process through the adoption of far-reaching constitutional amendments.

As confirmed on the occasion of different interviews with key stakeholders, both Government and Non-Government, during the evaluation field visit, when the objective of a Budget Support intervention includes the passing of necessary legislative and regulatory reforms, specific and well-focused support is needed in order to avoid any implementation delays. One lesson learnt is that whenever EU assistance is used to develop regulatory reform, political support from PAO and EUD is required to achieve the results. Different key stakeholders therefore recommended the development of a strategic approach first towards the legislative process and also to understand what processes are required to get the reform in place and have it actually implemented. In cases of weak or fragmented institutional responsibilities, a lack of coherent sector strategies and operational coordination has often resulted in fragmented donor assistance, activities within inappropriate policy or institutional frameworks, a weak ability to select and scale up successes, and ultimately little on-the-ground impact. This a fortiori applies to the area of democratic governance, as is also the case of private sector development, social protection, and financial management reform. This contrasts with the very positive experiences in the education programme.

When asked to which degree EU support has contributed to strengthened consultation of civil society on policy dialogue and development matters in Jordan, the responding CSOs participating in the CLE mini-survey and focus-group discussion gave an average appreciation score of 2.8 (on a 0-5 scale), which is about mid-range of the ten questions answers given. One of the narrative survey comments given was that one of the main strengths of the EU support to civil society was through the role it is playing, being a linkage between government and CSOs through its moderate communication channels, which allows both parties to share their thoughts and recommendations to each other through the EU. Nevertheless, CSOs are aiming for
more effective support from the EU on this regard.

Of the ten democratic governance assessment topics in the survey, the overall satisfaction with the EU support has improved from an average score of 4.4 or 88% in the period 2007-2013 to an average score of 1.6 or 32% in 2013. Amongst the main challenges to be addressed still for further strengthening of democratic governance in Jordan overall, were identified by the CSOs in the mini-survey amongst others: CSOs still not recognized as key players by the government; necessary changes in legal frameworks (e.g. women advancement in the Constitution, Association Law, Family Law, the legislative framework for CSOs operation in Jordan in general, Electoral Law); judiciary independence, non-interference of Government in civic work, the quality of the political dialogue between Government and CSOs. The interviewees pointed out as particularly worrying the Government’s new law for CSOs eliminating the possibility of their free funding and the fact that they are increasingly inspected by the government and the Intelligence Department. (KPI 3.6.6)

There is some empirical evidence that the chronology of changes in policies, policy processes and capacities in the field of democratic governance are affected by the different modalities of EU-Jordan cooperation, whether Budget Support, technical assistance, traditional project approaches, twinning arrangements, TAIEX expertise provision or their combination. There is also evidence that other than these factors at least equality contribute to / stir these developments. As such it is difficult, if not impossible to ascertain a causal relationship between the EU aid modalities and the mix thereof on the one hand and the changes in policies, policy processes and (human and/or institutional) capacities on the other. At best correlations could be established between these phenomena that occur simultaneously or with a slight lag in time. Evidence of other than aid flows impacting on policies, policy processes and capacities is provided by the chronology of major reform events and processes that occurred in the years 2011 and 2012, the height of the political reform processes in the region also impacting on Jordan. The timeline of political reform on the GoJ website for example situate 14 of the 19 listed reform initiatives over the 2002-2013 period exactly in those turbulent years 2011-2012, incorporating Jordan in the stream of regional reform processes. (KPI 3.6.7)

On the other hand, the EU-Jordan development cooperation and policy dialogue processes over the seven years period (2007-2013) covered by this evaluation undeniably have contributed to the advancing of political reform processes aimed at by this cooperation. This can be gleaned already from the list of thirteen (13) draft laws / bylaws discussed for enactment by the Parliament of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan during the June 2014 Extra-Parliamentary Session, of which by far a majority is related, directly or at least directly, to EU-Jordan cooperation interventions and/or political dialogue. In fact, the approval of quite a number of them is an explicit conditionality for facilitating the release of EU (sectoral) Budget Support variable tranches, as evidence by the respective SBS Performance Assessment Frameworks (PAF) and their monitoring. To mention a few of these: The Administrative Judiciary Bylaw (2014), the Independence of the Judiciary Law (2014), the Political Parties Bylaw (2014), the Amendment of the Civil Service Retirement Bylaw (2013), the Amendment of the Law on Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation Bylaw (2014), the Public Private Partnership Bylaw (2014), the Investment Law (2013), the Parliamentary Code of Conduct Bylaw (2014), the Juvenile Bylaw (2013).

The key issue here, however is not the formal meeting of benchmarks and compliance with targets, but the intrinsic quality of these achievements: just mere formal compliance with external requirements (e.g. with conditionalities for Budget Support tranches releases) or genuine, authentic and duly owned processes rooted in society. If these milestones are mere paper tiger, they moreover bring with them the danger of providing “democratic facades” for situations which do not change the essence of matters, but must be considered “formal” and superficial. Such window dressing may even have counterproductive consequences alienating formal society from organic society as it in reality is, which is not without danger for the very stability and social fabric itself of society. Moreover, as it came up in one of the interviews during the field visit: Buying reform can never be part of genuine, inclusive and empowering development processes. This would by no means be an argument against cooperation and policy dialogue as tools for bringing about reform. Quite the contrary. MoPIC, for example, insists that not only is the EU funding important for Jordan in revenue terms, but also politically, as without this incentive, it would be hard to push a reform agenda on reluctant ministries. To this end, the understanding of the nature of Budget Support has significantly improved on the part of the Ministry of Finance and MoPIC. Both ministries, in the “front line” of the Binational Assistance Committee have come to realise that Budget Support, far from being “free money”, actually obliges the
partner country to make substantial efforts in order to receive the full amounts on offer. The MoF criticised line Ministries for proposing benchmarks which are difficult to achieve (and vice versa). The Ministries however defend themselves by saying that if the MoF gave them the resources required, then the benchmarks were/re are realistic. On a related issue, despite Jordan’s oft-repeated commitment to reform and democratisation, the overall climate for civil society organisations in Jordan is deteriorating rather than improving, particularly for those involved in advocacy and human rights issues, as was clearly articulated by the CSOs participating in the evaluation field visit CSO focus group discussion and mini survey on democratic governance issues. (KPI 3.6.7)

There is a relative ignorance at the level of the main stakeholder groups in Jordan regarding EU aid modalities. Moreover, and more fundamentally, a relative ignorance of EU cooperation inputs (financial, TA and other) is observed at the level of the intermediate and ultimate target groups. At the level of the two main GoJ ministries concerned (MoPIC and Finance) a substantially improved awareness of the EU aid modalities and their main features and characteristics is noted, including of their potential impact on the evolution of policies, policy frameworks and capacities. This is much less the case at the level of the line ministries and other implementing agencies, as was confirmed during different meetings and interviews during the field visit. There are major remaining challenges not only of bringing Budget Support (and other aid modalities) to their ultimate destination on the ground, but also of raising awareness on these instruments and their leverage to induce / support evolution of policies, policy frameworks and capacities. This particularly pertains to the thematic area of democratic governance, which by its very nature is less tangible and visible. Moreover, as more detailed analysis in relation to other questions has revealed, there are wide variations amongst the sectors / thematic areas regarding the impact on the EU aid modalities, and Budget Support in particular, actually entailed with regard to evolutions in policies, policy frameworks and capacities. Positive perceptions of the influence of Budget Support as aid modalities are noted in the education sector, with less evident impact experienced in the area of public finance management and particularly in the sectors / thematic areas of private sector development, of renewable energy / energy efficiency, and of employment and technical and vocational education and training (E-TVET). Democratic governance is situated in the latter group, however with substantive differences amongst sub-areas within this broad area of democratic governance, with on the positive end of the spectrum elections and with justice reform and human rights at the other end. These general perceptions were evidenced in the CSOs consultations during the evaluation field visit, both in the focus group discussion and in the mini-survey.

Of the ten democratic governance assessment topics in the survey, the overall satisfaction with the EU support the respective organisations have benefited from in the period 2007-2013 got the highest average assessment score (4.4 or 88%), followed by the related (sub-)topics of both institutional / organisational and human capacities strengthening by EU support (both a score of 3.6 or 72%). At the other end of the scale with the lowest overall assessment and satisfaction is the actual impact CSO have on the political dialogue and agenda setting at present in Jordan, despite all the support provided by EU and from other sources (average score of 1.6 or 32%). This is further confirmed by the negative scores on the related impact topics on the extent to which systematic consultation of civil society on policy dialogue and development matters has improved in Jordan in the 2007-2013 period, at both national and local levels (both got an average score of 1.8 or 36%). The survey results thus show on the one hand an overall satisfaction by the responding CSOs with the support provided by the EU to them in the field of democratic governance, however on the other hand with very limited actual impact yet on the actual enhancement of democratic governance in the country and their actual role therein / contributions thereto, and secondly with limited improvement of the actual frameworks and enabling environment for policy dialogue. (KPI 3.6.8)

The necessary detailed financial information to make an assessment of the extent to which the gap of the justice sector’s medium term financing plan has been closed thanks to financing made available through BS is not available / has not been made available to the Evaluation Team despite different attempts and follow-ups. In the absence of this information, the Evaluation Team embarked on preliminary proxy calculation in the absence of firm Ministry of Justice (MoJ) annual budgetary figures of which further details can be found under the KPI-3.6.9 main findings. (KPI 3.6.9)
3.4. EQ-4 IM on public institutions strengthening

**Information Matrix EQ-4: Public institutions strengthening**

**Evaluation Question** *(code and title)*

EQ-4: To what extent has the EU support contributed to institutional reform and capacity strengthening of Jordan public institutions, including management of public resources, for enhanced delivery of public services to the citizens?

**List of Judgement Criteria (JCs) under the EQ** *(codes and titles)*

| JC-4.1 | EU support contributed to institutional reform and capacity development in public institutions at central level for more transparent, efficient, effective and inclusive delivery of public services |
| JC-4.2 | EU support contributed to institutional reform and capacity development of public institutions at local government level (in Governorates and municipalities) for more transparent, efficient, effective and inclusive delivery of public services |
| JC-4.3 | Public Finance Management (PFM) systems have been strengthened |
| JC-4.4 | EU support contributed to the strengthening of Public Finance Management (PFM) systems |
| JC-4.5 | EU support contributed to policy reform implementation through the use of the budget as a policy instrument |
| JC-4.6 | EU support contributed to capacity strengthened, empowered and diversified civil society organisations in bringing about more transparent and inclusive delivery of public services and to strengthened tripartism between government and social partners for work, employment and social protection related matters |
| JC-4.7 | EU support contributed to regulatory approximation with EU legislation |

**JC-4.1**

**EU support contributed to institutional reform and capacity development in public institutions at central level for more transparent, efficient, effective and inclusive delivery of public services**

**List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 4.1** *(codes and definition)*

| KPI-4.1.1 | Instances of central level public administrations / institutions of which the managerial, administrative and/or service delivery capacities are effectively strengthened particularly in relation to the pursuit of the public sector and public finance management reforms as strategized and planned for |
| KPI-4.1.2 | Extent to which the technical capacities of a number of specifically targeted public administrations and institutions are further strengthened (e.g. in relation to environment, water and energy) for the whole cycle of strategizing, planning, implementation, monitoring, reporting and re-formulation |
| KPI-4.1.3 | Number of public administrations / institutions of which the institutional and human capacity of the performance planning, monitoring and evaluation units directly reporting to the SG / Head of the institution are effectively and sustainably strengthened |
| KPI-4.1.4 | Extent to which the EU institutional reform and capacity development support provided through different modalities and programmes is strategically steered, effectively coordinated and harmonized, and institutionally anchored in an officially mandated institutional entity of the Government of Jordan and same within the EU Delegation |
KPI-4.1.5 Percentage improvement of the overall livelihood, quality of life and basic needs of the population (incl. access to quality health, education, water & sanitation and other MDGs) and increased accessibility and use of quality public services [4.2]

KPI-4.1.1: Instances of central level public administrations / institutions of which the managerial, administrative and/or service delivery capacities are effectively strengthened particularly in relation to the pursuit of the public sector and public finance management reforms as strategized and planned for

Main Findings on KPI-4.1.1:

The review of available data indicates that more than 25 twinning arrangements were set-up and implemented in the framework of the Support to the Implementation of the Association Agreement (SAAP) and Support to the implementation of the Action Plan (SAPP) programmes to the benefit of no less than 18 departments of ministries / public institutions. Public institutions benefitting from the twinnings range from the Ministry of Social Development to the Ministry of Agriculture, from the Tele-Communication and Regulatory Commission to the Public Security Directorate/Cyber Crime Unit. Twinning arrangements have included many EU partner countries, including the UK, France, Italy, Spain, Slovenia, Poland and Germany to name a few.

In addition to these, the SAAPs/SAPPs also provide the possibility of drawing on other forms of support, including TAs and studies (through service contracts) with a view to support institutional reform and capacity development in public as well as the supply of equipment (through supply contracts) or equipment plus services. Information gathered with regard to the SAPP II for example, shows that in addition to 9 twinning arrangements, over 5 additional contracts were launched to support public institutions, ranging from a Needs assessment for the Ministry of Industry and Trade within the framework of the EU-Jordan ENP Action Plan to the Supply of Water cooling and HVAC system for SESAME (for an amount of over EUR 2 million).

With specific reference to the support provided in strengthening capacities in the PFM reform sector two twinning arrangements benefitting the Audit Bureau have been implemented. Support provided has led to the achievement of intended results and couple with support provided under SIGMA has led to the formulation and implementation of the Audit Bureau's strategic plan (SIGMA and 1st twinning project under SAAP I) and to the progressive strengthening of the AB’s capacities in the areas of anti-fraud and anti-corruption, performance and environmental audits, and to the progressive shift away from pre-audit of public institutions to solely post-audit techniques (on-going under SAPP II). It is estimated that support provided has benefitted 10 units within the departments for an overall of 200 staff members. As synthesised by the respondent to the questionnaire: the support provided has strengthened the capacities of the staff thereby enhancing the audit operations and outputs which in turn have led to increased efficiency and effectiveness in ensuring that public funds are put to good use.

KPI-4.1.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Please see below
- Excel file stored under CRIS, presumed date, second half of 2013 depicting the list of contracts in the framework of the SAPP II. (partially reworked.)

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- MR-010426.02 of the “Support to the Implementation of the Association Agreement-SAAP II (2008), pp.2-3
- MR-010426.03 of the “Support to the Implementation of the Association Agreement-SAAP II (2009), pp.2-3

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- Please see below
**KPI-4.1.1 (i) Data, figures and tables:**

*File titled Overview of Twinning arrangements under SAAP and SAPP*

**Implementation period: Oct 2009 – Oct 2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Beneficiary</th>
<th>Amount (Million Euro)</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>EU Counterpart</th>
<th>Implementation period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Capacity building for fresh plant EU listing</td>
<td>Italy and Poland</td>
<td>03/09/2011 - 02/03/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior/Gendarmerie</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Improve operational capacity of gendarmerie</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>17/04/2011 - 16/11/2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Land and Survey</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>Enhance cadastral system</td>
<td>Sweden and Poland</td>
<td>01/10/2011 - 30/06/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tele-Communication and Regulatory Commission</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Develop a regulatory framework and capacity</td>
<td>France, Italy and Spain</td>
<td>30/09/2011 - 24/09/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan Institution for Standards and Metrology (JISM-previously JSMO)</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Implementation of the ACAA</td>
<td>Germany and Slovenia</td>
<td>05/09/2011 - 04/08/2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Twinning is an instrument for the cooperation between Public Administrations of EU Member States (MS) and of beneficiary countries. Beneficiaries include candidate countries and potential candidates to EU membership, as well as countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Beneficiary</th>
<th>Estimated Amount (M Euro)</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Publication date of twinning fiche</th>
<th>Country/ies selected</th>
<th>Mandatory Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Development</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Strengthening the Capacity of the Ministry of Social Development of the HKoJ to Promote and Protect the Rights of Vulnerable Families, Women &amp; Children.</td>
<td>Contract signed</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1. Strengthened capacity of the MoSD in monitoring and evaluation  2. Strengthened capacity of staff to provide quality services at the centres for people of concern to the MOSD, including but not limited to juveniles, women and children  3. Enhanced services offered in centres working with people of concern to the MOSD, including dysfunctional families, juveniles and women  4. Strengthened capacity of the MoSD to cooperate with the civil society organisations (CSOs) working on vulnerable families, juveniles, women and children.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Public Security Directorate / Cyber Crime Unit</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>Strengthen the capacity of the public administrations to combat cybercrime in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.</td>
<td>Contract signed</td>
<td>UK, Czech</td>
<td>1. The capacity of the CID officers in charge of managing investigations on cybercrime cases is strengthened through better knowledge of the new technologies, the adequate use of the techniques and tools of cybercrime investigation and to prepare accurate reports. For example credit card fraud, intrusion attacks and child sexual abuse online and prevention  2. Improved level of cooperation between CID- division of cybercrimes and other relevant institutions at both the national level (Ministry of Justice, Laboratories and Crime Evidence Department, Family Protection Department within the PSD) and international level in implementing coordinated actions in the fight against cybercrime.  3. Raised public awareness on the methods and dangers of cybercrime. For example, amongst the young population, families, banks and private companies, and educational sector, including the main measures to combat and prevent cybercrime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>PSD / Jordan Traffic Institute</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>Support the Jordanian Traffic Institute/Public Security Directorate in traffic safety management</td>
<td>Contract signed</td>
<td>France, Austria, Sweden</td>
<td>1. Stronger co-ordination, management, planning and follow up between all the relevant different entities involved in traffic safety  2. PSD/JTI trained and able to apply different methodologies for preparing awareness raising activities, such as broadcasting, campaigns, curricula and educational materials  3. Traffic Safety Campaign successfully prepared  4. Raised capacity of JTI staff in traffic accident investigation and reconstruction  5. Traffic surveillance and enforcement action plans developed and assessed  6. Raised capacity of JTI trainers in modern traffic surveillance and enforcement procedures  7. Enhanced traffic safety monitoring and analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Beneficiary</td>
<td>Estimated Amount (M Euro)</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Publication date of twinning fiche</td>
<td>Country/ies selected</td>
<td>Mandatory Results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 4. | Civil Aviation Regulatory Commission | 1.3 | Strengthen the civil aviation authority | Contract signed | Spain | 1. JCARS are harmonised with the relevant EU legislation […].
2. All EU regulation listed in Annexe 3 can be correctly applied through the harmonised JCARS by CARC and commercial operators using existing and developed technical guidance material and tools: e.g. certification specifications, airworthiness codes and Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC), as well as other guidance material (GM).
3. The tools (internal procedures, inspector’s guidance materials, check-lists, databases and other material or equipment) considered by the MS and CARC necessary for the implementation of EU aviation safety regulations specified in Annex 3 of the Comprehensive Aviation Agreement shall have been developed.
4. Technical guidance and those tools necessary for a proper implementation of EU Regulations, in particular: AOC operations procedures, FTO/TRTO operations procedures, FSTD, MTO certification and surveillance procedures, and Aircraft maintenance licensing procedures, inspector handbooks and checklists, approval specifications, including airworthiness codes and Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC), as well as operational Guidance Material (GM), have been elaborated and developed.
5. SOPs for the Effective Implementation and enforcement of safety oversight mechanisms have been developed.
6. Training through agreed instructional training modules and On the Job Training (OJT) as well as in Workshops in Jordan and Study Tours20 to the MS, have been organised and provided for selected CARC personnel and other relevant industry personnel |
| 5. | The Department of Statistics | 1.2 | Strengthen the capabilities of the Department of Statistics in Jordan | Contract signed | Denmark, Italy | 1. The National Accounts System in Jordan will be updated to SNA2008 and will cover the informal sector
2. The capacity of DoS staff to understand and apply modern sampling techniques is improved
3. Statistics published by DoS are quality assured and documentation is improved
4. New database structure defined and online dissemination improved |
| 6. | The Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities | 1.2 | Strengthen the institutional tourism system in Jordan by enhancing the capacities of the Ministry of Tourism | Contract signed | Italy | 1. The capacities of MoTA to effectively deliver Govt. of Jordan tourism policy, strategic objectives and to manage coordinated actions of tourism development are strengthened.
2. The capacities of MoTA to plan, develop and promote an enhanced product mix for the Jordanian tourism industry, in coordination with its partners DoA and JTB are strengthened |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Beneficiary</th>
<th>Estimated Amount (M Euro)</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Publication date of twinning fiche</th>
<th>Country/ies selected</th>
<th>Mandatory Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 7  | National Electric Power Company (NEPCO)  | 1.7                       | Institution building for the national electric power company (NEPCO) in Jordan | Contract signed Spain             |                      | 3. Tourism promotion and development instruments and tools are introduced, using the knowledgebase and exchange of experience  
1. Strengthened system capacity to integrate energy produced from renewable energy into the Transmission lines load management.  
2. Enhanced capacity of NEPCO’s staff to establish best approaches to strategic planning and management, with a focus on economic dispatch and schedule dispatch  
3. Upgraded skills and capacity of the technical staff in the usage, designing and operation of Simulators  
4.1 Enhanced transmission planning procedure and management to maximize efficiency, reduce cost and environmental impacts.  
4.2. Enhanced capacity and capabilities for systematic maintenance ad Control System (Balancing between demands and increased supply with limited capacity)  
5. Reduced power system vulnerability to shocks in an interconnected areas (Egypt and Syria) |
| 8  | Gendarmerie (support to the centre of excellence in Swaqa) | 1.1                       | Support to the Jordan’s Gendarmerie Regional Special Training Centre (JGRSTC) | Contract signed France, Sweden     |                      | 1. The Regional Special Training Center (RTSC) is strengthened with a strategy to ensure full operative efficiency and to provide with security and stability training services according to EU standards and MS best practices  
2. The RSTC is reinforced with a specialized School to impart training on Peace Support Operations and Human Rights in line with EU standards, including technical proficiency at Public Relations & Media Affairs, and an implemented JGF Communications and visibility plan.  
3. JGF masters democratic crowd management techniques in consonance with EU best practices |
| 9  | Audit Bureau                             | 1.2                       | Strengthening the Capacities of the Audit Bureau of Jordan             | Contract signed Spain, Estonia, Netherlands |                      | 1. A financial audit methodology is introduced and implemented for all audits, thereby facilitating the move away from pre- audit of public institutions to solely post – audit techniques; the audit of specialist areas such as the audit of the Public Debt, the Central Bank, and Revenue; and through improved quality assurance processes, improving the reporting outputs of the AB.  
2. An effective anti-fraud and anti-corruption strategy is introduced and implemented  
3. An IT development strategy for development needs and staff training on the basis of a review of the government’s financial accounting systems are completed  
4. The performance and environmental audit capacities within AB are further strengthened |
Institutional Support to the Ministry of Environment of Jordan on Environmental 

Programme Estimate is not yet completed and finally SAPP I, 1 contract: 

EUR 1 contract: 

February 2015 Final Report 

Closed in 20 

centre, security/combating terrorism, penitentiary reform and environment. 

Four twinning projects were implemented in the following areas: capacity building for the national energy research 

A second support programme (SAAP II) to the Association Agreement based on 3 priority fields. 6 twinning projects 

20 million). The agreeme 

In October 2002, the EU and Jordan signed the first Support (SAAP I) to the Association Agreement Programme (EUR 10 million) adopted in 2008 was completed, SAPP-II (EUR 20 million) adopted in 2009 was fully contracted, SAPP-III (EUR 13 million) adopted in 2011 is still in its identification phase and contracting 

Stage of the Action Plan Programme I (SAPP-I)”, Final Report, February 2014 

Support the development of the Human Rights and Training Center at the Department of the 

Support the Capacity of the Public Administrations to Combat Cybercrime in Jordan/Public 

Support the technical capacity of the Anti-Narcotics at the Public Security Directorate 

Support the Civil Aviation Regulatory Commission to strengthen its capabilities in line with the EU 

Support the Jordanian Traffic Institute in traffic safety management 

Support the institutional tourism system in Jordan by enhancing the performance of the public 

Establishing a National Water Management Information System” under preparations. 

Supply contracts under SAPP-III 

Previously, under SAAP II, 19 supply contracts were implemented in favour of 5 beneficiary institutions. 


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector/Project</th>
<th>Maximum Budget (€)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support the development of the Human Rights and Training Center at the Department of the Gendarmerie</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening the Capacity of the Public Administrations to Combat Cybercrime in Jordan/Public Security Department</td>
<td>220,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening the technical capacity of the Anti-Narcotics at the Public Security Directorate</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridging IT systems between the Ministry of Justice and the Public Security Directorate</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening the Capacities of the Audit Bureau of Jordan</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of the Roadmap for the Conclusion of the Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAA)/Jordan Institute for Standards and Metrology</td>
<td>950,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building for the Ministry of Agriculture in the field of EU third country listing criteria for fresh plants and their products</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhancement of the Cadastral System in Jordan/Department of Land and Survey</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to the Jordanian Traffic Institute in traffic safety management</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support the Civil Aviation Regulatory Commission to strengthen its capabilities in line with the EU norms, legislation and standards</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution Building for the Electric Power System</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening the institutional tourism system in Jordan by enhancing the performance of the public administration/Ministry of Tourism</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing bipolar power supply system to SESAME (Synchrotron-light for Experimental Science and Applications in the Middle East)</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Introduction, pp. 13-19 

As at January 15 , 2014, SAPP-I (EUR 10 million) adopted in 2008 was completed, SAPP-II (EUR 20 million) adopted in 2009 was fully contracted, SAPP-III (EUR 13 million) adopted in 2011 is still in its identification phase and contracting phase as its Programme Estimate is not yet completed and finally SAPP-IV (EUR 12 million) adopted in 2013 is in its programming phase. 

In October 2002, the EU and Jordan signed the first Support (SAAP-I) to the Association Agreement Programme (EUR 20 million). The agreement aimed at upgrading the Jordanian administration’s institutional capacities so it could deal with all aspects of the Association Agreement based on 3 priority fields. 6 twinning projects […] 

A second support programme (SAAP-II) to the Association Agreement was concluded in October 2005 (EUR 15 million). Four twinning projects were implemented in the following areas: capacity building for the national energy research centre, security/combating terrorism, penitentiary reform and environment. 

Closed in 2013, SAPP-I consisted essentially of 5 Twinning Projects and 11 Framework Contracts in various sectors. 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>Year of Adoption</th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SAAP-I</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>€ 20 million</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAAP-II</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>€ 15 million</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAPP-I</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>€ 10 million</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
KPI-4.1.2: Extent to which the technical capacities of a number of specifically targeted public administrations and institutions are further strengthened (e.g. in relation to environment, water and energy) for the whole cycle of strategizing, planning, implementation, monitoring, reporting and re-formulation

Main Findings on KPI-4.1.2:

Representatives of institutions and ministries which have benefitted from twinning projects financed in the framework of the SAPPs point to 'tangible improvements to their organisation' and to how these projects have 'strengthened their ability to continuously adapt and respond to developments in their respective policy fields' (MR-141402.01 Support to the implementation of the Action Plan – SAPP (2011), p.3). The final evaluation of SAPP I (p.77 & 78) states that 'the majority of mandatory results under the Twinning Projects and the expected results under the Framework Contracts included in the sample have been achieved adequately. [...] A number of instances have been identified where the achievement of the results is impacting and materialising in increased capacity at the individual institution level.' Evidence collected in relation to different twinning projects highlights:

- A distinctive improvement of the staff capacity in both MoA and NCARE has been achieved through the training, the preparation of technical and administrative procedures and drafting of technical manuals;
- Extensive and fruitful exchange of technical know-how and benefits from working with EU MS colleagues. (Telecommunication Regulatory Commission)
- Significant achievements in terms of institutional strengthening (Department of Land and Survey);
- Expected improvements in operational capacity as a result of revised management structure and management development and set-up of Swaqa training centre as a regional centre of excellence.

Jordan Progress Reports on the Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy report on the important role of twinning projects in strengthening technical capacities across a broad range of institutional stakeholders. Explicit reference is made – among others to the Jordanian customs whereby a twinning project has led to the strengthening of overall administrative capacity, deterrent judicial sanctions as well as to the establishment of a coordination body that will enable a better-targeted approach towards piracy and ensure effective implementation of the law through a collaborative effort with the European Patent Office. At the same time, it is reported (MR-010426.03) that the provision of TA (under SAAP I) and equipment (of SAAP II) to the Ministry of Agriculture (total EU contribution of EUR 1 million), led to the introduction of the National Animal Identification and Registration System (NAIRS) in the country. In the first year of operation, the government saved over EUR 50 million, from animal food subsidies!

KPI-4.1.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- 

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- MR-010426.02 of the “Support to the Implementation of the Association Agreement-SAAP II (2008), pp.2-3
- MR-010426.03 of the “Support to the Implementation of the Association Agreement-SAAP II (2009), pp.2-3
- MR-141402.01 Support to the implementation of the Action Plan – SAPP (2011), p.3
- IKRS (Feb 2010), pp. 13-14 with reference to SAAP I and SAAP II
(iii) **Additional information from field phase:**

- SAPP-1 Twinning Project with the Ministry of Agriculture “Capacity building for the Ministry of Agriculture in the field of EU third country listing criteria for plants and their fresh products pp. 25-26
- pp.45-46 SAPP-1 Twinning Project with Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (TRC)

**KPI-4.1.3: Number of public administrations / institutions of which the institutional and human capacity of the performance planning, monitoring and evaluation units directly reporting to the SG / Head of the institution are effectively and sustainably strengthened**

**Main Findings on KPI-4.1.3:**

As anticipated under KPI-4.1.1, no less than 18 departments through twinning projects. A number of these, in addition to other institutions, have also benefitted from TAs, studies and supplies while others (e.g. Audit Bureau and Ministry of Agriculture) have benefitted from more than one twinning, and others yet have benefitted from supply contracts.

The questionnaire administered to SAAP/SAPP beneficiaries has allowed a partial quantification of the number of units and staff members of beneficiary institutions that have benefited from institutional and human capacities’ strengthening activities provided in the form of twinning contracts. Responses provided by 10 out of 18 beneficiaries indicate that more than 130 departments within targeted institutions have benefitted from increased capacities for an estimated total of almost 6,000 staff members. Significant differences can however been seen in the scope of the different twinning arrangements whereby in some institutions the increase of capacities is particularly significant – up to more than 1,000 staff members (especially those who benefitted from more than one twinning) and in others it is more limited (around 100 with a low of 9).

All respondents indicated that twinnings have contributed to increase their technical capacities (either in their day-to-day job or on specific technical activities), and respectively 40% and 50% of respondents have also seen an increase in their planning, and monitoring and evaluation capacities.

**KPI-4.1.3 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) **Data, figures and tables:**
- -/-

(ii) **Key extracts from documents:**

(iii) **Additional information from field phase:**
- Please see below
KPI-4.1.3 (iii) Additional information from field phase

Results from the questionnaire administered to SAAP/SAPP beneficiaries indicate the following:

To note that 10 out of 18 beneficiaries of twinning contracts have responded.

How many units and/or staff benefitted from the support provided? (please provide number, estimate is fine)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer Options</th>
<th>Response Average</th>
<th>Response Total</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of units</td>
<td>13.60</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of staff</td>
<td>592.80</td>
<td>5,928</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

answered question 10

Detailed number per respondent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of units</th>
<th>Number of staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>2800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What kind of capacities were strengthened? (more than one option may apply)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer Options</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planning capacities</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical capacities (implementation)</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and evaluation capacities</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

answered question 10

Did the increased capacity help you / your institution in carrying out (more than one option may apply)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer Options</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Day-to-day activities</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific technical activities</td>
<td>70.0%</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please explain how or give an example:

answered question 5
KPI-4.1.4: Extent to which the EU institutional reform and capacity development support provided through different modalities and programmes is strategically steered, effectively coordinated and harmonized, and institutionally anchored in an officially mandated institutional entity of the Government of Jordan and same within the EU Delegation

Main Findings on KPI-4.1.4:

Overall coordination for the institutional reform and capacity development support provided by the EU under the SAAPs/SAPPs is anchored within the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC). The creation in July 2007, of government-donor co-ordination working groups (at a technical level and including representatives from MoPIC, the line ministries and the donors) in 10 priority sectors, has encouraged dialogue between the government and donors, and contributed to enhance responsiveness of donor funded projects to Jordan’s development priorities as well as overall complementarity.

The SAAPs/SAPPs are a key example of EU projects which respect and actually promote Government leadership in the steering of all project activities while at the same time ensuring complementarity with other donor support efforts. Indeed these interventions are designed as demand-driven and link up with other assistance programmes and to the deliberations and conclusions of the EU-Jordan Association Agreement Committee and ten thematic sub-committees, which meet annually to review progress and priorities. The Programme Administration Office is anchored within the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC) and each Line Ministry (i.e. the direct beneficiaries of the Programme) have appointed one or several "Focal Points" who are responsible for the follow-up of the technical implementation of the Programme in accordance with the EC practical guide and the twinning manual. As a result, the "on demand" mobilisation of assistance allows the EC to fully align the project to Jordanian national priorities in addition to those of the Action Plan, respect the aid effectiveness principle and the donor coordination mechanisms in place in Jordan and ensure full country ownership of activities.

KPI-4.1.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - TAPs 024-775Support to the implementation of the Action Plan IV – SAPP IV (2013), p. 4
   - TAPs 019-571 Support to the implementation of the Action Plan – SAPP (2008), pp.4-5
   - AF 020-478Support to the implementation of the Action Plan II – SAPP II (2008), pp.4-5
   - TAPs 019-571 Support to the implementation of the Action Plan – SAPP (2008), pp.4-5
   - AF 019-571 Support to the implementation of the Action Plan – SAPP (xx), p.4 & pp.8-9

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
   - Please see below

KPI-4.1.4 (iii) Additional information from field phase

Results from the questionnaire administered to SAAP/SAPP beneficiaries indicate the following:

To note that 10 out of 18 beneficiaries of twinning contracts contacted have responded.

Is the support provided through SAAP/SAPP linked to other areas of EU or other donors intervention?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer Options</th>
<th>Response Percent</th>
<th>Response Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IF YES, please explain how or give an example</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>answered question</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
sake the gap analysis of the
15 is likely. In particular, MDG2
portion of the population living on less than
b
ent sectors by providing complementary actions on the one hand, and involvement of EU
February 2015
Final Report

4.1.5

Additional comments:
- support provided by donors like UNDP and UNODC to implement strategic goals in the National Anti-
Corruption Strategy
- Support is in line with EU-Jordan Action Plan, and in line with EU Initiatives and programmes for rural
and agricultural development, and TAIEX activities
- TAIEX
- Building capacities of Audit Bureau always take in consideration the achievements in every area of other
donor interventions and builds on it, such as Performance Audit; we make the gap analysis of the
achievements of USAID and build on it to continue support and enhance this area by twinning project but
without overlapping
- it was linked to EU Sector support for Energy through "the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency
Program" through EUROPAID, in which there was 2 million EUR was allocated to establish Renewable
Energy and Energy Efficiency Labs in Jordan

Interviews with EUD and PAO representatives highlighted the following:
- Strong cooperation with MoPIC, partially decentralized. Joint assessment MoPIC and EUD with a view to correctly
identify needs;
- Not structured but systematic discussion among EUD staff members to discuss how SAPP can support on-going
efforts in the different sectors by providing complementary actions on the one hand, and involvement of EU-
Partnership division within MoPIC.
- Efforts made to link support with issues raised and discussed during sub-committees meetings. In this respect it
would be useful if sub-committees meetings could include not only policy discussions but also recommendations
so as to facilitate the identification and implementation of projects.
- The PAO carries out three types of activities:
  - POLICY level: involved in supporting the EU&Gov in the definition / shaping of the SAPP programmes.
  - PROGRAMME level: identification of beneficiaries, scoping with the EUD starting from the EU partnership
agreement / action plan with a view to link strategic priorities of the action plans with relevant agencies and
ministries. The PAO together with the EUD also goes to the institutions to enhance awareness on the
programme.
  - PROJECT level: once the activities / beneficiaries are identified, selection of mechanism, launching of
tendering procedure, follow-up on implementation. Plus make sure that the beneficiaries are aware of their role
and know how to carry it out.

KPI-4.1.5: Overall improvement of the overall livelihood, quality of life and basic needs of the
population (incl. access to quality health, education, water & sanitation and other
MDGs) and increased accessibility and use of quality public services

Main Findings on KPI-4.1.5:

According to the UNDP (2011) Jordan Human Development Report, Jordan’s Human Development Index
(HDI) level in 2010 measured at 0.681, thus placing it 82nd (1 being the best rank) out of 169 nations
worldwide and 8th among the 17 Arab countries for whom an HDI has been developed. However, while
Jordan’s rank between 2005 and 2010 remained midrange at 82nd, the country is progressing year-on-year
in its overall index (from 0.665 in 2007 to just above 0.68 in 2010), and further notes that if the oil exporting
Arab countries are removed from the comparison, Jordan’s rank jumps to second place, after Tunisia.

The Second National Millennium Development Goals Report Jordan 2010 states that “The overall picture of
achievement on the MDGs is satisfactory. Jordan has either achieved or is in the process of achieving
many of the goals. Achievement for some MDGs by 2015 is likely. In particular, MDG2 [Achieve Universal
Primary Education], has been achieved. Achievement of MDG 5 [Improve Maternal Health]and 6 [Combat
HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and other Diseases] by 2015 is possible. And with decisive and targeted policy actions
and political will, MDG 1 [Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger], 3 [Promote Gender Equality and
Empowerment of Women], 4 [Reduce Child Mortality] and 7 [Ensure Environmental Sustainability] remain
within reach.” More specifically:
- Goal 1) Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger: Efforts to halve the proportion of people in Jordan
whose income is less than JD 0.71 (USD 1) a day, for the 1990 to 2015 period, are continuing to make
headway. Jordan has exceeded its goal by reducing the proportion of the population living on less than
JD 0.71 (USD 1) per day from 6.9% of the population in 1990; to 2.3% in 2006 and to 0.754% of the
population in 2008.
- **Goal 2) Achieve Universal Primary Education.** Jordan’s achievement in children’s enrolment levels including boys and girls is remarkable. Primary school is free and obligatory for all Jordanian children. Jordan’s net enrolment rate of 86.7% in 1991 rose to 97.6% in 2006 and has remained stable since. The growth of enrolment rates is reflected in declining illiteracy rates (among those aged 15 to 24 years of age), which dropped from 2.6% (3.5% of women and 1.8% of men) between 1989/1990 to 0.9% in 2008.

- **Goal 3) Promote Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women:** The growth of female participation in the educational system is strong across Jordan, which all but eradicates gender disparity in primary and secondary education. The ratio of girls to boys in school enrolment, at all levels, went from 96% to 97% between 1992 and 2010; thus implying that Jordan should be able to fully meet this goal by 2015. Improvements have also been registered when looking at the share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector which has increased from 11% in 1992/3 to 13.8% in 2006 to 16.2% in 2009.

- **Goal 4) Reduce Child Mortality:** the Jordanian MDG is to reduce child mortality of those less than 5 years old by 67% between 1990 and 2015. In 2008, approximately 99% of births in Jordan were attended to by a specialist. Also, approximately 103% of children were immunized against measles in 2009 (the fact that the percentage is over 100% is due to the fact that many non-Jordanian children, principally Iraqi children, have also been immunized). […] Jordan appears to be underachieving on this front, as shown by the sharp jump in under 5 mortality, between 2007 and 2009.

- **Goal 5) Improve Maternal Health.** The score is mixed. The number of women who die due to child birth has decreased from 48 deaths per 100,000 births to 19 deaths per 100,000 births between 1990 and 2009 with a target for 2015 set at 12. Despite improvements and efforts deployed (increase in number of women who received medical counseling during pregnancy from 87% to 99% between 1990 and 2009 and increased use of contraceptives among 15–49 year old women from 40.2% to 59.3% between 1990 and 2009) Jordan is not achieving its goals.

- **Goal 6) Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and other Diseases.** The spread of HIV/AIDS in Jordan is limited. Goal achieved. Jordan has a relatively low prevalence of AIDS, with the majority of AIDS occurring among foreigners, and two-thirds of AIDS cases occurring between 20 and 39 year olds.

- **Goal 7) Ensure Environmental Sustainability.** In terms of water resources and availability, Jordan is the third weakest nation, in the world. It should be noted, that for the average individual in Jordan, per capita consumption of water does not exceed 150 m3 annually, whereas the global average for water consumption is 1000 m3 per individual, annually. On the other hand, Jordan is making progressive achievements in developing its sanitary infrastructure. The proportion of the population with a connection to a sewage network increased from 48% in 2001 to 62.2% in 2008.

- **Goal 8) Developing a Global Partnership for Development.** Economic openness and global partnerships have remained strong on the government agenda. With free trade agreements giving Jordanians access to over 1.1 billion consumers, and international trade and tourism figures growing annually.

Overall, Jordan has continually improved its measurable indices of human development. However, while Government policy has centered on the provision and growth of medical care and educational services, and gives special notice to poverty and unemployment programs, expenditures on basic social services have reached an estimated 17% of the overall national budget in 2010. Spending on the military is still heavier than spending on both health and education combined in Jordan. For example, 35.9% of current expenditures in 2010 were spent on the military.

The Report concludes that “In spite of remarkable accomplishments, the country continues to face a number of challenges. Most significant are its limited water resources, fiscal inflexibility, foreign debt, the weak participation of women in the labor market, income inequality, the relative lack of political participation, the enduring negative impact of the financial crisis, possible food insecurity, poverty and unemployment.”
KPI-4.1.5 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- The MDG Progress Index: Gauging Country-Level Achievements
- http://www.cgdev.org/page/mdg-progress-index-gauging-country-level-achievements

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Human Poverty Index (HPI).
- Multidimensional Poverty Index
- Gender-related Development Index (GDI)
- Jordan’s MDGs The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). ..... (pp.50-56)

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- /-

JC-4.1: EU support contributed to institutional reform and capacity development in public institutions at central level for more transparent, efficient, effective and inclusive delivery of public services

Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-4.1 (based on the KPIs main findings)

In line with the response strategy outlined in the 2007-2013 CSP, the Commission has financed a series of programmes aimed at helping build capacity of Jordanian institutions with a view to facilitate reform in different areas of interest in line with the implementation of the National Agenda as well as with the EU-Jordan Association Agreement and Action Plans. This was done through the Support to the implementation of the Action Plan Programmes SAPP I and SAPP II under the 2007-2010 NIP; and SAPP III and SAPP IV under the 2011-2013 NIP.¹

Overall coordination for the institutional reform and capacity development support provided by the EU under the SAAPs/SAPPs is anchored within the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC). As a result, the interventions - designed as demand-driven – ensure the provision of flexible ad hoc support, promoting government ownership and make the SAPPs a strategic tool for supporting the implementation of reforms and transferring capacity to Jordanian institutions. (KPI 4.1.4)

The review of available data indicates that more than 25 twinning arrangements² were set-up and implemented in the framework of the SAAPs/SAPPs to the benefit of no less than 18 departments of ministries / public institutions. Public institutions benefiting from the twinnings range from the Ministry of Social Development to the Ministry of Agriculture, from the Tele-Communication and Regulatory Commission to the Public Security Directorate/Cyper Crime Unit and Audit Bureau. In addition to these, the SAPPs also provide the possibility of drawing on other forms of support, including TAs and studies (through service contracts) with a view to support institutional reform and capacity development in public as well as the supply of equipment (through supply contracts³) or equipment plus services. (KPI 4.1.1)

Support provided has contributed to the strengthening of technical, planning and monitoring capacities; and representatives of institutions and ministries which have benefitted from twinning projects point to ‘tangible

¹ To note that: i) the SAPP programmes followed in the steps of the earlier programmes to Support to the Implementation of the Association Agreement (SAAP) financed under the previous CSP; and ii) as of the cut-off date for this evaluation, while the SAPP I and II were near completion, contracts in the framework of the SAPP III and SAPP IV had yet to be signed.

² Twinning is an instrument for the cooperation between Public Administrations of EU Member States (MS) and of beneficiary countries. Beneficiaries include candidate countries and potential candidates to EU membership, as well as countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy.

³ In some cases these are managed by the SAPP PAO but in others they are managed directly by the EUD as was the case for example of the over 2M € contract ‘Water Cooling and HVAC System for SESAME"
improvements to their organisation’ and to how these projects have 'strengthened their ability to continuously adapt and respond to developments in their respective policy fields' (MR-141402.01 Support to the implementation of the Action Plan – SAPP (2011), p.3). This was confirmed during the field visit where additional information gathered points to multiple instances in which the achievement of the twinnings' results is impacting and materialising in increased capacity at the individual institution level. The questionnaire administered to SAAP/SAPP beneficiaries has allowed a partial quantification of the number of units and staff members of beneficiary institutions that have benefitted from institutional and human capacities’ strengthening activities provided in the form of twinning contracts. Responses provided by 10 out of 18 beneficiaries contacted indicate that more than 130 departments within targeted institutions have recorded an increase in capacities following the twinning programmes for an estimated total of almost 6,000 staff members. In all cases, twinnings have contributed to an increase in technical capacities (either in their day-to-day job or on specific technical activities), and respectively 40% and 50% of respondents have also seen an increase in their planning, and monitoring and evaluation capacities. (KPI 4.1.2 & 4.1.3).

Although these programmes are geared to support the Government in the implementation of its National Agenda with the ultimate goal of improving delivery of public services and hence the overall livelihood of the population, it is difficult to draw direct links between the results achieved within the framework of these programmes and the slow but steady progress made by Jordan in terms of Human Development Index.1

(KPI 4.1.5). There is however some evidence that points to important contributions in terms of service provision:

- the provision of TA (under SAAP I) and equipment (under SAAP II) to the Ministry of Agriculture (total EU contribution of EUR1 million), led to the introduction of the National Animal Identification and Registration System (NAIRS) in the country. In the first year of operation, the government saved over EUR50 million, from animal food subsidies! (MR-010426.03), (KPI 4.1.2)
- Following the significant achievements in terms of institutional strengthening as well as the technological and efficiency improvements brought about by the twinning project the cost of services to end users provided by the Department of Land and Survey is likely to be reduced following (questionnaire);
- the support provided has strengthened the capacities of the Audit Bureau staff thereby enhancing the audit operations and outputs which in turn have led to increased efficiency and effectiveness in ensuring that public funds are put to good use. (KPI 4.1.1)

### List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 4.2 (codes and definition)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPI Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPI-4.2.1</td>
<td>Instances of targeted Local Government Units (Municipalities and Governorates) of which the managerial, administrative and/or service delivery capacities are effectively strengthened, particularly with regard to integrated and inclusive development planning and programme implementation, monitoring and reporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-4.2.2</td>
<td>Number of targeted Local Government Units of which the technical capacities in selective priority thematic areas and sectors (e.g. environment, water, energy) is effectively strengthened for the whole cycle of strategizing, planning, implementation, monitoring, reporting and re-formulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-4.2.3</td>
<td>Overall appreciation and satisfaction rating by Local Government Units of EU support for institutional reform and capacity development (both institutional and human capacity building)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-4.2.4</td>
<td>Number of targeted Local Government Units of which the institutional and human capacity of the local development planning, monitoring and evaluation units directly under the Mayor / Governor is effectively and sustainably strengthened</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1 While Jordan’s rank between 2005 and 2010 remained midrange at 82nd, the country is progressing year-on-year in its overall index (from 0.665 in 2007 to just above 0.68 in 2010), and further notes that if the oil exporting Arab countries are removed from the comparison, Jordan’s rank jumps to second place, after Tunisia. UNDP (2011) Jordan Human Development Report. 2011, p.47
KPI-4.2.1: Instances of targeted Local Government Units (Municipalities and Governorates) of which the managerial, administrative and/or service delivery capacities are effectively strengthened, particularly with regard to integrated and inclusive development planning and programme implementation, monitoring and reporting

Main Findings on KPI-4.2.1:

The EU has definitively contributed to increase capacities of Local Government Units (LGUs) in a number of spheres, albeit on a limited scale. This primarily as a result of two complementary initiatives undertaken within the timeframe covered by this evaluation, i.e.: i) The Building Development Capacities of Jordanian Municipalities – Baladiaty” programme (allocated amount of EUR 3 million over the period 2010-2013); and ii) the Promoting Local Economic Development in Jordan (PLEDJ) programme (allocated amount of EUR 5 million over the period 2011-2014).

Overall, the two programmes targeted two Governorates and their main municipalities under PLEDJ as well as three category A municipalities (Mafraq, Kerak and Zarqa) plus six small smaller municipalities (two for each bigger ones) under Baladiaty.

Through these programmes, the EU has – in targeted municipalities - contributed to:

- Enhance public understanding of Municipalities’ role and operating environment in supporting local development through awareness raising and training sessions, including capacity building of CBOs and NGOs;
- Strengthen the participation of local stakeholders in local development planning and implementation improved, including through the development of Sector Support Action Plans for key competitive sectors in each of three municipality clusters (e.g. fruits and olives, and dairy products) with a high level of participation of relevant local stakeholders;
- Improve the environment for LED and foster the identification of LED and investment opportunities to create job opportunities through, among others: i) enhanced dialogue and joint action between the main local stakeholder groups; ii) training of local development unit members on Investment promotion so that LDUs can carry out a new role of Business Development Facilitation through on-the-job mentoring of brokering linkages between entrepreneurs and relevant service providers; and iii) the establishment of LED Technical Committees in pilot Governorates and of Local Economic Development Forums (LEDF) in partner municipalities to facilitate and sustain the collaboration between the main stakeholders for the development and implementation of concrete LED initiatives and projects.

In this respect, it is worth noting that the MR-146740.01 of PLEDJ (2013), p.3 explicitly states that: “The project reinforces technical capacities in terms of management, planning and coordination through information events, lessons and seminars and it contributes to the improvement of institutional and management capacities of the involved stakeholders by provision of capacity strengthening trainings and training-of-trainers.

KPI-4.2.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- MR-144566.02, Building Development Capacities of Jordanian Municipalities – Baladiaty (2013), p.3
- AF Promoting Local Economic Development in Jordan (2010), pp.6-7
- MR-146740.01 - Promoting Local Economic Development in Jordan (PLEDJ), (2013), pp.2-3

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- Stakeholders interviewed
- RS-29069.01 - MR-144566.01 (05/06/2012), Building Development Capacities of Jordanian Municipalities – Baladiaty, p.2
**KPI-4.2.2:** Number of targeted Local Government Units of which the technical capacities in selective priority thematic areas and sectors (e.g. environment, water, energy) is effectively strengthened for the whole cycle of strategizing, planning, implementation, monitoring, reporting and re-formulation

**Main Findings on KPI-4.2.2:**

Issues covered under the KPI 4.2.1

**KPI-4.2.2 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - See extracts included under KPI 4.2.1

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
   - /-

**KPI-4.2.3:** Overall appreciation and satisfaction rating by Local Government Units of EU support for institutional reform and capacity development (both institutional and human capacity building)

**Main Findings on KPI-4.2.3:**

The last ROM report of the Baladiaty programme (2013) reports that "Impact is visible as target groups [...] have witnessed a 180° shift in mind-set as they see the longer term benefits of what their role in the LDUs should entail. They learnt how to develop SSAPs, conduct field research, emphasised how their communication skills were sharpened to support engagement with organisations/informal workers; to promote partnership and dialogue at the local-stakeholder level which they were exposed to during the project - something they said they would never have imagined prior to Baladiaty. [...]"

*Beneficiaries report that the BRG [Reference Guide to Economic and Business Development Support Services developed by the programme] has been a valuable tool in this process.*

That said, interviews carried out during the field phase have also highlighted that training of a more general nature focusing on project planning and management (and including excel), strategic planning and governance issues in the LED area would have been of greater value than more technical training looking at value chain analysis.

**KPI-4.2.3 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - MR-144566.02, Building Development Capacities of Jordanian Municipalities – Baladiaty (2013), p.3

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
   - RS-29069.01 - MR-144566.01 (05/06/2012), Building Development Capacities of Jordanian Municipalities – Baladiaty, p.2
Main Findings on KPI-4.2.4:

While there is no doubt that planning capacities have been strengthened as a result of activities undertaken in the framework of the two above-mentioned programmes (Baladyati and PLEDJ), no evidence has been found of increased capacity in relation to the monitoring and evaluation units. More specifically, the originally envisaged activities planned in this respect under the Baladyati programme – i.e. Support LDUs to ensure adequate data management and access by stakeholders on local economy & development projects including M&E systems for Local Development - have been redesigned and downsized and it was “agreed with MOMA and EUD that current institutional arrangements within Municipalities are not conducive to the development or sustainability of M&E systems in the lifetime of the Baladyati Project” (Final Report “Building Development Capacities of Jordanian Municipalities – Baladiaty” programme, 2013, p.18).

KPI-4.2.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - Ibid. p.15
   - Ibid. p.18

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
   - /-

JC-4.2: EU support contributed to institutional reform and capacity development of public institutions at local government level (in Governorates and municipalities) for more transparent, efficient, effective and inclusive delivery of public services

Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-4.2 (based on the KPIs main findings)

The EU has definitively contributed to increase capacities of Local Government Units (LGUs) in a number of spheres, though on a limited scale given the pilot nature of the implemented programmes1.

Overall, the two programmes targeted two Governatorates and their main municipalities under PLEDJ as well as three ‘category A’ (i.e. bigger) municipalities (Mafraq, Kerak and Zarqa) plus six small smaller municipalities (two for each one of the bigger ones) under Baladiaty.

Through these programmes, the EU has reinforced technical capacities of municipalities in terms of management, planning and coordination through information events, lessons and seminars and has contributed to the improvement of institutional and management capacities of the involved stakeholders. More specifically, the programmes have contributed to:
   - Enhance public understanding of Municipalities’ role and operating environment in supporting local economy and development.

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1 Two key programmes have been financed by the EU during the period under review with a view to support institutional reform and capacity building at the local level: i) the “Building Development Capacities of Jordanian Municipalities – Baladiaty” programme (allocated amount of € 3M over the period 2010-2013); and ii) the Promoting Local Economic Development in Jordan (PLEDJ) programme (allocated amount of € 5M over the period 2011-2014). These programmes follow the previously funded EU-supported Poverty Alleviation through Local Development programme (PALD) and aim at fostering local economic development through better cooperation between municipalities and NSA’s. These programmes were intended to be followed by an additional EU initiative the ‘Democratic governance project’ (EUR 10 million) originally designed to address among other things, the issue of decentralisation but was later cancelled in light of changed overall context and lower (though temporary) commitment of the government to decentralisation issues.
development through awareness raising and training sessions, including capacity building of CBOs and NGOs;

- Strengthen the participation of local stakeholders in local development planning and implementation improved, including through the development of for key competitive sectors in each of three municipality clusters (e.g. fruits and olives, and dairy products) with a high level of participation of relevant local stakeholders;

- Foster the identification of LED and foster the identification of LED and investment opportunities through enhanced dialogue and joint action between the main local stakeholder groups.

- Improve the environment for LED and foster the identification of LED and investment opportunities to create job opportunities through, among others: i) enhanced dialogue and joint action between the main local stakeholder groups; ii) the training of local development unit members on Investment promotion so that LDUs can carry out a new role of Business Development Facilitation through on-the-job mentoring of brokering linkages between entrepreneurs and relevant service providers; and iii) the establishment of LED Technical Committees in pilot Governorates and of Local Economic Development Forums (LEDF) in partner municipalities to facilitate and sustain the collaboration between the main stakeholders for the development and implementation of concrete LED initiatives and projects. (KPI-4.2.1)

Overall, strong appreciation has been expressed by beneficiaries “Impact is visible as target groups [...] have witnessed a 180° shift in mind-set as they see the longer term benefits of what their role in the LDUs should entail. They learnt how to develop SSAPs [Sector Support Action Plans], conduct field research, emphasised how their communication skills were sharpened to support engagement with organisations/informal workers; to promote partnership and dialogue at the local-stakeholder level which they were exposed to during the project - something they said they would never have imagined prior to Baladiaty. (ROM report, 2013). That said, interviews carried out during the field phase have also highlighted that training of a more general nature focusing on project planning and management (and including excel), strategic planning and governance issues in the LED area would have been of greater value than more technical training looking at value chain analysis, especially in light of the limited resources and institutional capacities currently available. (KPI-4.2.3)

On the down-side, results in terms of strengthened monitoring and evaluation units are scarce, as activities originally envisaged were redesigned and downsized to take into account limits of existing institutional arrangements for this type of activity. (KPI-4.2.4)
KPI-4.3.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:

- Repeat Public Financial Management Assessment following the PEFA Methodology (2011) as well as the earlier 2007 assessment.
- World Bank, Beyond the Annual Budget: Global experience with Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks. (2013), Jordan Case Study pp. 200-206
- USAID, Public Expenditure Perspectives, (2011)

(ii) Key extracts from documents:

- References to evolutions in terms of PFM reforms are also found in the Annual Progress Reports of the Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2013, the EAMRs and in programme documentation of those interventions that provide support in the PFM area and more generally in all BS programmes documentation (FA and tranche disbursement / payment files above all).

(iii) Additional information from field phase:

- Payment files related to the disbursement of tranches of SBS programmes in the PFM area.

KPI-4.3.2: Average percentage trends in indicators related to PFM quality as recorded in Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) Assessments (2007 and 2011), and other studies on quality of PFM systems and processes (e.g. EU, IMF, World Bank) (% indicator and % sub-indicators)

Main Findings on KPI-4.3.2:

The PEFA report is the primary source of specific indicators developed to monitor progress in quality of PFM processes and systems.
The latest report (2011) - which compares scores of the performance indicators between the 2007 and 2011 assessments - provides clear documentation that attests to the achievement of major improvements in Jordan’s PFM system since 2007, improvements which however do not appear as obvious when comparing the scores. Indeed, scores in 2007 were not fully based on the evidence required by the PEFA guidelines and, therefore, resulted in higher scores than those actually deserved. Nonetheless, improvements (some of them major) have been identified in at least one of the dimensions of 17 indicators, thereby attesting to a solid improvement since the 2007 assessment. Additionally, there are 7 performance indicator scores (as opposed to dimensions) that substantially remained unchanged since 2007. The remaining 7 performance indicator scores have either deteriorated or have been substantially changed by the PEFA Secretariat to the extent that they are truly not comparable. Overall, the report concludes that regardless of the comparability of scores assigned during the two assessments, the PFM reform efforts are on a very positive trajectory.

Similarly, the OECD Aid Effectiveness 2011: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration, (2012) points out that while no score can be presented for indicator 2a which looks at issues of reliable country public financial management systems, the Government reports that significant progress has been made in reforming and improving its public financial management systems in recent years in line with international best practices, for example in planning, monitoring, and transparency of its debt management. As an integral part of the Government’s efforts towards reforming the public sector in Jordan and achieving long-term fiscal sustainability, the Ministry of Finance, since the last survey of 2008, has further enhanced its financial management reform, aiming to improve the budget process via a number of mechanisms.

KPI-4.3.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Please see below

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Please see below
- OECD (2012), Aid Effectiveness 2011: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration, p.5

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- +/-

KPI-4.3.2 (i) Data, figures and tables:

EU (2011), Repeat Public Financial Management Assessment following the PEFA Methodology (authored by Sumar Sahurie, E.; Palacio, E.; Stroh, P.; Jordan, O.A.)

Jordan PEFA (Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability) Assessment
Overview of Indicators Achievements (EU 2007 and 2011) (CLE IR Table 2.10)

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<th>Improve since 2007</th>
<th>Compar - able Scores</th>
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<td>Credibility of the Budget</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Aggregate expenditure out-turn compared to original approved budget</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Stock and monitoring of expenditure payment arrears</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>NR</td>
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<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Comprehensiveness and Transparency</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Classification of the budget</td>
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<td>A</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Comprehensiveness of information included in budget documentation</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Extent of unreported government operations</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Transparency of Inter-Governmental Fiscal Relations</td>
<td>B+</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Oversight of aggregate fiscal risk from other public sector entities</td>
<td>B+</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Public Access to key fiscal information</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Policy-Based Budgeting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>PI Score</td>
<td>KPI</td>
<td>Note</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Orderliness and participation in the annual budget process</td>
<td>B+</td>
<td>C+</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Multi-year perspective in fiscal planning, expenditure policy and budgeting</td>
<td>B+</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td><strong>Predictability and Control In Budget Execution</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Transparency of taxpayer obligations and liabilities</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B+</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Effectiveness of measures for taxpayer registration and tax assessment</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Effectiveness in collection of tax payments</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>D+</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Predictability in the availability of funds for commitment of expenditures</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Recording and management of cash balances, debt and guarantees</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Effectiveness of payroll controls</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C+</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Competition, value for money and controls in procurement</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C+</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Effectiveness of internal controls for non-salary expenditure</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C+</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Effectiveness of internal audit</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D+</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td><strong>Accounting, Recording, &amp; Reporting</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Timeliness and regularity of accounts reconciliation</td>
<td>B+</td>
<td>B+</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Availability of information on resources received by service delivery units</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Quality and timeliness of in-year budget reports</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D+</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Quality and timeliness of annual financial statements</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C+</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td><strong>External Scrutiny &amp; Audit</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Scope, nature and follow-up of external audit</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C+</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Legislative scrutiny of the annual budget law</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B+</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Legislative scrutiny of external audit reports</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D+</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td><strong>Donor Practices</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Predictability of Direct Budget Support</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D+</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Financial information provided by donors for budgeting and reporting on project and program aid</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>D+</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Proportion of aid that is managed by use of national procedures</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>C+</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**KPI 4.3.2 (ii) Key extracts from documents:**

Repeat Public Financial Management Assessment following the PEFA Methodology (2011), p.16

Comparative Summary of the Scores for 2007 and 2011. Although most of the performance indicators are not directly comparable between the 2007 and 2011 assessments as shown in Table 1 and for reasons explained in Box 1 below, there is clear documentation that major improvements in the PFM system in Jordan have been accomplished since 2007. These improvements are, however, not obvious when comparing the scores of the performance indicators of the 2007 and 2011 PEFA assessments mainly because many of the scores in 2007 were not fully based on the evidence required by the PEFA guidelines and, therefore, resulted in higher scores than deserved to have received. Nonetheless, as can be seen in the body of this report and the accompanying annexes, improvements (some of them major) have been identified in at least one of the dimensions of 17 indicators (PI-5, PI-6, PI-7, PI-10, PI-11, PI-12, PI-13, PI-14, PI-15, PI-18, PI-22, PI-24, PI-25, PI-26, D-1, D-2, and D-3) (see summary provided under the previous box). This represents a solid improvement since the 2007 assessment. Additionally, there are 7 performance indicator scores (as opposed to dimensions) that substantially remained unchanged since 2007 (PI-1, PI-8, PI-16, PI-17, PI-20, PI-23, and PI-27). The remaining 7 performance indicator scores have either deteriorated or have been substantially changed by the PEFA Secretariat to the extent that they are truly not comparable (PI-2, PI-3, PI-4, PI-9, PI-19, PI-21, and PI-28). Overall, regardless of the comparable or not comparable scores assigned during the two assessments, the PFM reform efforts are on a very positive trajectory.

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Footnote: 1 It is recalled that performance indicators summarised in the table presented under KPI 4.3.2 comprise between one and four dimensions, each of which is rated to derive the overall performance indicator score.
KPI-4.3.3: Average overall assessments on relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of PFM reforms as included in independent reports and as provided by government officials (MoF, MoPIC), EU and other donors working on PFM reforms (EU, USAID, GIZ) (HSPU indicator and sub-indicators by criterion)

Main Findings on KPI-4.3.3:

All assessments included in independent reports produced in the framework of initiatives led by the IMF, the World Bank, the EU and other bilateral donors such as USAID, point to a positive performance of the country’s PFM system. “The global direction of change is overwhelmingly positive, despite a few areas requiring particular attention. MOF, ISTD, GBD and Audit Bureau are all progressing in the implementation of their respective strategic plans and the overarching strategic plan. (EU PFM Annual Monitoring Report Jordan 2013, p.8)

Together with the development of the of the National Agenda in 2005, the government launched its aggressive financial reform agenda focused on the identification of its highest priority needs including tax policy and administration reform, development of a medium-term fiscal framework (MTFF) process, preparation of medium-term expenditure frameworks (MTEF), installation of a government financial management information system (GFMIS), introduction and implementation of results-oriented budgeting, reform of commitment control and internal control processes, and institution of a treasury single account (TSA). These reforms were described in the Policy Statement for Public Sector Reform for 2004-2009 issued by the Office of the Prime Minister, the Financial Management Reform Strategy 2004-2007 adopted by the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the MoF Strategy for 2005-2009, and the General Budget Department (GBD) Strategy for 2007-2009. Since mid-2009 when the end of the period of the strategies described above was approaching, the MoF prepared a PFM reform strategy contained in the MoF “Overarching Financial Management Reform for Jordan’s Public Financial Management 2010–2013” and its action plan, which was issued in December 2009. This strategy encompasses the main elements of the PFM reform strategies of the MoF, GBD, ISTD and the AB, whose main elements are described below.

According to the PEFA report (2011), changes in the PFM system across the six critical areas of performance monitored have taken a positive direction reflecting the results of the many reforms that have taken place or are in their active implementation stage. The report concludes that the overall situation of the PFM system in Jordan is positive notwithstanding that certain PFM performance issues remain to be addressed by the government.

Main improvements in Jordan’s PFM system throughout the period 2007 – 2011 can be summarised as follows:

- Improvement in the transparency and analytical features of the general budget through: i) the adoption of an improved classification scheme and a revised chart of accounts compliant with the IMF GFS standards; ii) the introduction of a results oriented program-based budgeting methodology; and iii) the application of a multi-year budget perspective.

- Development and implementation of the Government Financial Management Information System (GFMIS). The GFMIS supports the MoF’s Treasury Department in the management of cash and the Budget Department to build and maintain consolidated manpower tables used during the budget preparation process. While the system has been rolled out to most budget organizations allowing data to be inputed and reports produced with significantly improved ease and accuracy, it does not yet cover the whole of government and the reports comprise largely data with little analytical content leaving top management challenged to integrate the data into a form on which to base management decisions.

- Enhancement of Treasury and cash management operations, facilitated by the uses of a Treasury Single Account (TSA), has allowed for streamlined processes related to revenue collection transactions, consolidation of multiple trust accounts previously maintained by individual MDAs at commercial banks, and greatly improved availability of financial data concerning the government's cash position on a daily basis. In addition, the TSA has facilitated Treasury to greatly reduce suspense accounts and advance accounts that in the past were large and varied in terms of the number of accounts and their monetary value.

- Revision of the Income Tax Law and amendment of the General Sales Tax Law in December 2009 have introduced simplification of the tax system and administrative procedures
- A revised Audit Bureau law has been approved by the Cabinet and is to be submitted to Parliament; creation of a Central Harmonisation Unit (CHU) for Internal Control within the MOF to oversee the development, implementation, training and operation of the Internal Control Units in Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs);

- Availability to the general public and publication on the internet - as of 2011, of the Audit Bureau reports and of the Government's final accounts, key tools which provide means for greater Parliament and citizen's scrutiny of Government operations.

- Impressive changes in the organizational structure of the Income and Sales Tax Department (ISTD). ISTD now uses IT and audit techniques that have allowed it to focus its resources more effectively. Work is currently being carried out with a view to: i) reviewing all tax exemptions, adjusting tax thresholds and accelerating the collection of tax arrears in order to meet the IMF target of generating additional revenues of 1% of GDP by the end of the Stand-by Arrangement. Further efforts will be required to address ongoing inefficiencies in the tax collection process.

- Approval by law of the budget of the independent Government Units since 2008.

- The emergence of a clearer focus on anti-corruption through actions of the Anti-Corruption Commission and the potential impetus that may emerge from the recently-appointed Royal Committee for Enhancing National Integrity.

The recent publication by the World Bank - Beyond the Annual Budget: Global experience with Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks (2013). Jordan Case Study – confirms this positive overall assessment and points to “a marked improvement in the budget process, with the MTEF strengthening planning over the medium term.” The top-down approach to budgeting and the MTEF process have helped to allocate funds to targeted sectors, while taking into account the limited resources. [ and ] has also contributed to significant agency buy-in to the MTEF reforms. The report further points out that the coinciding timeframe between the launch of the medium-term budgetary framework (MTBF) in 2008 with a period of heightened uncertainty, has prevented the MTBF from yielding the expected positive impact.

Political support for PFM reform has been strong and this has been supported by major donors such as DFID, EC, GIZ, USAID and the World Bank. On the down side, the impact of the global financial crisis on Jordan has affected the smooth implementation of the newly adopted MTEF and some fundamental aspects of the PFM reforms are still lagging. Main challenges to be addressed include:

- A more holistic, coordinated approach to PFM reforms, with the clear identification of a high-level driver of the overall reform process (MOF?) clearly in charge and accountable for the performance of the entire PFM system with a view to: i) bridge the gap between the reform areas defined separately by each institution (GBD, MoF, ISTD and the Audit Bureau); ii) overcome the fragmentation in the budget planning process, with duplicate functions between the Ministry of Finance, the General Budget Department, and the Ministry of Planning, which hampers proper prioritization; and iii) facilitate the assessment of the quality of cross-institutional working, and the undertaking of a critical analysis of what types of reform activities have worked well, those that have not worked well, and why.

- The provision of additional staff for priority PFM areas and capacity development in all system components.

- Need for further improvements with regard to the MTEF (still considered as over simplistic) and increased differentiation between the Budget Policy and Priorities Paper and the medium term fiscal framework (MTFF) which appeared to be the same. In addition, although the GBD has made significant progress in rationalizing the budget process including through the adoption of result-oriented budgeting, the latest EU PFM Monitoring report (2013) pointed out that “questions remain whether the KPIs are the right ones to track the most important functions of the programs and whether the results have any bearing on decision-making by the Cabinet or Parliament.”

- The establishment of a revised legislative basis for the Audit Bureau and for the Internal Audit function in MOF and in MDAs laying the grounds for the reform of the system of internal control and internal audit.
KPI-4.3.3 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- -

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- - Repeat Public Financial Management Assessment following the PEFA Methodology (2011), p.9
- - Repeat Public Financial Management Assessment following the PEFA Methodology (2011), pp.9-17
- - II. Assessment of the Impact of PFM Weaknesses (pp.14-15)
- - III. Prospects for Reform Planning and Implementation (p.15)
- - IMF/World Bank, Jordan: Advancing the PFM Reform Agenda, (2009)
- - IRKS (02/2012) covering 2011, p.12
- - AF, Good Governance and Development Contract – ENPI/2012/024-396 (2012), p.6
- - Please see below

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- - Delegation Assessment, Payment request 1st tranche “Support to the Public Financial Management Reform Programme”, ENPI/2010/021-932, pp.1-2 & 5-6
- - ECFIN, July 2013
KPI-4.3.3 (ii) Key extracts from documents:

Box 1. Main Improvements undertaken in the Jordan PFM System during 2007 and May 2011 (p.14)
- Improvements in the transparency and analytical features of the general budget through the adoption of an improved classification scheme and a revised chart of accounts that is compliant with the IMF GFS standards; the introduction of a results oriented program-based budgeting methodology; and the application of a multi-year budget perspective.
- Development of the Government Financial Management Information System (GFMIS) and its preliminary implementation in key ministries and departments. GFMIS has been particularly useful to the MoF Treasury Department to manage cash and to the Budget Department to build and maintain consolidated manpower tables used during the budget preparation process.
- Enhancement of Treasury and cash management operations, facilitated by the uses of a Treasury Single Account (TSA), has allowed for streamlined processes related to revenue collection transactions, consolidation of multiple trust accounts previously maintained by individual MDAs at commercial banks, and greatly improved availability of financial data concerning the government's cash position on a daily basis. In addition, the TSA has facilitated Treasury to greatly reduce suspense accounts and advance accounts that in the past were large and varied in terms of the number of accounts and their monetary value.
- Revision of the Income Tax Law and amendment of the General Sales Tax Law in December 2009 have introduced simplification of the tax system and administrative procedures.
- Impressive changes in the organizational structure of ISTD. The structure has changed from a tax-based structure to a modern combination of a (i) functional structure for tax headquarters providing guidance to the operational directorates and (ii) a taxpayers-size basis for operational purposes.
- Approval by law of the budget of the independent Government Units since 2008.

JC-4.3: Public Finance Management (PFM) systems have been strengthened

Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-4.3 (based on the KPIs main findings)

Multiple records of PFM reform activities undertaken by the government throughout the period covered by the evaluation are available (KPI-4.3.1) and all point to sound progress in the implementation of PFM reforms.

As of 2005, the government launched an aggressive financial reform agenda focused on a number of high priority needs including tax policy and administration reform, development of a medium-term fiscal framework (MTFF) process, preparation of medium-term expenditure frameworks (MTEF), installation of a government financial management information system (GFMIS), introduction and implementation of results-oriented budgeting, reform of commitment control and internal control processes, and institution of a treasury single account (TSA). These reforms were planned for and described in multiple government documents, including: i) the Policy Statement for Public Sector Reform for 2004-2009 (Office of the Prime Minister), the Financial Management Reform Strategy 2004-2007 (Ministry of Finance), the General Budget Department (GBD) Strategy for 2007-2009. Later on, in the mid-2009, the MoF prepared a PFM reform strategy contained in the MoF “Overarching Financial Management Reform for Jordan’s Public Financial Management 2010–2013” and its action plan, which was issued in December 2009. This strategy encompasses the main elements of the PFM reform strategies of the MoF, GBD, Income and Sales Tax Directorate and the Audit Bureau. (KPI-4.3.1)

The PEFA report (2011) emphasises the positive changes in the PFM system across the six critical areas of performance monitored as a result of the many reforms that have taken place or are in their active implementation stage. While improvements since 2007 do not always appear obvious when comparing the scores, the report concludes that regardless of the comparability of scores assigned during the two assessments, the PFM reform efforts are on a very positive trajectory (p.16). (KPI-4.3.2)

Similar conclusions are drawn by the PFM annual monitoring report (2013) which emphasis that “the global direction of change is overwhelmingly positive, despite a few areas requiring particular attention. MOF, ISTD, GBD and Audit Bureau are all progressing in the implementation of their respective strategic plans and the overarching strategic plan” as well as the 2013 World Bank study which points to “a marked improvement in the budget process, with the MTEF strengthening planning over the medium term”.

Main improvements in Jordan’s PFM system throughout the period can be summarised as follows:
- Improvement in the transparency and analytical features of the general budget through: i) the adoption of an improved classification scheme and a revised chart of accounts compliant with the IMF GFS
standards; ii) the introduction of a results oriented program-based budgeting methodology; and iii) the application of a multi-year budget perspective.

- Development and implementation of the Government Financial Management Information System (GFMIS) which supports the MoF’s Treasury Department in the management of cash and the Budget Department to build and maintain consolidated manpower tables used during the budget preparation process. The system is yet to cover the whole of government but has been rolled to most budget organizations allowing data to be inputed and reports produced with significantly improved ease and accuracy although these still lack an adequate analytical content.

- Enhancement of Treasury and cash management operations, facilitated by the uses of a Treasury Single Account (TSA), has allowed for streamlined processes related to revenue collection transactions, consolidation of multiple trust accounts previously maintained by individual MDAs at commercial banks, and greatly improved availability of financial data concerning the government’s cash position on a daily basis. In addition, the TSA has facilitated Treasury to greatly reduce suspense accounts and advance accounts that in the past were large and varied in terms of the number of accounts and their monetary value.

- Revision of the Income Tax Law and amendment of the General Sales Tax Law in December 2009 have introduced simplification of the tax system and administrative procedures.

- Impressive changes in the organizational structure of the Income and Sales Tax Department (ISTD).

- Approval by Cabinet of a revised Audit Bureau law and creation of a Central Harmonisation Unit (CHU) for Internal Control within the MOF to oversee the development, implementation, training and operation of the Internal Control Units in Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs);

- Availability to the general public and publication on the internet - as of 2011, of the Audit Bureau reports and of the Government’s final accounts, key tools which provide means for greater Parliament and citizen’s scrutiny of Government operations.

- The emergence of a clearer focus on anti-corruption through actions of the Anti-Corruption Commission and the potential impetus that may emerge from the recently-appointed Royal Committee for Enhancing National Integrity.

On the down side, reports also note that: i) the impact of the global financial crisis on Jordan has affected the smooth implementation of the newly adopted MTEF which is still considered as over simplistic; ii) some fundamental aspects of the PFM reforms are still lagging, in particular, a sound commitment control system; iii) there still appears to be some fragmentation in the budget planning process, with duplicate functions between the Ministry of Finance, the General Budget Department, and the Ministry of Planning, which hampers proper prioritization; iv) there is a strong need for the establishment of a revised legislative basis for the Audit Bureau and for the Internal Audit function in MOF and in MDAs laying the grounds for the reform of the system of internal control and internal audit; and v) the provision of additional staff for priority PFM areas and for capacity development in all system components remains a key challenge. (KPI-4.3.2)
EU support contributed to the strengthening of Public Finance Management (PFM) systems

**Introductory notes:**
Progress in the area of PFM is supported by the EU through a number of different interventions. Two key interventions take the form of SBS focusing specifically on Public Finance Sector Reform: Support to the Public Finance Reform Programme of 2007 (EUR 35.5 million in the form of Budget Support and a complementary envelope of EUR 7 million); and Support to the Public Financial Management Reform Programme of 2010, and Budget Efficiency Targets (EUR 75 million in the form of Budget Support and a complementary envelope of EUR 1 million).*

Other interventions then support these efforts either by providing additional Budget Support at sector level or by providing line ministries with the opportunity to access institutional capacity building support through the SAPPs in the form of twinings, TAs,....

* Addendum #2 of 2013 extended the scope of the SBS component adding the ‘Budget Efficiency Targets’ while at the same time further increasing the amount of funds to be provided in the form of SBS reaching a total of EUR 75 million (+1 million as complementary envelope) from an initial amount of EUR 44 million (+1 million as complementary envelope) then brought up to EUR 64 million (+1 million complementary envelope) with addendum #1.

**List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 4.4 (codes and definition)**

| KPI-4.4.1 | Overall quality of Budget Support (BS) Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) indicators on Public Finance Management (PFM) and links with changes identified in JC 04.3 (records of PFM reforms and system changes as presented in the BS reviews and assessments prior to tranche release) (HSPU indicator and sub-indicators) |
| KPI-4.4.2 | Quality of policy dialogue and links with changes identified in JC 4.3 (documentation reflecting the process and content of policy dialogue) (HSPU indicator and sub-indicators) |
| KPI-4.4.3 | Volume and timing of BS disbursements in relation to domestic funding of PFM reform programme (potential critical significance of flows) (% or HSPU indicator and possible sub-indicators) |
| KPI-4.4.4 | Overall quality of complementary capacity development activities (e.g. TA support) and links with changes identified in JC 4.3 (monitoring reports, annual reports, evaluations) (HSPU indicator and possible sub-indicators) |
| KPI-4.4.5 | Overall perceptions of MoF, EU and other donors’ representatives regarding the degree of influence of EU support to the strengthening of PFM systems through policy dialogue, PAFs, funds and complementary capacity building (HSPU indicator and sub-indicators) |
| KPI-4.4.6 | Overall perceptions of MoF, EU and other donors’ representatives regarding the degree of influence of other factors to the strengthening of PFM systems (other donors’ support, government ownership...) - (HSPU indicator and sub-indicators) |

**KPI-4.4.1:** Overall quality of Budget Support (BS) Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) indicators on Public Finance Management (PFM) and links with changes identified in JC 04.3 (records of PFM reforms and system changes as presented in the BS reviews and assessments prior to tranche release) (HSPU indicator and sub-indicators)

**Main Findings on KPI-4.4.1:**

Summing up, looking at the main areas tackled by the indicators included under the two programmes’ specific conditions, clear links can be established between main areas of PFM improvements as described under the previous JC and the specific conditions established defined in the framework of the programmes as triggers for disbursement.

As evidenced by the table below there is a strong link between the indicators included in the PAFs or conditions for disbursement and progress made in terms of implementation of PFM reforms.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reform areas tackled through the SBS PFM programmes</th>
<th>Specific issues tackled through the different conditions</th>
<th>Improvements registered as per JC 4.3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Improved management of tax collection &amp; B. Improved management of tax arrears</td>
<td>Income and Sales Taxes Tax Department – ISTD: automated system, staffing of unit, preparation of progress reports</td>
<td>The Income and Sales Tax Department (ISTD) has developed and monitored a media communications strategy since 2009. ISTD and the Customs Department offer user-friendly website access to comprehensive and updated information on tax legislation, forms, and administrative procedures. They also have taxpayer service centers and customs houses around Jordan. ISTD has an annual audit plan that is monitored with the Automatic Tracking System. A risk-based computer assisted system for selecting audit cases was developed, but there are still far too many cases selected for audit and thus the risk criteria is undermined. While the level of arrears is high and the debt collection ratio is low, there has been a substantial improvement in the availability of tax arrears data and the focus of the authorities on this problem since 2007 which resulted in two new directorates established at ISTD in 2009. Effectiveness of the transfer of tax collections to the Treasury is good, as commercial banks transfer tax collection to the Treasury Single Account daily. (see PEFA 2011, pp.11-12) Through new information technology systems and audit techniques, the ISTD identified about EUR 762 million of tax arrears. (EC 2013, Implementation of the ENP in 2012. Progress Report Jordan, p.10) Income and Sales Tax Department: the related specific conditions aimed at improving tax administration and, as a result, increase tax revenues. The conditions were satisfied and the compliance documentation provided. The installation of an automated system for managing taxpayer debt, i.e. current debt and arrears was completed, and the required documentation presented in Annex. Units to identify and pursue stop-filers and non-filers of tax returns were established in early 2009 and are properly resourced (with staff, computers, and budget). The compliance documentation is included in Annex 10. Monitoring EC Sector Budget Support for Public Finance Management Reform – Jordan. September 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Improved efficiency in planning, preparing, executing and controlling the budget</td>
<td>Gov Financial Management Information System in place (GFMIS)</td>
<td>Development of the Government Financial Management Information System (GFMIS) and its preliminary implementation in key ministries and departments. GFMIS has been particularly useful to the MoF Treasury Department to manage cash and to the Budget Department to build and maintain consolidated manpower tables used during the budget preparation process. An important upgrade in account recording and account reconciliations has occurred since the last assessment with the introduction of the GFMIS General Ledger and a standardized Chart of Accounts within the MoF. Treasury now has a more complete set of records that allows for more comprehensive and timely reporting. In addition, trust accounts that were previously held and managed by line agencies are now consolidated at the MoF Treasury Directorate in a single account at the Central Bank. Suspense accounts and advance accounts that in the past were large and varied have been greatly reduced in numbers and values. (see PEFA 2011, pp.12-13) The gradual implementation of GFMIS promises to greatly enhance the management of central government financial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D. Improved effectiveness of the Single Treasury Account (STA) – cash management</strong></td>
<td>** STA implemented on account of regional financial centres and ministries**</td>
<td><strong>Monthly financial reports</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>E. Medium Term Fiscal Frameworks established Improve Gov efficiency and effectiveness</strong></td>
<td><strong>Annual preparation of three-year macroeconomic frameworks (MTEFs)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Publication of gov annual data within 12 months from end of fiscal year</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F. Improved Fiscal Transparency and strengthen budget preparation and execution process</strong></td>
<td><strong>Publication of gov annual data within 12 months from end of fiscal year</strong></td>
<td><strong>Use of GFSM2001-compliant classification</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
for budget preparation, execution and reporting (2009 law) key tools which provide means for greater Parliament and citizen's scrutiny of Government operations. (see KPI-4.3.3)
The Ministry of Finance rolled out its new Government Financial Management Information System (GFMSIS), a financial and accounting system that automates many aspects of budget planning, execution, accounting, treasury operations, and reporting. All of these advances promise better control over public finances and more efficient and effective use of public resources.
The adoption of a new GFSM 2001 (Government Financial Management Information System) -compliant budget classification and chart of accounts, is identified as a main achievement in the IMF/World Bank report.
With regard to strengthened budget preparation and execution processes see info provided under point 2 of table that follows.

G. Enhanced Good Governance - Improve accountability and governance

| Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) staffed and operational | The government approved the Anti-Corruption Strategy 2013-2017 (06/2013). The strategy includes developing national anti-corruption legislation in accordance with international standards and strengthening the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC). The EU assisted with the drafting of the strategy through a twinning project, which also offered support to the ACC and other relevant agencies in other ways e.g. by providing training on investigation skills, asset recovery, mutual legal assistance and social media. On 22 December 2013, the Cabinet approved the amended law for the ACC, which extends its powers by allowing it to open branches throughout the Kingdom and to investigate corruption cases. (2014 ENP Jordan progress report) see KPI-4.71 |

2. Support to the Public Finance Management Reform Programme and Budget Efficiency Targets (FA 021-932)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reform areas tackled through the SBS PFM programmes</th>
<th>Specific issues tackled through the different conditions</th>
<th>Improvements registered as per JC 4.3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Improved cash flow management to support fiscal discipline</td>
<td>Cash-flow mechanism (also with TA from the IMF)</td>
<td>See info provided under point D of previous table.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Improved Fiscal Transparency and strengthen budget preparation and execution process</td>
<td>Preparation of 2011 General Budget, presentation of current expenditure expanded at the level of activities – necessary to allow for the effective implementation and follow-up of Results Oriented Budgeting (ROB)</td>
<td>The revised budget calendar approved in September 2009 also strengthened the link between strategic planning, budgeting and the medium-term framework by introducing the preparation of Budget Policies and Priorities Statements and Papers for the three-forthcoming years in the budget preparation calendar. A three-year rolling Macroeconomic and Fiscal Framework and Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks have been prepared since the budget for 2008 together with a basic results-oriented budgeting system. The link between multi-year estimates and subsequent setting of annual budget ceilings are clearly stated in the budget circular. Strategies for sectors representing well over 75 percent of primary expenditure exist, are fully costed, and consistent with national priorities and sectoral strategies. (PEFA 2011, p.11) Spending agencies prepare their budget according to the results-oriented budgeting concept, including their strategic plans. They also prepare a list of capital projects arranged by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ 4 Information Matrix</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Improved public debt management</strong></td>
<td>Explicit medium-term debt management strategy developed, published and under implementation to minimize medium- to long-term debt servicing costs and support internal debt market development along the lines of the June 2009 IMF/World Bank Strengthening Public Debt Management Report II</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| "- An explicit medium-term debt management strategy developed (domestic and external debt), approved and implemented."
| "- The Public Debt Department now issues a monthly calendar with minimum amounts of treasury bills and treasury bonds to be auctioned on pre-announced specific dates."
| "- Issued $750 million in Euro Bonds"
| "- Plans proceed for the issuance of Sukuk (Islamic bonds)"
| **5. Enhanced Government leadership in donor coordination** | Establishment and operationalisation of formal coordination mechanism on PFM |
| "The EU has supported MoPIC in the development of a new donor coordination mechanism called the *Jordan Aid Information Management System (JAIMS)*. This database intends to provide information on ongoing financial assistance, projects, and programs. JAIMS supports the goals of the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action and the *International Aid Transparency Initiative*, which promote transparency and accessibility of information to increase accountability, predictability, and effectiveness of aid and reduce transaction costs. (PEFA 2011, p.131)"
| Development partners played a lead role in promoting and developing the MTEF, for which the government received intensive technical assistance. There is a need to improve coordination among providers and to design a well-defined framework with identified tasks and a clear division of labor. (World Bank. Beyond the Annual Budget: Global experience with Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks (2013), Jordan Case Study p. 205). |
| **6. Improved public expenditure management and improved allocation of funds [improved allocation of resources in accordance to policy priorities]** | Submission of a Budget Policy and Priorities Paper (BPPP) to Cabinet at an earlier stage in the budget preparation in order to further streamline the budget preparation process with involvement of senior policy-makers at the outset → more efficient management of the budget cycle. BPPP and the Budget and Policy Briefs will be prepared for the largest Ministries |
| "In this respect, MoF and GBD prepared for the first time in 2010 a Budget Policy and Priorities Paper for 2011-2013, which established the basis of policies and priorities for the development of the forthcoming three-year budget proposal. (PEFA 2011)."
| Policy and budget priorities and Budget and Policy Briefs for the largest 5 Ministries for the 2014 Budget are presented for discussion to the Cabinet by end-March 2013. Assessment of the 4th tranche of the sector Budget Support entitled "Support to the Public Financial Management Reform Programme in Jordan". Final Report, November 2013 |
7. **Increased transparency and accountability in the use of public funds / Improve internal financial control systems in line Ministries**

Support a credible independence of the Audit Bureau (AB), as a Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) and responsible for external audit only and to support the capacity of Internal Control (IC) units in Ministries to perform internal control functions; three targets of this programme support these objectives (point 5 of the PAF)

- in the medium-term an amendment of AB law is prepared to reinforce the role of the AB and to ensure the independence of the AB as a Supreme Audit Institution according to international best practices

8. **Improved monitoring of tax collection and transparency**

Audit tracking System implemented (allows tracking of processing of tax declarations & collection at all stages; Sampling method for audit improved by using risk based sampling

- Monthly management reports
- Actionable debt raised up to 16%

9. **Improvement of monitoring and recording of tax arrears**

The Jordanian Audit Bureau is working on a law on the modernisation of public external audit, which, once adopted, would upgrade this body to the level of a supreme and independent audit institution. (ENP Jordan progress report of 2008)

- Twinning launched under the SAPP to strengthen the Capacities of the Audit Bureau of Jordan.
- The Audit Bureau and the MoF have engaged in a joint program to improve internal audit standards and functionality in the near term. (PEFA 2011, p.12)
- The Audit Bureau is on a trajectory for making substantial improvements in their role as the Supreme Audit Institution for Jordan. The current assessment shows a moderate improvement in their overall score but substantial improvement in some of the dimensions for external audit. They have set out an ambitious detailed action plan for gradual improvement, especially the withdrawal from ex-ante audits at the line agencies. (PEFA 2011, p.13)
- Concerning the reform of Internal financial control and audit, the Ministry of Finance and the Audit Bureau developed a multi-year training plan to reinforce internal control units and to complement Audit Bureau's plan to withdraw from internal control. This initiative followed the recommendation of the last year's progress report and continued to be supported by the EU under the Public Financial Management Programme launched in 2010. SIGMA (3SIGMA stands for “Support for Improvement in Governance and Management”, a joint initiative of the OECD and the EU, principally financed by the EU) missions supported the Audit Bureau in the implementation of its Strategic Plan 2011-2015. (ENP in 2012, Progress report Jordan, p.10)
- Specific condition linked to ‘Improve internal financial control systems in line Ministries - Internal Control Units in 10 lines Ministries and Departments are operational and according to by-laws and regulations.’ Indicated as partly realised (50%)
- Specific condition linked to ‘Strengthen AB role as SAI, and ensure more autonomy - Draft amendment of law approved by Cabinet and submitted to Parliament for approval Indicated as Not realised.

The ISTD’s [Income and Sales Tax Directorate] Action Plan for 2010–2014 focuses on raising its efficiency and increasing revenues by using risk-based auditing, fully implementing the audit tracking system to focus resources on high priority activities based on careful tracking and analysis of staff resources and work results, developing new sources of information to identify tax evaders, and broadening the tax base. (PEFA 2011, p.128)

- The Income and Sales Tax Department adopted new information systems and audit techniques including the new Audit Tracking System at the Large and Medium-Size Taxpayer Directorates. [...] (ENP 2011, Progress report Jordan, p.11)
- The Income and Sales Tax Department (ISTD) continued to modernise its tax management systems. Through new information technology systems and audit techniques, the ISTD identified about EUR 762 million of tax arrears. The next step should be to target the arrears through the justice system.
| 10. Improved public access to key fiscal information and transparency | Enhanced transparency of general budget preparation (published with understandable explanations) Citizen’s Guide to the budget developed and published General Supplies Dep. (GSD) publishes info on contracts Definition of Internal Audit, Internal & External Control better codified | See KPI-4.5.3 |

| 11. Improved corruption prevention | Amend the PPP law | So far the PPP agenda in Jordan has moved slowly which also resulted in the technical assistance focusing on providing a mix of training, legal and communications support, rather than working on PPP transactions. USAID’s TA for public private partnerships which should include one component to support the EPC is delayed and has not allowed for close coordination with the programme to be financed by USAID. IKRS (02/2010) covering 2010, p.9 |

| 12. Enhanced Domestic Revenue Mobilisation | Reform the income tax law with a view to progressively increase tax collection The new tax law must lower the exempted threshold thereby progressively broadening the tax base. Increase corporate taxes rates for some selected sectors of activity | With regard to the reform of the tax system, Jordan prepared a draft Income Tax Law changing the rate structure to become more progressive. The draft aims to exempt a larger number of lower income households from income taxes and to raise corporate taxes from banks, telecom and mining companies. (ENP in 2012, Progress report Jordan, p.10) Specific condition 19 “The government will reform the income tax law with a view to progressively increase tax collection. The new tax law must lower the exempted threshold thereby progressively broadening the tax base.” Indicated as Realised. Assessment of the 4th tranche of “Support to the Public Financial Management Reform Programme in Jordan”. Final Report, November 2013 |

| 13. Improve arrears payment discipline | Raise electricity tariffs or adopt other equivalent cost saving measures so as to reduce the losses of NEPCO and progressively reach the cost recovery target of 2017 & Set up a plan to address government arrears, with special focus/attention on addressing arrears to NEPCO | Specific condition 20 ‘Reduce the losses of NEPCO.’ Realised. The government will reform the income tax law with a view to progressively increase tax collection. The new tax law must lower the exempted threshold thereby progressively broadening the tax base”. Specific condition 21 'Improve arrears payment discipline - Set up a plan to address government arrears, with special focus/attention on addressing arrears to NEPCO.' Partly realised (30%), as no evidence of an arrears repayment plan for NEPCO was found. Assessment of the 4th tranche of "Support to the Public Financial Management Reform Programme in Jordan". Final Report, November 2013 |
KPI-4.4.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Please see below

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- IKRS (02/2010) covering 2010, p.9
- IKRS (Feb 2010), pp.16-18 in relation to the Public Finance Management Programme (019-214)

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- Please see below

KPI-4.4.1 (i) Data, figures and tables:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary of expected results and conditions set out in the Public Finance Management component of the Support to the Public Finance Reform Programme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Improved management of tax collection &amp; Improved management of tax arrears</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Improved efficiency in planning, preparing, executing and controlling the budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Improved effectiveness of the Single Treasury Account (STA) – cash management</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Medium Term Fiscal Frameworks established Improve Gov efficiency and effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Improved Fiscal Transparency and strengthen budget preparation and execution process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Enhanced Good Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Improve accountability and governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Income and Sales Taxes Tax Department – ISTD: automated system, staffing of unit, progress reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Gov Financial Management Information System in place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• STA implemented on account of regional financial centres and ministries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Annual preparation of three-year macroeconomic frameworks (MTEFs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Basic results-oriented Budgeting (ROB) framework implemented by budgetary agencies and Ministry of Health, Education, Social Dev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Publication of gov annual data within 12 months from end of fiscal year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Budget widely published</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Use of GFSM2001-compliant classification for budget preparation, execution and reporting (2009 law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) staffers and operational</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration based on the TAPs of FA 019-214 Support to the Public Finance Reform Programme (2007)

Budget Support:

Expected results of the Support to the Public Finance Management Reform Programme and Budget Efficiency Targets. The Budget Support component aims to support the stakeholders in implementing their strategic plans and operational action plans to reach at more efficient and effective PFM. It is expected to help (the GoJ) to secure the budgetary allocations required for the implementation of these operational action plans, according to their planned timetable. More specifically:

1. Improved cash flow management to support fiscal discipline  | Cash-flow mechanism (also with TA from the IMF)
2. Improved General Budget Preparation                        | Preparation of 2011 General Budget, presentation of current expenditure expanded at the level of activities – necessary to allow for the effective implementation and follow-up of Results Oriented Budgeting (ROB)
3. Improved public debt management                            | Explicit medium-term debt management strategy developed, published and under implementation to minimize medium- to long-term debt servicing costs and support internal debt market development along the lines of the June 2009 IMF/World Bank Strengthening Public Debt Management Report II
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Enhanced Government leadership in donor coordination</th>
<th>Establishment and operationalisation of formal coordination mechanism on PFM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Improved public expenditure management and improved allocation of funds [improved allocation of resources in accordance to policy priorities]</td>
<td>Submission of a Budget Policy and Priorities Paper (BPPP) to Cabinet at an earlier stage in the budget preparation in order to further streamline the budget preparation process with involvement of senior policy-makers at the outset → more efficient management of the budget cycle. BPPP and the Budget and Policy Briefs will be prepared for the largest Ministries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Increased transparency and accountability in the use of public funds / Improve internal financial control systems in line Ministries</td>
<td>Support a credible independence of the Audit Bureau (AB), as a Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) and responsible for external audit only and to support the capacity of Internal Control (IC) units in Ministries to perform internal control functions; three targets of this programme support these objectives (point 5 of the PAF) in the medium-term an amendment of AB law is prepared to reinforce the role of the AB and to ensure the independence of the AB as a Supreme Audit Institution according to international best practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Improved monitoring of tax collection and transparency</td>
<td>Audit tracking System implemented (allows tracking of processing of tax declarations &amp; collection at all stages; Sampling method for audit improved by using risk based sampling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Improvement of monitoring and recording of tax arrears</td>
<td>Monthly management reports Actionable debt raised up to 16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Improved public access to key fiscal information and transparency</td>
<td>Enhanced transparency of general budget preparation (published with understandable explanations) Citizen’s Guide to the budget developed and published General Supplies Dep. (GSD) publishes info on contracts Definition of Internal Audit, Internal &amp; External Control better codified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Improved corruption prevention</td>
<td>Amend the PPP law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Enhanced Domestic Revenue Mobilisation</td>
<td>Reform the income tax law with a view to progressively increase tax collection The new tax law must lower the exempted threshold thereby progressively broadening the tax base. Increase corporate taxes rates for some selected sectors of activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Reduce the losses of NEPCO</td>
<td>Raise electricity tariffs or adopt other equivalent cost saving measures so as to reduce the losses of NEPCO and progressively reach the cost recovery target of 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Improve arrears payment discipline</td>
<td>Set up a plan to address government arrears, with special focus/attention on addressing arrears to NEPCO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own elaboration based on Addendum II to the TAPs of FA 021-932 Support to the Public Finance Management Reform Programme and Budget Efficiency Targets (2013). The areas indicated in cursive have been added through the 2013 addendum.
### KPI-4.4.1 (iii) Additional information from field phase


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions of PFM system where key weaknesses have been identified</th>
<th>Baseline: Key specific weaknesses (acc. to PEFA) 2009</th>
<th>Short term reform expectations as set out at formulation stage¹ 2010</th>
<th>Progress to be monitored during the lifetime of the current Budget Support programme</th>
<th>Evolution since formulation: June 30 2013</th>
<th>Medium term objectives of the PFM reform programme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Improve Debt Management (MOF)</td>
<td>There is no medium term debt management strategy, no debt issue calendar</td>
<td>Preparation to formulate the strategy</td>
<td>- An explicit medium-term debt management strategy developed (domestic and external debt), approved and implemented.</td>
<td>The Public Debt Department issues a monthly calendar with minimum amounts of treasury bills and treasury bonds to be auctioned on pre-announced specific dates.</td>
<td>The Public Debt Department issues a monthly calendar with minimum amounts of treasury bills and treasury bonds to be auctioned on pre-announced specific dates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Strengthening macroeconomic analysis and linking to fiscal policy and the budget.</td>
<td>The deviations between actual and forecasts of in key macroeconomic variables was too high</td>
<td>Create a new model that improves forecast accuracy and provides macroeconomic forecast on a quarterly basis.</td>
<td>- New model developed; calibrated and implemented using three scenarios and sensitivity analyses for the forecast period.</td>
<td>Improved ability to model and assess the impacts on the economy of proposed policy alternatives.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Comprehensiveness and transparency of the budget</td>
<td>No big targets on comprehensiveness. Targets pertaining to transparency which were met</td>
<td>No big targets on comprehensiveness. Targets pertaining to transparency which were met – Budget in Brief and Children’s Budget</td>
<td>- Budget in Brief and Citizen’s Budget prepared for all fiscal years beginning with 2012 budget.</td>
<td>Budget by governorate prepared and distributed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Budget Calendar Revision (GBD, MOF)</td>
<td>Prepare budget calendar and submit it to cabinet to get approval</td>
<td>Announce the calendar for development of 2011+ budgets for all MDAs (including GU’s) and begin implementation it for preparation of 2011 budget</td>
<td>- New budget calendar implemented for 2013 fiscal year budget for all MDAs and GUs.</td>
<td>Calendar further refined as experience dictates.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Budget policy &amp; priority statement Initiative (MOF and GBD)</td>
<td>There was no such a statement to be submitted to the Cabinet in March</td>
<td>Develop Budget Policy &amp; Priorities Paper draft (incl. MTEF) for 2011 budget for Cabinet discussion until end March</td>
<td>- Prepared the Budget Priorities and Policies Paper 2014-2016, MTEF’s summary of the 2014 budgets for the largest five ministries for the fiscal year 2014.</td>
<td>Prepare Annual Budget Policy &amp; Priorities Statement for Cabinet by end March. All ministries develop budget &amp; policy briefs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ This refers to the PFM Overarching Strategy 2010-2013.
KPI-4.4.2: Quality of policy dialogue and links with changes identified in JC 4.3 (documentation reflecting the process and content of policy dialogue) (HSPU indicator and sub-indicators)

Main Findings on KPI-4.4.2:

There is multiple evidence that indicators selected as disbursement triggers (especially in relation to the second PFM SBS programme - i.e. the Support to the Public Finance Management Reform Programme of 2010 and later amendments) have been defined not only on the basis of Government plans for PFM reform but also as the result of extensive consultations and dialogue between the EU and MoF. This was confirmed both through supplementary analysis of documentary evidence and through interviews undertaken during the field phase. In particular it is emphasised that “In the area of Public Financial Management, serious and sustained efforts are underway to modernise and strengthen all parts of the PFM system, in particular through a sustained dialogue with international financial institutions and donors including the EU. The specific conditions defined under the current EU Sector Budget Support to Public Finance Reform closely match the issues identified through that dialogue. (Delegation Assessment, Payment request 3rd tranche “Support to the Public Financial Management Reform Programme”, ENPI/2010/021-932, p.6 with similar text found in other assessments for tranche release).

KPI-4.4.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:

- /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:

- Checklist oQSG2lor action fiche 019-214 Support to the Public Finance Reform Programme, p.2
- Addendum II to TAPs 021-932 Support to the Public Finance Management Reform Programme and Budget Efficiency Targets (2013), pp.7, 15, 18

(iii) Additional information from field phase:

- Delegation Assessment, Payment request 1st tranche "Support to the Public Financial Management Reform Programme", ENPI/2010/021-932, p.11
- Delegation Assessment, Payment request 3rd tranche "Support to the Public Financial Management Reform Programme", ENPI/2010/021-932, p.6
- PFM Annual Monitoring Report Jordan 2013, Assessing Public Financial Management Eligibility,
- EU Delegation to Jordan, 31 October 2013, pp.8-9 & 37
- EU – Jordan Government dialogue

KPI-4.4.3: Volume and timing of BS disbursements in relation to domestic funding of PFM reform programme (potential critical significance of flows) (% or HSPU indicator and possible sub-indicators)

Main Findings on KPI-4.4.3:

Throughout the period covered by the evaluation, the EU has allocated just shy of EUR 115 million to be transferred to the Treasury of the GoHKoJ to support the government in the implementation of its Public Financial Management Reform programme. Of these, EUR 93.1 million have already been transferred. Calculations made by the team highlight that funds disbursed by the EU in the framework of PFM programmes over the period 2008-2013 amount to:

- 0.63% of total expenditures over the period 2008-2013 of chapters (i.e. Ministries / Departments) involved in PFM reform efforts;
- 8.94% of total capital expenditures over the period 2008-2013 of chapters (i.e. Ministries / Departments) involved in PFM reform efforts; and up to
- 18.48% of total expenditures for selected programmes of PFM related chapters over the period 2008-2013*.

*For the Audit Bureau, the General Budget Dept and the Income and Sales Tax Dept. the entire budget figures were included, for the MoF instead only two programmes were considered as relevant to public finance reform efforts and these are 'Administration and Support Services' and 'Financial Management
Development’, all other expenditures related to pension payments, public debt payments, social safety net and goods subsidies, and support spending for Defence Services Affairs, Supporting Housing Services and Developing Society etc., were excluded.

A detailed costing exercise conducted by the EUD in the framework of the forthcoming “Support to public finance and public administration reforms” programme concluded that “The total cost over three years to undertake the activities of the two public finance and public administration reforms are estimated at JD 155,180,000 (EUR 159,059,500). That is an average cost per year of JD 51,726,666 (EUR 53,019,833). The EU Budget Support (of EUR 40 million) component would cover 25% of the total cost”.

KPI-4.4.3 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Please see below

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- IKRS (Feb 2010), pp.16-18 in relation to the Public Finance Management Programme (019-214)

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- Programme Title/Number: Support to public finance and public administration reforms, CRIS number: 2014/033-664 - COSTING OF THE REFORMS, document provided by the EUD during the field mission, pp. 1 & 4
- Please see below

KPI-4.4.3 (i) Data, figures and tables:
Disbursement schedule of the two SBS programmes (amounts and dates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total inputs</th>
<th>Complementary support</th>
<th>Financial inputs</th>
<th>Tranches</th>
<th>Amounts</th>
<th>Disbursement schedule</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support to the Public Finance Reform Programme, 2007-2011, Addendums taken into account</td>
<td>€ 42.5 M</td>
<td>€ 2.75 M (€ 0.62 M for audits, M&amp;E &amp; contingencies)</td>
<td>€ 39.75 M</td>
<td>Tranche I Fixed € 15 M € 15 M 12/2008</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tranche III Fixed € 10.25 M € 9.51 M 12/2010</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tranche IV Fixed € 4.25 M € 4.25 M 11/2012</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>TOTAL € 39.75 M € 39.01 M</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| Support to the Public Financial Management Reform Programme (and Budget Efficiency Targets), 2010-2014, Addendums taken into account | € 76 M | € 1 M (€ 0.4 M for technical cooperation) | € 75 M | Tranche I Fixed € 19 M € 9.925 M 12/2010 |
| | | | | Tranche II Variable € 27 M € 20 M 12/2011 |
| | | | | Tranche III Variable € 9.5 M |
| | | | | Tranche IV Variable € 19.5 M |
| | | | TOTAL € 75 M € 54 M as of 10/2013 |

KPI-4.4.3 (iii) Additional information from field phase
### Expenditures for selected chapters by program for the years 2008 - 2013, €

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>401 Audit Bureau</td>
<td>1,800,638</td>
<td>2,400,417</td>
<td>2,136,911</td>
<td>2,822,233</td>
<td>3,415,813</td>
<td>3,618,552</td>
<td>16,282,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0701 Administration and Support Services</td>
<td>1,800,638</td>
<td>2,400,417</td>
<td>2,136,911</td>
<td>2,822,233</td>
<td>3,415,813</td>
<td>3,618,552</td>
<td>16,282,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0705 Field Monitoring</td>
<td>3,292,950</td>
<td>4,420,093</td>
<td>4,711,463</td>
<td>4,788,020</td>
<td>5,496,659</td>
<td>5,375,758</td>
<td>28,092,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>5,172,589</td>
<td>6,830,510</td>
<td>6,842,374</td>
<td>7,610,253</td>
<td>8,912,665</td>
<td>8,994,109</td>
<td>44,374,591</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Ministry of Finance

| 2201 Administration and Support Services | 11,471,752 | 69,940,729 | 13,101,471 | 11,142,726 | 13,151,232 | 15,654,120 | 141,963,111 |
| 2205 General Expenditure               | 114,501,265 | 190,019,105 | 144,730,467 | 104,917,895 | 84,555,833 | 60,204,180 | 658,513,716 |
| 2210 Public Debt Interest              | 361,016,213 | 424,381,124 | 420,804,678 | 453,912,291 | 637,912,682 | 349,000,000 | 2,127,421,084 |
| 2220 Emergency Expenditures           | 63,532,644 | 53,767,348 | 10,969,670 | 11,191,173 | 15,900,000 | 315,375,734 |
| 2225 Social Safety Net and Goods Subsidies | 493,007,593 | 200,015,475 | 203,910,043 | 809,843,229 | 1,093,380,112 | 524,700,000 | 3,354,334,052 |
| 2230 Pension and Compensation         | 627,147,261 | 758,223,690 | 785,103,073 | 870,594,414 | 1,074,920,096 | 1,123,650,000 | 5,252,058,423 |
| 2235 Public Affairs                   | 3,296,553 | 4,432,205 | 4,544,770 | 5,529,388 | 5,225,049 | 7,276,900 | 29,297,737 |
| 2240 Supporting Defence Services Affairs | 2,394,750 | 1,058,400 | 1,313,130 | 1,116,938 | 1,060,000 | 6,942,354 |
| 2245 Supporting Housing Services & Developing Society | 59,301,000 | 104,315,788 | 77,228,375 | 66,761,335 | 141,217,713 | 42,453,000 | 244,781,831 |
| 2250 Supporting Health Affairs        | 14,687,799 | 36,090,206 | 2,116,800 | 50,505,000 | 14,990,540 | 11,931,360 | 130,329,726 |
| 2255 Supporting Media, Religious and Cultural Affairs | 72,950,790 | 67,203,785 | 75,171,506 | 76,185,342 | 81,125,421 | 80,889,860 | 438,417,883 |
| 2260 Supporting Education and Training Affairs | 7,992,191 | 9,090,050 | 5,802,080 | 7,323,225 | 4,906,853 | 4,654,000 | 40,453,859 |
| 2265 Supporting Economical Affairs    | 67,603,705 | 59,615,048 | 60,620,548 | 108,015,471 | 32,932,229 | 27,876,540 | 366,759,041 |
| 2270 Supporting Society Protection Affairs | 16,523,775 | 6,510,000 | 11,133,300 | 8,175,090 | 4,812,053 | 5,625,000 | 53,580,116 |
| 2275 Financial Management Development | 4,759,500 | 5,868,118 | 2,646,000 | 1,718,356 | 1,376,243 | 1,500,000 | 17,868,317 |
| 2280 Governance Development           | - | - | - | - | - | 25,265,600 | 27,365,000 | 67,881,340 | 120,468,840 |
| **TOTAL**                            | 1,090,613,578 | 1,213,621,159 | 1,834,553,559 | 2,091,339,558 | 3,083,530,012 | 2,878,901,769 | 14,463,959,850 |

**Ministry of Financial General Budget Department**

| 2301 Administration and Support Services | 889,354 | 1,140,308 | 1,101,920 | 1,101,637 | 1,075,576 | 1,178,720 | 6,490,915 |
| 2305 Developing the Budget Methodology  | 833,058 | 935,135 | 923,118 | 905,662 | 927,872 | 1,010,180 | 5,935,025 |
| **TOTAL**                                | 1,722,411 | 2,081,443 | 2,025,039 | 2,087,409 | 2,002,458 | 2,189,603 | 12,425,940 |

**Ministry of Finance Income and Sales Tax Dept**

| 2701 Administration and Support Services | 4,074,150 | 5,962,501 | 5,758,686 | 6,103,631 | 6,881,831 | 7,165,840 | 36,545,359 |
| 2705 Large and Medium Taxpayers Assessment and Audit | 19,443,679 | 34,674,648 | 43,242,680 | 20,842,204 | 22,485,856 | 22,779,400 | 163,433,486 |
| 2710 Individuals & Small Taxpayers Assessment and Audit | 12,229,242 | 12,045,224 | 15,088,169 | 14,056,719 | 16,085,768 | 15,878,380 | 87,364,991 |
| **TOTAL**                                | 35,728,070 | 52,686,393 | 65,488,960 | 65,003,955 | 45,434,476 | 47,426,529 | 287,360,077 |

**Own calculations based on data provided by the General Budget Department**

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**EQ-4 Information Matrix**

February 2015 – GFA-led Consortium

Page 237
Overall disbursements for PFM SBS programmes over the period 2008-2013: **93,092,857 €**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Amounts</th>
<th>% covered by SBS funds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total expenditures of PFM related chapters 2008-2013</td>
<td>14,807,734,168</td>
<td>0.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total capital expenditures of PFM related chapters 2008-2013</td>
<td>1,323,653,042</td>
<td>8.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total expenditures for selected programmes of PFM related chapters 2008-2013*</td>
<td>503,716,036</td>
<td>18.48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*That is all programmes for the Audit Bureau, the General Budget Dept and the Income and Sales Tax Dept, but only selected programmes for the MoF (i.e. Administration and Support Services and Financial Management Development, with the exclusion of other programmes such as Public debt interests, Emergency expenditures, Social safety net and goods subsidies, Pensions and compensations, Supporting Defence Services Affairs, Supporting Housing Services and Developing Society, General expenditures and other support spending).

**KPI-4.4.4:** Overall quality of complementary capacity development activities (e.g. TA support) and links with changes identified in JC 4.3 (monitoring reports, annual reports, evaluations) (HSPU indicator and possible sub-indicators)

Main Findings on KPI-4.4.4:

Jordan’s PFM reform efforts have attracted significant donor support from both multilateral and bilateral sources including the EU, GIZ, IMF, USAID and the World Bank.

Key areas of support provided by donors, include:

- IMF: support to the macro-fiscal unit, as well as on treasury and cash management issues;
- The World Bank: support to a variety of public sector reform initiatives, ranging from a joint expenditure review with the government to assistance developing capacities for macro-fiscal modeling in the MoF, support for the introduction of a Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and policy driven budget process.
- USAID: strong involvement in PFM reform (USD 40 million project primarily targeting PFM issues) with focus on budget reforms—including results oriented budgeting—and implementing a Government Financial Management Information System (GFMS).
- GTZ long term involvement in the PFM reform area focusing particularly on budget issues,
- EU: Internal control issues in addition to the previously mentioned support provided through SBS to sustainable economic growth and fiscal consolidation, as well as various sectoral reforms.

The largest PFM programmes (in terms of value) are the EU Budget Support programmes centred on PFM and the Fiscal Reform Project II, supported by USAID; with the overall amount of external grants provided for PFM and captured in the budget for the period 2008-2014 amount to USD 152,459 million (loans and smaller-scale support such as SIGMA are thus not included). Smaller-level support, managed by the donors themselves, are not captured (e.g. SIGMA). Source: ECFIN 2013, pp.81-82

Coordination among donors on PFM issues has been strong with efforts to align each other’s programmes with a view to develop synergies on the ground. While this is primarily the result of donor efforts rather than of a government-led process, donors’ assistance has consistently focused on the highest government priority needs through regular communications with key government departments (GBD, ISTD and MOF) with good results.

**KPI-4.4.4 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:

- ./.

(ii) Key extracts from documents:

- Repeat Public Financial Management Assessment following the PEFA Methodology (2011), p.128
- World Bank. Beyond the Annual Budget: Global experience with Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks, 2013, Jordan Case Study pp. 203-204
KPI-4.4.5: Overall perceptions of MoF, EU and other donors’ representatives regarding the degree of influence of EU support to the strengthening of PFM systems through policy dialogue, PAFs, funds and complementary capacity building (HSPU indicator and sub-indicators)

Main Findings on KPI-4.4.5:

While the ECFIN Report (2013, p. 80) concludes that “progress [in the PFM area] is only imperfectly related to areas where there is technical support, reflecting that local reform efforts are geared relatively more towards government’s priorities rather than those of donors, there is widespread recognition among both donors and government representatives that support provided by the EU (primarily in the form of BS but also through twinnings and SIGMA) has played a pivotal role in pushing forward reforms. This is particularly true for areas such as: i) internal control mechanisms / internal audit; ii) publication of final accounts (now available online) thereby providing an contribution in terms of transparency; iii) cash management system and STA; iv) Income, sales and tax dep; v) Chart of accounts; and vi) budget classification.

According to interviewees, it is the whole BS package (dialogue, conditionalities, financial resources) and its coordination / complementarity with other support and TA carried out by GIZ, USAID and others that has been instrumental. As stated by one of the interviewees “BS has acted as a catalyzer of efforts and has tipped the balance by providing an incentive, giving a sense of urgency that has facilitated the implementation of reforms / new procedures or systems to be introduced”.

For example with reference to Internal control mechanisms: the EU launched the idea of pursuing reform efforts in this area by including conditionalities linked to the strengthening of internal control mechanisms. Initial resistance from Gov but then other donors joined the EU in pushing forward the concept. Through SIGMA missions, TA provided by GIZ and USAID dialogue was started. TA was then provided for the identification of measures and these were then formalized in the FAs. Subsequent TA supported the Gov in meeting the conditionalities. USAID TA happy that a number of conditionalities were included within the FAs ensured additional efforts by the government in pushing forward the reform. On debt management same process but it then got stuck after the Arab Spring, loss of interest by the Gov.

KPI-4.4.5 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - /-

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
KPI-4.6: Overall perceptions of MoF, EU and other donors’ representatives regarding the degree of influence of other factors to the strengthening of PFM systems (other donors’ support, government ownership,...) - (HSPU indicator and sub-indicators)

Main Findings on KPI-4.6:

See preceding indicator KPI-4.4.5

KPI-4.6 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - See preceding indicator KPI-4.4.5

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
   - See evidence presented under indicator KPI-4.4.5

JC-4.4: EU support contributed to the strengthening of Public Finance Management (PFM) systems

Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-4.4 (based on the KPIs main findings)

Progress in the area of PFM is strongly supported by the EU through a number of different interventions. Two key interventions take the form of SBS focusing specifically on Public Finance Sector Reform. These are: (i) the Support to the Public Finance Reform Programme of 2007 (EUR 35.5 million in the form of Budget Support and a complementary envelope of EUR 7 million); and (ii) the Support to the Public Financial Management Reform Programme of 2010, and Budget Efficiency Targets (EUR 75 million in the form of Budget Support and a complementary envelope of EUR 1 million)\(^1\). Other EU-funded interventions further support these efforts either by providing additional Budget Support at sector level or by providing line ministries with the opportunity to access institutional capacity building support through the SAPPs in the form of twinnings, TAs (see also JC 4.1).

More specifically, throughout the period covered by the evaluation, the EU has allocated just shy of EUR 115 million to be transferred to the Treasury of the GoHKoJ to support the government in the implementation of its Public Financial Management Reform programme, of which EUR 93 million have been already transferred; and has supported capacity development through twinning and others modalities.

Calculations made by the team on the basis of data provided by the General Budget Department, allow to conclude that funds disbursed by the EU in the framework of PFM programmes over the period 2008-2013 covered approximately 18.5% of the total expenditures related to specific PFM reform efforts undertaken by concerned institutions, i.e. the Audit Bureau, the General Budget Dept and the Income and Sales Tax Dept. and the Ministry of Finance. (See KPI-4.4.3).

In addition documentary reviews and interviews point to:

- a strong link between the main areas for reform tackled by the indicators included under the two programmes’ specific conditions and progress made in terms of implementation of PFM reforms. (See KPI-4.4.1).
- The importance of ongoing government efforts to modernise and strengthen all parts of the PFM system, in particular through a sustained dialogue with international financial institutions and donors including the EU; (see KPI-4.4.2)
- A pivotal role of the support provided by the EU (primarily in the form of BS but also through twinnings and SIGMA) in pushing forward reforms, in particular in areas such as: i) internal control mechanisms / internal audit; ii) publication of final accounts (now available on line) thereby providing

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\(^1\) Addendum #2 of 2013 extended the scope of the SBS component adding the ‘Budget Efficiency Targets’ while at the same time further increasing the amount of funds to be provided in the form of SBS reaching a total of EUR 75 M (+1M as complementary envelope) from an initial amount of EUR 44 million (+1 million as complementary envelope) then brought up to EUR 64 million (+1M complementary envelope) with addendum #1.
an contribution in terms of transparency; iii) cash management system and STA; iv) Income, sales
and tax dep; v) Chart of accounts; and vi) budget classification.

Summing up, while the ECFIN Report (2013, p. 80) concludes that "progress [in the PFM area] is only
imperfectly related to areas where there is technical support, reflecting that local reform efforts are geared
relatively more towards government’s priorities rather than those of donors, it is also widely recognised that
in a number of areas, the whole BS package (dialogue, conditionalities, financial resources) coupled with
strong government ownership and its coordination / complementarity with other support and TA carried out by
GIZ, USAID and others has been instrumental in supporting reform efforts. As stated by one of the
interviewees "BS has acted as a catalyzer of efforts and has tipped the balance by providing an incentive,
giving a sense of urgency that has facilitated the implementation of reforms / new procedures or systems to
be introduced". (KPI-4.4.5).

**JC-4.5**
EU support contributed to policy reform implementation through the use of the budget as a policy
instrument

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPI-4.5.1</th>
<th>Level of improvements in policy-based budgeting (PEFA indicators PI 11 – 12)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| KPI-4.5.2 | Extent to which the evolution in budget allocations and/or public spending better reflects
government priorities (HSPU indicator) |
| KPI-4.5.3 | Level of improvement of democratic accountability and transparency of budgeting (relevant
PEFA indicators, ranking and scores of Open Budget Index) - (% or HSPU indicator and sub-
indicators) |
| KPI-4.5.4 | Level of evidence that financing made available through BS has contributed to closing the gap of
the sectors’ medium term financing plans (e.g. volume and share of EU's contribution to the
financing of reforms in key sectors benefiting from EU BS) / Level of evidence of increased
sectors expenditure in supported sectors (see also focal sectors KPIs concerned) |
| KPI-4.5.5 | Overall perceptions of MoF, concerned sector ministries, EU and other donors’ representatives
regarding the degree of influence of BS on sector policies implementation / spending |

**KPI-4.5.1:** Level of improvements in policy-based budgeting (PEFA indicators PI 11 – 12)

Main Findings on KPI-4.5.1:

Scores of the PEFA repeat assessment of 2011 report a strong improvement when looking at the provision
of a ‘multi-year perspective in fiscal planning, expenditure policy and budgeting’: (i) fully costed strategies
consistent with national priorities have been prepared as of 2008; (ii) again since 2008 all Ministries,
Departments and Agencies (MDAs) have started to prepare sector strategies that
need to be consistent with
priorities included in the National Agenda 2006-2015.

Improvements are also recorded by other reports such as the one produced by ECFIN in 2013, according to
which the budget calendar introduced in 2008 strengthened the link between strategic planning, budgeting
and the medium-term framework through introducing a Budget Policies and Priorities Paper [in 2010] for the
three-forthcoming years, a three-year rolling Macroeconomic and Fiscal Framework, a Medium-Term
Expenditure Framework, and more generally, a results-oriented budgeting system (p. 17).

On the other hand, the ‘orderliness and participation in the annual budget process’ (P-11) – the other
indicator developed to measure status and improvements in policy-based budgeting – records a
deterioration; deterioration which however can be attributed to differences in scoring methods or
interpretation. In fact, significant improvements have been recorded in relation to the budget preparation
calendar since 2007. The adoption of “a revised calendar approved in end-2009 brought forward the
beginning of the process from May to end-January and has allowed more time for strategic analysis of
forward expenditure requirements and priorities prior to issuing the budget circular. In this respect, MoF and
GBD prepared for the first time in 2010 a Budget Policy and Priorities Paper for 2011-2013, which

established the basis of policies and priorities for the development of the forthcoming three-year budget proposal.” In addition the 2010 budget circular provided a set of annexes to each MDA providing ceilings on current and capital expenditure for 2011-2013 that are consistent with a macroeconomic framework, a MTFF, and MTEFs. The budget circular is also more comprehensive. (PEFA repeat assessment, 2011).

Finally, despite significant improvements, a number of challenges are yet to be tackled with a view to consider the budget planning entirely efficient. Improvements are needed in the preparation methodology for the General Budget and the Budget of Government Units and in the analytical aspects through reviewing expenditures of all sectors; and the deepening of the implementation of results-oriented budgeting is to be pursued by improving: i) the allocation of budget resources in accordance with policy priorities, ii) the link between programmes and specific goals, iii) the link between strategic needs and ceilings and between domestic development and national and capital expenditure priorities; and iv) accountability for performance).

KPI-4.5.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Repeat Public Financial Management Assessment following the PEFA Methodology (2011), p.18
- Repeat Public Financial Management Assessment following the PEFA Methodology (2011), p.19

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Repeat Public Financial Management Assessment following the PEFA Methodology (2011), p.11
- Budget Preparation Calendar for the 2011 Budget Law as approved in Sep 2009 (p.65)
- Dates of Enactment of General Budget Laws (p.67)
- Performance change and other factors since 2007 PEFA assessment

(iii) Additional information from field phase:

KPI-4.5.2: Extent to which the evolution in budget allocations and/or public spending better reflects government priorities (HSPU indicator)

Main Findings on KPI-4.5.2:

While there is no doubt that throughout the period considered, the Government has implemented a number of important financial management reforms which promote the use of a country-wide system of ‘results-oriented budgeting’ thus promoting linkages between public spending and public policy goals, a number of key weaknesses still undermine effective budgeting processes, particularly in terms of linking budgetary allocations to the achievement of strategic policy objectives. Weaknesses in this respect are also highlighted in the Audit Bureau’s 2011 Annual report which concluded that “current plans examined in the audit do not link well to the National Plan and related government strategic priorities” and flagged the importance of improvements with regard to strategic planning1.

Overall figures related to government expenditures by chapter (Ministry / Institution) for the period 2008-2013 do not allow identifying consistent significant shifts across the period (neither when looking at trends in overall expenditures by chapter nor when looking at trends in capital expenditures). Looking at the sectors of particular relevance in relation to EU support, some changes can however be witnessed as highlighted below. These point among others to an increase in relative terms of expenditures for: i) the Ministry of Transport in the years 2010 and 2011; ii) the Ministry of Education in the period 2010-2013 (above 10% of overall government expenditures); iii) the Audit Bureau and the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research in the last years considered (i.e. respectively 2012-2013 and 2011-2013). That said, as highlighted by the Public Expenditures Perspectives report (USAID, 2011) “Capital spending tends to be considered as a residual in public expenditure policy making, based on available ‘fiscal space’.” (p. 15)

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Source: own calculations based on data provided by the General Budget Department

The analysis undertaken however does not allow identifying the underlying causes of these shifts.

As of 2008, all Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDA) have started to prepare sector strategies that need to be consistent with priorities included in the national strategies of the National Agenda 2006-2015 and the Kulluna Al Urdon initiative (We are all Jordan) of 2006. Strategies which are also in line with the results-oriented budgeting framework adopted in Jordan since 2008 that include key performance indicators for programs thereby strengthening the relationship between planning and spending according to sectoral priorities. (p. 70 PEFA 2011)

Within sectors, the priority and quality of capital expenditure are determined to a large extent by each MDA. During the 2011 budget preparation, a special effort was made in reviewing and finalizing the capital spending program to ensure consistency with the 2011-2013 Executive Development Program on capital expenditure that was being prepared by a Steering Committee chaired by MoPIC. Sectoral ministerial committees were formed to review new capital projects with the aim of ensuring priorities at sector level and reviewing costing implications.

The basic requirements are in place for an effective capital budgeting system that ensures that most capital projects undertaken within the budget are broadly in line with national and sector needs and priorities. Capital projects are prioritized considering priorities set up in the National Agenda, the Executive Development Program, internal MDAs planning committees, and central agency review of capital proposals involving GBD, MoF and MoPIC in consultation with the submitting line agency. However, forward budgeting of capital expenditure is determined as a residual after allowing for current expenditure and an agreed acceptable deficit balance. Thus, new capital projects or even continuous projects are largely constrained despite any priority in the national strategic framework. (p. 71 PEFA 2011).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>0.77%</td>
<td>0.88%</td>
<td>0.82%</td>
<td>0.75%</td>
<td>0.73%</td>
<td>0.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supreme Judge Department</td>
<td>0.16%</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
<td>0.21%</td>
<td>0.21%</td>
<td>0.17%</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ombudsman Bureau</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Transport</td>
<td>0.44%</td>
<td>0.27%</td>
<td>1.03%</td>
<td>1.40%</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
<td>0.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Industry and Trade</td>
<td>0.17%</td>
<td>0.19%</td>
<td>0.26%</td>
<td>0.22%</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
<td>0.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources</td>
<td>0.16%</td>
<td>0.23%</td>
<td>0.33%</td>
<td>0.32%</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
<td>0.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>9.67%</td>
<td>9.27%</td>
<td>10.36%</td>
<td>10.14%</td>
<td>11.03%</td>
<td>11.92%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research</td>
<td>0.46%</td>
<td>0.35%</td>
<td>0.34%</td>
<td>0.36%</td>
<td>0.84%</td>
<td>1.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Labour</td>
<td>0.26%</td>
<td>0.31%</td>
<td>0.27%</td>
<td>0.22%</td>
<td>0.21%</td>
<td>0.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit Bureau</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
<td>0.11%</td>
<td>0.11%</td>
<td>0.12%</td>
<td>0.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td>Overall Expenditure 2008-2013 (€)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1501 Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>1,909,613,579 - 2,143,621,196</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>001 Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>923,380,779 - 1,000,417,225</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2501 Ministry of Education</td>
<td>690,171,243 - 758,503,865</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1003 Ministry of Interior/Public Security</td>
<td>377,780,434 - 424,055,765</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2701 Ministry of Health</td>
<td>321,692,165 - 386,874,975</td>
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<tr>
<td>2191 Ministry of Public Works and Housing</td>
<td>126,985,169 - 169,543,087</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>002 Royal Medical Services</td>
<td>667,540,000 - 1,002,686,400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1001 Ministry of Municipal Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>1506 Ministry of Finance/Income and Sales Tax Department</td>
<td>35,278,070 - 52,066,396</td>
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<td>3101 Ministry of Transport</td>
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<tr>
<td>1301 Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>101 Royal Hashemite Court</td>
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<td>301 Prime Ministry</td>
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<td>2801 Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources</td>
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<td>1503 Ministry of Finance/Customs Department</td>
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<td>1001 Ministry of Interior</td>
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<td>2193 Ministry of Public Works and Housing/Government Buildings</td>
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<td>3201 Ministry of Information and Telecommunications</td>
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<td>2901 Ministry of Labour</td>
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<td>201 Parliament</td>
<td>13,353,058 - 13,164,876</td>
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<td>1504 Ministry of Finance/Department of Lands and Survey</td>
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<td>1001 Ministry of Industry and Trade</td>
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<td>1201 Supreme Audit Department</td>
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<td>3091 Ministry of Culture</td>
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<td>1502 Ministry of Interior/Status and Passports Department</td>
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<td>401 Audit Bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>1802 Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities/Department of Antiquities</td>
<td>6,017,057 - 7,653,966</td>
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<td>3004 Ministry of Culture/Jordan Information Center</td>
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<td>861 Civil Service Bureau</td>
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<td>381 Prime Ministry/ Jordan News Agency</td>
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<td>1502 Ministry of Finance/General Budget Department</td>
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<td>501 Ministry of Public Sector Development</td>
<td>1,535,038 - 1,869,767</td>
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<td>3013 Ministry of Transport/Meteorology Department</td>
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<td>2192 Ministry of Public Works and Housing/gov’t Tenders Dept</td>
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<td>1602 Ministry of Industry and Trade/Companies Control Department</td>
<td>611,105 - 1,034,859</td>
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<td>302 Ministry of Industry/Department of Press and Publications</td>
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<td>3021 Prime Ministry/ Legislation and Opinion Bureau</td>
<td>727,459 - 1,012,547</td>
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<td>701 Ministry of Culture/Department of the National Library</td>
<td>761,279 - 534,366</td>
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<td>701 Ministry of Political Development</td>
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<td>350 Subcontracting Bureau</td>
<td>- 544,412</td>
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<td>393 Prime Ministry/ Joint Procurement Department</td>
<td>452,438 - 606,047</td>
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<td>380 Ministry of Parliament Affairs</td>
<td>- 504,379</td>
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<td>780 Ministry of Political and Parliamentary Affairs</td>
<td>- 569,240</td>
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<td>3102 Ministry of Transport/Aviation Authority</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** own calculations based on data provided by the General Budget Department

**KPI-4.5.2 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:

- Please see below
(ii) Key extracts from documents:

(iii) Additional information from field phase:

KPI-4.5.2 (i) Data, figures and tables:
Trends in capital expenditures for selected chapters as % of total chapter expenditure, 2008-2013, €

![Graph showing trends in capital expenditures](image)

Source: own calculations based on data provided by the General Budget Department

KPI-4.5.3: Level of improvement of democratic accountability and transparency of budgeting (relevant PEFA indicators, ranking and scores of Open Budget Index) - (% or HSPU indicator and sub-indicators)

Main Findings on KPI-4.5.3:
Substantial progress has been registered in terms of comprehensiveness and transparency of budgeting. Use of a budget classification and chart of accounts system that conform to international standards, the implementation of a results-oriented budgeting framework, and an increase in the amount of information included in the budget documentation presented by the executive are all steps that have contributed to increase transparency and allow an improved level of budget scrutiny by the legislative (PEFA 2011). Findings from the PEFA assessment are confirmed by the Open Budget Survey (2012) which reports that Jordan – with its relatively transparent budget system - scores significantly better on the Open Budget Index than most of its peers. Jordan continues to rank first among the ‘Middle East and North Africa region’ countries, and its score has improved from 50 in 2006 to 57 in 2012.

Some important challenges remain when looking at comprehensiveness of the budget, fiscal-risk oversight and release of fiscal and budget information to the public in a way which can be easily understood. To note however that these challenges are acknowledged and efforts are underway to address them including through the inclusion of conditions within the EU-funded SBS PFM programme under the heading “Improved public access to key fiscal information and transparency”; among them the development and publishing of a Citizen’s guide to the budget (see KPI-4.4.1 for more details on conditions).

Finally, the government, in its efforts to respond to continuing strong public demand for an end to corruption has created, in 2012, the National Integrity Committee, which – among others aims at: i) promoting accountability and transparency in the public sector; ii) establishing a culture of transparency, accountability and concern for the public; and iii) empowering monitoring bodies to deter and fight corruption.
KPI-4.5.3 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Repeat Public Financial Management Assessment following the PEFA Methodology (2011), pp.10-11
- Open Budget Survey 2012, International Budget Partnership (2013), pp.2-4

(iii) Additional information from field phase:

KPI-4.5.4: Level of evidence that financing made available through BS has contributed to closing the gap of the sectors’ medium term financing plans (e.g. volume and share of EU’s contribution to the financing of reforms in key sectors benefitting from EU BS) / Level of evidence of increased sectors expenditure in supported sectors (see also focal sectors KPIs concerned)

Main Findings on KPI-4.5.4:

Information drawn from the inventory indicates that throughout the period 2007-2013, the EU has contracted an overall amount of EUR 284 million of which 73% or EUR 208 million have been disbursed and transferred to the Government.

The table below shows the amounts disaggregated at sector level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector Budget Support</th>
<th>Contracted amounts (EUR)</th>
<th>Paid amounts (EUR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>85,480,000</td>
<td>58,042,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Budget Support component of the &quot;Programme in support to the second phase of the education reform&quot; (2011, ongoing)</td>
<td>30,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Budget Support Component of Programme in Support to ET&amp;V re-forms (2010, ongoing)</td>
<td>29,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support to Jordan’s Education system to respond to the increasing educational needs of displaced Iraqi people (2009-2009, closed)</td>
<td>26,480,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>29,000,000</td>
<td>14,730,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sector Budget Support component of the &quot;Support to Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency programme in Jordan&quot; (2011, ongoing)</td>
<td>29,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public finance management</td>
<td>103,017,857</td>
<td>93,092,657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PFM 2010 2nd tranche payment (2011, closed)</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PFM 2010 Tranche Payments (2010, ongoing)</td>
<td>44,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SFFRP tranche payments (2009, closed)</td>
<td>39,017,657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and Transport facilitation</td>
<td>27,000,000</td>
<td>22,275,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trade and Transport Facilitation Programme (TTF) (2010, ongoing)</td>
<td>27,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total SBS</td>
<td>244,497,857</td>
<td>188,740,357</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General budget support</th>
<th>Contracted amounts (EUR)</th>
<th>Paid amounts (EUR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good Governance and Development Contract (2012, ongoing)</td>
<td>39,700,000</td>
<td>29,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total GBS</td>
<td>39,700,000</td>
<td>29,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall Total GBS + SBS</th>
<th>Contracted amounts (EUR)</th>
<th>Paid amounts (EUR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>284,197,857</td>
<td>208,740,357</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justice sector</th>
<th>Contracted amounts (EUR)</th>
<th>Paid amounts (EUR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support to the justice sector reform in Jordan</td>
<td>27,000,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Source: elaboration based on data retrieved from the inventory.

To note that:

- this table, drawn from the inventory does not include the additional amounts allocated by the EU to the second PFM programme through addendum number 2, i.e. EUR 11 million. This explains the discrepancy between the amount indicated under KPI-4.4.3 (EUR 114.75 million) and the amount indicated in the table.
- the Support to the Justice sector reform in Jordan was still shown in CRIS under commitment status at the cut-off date.

In an effort to estimate the contribution of direct transfers to the Government’s budget made by the EU in the framework of its SBS programmes, the team has looked at amounts of government expenditures by chapter (i.e. Ministry or Department) with a view to identify those which are concerned by EU support.

Summaries are indicated in the table below. To note that with a view to estimate the actual contribution of SBS direct transfers, only expenditures undertaken in the years in which the relevant SBS programmes have been implemented are accounted for the in the table below

| Ministry of Education, Total expenditures, 2008-2013 | 4,168,042,042 | 1.00% |
| Ministry of Transport, Total expenditures, 2010-2013 | 215,903,169 | 10.32% |
| ET-VET reform related chapters (Min of Higher Education and Scientific research & Ministry of Labour), 2010-2013 | 310,785,852 | 5.46% |

For the Justice sector a different calculation has been made in light of the fact that the programme is still indicated with commitment status in the inventory and therefore no disbursement are recorded (the programme is at the time of writing ongoing). (see details below)

| Ministry of Justice, 2013 re-estimated | 56,828,720 |
| Average annual amount to be transferred to the gov in the framework of the SBS programme, € | 7,363,636 |
| % of annual expenditures ideally covered by annual average SBS disbursement | 12.96% |

Overall, and as is to be expected, the picture is mixed (this is also due to the fact that the team had only limited access to figures disaggregated by programmes within each chapter and therefore calculations take into account total expenditure by chapter. Nevertheless, these broad estimates allow to highlight that funds disbursed by the EU in the framework of SBS programmes account for:

- 10.3% of total expenditures of the Ministry of Transport over the period 2010-2013;
- 16.6% of total expenditures of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources over the period 2011-2013;
- an ideal figure of 12.9% of annual expenditures by the Ministry of Justice (no disbursements to date);
- 5.4% of total expenditures of ET-VET reform related chapters (Min of Higher Education and Scientific research & Ministry of Labour) over the period 2010-2013; and a more marginal
- 1% of total expenditures of the Ministry of Education over the period 2008-2013.

Further evidence collected during the field phase shows that SBS programmes:

- Have increased fiscal space in a country where the State’s budget is under severe constraint and therefore also have an important symbolic meaning
- SBS transfers covered a substantial part of the institutional, regulatory and human capacity building cost of reform in the energy sector.
### KPI-4.5.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) **Data, figures and tables:**
- Please see below

(ii) **Key extracts from documents:**
- /-/.

(iii) **Additional information from field phase:**
- KPI-8.6.9
- KPI-9.7.9

### KPI-4.5.4 (i) Data, figures and tables:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector Budget Support</th>
<th>Contracted amounts</th>
<th>Paid amounts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget Support component of the &quot;Programme in support to the second phase of the education reform&quot; (2011, ongoing)</td>
<td>85,480,000</td>
<td>58,642,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget Support Component of Programme in Support to ETET reforms (2010, ongoing)</td>
<td>30,000,000</td>
<td>15,187,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support to Jordan’s Education system to respond to the increasing educational needs of displaced Iraqi people (2008-2009, closed)</td>
<td>29,000,000</td>
<td>16,975,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26,480,000</td>
<td>26,480,000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Energy</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29,000,000</td>
<td>14,730,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public finance management</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFM 2010 2nd tranche payment (2011, closed)</td>
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<td>93,002,857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFM 2010 Tranche Payments (2010, ongoing)</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPFFR tranche payments (2003, closed)</td>
<td>44,000,000</td>
<td>34,075,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39,017,657</td>
<td>39,017,657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trade and Transport Facilitation</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27,000,000</td>
<td>22,275,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and Transport Facilitation Programme (TTF) (2010, ongoing)</td>
<td>27,000,000</td>
<td>22,275,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>244,407,857</td>
<td>183,740,357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total SBS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **General budget support**                                 |                    |              |
|                                                            | 39,700,000         | 20,000,000   |
| **Total GBS**                                              | 39,700,000         | 20,000,000   |

| Overall Total GBS + SBS                                    |                    |              |
|                                                            | 294,107,857        | 203,740,357  |

| **Justice sector**                                         |                    |              |
| Support to the justice sector reform in Jordan             | 27,000,000         | -            |

**Source:** elaboration based on data retrieved from the inventory.

To note that:
- this table, drawn from the inventory does not include the additional amounts allocated by the EU to the second PFM programme through addendum number 2, i.e. EUR 11 million. This explains the discrepancy between the amount indicated under KPI-4.4.3 (EUR 114.75 million) and the amount indicated in the table.
- The Support to the Justice sector reform in Jordan was still shown in CRIS under commitment status at the cut-off date.
## Current and capital expenditures for selected chapters, 2008-2013 (€)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SELECTED CHAPTERS</th>
<th>Current</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>% of overall total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justice sector reform related chapters</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>3,549,072</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>422,958</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>3,972,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>1101</td>
<td>233,189,045</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>76,339,034</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>300,528,079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supreme Court Judge Department</td>
<td>1201</td>
<td>55,211,347</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>19,363,649</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>74,585,033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td></td>
<td>291,950,565</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>96,145,674</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>388,096,239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Transport</td>
<td>3101</td>
<td>48,976,715</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>207,781,873</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>256,768,387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Industry and Trade</td>
<td>1501</td>
<td>46,436,086</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>30,261,630</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>76,704,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources</td>
<td>2901</td>
<td>18,701,584</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>113,417,416</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>132,119,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET-VET reform related chapters (Min of Higher Education &amp; Scientific Research &amp; Ministry of Labour)</td>
<td>2501</td>
<td>215,285,842</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>77,488,638</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>292,774,478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Labour</td>
<td>2901</td>
<td>63,526,728</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>30,178,004</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>93,704,734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td></td>
<td>283,312,570</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>107,666,639</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>391,479,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>2501</td>
<td>3,651,445,721</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>316,565,321</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4,168,042,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Public Sector Development</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>6,376,389</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>6,292,509</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>11,768,898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td></td>
<td>33,393,538,379</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>6,352,214,199</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>39,785,752,579</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own calculations based on data provided by the General Budget Department

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source: own calculations based on: i) the inventory of EU interventions; and ii) data provided by the General Budget Department</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amounts</th>
<th>% covered by SBS funds disbursed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education, Total expenditures, 2008-2013</td>
<td>4,168,042,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Transport, Total expenditures, 2010-2013</td>
<td>215,903,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET-VET reform related chapters (Min of Higher Education and Scientific research &amp; Ministry of Labour), 2010-2013</td>
<td>310,785,852</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the Justice sector a different calculation has been made in light of the fact that the programme is still indicated with commitment status in the inventory and therefore no disbursement are recorded (the programme is at the time of writing ongoing).

Calculations take into account: i) the overall expenditure recorded in the government budget for the Ministry of Finance in 2013; ii) the amount now committed by the EU in the form of direct transfers in support of the Justice sector reform through the programme. The programme has a period of implementation of 44 months, therefore in order to ensure comparability, the overall sum has been broken down to obtain the average annual figure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source: own calculations based on: i) the inventory of EU interventions; and ii) data provided by the General Budget Department</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calculation</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice, 2013 re-estimated</td>
<td>56,828,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual amount to be transferred to the gov in the framework of the SBS programme, €</td>
<td>3,636,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of annual expenditures ideally covered by annual average SBS disbursement</td>
<td>12.96%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### KPI-4.5.5: Overall perceptions of MoF, concerned sector ministries, EU and other donors’ representatives regarding the degree of influence of BS on sector policies implementation / spending

**Main Findings on KPI-4.5.5:**

With specific reference to the energy sector, the monitoring report for REEEP indicates that there have likely been positive effects of the SBS programme in creating fiscal space and in supporting changes in the budget process, its allocation and execution. Field visits however were only able to confirm that SBS transfers covered a substantial part of the institutional, regulatory and human capacity building cost as indicated by stakeholders (NERC, JISM, MEMR) who declared that support received also enabled the purchasing of
laboratory equipment and the carrying out of sectoral surveys which would have otherwise been delayed indefinitely thereby filling a financing gap.

With regard to the education sector, again, it was confirmed that SBS allowed providing funds in a timely manner in support of government’s high levels of spending. EU Support also contributed to better planning within the MoE and enhanced the capacity of the staff to build indicators and to actually achieve these indicator targets as this is one of the essential requirements of Budget Support. Finally, although in the framework of the government PFM reform efforts (also supported by the EU), MTEF became a national requirement and mandated to be implemented for all budget preparation within MoE.

KPI-4.5.5 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- No information available in documentation consulted / available to date

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- See also findings under KPI 8.6.9 and KPI-9.7.9

JC-4.5: EU support contributed to policy reform implementation through the use of the budget as a policy instrument

Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-4.5 (based on the KPIs main findings)

There is no doubt that throughout the period considered, the Government has implemented a number of important financial management reforms which promote the use of a country-wide system of ‘results-oriented budgeting’, including with the support of the EU\(^1\), thus promoting linkages between public spending and public policy goals.\(^2\) However, a number of key weaknesses still undermine effective budgeting processes, particularly in terms of linking budgetary allocations to the achievement of strategic policy objectives. Weaknesses in this respect are also highlighted in the Audit Bureau’s 2011 Annual report which concluded that “current plans examined in the audit do not link well to the National Plan and related government strategic priorities” and flagged the importance of improvements with regard to strategic planning\(^3\). (KPI-4.5.1 & KPI-4.5.2)

Substantial progress has also been registered in terms of comprehensiveness and transparency of budgeting. Use of a budget classification and chart of accounts system that conform to international standards, the implementation of a results-oriented budgeting framework, and an increase in the amount of information included in the budget documentation presented by the executive are all steps that have contributed to increase transparency and allow an improved level of budget scrutiny by the legislative (PEFA 2011). Findings from the PEFA assessment which report on the increased transparency of the budget and improved level of budget scrutiny by the legislative are confirmed by the Open Budget Survey (2012) which highlights that Jordan – with its relatively transparent budget system - scores significantly better on the Open Budget Index than most of its peers (first among the ‘Middle East and North Africa region’ countries, with an improvement in the score from 50 in 2006 to 57 in 2012). Finally, the government, in its efforts to respond to

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\(^1\) Specific conditions linked to the introduction of basic-results oriented budgeting frameworks within both budgetary agencies and Ministries which constitutes a key step to improved policy-based budgeting were included in both EU-financed PFM SBS programmes.

\(^2\) The PEFA repeat assessment of 2011 reports a strong improvement when looking at indicators related to policy-based budgeting’ (i) fully costed strategies consistent with national priorities have been prepared as of 2008; (ii) all Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) have started to prepare – again as of 2008 - sector strategies that need to be consistent with priorities included in the National Agenda 2006-2015; and (iii) the MoF and the General Budget Department (GBD) prepared for the first time in 2010 a Budget Policy and Priorities Paper for 2011-2013, which established the basis of policies and priorities for the development of the forthcoming three-year budget proposal and annexed to the 2010 budget circular ceilings for each Ministry, Department and Agency on current and capital expenditure for 2011-2013; ceilings that are consistent with a macroeconomic framework, a MTFF, and MTEFs.

continuing strong public demand for an end to corruption has created, in 2012, the National Integrity Committee, which – among others aims at: i) promoting accountability and transparency in the public sector; ii) establishing a culture of transparency, accountability and concern for the public; and iii) empowering monitoring bodies to deter and fight corruption. (KPI-4.5.3)

Information drawn from the inventory of EU interventions on the one hand, and from the elaboration of data provided by the General Budget Department of the GoJ on the other, allows estimating the contribution of the direct transfers to the Government’s budget made by the EU in the framework of its SBS programmes to the financing of government expenditures (including therefore reform efforts) in key sectors of support.

For ease of reference the table below summarises the support provided by the EU - through its different SBS programmes - to the implementation of policy reforms in different sectors through the contracting during the 2007-2013 period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SBS financing by sector</th>
<th>Contracted amounts, 2007-2013</th>
<th>Paid amounts, 2007-2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>85,480,000</td>
<td>58,642,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>29,000,000</td>
<td>14,730,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public finance management</td>
<td>103,017,857</td>
<td>93,092,857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and Transport Facilitation</td>
<td>27,000,000</td>
<td>22,275,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Budget Support</td>
<td>39,700,000</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total GBS &amp; SBS</strong></td>
<td><strong>284,197,857</strong></td>
<td><strong>208,740,357</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Justice sector | 27,000,000 | amount not contracted at the cut-off date for the inventory |

To note that this table, drawn from the inventory does not include the additional amounts allocated by the EU to the second PFM programme through addendum number 2, i.e. €11M. This explains the discrepancy between the amount indicated under KPI-4.4.3 (EUR 114.75 million) and the amount indicated in the table.

Overall the calculations carried out by the team – despite being broad estimates - allow to highlight that funds disbursed by the EU in the framework of SBS programmes account for:
- 10.3% of total expenditures of the Ministry of Transport over the period 2010-2013;
- 16.6% of total expenditures of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources over the period 2011-2013;
- an ideal figure of 12.9% of annual expenditures by the Ministry of Justice;
- 5.4% of total expenditures of ET-VET reform related chapters (Min of Higher Education and Scientific research & Ministry of Labour) over the period 2010-2013; and a more marginal
- 1% of total expenditures of the Ministry of Education over the period 2008-2013. (KPI-4.5.4)

Further evidence collected during the field phase shows that SBS programmes:
- have increased fiscal space in a country where the State’s budget is under severe constraint and therefore also have an important symbolic meaning
- SBS transfers covered a substantial part of the institutional, regulatory and human capacity building cost of reform in the energy sector. (KPI-4.5.5)
JC-4.6

EU support contributed to capacity strengthened, empowered and diversified civil society organisations in bringing about more transparent and inclusive delivery of public services and to strengthened tripartism between government and social partners for work, employment and social protection related matters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 4.4 (codes and definition)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPI-4.6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-4.6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-4.6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-4.6.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KPI-4.6.1: Instances of independent and representative national (associations of) CSOs of which the capacities are strengthened to actively engage with government agencies on policy/political dialogues issues and development planning and implementation issues for enhanced transparency and accountability purposes

Main Findings on KPI-4.6.1:

No significant evidence was found in relation to the EU’s contribution to the strengthening of CSO’s capacities to actively engage in development planning and implementation issues with a view to increase transparency and accountability purposes as far as interventions covered under EQ 4 go.

With specific reference to budgetary issues, the involvement of civil society and the broader public in the budget preparation process in Jordan is very limited. In addition to better access to budget information (which has improved), this would also require: i) explicit provisions for greater participation in relevant legislation; and ii) support to civil society in monitoring budget execution/project implementation/ progress towards achieving key performance indicators. Regarding the latter, the ECFIN 2013 report (p.21) indicates that the EU’s “Action Fiche for Jordan: Support to the Public Financial Management Reform Programme” (2010) suggested that GBD build civil society capacities in results-oriented budgeting and that a broad consultative process be established involving MDAs, government units and civil society groups to debate on performance indicators and measures used by MDAs and government units in the budgeting process. The FA however does not include a specific condition / measure on this and progress on this issue is still outstanding.

Some degree of involvement of civil society is nevertheless present in legislative debates on the budget (i.e. budget adoption) as, during its review of the General Budget and Budget of Government Units proposals, the Economic Affairs and Finance Committee of the House of Representatives holds hearings with respective ministries but also stakeholders from civil society, the Economic and Social Council, journalists and academia.

This indicator is similar to those under EQ 3 / JC 3.3 / KPI 3.3.2 & 3.3.3

KPI-4.6.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - /

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
KPI-4.6.2: **Number of independent and representative local CSOs of which the capacities are strengthened to actively engage with local governments in local development planning and budgeting**

**Main Findings on KPI-4.6.2:**

While evidence gathered to date does not allow estimating the number of local CSOs whose capacities have been strengthened as a result of EU interventions, there is evidence that in the framework of the PLEDJ programme, awareness and capacity of stakeholders like CBOs and NGOs have been strengthened and that as a result their skills in economic development activities has been built and increasingly used.

**KPI-4.6.2 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:

(ii) Key extracts from documents:

(iii) Additional information from field phase:

KPI-4.6.3: **Number of independent and representative economic Non-State Actors (NSAs), both employers and workers, of which the capacities are strengthened as social partners to engage with government on decent work and employment issues in a tripartite setting**

**Main Findings on KPI-4.6.3:**

No evidence found in documents analysed to date of EU support in this area with regard to interventions falling under EQ 4.

**KPI-4.6.3 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:

(ii) Key extracts from documents:

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
### KPI-4.6.4: Increased level to which tripartism as consultative mechanism between government and the social partners (employers and workers) is getting institutionalised for matters related to decent work, employment, social security and social protection, amongst others

#### Main Findings on KPI-4.6.4:


2007 sees significant progress in the design of a sector programme for vocational training which included the restructuring of the institutional framework (creation of a vocational education training council), a medium term expenditure framework and the establishment of tri-partite (employers, employees and government) dialogue structures to help shift towards a more demand-driven system.

Still in 2007, an economic and social council was established, and efforts were registered in relation to the creation of a tripartite consultative committee on labour affairs. At the same time, the government and the International Labour Organisation agreed on a decent work country programme, focusing on development of an employment strategy, the strengthening of labour administration and social dialogue as well as the development of the necessary legal and administrative mechanisms for migration management. The legislation establishing a tripartite committee dealing with the approval of labour union entered into force in May 2010 and earlier that year, the Economic and Social Council (ESC), in collaboration with the University of Jordan and the Public Security Directorate, organised a conference on the rule of law and social tension.

In terms of social rights, Jordan established a National Pay Equity Committee in July 2011, co-chaired by the Ministry of Labour and the Jordanian National Women's Commission. The Committee aims to promote women's participation in the labour market, particularly through implementation of international labour standards on equal remuneration and non-discrimination. A substantial package of measures was drawn up to strengthen social rights, provide decent working conditions and ensure that labour standards comply with International Labour Organisation (ILO) commitments.

#### KPI-4.6.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- /-

### JC-4.6: EU support contributed to capacity strengthened, empowered and diversified civil society organisations in bringing about more transparent and inclusive delivery of public services and to strengthened tripartism between government and social partners for work, employment and social protection related matters

#### Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-4.6 (based on the KPIs main findings):

In line with the findings of the 2005 evaluation of EU operations in the field of governance in Jordan, which concluded that the EU had gained experience in governance issues and should continue to provide support
for civil society organisations with the objective of empowering civil society as a governance actor, the 2007-2013 CSP (p.17) foresaw the provision of financial assistance to support participation of civil society with a view to strengthen dialogue between public authorities and non-state actors (NSAs). This was to be achieved by strengthening NSAs’ structures by setting up platforms, networks or umbrella organisations and expanding their capacity to interact with: i) the government and parliamentary representatives; ii) small organisations; and iii) lower levels of government (municipal councils).

Issues linked to participatory democracy and the strengthening of CSOs as empowered partners in the policy/political dialogue and the national and local development processes are treated under EQ 3. Here focus has been placed on their enhanced capacity to deliver public services / hold government accountable and strengthened tripartism between government and social partners for work, employment and social protection related matters.

These objectives were to be achieved – among others - through the Support to Democratic Governance Programme (EUR 10 million) originally financed in 2010 but later cancelled. The programme in fact foresaw a component specifically aimed at supporting support Non State Actors (NSAs) to act as an effective drive for good governance and accountability (Action fiche, p.7) with the aim to: i) enhance policy dialogue between Government and NSAs and between Local Councils and CBOs; ii) enhance NSAs contribution to public policy development, monitoring and implementation; iii) enhance awareness of citizens political and civil rights; iv) enhanced women participation in the political and social life; and v) strengthened technical and advocacy capacity of NSAs. (Action fiche, p.7). This programme, which also included a component addressing decentralisation issues was later cancelled in light of changed overall context and lower commitment (though temporary) of the government to decentralisation issues.

That said, a number of achievements have been recorded, especially with reference to social dialogue. Among these:

- the design in 2007 of a sector programme for vocational training which included the restructuring of the institutional framework with the creation of a vocational education training council, a medium term expenditure framework and the establishment of tri-partite (employers, employees and government) dialogue structures to help shift towards a more demand-driven system. (see also JC 8.4)
- Still in 2007, the establishment of an economic and social council, the reaching of an agreement between the government and the International Labour Organisation on a decent work country programme, focusing on development of an employment strategy, the strengthening of labour administration and social dialogue;
- The entering into force in 2010 of legislation establishing a tripartite committee dealing with the approval of labour union. (KPI 4.6.4)

On a smaller scale but with important linkages with EU support, there is evidence that in the framework of the PLEDJ programme (which targeted two Governatores), awareness and capacity of stakeholders like CBOs and NGOs have been strengthened and that as a result their skills in economic development activities has been built and is increasingly used. (KPI 4.6.2)

Finally, with specific reference to budgetary issues, the involvement of civil society and the broader public in the budget process in Jordan is very limited. While in fact, some degree of involvement of civil society is present in legislative debates on the budget adoption, no progress has been registered with regard to an increasing role for - and of - civil society in monitoring budget execution/project implementation/ progress towards achieving key performance indicators. For this to happen: i) explicit provisions for greater participation of CSOs needs to be included in relevant legislation; and ii) support needs to be provided to build civil society capacities in results-oriented budgeting.
**JC-4.7**
**EU support contributed to regulatory approximation with EU legislation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPI-4.7.1</th>
<th>Extent to which regulatory frameworks are getting better aligned between Jordan and the EU as a result of the transfer and sharing of know-how, skills, tools, systems and procedures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPI-4.7.2</td>
<td>Degree to which the legislative frameworks are more effectively supportive to sustainable, inclusive and equitable socio-economic development and growth (sectors, scope and volume covered by these legislative frameworks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-4.7.3</td>
<td>Level to which the regulatory and institutional frameworks are getting further strengthened as basis for further structured and systematic consultations between the tripartite partners (government, employers and workers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-4.7.4</td>
<td>Degree to which the definition of service delivery standards is effectively accomplished, approved and effectively implemented (incl. capacity development and monitoring mechanisms)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KPI-4.7.1:** Extent to which regulatory frameworks are getting better aligned between Jordan and the EU as a result of the transfer and sharing of know-how, skills, tools, systems and procedures

**Main Findings on KPI-4.7.1:**

With the entry into force of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) the policy-driven character of EC assistance was reinforced. The introduction of new cooperation mechanisms such as twinning and TAIEX (Technical Assistance Information Exchange) also strengthened the EC’s ability to provide financial and technical support in key regulatory areas and reforms. This has allowed enhancing coherence between financial cooperation instruments and the priorities of the Action Plan. As a result, multiple examples of cases in which activities funded by the Commission have supported the government in aligning its regulatory frameworks to those of the EU can be found when reviewing the Progress Reports on Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Among these:

- In January 2011, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Turkey agreed to develop a joint sectoral outlook for economic integration through unified transport legislation to comply with EU and international standards. The Parliament ratified altogether four laws, of which one is permanent (on Land transport regulatory Commission) and three temporary laws, (namely: the Laws on Railroads establishing the Jordan Railway Corporation, on Passenger Public Transport). (2012 report, p.12). Further country efforts were recorded throughout 2013 with a view to meet obligations regarding the implementation of EU aviation legislation. Implementation of the twinning project on aviation started in August 2013 with the aim of strengthening the capacity of the Civil Aviation Regulatory Commission, in approximating the legislative and regulatory framework to EU standards. (2014 report, p.13).

- In the area of free movement of goods and technical regulations, Jordan made progress in preparing for negotiations on the Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of industrial products (ACAA) aimed at facilitating the access of Jordanian industrial products to the EU internal market (and vice-versa). The Jordanian authorities continued to transpose sectoral legislation in the three priority sectors — gas appliances, toys and electrical products. So far, 44 draft transpositions of EU directives have been submitted to Commission services for assessment. The Commission continued horizontal and sectoral assessment of legislation. The draft Jordanian legislation on the restriction of the use of certain hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment complies with the acquis. All European standards relevant to the three priority sectors were adopted in April 2013. (2013 report, pp.8-9 & 2014 report p.10)

Interviews and additional documentation gathered during the field visit allow confirming the significant role played by the overall partnership agreement between Jordan and the EU. With specific reference to the activities carried out under the cooperation umbrella, all evidence points to a significant role of the SAAPs/SAPPs programme in supporting regulatory approximation efforts. These are recognised by all parties (EUD, programme administration office and beneficiaries). Examples of cases in which support provided in the form of twinnings, TA and provision of supplies under these programmes has led to transfer...
and sharing of know-how, skills, tools, systems and procedures include:

- Twinning project with the Ministry of Agriculture which led to the establishment and adoption of the necessary general laws and secondary legislation in compliance with the EU Acquis. In one case they were enacted within the project time frame (traceability and JQS), and another is in the final stage of definition and enactment (phytosanitary inspection system).
- Twinning Project with Jordanian Standards and Metrology Organisation (JSMO) which assisted Jordanian regulatory authorities in the approximation of the identified EC legislation (establishment of the legal framework required for the introduction of EU regulations, 42 EU Regulations and Directives were approximated with for the three priority sectors; adoption as national standards of all EN harmonised standards relevant to priority sectors; development and implementation of a market surveillance concept in accordance with the EU system according to EU Regulation № 765/2008

KPI-4.7.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- “Evaluation of the Support to the Action Plan Programme I (SAPP-I)”, Final Report, February 2014,
- pp. 25-26 - SAPP-1 Twinning Project with the Ministry of Agriculture “

KPI-4.7.2: Degree to which the legislative frameworks are more effectively supportive to sustainable, inclusive and equitable socio-economic development and growth (sectors, scope and volume covered by these legislative frameworks)

Main Findings on KPI-4.7.2:

As anticipated under JC 4.6, the 2007-2013 period sees progressive improvements in social dialogue and frameworks for more inclusive legislative and institutional frameworks. Here it is worth pointing to: i) the entering into force of legislation establishing a tripartite committee dealing with the approval of labour union; ii) the progressive extension of social-security coverage; and iii) the establishment of a National Pay Equity Committee in July 2011, co-chaired by the Ministry of Labour and the Jordanian National Women's Commission. The Committee aims to promote women's participation in the labour market, particularly through implementation of international labour standards on equal remuneration and non-discrimination. A substantial package of measures was drawn up to strengthen social rights, provide decent working conditions and ensure that labour standards comply with International Labour Organisation (ILO) commitments.
### KPI-4.7.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- The team did not uncover additional information allowing to link the above-mentioned results to specific activities undertaken in the framework of SAPP / SAPPs.

### KPI-4.7.3: Level to which the regulatory and institutional frameworks are getting further strengthened as basis for further structured and systematic consultations between the tripartite partners (government, employers and workers)

#### Main Findings on KPI-4.7.3:
See KPI 4.6.4

### KPI-4.7.3 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- See evidence provided under KPI-4.6.4

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- /-

### KPI-4.7.4: Degree to which the definition of service delivery standards is effectively accomplished, approved and effectively implemented (incl. capacity development and monitoring mechanisms)

#### Main Findings on KPI-4.7.4:
Activities financed by the EU have not only supported the government in aligning its regulatory frameworks to those of the EU but also contributed to define service delivery standards.

Evidence can be found when reviewing the Progress Reports on Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Among these:

- Jordan and the EU continued cooperation on the harmonisation of **sanitary and phytosanitary** rules with EU standards, particularly through two twinning projects. Jordan prepared a new food law, which aims at harmonisation with EU rules (2009 report, p.10);

- In the area of **free movement of goods** and **technical regulations**, Jordan made progress in preparing for negotiations on the Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of industrial products (ACAA) aimed at facilitating the access of Jordanian industrial products to the EU internal market (and vice-versa). The Jordanian authorities continued to transpose sectoral legislation in the three priority sectors — gas appliances, toys and electrical products. So far, 44 draft transpositions of EU directives have been submitted to Commission services for assessment. The Commission continued horizontal and sectoral assessment of legislation. The draft Jordanian legislation on the restriction of the use of certain hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment complies with the acquis. All European standards relevant to the three priority sectors were adopted in April 2013. (2013 report, pp.8-9 & 2014 report p.10)
Interviews and additional documentation gathered during the field visit allow confirming that support provided through the SAAPs/SAPPs programmes has improved service delivery standards. Examples include:

- The establishment by the Jordanian Standards and Metrology Organisation of a technical information centre providing technical help services to relevant industrial sectors;
- The reduction in cost of services to end users following the technological and efficient improvements achieved by the Department of Land & Survey of the Jordan Cadastral System.
- Improved audit operations which in turn lead to more efficient protection in the use of public funds
- Application of modern risk based control mechanisms which further benefits in the facilitation of the trade supply chain and economy
- Improved outreach and communication, leading to a more transparent and open relationship between the Anti-corruption Commission and civil society.

**KPI-4.7.4 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) **Data, figures and tables:**
- J./-

(ii) **Key extracts from documents:**

(iii) **Additional information from field phase:**
- Please see below

**KPI-4.7.4 (iii) Additional information from field phase**

“Evaluation of the Support to the Action Plan Programme I (SAPP-I)”, Final Report, February 2014,

Respondents to the questionnaire delivered to SAAP/SAPP beneficiary institutions have all confirmed that support provided has strengthened capacities leading in turn to improvements in the provision of services for the public:

- Improved outreach and communication, being more transparent and open with the civil society.
- Clear management lines.
- Systematized Operational procedures.
- Comply with international standards and policing best practices during implementing of Public order missions and law enforcement especially in community demonstration.
- Through applying modern risk based control which reflected on further facilitation of trade supply chain and economy
- Implementing ISO17025:2005 ILAC-G19 quality system has provided greater assurance to the criminal justice system that it can have greater confidence in the forensic examination. The quality of forensic science analysis, within the Jordanian judicial system, is of fundamental importance to all Jordanian people as well as providing internationally accepted results
- Enhancing and improving audit operations led to more efficiency in protecting public funds
- Better classification of inmates that reflected positively on inmates, staff and families.
- Designing safer prison facilities for the community, staff and inmates.
- More productive and income generating rehabilitation projects for inmates.
- Releasing less dangerous inmates back to the society.
- Works as a third party for monitoring and evaluation.
- Enhancing the capabilities in fighting terrorism and organised crimes, leads to sustain stability and security for Jordan and the region
- All the cadastral procedures and services are enhanced day by day for instance the map sheets and quality of cadastral information and the whole valuation results.
| JC-4.7: EU support contributed to regulatory approximation with EU legislation |
| Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-4.7 (based on the KPIs main findings) |

With the entry into force of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) the policy-driven character of EC assistance was reinforced. The introduction of new cooperation mechanisms such as twinning and TAIEX (Technical Assistance Information Exchange) also strengthened the EC’s ability to provide financial and technical support in key regulatory areas and reforms. This has allowed enhancing coherence between financial cooperation instruments and the priorities of the Action Plan. As a result, there are multiple examples of cases in which activities funded by the Commission have supported the government in aligning its regulatory frameworks to those of the EU (KPIs-4.7.1 & 4.7.4). Among others, these include:

- Cooperation on the harmonisation of sanitary and phytosanitary rules with EU standards, particularly through two twinning projects with the Ministry of Agriculture which led to the establishment and adoption of the necessary general laws and secondary legislation in compliance with the EU Acquis. In one case they were enacted within the project time frame (traceability and JQS), and another is in the final stage of definition and enactment (phytosanitary inspection system).

- Cooperation with Jordanian Standards and Metrology Organisation (twinning project) which assisted the Jordanian regulatory authorities in the approximation of the identified EC legislation (establishment of the legal framework required for the introduction of EU regulations, approximation of 42 EU Regulations and Directives for the three priority sectors; adoption as national standards of all EN harmonised standards relevant to priority sectors; development and implementation of a market surveillance concept in accordance with the EU system according to EU Regulation No 765/2008 (KPI-4.7.1)

- Efforts to strengthen compliance of transport legislation with EU and international standards have been recorded leading to the ratification by Parliament of four laws (2012 ENP Jordan Progress report, p.12), and to the strengthening of the capacity of the Civil Aviation Regulatory Commission, in approximating the legislative and regulatory framework to EU standards through the implementation of a twinning arrangement (2014 report, p.13). See also JC 7.5 under EQ 7 on trade, transport and investment facilitation.

- In the area of free movement of goods and technical regulations, Jordan made progress in preparing for negotiations on the Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of industrial products (ACAA) aimed at facilitating the access of Jordanian industrial products to the EU internal market (and vice-versa). To date, 44 draft transpositions of EU directives have been submitted to Commission services for assessment, and the draft Jordanian legislation on the restriction of the use of certain hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment complies with the acquis (2013 report, pp.8-9 & 2014 report p.10) See also JC 7.2 under EQ 7 on trade, transport and investment facilitation.

In addition, significant progress has been made in enhancing social dialogue and setting for more inclusive legislative and institutional frameworks. Among these: i) the entering into force of legislation establishing a tripartite committee dealing with the approval of labour union; and ii) the establishment of a National Pay Equity Committee in July 2011, co-chaired by the Ministry of Labour and the Jordanian National Women’s Commission. A substantial package of measures was drawn up to strengthen social rights, provide decent working conditions and ensure that labour standards comply with International Labour Organisation (ILO) commitments. (KPI-4.7.2)
3.5. EQ-5 IM on Aid Modalities Mix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Question (code and title)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EQ-5: To what extent has the EU aid modalities mix been appropriate for the national context and the EU development strategy in efficiently bringing about the targeted reform and development results?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List of Judgement Criteria (JCs) under the EQ (codes and titles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JC-5.1 The synergy between different aid / cooperation modalities and financing instruments have been analysed and defined to suit partners’ capacities, both within each focal sector and overall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-5.2 Several options of aid modalities have been discussed for cooperation interventions by sector and overall their combination has been an inclusive internal strategic process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-5.3 The chosen mix of aid modalities has contributed to the establishment of a framework of policy dialogue, technical assistance and capacity building which is strategic and focused on government priorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-5.4 The chosen mix of aid modalities has contributed to the strengthening of policy processes and of public institutional and technical capacities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-5.5 The chosen mix of aid modalities has facilitated the timely attainment of sustainable results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-5.6 The chosen mix of aid modalities has contributed to the strengthening of monitoring and evaluation systems and capacities</td>
</tr>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>JC-5.1</th>
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<tr>
<td>The synergy between different aid / cooperation modalities and financing instruments have been analysed and defined to suit partners’ capacities, both within each focal sector and overall</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 5.1 (codes and definition)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPI-5.1.1 Level of comprehensiveness of the capacity assessment (and updates) of main coordinating and implementing Jordan partners in the EU (internal) programming and interventions implementation documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-5.1.2 The degree to which the mix of aid modalities and financing instruments differs by sector in order to take into account needs and institutional capacities over time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-5.1.3 Extent to which, according to the key stakeholders at country level, notably national counterparts and EU Delegation, the mix of aid modalities and financing instruments takes into consideration the beneficiary institutions’ capacities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-5.1.4 Degree to which the mix and link between aid modalities and financing instruments is analysed for focal sectors in the EU (internal) identification or preparation documents and the actual synergy between aid modalities is assessed in follow-up or monitoring reports</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**KPI-5.1.1: Level of comprehensiveness of the capacity assessment (and updates) of main coordinating and implementing Jordan partners in the EU (internal) programming and interventions implementation documents**

**Main Findings on KPI-5.1.1:**

The analysis of the set of documentation related to the interventions reviewed shows that in most cases these contain a correct and credible analysis of the context, pattern of reforms as well as the existence of the necessary preconditions for successful implementation. This is equally true for all sectors. In a number of cases, improvements have been registered throughout the period covered with regard to the level of comprehensiveness of capacity assessments and stakeholder analysis. This appears clearly when looking at programming documentation related to subsequent phases of given interventions. Among these:

- **the Support to the implementation of the Action Plan Programme** which received a B (good) in 2007 and later an A (very good) in 2008. Under SAPP I, all potential involved parties are listed but their capacity to deal with the projects and fulfill their obligations is not assessed (score B, good) whereas under SAPP II, stakeholder analysis lists all potentially involved parties and it is further stated that these institutions have already proved their commitment to reform and complying with EU standards, as well as their capacity to absorb a technical assistance or twinning project (score A, very good).

- **the Support to the Public Finance Sector Reform Programme** (2007): the checklist reports that all stakeholders are briefly mentioned (score B) and that little evidence exists that the problems have been appropriately analysed, with no annexes as required (score C). The following PFM SBS programme of 2010 instead provides a detailed problem analysis presented under appendix 1 'Description of Reform Benchmarks and Indicators Used for Disbursements.

In other cases, however, programme documentation did not systematically include the analysis of partners’ needs and capacities. This can be linked to the critical situation which followed the global crisis of 2008, the start of the Arab Spring together with the strategic and political importance of Jordan: exceptional circumstances that can explain the urgency underlying some allocation decisions and the shortened formulation process. In these cases (eg. SPRING) a more informal and pragmatic approach based on dialogue between the national authorities and the EU in coordination with the donor community was usually preferred.

**KPI-5.1.1 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:

- /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:

- Identification fiche 020-478 Support to the implementation of the Action Plan II – SAPP II (2008), p.4
- Checklist for AF 020-478 Support to the implementation of the Action Plan II – SAPP II (2008), p.2
- Checklist oQSG2for action fiche 019-214 Support to the Public Finance Reform Programme, p.2
- FD 2010/021-932 – Public Financial Management Reform Programme

(iii) Additional information from field phase

- see also KPI 3.6.1, KPI 6.5.1, KPI 6.5.2, KPI 8.6.3 and KPI-9.7.1

**KPI-5.1.2: The degree to which the mix of aid modalities and financing instruments differs by sector in order to take into account needs and institutional capacities over time**

**Main Findings on KPI-5.1.2:**

The analysis of the inventory highlights that different aid modalities and different financing instruments have been used to finance EU support in the different sectors.
A mix of SBS and project approach is used in the education, public finance management, energy, and trade sectors (SBS and project approach). Sectors such as water & sanitation, private sector development, human rights & legal and judicial development as well as decentralisation and support to sub-national governments instead indicate that project approach is the preferred aid modality, although this then encompasses both services such as TA and programme estimates.

A mix of geographic and thematic instruments is used in a high number of sectors, their mix however varies: i) in the education sector most of the funding (76%) flows through geographic instruments; ii) in the energy and decentralisation and support to sub-national governments (sub-sector of the Gov. and civil society sector), thematic instruments play a minor role (respectively 6% and 2% of total funding); and iii) in the water sector and to some extent in the human rights sector (sub-sector of the Gov. and civil society sector) the balance is reversed with respectively 56% and 43% of funding flowing from the thematic budget lines.

In other sectors yet, funding flows exclusively through the geographic instruments, among these: trade and policy regulations, public finance management (sub-sector of the Gov. and civil society sector), business and other services.

The analysis of a sample of programming documents indicates that the choice of the aid modality and implementation method clearly takes into account programmes’ objectives, existing capacities and external environment as well as coordination with complementary interventions undertaken by other donors.

That said, a case has been identified in the private sector where lack of sufficient analysis of needs and related opportunities coupled with complex negotiations processes have led to the cancelling of the loan guarantee fund, deemed to be an attractive and credible instrument to overcome one of the major constraints faced by SMEs, i.e. lack of access to finance.

KPI-5.1.2 Main References and Sources of Information:
(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Please see below
(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Checklist for AF 020-478 Support to the implementation of the Action Plan II – SAPP II (2008), p.2
- Checklist qSG2lor action fiche 019-214 Support to the Public Finance Reform Programme, p.2
(iii) Additional information from field phase
- See also KPI-6.5.3

KPI-5.1.2 (i) Data, figures and tables:
Combination of aid modalities per macro sector, selected sectors (source: own analysis based on CRIS data)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>SBS / GBS</th>
<th>Project approach</th>
<th>PE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government and Civil Society</td>
<td>103,017,857</td>
<td>41,086,362</td>
<td>8,318,978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>85,480,000</td>
<td>25,714,080</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy Generation and Supply</td>
<td>29,000,000</td>
<td>18,225,506</td>
<td>270,641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Policy and Regulations</td>
<td>27,000,000</td>
<td>8,773,533</td>
<td>6,124,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Budget Support</td>
<td>39,700,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry, incl. Business and other services</td>
<td>8,102,610</td>
<td>30,211,168</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and Sanitation</td>
<td>14,213,963</td>
<td>3,682,493</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency response</td>
<td>17,500,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>29,549,121</td>
<td>3,578,340</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>284,197,857</td>
<td>163,165,176</td>
<td>52,186,469</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own calculations based on data from CRIS database
**KPI-5.1.3:** Extent to which, according to the key stakeholders at country level, notably national counterparts and EU Delegation, the mix of aid modalities and financing instruments takes into consideration the beneficiary institutions’ capacities

**Main Findings on KPI-5.1.3:**

It is generally acknowledged by all stakeholders interviewed and in particular by government representatives and EU staff that the mix of aid modalities takes into account beneficiary institutions’ capacities leading, for example, in the case of SAAP / SAPPs to an incremental approach whereby a study or external TA is then followed by a TAIEX and/or SIGMA and/or a twinning.

At the same time, it was also brought to the attention of the team that in a smaller number of cases the diagnostic analysis and the overall preparation processes was shortened due to the need to rapidly identify and formulate projects and programmes. See also KPI 5.1.2

**KPI-5.1.3 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - -/-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - -/-

(iii) Additional information from field phase
   - -/-

**KPI-5.1.4:** Degree to which the mix and link between aid modalities and financing instruments is analysed for focal sectors in the EU (internal) identification or preparation documents and the actual synergy between aid modalities is assessed in follow-up or monitoring reports

**Main Findings on KPI-5.1.4:**

Programming documents from a selected sample of interventions as well as evidence gathered during the field phase clearly point to existing complementarities among aid modalities which are not only identified during the formulation phase but also sought and followed through during implementation through informal dialogue among EUD staff and between EUD staff and other partners. This is generally true for all sectors, particularly evident in the framework of the SAPPs and of the PFM SBS programmes and with some shortfalls in the private sector where it is noted that the potential for synergies and coordination as framed by the Association Agreement has some difficulties to become a reality in the implementation, preventing the realisation of a potential cumulative effect. Some problems are the consequence of a set of external events that affected the country thus leading to modified priorities and hence attention of the managers. Others are to be linked to the inherent difficult combination of increased competitiveness on the one hand and employment creation on the other, whereby the strong attention to employability mostly through VET associated programmes was not always coordinated with private sector support. [...] 

SAPP documentation (Action Fiche) states that “The SAPP 'being a small NIP within the NIP', is complementary to the other programmes identified in the Country Strategy Paper. It covers, on demand and without overlap, specific needs of the Jordanian administration, and facilitates reform in chosen areas and, where relevant, regulatory approximation with the EU." The TAPs then further clarify that “the programme complements all the EC support provided through Budget Support programmes [...] and through project approach programmes [...] In addition the programme will complement the assistance mobilised through TAIEX (Technical Assistance Information Exchange) and through the SIGMA Programme, both instruments are administered in Jordan by the PAO.” In addition it is also to be noted that the SAPP itself combines different approaches as although it uses exclusively the project approach it then includes the provision of services and supplies through different means, including programme estimates.

Similarly, the Support to the Public Finance Reform Programme (AF 019-214), complements other EC actions, amongst them: (i) a short-term technical assistance project, “Institutional strengthening of the Audit
**KPI-5.1.4 Main References and Sources of Information:**

1. **Data, figures and tables:**
   - +/-

2. **Key extracts from documents:**
   - AF 019-571 Support to the implementation of the Action Plan – SAPP (2008), p. 4
   - TAPs 019-571 Support to the implementation of the Action Plan – SAPP (2008), pp. 4-5
   - AF 019-214 Support to the Public Finance Reform Programme, p.3
   - Addendum 2 to FA 021-219: Building Development Capacities of Jordanian Municipalities – Baladiaty, p.9
   - Action Fiche, Promoting Local Economic Development in Jordan (PLEDJ), pp.3-4

3. **Additional information from field phase**
   - See also KPI 5.1.3, KPI-6.5.4 and KPI-8.6.1

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**JC-5.1: The synergy between different aid / cooperation modalities and financing instruments have been analysed and defined to suit partners’ capacities, both within each focal sector and overall**

The analysis of the inventory highlights that different aid modalities and different financing instruments have been used to finance EU support in the different sectors. A mix of SBS and project approach is used in the education, public finance management, energy, and trade sectors (SBS and project approach). Whereas, in sectors such as water & sanitation, private sector development, human rights & legal and judicial development as well as decentralisation and support to sub-national governments, the project approach is the preferred aid modality, although this then encompasses both services such as TA, studies, supplies, and programme estimates.

At the same time, the analysis of the inventory highlights the use of a mix of geographic and thematic instruments in a high number of sectors, although their mix varies: in the education sector most of the funding (76%) flows through geographic instruments whereas in the water sector and the human rights (sub-sector of the Government and civil society sector) sectors respectively 56% and 43% of funding flows from the thematic budget lines. In other sectors yet, funding flows exclusively through the geographic instruments, amongst these: trade and policy regulations, public finance management (sub-sector of the Government and civil society sector), business and other services. (KPI-5.1.2)

Going one step further, the analysis of a sample of programming documents indicates that the choice of the aid modality and implementation method clearly takes into account programmes’ objectives, existing capacities and external environment as well as coordination with complementary interventions undertaken by other donors. In the majority of cases, programme identification and formulation are based on correct and credible context analyses including pattern of reforms as well as on the existence of the necessary preconditions for successful implementation. This is generally true for all sectors, and in a number of cases, improvements have been registered throughout the period covered with regard to the level of comprehensiveness of capacity assessments and stakeholder analysis. This appears clearly when looking at programming documentation related to subsequent phases of given interventions (e.g. SAAP/SAPPs, PFM and education). In other cases, however, programme documentation did not systematically include the analysis of partners’ needs and capacities. This can be linked to the critical situation which followed the global crisis of 2008, the start of Arab Spring together with the strategic and political importance of Jordan: exceptional circumstances that can explain the urgency underlying some allocation decisions and the shortened formulation process. In these cases (e.g. SPRING) where a more informal and pragmatic approach based on dialogue between the national authorities and the EU in coordination with the donor community was usually preferred. Interviews confirmed that indeed, in some cases, the diagnostic analysis
and the overall preparation processes was shortened due to the need to rapidly identify and formulate projects and programmes.

Complementarities among different aid modalities and programmes within and – at times - across sectors are systematically mentioned in programming documents with some providing more details than others. Synergies are not always equally assessed although in some cases they appear quite evident. This is for example the case of the SAPP programmes which aim at strengthening the capacities of Jordanian institutions through the provision of flexible support for institution building. By their very nature, these programmes ‘complement all the EC support provided through Budget Support programmes [...] and through project approach programmes [...] In addition the programme will complement the assistance mobilised through TAIEX (Technical Assistance Information Exchange) and through the SIGMA Programme, both instruments are administered in Jordan by the PAO.” (TAPs of SAPP I, pp.4-5). In addition the SAPPs, although implemented entirely through the project approach modality, combines different approaches as it includes the sub-category of programme estimates as well as the provision of services such as TAs and studies, of supplies and of action grants.

Finally, in the area of private sector development, evidence is mixed. In fact, while it is reported that the comprehensive set of objectives and overall framework allowed the definition of programmes and projects fully coordinated with evident and clear synergies between them, the recent “Evaluation of the European Union’s Support to Private Sector Development” also reports that at country level there is little evidence of a structured EC approach to exploiting the potential and complementarities of the set of mechanisms for supporting the private sector, such as a fully-fledged sector strategy encompassing all types of need along with a well thought-out mix of the potential of the different funding sources available. (KPI-5.1.4). In particular it is reported that the lack of sufficient analysis of needs and related opportunities coupled with complex negotiations processes have led to the cancelling of the loan guarantee fund, deemed to be an attractive and credible instrument to overcome one of the major constraints faced by SMEs, i.e. lack of access to finance. (KPI-5.1.1)

| JC-5.2 | Several options of aid modalities have been discussed for cooperation interventions by sector and overall their combination has been an inclusive internal strategic process |
| List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 5.2 (codes and definition) |
| KPI-5.2.1 | Degree to which different aid modalities’ options are analysed and justification of the chosen modality (e.g. consideration of macro-economic goals or governance considerations, risks assessments, lessons learned,…) is integrated in strategic and programming documents, both overall and sectoral |
| KPI-5.2.2 | Degree to which the different aid modalities have been effectively discussed with the key institutional stakeholders concerned to arrive at the chosen option |
| KPI-5.2.3 | Degree to which interventions used appropriate aid delivery methods (e.g. use of TA services and twinning arrangements to build institutional and human resource capacities; programme estimates to support the implementation of programmes executed by public or public-private agencies or services of the beneficiary country, where that country’s administration possesses qualified managers; BS to support implementation of government policies and reforms including - where relevant - envelopes for embedded or complementary TA to strengthen institutional and human resources’ capacities; …). |
| KPI-5.2.4 | Overall appreciation levels of the respective aid modalities and financing instruments by the different key Jordan parties / stakeholders concerned as well as EUD |

**KPI-5.2.1: Degree to which different aid modalities' options are analysed and justification of the chosen modality (e.g. consideration of macro-economic goals or governance considerations, risks assessments, lessons learned,…) is integrated in strategic and programming documents, both overall and sectoral**

**Main Findings on KPI-5.2.1:**
Information contained in the programming documents of the sample of interventions reviewed to date point to the fact that in a number of instances but not always, due consideration was given – when choosing the aid modality – to the overall scope, objectives and partners’ capacities. This is the case for example of the support provided to strengthen capacities of Jordanian institutions with a view to support implementation of the Government’s reform agenda. The mix of project approach (including programme estimates) in the form of the SAPPs and SBS to support the Public Financial Management Strategy: On the one hand, the SAPPs, through the adoption of a flexible instrument allowed to enhance Jordan's capacities to take full advantage of the EU-Jordan Association Agreement (AA) and to link areas of support to the priorities emerging from the dialogue taking place within the AA subcommittees. On the other hand, the two SBS programmes have allowed to fully support what is defined in programming documents as a “well-defined policy and strategy framework that responds to the challenges Jordan faces is under implementation” thus confirming the appropriateness of the use of the SBS modality.

Evidence from the other sectors is also generally positive with regard to the analysis of different aid modalities including the consideration of lessons learnt, whereby:

- Improvements have been registered with to support in the area of democratic governance which point for example to a thorough examination of alternatives during the formulation of the Support to Justice Reform and Good Governance intervention support mixed, more positive in the education and ET-VET whereby:
- Alternative options of EU support to the energy, water and environment sectors are studied and piloted, and criteria for preference and eligibility are satisfactorily defined and applied. (see also KPI 9.7.3)
- EU support to the E-TVET Sector was defined in consultation with other donors and stakeholders in the sector and complements other interventions. All these are derived from a credible diagnostic analysis of the USAID as well as the World Bank through their contribution to the sector. (See also KPI 8.6.1)

Finally, evidence gathered with regard to the private sector points in a different direction (see also KPI-6.5.1 & 6.5.4) as it is reported that “a recurrent weakness that hampered results was the lack of strong preparatory analysis, including in consultation with the private sector.” (Evaluation of the European Union’s Support to Private Sector Development 2013). In addition there is little evidence of capitalisation exercises between different EUDs especially of the MENA Region to share experience and good practice in PSD support, a pity considering that EU has provided PSD support for many years, which must have led to an accumulation of useful knowledge. The opportunity to use B2B approach to PSD for example does not appear to have received sufficient consideration, although it could have been quite important to coordinate PSD with trade objective.

KPI-5.2.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- -

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- TAPs 019-571 Support to the implementation of the Action Plan – SAPP (2008), pp.4-5
- Checklist for identification fiche 020-478Support to the implementation of the Action Plan II – SAPP II (2008), p.2
- TAPs 020-478Support to the implementation of the Action Plan II – SAPP II (2009), p.5
- Addendum # 2 to the TAPs - Support to the Public Financial Management Reform Programme and Budget Efficiency Targets (2013), p.5
- KPI-6.5.4 on PSD
- KPI-6.5.2 on PSD, Evaluation of the European Union’s Support to Private Sector Development 2013

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- See also KPI 3.6.1, KPI-3.6.3, KPI-3.6.4, KPI-6.5.1 and KPI-9.7.3

KPI-5.2.2: Degree to which the different aid modalities have been effectively discussed with the key institutional stakeholders concerned to arrive at the chosen option

Main Findings on KPI-5.2.2:

An overall system is in place to ensure the systematic discussion of possible alternative options between the EUD and MoPIC. In a number of cases, programme documentation clearly shows that the mix of aid
modalities / implementation methods chosen was the result of a joint formulation process that saw the involvement of key stakeholders right from the conceptual phase. Among these the case of the SAAPs/SAPPs (project approach with the inclusion of programme estimates) but also others. That said, interviews point to a strong preference expressed by the GoJ / MoPIC for the adoption of the GBS or SBS modality as this allows to have increased fiscal space in a country where the State’s budget is under severe constraint and therefore also has an important symbolic meaning in terms of overall support from the EU to the country.

In other cases however, programme documentation did not systematically include the analysis of partners’ needs and capacities nor evidence of in-depth discussion regarding the use of diverse aid modalities. This can be linked to the critical situation which followed the global crisis of 2008, the start of Arab Spring together with the strategic and political importance of Jordan: exceptional circumstances that can explain the urgency underlying some allocation decisions and the shortened formulation process. In these cases (e.g. SPRING) a more informal and pragmatic approach based on dialogue between the national authorities and the EU in coordination with the donor community was usually preferred.

Finally, in the case of the private sector the Evaluation of the European Union’s Support to Private Sector Development 2013, indicates that in the two large access to finance projects implemented in Jordan between 2005 and 2010, the analysis of the financing challenges during project design was limited and lacked thorough consultation with the private sector. Consequently, avoidable implementation problems were observed, such as the provision of risk-mitigation mechanisms (e.g., credit guarantee schemes) before the supporting risk-reduction infrastructure had been laid (e.g., before credit bureaux were established and strengthened). See also KPI-6.5.2.

KPI-5.2.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - BCS to the MR-141402.01 Support to the implementation of the Action Plan – SAPP (2011), 1.Quality of Project Design

(iii) Additional information from field phase
   - Interviews
   - See also KIP-6.5.2

KPI-5.2.3: Degree to which interventions used appropriate aid delivery methods (e.g. use of TA services and twinning arrangements to build institutional and human resource capacities; programme estimates to support the implementation of programmes executed by public or public-private agencies or services of the beneficiary country, where that country’s administration possesses qualified managers; BS to support implementation of government policies and reforms including - where relevant - envelopes for embedded or complementary TA to strengthen institutional and human resources’ capacities; …).  

Main Findings on KPI-5.2.3:

The analysis carried out confirms that aid delivery methods selected were largely tailored to the specific objectives and purposes of the interventions. As a result, the interventions aimed at supporting institutional reform and capacity strengthening of Jordan public institutions included a mix of long and short-term TA, twinning (mobilised through programme estimates), TAIEX, SIGMA, provision of supplies and Budget Support with the overall objectives of supporting institutional strengthening while at the same ensuring local ownership. The same holds true for the other sectors analysed. With specific reference to the private sector a mix of project approach and programme estimates were used encompassing long and short-term TA, twinnings, studies as well as the provision of direct grants / direct final support to private sector beneficiaries depending on the needs. That said, it is also reported (see KPI-6.5.3 for further evidence) that the opportunity to use B2B (business to business) approach to PSD did not appear to have received sufficient consideration and the Jordan country case study of the Evaluation of the European Union’s Support to
Private Sector Development reports that “there is little evidence of a [...] well thought-out mix of the potential of the different funding sources available”.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that in sectors where SBS was less mature (e.g. energy, ET-VET, justice) although the choice was based on solid grounds (support to government policies and reforms) the presence of diverging or unclear priorities within government or at ministry level, despite the existence of policies or policy reform programmes, has led to an imperfect understanding of the mechanism among key stakeholders and has weakened their efficient implementation and effectiveness.

KPI-5.2.3 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   – /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   – TAPs 019-571 Support to the implementation of the Action Plan – SAPP (2008), p.5 & p.6
   – BCS to the MR-141402.01 Support to the implementation of the Action Plan – SAPP (2011),
     1.Quality of Project Design
   – See also KPI-6.5.3 for further evidence.

(iii) Additional information from field phase
   – See also JC 8.6, JC 9.7

KPI-5.2.4: Overall appreciation levels of the respective aid modalities and financing instruments by the different key Jordan parties / stakeholders concerned as well as EUD

Main Findings on KPI-5.2.4:

Field interviews have confirmed that overall the aid modalities used to implement interventions in the different sectors were highly appreciated. In particular the relatively high share of BS responds to a specific request by the GoJ expressed through MoPIC.

That said, and always in relation to BS, a related common observation made by stakeholders interviewed within ministries / institutions benefiting from SBS was that they were not aware of the budgetary resources actually flowing to the implementing line ministry entities and agencies concerned, pointing at insufficient understanding of the instrument with regard to budgeting, resources allocation and transfer processes. (KPI-8.6.9)

A certain ignorance appeared clear during interviews with main stakeholder groups in Jordan regarding EU aid modalities. Moreover, and more fundamentally, a widespread ignorance of EU cooperation inputs (financial, TA and other) is observed at the level of the intermediate and ultimate target groups. At the level of the two main GoJ ministries concerned (MoPIC and Finance) a very good understanding of the EU aid modalities and their main features and characteristics is noted, including of their potential impact on the evolution of policies, policy frameworks and capacities. This is much less the case at the level of the line ministries and other implementing agencies, as was confirmed during different meetings and interviews during the field visit. There are major remaining challenges not only of bringing Budget Support (and other aid modalities) to their ultimate destination on the ground, but also of raising awareness on these instruments and their leverage to induce / support evolution of policies, policy frameworks and capacities. This particularly pertains to the thematic area of democratic governance, which by its very nature is less tangible and visible.

KPI-5.2.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   – /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   – BCS to the MR-141402.01 Support to the implementation of the Action Plan – SAPP (2011),
     1.Quality of Project Design
### Additional information from field phase:

- /-/  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JC-5.2:</th>
<th>Several options of aid modalities have been discussed for cooperation interventions by sector and overall their combination has been an inclusive internal strategic process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

#### Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-5.2 (based on the KPIs main findings)

Programming documents reviewed and interviews undertaken during the field phase point to the fact that in most – but not all - instances, due consideration was given – when choosing the aid modality – to the overall scope, objectives and purposes of the interventions, and partners’ capacities and that choices were made on the basis of a consultative process. As a result, and with specific reference to the interventions covered under EQ 4 ‘institutional reform and capacity strengthening of Jordan public institutions, including public finance management’, a mix of project approach including programme estimates and SBS was put in place. On the one hand, the SAPPs, through the adoption of a flexible instrument allowed to enhance Jordan’s capacities to take full advantage of the EU-Jordan Association Agreement (AA) and to link areas of support to the priorities emerging from the dialogue taking place within the AA subcommittees; on the other hand, the two SBS programmes have allowed to fully support what is defined in programming documents as a “well-defined policy and strategy framework that responds to the challenges Jordan faces is under implementation”, thus confirming the appropriateness of the use of the SBS modality. (KPI-5.2.1) More specifically, long and short-term TAs, twinning, TAIEX, SIGMA, provision of supplies and SBS were all used with the overall objectives of supporting institutional strengthening while at the same time ensuring local ownership.

The mix of aid modalities / implementation methods chosen, i.e. project approach with the inclusion of programme estimates, was the result of a joint formulation process that saw the involvement of key stakeholders right from the conceptual phase. (KPI-5.2.2) Furthermore, the mix of contracting modalities (twinning projects, long and short-term TA and supplies) fully supports institutional strengthening and local ownership and is strongly appreciated. (MR 141402.01 of SAPP, 2011). (KPI-5.2.4)

Evidence from the other sectors is also generally positive with regard to the analysis of different aid modalities including the consideration of lessons learnt, whereby:

- In the area of democratic governance, the formulation of the Support to Justice Reform and Good Governance intervention saw a thorough examination of alternative options;
- Alternative options of EU support to the energy, water and environment sectors are studied and piloted, and criteria for preference and eligibility are satisfactorily defined and applied. (See also KPI 9.7.3)
- EU support to the E-TVET Sector was defined in consultation with other donors and stakeholders in the sector and complements other interventions. All these are derived from a credible diagnostic analysis of the USAID as well as the World Bank through their contribution to the sector. (See also KPI 8.6.1)

Evidence from the private sector is mixed. While the analysis of the set of PSD interventions during the evaluation period shows that all contain a correct and credible analysis of the context (see JC 6.5), it is also reported that “a recurrent weakness that hampered results was the lack of strong preparatory analysis, including in consultation with the private sector.” (Evaluation of the European Union’s Support to Private Sector Development 2013). Although support is delivered through a variety of methods including long and short-term TA, twinnings, studies as well as the provision of direct grants / direct financial support to private sector beneficiaries depending on the needs, the same report indicates that the opportunity to use B2B (business to business) approach to PSD did not appear to have received sufficient consideration and concludes that in Jordan “there is little evidence of a [...] well thought-out mix of the potential of the different funding sources available”. (KPI-5.2.3)

Interviews point to the fact that choices are always the result of a consultative process which sees the engagement of the EUD (and EU HQ) and the GoJ (both MoPIC and line ministries). That said, interviews also highlighted:

- a strong preference expressed by the GoJ / MoPIC for the adoption of the GBS or SBS modality as
this allows to have increased fiscal space in a country where the State’s budget is under severe constraint and therefore also has an important symbolic meaning in terms of overall support from the EU to the country. (KPI-5.2.2)

- that in sectors where SBS was less mature (e.g. energy, ET-VET, justice), although the choice was based on solid grounds (support to government policies and reforms), the presence of diverging or unclear priorities within government or at ministry level, despite the existence of policies or policy reform programmes, has led to an imperfect understanding of the mechanism among key stakeholders, whereby some interviewees within line ministries benefiting from SBS demonstrated an insufficient understanding of the instrument, particularly with regard to budgeting, resources allocation and transfer processes, as they did not see the money coming in from the donor. In this respect, it is worth emphasising a certain lack of understanding of the different EU cooperation inputs overall, and in particular of the inputs included in the framework of a BS intervention (financial flows to the treasury, conditionalities, dialogue) and possible complementary assistance in the form of TA or other capacity building measures among stakeholders. At the level of the two main GoJ ministries concerned (MoPIC and Finance), a very good understanding of the EU aid modalities and their main features and characteristics is noted, including of their potential impact on the evolution of policies, policy frameworks and capacities. This is much less the case at the level of the line ministries and other implementing agencies, as was confirmed during different meetings and interviews during the field visit. (KPI-5.2.4)

Finally, it is worth mentioning that in some cases the evidence collected points to the lack of a systematic analysis of partners’ needs and capacities, and to the lack of in-depth discussion regarding the use of diverse aid modalities. This can be linked to the critical situation which followed the global crisis of 2008, the start of Arab Spring together with the strategic and political importance of Jordan: exceptional circumstances that can explain the urgency underlying some allocation decisions and the shortened formulation process. In these cases (e.g. SPRING) a more informal and pragmatic approach based on dialogue between the national authorities and the EU in coordination with the donor community was usually preferred.

**JC-5.3**
The chosen mix of aid modalities has contributed to the establishment of a framework of policy dialogue, technical assistance and capacity building which is strategic and focused on government priorities

**List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 5.3 (codes and definition)**

| KPI-5.3.1 | Degree to which frameworks for policy dialogue at national / sectoral level (focal areas of EU intervention) steered by the GoHKJ are in place, with regular meetings and involvement of relevant sector ministries, clear objectives, and mechanisms for recording decisions |
| KPI-5.3.2 | Degree to which the content of discussions in policy dialogue frameworks are focused on strategic issues and conducive to the effective implementation of the government’s strategy / National Agenda and sectoral policies (in focal areas of EU intervention) |
| KPI-5.3.3 | Degree to which TA & capacity development activities are identified and managed through a government-led coordination system, address specific government priorities and feed into policy dialogue processes (e.g. studies carried out inform policy dialogue, capacity building activities reinforces policy dialogue processes...). |
| KPI-5.3.4 | Degree to which the chronology of changes in frameworks for policy dialogue and coordinated TA / capacity development initiatives show that BS programmes, projects, programme estimates and/or TA played a critical role (or not) in driving the development of effective frameworks (e.g. for BS, general and specific conditions for the disbursement of BS tranches are defined on the basis of the contents of policy dialogue and promote the development of improved frameworks for policy dialogue, and their monitoring feeds policy dialogue processes). |
| KPI-5.3.5 | Extent to which, in the perceptions of representatives of the GoHKJ (including sector ministries), EU and other donors’ representatives, BS processes and/or other aid modalities, working independently or as a complement to BS, influence the evolution of frameworks for policy dialogue and coordinated TA/capacity development initiatives. |
KPI-5.3.1: Degree to which frameworks for policy dialogue at national / sectoral level (focal areas of EU intervention) steered by the GoHKJ are in place, with regular meetings and involvement of relevant sector ministries, clear objectives, and mechanisms for recording decisions

Main Findings on KPI-5.3.1:

Jordan’s Ministry of Planning and International Co-operation is the focal point for all donors, international organisations, and financing institutions operating in the country. MoPIC has a broad mandate in planning and implementation of the country’s development policies and directions as well as in monitoring and evaluating development outcomes. As the institution in charge of coordinating and overseeing the implementation of the National Executive Programme (NEP), MoPIC also is the key institution responsible for alignment of external aid with the country’s development priorities and policies – and thus the key stakeholder in ensuring aid effectiveness, and is the key institution for mobilising external assistance. The role of the International Cooperation Department is to channel and coordinate the external assistance coming to Jordan through loans, grants and technical assistance towards the appropriate priorities, programmes and institutions. Thus, the Department acts as the key interlocutor in the aid management process between the donors and the Government.

The Aid Coordination Unit’s function is to manage and oversee aid coordination. Lately this function however has not been carried out due to fact that there is no personnel in the Unit - currently all allocated 3 positions are vacant. Due to particularly specialised staffing requirements for this function, MoPIC has found it difficult to attract and retain qualified personnel with the result that the Aid Coordination Unit is suffering under a chronic under-staffing. This has clearly made it impossible to adequately develop and manage the function.

The establishment of donor working groups,¹ in 2007, (to be chaired by the MoPIC with the participation of line ministries and donors) with the aim of establishing a structured and technical level dialogue with donors on Jordan’s development needs and priorities laid the basis for enhanced co-ordination but showed a number of shortcomings.

The present formal Government-led sector-level coordination mechanism has been in place since 2011 under the leadership of MoPIC and it is composed of 11 sector-level Government-Donor Coordination Working Groups. While attempts have been made by MoPIC to operationalise the mechanism, currently it is not working. At the sector-level no working groups are operational and at the sub-sector level 2 working groups - Education and Microfinance - are active. While neither of these groups display a full sector-wide coordination mechanism, they represent a programme-based approach at a sub-sector level and have been effective in coordinating alignment and harmonisation in their respective focus areas and could be singled out as demonstrations of good practice within the Jordanian aid coordination system.

With specific reference to PFM issues multilateral meetings occur annually organised by MoPIC, through the Government-led donor coordination group on PFM issues created led jointly by MoPIC and the Ministry of Finance. However the Jordanian authorities have not yet take full appropriation of these meetings as a means to achieve a specific outcome and the 4th Government-Donor PFM donor coordination meeting (October 2013) proved to be less productive than the previous meeting where the Jordanian counterparts were more proactive and produced more outputs. The meeting thus served more as information update and exchange rather than an attempt to coordinate future donor activities.

It seems that this mechanism has been useful for harmonisation – at least to a certain point. There is a relatively good division of labour in place among the resident donors and donor agencies collaborate well with each other to avoid duplication and to coordinate activities. The mechanism however suffers of weaknesses: it is inconsistent in terms of focus, lacks structure and continuity and includes only resident donors, and most importantly is applied only to some aspects of aid effectiveness - division of labour – leaving an equally important aspect of aid effectiveness – alignment largely outside its scope.

That said, while the institutionalised Government-led donor coordination could be much improved, bilateral meetings between GoJ and donors have consistently focused on the highest government priority needs in PFM and the results have been good. The GBD, ISTD, and MOF all communicate regularly with donors to ensure that aid is targeted to the greatest needs.

¹ Working groups have been established in the areas of water, environment, poverty alleviation and local development, education and vocational training, energy, tourism, health, trade and investments, good governance and gender.
Finally, the Jordan Aid Information Management System (JAIMS), operationalised in 2009-2010 with the financing of the EU, with the objective of providing a much needed a comprehensive account of all on-going projects and programmes funded through foreign aid in Jordan, has not performed as expected with the system being periodically out of function. As a result, the system falls short of servicing the needs of the various user groups – donors, Government and other entities involved in aid management and importantly, it fails to serve both international and national audiences such as the general public and media on the crucial aspect of aid transparency.

A recent study (2013) on Aid Coordination and Effectiveness in Jordan concludes that the “aid coordination system in Jordan is not geared towards generating optimal aid effectiveness. While some good practices can be identified the aid coordination system does not function in a manner that would maximise aid effectiveness nor solicit the full engagement of the key stakeholders – internal and international. All stakeholders seem to agree that there is scope for improvement for most elements and at various levels of the process (as discussed above). Also all stakeholders display in the Government – MoPIC and line ministries – demonstrate not only interest but also a clear ownership for aid coordination and are ready to assume leadership for its improvement. Similarly, there is a clear willingness and interest in the donor community to address the shortcomings and jointly work towards making the system more effective.”

KPI-5.3.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - -/-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - IKRS (Feb 2010), p.5
   - AF 020-478 Support to the implementation of the Action Plan II – SAPP II (2008), pp.4-5

(iii) Additional information from field phase
   - Aid Coordination and Effectiveness in Jordan Assessment, Framework and Plan of Action, FINAL REPORT - February 2013, pp.3-6
KPI-5.3.2: Degree to which the content of discussions in policy dialogue frameworks are focused on strategic issues and conducive to the effective implementation of the government’s strategy / National Agenda and sectoral policies (in focal areas of EU intervention)

Main Findings on KPI-5.3.2:

The IKRS (2012 & 2013) report an efficient and fruitful cooperation with the GoJ as well as smooth policy dialogue in all sectors of intervention. Efforts made to ensure a close inter-linkage between the dialogue maintained at programme implementation level and in the framework of the ENP subcommittee dialogue has proved effective in deepening the mutual understanding of the issues at stake, as well as the strategies for EU support in this respect. More specifically, improvements have been noted with regard to dialogue on human rights, social affairs and decentralization issues and point to the success of the SPRING/GGDC which proved to be a valuable platform for dialogue on a broad range of political, economic and social reform with EU MS participation. Macro-economic dialogue and on structural reforms provided a comprehensive overview of the current economic challenges and possibilities for EU support. That said, reference is also made to the need to step-up dialogue in those sectors which are not particularly high on the Governments political priorities. (See also KPI-5.3.1)

KPI-5.3.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - IKRS (Feb 2010), p.4
   - IKRS (02/2012) covering 2011, p.2
   - IKRS(09/2013) covering 2012, p.3

(iii) Additional information from field phase
   - See evidence presented under KPI 5.3.1

KPI-5.3.3: Degree to which TA & capacity development activities are identified and managed through a government-led coordination system, address specific government priorities and feed into policy dialogue processes (e.g. studies carried out inform policy dialogue, capacity building activities reinforces policy dialogue processes...).

Main Findings on KPI-5.3.3:

The 2012 OECD report on Aid Effectiveness 2011: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration reports (p.4 & p.8) that Jordan has maintained strong results since 2007 in respect of indicators on co-ordination of technical co-operation with national priorities and untying aid. Results that can be attributed to the government’s explicit encouragement of government-donor dialogue, transparency and improved planning techniques and to the establishment of clear mechanisms to co-ordinate and direct donor assistance to respond to national policies and development strategies.. [...] All aid received is aligned to national priorities and based on the request made by the GoJ (indicator 3).

The more recent 2013 UNDP report on Aid Coordination and Effectiveness is instead more critical in this respect. While the strong Government ownership of the national planning process is highly positive, for effective alignment of external aid the fact that donors do not take part in the process is an issue. The absence of a structured dialogue and exchange during the national planning process between the Government and the donors makes it challenging for the donors to align their assistance with the national development priorities and programming timetables as well as to harmonise planning with the national systems and to programme and plan external contributions accordingly. It also makes it challenging for the Government to anticipate and plan external funding and so to take the best possible advantage of these funding possibilities. Thus, while the NEP has the potential to set an effective stage for real alignment, this potential does not fully materialise due to the lack of a mechanism for collaboration between the Government and donors.

[...] The absence of tool for Government and the donors for a systematic dialogue about aid. There is no aid...
effectiveness policy that would assist the Government and the external partners in working jointly on the various aspects of aid effectiveness. Due to the lack of an appropriate tool, the Government and particularly MoPIC, do not have any means at hand to define the direction and priorities for the country's aid architecture nor to plan, monitor progress or manage towards results on the various aspects of aid effectiveness.

The informal donor/lender-coordination mechanism has been useful for harmonisation – at least to a certain point. There is a relatively good division of labour in place among the resident donors and donor agencies collaborate well with each other to avoid duplication and to coordinate activities. The mechanism however suffers of weaknesses: it is inconsistent in terms of focus, lacks structure and continuity and includes only resident donors, and most importantly is applied only to some aspects of aid effectiveness - division of labour – leaving an equally important aspect of aid effectiveness – alignment largely outside its scope.

See also KPI-5.3.1 for overall processes and JC 4.4 for specific info on PFM issues.

### KPI-5.3.3 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) **Data, figures and tables:**
- OECD (2012), Aid Effectiveness 2011: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration, p.9

(ii) **Key extracts from documents:**
- OECD (2012), Aid Effectiveness 2011: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration, p.4
- BCS to the MR-141402.01 Support to the implementation of the Action Plan – SAPP (2011), 1. Quality of Project Design
- OECD (2012), Aid Effectiveness 2011: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration, p.8

(iii) **Additional information from field phase**
- -/-

### KPI-5.3.4: Degree to which the chronology of changes in frameworks for policy dialogue and coordinated TA / capacity development initiatives show that BS programmes, projects, programme estimates and/or TA played a critical role (or not) in driving the development of effective frameworks (e.g. for BS, general and specific conditions for the disbursement of BS tranches are defined on the basis of the contents of policy dialogue and promote the development of improved frameworks for policy dialogue, and their monitoring feeds policy dialogue processes).

#### Main Findings on KPI-5.3.4:

Steering Committees established in connection with the different interventions do indeed provide the overall framework for dialogue as they are chaired by MoPIC and include representatives from the ministries / institutions involved in the SBS programmes as well as the EUD. Nevertheless, although dialogue between the Delegation and MoPIC takes place regularly and relations are good, the quality of the dialogue can be questioned. Discussions usually remain at a mechanical level – over how much and when the next payment will be and when it will be made, rather than on substantive policy matters. Policy dialogue is still quite difficult to obtain at the level of the line ministries, albeit the Ministry of Education constitutes a positive exception.

With reference to PFM issues evidence gathered points to the significant role played by the SBS Support to the Public Finance Management Reform Programme and Budget Efficiency Targets (2013) in supporting the establishment and functional operation of a formal mechanism for donor coordination on PFM aid/reform to be chaired by the MoF which was absent at baseline in 2010. The programme in fact included, among the conditions for tranche release, a measure to this end, and an assessment carried out in 2012 attest to the existence of such a coordination mechanism which has also led to the creation by the MoF of a donor/PM matrix was prepared which is expected to enhance harmonization of donor activities. Unfortunately however, despite the promotion of a formalised structure for dialogue in the form of a Government-led donor coordination group on PFM issues created led jointly by MoPIC and the Ministry of Finance and the fact that meetings do take place, the overall value of the coordination group has been thus far rather limited and
remains [only] a formal forum for common information. Government-led donor coordination has been weak on PFM issues in recent years. Despite this, coordination among donors on PFM issues has been strong with donors deploying strong efforts to align each other's respective programmes with other donors so as to develop synergies, and through bilateral meetings which have ensured that donor assistance has consistently focused on the highest government priority needs in PFM with good results. The GBD, ISTD, and MOF all communicate regularly with donors to ensure that aid is targeted to the greatest needs. (see KPI-5.3.1).

Similarly to the PFM SBS programme, the SBS programme to Support the Justice Sector Reform In Jordan includes two institutional framework conditionalities for enhanced policy dialogue amongst its eight special conditionalities for Budget Support variable tranches releases, these are: (1) strengthening of capacities and of co-ordination mechanisms between key-players in the judicial field, and other relevant stakeholders, and (5) strengthening of sector-wide consultation and participatory process for updating policies/action plans. While it is still too early to assess effective accomplishments and/or results related to these provisions in light of recent start-up, interviews with key stakeholders concerned during the field visits pointed out the uphill struggle in effectively establishing, maintaining and further strengthening of such enabling environment frameworks as the different parties concerned in the justice sector tend to maintain and protect this silo set-up and fragmentation.

**KPI-5.3.4 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:

- /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:

- Addendum II to TAPs 021-932 Support to the Public Finance Management Reform Programme and Budget Efficiency Targets (2013), pp.15, 18
- Addendum II to TAPs 021-932 Support to the Public Finance Management Reform Programme and Budget Efficiency Targets (2013), p.17

(iii) Additional information from field phase

- IKRS-2 (2014). p.2
- IKRS-2 (2014). p.3
- See also KPI-3.6.5

**KPI-5.3.5:** Extent to which, in the perceptions of representatives of the GoHKJ (including sector ministries), EU and other donors’ representatives, BS processes and/or other aid modalities, working independently or as a complement to BS, influence the evolution of frameworks for policy dialogue and coordinated TA/capacity development initiatives.

**Main Findings on KPI-5.3.5:**

Interviews confirmed the gist of the evidence presented under indicator KPI 5.3.4, i.e. that BS processes had limited influence on the evolution of effective frameworks for policy dialogue and coordinated TA/capacity development initiatives. This, even in those cases where the SBS programmes include specific conditionalities aimed at promoting dialogue fora. While there is compliance, and the working or coordination groups are actually set-up and meet, they tend to remain at a fairly formal level where information is exchanged but rarely provide an effective space for dialogue on priorities and policies.

Several stakeholders raised the point that coordination is less than optimal, with donor often setting up informal meetings and/or bilateral meetings. Beneficiaries in the energy sector expressed the opinion that coordination between line ministries involved and other beneficiary organizations is not adequate, their involvement in the process is limited and benefiting from BS being a complex procedure, whereas evidence from the justice sector points to the fact that the key stakeholders are more concerned with maintaining and protecting their positions in what appears to be a fragmented set-up rather than working together towards the establishment of an enabling environment for policy dialogue.
KPI-5.3.5 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - -/-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - -/-

(iii) Additional information from field phase
   - See KPI-9.7.6, KPI-3.6.6

JC-5.3: The chosen mix of aid modalities has contributed to the establishment of a framework of policy dialogue, technical assistance and capacity building which is strategic and focused on government priorities

Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-5.3 (based on the KPIs main findings)

Jordan’s Ministry of Planning and International Co-operation (MoPIC) is the focal point for all donors, international organisations, and financing institutions operating in the country. Jordan has promoted several initiatives to increase the co-ordination of aid programmes and build capacity. MoPIC has a broad mandate in planning and implementation of the country’s development policies and directions as well as in monitoring and evaluating development outcomes. It is also the key institution responsible for alignment of external aid with the country’s development priorities and policies – and thus the key stakeholder in ensuring aid effectiveness, and also the key institution for mobilising external assistance.

The present formal Government-led sector-level coordination mechanism has been in place since 2011 under the leadership of MoPIC and it is composed of 11 sector-level Government-Donor Coordination Working Groups. While attempts have been made by MoPIC to operationalise the mechanism, it is currently not working partly because of understaffing of MoPIC’s Aid Coordination Unit. At the sector-level, no working groups are operational and at the sub-sector level 2 working groups - Education and Microfinance - are active. While neither of these groups display a full sector-wide coordination mechanism, they represent a programme-based approach at a sub-sector level and have been effective in coordinating alignment and harmonisation in their respective focus areas and could be singled out as demonstrations of good practice within the Jordanian aid coordination system.

Finally, the Jordan Aid Information Management System (JAIMS), operationalised in 2009-2010 with the financing of the EU and with the objective of providing a much needed a comprehensive account of all ongoing projects and programmes funded through foreign aid in Jordan, has not performed as expected with the system being periodically out of function. As a result, the system falls short of servicing the needs of the various user groups – donors, Government and other entities involved in aid management and importantly, it fails to serve both international and national audiences such as the general public and media on the crucial aspect of aid transparency. (KPI-5.3.1)

Despite the fact that the 2012 OECD report on Aid Effectiveness reports (p.4 & p.8) that Jordan has maintained strong results since 2007 in respect of indicators on co-ordination of technical co-operation with national priorities and untying aid, a more recent study (2013) on Aid Coordination and Effectiveness in Jordan states that (p.5) “the absence of a structured dialogue and exchange during the national planning process between the Government and the donors makes it challenging for the donors to align their assistance with the national development priorities and programming timetables as well as to harmonise planning with the national systems and to programme and plan external contributions accordingly. It also makes it challenging for the Government to anticipate and plan external funding and so to take the best possible advantage of these funding possibilities. Thus, while the NEP has the potential to set an effective stage for real alignment, this potential does not fully materialise due to the lack of a mechanism for collaboration between the Government and donors. The same study then concludes (p.8) that “aid coordination system is Jordan is not geared towards generating optimal aid effectiveness”. And that while “some good practices can be identified, the aid coordination system does not function in a manner that would maximise aid effectiveness nor solicit the full engagement of the key stakeholders – internal and international”. (KPI-5.3.1 & 5.3.3)
That said, “All stakeholders seem to agree that there is scope for improvement for most elements and at various levels of the process (as discussed above). Also all stakeholders display in the Government – MoPIC and line ministries – demonstrate not only interest but also a clear ownership for aid coordination and are ready to assume leadership for its improvement. Similarly, there is a clear willingness and interest in the donor community to address the shortcomings and jointly work towards making the system more effective.” (p.8)

Zooming in on the EU and EU interventions, the IKRS (2012 & 2013) report an efficient and fruitful cooperation with the GoJ as well as smooth policy dialogue in all sectors of intervention. Efforts made to ensure a close inter-linkage between the dialogue maintained at programme implementation level and in the framework of the ENP subcommittee dialogue has proved effective in deepening the mutual understanding of the issues at stake, as well as the strategies for EU support in this respect. More specifically, improvements have been noted with regard to dialogue on human rights, social affairs and decentralization issues and point to the success of the SPRING/GGDC as a valuable platform for dialogue on a broad range of political, economic and social reform with EU MS participation. Macro-economic dialogue and dialogue on structural reforms provided a comprehensive overview of the current economic challenges and possibilities for EU support. That said, reference is also made to the need to step up dialogue especially in those sectors which are not particularly high on the Government’s political priorities. (KPI-5.3.2).

More specifically, although Steering Committees established in connection with the different interventions do indeed provide the overall framework for dialogue (chaired by MoPIC with the participation of representatives from the line ministries / institutions involved in the SBS programmes as well as the EUD), documentation analysed and interviews carried out during the field phase indicate that while dialogue takes place regularly and relations are good, the quality of the dialogue remains poor. Discussions usually remain at a mechanical level – over how much and when the next payment will be and when it will be made, rather than on substantive policy matters. Policy dialogue is still quite difficult to obtain at the level of the line ministries, albeit the Ministry of Education constitutes a positive exception. The following examples illustrate this point:

- In the energy sector, evidence points to the fact that BS induced processes have had a limited influence on the evolution of effective frameworks for policy dialogue and coordinated TA/capacity development initiatives. Although policy dialogue with GoJ exists through different channels, including the relevant Sub-Committee of the Association Agreement, there is no evidence that the existing form of dialogue would be conducive to important changes in GoJ policy. Several stakeholders raised the point that even coordination between line ministries and other beneficiary organizations involved in SBS is less than optimal. (See also KPI-9.7.6).

- In the PFM area, the SBS Support to the Public Finance Management Reform Programme and Budget Efficiency Targets (2013) included, among the conditions for tranche release, a measure aimed to promote the establishment and functional operation of a formal mechanism for donor coordination on PFM aid/reform to be chaired by the MoF which was absent at baseline in 2010. An assessment carried out in 2012 attests to the existence of such a coordination mechanism which has also led to the creation by the MoF of a donor/PMF matrix with the objective of enhancing harmonization of donor activities. Unfortunately however, despite the fact that a formalised structure for dialogue in the form of a Government-led donor coordination group on PFM issues does indeed exist with meetings taking place, the overall value of the coordination group has been thus far rather limited and remains [only] a formal forum for common information with government-led donor coordination remaining weak in recent years. That said, coordination among donors on PFM issues has been strong, with donors deploying strong efforts to align each other's respective programmes with other donors so as to develop synergies; regular communication between donors and the GBD, ISTD, and MOF - primarily on a bilateral basis - has ensured that donor assistance has consistently focused on the highest government priority needs in PFM with good results. (KPI-5.3.4 & 5.3.5).

- Similarly to the PFM SBS programme, the SBS programme to Support the Justice Sector Reform In Jordan includes two institutional framework conditionalities for enhanced policy dialogue amongst its eight special conditionalities for Budget Support variable tranches releases; these are: (1) strengthening of capacities and of co-ordination mechanisms between key-players in the judicial field, and other relevant stakeholders, and (5) strengthening of sector-wide consultation and participatory process for updating policies/actions plans. While it is still too early to assess effective accomplishments and/or results related to these provisions in light of recent start-up, interviews with key stakeholders concerned during the field visits pointed to the up-hill struggle in effectively establishing, maintaining and further strengthening such enabling environment frameworks, as the different parties concerned in the justice sector tend to maintain and protect this silo set-up and
The chosen mix of aid modalities has contributed to the strengthening of policy processes and of public institutional and technical capacities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 5.4 (codes and definition)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPI-5.4.1</td>
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<td>KPI-5.4.2</td>
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<td>KPI-5.4.3</td>
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<td>KPI-5.4.4</td>
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<td>KPI-5.4.5</td>
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</table>

Main Findings on KPI-5.4.1, 5.4.2 & 5.4.4:

Recent EUD assessments in this regard indicate that according to MoPIC “not only is the EU funding important for Jordan in revenue terms but also politically as, without this incentive, it would be very hard to push a reform agenda on reluctant ministries. To this end, the understanding of the nature of Budget Support has significantly improved on the part of the Ministry of Finance and MoPIC. Both these ministries, in the “front line” of the instrument have come to realise that Budget Support, far from being “free money”, actually obliges the partner country to make substantial efforts in order to receive the full amounts on offer”. Evidence gathered with regard to democratic governance issues shows that changes in policies, policy processes and capacities have been affected by the different modalities of EU-Jordan cooperation, whether Budget Support, technical assistance, traditional project approaches, twinning arrangements, TAIEX expertise provision or their combination. There is however also evidence that a number of other external factors also play a significant role in contributing to these developments especially when considering that 14 of the 19 main reform initiatives undertaken by the government over the 2002-2013 period took place in the turbulent years 2011-2012, thus incorporating Jordan in the stream of regional reform processes.

The EU-Jordan development cooperation and policy dialogue processes over the seven years period (2007-2013) covered by this evaluation undeniably have contributed to the advancing of political reform processes aimed at by this cooperation. This can be gleaned already from the list of thirteen (13) draft laws / bylaws discussed for enactment by the Parliament of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan during the June 2014 Extra-Parliamentary Session, of which by far a majority is related, directly or at least directly, to EU-Jordan
cooperation interventions and/or political dialogue. In fact, the approval of quite a number of them is an explicit conditionality for facilitating the release of EU (sectoral) Budget Support variable tranches, as evidence by the respective SBS Performance Assessment Frameworks (PAF) and their monitoring. To mention a few of these: The Administrative Judiciary Bylaw (2014), the Independence of the Judiciary Law (2014), the Political Parties Bylaw (2014), the Amendment of the Civil Service Retirement Bylaw (2013), the Amendment of the Law on Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation Bylaw (2014), the Public Private Partnership Bylaw (2014), the Investment Law (2013), the Parliamentary Code of Conduct Bylaw (2014), the Juvenile Bylaw (2013).

Evidence at sector level is more mixed.

With regard to the private sector, the recent evolution of the business environment and private sector support in the country shows some improvements and a general the willingness to move ahead despite the resistance of consolidated interest. In few cases however, the push form the donors through some specific conditionality allowed for decisive changes and there no direct links can be made between (the few) changes in the national policy framework and EU support. That said, the recent presentation by JEDCO of a specific strategy for SMEs, produced with the assistance of TA funded by EU, could hopefully push for the definition and approval of the new official government strategy.

With regard to the ET-VET sector there is evidence that the SBS programme is contributing to the emergence of a global vision of employment in relation to education, vocational training and higher education. It is also contributing to a better coordination between ministries, various agencies, NGOs and the private sector although this is yet to translate in critical changes in terms of frameworks for policy dialogue, policies processes and policies. The establishment and operationalisation of the E-TVET sector, has not only brought to the forefront the challenges inherent in linking employment and Technical and Vocational Education and Training but also increased the complexity of the sector, with now three government agencies directing / managing the E-TVET sector: MoL (ET-VET Council), MoE (Education Council) and MOHESR (Higher Education Council).

The multi-donor setting which characterises the education sector, where the EU supports the government’s efforts through SBS, has ensured an environment that is conducive to dialogue whereby discussions with government encompass issues related to policies. That said, while it is beyond doubt that the overall donors’ community working in the framework of the ERiKE in the education sector has contributed to establish a conducive environment for policy dialogue and the provision of aligned and harmonised support it is difficult to pinpoint the EU’s specific contribution although there is evidence that the technical expertise within the EUD has helped to move forward in dialogue instances which are then reflected in the choice of indicators.

With regard to the energy sector, it appears that pressure exerted by donors as well as private investors, relevant NGO’s and other activist groups was a driving force in leading the government to implement a comprehensive list of institutional and legislative reforms. With specific reference to EU support, there is some evidence that BS – in particular through the choice of indicators selected for tranche disbursement and their discussion with government has contributed - though marginally - to formal developments in policy frameworks in the energy sector. Reform benchmarks attached to REEEP led finally to the signing of an agreement between MEMR & NRDC/RSS/NERC, to the signing of MoUs with the EE targeted companies and to the creation of Codes Enforcement Office (EO) which has been established as a department within the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MPWH) and to the forming of energy managers/officers of public institutions group indicating more openness towards others a trend that needs enforcement. On the other hand however: i) lack of coordination between different actors relevant to the energy sector (MEMR, MOWI, MOT) indicates that there is more place for actual changes in frameworks for policy dialogue to take place; and ii) that formal changes in frameworks still need to be operationalised.

The key issue here, however, is not the formal meeting of benchmarks and compliance with targets, but the intrinsic quality of these achievements: mere formal compliance with external requirements (e.g. with conditionalities for Budget Support tranches releases) or genuine, authentic and duly owned processes rooted in society. If these milestones are mere paper tigers, there is a risk of providing “democratic facades” for situations which do not change the essence of matters.

Moreover, as it came up in one of the interviews during the field visit: Buying reform can never be part of genuine, inclusive and empowering development processes. This by no means would be an argument against cooperation and policy dialogue as tools for bringing about reform.
### KPI-5.4.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- /-

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- See KPI-3.6.5, KPI-3.6.6, KPI-3.6.7 & KPI-3.6.8, KPI-6.5.5 & KPI-6.5.7, KPI-8.6.5, KPI-8.6.6 & KPI-8.6.7, and KPI-9.7.5 & KPI-9.7.7

### KPI-5.4.3: Degree to which EU interventions have supported increases in technical and institutional capacities within line ministries (central and local level)

#### Main Findings on KPI-5.4.3:

See:

KPI-3.5.1 Extent to which the EU has contributed to a successful implementation of the Judicial Upgrading Strategy to enhance the capacity and efficiency of the judiciary (incl. mediation, criminal justice, juvenile justice and child protection, penitentary reform, administrative capacity, training and evaluation of judges, etc.)

JC 4.1 EU support contributed to institutional reform and capacity development in public institutions at central level for more transparent, efficient, effective and inclusive delivery of public services

JC 4.2: EU support contributed to institutional reform and capacity development of public institutions at local government level (in Governorates and municipalities) for more transparent, efficient, effective and inclusive delivery of public services

JC-6.1 The capacity of the Ministry of Industry and Trade and Supplies and related specialized institutions (public, private and public-private) is sustainably strengthened for SMEs development and modernisation

JC-7.1 The capacity of the overall enabling environment of related specialized institutions (public, private and public-private) with regard to trade, transport and investment facilitation is sustainably strengthened

JC-8.1 EU support contributed to Jordan education system reform for enhanced quality and accessibility of the overall education system through institutional capacity building at the different levels of the education system

JC-9.2 EU support contributed to institutional and human capacity development on renewable energy and on sustainable water use in relevant key entities of Jordan society (public, private and public-private)

#### KPI-5.4.3 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- /-

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- See reference to JCs as indicated above
KPI-5.4.5: Extent to which, in the perceptions of representatives of the GoHKJ (including sector ministries), EU and other donors’ representatives, BS processes and/or other aid modalities, working independently or as a complement to BS, had an influence on the evolution of policies, policy frameworks and capacities.

Main Findings on KPI-5.4.5:

Overall, with the important exceptions at MoPIC and in the line ministries and departments in the education and PFM sectors, the team has recorded a relative ignorance among the main stakeholder groups in Jordan regarding EU aid modalities. Moreover a widespread ignorance of EU cooperation inputs (financial, TA and other) is observed at the level of the intermediate and ultimate target groups.

While in fact, at the level of the two main GoJ ministries concerned (MoPIC and Finance) a substantially improved awareness of the EU aid modalities and their main features and characteristics is noted, including of their potential impact on the evolution of policies, policy frameworks and capacities. This is much less the case at the level of the line ministries and other implementing agencies, as was confirmed during different meetings and interviews during the field visit. There are major remaining challenges not only of bringing Budget Support (and other aid modalities) to their ultimate destination on the ground, but also of raising awareness on these instruments and their leverage to induce / support evolution of policies, policy frameworks and capacities.

This is particularly true with regard to the area of democratic governance, which by its very nature is less tangible and visible. Moreover, as more detailed analysis in relation to other questions has revealed, there are wide variations amongst the sectors / thematic areas regarding the impact the EU aid modalities, and Budget Support in particular, actually entailed with regard to evolutions in policies, policy frameworks and capacities. Positive perceptions of the influence of Budget Support as aid modalities are noted in the education sector and in the area of public finance management but are less evident in the sectors / thematic areas of private sector development, of renewable energy / energy efficiency, and of employment and technical and vocational education and training (E-TVET). Democratic governance is situated in the latter group, however with substantive differences amongst sub-areas within this broad area of democratic governance, with on the positive end of the spectrum elections and with justice reform and human rights at the other end. These general perceptions were also evidenced in the CSOs consultations during the evaluation field visit, both in the focus group discussion and in the mini-survey.

Private sector: despite efforts deployed to capture perceptions of stakeholders through the preparation of a questionnaire, little feedback has been received. That said, interviews point to a generic appreciation for the EU support.

EU support to the education and E-TVET Sectors entailed a recognized impact on the development of a number of policies, policy frameworks and derived strategies (e.g. the development of a 4-year TVET action plan, the development of an Employment strategy and its approval by Cabinet). It also contributed in a substantive manner to building the capacities of human resources at line ministries that adopt BS processes, as for example the Ministry of Education. This support for example covers MoE management and staff members, regional officials and principals of schools. As such, the fundaments are laid for a positive impact and also for positive perceptions on the EU and other donors, leading to the adaptation of up-to-date policies aiming at better performance in qualitative services delivery.

Strong appreciation was expressed for EU support in the education sector and the recent Aide Memoire of the Supervision Mission for ERFKE II of May 2014 indicates that some donors are adopting the concept of EU Budget Support.

For PFM see KPI-4.4.5 where evidence is presented with regard to: i) the strong complementarity between the different aid modalities both when looking at EU activities: e.g. strong complementarity / coordination between SBS and twinning activities financed under the SAPPs (two twinning for the Audit bureau) as well as SIGMA missions as well as between the EU and other donors’ interventions; and, ii) to the instrumental role played by SBS in supporting government reform efforts.

KPI-5.4.5 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - -/-
(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- 
(iii) Additional information from field phase
- See KPI-3.6.6, KPI-3.6.8, KPI-6.5.6, KPI-6.5.8, KPI-8.6.8, KPI-9.7.8

**JC-5.4:** The chosen mix of aid modalities has contributed to the strengthening of policy processes and of public institutional and technical capacities

**Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-5.4 (based on the KPIs main findings)**

Overall, a number of factors have played a role in contributing to changes in policies, policy processes and capacities; among these: government commitment to a reform process, the Arab Spring and all it entailed, donor support and - within this last category – the overall EU-Jordan Cooperation. As a result, it is difficult to attribute change to one or another of the EU support interventions. In fact, while there is evidence that changes have been supported by the EU-Jordan cooperation, whether in the form of Budget Support, technical assistance, or traditional project approaches, there is also evidence that other external factors have played a significant role in contributing to these developments, especially when considering that 14 of the 19 main reform initiatives undertaken by the government over the 2002-2013 period took place in the turbulent years 2011-2012, thus incorporating Jordan in the stream of regional reform processes.

With specific reference to the EU’s contribution, a recent EUD assessment (confirmed during interviews) indicates that according to MoPIC “not only is the EU funding important for Jordan in revenue terms but also politically as, without this incentive, it would be very hard to push a reform agenda on reluctant ministries. To this end, the understanding of the nature of Budget Support has significantly improved on the part of the Ministry of Finance and MoPIC. Both these ministries, in the “front line” of the instrument have come to realise that Budget Support, far from being “free money”, actually obliges the partner country to make substantial efforts in order to receive the full amounts on offer”.

Looking more closely at the EU-Jordan development cooperation and policy dialogue processes over the seven years period (2007-2013) covered by this evaluation, it is undeniable that the EU – through its interventions - has contributed to the advancing of political reform processes. In this respect, it is worth recalling, for example, that of thirteen (13) draft laws / bylaws discussed for enactment by the Parliament of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan during the June 2014 Extra-Parliamentary Session, the great majority is related, directly or at least directly, to the EU-Jordan cooperation interventions and/or political dialogue. A number of these are in fact included as explicit conditionalities for the release of EU (sectoral) Budget Support variable tranches, as evidenced by the respective SBS Performance Assessment Frameworks (PAF) and their monitoring. Among these: the Administrative Judiciary Bylaw (2014), the Independence of the Judiciary Law (2014), the Amendment of the Law on Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation Bylaw (2014), the Public Private Partnership Bylaw (2014), the Investment Law (2013), the Parliamentary Code of Conduct Bylaw (2014), the Juvenile Bylaw (2013).

Evidence at sector level is understandably more mixed whereby stronger links and/or marked achievements have been recorded in the different sectors.

With regard to governance issues and judicial reform the above-mentioned draft laws/ bylaws are testament to the links between the assessment frameworks included in the SBS programme and on-going reform efforts.

With regard to PFM, as detailed under JC 4.4 there is multiple evidence of the strong link between the indicators included in the PAFs or conditions for disbursement and progress made in terms of implementation of PFM reforms. Again, other factors have played a role including the strong coordination / complementarity with other support and TA carried out by GIZ, USAID and others, but both documentary reviews and interviews lead to conclude that “BS has acted as a catalyzer of efforts and has tipped the balance by providing an incentive, giving a sense of urgency that has facilitated the implementation of reforms / new procedures or systems to be introduced”.

With regard to the private sector, the recent evolution of the business environment and private sector support in the country shows some improvements and a general willingness to move ahead despite the resistance of consolidated interest. In a few cases, however, the push from the donors through some specific conditionality allowed for decisive changes. In these cases, no direct links can be made between (the few)
changes in the national policy framework and EU support. That said, the recent presentation by JEDCO of a specific strategy for SMEs, produced with the assistance of TA funded by EU, could hopefully push for the definition and approval of the new official government strategy.

With regard to the ET-VET sector there is evidence that the SBS programme is contributing to the emergence of a global vision of employment in relation to education, vocational training and higher education. It is also contributing to a better coordination between ministries, various agencies, NGOs and the private sector, although this is yet to translate into critical changes in terms of frameworks for policy dialogue, policies processes and policies. The establishment and operationalisation of the E-TVET sector has not only brought to the forefront the challenges inherent in linking employment and Technical and Vocational Education and Training, but also increased the complexity of the sector, with now three government agencies directing / managing the E-TVET sector: MoL (E-TVET Council), MoE (Education Council) and MOHESR (Higher Education Council).

The multi-donor setting which characterises the education sector, where the EU supports the government’s efforts through SBS, has ensured an environment that is conducive to dialogue whereby discussions with government encompass issues related to policies. That said, while it is undoubtable that the overall donors’ community working in the framework of the ERfKE in the education sector has contributed to establish a conducive environment for policy dialogue and the provision of aligned and harmonised support, it is difficult to pinpoint the EU’s specific contribution although there is evidence that: i) the technical expertise within the EUD has helped to move forward in dialogue instances which are then reflected in the choice of indicators; and ii) support provided has contributed to the building of human resource capacities. Finally, strong appreciation was expressed for EU support in the education sector and the recent Aide Memoire of the Supervision Mission for ERFKE II of May 2014 indicates that some donors are adopting the concept of EU Budget Support. As indicated to the team during the mission, the use of SBS in a context of strong government ownership, clear policies and effective dialogue, has allowed the EU to effectively support the efforts deployed by the MoE without setting up parallel structures, thus ensuring that all funds were effectively used to attain their intended purpose.

With regard to the energy sector, it appears that pressure exerted by donors as well as private investors, relevant NGOs and other activist groups was a driving force in leading the government to implement a comprehensive list of institutional and legislative reforms. With specific reference to EU support, there is some evidence that BS, in particular through the choice of indicators selected for tranche disbursement and their discussion with government, has contributed - though marginally - to formal developments in policy frameworks in the energy sector. Reform benchmarks attached to REEEP led finally to the signing of an agreement between MEMR & NRDC/RSS/NERC, to the signing of MoUs with the EE targeted companies and to the creation of Codes Enforcement Office (EO) which has been established as a department within the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MPWH) and to the forming of energy managers/officers of public institutions group indicating more openness towards others a trend that needs enforcement. On the other hand, however: i) lack of coordination between different actors relevant to the energy sector (MEMR, MOWI, MOT) indicates that there is more place for actual changes in frameworks for policy dialogue to take place; and ii) that formal changes in frameworks still need to be operationalised.

Finally, it is worth noting that when investigating the role and influence of the mix of aid modalities during the field visit, the team has become aware that, with the important exceptions of MoPIC and of the line ministries and departments in the education and PFM sectors, there is a relative ignorance among the main stakeholder groups in Jordan regarding EU aid modalities and in particular on the main features and characteristics of BS (inputs flowing to the treasury, conditionalities, dialogue). In a number of cases, interviewees at line ministry level stated that they did not receive the money, whereas further investigation with the MoF indicated that money had indeed been transferred, but that since it is does not arrive with a flag saying ‘EU money’, they were not aware of it.
The chosen mix of aid modalities has facilitated the timely attainment of sustainable results

List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 5.5 (codes and definition)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPI</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPI-5.5.1</td>
<td>Percentage improvement of the actual disbursements versus the planned disbursements over time, overall and broken down by aid modality</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>KPI-5.5.2</td>
<td>Extent of delays (if any) affecting disbursement and implementation related to / attributable to the degree of importance of management and procedural constraints (from both the beneficiary and EUD side) linked to the different aid modalities, overall and per aid modality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-5.5.3</td>
<td>Degree of programme efficiency, effectiveness and impact resulting from the analysis of ROM reports analysed by aid modality and sector</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>KPI-5.5.4</td>
<td>Degree of national ownership at policy and implementation level allowed by the choice of aid modality (parallel Programme Implementation Units, etc.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPI-5.5.5</td>
<td>Key stakeholders at country level confirm the role played by the choice of aid modalities (and their mix) in achieving (or not) the expected results at a reduced (or increased) cost</td>
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KPI-5.5.1: Percentage improvement of the actual disbursements versus the planned disbursements over time, overall and broken down by aid modality

Main Findings on KPI-5.5.1:

When looking at figures emerging from the analysis of the inventory, the percentages of paid amounts over contracted amounts shows an overall decreasing trend in the period 2007-2013, with an overall disbursement rate for the period of 71%. Paid amounts in respect of planned amounts reach highs of 100% in 2007 and 2008 and then start to decrease to 87%. They continue a declining trend over the remaining period, reaching a low of 42% in 2013. Although data related to 2013 is provisional in view of the cut-off date of the inventory at 04/10/2013. This declining trend is largely to be expected as the oldest contracts have been completely paid whereas the more recent ones are still at the implementation stage.

This interpretation is confirmed by the information contained in the most recent EAMRs which analyse yearly forecasted and actual payments, and for the years 2011 and 2012 report an outstanding performance in respect of contracting and payment ratios. “The Delegation met all its targets for the reference period - and beyond, with 100% contracting and 108% payments ratios, which is deemed highly satisfactory and was warmly praised by the counterpart”; and that “good performance in contracting and payments on the ongoing portfolio. As a result, the end year contracting and payment figures largely exceeded the forecast (contracts EUR 110 million / forecast 63 million; payments EUR 94.5 million / forecast EUR 53 million)”

KPI-5.5.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - Please see below

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - EAMR (02/2012) covering 2011, pp.12-13
   - EAMR (09/2013) covering 2012, p.2

(iii) Additional information from field phase
   - Please see below
KPI-5.5.1 (i) Data, figures and tables:

Percentages of paid amounts per year, total and broken down per aid modality over the 2007-2013 period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GBS</th>
<th>PE</th>
<th>project approach</th>
<th>SBS</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td></td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>56%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CRIS database and own analysis

Percentages of paid amounts per year, total and broken down per aid modality over the 2007-2013 period.

KPI-5.5.1 (iii) Additional information from field phase:

Interview with EUD staff.

No hard data in manageable format available to retrieve info on predictability of payments on yearly basis per aid modality and sector/ no statistics on a yearly basis of performance of EUD in terms of payments against forecasts.

KPI-5.5.2: Extent of delays (if any) affecting disbursement and implementation related to/attributable to the degree of importance of management and procedural constraints (from both the beneficiary and EUD side) linked to the different aid modalities, overall and per aid modality

Main Findings on KPI-5.5.2:

Delays affecting disbursements are primarily due to delayed implementation of programmes. Key causes include:

- Lack of capacity at counterpart level, which remains a problem in relation to decentralized programmes including at MoPIC/PAO level (e.g. for SAPP). In this respect, while some line ministries
institutions – despite difficulties – have expressed strong commitment resulting in smooth running of activities, others have been working ‘as if they are managing a fund to be disbursed rather than to be used according to given procedures to achieve given objectives’.

- Priority given by SBS counterparts to maximize tranche disbursement based on results (achievements measured for the on-going year) which leads to delayed or last minute presentation of supporting elements to assess achievements. This generates a vicious cycle of delayed / last minute presentation, delayed / last minute analysis of payments’ request and ultimately delayed payment when supporting documentation is missing or benchmarks not fully achieved.

- Finally, the various hiccups which can affect the smooth running of a TA or project, such as a less than ideal management on the contractor’s side, in addition to a complex and changing external environment.

Reports point to slight improvements when looking at % of projects requiring time extensions (from 42% in 2011 to 37% in 2012) but there remains the need to improve the facilitation role of MoPIC and to provide technical support to address weaknesses of national counterparts (MoPIC and other ministries) to enhance timeliness of decentralized programmes’ implementation and to ensure that targets included in the SBS programmes are set on the basis of realistic timescales.

To overcome difficulties linked to the smooth implementation of decentralized programmes and use of funds through programme estimates, a contract has been awarded and is currently under implementation to provide support to MoPIC and line ministries and help build capacities.

KPI-5.5.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:

(ii) Key extracts from documents:

(iii) Additional information from field phase

KPI-5.5.3: Degree of programme efficiency, effectiveness and impact resulting from the analysis of ROM reports analysed by aid modality and sector

Main Findings on KPI-5.5.3:

Highlights of the analysis of the ROM reports covering the 2007-2013 period:

- **Overall performance** of projects monitored is just below good with an average score across the different criteria of 2.83. Relevance is consistently good and is the only criteria with an average score of 3; all other criteria fall below, ranging from 2.96 (impact prospects) to a low of 2.67 (average score for effectiveness).

- **Best performers** are the Agricultural and Multi-sector aid sectors, with scores ranging consistently above 3 (good), although only 3 projects have been monitored in these sectors overall. Worst performers are, on the other hand, the Education and Trade policy and regulations sectors with an overall average score across the 5 criteria of 2.67 and 2.60 respectively.
- The Agricultural and Multi-sector aid sectors are the best performers (4 or very good) when looking at relevance and efficiency; although only 3 projects have been monitored in these sectors.

- The Multi-sector aid sector is the top performer also when looking at effectiveness with an average score of 4 (good), followed by the Agricultural, Water and sanitation and Emergency response sectors.

- Impact prospects are high for the Emergency response sector (4 – very good), even though there is only one project monitored and again for the Multi-sector aid sector (3.5). Surprisingly, given the relatively lower scores registered under efficiency and effectiveness, impact prospects are also good (2.96) in the Government and civil society sector, sector which has by far the highest number of monitored projects.

- Looking at aid modalities, while the average overall scores across the 5 criteria are similar (2.84 for the project approach and 2.80 for SBS), slight differences emerge when analysing disaggregated data. While both aid modalities register a 3 (good) when looking at relevance and quality of design, the project approach scores better in terms of efficiency (2.83 versus 2.33) and just marginally better in terms of effectiveness (2.68 versus 2.67); the situation is reversed when looking at the remaining criteria with SBS scoring slightly better in terms of impact prospects (3 versus 2.95) and better when looking at potential sustainability (3 versus 2.76).

**Relevance**

As anticipated, the relevance and quality of design records the highest average score of 3 or good. The Agricultural and Multi-sector aid are the best performing sectors with average scores of 4 (very good), whereas the Government and civil society sector, which is also the sector with the highest number of interventions monitored (27), is the worst performer with an average score of 2.89, i.e. just below good.

Looking at aid modalities, both project approach and SBS score an average of 3.

**Efficiency**

The average efficiency score at the time of the monitoring visits across sectors is of 2.76. This average however hides marked discrepancies among sectors. While the Agricultural and Multi-sector aid sectors remain the best performers with an average of 4, and the Industry sector performs well with an average of 3.11, all other sectors fall below the good average score, with marked lows in Water and sanitation (2) and Emergency response (2) meaning that the projects in these sectors have problems and will not meet their purposes in the absence of corrective measures.

Looking at aid modalities, the project approach presents a fairly significantly higher score (2.83) than SBS (2.33) although both fail to reach the 3 – or good average score.

**Effectiveness**

The average effectiveness score at the time of the monitoring visits across sectors is of 2.67, and is the lowest average score recorded across the criteria. The average score however hides a number of discrepancies among sectors. The Multi-sector aid sector confirms its rank as best performer (average score of 4) whereas Water and sanitation, Emergency response and Agriculture register an average score of 3 (good). All other sectors fall below the required threshold to meet their objective with lows in the Industry sector (2.33) and Trade policy and regulations (2.50).

Looking at aid modalities, once again the project approach scores higher than SBS although differences are minimal (2.68 versus 2.67).

**Impact prospects**

The average impact prospects score at the time of the monitoring visits across sectors is of 2.96, therefore significantly higher than efficiency and effectiveness scores. The Emergency sector is the best performer (4 or very good) under this criterion, followed by the Multi-sector aid sector (3.5). Civil society and Energy sectors are also performing well (with averages of 2.96 and 3), this despite their non-satisfactory performances in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. As was the case for the effectiveness scores, the Industry and the Trade policy and regulations sectors are among the worst performers with 2.67 and 2.50 respectively.

Looking at aid modalities, performance of SBS is good (average of 3) while the project approach falls just below (2.95).
**Potential sustainability**

The average potential sustainability score at the time of the monitoring visits across sectors is of 2.7. In this case no sector presents averages beyond 3.5, which is the highest score, and is registered in the Multi-sector aid sector. Water and Sanitation, Energy, Emergency response and Agriculture perform well with averages of 3 or good. All other sectors fall below the good average with a low of 2.5 in the trade policy and regulations sector.

Looking at aid modalities, performance of SBS is once again good (average of 3) while the project approach fails to reach the good threshold and stops at 2.76.

**KPI-5.5.3 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) **Data, figures and tables:**
- Please see below

(ii) **Key extracts from documents:**
- MR-141402.01 Support to the implementation of the Action Plan – SAPP (2011), pp. 1-3

(iii) **Additional information from field phase**
- MR-141402.01 Support to the implementation of the Action Plan – SAPP (2011), pp. 1-3

**KPI-5.5.3 (i) Data, figures and tables:**

The information provided hereunder is the result of the analysis of a file summarising the results of the Results Oriented Monitoring reports (ROM) available for interventions implemented in Jordan between 2007 and 2013. The file is an extraction from the CRIS database of the ROM reports for Jordan.

It provides the following data for 70 monitoring reports:

The information provided hereunder is the result of the review and analysis of a file summarising the results of the Results Oriented Monitoring reports (ROM) available for interventions implemented in Jordan between 2007 and 2013. The file is an extraction from the CRIS database of the ROM reports for Jordan

It is structured in four sections:
- Section one presents the methodology;
- Section two presents an overview of available ROM reports;
- Section three presents the results of the analysis undertaken on the whole set of available monitoring reports and focuses on the results or scores attributed by the ROM reports to the projects; and
- Section four presents the results of a more qualitative analysis of those ROM reports which refer to the selected programmes.

**Methodology:**

The starting point for the analysis undertaken on the set of available monitoring reports (MR) is the reconstruction of the extracted raw data from CRIS (Excel file) for the MRs in relation to the cooperation between the EU and Jordan. The extracted file summarizes the results of the MRs available for projects implemented in the country within the framework of the financing decisions / contracts retained within the inventory.

Overall the file provided data for 58 MRs, including:
- CRIS identification number (contract number or decision number);
- MR identification number
- Title of project
- Sector/subsector (DAC code)
- Budget (contracted)
- Data on the scores attributed by the MR reports to the various projects. For each monitoring report marks “A” to “D” are provided in relation to the five DAC evaluation Criteria of: i) relevance and quality of design, ii) efficiency of implementation to date, iii) effectiveness to date, iv) impact prospects, v) potential sustainability.
- Monitoring reference (number of monitoring report); and
- Report date.

Starting from this available information, the team has validated the data and reworked the file. More specifically:
- Cross-checked with all the projects included in the inventory;
- Classified projects by aid modality, financing instrument and sectors/sub-sectors as per inventory.
With a view to enabling the calculation of average scores, the alphabetical scores have been transformed in numerical scores as follows:

- A: Very good (very good project, fully according to or better than to plan. There is every indication that it will achieve its Purpose and Objectives.) = 4 points;
- B: Good (good project, broadly progressing as planned. But certain corrective measures might be required if the project is to fully reach its Purpose and Objectives) = 3 points;
- C: Problems (the project has problems. Without corrective measures it will not meet its Purpose and Objectives) = 2 points;
- D: Serious deficiencies (Substantial corrective measures, major redesign or termination of the project is necessary.) = 1 point.

After the validation process the monitoring reports decreased from 70 to 56 (i.e. 12 MRs referred to programmes financed through contracts that fell out of the scope of the present evaluation). Furthermore, it is interesting to note that these 56 MRs refer to 89 contracts, which in turn represent 46 interventions. This is explained by the fact that: i) an intervention can be financed through a single contract or a number of contracts falling under the same decision and covering activities of different phases of the same project (the projects that are financed through several contracts but fall under the same Decision tend to have a single monitoring report); and ii) more than one ROM report might be available for a given project.

The aggregated analysis of these ROM reports has been carried out for two purposes:
- Firstly to provide an overview by sector of the average scoring for each of the five DAC criteria; and
- Secondly to provide an overview by aid modality of the average scoring for each of the five DAC criteria.

For these analyses, the following scores have been considered for each programme:

- Score of 1st ROM report for Relevance because the relevance of a programme is better assessed at starting phase;
- Average score of all ROM reports for Efficiency because efficiency of implementation varies during implementation;
- Score of last ROM report for Effectiveness, Impact and Sustainability because effectiveness, impact and sustainability of a programme are better assessed late in implementation.

All figures and tables presented below are thus the result of own analysis based on CRIS data.

As anticipated averages are calculated out of a range of 4 with 1 being the lowest score (i.e. D = serious deficiencies) and 4 being the highest (i.e. A = Very good).

The table below provides an overview of the available ROM reports in relation to the interventions funded in the period covered by the evaluation. Out of the 401 funded contracts between 2007 and 2013, 89 contracts (22.4%) have at least one monitoring report, covering 35% of overall amounts contracted.

**Table 1: Overview of ROMs and corresponding amount by type of cooperation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># of MRs</th>
<th>N. of Projects covered by MRs</th>
<th>Corresponding Contracts</th>
<th>N. of contracts in the inventory</th>
<th>% of contracts of the inventory having MR</th>
<th>Overall Contracted Amount €</th>
<th>Contracted amounts covered by MRs</th>
<th>% of overall contracted amounts covered by MR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>22,4%</td>
<td>405.061.948</td>
<td>173.128.534</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own elaboration based on CRIS data.

Figure 1 – Overall performance per evaluation criteria
In the following figures, number of projects with ROM report per sector / aid modality are indicated in brackets.

**Figure 2: Overall sector performance for Relevance and Quality of Design**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Relevance &amp; Quality of Design</th>
<th>Efficiency to date</th>
<th>Effectiveness to date</th>
<th>Impact prospects</th>
<th>Potential Sustainability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture (1)</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>2.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (3)</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government and civil society (27)</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency response (1)</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy generation and supply (3)</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry (3)</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multisector aid (2)</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Policy and Regulations (2)</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water &amp; Sanitation (2)</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3: Overall sector performance for Efficiency**
Figure 4: Overall sector performance for Effectiveness
Figure 5: Overall sector performance for Impact prospects

Figure 6: Overall sector performance for Potential sustainability (out of 4)
Figure 7: Overall performance per aid modality, all criteria

Table 2: Summary tables with average scores per sector and per aid modality
Main Findings on KPI-5.5.4:

The high percentage of funds channelled through the Budget Support modality (57%) and through the decentralised management (i.e. implementation through Jordanian public structures) within the project approach aid modality, including 10% of funds channelled through programme estimates, indicates the strong willingness of the EU to support national ownership at policy and implementation level.

At country level, the 2012 OECD report on Aid Effectiveness 2011: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration (pp.10-11) reports an impressive rise in the number of dedicated / parallel project management units or implementation units (PIUs) from two PIUs in 2007 to 92 in 2010 - instituted primarily by two major providers of aid – the United Nations and the United States.

Of these PIUs, only one has been established by the EU, and while the latest EAMR (08/2013) confirms the existence of this PIU, it also emphasizes that no new PIUs have been established during the reporting period. On the contrary, the EAMR (02/2012) emphasizes not only the high ratio of Budget Support programs (about 60% of portfolio in 2011 and forecasted to increase in 2012) but also the almost exclusive use of the decentralized management mode for bilateral cooperation.

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1 To make aid more effective, the Paris Declaration encourages donors to “avoid, to the maximum extent possible, creating dedicated structures for day-to-day management and implementation of aid-financed projects and programmes.” A PIU is said to be “parallel” when it is created by the donor and operates outside existing country institutional and administrative structures. In the short term, parallel PIUs can play a useful role in establishing good practice and promoting effective project management. However, in the long run, parallel PIUs often tend to undermine national capacity development efforts, distort salaries and weaken accountability for development. OECD (2012), p.10.
**KPI-5.5.4 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- -/

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- OECD (2012), Aid Effectiveness 2011: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration, pp.10-11
- EAMR (09/2013) covering 2012, pp.12-13
- EAMR (02/2012) covering 2011, p.3
- SAPP I - AF 019-571 Support to the implementation of the Action Plan – SAPP (xx), p.4 & pp.8-9
- OECD (2012), Aid Effectiveness 2011: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration, p.6

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- -/

**KPI-5.5.5 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- -/

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- SAPP I
  BCS to the MR-141402.01 Support to the implementation of the Action Plan – SAPP (2011), 4.Impact Prospects

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- -/

**KPI-5.5.5 Main Findings:**

Key stakeholders at country level confirm the role played by the choice of aid modalities (and their mix) in achieving (or not) the expected results at a reduced (or increased) cost.

**KPI-5.5.5 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- -/

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
-  SAPP I
  BCS to the MR-141402.01 Support to the implementation of the Action Plan – SAPP (2011), 4.Impact Prospects

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- -/

**JC-5.5:** The chosen mix of aid modalities has facilitated the timely attainment of sustainable results.

**Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-5.5 (based on the KPIs main findings):**

Information contained in the different sectoral EQs coupled with information gathered across sectors indicates that choices made with regard to the different aid modalities selected to implement interventions take into account multiple issues: context analysis including policy reform processes, project objectives and purpose, stakeholders / beneficiaries’ capacities, on-going and planned support by other donors. While in the majority of cases, choices made have been soundly based on these different elements and have been discussed between the GoJ and the EUD, in some cases, the identification and formulation phases were not as thorough. This can be explained by the need to support the GoJ in responding to critical situations such as those linked to the global crisis of 2008, the start of the Arab Spring, the Syrian crisis together with the strategic and political importance of Jordan: all exceptional circumstances that can explain the urgency underlying some allocation decisions and the shortened formulation process. In these cases (eg. SPRING) a more informal and pragmatic approach based on dialogue between the national authorities and the EU in coordination with the donor community was usually preferred.

Achievements and progress described under the sectoral EQs (see EQs 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9) indicate that the aid modality chosen has indeed allowed to reach the intended results, albeit with some shortcomings in...
some cases, and in no case did the information retrieved through multiple interviews during the field phase indicate that a different aid modality would have allowed to attain the same result.

Furthermore, evidence provided under JC 5.4 confirms the role played by the EU and the interventions funded in contributing to changes – more pronounced in some sectors than others – in the government reform process both by supporting changes in policies and by strengthening capacities at the level of the different line ministries, agencies and institutions involved. That said, and as previously emphasised, there does appear to be a lack of understanding of the functioning of BS programmes.

The analysis of the summary scores included in the available Results Oriented Monitoring reports (ROM) in relation to interventions implemented in Jordan between 2007 and 2013 provides further insights on the performance of the two key aid modalities (project approach and SBS) used in projects monitored. In fact, while the average overall scores across the 5 criteria are similar (2.84 for the project approach and 2.80 for SBS), slight differences emerge when analysing disaggregated data:

- both aid modalities perform well (3 - good) when looking at relevance and quality of design;
- the project approach scores better in terms of efficiency (2.83 versus 2.33) and just marginally better in terms of effectiveness (2.68 versus 2.67);
- the situation is reversed when looking at the remaining criteria with SBS scoring slightly better in terms of impact prospects (3 versus 2.95) and better when looking at potential sustainability (3 versus 2.76). (KPI-5.5.3).

More generally, when looking at sustainability, it is worth noting the high percentage of funds channelled through the Budget Support modality (57%) and through decentralised management (i.e. implementation through Jordanian public structures) within the project approach aid modality, including 10% of funds channelled through programme estimates, indicating the strong willingness of the EU to support national ownership at policy and implementation level, and thereby foster sustainability. The EAMR (02/2012) emphasizes not only the increasingly high ratio of Budget Support programmes (about 60% of portfolio in 2011 and forecasted to increase in 2012), but also the almost exclusive use of the decentralized management mode for bilateral cooperation. In line with this finding, the 2012 OECD report on Aid Effectiveness 2011: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration (pp.10-11) indicates that the EU – contrary to the rising trend in the number of dedicated / parallel project management units or implementation units (PIUs)\(^1\) – from two PIUs in 2007 to 92 in 2010 – has established only one PIU within the first part of the period analyzed. (KPI-5.5.4)

Looking at actual disbursements, information contained in the most recent EAMRs which analyse yearly forecasted and actual payments, report an outstanding performance in respect of contracting and payment ratios for the years 2011 and 2012, which have either met or exceeded their targets. (KPI-5.5.1) That said, delayed implementation of programmes has indeed occurred throughout the period:

- Lack of capacity at counterpart level, which remains a problem in relation to decentralized programmes within the project approach aid modality including at MoPIC/PAO level (e.g. for SAPP). In this respect, while some line ministries / institutions – despite difficulties – have expressed strong commitment resulting in smooth running of activities, others have been working ‘as if they are managing a fund to be disbursed rather than to be used according to given procedures to achieve given objectives’.

- Priority given by SBS counterparts to maximize tranche disbursement based on results (achievements measured for the on-going year), which leads to delayed or last minute presentation of supporting elements to assess achievements. This in turn generates a vicious cycle of delayed / last minute presentation, delayed / last minute analysis of payments’ request and ultimately delayed payment when supporting documentation is missing or benchmarks not fully achieved.

- Finally, the various hiccups which can affect the smooth running of a TA or project, such as a less than ideal management on the contractor’s side, in addition to a complex and changing external

\(^1\) To make aid more effective, the Paris Declaration encourages donors to “avoid, to the maximum extent possible, creating dedicated structures for day-to-day management and implementation of aid-financed projects and programmes.” A PIU is said to be “parallel” when it is created by the donor and operates outside existing country institutional and administrative structures. In the short term, parallel PIUs can play a useful role in establishing good practice and promoting effective project management. However, in the long run, parallel PIUs often tend to undermine national capacity development efforts, distort salaries and weaken accountability for development. OECD (2012), p.10.
environment.

EUD reports point to slight improvements when looking at % of projects requiring time extensions (from 42% in 2011 to 37% in 2012), but there remains the need to improve the facilitation role of MoPIC and to provide technical support to address weaknesses of national counterparts (MoPIC and other ministries) to enhance timeliness of decentralized programmes’ implementation and to ensure that targets included in the SBS programmes are set on the basis of realistic timescales.

To overcome difficulties linked to the smooth implementation of decentralized programmes and use of funds through programme estimates, a contract has been awarded and is currently under implementation to provide support to MoPIC and line ministries and help build capacities. (KPI-5.5.2). Finally, with regard to SBS, it is worth recalling that – as anticipated under JC 5.4 – a number of interviewees at the level of line ministries (with the exception of the MoF) still appear to lack an understanding of the SBS mechanism. As a result, this not only leads to misunderstandings on how the funds flow from the EU in support of sector policies and institutions but also on the extent to which actual performance in respect of key indicators agreed with the EU affects payments and may thus lead to significant delays in the release of tranches. Discussions with the MoF indicated that under-performance and hence delayed or partial payment by the EU (for variable tranches) might affect the subsequent flow of funds to line ministries depending on the urgency and priority attached to the actions to be funded.

**JC-5.6**

The chosen mix of aid modalities has contributed to the strengthening of monitoring and evaluation systems and capacities

| List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 5.5 (codes and definition) |
| KPI-5.6.1 | Degree to which the indicators / triggers to monitor implementation of EU programmes were jointly identified with the GoHKJ and tailored to the specific context, in particular with reference to BS and programme estimates |
| KPI-5.6.2 | Degree to which the GoHKJ has put in place an effective performance monitoring system to monitor the implementation of EU supported policies and programmes |
| KPI-5.6.3 | Degree to which data on selected indicators collected by the GoHKJ on a regular basis is reliable |
| KPI-5.6.4 | Degree to which data on selected indicators collected by the GoHKJ on a regular basis disseminated |
| KPI-5.6.5 | Percentage of progress and results reports submitted in time (and for BS to facilitate next tranche releases as proxy for the improvement of timely and quality results-oriented performance monitoring and reporting, overall and by sector |

**KPI-5.6.1:**

Degree to which the indicators / triggers to monitor implementation of EU programmes were jointly identified with the GoHKJ and tailored to the specific context, in particular with reference to BS and programme estimates

**Main Findings on KPI-5.6.1:**

The analysis of the documentation reviewed and interviews conducted during the field visit indicate that indicators (general and specific conditions) set out in the Budget Support programmes were in the great majority of cases aligned to country results frameworks and mutually agreed between the GoHKJ and the EU. Furthermore, indicators - often identified and proposed by the EU external formulation mission - are then discussed and agreed between the EUD, MoPIC and the concerned relevant line ministries / institutions. This consultative process, however, did not prevent the selection of overly ambitious targets in some cases.

In the case of SBS programmes, relevance of indicators is evident when looking at the annexes of the Financing Agreement of the second EU-funded SBS PFM programme, where reference is made to extensive dialogue and discussions between the two parties leading to the identification of selected indicators as well as references to other complementary assistance provided. (See also KPI-4.4.2). The BCS of the MR-146414.01 (2013) of the E-TVET reform SBS programme (p.5) also points to the alignment of indicators and
benchmarks with the country’s strategies and policies with the exception of those related to Employment due to the fact that the employment strategy was not yet established. With regard to other programmes implemented through the project approach aid modality, evidence is mixed and limited to date (this will form the object of further analysis during the field phase).

Looking at interventions implemented through the project approach, in the case of the SAPPs for example, while there is no overall programme LogFrame (LF) “specific LFs are developed for each of the projects where objectively verifiable indicators (OVIs) are identified, are SMART and conform to current PCM methodology. Risks/assumptions provide thorough perceptions for an effective implementation.” (MR-141402.01, p.2). The fact that the SAPPs are managed by a PAO within the MoPIC that then coordinates with representatives of line ministries enhances the relevance of activities and indicators.

### KPI-5.6.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- -/-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- MR-141402.01 Support to the implementation of the Action Plan – SAPP (2011), p.2
- BCS –MR-146414.01 Support to the Employment and Technical Vocational Education and Training (ETVET) reform (25/06/2013), p.5

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- -/-

### KPI-5.6.2:
Degree to which the GoHKJ has put in place an effective performance monitoring system to monitor the implementation of EU supported policies and programmes

### KPI-5.6.3 & 5.6.4:
Degree to which data on selected indicators collected by the GoHKJ on a regular basis is reliable and disseminated

### & KPI-5.6.5:
Percentage of progress and results reports submitted in time (and for BS to facilitate next tranche releases as proxy for the improvement of timely and quality results-oriented performance monitoring and reporting, overall and by sector

**Main Findings on KPI-5.6.2:**

The 2012 OECD report on *Aid Effectiveness 2011: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration* (pp.10-11) indicates that Jordan’s overall score regarding the status of results-based monitoring frameworks was rated as a C by the World Bank in 2010, below the global target of an A or B. According to the Government, Jordan has made efforts to ensure the implementation of a monitoring and evaluation framework for its development efforts. The National Development Strategy (NDS) sets out 600 key performance indicators to measure targeted outcomes and implementation, and quarterly and annual progress reports will be produced. Key performance indicators for monitoring the impact of the reforms on development priorities and objectives were adopted, and specialised units were created in a number of ministries. A range of improvements have also been made in the gathering of statistics. The government also reports that 100% of the quantitative indicators for the NDS have baseline data and the report further states that “there are indications that data now available are of the quality and reliability to meet current M&E demands.”

That said, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Development Policy Review Improving Institutions, Fiscal Policies and Structural Reforms for Greater Growth Resilience and Sustained Job Creation report (2012), p. 25 emphasizes that “a good policy process utilizes evaluation mechanisms to inform and feed into the design of future government priorities. The chain is thus intended to act as a virtuous circle, utilizing results and feedback to inform policy makers. This feedback will help provide better clarity to policy strategies and help build momentum for reform sustainability by ensuring adequate targeting of policies. In order for this chain to function properly, the impact of implemented policies must be sufficiently evaluated and civil society organizations must be empowered to provide input and, most importantly, hold the political leaders and civil society organizations accountable.”

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1 This indicator considers the quality of the information generated, stakeholder access to information, and the extent to which the information is utilised within a country level monitoring and evaluation system.
servants accountable for their performance” which is currently not the case.

This is confirmed by further evidence gathered through the review of documentation available and during the field mission in relation to EU interventions which points to the lack of systematic and timely availability of data related to selected indicators required to assess the fulfilment of conditions for the release of tranche payments. This is the case for example of the ETVET that (in the BCS –MR-146414.01 dated 06/2013) receives a score of B in relation to ‘data collection systems and reporting mechanisms foreseen in Financing Agreement being developed, implemented and monitored; and of the Public Finance Management Reform Programme where it is indicated that “several of the sources of verification requested in the policy matrix had not been provided (3rd + 4th tranche payment request, Public Finance Management Reform Programme - 2007/019-214 of 12/2010, pp.1-2). Finally, in the case of the energy sector SBS it is reported that “stakeholders should […] develop a sector-wide monitoring system including performance indicators. Such a mechanism would be instrumental for future policy arrangements and dialogue. (See also KPI-9.7.6).

### KPI-5.6.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- -/-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- BCS –MR-146414.01 Support to the Employment and Technical Vocational Education and Training (ETVET) reform (25/06/2013), p.8
- OECD (2012), Aid Effectiveness 2011: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration, Volume 2, Country Chapters Jordan p.15

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- See also KPI-8.6.2

### Main Findings on KPI-5.6.3:

See KPI 5.6.2 above

### KPI-5.6.4: Degree to which data on selected indicators collected by the GoHKJ on a regular basis disseminated & KPI-5.6.5: Percentage of progress and results reports submitted in time (and for BS to facilitate next tranche releases as proxy for the improvement of timely and quality results-oriented performance monitoring and reporting, overall and by sector

### Main Findings on KPI-5.6.4:

Information gathered during the field phase as well as the review of relevant documentation has led the team to conclude that data is not routinely collected by the government and submitted in the form of progress reports for timely submission of payment requests, but rather that this process is often led by the EUD through the recruitment of external missions and supported in a first instance by MoPIC and then by line ministries.

### KPI-5.6.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- -/-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- -/-
(iii) Additional information from field phase

- /-

**JC-5.6:** The chosen mix of aid modalities has contributed to the strengthening of monitoring and evaluation systems and capacities

**Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-5.6 (based on the KPIs main findings)**

Monitoring and evaluation systems and capacities within the GoJ are still lagging behind.

Indicators / triggers to monitor implementation of EU programmes were tailored to the specific context and are the result of a joint identification process between the EU and the GoHKJ, in particular with reference to Budget Support programmes. The documentary review and field interviews confirm this and indicate that while the indicators are often identified and proposed by EU external formulation missions, these are then discussed and agreed between the EUD, MoPIC and the concerned relevant line ministries / institutions. Consultative process that did not prevent the selection of overly ambitious targets in some cases.

However, despite the fact that indicators (general and specific conditions) set out in the Budget Support programmes were aligned to country results’ frameworks (with the exception being when a policy or strategy was yet to be developed, as was the case with employment within the ETVET reform SBS programme), were mutually agreed between the GoHKJ and the EU and should thus be part of the natural monitoring process undertaken by the Government, there is no evidence that shows that these were consistently and systematically monitored through internal, government-owned mechanisms. Furthermore, information gathered during the field phase as well as the review of relevant documentation in relation to BS programmes has led the team to conclude that data is not routinely collected by the government and submitted in the form of progress reports for timely submission of payment requests, but rather that this process is often led by the EUD through the recruitment of external missions and supported in a first instance by MoPIC and then by line ministries.

Examples of this include:

- the ETVET programme, where the BCS to the MR (06/2013) gives a score of B in relation to the indicator ‘data collection systems and reporting mechanisms foreseen in Financing Agreement being developed, implemented and monitored’; this is confirmed by a recent ILO study which concludes that “a fully integrated M&E system is lacking”, and that the E-TVET Fund should have access to an M&E system, which allows them to measure the performance indicators for each programme, to inspect problems hindering the programme's progress, and to receive beneficiaries’ feedback.

- the Public Finance Management Reform Programme where it is indicated that “several of the sources of verification requested in the policy matrix had not been provided” (3rd + 4th tranche payment request, Public Finance Management Reform Programme - 2007/019-214 of 12/2010, pp.1-2).

- the REEEP - energy sector SBS, where documentation points to the need for stakeholders to “develop a sector-wide monitoring system including performance indicators. Such a mechanism would be instrumental for future policy arrangements and dialogue”. (See also KPI-9.7.6).

As a result, while one of the objectives of BS programmes, i.e. avoid duplication of monitoring efforts, was achieved by ensuring consistency of indicators selected to monitor the implementation of EU programmes with those identified by the GoHKJ’s to monitor the implementation of national strategies / policies, a second objective (be it implicit or explicit) – i.e. to contribute to the strengthening of national governments capacity to monitor and evaluate the implementation of policy reforms – was not.

Finally, whereas Government sources point to the efforts made by the country in implementing a monitoring and evaluation framework for its development efforts, encompassing: i) the identification of 600 key performance indicators for which baselines exist to measure targeted outcomes and implementation of the National Development Strategy (NDS), ii) the creation of specialised units in a number of ministries, and iii) improvements in the gathering of statistics, other sources point to the need for further efforts. More specifically, the 2012 OECD report on Aid Effectiveness (pp.10-11) indicates that Jordan’s overall score...
regarding the status of results-based monitoring frameworks was rated as a C by the World Bank in 2010, below the global target of an A or B\(^1\), and a WB report of 2012\(^2\) (p.25) emphasises that “a good policy process utilizes evaluation mechanisms to inform and feed into the design of future government priorities. The chain is thus intended to act as a virtuous circle, utilizing results and feedback to inform policy makers. This feedback will help provide better clarity to policy strategies and help build momentum for reform sustainability by ensuring adequate targeting of policies. In order for this chain to function properly, the impact of implemented policies must be sufficiently evaluated and civil society organizations must be empowered to provide input and, most importantly, hold the political leaders and civil servants accountable for their performance”, which is currently not the case.

\(^{1}\) This indicator considers the quality of the information generated, stakeholder access to information, and the extent to which the information is utilised within a country level monitoring and evaluation system.

3.6.  EQ-6 IM on Sustainable Private Sector Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Question (code and title)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EQ-6:</strong> To what extent has EU’s support in the area of private sector development (PSD) contributed to the process of sustainable and value added modernisation of the Jordan economy and to more sustainable, inclusive and equitable economic growth?</td>
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<tr>
<th>List of Judgement Criteria (JCs) under the EQ (codes and titles)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JC-6.1</td>
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<td>JC-6.3</td>
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<th>JC-6.1</th>
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<tr>
<td>The capacity of the Ministry of Industry and Trade and Supplies and related specialized institutions (public, private and public-private) is sustainably strengthened for SMEs development and modernisation</td>
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<th>List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 6.1 (codes and definition)</th>
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<td>KPI-6.1.1</td>
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<td>KPI-6.1.4</td>
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### KPI-6.1.1: Percentage of intended / required specific laws and regulations for investment promotion and SMEs development effectively drafted, approved and implemented

#### Main Findings on KPI-6.1.1:

The support to Private Sector and the policies for SMEs, often marked as basic points to increase employment and Jordan’s presence in the international markets, did not avoid the medium to long term absence of coherent strategies and policies.

SMEs constitute a major component of the enterprise sector. They are often engaged in activities with high labour and low capital intensity such as services, construction, transport and light manufacturing. Hence, SMEs have the potential to generate a relatively large number of jobs with limited capital requirements. This may make SME support attractive to government facing strong pressure from raising unemployment rates, and particularly youth unemployment. However, it is important to stress that SME policy is, in essence, a structural policy. Its primary objective is to increase the efficiency and productivity of micro, small and medium size enterprises, by addressing structural market and coordination failures. SME policy contributes to raising the growth potential of an economy over the medium term through a mix of horizontal measures aiming at improving the business climate and target measures directed at raising enterprise efficiency.

In the WB Doing Business 2014 report Jordan kept its position (119) after it went down one rank in each of the preceding years. In the WFE Global Competitiveness Jordan occupies the 68th rank in 2013 after being ranked 64th in 2012, 71st in 2011 and 65th in 2010. The trend shows that the supposed reforms have had less impact in the last years. The country has been considerably affected by the global financial and economic crisis in recent years. After a marked improvement in the first years of 2000, in recent ones Jordan slowly but steadily went down in both rankings (doing business reports are related mostly to SMEs while global competitiveness reports focus on enterprises / investments in general).

Jordan can surely benefit more from openness to international trade and investment, which could trigger efficiency gains in the domestic economy, as well as the transfer of knowledge and technology. But tariff barriers remain high in international comparison (104th) and regulatory barriers to FDI remain in place (70th). Overall, Jordan compares well with the other MENA countries, except for Tunisia (40th), as we have Morocco ranked 73th, Lebanon 89th and Egypt 94th.

According to the “Report on the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Enterprise 2013”, the structure of the institutional framework for SME policy in Jordan has remained largely unchanged since the publication of the 2008 report. The Ministry of Industry and Trade is formally in charge of enterprise and SME policy elaboration, while the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation is responsible for elaborating the broader country development strategy and mobilizing donor support. Policy implementation is delegated to a number of specialized agencies. The most relevant body for SME policy has been since 2006 the Jordanian Enterprise Development Corporation (JEDCO).

However the institutional set-up (from investment legislation to supporting tools for SMEs to financial / credit sector regulations and set-up) needs more clarity and separation of tasks and responsibilities to increase effectiveness on the one hand and to offer credible and stable support and safety to economic operators on the other. In many cases there have been announcements for new regulations / laws, but then the real approval and implementation did not follow.

When in the Doing Business WB 2011 report Jordan’s ranking dropped sharply, MoPIC started a public-private dialogue to identify and prioritize reform issues and challenges in order to prepare and implement a comprehensive reform plan that would increase Jordan’s competitiveness. To shape this initiative appropriately, this process was not planned as a one-off innovation strategy exercise squeezed through during one short-lived government tenure, but a process with the capacity to span successive government tenures and enlist many stakeholders and partners in a continuous flow of reforms leading towards the goal. The initiative was placed under the banner of innovation because innovation is more readily associated with leapfrogging and creating a distinctive future, whereas it is harder to mobilize and motivate the nation through a pure “competitiveness” label, which many people tend to associate with negative experiences (e.g. wage restraint, devaluation). The Committee, which includes representatives from relevant ministries and agencies, devised recommendations to improve the business environment in Jordan on the basis of the framework provided by the Doing Business (DB) report and key areas of concern underlined by the 2007 Investment Climate Survey. These recommendations focused on: (i) the legal infrastructure for access to financial services; (ii) SME development and access to credit; and (iii) the Public Private Partnership
programme (PPP) as an infrastructure investment model in the Kingdom. This commendable effort however should be re-launched to recover momentum and impact.

Despite the fact that Jordan has made substantial strides in reforming its legal and regulatory framework for businesses, much still remains to be done. There have been however some improvements: as an example, the key obstacle to start a business is getting the licenses to actually operate. As part of the various reforms to speed up the opening of businesses, the latter now can be done within a day. Credit reporting and information-sharing is being improved through the public credit registry and through a new Credit Bureau Law, whose full implementation needs yet to be finalized. The required paid in minimum capital went from 795.4% of Gross National Income (GNI) in 2007 down to zero% in 2011, and the cost of obtaining construction permits was reduced by 42% between 2007 and 2011. Notwithstanding these achievements, Jordan has been overtaken in the Doing Business rankings by other countries that have more active and effective business regulation reform programmes. In a number of areas, including registering property, official fees remain relatively high compared to other regional and global practices.

Areas striving for improvement are those related to business registration, construction permits, contract enforcement and bankruptcy procedures. In particular, Jordan scores low on the ease to “start a business,” as starting a business in Jordan still requires numerous procedures and high costs (rank 95 out of 183 in 2012 and 103 out of 185 in 2013), and “dealing with construction permits” (rank 93 out of 183 in 2012 and 102 out of 185 in 2013). Lastly, in “enforcing contracts” (rank 130 out of 183 in 2012 and 129 out of 185 in 2013) and in “resolving insolvency” (rank 104 out of 183 in 2012 and 112 out of 185 in 2013) Jordan performs poorly. Unpredictability or inconsistency in the interpretation of the regulations by officials does not seem to be a problem for firms in Jordan, as compared to firms in other countries in the region such as Yemen. The enforcement of basic contractual rights in Jordan is cumbersome, time consuming and costly, representing a significant disincentive for lending to SMEs. Weak credit information and limited creditor rights aside, the court system in Jordan is slow and costly. In particular, the 2012 Doing Business indicator of “enforcing contracts” places Jordan low at a global rank of 130 (out of 183), reflecting impediments such as simple commercial disputes that take 689 days and 31% of the claim value to resolve.

In addition to the high costs and inefficiency associated with the majority of regulatory procedures in Jordan, unpredictability or inconsistency in the interpretation of those procedures by officials does seem to be an issue. According to a recent WB survey, almost every second firm in Jordan disagrees with the statement that interpretations of regulations by officials are “consistent and predictable”.

On the status of the main laws and regulations affecting the business environment, recent reports state the following:

**The Credit Information By-Law.** This by-law establishes the regulatory framework for private credit bureaus. Importantly, it includes a provision for mandatory sharing and inquiring by banks on borrowers, which will help ensure that a future credit bureau(s) makes a significant contribution to managing systemic and credit risk, while reducing the time needed to build a solid database and have the credit bureau operational. The Ministry of Industry and Trade prepared the first draft of the Law and undertook wide consultations with private sector representatives, the Central Bank and the Banking Association. Then, it passed the draft legislation on to the licensed banks for feedback and posted it on its website for feedback. Following this step, the draft legislation was transferred to the Central Bank of Jordan for final review and amendment. The Central Bank of Jordan in turn conducted its own consultation with relevant stakeholders on some aspects of the draft law before submission to the relevant Inter-Ministerial Committee, then tabled to the Council of Ministers for approval. The country has established a public credit information bureau, but the information is still not widely available and firms and individuals cannot access their data by law. Furthermore, the bureau is confined only to financial institutions. In practice, this is reflected in the weak coverage of the bureau of only 2% of the population in 2013. However, a private credit bureau, the Credit Bureau Corporation, currently under registration, is expected to start in early 2014.

The collateral regime is still restrictive and provisioning requirements are not different for loans under EUR 20,000. With respect to creditor rights, the IFC is currently working with the Jordanian government to develop a secured transaction law for moveable property. According to Doing Business, secured creditors are able to seize their collateral after reorganisation, i.e. there is no ‘automatic stay’, but most of the other rights protecting creditors are still missing in Jordan.

**The Draft Public Private Partnership Law.** The PPP Law has been submitted to wide consultations. Beyond routine discussions with relevant ministries, numerous workshops were organized by the Executive Privatization Commission to collect the private sector’s feedback on the draft law. Accordingly, amendments were made to the law prior to presenting to the council of Minister for the executive branch’s approval before
The Draft Investment Law. The Ministry of Industry and Trade held several seminars and workshop in February 2011 to discuss the different aspects of the proposed law. Stakeholders attending the workshop included representatives from public entities, business associations, the Chambers of Commerce, banks, realtors, and donors. These stakeholders contributed to the amendments of the draft law. The investment law (approved by the Council of Ministers in June 2011) includes provisions in the right direction. It streamlines the number of tax exemptions. Article 4 of the new law stipulates that the Council of Ministers can grant any privileges to economic activities that create jobs for the Jordanians, increase local added value, or contribute to R&D, regional development, and the transfer of technology; the list of the privileges has to be published in an official gazette. However, the law refrains from the implementation of monitoring and evaluation systems to benchmark the performance of benefitting firms.

Other measures adopted to support SMEs recently announced are:

- Strengthening the capacity of financial institutions, banks, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)-MFIs, to enhance MSMEs’ access to finance.
- Finalizing a partial guarantee scheme with the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), which was led by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, aiming at improving access to finance for medium enterprises.
- Preparing a National Start-ups and MSME Strategy that is led by the Jordan Enterprise Development Corporation (JEDCO).
- Improving the business environment for SMEs, especially fast-growing innovative ones through regulatory reforms related to red tape, etc.
- Approving basic mobile phone payments, and the enactment of its guidelines.
- Working on adopting a comprehensive secured transactions law and the development of a collateral registry.
- Under a new revitalized management, the Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation (JLGC) has refocused its attention on SME lending, developed a new Islamic product, and signed new agreement with three banks to extend guarantees to their SME lending.

It must be added that the privatisation programme implemented around the years 2005/6 (where the EC SRRP offered a strong support) was viewed as one of the most successful privatization programmes in the Middle East. It was broad-based, covering telecommunications, public road transportation, air transportation, and energy and mineral resources. Its proper implementation was facilitated by a number of structural reforms that made Jordan more attractive to investors. It involved all the modalities provided for by the law: direct sell-offs to strategic investors, public offerings, concessions, BOTs and other modalities of PPP. The programme brought about substantial benefits to the companies, their workers, consumers (e.g. lower prices of services in the telecom sector, better quality and range of services and better market penetration); it has helped the involved sectors to become more competitive, and it benefited the economy through its direct and indirect impact on investment, deepening the financial sector, improving public finance and reducing public debt. Accordingly, most objectives of the privatisation programme as stated in the Privatisation Law have been almost fully met. Within this frame, regulatory bodies in the telecom, electricity, civil aviation and public transport sectors have become more effective in conducting their mandates as their capacities grew. However, the actual impact of the regulatory agencies will depend primarily on their actual independence from their Ministries.

The most recent development is the presentation of the “Draft Jordan National Entrepreneurship and SME Growth Strategy Framework”, on the occasion of the Conference organized by JEDCO on “Private sector led Growth: promoting entrepreneurship, MSME development and job creation in Jordan”, held in January 2014. Prepared by TA within the EU-funded SEED project with JEDCO, the “Strategy” was endorsed by the Cabinet. Now the ongoing translation into Arabic will allow for a larger distribution and the formal presentation to the Parliament.

Later, in the framework of the strategy approval process, a new institution was announced upon decision by the Cabinet on 16 March 2014, the “Higher Council for SMEs Support”: composed by MoPIC (chairperson), MoIT, MoF, Central Bank, Jordan Chamber of Commerce, Jordan Chamber of Industry, it will have two committees, one “technical” committee that should study the policy measures and one “allocation” committee that should be in charge of assessing and distributing the resources coming from the donors addressing the private sector support. Both committees are supposed to be supported by JEDCO as secretary; but for the moment, apart from the announcement of the new body, (that should be a substantial novelty in the private sector support environment), there is no trace of real activities.
One critical issue within the support offered by the EC has been the transfer of the accumulated experience and knowledge that risked being lost during the shift from project / programmes to Jordan management. This problem has been observed despite joint efforts by the EC and the Government to manage the transition process. The process of transferring knowledge from EC projects to the Government is therefore to be recognised as complex and not yet fully mastered. The most recent experiences with JEDCO produced better results in terms of consolidation of TA experience but leaves doubts on sustainability.

KPI-6.1.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Please see below

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- CSPNIP2007-2010 p.9
- CSPNIP2007-2010 p.13
- EU AR 2009
- EU AR 2010
- EU AR 2011
- EU AR 2012
- SRRP Final evaluation 2012
- Jordan Country Eval 2005
- EBRD Country strategy 2012
- EU AR 2013
- CBJ 2013 Annual Report
- SRRP Final Evaluation 2012
- WB Jordan doing business 2014
- Report on the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Enterprise, 2013 enterprise policy assessment, DG ENTERPRISE

(iii) Additional information from field phase

KPI-6.1.1 (i) Data, figures and tables

Jordan performance in WB doing business criteria 2005-2013
(WB Doing Business Jordan 2013)
KPI-6.1.2: Percentage of planned specialized institutions (public, private and public-private) to support SMEs with clear mandate established, funded and effectively operational

Main Findings on KPI-6.1.2:

The attention to SMEs in the country has always been high both with the Government and with the major international donors. However, as shown in the former paragraph, this attention did not coalesce into a formalized institutional set-up well focused on SMEs, but mostly developed a wide set of operators (public and private) without a leading and coordinating role. Only recently, thanks to JEDCO effort, a formal overall strategy has been presented together with the suggestion to have a specific law for the SMEs.

After many years of reforms and plans, it should be noted that the role of industrial policies in Jordan is not completely defined; in effect, several ministries and institutions have overlapping responsibilities with respect to fragmented investment promotion and industrial policy strategies, including the attention for SMEs promotion. It is well acknowledged in all official documents that the largest share of employment is at SMEs level and that then the promotion of SMEs should be a priority for actions and investments. All international donors stress the same theme and offer support while alternative strategies are mobilized. A recent study counted 41 institutions / organizations operating for supporting SMEs in the country.

There exist different sector-specific incentive programmes with varying objectives. The Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT) developed an industrial policy strategy focusing on SMEs where JEDCO is generally responsible for its implementation. The Jordan Investment Board (JIB) had the mandate to improve business environment and provide (tax) incentives to investors (but the recent re-organization still needs to produce the new directives). The Development and Free Zones Commission (DFZC) developed a comprehensive strategy for four regional development zones, each of which aims to promote specific industries by granting substantial tax exemptions and providing other incentives. The Central Bank of Jordan implements a credit support programme for SMEs (reducing reserve requirements for private banks equivalent to their total SME loans). The industrial policy programme of the MoIT assists SMEs in upgrading their technologies and knowledge base; however, it refrains from targeting specific industries or groups of firms with the highest potential to benefit and does not define clear-cut conditions linking government support to SMEs' performance.

The government has started to address some critical bottlenecks in the country's financial infrastructure. In particular, critical reforms to the legal framework for credit information would reduce the cost and risk of SME lending, thus easing the constraints to access to finance that limit SMEs' potential contribution to employment, competitiveness and growth. To support the reform efforts, a credit information by-law has been approved. This by-law establishes the regulatory framework for private credit bureaus. Importantly, it includes a provision for mandatory sharing and inquiring by banks on borrowers, which will help ensure that a future credit bureau(s) makes a significant contribution to managing systemic and credit risk, while reducing the time needed to build a solid database and have the credit bureau operational.

Legal reforms enabling broad-based access to bank finance, investor protection, and contract enforcement started, but for the moment not all institutions and organizations have completed the set-up with definite tasks and responsibilities.

In particular, the official legal regulations to protect investors and enforcing contracts have not changed significantly since 2004. The latter indicates a problem of implementation in the judiciary system since ‘enforcing contracts’ measures the number of official procedures, time and costs to enforce a contract. While the low ranking in contract enforcement reveals room for discretion in the judiciary system, the low ranking of investor protection suggests similar room for discretion in the corporate sector. Thus, both indicators reflect high degrees of discretion in the system that can potentially be exploited to discriminate between firms or to gain privileges.

The below figure from “Doing Business” confirms that the main critical points in the Jordan Business environment are the protection of investors and the inefficient credit / financial markets. The Access to Finance criteria show the absence of reliable information exchange on creditors and the lack of a transparent system, discouraging banks from lending to businesses unless they have a long and established relationship or asking exorbitant collateral. To establish a responsive and appropriate credit information system has been a long-term priority still not completely achieved in the present banking practice, as the indicators of the Doing Business 2014 show, even though a law has been drafted (see former paragraph). Other financial services sector areas lacking consolidated capacity are venture capital, long-term loan finance, capital
equipment leasing and securitisation of financial instruments.

MSMEs are major contributors to the Jordanian economy and to its competitiveness, and employment potential. There are around 150,000 registered enterprises in Jordan, of which MSMEs account for more than 99%. The majority of jobs are generated through MSMEs, employing around 71% of private sector employees, of which SMEs employ 32.7% and microenterprises 38.7%. This sector is also a substantial source of exports and incomes in Jordan. It can play a key role in the shift to the establishment of high-value growth sectors, initially through enterprise creation and subsequently through providing services and inputs, and increasing productivity through adopting and applying innovations. Although smaller firms in Jordan grow at faster rates in comparison with their large counterparts, and create more new job opportunities, they are confronted with numerous hurdles. Inadequate access to finance is frequently cited as one of the main constraints confronting their development. Financial intermediation, in general, is very low in Jordan compared to other developing economies.

The Jordanian financial system is relatively large, dominated by the banking sector. There are 26 commercial banks, and among them four Islamic banks that offer Shari’a compliant products. However, 47% of assets, loans and deposits are concentrated in the three largest banks. Also, the banking sector is less competitive compared to banking sectors of other countries in the MENA region. In parallel, non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) in Jordan are underdeveloped and play a limited role in the financial intermediations. Private sector credit-to-GDP is also relatively low at 80% and mainly allocated for the large corporate lending (80%). However, only 11% of the bank lending goes to SMEs, compared to 25% in emerging markets. Furthermore, SMEs are undercapitalized and predominantly financed through internal funds and informal sources.

Private sector credit-to-GDP is relatively low at 8%, which is largely allocated to the large corporations. Although banks are the principal source of external finance for SMEs, only 11% of bank lending goes to SMEs, compared to 25% in emerging markets. There are large disparities in terms of access to credit by size of firms. Only 27% of the small firms have a loan versus 38% of medium-sized firms and 53% of large corporations. Only 27% of the small firms in Jordan have a loan, compared to 49% of medium-size firms. Also, bank financing mainly funds working capital, rather than new investments. In terms of physical outreach, the allocation of the bank branches generally matches the concentration of population in Jordan. Although Irbid and Zarqa (both of which have many active SMEs), have much less bank branches as compared to Amman.

In terms of physical outreach, overall branches are distributed in line with population, although Governorates such as Irbid and Zarqa, both of which have active SME populations, are relatively less well served by bank branches compared to Amman.

Bank’s SME lending in Jordan is constrained, among other factors, by outdated techniques that do not effectively manage risk or lower costs. In particular, more efficient SME lending techniques and better risk management are held back by a lack of credit information, by weaknesses in the secured transactions and by insolvency frameworks. The situation for MSMEs has become worse after the Arab Spring, for two main reasons: first, the public budget deficit meant that Government borrowing from banks has expanded crowding out private sector borrowing in general, but especially SMEs. Only a few banks in Jordan have established dedicated SME departments, and have the capability to lend to SMEs. Most Jordanian banks use internal rating systems for SME lending (which are based on a financial and qualitative analysis of SMEs), and most of them are not following international best practices. This is because banks often use outdated techniques that do not effectively help in risk management or in reducing costs. Moreover, credit risk is not well managed in Jordan, leading to a higher rate of non-performing loans (NPLs) for SMEs (20%), as compared to larger firms (10%) and the average rate for MENA (12%). The estimated gap for SME lending in Jordan is around USD 547 million, compared to USD 1.05 billion in Egypt, USD 497 million in Morocco, and USD 247 million in Tunisia. Therefore, the figures reveal that there is high potential for growth in the SME sector.

Regarding the credit environment, there are, however, some issues that deserve attention. Due to the still difficult overall context and the credit regulations still not effective, banks tend to move away from MSME lending to other sectors. There has been some evidence of crowding out of the private sector by the Government with the widening fiscal deficit, which will inevitably have implications on the liquidity of the banking system. The problem is made worse by the uneven distribution of liquidity among the banks. In particular, apart from the three largest banks in Jordan, the other small and medium sized banks are facing considerable stresses on their liquidity position. So, although on aggregate the banking system seems to have excess liquidity, this liquidity is unevenly distributed, whereby the medium-size banks that usually lend
to SMEs are the ones suffering most from lack of liquidity, while the three biggest banks have ample liquidity. Recent analysis of the hidden demand for financial services reaches the amount of 1 billion JD, out of which almost 550 million from SMEs; there are few credit opportunities facilitated by IFIs that are – according to JEDCO sources – scarcely used; a questionnaire circulated recently to the beneficiaries of EC support through JEDCO showed a strong reluctance by the economic operators to respond to credit offer (this can probably be explained by the large amount of resources distributed as grant that created an attitude and further expectations).

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Jordan market could be too small for a plurality of actors active in the SME support environment: as an example, the potential universe of credible beneficiaries in the manufacturing sector could be estimated in 1000/1500 units (consider that almost half have received already some form of support from the different EC Programmes). A revolving fund with 50/75 million JD capital could easily service while at the same time being fully sustainable. The return of much larger investments with the same purpose could be limited with reduced marginal benefits.

KPI-6.1.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- IBRD MSME Inclusive Development project 2013
- Investment climate survey 2012
- See also below

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- WB Development Policy Review 2012b
- CSPNIP2007-2010 p8-9
- ROM MR10206.04
- ROM MR10206.04
- www.kafalat.com
- World Bank Doing Business 2014

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- Junji Wakui, Senior Representative, JICA

KPI-6.1.2 (i) Data, figures and tables:

Criteria for Doing Business in Jordan 2014

(WB Doing Business in Jordan 2014)
KPI-6.1.3: Degree to which the operationalisation of more efficient company registration processes have been effectively facilitated

Main Findings on KPI-6.1.3:

As “Doing Business” reports, there have been recent improvement in the registration process and in the rules to start a business: reduction of minimum paid in capital, reduced property transfer fees, eased the process of paying taxes for business with the introduction of an online filing and payment system, and a simplification of filing forms, a single reception service for registration at the company registrar). Although announced in many occasions, the “one window” registration process is still to be organized. The overall decision needs to be adapted with other changes in regulations at different institutions involved in the process (MoIT, Chambers of Commerce/Industry, Safe Department of Ministry of Interior, Municipality, etc.) that up to now have not been completed. It must be noted that the most recent assessments of the process mark that the time needed is not substantially different from neighbouring countries.

However Jordan has one of the lowest firm entry rates (per capita) among the selected emerging economies with available data. The entry density is measured by the number of newly registered limited liability firms per 1,000 working-age people (between ages 15-64). The data collected by IBRD are available for 80 countries. Only 26 out of these 80 countries had an entry density below the one in Jordan in 2009 (0.74). Between 2004 and 2011, there was an average of 0.67 limited liability companies established per 1000 working-aged resident. This compares favourably to most other economies in the region but not with other countries on the same level of development (Croatia / Costa Rica / Montenegro); the density of around 25.6 MSMEs per 1,000 inhabitants remains low in a global perspective.

Even though entry levels are still relatively low, the yearly number of newly registered firms increased noticeably in recent years. Following a new law in 1997, Jordan created a new entity in charge of modernizing business registrations, which fully implemented electronic firm registrations in 2002. The yearly number of newly registered firms increased steadily thereafter: from 1,104 new firms (density of 0.37) in 2004 to 2,737 new firms (density of 0.74) in 2009, even though this does not allow the country to climb up in the score, that remain quite low. Jordan was one of the few countries where the number of newly registered firms did not decline in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2009.

Of the total 156,728 private sector establishments reported by the 2011 Establishment Census, 92% employed between 1-4 persons and another 7% employed between 5-19 persons. Further, 94% of enterprises have a registered capital of no more than JD 20,000. The 2011 Employment Survey shows that businesses with fewer than 100 employees account for 64% of private sector employment, with businesses with 4 or less employees making up 35% alone. These micro enterprises operate predominantly in the retail trade (non-vehicle) sector, where they account for 98% of businesses.

The low density of enterprises and the low growth are surely consequence of the regulatory and business environment that, as we have seen, needs to be strengthened on the one side and facilitated on the other side. But probably there is one more reason: the lack of entrepreneurship as attitude. It is not surprising to find out that as such there is no special course in any school curriculum for it.

In Jordan, the community of higher education has already prepared a national discussion paper on entrepreneurial learning in higher education. There are efforts from higher education sector to exchange good practices on entrepreneurial learning, which can create more opportunities for networks of universities to connect entrepreneurial learning in higher education with a national policy of education and economic development. But they still have to produce credible results. Only few private universities offer management and entrepreneurship course.

KPI-6.1.3 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Average entry density for selected emerging economies from 2004-2009, World Bank 2012b

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- EU JORDAN Action Plan
- WB Development Policy Report 2012b

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- /-

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KPI-6.1.4: Number of targeted SMEs effectively and sustainably supported by the specialized institutions, with breakdown by type and size of support services, by type (size, sector) and location of SMEs and with special focus on starters and on economic governance aspects

Main Findings on KPI-6.1.4:

No data are available at country level on the number of targeted SMEs effectively and sustainably supported by the specialized institutions.

The only available data refers to the EU interventions implemented though JEDCO (see below table).

The total up to now gives 492 contracts signed; because there have been cases on the same company awarded more the one contract, it is possible to estimate the final beneficiaries around 460 companies, out of an universe, as we mentioned, in the former paragraph, of around 11,000 companies of the targeted dimension (>5 employees, <250 employees).

The total invested until July 2014 amount to EUR 26.2 million in grants that developed as multiplier EUR 38.8 million expenses (as capital investment and working capital): the final multiplier is close to 1.48, that is a rather low result.

The main reason is evidently the modality: grants when they can cover up to 90% of costs cannot produce a relevant multiplier.

KPI-6.1.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - /-

(iii) Additional information from field phase
   - /-

JC-6.1: The capacity of the Ministry of Industry and Trade and Supplies and related specialized institutions (public, private and public-private) is sustainably strengthened for SMEs development and modernisation

Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-6.1 (based on the KPIs main findings)

After many years of reform efforts followed by acknowledged successes by major IFIs and after years of increased attention, the business environment consequent to the open market and open trade long-term strategy established since the 90’s – that was indeed able to start the improvement of the overall institutional context – also the business country environment saw some important positive changes but still needs critical improvements as the scoring (and the recent years trend) in 2014 edition of “Doing Business” and “Global Competitiveness” show (KPI 6.1.1). In effect, the trend shows that the reforms have less impact in the last years. The country has been considerably affected by the global financial and economic crisis. After a marked improvement in the first years of 2000, in recent years Jordan went down in both rankings.

It is evident that the level of political instability has had a negative relationship with government strategic policies and almost every sector of the economy suffers from the consequent lack of continuity. Political instability is a result of many external political events, but also a consequence of internal political instability. Jordan has the most frequent cabinet reshuffle in the world: during the period 1946-2013 Jordan changed the cabinet approximately 80 times. On average, each Jordanian government lives for less than one year. The support to the Private Sector and the policies for SMEs was also affected by the medium to long-term absence of coherent strategies and policies. SME development is however to be seen as a basic point to increase employment and to foster the presence of Jordan in international markets.

In WB Doing Business 2014 report Jordan kept its position (119) after it went down one rank in each of precedent years. In the WFE Global Competitiveness Jordan occupies the 68th rank in 2013 after ranking...
64th in 2012, 71st in 2011 and 65th in 2010. The trend shows that the supposed reforms have less impact in the last years.

According to the “Report on the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Enterprise 2013”, the structure of the institutional framework for SME policy in Jordan has remained largely unchanged since the publication of the 2008 report. The Ministry of Industry and Trade is formally in charge of enterprise and SME policy elaboration, while the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation is responsible for elaborating the broader country development strategy and mobilizing donor support. Policy implementation is delegated to a number of specialized agencies. The most relevant body for SME policy has been since 2006 the Jordanian Enterprise Development Corporation (JEDCO). (KPI 6.1.1)

In particular the investment promotion and protection law as well as the strategy to support the private sector are still work in progress and need to be finalized: this last one presently shows competing institutions and international donors active in the same area. Since 2005 there have been 14 regulatory reforms in areas covered by Doing Business, nevertheless the Jordan rank slowly but steadily went down. The institutional set-up (from legislation to supporting tools for SMEs to financial / credit sector) needs more clarity and separation of tasks and responsibilities on one hand to increase effectiveness and on the other hand to offer a credible and stable support and safety to economic operators. In many cases there have been announcements for new regulations / laws, but then the real approval and implementation did not follow.

In addition to the high costs and inefficiency associated with the majority of regulatory procedures in Jordan, unpredictability or inconsistency in the interpretation of those procedures by officials does seem to be an issue. According to a recent WB survey, almost every second firm in Jordan disagrees with the statement that interpretations of regulations by officials are “consistent and predictable”. The most recent development is the presentation of the “Draft Jordan National Entrepreneurship and SME Growth Strategy Framework “, on the occasion of the Conference organized by JEDCO “Private sector led Growth: promoting entrepreneurship, MSME development and job creation in Jordan”, held in January 2014. Prepared by TA within the SEED EU-funded project with JEDCO, the “Strategy” was endorsed by the Cabinet. Now the ongoing translation into Arabic will allow for a larger distribution and the formal presentation to the Parliament. One critical issue within the support offered by the EC has been the transfer of the accumulated experience and knowledge that risked being lost during the shift from project / programmes to Jordan management. This problem has been observed despite joint efforts by the EC and the Government to manage the transition process. The process of transferring knowledge from EC projects to the Government is therefore to be recognised as complex and not yet fully mastered. The most recent experiences with JEDCO produced better results in terms of consolidation of TA experience but leave doubts on sustainability. (KPI 6.1.1).

After many years of reforms and plans, it should be noted that the role of industrial policies in Jordan is not completely defined; in effect, several ministries and institutions have overlapping responsibilities with respect to fragmented investment promotion and industrial policy strategies, including the attention for SMEs. It is well acknowledged in all official documents that the largest share of employment is at SMEs level and that then the promotion of SMEs should be a priority for actions and investments. All international donors stress the same theme and offer support while alternative strategies are mobilized. A recent study counted 41 institutions / organizations operating to support SMEs in the country. Different sector-specific incentive programmes with varying objectives exist. The Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT) developed an industrial policy strategy focusing on SMEs where JEDCO is generally responsible for its implementation. The Jordan Investment Board (JIB) had the mandate to improve business environment and provide (tax) incentives to investors (but the recent re-organization still needs to produce the new directives). The Development and Free Zones Commission (DFZC) developed a comprehensive strategy for four regional development zones, each of which aims to promote specific industries by granting substantial tax exemptions and providing other incentives. The Central Bank of Jordan implements a credit support programme for SMEs (reducing reserve requirements for private banks equivalent to their total SME loans). The industrial policy programme of the MoIT assists SMEs in upgrading their technologies and knowledge base; however, it refrains from targeting specific industries or groups of firms with the highest potential to benefit and does not define clear-cut conditions linking government support to SMEs’ performance.

The government has started to address some critical bottlenecks in the country’s financial infrastructure. In particular, critical reforms to the legal framework for credit information would reduce the cost and risk of SME lending, thus easing the constraints to access to finance that limit SMEs’ potential contribution to employment, competitiveness and growth. (KPI 6.1.2)

“Doing Business” analysis confirms that the main critical points in the Jordan business environment are the protection of investors and the inefficient credit / financial markets. The Access to Finance criteria show the
absence of reliable information exchange on creditors and the lack of a transparent system, discouraging banks from lending to businesses unless they have a long and established relationship or ask for exorbitant collateral. To establish a responsive and appropriate credit information system has been a long-term priority still not completely achieved in the present banking practice, as the indicators of the Doing Business 2014 show, even though a law has been drafted (see former paragraph). Other financial services sector areas lacking consolidated capacity are venture capital, long-term loan finance, capital equipment leasing and securitisation of financial instruments. Private sector credit-to-GDP is also relatively low at 80% and mainly allocated for the large corporate lending (87 percent). However, only 11% of the bank lending goes to SMEs, compared to 25% in emerging markets. Furthermore, SMEs are undercapitalized and predominantly financed through internal funds and informal sources. Banks’ SME lending in Jordan is constrained, among other factors, by outdated techniques that do not effectively manage risk or lower costs. The situation for MSMEs has become worse after the Arab Spring, for two main reasons: first, the public budget deficit meant that Government borrowing from banks has expanded crowding out private sector borrowing in general, but especially SMEs. (KPI 6.1.2)

The recent WB assessment on SME stresses the regulatory constraints and indicates that there is still some major work to do - even if the Government claims that substantial advancements were made. There have been recent improvements in the registration process and in the rules to start a business according to the “Doing Business” report.

The Doing Business scoring is then justified. The uncertainty in the regulatory framework – which often changes under the pressure of the international donors or of the Jordanian groups most interested in special issues – is a constraint for domestic and international investors. High transport costs are considered one of the most important constraints for exports (including the customs operations). Overall exports from SMEs have low value added and some claim that subsidies (see JEDCO) are not well targeted. (KPI 6.1.2 / 6.1.4)

As “Doing Business” reports, there have been recent improvements in the registration process and in the rules to start a business: reduction of minimum paid in capital, reduced property transfer fees, eased tax payment process for businesses with the introduction of an online filing and payment system, and a simplification of filing forms, a single reception service for registration at the company registrar. Although announced in many occasions, the “one window” registration process is still to be organized. However, Jordan has one of the lowest firm entry rates (per capita) among the selected emerging economies with available data. The low density of enterprises and the low growth are surely consequence of the regulatory and business environment that, as we have seen, needs to be strengthened on the one side and facilitated on the other side. But there is probably one more reason: the lack of entrepreneurship as attitude. It is not surprising to find out that as such there is no special course in any school curriculum for it. (KPI 6.1.3)

No data are available at country level on the number of targeted SMEs effectively and sustainably supported by the specialized institutions. The only available data refers to the EU interventions implemented through JEDCO. The total up to now is around 460 companies, out of a universe, as mentioned further above, of around 11,000 companies of the targeted dimension (>5 employees, <250 employees). The total invested until July 2014 amounts to EUR 26.2 million in grants that developed as multiplier EUR 38.8 million expenses (as capital investment and working capital): the final multiplier is close to EUR 1.48 million, which is a rather low result. The main reason is evidently the modality: grants, while they can cover up to 90% of costs, cannot produce a relevant multiplier. (KPI 6.1.4)

The EC support has been geared to tackling the main institutional and regulatory obstacles to PSD through BS interventions and projects: institutional and regulatory reforms achieved stand out for their sustainability effects. However, there is presently no comprehensive survey yet on the impact of institutional and regulatory reforms and on the creation, better functioning and growth of enterprises attributable to EC support. In effect, the Competition Law was prepared with the support of EJADA, but the Investment Promotion Law (expected in 2012) still has to be finalized together with tasks and responsibilities, while the National SME Strategy has been recently presented (KPI 6.1.2). One critical issue within the support offered by the EC has been the transfer of the accumulated experience and knowledge that risked being lost during the shift from project / programmes to Jordan management. This problem has been observed despite joint efforts by the EC and the Government to manage the transition process. The process of transferring knowledge from EC projects to the Government is therefore to be recognised as complex and not yet fully mastered. The most recent experiences with JEDCO produced better results in term of consolidation of TA experience but leaves doubts on sustainability.
JC-6.2
Jordan enterprises, particularly SMEs, are better able to compete regionally and internationally and have better access to technology and new markets, through fostered enterprise competitiveness at both individual firm and sector level

List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 6.2 (codes and definition)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPI-6.2.1</th>
<th>Number of SMEs with enhanced access to new markets (domestic and regional, international) thanks to improved competitiveness and access to technology, by type and location of SMEs in the broader perspective of sustainable and inclusive economic growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPI-6.2.2</td>
<td>Trends in imports of advanced commodities (total value and percentage) and percentage changes in prices of a basket of advanced commodities to local consumers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-6.2.3</td>
<td>Trends in exports from most advanced, special growth (production and services) sectors (incl. ICT, health and pharma, engineering, education), both total value and percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-6.2.4</td>
<td>Percentage actual achievements of targeted Key Performance Indicators of EU support to sustainable, value added and inclusive Private Sector Development, both at SMEs micro and overall sector macro-economic levels (e.g. those included in WEF Competitiveness Index)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KPI-6.2.1: Number of SMEs with enhanced access to new markets (domestic and regional, international) thanks to improved competitiveness and access to technology, by type and location of SMEs in the broader perspective of sustainable and inclusive economic growth

Main Findings on KPI-6.2.1:

As already mentioned in paragraph 6.1.4, figures on the SMEs that received support from the different programmes have never been collected. Recent evaluations made in the country confirmed the difficulties in getting clear information.

It was hoped that during the field visit, it would have been possible to get better information, but apparently this information is not available except through specific and very expensive survey. Official statistics do not report on these facts.

Even for the projects supported by EC up to now there is no consolidated collection of figures and data. As baseline studies were never realized, it is still more difficult to reach a correct assessment.

There are only two surveys available that cover the beneficiaries of EU supported interventions managed by JEDCO: one survey made by the World Bank (on the effectiveness of export promotion actions through JUMP and JEPA projects) and one made for the final evaluation of JSMP (focused on the impact of the grants on the beneficiaries in terms of sales and employment.

According to the World Bank research, the impact of the JUMP/JEPA programmes (370 firms that benefited from JEPA and 174 firms that benefited from JUMP) on growth in total exports is positive one year after treatment but is negative two years after, and then growth rates in total exports stop differing between the treatment and the control groups. Also, after two years, even the levels of total exports of JUMP beneficiary firms have converged back to similar levels as those of the control firms. The baseline results suggest that the benefits of the JEDCO programmes were a positive but short-lived effect on total exports of treated firms. But to be able to address the question of whether the JEDCO programme was worth it we also need to take into account the cost side and provide an indication of the economic benefits of JEDCO: from this point of view, the fact that JUMP was based on grants reduces obviously the long term effectiveness and impact and consequently the value for money. The cumulative effects for the JUMP programme do not show persistence related to total exports. To sum up, one year after benefiting from JEPA, the growth rates in Jordan firms’ total exports stop differing between the treatment and the control groups, whereas four years after benefiting from JEPA even the levels of total exports of beneficiary firms have converged back to similar levels as those of the control group.

JSMP offered grants support to 145 beneficiaries through 175 contracts in the years 2009-2011. The analysis shows firm evidence of job creation, also supporting staffing levels during the downturn of the economy in some sectors. Some promising export successes were reported, and with certifications of a
number of beneficiaries a sound basis for future activities has been created. There is clear evidence that the grant support helped to improve the situation of the private sector beneficiaries, in particular as shown by the increase in employment, and in some instances in the creation of new positions, even though there has been a switch from the expected long-term results to prioritized short-term achievements. In effect, it had to discount the efficacy in respect of the long-term main objectives: in a number of cases short-term objectives (as generic employment in the service sector) have been privileged against the long-term objective of “modernisation and globalization” of the service sector, which was the main objective within the framework of the trade liberalization policy.

However, the selection of priorities in the grant schemes is not always fully consistent with the project purpose, especially for scheme 5 (upgrading), generating the risk of potential choices in conflict with the trade deficit reduction: even if the evaluators should be able to screen the cases, the possibility of a claim from applicants remains. The programme objective was “To enhance Jordan’s manufactured and agro-industry exports and diversify export markets”: it means that in order to have a real impact one should focus on the most promising sectors and not offering support to any SME that can qualify. The Jordan manufacturing sector cannot exploit economies of scale: the focus should thus be on identifying “niche” markets with special value added. The efforts should then be based on direct support to selected and promising Jordanian SMEs and clusters of companies, to assist them in developing strategies for the internationalisation of their businesses, focused on the development of links upstream (access to inputs, technologies, investment) and downstream (distribution channels and markets). Such efforts are expected to have a strong positive impact on Jordan's export performance in the medium term. It is well known that SMEs in Jordan suffer from the high cost of energy, that energy imports are the largest component of the trade deficit. If the programme gives special attention to energy savings per unity of product, it will amplify its impact. Another basic constraint especially for agro-food sector SMEs is the water scarcity: again, the objective of water saving per unity of product could allow the programme to increase the impact both on production and on the environment. It should nevertheless be noted that these two issues are never mentioned not even as suggestions in the guidelines for the grant schemes.

KPI-6.2.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- JUMP Internal report 2009
- JSMP Final Evaluation

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Jordan EvalVol2p32
- Jordan EvalVol2p80
- JSMP Final Evaluation 2013
- World Bank: Improving Institutions, Fiscal Policies and Structural Reforms for Greater Growth Resilience and Sustained Job Creation, 2012B

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- -/-

KPI-6.2.2: Trends in imports of advanced commodities (total value and percentage) and percentage changes in prices of a basket of advanced commodities to local consumers

Main Findings on KPI-6.2.2:

There is no information available to assess this KPI.

KPI-6.2.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- -/-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- -/-
From the available data it appears that there are sectors of “advanced technology / knowledge” that show the best performance for international sales (especially ICT, pharmaceutical products and health services) with potentialities for still future expansion. In effect, the attention to the most promising sector of the economy is a constant in the recent government strategies, founded on a large quantity of general and sectoral studies. The country’s growth strategy is traditionally based on trade openness and continuous improvements of the business environment through reforms of business regulations, enhancements of key infrastructures and strengthening of the education system. In recent years, the Government has emphasized the need to promote investments and innovation in specific sectors with a view to “redirecting the economy towards sectors and activities based on knowledge anchored on its vast pool of talent and expertise”.

To that effect, following a very large number of sectoral studies, a few sectors in which Jordan has comparative advantage were identified as holding high hopes for accelerating the economy’s structural transformation. These sectors include information and communication technology services (ICT), the pharmaceutical sector, business services (including auditing, accounting, legal and architectural services), financial services, education services, and health services (including health tourism). The strong externalities (or social benefits) associated with growth in these strategic sectors, not captured fully by markets, provide a rationale for public support. Thus while emphasizing improvements in the business environment, trade and education reforms as well as infrastructure development benefiting all sectors, additional effort is deployed to remove the sector specific obstacles and overcome the market failures that prevent the rapid expansion of specific sectors.

The choice of the targeted sectors was based on two key factors. First was Jordan’s comparative advantage proxied by the skill-intensity of the sectors in the country. ICT, the pharmaceutical sector, business services, financial services, education services and health services present the highest levels of skill-intensity in the economy. It is hoped that growth in the skill-intensive sectors will contribute to enhancing the employment of skilled individuals, which all else being equal, should reduce overall unemployment. In 2010, these six sectors collectively represented about 20% of Jordan’s GDP. The second factor was the tradeability status and the potential for growth through exports. The chosen strategic sectors have all seen rapid growth in the past decade (8% on average in 2000-2008), largely driven by exports. To the extent that they expand their market shares in regional and international markets, their contribution to the balance of payment and foreign reserves of Jordan will be significant.

The recent trends in exports for these sectors show a relative larger increase than the average of the country. The fact that the increase in the value of the exports is by far larger than the increase in volume (that actually is relatively stable) could mean that there is a shift from less valued goods to the ones with more value as typical for the mentioned sectors. However, this conclusion should be weighted with the effect of the Dutch disease, already mentioned, that probably in this case shows again the over-valuation of the JD.
KPI-6.2.3 (iii) Additional information from field phase – primary and secondary sources:

Value and Volume Indices of Jordanian Exports 1995 - 2010 [Total exports, 1995=100]

(SOURCE: UNCTAD Database)

KPI-6.2.4: Percentage actual achievements of targeted Key Performance Indicators of EU support to sustainable, value added and inclusive Private Sector Development, both at SMEs micro and overall sector macro-economic levels (e.g. those included in WEF Competitiveness Index)

Main Findings on KPI-6.2.4:

There is no clear definition nor a use of targeted Key Performance Indicators related to the support of a sustainable, value added and inclusive Private Sector Development - neither on the level of SME support, nor on the macro-economic level. There is no memory of any official document trying to summarize the performance indicators for the PS support.

The analysis of the single project documents, besides a general reference to private sector as instrument for growth and employment and to the trade liberalization as general context, does not help to create a synthetic framework. Moreover in some cases it appears that the definition of the expected results was not always consistent with the objectives and as such not even usable for the analysis (see the comments on JSMP by the ROM report and the evaluators).

In order to get some concrete details and facts on the past compliance and performance, the expert prepared a “Perception Analysis questionnaire” based on the expected results form the Association Agreement for three priority sectors (Private Sector Development / Trade /Transport).

The questionnaire has been distributed to 4 EU Delegation Officers and to 3 MoPIC officers. It should be noted that only one (from a EU Officer) was returned.

Moreover it should be noted that most of the EU intervention for Private Sector support have been addressed in the period of our evaluation to micro-level, that is final beneficiaries have been economic operators who used the support to implement their businesses. The only meso-intervention is the overall support to JEDCO as specialized institution for SMEs: in this case, the results in terms of consolidation of the institution are positive (the consulted sources – ROM and evaluation – agree on the quality of JEDCO management capacity; nonetheless the effect on the business environment for the moment is marginal. The TA to JEDCO produced recently a strategy for SMEs (see 6.1.1), but it remains a proposal that should go through the full approval and implementation process.

We controlled all the ROM reports available on the Private Sector Support projects: the average result related to the design is below sufficient. This is the same for effectiveness and impact, but lower for sustainability.
KPI-6.2.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- JSMP Final Evaluation 2014

(iii) Additional information from field phase

JC-6.2: Jordan enterprises, particularly SMEs, are better able to compete regionally and internationally and have better access to technology and new markets, through fostered enterprise competitiveness at both individual firm and sector level

Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-6.2 (based on the KPIs main findings)

Data on the SMEs beneficiary of support are hardly collected. During the field phase this fact has been confirmed. The only data available are those related to projects’ activities or coming from quite expensive ad hoc research and survey. Recent evaluations made in the country confirmed the difficulties in getting clear information on this issue.

Even for the projects supported by EC up to now there is no consolidated collection of figures and data. As baseline studies were never realized, it is even more difficult to reach a correct assessment.

There are only two surveys available that cover the beneficiaries of EU supported interventions managed by JEDCO: one survey made by the World Bank (on the effectiveness of export promotion actions through JUMP and JEPA projects) and one made for the final evaluation of JSMP (focused on the impact of the grants on the beneficiaries in terms of sales and employment). According to the World Bank research, the impact of the JUMP/JEPA programmes (370 firms that benefited from JEPA and 174 firms that benefited from JUMP) on growth in total exports is positive one year after treatment, but is negative two years after, and then growth rates in total exports stop differing between the treatment and the control groups. Also, after two years, even the levels of total exports of JUMP beneficiary firms have converged back to similar levels as those of the control firms. The baseline results suggest that the benefits of the JEDCO programmes were a positive but short-lived effect on total exports of treated firms.

JSMP offered grants support to 145 beneficiaries through 175 contracts in the years 2009-2011. The analysis shows firm evidence of job creation, also supporting staffing levels during the downturn of the economy in some sectors. Some promising export successes were reported, and with certifications of a number of beneficiaries a sound basis for future activities has been created. There is clear evidence that the grant support helped to improve the situation of the private sector beneficiaries, in particular as shown by the increase in employment, and in some instances in the creation of new positions, even though there has been a switch from the expected long-term results to prioritized short-term achievements. In effect, there is a negative trend in relation to the long-term main objectives: In a number of cases, short-term objectives (as generic employment in the service sector) have been privileged against the long-term objective of “modernisation and globalization” of the service sector, which was the main objective within the framework of the trade liberalization policy. (KPI 6.2.1)

From the available data it appears that there are sectors of “advanced technology / knowledge” that show the best performance for international sales (especially ICT, pharmaceutical products and health services) with potentialities for still future expansion. In effect, the attention to the most promising sector of the economy is a constant in the recent government strategies, founded on a large quantity of general and sectoral studies. The country’s growth strategy is traditionally based on trade openness and continuous improvements of the business environment through reforms of business regulations, enhancements of key infrastructures and strengthening of the education system. In recent years, the Government has emphasized the need to promote investments and innovation in specific sectors with a view to “redirecting the economy towards sectors and activities based on knowledge anchored on its vast pool of talent and expertise”.

To that effect, following a very large number of sectoral studies, a few sectors in which Jordan has comparative advantage were identified as holding high hopes for accelerating the economy’s structural
transformation. These sectors include information and communication technology services (ICT), the pharmaceutical sector, business services (including auditing, accounting, legal and architectural services), financial services, education services, and health services (including health tourism). The strong externalities (or social benefits) associated with growth in these strategic sectors, not captured fully by markets, provide a rationale for public support. The recent trends in exports for these sectors show a relative larger increase than the average of the country. The fact that the increase in the value of the exports is by far larger than the increase in volume (that actually is relatively stable) could mean that there is a shift from less valued goods to those with more value, as is typical for the mentioned sectors. However, this conclusion should be weighted with the effect of the Dutch disease, already mentioned, that in this case probably shows again the over-valuation of the JD. (KPI 6.2.2)

The definition as well as the use of targeted Key Performance Indicators for the support to sustainable, value added and inclusive Private Sector Development, both at SMEs micro and overall sector macro-economic levels, are not available: there is no memory of any official document trying to summarize the performance indicators for the PS support.

The analysis of the single project documents, besides a general reference to private sector as instrument for growth and employment and to the trade liberalization as general context, does not help to create a synthetic framework. Moreover, in some cases it appears that the definition of the expected results was not always consistent with the objectives and as such not even usable for the analysis (see the comments on JSMP by the ROM report and the evaluators). It should be noted that in the period under evaluation most of the EU intervention for Private Sector support have been addressed to micro-level, that is, final beneficiaries have been economic operators who used the support to implement their businesses. The only meso-intervention is the overall support to JEDCO as specialized institution for SMEs: in this case, the results in terms of consolidation of the institution are positive (the consulted sources – ROM and evaluation – agree on the quality of JEDCO management capacity; nonetheless the effect on the business environment for the moment is marginal. The TA to JEDCO recently produced a strategy for SMEs (see 6.1.1), but it remains a proposal that should go through the full approval and implementation process.

We controlled all the ROM reports available on the Private Sector Support projects: the average result in design is below sufficient, the same for effectiveness and impact, lower for sustainability. (KPI 6.2.4)

The lack of targeted information on the SMEs beneficiary of support can be an indicator of the scarce attention given to “innovation” (the SMEs beneficiaries should be the ones most prone to increase the innovations). While the Government continuously reiterates a strong commitment to creating a “knowledge-based economy” that values entrepreneurship and creativity, Jordan spent 0.34% of GDP on research & development (R&D), less than countries on the same level of development: firm level innovation capacities are at very low levels. Research in Jordanian academic institutions is basic in nature and generally not focused on development of industrial and commercial products. Partnership between academia and private sectors are rare and inhibited by laws that do not allow professors to receive payments for R&D research. With this level of R&D expenditure, Jordan has only a trickle of patents, has little R&D activity in the private sector (e.g. compared with 20,000 private labs in Korea). Reconfiguring supply-side innovation policy is a necessity for developing a more efficient and outcome-driven innovation policy in Jordan.

The lack of a guide for innovation policy within the government is one critical process problem of innovation governance in Jordan, especially as administrations and boards in Jordan change very often. Another problem concerns the funding of risks. The large number of initiatives, institutions and policies in the area of innovation in Jordan are relatively ineffective and should be better strategically aligned with the country’s challenges and opportunities base. According to the 2011 ICES for Jordan, only 32% of firms have recently introduced new or significantly improved products or services, and almost 80% of those new products were new to the local rather than the global market. As expected, medium-size firms in Jordan are significantly more likely to invest in in-house R&D, but they are only slightly more likely to introduce new or upgraded product lines/services as compared to small firms. Given its stage of development (in terms of GDP per capita), Jordan would still benefit from extensive technology licensing (which is very limited for SMEs in the country) in order to move to more sophisticated ways of competing. More than half of the firms in Jordan that do not innovate do not do so mainly because innovation is too expensive, they lack domestic competition and support from public institutions. When it comes to innovation, firms in Jordan lack a proactive and aggressive approach towards their domestic and foreign counterparts, and depend on and expect the Government to support their innovative activities.

Jordan’s vision is to pursue a knowledge-based, high value-adding economy, which leverages on the country’s human capital potential when creating jobs. Innovation policy to incentivize the private sector is in
its infancy in Jordan. The weakness of innovation policy targeted at the private sector in Jordan results, on the one hand, from a lack of awareness of the benefits of a fully articulated innovation strategy for the private sector as well as for the whole country. Innovation is the driver of sustainable increases in productivity, and it depends on the nature and maturity of the national innovation capacities. The current situation in Jordan is characterized by weak institutions, lack of coordination between stakeholders, limited articulation between universities, research institutions and firms, technology-related institutions are underdeveloped, and there are low technological capabilities at the firm level, particularly in small enterprises. Significant changes have been introduced in the regulatory framework, through adopting stringent binding commitments on intellectual property rights in multilateral and bilateral trade agreements and enhanced enforcement capabilities at the domestic level. Stronger protection of intellectual property rights is supposed to promote innovation and the transfer of technology by international firms. As the case of Jordan shows, by itself it is not sufficient.

JC-6.3
EU Private Sector Development support contributed to facilitating the generation of sustainable employment

List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 6.3 (codes and definition)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPI-6.3.1</th>
<th>Trends in the development of Jordanian SMEs in terms of number, size and turnover (number and percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPI-6.3.2</td>
<td>Trends of employment in the firms directly or indirectly benefitting from EU support, in terms of numbers (absolute and percentage growth), quality (gainful, decent and sustainable) and geographical location (decentralisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-6.3.3</td>
<td>Trends in share of private sector employment in the overall employment figures, both self-employed and wage employment (gender and age differentiated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-6.3.4</td>
<td>Number, percentage and trends of entrepreneurs transiting from the informal to the formal sector (gender differentiated)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KPI-6.3.1: Trends in the development of Jordanian SMEs in terms of number, size and turnover (number and percentage)

Main Findings on KPI-6.3.1:

In paragraph 6.1.3 there is some analysis of the recent trends on new enterprises establishment. It should be noted that data for recent years are still not available.

One basic issue is the definition of SMEs: the Central Bank of Jordan uses the “5 to 100 employees” criterion, JEDCO has used for its interventions and the selection of beneficiaries the European one (5 to 250 employees), other donors use other criteria that mix employees with revenues according also to the sector.

This is why there is, according to many informed persons, the need for a specific law on SMEs that will help with definition and main features. In the January’s conference, organized by JEDCO, on “Private sector led Growth: promoting entrepreneurship, MSME development and job creation in Jordan”, there was a strong and documented demand to start the discussion and the preparation for a specific law on SMEs.

A very slow rate of growth has been reported in the net stock of non-agricultural enterprises from 2006 to 2011 (annual average of only 1.3%); in effect, the number of enterprises has remained relatively static since 2006. The fact that the growth in the net stock of enterprises slowed considerably in the second half of the decade (down from annual average of 3.8%) could be threatening to Jordan’s economic future if the trend continued, moreover because from 2001-2011, microenterprises (1-4 workers) accounted for over 87% of the overall net increase in the number of enterprises.

The relatively moderate levels of early-stage entrepreneurial activity suggest the need to boost efforts to promote entrepreneurship and develop the entrepreneurial capacity of the population: this will depend, on one the hand, on the improvement of the regulatory environment, but also, on the other hand, on a new effort to introduce in school curricula some introduction to management and entrepreneurship, that at the moment is completely absent.
Together with the aforementioned low density of enterprises and the staggered growth in the number of enterprises, it confirms the need for more effort to accelerate the rate of new business start-ups and to increase the pool of private sector enterprises and resulting jobs.

### KPI-6.3.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

- **(i) Data, figures and tables:**
  - -/-
- **(ii) Key extracts from documents:**
  - -/-
- **(iii) Additional information from field phase**
  - -/-

### KPI-6.3.2: Trends of employment in the firms directly or indirectly benefitting from EU support, in terms of numbers (absolute and percentage growth), quality (gainful, decent and sustainable) and geographical location (decentralisation)

**Main Findings on KPI-6.3.2:**

Credible data on the impact of EC intervention for PSD for employment are almost non-existent. The only available data are given in the paragraph below, stemming from a recent evaluation of a PSD Programme (JSMP), where the impact on employment is positive, although for the moment limited to the short period.

This situation has also been noted during the most recent “Private Sector Evaluation”, stressing that no monitoring of EC interventions’ effect on employment had been conducted, nor any final assessment of the impact on employment of key EC programmes (e.g. EJADA, SRF, JUMP, JSMP, etc.).

In effect, the strategic focus for PSD in Jordan following the official documents of the Government and EC was more addressed to enterprise competitiveness rather than employment, at least up to 2010. Employment was considered more a result of enterprise upgrading than a clear target (e.g. in selection of beneficiary enterprises).

Since the Arab Spring (2010), employment has become a clear priority for Jordan Government: generation of employment is now a major objective for JIB (important selection criteria for exemptions and incentives) and for CBJ.

However, this shift between competitiveness / modernization and employment increase did not fully take the implicit contradiction into account: pushing for increased competitiveness, especially of the SMEs, could mean reducing the employment in order to increase productivity. This is more evident when considering that the push for employment and modernisation should come from the most advanced sectors. In effect, low productivity sectors have a higher propensity to create jobs when they expand than higher productivity sectors. Sectors with the highest employment elasticity are construction, real estate, education, public administration and transport. Construction and real estate stand out as the most job-creating sectors of the economy. On the other hand, a large number of sectors have become job destructing in recent years (labour shedding while the sector output expands). These include mining, retailing and hotels. Because high productivity sectors have a lower propensity to create jobs when they expand, it is thus necessary that these sectors experience a growth far superior to the overall economy to absorb the available skilled labour in the market.

From the below table it appears that the elasticity of employment to growth is quite low: the unemployment level remains almost constant at the variation of the rate of growth. This is probably a consequence of the large amount of informal workers that are the first to be expelled from the market. But it is also a special feature of Jordan’s context that should be taken into account. Indeed, sectors such as pharmaceuticals (chemicals), information and communication technologies, financial intermediation, health (including health tourism which is a high value-added sector) all have low elasticity of employment to output growth. Yet it is these sectors that hold high hopes for bringing the country to a knowledge-based status and for employing Jordan’s large pool of skilled labour. For Jordan to capture these positive externalities, these sectors need to grow much faster than in the last decade.
KPI-6.3.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- JSMP FINAL EVALUATION 2013
- WDI and Department of Statistics, Jordan

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- CSPNIP2007-2010 p9-10
- CSPNIP2007-2010 p30

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- -/

KPI-6.3.3: Trends in share of private sector employment in the overall employment figures, both self-employed and wage employment (gender and age differentiated)

Main Findings on KPI-6.3.3:

According to Jordan’s National Employment Strategy 2012, Jordan created 457,000 new jobs between 2000 and 2008 owing to the high GDP growth of almost 7%. However, 42% of those jobs were created in the public sector. Despite the increase in the employment rate, the unemployment rate has hardly changed. Furthermore, the potential for additional employment by the public sector, especially during times of fiscal challenges, is limited. Hence, the role of the private sector in reducing the unemployment rate in Jordan is becoming increasingly critical.

According to the 2011 Jordan Employees Survey, on average, nearly half of the employees in Jordanian SMEs are foreign nationals. It is also important to note that foreign employees are mainly unskilled workers. The main reason why firms in Jordan would prefer to hire foreign workers is not necessarily the fact that foreign workers might be a cheaper labour force. More likely, it is because Jordanian workers would not accept the types of jobs offered, especially by firms producing construction materials and those in export processing zones.

Foreign workers are also more flexible than Jordanian workers in terms of working hours and work nature, especially when it comes to medium size firms in the services sector (such as packaging industry or tourism). Therefore, a high employment rate of foreign workers in Jordan may momentarily reflect the relatively low employment rate of Jordanian workers.

It is important to remember that the employed population in Jordan is relatively low, well below the average of similar countries (see below table), is predominantly male with mid-level education. Of the 1.2 million working Jordanians, 84% are male, and 61% have a high school education or below. The proportion of workers with university degrees has steadily risen, however, from 17.6% in 2000 to 23.7% in 2009. Females employed by the public sector and the private sector represent 65% and 13%, respectively, of all employees. Females are attracted to public sector jobs in the social fields (mainly health and education) and by the fringe benefits including job security, shorter working hours, and health insurance (which most small private firms do not provide) and social security benefits (which until the adoption of the new Social Security Law in 2010, firms with fewer than 5 workers did not provide). There is evidence that private firms avoid hiring pregnant or married women because of maternity benefits enforced through the labour law (10 weeks of wage) and the new social security law (0.75% payroll contribution paid by the employer).

The unemployed population in Jordan is overwhelmingly young and educated. 49% are below the age of 25 and 89% are below the age of 40. In absolute numbers, they are mostly males, but the unemployment rate is 46% for young females compared to 23% for young males. Over 75% of unemployed males have a high school education or below. The opposite is true for females: over 75% of unemployed females have diplomas or higher. The unemployment of university degree holders is relatively new in Jordan and is on the rise, signaling a mismatch between specializations and skills supplied and those demanded by the market.

One other feature is the relevant role of the micro-enterprises in the offer of employment, especially for the not qualified workers. Of the total 156,728 private sector establishments reported by the 2011 Establishment Census, 92% employed between 1-4 persons and another 7% employed between 5-19 persons. The 2011
Employment Survey shows that businesses with fewer than 100 employees account for 64% of private sector employment, with businesses with 4 or less employees making up 35% alone. These microenterprises operate predominantly in the retail trade (non-vehicle) sector, where they account for 98% of businesses.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPI-6.3.3 (i) Main References and Sources of Information:</th>
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<tr>
<td>(i) Data, figures and tables:</td>
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<td>- DOS, Amman</td>
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<td>(ii) Key extracts from documents:</td>
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<td>(iii) Additional information from field phase</td>
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<tr>
<th>KPI-6.3.4: Number, percentage and trends of entrepreneurs transiting from the informal to the formal sector (gender differentiated)</th>
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Main Findings on KPI-6.3.4:

The transition to formal sector was never an explicit objective of any EU programme but is an “expected” outcome of the more specific action addressed to the business context improvement. It should be noted that the Guidelines for the different Calls for proposal for private sector actions funded by EC and implemented since 2008 state as eligibility conditions the presentation of full documentation attesting the registration of the applicant according to the fiscal and social laws. However, this attention to procedures was not able to deal with an essential issue, that is, how to report grants into the official firm’s accounts. JSMP management did not issue any suggestion, nor did it contact the Ministry of Finance for advice. Some of the beneficiaries accounted the grant as “loan” (which it is not), other as “revenue” (neither, even though closer, but with the risk of paying taxes on it), other were not able to say (from some of the comments it appears that in a number of cases the grants were not completely integrated into the accounts, but the beneficiary used its own personal account, something that is precisely against one of the expected parallel outcomes, that is the “formalization” of non-formal service sector).

An Informal sector study by MoPIC in 2011 reported that informal employment constitutes 44% of total employment and accounts for 55% of wage earners in the private sector. The informal sector activities may account for 20%-25% of Jordan’s GDP, although relatively low compared to Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt. Moreover, the share of informal workers escalates to 92% in enterprises with fewer than five workers (that officially compose 35% of total employment).

The Jordanian Government estimates that 30% of the total labour force in Jordan is informal. World Bank estimated there were 262,094 informal enterprises in Jordan in 2009 – 1.8 times the number of active establishments reported by the DOS Annual Establishments Survey (or 2/3rds of total); the same report estimated that 44% of the total labour force in Jordan is employed without social security coverage, and around % of the total workforce is unpaid, while 10% of the total workforce is self-employed.

The IMF estimates that the informal sector in Jordan reaches 26% of the country’s GDP, a relatively low proportion in the MENA region, as compared to Morocco (4%), Syria and Egypt (34%), Lebanon and Tunisia (29%). In particular, the IMF identifies the tax burden as the single biggest “determinant” of the size of the informal economy.

Anti-competitive practices of the informal sector are one of the leading constraints to private business in Jordan according to a recent WB survey. By sector, informal sector practices are the biggest hindrance to domestic firms in the packaging industry. In general, international evidence suggests that informality moves in tandem with high taxes and regulatory burden.

Thus, it is highly relevant that, according to the same survey, almost 60% of the SMEs in Jordan feel constrained by the general sales tax and nearly every second SME is concerned about the corporate income tax rate. Recent IMF analysis finds that the biggest determinant of the informal economy in Jordan is the tax
burden.

KPI-6.3.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Evaluation of the European Union’s Support to Private Sector Development 2013

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- /-

JC-6.3: EU Private Sector Development support contributed to facilitating the generation of sustainable employment

Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-6.3 (based on the KPIs main findings)

There is a broad consensus on the importance of the private sector and hence of PSD in generating employment, even if it is also clear that through the streamlining of enterprises PSD can lead to job losses in the shorter run. This consensus was also (increasingly) shared in EU strategy documents and guidelines. Accordingly, one could expect, on the one hand, that job creation would be a central objective of support to PSD, and on the other hand that, conversely, when employment generation is considered to be the main need, one would immediately revert to PSD as a means to this end.

In effect, until 2010 this was not the case: on the contrary, the EU interventions had a tendency to treat employment as part of the programmes on VET / education in isolation from the PSD assistance: employment creation activities were addressed through social affairs actions whilst PSD was dealt with by development units. The existence of positive interactions toward potential synergies built at strategic level against the simple exchange of information on a project-by-project level does not appear to have been methodically pursued.

Credible data on the impact of EC intervention for PSD for employment are almost non-existent. The only available data are given in the paragraph below, stemming from a recent evaluation of a PSD Programme (JSMP), where the impact on employment is positive, although for the moment limited to the short period. (KPI 6.3.2)

This situation has also been noted during the most recent “Private Sector Evaluation”, stressing that no monitoring of EC interventions’ effect on employment had been conducted, nor any final assessment of the impact on employment of key EC programmes (e.g. EJADA, SRF, JUMP, JSMP, etc.).

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Since the Arab Spring (2010), employment has become a clear priority for Jordan Government: generation of employment is now a major objective for JIB (important selection criteria for exemptions and incentives) and for CBJ.

However, this shift between competitiveness / modernisation and employment increase did not fully take the implicit contradiction into account: pushing for increased competitiveness, especially of the SMEs, could mean reducing the employment to increase productivity. This is more evident when considering that the push for employment and modernisation should come from the most advanced sectors. In effect, low productivity sectors have a higher propensity to create jobs when they expand than higher productivity sectors. Sectors with the highest employment elasticity are construction, real estate, education, public administration and transport. Construction and real estate stand out as the most job-creating sectors of the economy. On the other hand, a large number of sectors have become job destructing in recent years (labour shedding while the sector output expands). These include mining, retailing and hotels. Because high productivity sectors have a lower propensity to create jobs when they expand, it is thus necessary that these sectors experience a growth far superior to the overall economy to absorb the available skilled labour in the market. (KPI 6.3.2)
From the table in 6.3.2 it appears that the elasticity of employment to growth is quite low: the unemployment level remains almost constant at the variation of the rate of growth. This is probably a consequence of the large amount of informal workers that are the first to be expelled from the market. But it is also a special feature of Jordan’s context that should be taken into account.

Indeed, even if job creation was often one of the potential outcomes of the EU’s PSD support, until 2010 it was generally not the objective to which the support intended to contribute ultimately (that was mostly competitiveness and modernization). The effects of PSD support on employment generation have also rarely been really monitored.

The case of JSMP – which is the only support intervention that has been recently assessed with a final evaluation – is of special evidence in this context: in a number of cases short-term objectives (as generic employment in the service sector) have been privileged against the long-term objective of “modernisation and globalization” of service sector, that was the officially stated objective of the FA. (KPI 6.3.2)

The change of the “real” objective of the programme became effective during 2010, coupled with the increased attention to the employment opportunities “outside” Amman (something that was never mentioned in the official formulation documents). The EUD accepted this new objective as part of the new approach consequent to the Arab Spring and the new commitments of the EC toward the region. (KPI 6.3.2)

The unemployed population in Jordan is overwhelmingly young and educated. 49% are below the age of 25 and 89% are below the age of 40. In absolute numbers, they are mostly males, but the unemployment rate is 46% for young females compared to 23% for young males. Over 75% of unemployed males have a high school education or below. The opposite is true for females: over 75% of unemployed females have diplomas or higher. The unemployment of university degree holders is relatively new in Jordan and is on the rise, signaling a mismatch between specializations and skills supplied and those demanded by the market.

A very slow rate of growth has been reported in the net stock of non-agricultural enterprises from 2006 to 2011 (annual average of only 1.3%); in effect, the number of enterprises has remained relatively static since 2006. The fact that the growth in the net stock of enterprises slowed considerably in the second half of the decade (down from annual average of 3.8%) could be threatening to Jordan’s economic future if the trend continued, moreover because from 2001-2011, microenterprises (1-4 workers) accounted for over 87% of the overall net increase in the number of enterprises.

The relatively moderate levels of early-stage entrepreneurial activity suggest the need to boost efforts to promote entrepreneurship and develop the entrepreneurial capacity of the population: this will depend, on the one hand, on the improvement of the regulatory environment, but also, on the other hand, on a new effort to introduce in school curricula some introduction to management and entrepreneurship, which at the moment is completely absent. (KPI 6.3.1)

Together with the already mentioned low density of enterprises and the staggered growth in the number of enterprises, it confirms the need for more effort to accelerate the rate of new business start-ups and to increase the pool of private sector enterprises and resulting jobs.

The transition to formal sector is never an explicit objective of any EU programme but is an “expected” outcome of the more specific action addressed to the business context improvement. In effect, it should be noted that the Guidelines for the different Calls for proposals for private sector actions funded by EC and implemented since 2008 state as eligibility conditions the presentation of full documentation attesting the registration of the applicant according to the fiscal and social laws. (KPI 6.3.4)

However, this attention to procedures was not able to deal with an essential issue, that is, how to report grants into the official firm’s accounts. JSMP management did not issue any suggestion, nor did it contact the Ministry of Finance for advice. Some of the beneficiaries accounted the grant as “loan” (which it is not), others as “revenue” (neither, even though closer, but with the risk of paying taxes on it), others were not able to say (from some of the comments it appears that in a number of cases the grants were not completely integrated into the accounts, but the beneficiary used its own personal account, something that is precisely against one of the expected parallel outcomes, that is the “formalization” of non-formal service sector).

The IMF estimates that the informal sector in Jordan reaches 26% of the country’s GDP, a relatively low proportion in the MENA region, as compared to Morocco (44%), Syria and Egypt (34%), Lebanon and Tunisia (29%). In particular, the IMF identifies the tax burden as the single biggest “determinant” of the size of the informal economy.

Anti-competitive practices of the informal sector are one of the leading constraints to private business in
Jordan according to a recent WB survey. By sector, informal sector practices are the biggest hindrance to domestic firms in the packaging industry. In general, international evidence suggests that informality moves in tandem with high taxes and regulatory burden. Thus, it is highly relevant that, according to the same survey, almost 60% of the SMEs in Jordan feel constrained by the general sales tax and nearly every second SME is concerned about the corporate income tax rate. Recent IMF analysis finds that the biggest determinant of the informal economy in Jordan is the tax burden. (KPI 6.3.4)

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<th>JC-6.4</th>
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<tr>
<td>The EU Private Sector Development support contributed to more inclusive and equitable national and local economic development and growth</td>
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**List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 6.4 (codes and definition)**

| KPI-6.4.1 | Percentage distribution of EU resources for Private Sector Development according to the location of beneficiaries |
| KPI-6.4.2 | Percentage increase of new enterprises in the different Governorates, especially in the more advanced sectors, and improved sustainability of operations |
| KPI-6.4.3 | Degree to which the recommendations of past sector and projects / programmes evaluations have been taken into account and are actually implemented to ensure PSD contribution to more inclusive and equitable national and local economic development and growth |
| KPI-6.4.4 | Overall quality of the policy dialogue and coordination with the European Financial Institutions active in Jordan (EIB and EBRD) and Member States financing agencies active in Jordan on PSD and of their programmes complementarity |

**KPI-6.4.1: Percentage distribution of EU resources for Private Sector Development according to the location of beneficiaries**

There are no documents available on the territorial distribution of EC support except for a recent study on JSMP (see below table). If the distribution is compared with the rate of unemployment according to governorates, it becomes evident that the distribution of the investment did not correspond to this priority. But it should be remembered that the PSD objectives were more on enterprises competitiveness and export capacity than on employment and local development. Again, as previously mentioned, local development and employment become a priority after 2010 and most of the PSD actions had the flexibility to adapt to the new objectives.

At the national level, there are multiple institutions with mandates relevant to Local Economic Development (LED) and promotion and a considerable interest in the subject, but no national institution can be said to have taken the leadership in advancing its promotion as an important national development policy issue. There are Local Development Directorates within the Ministry of Municipal Affairs (MoMA), the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC) and the Ministry of Interior (MoI). They liaise on LED issues as the need arises but there is no regular coordination mechanism between them. There is also no current link or coordination mechanism between them and other institutions with mandates relevant to LED such as the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT), the Jordan Enterprise Development Corporation (JEDCO), the Jordan Investment Board (JIB), etc.

At the local level, assessments of Municipalities have indicated their weak institutional capacity for promoting local development in general (let alone LED). Deficiencies include a weak organisational structure, overstaffing, lack of performance incentives, poor levels of qualification, limited powers for autonomous initiative, limited use of PPPs and lack of equipment. The Local Development Units (LDUs) are, in theory, meant to work with other departments, such as Investment, to promote LED. In practice, however, most Municipalities are not even able to fulfil their most basic service delivery responsibilities due to a lack of resources and capacity. Therefore, the LDUs' role remains limited to data collection and small initiatives.

On the other hand, Jordan's evolving decentralisation process may result in greater autonomy and the availability of some programmable resources at the Governorate level to promote LED – while Municipalities...
(at least in terms of legal prerogatives) do already enjoy this autonomy.

Current options under consideration in the ongoing process of revision of the draft Local Councils Law include the creation of a Governorate Council of Municipalities, with the power to approve plans and programmes and receive fiscal transfers, and the Governor acting as their Chief Executive Officer. The other option is an elected Governorate Council with only advisory responsibilities. Whichever council is created, or even if neither is created, the Governor's office is already starting to be given considerable autonomy to promote local development – and even implement it in areas not under the responsibility of sectoral ministries (such as LED).

Municipalities already have the legal autonomy to promote local development (including LED), but their corporate image of themselves and what central agencies empower them to do is far more restricted.

KPI-6.4.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - Dep of Statistics Yearbook 2012

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - JEDCO – Presentation of the SME Financial Support March 2013

KPI-6.4.2: Percentage increase of new enterprises in the different Governorates, especially in the more advanced sectors, and improved sustainability of operations

Main Findings on KPI-6.4.2:

The data on new enterprises are presented and discussed in paragraphs 6.1.3 and 6.3.1. There are no data available on the increase of new enterprises in governorates. There is, however, a recent experience implemented by the World Bank that is worth mentioning (see basic description in below space).

It should be noted that the basic approach of the intervention is the offer of financial support to SMEs through loans at market interest rate, with a special analysis of the guarantees to be required to beneficiaries in order to offer the opportunity to a larger universe. At a recent conference on Innovation (July 17, 2014) the first results have been presented. In the first year and half of implementation, the project distributed 15MJD to 3,217 beneficiaries, out of which 58% are women, 1100 new jobs have been created, 63% out of Amman.

In comparison, the support to SMEs funded by EU through JEDCO achieved almost the same results with grants in 5 years with 2 times the amount of resources.

Besides the main constraints related to the structure and features of the financial sector in the country – see the KPI in JC 1 for a larger assessment – there is one issue that should be noted in the behaviour of SMEs managers. They claim that the market interest rates – now around 9 to 11% for the normal credit line to generic clients – are unbearable. When one considers that the actual inflation rate is around 5/6%, it is easy to understand that the real interest rate is around 4-5%, a level that can be accepted as a credible threshold to select good investments from not profitable ones (a lower one can reduce this selection criterion to allow for bad investments that will destroy wealth not increase growth). The point is that the managers lack of financial capacity to really understand the market behaviours (perhaps also coupled with the consolidated “grant” attitude that many researches found as typical in Jordan managers, thanks probably to the past behaviour of many donors).

KPI-6.4.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - JEDCO – Presentation of the SME Financial Support March 2013
KPI-6.4.3: Degree to which the recommendations of past sector and projects / programmes evaluations have been taken into account and are actually implemented to ensure PSD contribution to more inclusive and equitable national and local economic development and growth

Main Findings on KPI-6.4.3:

According to the most recent evaluation of PSD (2013), there is scarce evidence of the use of former recommendations or even of ad hoc studies. The review of the QSG procedure shows in many cases that the PSD projects were assessed with the due attention but at the end the mist used formula was “Document approved provided that the comments mentioned in the checklists are taken into account”.

It can be noted that in case of the set of project supporting the SMEs through JEDCO, (starting from 2007 to 2012), there is no one case where a final evaluation of the precedent phase has been completed before the approval of a following phase and the finalisation of the financial decision. It can also be reported that the final evaluation of EJADA (a EUR 45 million programme 2000 – 2006) was carried out at the end of 2011, when two of the projects built partially on the EJADA experience were already designed, approved and ongoing. The final evaluation of JSMP I took place in 2013, when the continuation JSMP II was already approved and ongoing.

The critical situation consequent of the global crisis of 2008 and the start of Arab Spring together with the strategic and political importance of Jordan should be considered as the exceptional circumstances that can explain this mode of procedure.

In effect, it should be mentioned that according to EU Delegation officers for some allocation decisions, the formulation process was short, driven by the Arab spring aftermath urgency of assigning SPRING allocations to programmes that were already in implementation and could be topped up.

KPI-6.4.3 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - /
(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - Evaluation of the European Union’s Support to Private Sector Development in Third Countries ADE 2013
   - 19570 QSG2 Check list
   - EU SBA 2008
(iii) Additional information from field phase
   - /

KPI-6.4.4: Overall quality of the policy dialogue and coordination with the European Financial Institutions active in Jordan (EIB and EBRD) and Member States financing agencies active in Jordan on PSD and of their programmes’ complementarity

Main Findings on KPI-6.4.4:

The documentation available is quite scarce on the policy dialogue with the European Financial Institutions operating in Jordan, even though in the case of EIB, because of the long term associations with the country and of the amounts purposely invested, the common interest to share information and possibly to create synergies affecting the overall effectiveness and impact of the interventions did produce closer contacts.

Better relations are reported with the EU member states that are often consulted and informed on the main actions and decisions.
It can be noted that the main annual document on the state of the affairs with the country (the so called Joint Staff Working Document Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Jordan Progress in 2011 and recommendations for action prepared by High Representative of the European Union for foreign affairs and security policy for the Parliament and the Council) never mentions the coordination and complementarities with EU MS and IFIs.

See EQ2.JC3 for an extensive assessment of the recent activities of EU IFIs and the relation with EU Delegation and DEVCO.

It is worth mentioning that in the course of the period analysed by this evaluation EBRD and EIB have invested more than EUR 500 million in the country, all of it for private sector interventions, that is 10 times the amount committed by EU DEVCO for the private sector support. Even though documentation on the relations is scarce and in many cases – according to the IFIs officers interviewed – there was no direct exchange with the EU Delegation, it appears that the sharing of objectives and the complementarities are substantial.

In effect, the list of interventions of EIB and EBRD shows the very high coherence with the overall EU and ENP policy, that is, attention to private sector beneficiaries directly or through local financial institutions, priority to sustainable energy investments and respect for the environment, increase of Jordan exports and of employment in out of Amman regions.

KPI-6.4.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   – -/-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   – -/-

(iii) Additional information from field phase
   – -/-

JC-6.4: The EU Private Sector Development support contributed to more inclusive and equitable national and local economic development and growth

Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-6.4 (based on the KPIs main findings)

The attention to local economic development and jointly to the creation of employment in the governorates out of Amman becomes a major priority in Government action only after 2010.

Since the Action Plan and the CSP 2007, the PSD objectives were more on enterprises competitiveness and export capacity than on employment and local development.

It should, however, be noted that the interventions implemented through calls for proposals with distribution of direct grants to private sector beneficiaries allowed for more flexibility (in terms of guidelines, objectives and assessments), so it has been possible to adapt quickly to the critical circumstances (KPI 6.4.1). The EU PSD programmes’ global assessment of the real impact on inclusive and equitable development (and possibly at the same time with the original expected results) needs to be conducted, as until now only in one case (JSMP I) a final impact evaluation has been completed. This evaluation confirmed that some good results have been achieved but the main objective shifted from SMEs modernisation face to international markets to simple support to SMEs for short term increase of employment.

There are no data available on the increase of new enterprises in governorates. There is however a recent experience implemented by the World Bank that is worth mentioning (see basic description below).

It should be noted that the basic approach of the intervention is the offer of financial support to SMEs through loans at market interest rate, with a special analysis of the guarantees to be required from beneficiaries in order to offer the opportunity to a larger universe. At a recent conference on Innovation (17 July 2014) the first results have been presented. In the first year and half of implementation, the project distributed 15MJD to 3,217 beneficiaries, out of which 58% are women; 1,100 new jobs have been created, 63% out of Amman.
As comparison, the support to SMEs funded by EU through JEDCO achieved almost the same results with grants in 5 years with 2 times the amount of resources.

Besides the main constraints related to the structure and features of the financial sector in the country – see the KPI in JC 1 for a larger assessment – there is one issue that should be noted in the behaviour of SMEs managers. They claim that the market interest rates – now around 9 to 11% for the normal credit line to generic clients – are unbearable. When considering that the actual inflation rate is around 5/6%, it is easy to understand that the real interest rate is around 4-5%, a level that can be accepted as a credible threshold to select good investments from not profitable ones (a lower one can reduce this selection criterion to allow for bad investments that will destroy wealth, not increase growth). The point is that the managers lack financial capacity to really understand the market behaviours (perhaps also coupled with the consolidated “grant” attitude that many researches found as typical in Jordan managers, thanks probably to the past behaviour of many donors). (KPI 6.4.2)

According to the most recent evaluation of PSD (2013), there is scarce evidence of the use of former recommendations or even of ad hoc studies. The review of the QSG procedure shows in many cases that the PSD projects were assessed with the due attention but at the end the most used formula was “Document approved provided that the comments mentioned in the checklists are taken into account”.

The critical situation following the global crisis of 2008 and the start of the Arab Spring together with the strategic and political importance of Jordan should be considered as the exceptional circumstances that can explain this mode of procedure. In effect, it should be mentioned that according to EU Delegation officers, for some allocation decisions the formulation process was short, driven by the Arab spring aftermath urgency of assigning SPRING allocations to programmes that were already in implementation and could be topped up. (KPI 6.4.3)

Policy dialogue and coordination with EU MS and EU IFIs are not well documented (in the Annual Communication on Jordan presented to the Parliament there has never been a mention of such issues. It is worth noting that in the course of the period analysed by this evaluation ERBD and EIB have invested more than EUR 500 million in the country, all of it for private sector interventions, that is 10 times the amount committed by EU DEVCO for the private sector support. Even though documentation on the relations is scarce and in many cases – according to the IFIs officers interviewed – there was no direct exchange with the EU Delegation, it appears that the sharing of objectives and the complementarities are substantial.

In effect, the list of interventions of EIB and EBRD shows the very high coherence with the overall EU and ENP policy, that is, attention to private sector beneficiaries directly or through local financial institutions, priority to sustainable energy investments and respect for the environment, increase of Jordan’s exports and of employment in out of Amman regions. (KPI 6.4.4).
The choice and the combination of the EU aid modalities (BS and project) for PSD are the consequence of the search for efficiency and cost/effectiveness in line with Jordan Government objectives and complementary to other DP support to the sector.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 6.5 (codes and definition)</th>
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<tr>
<td>KPI-6.5.1</td>
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Main Findings on KPI-6.5.1:

The analysis of the set of PSD interventions during the evaluation period shows that all contain a correct and credible analysis of the context. Especially the BS interventions enlarge the assessment to the existence of the necessary preconditions.

The policy context and the pattern of the reforms the country is implementing are always well presented.

Also, the general recommendations for formulating and implementing PSD interventions according to the basic documents appear to have been always followed.

The Commission published in 2003 a defining document for its approach to PSD over the evaluation period.
namely, the communication to the Council and the European Parliament COM (2003) 267. This document identified five key areas of Commission intervention: (i) Support to governments to improve the necessary regulatory framework, and institution building related to PSD; (ii) Investment and inter-enterprise cooperation promotion activities; (iii) Facilitation of investment financing and access to financial markets, in general; (iv) Support for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the form of nonfinancial services; (v) Support for micro-enterprises.


The 2010 Guidelines on Private Sector and Trade Support provided elements of clarification on the role the Commission aims to play in private sector development and why this is an important contribution to the overall development objectives. The 2010 Guidelines underline the importance of the private sector in generating economic growth that in turn, through job creation and enhanced wealth, can lead to poverty reduction, depending on the patterns of growth and the distribution of income. It also highlights the importance of ensuring that policies for growth are accompanied by policies pursuing social and public service delivery. The second recommendation called for better prioritisation of the various areas of intervention, underlining the importance of identifying the areas in which Community support could better contribute to development of the private sector.

The use of the in-house PSD knowledge depository, capitalising on experience coming from other experiences does not appear to have been exploited. There are no evident traces of capitalisation exercises between different EUDs especially of the MENA Region to share experience and good practice in PSD support, considering that EU has provided PSD support for many years, which must have led to an accumulation of useful knowledge.

In effect, the “Report on the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Enterprise / 2008 enterprise policy assessment”, made jointly by DG ENTERPRISE and OCDE, contained some precise indication for an active intervention on private sector that does not appear to be fully used in the preparation of the following PSD interventions.

It is true that the attention to institutional reforms was included in the packages of grants to be managed by JEDCO, but in the period direct intervention for the business environment have not been produced. Even if it is true that the other major points (innovation policy, human capital mentioned in the SBA report), have been addressed by some specific interventions (SRTD I and II, TVET) the direct relation with private sector does not appear to be followed.

As comparison we listed below the set of studies produced by the World Bank to support the most recent interventions for private sector and employment: 8 large studies that included to very large surveys on SMEs behaviours and attitudes.

KPI-6.5.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- -/-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Evaluation of the European Union’s Support to Private Sector Development 2013
- JSMP Impact Evaluation 2014
- SPR FA annexII p6
- Report on the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Enterprise / 2008 enterprise policy assessment

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- Please see below
KPI-6.5.1 (iii) Additional information from field phase

WORLD BANK RECENT STUDIES FOR PRIVATE SECTOR AND SMEs in JORDAN

1. Development Policy Loan (led by Eric Le Borne);
2. Development Policy Review (DPR) (led by Ndiame Diop);
3. Jordan Science, Technology and Innovation Policy (led by Kurt Larsen);
4. National Employment Strategy (led by Omar Razzaz);
5. Jordan MSME Financing Technical Assistance Gap Analysis (led by Sahar Nasr and Gabi Afram);
6. SME Investment Climate Assessment (ICA) (led by Jana Malinska and Jean Michel Marchat)
7. Education for Employment initiative (led by Dahlia Khalifa).
8. Jordan Competitiveness and Innovation Partnership (JCIP) (led by Jana Malinska)

KPI-6.5.2: Percentage of PSD interventions for which the full set of project identification, formulation, key implementation and M&E documents are available

Main Findings on KPI-6.5.2:

The table below shows the situation (information received up to the end of March 2014) of the cycle for PSD interventions (both the direct ones and the ones where PSD is only a component within others) as far as identification and formulation is concerned.

We focus on this part of PCM as it is the phase when the investment decisions are made and then should be the more important from a strategic and long-term point of view.

It appears that the full cycle has been completed in less that 50% of the cases; we found some cases where it appears that the some part of the diagnostic analysis was missing,

The first one is reported in the recent PSD Evaluation. In Jordan, two large access-to-finance projects were implemented between 2005 and 2010, but analysis of the financing challenges during project design was limited and lacked thorough consultation with the private sector.

Consequently, avoidable implementation problems were observed, such as the provision of risk-mitigation mechanisms (e.g., credit guarantee schemes) before the supporting risk-reduction infrastructure had been in place (e.g., before credit bureaus were established and strengthened).

The second one relates to JSMP II (support to modernisation of service sector) and to SEED: both are a second phase on an initial intervention and both have been finalised and approved before a complete evaluation of the first phase (by the way only JSMP I received a final evaluation). Note that JSMP II has been approved with the same type of expected results as JSMP I, between them “increase contribution of the service sector to GDP”, when all the analysis and studies done in the country and at international level stress that the service sector in Jordan is too large for the level of development and future trends: the need is increase efficiency and productivity, not increase the size.

In effect, reading the ROM reports, it appears that the monitoring and evaluation procedures in place failed to provide a clear view of the results obtained by PSD interventions. It is true that often ROM reports and evaluation reports provide information on outputs (e.g. the number of investment promotion events held or the number of participants attending), but much less at results level (e.g. the impact of investment promotion activities on investment partnerships over time); this may be due to the lack of quality of the evaluation or to the fact that assessing results was hardly feasible, but also because, as it could happen in some cases, the expected results were not always specified.

The limited documented identification is also consequence the lack of time mainly because of the external events, as mentioned in paragraph 6.4.3 The critical situation consequent of the global crisis of 2008 and the start of Arab Spring together with the strategic and political importance of Jordan should be considered as the exceptional circumstances that can explain this mode of procedure. In effect it should be mentioned that according to EU Delegation officers for some allocation decisions, the formulation process was short, driven by the Arab spring aftermath urgency of assigning SPRING allocations to programmes that were already in implementation and could be topped up. Consequently a more informal and pragmatic approach based on dialogue was usually preferred. This dialogue normally takes place formally between the national authorities and the EU in coordination with the donor community. Relying on policy debates and informal exchanges of views rather than documentary evidence to prepare PSD has the advantage of ownership by the...
implementing authorities but may potentially lead to inadequate, unsustainable programmes. The consultations held with the private sector when programmes conducive to PSD were prepared and undertaken were also quite reduced, but again informal meetings were the preferred modality.

### KPI-6.5.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) **Data, figures and tables:**
   - Please see below

(ii) **Key extracts from documents:**
   - CSPNIP2007-2010 p24
   - Evaluation of the European Union’s Support to Private Sector Development 2013
   - Evaluation of the European Union’s Support to Private Sector Development 2013

(iii) **Additional information from field phase**
   - -/

### KPI-6.5.2 (i) Data, figures and tables:

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<td>Promoting financial inclusion through increased financial governance and outreach of microfinance in Jordan</td>
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Final Report - Vol. II: Evaluation Questions Information Matrices (Abridged)
February 2015 – GFA-led Consortium
EQ-6 Information Matrix
Page 335
### KPI-6.5.3: Extent to which alternative options of PSD support are studied and piloted, and criteria for preference and eligibility are defined and applied

**Main Findings on KPI-6.5.3:**

It is well known that EU overall approach to delivering external aid is to work primarily with the public sector. Budget Support has for instance become the preferred modality for EU aid delivery whenever conditions allow, in line with the global Aid Effectiveness agenda.

Moreover, the Commission’s standard rules and procedures have become increasingly strict since the 2003 Financial Regulation. Even if it is possible according to PRAG to contract private sector organisations, the procedures are perceived as ill-suited to smaller private sector organisations but can fit large companies especially for tender of works and services. Procedural and administrative constraints were often considered exceedingly onerous by enterprises, and hence had counterproductive effects. It showed how accountability for process took overwhelming precedence over accountability for results.

The assumption that in Jordan the importance of achieving a demonstration effect of the capacities of PSD showing national authorities and all other types of stakeholder the concrete benefits they might expect from developing the private sector was considered decisive in the selection of interventions and modalities should be verified.

In effect EJADA programme (2000-2006) was the first case of non-financial support (TA, transfer of know-how, etc.) that proved to be a key success factor. The offer of EJADA was a fundamental change from “providing services” to “empowering buyers” to purchase services that suit them. The continuation of EJADA extended the instrument toward the direct financial support to private sector.

The programmes that followed the EJADA experience strengthened the approach to the offer of direct grants to private sector beneficiaries. The hypothesis was that it was possible to establish the link “grants>>> private sector development >>> modernisation of service sector>>>increased exports” in case of JSMP and “grants>>> private sector development >>> modernisation of manufacturing sector>>>increased exports”. In effect the main instrument of JSMP and JUMP has been since the start the use of financial resources directly distributed to private sector beneficiaries, through calls of proposals. However there was no explicit analysis of the consequences and of the needed procedural steps according to EC rules and regulations. The negotiations to define the acceptable context for the grant management (guidelines / format / beneficiaries / amount / evaluation process / etc.) lasted for more than one year and their outcome had heavy consequences on JSMP/JUMP management and efficiency.

After the first experiences it appears that one key criterion is at the base of the selection of the PSD modalities: for institutional reforms the tool should be BS while for direct support to meso-institutions and final beneficiaries the decentralised project was selected as best options. According to the recent evaluation of PSD, effective and sustainable results are in PSD seemingly stronger under EC’s programme-approach than under SBS. This is mostly due to the demonstration effect of what has been considered a highly visible success of EJADA first and the above mentioned continuation projects: it should be mentioned again that the success has never been fully evaluated in terms of real impact and sustainability. It comes mostly from the stakeholders and the beneficiaries that received TA and grants.

The use of SBS for institutional reforms is a standard instrument for EC: in case of Jordan is has been applied more and more as the general conditions of the country economic and financial management allowed its use. It could be that the decision for SBS approach originated more at EC HQ in compliance with general EU policy / trends / regulations, rather than local effectiveness considerations: it is another case where following packages have been approved and implemented without former evaluation of results and sustainability. Again the recent evaluation of PSD states that “relatively vague conditions are the standard set up of BS for PSD, focusing on activities vs. results/impact and with lack of follow-up in respect of BS conditions; there is evidence of some outputs created just for meeting SBS conditions with little evidence of long-standing results and impact”.

The opportunity to use B2B approach to PSD does not appear to have received sufficient consideration, although it could have been quite important to coordinate PSD with trade objective.

One case can probably show the lack of sufficient analysis of the needs and of the related opportunities.

The lack of access to finance was a serious constraint in the Jordanian economy for firms and individuals at every level and is a large hindrance to Jordan’s overall competitiveness. Equity investors are discouraged by
an opaque, often confusing set of institutions and regulations that govern their activities in Jordan. Micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), which employ approximately 69% of the workforce, are typically unable to produce basic financial documents that would attract investment or even allow them to obtain bank loans. Banks are conservative and do not provide loans to the extent demanded by MSMEs. These challenges are exacerbated for women-owned businesses, as many women do not have access to the kind of collateral that they would need to get a bank loan or information on networking and value chain opportunities. Apart from the macro-economic factors inhibiting the supply of finance to MSMEs, their low access to finance can also be attributed to numerous other factors. In addition to regulatory hurdles, on the supply side, few banks have established dedicated SME departments, or have the capability to lend to SMEs. Several banks rely primarily on collateral-based lending rather than creditworthiness, leaving creditworthy SMEs unfinanced. Most loans require collateral, on average equal to about 25% more than the loan value, where small firms report having provided even higher collateral than large ones. Moreover, the enforcement of basic contractual rights is cumbersome, time consuming and costly, representing a significant disincentive when lending to SMEs. To address this, several Jordanian banks use internal ratings systems for SME lending, which are based on a financial and qualitative analysis of SMEs. However, banks often use outdated techniques that do not effectively help in risk management or in lowering cost.

Blending of financial instruments (that is the use of mixed loans and grants) is an option available within the EU facilities. It entails a combination of market (or concessional) loans with grant (or grant equivalent) components which may be in various forms: Direct investment grants; Interest rate subsidies; Loan guarantees; Technical assistance, Risk mitigation, guarantee and equity instruments, etc.

In the original JSMP I design – as seen in the action fiche and the FA - the use of grants was partially coupled with a potential offer for loan guarantee fund to be managed by the existing appropriate Jordan institutions JLG (Jordan Loan Guarantee Corp) and for some extra support from financial markets through a “banking window service”: this should have increased the low sustainability of the grant component. But after long negotiations between EUD, the MoPIC, the CBJ, the JLG and JEDCO (where the issue was the obligation to reach a minimum level of multiplier for the use of the EU funds) were not able to solve the problems of management criteria.

It is evident that any well-managed financial institution would have not accepted the condition. The achievement of certain results for a financial institution is conditioned by the demand on one end and the risks that the institution is willing to accept according to the available capital and resources on the other hand and cannot be imposed by external stakeholders. As it is formulated appears more a condition to break the relation than one to establish a common strategy. It should have been the role of JEDCO to present enough demands for loans guarantee from its clients well structured in solid business plans in order to achieve a high multiplier: the main beneficiaries of the loan guarantee fund would have been the PS SMEs, that is JEDCO clients. JEDCO role was supposed to prepare the SMEs for the new financial opportunity; and the resources to achieve this (that by the way was defined as one of the expected results of the programme) were available. It is still not completely understandable why a solution was not found when the tasks and the objectives of the two parts are so clearly defined and potentially the synergies are evident.

The final decision approved by the EC Delegation and HQ was to cancel the guarantee fund and to transfer the resources to increase the grant part.

The point to mark is not only that in this way the most attractive and credible instrument to create sustainability for JSMP I was lost, but also that it created a precedent: all following programmes for PSD did not contain any more component for loan guarantee, even though, as mentioned before, this appears to be the main constraints for SMEs. The existence on the same period of an EIB intervention to financially support SMES through local banks was never explored.

It is indicative that ROM failed to understand the core actions and difficulties of the implementation and gave after the first missions positive comments.

### KPI-6.5.3 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - Checklist QSG2 on 19214
### (iii) Additional information from field phase

-  

### KPI-6.5.4: Level of coordination and research of synergies between the different interventions

#### Main Findings on KPI-6.5.4:

The underlying strategic element for the EC’s actions in PSD in Jordan is the market liberalisation relating to the progressive entry into force of the EU-Jordan free trade market (cf. 2002 Association Agreement) accompanied by the appreciation of the path followed by the country in the economic and social reforms and of its repeated commitment to continue along this path.

The strong links between PSD and Trade in EC approach to Jordan are evident in the main strategic documents, in line with EU external policy objectives for Mediterranean countries, mainly in terms of economic development and progressive creation of Euro-Med free trade area. These action plans are translated into specific strategic actions and corresponding budgets through the CSP/NIP.

The recent “Evaluation of the European Union’s Support to Private Sector Development” reports that at country level there little evidence of a structured EC approach to exploiting the potential and complementarities of the set of mechanisms for supporting the private sector, such as a fully-fledged sector strategy encompassing all types of need along with a well thought-out mix of the potential of the different funding sources available. The 2010 European Commission Reference Document on support for Trade and Private Sector raises the issue of the necessary linkages between law reforms and their institutional framework.

In Jordan the presence of an Association Agreement and an Action Plan covering the main sectors of cooperation with a large list of expected results offered the large framework where the objectives were clearly set: these demanded supporting gradual market liberalisation through upgrading enterprise competitiveness and making improvements in the related enabling /institutional environment. This allowed the production of a set of programmes and projects fully coordinated with evident and clear synergies between them.

The potential synergies and coordination as framed by the Association Agreement has some difficulties to become a reality in the implementation so that a cumulative effect has not been achieved. Some problems have been consequence of a set of external events that affected the country and changed the priorities and the attention of the managers. Another issue is the difficult combination of increased competitiveness and employment creation (as mentioned in JC 6.2 and 6.3) joined by the attention to employability mostly through VET associated programmes not always coordinated with private sector support.

The hypothesis that the EU support was geared by what can be considered to be the potential VA for intervening in PSD, even though references to EU value-added in project fiches are minimal, is respected as the value of free market and trade liberalization, at the basis of the same EU idea, are always confirmed in the project design. Nevertheless it is sure that the primary logic during intervention design had been one of alignment with country needs rather than maximisation of any particular EU added-value.

At individual project level, coordination with other donors took place, but it was at best an exchange of information and did not aim at maximising complementarities and synergies.

Regarding the potential synergies and coordination with EU IFIs, it should be remembered that there are particular conditions among the facilities in the formal role played by beneficiaries. For the NIF, only IFIs and members of the Financial Institutions Group (FIG) /Project Financiers Group (PFG) can submit project proposals. For example, this means that, in order to benefit from the NIF, a project has to be submitted by a European Public Finance Institution (EPFI) and recognised by the NIF Board as “eligible”. Currently this comprises the EIB, the EBRD, the CEB, the Nordic Investment Bank, AFD, KfW, the Oesterreichische Entwicklungsbank AG, the Società Italiana per le Imprese all’Estero, or the Sociedade para o Financiamento do Desenvolvimento.

As reported in EQ2.3, the coordination with EU IFIs, even if not reported in official documents, appear to be developed through informal meetings and exchange of information. There is however a large space for increased synergies when one thinks that the investments of EU IFIs for private sector in Jordan are 10 times larger that the ones committed by EU DEVCO through the CSPs.
KPI-6.5.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- -/-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- -/-

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- -/-

KPI-6.5.5: Degree to which the chronology of changes in frameworks for policy dialogue and coordinated TA / capacity development initiatives show that BS programmes, projects, programme estimates and/or TA played a critical role (or not) in driving the development of effective frameworks for sustainable private sector development (e.g. for BS, general and specific conditions for the disbursement of BS tranches are defined on the basis of the contents of policy dialogue and promote the development of improved frameworks for policy dialogue, and their monitoring feeds policy dialogue processes) - (Cfr. 5.3.4)

Main Findings on KPI-6.5.5:

As reported in 6.1, the recent evolution of the business environment and private sector support in the country shows some improvements, few declarations of intents and in general the willingness to move ahead but the resistance of consolidated interest to allow it.

In few cases the push from the donors through some specific conditionality allowed for decisive changes.

There is however quite a large amount of steps to be climbed before the complete establishment of effective frameworks for sustainable private sector development. There is no lack of proposals for it, actually, as we can see in EQ 7, in many cases there is an excess of proposals, that is a clear indicator of what is missing, that is a strategic coordination with unambiguous and lucid objectives and a correct and credible selection of means and modalities.

KPI-6.5.5 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- -/-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- SRF FA annexII p5

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- -

KPI-6.5.6: Extent to which, in the perception of representatives of the GoHKJ (including sector ministries), EU and other donors’ representatives, BS processes and/or other aid modalities, working independently or as a complement to BS, influence the evolution of frameworks for policy dialogue and coordinated TA/capacity development initiatives for sustainable private sector development. - (Cfr. 5.3.5)

Main Findings on KPI-6.5.6:

We tried to collect the perceptions of 3 representatives of the GoHKJ and 4 EU officers on the influence on the evolution of the frameworks for policy dialogue of the TA / capacity development initiatives for sustainable private sector development through a specific questionnaire.

Unfortunately only one EU officer sent back the filled questionnaire.

During the meetings, the generic appreciation for the EU support has been confirmed.
**KPI-6.5.6 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- -/-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- -/-

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- -/-

**KPI-6.5.7**

Degree to which the chronology of changes in policies (e.g., investment promotion, SME development), policy processes and capacities (in particular at the level of the Ministry of Industry and Trade and Supplies as well as related specialized institutions), show evidence that BS programmes, programme estimates and/or TA played a critical role, or not, in furthering sustainable private sector development *specific conditions for the disbursement of BS tranches address issues of policy processes and capacities; complementary or embedded TA foresees support to the strengthening of capacities; programme estimates enhance institutional capacities,..* - (Cfr. KPI 5.4.4)

**Main Findings on KPI-6.5.7:**

There are no specific changes in the PS policies directly linked to BS programmes, programme estimates and/or TA, as the evolution of the policy framework, as reported in JC 6.1 has been quite slow in recent years.

The recent presentation by JEDCO of a specific strategy for SMEs, produced with the assistance of TA funded by EU, could hopefully push for the definition and approval of the new official government strategy. The establishment of a “higher Council for SMEs” has been the first step.

**KPI-6.5.8 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- -/-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- -/-

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- -/-

**KPI-6.5.8**

Extent to which, in the perceptions of representatives of the GoHKJ (including sector ministries), EU and other donors’ representatives, BS processes and/or other aid modalities, working independently or as a complement to BS, had an influence on the evolution of policies, policy frameworks and capacities on sustainable private sector development *(cfr. KPI 5.4.5)*

**Main Findings on KPI-6.5.8:**

As mentioned already, the tentative to collect perceptions from Jordan / EU officers failed.

However, in meetings with the representatives of private sector and during the focus group discussion, the relation between public sector and private sector has often been raised.

During a meeting with a Jordan Palestinian businessman, he confirmed the hypothesis that the meaning of the public sector as differentiated and separate from the private sector can be considered as blurred. It is difficult to say where one ends and the other starts as in a number of cases the same principle and decisions appear to come from both sides.
Consolidated interest (economic / tribal) and the privileges of some areas of private sector depend essentially by the close relations between public sector representatives and private sector beneficiaries. A recent example is what happens to the Private Hospital Association: they planned to build a solar power unit for 15 MW to supply the private hospitals but they do not receive the official approval because of the present energy producers’ opposition as these are keen to continue to receive the good tariff payment the hospitals make. The new solar plant, completely funded by private resources, is beneficial for the country, but the consolidated interest of another group of private investors appears to have more influence.

Another recent case is what happened for the licences for 3G telecommunications; it shows the partiality of the government: ZAIN (ownership by local investors) got it for 33M JD and ORANGE (ownership by international investors) had to pay 153M JD.

During the focus group discussion it was remarked that there is a tension between the public sector and the private sector that has created wide inefficiencies. Neither sector seems to acknowledge that its success – and that of the country – is intertwined with the smooth functioning of the other.

KPI-6.5.8 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - -/

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - -/

(iii) Additional information from field phase
   - Meeting with Mr Bassdji – Amman Chamber of Commerce

JC-6.5: The choice and the combination of the EU aid modalities (BS and project) for PSD are the consequence of the search for efficiency and cost/effectiveness in line with Jordan Government objectives and complementary to other DP support to the sector

Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-6.5 (based on the KPIs main findings)

In Jordan, the presence of an Association Agreement and an Action Plan covering the main sectors of cooperation with a large list of expected results offered the large framework where the objectives were clearly set: these demanded supporting gradual market liberalisation through upgrading enterprise competitiveness and making improvements in the related enabling /institutional environment. This allowed the production of a set of programmes and projects fully coordinated with evident and clear synergies between them (KPI 6.5.4). The underlying strategic element for the EC’s actions in PSD in Jordan is the market liberalisation relating to the progressive entry into force of the EU-Jordan free trade market (cf. 2002 Association Agreement) accompanied by the appreciation of the path followed by the country in the economic and social reforms and of its repeated commitment to continue along this path.

The strong links between PSD and Trade in the EC approach to Jordan are evident in the main strategic documents, in line with EU external policy objectives for Mediterranean countries, mainly in terms of economic development and progressive creation of Euro-Med free trade area. These action plans are translated into specific strategic actions and corresponding budgets through the CSP/NIP. The analysis of the set of PSD interventions during the evaluation period shows that all contain a correct and credible analysis of the context; especially the BS interventions enlarge the assessment to the existence of the necessary reconditions. The policy context and the pattern of the reforms the country is implementing are always well presented. Also the general recommendations for formulating and implementing PSD interventions according to the basic documents appear to have been always followed. The 2010 Guidelines on Private Sector and Trade Support provided elements of clarification on the role the Commission aims to play in private sector development and why this is an important contribution to the overall development objectives. The 2010 Guidelines underline the importance of the private sector in generating economic growth that in turn, through job creation and enhanced wealth, can lead to poverty reduction, depending on the patterns of growth and the distribution of income. It also highlights the importance of ensuring that policies for growth are accompanied by policies pursuing social and public service delivery. The second recommendation called for better prioritisation of the various areas of intervention, underlining the
importance of identifying the areas in which Community support could better contribute to development of the private sector. The use of the in-house PSD knowledge depository, capitalising on experience coming from other experiences does not appear to have been exploited. There are no evident traces of capitalisation exercises between different EUDs especially of the MENA Region to share experience and good practice in PSD support, considering that EU has provided PSD support for many years, which must have led to an accumulation of useful knowledge.

In effect the “Report on the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Enterprise / 2008 enterprise policy assessment”, made jointly by DG ENTERPRISE and OCDE, contained some precise indication for an active intervention on private sector that does not appear to be fully used in the preparation of the following PSD interventions. (KPI 6.5.1).

The table in KPI 6.5.2 describes the situation (information received up to the end of March 2014) of the cycle for PSD interventions (both the direct ones and the ones where PSD is only a component within others) as far as identification and formulation are concerned. We focus on this part of PCM as it is the phase when the investment decisions are made and thus should be the more important from a strategic and long-term point of view. It appears that the full cycle has been completed in less than 50% of the cases. The related assumption to check during the field phase is that there was limited documented identification because of the lack of time and resources. The limited documented identification is also consequence of the lack of time mainly because of the external events, as mentioned in paragraph 6.4.3. The critical situation following the global crisis of 2008 and the start of the Arab Spring together with the strategic and political importance of Jordan should be considered as the exceptional circumstances that can explain this mode of procedure. In effect, it should be mentioned that according to EU Delegation officers, for some allocation decisions, the formulation process was short, driven by the Arab spring aftermath urgency of assigning SPRING allocations to programmes that were already in implementation and could be topped up. Consequently, a more informal and pragmatic approach based on dialogue was usually preferred. This dialogue normally takes place formally between the national authorities and the EU in coordination with the donor community. Relying on policy debates and informal exchanges of views rather than documentary evidence to prepare PSD has the advantage of ownership by the implementing authorities but may potentially lead to inadequate, unsustainable programmes. (KPI 6.5.3).

The reading of the monitoring reports failed in some cases (see JSMP and SEED reports) to provide a clear view of the results obtained by PSD interventions. It is true that often ROM reports and evaluation reports provide information on outputs (e.g. the number of investment promotion events held or the number of participants attending), but much less at results level (e.g. the impact of investment promotion activities on investment partnerships over time); this may be due to the lack of quality of the evaluation or to the fact that assessing results was hardly feasible, but also because, as it could happen in some cases, the expected results were not always specified.

After the first experiences it appears that one key criterion is at the base of the selection of the PSD modalities: for institutional reforms the tool should be BS while for direct support to meso-institutions and final beneficiaries the decentralised project was selected as best options. According to the recent evaluation of PSD, effective and sustainable results in PSD are seemingly stronger under EC’s programme-approach than under SBS. This is mostly due to the demonstration effect of what has been considered a highly visible success of EJADA first and the above mentioned continuation projects. Again, the recent evaluation of PSD states that “relatively vague conditions are the standard set up of BS for PSD, focusing on activities vs. results/impact and with lack of follow-up in respect of BS conditions; there is evidence of some outputs created just for meeting BS conditions with little evidence of long-standing results and impact”. The opportunity to use B2B approach to PSD does not appear to have received sufficient consideration, although it could have been quite important to coordinate PSD with the trade objective. The case for an intervention in the financial sector (according to the recent Commission guidelines it should offer the possibility to blend different tools) within JSMP (where the presence of an amount for loan guarantee was cancelled to transform it into grants) shows that in some cases short term constraints had the priority on long term objectives. The point to mark is not only that in this way the most attractive and credible instrument to create sustainability for JSMP I was lost, but also that it created a precedent: all following programmes for PSD did not contain any more component for loan guarantee, even though, as mentioned before, this appears to be the main constraints for SMEs. The existence in the same period of an EIB intervention to financially support SMES through local banks was never explored. It is indicative that ROM failed to understand the core actions and difficulties of the implementation and gave after the first missions positive comments.

It is true, however, that in the period of this evaluation special external circumstances could have pushed to
hasten some financial decisions. If this is confirmed, part of the field analysis should be addressed to verify the consequences in the implementation of the actions in term of efficiency, effectiveness and impact face to the stated objectives.

The potential synergies and coordination as framed by the Association Agreement have some difficulties to become a reality in the implementation so that a cumulative effect has not been achieved. Some problems have been consequence of a set of external events that affected the country and changed the priorities and the attention of the managers. Another issue is the difficult combination of increased competitiveness and employment creation (as mentioned in JC 6.2 and 6.3), joined by the attention to employability mostly through VET associated programmes being not always coordinated with private sector support.

The hypothesis that the EU support was geared by what can be considered to be the potential Value Added for intervening in PSD is respected in relation to the value of a free market economy and trade liberalization (even though references to EU value-added in project fiches are minimal). Nevertheless it is sure that the primary logic during intervention design had been one of alignment with country needs rather than maximisation of any particular EU added-value.

At individual project level, coordination with other donors took place, but it was at best an exchange of information and did not aim at maximising complementarities and synergies.

As reported in EQ2.3, the coordination with EU IFIs, even if not reported in official documents, appear to be developed through informal meetings and exchange of information. There is however a large space for increased synergies when one thinks that the investments of EU IFIs for private sector in Jordan are 10 times larger than the ones committed by EU DEVCO through the CSPs. (KPI 6.4.4)

As reported in 6.1, the recent evolution of the business environment and private sector support in the country shows some improvements, few declarations of intents and in general the willingness to move ahead but the resistance of consolidated interest to allow it. In few cases the push form the donors through some specific conditionality allowed for decisive changes. There is however quite a large amount of steps to be climbed before the complete establishment of effective frameworks for sustainable private sector development. There is no lack of proposals for it, actually, as we can see in EQ 7, in many cases there is an excess of proposals, that is a clear indicator of what is missing, that is a strategic coordination with unambiguous and lucid objectives and a correct and credible selection of means and modalities. (KPI 6.4.5)

However, in meetings with the representatives of private sector and during the focus group discussion, the relation between public sector and private sector has often been raised.

During a meeting with a Jordan Palestinian businessman, he confirmed the hypothesis that the meaning of the public sector as differentiated and separate from the private sector is in the country “fuzzed”. It is difficult to say where one ends and the other starts as in a number of cases the same principle and decisions appear to come from both sides.

Consolidated interest (economic / tribal) and the privileges of some areas of private sector depend essentially on the close relations – via wasta and similar – they are able to create between public sector representatives and private sector beneficiaries.

One more case is the new energy policy with the long debated MOUs with new investors in sustainable energy (requested to have the final Ministerial approval for an investment) and the confirmed strategy to get nuclear power. A recent example is what happens to the Private Hospital Association: they planned to build a solar power unit for 15 MW to supply the private hospitals but they do not receive the official approval because of the present energy producers’ opposition as these are keen to continue to receive the good tariff payment the hospitals make. The new solar plant, completely funded by private resources, is beneficial for the country, but the consolidated interest of another group of private investors appears to have more influence.
### JC-6.6
The EU interventions for PSD explicitly incorporate aspects related to cross-cutting issues as environment, social standards, human rights, rule of law, women participation, etc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPI-6.6.1</th>
<th>Extent to which non-governmental stakeholders have been actively involved in the different stages of PSD intervention cycles (policies, strategies, programming and PCM) with evolutions over time of such involvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPI-6.6.2</td>
<td>Level of evidence of consultations, discussion groups, community councils, public debate notably in the local press, etc. at the different stages of the programming and interventions cycles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-6.6.3</td>
<td>Percentage of PSD projects /programmes of which the design and implementation documents explicitly refer to cross cutting issues and implementation reports provide empirical evidence of such effective mainstreaming throughout the project/programme cycle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-6.6.4</td>
<td>Overall quality of the references to cross cutting issues in Call for Proposals (CfPs) guidelines and other procedural documents for PSD support programmes and interventions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KPI-6.6.1:** Extent to which non-governmental stakeholders have been actively involved in the different stages of PSD intervention cycles (policies, strategies, programming and PCM) with evolutions over time of such involvement

**Main Findings on KPI-6.6.1:**

The information on the dialogue with NSA organizations on the identification / formulation of PSD programmes is quite scarce.

It is true that in the projects managed through JEDCO (and before during the EJADA experience), some NSA operating for private sector support have been beneficiaries of TA support (see Amman Chamber of Commerce for training activities) or of direct grants (15 different associations during JSMP I).

The Economic and Social Council (ESC) is the main conduit for PP consultations. The ESC meets regularly twice a year. Additional consultations take place at the time of presentation of major economic measures. However private sector organizations consider the current framework as not conducive to a productive dialogue. The Government is currently reviewing the draft of a new PP law, while a new National Innovation and Competitiveness Council, bringing together private and public sector representative and focusing on the improvement of the investment climate and on enhancing productivity in Jordanian enterprises has been established, on the process of elaborating the new 2012-2012 innovation and R&D strategy. Intensive PP consultations have been conducted during the preparation of the new SME Development Strategy.

During the focus group discussion the relations between private sector and public authorities came often on the table. A popular complaint from industrialists and business organizations has been that policy makers have not consulted the private sector when it comes to laws and policies impacting the business environment. There is a clear dichotomy within the two phases of what should be a unique and continuous process, that is: The design of the strategies where in general a large participation is sought for, and the production / approval of new laws and policies, where the transparency is much reduced.. While the general policy with regard to overall strategies involves the representatives of businesses, the outcomes of the laws process do not always reflect business concerns, views and positions. From a regulatory perspective the government should always include the business – not only through the classic associations but also including the new experiences that are in many cases the most promising –, should try to conduct meetings and accept collective views during the preparatory process, especially at Parliament stage. Lately the public-private partnership is facing major challenges, with decisions made without any involvement of the concerned sectors and without proper studies to verify the efficacy of these decisions.
KPI-6.6.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - -

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - -

(iii) Additional information from field phase
   - -

KPI-6.6.2: Level of evidence of consultations, discussion groups, community councils, public debate notably in the local press, etc. at the different stages of the programming and interventions cycles

Main Findings on KPI-6.6.2:

Evidence of formal consultations, discussion groups, community councils, public debate notably in the local press, etc. at the different stages of the programming and interventions cycles is scarce.

Informal meetings and the network that each EU officer has been able to build appear to be the major source of information and consultation.

KPI-6.6.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - -

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - -

(iii) Additional information from field phase
   - Please see below

KPI-6.6.2 (iii) Additional information from field phase

During the “Focus Group on Private sector”, the relation between the PS and the Government Institutions has been a major debated point. There is a tension between the public sector and the private sector that has created wide inefficiencies. Neither sector seems to acknowledge that its success – and that of the country – is intertwined with the smooth functioning of the other. To use an overused analogy we are all in the same boat together, even though sometimes it feels we are using the oars to bludgeon each other.

A popular complaint from industrialists and business organizations has been that policy makers have not consulted the private sector when it comes to laws and policies impacting the business environment. There is a clear dichotomy within the two phases of what should be an unique and continuous process, that is the design of the strategies, where in general large participation is sought, and the production / approval of new laws and policies, where the transparency is reduced. While the general policy when it comes to overall strategies involve the representatives of businesses, the outcomes of the laws process do not always reflect business concerns, views and positions. From a regulatory perspective the government should always include the business but not only through the classic associations but also including the new experiences that are in many case the most promising, should try to conduct meetings and accept collective views during the preparatory process, especially at Parliament stage. Lately the public – private partnership is facing major challenges with decisions made without any involvement of the concerned sectors and without proper studies to verify the efficacy of these decisions.

One of the most worrisome aspects of Jordanian business environment is that government appears to make decisions on important matters such taxation on an ad hoc basis and not based on well-defined principles. For potential investors in the country, this has become a major preoccupation where the tax environment over the past several years has been unstable with changing tax laws, an impending change on tax rates for corporations and individuals, the unexpected change rate in certain taxes as the increased tax on telecoms. The most obvious example is the fact that, while no capital gains tax is payable on shares, the government has applied in certain cases a “goodwill tax” that amounts to the same thing, but only on some sectors not as cross cutting measure. The increased telecom tax and the increased sales tax on telecom consumption and no taxes on the operators and their profits!!!!! This implies that the government seeks

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Main Findings on KPI-6.6.2:

Evidence of formal consultations, discussion groups, community councils, public debate notably in the local press, etc. at the different stages of the programming and interventions cycles is scarce.

Informal meetings and the network that each EU officer has been able to build appear to be the major source of information and consultation.

KPI-6.6.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - -

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - -

(iii) Additional information from field phase
   - Please see below

KPI-6.6.2 (iii) Additional information from field phase

During the “Focus Group on Private sector”, the relation between the PS and the Government Institutions has been a major debated point. There is a tension between the public sector and the private sector that has created wide inefficiencies. Neither sector seems to acknowledge that its success – and that of the country – is intertwined with the smooth functioning of the other. To use an overused analogy we are all in the same boat together, even though sometimes it feels we are using the oars to bludgeon each other.

A popular complaint from industrialists and business organizations has been that policy makers have not consulted the private sector when it comes to laws and policies impacting the business environment. There is a clear dichotomy within the two phases of what should be an unique and continuous process, that is the design of the strategies, where in general large participation is sought, and the production / approval of new laws and policies, where the transparency is reduced. While the general policy when it comes to overall strategies involve the representatives of businesses, the outcomes of the laws process do not always reflect business concerns, views and positions. From a regulatory perspective the government should always include the business but not only through the classic associations but also including the new experiences that are in many case the most promising, should try to conduct meetings and accept collective views during the preparatory process, especially at Parliament stage. Lately the public – private partnership is facing major challenges with decisions made without any involvement of the concerned sectors and without proper studies to verify the efficacy of these decisions.

One of the most worrisome aspects of Jordanian business environment is that government appears to make decisions on important matters such taxation on an ad hoc basis and not based on well-defined principles. For potential investors in the country, this has become a major preoccupation where the tax environment over the past several years has been unstable with changing tax laws, an impending change on tax rates for corporations and individuals, the unexpected change rate in certain taxes as the increased tax on telecoms. The most obvious example is the fact that, while no capital gains tax is payable on shares, the government has applied in certain cases a “goodwill tax” that amounts to the same thing, but only on some sectors not as cross cutting measure. The increased telecom tax and the increased sales tax on telecom consumption and no taxes on the operators and their profits!!!!! This implies that the government seeks
out successful and/or large enterprises and would like to tax them at higher rates that other enterprises, creating market inequalities and suggesting worst scenarios for the future.

The difficult decisions are tax reform and expenditures adjustments that come with a political sacrifice, since current expenditures (mainly wages and salaries) are not politically easy to downsize. While indirect taxation review is easier and faster when applied to certain sectors, it creates a burden on corporate activities as well as on end consumers. Taxation across economic sectors driven by seeking economic streams is a diversion from the real purpose of taxation and aggressive rates above a certain level are counter productive to raise further tax revenues since tax rates that are too high will strangle business activity and the total tax pool would shrink.

Tax incentives should be completely reformed as they should be used as a with a long term vision favouring the growth of new enterprises and priority sectors, penalising not performing ones in term of innovation and employment of local manpower.

**KPI-6.3:** Percentage of PSD projects /programmes of which the design and implementation documents explicitly refer to cross cutting issues and implementation reports provide empirical evidence of such effective mainstreaming throughout the project/programme cycle

### Main Findings on KPI-6.3:

The below analysis of the main documents related to the set of interventions affecting the private sector development shows that in general cross cutting issues received a marginal attention in the formulation phase.

Some projects during implementation (the ones managed by JEDCO and using direct grants as main tool) included preferential treatment for women applicant and beneficiaries. However consolidated analysis of results is still lacking.

### KPI-6.3 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - -/-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - -/-

(iii) Additional information from field phase
   - -/-

**KPI-6.4:** Overall quality of the references to cross cutting issues in Call for Proposals (CfPs) guidelines and other procedural documents for PSD support programmes and interventions

### Main Findings on KPI-6.4:

The Guidelines on the programmes implemented through JEDCO for PSD have paid explicit attention to gender. The women applicants had the opportunity to reach a higher threshold of grant support (up to 90% in some cases). This, in effect, stimulated the participation of business women.

In Jordan, the rate of participation of women in the working sector is one of the lowest in the region. Nevertheless, as is evident from the third table below, working women generally have higher qualifications than men, although the salaries (see first table) are always substantially lower (except in sales services). This can be interpreted as women being better opportunity for using resources in private sector support, as they should have better education and motivation.

Attention to environmental issues has not been considered a priority in the programmes’ guidelines, even though Jordan’s critical problems with availability of water and energy would have suggested that innovative practices in water / energy efficiency should be given strong priority.

In contrast, the interventions of the EU IFIs show a clear reference and priority to sustainable energy, protection of the environment and attention to gender.
### KPI-6.6.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- sex 2012
- WB, Small and Medium Enterprises in Jordan | December 2013
- sex 1993-2012
- Dep Statistics Yearbook 2012

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- ROM report on 19570 7/2011

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- -/-

### JC-6.6: The EU interventions for PSD explicitly incorporate aspects related to cross-cutting issues as environment, social standards, human rights, rule of law, women participation, etc.

### Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-6.6 (based on the KPIs main findings)

PSD has been regarded mainly in the framework of enterprise competitiveness and in relation to support to modernisation. Participation of NSA stakeholders in formulation is not recorded, but there have been many cases where associations working for private sector support received grants. During the focus group discussion, the relations between private sector and public authorities were a frequent topic. A popular complaint from industrialists and business organisations has been that policy makers have not consulted the private sector when it came to laws and policies impacting the business environment.

There is a clear dichotomy within the two phases of what should be a unique and continuous process, that is: The design of the strategies where in general a large participation is sought for, and the production / approval of new laws and policies, where the transparency is much reduced. While the general policy regarding overall strategies involves the representatives of businesses, the outcomes of the laws process not always reflect business concerns, views and positions. From a regulatory perspective, the government should always include the business – not only through the classic associations but also including the new experiences that are in many cases the most promising –, should try to conduct meetings and accept collective views during the preparatory process, especially at Parliament stage. Lately, the public-private partnership faces major challenges with decisions made without any involvement of the concerned sectors and without proper studies to verify the efficacy of these decisions. (KPI 6.6.1).

Cross-cutting issues received marginal attention (KPI 6.6.3), except for gender (as women got preferential treatment for grant amount threshold in calls for proposals).

Guidelines for calls for proposals for direct grants to the private sector (even when the objectives are stated as modernisation / reduction of trade deficit) set as condition that work regulations and tax payments be respected, while scarce / no attention was given to environmental issues (unfortunately, this includes also a lack of attention to energy efficiency or water efficiency in a country where cost of energy is the main component of the trade deficit and the scarcity of water is the main long-term environmental issue). In contrast, the attention for gender (women as applicant and beneficiary) was an explicit condition for preferential treatment. No consolidated analysis of achieved results has been conducted up to now. Special consideration deserve the EU IFIs’ interventions as they show a clear reference and priority to sustainable energy, protection of the environment and attention to gender. (KPI 6.6.4)
### 3.7. EQ-7 IM on Trade, Transport and Investment Facilitation

#### Information Matrix EQ-7: Trade, transport and investment facilitation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Question (code and title)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EQ-7: To what extent has EU’s support in the area of trade, transport and investment facilitation contributed to improving the balance of trade and the investment relations between EU and Jordan?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### List of Judgement Criteria (JCs) under the EQ (codes and titles)

| JC-7.1 | The capacity of the overall enabling environment of related specialized institutions (public, private and public-private) with regard to trade, transport and investment facilitation is sustainably strengthened |
| JC-7.2 | Solid and sustainable increase in exports to the European Union (EU) is facilitated by a conducive overall policy, regulatory and institutional framework |
| JC-7.3 | Increase of sustainable investments from EU to Jordan as facilitated by a favourable investment policy, regulatory and institutional framework |
| JC-7.4 | Increase in sustainable and sustained Jordan domestic value added exports with increased share in overall exports realised by SMEs and by enterprises located outside of Greater Amman, enabled with EU support |
| JC-7.5 | The Country transport strategy developed with EU support facilitates the evolution of Jordan towards a regional transport hub |

#### JC-7.1

The capacity of the overall enabling environment of related specialized institutions (public, private and public-private) with regard to trade, transport and investment facilitation is sustainably strengthened

#### List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 7.1 (codes and definition)

| KPI-7.1.1 | Percentage progress in the drafting and approval of the Investment Promotion Law and its implementing rules and regulations |
| KPI-7.1.2 | Percentage progress in the drafting, approval and funding / operationalisation of the Export Strategy |
| KPI-7.1.3 | Degree to which the trade and investment regulatory and institutional framework is defined and operational, including a clear definition of roles and delineation of tasks of the Institutions operating for export promotion and investment |
| KPI-7.1.4 | Degree to which the strategic plan of the Jordan Investment Board is finalised, approved and translated in annual operational plans with clear target setting on key performance indicators, with special attention for trade and investment factors related to sustainable and inclusive development and growth |
Jordan is a free market oriented economy, with outward-oriented economic policies and a private sector led approach. Jordan experienced a privatization of major state-owned enterprises in the first 2000-decade and implemented significant advances in structural and legal reform. Jordan’s growth is supposed to be exports-led and trade and private sector development have been central elements of the country’s development strategy. The need for an improved environment for private investment was acknowledged since the 2007 CSP, where the importance of trade and private sector investments was coupled with the attention to the creation of the needed overall legislative framework. Different donors supported the Jordan effort in improving the investment climate.

Trade liberalization has been the thrust of Jordan’s reform efforts. Tariffs were substantially reduced, unilaterally or on a negotiated basis in trade agreements; and, non-tariff restrictions eliminated opening the country to foreign competition. Simultaneously, the country pursued a strategy of obtaining preferential market access for its exports. Jordan acceded to the WTO in 2001, and it entered into preferential trade agreements with the EU, US, EFTA, Arab countries under GAFTA, Canada, Turkey and Singapore, which implied broad tariff elimination. By the end of 2008, Jordan had a simple tariff structure with an average applied MFN tariff of 10 percent. The effective tariff rate, custom revenues out of total imports, declined from 17.8% in 1990 to only 2.3% in 2008 reflecting the effect of the trade agreements. Jordan has implemented one of the most drastic trade liberalization programmes in the region, and also in comparison with other middle income countries. At the same time most Jordanian exports enjoy duty-free access to the country’s main markets.

Some results in term of basic regulation for establishing a business have been achieved.

The EU support since the Sector Reform Facility BS targeted the preparation of a new investment law. However a unified new investment law and the corresponding national strategy for investments are still to be finalized. The existing Investment promotion Law dates of 1995 and received some improvement in 2000. There is a diffused awareness that it should be reformulated to better face the challenges of the new global context but up to now the finalization of this effort looks difficult. The fact that different drafts have been circulated and that there is a general commitment to push the matter quickly to the Parliament could be an indicator to a credible success in near future. A draft investment promotion law is currently pending parliamentary review. Investment promotion activities were consolidated under the Jordan Investment Board (JIB), which should provide a “one-stop shop” for investors seeking to do business in Jordan. Local and foreign investments are screened by the JIB’s Incentives Committee, which can offer tax breaks and other incentives for prospective investors. From some comments on the draft investment law, it appears that it aims to reorganize institutional framework and clarify the incentives regime, based on separate regions with different categories. The EU contributed to the consolidation of JIB action through some direct support (development of JIB’s strategic plan, drafting of the Investment Promotion Law, some action from regional B2B programme), but without convincing results.

EPC is a public body in charge under Jordanian law to implement the PPP programme and has a track record of privatisation in the infrastructure and public services sectors, including electricity, water and telecoms as well as many smaller transactions in public services sectors. EPC’s record is regarded as one of the more successful within the region. EPC is in the process of transition from the implementation of a successful privatization programme to a PPP Unit. However a decision of the Jordan Government from May, 2011 decided that EPC is to be dissolved and its PPP activities transferred to a new organization, the Investment Promotion and Development Corporation, subject to the enactment of a new law currently under discussion at the Parliament. The present PE takes this evolution into consideration as it is focused on the whole PPP community in Jordan rather than purely on EPC as an institution.

However, while the long-term need for PPP as an option for Jordan increases, there have been important challenges to the task of fixing the legal, regulatory, and institutional framework for PPPs in Jordan firmly in place. On May 18, 2011 the Cabinet announced that it would: 1.Merge the Jordan Investment Board (JIB) and the Development Zones Commission (DZC) and the duties related to the promotion of exports and exhibitions of the Jordan Enterprise Development Corporation into one institution that will be called “Investment Development and Promotion Corporation”; 2. Abolish/cancel the EPC and assign its privatisation related duties to the Ministry of Finance, and assign duties of supporting and strengthening PPP projects to

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KPI-7.1.1: Percentage progress in the drafting and approval of the Investment Promotion Law and its implementing rules and regulations

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the "Investment Development and Promotion Corporation".

It was further announced that the Privatization Law, that first created the EPC, would need to be officially repealed before this abolition/cancellation of the EPC could be affected. This would be accomplished through the expected passage within the next few months of a new PPP Law, which would officially establish the new institutional arrangements, powers, functions, and duties for PPPs as well as mark the official end of the existing Privatization Law.

While both privatization and PPP are concerned with attracting private sector investment, there are many important differences between the two, and this has important implications for the skills EPC in undertaking this new mandate. The purpose of this EU funded project is to deliver the required technical support to EPC during this important transition period towards public-private partnerships.

It succeeded in setting up Jordan Investment Board’s (JIB) One-Stop-Shop Service (OSS), one place for setting up business in Jordan where the representatives from 9 ministries can jointly register and license new projects. Through this service window an investor can register and license his/her project in Jordan at one place within 14 working days.

A recent decision to re-format the JIB and the export promotion with a Higher Council is still to be implemented. This creates some confusing environment in term of tasks and responsibilities of different institutions operating in the country.

In the regular dialogue between the EU and Jordan discussions on the implementation of the different chapters of the Action Plan, where trade and investments are priorities, should enable specific priorities to be identified and better modalities of support implemented.

The investment promotion law reform should be joined by the overall tax reform on which donors are working. The current tax system is devised in a manner that favours certain economic activities over others, according to whether those economic activities need government support in the form of lower income taxes to sustain their operations and profitability. As such, manufacturing activities are taxed the least, while mining and banking activities are taxed the most. The direction is therefore to further increase taxes on the mining, telecommunications and banking sectors, as has been deliberated for months in Parliament. The telecom sector already stated that it will incur a loss of JD25 million as a result of the hike in electricity tariffs already applied; therefore the additional taxes could hold back the growth of this important driver of economic growth in Jordan. The telecommunications sector provides the needed infrastructure for a number of growing IT-enabled services directed at the Gulf and the West where Jordan is attempting to carve a niche and a competitive advantage. As such, the government must strike a balance between raising the much needed domestic revenues, and creating the suitable environment for businesses to flourish to create jobs. Hence, overburdening a sector with taxes could have an undesirable impact.

During the Focus Group on Private Sector & Trade the tax issue was raised as one of the most critical for the investors. One of the most worrisome aspects of Jordanian business environment is that government appears to make decisions on important matters such taxation on an ad hoc basis and not based on well-defined principles. For potential investors in the country, this has become a major preoccupation where the tax environment over the past several years has been unstable with changing tax laws, an impending change on tax rates for corporations and individuals, the unexpected change rate in certain taxes as the increased tax on telecoms. The most obvious example is the fact that, while no capital gains tax is payable on shares, the government has applied in certain cases a “goodwill tax” that amounts to the same thing, but only on some sectors not as cross cutting measure. Increased telecom tax and increased sales tax on telecom consumption are there but there are no taxes on the operators and their profits. This implies that the government seeks out successful and/or large enterprises and would like to tax them at higher rates that other enterprises, creating market inequalities and might lead to highly undesirable scenarios for the future.

The difficult decisions are tax reform and expenditures adjustments that come with a political sacrifice, since current expenditure (mainly wages and salaries) are not politically easy to downsize. While indirect taxation review is easier and faster when applied to certain sectors, it creates a burden on corporate activities as well as on end consumers. Taxation across economic sectors driven by seeking economic streams is a diversion from the real purpose of taxation and aggressive rates above a certain level are counterproductive to raise further tax revenues since tax rates that are too high will strangle business activity and the total tax pool would shrink.
KPI-7.1.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- EU AR Report Jordan 2007
- MoPIC – Plan 2011-13
- EU JAR 2012
- EU AR 2013
- WB Jordan Doing Business 2013
- USAID Doing business in Jordan 2013
- USAID Strategy 2012-2015
- EBRD Jordan Country paper 2012
- WB Doing Business in Jordan 2014

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- CSP 2007-11
- Sector Reform Facility SBS annexII p9-10
- CSP 2007
- CSP 2007
- CSP 2007
- EvalVol2 p34
- JordanEval2005Vol2p35
- CSPNIP2007-2010 p3
- CSPNIP2007-2010 p8
- Evaluation of the European Union’s Support to Private Sector Development 2013
- Action Fiche SAPP II
- ROM report on SAAP II 8/2007
- Monitoring mission on TTF – 9/2013
- Evaluation of the European Union’s Support to Private Sector Development 2013

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- /-

KPI-7.1.2: Percentage progress in the drafting, approval and funding / operationalisation of the Export Strategy

Main Findings on KPI-7.1.2:

There have been some important achievements in terms of published strategies (produced thanks to the support of international donors; see below for the full list of available strategies recently prepared by different institutions / organizations public and private). The most important for export promotion are the following:

- The National Export strategy prepared by MoITS (May 2014) with the support of CIDA. A very careful analysis of the recent trends of Jordanian external trade. However the conclusions are quite shocking: the main sectors selected for special support are: fruits/vegetables, prepared/preserved meat, electric wires, paints, engineering. Moreover, does not cover the importance of transport, but does well regarding trade facilitation. The Export strategy has been approved by main stakeholders but still has to be presented to the Cabinet for final approval.
- The National Strategy for External Trade (2010-2014) also prepared by MoITS. Highlights: increase exports of goods and services, attract foreign investments, and improve institutional capacity.
- The Jordan’s National Industrial Policy for 2010-2014 again by MoITS also deals with some trade facilitation related issues. Now plan to get a TA from SAPP with the aim to increase capacity building in management of the different tasks related to external trade.
- The Jordan Innovation Strategy prepared in 2013 by the Higher Innovation Council: the focus was made on the following priority clusters: - Medical services and pharmaceuticals - Information and Telecommunications technology - Clean technology - Architecture and engineering services - Education and career guidance services - Banking and financial services
- The Jordan Competitiveness and Innovation Partnership (JCIP) prepared in 2014 by World Bank Group in coordination with the Government of Jordan to promote the competitiveness and innovation of the
Jordanian economy and its industry sectors open to the international markets. The three selected sectors are: Information Communication and Technology (ICT) and IT-enabled services; tourism sector with a medical tourism sub-sector, and renewable energy/energy efficiency (RE/EE).

There are some common elements in all these documents: 1) all acknowledge that Jordan needs to focus on improving its export performance as instrument to increase growth and employment; 2) all suggest that the intervention of the public authorities is necessary to guide the development as the market trends alone will not successfully produce the best results; 3) they all agree that to be successful an export strategy must concentrate on selected sectors.

But then not only the selection of the targeted sectors is widely different but also the strategies and the modalities to transform them into policies are not similar.

It is evident that there is the need for an overall coordination and synthesis.

Innovation is the driver of sustainable increases in productivity, and it depends on the nature and maturity of the National Innovation System (NIS). The NIS is the network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies. In this area, very limited progress has been made as reflected in the state of the national innovation system, the limited availability of funding for research, and reduced investment and technological capabilities at the firm-level.

The NIS emerges from the interaction between four levels of technological capabilities: a regulatory framework that stimulates learning and innovation, the education system at all levels, technology-related institutions, and the innovation and absorptive capacity at the firm level. Analyzed from this perspective, the NIS in Jordan is in an embryonic stage, which is not generating the innovation dynamism that is required for upgrading. The current situation in Jordan is characterized by weak institutions, lack of coordination between stakeholders, limited articulation between universities, research institutions and firms, technology-related institutions are underdeveloped, and there are low technological capabilities at the firm level, particularly in small enterprises.

Significant changes have been introduced in the regulatory framework, through adopting stringent binding commitments on intellectual property rights in multilateral and bilateral trade agreements and enhanced enforcement capabilities at the domestic level. Stronger protection of intellectual property rights is supposed to promote innovation and the transfer of technology by international firms. As the case of Jordan shows, by itself it is not sufficient.

KPI-7.1.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - Please see below

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - Jordan Times April 13, 2013
   - EU JAR 2011

(iii) Additional information from field phase
   - /-
### KPI-7.1.2 (i) Data, figures and tables:

**Available National Strategies affecting the Export Strategy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Strategy</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Related NES Gear</th>
<th>Relevance to the NES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Agenda</td>
<td>2006-2015</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategy for Export Development</td>
<td>2010-2012</td>
<td>Border - in</td>
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<td>Border - out</td>
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<td>Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Industrial Policy (NIP)</td>
<td>2010-2014</td>
<td>Border - in</td>
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<td>Development</td>
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<td>Foreign National Trade Strategy (FNTS)</td>
<td>2010-2014</td>
<td>Border - in</td>
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<tr>
<td>National E-Commerce Strategy (ENS)</td>
<td>2008-2013</td>
<td>Border - in</td>
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<td>Border - out</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apparel &amp; Textiles Strategy (ATS)</td>
<td>Up to 2020</td>
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<td>Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fruit &amp; Vegetables Strategy</td>
<td>Up to 2020</td>
<td>Border - in</td>
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</table>

**This Strategy provides a reliable work plan for Jordan Enterprise Development Corporation (JEEDCO) to enhance Jordanian exports as it highlights important factors that impact exports. This strategy is general and brief and thus it can serve as a reference document for the NES.**

The NIP is very relevant to the NES yet it cannot replace the latter because:

- The NIP is not meant to be an export strategy for the industrial sector. The NIP is a diagnostic initiative for improving the industrial sector as a whole in Jordan, only part of which is related to exports.
- The NIP was designed for the industrial sector as a whole and does not respond to the needs of specialized industrial sub-sectors.
- Although the NIP calls for the establishment of a committee for the industrial sector, it does not offer a solid and systematic institutional structure to enhance exports. The mandate and the authority of a national committee for industrial development are still vague and not fully defined vis-à-vis other government bodies, namely JEEDCO and the Department of Industrial Development in the MITS.

The FNTS is an ambitious attempt to draw a framework for export. It is a tool that serves as a guideline for all Jordanian sectors since it treats generally the challenges and hurdles that they confront. That cannot serve as a national export strategy. The FNTS ignores the importance of gender inclusiveness.

Jordan’s e-commerce strategy was developed and approved during the years 2007-2008. The objectives of the ENS are to mobilize the nation to develop technical and commercial capacity in e-commerce and to adopt e-commerce in trading of goods and services. The reasons for the adoption of e-commerce are to increase Jordan’s trade and to ensure that Jordan participates in a trading revolution which is transforming the commercial world.

The ATS could have been used and included in the NES if apparel and textiles were determined as a priority sector (which they haven’t been).

The Fruits and Vegetables Strategy is a serious document that the NES builds upon. It thoroughly analyses the situation of the agriculture industry at the time it was drafted.

The room for improvement lies in the following areas:

- Updating the Fruits and Vegetables Strategy in light of Jordan’s recent FTAs and other promising markets’ conditions.
- Evaluating the progress that has been made according to the timetable drawn in the strategy.
- Examining the relevant legislation to find out whether the amendments that the strategy has called for have been introduced including water consumption law, the transit laws, foreign worker labour laws, and tax laws.
KPI-7.1.3: Degree to which the trade and investment regulatory and institutional framework is defined and operational, including a clear definition of roles and delineation of tasks of the Institutions operating for export promotion and investment

Main Findings on KPI-7.1.3:

As acknowledges in the former paragraphs, the finalization of a coordinated strategy for export promotion and investment is still to be completed. The pressing need to modernise the major industry and service sectors and to improve the productivity, competitiveness and export potential of the Jordanian economy in order to cope with stronger competition from neighbouring and world markets is well acknowledged by the Jordanian Authorities and is present in all the strategic documents produced by the EC since the Association Agreement.

Some recent improvements in the trade and investment regulatory and institutional framework refer to the custom administration (ASYCUDA World System for customs declarations active, negotiations an Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAA) to be started soon, Tariff dismantling proceed almost as planned in the EU-Jordan Association Agreement, the Single Window concept applied in most customs houses, the Protocol for the Dispute Settlement in bilateral trade that entered into force in July 2011).

In effect according to OECD trade facilitation performance, Jordan scores relatively well (see graphic in KPI 7.1.3)

It should be noted as reported in the last Monitoring Mission on TTF that for Public Financial Management, despite a very negative review, there is still no coherent ROB in place and at the MoIT and there is a distinct lack of synchrony between budget requests and required deliverables from a project perspective.

See findings of 7.1.2

KPI-7.1.3 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Jordan’s trade facilitation performance: OECD indicators 2013
(ii) **Key extracts from documents:**
- CSP/NIP2007-2010 p4
- CSP/NIP2007-2010 p5
- TTFP / TAP
- EU JAR 2009
- EU JAR 2010
- EU JAR 2011
- EU JAR 2012
- EU JAR 2013
- Please see below

(iii) **Additional information from field phase**
- /-

**KPI-7.1.3 (ii) Key extracts from documents:** *(with explicit source referencing)*

"The strategy behind the Association Agreement was focused on trade liberalisation, including the reduction of EU tariffs and quotas, complemented by support to export-oriented SMEs. The implicit assumption was that export-based growth would follow, which did not prove to be the case, essentially due to technical barriers (non-tariff barriers)."

(EvalVol2p39)

**KPI-7.1.4:** Degree to which the strategic plan of the Jordan Investment Board is finalised, approved and translated in annual operational plans with clear target setting on key performance indicators, with special attention for trade and investment factors related to sustainable and inclusive development and growth

**Main Findings on KPI-7.1.4:**

As mentioned before, changes in the structure and institutions in charge of investment promotion and export are ongoing. For the moment there no final set up with clear tasks and responsibilities.

**KPI-7.1.4 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) **Data, figures and tables:**
- /-

(ii) **Key extracts from documents:**
- Monitoring of the Fourth/Fifth Years Trade and Transport Facilitation, May 2014
- Monitoring of the Fourth/Fifth Years Trade and Transport Facilitation, May 2014

(iii) **Additional information from field phase**
- /-

**JC-7.1:** The capacity of the overall enabling environment of related specialized institutions (public, private and public-private) with regard to trade, transport and investment facilitation is sustainably strengthened

**Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-7.1 (based on the KPIs main findings):**

It is evident that, although Jordan continues in a reform process with a credible pattern, for the Investment Promotion and Export Strategy some work still need to be made (KPI 7.1.1). The support give to different institutions (especially to the demand driven SAAP/SAPP programmes) did produce important results (customs regulations, custom single window, tariff dismantling, negotiating directives for DCFTA, negotiations on Conformity ACAA, working arrangement on technical cooperation in the field of civil aviation safety between European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and Jordan Civil Aviation Regulatory Commission (CARC), the protocol for the Dispute Settlement in bilateral trade). In 2010 the National Foreign Trade Strategy and the National Industrial Strategy for 2010–2013 were approved: this should be a positive indicator for the finalization for the Investment Promotion and Export Strategy. Now also the Export Strategy...
at MoIT has been completed. However, while there are some common elements in all these documents (all acknowledge that Jordan needs to focus on improving its export performance as instrument to increase growth and employment; all suggest that the intervention of the public authorities is necessary to guide the development as the market trends alone will not successfully produce the best results; they all agree that to be successful an export strategy must concentrate on selected sectors), nonetheless not only the selection of the targeted sectors is widely different but also the strategies and the modalities to transform them into policies are not similar. It is evident that there is the need for an overall coordination and synthesis (KPI 7.1.2). Some delay for the completion and approval of new strategies and/or specific legislations can be attributed to the difficult overall conditions that demand the attention of the Jordan Authorities towards different priorities. Nonetheless it is critical that the Government takes responsibility for continuing in the restructuring process. It can be important perhaps to study the institutional process for approving laws (drafted / designed) so that a mechanism for modernising the legislative and regulatory framework can be achieved with consequent positive results for all the economic sectors.

In effect Jordan signed trade agreements with a number of bilateral and regional trade agreements, including the US (JUS FTA in 2001), EU (Euro-Med Agreement in 2002) and other European countries (EFTA in 2001), Singapore (2006), the Greater Arab region (GAFTA in 1998), as well as Agadir (2006) and, most recently, with Canada (2008). Those reforms all together have promoted the expansion of trade in Jordan, nearly doubling the annual growth rate, from an average 9.4% between 1990 and 1999 to an average 16.1% since 2000. In effect according to OECD trade facilitation performance, Jordan scores relatively well (KPI 7.1.3)

Past experience shows that when the objective includes to pass necessary legislative and regulatory reforms, specific and well focused support is need in order to avoid any implementation delay. One lesson learned is that whenever EU assistance is used to develop regulatory reform, political support from PAO and EUD is required to achieve the results. (KPI 7.1.1)

The trade and investment regulatory and institutional framework is improving (ASYCUDA World System for customs declarations active, negotiations an Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAA) to be started soon, Tariff dismantling proceed almost as planned in the EU-Jordan Association Agreement, the Single Window concept applied in most customs houses, the Protocol for the Dispute Settlement in bilateral trade that entered into force in July 2011) but as mentioned before finalization still should be completed (KPI 7.1.3)

As mentioned before, changes in the structure and institutions in charge of investment promotion and export are on going. For the moment there no final set up with clear tasks and responsibilities. The direct support to JIB for the production of a strategic plan still has to be transformed into a credible tool (KPI 7.1.4)
JC-7.2
Solid and sustainable increase in exports to the European Union (EU) is facilitated by a conducive overall policy, regulatory and institutional framework

List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 7.2 (codes and definition)

| KPI-7.2.1 | Trends in EU Jordan trade volumes from different sources, both in monetary terms and in volume, and both in absolute and percentage increase |
| KPI-7.2.2 | Percentage increase of Jordan exports to the European Union, overall and broken down for the individual EU Member States |
| KPI-7.2.3 | Overall level and quality of the progress in TBT and SPS standards setting and metrology advancements |
| KPI-7.2.4 | Overall progress status of accreditation and related institutional processes regarding trade facilitation, with special focal attention for TBT, SPS and rules of origin issues |

KPI-7.2.1: Trends in EU Jordan trade volumes from different sources, both in monetary terms and in volume, and both in absolute and percentage increase

Main Findings on KPI-7.2.1:

The openness of Jordan economy has been confirmed in the last years (according to most recent figures it has reached 82% of GDI at current prices), but unfortunately more on the imports flows than in the exports ones, giving rise to the increased trade deficit that characterizes the most recent trends.

The structural merchandise trade deficit is a major challenge for Jordan. The deficit exerts strong pressure on the current account. Traditionally the trade deficit has been financed by remittances and grants and by a surplus on trade in services. While the first two are highly volatile, the services surplus has declined significantly during the 2000s, notwithstanding the increase in tourism receipts. This raises concerns regarding the sustainability of the external position of the Jordanian economy; in particular considering the high-income elasticity of Jordanian imports. A major objective of the reforms was to reverse the current situation and to generate an export-led growth process through increasing and diversifying exports. The exports did increase in the first 2000 years, but the participation of Jordan in total world exports has remained almost constant since the reforms. Garments exports contributed significantly to export growth. The table in presents the structure of Jordanian exports excluding garment exports. Minor changes have taken place. Furthermore, within each chapter exports are highly concentrated in a limited number of products. The product variety index shows limited diversification.

The export data also reflect a high degree of instability to some major markets. For many products exports took place only in some years of the time series, and there is a significant yearly variation in export value in a wide range of products. The destination of Jordanian exports shows limited market diversification, with the exception of the growing importance of the US due to garment exports. Excluding these exports Jordan’s reliance on the Arab region has increased. The evolution of the structure of Jordanian trade by technological content is presented in the following table. Upgrading would be reflected in a movement towards higher participation of exports with increased technological content. The composition of Jordanian trade shows significant overall stability during the period analyzed. Exports were concentrated in primary, resource-based and low-tech products. These categories represented 63% of exports in the first period and around 57% in 2007-2008. The major change in the technological composition of exports is within these categories. The reduction of resource based products from 43% of total exports in 1990 to around 15% in 2010, and the concomitant increase of low technology products from 19.5% to 27.9% due to the dramatic increase in garment exports. The shares of medium and high technology products have remained almost the same.

The participation of medium and high technology exports is biased by significant re-exports of these products. Jordan is specializing in labour-intensive and resource-based products, with a slight participation of medium and high-tech products, explained basically by pharmaceutical products and fertilizers. Growth of Jordanian exports has resulted from the intensive margin; that is in exports of existing products to existing
The progressive reduction of the main exports (textiles to US thanks to the free zones) has had a strong weight on the most recent performances recorded in the trade balance. The current account deficit expanded in 2012 to stand at JD 3,979.1 million (18.1% of GDP), compared with a deficit amounting to JD 2,462.6 million, (12.0% of GDP) in 2011. The increase in the current account deficit was driven by the rise in the trade balance deficit by 19.0% to total JD 7,448.8 million in 2012, as a result of the increase in petroleum products imports to offset the decline in the Egyptian gas flows used to generate electrical power, on one hand, and the decline in total exports by 1.5 percent.

The past decade has seen some diversification in the Kingdom’s export base, which has been achieved primarily through entering new markets with traditional products together with limited diversification of exported products or services. Product-market pair analysis, which seeks to estimate the sustainability of export relationships, suggests that the probability of a new product-market export relationship surviving into a second year is only 17 %. The probability of such a relationship surviving for more than two years is estimated at 11 %. Under these parameters Jordan performs worse than peers within the first two years of an export relationship, but its performance does not differ much over the medium-term compared with neighbouring countries with a similar level of development. The underlying reasons for such low survival rates could include limited innovation; weak marketing, branding or other support for new export products; low productivity and reliability; poor after sales support; a highly competitive market; or a weak domestic business environment.

More generally, Jordan’s export scan suggests that one of the most important challenges for the Kingdom is to successfully enter new export markets and to increase exports with higher technological sophistication. The difficulty of achieving these objectives could be made easier by effective trade support institutions and conducive Government trade policies, particularly through their impact on Jordan’s business environment. Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of logistics and trade related services would also be important for increasing the success of exporting firms in keeping their export relationships alive.

Jordan’s Revealed Comparative Advantages index (RCA) calculates the Kingdom’s relative advantage or disadvantage in various classes of goods and services as evidenced by trade flows. Between 2002-2004 and 2008-2010, Jordan’s RCA increased in most product groups, in particular in chemicals and stone and glass products. Although Jordan’s RCA remains one of the highest in textiles and clothing, its relative advantage has declined in this activity. Importantly, Jordan does not show any comparative advantages in the sectors most associated with higher levels of innovation and forward and backward linkages. This, however, does not necessarily mean that Jordan does not have the potential to move into the latter segments.

The Global Competitiveness Index for 2013-2014 ranks Jordan 51 out of 148 countries, recognizing the high availability of scientists and engineers (Jordan ranks 7 under this criterion) in the Kingdom. Nevertheless, Jordan ranks much lower with respect to R & D, patents registration, capacity for innovation and quality of scientific research institutions. These assessments are reflected in the low technological sophistication of Jordan’s exports. Jordan’s exports of low technology manufacture outweigh those with higher technology inputs. Nevertheless, the last decade has seen a significant and steady rise of medium technology exports. This positive trend indicates that Jordan could more readily capitalize on products with higher value-added that are part of its existing industries.

The analysis of the impact of trade agreements in the period 2005-2010 (see table in KPI 7.2.1 data) shows the AGADIR Agreement has not brought trade gains for Jordan, since other Resource Poor countries present in the same agreement have significantly increased their export to Jordan, generating trade diversion from the Jordan perspective. It is true that the Euro-Med Agreement had some positive impact positively Jordan, but with only marginal results, as we mentioned before.

One more debated point in the Jordan exports problems – and by the way never mentioned in any of the strategies prepared as for point KPI 7.1.2 – is the exchange rate of the Jordanian dinar. The CBJ decided to utilize the exchange rate to control inflation, and fixed the Jordan Dinar to the dollar since 1995. There is an ongoing discussion of the effect of this policy on the competitiveness of the Jordanian economy; and the estimates of misalignment vary. Nevertheless, most estimates show an overvaluation of the Dinar during the period up to 30/40%. The World Bank asserted that Jordan was affected by Dutch disease effects, evidenced by real exchange rate overvaluation. However, the evolution of the external accounts, the limited
reaction of investment in tradable activities in a context a business friendly environment, and significant
domestic cost increases in dollar terms indicate that the exchange rate policy negatively impacts investment
and competitiveness. The minimum wage for example, established in 1999, has doubled in dollar terms. The
significant inflow of unrequired transfers and the increasing inflows of FDI have produced Dutch disease
conditions.

**KPI-7.2.1 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) **Data, figures and tables:**
- Jordan Dep of Statistics 2013
- L. Abugattas: Firm Level Capabilities Upgrading in Jordan, January 2014

(ii) **Key extracts from documents:**
- EU JORDAN AP 2005
- CSP 2007)
- CSP/NIP2007-2010 p18
- CSPNIP2007-2010 p19
- Sector Reform Facility SBS annexII p8-9
- CSPNIP2007-2010 p19
- CSPNIP2007-2010 p21
- EU JAR 2009

(iii) **Additional information from field phase**
- /-

**KPI-7.2.2: Percentage increase of Jordan exports to the European Union, overall and broken down for the individual EU Member States**

**Main Findings on KPI-7.2.2:**

With reference to the trade with EU, the expected increase of the exports to EU countries that should have received the support of the better trade regulations and reduction of TTF, did not materialize. Even though from 2007 to 2013 the increase of Jordan exports to EU – 60% - has been superior to the increase of EU exports to Jordan – 40% – the trade deficit increased from EUR 2.434 million to EUR 3.369 million: in effect the share of Jordan exports to the EU imports remain quite low (8.28% in 2007 up only to 9.46% in 2013 with an increase of only 14% in 7 years).

The analysis of the flows of exports to EU countries shows that except for Italy, Spain and UK, Jordan exports do not show stable trends, marking then the case for the absence of a solid and consolidated export strategy. Exports to Bulgaria increased 40 times between 2007 and 2012 but went down 50% in 2013. Germany is the biggest market only in 2013, reaming marginal in the other years.

**KPI-7.2.2 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) **Data, figures and tables:**
- EU Export to Jordan 2006-2013
- EUROSTAT 2014

(ii) **Key extracts from documents:**
- /-

(iii) **Additional information from field phase**
- /-
KPI-7.2.3: Overall level and quality of the progress in TBT and SPS standards setting and metrology advancements

Main Findings on KPI-7.2.3:

Since the CSP 2007 the progress in TBT and SBS was considered essential to achieve the new expected dimension of the EU Jordan trade.

Important results can be seen in TBT both in new regulations and in the approximation of EU directives, thanks to specific intervention implemented within the framework of SAAP/SAPP. Especially successful the twinning between the Jordan Standard & Metrology Organization and Germany: they achieved the finalization of EU standards for toys and house electric appliances that are now applied in the country.

In the area of free movement of goods and technical regulations, Jordan made progress in preparing for negotiations on the Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of industrial products (ACAA) aimed at facilitating the access of Jordanian industrial products to the EU internal market (and vice-versa).

KPI-7.2.3 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- CSP 2007
- EU JAR 2013

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- /-

KPI-7.2.4: Overall progress status of accreditation and related institutional processes regarding trade facilitation, with special focal attention for TBT, SPS and rules of origin issues

Main Findings on KPI-7.2.4:

Thanks to a set of twinning projects under SAAP II (covering: food safety, phytosanitary measures, standards and metrology, customs and the Audit Bureau), some notable achievements have been obtained. The overall objective of these twinning projects was to enable the trade-related departments of the Ministry of Industry and Trade to fulfill Jordan’s commitments related to international trade issues within the EU-Jordan Association Agreement and to its WTO membership. Specific objectives of the project include supporting the Foreign Trade Policy Department in all aspects of the Jordanian Foreign Trade Policy decision-making process, including the implementation of the trade policy review mechanism, in the context of WTO membership and the EU-Jordan Association Agreement.

According to the SAAP II evaluations, quality of Expertise was the not always up-to-date (e.g. references to GATT; hardly any relevant WTO experience). CVs do not always reflect capacities and skills very well. The main objective to strengthen and build the capacity for the Jordan Institution for Standards and Metrology (JISM) with a particular stake in conformity assessment, accreditation, metrology, market surveillance and standardization has been achieved. The Accreditation Law has been initially approved by the Cabinet and awaits the Parliament’s endorsement.

The Jordan Accreditation Body is technically competent and has officially applied to become signatory to the multilateral agreement of the European Accreditation Cooperation (EA) in the scope of accreditation of testing laboratories.

JISM has amended its Law on Standards, Metrology and Product Safety which incorporated market surveillance, placing safe products in the market and notification of notified bodies.
### KPI-7.2.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- EU JAR 2009
- EU JAR 2013

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- /-

### JC-7.2: Solid and sustainable increase in exports to the European Union (EU) is facilitated by a conducive overall policy, regulatory and institutional framework

#### Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-7.2 (based on the KPIs main findings)

Since 2008 Jordan has faced multiple external shocks; the global economic and financial crisis, the European debt crisis, and the Arab spring and its repercussions which affected the Egyptian gas flows to Jordan, and resulted in an accelerated inflow of Syrian refugees. These unfavourable developments have resulted in significant pressures on the balance of payments that have not been compensated by an increase of exports. The current account deficit expanded to stand at JD 3,979.1 million (18.1% of GDP), compared with a deficit amounting to JD 2,462.6 million, (12.0% of GDP) in 2011. In 2012 moreover, “Net current transfers” surplus decreased by JD 586.2 million, to reach JD 2,868.5 million due to the decline in foreign grants by JD 383.8 million.

Meanwhile, the surplus of the services account was up by JD 342.9 million as a result of the increase in travel receipts by JD 326.7 million, or 15.3 percent. As for current account financing deficit, the transactions in the capital and financial account with the rest of the world resulted in a decline in net foreign assets in the amount of JD 3,944.7 million in 2012, as a result of the decline in net foreign assets of the banking system by JD 2,440.6 million. Also, net external loans increased by JD 380.0 million and net inflows of foreign direct investment stood at JD 996.1 million.

The openness of Jordan economy has been confirmed in the last years (according to most recent figures it has reached 82% of GDI at current prices), but unfortunately more on the imports flows than in the exports ones, giving rise to the increased trade deficit that characterizes the most recent trends.

The structural merchandise trade deficit is a major challenge for Jordan. The deficit exerts strong pressure on the current account. Traditionally the trade deficit has been financed by remittances and grants and by a surplus on trade in services. While the first two are highly volatile, the services surplus has declined significantly during the 2000s, notwithstanding the increase in tourism receipts. This raises concerns regarding the sustainability of the external position of the Jordanian economy; in particular considering the high-income elasticity of Jordanian imports. A major objective of the reforms was to reverse the current situation and to generate an export-led growth process through increasing and diversifying exports. The exports did increase in the first 2000 years, but the participation of Jordan in total world exports has remained almost constant since the reforms.

The export data also reflect a high degree of instability to some major markets. For many products exports took place only in some years of the time series, and there is a significant yearly variation in export value in a wide range of products. The destination of Jordanian exports shows limited market diversification, with the exception of the growing importance of the US due to garment exports. Excluding these exports, Jordan's reliance on the Arab region has increased. If any upgrading had occurred, the evolution of the structure of Jordanian trade by technological content would be reflected in a movement towards higher participation of exports with increased technological content. The composition of Jordanian trade, on the other hand, shows significant overall stability during the period analyzed. Exports were concentrated in primary, resource-based and low-tech products. More generally, Jordan's export scan suggests that one of the most important challenges for the Kingdom is to successfully enter new export markets and to increase exports with higher technological sophistication. The difficulty of achieving these objectives could be made easier by effective trade support institutions and conducive Government trade policies, particularly through their impact on Jordan's business environment. Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of logistics and trade related
services would also be important for increasing the success of exporting firms in keeping their export relationships alive.

The participation of medium and high technology exports is biased by significant re-exports of these products. Jordan is specializing in labour-intensive and resource-based products, with a slight participation of medium and high-tech products, explained basically by pharmaceutical products and fertilizers. Growth of Jordanian exports has resulted from the intensive margin; that is in exports of existing products to existing markets. The extensive margin contribution, which entails new products to existing markets, or existing products to new markets, or new products to new markets, has been quite limited. This is a significant indicator of the limited capacity of Jordanian firms to discover new opportunities and to realize their potential.

The analysis of the impact of trade agreements in the period 2005-2010 shows the AGADIR Agreement has not brought trade gains for Jordan, since other Resource Poor countries present in the same agreement have significantly increased their export to Jordan, generating trade diversion from the Jordan perspective. It is true that the Euro-Med Agreement had some positive impact positively Jordan, but with only marginal results. One more debated point in the Jordan exports problems – and by the way never mentioned in any of the strategies prepared as for point KPI 7.1.2 – is the exchange rate of the Jordanian dinar. The CBJ decided to utilize the exchange rate to control inflation, and fixed the Jordan Dinar to the dollar since 1995. There is an ongoing discussion of the effect of this policy on the competitiveness of the Jordanian economy; and the estimates of misalignment vary. Nevertheless, most estimates show an overvaluation of the Dinar during the period up to 30/40%. The World Bank asserted that Jordan was affected by Dutch disease effects, evidenced by real exchange rate overvaluation.

However, the evolution of the external accounts, the limited reaction of investment in tradable activities in a context a business friendly environment, and significant domestic cost increases in dollar terms indicate that the exchange rate policy negatively impacts investment and competitiveness. The minimum wage for example, established in 1999, has doubled in dollar terms. The significant inflow of unrequired transfers and the increasing inflows of FDI have produced Dutch disease conditions. (KPI 7.2.1)

With reference to the trade with EU, the expected increase of the exports to EU countries that should have received the support of the better trade regulations and reduction of TBT, did not materialize. Even though from 2007 to 2013 the increase of Jordan exports to EU – 60% - has been superior to the increase of EU exports to Jordan – 40% - the trade deficit increased from EUR 2.434 million to EUR 3.369 million: in effect, the share of Jordan exports to the EU imports remain quite low (8.28% in 2007 up only to 9.46% in 2013 with an increase of only 14% in 7 years). The analysis of the flows of exports to EU countries shows that except for Italy, Spain and UK, Jordan exports do not show stable trends, marking then the case for the absence of a solid and consolidated export strategy. Exports to Bulgaria increased 40 times between 2007 and 2012 but went down 50% in 2013. Germany is the biggest market only in 2013, reaming marginal in the other years. (KPI 7.2.1 and 7.2.2)

The perspective of moving beyond cooperation to a significant degree of economic integration, including through a stake in the EU’s Internal Market, and the possibility for Jordan to participate progressively in key aspects of EU policies and programmes was one of the main assumptions of the EC strategy in the Action Plan and the CSP 2007. These achievements should have been based on the convergence of economic legislation, the opening of economies to each other, and the continued reduction of trade barriers, which will stimulate investment and growth.

Deepening trade and economic relations, should have provided the conditions for increasing investment from EU side and increased exports from Jordan side to reduce the very large trade deficit. The analysis of the impact of trade agreements in the period 2005-2010 shows the AGADIR Agreement has not brought trade gains for Jordan, since other Resource Poor countries present in the same agreement have significantly increased their export to Jordan, generating trade diversion from the Jordan perspective. It is true that the Euro-Med Agreement had some positive impact positively Jordan, but with only marginal results, as we mentioned before (KPI 7.2.2)

Thanks to a set of twinning projects under SAAP II (covering: food safety, phytosanitary measures, standards and metrology, customs and the Audit Bureau), some notable achievements have been obtained. The overall objective of these twinning projects was to enable the trade-related departments of the Ministry of Industry and Trade to fulfill Jordan’s commitments related to international trade issues within the EU-Jordan Association Agreement and to its WTO membership. Specific objectives of the project include supporting the Foreign Trade Policy Department in all aspects of the Jordanian Foreign Trade Policy decision-making process, including the implementation of the trade policy review mechanism, in the context
of WTO membership and the EU-Jordan Association Agreement. Important results can be seen in TBT both in new regulations and in the approximation of EU directives, thanks to specific intervention implemented within the framework of SAAP/SAPP. Especially successful the twinning between the Jordan Standard & Metrology Organization and Germany: they achieved the finalization of EU standards for toys and house electric appliances that are now applied in the country.

In the area of free movement of goods and technical regulations, Jordan made progress in preparing for negotiations on the Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of industrial products (ACAA) aimed at facilitating the access of Jordanian industrial products to the EU internal market (and vice-versa).

(JPI 7.2.3)

In the area of free movement of goods and technical regulations, Jordan made progress in preparing for negotiations on the Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of industrial products (ACAA) aimed at facilitating the access of Jordanian industrial products to the EU internal market (and vice-versa).

(JPI 7.2.4)

**JC-7.3**

Increase of sustainable investments from EU to Jordan as facilitated by a favourable investment policy, regulatory and institutional framework

**List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 7.3 (codes and definition)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPI-7.3.1</th>
<th>Absolute and percentage increase of EU investments in Jordan, EU overall and by Member States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPI-7.3.2</td>
<td>Extent to which specific financial credit lines are available to and effectively used by EU operators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-7.3.3</td>
<td>Percentage share of Jordan exports coming from EU investments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-7.3.4</td>
<td>Extent to which the planned Direct Foreign Investments, customs, taxation, international payments and related trade and investments coordination agreements between Jordan and Europe have been formally concluded, implemented and monitored</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KPI-7.3.1:** Absolute and percentage increase of EU investments in Jordan, EU overall and by Member States

**Main Findings on KPI-7.3.1:**

There is not easily available information on the EU direct investments in Jordan.

FDI in the country showed increasing dynamism since the late 1990’s. However, a large portion of FDI has been directed at privatized public entities, such as the Jordan Cement Company, the Jordan Phosphate Company, Jordan Telecommunications, and in the water and transport sectors. Since 2000 sixty-six public entities have been privatized attracting over USD 1 billion. In addition, some of the largest investments involved acquisitions of Jordanian firms. Therefore, the large FDI projects did not lead to the establishment of new wealth-generating companies. FDI has contributed to the expansion of the tourism sector and financial and telecommunications services, and a significant proportion of FDI went to real estate purchases and portfolio investments. On average, during 2004-2009 foreign portfolio investment accounted for 46% of investment in the Jordanian capital market. Most of portfolio and real estate investments are from countries of the region. In the manufacturing sector FDI has been mainly in the garment industry to take advantage of special access to the US market under the Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ). The effect of FDI on growth has been more indirect through the financial and telecommunications sectors’ contribution to growth. With the exception of the garment industry FDI has made limited contribution to new exports. FDI inflows to the country averaged USD 31 million annually from 1972-1990, representing on average only 0.8% of GDP and 2.8% of GFCF (UNCTAD Database). The political and security situation in the region certainly had an effect on FDI behaviour, which in the case of Jordan was compounded by the limitations imposed by the size of the domestic market, normative barriers and resource scarcity.

The overall analysis of composition of FDI and exports suggests that investments are channelled into lower
added value activities. Jordan did not manage to significantly specialize in higher value added industries. The World Development Indicators reports that high-technology exports account for only 1% of manufacturing exports in Jordan. Likewise, the share of ICT in Jordanian commercial service exports accounts for only 12% of total service exports; this is relatively low when compared with Lebanon (52%). This is particularly striking given that the Jordanian government considers ICT services as a key sector to spur productivity growth and employ university. The collected available data shows that the high share of FDI in Jordan between 2000 and 2007 primarily originates from foreign investments in the construction and tourism sectors, which created few high skilled jobs. This contrasts sharply with China where the high share of FDI primarily directed towards the manufacturing sector.

Investment into Jordan outside the special zones has been largely market and asset seeking. Market seeking FDI in Jordan has come into the financial services and retail sectors and asset seeking investment has taken place in real estate. Investment into non-productive sectors in Jordan seems to be market seeking and a function of the country's relative stability and access to nearby markets, which although larger than Jordan's suffer from significant political instability. Investments into nonproductive sectors such as real estate, emanating from the Gulf countries and the arrival of economic refugees from Iraq, Libya and Syria has served to increase spending on imported consumables. Broadly, one possibility could be that the type of FDI coming into Jordan has not been effective in moving the economy up the value chain towards the production and export of higher value products or services, nor to produce long standing benefits for the local economy in terms of technology transfer or employment. Comparing investment decisions in Jordan to investments in the whole of MENA highlights the potentially missed investment opportunities and can guide investment policy in Jordan. The United States, the UAE, the UK, France, Germany and India represent key sources of FDI into the Middle East but not to the same extent into Jordan. Presently, a much lower proportion of FDI originates from emerging markets and European countries compared to the rest of MENA.

The significant fall in FDI flows into Jordan and the inability of the country to attract investments that are flowing to the MENA region at a time when they are urgently needed as a trigger for private sector development, presents a frontline policy challenge identified by all Government partners. Government interlocutors have put the main objective of FDI as job creation. What can be remarked is the negative trend in most recent years in foreign investments in the country, from a peak in 2006, consequent to the privatization process, to low amount recorded in 2012 (more than 50% reduction on 2011and only one sixth of the record amount of 2006). Moreover in the years since 2000 FDI became a substantial part of the total private investment in the country, confirming again the openness of Jordan. 2013: JD 1,276.9 million (20.1% compared to 2012). Only in 2013 there is a recover of FDI thanks to resources coming from Syria. In effect in the last four years Syria and Iraq became the major investors in the country: 80% of new companies established in Jordan by number, 90% by value by the combined investments from Iraq and Syria FDIs. However the preference went again to Real estate creating than an increased pressure in domestic housing sector.

Jordan's position as a small, stable economy, neighbor to some larger and unstable countries could be its strategic advantage. Proximity and historical ties with countries such as Iraq and Libya allow Jordan to establish itself as a hub for investment into these countries through, for example, the provision of logistical support, back office and financial services for investment.

FDI has not made, until very recently, a major contribution to Jordan’s development except for the garment industry (but with ongoing risk of exit) and real estate (with the consequence of increased price for living and entry of foreign workers in competition with local ones).

### KPI-7.3.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

#### (i) Data, figures and tables:
- MoPIC – Plan 2011-2013
- Jordan Dep Statistics 2013 – in JD at current prices
- UNCTAD WIR report
- IMF
- CBJ & MoF
- DLS
- CCD
- Please see below
(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- EU JORDAN Action Plan
- Sector Reform Facility SBS FA annex II p9-10
- ENPI RIP 2011

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- /-

KPI-7.3.1 (i) Data, figures and tables:

(WB Development Policy Review 2012, vol 2)

KPI-7.3.2: Extent to which specific financial credit lines are available to and effectively used by EU operators

Main Findings on KPI-7.3.2:

The EIB claims to have provided substantial amount to public and private sector in Jordan (see below paragraph KPI extracts from documents); however we were notable to find specific trace of European beneficiaries. The same should be said for EBRD. (See however EQ2 for more precise analysis of the RIB and EBRD interventions in Jordan).
During the meetings with EIB and EBRD, they confirmed that the procurement procedures under their loans are completely open to any provider, and that there are no special arrangements that prioritize European providers.

KPI-7.3.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- ENPI RIP 2011
- EIB FEMIP brochure on Jordan 2013

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- /-

KPI-7.3.3: Percentage share of Jordan exports coming from EU investments

Main Findings on KPI-7.3.3:

As consequence of former paragraph findings, there are no figures for the share of Jordan exports coming from European investments.

KPI-7.3.3 (Main References and Sources of Information):

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- /-

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- /-

KPI-7.3.4: Extent to which the planned Direct Foreign Investments, customs, taxation, international payments and related trade and investments coordination agreements between Jordan and Europe have been formally concluded, implemented and monitored

Main Findings on KPI-7.3.4:

Jordan acceded to the WTO in 2001, and it entered into preferential trade agreements with the EU, US, EFTA, Arab countries under GAFTA, Canada, Turkey and Singapore, which implied broad tariff elimination. By the end of 2008, Jordan had a simple tariff structure with an average applied MFN tariff of 10 percent. The effective tariff rate, custom revenues out of total imports, declined from 17.8% in 1990 to only 2.3% in 2008 reflecting the effect of the trade agreements. Jordan has implemented one of the most drastic trade liberalization programmes in the region, and also in comparison with other middle income countries. At the same time most Jordanian exports enjoy duty-free access to the country’s main markets.

A Customs Administration Modernization Programme started in 2009. The Strategic Plan for 2008-2010 aims at facilitating the movement of passengers and cargo, combating illegal trade activities and development of infrastructure, organization and overall performance of Jordan’s Customs. The rolling out of the ASYCUDA World System for customs declarations processing to several customs centres took place in 2010. The adoption of the draft proposal to revise the customs law which was expected in 2008 has been delayed until 2009. Jordan decided not to apply the Combined Nomenclature contrary to what is foreseen by Article 29 of the Association Agreement.

Concerning free movement of goods and technical regulations, Jordan continued preparations to negotiate an Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAA).

In 2009 tariff dismantling proceeded in accordance with the EU Jordan Association Agreement, including for
products listed in Annex IV. In December 2009, Jordan and the EU concluded negotiations on the text of the Protocol for the Dispute Settlement in bilateral trade disputes. The computerisation of the customs administration is well advanced: 95% of all customs houses, including the major ones, were connected to the customs declaration processing system ASYCUDA World. In 2010 two concrete achievements of the EU-Jordan cooperation were the signing of a comprehensive air services agreement leading to a gradual opening-up of these markets (first country in the Near East to reach such a comprehensive Agreement with the EU) and the signing in February 2011 of the Protocol for Dispute Settlement in bilateral trade. The Cabinet approved in July 2010 a temporary law amending the customs law, which includes new provisions on the enforcement of intellectual property rights and on simplified procedures in line with the Kyoto Convention.

Tariff dismantling proceeded as planned in the EU-Jordan Association Agreement.

The Jordanian Customs Department issued in May 2011 a circular on the further tariff dismantling for the industrial products imported from the EU listed under Annexes III and IV, and the Annex to Protocol 2. Another positive development was the entry into force of the EU-Jordan dispute settlement Protocol in July 2011. During 2011, minor trade barriers persisted, namely on issues related to sanitary and phyto-sanitary issues. Jordan continued to impose safeguards on imports of ceramic tiles. The Protocol for the Dispute Settlement in bilateral trade that entered into force in July 2011 constitutes a concrete achievement of EU-Jordan cooperation. In February 2011 Jordan agreed with the EU on the scope of future negotiations on trade in services and establishment. These negotiations will be embedded in the framework of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement negotiations, for which the EU Council mandated the Commission in December 2011. In July 2011, Jordan signed the regional Convention on pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin. Jordan had chosen electrical products, toys and gas appliances as priority sectors. Jordanian customs apply a single window concept. The number of companies participating in the ‘Golden List’ programme further increased to 39. The implementation of pre-arrival and pre-departure processing of declarations was still pending as Jordan has not adopted a new Customs Law. The new law, will include provisions to extend the competence of customs authorities to pursue intellectual property rights infringements.

The negotiating directives for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with Jordan were adopted in December 2011. The DCFTA aims at progressively integrating Jordan into the EU single market. It should lead to regulatory convergence in areas that have an impact on trade and investment.

In April 2012, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and Jordan Civil Aviation Regulatory Commission (CARC) signed a working arrangement on technical cooperation in the field of civil aviation safety.

Concerning free movement of goods and technical regulations, preparations to negotiate an Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAA) continued. Technical preparations for ACAA negotiations progressed but adoption of the corresponding laws did not.

KPI-7.3.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - -/-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - -/-

(iii) Additional information from field phase
   - -/-
There is not easily available information on the EU direct investments in Jordan. FDI in the country showed increasing dynamism since the late 1990's. However, a large portion of FDI has been directed at privatized public entities, such as the Jordan Cement Company, the Jordan Phosphate Company, Jordan Telecommunications, and in the water and transport sectors. Since 2000 sixty-six public entities have been privatized attracting over USD 1 billion. Therefore, the large FDI projects did not lead to the establishment of new wealth-generating companies. FDI has contributed to the expansion of the tourism sector and financial and telecommunications services, and a significant proportion of FDI went to real estate purchases and portfolio investments. On average, during 2004-2009 foreign portfolio investment accounted for 46% of investment in the Jordanian capital market. Most of portfolio and real estate investments are from countries of the region. In the manufacturing sector FDI has been mainly in the garment industry to take advantage of special access to the US market under the Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ). The effect of FDI on growth has been more indirect through the financial and telecommunications sectors’ contribution to growth. With the exception of the garment industry FDI has made limited contribution to new exports. The political and security situation in the region certainly had an effect on FDI behaviour, which in the case of Jordan was compounded by the limitations imposed by the size of the domestic market, normative barriers and resource scarcity. Investment into Jordan outside the special zones has been largely market and asset seeking. Market seeking FDI in Jordan has come into the financial services and retail sectors and asset seeking investment has taken place in real estate. Investment into non-productive sectors in Jordan seems to be market seeking and a function of the country’s relative stability and access to nearby markets, which although larger than Jordan’s suffer from significant political instability. Investments into nonproductive sectors such as real estate, emanating from the Gulf countries and the arrival of economic refugees from Iraq, Libya and Syria has served to increase spending on imported consumables.

The overall analysis of composition of FDI and exports suggests that investments are channelled into lower added value activities. Jordan did not manage to significantly specialize in higher value added industries. The World Development Indicators reports that high-technology exports account for only 1% of manufacturing exports in Jordan. The collected available data shows that the high share of FDI in Jordan between 2000 and 2007 primarily originates from foreign investments in the construction and tourism sectors, which created few high skilled jobs. This contrasts sharply with China where the high share of FDI primarily directed towards the manufacturing sector. Broadly, one possibility could be that the type of FDI coming into Jordan has not been effective in moving the economy up the value chain towards the production and export of higher value products or services, nor to produce long standing benefits for the local economy in terms of technology transfer or employment. The significant fall in FDI follows into Jordan and the inability of the country to attract investments that are flowing to the MENA region at a time when they are urgently needed as a trigger for private sector development, presents a frontline policy challenge identified by all Government partners.

Only in 2013 there is a recover of FDI thanks to resources coming form Syria. In effect in the last four years Syria and Iraq became the major investors in the country: 80% of new companies established in Jordan by number, 90% by value by the combined investments from Iraq and Syria FDIs. However the preference went again to Real estate creating than an increased pressure in domestic housing sector.

Jordan’s position as a small, stable economy, neighbor to some larger and unstable countries could be its strategic advantage. Proximity and historical ties with countries such as Iraq and Libya allow Jordan to establish itself as a hub for investment into these countries through, for example, the provision of logistical support, back office and financial services for investment

FDI has not made, until very recently, a major contribution to Jordan’s development except for the garment industry (but with ongoing risk of exit) and real estate (with the consequence of increased price for living and entry of foreign workers in competition with local ones). (KPI 7.3.1)

The EIB claims to have provided substantial amount to public and private sector in Jordan (see below paragraph KPI extracts from documents), however we were notable to find specific trace of European beneficiaries. The same should be said for EBRD.

During the meetings with EIB and EBRD, they confirmed that the procurement procedures under their loans
are completely open to any provider, and that there is no special arrangements for prioritize European providers (KPI 7.3.2). As consequence of former paragraph findings, there are no figures for the share of Jordan exports coming from European investments. (KPI 7.3.3)

Jordan acceded to the WTO in 2001, and it entered into preferential trade agreements with the EU, US, EFTA, Arab countries under GAFTA, Canada, Turkey and Singapore, which implied broad tariff elimination. By the end of 2008, Jordan had a simple tariff structure with an average applied MFN tariff of 10 percent. The effective tariff rate, custom revenues out of total imports, declined from 17.8% in 1990 to only 2.3% in 2008 reflecting the effect of the trade agreements. Jordan has implemented one of the most drastic trade liberalization programmes in the region, and also in comparison with other middle income countries. At the same time most Jordanian exports enjoy duty-free access to the country’s main markets. The negotiating directives for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with Jordan were adopted in December 2011. The DCFTA aims at progressively integrating Jordan into the EU single market. It should lead to regulatory convergence in areas that have an impact on trade and investment.

In April 2012, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and Jordan Civil Aviation Regulatory Commission (CARC) signed a working arrangement on technical cooperation in the field of civil aviation safety.

Concerning free movement of goods and technical regulations, preparations to negotiate an Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAA) continued. Technical preparations for ACAA negotiations progressed but adoption of the corresponding laws did not.(KPI 7.3.4)

**JC-7.4**

Increase in sustainable and sustained Jordan domestic value added exports with increased share in overall exports realised by SMEs and by enterprises located outside of Greater Amman, enabled with EU support

**List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 7.4 (codes and definition)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPI-7.4.1</th>
<th>Percentage increase of amounts / total value / unit value of exports from Jordan (commodities and services), with special attention for the value added exports realised by SMEs and by enterprises located outside of Greater Amman having benefitted from EU support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPI-7.4.2</td>
<td>Overall quality assessment and domestic added value of exports from Jordan (for both commodities and services) with special attention for the value added exports realised by SMEs and by enterprises located outside of Greater Amman having benefitted from EU support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-7.4.3</td>
<td>Quality / amounts / total value / unit value of imports into Jordan (commodities and services) from Europe, with trends over time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-7.4.4</td>
<td>Trends in percentage taxation of imports / exports, overall and broken down by types of goods and services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Main Findings on KPI-7.4.1:**

Even though the main export products remain almost the same ones since 15 years ago (see KPI 7.2.1), Jordan has been to improve its position over the last decade, shifting part of the exports from a low and medium-low industry over 2000-05 (apparels and edible vegetables) to medium-tech industry (fertilizers and pharmaceutical products). Some new markets have been reached (in particular in Asian countries) for those medium-tech products, especially fertilizer products and inorganic chemicals. However in 2005-2010, the only significant new exports were Iron and Aluminum, medium low tech products shipped to regional markets. Surprisingly Jordan did not benefit from the rising demand for metal and mining products those last five years.

Since year 2000 the trend of exports from Jordan shows that the increased amounts reported have been due
almost equally to growth of the intensive margin – export of existing products in existing markets - (49 percent) and to that of the extensive margin - exports of existing products in new markets (51 percent). This pattern is probably the consequence of the important amount of textile products that they used to export to other markets and started exporting to USA. In the years since 2005 the importance of extensive margins remains (48 percent) but patterns among intensive margins is quite different from the previous period. Exports of new products have not been important to the recent growth of the aggregate exports showing a certain difficulties in moving up on the technological scale after some success in former years.

In terms of geographical distribution the role of EU continues to be quite limited for all categories of products. Goods that are exported from Jordan are not complex or sophisticated, corroborating other data suggesting that Jordan’s comparative advantage is not based on high-value-added products. Irrespective of the firms' characteristics, most firms in Jordan export final goods to final consumers.

Jordan scores relatively high on the ease to “trade across borders” (rank 58 out of 183 in 2012 and 52 out of 185 in 2013), in part owing to the partial introduction of x-ray scanners for risk management systems which have accelerated the port processing of goods. However, the country scores poorly on “logistics competence” in many aspects of logistics ranging from customs to tracking, tracing and infrastructure, and is well behind the regional leader, Tunisia, and the upper middle income leader, Taiwan.

According to a recent survey made by the World Bank, Jordan's export support programmes and incentive schemes appear to reach a high percentage of non-exporting and female-owned SMEs. On average, 35% of small firms and more than half of the medium-size companies report on benefiting from an exemption from import duties. However, only 15% of SMEs benefit from an export credit guarantee scheme and among them only 5% are exporting SME firms. Firms that do not take advantage of any support schemes report that they do not need the financing (24 percent) or did not know about the schemes in the first place (23 percent). Also, 15% see no real benefits to the various programmes in place.

Overall, Jordan scores 81 out of 155 on the Logistics Performance Index 2012. Specifically, Jordan does relatively well in the ease of arranging competitively priced shipments (ranked 65 out of 155). On the negative side, Jordan is deteriorating on the quality of trade and transport related infrastructure (ranked 92 out of 155), it remains less efficient in the customs clearance process (ranked 116 out of 155) and timeliness of shipments reaching destinations within the scheduled or expected delivery time (ranked 105 out of 155), while reaching a very low score on the ability to track and trace consignments (104 out of 155).

Relative to other MENA comparators, Jordan is only better than Egypt, in "logistics competence" and last in "tracking and tracing". Also, road transport rates are perceived to be high in Jordan, the quality of rail very low, but the competence and quality of the air transport is perceived very high.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPI-7.4.1 Main References and Sources of Information:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) Data, figures and tables:</td>
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<td>(ii) Key extracts from documents:</td>
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<tr>
<td>(iii) Additional information from field phase</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| KPI-7.4.2: Overall quality assessment and domestic added value of exports from Jordan (for both commodities and services) with special attention for the value added exports realised by SMEs and by enterprises located outside of Greater Amman having benefitted from EU support |

| Main Findings on KPI-7.4.2: |

The tables in KPI – 7.4.2 show the results from a WB study on the effect of different export support programmes implemented recently in Jordan (JEPA funded by USAID and JUMP funded by EU)

The studies show that the export promotion activities have had a stronger impact at the intensive margin than at the extensive margin for Jordanian firms. Export promotion has a stronger impact in terms of geographical diversification than in terms of product diversification.
The EU funded JUMP programme which primarily aims at modernizing and upgrading SMEs had an impact on the intensive margin of export growth less persistent, and the impact on the extensive margins is verified in terms of product diversification only.

Similar results come from another study recently made on the impact of direct support to private SMEs operating in international markets. To assess the overall impact on the firm development, the sales / turnover and the export trends were the main indicators to be compared with the overall Jordan GDP and exports trends at market prices.

The results compared favourably with the general development on the economy, as measured by the growth in GDP. It must be noted that among the beneficiaries were some major players which had impacted on the overall group performance, and not all respondents were able or prepared to provide all data in time, clearly indicating that the actual sales figures of the beneficiaries were in excess of those reported here and used as a basis for analysis. The graphic shows the growth in sales of JSMP grant recipients in the period 2008 to 2012, compared with the country’s GDP growth. The peak of the beneficiaries’ sales in 2010 was the result of some outstanding sales to new customers that is not possible to confirm completely to JSMP contribution. In effect the growth rates in sales by JSMP beneficiaries overall were found to be marginally ahead of the country’s GGP growth.

KPI-7.4.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Please see below

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- -/-

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- -/-

KPI-7.4.2 (i) Data, figures and tables:
Trends in overall sales for companies having benefitted from EU JSMP

![Graph showing sales growth by beneficiaries and GDP growth rate]

(JSMP Impact Evaluation March 2014)

KPI-7.4.3: Quality / amounts / total value / unit value of imports into Jordan (commodities and services) from Europe, with trends over time

Main Findings on KPI-7.4.3:

The available data of European exports to Jordan are grouped in main classes of products, as from the below tables.

As it can be expected, the main products are machinery / means of transport and other manufactured goods, which are in general between 50 % and 60% of the total. The general trend shows increased amounts for all classes of products, except for machinery / means of transport during the 2008/2011 crisis.
KPI-7.4.3 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - EUROSTAT 2014
   - Please see below

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - -/-

(iii) Additional information from field phase
   - -/-

KPI-7.4.3 (i) Data, figures and tables:

EUROPEAN EXPORTS TO JORDAN (million euro)

![Graph of European exports to Jordan](EUROSTAT 2014)

KPI-7.4.4: Trends in percentage taxation of imports / exports, overall and broken down by types of goods and services

Main Findings on KPI-7.4.4:

From below table it can be assumed that except for India, Jordan already enjoys an almost duty free trade with the most important trading partners.

It also shows that Jordan can not get more advantages from new trade agreement: in the same time it also confirms certain doubts within the private sector representatives met during the field mission: they wondered if the full trade liberalization is the most useful instrument for Jordan, especially when the rate of exchange of the dinar is pegged to the US dollar.

The trends of the volume and value of Jordanian exports (see below graphic) appear to confirm a general over evaluation of the JD, at least from the start of the trade liberalization and privatization (with consequent increase in FDI).
KPI-7.4.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Tariff Profiles, WTO Statistics Database
- UNCTAD Database

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- -/

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- -/

JC-7.4: Increase in sustainable and sustained Jordan domestic value added exports with increased share in overall exports realised by SMEs and by enterprises located outside of Greater Amman, enabled with EU support

Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-7.4 (based on the KPIs main findings)

A key area of structural reform to boost growth is trade. Jordan is highly dependent on external markets compared to countries with similar level of development. Thus export competitiveness is crucial for growth and development. The Government has, over the past fifteen years, made great strides in liberalizing its trade and investment environment. Jordan's accession to the WTO in April 2000 signalled its commitment to global integration.

According to the IMF (report 2004) “effective structural reforms have transformed Jordan from an inward-oriented, mostly state-controlled, highly indebted economy to an export-oriented one where the private sector is the primary engine of growth”.

In reality, even though the main export products remain almost the same ones since 15 years ago (see KPI 7.2.1), Jordan has been able to improve its position over the last decade, shifting part of the exports from a low and medium-low industry over 2000-05 (apparels and edible vegetables) to medium-tech industry (fertilizers and pharmaceutical products). Some new markets have been reached (in particular in Asian countries) for those medium-tech products, especially fertilizer products and inorganic chemicals. However in 2005-2010, the only significant new exports were Iron and Aluminum, medium low tech products shipped to regional markets. Surprisingly Jordan did not benefit from the rising demand for metal and mining products those last five years.

Since year 2000 the trend of exports from Jordan shows that the increased amounts reported have been due almost equally to growth of the intensive margin – export of existing products in existing markets - (49 percent) and to that of the extensive margin - exports of existing products in new markets (51 percent). This pattern is probably the consequence of the important amount of textile products that they used to export to other markets and started exporting to USA. In the years since 2005 the importance of extensive margins remains (48 percent) but patterns among intensive margins is quite different from the previous period. Exports of new products have not been important to the recent growth of the aggregate exports showing a certain difficulties in moving up on the technological scale after some success in former years (KPI 7.4.1)

Recent studies show that the export promotion activities have had a stronger impact at the intensive margin than at the extensive margin for Jordanian firms. Export promotion has a stronger impact in terms of geographical diversification than in terms of product diversification (KPI 7.4.2). The EU funded JUMP programme which primarily aims at modernizing and upgrading SMEs had an impact on the intensive margin of export growth less persistent, and the impact on the extensive margins is verified in terms of product diversification only. Similar results come from another study recently made on the impact of direct support to private SMEs operating in international markets. To assess the overall impact on the firm development, the sales / turnover and the export trends were the main indicators to be compared with the overall Jordan GDP and exports trends at market prices.

The results compared favourably with the general development on the economy, as measured by the growth in GDP. It must be noted that among the beneficiaries were some major players which had impacted on the overall group performance, and not all respondents were able or prepared to provide all data in time, clearly indicating that the actual sales figures of the beneficiaries were in excess of those reported here and used as a basis for analysis.
Upon accession to the WTO, Jordan substantially reduced its simple average tariff rate (based on Most Favoured Nation, or MFN, tariff rates) from 23.8% in 2000 to 10.2% in 2011. In parallel, Jordan stepped up its efforts to promote exports through specific programmes. In 2010, the US (19 percent), Iraq (17 percent), India (16 percent) and Saudi Arabia (11 percent) were Jordan major exports markets. Major shifts have occurred since in 2000, India was Jordan’s largest export market, with 22% of exports, followed by Saudi Arabia (12 percent) and Iraq (9 percent). The changes reflect the rapid increase in export of textiles to the US, following the US Jordan FTA and QIZ agreements. Exports of phosphates and potash to India, still important, were relegated by the rise in textiles. Iraq’s share in Jordan’s export consistently rose from 9% in 2000 to 17% in 2010. Jordan has however not been able to consistently penetrate the EU markets even if (a small) trade creation occurred following the Euro-Med agreement.

The available data of European exports to Jordan are grouped in main classes of products, as from the below tables. As it can be expected, the main products are machinery / means of transport and other manufactured goods, which are in general between 50 % and 60% of the total. The general trend shows increased amounts for all classes of products, except for machinery / means of transport during the 2008/2011 crisis. (KPI 7.4.3)

From data collected it can be assumed that except for India, Jordan already enjoys an almost duty free trade with the most important trading partners.

It also shows that Jordan cannot get more advantages from new trade agreement: in the same time it also confirms certain doubts within the private sector representatives met during the field mission: they wondered if the full trade liberalization is the most useful instrument for Jordan, especially when the rate of exchange of the dinar is pegged to the US dollar. (KPI 7.4.4)

Jordan shows certain resilience in its exports trends when the critical context of the recent years is considered: however the fact that the trade deficit continues to increase should be a motive of concern when the recent trends in exports are assessed. In effect they show a tendency to continue more on the intensive margins than to increase the extensive ones (that is the search for new markets and the offer of new products). (KPI 7.4.1 and KPI 7.4.2).

**JC-7.5**

The Country transport strategy developed with EU support facilitates the evolution of Jordan towards a regional transport hub

**List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 7.5 (codes and definition)**

| KPI-7.5.1 | Degree to which the elaborated transport strategy and a trade facilitation strategy, including the inter modality approach (connection between road and rail transport) are actually implemented |
| KPI-7.5.2 | Number of neighbouring countries with which shared procedures for cross-border transport and trade facilitation are agreed upon and implemented |
| KPI-7.5.3 | Degree to which horizontal legislation is aligned and related infrastructure is upgraded to enable the conclusion of an ACAA covering Jordan’s priority sectors |
| KPI-7.5.4 | Percentage increase of traffic volumes of passengers and goods with neighbouring countries destinations and percentage reduced average waiting time at border crossings / Aqaba port |

**KPI-7.5.1:** Degree to which the elaborated transport strategy and a trade facilitation strategy, including the inter modality approach (connection between road and rail transport) are actually implemented

**Main Findings on KPI-7.5.1:**

Under the Infrastructure Upgrade theme, the National Agenda places great emphasis on upgrading the transport network in support of economic growth. It highlights the need for a sound regulatory framework, the importance of exploring the development of new transport modes, particularly the railways, and the improvement of Aqaba port as the major link with maritime transport and the liberalisation and upgrading of the air transport sector.
Trade facilitation and transport have been always priorities in bilateral and regional strategies. In the transport field, the regular dialogue established through the Euro-Mediterranean Transport Forum and its working groups continued since few years, and work is on going under several projects, in particular the Euromed Main Transport Project, the transport Infrastructure project, the Euromed GNSS Project (Egnos/Galileo satellite navigation programmes), the Safemed Project (maritime safety and security in the Mediterranean region), the MEDA Motorways of the Sea project and the MEDUSA project for satellite tracking (based in Tunisia). A new regional project is under preparation in the field of aviation. At sub-regional level, a transport cooperation process has been initiated between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, which may, depending on political developments in the region, lead to the setting-up of a Joint Transport Office between the parties.

In terms of land infrastructure (road) it does not seems that in recent years there has been major developments (on the contrary): one reason more to develop urgently a long term strategy.

Moreover from the data on the means of transport used in exports and imports, it is evident the dependence of Jordanian exports trade on land infrastructure (confirming that major markets are the neighbouring countries).

The energy intensity of the Jordan economy stands at 0.21 toe/ 1,000 USD, which is the highest among the SEMED countries, and considerably above the levels seen in the EU or in Turkey. Energy consumption per capita is 1.26 toe. The transport sector is the most energy inefficient sector. Another motivation to develop a credible transport strategy as this sector consumes 40% of the global country energy on an increasing trend: considering the difficulties for the country to acquire the energy it needs, one interesting area for transport strategy is how to increase energy efficiency.

Through a Sector Budget Support programme - Trade and Transport Facilitation Programme (TTF) – the EU and the Jordan Government intended to reinforce the Jordan efforts to improve the competitiveness of Jordan exports by developing a more supportive regulatory framework in areas of trade, custom and transport. At border points and custom, the programme aimed to better the collaboration between agencies to simplify the inspection and custom procedures. In the transport field, the programme wanted to support the Jordan Government to develop an efficient and environmentally sound multi-modal transport system, integrated into the regional networks.

In 2008, the Ministry of Transport proceeded to upgrade its transport strategy, with the assistance of a team of international experts. Through a workshop with all stakeholders in Amman in January 2009, the Ministry of Transport concluded the preparation of the new National Transport Strategy for the period 2009-2011. It was approved by the Cabinet in June 2009 and was implemented since, although with delays. By decision of the Council of Ministers in January 2012, the validity of the National Transport Strategy (NTS) was further extended until 2014, with a view to ensure efficient, safe, secure, and sustainable transport system. More recently, the LTRC (Railways Commission), CARC (Civil Aviation Regulatory Commission), JMA (Jordan Maritime Authority) were established to separate the regulator from the operators, and are now fully functional. To complement and substitute the NTS, the preparation of a new Long Term National Transport was included in the TTF BS.

The contract for the preparation of a new “Long Term National Transport Strategy” (LTNTS) was awarded in September 2012. This commenced on the 2nd September 2012 with an 18-month duration. Phase 1 of the project – the overall strategy - was completed at the end of February 2014 with 4 Components (Component 1 for identification of policy principles, Component 2 for the transport forecast model and to establish an investment appraisal methodology, Component 3, which is the core of the project and has culminated in the preparation of the Long Term National Transport Strategy accompanied by a five year rolling action plan, Component 4 for the improvement of MoT skills). Component 1 was completed by April 2013 and included a Review of the National Transport Strategy for 2012-2014, the development of a draft National Transport Safety Strategy for the same period and a National Transport Action Plan for 2012-2014. Component 2 was completed in July 2013. Component 3 output is the “Long Term National Transport Strategy ” that was presented during a workshop in Amman on 7 April 2014. The Strategy is now to be translated into Arabic so it can go to the Cabinet for approval.

The main philosophy beyond the LTNTS is the use of a multi modal approach at all levels: this means to let each transport mode play his role in the system in order to satisfy the transport demand within a framework of social, economic, financial and environmental sustainability. It is based on a different vision, moving from one that simply provides the infrastructure to satisfy the demand towards a more sophisticated one that tries to manage passengers and freight demand, and to match supply with demand. This new approach has to
take the challenges into consideration that the transport system has to face: reduce pressure on the road sector by introducing new modes of transport for freight (e.g. railways and pipeline), and by revitalising public transport. A modernised port of Aqaba, a specialisation of the airport system and important policy measures will support this approach. The connection between Aqaba, the Amman area and later the border to Syria is the backbone of a new railway system designed to intercept part of the long distance freight demand that otherwise would be using the roads

LTNTS correctly mention environment / energy efficiency as criteria to be included in the analysis. However then in the indication of priorities it gives them low importance as well as to PPP partnerships: considering the energy consumption of transport (40% of total country energy consumption) and the need to reduce trade deficit it could appear an under estimation. The same for the PPP in a strategy where road tolls are suggested as new instruments for cost recovering and incentive for change: there could be a long term interest for some specific investors (assurances linked to pensions) to participate in these investments. The same for the core proposal of the strategy (the renovation / upsizing of the rail network) that surely can attract private investors. The LTNTS is quite complete and is based on the increase of multi-modal approach, with the objective to reduce the present overwhelming importance of road transport, both for persons and commodities. It plans to have Jordan as logistic hubs in north-south and east-west corridors, a credible hypothesis shared by most analysts.

Enhancing the use of public transport by improving the quality of the services provided is another main building block of the multimodal strategy. Public transport cannot only be a residual mode for those people that have no access to the private car. Additionally, it has to be able to attract new passengers because the services provided are of high quality and can compete with private cars. It is not an easy challenge to move from the existing supply toward a cost effective and high quality service

What is perhaps missing is a specific attention to the potential participation of private sector in a number of future investments, as it is quite certain that the public budget will not have the resources to fund the foreseen large investments (in excess of 5 billion JD). On the same time more attention should be given to the transport sector in this energy consumption feature: it takes 40% of energy consumption of the country and then it can be an opportunity for energy saving measures.

The Minister during our meeting agreed that the transport sector could support PPP actions, as the successful example of Queen Alia airport shows: the dry port in Amman and the Amman –Zarqa rapid transport line could be the occasions for it. In effect, the priority for the Minister is the transport of persons, especially in the Amman-Zarqa connection, where a bus connection is now in advanced feasibility.

At the Ministry of Transport it was especially mentioned with satisfaction the participation of Jordan in regional transport programmes, where according to the two officers the benefits for the country are quite high and compare favourably against the direct bilateral support.

In the public transport sector, the TTF provided more limited but essential technical assistance and training in support to the ongoing regulatory reform in this field. The transport sector is moving toward a multimodal system with a need for regulation and “deregulation” of the sub sectors. The study to create a regulator for the road freight sub sector is a first example of regulation within the transport sector. A Multi-Modal Law was drafted and was expected to be approved. Also the creation of a Land Transport Regulatory Commission covering freight, public transport and rail should be a step forward in regulatory integration. The Greater Amman Municipality took upon itself the responsibility of developing a PPI for a Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system with French partial financing. The case is a hard lesson learned for regulators, as the GAM avoided working with the LTRC because of the limited institutional capacity of the regulatory body.

In two areas covered by the TTF, the Ministry of Transport activities and tasks look under achieved, the internal monitoring system and the improvement of the HHRR, necessary to ensure the fair and effective application of the strategy.

A draft Trade and Transport Facilitation Strategy document has been produced for 2014-2016 and has been circulated to stakeholders: the Technical Committee for TTF has approved the document on May 2014. The document, however, is extremely brief and generic and offers little apart from some brief, broad statements of intent, which are already specified in the TAPs in the Financing Agreement of TTF signed in 2009. This needs to be revised urgently with substantially more detail including more precise institutional setting for the implementation of the 3-year TTF Strategy and the Action Plan.

It is interesting to note that the Long Term National Transport Strategy sees good synergies with the EIB plans to support Jordan road development (see Road 15 improvement and the other planned interventions in the list below).
The World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index (LPI) benchmarks countries’ trade logistics performance across six criteria, some of those overlapping those applied in the OECD’s TFIs. In 2012 Jordan ranked only 102 out of 155 countries, with an overall LPI score of 2.56 out of 5. According to an USAID report, as of 2012 Jordan was compliant with almost all of its international obligations in relation to trade control and facilitation, including Article VII of the GATT with respect to valuation; WTO on standardized data set (SDS) of information required by all agencies involved in trade; and the World Customs Organization in respect of the Golden List related Framework Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade (SAFE).

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For TTF, it needs to be noted that probably the initial design of the programme was far too ambitious, it did not take into account the multiplicity of institutions and organizations that have a say in the different phase of a transport strategy and implementing policy (see below list), this produce a certain lack of leadership by the Ministry of Transport as official main counterpart through the TTF Secretariat. The real empowerment of the TTF secretariat throughout the programme implementation period has been difficult for the different views of each involved stakeholders (the programme has the record of Steering Committee meetings – 10 in three years – without evident successes); moreover it has suffered from numerous changes of management that have further hindered advancement. MoT has been ‘trying’ to lead but the others, especially the MoITS and the MoPW, involvement has been very limited. The NCTTF was relatively inactive until 2011, when it was relaunched, under the auspices of the EU TTF project. The NCTTFES is its main operating arm, providing analyses and advice for implementation, for approval by the Council of Ministers. The NCTTF is chaired by the Minister of Transport and is represented by five other ministries, Jordan Customs, and the chambers of commerce and industry. The TTF Technical Committee (TTFTC) has a wider membership of public and private sector entities.

The NCTTF faces a number of challenges, including the lack of a legal framework giving it powers and logistical challenges in organizing TTFTC meetings. The TTFES also lacks appropriately qualified staff.

The slow advancement of the programme also had an impact on the capacity of the country to develop its strategy to become a regional logistics hub, an objective that anyway remains even more valuable today with the advantage on Jordan side of the relative stability while the region is in turmoil.

KPI-7.5.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- (EU JAR 2012
- EU JAR 2013
- Dep Statistics 2012 Yearbook
- Please see below

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- EU JORDAN Action Plan
- EC NIP 2011
- ENPI RIP 2011
- Monitoring mission on TTF – 9/2013
- Monitoring of the Fourth/Fifth Years Trade and Transport Facilitation, September 18th 2013
- ROM MR-010426.02 8/2008
- ROM report on SAAP II, MR-010426.03, Jul 2, 2009
- IBRD Country strategy paper 2012-2015

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- Monitoring of the Fourth/Fifth Years Trade and Transport Facilitation, May 2014
- EIB – Presentation of opportunities for transport sector, Amman 2013
### KPI-7.5.1 (i) Data, figures and tables:

**Identified constituent bodies of the transport industry in Jordan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transport Mode</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Entity/ component of the Industry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Road transport** | - Planning authority, Infrastructure development, Infrastructure maintenance and operation | - Ministry of Public Works and Housing  
- Greater Amman Municipality (GAM) |
| | - Regulatory authority | - LTRC – Public Transport Directorate  
- LTRC – Freight Transport Directorate |
| | - Private passenger transport operators (Private vehicles) | - Royal Automobile Club of Jordan  
- Drivers and Vehicles Licensing Department |
| | - Public passenger transport operators | - JETT buses (private operator)  
- AUTOBUS (private operator)  
- General Union of Jordanian Bus owners (Association)  
- Greater Amman Municipality (GAM) |
| | - Freight transport operators | - Syndicate of Jordanian Trucks Owners (Association)  
- Forwarders Association Owners Syndicate |
| **Rail transport** | - Planning authority | - Ministry of Transport |
| | - Regulatory authority | - LTRC - Railways Transport Directorate |
| | - Infrastructure development | - Ministry of Transport |
| | - Infrastructure maintenance and operation | - Jordan Hejaz Railway and Aqaba Railway corporation |
| | - Public passenger transport operators | - Jordan Hejaz Railway |
| | - Freight transport operators | - Aqaba Railway Corporation |
| **Civil aviation** | - Planning authority | - Ministry of Transport |
| | - Regulatory authority | - Civil Aviation Regulatory Commission |
| | - Infrastructure development | - Ministry of Transport – Project Management Unit QAIA  
- Airport International Group |
| | - Infrastructure maintenance and operation | - Jordan Airports’ Company  
- Aqaba Airports’ Company  
- Airport International Group |
| | - Public passenger transport operators, Freight transport operators | - Royal Jordanian Airlines  
- Royal Jordanian Airlines |
<p>| | - Service provider | - Jordan Meteorological Department |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maritime transport</th>
<th>Planning authority</th>
<th>Ministry of Transport</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regulatory authority</td>
<td>Jordan Maritime Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infrastructure development</td>
<td>Aqaba Development Corporation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Infrastructure maintenance and operation</td>
<td>Aqaba Ports Corporation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Aqaba Container Terminal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public passenger transport operators, Freight transport operators</td>
<td>Jordan Shipping Association</td>
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<td>Contractors Association</td>
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<td>Service provider</td>
<td>Jordan Meteorological Department</td>
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<td>Jordan Investment Board</td>
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<td>Arab Bridge Maritime</td>
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<tr>
<td>All modes</td>
<td>Infrastructure development companies</td>
<td>Contractors Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>Service provider</td>
<td>Jordan Investment Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic System</td>
<td>Development Zones Commission</td>
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There is still no coherent project monitoring system in place and no follow up to the Steering Committee meetings. Many of the problems related to the deliverables with respect to projects could have been avoided if a rigorous monitoring system had been in place.

There is still no Trade Facilitation Strategy and this element was not included in the Long Term National Transport Strategy. A Trade Facilitation Strategy needs to be produced as a matter of urgency and the expert provided should undertake this with longer inputs than those previously envisaged. Care should be taken to ensure that this strategy is synchronised with the LTNTS.

(Monitoring of the Fourth/Fifth Years Trade and Transport Facilitation, September 18th 2013)

KPI-7.5.2: Number of neighbouring countries with which shared procedures for cross-border transport and trade facilitation are agreed upon and implemented

Main Findings on KPI-7.5.2:

According to available sources, the process to involve the neighbouring countries in shared procedures for cross-border transport and trade facilitation is only at a preliminary phase.

Nevertheless the participation of neighbouring countries in a long term transport strategy and trade facilitation is well acknowledged as an essential component in Jordan external trade strategy when the data on the transit shown in the table below are analysed: there is a stable increase on the transit of commodities through the country (reduced in last years due to the general crisis but on the increase in a long term perspective). This can create problems but also new opportunities for the country as logistic hub, something that the long-term transport strategy and the trade facilitation strategy had partially incorporated.

The Problems in developing projects and regional co-operation appear to be the consequence of the lack of dynamism within the TTF Secretariat at the MOT. Recent changes in the personnel and structure could promote better achievements in the future. A Regional Workshop was held in April 2014 and attended by a number of international agencies (UNECE, ESCWA, Arab League) and representatives from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Palestine, who signed a Declaration of the Countries of the Arab League present to have closer cooperation and engagement for trade and transport facilitation: but in reality no regional projects have been developed and only limited follow up to develop regional co-operation has been undertaken.

The instability of the region has been an element that has prevented the regional cooperation to progress at the aimed speed.
However no regional studies have been initiated to date to try and develop a cohesive regional approach to transport policy and planning between Jordan and the countries in the region. This issue is extremely important since numerous projects and programmes are underway in the region and it is very important that there is coherence and synergy in approach to avoid duplication. In the light of political instability in the region especially Syria, the re-alignment of trade and transport policy is a very important issue that needs to be addressed.

KPI-7.5.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Please see below

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- EC note of second payment TTF 2010
- Monitoring of the Fourth/Fifth Years Trade and Transport Facilitation, September 18th 2013
- Monitoring of the Fourth/Fifth Years Trade and Transport Facilitation, May 2014
- EC HQ decision for payment of TTF tranche in 2011
- EC HQ decision for payment of TTF tranche in 2012
- EU Del assessment for payment of TTF tranche in 2013

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- -/-

KPI-7.5.2 (i) Data, figures and tables:

No regional studies have been initiated to date to try and develop a cohesive regional approach to transport policy and planning between Jordan and the countries in the region. This is consistent with the prolonged delays in launching key studies under this programme. This issue is extremely important since numerous projects and programmes are underway in the region and it is very important that there is coherence and synergy in approach to avoid duplication. In the light of political instability in the region especially Syria, the re-alignment of trade and transport policy is a very important issue that needs to be addressed.

A Regional Workshop was, however, held in Amman on the 18/19th September, which brought together a number of neighbouring countries and international agencies, involved in trade and transport facilitation.

Unfortunately, there has been no follow up to the recommendations made at the Workshop and little has been done to engender a spirit of regional cooperation. Since this is the first Secretariat for Trade and Transport Facilitation to be established in the region, it was felt that this would act as a catalyst to the development of others in the region. The presence of senior representatives from Palestine, Saudi Arabia. Turkey should have provided the impetus for Jordan to take the lead in promoting TTF in the region.

A further Workshop was organised in November 2012 and another planned later this year.

(Monitoring of the Fourth/Fifth Years Trade and Transport Facilitation, September 18th 2013)

Commodities transiting through Jordan
KPI-7.5.3: Degree to which horizontal legislation is aligned and related infrastructure is upgraded to enable the conclusion of an ACAA covering Jordan’s priority sectors

Main Findings on KPI-7.5.3:

Some progress has been achieved thanks to the different programmes/projects addressed to these objectives. Especially important is the custom single window used by almost all custom houses, while better coordination is necessary within the various institutions and authorities to reach the ACAA standards.

The ACAA negotiations have not yet been launched. For Jordan it is pending the amendments to standardization law to implement horizontal legislation which is pending in the Parliament.

In terms of the simplification and computerisation of procedures for foreign trade, Jordan implements UNCTAD’s ASYCUDA platform and the Jordan customs website provides e-services; yet, according to the independent assessment, actions remain disparate and uncoordinated.

Risk management remains a key element in developing a modern border management system in Jordan as it allows the border agencies to apply proportionate and justifiable responses to identified and known risks to the border. It also allows the management of the various border agencies to deploy their resources (human, technical, and financial) in a more efficient and effective manner thereby ensuring efforts are directed towards areas of highest risk and away from controlling legitimate trade, which is allowed to cross the border with limited interference and delay. The work on developing an effective risk analysis system amongst all the major border agencies (JCA, MoA, JSOM and JFDA) still has to be completed, according to the most recent monitoring of the programme.

KPI-7.5.3 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - -

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - EC HQ decision for payment of TTF tranche in 2011
   - EC HQ decision for payment of TTF tranche in 2012
   - EU Del assessment for payment of TTF tranche in 2013

(iii) Additional information from field phase
   - -
**KPI-7.5.4: Percentage increase of traffic volumes of passengers and goods with neighbouring countries destinations and percentage reduced average waiting time at border crossings / Aqaba port**

**Main Findings on KPI-7.5.4:**

Aqaba remains the major hub for international trade for the country, especially for imports and transit commodities. The recent data show that the port, after a large reduction in activities after the 2008 crisis, is recovering slowly to the peak of years 2004/5.

After some improvement up to 2010, recent monitoring shows that the waiting period is back to 11.5 days, which is longer than the start of TTF, where the waiting time of 10.73 days was the base to assess the improvement as conditionality. The transit time for containers through Aqaba remains well above the one included in TTF conditionality (2.68 days). The average for May 2014 is 9.8 days for full containers and 8.0 days for empty. In the summer months, this will rise to over 10 days based on previous years experience. In reality the reduction in dwelling time in Aqaba port probably was not realistically set from the beginning – international figures range between 4-7 days – and for Jordan for some reason the target was set to 2.68 days. In the Aqaba Container Terminal (ACT) contract the target is to reach 7 days by 2015. The average in 2013 and in the first months of 2014 has been 9.8 days. Regular dialogue during steering committees and in high level meetings has born little fruit so far.

The investments and expansion rate of the terminal has not so far been matched by parallel efficiency gains as measured by such operational indicators as ‘dwell time’ and ‘reduced trading costs’. In fact, when the ‘Trading Across Borders’ indicators contained in the World Bank ‘Doing Business 2013’ report are examined, one can see the scale of the challenge that still faces ACT and Jordan if they are to compete effectively on the regional and international stage.

The large investment supported by TTF for the availability of X-rays scanners to facilitate the control of the containers unfortunately has not been able yet to give the expected improvement as the installation appears to have some important problems to solve before getting fully operational. The most recent monitoring report (May 2014) is still quite negative on the real capacity of Aqaba Port Authority to reach a feasible solution quickly.

**KPI-7.5.4 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:

- EC note on payment second tranche TTF 2010
- Monitoring of the Fourth/Fifth Years Trade and Transport Facilitation, September 18th 2013
- Monitoring of the Fourth/Fifth Years Trade and Transport Facilitation, September 18th 2013
- Dep Statistics Yearbook 2012

(ii) Key extracts from documents:

- -/-

(iii) Additional information from field phase

- -/-

**JC-7.5: The Country transport strategy developed with EU support facilitates the evolution of Jordan towards a regional transport hub**

**Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-7.5 (based on the KPIs main findings):**

Transport accounts for about 11% of GDP and earns foreign exchange through the provision of transshipment services via the Port of Aqaba and overland transport routes. Jordan has a well-developed highway and roads network that extends beyond the Amman urban area. The roads infrastructure has adequate capacity for the present traffic charge but requires enhanced maintenance. Certain links in the trunk road system are missing, particularly a complete ring road in the rapidly urbanizing Greater Amman Area. Another priority need in the transport sector is for an integrated urban public transport system in the...
Amman metropolitan area to alleviate congestion and improve mobility. The Government has reformed transport services, including privatizing public enterprises and liberalizing the trucking industry. Together with the European Investment Bank, it is preparing a National Highway Master Plan that will serve as the basis for all major inter-urban highway sector developments in Jordan in 2010-30.

Under the Infrastructure Upgrade theme, the National Agenda places great emphasis on upgrading the transport network in support of economic growth. It highlights the need for a sound regulatory framework, the importance of exploring the development of new transport modes, particularly the railways, and the improvement of Aqaba port as the major link with maritime transport and the liberalisation and upgrading of the air transport sector.

Trade facilitation and transport have been always priorities in bilateral and regional strategies. In the transport field, the regular dialogue established through the Euro- Mediterranean Transport Forum and its working groups continued since few years, and work is on going under several projects, in particular the Euromed Main Transport Project, the transport Infrastructure project, the Euromed GNSS Project (Egnos/Galileo satellite navigation programmes), the Salemed Project (maritime safety and security in the Mediterranean region), the MEDA Motorways of the Sea project and the MEDUSA project for satellite tracking (based in Tunisia). A new regional project is under preparation in the field of aviation. At sub-regional level, a transport cooperation process has been initiated between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, which may, depending on political developments in the region, lead to the setting-up of a Joint Transport Office between the parties.

The energy intensity of the Jordan economy stands at 0.21 toe/ 1,000 USD, which is the highest among the SEMED countries, and considerably above the levels seen in the EU or in Turkey. Energy consumption per capita is 1.26 toe. The transport sector is the most energy inefficient sector. Another motivation to develop a credible transport strategy as this sector consumes 40% of the global country energy on an increasing trend: considering the difficulties for the country to acquire the energy it needs, one interesting area for transport strategy is how to increase energy efficiency. A recent OECD study estimated that improving trade facilitation across a range of areas could reduce trade-related costs by up to 13.2 % for an Upper Middle Income Country (UMIC) such as Jordan. In particular, it suggests that for UMICs the strongest impact comes from streamlining border import and export procedures. Jordan is well placed to serve as a regional logistics hub, given its position in the Middle East and access to the Red Sea. Irrespective of their characteristics, SMEs in Jordan find high transport costs as a serious impediment to export. Even though the cost to export for Jordan is lower than the regional average, it has been increasing over time. The efficiency of customs and ports seems to be at a peak in Jordan, contributing significantly to external competitiveness. The ports and customs in the country appear to work more efficiently, as compared to other countries in the region.

Through a Sector Budget Support programme - Trade and Transport Facilitation Programme (TTF) – the EU and the Jordan Government intended to reinforce the Jordan efforts to improve the competitiveness of Jordan exports by developing a more supportive regulatory framework in areas of trade, custom and transport.

In 2008, the Ministry of Transport proceeded to upgrade its transport strategy, with the assistance of a team of international experts. Through a workshop with all stakeholders in Amman in January 2009, the Ministry of Transport concluded the preparation of the new National Transport Strategy for the period 2009-2011. It was approved by the Cabinet in June 2009 and was implemented since, although with delays. By decision of the Council of Ministers in January 2012, the validity of the National Transport Strategy (NTS) was further extended until 2014, with a view to ensure efficient, safe, secure, and sustainable transport system. More recently, the LTRC (Railways Commission), CARC (Civil Aviation Regulatory Commission), JMA (Jordan Maritime Authority) were established to separate the regulator from the operators, and are now fully functional. To complement and substitute the NTS, the preparation of a new Long Term National Transport was included in the TTF BS. (KPI 7.5.1)

Through a Sector Budget Support programme - Trade and Transport Facilitation Programme (TTF) – the EU and the Jordan Government intended to reinforce the Jordan efforts to improve the competitiveness of Jordan exports by developing a more supportive regulatory framework in areas of trade, custom and transport. At border points and custom, the programme aims to better the collaboration between agencies to simplify the inspection and custom procedures. In the transport field, the programme wants to support the Jordan Government to develop an efficient and environmentally sound multi-modal transport system, integrated into the regional networks. (KPI 7.5.1)

When the TTF Budget Support programme was conceived in 2008 and 2009, it was believed that this large programme with a significant budget (EUR 33 million) would have a major impact not just in Jordan itself but
would provide an example to the region of how to develop a strong TTF Secretariat and to galvanise stakeholders in the promotion of a comprehensive trade and transport facilitation programme. The overall objective of the Trade and Transport Facilitation Programme (TTF) was to contribute to Jordan’s integration into the global economy by reducing trade-related costs and developing a multi-modal transport sector that maximises efficiency, is environmentally sustainable and improves exporter’s competitiveness. The expected results of the programme are: (i) Improved customs procedures, practices and infrastructure at border crossings; (ii) Improved transport infrastructure and private sector participation (iii) Institutional capacity building at the Ministry of Transport (MoT) as well as all the institutions involved in trade facilitation in Jordan (iv) The establishment of a strong Secretariat to support the National Committee for Trade and Transport Facilitation (NCFTT) to act as the focal point for a wide range of initiatives to support the national strategies for transport and trade. The programme draws to a close in 2014 after a global investment of more than EUR 21 million and the achieved results appear not fully consistent with the expectations.

The insufficient lack of ownership by the MoT, further affected by the recurrent changes of Government) could be considered the base of the unsatisfactory success its failure to drive this programme forward and achieve its ambitious objectives through an active leadership of the National and Technical Committees for Trade and Transport Facilitation, as well as through the effective empowerment of the Secretariat. (KPI 7.5.1)

The “Long Term National Transport Strategy “ a major output of the TTF programme was presented during a workshop in Amman on 7 April 2014. The Strategy is now to be translated into Arabic so it can go to the Cabinet for approval. The main philosophy beyond the LTNTS is the use of a multi modal approach at all levels: this means to let each transport mode play his role in the system in order to satisfy the transport demand within a framework of social, economic, financial and environmental sustainability. It is based on a different vision, moving from one that simply provides the infrastructure to satisfy the demand towards a more sophisticated one that tries to manage passengers and freight demand, and to match supply with demand. This new approach has to take the challenges into consideration that the transport system has to face: reduce pressure on the road sector by introducing new modes of transport for freight (e.g. railways and pipeline), and by revitalising public transport. A modernised port of Aqaba, a specialisation of the airport system and important policy measures will support this approach. The connection between Aqaba, the Amman area and later the border to Syria is the back bone of a new railway system designed to intercept part of the long distance freight demand that otherwise would be using the roads.

LTNTS correctly mention environment / energy efficiency as criteria to be included in the analysis. However then in the indication of priorities it gives them low importance as well as to PPP partnerships: considering the energy consumption of transport and the need to reduce trade deficit it could appear an under estimation. The same for the PPP in a strategy where road tolls are suggested as new instruments for cost recovering and incentive for change: there could be a long term interest for some specific investors (assurances linked to pensions) to participate in these investments. The same for the core proposal of the strategy (the renovation / upsizing of the rail network) that surely can attract private investors. The LTNTS is quite complete and is based on the increase of multi-modal approach, with the objective to reduce the present overwhelming importance of road transport, both for persons and commodities. It plans to have Jordan as logistic hubs in north-south and east-west corridors, a credible hypothesis shared by most analysts.

What is perhaps missing is a specific attention to the potential participation of private sector in a number of future investments, as it is quite certain that the public budget will not have the resources to fund the foreseen large investments (in excess of 5 billion JD). On the same time more attention should be given to the transport sector in this energy consumption feature: it takes 40% of energy consumption of the country and then it can be an opportunity for energy saving measures. (KPI 7.5.1)

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Nevertheless the participation of neighbouring countries in a long term transport strategy and trade facilitation is well acknowledged as an essential component in Jordan external trade strategy when the data on the transit shown in the table below are analysed: there is a stable increase on the transit of commodities through the country (reduced in last years due to the general crisis but on the increase in a long term perspective). This can create problems but also new opportunities for the country as logistic hub, something that the long-term transport strategy and the trade facilitation strategy had partially incorporated. The instability of the region has been an element that has prevented the regional cooperation to progress at the aimed speed.

However no regional studies have been initiated to date to try and develop a cohesive regional approach to transport policy and planning between Jordan and the countries in the region. This issue is extremely important since numerous projects and programmes are underway in the region and it is very important that there is coherence and synergy in approach to avoid duplication. In the light of political instability in the region especially Syria, the re-alignment of trade and transport policy is a very important issue that needs to be addressed. (KPI 7.5.2)

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The ACAA negotiations have not yet been launched. For Jordan it is pending the amendments to standardization law to implement horizontal legislation which is pending in the Parliament.

In terms of the simplification and computerisation of procedures for foreign trade, Jordan implements UNCTAD’s ASYCUDA platform and the Jordan customs website provides e-services; yet, according to the independent assessment, actions remain disparate and uncoordinated. (KPI 7.5.3)

After some improvement up to 2010, recent monitoring shows that the waiting period is back to 11.5 days, which is longer than the start of TTF, where the waiting time of 10.73 days was the base to assess the improvement as conditionality. The transit time for containers through Aqaba remains well above the one included in TTF conditionality (2.68 days). The average for May 2014 is 9.8 days for full containers and 8.0 days for empty. In the summer months, this will rise to over 10 days based on previous years’ experience. In reality the reduction in dwelling time in Aqaba port probably was not realistically set from the beginning – international figures range between 4-7 days – and for Jordan for some reason the target was set to 2.68
days. In the Aqaba Container Terminal (ACT) contract the target is to reach 7 days by 2015. The average in 2013 and in the first months of 2014 has been 9.8 days. Regular dialogue during steering committees and in high level meetings has born little fruit so far.

The investments and expansion rate of the terminal has not so far been matched by parallel efficiency gains as measured by such operational indicators as ‘dwell time’ and ‘reduced trading costs’. In fact, when the ‘Trading Across Borders’ indicators contained in the World Bank ‘Doing Business 2013’ report are examined, one can see the scale of the challenge that still faces ACT and Jordan if they are to compete effectively on the regional and international stage. (KPI 7.5.4)
3.8. EQ-8 IM on Education and Employment

### Information Matrix EQ-8: Education and employment

**Evaluation Question (code and title)**

**EQ-8:** To what extent has EU’s support to Education Reform and to the Employment and Technical and Vocational Education and Training (E-TVET) sector contributed to enhanced education quality and to improved employment?

**List of Judgement Criteria (JCs) under the EQ (codes and titles)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JC-8.1</th>
<th>EU support contributed to Jordan education system reform for enhanced quality and accessibility of the overall education system through institutional capacity building at the different levels of the education system</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JC-8.2</td>
<td>EU support contributed to enhanced quality of Jordan’s overall education system through improved teacher professional development and updating of curricula, textbooks, pedagogical aids and methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-8.3</td>
<td>EU support contributed to the national employment strategy and programme in terms of increased formal employment with social security coverage and to an expanded coverage of employment training and career guidance and counselling services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-8.4</td>
<td>EU support contributed to the national employment strategy and programme, including an expanded coverage of employment, training and career guidance and counselling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-8.5</td>
<td>EU support contributed to the empowerment of the Gender Unit in the Ministry of Labour in promoting gender sensitization of E-TVET and employment policies, strategies and programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-8.6</td>
<td>The choice and the combination of the EU aid modalities for education reform and E-TVET are the results of the search for efficiency and cost/effectiveness in line with Jordan Government objectives and complementary to other DP support to the sector</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**JC-8.1**

**EU support contributed to Jordan education system reform for enhanced quality and accessibility of the overall education system through institutional capacity building at the different levels of the education system**

**List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 8.1 (codes and definition)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPI-8.1.1</th>
<th>Degree to which the EU support contributed to improvements in the delegation of authority and responsibility to the regional (Governorates), local (municipalities) and schools levels, enabled by an operational performance monitoring and evaluation systems and based on partnerships with local communities and the private sector.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPI-8.1.2</td>
<td>Degree to which the EU support contributed to the successful use of the Budget Support Modality - MTEF, including translation of policy priorities into budget priorities based on thorough cost calculation methods at the programme level within MoE Departments and entities, and the effective monitoring of the execution of these programmes in relation to the priorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-8.1.3</td>
<td>Increased enrolment rates of children in early childhood education / pre-school education (KG2 level), overall and in underserved areas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Main Findings on KPI-8.1.1:

The improvement of delegation of authority and responsibility to the regional (Governorates), local (municipalities) and schools levels by MoE – to be accompanied by an operational performance monitoring and evaluation system - is not yet satisfactory, despite efforts by EU in supporting this process. MoE does not have yet sufficient experience and capacity for this process. The MoE is still working on training and capacity building of the local communities to enable them to play the key role in local human resources development, and to assume full ownership, particularly in education issues.

With regard to the MoE central and regional capacity to implement the education system reform, reports point out that there is a need still to enhance the capacities at the central and the field directorates’ levels and to facilitate undertaking the assigned functions according to the reform requirements. Identified major areas for overall capacity building include: Policy making and strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation, quality assurance and resource management. Specific capacity building in the areas identified in the newly developed Policies and Strategies Framework include: Curriculum review and development; ICT strategy management; Assessment of learning, Early childhood, Vocational education and special education as well as the capacity required to ensure the sustainability of the reform process. Reform ownership at the sub-national level by de-concentrating or delegating authority into Governorates and Municipalities (with the latter until now not having any experience nor specific mandate to look into education issues) remains a critical issue.

The initiative to establish a School Development Planning and Monitoring Team at the national level to shape, steer, and support detailed planning, implementation actions, and monitoring progress and results, and will link with field directorate planning and monitoring teams to work collaboratively with teachers, principals, community representatives and members of field directorates are a major achievement. There however is no conclusive evidence of the operational status of this team, its activities and results achieved.

With reference to the mini-survey and focus group discussion that was held, some expressed that EU support contributed positively and facilitated in the delegation of authority at school level as the decisions became decentralized on the basis of partnership with local communities to a certain limit but it was not in an organized and systemic way, they expressed about the need for more systemic focused training due to the lack of knowledge on the implementation of the delegation of authorities and the weaknesses of resource management, while others expressed that it improved the capacity of human resources and they were able to overcome some of the education challenges that were facing, whereas the authorities that were granted are minor and cosmetic.

During focus group discussions, Directors, principals, supervisors, and MoE staff meetings during the field phase stated that delegation of authorities has strengthened and supported field education directorates and principals of schools in decision making, facilitated the work of the others, contributed with more trust and self-confidence, no more random decisions, they became further away from bureaucracy, more attention should be considered to the quality of training, particularly to the newly appointed teachers.

KPI-8.1.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, MoE, DCU Narrative Report / April 2013, pp. 7 &15

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- MoE (ERfKE II) Annual Narrative Report April 2013 (Mid-Term Stage), pp. 54-55
- World Bank, Draft Aide-Memoire of ERfKE II, Supervision Mission in May 14-23, 2013, p.6
- Final Evaluation Report, EU support to Jordan’s Education Reform (JOR/2006/018-208) and EU
**iii) Additional information from field phase**

- The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (ERIKE II), Assessment of the School and Directorate Development Programme (SDDP), Monitoring & Evaluation Partnership (MEP) Project*, June 11, 2013 (page 5, 52)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPI-8.1.2: Degree to which the EU support contributed to the successful use of the Budget Support Modality - MTEF, including translation of policy priorities into budget priorities based on thorough cost calculation methods at the programme level within MoE Departments and entities, and the effective monitoring of the execution of these programmes in relation to the priorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Findings on KPI-8.1.2:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The EU Budget Support to education reform aims to support the Government of Jordan (GoJ) in setting up a comprehensive strategic framework for the planned education reform. It is expected to help the GoJ to secure the budgetary allocations required for the implementation of its operational plan, according to the planned timetable.

The applied Budget Support modality is sectoral oriented (SBS – Sector Budget Support). The general education policy and strategy is articulated within one ministry, the Ministry of Education, and there are no other institutions or ministries with a mandate for this sector. Also the Ministry of Education is under one budget chapter in the Jordan general budget. Basically because of these factors, the coordination of the translation of policy priorities into budget priorities by the use of a Budget Support modality (MTEF – Medium-Term Expenditures Framework) has been successful. At the same time Budget Support contributed to the Ministry of Education remaining the owner of the reform process and in a position to control risk which may be emerging in the process. As such, the EU decision to introduce this SBS modality to MoE is well-positioned in relation to the envisioned education reform and its funding requirements to MoF. The specific implementation strategy and its management and coordination arrangements anchored in this overall SBS are appropriate and acceptable.

This is different for the E-TVET sector which includes several ministries including the Ministry of Labour (MOL), the Ministry of Education (MOE) and the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MOHESR), as well as other agencies including amongst others the Vocational Training Corporation, the E-TVET Council, E-TVET Secretariat, E-TVET Fund, the Center for Accreditation and Quality Assurance, the Higher Education Agency for Quality Assurance and Certification, sector teams, as well as private and public sector employers and unions. This complicated set up needs streamlining and better coordination and understanding amongst all TVET stakeholders regarding the translation of policy priorities into budget priorities, especially since the overall reform remains fragmented and insufficiently integrated at the strategic planning and policy level. Result is that some officials in the sector often still operate within a project modality framework, lacking common long-term vision of governance and management of this sector.

From the meetings with and the documents collected from the concerned MoE officials during the evaluation field phase it became clear that EU support has contributed to significant progress in enhancing education sector goals through the distinctive style of the Budget Support aid modality. Furthermore the support’s sustainability is expected to be duly addressed as the supported programme becomes an item in the budget law. MoE benefited from the real value of the funding, compared to other funding modalities which often tend to end when project support ends. Also, other donors are adopting / will be adopting the same EU Budget Support modality. MTEF became a national requirement and mandated to be implemented for all budget preparation within MoE.

EU Support contributed to better planning at the MoE and enhanced the capacity of the staff to build indicators and to actually achieve these indicator targets as this is one of the essential requirements of Budget Support.

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special measure in support of Jordan’s public education system to cope with absorption of Iraqi refugee children (DCI-MED 2007/019-517) Draft 1, 31 December 2011, p.13

- Ministry of Education [ERIKE II], Project Operational Manual Section II, Chapter 3. Special Institutional and Other Arrangements for Project Execution, MoE DCU - 12/09, p.10
KPI-8.1.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Final Evaluation Report, EU Support to Jordan’s Education Reform, (JOR/2006/018-208), and EU Special Measure in support of Jordan’s Public Education System to Cope with Absorption of Iraqi Refugee Children, Draft 1, 31 December 2011, Gregor B.M. Meiering, Jean-Francois Bernede, Ahmad Atwan, pp. 6 & 18.
- Final Evaluation Report, EU Support to Jordan’s Education Reform, (JOR/2006/018-208), and EU Special Measure in support of Jordan’s Public Education System to Cope with Absorption of Iraqi Refugee Children, Draft 1, 31 December 2011, Gregor B.M. Meiering, Jean-Francois Bernede, Ahmad Atwan, p. 43.
- MoE (ERIKE II) Annual Narrative Report April 2013 (Mid-Term Stage) p.57.
- Please see below.

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- MoE (ERIKE II) Annual Narrative Report April 2013 (Mid-Term Stage) – p.56.

(iii) Additional information from field phase

KPI-8.1.2 (i) Data, figures and tables:
European Union’s Support to Jordan’s Education Reform Analysis Matrix for the Status of Tranche III / Variable Components – June 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Target III tranche</th>
<th>OCT 2009 (Status)</th>
<th>JUN 2010 (Status)</th>
<th>Percent Achieved</th>
<th>Assigned Weight</th>
<th>Implementation Status and expected completion dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>% of general budget allocated to pre-primary, basic, and secondary education</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Based on the definition of the indicator, this can not be achieved. The expenditures on education are exceeding the allocations in the budget. This indicator has been identified on previous evaluation mission as a problematic one. however the Ministry of Education has additional expenditures from other resources, such as Royal Court and Donor Support which is not reflected in the Budget Allocations. Therefore there is an increase in the Net Allocated amount and not as a percentage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>Gross intake rate at pre-primary education in rural</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>Although this indicator has been achieved nationally, the gross intake rate in rural areas as per the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Expected</td>
<td>Observed</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>Total number of primary and secondary schools newly built and equipped according to ERFKE standards</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>101.25%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>No. of disabled children benefiting for transportation to schools</td>
<td>1,194</td>
<td>1,215</td>
<td>1,238</td>
<td>103.68%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Total number of hearing aids</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>100.53%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.3. Total number of PERKINS printers</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.4. Total number of wheelchairs</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>120%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.5. Total number of laboratories for deaf</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>127.8%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>Total number of special resources rooms for students with hearing disabilities</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>114.9%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>Number of special resources rooms for severely mentally handicapped</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>142.85%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Number of children benefiting from feeding program</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>460,000</td>
<td>+115,000 from 7/2-31/12 - 2010</td>
<td>247.5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Number of learners attending adult literacy centers</td>
<td>4,250</td>
<td>6,128</td>
<td>6,322</td>
<td>148.75%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>Number of students trained in secondary vocational schools</td>
<td>27,275</td>
<td>29,536</td>
<td>24,100</td>
<td>108%</td>
<td>This number only reflects MOE students enrolled in Vocational Classes. Not reflected percentage/the number needs to be adjusted to include students enrolled in vocational centers. 29,536 students including those enrolled in Vocational Centers. Total MoE Vocational Students = 22,330 in the years 2008-09. This indicator has been identified on previous evaluation mission as a problematic one.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>No. of teachers trained in the specified period to work with young children</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>139 KG Teachers Trained 2008-09</td>
<td>350 KG Teachers Trained 2009-10</td>
<td>636.4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>No. of teachers trained in the specified period as special need teachers</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>238.5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>No. of teachers trained in the specified period as secondary vocational teachers</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>98.25%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>822 teachers enrolled in Training 08-09. 779 completed the training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>Primary (Basic) Education dropout</td>
<td>0.13%</td>
<td>0.343%</td>
<td>0.30%</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Unrealistic baseline data and consequent targets. The source of information for the dropout rate is based on draft EMIS data. This indicator has been identified on previous evaluation mission as a problematic one.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>Secondary Education dropout</td>
<td>0.65%</td>
<td>0.639%</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>Student success rate in the general secondary school certificate examination</td>
<td>46.50%</td>
<td>51.2%</td>
<td>51.4%</td>
<td>110.54%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Achieved 51.2% Success rate for the Year 2007-08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**KPI-8.1.3:** Increased enrolment rates of children in early childhood education / pre-school education (KG2 level), overall and in underserved areas

**Main Findings on KPI-8.1.3:**

EU support to Jordan was to enhance the quality and accessibility of early childhood education. It is documented that slight progress has been made in the enrolment of Early Childhood Education (ECE) at MoE as per the evaluation reports of the EU and World Bank. But there were not enough pre-social researches and studies before establishing ECE. Also, Jordanian officials have tended to overestimate the costs of the reform or the absorption capacity of public administration, or both.

It has been a crucial step forward if not achievement however to gradually convince people about the crucial importance of early childhood education through awareness campaigns targeting families in the rural and underserved areas and in particular women (most of them stay at home / are not employed and are of the opinion that it is preferable to keep children at home at this early age), and effectively enrolling children in KG’s at this crucial stage of life in terms of a child's physical, intellectual, emotional and social development. The WB Aide Mémoire on the recent Supervision Mission of 12-22 May 2014 on ERfKE II acknowledged the positive aspects of the intensified awareness raising campaign of the MOE regarding the importance of early childhood education through the active targeting and engagement of mothers through lectures, placement of informative posters and also through cooperation with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and other community based entities. The latter being a most important conduit for ECE promotion in the Syrian host communities and to refugee’s families living in camps.

In spite of the substantive EU support to improve access to learning for all children in Jordan through special focus on Early Childhood Education, the actual demand for ECE is still low.

**KPI-8.1.3 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- MoE/ DCU/EU EU Contribution to ERfKE Support to Education Reform
- Planning and General Education and Student Affairs Directorates – May 27, 2010
- General Education and Student Affairs/ KG Division - May 24 2010

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Final Evaluation Report, EU Support to Jordan’s Education Reform, (JOR/2006/018-208), and EU Special Measure in support of Jordan’s Public Education System to Cope with Absorption of Iraqi Refugee Children, Draft 1, 31 December 2011, Gregor B.M. Meiering, Jean-Francois Bernede, Ahmad Atwan, p.5
- Final Evaluation Report, EU Support to Jordan’s Education Reform, (JOR/2006/018-208), and EU Special Measure in support of Jordan’s Public Education System to Cope with Absorption of Iraqi Refugee Children, Draft 1, 31 December 2011, Gregor B.M. Meiering, Jean-Francois Bernede, Ahmad Atwan, pp. 31&40.
- World Bank Draft Aide-Memoire of the ERfKE II, Supervision Mission in May 14-23, 2013, pp. 19-20

(iii) Additional information from field phase

**KPI-8.1.4:** Increased enrolment rates of children in Special Needs Education schools and programmes, overall and in underserved areas

**Main Findings on KPI-8.1.4:**

The special needs equipment and resources programme provisions were implemented and the indicator targets concerned were fully met. But there is a need for more detailed, reliable and updated statistical information concerning the increased enrolment rates of children with special needs benefiting from these enhanced learning aids, equipment and other resources made available.
It is pointed out in different evaluation reports that no reliable data on the prevalence of disability in Jordan are available. Thus there are many students in all categories of special needs who have not been identified. Enrolment figures indicate that students with a disability are often already enrolled in regular schools and no special services are being provided well to them. In the absence of reliable data, the Ministry of Education is still to develop systems for collecting the required reliable data for proper planning and programme management purposes.

There is also a lack of trained specialists, especially educational psychologists. The appropriate identification tools for students with a special need at the pre-stage are not available or are not in use to enable them to mingle and integrate more easily with other students in regular schools (in line with integration / mainstreaming concepts) and to adequately plan for this purpose in support of these students.

**KPI-8.1.4 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - Please see below

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - -/

(iii) Additional information from field phase

**KPI-8.1.4 (i) Data, figures and tables:**

MoE: EU Support to Jordan's reform Grant I, Analysis matrix for the status of tranche III / Variable Components, June 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Target III tranche</th>
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<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Total number of laboratories for deaf</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>127.8%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21 FM Labs procured by the Ministry, 2 provided from other resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>Total number of special resources rooms for students with hearing disabilities</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>114.9%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50 new resource rooms will be established in 2010-2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>Number of special resources rooms for severely mentally handicapped</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>142.85%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**JC-8.1: EU support contributed to Jordan education system reform for enhanced quality and accessibility of the overall education system through institutional capacity building at the different levels of the education system**

**Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-8.1 (based on the KPIs main findings)**

The Ministry of Education, through the EU support to the education system, has made significant progress in enhancing the quality and accessibility of the overall education system, and in particular for the students with special needs. The EU is the only donor to support the education reform with regard to strengthening the quality and accessibility of the education offerings for students with special needs.

More efforts are still needed on training with special focus on quality of training, and capacity building of teachers, school leaders, education field directors and the local communities to enable them to play the key role in the local human resources development, so as to assume full ownership or human resources development programme, particularly regarding education issues. Reform ownership at the sub-national level by de-concentrating or delegating authority into Governorates and Municipalities (with the latter until now not having any experience nor specific mandate to look into education issues) remains a critical issue. (KPI-8.1.1)

MoE benefited from the real value of EU support funding provided through the distinctive style of the sector Budget Support aid modality. EU support contributed to significant progress in achieving education sector goals in a sustainable manner, as the support is integrated / mainstreamed as a regular item in the budget law. Moreover, other donors decided to adopt the same EU Budget Support modality strengthening harmonization of DPs sectoral support. The general education policy and strategy is articulated within one ministry, the Ministry of Education, and there are no other institutions or ministries with a mandate for this sector. The coordination of the translation of policy priorities into budget priorities by the use of a Budget Support modality (MTEF – Medium-Term Expenditures Framework) has been successful. At the same time Budget Support contributed to the Ministry of Education remaining the owner of the reform process and in a position to control risk which may be emerging in the process. As such, the EU decision to introduce this SBS modality to MoE is well-positioned in relation to the envisioned education reform and its funding requirements to MoF. The specific implementation strategy and its management and coordination arrangements anchored in this overall SBS are appropriate and acceptable.

MTEF became a national requirement and was mandated to be implemented for all budget preparation within MoE. EU Support, in tandem with other key players in the international community, contributed to better planning within the MoE Departments and enhanced the capacity of the staff to implement programmes accordingly based on agreed upon indicators and targets, and to achieve these indicators as this is amongst the essential requirements for Budget Support eligibility.

This is different for the E-TVET sector which includes three ministries with a mandate for E-TVET plus a broad series of other agencies, both public and private. This complicated set up needs streamlining and better coordination and understanding amongst all TVET stakeholders regarding the translation of policy priorities into budget priorities, especially since the overall reform remains fragmented and insufficiently integrated at the strategic planning and policy level. Result is that some officials in the sector often still operate within a project modality framework, lacking common long-term vision of governance and management of this sector.

On the whole, as was learned during the field phase, indicators selection and target setting for both education and E-TVET sectors has not been a participatory, inclusive process, with insufficient involvement of the key stakeholders concerned. The indicators should be flexible and realistic. Insufficient involvement of the tripartite private sector partners (both employers and labour) in both the design and implementation of the E-TVET programmes is also reported, as symptomatic for the limited interest and commitment so far, but this is presently being addressed. (KPI-8.1.2)

EU support to Jordan was to enhance the quality and accessibility of Early Childhood Education (ECE). It is documented that slight progress has been made in ECE enrolment at MoE. In spite of the substantive EU support to improve access to learning for all children in Jordan through special focus on Early Childhood Education, the actual demand for ECE is still low. The challenge of scaling up access to public KG, especially to the mid-region of Jordan where about 67 % of the population doesn’t have access, does not seem easily solvable in the short term. It has been a crucial step forward if not achievement however to gradually convince people about the critical importance of early childhood education through awareness.
Campaigns targeting families in the rural and underserved areas and in particular women (most of them stay at home / are not employed and are of the opinion that it is preferable to keep children at home at this early age), and effectively enrolling children in kindergarten at this crucial stage of life in terms of a child's physical, intellectual, emotional and social development. (KPI-8.1.3)

As far as EU support to Special Needs Education is concerned, the special needs equipment and resources programme provisions were implemented and the indicator targets concerned were fully met. But there is a need for more detailed, reliable and updated statistical information concerning the increased enrolment rates of children with special needs benefiting from these enhanced learning aids, equipment and other resources made available. Enrolment figures indicate that students with a disability are often already enrolled in regular schools and no special services are being provided well to them. There also is a lack of trained specialists, especially educational psychologists. The appropriate identification tools for students with a special need at the pre-stage are not available or are not in use to enable them to mingle and integrate more easily with other students in regular schools (in line with integration / mainstreaming concepts) and to adequately plan for this purpose in support of these students. (KPI-8.1.4)

**JC-8.2**

EU support contributed to enhanced quality of Jordan’s overall education system through improved teacher professional development and updating of curricula, textbooks, pedagogical aids and methods

**List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 8.2 (codes and definition)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPI-8.2.1</th>
<th>Number of teachers trained in the National Teacher Professional Standards who effectively apply this pre-service and in-service learning in their teaching practice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPI-8.2.2</td>
<td>Actual coverage rate of teachers by the Ministry of Education's &quot;Continuous Professional Career Development&quot; framework including a clear career path matrix and rewarding structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-8.2.3</td>
<td>Degree to which the EU support to MoE contributed to the actual achievement of programme targets in relation to the development and actual introduction of new curricula (with application of new teaching methods) and to the production and disseminating of new textbooks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-8.2.4</td>
<td>Improved progression rates and reduced drop-out rates of pupils and students exposed to / benefiting from the reformed education programmes (incl. the reformed curricula, improved textbooks, enhanced pedagogical aids and methods, enhanced school contacts with the community and parents, etc.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KPI-8.2.1:** Number of teachers trained in the National Teacher Professional Standards who effectively apply this pre-service and in-service learning in their teaching practice

**Main Findings on KPI-8.2.1:**

Training of teachers is a continuous process at the MoE, being established as a regular MoE result area and programme. There are strong indications of families still complaining about the quality of teaching that their children are receiving. As was learned during different interviews on the occasion of the field visit, not exceptionally, families who can afford so are investing in extra private teaching services, which in itself already is a proxy indicator of the perceived quality of teaching by key Jordan education stakeholders.

Training of teachers is very crucial as indicated in the mini-survey and focus group discussion that at school level is still witnessing weak performance due to non-qualified cadres entering the education system, especially in the first three classes. Also schools are experiencing difficulty in maintaining high quality of education due to brain drain of qualified teachers for financial constraint.

An EU evaluation report of 2011, also during the focus group discussion meeting in the field phase of the EU evaluation mission with education field directors and school principals pointed out that there is lack of a comprehensive and integrated policy framework for teacher preparation (pre-service and in-service) and actual teacher training programmes are compromised by quality standard. There is a lack of consistent career development of teacher, which is acknowledged as such by the GoJ.

Through the field phase meetings e.g. at the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit of the National Centre for...
Human Resource Development and through the focus group meeting discussion for MoE Field Directorates and Principals of Schools, it was learned that there are no standards for National Teacher Professional training. The training of teachers is sub-standard and has no or at best limited impact and is not taken seriously as part of Life Long Learning (LLL). There is no effective accountability system to ensure the achievement of the goals and quality standards of the training programme to upgrade teaching skills of teachers. Most of the training is conducted during teaching periods of the academic year (mostly in the afternoon) after class hours resulting in limited attention and active involvement of the teachers in the learning process. There is a missing link between the intended European Union programme support and the actual training activities of teachers, resulting in lack of accountability for results aimed at, with no monitoring or direct follow-up provided by MoE to make sure that the training meets quality standards and that the intended training methodology and curriculum is effectively applied.

Declining quality of teaching is noticeable for example the trends analysis of the International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) 2011, which showed a significant decline in the performance of Jordanian students in both subjects of mathematics and science in 2011 as compared to the previous cycle ending in 2007.

Lack of qualified teachers’ recruitment is a vital challenge Jordan education system is facing as it negatively affects students’ achievements. Teachers’ recruitment is still the responsibility of the Civil Service Bureau, as it also the responsible body for the attendance of the pre-service training programme by prospective teachers.

KPI-8.2.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Please see below

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- World Bank Draft Aide-Memoire of the ERfKE II Project, Supervision Mission, May 14-23, 2013 (p 2)
- Final Evaluation Report, EU Support to Jordan’s Education Reform, (JOR/2006/018-208), and EU Special Measure in support of Jordan’s Public Education System to Cope with Absorption of Iraqi Refugee Children, Draft 1, 31 December 2011, Gregor B.M. Meiering, Jean-Francois Bernede, Ahmad Atwan (pages, 5, 39).

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- National Center for Human Resources Development, (TIMSS 2011) Report, p.75, p.82

KPI-8.2.1 (i) Data, figures and tables:
Source: Department of Statistics, Jordan Statistical Yearbook 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry of Education</th>
<th>Educational Stage</th>
<th>Total No. of Teachers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vocational secondary</td>
<td>Academic secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1645</td>
<td>6312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>7602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3545</td>
<td>13914</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank (Report No: ICR00001208) Implementation Completion and Results Report for ERIKE I (IBRD-71700 TF-53276), December 28, 2009 (p.5)
KPI-8.2.2: Actual coverage rate of teachers by the Ministry of Education's "Continuous Professional Career Development" framework including a clear career path matrix and rewarding structure

Main Findings on KPI-8.2.2:

From the evaluation study conducted by the EU a number of recommendations emanated regarding the overall enhancement of the quality of education through the establishment of a more conducive overall framework, with special focused attention for clearer career paths of teachers and an appropriate rewarding structure to enhance the quality of education through teachers’ permanent education and accompanying structural measures to make the teaching profession more attractive, respected and rewarding.

As also found in relation to the previous KPI – 8.2.1, (additional) training of teacher is not related to any increase in remuneration or other rewards, no structure or systems for professional career development are in place. During different field phase meetings and particularly during the MoE focus group meeting, clear demands / suggestions were made to more closely link the training of teachers to a rewarding structure to ensure interest in and guarantee best added value for continued training. This should be one of the elements of a broader package of making the teaching profession more attractive by attributing it a higher cultural and socio-economic status, a better rewarding structure and with professional career development and advancement perspectives. According to the mini-survey some answers were stressing on the newly appointment teachers should be selected according to fair competition, testing and should have good qualifications.

KPI-8.2.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- -/-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Final Evaluation Report, EU Support to Jordan’s Education Reform, (JOR/2006/018-208), and EU Special Measure in support of Jordan’s Public Education System to Cope with Absorption of Iraqi Refugee Children, Draft 1, 31 December 2011,Gregor B.M. Meiering, Jean-Francois Bernede, Ahmad Atwan, p.7
- Final Evaluation Report, EU Support to Jordan’s Education Reform, (JOR/2006/018-208), and EU Special Measure in support of Jordan’s Public Education System to Cope with Absorption of Iraqi Refugee Children, Draft 1, 31 December 2011,Gregor B.M. Meiering, Jean-Francois Bernede, Ahmad Atwan, p.65

(iii) Additional information from field phase

KPI-8.2.3: Degree to which the EU support to MoE contributed to the actual achievement of programme targets in relation to the development and actual introduction of new curricula (with application of new teaching methods) and to the production and disseminating of new textbooks

Main Findings on KPI-8.2.3:

As set of recommendations were included in the EU evaluation report on the education sector in Jordan for studies and researches concerning the development and actual introduction of new curricula (with application of new teaching methods), as these latter issues have proven to constitute major challenges to be addressed still. During the field phase meetings with MoE/ Vocational Education officials and in the education and employment focus group discussion it has been acknowledged that 9 curricula of vocational specialization have been developed out of the total of 25 specialisations. Consequently, the numbers of specialisations were reduced. According to the labour market survey of 2006, there are no regulatory provisions and there also no system in place to train students at the private sector. All depends on personal
teacher’s initiatives and the quality and extent of their relationship with the private sector.

As per the mini-survey it is quoted that “the only role of vocational schools is to guide the students to the path of vocational education and prepare them for employment but schools are not concerned with the employment of the graduates since this is the responsibility of Ministry of Labour and Civil Service.”

Based on the New Vision for Education in Jordan (2014-2019), MOE is actually engaged in updating and completing the National Education Strategy. The new Education Strategy will particularly focus on the quality and relevance of the education system in Jordan and will give particular attention to the development and actual introduction of new curricula with integration of ICT, the application of new teaching methods and to the production and dissemination of updated new textbooks. Other major pillars relate to the expansion of preschool including the universalization of the current KG2, further measures to strengthen the teaching profession, the reform of the structure of secondary education – academic and vocational –together with the Tawjihi examination, and a thorough reorganization of the MOE itself and its governance and accountability relationships with the Field Directorates (FDs), the school and civil society at large.

KPI-8.2.3 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:

(ii) Key extracts from documents:

- MoE (ERfKE II) Annual Narrative Report April 2013 (Mid-Term Stage), p.54
- MoE (ERfKE II) Annual Narrative Report April 2013 (Mid-Term Stage), p. 55
- Final Evaluation Report, EU Support to Jordan’s Education Reform, (JOR/2006/018-208), and EU Special Measure in support of Jordan’s Public Education System to Cope with Absorption of Iraqi Refugee Children, Draft 1, 31 December 2011, Gregor B.M. Meiering, Jean-Francois Bernede, Ahmad Atwan, p. 5, 7
- World Bank, Draft Aide-Memoire of the ERfKE II, Supervision Mission in May 14-23, 2013. p.18

(iii) Additional information from field phase


KPI-8.2.4: Improved progression rates and reduced drop-out rates of pupils and students exposed to / benefiting from the reformed education programmes (incl. the reformed curricula, improved textbooks, enhanced pedagogical aids and methods, enhanced school contacts with the community and parents, etc.)

Main Findings on KPI-8.2.4:

During the field phase meetings with the officials of the MoE and according to the focus group discussion meeting with the MoE field directors and schools principals had elaborated that contribution to improved progression rates and reduced drop-out rates of Jordan Education was due to the increased number of students but not because of the improved progression rates of students this is due to the decision of the ministry to progress all the students including the weak to the next grade without retention or no repetition for the same grade this lead to reduce dropout rates, this was applied for basic (Primary) education level which leads of having both the very weak students with the good achiever together at the same grade accordingly teachers will not be able to maintain quality of education, however this decision recently had suspended (no retention for weak students) that was appreciated by MoE-FDs and principals of schools as it will allow for quality of students to be upgraded to the next grade.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>2007-2008</th>
<th>2008-2009*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Authorities</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>All Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Edu</td>
<td>99.689 %</td>
<td>99.635 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As can be seen from the table above that Progression rated in Primary Education is marginally higher with 0.001% in 2008-2009, compared to 2007-2008

As concluded in the Final Evaluation Report of the EU Support to Jordan’s Education Reform, dropouts remain an important issue (even if the indicator is not used anymore for Budget Support disbursements). The qualitative reasons for dropouts are understudied and non-formal education is assessed to be only one remedy. As far as TVET is concerned, it remains largely seen in general as a residual emergency education safety net for dropouts.

The support to the improved quality of the Jordan education system has mainly concentrated on the quantities (access and enrolment rates, etc.) on the assumption / in the hope that this would assure the overall quality of the education system. But new technologies, as well as cultural and social changes have had a strong impact on the Jordan education system and it is not evident that the system was and is well prepared to positively / constructively interact with these crucial changes and adapt accordingly. It was also learned from different interviews with key knowledgeable parties concerned during the field phase, that the number of learning contact hours, as well as the prominence of literacy and mathematics in curricula remains key challenges to be addressed on a priority and urgent basis.

KPI-8.2.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- MoE/ DCU/EU Contribution to ERfKE / GRANT I / Indicator 8, Reviewed Jun 2010

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- MoE (ERfKE II) Annual Narrative Report April 2013 (Mid-Term Stage), p. 54
- Final Evaluation Report, EU Support to Jordan’s Education Reform, (JOR/2006/018-208), and EU Special Measure in support of Jordan’s Public Education System to Cope with Absorption of Iraqi Refugee Children, Draft 1, 31 December 2011, Gregor B.M. Meiering, Jean-Francois Bernede, Ahmad Atwan, p.5

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- Minutes of focus group meeting discussion with MoE Field Directors, Principals of schools and teachers during the CLE Jordan field mission,
- Mini-survey questionnaire forms filled-up by 19 Field Directors and Principals of Schools

JC-8.2: EU support contributed to enhanced quality of Jordan’s overall education system through improved teacher professional development and updating of curricula, textbooks, pedagogical aids and methods

Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-8.2 (based on the KPIs main findings)

EU support to the enhancement of the quality of overall Jordan's education sector has been substantive and its results noticeable. Nevertheless more efforts are required by the MoE to assure sustainably enhanced quality of teaching and to introduce major reform changes needed still to effectively and sustainably introduce methods of teaching appealing to critical thinking and problem solving, rather than depending on the “traditional” methods of teaching (ex cathedra, memorising, etc.) Evaluations and specialised studies prove these still to be crucial issues of teaching enhancement in Jordan to be given priority attention.

A comprehensive and integrated policy framework for teacher preparation (pre-service and in-service) is still to be worked out. Through the field phase meetings at the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit of the National Centre for Human Resource Development and through the focus group meeting discussion for MoE Field Directorates and Principals of Schools, it was learned that that there are no standards for National Teacher Professional training. The training of teachers is sub-standard and has no or at best limited impact and is not taken seriously as part of Life Long Learning. There is no effective accountability system to ensure the achievement of the goals and quality standards of the training programme to upgrade teaching skills of teachers. Most of the training is conducted during teaching periods of the academic year (mostly in the
afternoon) after class hours resulting in limited attention and active involvement of the teachers in the learning process. There is a missing link between the intended European Union programme support and the actual training activities of teachers, resulting in lack of accountability for results aimed at, with no monitoring or direct follow-up provided by MoE to make sure that the training meets quality standards and that the intended training methodology and curriculum is effectively applied.

Declining quality of teaching is noticeable in for example the trends analysis of the International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) 2011, which showed a significant decline in the performance of Jordanian students in both subjects of mathematics and science in 2011 as compared to the previous cycle ending in 2007. (KPI-8.2.1)

Evaluation studies (amongst which from the EU) point to the priority need of overall enhancement of the quality of the Jordan education system through the establishment of a more conducive overall framework, with special attention for clearer career paths of teachers and an appropriate rewarding structure to enhance the quality of education through teachers’ permanent education and accompanying structural measures to make the teaching profession more attractive, respected and rewarding. (KPI-8.2.2)

In line with the New Vision for Education in Jordan (2014-2019), MOE is actually engaged in updating and completing the National Education Strategy. The new Education Strategy particularly focuses on the quality and relevance of the education system in Jordan and will give particular attention to the development and actual introduction of new curricula with integration of ICT, the application of new teaching methods and to the production and dissemination of updated new textbooks. Other major pillars relate to the expansion of preschool including the universalization of the current KG2, further measures to strengthen the teaching profession, the reform of the structure of secondary education – academic and vocational –together with the Tawjihi examination, and a thorough reorganization of the MOE itself and its governance and accountability relationships with the Field Directorates (FDs), the school and civil society at large. (KPI-8.2.3)

Dropouts remain an important issue (even if the indicator is not used anymore for Budget Support disbursements). The qualitative reasons for dropouts are understudied and non-formal education is assessed to be only one remedy. As far as TVET is concerned, it remains largely seen in general as a residual emergency education safety net for dropouts. The support to the improved quality of the Jordan education system has mainly concentrated on the quantities (access and enrolment rates, etc.) on the assumption / in the hope that this also would assure the overall quality of the education system. But new technologies, as well as cultural and social changes have had a strong impact on the Jordan education system and it is not evident that the system was and is well prepared to positively / constructively interact with these crucial changes and adapt accordingly. It was also learned from different interviews with key knowledgeable parties concerned during the field phase, that the number of learning contact hours, as well as the prominence of literacy and mathematics in curricula remains key challenges to be addressed on a priority and urgent basis. (KPI-8.2.4)
**JC-8.3**  
**EU support contributed to the national employment strategy and programme in terms of increased formal employment with social security coverage and to an expanded coverage of employment training and career guidance and counselling services**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPI-8.3.1</th>
<th>Degree to which the EU support to Jordan contributed to the strengthening and expansion of the social security system in terms of reach, coverage and quality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPI-8.3.2</td>
<td>Increased number and rates of employment in the formal sector covered by the Social Security Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-8.3.3</td>
<td>Overall quality and extent to which the national policy, strategy and system of employment mediation, employment training, career guidance and training is in place, with due consideration given to brain drain and migration issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-8.3.4</td>
<td>Number of municipalities providing employment, training and career guidance and counselling, for which they are fully operational and equipped in terms of infrastructure and trained human resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-8.3.5</td>
<td>Success rates of these mediation and counselling services in terms of numbers of sustainable entrances in the wage labour market or self-employment / entrepreneurship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KPI-8.3.1:** Degree to which the EU support to Jordan contributed to the strengthening and expansion of the social security system in terms of reach, coverage and quality

**Main Findings on KPI-8.3.1:**

Major achievements are registered and documented regarding the further strengthening and expansion of the social security system in Jordan, both in terms of reach and coverage and of quality, having benefited throughout from EU support. The latter particularly took the form of support to a multi-media campaign, conducted on a permanent, daily basis spearheaded by the Social Security Corporation (SSC). This includes a comprehensive awareness raising campaign through the daily newspapers and other media coverage, targeting the general public and all workers, particularly women, either employed or unemployed to expand the coverage of the social security. From the field visit it was learned that the latest additions in the social security package include unemployment insurance and maternity insurance to increase employability of women. The next steps in the social security package expansion are retirement benefits. Ample opportunities for strengthened EU-Jordan collaboration with regard to expertise required for guiding this social security expansion (both vertically and horizontally) were highlighted during the field visit meeting at the SSC. Whereas the package is expanding for those who are / will be in the system, a raising divide is observed with those who are not in the system and tend to be kept deprived from SSC benefits (particularly in the private sector) as symptomatic for a society where inequality is raising (socio-economically, geographically and ethnically) and social exclusion is aggravating.

Based on SSC plans and reports, 64.3% of formal sector employment would be covered by the end of 2012 whereas the target coverage included in the E-TVET Budget Support conditionalities for tranches releases include 65% as target for that year. As such, the 2nd and 3rd EU assessment missions verified positive achievement of the said indicator target. However it appeared not possible to obtain a percentage of overall contributors in relation to the overall employment figures in the absence of the necessary statistical data exchange arrangements between DOS and the Ministry of Labour (MoL).

In general, all Progress Assessment Missions for the E-TVET Budget Support programme have given due consideration to assessment of benchmark fulfilment on one hand, but one the other hand faced a lack of unambiguous empirical evidence and hard data to underpin findings.

In the meeting that was held with SSC officials during the field phase, it was pointed out that SSC intends to increase social security coverage to include both Jordanian and non-Jordanian labour. The other major challenge is the need for improvement to better serve youth and vulnerable groups, to ensure there social coverage under the social security system or through social safety nets.
KPI-8.3.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Jordan’s National Employment Strategy 2011-2020, p.10
- Please see below

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Matrix E-TVET Progress on 2011, Benchmarks of the EU Support to E-TVET Reform Programme, p.11
- Jordan’s National Employment Strategy 2011-2020, p.41

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- Please see below

KPI-8.3.1 (i) Data, figures and tables
Percentage of people included in the social security 2009-2012

![Percentage of people included in the social security 2009-2012](image)

- Percentage of SS registered manpower
- Percentage from total working force in formal sector

KPI-8.3.1 (iii) Additional information from field phase
From the meeting during the field phase mission with the SSC officials it was learned that:
- SSC work with MoPIC and EU on: i) Good governance; ii) Spring donation (regional programme); iii) E-TVET Sector enhancing of social security coverage horizontally and vertically.
- The new law was approved, that has new elements such as unemployment insurance and maternity insurance to increase employability of women.
- Working now on the bylaws the regulations for the new law to be approved by the cabinet.
- SSC provides social security for Jordanian also for foreign labourers through social security mechanism and saving mechanism.
- The future plans to involve and cover elderly people in the system.
- The coverage will be mandatory for the private sector.
- Social dialogue / SSC Board of Directors consists of members from the tripartite sectors: 1/3 from employers; 1/3
• SSC has a full benchmark to be achieved included as conditionality for tranches releases from the EU E-TVET Budget Support programme.
• Perception of the E-TVET reform: i) Reforms take time, as labour markets policies and strategies are long term processes; ii) Some institutions do not have the required qualified staff; iii) The KPI’s and the benchmarks are good to achieve the objectives, be it ambitious.

KPI-8.3.2: Increased number and rates of employment in the formal sector covered by the Social Security Corporation

Main Findings on KPI-8.3.2:

Social security coverage is one of the benchmarks of the EU Budget Support programme in support of E-TVET reforms with a budget of EUR 29 million. (CO 257782). For example, the related benchmark for the release of the second tranche by July 2011 was 60% of employment in the formal sector covered by SSC by the end of 2010. The necessary caution is to be observed with interpreting the data, as it is not clear to what extent companies employing less than 5 employees are monitored by SSC and the bulk of the national formal employment are exactly located in these small enterprises as revealed by the 2nd PAM BSP mission. Also, the resident TA experts estimated the coverage of the formal sector to be 85.73% instead of 64.3% now (64.3% / 0.75 = 85.73% - progress assessment Nov 2013, p. 56).

As already indicated in relation to the previous indicator KPI-8.3.1, according to the 2nd and 3rd EU assessment missions of BS support to the TVET sector, the attainment of the 60% of formal employment coverage by the Social Security Corporation system was positively assessed as achieved. However it appeared not possible to obtain a percentage of overall contributors in relation to the overall employment figures in the absence of the necessary statistical data exchange arrangements between DOS and the Ministry of Labour (MoL).

In general, all Progress Assessment Missions for the E-TVET Budget Support programme have given due consideration to objective assessment of benchmark fulfilment on one hand, but one the other hand faced a lack of unambiguous empirical evidence and hard data to solidly underpin findings. After going through the statistics and the annual reports of the SSC for the previous years, one had to conclude that the information available in the different tables cannot be compared with each other; hence it is not possible to establish trends based on trend analyses.

As it is also reported in the Action Document on Skills for Employment and Social Inclusion, under the section of lessons learnt, there is a general lack of information even on the basic SSC social security programme features and coverage, such as budgets, the number and characteristics of beneficiaries, dropout rates, and particularly in relation to the follow-up of beneficiaries and evaluation of the policies’ effectiveness in terms of job placement rates, impact on duration of unemployment and quality of employment (e.g. average earnings, formality). The TVET programme assessment mission of November 2013 for example had to conclude that “the calculation of the percentage of contributors and their inclusion in the employed persons in the formal sector in 2013 cannot be done at the moment for objective reasons.”

To date there has been no systematic data collection on TVET and ALMMs, neither at national nor at regional level. The limited evidence that does exist suggests that there is: (a) a multiplicity of schemes, often overlapping, without proper coordination between them (and often managed by different institutions), leading to a waste of resources; (b) a strong concentration of TVET and ALMMs on unemployed males and on urban areas, and; (c) often the most qualified applicants among the unemployed population are targeted for programme participation in order to boost effectiveness. The later poses a serious equity problem (phenomenon sociologically referred to as the matthew effect: “Those who have will be given”), and leaves behind the hard-to-place groups who are most vulnerable. Because of this absence of attention (both programmatic and statically) for the most vulnerable and excluded segments of society, policy makers and programme managers from both governments and donors have little insight into the real economic and social effects of TVET and ALMMs as tools for enhancing equitable, inclusive and sustainable economic growth and social inclusion.

KPI-8.3.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- FWC contractor; “Progress assessment of the Budget Support Programme to the Employment and Technical and Vocational Education and Training Reforms”, Specific Contract N° 2013/318675,
Framework Contract Beneficiaries – Lot 9, November 2013, (pp. 58-59)
- Note concerning an estimation of SS coverage at the end of 2013 (resident TA expert’s appraisal).
- Matrix E-TVET Progress on 2011, Benchmarks of the EU Support to E-TVET Reform Programme p.3
- Jordan: tackling the paradox of (national) jobless growth, Sahar Taghdisi Rad, 20-23 September 2011, ILO Geneva, p.8-10

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- /-

(iii) Additional information from field phase

KPI-8.3.3: Overall quality and extent to which the national policy, strategy and system of employment mediation, employment training, career guidance and training is in place, with due consideration given to brain drain and migration issues

Main Findings on KPI-8.3.3:

The Ministry of Labour recently is at the helm of providing more intensive services in an effort to more systematically match available jobs with the potential graduates to increase employability of youth and of unemployed men and women. MoL is promoting its service through its employment centres, workshops and awareness campaign. Generally, unemployment rates remain high, particularly amongst women and youngsters, resulting in relatively low labour force participation rates of these (vulnerable) groups. It is not clear how the employment mediation, career guidance and training services especially focus on these segments of the population and labour market in particular.

A recognised and considerable progress has been made with regard to the operationalisation of the 19 MoL Employment Offices that are scattered in different governorates and districts of Jordan to ensure easier access to improved employment, career counselling and guidance and training services throughout the Kingdom. The improved performance also stems from enhanced staff capacity, modern methodologies and procedures in bringing into contact job-seekers and employers based on the use of electronic means, as well as for the promotion of self-employment and with a special focus on the employability of women. Compliance was evidenced through site-visits by the 2nd progress assessment mission for the sector (June 2013). Achievement of the target is estimated at 95% by the time of the mission conducted. The intended improvement / upgrading of the next 38 Employment Offices based on the success with the first set of 19 branch-offices is a promising indication of further strengthened employability promotion activities. Outputs of the National Employment Campaign related to extension of employment, training and CG&C services reported that, since 2011, 24,000 Jordanians have been supported by access to employment

Based on a browsing of the ELE website (www.nees.jo) very good quality printed information for potential job seekers was found, used during well-organised job fairs with active participation of employers.

In spite of EU support and Jordan government efforts to increase employability and reduce unemployment, job creation remains a most crucial issue for Jordan particularly for youngsters, women and vulnerable segments of society. This is due to many factors but mainly to the following: A lack of a coherent national policy to reduce poverty that promotes employability as a key strategic target; Limited capacity of human resources in the public sector; Moreover aggravated by the Iraqi and Syrian crises of refugees inflows impacted negatively on the economy by increasing unemployment rates of nationals, since a significant number of jobs has been occupied by Syrian, Iraqi and other foreign low-cost labour.
KPI-8.3.3 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Matrix E-TVET Progress on 2011, Benchmarks of the EU Support to E-TVET Reform Programme, p.11
- Please see below

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Matrix E-TVET Progress on 2011, Benchmarks of the EU Support to E-TVET Reform Programme, p.2
- Benchmarks of the EU Support to E-TVET Reform Programme
- E-TVET Strategy, p.1
- Progress report, p.1

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- FWC contractor; “Progress assessment of the Budget Support Programme to the Employment and Technical and Vocational Education and Training Reforms”, Specific Contract N° 2013/318675, Framework Contract Beneficiaries – Lot 9, November 2013, (pp. 50, 52

KPI-8.3.3 (i) Data, figures and tables:


The paradox: strong investment and GDP growth, but high unemployment

![Graph showing GDP growth and unemployment](image)

Source: Central Bank of Jordan, World Development Indicators, Employment and Unemployment Surveys

KPI-8.3.4: Number of municipalities providing employment, training and career guidance and counselling, for which they are fully operational and equipped in terms of infrastructure and trained human resources

Main Findings on KPI-8.3.4:

According to the reviewed documents and to the analyses of the Progress Assessment Missions for the EU E-TVET Budget Support programmes, the MoL Directorate of Employment and Training and the Regional Directorates and Districts, 19 Districts have increased capacity of staff and access to improved Employment software and tools. Career Counselling and Guidance and Training Services are available throughout the Kingdom, based on printed informative materials and the participation / organisation of economically relevant
periodical Job Fairs with involvement of local partners (universities, chambers of industry and major employers). A verification of the access to ELE (www.nees.jo) by job seekers revealed that also the officers of the local Directorates and Districts proved they have an adequate understanding of their tasks and responsibilities. At the same time, the networking with local stakeholders has been ensuring good support for developing and actual provisions of actual, relevant services.

Through meetings with MoL during the field phase, officials indicated that the Governorates and Municipalities themselves do not provide any employment services. It is the MoL employment directorates’ offices that are located in the different municipalities which provide these services.

Main achievements regarding the provision of employment, training and career guidance and counselling at the local level include the following: (i) Generally available access by the local MoL offices and other partners / employers to the improved Electronic Labour Exchange has been verified as being generally available; (ii) Upgraded equipment, Internet connectivity and space at the local labour offices serving the expanded needs of related services (with three cases of newly built locations or newly equipped offices (e.g. in Salt and Sahab); (iii) Limited availability still of the Training Information System and this mostly concerns the VTC-based training provision as well as private training providers accredited by CAQA. (iv) The career guidance and counselling services have been significantly upgraded with the adoption of the budgeted mid-term Career Guidance & Counselling Strategy and Implementation Plan. Within the CG Strategy (under implementation) specific actions for training of counsellors have taken place, and related information packages and manuals on career paths have been made available. Training services are being introduced progressively.

**KPI-8.3.4 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) **Data, figures and tables:**

(ii) **Key extracts from documents:**
- Jordan and the IMF, Jordan: Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding March 27, 2013, p.68
- Matrix E-TVET Progress on 2011, Benchmarks of the EU Support to E-TVET Reform Programme, p.10

(iii) **Additional information from field phase**
- FWC contractor; “Progress assessment of the Budget Support Programme to the Employment and Technical and Vocational Education and Training Reforms”, Specific Contract N° 2013/318675, Framework Contract Beneficiaries – Lot 9, November 2013, (pp. 50 - 52)

**KPI-8.3.5: Success rates of these mediation and counselling services in terms of numbers of sustainable entrances in the wage labour market or self-employment / entrepreneurship**

**Main Findings on KPI-8.3.5:**

There is improved accessibility of the Electronic Labour Exchange software and training services are being introduced progressively, but major challenges remain regarding the actual delivery of employment mediation and counselling services, both in terms of quantities and quality.

MoL acknowledged that there is a need to further expand and operationalise its Labour Market Information System (LMIS) as there is no system or mechanism in place yet for tracing the entrance in the wage labour market or self-employment / entrepreneurship of those who have been serviced / assisted through the MoL Employment Directorate or Labour Office e.g. with career guidance and counselling services, as it is these offices which provide the counselling services and match the employers with the job seekers. Likewise the 3 Centres of Excellence that were supported by EU funding will begin enrol students/ trainees by September 2014 only, as these centres are still under construction / being operationalised and the success rates thus can’t be measured yet. Most advanced is the Pharmaceutical Centre of Excellence in Salt visited by the Evaluation Team during the field visit. It will start operations in September of this year. The equipment is installed but the curricula are still being finalised for approval and student recruitment still need to start awaiting the approval of the curriculum.
**KPI-8.3.5 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) **Data, figures and tables:**
- ILO, TOR for an Evaluation of Active Labour Market Programmes in Jordan, p.8

(ii) **Key extracts from documents:**
- -/-

(iii) **Additional information from field phase**
- -/-

**JC-8.3: EU support contributed to the national employment strategy and programme in terms of increased formal employment with social security coverage and to an expanded coverage of employment training and career guidance and counselling services**

**Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-8.3 (based on the KPIs main findings)**

Major achievements are registered and documented regarding the further strengthening and expansion of the social security system in Jordan, both in terms of reach and coverage and of quality, having benefited throughout from EU support. This support particularly took the form of support to a multi-media campaign, conducted on a permanent, daily basis spearheaded by the Social Security Corporation (SSC). This includes a comprehensive awareness raising campaign through the daily newspapers and other media coverage, targeting the general public and all workers, particularly women, either employed or unemployed to expand the coverage of the social security. More statistical and other information is needed however to further quantify the effects and impact of the campaign.

From the field visit it was learned that the latest additions in the social security package include unemployment insurance and maternity insurance to increase employability of women. The next steps in the social security package expansion are retirement benefits. Ample opportunities for strengthened EU-Jordan collaboration with regard to expertise required for guiding this social security expansion (both vertically and horizontally) were highlighted during the field visit meeting at the SSC. Whereas the package is expanding for those who are / will be in the system, a raising divide is observed with those who are not in the system and tend to be kept deprived from SSC benefits (particularly in the private sector) as symptomatic for a society where inequality is raising (socio-economically, geographically and ethnically) and social exclusion is aggravating. In the meeting with SSC officials during the field phase, it was pointed out that SSC intends to increase social security coverage to include both Jordanian and non-Jordanian labour. The other major challenge is the need for improvement to better serve youth and vulnerable groups, to ensure there social coverage under the social security system or through social safety nets. (KPI-8.3.1)

To date there has been no systematic data collection on TVET and ALMPs, neither at national nor at regional level. The limited evidence that does exist suggests that there is: (a) a multiplicity of schemes, often overlapping, without proper coordination between them (and often managed by different institutions), leading to a waste of resources; (b) a strong concentration of TVET and ALMPs on unemployed males and on urban areas, and; (c) often the most qualified applicants among the unemployed population are targeted for programme participation in order to boost effectiveness. The later poses a serious equity problem (phenomenon sociologically referred to as the matthew effect: “Those who have will be given”), and leaves behind the hard-to-place groups who are most vulnerable. Because of this absence of attention (both programmatic and statically) for the most vulnerable and excluded segments of society, policy makers and programme managers from both governments and donors have little insight into the real economic and social effects of TVET and ALMMs as tools for enhancing equitable, inclusive and sustainable economic growth and social inclusion. (KPI-8.3.2)

The Ministry of Labour recently is providing intensive services to match available jobs with the potential graduates with the aim to increase employability of youth and of unemployed men and women. It is delivering its services through its employment centres, e.g. by means of workshops and awareness campaigns and individual services. The MOL Directorate of Employment and Training (MOL-DET) currently has 19 employment directorates functioning. MOL-DET provides employment services but the training services are provided by the VTC centres located in different directorates. MoL employees working in these are assessed to need more and better training services themselves in first instance. Also a general lack of
information is noted even on the basic features, such as budgets, the number and characteristics of beneficiaries, and dropout rates, particularly in relation to the follow-up of beneficiaries and evaluation of the policies’ effectiveness in terms of job placement rates, impact on duration of unemployment and quality of employment.

Generally, unemployment rates remain high, particularly amongst women and youngsters, resulting in relatively low labour force participation rates of these (vulnerable) groups. It is not clear how the employment mediation, career guidance and training services especially focus on these deprived segments of the population and labour market. A recognised and considerable progress has been made with regard to the operationalisation of the 19 MoL Employment Offices that are scattered in different governorates and districts of Jordan to ensure easier access to improved employment, career counselling and guidance and training services throughout the Kingdom. Outputs of the National Employment Campaign related to extension of employment, training and CG&C services reported that, since 2011, 24,000 Jordanians have been supported by access to employment

In spite of EU support and Jordan government efforts to increase employability and reduce unemployment, job creation remains a most crucial issue for Jordan particularly for youngsters, women and vulnerable segments of society. This is due to many factors including (i) A lack of a coherent national policy to reduce poverty that promotes employability as a key strategic target; (ii) Limited capacity of human resources in the public sector; and (iii) Moreover aggravated by the Iraqi and Syrian crises of refugees inflows impacted negatively on the economy by increasing unemployment rates of nationals, since a significant number of jobs has been occupied by Syrian, Iraqi and other foreign low-cost labour. (KPI-8.3.3)

EU support has been responsive to the E-TVET sector reform programme that was part of the National Agenda 2006-2015. One of the main achievements was the development of the National Employment Strategy, which was released in 2011 and currently is under implementation. The EU support contributed to the E-TVET Sector reform throughout based on a holistic, integrated vision of employment in relation to Vocational Education and Training. EU support also contributed to a better coordination among ministries involved in the sector, various agencies, NGO’s and the private sector. The strengthening of the collaboration and cooperation between the education and training providers as one side and the employers as the other side however is a long-term process and is expected to take several years until it produces tangible results in terms of an increase in employment and more adequate responses to the labour market.

According to the reviewed documents and to the analyses of the Progress Assessment Missions for the EU E-TVET Budget Support programmes, 19 Districts have increased capacity of staff and access to improved employment software and tools. Career Counselling and Guidance and Training Services are available throughout the Kingdom, based on printed informative materials and the participation / organisation of economically relevant periodical Job Fairs with involvement of local partners (universities, chambers of industry and major employers). Based on recent assessments, the officers of the local Directorates and Districts proved to have an adequate understanding of their tasks and responsibilities. At the same time, the networking with local stakeholders has been ensuring good support for developing and actual provisions of actual, relevant services. From meetings with MoL during the field phase emanated that the Governorates and Municipalities themselves do not provide any employment services. It is the MoL employment directorates’ offices that are located in the different municipalities which provide these services. Four one-stop-shops were established and are operational. (KPI-8.3.4)

There is an improved accessibility of the MoL Electronic Labour Exchange software and training services are being introduced progressively, but major challenges remain regarding the actual delivery of employment mediation and counselling services, both in terms of quantity and quality. MoL acknowledged that there is a need to further expand and operationalise its Labour Market Information System (LMIS) as there is no system or mechanism in place yet for tracing the entrance in the wage labour market or self-employment / entrepreneurship of those who have been serviced / assisted through the MoL Employment Directorate or Labour Office e.g. with career guidance and counselling services, as it is these offices which provide the counselling services and match the employers with the job seekers. Likewise the 3 Centres of Excellence that were supported by EU funding will begin enrol students/ trainees by September 2014 only, as these centres at present are still under construction / being operationalised and the success rates can’t be measured. (KPI-8.3.5)
## JC-8.4
EU support contributed to E-TVET sector reform with adoption of effective mechanisms for private sector collaboration in design and development of training programmes

### List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 8.4 *(codes and definition)*

| KPI-8.4.1 | Number of Vocational Training Centres of Excellence developed / supported which are running new programmes developed (and implemented) in collaboration with the private sector, employers and/or in a tripartite setting (government, employers, workers / communities) |
| KPI-8.4.2 | Satisfaction of both employers and students in the target sectors with the quality and relevance of the training programmes that lead to increased formal self-employment and wage employment rates |
| KPI-8.4.3 | Number and percentage of companies in the target sectors which contributed to designing and actually developing apprenticeship training programmes, with numbers of effectively graduating interns / apprentices |
| KPI-8.4.4 | Number of graduating TVET students that find sustainable employment (self of wage) within one year after graduation for at least an uninterrupted period of minimum 12 months |

### KPI-8.4.1: Number of Vocational Training Centres of Excellence developed / supported which are running new programmes developed (and implemented) in collaboration with the private sector, employers and/or in a tripartite setting (government, employers, workers / communities)

**Main Findings on KPI-8.4.1:**

Three Vocational Training Centres (VTC) of Excellence institutes are being established and developed with support from the EU for 3 sectors of industry: i) Pharmaceutical; ii) Water and environment; iii) Renewable energy. The pharmaceutical Centre of Excellence in Salt is being established within existing premises and its equipment installed. The curricula are in a final development process. They have been developed by local and internal experts and with the involvement of the Jordan Association of pharmaceutical industries. The enrolment of 40 students will start on Sep. 2014. The water and environment Centre of Excellence in Marka has a management supervisory board shared with the private sector in accordance with the conceptual framework for PPP that was developed earlier by the Vocational Training Corporation. A project manager was hired, curricula have been developed with students, and a teacher’s work plan in according with the DACUM (Developing a Curricula) principles and process was worked out. The Curricula are now with CAQA for Accreditation. The Water Centre is expected to start training students on September 2014. The third Centre of Excellence is the Maan Centre for renewable energy. Currently the centre is teaching and training electricity to 43 students. The Centre is under renovation at present to become a centre of excellence for renewable energy. However, the Centre at present is facing some difficulties with the citizens of Maan, who are afraid that it may jeopardise their own business through selling solar energy to the electricity company. There is a study by the Vocational Training Corporation officials with a proposal to change the Centre’s location to Aljaffer centre.

### KPI-8.4.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

**(i) Data, figures and tables:**

- MoL, E-TVET Council, ILO, An Evaluation Study For The Active Labour Programmes, 8/2/2012, p.3

**(ii) Key extracts from documents:**

- Matrix E-TVET Progress on 2011, Benchmarks of the EU Support to E-TVET Reform Programme, pp. 5-6
- World Bank, (EDSDP) Aide Memoire, Supervision Mission, 10 – 13 March 2013, p.3
- Jordan’s National Employment Strategy 2011-2020, pp. 43-44
### KPI-8.4.2: Satisfaction of both employers and students in the target sectors with the quality and relevance of the training programmes that lead to increased formal self-employment and wage employment rates

#### Main Findings on KPI-8.4.2:

The EU support to the E-TVET sector is relatively recent, especially with regard to activities on the ground. For example, the three Model Skills Centres of Excellence are newly developed and not yet fully operational. Consequently, no enrolment or related figures have been found yet as these centres will start enrolment of trainees this year onwards, mostly in September 2014.

As far as the other similar initiatives are concerned, the TVET operational activities under the Jordan Tourism Development Project result in employability / employment rates of around 75-80%, with variations depending on the location of the VTCs across Jordan.

The participation of employers in E-TVET Sector is formally established. For example, they are members of the E-TVET Council, and they are also board members in the Vocational Training Corporation. Employers actively participate in the development of the curricula for training programmes in the targeted sectors of industry according to the DACUM process.

The process of rehabilitation of the training centres is time consuming and also the freezing of recruitment by the GoJ has delayed the progress of Centres of Excellence operationalisation. Hence any satisfaction of both employers and students in the target sectors with the quality and relevance of the training programmes cannot be ascertained yet, as these programmes are not yet operational.

Among the main players in vocational training, the MOE bears the brunt of the training load through its vocational training stream in grades 11 and 12. About 14% of high school students go through the vocational stream, or about 24,000 students in total over a two year period. Students can specialize within four main training fields (industry, agriculture, home economics, or hotel management and tourism). The vocational stream faces significant challenges: i) a stigma of “academic failure” associated with the stream; ii) inadequate facilities, outdated equipment, and unmotivated instructors; iii) not enough emphasis on applied/hands-on practice; and iv) little or no involvement of the private sector. More resources might be part of the answer, but it will be difficult to improve the image, reputation, enrolment, and quality of TVET without vocational training courses in earlier stages (e.g., primary and middle school), greater involvement of the private sector, and involvement of vocational schools in real production.

### KPI-8.4.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

#### (i) Data, figures and tables:

- ILO, TOR for an Evaluation of Active Labour Market Programmes in Jordan. p.12

#### (ii) Key extracts from documents:

- MoL, E-TVET Council, ILO, An Evaluation Study For The Active Labour Programmes, 8/2/2012, p.5

#### (iii) Additional information from field phase

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Additional information from field phase

- /-
**KPI-8.4.3: Number and percentage of companies in the target sectors which contributed to designing and actually developing apprenticeship training programmes, with numbers of effectively graduating interns / apprentices**

**Main Findings on KPI-8.4.3:**

The VTC centres are under development and just now are about to start operations. As such there are no data available yet on the number of graduates.

As it was mentioned earlier already in relation to KPIs 8.4.1 and 8.4.2, the private sector’s involvement in the TVET Sector is formally guaranteed as both the E-TVET council and the VTC Council have a constitutional representation from the private sector in their Boards. The involvement of the private sector is also evident at the operational level. For example, the E-TVET Council created 6 sector teams and developed occupational standards for each sector in coordination with / with involvement of the private sector. Each Vocational Training Centre has a management supervisory board, of which the private sector is statutory member.

A Tripartite Committee was established in 2010 chaired by the Ministry of Labour. It has 9 members, with 3 each representing the government (MoL), employers and workers representatives (labour unions). The Tripartite Committee meets according to the needs. It has its own mandate endorsed by the Cabinet, basically dealing with following main subjects: i) employment; ii) labour associations; iii) inspection, iv) minimum wages; v) Labour disputes, amongst others.

From the field visit meetings with the TVET Council and other instances concerned it however was learned that the interest and actual inputs from the private sector is somewhat lukewarm at best in general. The private sector from its side asserts that they need to see faster results on the ground commensurate with the progression needed of this vital sector for the national economy.

**KPI-8.4.3 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - -/-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - Matrix E-TVET Progress on 2011, Benchmarks of the EU Support to E-TVET Reform Programme, pp. 3-7

(iii) Additional information from field phase
   - -/-

**KPI-8.4.4: Number of graduating TVET students that find sustainable employment (self of wage) within one year after graduation for at least an uninterrupted period of minimum 12 months**

**Main Findings on KPI-8.4.4:**

The EU intervention in support of the development of the E-TVET training centres and curricula development with the participation of the private sector in accordance with labour market requirements, is still in its early phase of implementation / operationalisation.

It was found during the field phase that there are no graduates yet of the E-TVET training centres. The operationalisation of the Centres faced serious delays as they need time to be renovated and equipped, new training curricula and materials is needed / need to be prepared. Also the overall freezing of recruitment by the GoJ has delayed the progress of these Centres.
KPI-8.4.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - /-

(iii) Additional information from field phase
   - /-

JC-8.4: EU support contributed to E-TVET sector reform with adoption of effective mechanisms for private sector collaboration in design and development of training programmes

Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-8.4 (based on the KPIs main findings)

GOJ has achieved significant progress in the development and approval of the national policies and strategies for the TVET sector reform to enhance employability of youth as such. This for example pertains to the endorsement of the National Employment Strategy, further strengthening career guidance and counselling campaigns. Major challenges to be addressed still remain with regard to the effective operationalisation of these strategies with tangible results at the level of the ultimate beneficiaries in terms of skills upgrading and sustainable, gainful and decent employment, whether self-employment or wage employment.

This particularly pertains to the operationalisation of the three EU supported Vocational Training Corporation (VTC) centres which are still under development and just now in September 2014 are about to start operations. As such, there are no enrolled trainees at these model skills development centres, as enrolment will begin by September 2014 with 40 trainees for each Centre.

Among the main players in vocational training, the MOE bears the brunt of the training load through its vocational training stream in grades 11 and 12. About 14% of high school students go through the vocational stream, or about 24,000 students in total over a two year period. Students can specialize within four main training fields (industry, agriculture, home economics, or hotel management and tourism). The vocational stream faces significant challenges: i) a stigma of “academic failure” associated with the stream; ii) inadequate facilities, outdated equipment, and unmotivated instructors; iii) not enough emphasis on applied/hands-on practice; and iv) little or no involvement of the private sector. More resources might be part of the answer, but it will be difficult to improve the image, reputation, enrolment, and quality of TVET without vocational training courses in earlier stages (e.g., primary and middle school), greater involvement of the private sector, and involvement of vocational schools in real production. (KPI-8.4.2)

Private companies in the target sectors have actually contributed to the design and to the actual development of apprenticeship training programmes to be conducted in these VTC centres. The 3 VTC Centres have a management supervisory board shared by the private sector in compliance with the conceptual framework for Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) that was developed. Also new curricula are being prepared with the participation of the private sector through the DACUM process in accordance with labour market requirements and the introduction of innovate teaching and learning methods. Each Vocational Training Centre has a management supervisory board, of which the private sector is statutory member. A Tripartite Committee was established in 2010 chaired by the Ministry of Labour. It has 9 members, with 3 each representing the government (MoL), employers and workers (labour unions). The Tripartite Committee meets according to the needs. It has its own mandate endorsed by the Cabinet, basically dealing with following main subjects: i) employment; ii) labour associations; iii) inspection, iv) minimum wages; v) Labour disputes, amongst others. From the field visit meetings with the TVET Council and other instances concerned it however was learned that the interest and actual inputs from the private sector is somewhat lukewarm at best in general. The private sector from its side asserts that they need to see faster results on the ground commensurate with the progression needed of this vital sector for the national economy. (KPI-8.4.3 and 4)

No measures were taken yet to develop the capacities of the MoL Gender Unit, as this was not foreseen as such in the programme design. There also is no information concerning the further development of the four
pilot centres which will have new incentive schemes to increase the participation of Jordanian women in the formal private sector labour market implemented with support of the GOJ.

These different elements were further explored and assessed/confirmed on the spot during the field visit. There is a significant progress concerning the implementation of the National Employment Strategy Action Plan. It was recognised that this is largely due to the technical support provided by the EU technical assistance project mobilised in support of the Employment and TVET Reforms. The following were endorsed through NSC meetings, amongst others: The duties and responsibilities of the Executive Team and technical committees; the duties and responsibilities of the NES Implementation Unit, the NES organizational structure (Unit Director, Projects Coordination Unit, Monitoring & Evaluation Unit, and Information and Statistics Unit), the updated NES Projects Fiches and Matrix and the NES budget for the year 2013.

Progress reports on the management / the capacity of National Employment Strategy M&E Unit, indicate that significant progress has been realised in the implementation of the TVET Council Action Plan to support the Employment and TVET Reforms. A Policy Paper of Career Guidance was developed. Career guidance manuals of adequate quality and life skills action within schools have been developed with active support/cooperation with MoL. The following priority sectors have been identified: retail sales, printing, and vehicle and car maintenance. Sector teams were formed to develop occupational standards with the participation of employers.

Three Centres of Excellence have been/are being developed and equipped with modern equipment in the Water and Environment Institute (that is located in Amman), the Pharmaceutical Operators Institute (located in Salt) and the Renewable Energies Institute located (in Maan). The programmes were/are developed with the proactive participation of employers/the private sector and as such are demand driven.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JC-8.5</th>
<th>EU support contributed to the empowerment of the Gender Unit in the Ministry of Labour in promoting gender sensitization of E-TVET and employment policies, strategies and programmes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 8.5 (codes and definition)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>KPI-8.5.1</td>
<td>Degree to which the capacities of the Ministry of Labour and of its Gender Unit in particular are effectively strengthened with regard to gender sensitive policy making, strategizing, programming and actual programmes implementation with regard to TVET and the education - work link in general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-8.5.2</td>
<td>Number of programmes and curricula are gender sensitized in non–conventional areas for women's participation in TVET sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-8.5.3</td>
<td>Degree to which the gender sensitized programmes and curricula are effective in promoting women employment (self and wage) as for example evidenced from tracer studies amongst others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-8.5.4</td>
<td>Increased labour force participation rate of women, with breakdowns by sector (special attention for wage employment in the non-agriculture sector), by region, by education attainment and age group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KPI-8.5.1:</strong></td>
<td>Degree to which the capacities of the Ministry of Labour and of its Gender Unit in particular are effectively strengthened with regard to gender sensitive policy making, strategizing, programming and actual programmes implementation with regard to TVET and the education - work link in general</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Main Findings on KPI-8.5.1:**

There is no evidence/information concerning the development of the four Vocational Training Corporation (VTC) Centres which would introduce new incentive actions with the objective to increase the participation of Jordanian women in the private formal labour market implemented with support of the GOJ. But it could be readily concluded through the field visit to the pharmaceutical Vocational Training Centre and the meetings with MoL officials during the field phase that both female and males can actually enrol in these Centres.
From the revised documents and the FWC assessment reports it can be concluded that MoL “Women Employment Department” and MoL “Legal Department” are gender sensitive and provide full attention to issues of increasing female participation in the labour market.

MoL Offices and Municipalities explicitly focus on and support policies and actions aiming at promoting the employment of women. Targeted measures were taken in support of increasing the participation of Jordanian women in formal employment. There also is a focus on supporting mothers at their work-place in order to avoid interruption of work due to their need to take care of infants. Support for the development of self-employment and micro-businesses based at the homes of families initiatives were screened. All of these have been identified by EUD missions as relevant measures for increasing formal participation of women in the labour market.

During the field visit a meeting with the Gender Unit at the Ministry of Labour took place. From this, it was obvious that the Gender Unit at the MoL can and will play as significant role in strengthening gender sensitive policy making, strategizing, programming and actual programmes implementation of TVET and the education - work link in general. But thereto the limited number of the Unit staff and their capacities need to be strengthened further and enhanced to be able to fulfil a better role in increasing women employability.

KPI-8.5.1 Main References and Sources of Information:
(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Matrix E-TVET Progress on 2011, Benchmarks of the EU Support to E-TVET Reform Programme, p.9
- Did the Arab Spring Benefit Economic Freedom in Jordan? Dr. Yusuf Mansur, p.36
- Quarterly Unemployment Rate for Age Group (15-24) by Gender, Q1 2008 – Q1 2012

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Matrix E-TVET Progress on 2011, Benchmarks of the EU Support to E-TVET Reform Programme, p.1
- World Bank, EDSD Aide Memoire Supervision Mission 10 - 13 March 2013 - p. 6

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- Please see below

KPI-8.5.1 (iii) Additional information from field phase


Last quoted line reads: “Females of Total Employed Persons Age 15+ Years (%) – 16.7%”.

In addition to the above, the resident technical assistance experts have provided the following estimation, which shows an increasing trend during recent years

| Year | Males | | | Females | | | Proportion of working women of total workers |
|------|-------|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|
|      | Sample| Employed rate | Employed | Sample| Employed rate | Employed |
| 2009 | 75,250| 58.1 | 43,720.25| 73,721| 11.3 | 8,330.473 |
| 2010 | 73,714| 56.9 | 41,943.27| 71,653| 11.5 | 8,240.095 |
| 2011 | 71,848| 55.9 | 40,163.03| 69,948| 11.6 | 8,113.968 |
| 2012 | 69,676| 54.9 | 38,252.12| 67,778| 11.3 | 7,658.914 |
|      | | | | | | 16.68% |
In the above, the value of 16% represents the ratio between number of women in the formal sector and total number of persons in formal sector in 2009. All figures are based on the sample used by DoS in its surveys. The actual usefulness of above Table is that it shows the solid upward trend of women’s participation throughout the period under review.

Although the overall employment rate was decreasing in the period under review, this was actually caused by the significant reduction of the rate for males, while the respective proportion of women had a slightly upward trend in the total number of employed.

In parallel, the MoL “Women Employment Department” and MoL “Legal Department” give full consideration and importance to the issues of female participation. MoL in cooperation with DoS are preparing the fundamental methodology and necessary documentation for endorsing an official and clear view for the indicators related to the formal participation of women into the labour market.

**KPI-8.5.2: Number of programmes and curricula that are gender sensitized in non–conventional areas for women’s participation in TVET sector**

**Main Findings on KPI-8.5.2:**

The 1st PAM BSP of June 2013 identified the required four (4) initiatives / pilot actions that promote women’s employment. These pilot initiatives will be ensured for their sustainability, compatibility with the NES Action Plan and their anticipated impact.

1. The establishment of the “Women’s Networking Project” is considered as an interesting initiative that will promote women’s participation in formal employment and entrepreneurship.
2. The Tranche-4 (year 2013) requirement for 16.5% Jordanian women participation in the formal sector is achieved.
3. There has been a (policy) dialogue on the legal background, the measurement methodology, the wider framework of formal and informal employment, the means of verification, the sources of errors and approximation related to women’s participation.
4. Based on the documents received as progress assessment of the Budget Support and through the field phase meetings with MoL officials of the resident TA project, a partial fulfilment (60%) of this basic indicator set under Tranche-4 is concluded to. This points at important challenges still to be met regarding gender sensitivity in the E-TVET sector.

**KPI-8.5.2 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - ILO, TOR, for an Evaluation of Active Labour Market Programmes in Jordan, p.6

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - /-

(iii) Additional information from field phase
   - According to the information that was collected in KPI-8.5.1

**KPI-8.5.3: Degree to which the gender sensitized programmes and curricula are effective in promoting women employment (self and wage) as for example evidenced from tracer studies amongst others**

**Main Findings on KPI-8.5.3:**

It was not yet possible to have access to tracer studies or other similar documents to make an assessment of this indicator on the degree to which the introduced gender sensitive programmes and curricula are effective in promoting women employment (self and wage).

Further efforts are needed from the EU support and the GOJ through the MoL / Gender Unit and the Vocational Centres to promote and assist women employability (self and wage). Gender studies indicate that women tend to work in the informal economy, where opportunities for training are limited, and demand for female employment is concentrated on jobs requiring labour which is considered unskilled. This will not make possible / encourage professional advancement of women, also because of limited training opportunities for women in the modern technology sector where there is an actual demand for women employees.
KPI-8.5.3 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - -/

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - -/

(iii) Additional information from field phase
   - Example: Tracer studies of Tourism graduates from the Vocational Training Centers-(Syiah Programme), Source VTC or Syiah project

KPI-8.5.4: Increased labour force participation rate of women, with breakdowns by sector (special attention for wage employment in the non-agriculture sector), by region, by education attainment and age group

Main Findings on KPI-8.5.4:

The proportion of working women to the total number of workers is increasing from 16.00% in the year 2009 to become 16.68% in the year 2012, hence an increase of 2/3% in three year time. The main finding is that to achieve an increased labour force participation rate of women, more efforts are needed in effectively promoting gender empowerment through more conducive legal frameworks and socio-cultural changes in general, through further strengthened awareness rising campaigns and intensified investments in both formal education and more informal learning and through other policy and structural measures in order to enhance sustainable employability of women. For the time being, there are still a disproportionately high percentage of economically inactive women in all segments of the economy and cutting across all age categories.

The progress assessment missions for the E-TVET Budget Support programme identified that although the overall employment rate was decreasing in the quoted period, this was actually mainly caused by significant reduction of the rate for males. The specific proportion of women had a slightly upward trend in the total number of employed persons. The MoL “Women Employment Department” and the MoL “Legal Department” are giving special attention to the issues of women participation. MoL in cooperation with DoS is preparing the fundamental methodology and necessary documentation for endorsing an official and clear view for the indicators related to the formal participation of women into the labour market.

KPI-8.5.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:

(ii) Key extracts from documents:

(iii) Additional information from field phase
JC-8.5: EU support contributed to the empowerment of the Gender Unit in the Ministry of Labour in promoting gender sensitization of E-TVET and employment policies, strategies and programmes

Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-8.5 (based on the KPIs main findings)

Generally, major challenges remain regarding the effective and sustainable empowerment of the Gender Unit in the Ministry of Labour, particularly also with regard to the promotion of gender sensitization of E-TVET and employment policies, strategies and programmes. There is no conclusive evidence as to major achievements in this regard, neither in terms of policies and strategies, nor in the more institutional and programmatic areas. Within this overall framework, also the EU support to the TVET sector is facing major setbacks particularly on measures to increase the participation of women in the formal sector, as is one of the benchmarks for the TVET Sector Budget Support. There also is no information concerning the development of the three Vocational Training Corporation Centres which would introduce new incentive actions with the objective to increase the participation of Jordanian women in the private formal labour market implemented with support of the GOJ. Gender sensitive data and statistics on women's participation in the TVET sector have not yet been produced which in a way is already in itself is illustrative of the state of play concerned. It likewise has not been possible yet to have access to tracer studies or other similar documents to make an assessment of this indicator on the degree to which the introduced gender sensitive programmed and curricula are effective in promoting women employment (self and wage).

In the Jordan Labour Law there are no explicit provisions which prohibit discrimination in employment and occupation and which establish a right to equal remuneration for men and women for work of equal value. Also, there is no official programme or campaign run by the government, employers' organizations, and/or workers' unions that advocate for equal pay, either through raising awareness, encouraging negotiations between workers and employers, or through practical procedures that include rewarding complying parties and depriving discriminating parties from particular privileges in public procurement. For the purpose of eliminating gender-based discrimination in the workplace there are areas of major improvements that involve social protection: Equalizing pension age and revisiting the compensation system proposed by the Temporary Social Security Law, increasing the allowed maternity leave, lifting the limitation to the number of pregnancies covered, and finding mechanisms for making childcare more accessible and available to working parents.

During the field visit a meeting with the Gender Unit at the Ministry of Labour took place. From this, it was obvious that the Gender Unit at the MoL can and will play as significant role in strengthening gender sensitive policy making, strategizing, programming and actual programmes implementation of TVET and the education - work link in general. But thereto the limited number of the Unit staff and their capacities need to be strengthened further and enhanced to be able to fulfil a better role in increasing women employability. (KPI-8.5.1)

Based on the documents received as progress assessment of the Budget Support and through the field phase meetings with MoL officials of the resident TA project, a partial fulfilment (60%) of this basic indicator set under Tranche-4 was concluded to. At this point important challenges are still to be met regarding gender sensitivity in the E-TVET sector. (KPI-8.5.2).

It has not been possible to have access to tracer studies or other similar documents to make an assessment of the degree to which the introduced gender sensitive programmes and curricula are effective in promoting women employment (self and wage). Further efforts are needed from the EU support and the GOJ through the MoL / Gender Unit and the Vocational Centres to promote and assist women employability (self and wage). Gender studies indicate that women tend to work in the informal economy, where opportunities for training are limited, and demand for female employment is concentrated on jobs requiring labour which is considered unskilled. This will not make possible / encourage professional advancement of women, also because of limited training opportunities for women in the modern technology sector where there is an actual demand for women employees. (KPI-8.5.3)

The proportion of working women to the total number of workers is increasing from 16.00% in the year 2009 to become 16.68% in the year 2012, hence an increase of 2/3% in three year time. There thus appears to be a slight improvement and this of course still is a very low labour force participation rate of women. A main overall preliminary observation is that while there is a slightly increased labour force participation rate of women, more concerted efforts are needed to effectively promote gender empowerment through more conducive legal frameworks and socio-cultural changes in general, through further strengthened awareness...
rising campaigns and intensified investments in both formal education and more informal learning and through other policy and structural measures with the aim of enhancing sustainable employability of women. For the time being, there is still a disproportionally high percentage of economically inactive women in all segments of the economy and cutting across all age categories.

The establishment of the “Women’s Networking Project” is considered by the 1st PAMBSP as an interesting initiative that will promote women’s participation into formal employment and entrepreneurship and will increase their interest and respective mobilisation. It is considered a challenging intervention that could lead toward increasing overall women’s professional activation.

Also the adoption of the new SSC (Social Security Corporation) to expand the people covered by social security and health insurance (incl maternity benefits), and the expanded social security coverage of small establishments with fewer than 5 employees (counting for a total of 15,015 establishments) in all Governorates in the south and the Governorates of Irbid, Madaba, Mafraq, and Balqa, are important measures for increasing the formal participation of women in the labour market.

**JC-8.6**

The choice and the combination of the EU aid modalities for education reform and E-TVET are the results of the search for efficiency and cost/effectiveness in line with Jordan Government objectives and complementary to other DP support to the sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 8.6 (codes and definition)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPI-8.6.1 Percentage of programmed education reform and E-TVET interventions which are derived from a credible diagnostic analysis taking into account the existing preconditions (the current stage of policy and reform context)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-8.6.2 Percentage of education reform and E-TVET interventions for which the full set of project identification, formulation, key implementation and M&amp;E documents are available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-8.6.3 Percentage of education reform and E-TVET interventions for which the overall objectives and project purpose are clearly and correctly differentiated and the assumptions and risk are clearly identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-8.6.4 Level and overall quality of coordination with the UNRWA action in the education sector for the Palestinian refugees and coherence with the on-going evaluation on Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-8.6.5 Degree to which the chronology of changes in frameworks for policy dialogue and coordinated TA/capacity development initiatives show evidence that BS programmes, projects, programme estimates and/or TA played a critical role (or not) in driving the development of effective frameworks in the education and E-TVET sectors (e.g. for BS, general and specific conditions for the disbursement of BS tranches are defined on the basis of the contents of policy dialogue and promote the development of improved frameworks for policy dialogue, and their monitoring feeds policy dialogue processes) - (Cfr. 5.3.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-8.6.6 Extent to which, in the perception of representatives of the GoHKJ (including sector ministries), EU and other donors’ representatives, BS processes and/or other aid modalities, working independently or as a complement to BS, influence the evolution of frameworks for policy dialogue and coordinated TA/capacity development initiatives in the education and E-TVET sectors. - (Cfr. 5.3.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-8.6.7 Extent to which, the chronology of changes in policies, policy processes and capacities show evidence that BS programmes, programme estimates and/or TA played a critical role, or not, in supporting the changes in reforms in the education and E-TVET sector (e.g. specific conditions for the disbursement of BS tranches address issues of policy processes and capacities; complementary or embedded TA foresees support to the strengthening of capacities; programme estimates enhance institutional capacities,...) - (Cfr. KPI 5.4.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-8.6.8 Extent to which, in the perceptions of representatives of the GoHKJ (including sector ministries), EU and other donors’ representatives, BS processes and/or other aid modalities, working independently or as a complement to BS, had an influence on the evolution of policies, policy frameworks and capacities in the education and E-TVET sectors (cfr. KPI 5.4.5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
KPI-8.6.9 | Level of evidence that financing made available through BS has contributed to closing the gap of the education and E-TVET medium term financing plans [e.g. volume and share of EU’s contribution to the financing of reforms in key sectors benefiting from EU BS / Level of evidence of increased sector expenditure in supported sectors (cfr. KPI 4.5.4)]

KPI-8.6.1: Percentage of programmed education reform and E-TVET interventions which are derived from a credible diagnostic analysis taking into account the existing preconditions (the current stage of policy and reform context)

Main Findings on KPI-8.6.1:

The EU intervention on E-TVET complements and capitalizes on lessons learnt and credible diagnostic analysis from earlier EU support programmes, other donor programmes (incl. USAID projects such as Siyaha), and from GOJ policies and other reform interventions in the E-TVET Sector. In consultation with other donors and stakeholders in the sector, the programme has identified areas of coordination and collaboration which would help the E-TVET Sector reform and other activities achieve their objectives and produce the expected results, including in relation to the following below:

- The USAID tourism project is raising awareness among youth about tourism career opportunities. This initiative is implemented with the involvement of the industry, MoTA, and Ministries of Labour, of Education and of Higher Education and Education (MOL, MOE, and MOHE), and Vocational Training Corporation and aims at adopting a national strategy to rapidly expand the availability of educated and trained employees and managers. This project seeks to build the capacity of young / youth human resources across all major sectors of the tourism industry to ensure excellent standards of services. It more particularly aims at improving the quality of hospitality and tourism enterprises for a safe and distinguished experience through the development of the VTC centres to be state of the art centres. Then there also are the programmes to be developed with the participation of the private sector aiming at the employment of the VTC graduates, accordingly. 13 Vocational Training Centres were developed, with support from USAID and E-TVET Fund. Consequently, the employment rate of the graduates reaches around 75-80%.

- The World Bank’s EDSD project for the development of new programme to strengthen VTCs in 3 pilot centres focusing on the: (i) New training model; (ii) New business model; (iii) New governance model.

- KOICA (Korean) provided a grant to upgrade the VTC in Marka for Automotive Repair, adding workshops, a dormitory, equipment, and funding to duplicate this project in Ma'an.

- JICA (Japanese) completed their project with VTC developing a management structure in 3 chosen VTC Institutes.

- CIDA’s “BEST” project, which ended in 2012, supported the E-TVET Council.

From the above donors projects and initiatives it is obvious that the EU support to the E-TVET Sector complements other donors interventions. All these are derived from a credible diagnostic analysis of the USAID as well as the World Bank through their contribution to the sector. The EU Budget Support for the VTC through developing three (3) Model Skill Centres of Excellence in water and environment (Marka), renewable energy and energy efficiency (Ma'an) and pharmaceutical industries (Salt) (3) centres is very much in line with the policy and reform context of the Jordan Government.

A recent study was to conclude that E-TVET Council board members – mainly the Army/NET (78%), VTC (8%), and MOL (11) – seize more than 97% of the E-TVET Fund’s total allocations. Therefore, the training market that emerged after the establishment of the E-TVET council was not a competitive market, and it is closer to the monopsonic market, where one large training provider (NET) controls almost the whole market.
KPI-8.6.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Jordan’s Employment Strategy and Recent Economic Results
- Please see below

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Matrix E-TVET Progress on 2011, Benchmarks of the EU Support to E-TVET Reform Programme. p.1
- MoL, E-TVET Council, ILO, An Evaluation Study For The Active Labour Programmes, 8/2/2012, pp. 27-29
- ILO, Global Jobs Pact Country Scan Jordan, 2011, p.68

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- /-

KPI-8.6.1 (i) Data, figures and tables:
Expenditures of the E-TVET Council Fund (JOD) Based on the executing agency (2005-2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Beneficiary</th>
<th>Total of expenditures financed by the TVET Fund</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Employment and Training Company</td>
<td>73,675,493</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational Training Corporation</td>
<td>7,355,944</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Training &amp; Employment Project</td>
<td>6,337,772</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Labour</td>
<td>3,913,118</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan German University</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,752,637</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>94,056,773</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: E-TVET Fund, 2012

KPI-8.6.2: Percentage of education reform and E-TVET interventions for which the full set of project identification, formulation, key implementation and M&E documents are available

Main Findings on KPI-8.6.2:
As presented by the referenced documents below regarding the E-TVET Sector reform that started in year 2007 with the World Bank and USAID in Siyaha I, other donors followed like for example CIDA with BEST project and also the ILO. Furthermore other donors were involved by providing TA such as JICA for other Government of Jordan documents as Jordan’s National Employment Strategy 2011-2020. All these actions and interventions in the E-TVET sector reform were in place and PPCM documents concerned available for the EU support in 2011 to the education and E-TVET reform.

Apart from the CRIS fiche, no other key PPCM documents pertaining to the Budget Support Component of the Programme in Support to the E-TVET reforms of 2010 (contract number 257782 and total planned amount of EUR 29 million) are available, neither in relation to the identification and formulation phases, nor
to the actual implementation phase of the programme. Of the “mother” EU Financing Decision 20480 entitled “Support to the Employment and Technical Vocational Education and Training (E-TVET) Reform of 2009 and with a total approved / allocated amount of EUR 35 million, a total of 10 PPCM and related key documents are available (including the identification fiche, the QSG 1 and 2 checklists, the action fiche, the financing agreement and logframe and two ROM reports).

A recent evaluation study by the ILO commissioned by the E-TVET Council concluded that the E-TVET Fund should have access to an M&E system, which allows them to measure the performance indicators for each programme, to inspect problems hindering the programme’s progress, and to receive beneficiaries’ feedback. The programme internal evaluations should be complemented by regular spot checks at all stages of the process, and by at least yearly independent evaluations. The study also recommended that an independent unit under the E-TVET Fund should be instituted to sub-contract independent evaluations, tracer studies and audits.

According to “Jordan’s National Employment Strategy 2011-2020”, an M&E system would be developed within 2013. This M&E system would be handled by two government units, the GPA at the Ministry of Public Sector Development and the DU at the Prime Minister’s Office. The GPA helped align the NES’s performance indicators with those of the National Agenda and provided the Implementation Team with an automated system to update progress on each action. However, during the field visit the Evaluation Team was not able to get access to this system, neither was it possible to get copies of system outputs (only some summary PR documents).

**KPI-8.6.2 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- MoL, E-TVET Council, ILO, An Evaluation Study For The Active Labour Programmes, 8/2/2012. p. 29
- Jordan’s National Employment Strategy 2011-2020, p. 91
- World Bank, EDSDP Aide Mémoire Supervision Mission 20 – 22 January 2013, pp. 6-7

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- -PPCM and other crucial documents of the E-TVET BS programme
- Jordan’s National Employment Strategy 2011-2020
- PowerPoint Presentation of the National Employment Strategy, June 2014

**KPI-8.6.3:** Percentage of education reform and E-TVET interventions for which the overall objectives and project purpose are clearly and correctly differentiated and the assumptions and risk are clearly identified

**Main Findings on KPI-8.6.3:**

See above indicator 8.6.2.

The Action Document on Skills for Employment and Social Inclusion of the Commission Decision implementing Annual Action Programme of 2014 for Jordan, and CRIS fiche, no other key PPCM documents pertaining to the Budget Support Component of the Programme in Support to the E-TVET reforms of 2010 (contract number 257782 and total planned amount of EUR 29 million), neither in relation to the identification and formulation phases, nor to the actual implementation phase of the programme. Of the “mother” EU Financing Decision 20480 entitled “Support to the Employment and Technical Vocational Education and Training (E-TVET) Reform of 2009 and with a total approved / allocated amount of EUR 35 million, a total of 10 PPCM and related key documents are available (including the identification fiche, the QSG 1 and 2 checklists, the action fiche, the financing agreement, the TAPs and logframe and two ROM reports.

As indicated in the ROM report for the support of the E-TVET reforms (monitoring reference-25/06/2013), the programme’s risk assessment /management framework obtained a grade c “problems” score. This contrasts with the assessment and recommendation of no specific requirement for monitoring and mitigation risks of SBS at the time of formulation of the sector programme in 2007. Whereas the Action Fiche included a set of
risks and assumptions, these were downplayed in the formulation document wherein is referred for risk mitigation and management to the capacity of MoL to ensure the proper coordination of the E-TVET reform. Other assumptions / risks put up but positively assessed at that time include: (i) the fact that the E-TVET Council meets regularly (which is the case) and (ii) the fact that the Higher Council for Human Resource Development would be operational in 2009 (which was not established until the time of this evaluation).

KPI-8.6.3 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- ROM BS REPORT; Jordan-JO, Programme Title: Budget Support Component of Programme in Support to E-TVET Reforms; Modality of Aid: Sector Budget Support (SBS); Monitoring Reference-25/06/13; Page: 15,16

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- +/-

KPI-8.6.4: Level and overall quality of coordination with the UNRWA action in the education sector for the Palestinian refugees and coherence with the on-going evaluation on Palestine

Main Findings on KPI-8.6.4:

No documentary evidence is available with regard to the level and overall quality of coordination with the UNRWA action in the education sector for the Palestinian refugees and regarding the coherence with the ongoing evaluation on Palestine. As can be gleaned from the CLE inventory of available PPCM and other key documents from the 43 key interventions / financing decisions, no such documents are available to the evaluation team regarding FD 24567 of 2012 entitled “Contribution to UNRWA for improvement of living conditions of vulnerable Palestine Refugees in Jerash Camp”, which has been allocated EUR 2 million.

During the evaluation field phase, a meeting was held with UNRWA representatives for Education and TVET. Both indicated that there is no coordination of the UNRWA action in the education sector for the Palestinian refugees with the Jordan Ministry of Education or the TVET Sector. Also, no copies of FD 24567 PPCM documents could be obtained. It on the other hand was confirmed that the schools and colleges are subjected to the same Jordanian curricula and quality assurance since all the students are subject to the general high school exams (Tawjihi) which are held every year under the supervision of the MoE. Likewise, the technical colleges are subjected to the comprehensive exams conducted under the supervision of MoHESR / Al-Balqa Applied University.

The World Bank Supervision Mission of May 2013 of ERfKE II reported a potential disconnect between VET programme development and programmes developed by other TVET providers. There is a clear disconnect between activities taking place within the E-TVET Council and CAQA vis-à-vis review of specialisations in terms of curriculum development, teachers competencies, and testing material within VET. The mission recommended that it would be worthwhile to proceed with the proposed collaboration between MOE/VET and CAQA on a pilot basis to be able to establish an effective communication that addresses evident disconnect in the sector.

KPI-8.6.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- +/-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- +/-
**KPI-8.6.5:** Degree to which the chronology of changes in frameworks for policy dialogue and coordinated TA / capacity development initiatives show evidence that BS programmes, projects, programme estimates and/or TA played a critical role (or not) in driving the development of effective frameworks in the education and E-TVET sectors (e.g. for BS, general and specific conditions for the disbursement of BS tranches are defined on the basis of the contents of policy dialogue and promote the development of improved frameworks for policy dialogue, and their monitoring feeds policy dialogue processes) - (Cfr. 5.3.4)

### Main Findings on KPI-8.6.5:

In accordance with the referenced documents under KPI-8.6.6 as well as the below references in relation to this indicator, it is obvious that not much changes in frameworks for policy dialogue and coordinated TA / capacity development initiatives took place with regard to the E-TVET sector. This provides evidence that BS programmes, projects, programme estimates and/or TA were not able to play the expected critical role in driving the development of effective frameworks in the E-TVET sector. It should be noted in this regard that as far as the Sector Budget Support is concerned, the general and specific conditions for the disbursement of BS tranches are defined on the basis of the contents and successful achievements of the policy dialogue, as well as of the promotion of the development of improved frameworks for this policy dialogue, including monitoring in turn feeding / to feed policy dialogue processes.

The E-TVET Budget Support assessments and disbursements reports concerned indicated that it is difficult to confirm 100% as to the appropriateness of the releases of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} tranches for the E-TVET sector reform, despite the hard efforts made by the proponents and beneficiaries to achieve the benchmarks in all areas of the programme. It is also felt crucial to further operationalise the High Council for Human Resources Development directly located under the Prime Minister at the earliest time possible, since it is expected to play a major role in driving the development of effective frameworks in the education and E-TVET sectors.

Throughout the field visit phase it was commented that the reform process necessarily is a long-term process, whereas the period for utilising the annually released budget tranches is too short because the actual financial year for the general budget is at its maximum 8-10 months. On different occasions, suggestions were made to consider increasing the spending periods of EU Budget Support tranches releases. Pleas were also made for BS tranche payments to be more flexible, especially because sometimes changes are not fully controllable (particularly in a highly volatile region as Jordan’s). Synchronisation of cycles is another important issue raised, as utilisation of EU funds is best guaranteed if the releases timing is aligned with the preparation cycle of the general budget law.

### KPI-8.6.5 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:

- -/

(ii) Key extracts from documents:

- ROM BS Report; Jordan-JO, Programme Title: Budget Support Component of Programme in Support to E-TVET Reforms; Modality of Aid: Sector Budge Support (SBS); Monitoring Reference-25/06/13; p.6
- ROM BS Report; Jordan-JO, Programme Title: Budget Support Component of Programme in Support to E-TVET Reforms; Modality of Aid: Sector Budge Support (SBS); Monitoring Reference-25/06/13; pp. 15-16
- ROM BS Report; Jordan-JO, Programme Title: Budget Support Component of Programme in Support to E-TVET Reforms; Modality of Aid: Sector Budge Support (SBS); Monitoring Reference-25/06/13; pp.: 22 & 23,25,27, 29

(iii) Additional information from field phase

- -/
KPI-8.6.6: Extent to which, in the perception of representatives of the GoHKJ (including sector ministries), EU and other donors’ representatives, BS processes and/or other aid modalities, working independently or as a complement to BS, influence the evolution of frameworks for policy dialogue and coordinated TA/capacity development initiatives in the education and E-TVET sectors. - (Cfr. 5.3.5)

Main Findings on KPI-8.6.6:

The E-TVET sector consists of many stakeholders with a continuous change of the leadership of the different stakeholders involved in the E-TVET reforms that has impacted on its vision and the achievement of its objectives. It also has delayed / disrupted the sequence of achievements of certain interventions. Through the establishment and operationalisation of the E-TVET sector, linking challenges between employment and Technical and Vocational Education and Training got more prominent and substantive. But this also further increased the complexity of the sector, with now three government agencies directing / managing the E-TVET sector: MoL (E-TVET Council), MoE (Education Council) and MOHESR (Higher Education Council).

According to different sources consulted during the evaluation field phase, there is not much coordination among those Councils. Their for example is no joint (results) framework to enable the identification and prioritisation of sector interventions, which as such leads to further fragmentation. Also, there are no updated comprehensive documents in all programmes and projects that provide prove of effectively addressing the sector action plan and strategy. This in turn results in not having updated comprehensive MTEFs for the E-TVET sector, jeopardizing its overall operations.

As a conclusion it was difficult for the E-TVET Sector to find an umbrella to embrace, adequately steer, monitor and follow up all the developments and responses, while keeping focused on the key needs of the sector evolving over time. This contrasts with the education reform programme with the Ministry of Education, where the DCU is providing the umbrella steering, which is feasible since only one main GoJ entity (the MoE) takes full sectoral responsibilities.

KPI-8.6.6 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- ROM BS Report; Jordan-JO, Programme Title: Budget Support Component of Programme in Support to E-TVET Reforms; Modality of Aid: Sector Budge Support (SBS); Monitoring Refernce-25/06/13; p.11

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- ROM BS Report; Jordan-JO, Programme Title: Budget Support Component of Programme in Support to E-TVET Reforms; Modality of Aid: Sector Budge Support (SBS); Monitoring Reference-25/06/13; p.10
- Please see below

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- /-

KPI-8.6.6 (ii) Key extracts from documents:

The following table represent clustered approach off the families of stakeholders.

Table 2 Main stakeholders in the E-TVET sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clusters</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Non-governmental</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reform leadership</td>
<td>MoL</td>
<td>MoPIC (coordination with donors)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy making</td>
<td>E-TVET Council (with support of its Secretariat)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| TVET provision | - MoE (Vocational Education)  
- VTC (Vocational Training Corporation)  
- Balqa Applied University –BAU- (Technical Training) including the National institute for training of Trainers (NITT) | Private training providers (no official representation) |
|----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
| Intermediation employment-training | - National Training and Employment Project  
- National Employment and training  
- National Employment Centres (NEC)  
- Satellite project | - Employers (represented by Jordan Chambers of Commerce and Industry)  
- Employees (represented by the General Federation of Jordan Trade Unions)  
- Families and Youth (not represented so far) Unemployed (not represented so far) |
| Training beneficiaries | Employment-Technical and Vocational Education and training Fund (public managed with private funding) | |
| Reform financers | GoJ (through Ministry of finance (MoF) and MoPIC) | Donors  
- EU (including European Training Foundation (ETF))  
- World Bank  
- Canada International  
- Development Agency (CIDA)  
- Gesellschaft fur international Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)  
- Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)  
- United States Agency for international Development(USAID) (Siyaha, Sabeq, Save the Children)  
- International Labour Organisation  
- Korea |
| Information providers (statistic and research) | - National Centre for Human Research Development (NCHRDRD)  
- Al Manar project  
- NEC  
- Department of Statistics (DOS)  
- Social Security  
- Civil Service Bureau (CSB) | - Jordan Chambers of Commerce and Industry  
- Branch federations (for a limited number of them, i.e. Tourism) |
| Quality Control, Accreditation and licensing | Presently  
- MoE  
- MoHESR  
- Vocational Training Cooperation)  
- MoE experts  
- MoE experts  
- VTC experts  
- VTC experts  
- MoE experts | - Save the children  
- InJaz |
| Guidance and Counselling | All Manar  
- Mol labour offices  
- VTC experts  
- MoE experts | - Save the children  
- InJaz |
KPI-8.6.7: Degree to which the chronology of changes in policies, policy processes and capacities show evidence that BS programmes, programme estimates and/or TA played a critical role, or not, in supporting the changes / reforms in the education and E-TVET sector (e.g. specific conditions for the disbursement of BS tranches address issues of policy processes and capacities; complementary or embedded TA foresees support to the strengthening of capacities; programme estimates enhance institutional capacities,..) - (Cfr. KPI 5.4.4)

Main Findings on KPI-8.6.7:

While major achievements are documented in relation to Education sector reform, the picture is somehow more complex and diverse as far as the E-TVET (sub-)sector is concerned. Whereas the education BS resorts under one ministry only (MoE), the E-TVET Sector reform has many stakeholders, both public and private, including several ministries as the Ministry of Labour (MOL), the Ministry of Education (MOE) and the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MOHESR), and other agencies as the Vocational Training Corporation (VTC), the E-TVET Council, the E-TVET Secretariat, and E-TVET Fund) as well as private and public sector employers. Stagnation in the reform process, political changes as well as budgetary constraints affected the degree of priority setting for the TVET reform implementation. Whilst employment stands very high among the national priorities, the strategy was mainly focused on TVET issues with only very general references to employment issues. While generally the reform process is rather slow, some significant steps in in the reform process are noted however. These include:

- The development of a 4-year TVET action plan;
- The development of an Employment strategy, which has been approved by the Cabinet;
- Three (3) Model Skill Centres of Excellence for 3 sectors of industry are under establishment and readied for operations: (i) Pharmaceutical, (ii) Water and environment and (iii) Renewable energies.

In this regard, it is recognized that these achievements in both the education and TVET sectors to an extent were made possible / feasible thanks to the EU support through the main applied aid modality of sectoral Budget Support, complemented by Technical Assistance.

It was noticed during the evaluation field phase mission that parallel mechanisms and institutions are created by the Government which replace / take over part of the functions of the mandated Line Ministries concerned. An example in case is the creation of the NES (National Employment Strategy) Unit of which it is not clear if its mandate relates to Monitoring and Evaluation only or if it also has direct responsibilities for implementing and/or managing projects, for capacity building of stakeholders and/or enhancing the capabilities of the ministries as well. It is essential that this is further cleared out in order to avoid that the institutional and governance picture for the E-TVET sector becomes even more blurred.

KPI-8.6.7 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Annex II, Terms of Reference, Technical Assistance of the Programme in Support to the Employment and TVET reforms, Europe Aid/131668/C/SER/JO November 2010 updated March 2011, p.8

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
### KPI-8.6.8: Extent to which, in the perceptions of representatives of the GoHKJ (including sector ministries), EU and other donors’ representatives, BS processes and/or other aid modalities, working independently or as a complement to BS, had an influence on the evolution of policies, policy frameworks and capacities in the education and E-TVET sectors (cfr. KPI 5.4.5)

**Main Findings on KPI-8.6.8:**

EU support to the education and E-TVET Sectors entailed a recognized impact on the development of a number of policies, policy frameworks and derived strategies (e.g. the development of a 4-year TVET action plan, the development of an Employment strategy and its approval by Cabinet). It also contributed in a substantive manner to building the capacities of human resources at line ministries that adopt BS processes, as for example the Ministry of Education. This support for example covers MoE management and staff members, regional officials and principals of schools. As such, the fundamentals are laid for a positive impact and also for positive perceptions on the EU and other donors, leading to the adaptation of up-to-date policies aiming at better performance in qualitative services delivery.

In different interviews during the evaluation field phase, it was recognised by GOJ representative that contribution of donors to the sectors are positive and more or less complement each other. But there is still substantive room for improvement since coordination and complementarity are not as they should be, since there is basically no adequate proactive overall steering by GoJ, and the donors including the EU tend to work independently with each having its own modality of support. This particularly pertains to the E-TVET sector. More recently, some donors are adopting the concept of EU Budget Support, as for example is indicated in the WB Aid Memoire Supervision Mission for ERFKE II of May 2014. By way of example as further illustration: The MOE has requested JD 2.0 million from the Gulf fund to support Block Grants. In addition the Canadian government is planning to provide CAD 20 million in sector Budget Support over the next three years to the MOE through the MOF to further finance reform programme components 1 and 3.

### KPI-8.6.8 Main References and Sources of Information:

1. **(i) Data, figures and tables:**
   - /-

2. **(ii) Key extracts from documents:**
   - DEC - ENPI/2011/022-722; EU Support to Second Phase of Education reform, The specific objective is to provide support to the second phase of the education sector reform (Education Reform for the Knowledge Economy – ERrfKE II) 3.3 - Implementation Report - 07.2013 _ 12.2013, p. 1
   - Matrix E-TVET Progress on 2011, Benchmarks of the EU Support to E-TVET Reform Programme, p. 8
   - ROM BS Report; Jordan-JO, Programme Title: Budget Support Component of Programme in Support to E-TVET Reforms; Modality of Aid: Sector Budge Support (SBS); Monitoring Reference-25/06/13; p.5
   - "Support to the Public Financial Management Reform Programme"; Decision number: ENPI/2010/021-932; Delegation's Assessment of the; 3rd tranche payment request; 22/11/2012, p.4

3. **(iii) Additional information from field phase**
   - /-
KPI-8.6.9: Level of evidence that financing made available through BS has contributed to closing the gap of the education and E-TVET medium term financing plans [e.g. volume and share of EU’s contribution to the financing of reforms in key sectors benefiting from EU BS / Level of evidence of increased sector expenditure in supported sectors (cfr. KPI 4.5.4)]

Main Findings on KPI-8.6.9:

EU support has contributed to closing the gap in the medium term financing plans of the education and E-TVET sectors it assisted. This support also accelerated the reform process of the education sector under the auspices of the MoE and, being is less outspoken and visible, of the E-TVET sector reform spearheaded by the Ministry of Labour together with other TVET related institutions and human resource development agencies, both public and private. At the overall macro-economic and macro-financial level, Jordan is suffering from a severe budget deficit (partly because of the regional crisis with a massive influx of refugees from neighbouring countries) and in addition for this reason the EU support has contributed to reducing the financing gap of the education and E-TVET sectors.

It was mentioned on different occasions during the different field phase meetings that the period for utilising the EU funds channelled through the GoJ general budget is (too) short in relation to the processes required. This brings with it that accordingly (substantive) delays in SBS supported programme implementation have occurred in most cases, in turn leading to not meeting the required targets / benchmarks on time. It also has been observed that the actual duration of the period to utilise the resources originating from Budget Support annual tranches releases in fact is maximum 8 to 10 months. The Budget Support modality generally is appreciated a good approach to reduce the gaps, but benchmarks should be related to actual programme accomplishments and not to benchmarks / targets in other sectors. Moreover, the indicator targets should be realistic and flexible, with the possibility of regular review and updating, based on mutual consent. A related common observation and concern shared during different interviews was the ignorance about the budgetary resources actually coming to the implementing line ministry entities and agencies concerned, pointing at insufficient if not lack of transparency of budgeting and resources allocation and transfer processes.

KPI-8.6.9 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - ROM BS Report; Jordan-JO, Programme Title: Budget Support Component of Programme in Support to E-TVET Reforms; Modality of Aid: Sector Budget Support (SBS); Monitoring Reference-25/06/13; p.9
   - ROM BS report; Jordan-JO, Programme Title: Budget Support Component of Programme in Support to E-TVET Reforms; Modality of Aid: Sector Budget Support (SBS); Monitoring Reference-25/06/13; p.13

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - ROM BS REPORT; Jordan-JO, Programme Title: Budget Support Component of Programme in Support to E-TVET Reforms; Modality of Aid: Sector Budget Support (SBS); Monitoring Reference-25/06/13; p.6

(iii) Additional information from field phase
   - Power Point Presentation to the executive committee meeting number (1-2014) of the E-TVET Council held on 5/2/2014; Technical Assistance of the Programme in Support to the Employment and TVET Reforms (Europe Aid/131668/C/SER/JO); Funded by the European Union; Meeting to assess/discuss achievement against programme benchmarks and determine further actions.
**JC-8.6:** The choice and the combination of the EU aid modalities for education reform and E-TVET are the results of the search for efficiency and cost/effectiveness in line with Jordan Government objectives and complementary to other DP support to the sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-8.6 (based on the KPIs main findings)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generally, the choice of the most appropriate / suitable EU aid modalities to the education sector reform mainly evolved from the search for efficiency and cost/effectiveness, which is in line with the Government of Jordan objectives and preferences, and complementary to the other DPs support. This more or less also has been the case with the EU aid modalities in support of E-TVET sector reform, although less evidently so. The E-TVET sector in 2007 took the initiative to implement a comprehensive Medium Term Expenditures Framework (MTEF) for the sector through the Ministry of Labour (MoL) with a task force constituted covering all main stakeholder institutions from both the public and private sectors. The task force prepared the new budget according to the guidelines adopted by the General Budget Department (GBD) and MoF in 2007. As the new coding of projects and programmes was not finalized yet during the early stages of MTEF preparation, it was difficult to clarify projects and programmes and the output was a draft sector MTEF that includes a comprehensive document of all programmes and projects for the E-TVET sector, which addresses the sector action plan and strategic priorities. Until now the draft sector comprehensive MTEF has not been updated for the sector as a whole, due to the complexity and the fragmentation of the sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While major achievements are documented in relation to Education sector reform, the picture is somehow more complex and diverse as far as the E-TVET (sub-) sector is concerned. While the reform process is rather slow, significant steps in the reform process are noted. In this, it is recognized that these achievements in both the education and TVET sectors to an extent were made possible / feasible thanks to the substantive EU support and inputs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU intervention on E-TVET complements and capitalizes on lessons learnt and credible diagnostic analysis from earlier EU support programmes, other donor programmes (incl. USAID projects such as Siyahal), and from GOJ policies and other reform interventions in the E-TVET Sector. There however are relatively few documents available regarding programme / projects identification, formulation, implementation and M&amp;E on education reform and E-TVET interventions in particular, and hence it is difficult to ascertain the rationale for the preferred aid modalities and their mix of the EU support to the education and E-TVET reform. This particularly pertains to the support to the E-TVET reform. (KPI 8.6.1). A recent evaluation study commissioned by the E-TVET Council concluded that the E-TVET Fund should have access to an M&amp;E system, which allows them to measure the performance indicators for each programme, to inspect problems hindering the programme's progress, and to receive beneficiaries' feedback. The programme internal evaluations should be complemented by regular spot checks at all stages of the process, and by at least yearly independent evaluations. The study also recommended that an independent unit under the E-TVET Fund should be instituted to sub-contract independent evaluations, tracer studies and audits. According to “Jordan's National Employment Strategy 2011-2020”, M&amp;E system would be developed within 2013. (KPI-8.6.2) With regard to risk mitigation and management in relation to the EU support to the E-TVET sector, the ROM report of 25 June 2013 on the support of the E-TVET reforms includes a grade C “problems” score for the programme’s risk assessment /management framework. This contrasts with the assessment and recommendation of no specific requirement for monitoring and mitigation risks of Sector Budget Support at the time of formulation of the sector programme in 2007. Whereas the Action Fiche included a set of risks and assumptions, these were downplayed in the formulation document wherein is referred for risk mitigation and management issues to the capacity of MoL to ensure the proper coordination of the E-TVET reform. (KPI-8.6.3) No documentary evidence is available with regard to the level and overall quality of coordination with the UNRWA action in the education sector for the Palestinian refugees. A recent WB supervisory mission of ERIKE II reported a potential disconnect between VET programme development and programmes developed by other TVET providers. One of the symptoms is a clear disconnect between activities taking place within the E-TVET Council and CAQA vis-à-vis review of specialisations in terms of curriculum development, teachers competencies, and testing material within VET. (KPI-8.6.4) Not many changes in frameworks for policy dialogue and coordinated TA / capacity development initiatives took place in relation to the E-TVET sector. This provides evidence that BS programmes, projects, programme estimates and/or TA were not able to play the expected critical role in driving the development of effective frameworks in the E-TVET sector. It should be noted in this regard that as far as the Sector Budget Support is concerned, the general and specific conditions for the disbursement of BS tranches are defined on the basis of the contents and successful achievements of the policy dialogue, as well as of the promotion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of the development of improved frameworks for this policy dialogue, including monitoring in turn feeding to feed policy dialogue processes. (KPI-8.6.5)

It has been difficult for the E-TVET Sector to find an umbrella entity to embrace, adequately steer, monitor and follow up all the developments and responses, while keeping focused on the key needs of the sector evolving over time. This contrasts with the education reform programme with the Ministry of Education, where the DCU is providing the umbrella steering, which is feasible since only one main GoJ entity (the MoE) takes full sectoral responsibilities. (KPI-8.6.6)

While major achievements are documented in relation to Education sector reform, the picture is somehow more complex and diverse as far as the E-TVET (sub-) sector is concerned. Whereas the education BS resorts under one ministry only (MoE), the E-TVET Sector reform has many stakeholders, both public and private, including several ministries and other agencies. Stagnation in the reform process, political changes as well as budgetary constraints affected the degree of priority setting for the TVET reform implementation. Whilst employment stands very high among the national priorities, the E-TVET strategy was mainly focused on TVET issues with only very general references to employment issues. While generally the reform process is rather slow, some significant steps in the reform process are noted however. These include the development of a 4-year TVET action plan, the development of an employment strategy and the establishment of three Model Skill Centres of Excellence for 3 sectors of industry. It is recognized that these achievements in both the education and E-TVET sectors to an extent were made possible thanks to the EU support through the main applied aid modality of sectoral Budget Support, complemented by Technical Assistance. (KPI-8.6.7)

EU support to the education and E-TVET Sectors entailed a recognized impact on the development of a number of policies, policy frameworks and derived strategies (e.g. the development of a 4-year TVET action plan, the development of an Employment strategy and its approval by Cabinet). It also contributed in a substantive manner to building the capacities of human resources at line ministries that adopt BS processes, as for example the Ministry of Education. This capacity building support for example covered MoE management and staff members, regional officials and principals of schools. As such, the fundamentals are laid for a positive impact and also for positive perceptions on the EU and other donors, leading to the adaptation of up-to-date policies aiming at better performance in qualitative services delivery. (KPI-8.6.8)

EU support has contributed to closing the gap in the medium term financing plans of the education and E-TVET sectors it assisted. This support also accelerated the reform process of the education sector under the auspices of the MoE and, being is less outspoken and visible, of the E-TVET sector reform spearheaded by the Ministry of Labour together with other TVET related institutions and human resource development agencies, both public and private. At the overall macro-economic and macro-financial level, Jordan is suffering from a severe budget deficit (partly because of the regional crisis with a massive influx of refugees from neighbouring countries) and in addition for this reason the EU support has contributed to reducing the financing gap of the education and E-TVET sectors.

The Budget Support modality generally is appreciated a good approach to reduce the gaps, but benchmarks should be related to actual programme accomplishments and not to benchmarks/targets in other sectors. Moreover, the indicator targets should be realistic and flexible, with the possibility of regular review and updating, based on mutual consent. A related common observation and concern shared during different interviews was the ignorance about the budgetary resources actually coming to the implementing line ministry entities and agencies concerned, pointing at insufficient if not lack of transparency of budgeting and resources allocation and transfer processes. (KPI-8.6.9)
3.9. EQ-9 IM on Sustainable, Environment Friendly Energy and Water Solutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Question (code and title)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EQ-9:</strong> How successful has the EU cooperation with Jordan been in contributing to the promotion of environment friendly, climate change mitigating and adaptation, and sustainable solutions in the energy and water sectors?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List of Judgement Criteria (JCs) under the EQ (codes and titles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JC-9.1 EU support contributed to successful regulatory and institutional reform in the Jordan energy and water sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-9.2 EU support contributed to institutional and human capacity development on renewable energy and on sustainable water use in relevant key entities of Jordan society (public, private and public-private)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-9.3 The national awareness level on renewable energy and the need / necessity of energy efficiency has been considerably raised over time, partly due to EU support in these areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-9.4 EU support contributed to changing public awareness and changes in actual water-use trends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-9.5 EU support contributed to the legislative framework for environmental protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-9.6 EU support contributed to improving the institutional and human capacity of the Ministry of Environment on sustainable environment protection and to ensure its mainstreaming, including on cross-border environmental and climate change issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC-9.7 The choice and the combination of the EU aid modalities to support sustainable solutions in the energy and water sectors are the results of the search for efficiency and cost/effectiveness in line with Jordan Government objectives and complementary to other DP support to the sectors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 9.1 (codes and definition)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPI-9.1.1 Overall quality and adequacy level of issued laws and regulations on sustainable and affordable energy supply and inclusive access, energy efficiency and diversification to renewable energy, and on efficient, sustainable water use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-9.1.2 Overall quality and adequacy of the institutional setup for strategic and operational energy and for efficient, sustainable water use matters (including public, private and public-private entities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-9.1.3 Trends and assessment ratings of the historic and present levels of energy and water subsidies from both macro-economic and main consumers / clients groups perspectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-9.1.4 Overall extent to which the energy and water sectors have been effectively privatised in accordance with the officially approved laws, rules and regulations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
KPI-9.1.1: Overall quality and adequacy level of issued laws and regulations on (i) sustainable and affordable energy supply and inclusive access, energy efficiency and diversification to renewable energy, and on (ii) efficient, sustainable water use

Main Findings on KPI-9.1.1:

Energy:
Extensive efforts were made towards restructuring the regulatory framework of the energy sector. This is shown by the referenced evaluation documents below regarding the achievements in issuing the necessary laws and regulations and reforming the institutional setting of the energy sector institutions. The overall quality and adequacy level of issued laws and regulations on sustainable and affordable energy supply and inclusive access, energy efficiency and diversification to renewable energy are very good.

As an example, GOJ issued the following laws and By-laws:
- Bylaw No. (73) For year 2012. The Bylaw on Regulating Procedures and Means of Conserving Energy and Improving Its Efficiency

Relevant instructions and directories were also issued to facilitate investments in RE/EE

The necessary laws and regulations were issued to facilitate the participation of private investors in all subsectors including renewable energy and energy efficiency. As a result of these achievements several small scale RE projects were implemented by the private sector and other projects were licensed. Recently MEMR has also signed a Power Purchase Agreement from a 50 MW PV plant to be installed in Ma’an area. Another 10 MW PV project was approved and PPA signed in the same area.

During the meetings with Stakeholders, the general perception expressed was satisfaction with the overall level of institutional and regulatory reforms with reservations regarding the cooperation framework between line sector ministries and cooperation framework organizations within the electricity sector.

However, in EE area, and as indicated by the consulted REEEP Monitoring Report “The field of EE is however still lagging behind, with regard to both strategic planning and the adoption of conducive legislations and regulations”, this evaluation shares this opinion and stresses the need for farther enhancements of the laws and regulations to resolve the following issue identified in the references below “ despite the fact that electric utilities’ profits are ‘decoupled’ from electricity sales, the current business model creates a disincentive for them to focus on EE options, especially the distribution channels as their profit is tied to the amount of capital investment put in their infrastructure. Electric utilities are key investors and market players that could influence the sector’s demand-side usage patterns but the status quo situation lends no justification for them to pursue demand side efficiency – at least not for any economic reason, therefore, there is a need to align their economic interests with increasing demand-side efficiency”. In general, and as illustrated by other KPI’s analysed, electric utilities received limited attention from the GOHKJ in areas of institutional reform, capacity building and awareness.

In conclusion, EU intervention was responsive to GOHKJ needs in the regulatory reform programmes, EU contributed meaningfully to the achievement of the above mentioned indicator, mainly through its Budget Support programme on renewable energy and energy efficiency and partly through SAAP programmes I and II.

Water:
The current laws and regulations are clearly defining the legal authorities and major functions of the Ministry and the two major Authorities, i.e. Water Authority of Jordan (WAJ) and Jordan Valley Authority (JVA), with clear mentioning of their roles in efficient and sustainable water use.

The Ministry’s website provides a historical background of the institutional setup and the current applicable laws.

“The Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MWI) is the official body responsible for the overall monitoring of the water sector, water supply and wastewater system and the related projects, planning and management, the formulation of national water strategies and policies, research and development, information systems [1]and procurement of financial resources. Its role also includes the provision of centralized water-related data,
standardization and consolidation of data.

The MWI was established in: 1988 by-law issued by the executive branch of the Government under the Jordanian Constitution. The establishment of the Ministry of Water and Irrigation was in response to Jordan’s recognition of the need for a more integrated approach to national water management. Since its establishment, MWI has been supported by several donor organization projects that have assisted in the development of water policy and water master planning as well as restructuring the water sector. Seven directorates under the direction of the Assistant Secretary Generals for Finance and Administration and Technical Affairs as well as two units for Legal Affairs and Project Finances directly subordinate to the Secretary General fulfill the said functions.

Units for public relations, internal monitoring and water security and protection are directly subordinate to the Minister of Water and Irrigation with responsibilities overarching MWI, WAJ and JVA (Ministry By-Law No.52 of 1992).

The Ministry of Water and Irrigation embraces the two most important entities dealing with water in Jordan:
- The Water Authority of Jordan (WAJ): in charge of water & sewage systems.
- The Jordan Valley Authority (JVA): responsible for the socio-economic development of the Jordan Rift Valley, including water development and distribution of irrigation.”

The EU funded project, Al MEYYAH, proposed amendments to Jordan water legislation. Though those proposals were drafted and presented to the Ministry on August 9, 2009, the old laws remained active, and the new proposals were not implemented. In June 11, 2010 the then Minister, Mr. Mohamad Najjar stated that “there are no plans to draft a new water law. We don't see a need to draft a new water law(C) the laws governing the Water Authority of Jordan and the Jordan Valley Authority are efficient and strong,” As such, there were no new laws were passed or introduced until the date of this evaluation.

This does not negate that the EU funded project Al Meyyah did contribute to the attempts to the restructuring of the water sector in Jordan. Al Meyyah programme introduced a much needed unit “Water Sector Audit Unit” (WASAU) to monitor the water sector in Jordan.

KPI-9.1.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- BS REEEP, Monitoring report, 06/2013, p.15
  - www.memr.gov.jo
  - www.erc.gov.jo Electricity Regulatory Commission

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- BS Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Programme – Monitoring report 06/2013
- Review of the Energy Situation in Jordan and Recommended Strategic Priorities USAID Publication (Apr 2012), pp. 6

(iii) Additional information from field phase:
- 003311 Regulatory reform 04 Final Report ERC. Technical Assistance for the Electricity Regulatory Commission of Jordan (ERC) EuropeAid/115326/D/SV/JO pp 71
KPI-9.1.2: Overall quality and adequacy of the institutional setup for (i) strategic and operational energy and (ii) for efficient, sustainable water use matters (including public, private and public-private entities)

Main Findings on KPI-9.1.2:

Energy:

Despite the persisting need for more reform in the institutional setup of MEMR, and electric utilities, it could be concluded that EU intervention was responsive to the GOJ’s needs in the institutional reform programmes and contributed meaningfully to the achievement of the above mentioned indicator in most sector organizations, mainly through its BS programme on renewable energy and energy efficiency, through its wind energy and solar power programme and partly through SAAP programmes I and II.

Reform needs and recommendations highlighted by previous studies (see below extracts) were to a significant degree implemented during the last 2-3 years. Major achievements were made regarding institutional reform in the electricity. The electricity sector was restructured and the Jordan Electricity Authority was split into three new companies (generation, transmission and distribution). The same was also achieved in the downstream oil products sector where three new oil product distributors were licensed.

A major addition was the formation of an independent Electricity Regulatory Authority which will be soon expanded into Energy and Mineral Resources Regulatory Authority by including other energy upstream subsectors (previously regulated and coordinated by the recently dissolved Natural Resources Authority NRA) under its umbrella. A significant step in this direction was the approval of the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Fund REEEF.. Other institutional reforms were achieved within several organizations like ERC and MPWH where the Codes Enforcement Office (EO) has been established as a department.

Since 2010 GOJ with little success followed up the shortcomings identified by several studies (see extracts below) in the institutional readiness of the electricity transmission and distribution entities to fulfill their expected role as Energy Service Providers especially in EE domain. GOJ efforts should continue to target overcoming the weaknesses and shortcoming identified in earlier studies since to this date, almost no reforms were noticed within the electric utilities institutional arrangements to successfully perform their expected role in spearheading EE activities on the one hand and facilitating private investment in RE on the other. Several complaints were raised by private investors dealing with the electric utilities especially in relation to interconnecting to electricity distribution nets. This shortcoming is also emphasized in the extracts below (EGAT-USDAID Document) “While NEPCO currently has an energy efficiency unit, it is neither ready, nor properly staffed to implement a national programme for the medium voltage level customers. Furthermore, none of the three (3) electricity distribution companies could effectively develop and deliver energy efficiency programmes to the market under the proposed incentive mechanism”.

Originally JREEEF was intended to be an independent entity to avoid the bureaucracy and constraints imposed by the civil service rules and regulations, but under Parliament pressure with the intention to reduce the number of independent organizations to minimize GB expenditures, the law was amended and the Fund was annexed to MEMR as a department. This is a major constraint facing proper structuring and operationalization of the Fund. JREEEF is still not fully structured and operational although a Structuring Study was implemented since 2011. MEMR failed to appoint a Director to the fund, three junior staff members were newly hired with no experience or training.

As concluded by “Assessment of implementation of sector budget “Renewable energy and Energy Efficiency Programme in Jordan” Second Mission: Final Report Specific contract No 2012/298761, pp18” below, MEMR facing problems in its institutional (especially in defining role and mandate of the Ministry and its subordinate directories) arrangements reflecting negatively on cooperation and synergy with other organizations in the energy sector. MEMR’s institutional and human capacity falls short of requirements to fulfill its originally established role of policy maker and overall coordinator of the sector. Instead, MEMR is becoming more involved in the operational aspects of programmes and projects creating unnecessary competition with other sector organizations. This weakness aspect identified during this evaluation was also highlighted by the REEEP Final Assessment Report sighted below as “main problems”:

- Poor capacity of MEMR to meet the set reform benchmarks in the broader area of EE under the current approach and use of resources.
- Delay in incorporating the capability and resources of NERC, in principle, but also of other institutions in implementation actions in the area of EE.
• Delay in mobilizing policy measures and support programmes through the mechanism of JREEF.

As a conclusion, reforms towards RE development needs were generally more successful than reforms towards EE development. One main reason is the external strong pressure by investor groups who recognized the promising economic opportunities in the field of RE, where on the other hand very little private sector interest was expressed in EE projects for the generic reasons much identified and discussed in sighted documents.

**Water:**

In March 2014, Mercy Corps issued a report under the title: “Water Scarcity and Refugee Pressures in Jordan.” The report states, “The MWI is under-resourced, under-manned, and strangled by red tape. Within the Ministry, the Project Management Unit (PMU) is responsible for prioritizing and implementing critical projects. Sadly, the PMU’s ability to move quickly is constrained by elaborate procurement procedures. A large-scale project may take three years to get moving – and that’s before breaking ground. In an emergency environment, according to PMU representatives, this is too long. Meanwhile generous government subsidies for water – which have been extended to refugees – undermine the Ministry’s ability to pay for such projects: debt is in excess of USD 1.3 billion, and the 2014 deficit is projected to run over USD 310 million. Servicing debt is the largest item on the budget, and costs are rising. A three-year bond carries an interest rate of 8.5 percent. In this cash-strapped environment, public-sector wages for engineers are low and there is the attendant problem of brain drain.”

Despite that Al Meyyah programme managed to create the Water Sector Audit Unit, WSAU to develop and implement a nationwide performance indicator system, yet and until this date, WSAU ‘regulates’ only commercialized water providers

A report prepared for the GTZ Working Group “Regulation and Performance Monitoring of Water Utilities”, Aug. 2010 summarizes the PMU role as “purely advisory.”

Similar remarks were made at the “Governance & Financing for the Mediterranean Water Sector: Water Policy Dialogue in Jordan” meeting on Oct. 23, 2013. The “Summary of Donors’ Meeting” stated “Deep reforms are needed in several areas to lever the benefits of PSP in the water sector. The restructuring of the institutional set up needs to be continued. In particular, the efforts underway to transform the Programme Management Unit (PMU) within the Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MWI) into a dedicated water regulator need to be sustained. The donors noted that with the corporatization of water utilities and the consolidation of water services, the time was ripe and there was political momentum for the establishment of a regulator for the sector – although the legislative foundations for its establishment remain weak. The donors also expressed some concerns that ensuring the independence of the regulator would be challenging given the experience of regulators in other sectors, particularly transport and energy, which have been increasingly falling back under political control. The establishment of the water regulator needs to be accompanied by additional restructuring, including the change of the Water Authority of Jordan (WAJ)’s functions to a bulk water supplier and reinforcing the commercialization of the utilities.”

The overall quality and adequacy of the institutional setup of the water sector can be described as satisfactory, but requires definite improvements. The quality and adequacy of the institutional set up for EU interventions in the water sector (3) can be confirmed. The documents (Final report, Progress report, BCS) for the 3 EC interventions confirm the adequacy and quality with restrictions for the Al Meyyah Water Resources Management Project.

**KPI-9.1.2 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) **Data, figures and tables:**
- -/-

(ii) **Key extracts from documents:**
- Review of the Energy Situation in Jordan and Recommended Strategic Priorities. USAID Publication (Apr 2012), pp 11

Euronet 2013, Final project evaluation: Al Meyyah Supporting Water Services Management in Jordan, p 6-7

Water Loss Reduction Zarqa – see TOR and progress report;

Water Security for low income communities - Background Conclusion Sheet (BCS 31.10.2013)

(iii) Additional information from field phase

- 017549 SAAP II Final Report pp 28

**KPI-9.1.3:** Trends and assessment ratings of the historic and present levels of energy and water subsidies from both macro-economic and main consumers / clients groups perspectives

**Main Findings on KPI-9.1.3:**

**ENERGY:**

The GoJ laid a principle of phasing out all sorts of subsidies in the energy sector. This principle was emphasized in the National Energy Strategy and all documents relevant to energy planning and policy. The actual implementation of the decision faced political obstacles and resistance. In oil products the GOJ adopted a pricing formula to reflect international prices and actual costs in the price of the product. The formula is made public and monthly oil product price adjustments were made. In the electricity sector, the sudden shock of Egyptian Natural Gas supply shortages was too large to be reflected instantly into the electricity tariff for consumers without major political and popular rejection. GoJ has announced recently a gradual tariff increase plan over three years period to gradually offset the accumulated debt due to the difference between bulk purchase tariffs from generators and retail selling tariffs, the measures will contribute to macroeconomic stability but will have negative socio-economic impacts on the population. The savings from removal of subsidies are not fully used for capital investments and will therefore have in the medium and long term a negative impact on the sustainability of macroeconomic stability.

It is however important to note, that:..."in the context of the Arab Spring growing spending commitments (including increased subsidies) were made as a result of the growing wave of domestic protests...The budget deficit, debt and curtailing the losses of the National Electric Power Company (NEPCO) remain the top challenges for policy makers... The energy bill and its consequences were the main trigger for Jordan to negotiate the Stand-By Arrangement with the IMF"...

This has resulted in a high increase in the energy bill ...and increased energy price subsidies." (see extracts below)

Despite the fact that GoJ was forced to raise subsidies (by freezing energy prices over a period of time coinciding with the wave of civil protests in Jordan) in the energy sector contrary to agreed Government policies, the fuel price adjustment policy was resumed and GoJ has announced the up-mentioned gradual tariff increase plan over three years period.

**WATER:**

Subsidies in the water sector remain high. In 2013 subsidies amounted to USD 52.15 per capita. The average subsidy and transfer cost (all subsidies and transfers) amounted in 2012 to USD 38.4. Water subsidies are therefore much higher than the average subsidy level. Jordan's Water Strategy 2008 to 2022 aims at reducing subsidies in the water sector in order to contribute to macroeconomic stability. Subsidy reduction will however be applied in line with pro poor mechanisms. Affordability remains however high. Cost for water and sewerage can amount to up to 6.3% of household expenditures taking into account expenditures beyond water bills such as need to buy bottled or tanked water, cost for rooftop storage tank, etc. Subsidy reduction will most likely have negative socio-economic impacts on household level.

The report of USAID states "The division of expenditures and revenues between WAJ and the water companies ensures that the companies are moderately profitable, while WAJ's debt is rising at an alarming rate (see Figure 10). Debt levels are expected to rise from JD 0.7 billion in 2010 to JD 1.9 billion in 2016. In..."
the absence of price increases or significant improvement in reducing NRW, it is likely that the Government of Jordan will have to assume WAJ’s debt as it did in 1999, making the deficit financing for WAJ a government subsidy, rather than an investment that will eventually be repaid through resulting increased revenues. The losses on WAJ’s balance sheet make it look less like a financially self-sufficient Government Unit and more like a ministry or department under the General Budget Law receiving annual funding.”

Figure 10: WAJ Debt

![Graph showing WAJ Debt](image)

Source: WAJ actual data through 2010. Projections for 2011-2016 are based on expenditure and revenue projections presented earlier in this report, but also include WAJ’s non-water revenues (e.g., international assistance).

The report also noted that the companies “cost recovery is highly dependent on the subsidized prices of WAJ bulk water and electricity, and the fact that water companies are not responsible for major capital investments (WAJ is). If WAJ charged the utilities a price for water that covered WAJ’s capital costs, the utilities would not achieve O&M cost recovery.”

At this stage it can be concluded that subsidy levels are still high and may very well remains so on the short term due to political difficulties.

KPI-9.1.3 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- -/

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Monitoring Report 06/2013 BS REEEP, p. 2
- Electricity and National Economy, Source: http://erc.gov.jo/English/Pages/ElectricityAndNationalEconomy.aspx
- National Strategic Plan for Dealing with NEPCO’s Losses: Sources: http://www.memr.gov.jo/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=PHxs463H8U0%3d&tabid=255
- Jordan Water Strategy p 19

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- -/
**KPI-9.1.4: Overall extent to which the energy and water sectors have been effectively privatized in accordance with the officially approved laws, rules and regulations**

### Main Findings on KPI-9.1.4:

**ENERGY:**

The overall extent to which the energy sector has been effectively privatized in accordance with the officially approved laws, rules and regulations is very good. Specific participation of the EU in these efforts is visible. Private sector participation in the energy sector increased significantly in the last decade. In the electricity sector, four Independent Power Producers with a total of 814 MW generation capacity are operating already in Jordan. GOJ assets related to the generation and distribution companies were also sold to private investors. In June 2011, ACWA Power International (a Saudi developer, owner and operator of power generation and desalinated water production plants) acquired majority stake in CEGCO. ACWA Power currently owns 90% stake in ENARA, which in turn owns 51% controlling stake in CEGCO, the Government of Jordan retained 40% stake of CEGCO, and 9% is held by Social Security Corporation. A private company owned by the American company AES and the Japanese company MITSUI, it was founded in 2009. It is responsible for the generation and selling of electricity to NEPCO and owns the first private project in Jordan in generating electricity. Al Qatraneh Electric Power Company: a private company established by coalition of Korean company KEPCO and Saudi company XENEL. It is responsible for the generation and selling of electricity to NEPCO.

Jordan selected a Russian company as a preferred bidder to build the country's first nuclear reactor which is hoped to deliver 12% of the Kingdom's needs of energy by 2020. The Russian side will contribute in 49% of the project's cost while the Jordanian government will contribute in 51 percent.

In renewable energy several small scale projects were implemented by household and commercial consumers benefiting from the Feed-in-Tariff recently adopted, large number of requests from consumers to benefit from this mechanism are made continuously. Large number of offers are also being made by private investors either in response to tender calls or as direct proposals to invest in large scale grid connected RE Power plants. 23 private companies were qualified to enter bidding on large scale grid connected PV Power plants. Jordan Wind Wind recently signed an agreement with the GOJ to install and operate 117 MW Wind Power Plant in Tafileh area. The installation is in progress and expected to connect to the national grid in mid-2015. The downstream oil derivatives market was opened for private supply distributors by licensing two additional companies in addition to the existing Jordan Petroleum Refinery Company, the oil derivatives market is planned to be fully liberalized within 5 years. Substantial foreign investments are expected in the field of oil refining where a strategic partner is being sought by the Refinery Company and strategic partnership with foreign investors is also sought in the field of Nuclear Power Plants planned for Jordan. All additional power requirements are being tendered for Independent Power Producers, in this regard it could be concluded that “competition for the electricity market” is fully achieved while “competition in the electricity market” is a longer term objective.

Successful privatization and energy market liberalization can be considered as part of the impact of EU interventions in support of efforts in the regulatory and institutional reforms and institutional and human capacity building.

**WATER:**

Privatisation initiatives within the water sector have been conducted in accordance with the officially approved laws, rules and regulations. In order to go along with the privatisation process in a legal manner, the Government of Jordan amended WAJ Law: Law No. 18 of 1988 for the Water Authority and its Amendments (1988). The amendment authorizes the Cabinet to delegate any of WAJ tasks or projects to parties from the public, public-private and/or private sector.

Examples are:

- In 1999 through a “Management Contract” for 4 years, LEMA, a Jordanian company owned by a consortium of international companies was established. LEMA managed the full water sector business of Amman Governorate. The contract had been extended two times up until 2006.
- In 2004, WAJ has established a “publicly owned Jordanian limited liability company” (Aqaba Water Co.), owned by WAJ (85%), and Aqaba Development Co. (15%). It was delegated to manage the water and wastewater business in Aqaba Governorate. It is considered a successful case.
- In 2007, WAJ, with 100% ownership copied Aqaba experiment by establishing Jordan Water Co. (Miyahuna) as a successor of LEMA. Miyahuna example, like Aqaba water is considered a success.
- In 2011, the same experiment of “Management Contract” for 4 years had been copied with the establishment of Veolia Water Jordan to manage Yarmouk Water Company. Veolia Water Jordan contract was ended after one year of operation.
- “Build-Operate-Transfer” (BOT) has been experimented at the end of 2003 for As-Samra Wastewater Treatment Plant. Lately, in 2009, another BOT project started, Disi Water Conveyance, where water started coming to Amman in July 3013. BOT projects are considered successful.
- Micro Private Sector Participation: Authorising Jordanian private companies to manage part of the functions of a water utility, such as meter reading, billing, and collection. It had been done in 2008 for Madaba, and in 2011 for Balqa and Karak.

KPI-9.1.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:

- 

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Source: http://erc.gov.jo/English/Pages/ElectricityAndNationalEconomy.aspx
- Source: http://erc.gov.jo/English/ElectricityCompanies/Pages/EDCO.aspx
- MEMR Annual Report (2012), pp 6
- MEMR, Energy Strategy in Jordan (Jul 2013), pp 2
- Law No. 18 of 1988 for the Water Authority and its Amendments (1988), pp. 8
- Regulatory Framework Concept Source:
- Source:
- As-Samra Wastewater Treatment Plant Project on BOT Basis Development and Lessons Learned
- Aqaba Water Our Company, Source: http://aqabawater.com/eng/?page_id=190
- Micro Private Sector Participation, Karak Example Source:
- Regulatory Framework Concept - Source:
- Micro Private Sector Participation, Karak Example Source:

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- -/-
Evidence from consulted documents and references show that GOJ has achieved significant progress in the institutional and regulatory reform of the energy water and environment sectors (KPI-9.1.1). The assessment of the EU contribution to the regulatory and institutional reforms based on the evaluation of the key performance indicators indicates a direct positive contribution and shows that EU interventions can be seen as a driving force for changes. The impact of these reforms is materializing through the high level involvement of private investors in all aspects of the energy sector (KPI-9.1.4). In the water sector, EU support has contributed successfully to a degree to the regulatory and institutional reform (KPI-9.1.1, KPI-9.1.2). This statement can be derived from the convincing and appropriate legal structure of the water sector in Jordan, the corresponding institutional set up (strategic and operational), the legal coverage for public and private institutions and the successful privatization efforts. EU projects and programmes have had a significant share in the regulatory and institutional reform. Some of the programme related documents indicate however that there are still open regulatory issues. For example, the EU funded project, Al MEYYAH, proposed amendments to Jordan water legislation were not implemented (KPI-9.1.1) Another still existing problem is however the high trends in water subsidies in Jordan over the past years despite clear indications in the Jordan Water Strategy to reduce subsidies KPI-9.1.3).

In the perception of stakeholders interviewed, there is consensus that EU support did contribute to successful regulatory and institutional reform in the Jordan energy and water sectors. The conclusions reached during this assessment confirms previous conclusions made by earlier assessment reports concerning MEMR where there is still need for a clear definition and delineation of its role as policy maker and overall umbrella for other organizations in the sector. MEMR should rely on JREEEF and NERC for execution, implementation and day to day management activities (KPI-9.1.2). As for the water sector, it is currently structured in such a way that essential water-related functions continue to be spread among WAJ, MWI and JVA. This creates several areas in which there is duplication of effort, unclear responsibility for decisions, and poor accountability. Also, due to the way in which MWI was created (through a By law rather than a dedicated law), it lacks sufficient authority to effectively carry out its water management responsibilities. One result of this is that control of groundwater abstraction is weak (KPI-9.1.2).

Reforms towards RE development needs were generally more successful than reforms towards EE development. One main reason is the external strong pressure by investor groups who recognized the promising economic opportunities in the field of RE, where very little private sector interest was expressed in EE projects for generic reasons (these reasons are identified in several dedicated studies but no concrete remedy actions were taken). (KPI-9.1.2) In the water sector policy decision-making is narrowly-based and focused almost solely within the Ministry. In addition MWI has a conflict of interest due to its dual responsibility for both policy decision-making and policy implementation. There is no viable mechanism for monitoring and follow-up in policy implementation. There is also a lack of good shared data and information to provide the basis of informed policy and management decisions (KPI-9.1.2).

Pricing Policy reforms in the energy sector progressed satisfactorily despite temporary setbacks due to political pressures during the Arab spring period where phasing out subsidies would have provoked strong objections by the population. The GOHKOJ explicitly adopted a pricing formula for fuel derivatives reflecting international price changes onto local prices on a monthly basis, and has announced recently a gradual tariff increase plan over three years period to gradually offset the accumulated debt due to the difference between electricity bulk purchase tariffs from generators and retail selling tariffs by NEPCO the single buyer entity in the electric system(KPI-9.1.3).

The necessary laws and regulations were issued to facilitate the participation of private investors in all subsectors including renewable energy and energy efficiency. As a result of these achievements several small scale RE projects were implemented by the private sector and other projects were licensed. Recently MEMR has also signed a Power Purchase Agreement from a 50 MW PV plant to be installed in Ma’an area. Another 10 MW PV project was approved and PPA signed in the same area. The overall extent to which the energy sector has been effectively privatized in accordance with the officially approved laws, rules and regulations is very good. The impact of the EU in these efforts is visible (KPI-9.1.4).

Institutional and regulatory reforms in general concentrated on the governmental institutions working in the sector and were particularly successful within NERC, ERC and MPWH but less so within MEMR. On the
other hand, no reforms were noticed within the private electric utilities in relation to their upcoming crucial role in the field of RE/EE, several complaints were made by private investors when dealing with the electric utilities especially in relation to interconnecting RE power generation plants to distribution nets, one striking example is the delay in connecting NERC’s new Wind Energy pilot plant recently installed as part of the EU intervention.(KPI-9.1.2)

In EE area, and as indicated by the consulted REEEP Monitoring Report "The field of EE is however still lagging behind, with regard to both strategic planning and the adoption of conducive legislations and regulations", this evaluation shares the opinion expressed in the quote above and stresses the need for farther enhancements of the laws and regulations to resolve the issues identified during the evaluation; for example electric utilities current business model creates a disincentive for them to focus on EE options, especially utilities being key investors and market players that could influence the sector's demand-side usage patterns but the status quo situation lends no justification for them to pursue demand side efficiency – at least not for any economic reason, therefore, there is a need to align their economic interests with increasing demand-side efficiency".(KPI-9.1.1)

As concluded by this evaluation and by other assessment reports consulted, MEMR is facing problems in its institutional (especially in defining role and mandate of the Ministry and its subordinate directories) arrangements reflecting negatively on cooperation and synergy with other organizations in the energy sector MEMR's institutional and human capacity falls short of requirements to fulfil its originally established role of policy maker and overall coordinator of the sector. Instead, MEMR is becoming more involved in the operational aspects of programmes and projects creating unnecessary competition with other sector organizations.(KPI-9.1.2)

As will be elaborated further below (under JC-7), it is noticed that BS Reform Indicators are very general and that they put a lot of emphasis on policy, regulatory and institutional setting issues (the formal aspects). They do not cover operational aspects, including detailed plans of actions in each pertinent work area, means of ensuring networking and partnership development.

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**JC-9.2**

**EU support contributed to institutional and human capacity development on renewable energy and on sustainable water use in relevant key entities of Jordan society (public, private and public-private)**

**List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 9.2 (codes and definition)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPI-9.2.1</th>
<th>Number of relevant institutes and of human resources / personnel having benefitted from Renewable Energy and efficient, sustainable water use related (re-) training / capacity building</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPI-9.2.2</td>
<td>Number of RE related training programmes and activities implemented in accordance with the national training strategy and programme and training needs assessment, with overall quality and results assessment, both with regard to renewable energy and efficient, sustainable water use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-9.2.3</td>
<td>Number and value of EU supported Technical Assistance (TA) and twinning programmes implemented in the energy sector with special focus on RE and Energy Efficiency (EE), and in the water sector with special focus on efficient, sustainable water use, with overall quality and results assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-9.2.4</td>
<td>Number and value of energy related and of water related Research and Development (R&amp;D) projects implemented / under implementation, with overall quality and results dissemination assessment, including facilitation of and impact on regulatory approximation with EU legislation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**KPI-9.2.1: Number of relevant institutes and of human resources / personnel having benefitted from Renewable Energy and of efficient, sustainable water use related (re-) training / capacity building**

**Main Findings on KPI-9.2.1:**

**Energy:**
The following institutions have benefitted from capacity building measures.

i. Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources;
ii. Jordan Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Fund (JREEF);
iii. Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MPWH);
iv. National Building Council under the MPWH;
v. Electricity Regulatory Commission (ERC);
vi. Jordan Institution for Standards and Metrology (JISM);
vii. Building Research Centre;
viii. National Energy Research Centre (NERC)

As shown by the reference below, and from information received during visits to stakeholders, significant number of persons benefitted from training sessions held in country and abroad. NERC, ERC, and JISM were particularly beneficial from training programmes. During the meeting with Standards and Metrology staff it was revealed that some 150 persons from different government and non-government organizations benefitted from training opportunities during the TA & twinning program, although a number of trained personnel left their original organizations, the knowledge acquired remains largely within the organizations through incorporation in work procedures, manuals and instructions. In particular, MEMR personnel did not adequately benefit from institutional and personnel capacity building, although new staff were recruited by the ministry as a response to BS reform Indicator, extensive training and capacity building is required in all aspects of RE/EE policy making, project identification, appraisal, M&E. This situation is also recognizes by the ROM BS REPORT (see extract below) where in answering the relevance of BS and related complementary assistance the report concluded the result as Grade C: partially due MEMR’s refusal of a long term TA. The same was observed within the electric utilities whose role could be detrimental to RE/EE projects if their institutional and human capacity is not properly developed.

TA and twinning projects had positive impacts on developing capacities, in particular NERC, ERC and JISM personnel rated these activities as highly beneficial. NERC under SAAP II also had the opportunity to benefit from over 94 expert missions that have been carried out in total according the plan, 78 training courses and 21 study visits were conducted. The overall result is high number of institutes and personnel benefitted from training and capacity building. As the extract below shows, WECSP represents a continuous instrument for providing highly specialized training for Jordanian and non-Jordanian professionals in the field of wind energy and CSP. As for ERC, the extract below shows a significant number of persons including but not limited to ERC staff benefitted from a comprehensive capacity building program.

In conclusion, a substantial number of institutions benefitted largely from human and institutional capacity building (NERC, ERC, JISM, MPWH) while other institutions still need significant assistance in this area (MEMR, JREEEF, Electric utilities)

**Water:**
2 out of the 3 projects, supported by EC have carried out successful capacity building measures.

**KPI-9.2.1 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   - /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   - Water Security for low income communities, BCS 2013, point 6.4

(iii) Additional information from field phase
   - 25-22721-4.1.1 ROM BS Report 25.062.013 pp20
KPI-9.2.2: Number of RE related training programmes and activities implemented in accordance with the national training strategy and programme and training needs assessment, with overall quality and results assessment, both with regard to renewable energy and efficient, sustainable water use

Main Findings on KPI-9.2.2:

Energy:

Training programmes have been carried out under the WECSP project, NERC and other relevant institutions benefitted from these activities. Training components were also part of BS programme on REEE and in a number of SAAP I&II related projects. With the Wind Energy and CSP pilot plants in place, sustainability of training activity will be assured. Substantial number of training programmes were executed, meetings held with stakeholders highly valued the training activities conducted so far either with EU support or other donors. One example is the comprehensive training programme held for ERC (see extract below) which covered issues related to dealing with RE electricity producers (Setting Feed-in Tariffs, interconnection regulations). MEMR & Electric utilities are exemptions, where no significant benefits occurred. The need for strengthening MEMR to carry out its mandate as a policy maker and overall coordinator of the sector was foreseen in the REEEP TA Terms Of Reference (see extract below) as one of the expected institutional results where MEMR and particularly RE/EE Departments and JREEEF develop detailed and concrete Action Plans consistent with the goals defined by the strategy clearly linking government budgeted initiatives with resulting impacts. This component however was delayed as MEMR refused long-term TA.

Except for NERC and ERC, RE related training programmes were limited, several initiatives were taken by some NGOs to introduce RE technology and concepts to the public such as the MANSUR project, these projects qualify more as awareness projects.

Water:

The Jordan Water Strategy foresees comprehensive training and the set-up of a training institute. The latter has however not yet taken place. 2 out of 3 EC supported projects have provided training.

KPI-9.2.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
  -  

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
  - Source: http://www.mansur-energy.eu/

(iii) Additional information from field phase
  - Annex II REEE TA Terms Of Reference
  - SAAP-II Final Report (October 20,2005 –December 31,2010) pp 28 (Key achievements with NERC)
### KPI-9.2.3: Number and value of EU supported Technical Assistance (TA) and twinning programmes implemented in the energy sector with special focus on RE and Energy Efficiency (EE), and in the water sector with special focus on efficient, sustainable water use, with overall quality and results assessment

#### Main Findings on KPI-9.2.3:

**Energy**

8 projects have been identified comprising TA projects, TA related to Budget Support and twinning approaches. The total value is EUR 21.45 million. Jordan has been a frontrunner in utilizing all EC capacity building tools, notably Twinning, TAIEX and Sigma. Twinning was introduced to Jordan in 2003 and the first project started in 2004, TAIEX was introduced and used in 2006, whereas Sigma was introduced in 2008 and started in 2009.

These tools have been instrumental in helping in building the institutional capacity of Jordan’s public administrations, in addition to creating and maintaining long-lasting partnerships with the EU counterparts. JISM was one of the most successful cases in benefitting from twinning projects. Implementation of ACCA included organizational capacity building and transposing EU legislations information system building, private sector was involved and benefitted from capacity building. JISM also benefitted from 900,000 EURO worth of laboratory equipment. NEPCO also benefitted from a twinning project aimed at building capacity in the field of connecting RE Power plants to the grid. To date, ten twinning projects were concluded with EU Member States in the fields of Trade, Customs, Veterinary Measures, Standards and Conformity Assessment, Public Auditing, Food Inspection Services, Penitentiary Reform, Anti-Terrorism, Energy, and Environment. Twinning partners included the United Kingdom, Germany, Austria, Denmark, Italy, and Greece. In the energy sector most significant twinning projects were Building the Capacity of the National Energy Research Centre, JISM labeling and specification project for energy consuming appliances, and ERC twinning for capacity building. TA components were particularly successful in the case of JNBC, complementary support provided for NERC/NCRD to complement the laboratories was considered invaluable by the stakeholders interviewed and as closing a financing gap. NRC highly benefitted under SAAP II through the twinning with the Greek Research Centre. Other important TA and twinning projects are: WEGSP Project, BS REEEP TA, JNRC AAP 2006 part II, INSC 2010, INSC 2013, Institutional Support to the Ministry of Environment of Jordan on Environmental Management, Legislation (Service Contract) and Institutional Strengthening of the Environmental Directorates in the Governorates of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Framework Contract) No. FWC 143979/2007 and Development, strengthening and harmonization of environmental legislation and its enforcement (Twinning Light Project).

Stakeholders interviewed in the course of this evaluation expressed their satisfaction with the TA and twinning projects which produced tangible and measurable results compared to the more complex BS instrument. In conclusion, TA & Twinning instruments were highly satisfactory effective and efficient.

**Water:**

From the available documents, there were no EU supported twinning programmes in the water sector with special focus on efficient water use.

The number and value of EU supported TA in the water sector with focus on efficient sustainable water use are:

- **Al Meyyah Project - Water Resources Management** (EUR 4,134,179)
- **Water Loss Reduction in Zarqa** (EUR 2,519,337)
- **Water Security for low income communities - Delegated cooperation with GIZ** (EUR 3,240,000); Total Amount: EUR 9,893,516

#### KPI-9.2.3 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:

- [http://www.mop.gov.jo/pages.php?menu_id=296&local_type=0&local_id=0&local_details=0&local_details1=0](http://www.mop.gov.jo/pages.php?menu_id=296&local_type=0&local_id=0&local_details=0&local_details1=0)

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
(iii) Additional information from field phase

| KPI-9.2.4: | Number and value of energy related and of water related Research and Development (R&D) projects implemented / under implementation, with overall quality and results dissemination assessment, including facilitation of and impact on regulatory approximation with EU legislation |

Main Findings on KPI-9.2.4:

**ENERGY:**

Energy and Environment befitted under SRTD I 2008-2010 (6 research grants in energy & 5 grants in water & environment), under SRTDII Water and Energy are identified as key areas to benefit from the program. Currently a bio-energy research component is scheduled under NCRD/H CST, implementation is expected to be carried by NERC & the RSS. One concern is that the collaboration level between HCST and NERC is not near optimal.

The cooperation with the European Union varied to include S&T association agreement, capacity building projects with the objective of increasing the Jordanian researchers’ awareness of programmes and projects funded by the European Union, examples of such agreements are: S&T Association Agreement with the European Union, EU-JORDANNET Project “Enhancement of Jordan-European S&T Partnerships” and MIRA Project “Mediterranean Innovation and Research Coordination Action. In general R&D activities in Jordan are limited and constrained by lack of resources, accordingly cooperation in R&D remains modest. The challenge is translating R&D results into commercial applications, a problem persistent and witnessed in Jordan until now. This fact is recognized by SRTD II (Applied Research Grant Scheme Guidelines for grant applicants sighted below): “The most prominent problem in the Jordanian R&D and Innovation sector has been identified as the little “commercialization & marketing potential” of research community output. Indeed, the focus of a large part of the research community is not on commercialization of RTD/innovation but rather on publishing scientific articles especially within the country and the region, and scarcely at the international level. Professors perform research that arises from the need of faculty members to produce research results for publication for advancement in their academic careers rather than the initiation of applied research programmes. Jordanian professors and researchers need to transform their research results into marketable products and/or services, in order to participate in the building up of the knowledge-based economy in Jordan”. This evaluation supports the above quoted remark and additionally, the insignificant amount of grants dedicated per application/research proposal does not give much prospects for serious and professional scale research (the grant per proposal should be between 10,000 and 25,000 EURO as shown in the extracts below). It is obvious that R&D (and for obvious reasons) is not at the top of the priority list for the GOJ neither it is on the EU intervention priority list.

**WATER:**

No water related R&D projects have been carried out.

KPI-9.2.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- -

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Revised TAPS for Addendum, Capacity building of Wind Energy and Concentration Solar Power-WECSP project
- Capacity building of Wind Energy and Concentration Solar Power-WECSP project“
- http://www.wecsp.org.jo/about
- JoRIEW Improving Capacity of Jordanian Research in Integrated Renewable Energy & Water
(iii) Additional information from field phase

- Support to Research and Technological Development & Innovation in Jordan SRTD II
  Commercialisation Grant Scheme Guidelines for grant applicants
- Support to Research and Technological Development & Innovation in Jordan SRTD II
  Applied Research Grant Scheme Guidelines for grant applicants
- http://hcst.gov.jo/?page_id=132
- http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.5004/dwt.2009.456#.U6r65PmSyJk

Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-9.2 (based on the KPIs main findings)

The judgment criteria can be confirmed, i.e. EU support contributed to institutional and human capacity development on renewable energy and on sustainable water use in relevant key entities of Jordan society. It also contributed to institutional and human capacity development on sustainable water use in relevant key entities of Jordan society. It has however to be indicated that this support aimed mainly at public key entities and less on the private sector. Information received during visits to stakeholders, reveal significant number of persons benefitted from training sessions held in country and abroad. NERC, ERC, and JISM personnel were the prime target of these training courses. In particular, MEMR personnel did not benefit from institutional and personnel capacity building, although new staff were recruited by the ministry, MEMR needs extensive training and capacity building in all aspects of RE/EE policy making, project identification, appraisal, M&E. The same was observed within the electric utilities whose role could be detrimental to RE/EE projects if institutional and human capacity are not properly developed. (KPI-9.2.1, KPI-9.2.2)

TA and twinning projects had positive impacts on developing capacities, in particular NERC, ERC and JISM personnel rated these activities as highly beneficial. As shown by extracts under relevant KPI's (1,2,3), numerical data concerning persons trained and training programmes implemented has been obtained for certain organizations in the sector, on the other hand and since all TA activities have a training component and human capacity is raised as a consequence of these activities (KPI-9.2.1), assessments were made based on meetings with the concerned organizations. On the institutional capacity, available documentation strongly suggest the improvements in this area partly as a result of EU intervention (KPI-9.2.3).

R&D being modest in Jordan and constrained by lack of financial and human resources, the support provided by EU in this field remains modest with limited effects due to Jordan’s inherent difficulties discussed above and the insignificant amount of grants dedicated per application/research proposal which does not give much prospects for serious and professional scale research. It is obvious that R&D (and for obvious reasons) is not at the top of the priority list for the GOJ neither it is on the EU intervention priority list.(KPI-9.2.4)

The overall assessment of this JC can be rated as satisfactory. It however has to be stated that the support aimed mainly at public key entities and less at the private sector. One example is the lack of institutional and human capacity in electric utilities to efficiently deal with RE private investors (connecting to grid and other relevant matters) and assist and lead EE initiatives based on their unique situation in the market and their established networks with final consumers. Second, while NERC, ERC, NBC and JISM benefitted from the interventions by EU and other donors, MEMR & JREEEF remain in need for more institutional and human capacity building especially in policy making and EE planning issues and in relation to Inter-institutional coordination.(KPIs 9.2.1, 9.2.2, 9.2.3)
### JC-9.3
The national awareness level on renewable energy and the need / necessity of energy efficiency has been considerably raised over time, partly due to EU support in these areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPI Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPI-9.3.1</td>
<td>Number and overall value of public awareness programmes on Renewable Energy (RE) and Energy Efficiency (EE) implemented, with overall programme reach, quality and effects assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-9.3.2</td>
<td>Number of dedicated forums and platforms (both virtual and institutional) on RE and EE created and sustainably operational / maintained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-9.3.3</td>
<td>Overall quality and intensity of policy, opinion and decision makers involvement in public debates at national and local levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-9.3.4</td>
<td>Percentage levels of / trends in national awareness of renewable energy and energy efficiency, with breakdown by main energy stakeholder / user categories</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KPI-9.3.1:** Number and overall value of public awareness programmes on Renewable Energy (RE) and Energy Efficiency (EE) implemented, with overall programme reach, quality and effects assessment

**Main Findings on KPI-9.3.1:**

**ENERGY:**

In all energy / environment related EU projects (except for nuclear safety projects) public awareness programmes have played an important role. This is in particular valid for the support to the Ministry of Environment within the framework of SAAP I & II. The detailed number and value cannot be derived from available documentation since no awareness dedicated projects were planned under the intervention.

Public awareness efforts in the energy sector are in general small scale and scattered efforts, different organizations implement modest small scale awareness programmes with limited resources allocation and coordination. A comprehensive nationwide awareness programme led and coordinated by MEMR is due. The number of programmes being implemented is of significance but the real question is about the sustainability and effectiveness (value) of these efforts. High level of public awareness has been achieved in relation to the problem of energy in Jordan and to the importance of RE&EE, the driving force behind this achievement was mainly the financial burden that energy represents to the government and to consumers. Activists and observers continuously raised the need for the government to maximize reliance on endogenous resources and rationalize energy use. The issue of alternative energy sources is discussed frequently in TV talk shows and open workshops and seminars held by different institutions. TV & newspapers ads are frequently released by ERC. GBC also held several workshops and seminars on EE in buildings and the concept of green building. Several awareness raising projects were conducted under USAID’s PAP supported programme to enhance awareness in energy and water. MEMR is relying on the EU support to rehabilitate the Consumer Service Center, once this Center is operational MEMR should be able to fill the gap in awareness raising efforts.

In general, all EU supported RE/EE related projects have an awareness component embedded, one clear example is the WECSP Project run by NERC, where awareness and capacity building are achieved by taking advantage of the pilot installations and testing facilities, the reliability and potentials of the selected wind testing facility and CSP pilot plant/s technologies are demonstrated and promoted through a training programme in the relevant areas for various beneficiaries, including specific partnerships with universities, testing facilities for entrepreneurs from Jordan and the region (see extract below).

In general the number of awareness programmes is large but small sized, short-lived and scattered among several institutions. Decision makers in general assign very low benefit –to-cost ratio to awareness activities leading to allocation of minimum resources to these activities. The value of these programmes is therefore questionable mostly their sustainability and effectiveness.
### KPI-9.3.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

#### (i) Data, figures and tables:
- Final evaluation, SAAP I & II, p. 50
- Network for Jordanian Energy Sustainability http://jordannetwork.net
- Category: Developing a green economy in Jordan: focus on resource and energy efficiency, 28 – 30 April 2013 Amman, Jordan

#### (ii) Key extracts from documents:
- 16-20479-2.5.1 Revised TAPs for Addendum1 WECSP Technical and Administrative Provisions

#### (iii) Additional information from field phase
- -/-

### KPI-9.3.2: Number of dedicated forums and platforms (both virtual and institutional) on RE and EE created and sustainably operational / maintained

#### Main Findings on KPI-9.3.2:

A reasonable number of dedicated forums and platforms were identified, examples are Renewable Energy Society, Green Building Council, EDAMA Energy, Water & Environment Productivity. The number of participants in such forums is growing especially from academia and NGO’s. These forums serve also as pro EE&RE lobbying platforms. As part of their reform actions, NERC has already oriented its website to provide information on certain energy topics and especially in the area of renewables, this web site will be developed farther to serve the entities concerned in RE/EE. MEMR’s web site provides information on recent activities, projects, tenders in the energy sector in general and in RE/EE in particular, the site provides the necessary information for interested investors to conduct their due elegance. It also provides basic data and information regarding the legislative framework governing the sector. ERC’s web site provides all necessary information for entities interested in investing in the electricity sector, the site provides a full list of the laws, By-laws and regulations applicable to the electricity generation transmission and distribution business. Several NGO forums also exist and actively participate in the dialogue taking place on energy related issues such as the Network for Jordanian Industrial Sustainability. Partnerships for Environmental Responsibility, Jordan Renewable Energy Society JRRES, Jordan Green Building Council JGBC, and EDAMA Energy, Water & Environment Productivity. The latter forums are also striving to advance Jordan’s movement towards a green economy via creating a vibrant new economic sector of energy businesses; driving applied research, development and commercializing of Jordanian technologies; building public awareness; and advocating for policies that will make Jordan a model of energy efficiency, water conservation, and environmental stewardship. Overall the number of dedicated forums and platforms is satisfactory. EU intervention contributed positively in the development of these forums.
### KPI-9.3.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

**(i) Data, figures and tables:**

- -/

**(ii) Key extracts from documents:**

- GBC http://www.jordangbc.org/

**(iii) Additional information from field phase**

- -/

### KPI-9.3.3: Overall quality and intensity of policy, opinion and decision makers involvement in public debates at national and local levels

**Main Findings on KPI-9.3.3:**

The public debate in Jordan regarding energy is intense. Issues like consumer prices, nuclear future project, security of supply and the high energy cost to the economy lead the general public attention to the energy policy. Several dedicated TV talk shows are being held periodically entertaining decision makers and activists in the energy and environment policy, MP’s and researchers to discuss and explore solutions for the energy problem. Regular conferences organized by universities and other NGO's are held in Jordan providing the opportunity for public activists, decision makers and occasionally experts from abroad to meet and discuss energy developments worldwide and the opportunities for Jordan. Recently a group of parliament members organized a movement named (Mubadara, i.e. Initiative) which worked closely with different ministries including MEMR. The group and MEMR approved a joint document serving as short term work plan. Several international and regional dedicated workshops and forums were held in Jordan under the patronage of high ranking government officials. This intensive and continuous debate helped in creating a general public opinion in favor for RE & EE and sustained public pressure on the government to produce tangible results. Therefore, overall quality and intensity of policy, opinion and decision makers involvement in public debates at national and local levels is very satisfactory.

The private sector recognizing the economic opportunities in RE business was particularly influential in lobbying for facilitating RE new investments. The lobby was successful in convincing PMs and public opinion leaders of the importance of RE in the future of Jordan’s energy sector. The GOJ relative success in implementing the regulatory and institutional reforms particularly related to RE was strongly driven by this interest of the private sector. As for EE, the debate is also live and intense, but due to the special nature of EE projects, no influential private sector entities are genuinely interested in investing in this area. In contrary to RE, investment in EE is entirely government driven (providing incentives, disincentives, substantial financial support, etc). As illustrated by discussions under previous KPIs, achievements in EE are lagging behind especially in operational aspects. GOJ through MEMR should give serious attention to EE in all consuming sectors.

### KPI-9.3.3 Main References and Sources of Information:

**(i) Data, figures and tables:**

- -/

**(ii) Key extracts from documents:**


**(iii) Additional information from field phase**

- -/
KPI-9.3.4: Percentage levels of / trends in national awareness of renewable energy and energy efficiency, with breakdown by main energy stakeholder / user categories

Main Findings on KPI-9.3.4:

It can be concluded that there has been an increase in the level of awareness among different categories of stakeholders/consumers. As suggested by documentation and stakeholder interviews, percentage levels of / trends in national awareness of renewable energy and energy efficiency proves to be HIGH.

The trend is obviously towards increasing the awareness level in all user categories. Consumers being constantly under the pressure of high energy cost, are becoming more and more interested in ways and means to reduce their energy bills. One obvious trend in the household sector is the increase in penetration rate of solar water heaters and efficient lighting devices. Recently, a new trend emerged in the household buildings sector to install PV power generation benefitting from recent legislative reforms and the introduction of Feed-in-tariff approach. The service sector is also showing interest in alternative energy sources especially in the wake of issuing the laws and regulations permitting self-generation. Several hotels, universities and hospitals applied for licenses to install PV systems under net metering arrangements with electricity distributors.

A large number of industrial and commercial establishments were audited for EE&RE opportunities over the past years by specialized auditors, financed under different programmes by various donors. Despite the awareness emerging from these audits, a limited number of the results of the audits were implemented due to unresolved obstacles such as limited number of capable ESCO’s, owner-tenant problem in commercial/residential buildings, high discount rates applied to EE activities by facility owners, small scale and scattered EE projects, financing constraints, etc. These constraints need specific arrangements to be overcome, one urgent action in this direction is to raise the institutional and human capacity at MEMR and the electric utilities to be able to address these obstacles at the policy and executive levels. In the future, the operational aspects of the reforms should be given more attention during M&E.

KPI-9.3.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- +/-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- +/-

JC-9.3: The national awareness level on renewable energy and the need / necessity of energy efficiency has been considerably raised over time, partly due to EU support in these areas

Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-9.3 (based on the KPIs main findings)

The national awareness level on renewable energy and the need / necessity of energy efficiency has been considerably raised over time, partly due to EU support in these areas.

Strong evidence suggest that awareness in the field of RE&EE in Jordan has grown considerably in the past few years as a consequence of national awareness raising efforts and the pressure generated on different consumer categories by the increasing cost of energy. In all energy / environment related EU projects (except for nuclear safety projects) public awareness component have played an important role. This is in particular valid for the support to the Ministry of Environment within the framework of SAAP I & II. The detailed number and value cannot be derived from available documentation since no awareness dedicated projects were planned under the intervention.(KPI-9.3.1)

Public awareness efforts in the energy sector are in general small scale and scattered efforts, different
organizations implement modest small scale awareness programmes with limited resources allocation and lack of coordination. The number of awareness programmes is large but small sized, short-lived and scattered among several institutions. Decision makers in general assign very low benefit–to-cost ratio to awareness activities leading to allocation of minimum resources to these activities. The value of these programmes is therefore questionable mostly their sustainability and effectiveness. A comprehensive nationwide awareness programme led and coordinated by MEMR is due. High level of public awareness has been achieved in relation to the problem of energy in Jordan and to the importance of RE&EE, the driving force behind this achievement was mainly the financial burden that energy represents to the government and to consumers. Activists and observers continuously raised the need for the government to maximize reliance on endogenous resources and rationalize energy use. (KPI-9.3.1)

A reasonable number of dedicated forums and platforms were identified, examples are Renewable Energy Society, Green Building Council, EDAMA Energy, Water & Environment Productivity. The number of participants in such forums is growing especially from academia and NGO’s. NERC has already oriented its website to provide information on certain energy topics and especially in the area of renewables, this website will be developed farther to serve the entities concerned in RE/EE. EU support contributed in developing these sites partly as direct requirements under BS or TA projects and partly through the awareness raising impact of the supported projects. (KPI-9.3.2)

MEMR’s web site provides information on recent activities, projects, tenders in the energy sector in general and IN RE/EE in particular, the site provides the necessary information for interested investors to conduct their due elegance. It also provides basic data and information regarding the legislative framework governing the sector. ERC’s web site provides all necessary information for entities interested in investing in the electricity sector, the site provides a full list of the laws, By-laws and regulations applicable to the electricity generation transmission and distribution business. (KPI-9.3.2) Several NGO forums also exist and actively participate in the dialogue taking place on energy related issues. These latter forums are also striving to advance Jordan’s movement towards a green economy via creating a vibrant new economic sector of energy businesses. Overall the number of dedicated forums and platforms is GOOD. EU intervention contributed positively in the development of these forums. (KPI-9.3.2)

The public debate in Jordan regarding energy is intense. Issues like consumer prices, nuclear future project, security of supply and the high energy cost to the economy lead the general public attention to the energy policy. Several dedicated TV Programmes, regular conferences organized by universities and other NGO’s are held in Jordan providing the opportunity for public activists, decision makers and occasionally experts from abroad to meet and discuss energy developments worldwide and the opportunities for Jordan. (KPI-9.3.3)

Recently a group of parliament members organized a movement named (Mubadara, i.e. Initiative) which worked closely with different ministries including MEMR. The group and MEMR approved a joint document serving as short term work plan. This intensive and continuous debate helped in creating a general public opinion in favor for RE & EE and sustained public pressure on the government to produce tangible results. (KPI-9.3.3)

The private sector was particularly influential in lobbying for facilitating RE new investments. The lobby was successful in convincing PMs and public opinion leaders of the importance of RE in the future of Jordan’s energy sector. The GOJ relative success in implementing the regulatory and institutional reforms particularly related to RE was strongly driven by this interest of the private sector. As for EE, the debate is also live and intense, but due to the special nature of EE projects, no influential private sector entities are genuinely interested in investing in this area. Contrary to RE, investment in EE is entirely government driven (providing incentives, disincentives, substantial financial support, etc). As illustrated by discussions under previous KPIs, achievements in EE are lagging behind especially in operational aspects. GOJ through MEMR should give serious attention to the development of the EE market. (KPI-9.3.3)

The trend in public awareness is obviously towards increasing the awareness level in all user categories. Consumers are constantly being under the pressure of high energy cost. One obvious trend in the household sector is the increased penetration of solar water heaters and efficient lighting devices. Recently, a new trend emerged in the household buildings sector to install PV power generation benefitting from recent legislative reforms and the introduction of Feed-in-tariff approach. (KPI-9.3.4)

A large number of industrial and commercial establishments were audited for EE&RE opportunities over the past years by specialized auditors, financed under different programmes by various donors. Despite the awareness emerging from these audits, a limited number of the results of the audits were implemented due
to unresolved obstacles illustrated above. These obstacles need specific arrangements to be overcome, one urgent action in this direction is to raise the institutional and human capacity at MEMR and the electric utilities to be able to address these constraints at the policy and executive levels. In the future, the operational aspects of the reforms should be given more attention during M&E. (KPI-9.3.4)

**JC-9.4**
EU support contributed to changing public awareness and changes in actual water-use trends

| List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 9.4 (codes and definition) |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------------------|
| KPI-9.4.1 | Overall quality, reach and intensity of the public information campaign on the non-continuous distribution of water resources and of the need / necessity of rational water use |
| KPI-9.4.2 | Percentage change in water-use trends for irrigation in the Jordan Valley as a result of the measures taken by the Jordan Valley Authority |
| KPI-9.4.3 | Percentage change in water-use trends for irrigation in the Jordan Valley with emphasis on increasing the use of treated waste water as a result of the measures taken by the Jordan Valley Authority |
| KPI-9.4.4 | Awareness level of the general population of the non-continuous distribution of water resources and percentage of the population which has changed its behaviour accordingly (with breakdowns by main water users groups, geographical location, urban-rural differences, age groups, etc.) |

**KPI-9.4.1: Overall quality, reach and intensity of the public information campaign on the non-continuous distribution of water resources and of the need / necessity of rational water use**

**Main Findings on KPI-9.4.1:**

**WATER**

Public information campaigns on the non-continuous distribution of water resources and of the need / necessity of rational water use were not foreseen for the 3 EC supported projects in the water sector.

It however needs to be stated that the PMU in the Al Mayah – Supporting Management of Water Resources Project has been enabled to provide Jordan wide information on the water sector.

**KPI-9.4.1 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:

- /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:

- Final project evaluation: Al Meyyah Supporting Water Services Management in Jordan (Euronet Consulting, 2013, page 6

(iii) Additional information from field phase

- /-
**KPI-9.4.2:** Percentage change in water-use trends for irrigation in the Jordan Valley as a result of the measures taken by the Jordan Valley Authority

**Main Findings on KPI-9.4.2:**

Historically, irrigation water comprised the largest share of water demand in Jordan. Until mid seventies of the last century, irrigation water posed no problem to Jordan and its executive arm in the Jordan Valley, the Jordan Valley Authority, JVA. By mid seventies, drought hit Jordan, and there was pressure to provide for drinking water. The main source for the new drinking water schemes was the Yarmouk River. Consequently, irrigation water available for agriculture in JV was affected. At the same time, the amount of treated water reused for agriculture increased significantly to 115 MCM according to the MWI Yearly report of 2012. All of this led to Agricultural irrigation water usage decrease overall between 2002 and 2010 by approximately 15% and irrigated land usage in the Jordan Valley increased by 5 percent. This trend is at least partly due to the increasing cost of agricultural irrigation water from Jordan’s national canal system.

It is important to note, that despite the recorded reduction in the water consumption in the agricultural activities, there is a discrepancy between the factual agricultural water use and the physiological crop water requirements (CWR) of the recorded cultivation. One possible explanation would be the unrecorded ground water abstraction.

**KPI-9.4.2 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:

- +/-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:

- Historical Outline of Water Resources Development in the Lower Jordan River Basin, Rebhieh Suleiman. A research that contributes to the Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management in Agriculture (www.iwmi.org) and was supported by a grant from the Government of Netherlands to the Comprehensive Assessment.
- Regional Land Use Patterns and Water Consumption in the Jordan Valley Using Geographic Information Systems, Department of Geography, Faculty of Arts, University of Jordan, Amman; Published: May 20, 2012.
- MWI, JVA, Private Sector Participation in Irrigation Water Management in the Jordan Valley through WUA’s, Eng Qais Owais, SG for Jordan Valley. PPT Presentation during conference: Water in the Arab World: Status, Challenges and Opportunities, Feb 2014.
- Please see below

(iii) Additional information from field phase

- +/-

**KPI-9.4.2 (ii) Key extracts from documents:** (with explicit source referencing)


The recorded total water use in 2009 amounted to 883 MCM/year (2), which is most probably less than the factual water use due to partially uncontrolled abstraction of groundwater in particular by agricultural enterprises and farming systems. Recorded water use by agriculture amounted to 537 MCM in 2009, which was equalled about 61% of the recorded total water use. Water for municipal water use was the second largest position with about 34 % and water for industry and tourism made up for the remaining 5%.
Agricultural water use comprises mainly irrigation, where recorded water use was up to more than 584 MCM in 2009, and to a far lesser extent intensive livestock husbandry, e.g. poultry farms, with a water use of less than 10 MCM in the same year. Figures on agricultural water use do not include water use by rainfed agriculture, which makes up for slightly more than half of Jordan's 260 thousand hectares of cultivated areas. About 70% of Jordan's agricultural holdings have access to irrigation for at least parts of their cultivated areas (5).

The sources for irrigation water and challenges in water supply distinguish two major regions of agricultural water use. Irrigated agriculture in the Jordan Valley relies predominantly on surface water, which includes water from the tributaries to the Jordan River, water flows from the side Wadis and treated wastewater from the urban areas in the highlands. Irrigated agriculture in the highlands east and south of the Jordan Valley relies predominantly on groundwater and is thus a direct competitor for the current major water source of municipal and industrial water supply.

The assessment of factual agricultural water use varies by about 44% between the recorded water abstractions by Jordan's water authorities and the physiological crop water requirements (CWR) of the recorded cultivation (7). Recorded water abstraction for agriculture amounted to 537 MCM in 2009 according to the MWI, while estimates based on CRWs amounted up to about 960 MCM for the same year. Assumed reasons for the difference are a combination of unrecorded groundwater abstractions and depressions or even failure of yields.

KPI-9.4.3: Percentage change in water-use trends for irrigation in the Jordan Valley with emphasis on increasing the use of treated waste water as a result of the measures taken by the Jordan Valley Authority

**Main Findings on KPI-9.4.3:**

The sewer networks in Jordan drain its load into 22 existing central Waste Water Treatment Plants (WWTP). The effluent is used for agriculture purposes inside the premises of WWTP and in their vicinities. The surplus of effluents goes down along wadis where it either dies away owing to evaporation and infiltration or reaches subsequent water bodies like dams.

Three out of 22 WWTPs (Khirbet As Samra, Jerash, Baq’a) drain the biggest share of the total effluents (around 53 MCM a year) to King Talal Reservoir (KTR) where it is diluted by the annual rainfalls. Farmers in the middle JV totally depend on this resource, as they don’t receive any surface water from King Abdulla Canal (KAC). Therefore, this dam is considered as a vital necessity for agriculture in Jordan Valley.
recently increasing cultivation of crops in the upstream area of KTR has negative consequences on KTR water balance as it comes at expense of agriculture in JV. While in former days, farmers had to be convinced to use KTR water, now farmers’ faces clear competition for the limited resources.

"Jordan currently (2014) treats 113 million cubic metres (mcm) of wastewater annually, 95% of which is used for agricultural and industrial purposes. The amount will be raised to 240mcm by the year 2020 according to Jordan Valley Authority (JVA).

The Water Reuse Index (WRI) for Jordan indicates an increase in reuse from 30.4% in 2004 to 37.79% in 2007, whilst in 2006, the WRI is at 45% for the Jordan Valley.

KPI-9.4.3 Main References and Sources of Information:
(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Treated Wastewater for Irrigated Agriculture in the Jordan Valley, Dissertation: Amani Alfara, 2009

(ii) Key extracts from documents:

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- /-

KPI-9.4.4: Awareness level of the general population of the non-continuous distribution of water resources and percentage of the population which has changed its behaviour accordingly (with breakdowns by main water users groups, geographical location, urban-rural differences, age groups, etc.)

Main Findings on KPI-9.4.4:

The public of Jordan is all aware of the fact that water supply is intermittent in Jordan. For 2012, and on average the national water consumption per capita per day, inclusive of the NRW, ranged between 309 l/c/d in Aqaba, 150 l/c/d in Amman, to 82 l/c/d in Ajloun. If we take the NRW into consideration for Ajloun as an example, the per capita share drops to 50 l/c/d.

Its important to keep in mind that because the water supply is intermittent, the per capita share is delivered in periods ranging between 12 hrs. to 48 hrs. per week. Facing this reality, the residents of Jordan depend on rooftop (1 m³, or 2 m³) steel storage tanks to store their share of water.

Thus, in terms of awareness, the awareness is present, as people can only use what they can store. However, the awareness of the intermittent supply does not necessarily mean that they will conserve in that water. For those who can store more, they will use more.

To address this issue, the Ministry of Water and Irrigation conducts awareness campaigns with schools and communities to raise awareness about water conservation. For example in 2012, as reported in the ministry yearly book of 2012, the Department of Media and Awareness conducted the following activities:
- 150 lecture about water conservation in different schools in Jordan
- Print and distribute 30,000 pamphlet to other ministries and institutions
- Communicate with the public through the different media venues
- Field visits for media representatives
Beside the ministry, other donors contributed in related conservation efforts. For example the IDARA, a USAID funded project, had an activity to distribute 18,000 water devices through the water companies, Miyahunna, Yarmouk Water Company, and Aqaba Water. Another activity by IDARA was to develop Best Management Practices manuals to be used in Office Buildings, Hotels, and Landscapes.

Another USAID project, Public Action Project, focused on the behavioral change of the public on issues related to water and energy by offering grants to help organisations and individuals in Jordan implement programmes that had impact on the water and energy resources of the country and also to reduce the burden of solid waste that a growing and upwardly mobile population was creating.

On the sectorial level, the only sector that witnessed reduction in its consumption of water was agriculture.

### KPI-9.4.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- MWI, Annual Report 2012

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Directorate of Media and Awareness
- MWI, Annual Report 2012

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- /-

### JC-9.4: EU support contributed to changing public awareness and changes in actual water-use trends

**Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-9.4 (based on the KPIs main findings)**

EU support contributed positively to increasing public awareness and changing actual water use trends due to the implementation of its main interventions: Al Meyyah - Water Resources Management, Water Loss Reduction in Zarqa, Water Security for low income communities. The support of the first intervention (Water resources management) is more of indirect nature since the introduction of commercial principles and support to regulatory reform was the main focus. This type of support strengthened however the capacity of relevant Jordanian authorities to ensure country wide information dissemination. Public awareness and water use played a more prominent role in the projects on water loss reduction in Zarqa and Water resources security for low income communities.
**JC-9.5**  
**EU support contributed to the legislative framework for environmental protection**

### List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 9.5 *(codes and definition)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPI</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPI-9.5.1</td>
<td>Required environment protection by-laws, implementing rules and regulations of the Environment Law are developed, approved, codified and disseminated through multi-media channels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-9.5.2</td>
<td>Degree to which the environment protection articles of the Environment Law are effectively enforced by the Ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-9.5.3</td>
<td>Number of qualified staff at the Legal Affairs Unit at the MOE to adequately monitor and trace violations of the Environment Law and to refer to the appropriate administrative and/or judicial entities for sanctioning (actual versus necessary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-9.5.4</td>
<td>Level of adequacy of the EU support to develop the environment protection legal framework, to ensure its effective implementation including support to public awareness raising campaigns, to institutional and human capacity development of key stakeholders and actors concerned, and to mechanisms to sanction violations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-9.5.1:</td>
<td>Required environment protection by-laws, implementing rules and regulations of the Environment Law are developed, approved, codified and disseminated through multi-media channels</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Main Findings on KPI-9.5.1:

All EU interventions had a strong focus on laws and regulations. This is in particular valid for the SAAP related support to the Ministry of Environment. Law development and approval played an important role for WECSP, REEEP and Nuclear Safety projects, whereas the SAAP related interventions contributed also to dissemination.

EU interventions in the environment sector were through two types of interventions, the by-lateral projects, and the regional ones. For the by-lateral projects the EU had two projects supporting the Ministry of Environment between 2007 and 2013. The first one was a Framework Contract through SAAP, while the second was a twinning program.

The two by-lateral projects were conducted in 2008 and 2009. The first project focused on institutional capacity building of the Ministry, while the second has produced drafts for three legal documents, namely as follows: Cannon on Waste Management framework, Air Quality Protection and Emission Control Regulations and Regulations on Environmental Liability.

### KPI-9.5.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

1. **Data, figures and tables:**
     http://www.moenv.gov.jo/En/LegislationAndPolicies/Legislation/Systems/Pages/default.aspx

2. **Key extracts from documents:**

3. **Additional information from field phase**
   - -/-
KPI-9.5.2: Degree to which the environment protection articles of the Environment Law are effectively enforced by the Ministry

Main Findings on KPI-9.5.2:

Despite that the MoENV is entrusted to enforce the environmental regulations, the limited numbers staff, and the huge mandate it is trusted to enforce, does not allow it to have 100% legal enforcement of its mandates. At the moment, the MoEMV cooperates with the to provide trainings for inspectors, criminal investigators, and Judges.

Between 2008 and 2010, the US Environmental Protection Agency, USEPA, provided technical assistance and training for MoEnv and the the Royal Department for Environmental Protection, also known as the “Royal Rangers” (an Environmental Police Department). The TA and training focused on Environmental Enforcement, and the development of a National Inspection Action Plan for industrial activities in Jordan.

KPI-9.5.2 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Please see below

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- http://www.menawater-2011-berlin.de/abstracts/Mj_Mohammed_Al_Rahahleh.html
- The Royal Department for Environment Protection / Rangers in Jordan: General Tasks and Mission and Specific Roles in Water Resources Protection

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- Study Tours to the U.S

KPI-9.5.2 (i) Data, figures and tables:
The total number of cases of environmental violations pursued by the Royal Rangers increased from 7781 in 2007 to 56914 in 2012 as recorded in the yearly report of 2012. Those cases were divided into the following types of cases:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Case</th>
<th>Number of Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fauna</td>
<td>606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flora</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Environment</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Resources</td>
<td>630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial workshops</td>
<td>8991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health</td>
<td>30883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>15509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Number of Cases</strong></td>
<td><strong>56914</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KPI-9.5.3: Number of qualified staff at the Legal Affairs Unit at the MOE to adequately monitor and trace violations of the Environment Law and to refer to the appropriate administrative and/or judicial entities for sanctioning (actual versus necessary)

Main Findings on KPI-9.5.3:

Based on the communication with the MoENV during the field visit phase, there are 3 people working at the Legal Affairs Unit. Based on their educational backgrounds and the number of years of experience on monitoring and tracing violations of the Law, it can be concluded that there are 3 of qualified staff.
MOE is fully cooperating with the Royal Department for Environment Protection (RAEP), previously called Environment Police, respectively the Rangers. The rangers of RAEP are responsible for monitoring and tracing violations of the Environment Law is 3.

### KPI-9.5.3 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- \/-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- MoEnv. Website last visited on July 2, 2014.
  http://www.moenv.gov.jo/En/AboutUS/Pages/OrganizationalStructure.aspx#.U8thHxYV3B0

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- \/-

### KPI-9.5.4: Level of adequacy of the EU support to develop the environment protection legal framework, to ensure its effective implementation including support to public awareness raising campaigns, to institutional and human capacity development of key stakeholders and actors concerned, and to mechanisms to sanction violations

### Main Findings on KPI-9.5.4:

The level of adequacy of EU support through the bilateral project was not high. Contributions to the development of the environmental protection legal framework to ensure its effective implementation is prominent in all EU interventions, including support to public awareness raising campaigns, to institutional and human capacity development of key stakeholders and actors concerned. Support to mechanisms to sanction violations could not be identified.

### KPI-9.5.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- \/-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Please see below

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- \/-

### KPI-9.5.4 (ii) Key extracts from documents:

The Ministry of Environment: Legislations and Policies, Regulations
http://www.moenv.gov.jo/En/LegislationAndPolicies/Legislation/Systems/Pages/default.aspx

There are 10 environment protection related Regulations (By-Laws), and 14 official Instructions; which are all approved:
- **Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations** of 2005
- **Regulation No. 66 of 2009** for Environmental Protection Fund (in Arabic)
- Regulations No. 28 of 2005 for the Protection of the Air
- Regulations No. 25 of 2005 for Soil Protection Regulations
- Regulations No. 26 of 2005 for Protecting the Environment from Pollution in Emergency Situations
- **Regulation No. 51 of 1999 and its Amendments for Marine Environment and Coasts** (in Arabic)
- Regulations No. (29) of 2005 Natural Reserves and National Parks Regulations
- Regulation No. 65 of 2009 for Environmental Control and Inspection (in Arabic)
- Regulations No. (27) of 2005 for Management of Solid Waste Regulations
- **Regulation No. 24 of 2005 for Dangerous and Hazardous Materials Management and Handling** (in Arabic), and
14 Instructions, all are in Arabic with the following titles:
- **Licensing Environmental Societies**
• Used Oils Management and Handling
• Selecting the Locations of the Development Activities
• Spending/Funding and Studying Environmental Projects
• Hazardous Wastes Management and Handling
• Working with Sand Blasting
• Noise Prevention and Limitation
• Fees Collection for Hazardous Wastes Processing and Dumping
• Environmental Auditing
• Bio-safety
• Classifying Facilities According to Their Environmental Risks
• Organic Fertilizers Producing, Organizing, Storing, Trading with, and Using
• Natural Reserves and National Parks
• Controlling the Uses of Ozone Depleting Materials

JC-9.5: EU support contributed to the legislative framework for environmental protection

Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-9.5 (based on the KPIs main findings)

EU support contributed effectively and efficiently to the legislative framework for environmental protection. All EU interventions had a strong focus on laws and regulations. This is in particular valid for the SAAP related support to the Ministry of Environment. Development and approval played an important role for WECSP, REEEP and Nuclear Safety projects, whereas the SAAP related interventions contributed also to dissemination.

The degree to which environment protection articles of the Environment Law are effectively enforced by the Ministry cannot be answered on the basis of the available documentation. It requires further research at the Ministry of Environment, provided corresponding statistics are available.

Contributions to the development of the environmental protection legal framework, to ensure its effective implementation including support to public awareness raising campaigns, to institutional and human capacity development of key stakeholders and actors concerned is prominent in all EU interventions. Support to mechanisms to sanction violations could however not be identified.
JC-9.6
EU support contributed to improving the institutional and human capacity of the Ministry of Environment on sustainable environment protection and to ensure its mainstreaming, including on cross-border environmental and climate change issues

List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 9.5 (codes and definition)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPI</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPI-9.6.1</td>
<td>Degree to which environmental concerns are effectively mainstreamed into at least two to three other national policies and in all EU cooperation policies, strategies and programmes with Jordan as cross-cutting issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-9.6.2</td>
<td>Degree to which the Ministry of Environment (MoE) is proactively cooperating and networking with other Jordanian institutions (public, private and civil society) regarding environment protection initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-9.6.3</td>
<td>Percentage of MOE personnel with knowledge and capacities effectively strengthened on environment protection through participation in EU supported capacity development activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPI-9.6.4</td>
<td>Level of MOE participation in regional programmes oriented towards environment protection at the regional level especially with regard to cross-border environmental and climate change issues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KPI-9.6.1: Degree to which environmental concerns are effectively mainstreamed into at least two to three other national policies and in all EU cooperation policies, strategies and programmes with Jordan as cross-cutting issue

Main Findings on KPI-9.6.1:

The degree to which environmental concerns are effectively mainstreamed into at least two to three other national policies can be considered satisfactory. Mainstreaming of environmental concerns in all EU cooperation policies, strategies and programmes as a cross-cutting issue is to be considered with more vigor. The SAAP final evaluation confirms important achievements, but criticizes that in many cases mainstreaming was substituted by project approaches and that responsible institutions/persons had little understanding of how to deal effectively with mainstreaming.

Meetings held during the field visit phase confirm the lack of cooperation in relation to cross-cutting issues. For example, the MoENV has no cooperation with the Ministry of Energy on renewable energy issues despite its close relationship to climate change issues facing Jordan. Another example is that the Ministry of Environment has no cooperation with the MWI on water resources issues and its relationship with climate change issues.

KPI-9.6.1 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- Final evaluation, SAAP I&II, p.9
- Final evaluation, SAAP I&II, page 50;
- Jordan CSP 2007-13 and NIP 2007-10
- Jordan NIP 11-13
- ENP Progress Report Jordan 2012 - 20 Mar 13
- EU-Jordan ENP Action Plan 2013

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
### KPI-9.6.2: Degree to which the Ministry of Environment (MoE) is proactively cooperating and networking with other Jordanian institutions (public, private and civil society) regarding environment protection initiatives

**Main Findings on KPI-9.6.2:**

The only institution that the ministry if closely cooperating with, regarding the environment protection initiatives is the Royal Rangers. To a lesser degree, the ministry cooperates with the Department of Statistics. Meetings with MWI and MEMR representatives showed that the MoENV has no cooperation or programmes with the Ministry of Water and irrigation, or with the Ministry of Energy. The low yearly budget of the ministry, approximately of 3 million JD does not allow it, according to its representative to do its role of reaching out to all public and private institutions regarding environmental protection initiatives.

**KPI-9.6.2 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:
-  
(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- Source:
  
  http://www.allinjordan.com/index.php?cGc9TWluaXN0cmllcyZjdXN0b211c1NaW5pc3RyeSBvZiBFbnZpcm9ubWVudA==

(iii) Additional information from field phase
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### KPI-9.6.3: Percentage of MOE personnel with knowledge and capacities effectively strengthened on environment protection through participation in EU supported capacity development activities

**Main Findings on KPI-9.6.3:**

The MoENV do acknowledge that some of its staff have participated in training activities related to the FWC and the twining projects that took place between 2008 and 2009. However, the MoENV did not have the information of the exact number of trainees and the areas they have participated in. The SAAP II Final report had a summary of the key achievements of the two projects. However, it did not list the number of trainees and the areas they have been trained in.

**KPI-9.6.3 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:
-  

KPI-9.6.4: **Level of MOE participation in regional programmes oriented towards environment protection at the regional level especially with regard to cross-border environmental and climate change issues**

**Main Findings on KPI-9.6.4:**

Based on the communication with Director for Project Cooperation at the ministry, between the period of 2007 and 2013, the Ministry did not participate on EU regional programmes. All environment-related EU programmes were directed to the Department of Statistics, DoS.

The main reason for this was due to a problematic participation of the MoENV in a regional programme with Palestine. This programme was financed in 2004, but had difficulties in implementation and some financial ramifications resulted as a result. The EU is asking the ministry to refund back a total of 600,000 EURO, of which the ministry disputes the amount.

The ministry complains from project management procedures by the EU.

**KPI-9.6.4 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- */-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- */-

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- */-

**Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-9.6 (based on the KPIs main findings)**
**JC-9.7**

The choice and the combination of the EU aid modalities to support sustainable solutions in the energy and water sectors are the results of the search for efficiency and cost/effectiveness in line with Jordan Government objectives and complementary to other DP support to the sectors

### List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) under JC 9.5 (codes and definition)

| KPI-9.7.1 | Percentage of programmed EU supported interventions in the energy, water and environment sectors which are derived from a credible diagnostic analysis taking into account the existing preconditions (the current stage of policy and reform context) |
| KPI-9.7.2 | Percentage of EU supported interventions in the energy, water and environment sectors for which the full set of project identification, formulation, key implementation and M&E documents are available |
| KPI-9.7.3 | Extent to which alternative options EU support to the energy, water and environment sectors are studied and piloted, and criteria for preference and eligibility are defined and applied |
| KPI-9.7.4 | Percentage of EU supported interventions in the energy, water and environment sectors for which the overall objectives and project purpose are clearly and correctly differentiated and the assumptions and risk are clearly identified |
| KPI-9.7.5 | Degree to which the chronology of changes in frameworks for policy dialogue and coordinated TA/capacity development initiatives in the energy, water and environment sectors show evidence that BS programmes, projects, programme estimates and/or TA played a critical role (or not) in driving the development of effective frameworks in the energy and water sectors (e.g. for BS, general and specific conditions for the disbursement of BS tranches are defined on the basis of the contents of policy dialogue and promote the development of improved frameworks for policy dialogue, and their monitoring feeds policy dialogue processes) - (Cfr. 5.3.4) |
| KPI-9.7.6 | Extent to which, in the perception of representatives of the GoHKJ (including sector ministries), EU and other donors’ representatives, BS processes and/or other aid modalities, working independently or as a complement to BS, influence the evolution of frameworks for policy dialogue and coordinated TA/capacity development initiatives in the energy and water sectors. - (Cfr. 5.3.5) |
| KPI-9.7.7 | Degree to which the chronology of changes in policies, policy processes and capacities show evidence that BS programmes, programme estimates and/or TA played a critical role, or not, in supporting the changes / reforms in the energy and water sectors (e.g. specific conditions for the disbursement of BS tranches address issues of policy processes and capacities; complementary or embedded TA foresees support to the strengthening of capacities; programme estimates enhance institutional capacities...) - (Cfr. KPI 5.4.4) |
| KPI-9.7.8 | Extent to which, in the perceptions of representatives of the GoHKJ (including sector ministries), EU and other donors’ representatives, BS processes and/or other aid modalities, working independently or as a complement to BS, had an influence on the evolution of policies, policy frameworks and capacities in the energy and water sectors (cfr. KPI 5.4.5) |
| KPI-9.7.9 | Level of evidence that financing made available through BS has contributed to closing the gap of the energy and water medium term financing plans [e.g. volume and share of EU’s contribution to the financing of reforms in sectors benefiting from EU BS / Level of evidence of increased sector expenditure in supported sectors (cfr. KPI 4.5.4)] |
KPI-9.7.1: Percentage of programmed EU supported interventions in the energy, water and environment sectors which are derived from a credible diagnostic analysis taking into account the existing preconditions (the current stage of policy and reform context)

Main Findings on KPI-9.7.1:

**ENERGY:**

A high percentage of EU TA & project based supported interventions are actually derived from credible diagnostic analysis which takes into account the existing preconditions. As illustrated in the extracts below (Identification fiche for project approach), the three programmes under SAAP & SAPP were demand driven which implies that a credible diagnostic analysis taking into account the existing preconditions is satisfied. The reference also recognizes the fact that: The decentralized project approach is the best tool to ensure flexibility and ownership, and has proved to be, during the management of SAAP I and SAAP II, a strategic instrument for supporting the implementation of reforms and transferring capacity to Jordanian institutions. As for the BS segment, the satisfactory degree of meeting reform benchmarks governing the tranches (reported in assessment reports consulted) of the Renewable energy and Energy Efficiency Programme in Jordan is an indication towards the credible diagnostic analysis of the present preconditions, although these benchmarks are to a good extent realistic and achievable, but may be misleading in the sense that formal achievement is possible at this stage but do not necessarily indicate future success in actual implementation of RE and specially EE Projects.

The EU support programme was initiated in the spirit of the Jordanian National Agenda 2006-2015 which is the policy umbrella for all sectoral activities including energy. The National Agenda and the National Energy Strategy 2007-2020 are frequently referred to in the support programmes documents, therefore it can be concluded that the EU support has been responsive to the developments in the Jordanian context. Over the period of investigation, Jordan implemented a significant number of steps towards achieving the goals of the National Energy Strategy initiated in 2004. During this period, EU support was directed to support the implementation of Jordan's plans and programmes (especially in the regulatory and institutional reform, training and public awareness in the energy water and environment sectors). RE development is essential for Jordan, which lacks fossil fuel resources and is heavily dependent on e.g. gas imports from Egypt, which fluctuated recently due to pipeline incidents. In 2012 energy imports accounted for 22% of Gross Domestic Product and electricity tariffs rose significantly. Jordan's potential for wind farming and solar energy is however substantial. Extending RE would, additionally, provide opportunities for business. The EU funded programme aims to address this priority need, and serves to develop relevant policies and build in the needed institutional and technical capacities, for different stakeholders, and in a form to facilitate the implementation of the renewable energy and energy efficiency components of the 2007-2020 Master Energy Strategy. In practice, and as evidenced by the consulted documents and stakeholders meetings the following EU interventions play a significant role in the energy / environment sector and are reasonably derived from a credible diagnostic analysis taking into account the existing preconditions.

I. Capacity-Building in Wind Energy and Concentrating Solar Power (CSP) credible diagnostic analysis taking into account the existing preconditions: yes

II. BS Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Programme credible diagnostic analysis taking into account the existing preconditions: yes

III. Provision of assistance related to the first cooperation steps for developing and strengthening the capabilities of Jordan Nuclear Regulatory Commission credible diagnostic analysis taking into account the existing preconditions: No data available for assessment;

IV. SAAP I & II – 3 projects credible diagnostic analysis taking into account the existing preconditions: yes

V. The laboratory equipment provided by the SBS programme to NRCD/NERC. credible diagnostic analysis taking into account the existing preconditions: yes

VI. NERC database and management information system. credible diagnostic analysis taking into account the existing preconditions: yes

As evidenced by Annex II to the Financing Agreement N°ENP/2011/22721, the actions identified under the TA component are duly analyzed leading to future specific projects formulated on a solid credible base. One important example is the wind energy and CSP (WECSP) grid connected power generation project implemented with NERC which are in an advanced stage of implementation, this project represents the first of its kind in Jordan and serves multiple purposes. As for the first complementary specific objective of the
programme (see extracts below) regarding “Jordan to complete the relevant institutional and legislative reforms, with the view of creating the best possible enabling environment to mobilize public and private sectors in order to achieve RE&EE goals in 2020” is fulfilled to a great degree. What remains to be seen is the fulfillment of the second complementary specific objective that relevant to “full scale implementation of activities to induce behavioral changes and adoption of best available technologies and practices for RE & EE”.

In ROM BS Report sighted below it is recognized that “it should be noted that these indicators are very general and that they put a lot of emphasis on policy, regulatory and institutional setting issues. They do not cover operational aspects, including detailed plans of actions in each pertinent work area, means of ensuring networking and partnership development, incentive policy, market strategy, stakeholders mobilization methodology outside government spheres, as-well-as details regarding capacity building efforts required”. Unless reform indicators for future interventions are adjusted to reflect operational milestones uncertainty in achieving the second objective will persist. The sighted document also highlights the lack of a national plan of action in the area of EE and the inadequacy of MEMR’s management and implementing ability a conclusion supported by the investigations carried during this evaluation, interviewed stakeholders emphasized the lack of clarity in BS implementation, weak cooperation between line ministries and other organizations and unnecessary competition between organizations due to unclear definition of respective roles. One of the conclusions mentioned in SAAP II Final report acknowledged the following fact: [need to] Overcome deficiencies in the planning, coordination and management by further building the capacity of PAO- Jordan staff capabilities In conclusion, TA and project based interventions were reasonably derived from a credible diagnostic analysis taking into account the existing preconditions, while BS assumptions overlooked the weaknesses and shortcomings in the existing organizational structure of the energy sector.

WATER:
For all 3 interventions, a credible diagnostic analysis has been carried out taking into account the existing preconditions (the current stage of policy and reform context).

KPI-9.7.1 Main References and Sources of Information:
(i) Data, figures and tables:
- /-
(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- ROM -Monitoring Report, REEEP, 06/2013
- ROM - Monitoring report, REEP, 06/2013
- 25-22721 Renewable Energy, 3.4-Disbursement Report p. 2
- ENPI SP 2007-2013 &NIP 2007-2010 p. 3
- Evaluation of the European Commission’s Support to the HKo Jordan – Final Report Volume 1 – Overall Assessment, August 2007, p. i
- ENPI Jordan NIP 2011-2013 p.14
(iii) Additional information from field phase
**KPI-9.7.2:** Percentage of EU supported interventions in the energy, water and environment sectors for which the full set of project identification, formulation, key implementation and M&E documents are available

**Main Findings on KPI-9.7.2:**

**ENERGY:**

BS is not directly and univocally attached to the implementation of well-defined Action Plan (for example, there is a formal NEEAP (see extract below) in place and is being referred to in the documentation, unfortunately as the extract from the document shows the document does not qualify as a credible Action Plan which should include a precise and transparent execution program).

On the other hand, for the project based interventions the condition of the full set of project identification, formulation, key implementation and M&E documents was observed. WECS is one illustrative example of projects with full set of project identification, formulation, key implementation and M&E documents are available. Another example is the strengthening of MPWH through institutional and human capacity building and supporting the creation of Enforcement Office (EO) within the ministry and supporting the JNBC in its endeavors to upgrade National Building Codes capacity. Jordan Institution for Standards & Metrology (JISM) befitted from Supplies Contract, Framework Contract and subscription to CEN. As for MoEnv, projects included FWK contract "Institutional Strengthening of MoEnv, and Twinning light Project. The following major projects fulfill this condition:

   - full set of documents: yes
2. BS Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Programme
   - full set of documents: yes
3. Provision of assistance related to the first cooperation steps for developing and strengthening the capabilities of Jordan Nuclear Regulatory Commission
   - full set of documents: no
4. SAAP I & II – 3 projects
   - full set of documents: only partly
5. The laboratory equipment provided to NRCD/NRC. Full set of documents: yes
6. NERC database and management information system. Full set of documents: yes
7. Strengthening MPWH & JNBC
8. MEMR Information System

**WATER:**

All documents for all 3 interventions are available.

**KPI-9.7.2 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) **Data, figures and tables:**

- JO3.01/10 Provision of assistance related to developing and strengthening the capabilities of Jordan Nuclear Regulatory Commission (JNRC)
- ENPI JORDAN NIP 2011-2013 pp 14

(ii) **Key extracts from documents:**

- /-

(iii) **Additional information from field phase**

- Identification Fiche for Project Approach; Support to the implementation of the Action Plan programme II (SAPP II) pp II, pp VI
**KPI-9.7.3: Extent to which alternative options of EU support to the energy, water and environment sectors are studied and piloted, and criteria for preference and eligibility are defined and applied**

**Main Findings on KPI-9.7.3:**

**Energy:**

The following projects demonstrate that alternative options of EU support to the energy, water and environment sectors are studied and piloted, and criteria for preference and eligibility are satisfactorily defined and applied:

1. **Capacity-Building in Wind Energy and Concentrating Solar Power (CSP) (example, upgrading the CSP from 0.5 MW to 1 MW capacity)**
   - Alternative options defined: yes
2. **BS Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Programme**
   - Alternative options defined: yes
3. **Provision of assistance related to the first cooperation steps for developing and strengthening the capabilities of Jordan Nuclear Regulatory Commission**
   - Alternative options defined: no data available;
4. **SAAP I & II – 3 projects**
   - Alternative options defined: only partly
5. **MEMR's Energy Information System and Data Base**
6. **The laboratory equipment provided by the SBS programme to NRCD/NERC. Alternatives considered**
7. **NERC database and management information system. Alternatives considered**

This indicator is mainly constrained by the level of coordination between EU and the beneficiary organizations in Jordan. In this evaluation, Donor-Donor, Donor-Beneficiary and Beneficiary –Beneficiary coordination was analyzed and evaluated under the relevant JCs.

**Water:**

Only for one out of three interventions appropriate documentation available. Alternative options for Improved water resources security for low income rural and urban communities have been studied.

**KPI-9.7.3 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) **Data, figures and tables:**
   - Please see below

(ii) **Key extracts from documents:**
   - QSG Checklist Stand Alone Project Formulation, 15.02.2010

(iii) **Additional information from field phase**
   - -/-

**KPI-9.7.3 (i) Data, figures and tables:**

**ENERGY**

EU – Energy Portfolio
- Capacity Building for the National Energy Research Centre NERC (Twinning) EUWuropeAid/125624/C/A/ACT/JO Twinning project:JO 07/AA/EY07
- Capacity-Building in Wind Energy and Concentrating Solar Power (CSP) in Jordan, CRIS no.: 2010/20479
- Support to the Jordan Nuclear Regulatory Commission on Nuclear safety, Project no. JO3.01/08 managed by HQ
- Renewable energy and Energy Efficiency programme in Jordan REEE Euro Arab Mashreq Gas Market Project EAMGMP
- Energy Efficiency in the Construction Sector programme (MED- ENEC) MED-EMIP Energy market integration project
Main Findings on KPI-9.7.4:

**ENERGY:**

I. Capacity-Building in Wind Energy and Concentrating Solar Power (CSP)
   overall objectives/project purpose clearly and correctly differentiated and assumptions and risk clearly identified: yes for overall objectives/project purpose and for assumptions, but no for risks (no risks identified or at least not documented);

II. BS Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Programme
   overall objectives/project purpose clearly and correctly differentiated and assumptions and risk clearly identified: yes for overall objectives/project purpose; only partly for assumptions and risks (see quote below – document 1);

III. Provision of assistance related to the first cooperation steps for developing and strengthening the capabilities of Jordan Nuclear Regulatory Commission
   overall objectives/project purpose clearly and correctly differentiated and assumptions and risk clearly identified: No project purpose and no risks and assumptions formulated;

IV. SAAP I & II – 3 projects
   overall objectives/project purpose clearly and correctly differentiated and assumptions and risk clearly identified: only partly – see quote from final evaluation report;

Initially, the overall objectives and project purpose are clearly and correctly differentiated for EU supported interventions. As shown in the extract from (Identification Fiche for Project Approach) the programmes are based on specific objectives identification, and definition of priorities in the course of project implementation. Obviously, several risk elements which were not initially envisaged emerged during implementation. Most obvious example of such risk elements are: limited coordination and cooperation between energy organizations (MEMR-NERC where, for example, an agreement among MEMR/NRDC/RSS/NERC has been delayed to be signed just recently, MEMR-Electricity companies delay in interconnecting RE plants (NERC’s 1.6 MW Wind Power plant) to the grid, MEMR-MWI lack of coordination in EE, MEMR-MOT lack of coordination in EE)) and for that matter, the lagging behind of MEMR in upgrading its human capacity (limited number of staff and low level of training) and institutional arrangements (the delay in fully operationalising JREEEF) are major risk factor that affected the implementation of the Renewable energy and Energy Efficiency Programme in Jordan. Nevertheless, with growing local experience in dealing with EU-projects, and the urgent and critical nature of the energy related problems faced by Jordan, the overall Jordanian government sector performance has improved over the analyzed period

**WATER:**

In all 3 interventions assumptions have been clearly defined. Risks have been adequately defined for 2 out of 3 interventions. No documentation for all Al Meyah project in risks found.

KPI-9.7.4 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:
   
(ii) Key extracts from documents:
   
   – BS REEEP, Monitoring Report, 06/2013, p.20
   – Action Fiche for Jordan: Assistance to Regulatory Authority, JO3.01/08 Provision of assistance related to the first cooperation steps for developing and strengthening the capabilities of Jordan
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (JNRC), 2008

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- 25721-2.6-Revised LF For Addendum 1 ANNEX I LOGICAL FRAMEWORK
- Identification Fiche for Project Approach; Support to the implementation of the Action Plan programme II (SAPP II) pp VI

KPI-9.7.5: Degree to which the chronology of changes in frameworks for policy dialogue and coordinated TA / capacity development initiatives in the energy, water and environment sectors show evidence that BS programmes, projects, programme estimates and/or TA played a critical role (or not) in driving the development of effective frameworks in the energy and water sectors (e.g. for BS, general and specific conditions for the disbursement of BS tranches are defined on the basis of the contents of policy dialogue and promote the development of improved frameworks for policy dialogue, and their monitoring feeds policy dialogue processes) - (Cfr. 5.3.4)

Main Findings on KPI-9.7.5:

ENERGY:
The indicator refers to programmes, especially Budget Support programmes in the field of enhanced economic (and democratic) governance. It was not possible to conclude from the documentation if changes in frameworks for policy dialogue and coordinated TA / capacity development initiatives for enhanced economic (and democratic) governance show evidence that BS programmes, projects, programme estimates and/or TA played a critical role in driving the development of effective frameworks in the energy and water sectors. It is however worthwhile to mention that the disbursement report for BS in the Good Governance and Development Contract indicates that: “Jordan has a track record of sound economic fundamentals and prudent policies, which have been supported by a well-developed institutional policy framework and strong implementation capacity despite structural economic shortfalls”. The challenge in the context of this indicator 9.7.5 here however is to assess if and how the EU support programmes have contributed to enhanced economic governance and its overall enabling environment. For this purpose, and to reach a satisfactory conclusion, the development in compliance with reform benchmarks from previous assessment reports was adopted as the main indicator. As shown in the table from reference Assessment of implementation of sector budget “Renewable energy and Energy Efficiency Programme in Jordan” majority of benchmarks witnessed improvements in compliance degree over time.

Latest progress on Strategy and policy implementation for the renewable energy part started in February 2010, when the new RE & EE law was adopted and approved in 2011. Also there was a clear milestones when the MEMR launched an “Expression of Interest call” in May 2011 for possible interested investors in the RE sector (for sites which were not tendered yet), which is followed by signing MoUs with a group of competent investors, who were asked to prepare full technical proposals for their possible generation facilities; ending up in having contracts to build RE generation facilities.

According to MEMR 2013 Annual Report, Al Fujiej wind energy tendered was issued, a 90MW capacity plant expected to be online end of 2014, MEMR also proceeded with the installation of 65-75 MW PV and 65-75 Wind turbine plants on EPC basis. These and other developments strongly suggest developments in frameworks.

However it is obvious from the number of donors involved in supporting the reforms as well as from the perceptions received from interviewed stakeholders, that external pressure exerted by these donors along with external pressure exerted by private investors and relevant NGO's and other activist groups was a strong driving force in leading the government to implement a comprehensive list of institutional and legislative reforms. It is hard to imagine that this level of reform were to be achieved without this constant pressure on the government.

As for energy efficiency, less improvements are noticed, REEEEF is still not functional, efficient lighting projects announced by MEMR since 2011 are still not implemented, MOUs signed (to fulfill BS reform indicator) are mainly with government companies implying failure to attract large private sector consumers and finally the very low number of EE projects implemented compared to the already audited EE projects.
pipeline. No implementation of the adopted National Energy Efficiency Action Plan NEEAP since 2013 was done, the plan itself needs serious revision which will be evident once it is put to implementation test.

On the other hand and through the green financial incentives which are supposed to be developed, REEEP is also expected to provide benefits to “the population, industries, public sector, the commercial sector as well as professionals involved in the implementation of RE/EE technologies and their associations” (see extract below). This expectation obviously is not fulfilled until now and the reform indicators in place do not reflect progress if any in this direction

It is concluded that the authorities pursue a credible and relevant stability oriented macroeconomic policy aiming at restoring fiscal and external stability in the medium term and moving towards sustainability in the long term, despite the fact that GoJ was forced to raise subsidies (by freezing energy prices over a period of time coinciding with the wave of demonstrations and civil unrest in Jordan) in the energy sector contrary to agreed Government policies. However, the fuel price adjustment policy was resumed and GoJ has announced recently a gradual tariff increase plan over three years period to gradually offset the accumulated debt due to the difference between bulk purchase tariffs from generators and retail selling tariffs. BS programme REEEP: At this stage of reform development, there is indication that BS through the general and special conditions contributed marginally as a driving force for formal developments in policy frameworks in the energy sector. Reform benchmarks attached to REEEP led finally to the signing of agreement between MEMR & NRDC/RSS/NERC, signing MoUs with the EE targeted companies and the creation of Codes Enforcement Office (EO) which has been established as a department within the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MPWH) and forming the energy managers/officers of public institutions group indicating more openness towards others a trend that needs enforcement.

On the other hand, lack of coordination between different actors relevant to the energy sector (MEMR, MOWI, MOT) indicates that there is more place for actual changes in frameworks for policy dialogue to take place.

WATER:

The information collected during the desk and field phases does not allow to assess whether BS programmes, projects, programme estimates and/or TA played a critical role (or not) in driving the development of effective frameworks in the water sector.

KPI-9.7.5 Main References and Sources of Information:

(i) Data, figures and tables:

- /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:

- BS REEP, Monitoring Report, 06/2013
- 25-22721-2.4-FA+TAPs 19122011 REEEP-2011

(iii) Additional information from field phase

- ROM BS Report Programme Title: Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Programme REEEP Monitoring Reference -25/06/2013 pp 6, p 8
- Evaluation of the European Commission's Support to the HKo Jordan – Final Report Volume 1 – Overall Assessment, August 2007, p. i
- Assessment of implementation of sector budget “Renewable energy and Energy Efficiency Programme in Jordan” p. 16
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Area</th>
<th>Reform Benchmark</th>
<th>Compliance Identified (Sept. 2012) (%)</th>
<th>Compliance Identified (May 2013) (%)</th>
<th>Compliance Identified (Sept. 2013) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Sector policies and strategies implementation and update</td>
<td>1.1: Budget allocations for RE and EE actions, measures and investments plans for RE/EE</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2: Establishment of a code Enforcement Office by JNBC</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Legislation, regulations, standards and tariffs are developed and set for implementation</td>
<td>2.1: RE &amp; EE regulations adopted by the Government</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.2: Review and updating of Building Codes</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Clear mandates and capacities of relevant Institutions are set and implemented</td>
<td>3.1: Sufficient staff for the RE/EE Department of MEMR</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.2: NRDC/energy programme works closely with MEMR</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Established and developed Monitoring and evaluation methods and data bases</td>
<td>4.1: Database and forecasting software implemented</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.2: Plans for surveys in 6 economic sectors and reports in 2 sectors</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Impacts reflecting Implementation and achieved results</td>
<td>5.1: Large industries, commercial and transport companies signed MoUs for medium term RE/EE projects with MEMR, JNBC, NERC</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.2: Energy managers designated in government and public administrations</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.3: Construction sector professionals’ participation in standardization process for buildings</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.4: Up to 5 agreements has signed between Government and investors for RE electricity generation capacity</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
KPI-9.7.6: Extent to which, in the perception of representatives of the GoHKJ (including sector ministries), EU and other donors’ representatives, BS processes and/or other aid modalities, working independently or as a complement to BS, influence the evolution of frameworks for policy dialogue and coordinated TA/capacity development initiatives in the energy and water sectors. - (Cfr. 5.3.5)

Main Findings on KPI-9.7.6:

ENERGY:
In general (based on the below evaluation), there is an indication that BS processes had influence on the evolution of frameworks for policy dialogue and coordinated TA/capacity development initiatives in the energy sectors.

The following excerpts from the Aid Coordination and Effectiveness in Jordan, Final Report Feb. 2013, summarize the findings on this KPI. These findings are supported by the research carried out during this evaluation: “The development planning process is led by the Government and reflects a strong national ownership. The formulation of the National Executive Plan NEP takes place solely among Jordanian actors. Donors do not contribute to this process and their involvement starts when the NEP is in place and the areas for external financing have been identified. At this stage, the donors are requested to align their assistance in support of the NEP – according to the identified areas and following the 3-years NEP cycle. The absence of a structured dialogue and exchange during the national planning process between the Government and the donors makes it challenging for the donors to align their assistance with the national development priorities and programming timetables as well as to harmonize planning with the national systems and to programme and plan external contributions accordingly. It also makes it challenging for the Government to anticipate and plan external funding and so to take the best possible advantage of these funding possibilities”.

Another shortcoming in this regard was identified by the 25-22721-4.1.1ROM BS Report 25,062,013 where “coordination of donor’s assistance at GOJ level is ensured by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation MoPIC which organizes one or two meetings each year with all donors to streamline the use of external support and to avoid overlaps. MoPIC is also charged with the task of overseeing project execution which requires a more frequent type of coordination with donors, on an individual basis”. During meetings held in the course of this evaluation, several stakeholders raised the point that coordination is less than optimal, instead donors working in the field of energy organized meetings on their own initiative. Beneficiaries in particular expressed the opinion that coordination between line ministries and other beneficiary organizations is not adequate, their involvement in the process is limited and benefiting from BS being a complex procedure.

WATER:
The indicator is not applicable for the water sector. All interventions in the water sector were not related to Budget Support. The 3 stand-alone initiatives in the water sector did not influence the evolution of frameworks for policy dialogue and coordinated TA/capacity development initiatives.

KPI-9.7.6 Main References and Sources of Information:
(i) Data, figures and tables:
- BS REEEP, ROM Monitoring report, 06/2013
- 22721 REEE Analysis of REEE 1st disbursement report, p.5
- Aid Coordination and Effectiveness in Jordan. Final Report Feb. 2013, p. 4
(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- -/-
(iii) Additional information from field phase
- Identification Fiche for Project Approach, Support to the implementation of the Action Plan programme II (SAPP II) pp III
As already mentioned to the donor agencies and confusion among the donor community AP Programmes. It has been identified that most projects had the country’s different characteristics. This started with the presentation of oil pricing, later electricity pricing, and lately a clear reflection on the main sources of energy imports, and how they are further injected in the country’s energy sector facts. This started with the presentation of oil pricing, later electricity pricing, and lately a clear reflection on the main sources of energy imports, and how they are further injected in the country’s energy sector facts.

Several setbacks were encountered during implementation of the BS activities such as delay in coordination between MEMR & NERC (a specific reform Benchmark), which ended by signing an agreement which may in part be attributed to the EU intervention, failing to allocate (and spend) through the budget the full required sum (2 million JD/year to support JREEEF indicating that financial planning is still poor, and delay in staffing and operationalising JREEEF. This trend was observed in reference three “Evaluation of the Support to the Association Agreement Programme I & II, Final Report, December 2011, p. 7:” Prepare a logical framework for the overall SAAP and a monitoring & evaluation management system. Important are the management and the timing of the projects within the SAAP Programmes. It has been identified that most projects had delays and requested an extension period.

As concluded by reference “Assessment of implementation of sector budget Renewable energy and Energy Efficiency Programme in Jordan: “As already mentioned in the previous paragraphs and the estimated degree of compliance in Tranche 2 and Tranche 3, it is obvious that the main problems are concentrated on the area of Energy Efficiency (EE) implementation and could be summarized as follows:

- Poor capacity of MEMR to meet the set reform benchmarks in the broader area of EE under the current approach and use of resources.
- Delay in incorporating the capability and resources of NERC, in principle, but also of other institutions in implementation actions in the area of EE.
- Delay in mobilizing policy measures and support programmes through the mechanism of JREEEF.
- Unrealistic budgeting and poor financial project planning capacities.
- Delays in spending the allocated budget.”

More generally, there is no evidence that the existing form of policy dialogue would be conducive to important changes in GoJ policy. In general, and to be effective in conducing such a change, the necessary condition is that dialogue with GoJ should start at the policy making stage, while current approach is described by reference 2 below as “At the programming level the process seems to become focused on the matching/approval process and the individual development projects for which funding is sought from donors – usually by approaching donors bilaterally. From the donors’ perspective, the process lacks transparency and many donors perceive that this project-based approach has resulted in "shopping" among donors for the best deal causing additional workload for donor agencies and confusion among the donor community.” The conclusion reached by the referenced assessments is fair and is supported by findings during this evaluation: “The assessment clearly demonstrates that aid coordination system is Jordan is not geared towards generating optimal aid effectiveness. While some good practices can be identified the aid coordination system does not function in a manner that would maximize aid effectiveness nor solicit the full engagement of the key stakeholders – internal and international”

Another important conclusion is that MEMR is the weak link in the energy sector, more emphasis should be given to reforming and upgrading MEMR’s institutional and human capacity and better definition of its mandate, role in the sector and relations with other organizations. MEMR being the line ministry and the hub in any BS, resolving these issues with the ministry will maximize the benefits of BS to the whole sector.

One obvious and important development in GOJ’s policy is the transparency in presenting to the public its energy sector facts. This started with the presentation of oil pricing, later electricity pricing, and lately a clear reflection on the main sources of energy imports, and how they are further injected in the country’s different energy needs. For electricity tariff, the government presented to the public, the subsidies for different users, as well as selling prices, in comparison with imports cost, especially being heavily dependent on heavy fuel for electricity generation, since the Egyptian natural gas flow went down to 1/3 or half of the agreed quantities. The Government has been very clear and public showing the figures to reform the sector and to

### KPI-9.7.7: Degree to which the chronology of changes in policies, policy processes and capacities show evidence that BS programmes, programme estimates and/or TA played a critical role, or not, in supporting the changes / reforms in the energy and water sectors (e.g. specific conditions for the disbursement of BS tranches address issues of policy processes and capacities; complementary or embedded TA foresee support to the strengthening of capacities; programme estimates enhance institutional capacities,..) - (Cfr. KPI 5.4.4)

#### Main Findings on KPI-9.7.7:

##### ENERGY:

Several setbacks were encountered during implementation of the BS activities such as delay in coordination between MEMR & NERC (a specific reform Benchmark), which ended by signing an agreement which may in part be attributed to the EU intervention, failing to allocate (and spend) through the budget the full required sum (2 million JD/year to support JREEEF indicating that financial planning is still poor, and delay in staffing and operationalising JREEEF. This trend was observed in reference three “Evaluation of the Support to the Association Agreement Programme I & II, Final Report, December 2011, p. 7:” Prepare a logical framework for the overall SAAP and a monitoring & evaluation management system. Important are the management and the timing of the projects within the SAAP Programmes. It has been identified that most projects had delays and requested an extension period.”

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- Poor capacity of MEMR to meet the set reform benchmarks in the broader area of EE under the current approach and use of resources.
- Delay in incorporating the capability and resources of NERC, in principle, but also of other institutions in implementation actions in the area of EE.
- Delay in mobilizing policy measures and support programmes through the mechanism of JREEEF.
- Unrealistic budgeting and poor financial project planning capacities.
- Delays in spending the allocated budget.”

More generally, there is no evidence that the existing form of policy dialogue would be conducive to important changes in GoJ policy. In general, and to be effective in conducing such a change, the necessary condition is that dialogue with GoJ should start at the policy making stage, while current approach is described by reference 2 below as “At the programming level the process seems to become focused on the matching/approval process and the individual development projects for which funding is sought from donors – usually by approaching donors bilaterally. From the donors’ perspective, the process lacks transparency and many donors perceive that this project-based approach has resulted in “shopping” among donors for the best deal causing additional workload for donor agencies and confusion among the donor community.” The conclusion reached by the referenced assessments is fair and is supported by findings during this evaluation: “The assessment clearly demonstrates that aid coordination system is Jordan is not geared towards generating optimal aid effectiveness. While some good practices can be identified the aid coordination system does not function in a manner that would maximize aid effectiveness nor solicit the full engagement of the key stakeholders – internal and international”

Another important conclusion is that MEMR is the weak link in the energy sector, more emphasis should be given to reforming and upgrading MEMR’s institutional and human capacity and better definition of its mandate, role in the sector and relations with other organizations. MEMR being the line ministry and the hub in any BS, resolving these issues with the ministry will maximize the benefits of BS to the whole sector.

One obvious and important development in GOJ’s policy is the transparency in presenting to the public its energy sector facts. This started with the presentation of oil pricing, later electricity pricing, and lately a clear reflection on the main sources of energy imports, and how they are further injected in the country’s different energy needs. For electricity tariff, the government presented to the public, the subsidies for different users, as well as selling prices, in comparison with imports cost, especially being heavily dependent on heavy fuel for electricity generation, since the Egyptian natural gas flow went down to 1/3 or half of the agreed quantities. The Government has been very clear and public showing the figures to reform the sector and to
stop the deficit generated through such subsidies, and reflected in NEPCO's budget.

**WATER:**

All interventions in the water sector have been project interventions. Two of the interventions have been carried out under a Programme Estimates (PE) arrangement. One of those interventions, the Al Meyah Project contributed strongly to reform in the water sector. This can be attributed partly to the aid modality (PE) which ensured a higher ownership of the beneficiary institution, compared to a project approach whereby an external TA would have been contracted directly by EUD. The other two interventions have been carried out under the below aid modality interventions. Both projects did not directly contribute to the reform of the water sector.

- Zarqa: Project Approach / Partially decentralized; on the basis of PE's;
- Improved Water Resources Security: Direct and indirect (delegated cooperation) centralized implementation.

**KPI-9.7.7 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:
- /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:
- BS REEEP, Monitoring report, 06/2013, p.15

(iii) Additional information from field phase
- 25-22721-3.3.2-Disbursement Report-1022013
- Evaluation of the European Commission’s Support to the HKo Jordan – Final Report Volume 1 – Overall Assessment, August 2007, p. i

**KPI-9.7.8**: Extent to which, in the perceptions of representatives of the GoHKJ (including sector ministries), EU and other donors’ representatives, BS processes and/or other aid modalities, working independently or as a complement to BS, had an influence on the evolution of policies, policy frameworks and capacities in the energy and water sectors (cfr. KPI 5.4.5)

**Main Findings on KPI-9.7.8:**

**ENERGY:**

Several shortcomings that are identified in the document Aid Coordination and Effectiveness in Jordan sighted below are supported by findings during this evaluation, most important are:

“The programming stage is fully led by MoPIC whereby it works closely with the Ministry of Finance on issues relating to lending, the sector ministries will need to become involved at an earlier stage of the process”… “At the programming level the process seems to become focused on the matching/approval process and the individual development projects for which funding is sought from donors – usually by approaching donors bilaterally”. Weak Donor-Donor & Donor-GOJ coordination

“The concentration on the process of resource mobilization for individual projects and initiatives distracts the attention from economies of scale at the level of alignment with development priorities”. Weak high level coordination within GOJ

“The capacities for planning and project management are often weak in the line ministries and the decision-making processes are concentrated high up in the hierarchy at the level of Secretary General and the Minister with the result that the frequent changes of holders of political offices greatly impede efficient implementation of aid initiatives”. Weak institutionalization of aid management within line ministries

“The aid coordination system does not function in a manner that would maximize aid effectiveness nor solicit the full engagement of the key stakeholders – internal and international”. Weak coordination

Apart from the development in GOJ’s policy mentioned under KPI-9.7.7, it could be concluded that EU and
other donors’ representatives, BS processes and/or other aid modalities, working independently or as a complement to BS, had little influence on the evolution of policies, policy frameworks and capacities in the energy and water sectors.

**WATER:**

Two out of three interventions (Al Meyah Project and Improved Water Resources Security Project) had an influence on the evolution of policies, policy frameworks and capacities in the water sector. Al Meyah had a clear contribution to policy reform and the Improved Water Resources Security Project on the implementation of policy frameworks.

The Zarqa project has more to be seen as a support project without strong capacity building and policy reform objectives. It was mainly deemed to establish proper technical TOR for water infrastructure rehabilitation and to contract technical companies according to agreed administrative procedures to carry out rehabilitation works.

**KPI-9.7.8 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:

- /-

(ii) Key extracts from documents:

- Aid Coordination and Effectiveness in Jordan Assessment, Framework and Plan of Action Final Report - February 2013 MoPIC/UNRC Publication, pp.5 & 8
- BCS: 31.10.2013; Improved Water Resources Security for the Low Income Urban and Rural Communities" (WRAP)
- BS REEEP, Monitoring report, 06/2013, p.15

(iii) Additional information from field phase

- /-

**KPI-9.7.9:** Level of evidence that financing made available through BS has contributed to closing the gap of the energy and water medium term financing plans [e.g. volume and share of EU’s contribution to the financing of reforms in sectors benefiting from EU BS / Level of evidence of increased sector expenditure in supported sectors (cfr. KPI 4.5.4)]

**Main Findings on KPI-9.7.9:**

**ENERGY:**

The monitoring report (06/2013) of the BS REEEP programme indicates that there might be some positive effect of the SSP, but that this cannot be substantiated. In general, available information does not allow to conclude (positively or negatively) whether BS has contributed to closing the gap of the energy medium term financing plans. The information below indicates positive effects from BS:

The estimated investment requirements for the energy sector during the period 2008-2020 ranges between USD 13.2 and 17.3 billion. Comparing this figure to the total allocated to Energy Generation and Supply subsector amounting to EUR 58.2 million, reveals the limited (direct) financial effect of the intervention. Still other indirect effects of the EU support on the overall governance and management of the sector are significant. The allocated budget covered a substantial part of the cost of institutional, regulatory and human capacity building which in the case of Jordan are primarily financed through donors support. This is essential to pave the field for private sector investors in the implementation of energy projects.

The Aid Coordination and Effectiveness in Jordan Report (see below extract) shows that more than 80% of the grants come in form of project funding – decreasing the amount of direct Budget Support to around 15% of the grant component or 7% of the total external aid. It also lists the top 10 donors to Jordan which do not include EU. Accordingly, EU’s financing has relatively low volume and share contribution to the financing of reforms in sectors benefiting from EU BS.

On the other hand, stakeholders (NERC, JISM, MEMR) declared that support received did close a financing gap, where laboratory equipment for example may not have been purchased without this support and sectoral surveys would have been delayed indefinitely. This is a credible conclusion taking into consideration...
the minimal allocation by the GOJ to sector budget. In conclusion, volume and share of EU’s contribution to the financing of reforms in sectors benefiting from EU BS is limited.

**WATER:**

Available information does not allow to conclude (positively or negatively) whether BS has contributed to closing the gap of the water medium term financing plans.

**KPI-9.7.9 Main References and Sources of Information:**

(i) Data, figures and tables:

- PA.REP-02-FDs by DAC sector

(ii) Key extracts from documents:

- BS REEEP, Monitoring report, 06/2013

(iii) Additional information from field phase

- Aid Coordination and Effectiveness in Jordan Assessment, Framework and Plan of Action FINAL REPORT - February 2013

**JC-9.7: The choice and the combination of the EU aid modalities to support sustainable solutions in the energy and water sectors are the results of the search for efficiency and cost/effectiveness in line with Jordan Government objectives and complementary to other DP support to the sectors**

**Assessment of / statement on Judgement Criterion JC-9.7 (based on the KPIs main findings)**

In 2010, the main sectors receiving donor support were: energy, water & irrigation, education, health, private development & investment, employment & vocational training and environment. Due to the dramatic developments in the energy supply during the recent year, energy sector has rapidly become a main strategic priority of the Government for foreign assistance.

Based on the evidence and discussion presented above, it can be concluded that the choice and the combination of the EU aid modalities to support sustainable solutions in the energy and water sectors are to an important extent (especially the TA instrument) the results of the search for efficiency and cost/effectiveness in line with Jordan Government objectives and complementary to other DP support to the sectors. A high percentage of EU TA & project based supported interventions are actually derived from credible diagnostic analysis which takes into account the existing preconditions. As for the BS segment, the satisfactory degree of meeting reform benchmarks governing the tranches (reported in assessment reports consulted) of the Renewable energy and Energy Efficiency Programme in Jordan is an indication towards the credible diagnostic analysis of the present preconditions, although these benchmarks are to a good extent realistic and achievable, but may be misleading in the sense that formal achievement is possible at this stage but do not necessarily indicate future success in actual implementation of RE and specially EE Projects (KPI-9.7.1).

As evidenced by the analysis above, the actions identified under the TA component are duly analyzed leading to future specific projects formulated on a solid credible base. One important example is the wind energy and CSP (WECSP). Also the first complementary specific objective of the programme is fulfilled to a large degree. What remains to be seen is the fulfilment of the second complementary specific objective that relevant to “full scale implementation of activities to induce behavioral changes and adoption of best available technologies and practices for RE & EE”. (KPI-9.7.1)

To the same end, the analysis above confirmed findings from other assessment reports in regard to the Reform Indicators mainly: it should be noted that these indicators are very general and that they put a lot of emphasis on policy, regulatory and institutional setting issues. They do not cover operational aspects, including detailed plans of actions in each pertinent work area, means of ensuring networking and partnership development, incentive policy, market strategy, stakeholders mobilization methodology outside
government spheres, as well as details regarding capacity building efforts required. This is an important issue for monitoring the fulfilment of the second complementary specific objective of the program. (KPI-9.7.1)

BS & TA instruments should be differentiated in analysis where in conclusion, TA and project based interventions were reasonably derived from a credible diagnostic analysis taking into account the existing preconditions, while BS assumptions overlooked the weaknesses and shortcomings identified in the analysis above in the structure of the energy sector. (KPI-9.7.1)

With the exception for the initiatives related to the strengthening of the capabilities of the Jordan Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the condition of the full set of project identification, formulation, key implementation and M&E documents under TA instrument was observed. WECSP is one illustrative example of projects with full set of project identification, formulation, key implementation and M&E documents are available. (KPI-9.7.2)

As for activities under BS instrument, the general conclusion is such activities are not directly and univocally attached to the implementation of well-defined Action Plan. (KPI-9.7.2)

For all of the EU supported project and programmes the overall objectives and project purpose have been clearly and correctly differentiated. Assumptions and risk have however not consistently be identified.

One risk element identified during the evaluation and substantiated by the findings of ROM BS REPORT sighted under KPI-9.7.2 is the adequacy of MEMR’s management and implementing ability, particularly in respect of: working out a detailed plan of operations, establishing and developing sound inter-institutional relationships, putting in motion, directly or indirectly, multiple activities in liaison with the private sector. (KPI-9.7.2)

Percentage of EU supported interventions in the energy, water and environment sectors for which the overall objectives and project purpose are clearly and correctly differentiated and the assumptions and risk are clearly identified is good especially under TA. However this indicator is mainly constrained by the level of coordination between EU and the beneficiary organizations in Jordan. In this evaluation, Donor-Donor, Donor-Beneficiary and Beneficiary –Beneficiary coordination was analyzed and evaluated under the relevant JCs. (KPI-9.7.3)

As for the percentage of EU supported interventions in the energy, water and environment sectors for which the overall objectives and project purpose have been clearly and correctly differentiated and the assumptions and risk are clearly identified, the analysis above differentiated between one: overall objectives and project purpose differentiation and two: assumptions and risk identification. For part one, all evidence suggest that this condition was reasonably met in the majority of programme interventions, while for part two, delays and setbacks during implementation revealed that several crucial risk elements where overlooked mainly in relation to structural and institutional weaknesses in the energy sector, lack of coordination frameworks, lack of clear mandate and job descriptions for different organizations and the unnecessary competition between MEMR and other organizations. It was also observed that the overall Jordanian government sector performance did improve over the analyzed period as a consequence of pressure exerted by other stakeholders (private sector, donors, public opinion). (KPI-9.7.4)

The role of BS programmes, projects, programme estimates and/or TA in driving the development of effective frameworks in the energy and water sectors cannot be precisely determined. On the other hand, assessments of the overall GOJ performance were positive and indicated improvements. (KPI-9.7.5)

To appreciate the role of EU’s intervention program, and to reach a satisfactory conclusion, the development in compliance with reform benchmarks from previous assessment reports was adopted as the main indicator. As shown in the relevant assessment report consulted during the evaluation, majority of benchmarks witnessed improvements in compliance degree over time. (KPI-9.7.5)

The chronology of changes, events and actions taken by the GOJ indicate important reforms in the sector’s framework. Based on the number of donors involved in supporting the reforms as well as from the perceptions received from interviewed stakeholders, that external pressure exerted by these donors including EU along with external pressure exerted by private investors and relevant NGO’s and other activist groups was a strong driving force in leading the government to implement a comprehensive list of institutional and legislative reforms. It is hard to imagine that this level of reform were to be achieved without this constant pressure on the government. With the diversity of stakeholders involved and diversity of the instruments applied, the conclusion is that EU contributed in driving the developments in proportion to its relative role among different stakeholders. (KPI-9.7.5)
Several obstacles prevent BS processes and/or other aid modalities from strongly influencing the evolution of frameworks for policy dialogue and coordinated TA/capacity development initiatives in the energy and water sectors. Among these obstacles identified by previous assessments and substantiated during this evaluation are (KPI-9.7.6):

- The formulation of the National Executive Plan NEP takes place solely among Jordanian actors. Donors do not contribute to this process and their involvement starts when the NEP is in place and the areas for external financing have been identified.
- The absence of a structured dialogue and exchange during the national planning process between the Government and the donors makes it challenging for the donors to align their assistance with the national development priorities and programming timetables.
- Coordination of donor’s assistance at GOJ level should be ensured by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation MoPIC, which in the opinion of the majority of stakeholders interviewed is less than satisfactory.
- Coordination between line ministries and other beneficiary organizations is not adequate, their involvement in the process is limited and benefiting from BS being a complex procedure.

Several setbacks were encountered during implementation of the BS activities, delays and failure to meet deadlines and fulfill certain indicators. It has been identified that most projects had delays and requested an extension period. (KPI-9.7.7)

The main problems are concentrated in the area of Energy Efficiency (EE) implementation, these problems are listed under KPI-9.7.7 (Poor capacity of MEMR, Delay in incorporating the capability and resources of NERC, Delay in mobilizing policy measures and support programmes through the mechanism of JREEEF, Unrealistic budgeting and poor financial project planning capacities, and Delays in spending the allocated budget). It is concluded that there is no evidence the existing form of policy dialogue would be conducive to important changes in GoJ policy. In general, and to be effective in conducting such a change, the necessary condition is that dialogue with GOJ should start at the policy making stage. (KPI-9.7.7)

Another important obstacle facing the BS program, programme estimates and/or TA in playing a critical role, in supporting the changes / reforms in the energy sector is that MEMR is the weak link in the energy sector, more emphasis should be given to reforming and upgrading MEMR’s institutional and human capacity and better definition of its mandate, role in the sector and relations with other organizations. MEMR being the line ministry and the hub in any BS, resolving these issues with the ministry will maximize the benefits of BS to the whole sector.(KPI-9.7.7)

One obvious and important development in GOJ’s policy is the transparency in presenting to the public its energy sector facts. This developments can be partly attributed to EU intervention programmes in line with other donors and stakeholders influence.(KPI-9.7.7)

BS processes and/or other aid modalities, had limited influence on the evolution of policies, policy frameworks and capacities in the energy sector due to the following obstacles identified and discussed under (KPI-9.7.8):

- Weak Donor-Donor & Donor-GOJ coordination
- Weak high level coordination within GOJ
- Weak institutionalization of aid management within line ministries
- Weak coordination

Level of evidence that financing made available through BS has contributed to closing the gap of the energy and water medium term financing plans and level of evidence of increased sector expenditure in supported sectors is modest. Taking into consideration the estimated investment requirements for the energy sector during the period 2008-2020 ranging between USD 13.2 and 17.3 billion, and considering the relatively small volume of EU SSP in comparison with other major donors (EU is not part of the 10 largest donors to Jordan nor in the energy sector) (reveals the limited level of (direct) financial effect of the intervention. Still other indirect effects of the EU support on the overall governance and management of the sector are significant. (KPI-9.7.9)

The allocated budget covered a substantial part of the cost of institutional, regulatory and human capacity building which in the case of Jordan are primarily financed through donors support. This is essential to pave the field for private sector investors in the implementation of energy projects. Stakeholders emphasized the importance of the programme in filling financing gaps in their respective organizations, such as WECSp, laboratory equipment, Information systems and capacity building. Under the stringent financing conditions followed by the GOJ, these activities had to be postponed indefinitely (KPI-9.7.9)
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01 EC Jordan CSP-NIP and related docs

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01.2 ENPI South RSP-RIP


01.3 ENPI RSP-RIP


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