REPORT ON THE PUBLIC CONSULTATION
ON THE COMMUNICATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
ON
"THE EU, AFRICA AND CHINA: TOWARDS TRILATERAL DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION ON PEACE, STABILITY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT"

Brussels, 14 July 2008
Section 1: Introduction

In view of the envisaged Commission Communication on "The EU, Africa and China: Towards trilateral dialogue and cooperation on peace, stability and sustainable development", the Commission held a public consultation between 16th April and 15th June 2008. Chinese activities in Africa have been a hot topic for the last 2 years, debated both in the press and by experts at international conferences. The Commission considered it time to understand what the impacts of such Chinese activities are on Africa's development and on the EU's relations with China and Africa and take action, proposing trilateral cooperation between Africa, China and the EU on peace, stability and sustainable development. The purpose of this consultation was therefore to gather information and opinions from all African, Chinese and European stakeholders i) on the idea of setting up a trilateral (Africa-China-EU) dialogue and cooperation notably in the areas of peace and security, infrastructure and sustainable management of natural resources and ii) on possible joint actions to be taken by the EU, its Member States, China and Africa to support it.

The consultation took place through two channels. The main channel was an on-line form in French and English, accessible through the Your voice in Europe and Europa web-sites. The secondary channel was a Microsoft Word document with the same text which could be completed and emailed or posted.

In addition to these channels, the Commission promoted the consultation by contacting a list of experts and civil society organizations in Europe, Africa and China and requested its Delegations in Africa to promote the public consultation through their websites.

This report contains a synthesis of the replies received to each of the questions, as well as a summary of the quantitative assessments.

Respondents and methodological notes

In total, 47 replies to the public consultation were received. These replies can be broken down as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1.2. Are you replying…? single choice reply (compulsory)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Requested records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on behalf of an organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as an individual</td>
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<tr>
<th>1.5. What type of organisation is it? single choice reply (optional)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Requested records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A business organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>A research Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>A non-governmental organisation (NGO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>A company</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other category</td>
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<tr>
<td>A national public administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>A regional public administration</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The list of the organizations that answered the consultation is quite diverse including 13 business organisations and 4 companies, 10 respondents from research institutes, 8 NGOs and 1 National Public Administration. It should be noted that 8 business organisations seem to have coordinated their answers to some questions as the wording of their replies is partly identical.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requested records</th>
<th>Count</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In the EU</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In an African Country</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsewhere</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In China</td>
<td>3</td>
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</table>

While the recorded questions were 29 from the EU, 10 from an African country, 3 from China and 5 from elsewhere, the nationality of respondents indicates that replies from 28 Europeans, 14 Africans, 3 Chinese and 2 from elsewhere were received.

The questionnaire contained several multiple choice questions, and additionally provided respondents with the opportunity to add written comments to these multiple choice questions.

For the multiple choice part questions, a statistical method was used to summarise the answers. The results of all 47 respondents are presented together in graphical or tabular form.

Respondents' written comments naturally could not be analysed using such a clear-cut method. Therefore, the comments by all respondents on each particular question were analysed, and recurring opinions were extracted. Additionally, individual comments of particular interest and/or relevance were included.

Section 2. Current Sino-African relations

2.1+ 2.2 + 2.3+ 2.4. What is the role of civil society in current Sino-African relations? What role should civil society play in Sino-African cooperation in the peace and security area/infrastructure area/ sustainable management of natural resources?

Summary of answers & comments

The African responses observed that civil society (CS) has a small role, or is not involved at all in Sino-African cooperation. They acknowledged that civil society organisations (CSO) are not very involved in negotiations, or Sino-African cooperation (5 answers). The general opinion was that civil society did not benefit from Chinese development cooperation.

Research institutes were cited as being part of civil society involvement in Sino-African relations. The examples mentioned were: 1) the African Economic Research Consortium’s Asian Drivers project 2) Fahamu’s Africa-China Civil Society Dialogue, 3) The South African Institute of International Affairs’ China in Africa Project and 4) the Centre for Chinese Studies and ad hoc research projects on Sino-African relations being conducted by African academics based at various universities located within and outside of the continent. Most of these projects were described as being funded by external western donors who were interested in China’s deepening engagement in Africa and the implications thereof for bilateral and multilateral relations as well as the issues of sustainable development and governance. Even though these specific civil society examples were provided it can be
concluded that few CSOs are working on this issue, they are managed independently and are not being co-ordinated in order to develop a coherent policy response that could assist African governments and policy-makers to initiate a pragmatic policy engagement with China.

Some African civil society groups are said to be viewed with suspicion and as a threat because the nature of their work tends to ask sensitive questions and spot dark places of the cooperation.

One Chinese respondent observed that civil society and Chinese civilians are not aware of Chinese government cooperation in Africa. The Chinese respondents do not have a lot of information on African civil society organizations interested in Sino-African cooperation.

8 of the European respondents which answered this question observed the same trend – the very limited role that civil society is playing in these relations, as there is limited transparency in government to government relations in Sino-African cooperation.

More informed CSOs that have researched the role of civil society in the context of Sino-African relations talk about different aspects of African and Chinese civil society:

- Chinese civil society is characterised by a lack of awareness about Sino-African relations.
- The so-called Government-operated Non-governmental organizations (GONGOs) in China are very immature in operating with the African context (2 answers) but they have an impact in some parts of China. They are not so engaged in controversial, oppositional or advocacy issues.
- African civil society is seen as polymorphic, at different development levels and with different interests than official Sino African cooperation.
- With all the differences between civil society in Africa and China, there are still new opportunities arising for civil society to engage and influence the nature of Sino-African relations: through joint research and projects with Chinese institutions; through the contact between African communities and Chinese “diasporas” to help to improve awareness on the poverty reduction strategies developed by GONGOs in China; through the liberalisation of public space by the internet that would have a positive effect on public opinion.

In total 17 respondents did not answer these questions. This confirms that the involvement of civil society in current Sino-African relations is not well known.

**The role of CS in the peace and security sector**

The common concern stated in this section of the public consultation by the African respondents was the fact that Sino-African cooperation is mostly benefiting the African elite and this affects the population and has a considerable impact on the peace and security sector. The majority of respondents see civil society as a critical partner for peace and security.
Other roles mentioned that CS could play in the peace and security area are: research, early warning, conflict resolution, and post-conflict reconstruction.

The respondents also signalled a need for CSOs to be given the necessary support by their governments as a long term approach for monitoring, policy formulation, coherence and sustainable development. Training and capacity building are also important needs of civil society.

On the cooperation between African-EU-Chinese CSOs, the following concrete ideas were put forward:

- CSOs could establish a parallel meeting to the official government FOCAC summits which take place every three years. At such meetings experiences/skills could be shared between CSOs in a range of different areas and CSOs could also put forward analyses and suggestions to government officials.
- CSOs could organise exchanges between Chinese CSOs and colleagues in Africa and elsewhere to share concrete lessons from poverty reduction projects.
- CSOs and researchers could meet for joint discussions on the results of monitoring the concrete impact of China’s assistance to and cooperation with Africa.
- Similarly, CSOs in western countries could provide analysis of the activities of their nations’ companies in China which are part of the global triangular dynamic of trade and investment related to China’s increased engagement in Africa.

**The role of CS in infrastructure**
Infrastructure is seen as a core area for ensuring sustainable development of a country, and civil society is seen as a critical actor.

**The role of CS in ensuring sustainable management of natural resources**
The majority of respondents see the management of natural resources as a critical sector for development with strong impacts on peace and security, economic growth and the environment. Therefore, civil society's role in the sustainable management of natural resources is very important.
Section 3. The context of trilateral cooperation between Africa, China and the EU

3.1 What do you think in general of the idea of establishing trilateral cooperation on development between Africa, China and the EU?

Summary of answers
In 47 answers, a large majority of respondents (35, 74%) were positive about potential trilateral cooperation, 7 respondents preferred not to begin trilateral cooperation yet, 2 gave no answer and two were neutral on the subject.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages of trilateral cooperation</th>
<th>Doubts, Fears</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• African development has been defined as a key priority both by China and Europe (4 respondents)</td>
<td>• Amounts to the scramble for Africa all over again only this time it is for resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Structure and prior agreement exist.</td>
<td>• Implementation fears</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Important for the exchange of views and opinions to strengthen mutual understanding by more communication among the 3 partners (15 respondents)</td>
<td>• There must be common ground for understanding on some basic principles with respect to Corporate Social Responsibility issues at least (23% of respondents indicated the need for common values and principles for cooperation to be achieved through dialogue)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The context of globalization; if for the past 50 years China has engaged bilaterally, which made sense in the Cold War, now China is realising it cannot act in this way and needs to gain the legitimacy of international co-operation (3 respondents)</td>
<td>• Differences in approach could hamper an effective and positive result overall Needs to be pursued in a way that ensures environmental sustainability, long term sustainable economic development and poverty reduction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To have a positive impact there is a need to ensure that they do not contradict but complement, and, where possible, strengthen each other from the perspective of African development (4 respondents)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• To take advantage of existing synergies and avoid bilateral engagement which is creating double costs</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Could give more opportunities to African countries, especially in the area of the economy and infrastructure development</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Since discussions regarding China–Africa by EU-member states have been weak in representing African viewpoints and decision makers</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• To maximise effectiveness and benefits to Africa, <strong>coherence and complementarity</strong> are important, especially in areas of common interest for cooperation</td>
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Comments on the answers
86 % of the respondents who preferred to postpone this cooperation were EU business organizations (7) which fear the unfair competition by Chinese companies in the infrastructure sector based on the argument that they do not respect the same standards. These
same respondents enquired why Europe is treating the relationship with China differently from that with the US, Japan and other donors, and why Europe wants to engage trilaterally.

The majority of respondents of diverse locations and backgrounds (all types of organization from all regions) that considered this cooperation important and necessary leads us to clearly state that trilateral cooperation and dialogue are needed, with specific attention to implementation, but that business organisations remain sceptical for specific reasons.

3.2 + 3.3 + 3.4 In your opinion, in which sectors/areas should this cooperation start and why? If other category, please specify.

Statistics of answers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors/areas</th>
<th>Requested records</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sustainable management of natural resources</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good governance</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace and security</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education/training</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural dialogue</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>12</td>
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</table>

Summary of the answers

This was a multiple choice question and respondents had the possibility to choose as many sectors as they considered suitable. 68.1 % of them chose sustainable management of natural resources, 61.7% - Good governance, 53.2 % - Environment, 51.1% - Infrastructure, 48.9% - Peace and security, 44.7% Education/Training, 38.3% Health and 31.9% Cultural dialogue.

Taking the analysis further and trying to see where the influence of the respondent's origin, the following can be considered:

The majority of African respondents (11 out of 14) considered the sustainable management of natural resources as the sector in which to begin trilateral cooperation, 10 Africans considered infrastructure and peace and security as second and third sectors. Environment came 4th with 9 votes and good governance 5th with 8 votes from African respondents.

Half of the Europeans replied that sustainable management of natural resources and good governance are the sectors in which to start cooperation, environment following closely with 15 votes, while infrastructure and peace and security came 4th and 5th with 13 and 11 votes respectively. However, the first five sectors voted by the majority of respondents got 1 vote each out of 3 from the Chinese. The education sector was the only one voted for twice by the Chinese respondents.

Poverty reduction strategies were mentioned by 3 respondents as a good sector for starting trilateral cooperation given the different experiences and perspectives of the three partners and the importance of this in achieving MDG1. Trade issues and rules were mentioned by 2 other respondents given the importance of trade and the interrelation with development.
Other sectors mentioned occasionally were: Cooperation on aid effectiveness and responsible lending practices; Creation of a regulatory environment for investors; Capacity building initiatives; Youth as a cross cutting issue; Low carbon technology; IPR – Intellectual Property Rights; Maritime transport (Security and Safety)

Comments on the answers:
3 out of 14 African respondents say that all the sectors given as an option are to be taken in consideration when starting trilateral cooperation.

Some answers show suspicion on the African side of the purpose of this trilateral cooperation, in terms of imposing conditionality on speedy Chinese cooperation, or controlling cooperation for Africa's development. Trilateral cooperation is also seen by a few people as balancing cooperation with Europeans which is haunted by the colonial past and misconceptions related to that.

It is interesting that half of the African respondents link sustainable management and the use of natural resources to good governance and peace and security arguing that the latter 2 are a condition for the former to happen, while the other half believe that good governance is important but a very sensitive topic, and initiating cooperation with this would not make it efficient or frank.

10 out of 14 Africans see infrastructure as a very important component of Africa's development.

Of the 3 Chinese respondents, 2 recommended cultural dialogue and education/training for starting cooperation, while the third commented on the overlapping characteristics of this cooperation and the need for it.

European business networks seem to have coordinated the answers regarding the conditions and the start to trilateral cooperation. 8 Respondents commented on the need to familiarise Chinese industry with the EU's environmental, social, human rights and ethical standards before entering into closer cooperation with them. These respondents believe that joint projects can only be started after Chinese companies have agreed to comply with the same standards as EU companies and in the meanwhile good governance and cultural dialogue can be started.

A different opinion is given by 9 other respondents who understand the importance of trilateral cooperation in all the sectors mentioned for Africa's development. Sustainable management of natural resources is closely linked to the environment sector and the need for the EU to enter into this cooperation to ensure that Africa does not suffer resource depletion or other environmental damage due to Chinese cooperation or Western needs for consumption that feed global chains.

One of the respondents mentioned that it is difficult to understand how cooperation will work, therefore this and the fear of joint projects in the infrastructure sector should be addressed with a clear explanation of the objectives and ways of implementing this cooperation.

In relation to the infrastructure sector, where 13 respondents commented on the need for cooperation, it was mentioned that cooperation should address African needs in the sector, not only EU or Chinese interests.
3.5 In which of the above sectors could China have a competitive advantage? Why?

This was an open question therefore no statistics on the answers can be given.

Summary of the answers:
Most of the replies indicated a clear competitive advantage for China in the infrastructure sector (22) because of the Chinese pragmatic and business oriented approach in building infrastructure without conditionality and without setting pre-conditions which is possibly also due to the non-membership of China in the OECD as business organisations informed. The readiness to take risks was estimated to be higher than with Western actors. This includes that Chinese companies would go where Western companies do not go. The sub-sector of energy (oil, hydropower) is mentioned several times. State subsidies for Chinese companies allow them to offer the lowest prices. Aid is tied to Chinese projects.

Risks: Low construction and labour costs lead to low quality. EU stakeholders feel there is unfair competition in the African infrastructure market.

Other sectors which were mentioned several times (decreasing order): education (15), health (13) and peace and security (6). The latter is explained by the Chinese right of veto in the UN Security Council and their presence in fragile states.

African respondents said that the Chinese are generally strong in capacity building activities due to their domestic experiences. In general, African replies indicate that China understands the needs of a developing country better than the EU does simply thanks to its own experience. Africans want to learn from Chinese experience. Development finance is seen as another competitive advantage for China as an innovative and alternative financial instrument.

In addition, 2 African respondents think that the reluctance of some African governments concerning the negotiations on Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) is pushing them towards the Chinese approach as an alternative to the EU.

Interestingly, one respondent mentioned Chinese competitive advantage in the sector of sustainable management of natural resources, as seen by Africans as more efficient and having fewer moral prejudices.

Comments on the answers:
The replies to the public consultation do not contain unexpected results. Chinese competitive advantage lies clearly in the sectors of infrastructure, health and education. What may not have been realised very much in the EU so far is that in the African view Chinese capacity building and training are seen as highly efficient and adapted to the real needs on the ground. A Chinese respondent also indicates this sector as a specific Chinese strength. China is a clear option for the African side to choose which it does not want to lose by entering into trilateral cooperation.
3.6 What is your opinion on the non-conditional approach proposed by the Chinese Government in existing Sino-African relations?

This was an open question therefore no statistics on the answers can be given.

Summary of the answers
EU and African respondents stated that the principles of sovereignty and non-interference should not be applied in cases where human rights violations are obvious.

Risks of non-conditionality: Countries violating human rights but enjoying a good business relationship with China can rely on China's veto against sanctions in the UN Security Council; lack of good governance, transparency and accountability, aid effectiveness, sustainable and future oriented thinking.

According to EU respondents, the Chinese non-conditionality approach was not consistent with international agreements and standards. This undermines efforts by the international community to adopt development oriented policies. Donors and recipients should adhere to their international commitments. Transparent accountability on the use of revenues should be a matter of course. Trilateral cooperation is seen as difficult as it would not be based on the same principles. One European business organisation also sees risks with exaggerated conditionality and it expects trilateral cooperation to narrow the gap between the European and Chinese approaches.

Africans see this approach as a welcome alternative to Western conditions-based aid and many support it clearly. The non-conditionality policy of Chinese activities in Africa avoids the neo-colonial effect of Western countries. China's flexibility to align its aid on African government priorities is well appreciated and a few respondents assume that it brings sustainable development. Africans wanted to differentiate between economic/business and political conditionality. As to the latter, African respondents also said that political conditionality related to human rights is crucial and should not be passed over. African civil society representatives however, are more sceptical. Several respondents call for a balanced approach to conditionality.

Many respondents think that this policy is an interim phenomenon and they expect that China will re-evaluate and adapt its policy to the ongoing international discussions not least because China is interested in being increasingly integrated into international systems.

Comments on the answers:
The replies to the public consultation do not contain unexpected results. African respondents consider the Chinese non-interference policy as an option for choosing between different kinds of development aid. In their view, the Chinese approach clearly delivers in a more efficient way what is needed on the ground. On the other hand, the risks and problems of this policy are also recognised by many African respondents who would wish to see a golden middle way. Trilateral cooperation may be a suitable way towards reducing the gaps between Chinese and European approaches.

EU respondents do mainly see the negative impact of this approach (non transparency, competition constraints, undermining of international efforts to create the conditions for democracy and good governance in Africa) but do neglect the real value for African people of Chinese activities.
The only Chinese respondent's comment "good but not enough" may reveal the fact that China indeed has started a reflection process on its policy. There seem to be signals that China is willing to re-evaluate its strategy. This would therefore be a good moment to enter into political tri-logue with China and Africa including on these issues.

3.7 *In which of the above sectors could the European Union have a competitive advantage? Why?*

This was an open question therefore no statistics on the answers can be given.

**Summary of the answers:**
Sustainable development is seen as the key purpose of EU development aid and not commercial interest which leads to high credibility. Sectors of competitive advantage indicated more (in the order of importance): good governance (political, juridical and economic) (18 out of 46); capacity building/training/education (16); peace and security and regional integration (mostly seen as being linked to each other) including information and alert systems (13); management of infrastructure projects including cross-border networks, engaging local work force, public-private-partnerships, technical assistance (13); sustainability of the use of natural resources (13); environment related issues (10); long strategic and historical relationship with Africa (6); health (5); cultural dialogue (5); experience in creating supranational co-operative models and developing policy consensus (2); availability of financial and know-how resources (1).

2 out of 15 respondents of African nationality see some European countries as the source of evil in Africa which they are now remedying. One African opts clearly for a division of labour: China could focus on the infrastructure part and the EU on good governance and training/capacity building. One African respondent states that the EU is respected in Africa for the achievements in the EU itself.

**Comments on the answers:**
Most respondents see major EU competitive advantages lying in governance and peace and security. Infrastructure, notably management and know-how is also a sector where EU competencies are widely recognized. Taking into account that the main Chinese competitive advantage lies in the construction of infrastructure, there seems to be a clear potential for trilateral cooperation in this sector. To the extent possible, trilateral cooperation should take into account the African wish for a division of labour between China and the EU in Africa.

3.8 *In which of the above sectors could Africa have a competitive advantage? Why?*

This was an open question therefore no statistics on the answers can be given.

**Summary of the answers:**
African ownership is seen as a key principle for trilateral cooperation. Both African political actors and civil society need to be involved.

Sectors indicated: Possession of natural resources and low rate of exploitation for Africa's own use including indigenous knowledge on sustainable use (9); huge human resources capital (workers, young people) (4); cultural dialogue including hospitality (4); increasingly active civil society empowerment as link/facilitators between African governments and EU
and Chinese civil societies (3); environment as some countries take care not to contribute to environmental degradation (3); offering opportunities for investors (2); experience in peace and security (2).

3 respondents stated that Africa did not have any competitive advantages at this stage.

Comments on the answers:
It is obvious that 17 respondents (37%) have not answered this question (12 Europeans (8 business organisations), 3 Africans, 2 Chinese). Awareness raising activities could be envisaged to improve Africa's image and knowledge of its existing competitive advantages. There must be a reason why an increasing number of Chinese and European companies want to do business in Africa; why should they be interested in the continent if they do not consider that Africa has competitive advantages?

3.9 + 3.10 How could such trilateral cooperation be implemented? (Multiple choice reply – several responses possible, compulsory)

Statistics on the answers:

The above graph shows that out of 47 respondents, 32 (9 Africans, 21 Europeans, 2 Chinese) think that trilateral cooperation should be carried out through a platform with the main purpose of sharing good practices while staying at an informal level. However, this informal platform is seen mainly by the Africans (9) and the Chinese (2) respondents as a complementary option which does not do any harm. 10 European respondents indicate it as their first choice, and 11 as an alternative/complementary option. It is interesting to see though that on the other hand, for 7 Africans, 7 Europeans and 1 Chinese, the establishment of formal common institutions would be the best way forward. None of the other respondents has given this option as an alternative. The option of expert meetings is considered by all 3 partners as a complementary option but none of the respondents has indicated it as his/her first priority. Mostly it is ranked in place 3 or 4.

The chart shows that there is a tendency to use existing structures for this trilateral cooperation, such as the 8 partnerships of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. 8 African, 10 European and 1 Chinese respondent have indicated as first option for implementing trilateral cooperation to do it through China's participation in some of the activities under the Joint EU-Africa partnerships. 3 Africans and 6 Europeans have indicated this as their second choice.

"Other" (question 3.10): Under the option "other" 14 respondents (30,4%) have stated the following: the need to work towards concrete issues based on current plans and programmes and responding to the "missing links" through (experimental) joint projects including between civil society groups as well as joint research and shared technical expertise; no new formal
institutions should be created in order to avoid additional bureaucracy; there is also a call for innovative types of dialogue at different levels and fora; UN initiatives, which are more easily accepted by China should be investigated for their suitability; African regional bodies should be in the lead; meetings should be held at political and governmental level including civil servants in order to establish a joint "Africa-approach"; in specific areas also include other international actors; helping China to establish development thinking.

Comments on the answers:
Their reveal that the majority of respondents opt as a first choice for cooperation implementation through the Joint Africa-EU Strategy partnerships. The fact that the option of establishing new formal common structures is also quite high in the ranking on both the European and the African sides is somewhat surprising as the establishment of new structures is usually seen as an additional bureaucratic burden which for the sake of efficiency should be avoided. 4 European and 2 African business representatives, 3 European NGOs and 4 African and 1 Chinese other organisations as well as 1 African private person opt for common institutions. When formulating the way forward for implementing this innovative form of cooperation, the evident need for clear, transparent and tri-partite owned structures as requested here by the private sector should not be overlooked if we want the private sector to play a key role in this.

3.11 What could be the African interest in such trilateral cooperation?

Summary of the answers:
We found it relevant to present the opinions on each of the three partners' interests in such cooperation by region.

In Africans' views, African countries' interest in trilateral cooperation should be:
- The beneficial use of natural resources (3 respondents)
- Having other development choices (2 respondents)
- Transfer of knowledge and technical skills and technology (2 respondents)
- Capacity building in the fields of good governance, peace and security, sustainable management of the natural resources.
- Infrastructure cooperation that is complementary (e.g. joint funding of infrastructure projects would be complementary.)
- To benefit from complementarity between China and the EU in most of the sectors mentioned in 3.1 (6 respondents)
- Creation of local labour – employment (2 respondents)
- Doing business and not having to deal with bureaucratic aid (2 respondents)
- Sustainable development (2 respondents)

In Chinese respondents' views (1 out of 3) sustainable development is Africa's interest in this trilateral cooperation. The other two respondents did not answer the question.

In the view of respondents from elsewhere, African countries' interest in cooperation is having partners which are accountable to each other, monitoring cooperation, benefiting all the people in Africa and not just the governments.
European respondents' comments on Africa's interest in trilateral cooperation:

- Coherence of the aid it receives. Africa will also benefit from increased private sector initiatives due to job creation, tax revenues and transferring of expertise. Private sector initiatives will contribute to broad-based development.
- Support for investment in Africa which provides added value to its natural resource exports (2 answers)
- Analyse the Chinese and European business model and improve economic development (2 answers)
- Transfer of knowledge and technical skills and technology (5 answers)
- Creation of local labour – employment (2 answers)
- Strengthening existing mechanisms such as NEPAD and AU (1 answer)
- To learn from Chinese experience in fast development (3 answers)
- Synergies in the use of funding – have bigger capacity and faster development of projects in different areas
- Balancing the development models of 2 partners, stronger monitoring of objectives (5 answers)
- Having a win-win partnership between equals (3 answers)
- Civil society development, multilateralism and partner diversification; avoid increasing competition between international players; avoid resource exploitation by different players (4 answers)

Comments on the answers:
Some fears and key words appeared in the African answers to this question, e.g. mentioning the unequal benefit of development cooperation (politicians versus people), the international companies working in natural resources or international banks supporting and perpetuating such a system. Given the answers of the different stakeholders the sustainable management of natural resources is one of the most burning issues that this cooperation might find solutions for.

The African views confirm the belief that Africans want a win-win partnership, equal partners, and increased use of business and foreign direct investment that will benefit people not just politicians, the balancing and complementarity of 2 big players’ forces.

It is worth mentioning that 2 out of 3 Chinese and 5 out of 28 Europeans did not answer this question which could be interpreted as lack of information on what is the interest of Africans in this trilateral cooperation, or not understanding how this cooperation is going to work for the benefit of Africa.

3.12 What could be the Chinese interest in such trilateral cooperation?

Summary of the answers:
African views on Chinese interest in trilateral cooperation:

- Access to natural resources and markets (5 answers)
- Recognition of its own contribution to development in Africa, show that it is a flexible and open partner, and show its commitment to sustainable development (6 answers)

Other single answers were: China can benefit from the EU’s recognised role in supporting capacity building and creating a viable legal and institutional architecture in Africa; reach
better understanding by Europeans of their development strategies; technology transfer; trade improvement.

Chinese views on Chinese interest in trilateral cooperation:
- Frank dialogue with Europeans on Africa;
- Coordinating with Africans on the western reactions to China's role in Africa;
- Seeking trilateral cooperation in various forms;
- Mutual development and peace in general.

Europe & other views on Chinese interest in entering trilateral cooperation:
- Legitimacy as a donor, promoting a positive image in the international arena (7 answers);
- Learning from Africa's biggest and oldest development partner in terms of aid delivery, capacity building, development experience (3 answers);
- Joining the international community in applying and defining rules (3 answers);
- Harmonious external policies (3 answers).

Other answers were the following: high economic and political interests in Africa; trade relations; avoid stigma of label “Made in China”; avoid Chinese diasporas issues; sharing of economic risk; development of NGOs alert systems; institution-building relating to regulations, legislation, standards; laboratory to improve and to translate procedures and management skills into domestic enterprises and administration; cost and risk reduction on security and safety (maritime connections); multilateralism strength; Beijing Consensus success - increase Chinese presence and responsibilities in international fora.

Comments on the answers:
In African and European views, Chinese's main interest in this cooperation is the recognition of its development policies in the international arena, its commitment to sustainable development and combating "western criticism" regarding its cooperation.

A third of African respondents (5) say that China's main interest in this cooperation is economic due to their energy and raw materials needs and need to access other markets.

The Chinese answers stated that China's interest is to have a frank dialogue with Europe on development in Africa, avoid criticism of their cooperation in Africa and being open to trilateral cooperation in order to promote mutual development and peace. This concurs with both African and Chinese views and shows openness to cooperation by China.

14 respondents did not answer this question which shows the difficulty of understanding Chinese cooperation in Africa.

3.13 What could be the European interest in such trilateral cooperation?

Summary of the answers:

The African views on European interest in the trilateral cooperation were:
- To exchange and benefit from the knowledge and expertise that China has in areas of development with respect to its own experience as a developing country and in Africa (2 answers);
- To show that there is no strategic competition with China in Africa and that this trilateral cooperation is motivated by China's deepening involvement in the continent (2 answers);
- Economic interests (3 answers);
• To recover reputation or control in Africa (3 answers).

Other answers provided the following information: Trade improvement; cultural exchanges; peace and security; leadership and global management

2 out of the 3 Chinese respondents did not answer while one of them observed that the European interest in this cooperation is international development and peace.

Elsewhere respondents identified as the main interest to oversee African-Chinese relations.

Europeans believe that Europe's interest in this cooperation is:
• To engage in a dialogue on international standards (2 answers);
• Jointly engaging in initiatives to develop economic infrastructure, good governance and training/expertise in order to stimulate private sector initiatives (4 answers);
• To balance the current view of the Africans on European cooperation in contrast with Chinese cooperation. This is motivated by the belief that the Chinese have better access to African elites, as they do not have a colonial past. More than this, Africans do not understand the European way of doing things, considered very often as being very pretentious (3 answers);
• To adapt its development policies due to China's rise in Africa (4 answers);
• To contribute to achieving the MDGs which is an official policy objective of the EU and its member states (3 answers);
• To gain experience in collaboration with Chinese actors when it comes to addressing global challenges; to learn from the Chinese with regard to speed of delivery, and technologically appropriate solutions; (3 answers);
• To avoid having a conflictive situation and/or competing with China in the wrong ways by doubling aid projects or providing funding for the same purposes (3 answers).

Other answers to this question referred to: the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy with the involvement of other important external actors which are playing a significant role in Africa; the sustainable economic and social effort addressed to developing countries will help to stabilise migration concerns on European borders; the advanced integration of developing countries in the world economy; observance of specified wage rates, health and safety regulations; improve democracy and multilateralism; avoid the old imperialism reflex of preserving “influence” over old colonies; renew the dialogue of a new brand policy based on a communitary framework (Commission – AU dialogue); regain some degree of credibility in Africa.

Comments on the answers:
Africans see China as a valuable development partner due to its own development experience and its non-colonial past. The Europeans' interest in this context is to balance this new access by the Chinese to African elites.

Some of the Africans refer to the fact that Europe wants to regain its power and reputation in Africa as if they had been lost with the increasing presence of China on the continent.

Europeans' views regarding their interest concur in some areas with African views, in terms of adapting their policies to the new Chinese influence on the continent and the new types of cooperation, avoiding competition and including other development partners on global issues. This shows an intensive reflective process by European policy makers in response to
increasing Chinese influence in Africa and their different and customized approach to development. It is clearly necessary to address the question of mutual perceptions and clarify interests.

3.14 What could/should be the role of the African Union Commission and/or African regional organisations in this context?

This was an open question therefore no statistics on the answers can be given.

Summary of the answers:
A part from the AU and NEPAD, recognized by the EU and China as leading bodies, replies show evidence that the business community should take a strong role in such trilateral cooperation. It is expected that the AUC should play the role of coordinator and consolidator in order to ensure that it is not the bilateral interests between individual African countries and China which dominate the proposed cooperation process. Overarching African interests should prevail in trilateral cooperation (e.g. cross-border connections in the field of infrastructure). The AU is also considered as the best discussion partner to inform the EU and China whether their development models suit or do not suit African needs and why.

In addition to the AUC/NEPAD, most Europeans, Africans and 1 Chinese see the role of the African regional organisations in the development of the African continent as a key. They are expected to own, shape, lead, coordinate and monitor the process towards common development goals and strategies, to open up new ways for development, to strengthen the engagement of African stakeholders, to ensure the protection (of African actors?) and to prevent abuse.

Risks: The AU/NEPAD and the regional organisations still lack capacity which could push them into a merely observer role. Therefore a major objective should be to strengthen their capacities.

In the case of the sustainable management of natural resources, 2 African respondents called for international institutions to supervise the use of revenues and environmental protection within African countries.

6 EU respondents do see the role of AU(C)/NEPAD and regional organisations mainly as mediators but less in an active role. They prefer civil society groups to be given a more important role.

Comments on the answers:
African civil society seems to mistrust African governments. Therefore, in their view, the main actors for such trilateral cooperation should be the AUC, the regional organisations and African civil society. From the replies, it also appears that Africans would like to see an increasing business component in this trilateral cooperation, moving away from the traditional purely development oriented angle.

Most of the EU respondents also expect the AUC/NEPAD and the regional organisations to play a major role, although the call for the active involvement of civil society seems to be increasing. A priority and major challenge will therefore be to strengthen the capacity of both the AUC and regional authorities on the one hand and African civil society on the other hand in order to be able to cope with this innovative initiative.
Section 4. Actors in the cooperation process

4.1 +4.2 Who should develop the strategy in the Africa-China-EU triangle on the African side?

Statistics on the answers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requested records</th>
<th>47</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African Union/NEPAD</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Economic Communities</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What do the statistics say?
The statistics show that a majority would like to see the AU/NEPAD entrusted with the development of the trilateral cooperation strategy on the African side. The 37 respondents who chose this as their first priority included all the 3 Chinese respondents, 13 Africans and 22 Europeans. Another clear result is that almost all respondents who also indicated the Regional Economic Communities (REC), ranked them 2nd (including 2 Chinese); only 1 European and 1 African indicated them as their preferred strategy developer.

The picture is slightly more diverse concerning the other groups. In general, African governments rank 3rd or 2nd among the 3 partners whereas private sector and civil society rank 4th and 5th. Here, a modest preference on the part of the African respondents towards the private sector can be observed, whereas Europeans tend more towards civil society. The Chinese see civil society as the last choice.

"Other" (question 4.2): 1 African respondent explicitly suggests that the AU/NEPAD leads in the developing process while consulting all other groups closely. Mainly European business respondents (3) were hesitant in indicating a first choice. As long as EU contractor's needs are taken into consideration they do not seem to have preferences.

Interestingly, 1 European business respondent opts exclusively for the establishment of trilateral cooperation with individual African countries, as trilateral cooperation with the whole of Africa would not work efficiently.

Comments on the answers:
The answers show that generally the AU/NEPAD is expected to play the leading role in developing the strategy together with the REC. The fact that many respondents opted for at least 3 or even more responses means that in general, there is a tendency to involve all other groups in the process. Therefore, the EU proposal should seek to be open enough for all stakeholders to be consulted by those who will lead in developing the strategy.
4.3 + 4.4 Who should develop the strategy in the Africa-China-EU triangle on the Chinese side?

Statistics on the answers:

The statistics show a very clear result: 43 respondents out of 47 (92%) opt for the Chinese government as the main actor for developing the strategy of trilateral cooperation on the Chinese side. Only 3 respondents (1 African individual and 2 European NGOs) do not mention the Chinese government at all in their choice; they would prefer either the Chinese private sector or civil society take the lead in this process. A clear ranking can also be observed for the role which the Chinese private sector and civil society should play: With the exception of the one individual mentioned above, all African respondents indicated the private sector as 2nd option followed by civil society. If indicated by Europeans, the private sector ranks often also as 2nd option (9) while another 6 European respondents put civil society in 2nd place. The 3 Chinese see their Government playing the key role, while they also want to see the private sector (1) and civil society (2) getting involved.

"Other" (question 4.4): 1 European would specifically like to see Chinese research institutes involved, another one the so-called Government-operated Non-governmental organizations (GONGOs) and a 3rd European as well as an African respondent explicitly say that the Chinese government should lead but should consult the other stakeholders broadly.

Comments on the answers:
Over 90% see the leading role for developing the strategy on the Chinese side with the government. However, it also results clearly from the responses that both the private sector and civil society should be involved early on, when the strategy is developed. Therefore, the proposals made in the Communication should take these expectations from stakeholders into account.

4.5 + 4.6 Who should develop the strategy in the Africa-China-EU triangle on the European side?

Statistics of answers:

Here also the statistics show a clear result: 89% of the respondents (42 out of 47) see the European Commission (EC) in the lead for developing the strategy (all 3 Chinese, 11 Africans
and 28 Europeans). 7 Africans also give a key role to the Members States (MS) and most of them would also like to see firstly the private sector and secondly civil society involved. Among the EU business respondents, most (8 out of 13) have not indicated the MS at all as an option but the private sector 2nd after the EC. However, in total 16 European respondents see MS as an important player directly after the EC. Civil society ranks last among the European respondents. For 2 African respondents the main developing actors on the EU side should be MS and the private sector respectively. 1 European individual sees only the MS in the lead. 1 European and 1 African did not reply to this question.

"Other" (Question 4.6): Again 1 European would specifically like to see European research institutes involved in developing the strategy, notably as far as governance related issues are concerned and another European respondent calls for the ongoing bilateral dialogues between individual MS and one of the 2 other partners to be captured in the developing process. Interestingly, 1 African respondent calls for a coherent EU approach as the existing individual MS's own "avenues of contact" with Africa and China may undermine this initiative.

Comments on the answers:
The respondents from all sides clearly call on the EC to take the leading role in the EU in the exercise of developing a strategy for trilateral cooperation. But the results also show that there is a need to involve all other stakeholders from the beginning. There might be difficulties in convincing the business sector that MS should also have a role to play in order to ensure a coherent political dialogue as they seem to focus mainly on commerce and business interests.

4.7 + 4.8 Who should implement the strategy in the Africa-China-EU triangle on the African side?

Statistics of answers

The results are not self-evident and need to be looked at in more detail: On the one hand, most African respondents think that the implementation on the African side should in the first place be carried out by the African Union (AU)/NEPAD (10 out of 14) followed by all 3 Chinese respondents. On the other hand, the European respondents are split between opting for the EU/NEPAD or for African governments as key implementing actors (11 : 10). 9 out of the 10 respondents favouring African governments are business organisations or companies. This could mean that they prefer to negotiate directly with African governments on concrete business contracts instead of passing through supranational organisations. The RECs also play an important role and rank - if indicated at all - among all groups in 2nd place as implementing actors. Among the African respondents, governments and the private sector share 3rd place in the ranking, whereas civil society although mentioned 11 times in total is given less importance. Also among the Chinese and Europeans, civil society does not play a major role in implementing the strategy. Europeans consider the private sector to be quite important. 50% out of the 16 European respondents who indicated the private sector as an
option ranked it 2\textsuperscript{nd}. Surprisingly, among the 3 Chinese respondents only one indicated governments as implementing actor and he ranks them only 3\textsuperscript{rd} after AU/NEPAD and the RECs. 3 Europeans and 1 African did not reply to this question.

"Others" (Question 4.8): The need to involve research institutes notably for cooperation in the governance field is again mentioned by a European research institute. Another European respondent calls for civil society to monitor governments' actions in this context. 1 African respondent clearly raises awareness of the lack of capacity in the AU/NEPAD as well as in the RECs.

Comments on the answers:
From the answers it can be seen that the implementation question on the African side seems to be a more complex one than strategy development. This means that a good balance needs to be found once discussions on implementation start. Africans and Chinese clearly tend to call on the AU/NEPAD and RECs and only as a 3\textsuperscript{rd} option on governments to implement the strategy, whereas Europeans are split between AU/NEPAD, the governments and the RECs on the one hand and mainly the private sector on the other hand. It will therefore be important also to get business representatives into the implementation discussion.

Interestingly, civil society plays a less important role than all the other actors and this is surprisingly also the case among the European respondents.

\textbf{4.9 + 4.10 Who should implement the strategy in the Africa-China-EU triangle on the Chinese side?}

\textbf{Statistics of answers}

\begin{table}[h]
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Requested records} & \textbf{47} \\
\hline
Government & 40 \\
Private sector & 23 \\
Civil Society & 21 \\
Other & 7 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

The results to this question are clear: All Africans, all Chinese and almost all European respondents consider that the Chinese government should be the main actor in implementing this new strategy (85 \%). The Chinese private sector is ranked 2\textsuperscript{nd} among all groups (49 \%) whereas civil society, although mentioned by 10 Europeans, 9 Africans and 2 Chinese only ranks as the 3\textsuperscript{rd} option. 2 European respondents do see the private sector as best suited for implementation and do not even mention the Chinese government as a possible implementing actor. 3 European and 1 African respondent did not respond to this question.

"Others" (question 4.10): 1 European respondent also suggests involving the different Chinese sectoral (regulatory) authorities and financial institutions. A European research institute proposed to involve research entities and another European respondent refers to Chinese civil society's role to monitor the governments' activities.

Comments on the answers:
The views on the implementation actors on the Chinese side seem to be quite coherent among the 3 partners and also among the different stakeholder groups. The Chinese partners will have to be composed of government and private sector representatives. Interestingly, at least
one respondent thought of Chinese financial institutions being involved. This may be worth reflecting in the Communication.

4.11 + 4.12 Who should implement the strategy in the Africa-China-EU triangle on the European side?

Statistics of answers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who should implement the strategy in the Africa-China-EU triangle on the European side?</th>
<th>Requested records</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member States</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The chart shows a relatively close run between the European Commission (EC), the private sector, the Member States (MS) and even civil society. However, when looking in more detail, it reveals that all 3 partners clearly see the EC as the main actor for implementing the strategy on the EU side (25 Europeans, 11 Africans and all 3 Chinese). In order of importance, MS ranks 2nd, the private sector 3rd and civil society only 4th. Interestingly, 7 and 3 Africans respectively do not mention the MS and the EC at all as implementing actors. 2 out of the 3 African respondents, who did not mention the EC, see the MS as leading implementation on the EC side (1 company and 1 individual). Also among the Europeans, 3 and 2 respondents do not mention the EC or the MS respectively. They opt for the private sector and civil society as key implementing actors.

Interestingly, the European private sector does not seem to be seen as a major implementing actor by Chinese respondents. Only 1 Chinese mentions it and ranks it 3rd. 2 Europeans and 1 African did not reply to this question.

"Other": (Question 4.12): An African research institute makes a very interesting remark: In theory, the EC should be in the lead for implementing the strategy but they question whether the EC will have sufficient capacity for follow-up. In addition, the same respondents as under questions 4.7 and 4.9 call for the involvement of research institutes and of civil society to have an eye on what governments are doing.

Comments on the answers:
The EC seems to be the actor which is favoured by all 3 partners to implement the strategy on the EU side (although there seems to be doubts about its capacity; indeed, the EC will need to take care that sufficient capacity is available for efficient and thorough follow-up). The fact that MS rank 2nd as implementing actors will require significant consolidation and cooperation work between the EC and the MS. The private sector and civil society should be involved as appropriate in implementation. Careful attention should be given to the fact that some European private sector representatives do not see the need for the EC and/or the MS to lead the implementation process. It should be made clear that this new trilateral relationship will have two components: political dialogue and cooperation in sectors which will involve business aspects.