JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL

Elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform

{SWD(2016) 221 final}
1. RATIONALE AND SCOPE

Security sector reform (SSR) is the process of transforming a country’s security system so that it gradually provides individuals and the state with more effective and accountable security in a manner consistent with respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and the principles of good governance. SSR is a long-term and political process, as it goes to the heart of power relations in a country. It needs to be nationally driven and requires political commitment and leadership, inter-institutional cooperation and broad stakeholder participation to achieve the widest possible consensus.

Conflict, insecurity, and instability are widespread, including in countries directly neighbouring the EU. They lead to human suffering, forced displacement and dire development outcomes, as recognised by EU development policy, in work on security and development in general and in the United Nations Resolution Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including Goal 16 and its security-related targets.

Insecurity and instability are frequently generated or exacerbated by a lack of effective and accountable security systems. Helping partner countries to reform their security systems supports the EU’s objectives of peace and stability, inclusive and sustainable development, state-building and democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law. As recognised in the 2015 European Agenda on Security, which emphasises the strong link between the EU’s internal and external security, conflict and insecurity in partner countries, sometimes associated with violent extremism, also affect the EU’s internal security, and that of EU citizens and EU trade and investment interests abroad.

The EU’s engagement on SSR to date is assessed in the Joint Staff Working Document accompanying this Joint Communication, which summarises the findings from various evaluations, ‘lessons identified’ reports, studies and consultations with stakeholders over the past 15 years. The assessment concludes that there is room for improvement in the coherence, complementarity and coordination of the EU’s capacities and instruments. It also underlines

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1 In line with the OECD-DAC’s SSR guidelines, a national security sector is seen as including the law enforcement institutions (police, gendarmerie, customs, border guards, etc.), the criminal justice system (i.e. penal courts, prosecutor’s office, corrections), the armed forces, the intelligence services, the institutions that provide political, financial and judicial oversight (line ministries, parliamentary committees, court of auditors, the judiciary, etc.) and non-state security actors, including customary authorities, traditional courts, guerrillas and liberation armies, private military and security companies. See The OECD DAC handbook on security system reform: supporting security and justice (OECD Publishing, Paris)


3 43% of those living in absolute poverty reside in fragile and conflict-affected countries.


5 Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015; UNGA A/RES/70/1); Goal 16: ‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’

6 In line with the provisions in the EU Treaties for the EU’s external action in general (Articles 21-22 TEU), CFSP/CSDP (Articles 23-46 TFEU), development cooperation policy (Articles 208-211 TFEU) and other cooperation policies (Articles 212-213 TFEU).

7 European Agenda on Security, Commission Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (COM(2015) 185)

8 SWD(2016) 221
that in-depth SSR is complex and requires long-term commitment, without prejudice to the shorter-term initiatives that might be needed to address immediate security threats.

The EU’s diplomatic and financial, military and civilian, short-term and long-term interventions should be anchored more securely in a single EU-wide SSR support framework that takes account of the interlinkages between politics, security, justice, humanitarian response\(^9\), development, conflict and fragility. Particularly in fragile, developing and transition countries, SSR requires political, financial and technical support from international partners. With its global reach, wide-ranging external policies, instruments, tools and well-established presence and experience, the EU is well placed to support partner countries in this respect, in coordination with other international actors, including the UN.

This Joint Communication\(^10\) provides elements for such a framework, as set out in the May 2015 Council conclusions\(^11\), including also for guiding the EU’s work on capacity building in support of security and development\(^12\) (CBSD). It reflects the ‘comprehensive approach’ to external conflict and crisis\(^13\) in bringing together common security and defence policy (CSDP) and all other relevant common foreign and security policy (CFSP) tools, external action instruments and freedom, security and justice actors, thus merging and updating two previously separate EU policy concepts for SSR support\(^14\). It will contribute to the effectiveness of the Global Strategy on foreign and security policy\(^15\) and of the European Agenda on Security\(^16\). It also takes account of relevant OECD-DAC decisions\(^17\) and, where applicable, OECD-DAC directives in the field of peace and security.

This framework:

- **applies to all EU actors and instruments:** political/diplomatic, external action instruments, crisis response\(^18\) and CSDP civilian and military actors at all levels. EU Member States are encouraged to frame their bilateral SSR programmes within it, *inter alia* through joint programming exercises, in line with the Council conclusions on ‘stepping up joint programming’\(^19\);

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\(^9\) In line with JOIN(2013) 30 final, humanitarian aid is to be provided in accordance with its specific *modus operandi*, respectful of the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, solely on the basis of the needs of affected populations.

\(^10\) Initiative No 21 in Annex I of the Commission’s 2016 Work Programme (COM(2015) 610 final)


\(^12\) JOIN(2015) 17 final, *Capacity building in support of security and development – Enabling partners to prevent and manage crises*

\(^13\) JOIN(2013) 30 final, *The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises*

\(^14\) A concept for European Community support for security sector reform, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament (SEC(2006) 658); and EU concept for ESDP support to SSR (Council 12566/4/05), which was produced on the basis of the European Security Strategy - A Secure Europe in a Better World, adopted by the European Council on December 2003


\(^16\) COM(2015) 185 final, *The European Agenda on Security*

\(^17\) For example the agreement to ‘update and modernise the ODA reporting directives on peace and security expenditures’; see high-level meeting final communiqué (OECD DAC, 19 February 2016)

\(^18\) For the purpose of this Communication, crisis response does not encompass humanitarian aid.

\(^19\) See Council document 8831/16.
will guide the identification, planning and/or implementation/execution of all EU SSR-related external action instruments/programmes/projects, including CSDP tools with specific and/or partial mandates involving SSR-related activities. While the focus is on EU support to security sectors in other countries, this Joint Communication recognises the interdependence of security and justice. The principles it sets out can also be applied to justice actors, where their roles and functions have clear implications for the security sector.

applies in all contexts, not only in conflict and post-conflict situations\textsuperscript{20}, and is sufficiently broad to allow adaptation to the needs of each specific situation.

2. WHAT WE WANT TO ACHIEVE

The overarching goal of this EU-wide strategic framework is to help to make states more stable and individuals more secure. To this end, it aims to enhance the EU’s effectiveness in promoting and supporting:

A. partner countries’ efforts to ensure security for individuals and the state; and

B. the legitimacy, good governance, integrity and sustainability of the security sector of partner countries.

A. ENSURING SECURITY FOR INDIVIDUALS AND THE STATE

To be effective, a national security sector must:

– benefit from a clear and appropriate legal framework;
– be guided by appropriate security and justice policies and strategies; and
– consist of well-coordinated and cooperative institutions, each of which should be properly structured and organised, with a clearly defined role, appropriate procedures, skilled staff and resources.

It must take account of existing informal or non-governmental providers of security and uphold the rule of law.

Human security

The first objective of a national security system must be to ensure the security of individuals, as perceived and experienced by them. This involves upholding their fundamental freedoms\textsuperscript{21} and properly assessing, in a participatory way, the security needs of different groups, including the most vulnerable. The system should address the specific security needs of women, minors, the elderly and minorities.

Reform efforts must be gender-sensitive\textsuperscript{22}, to ensure that women and men have effective and equal access to judicial and security services. To this end, the formulation or review of national security policies should be informed by gender-based analysis. In addition, support

\textsuperscript{20} While the principles outlined in this Joint Communication also apply to enlargement countries, the accession process involves different measures and procedures to ensure that the countries meet the accession criteria.

\textsuperscript{21} Starting with freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to take action on one’s own behalf.

\textsuperscript{22} See Council conclusions on the 2016-2020 Gender Action Plan (document 13201/15)
for victims of violence should be accompanied by preventive measures (e.g. legislation, gender awareness-raising in police and military structures, tackling perpetrator impunity).

Preventing and addressing transnational security threats

National security systems must also be effective in countering transnational security threats, such as terrorism and organised crime in all its forms. Responses must include the establishing or strengthening of international cooperation.

B. LEGITIMACY, GOOD GOVERNANCE, INTEGRITY AND SUSTAINABILITY

Human rights, the rule of law and democratic principles

Security actors must respect and uphold human rights, without discrimination, for the general population and their own members. The security sector must be subject to effective democratic control and oversight. It should operate within a clear and unambiguous legal framework approved by the national legislator, including effective civilian control. Its budget should be an integral part of the national budget and be discussed and approved by the legislature, which must be able to exercise effective oversight. Consulting and involving civil society should be standard practice in the development and monitoring of security and justice policy and activities.

Good governance principles

Transparency and openness should apply and legal guarantees be put in place to prevent arbitrary decision-making. Recruitment and promotion procedures and appointments to senior positions in the security structure should be based on clearly defined, publicly available criteria. Official chains of command must be respected. The classification and dissemination of, and access to, security sector documents (including procurement processes) should be subject to officially agreed and predictable procedures. Information should be public, so as to enhance transparency and understanding. Limitations to openness and transparency may be justified on grounds of clearly defined public policy (e.g. data protection), but should always be kept to a minimum.

The participation of all stakeholders in the reform process implies that national security policies and strategies are developed through inclusive consultation processes. In particular, women’s participation should be ensured in line with relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.

23 For the purposes of this document, a security sector is deemed legitimate when: i. it respects internationally accepted human rights, the rule of law and democratic principles; ii. it applies the good governance principles of transparency and openness, participation and inclusivity, and accountability; and iii. it fights corruption.

24 This is in line with Articles 3 and 21c TEU, which require the Union, in its relations with the wider world, to uphold and promote its values and interests, including democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Lisbon Treaty requires that the EU’s policies, including those on external relations, are in accordance with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

25 In the specific case of the judiciary, the separation of powers should be ensured so that judicial independence is guaranteed and the courts are not subject to improper influence from the other branches of government or from private or partisan interests.

26 See European Governance: A White Paper (COM(2001) 428); two other good governance principles (effectiveness and coherence) are outlined under objective A and in chapter 3 respectively.

The security sector itself should be **inclusive**. Security forces should not exclude or discriminate against any particular group. To avoid generating tension, resource allocation should be public, justified and reflect legally defined roles/tasks. Women should have equal opportunities and be empowered within the security forces.

Effective internal **accountability** systems, such as internal inspection services and audits, should be in place within individual security institutions, which should also be subject to external financial and operational conduct control by the national court of auditors and other oversight or equivalent bodies. Mechanisms such as vetting, codes of conduct, independent complaints bodies and scrutiny by civil society also contribute to accountability. To avoid impunity, it is important to uphold the principle of equality before the law, avoidance of arbitrariness, and procedural and legal transparency when a security actor is brought to justice. The remit of any separate military justice system should be clear and circumscribed; in all cases, civilians should be tried by civilian courts.

**Integrity and the fight against corruption**

Trust between the population and security actors is crucial for the effectiveness of the security sector. It is undermined by any instance of bribery, extortion, embezzlement of funds, cronyism and nepotism. The financial resources allocated to the security sector should be managed on the basis of the same good governance principles that apply to other public sectors. Like other public procurement processes, the procurement of military and police equipment and services should be subject to appropriate procedures, constraints and scrutiny. Nationwide anti-corruption strategies should equally apply to security actors.

**Sustainability**

To be applicable and effective, security legislation, institutions and procedures should be developed on the basis of nationally owned processes, in line with the ‘whole of society’ approach. The commitment of key political, security and justice stakeholders, and the support of civil society are essential.

In principle, levels of staffing, investment and financial resources should be based on proper planning and be **fiscally sustainable**, so as not to jeopardise the provision of other essential public services.

3. **HOW WE WANT TO ACHIEVE IT**

EU engagement in the security sector is based on a set of key elements and principles, including the aid effectiveness principles, which apply to security as much as to other areas of cooperation.

**Understand the security sector in its wider context**

EU engagement in the security sector of a partner country or region will involve understanding and factoring in the formal and informal rules that govern how security and

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29 See OECD-DAC *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness* (2005) and the *Accra Agenda for Action* (2008); *Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation*; Fourth High-Level Forum On Aid Effectiveness (Busan, Republic of Korea, 29 November–1 December 2011).
justice actors operate. Similar appreciation is needed for the interactions and power relations between security, justice and non-security actors, and for existing conflict dynamics. Political, socio-economic, cultural and historical awareness is key.

The EU should base its political dialogue and action on prior analysis of a country’s security sector and how it is situated within this wider context. EU Delegations have been instructed to analyse and report on the security sector using existing reporting mechanisms. When a CSDP mission is present, such analysis and reporting will be joint, in line with the ‘comprehensive approach’. Member State embassies, in particular those with security and/or defence attachés, will be invited to contribute information and expertise.

Where large-scale SSR support is envisaged, the EU will carry out a structured context assessment (e.g. a political economy analysis) covering all stakeholders (e.g. security and justice actors, including expected sources of resistance, drivers for change and groups traditionally excluded from the security and justice institutions, such as women, young people and minorities). This assessment should focus on security needs as perceived and experienced by key demographic groups and how the security sector is addressing them.

The assessment should include analysis of existing national policies/strategies and budget, local security and judicial practices, sources of insecurity and instability, potential risk factors, observance of democratic governance and human security principles, how effectively individuals’ security is protected, existing international cooperation and coordination, and opportunities for support. It should identify specific security problems that EU assistance could prioritise and the process of change to which the assistance can contribute. The EU should promote shared analysis by involving relevant local and international actors and sources of expertise. Wherever possible, national authorities will be involved in and, ideally, lead such assessments. Peer review expertise may be mobilised.

In addition to informing the design of SSR support, such assessments will serve to establish baselines against which to monitor the impact of EU engagement. They will be updated regularly to keep track of changes and retain their usefulness for the implementation of support.

**Action box**

As instructed, EU Delegations will include analysis of the security sector in their regular reporting (together with CSDP missions where present). The EU should launch deeper security sector assessments where significant engagement is envisaged.

Building on existing methodological documents, EEAS/Commission services will provide guidance on how to carry out security sector analyses.

**Enable broad national ownership**

‘National ownership’ goes beyond a government’s acceptance of international actors’ interventions. Reform efforts will be effective and sustainable only if they are rooted in a country’s institutions (including through budgetary commitment), owned by national security and justice actors, and considered legitimate by society as a whole. This means that national actors should steer the process and take overall responsibility for the results of interventions, with external partners providing advice and support. It also means that all (state and non-

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30 See the joint EEAS-Commission services Guidance note on the use of Conflict Analysis in support of EU external action.
state) stakeholders, including marginalised groups, should be involved in efforts gradually to build consensus around intervention in the security sector on the basis of nationally owned and accepted strategies, where applicable. This is a challenge, as actors will have divergent interests and some will resist reform.

In a crisis situation or in the immediate aftermath of conflict, when state institutions may be weak or absent, the early stages of EU support should pave the way for national ownership on the basis of a participatory process which includes civil society.

**Action box**

When engaging in SSR support activities, the EU should:

- assess political commitment to reform, likely sources of resistance and ways in which its support can build constituencies that may come to support the change process;
- base its support on national policies, plans and strategies, and priority issues, where relevant building on national processes or ongoing action; and
- involve all stakeholders, including non-state and civil society actors, from the identification stage, to build the greatest possible consensus around interventions.

**See the bigger picture**

Security sector governance reflects the general governance situation of the country in question and should be developed in the context of wider governance initiatives. The EU should encourage partner governments and civil society to embed security sector issues in nationwide multiannual development strategies and to link them as far as possible to ongoing or planned governance efforts in other sectors. Equally, policy dialogues on public finance management and transparency/budget oversight have to include the security sector.

SSR support should anticipate the impact it will have across the security sector and beyond. The criminal justice chain and border management are clear examples of a strong interconnection between various security and justice actors that calls for a holistic approach. This does not mean that EU support must encompass the entire security sector of the partner country; it may be most effective when it targets selected entry points that are more accessible, susceptible to positive development and/or that maximise leverage.

To tackle identified security challenges, the EU may consider adopting a problem-solving approach by developing programmes composed of different sets of interventions. It may be that not all of them involve security and justice actors directly, but seek to engage a range of stakeholders from different sectors. For instance, urban security programmes may include support for local security services, urban planning and vocational training for young people.

Where feasible, effective and cost-efficient, budget support operations based on national policy or strategy and clear and achievable security-related indicators should be encouraged so as to strengthen national ownership and governance, in full compliance with the relevant budget support guidelines.31

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Systematic political and policy dialogue

SSR-related intervention should be systematically accompanied by broad sectoral dialogue and supported by high-level political engagement. There must be read-across to political and policy dialogue(s) on human rights, rule of law, democracy and good governance issues, and compliance with international obligations, *inter alia* in the field of international humanitarian law. Progress in this respect will be monitored and evaluated throughout the intervention. Political and policy dialogue can also serve to promote national ownership.

**Action box**

*Where there is significant engagement, the EU and the partner country may discuss and agree benchmarks and relevant mechanisms for regular review in order to measure progress in security sector governance and effectiveness. These may take the form of a non-binding instrument entailing political commitments*\(^{32}\); *specific arrangements will be made case by case.*

Coordinate EU support

In line with the ‘comprehensive approach’ to external conflict and crisis, all EU diplomatic, development and CSDP support action should be coherent, coordinated, complementary, properly sequenced and in line with legal, policy and institutional frameworks. The aim is to promote the effectiveness of EU SSR support. Where significant EU intervention in the security sector is planned, the EU and the Member States should map SSR activities, preferably with other international actors. This will enable information-sharing so as to develop a common understanding of context and gather lessons identified and recommendations to be fed into political and policy dialogue, adjustments to ongoing programmes, the formulation of planned intervention, and programming processes.

This mapping could also form a basis on which EU actors jointly define common objectives and develop a ‘**coordination matrix**’ (coordinated in the field by the EU Delegation), which would enable them to identify appropriate links and sequencing between political dialogue, cooperation activities/instruments and possible CSDP missions/operations. The coordination matrix would be a living document, building, where relevant, on existing political frameworks for crisis approach (PFCAs) and/or country programming frameworks and strategies, including in the context of joint programming.

EU instruments are subject to different programming and decision-making procedures and regulatory constraints, which stem from their respective legal bases. EU coordination matrices at country level will not amend these rules but rather reflect a common understanding among all EU actors as to priorities, objectives and their possible roles.

Such “coordination matrices” will identify risks, mitigating measures and, to the extent possible, an exit strategy that is coherent with the partner country’s longer-term national plan and financial capacity. They will form the basis for a monitoring and evaluation system allowing measurement of progress and the impact of EU support. Where a single support strategy is developed, such elements will be discussed directly and agreed at that level.

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\(^{32}\) For example memoranda of understanding, joint statements, arrangements, etc.
**Action box**

A comprehensive EU ‘coordination matrix’ will be developed in at least two countries in the two years following adoption of this Joint Communication, in coherence with any existing joint programming donor matrices.

**Coordinate with other international actors**

The EU in coordination with the Member States should seek synergies with other international actors and seek to build consensus with them in line with Article 210 TFEU. To this end, close cooperation will be sought with the UN, regional and other international organisations (in particular those with a security mandate), bilateral partners active on security-related issues and, where appropriate, specialised international NGOs. The security sector should be an inherent part of in-country coordination among international actors/donors. Where possible and applicable, international actors should consider framing their actions around a nationally owned, single support strategy for security sector development.

**Building on the ‘coordination matrix’, the EU in coordination with the Member States and other international partners will promote a comprehensive international engagement around a single security sector support strategy to be developed together with the partner country.**

**Be flexible and balance long-term systemic change and immediate security needs**

Transforming any security sector involves a lengthy process that must take account of specific institutional cultures and sensitivity to change. It requires long-term vision and engagement. In each specific context, the EU needs to find the proper balance and coherence between such long-term efforts and the need to meet individuals’ more pressing, often immediate, security needs.

As the operational environment may change rapidly, especially in fragile states or post-conflict, some actions may come to a standstill, or human rights or governance principles may be violated. SSR support programmes will need to be adaptable.

**Action box**

When engaging in SSR-related activities, the EU should:

- set incremental and achievable targets;
- engage in short-term activities to build the confidence of security and justice actors, open doors for future cooperation and sustain political and policy dialogue;
- adapt to rapidly changing operational conditions, especially in fragile or post-conflict states. Where appropriate the intervention will be implemented using the flexibility under the Union’s financial rules and procedures; and
- plan CSDP missions in support of SSR to reflect the need for long-term and sustainable involvement in the security sector and entail close cooperation with the EU Delegations.

**Measure progress: monitor and evaluate**

The general monitoring and evaluation principles for projects and programmes apply to all security sector interventions; in particular, it is important to:
- define baselines from the outset;
- establish clearly defined, feasible and time-bound targets and impact indicators linked to clear criteria to measure the achievement of results and objectives; and
- allocate sufficient human and financial resources for internal monitoring.

Monitoring and evaluation activities should include qualitative and quantitative data-gathering and analysis to integrate community and individual perceptions of change in line with people-centred human security approaches.

Robust monitoring and regular evaluations of ongoing interventions will allow the EU (and non-EU active partners) to take stock of progress, draw lessons and review activity.

**Action box**

*The EEAS/Commission services will prepare joint monitoring and evaluation guidelines, including indicators for security capacity-building and SSR-related activities applicable to all external action instruments and missions.*

**Manage risk**

SSR support entails risks which must be anticipated and for which mitigation measures must be drawn up; these include:

1. **insufficient national political commitment to change**

   Political commitment to reform may be insufficient or superficial; it may fade over time. The EU must be equipped to gauge the real level of commitment on the side of the partner country and plan its engagement accordingly. In some contexts, it could start with small interventions that aim to foster confidence and national political commitment and scale up at a later stage. Engagement with civil society may be an entry point.

2. **negative unintended consequences**

   No intervention is neutral and support to the security sector demands a ‘do no harm’ approach\(^\text{33}\) that factors in underlying sources of conflict. Context analysis will help EU actors to avoid unintended negative impacts on conflict dynamics, for example by:
   - inadvertently replicating or amplifying existing tensions, e.g. by reinforcing patterns of domination and exclusion;
   - introducing reforms and resources that favour vested interests or become entangled in corruption and patronage systems and in turn generate new grievances/instability.

3. **reputational risk**

   Security actors supported by the EU may act in a biased, discriminatory or abusive way towards the population; this will have an indirect negative effect on the EU’s reputation. Also, assets may fall into the wrong hands. Working with other international actors to assess reputational risk and draw up realistic mitigating

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\(^{33}\) COM(2010) 126, *Humanitarian Food Assistance*
measures will be part and parcel of designing SSR support. Where applicable and on the basis of careful case-by-case analysis, derogations can be applied to the visibility rules for EU external action programmes/tools.

iv. risk of non-intervention

It is the duty of any state to protect its civilians. In some cases, its failure to do so may lead to serious violations of human rights or democratic principles, human suffering or loss of life, including atrocity crimes. When considered useful to prevent such extreme occurrences and help deal with them where they could arise, on the basis of a UNSC resolution or a bilateral agreement with the partner state, the EU may decide to engage in SSR support activities even in the absence of important conditions, such as real commitment to change.

**Action box**

The EEAS/Commission services will prepare a dedicated risk management methodology for EU support. This will include mitigating measures drawing inter alia on the ‘risk management framework mechanism for budget support operations’.34

As provided for in its 2015-2019 Action plan for human rights and democracy35, the EU has to develop a ‘human rights due diligence policy’ outlining measures to ensure that EU and Member States’ support to the security sector is in compliance with/contributes to the promotion, protection and enforcement of international human rights and international humanitarian law, and is consistent with the EU’s human rights policies.

**Make best use of EU SSR expertise**

The EU should mobilise staff with the appropriate expertise and experience and with a strong understanding of technical and political issues relating to SSR. It must draw on the expertise of the Member States and, in specific areas where they bring clear added value, relevant EU agencies (e.g. Europol, CEPOL, FRONTEX) subject to their respective mandates, priorities and resources.

This EU-wide SSR policy framework envisages strong coordination and cooperation between EU actors and Member States to foster synergies and complementarities between instruments and missions in a ‘whole EU’ approach. It also provides for coordination with the activities of international and regional organisations and relevant NGOs.

**At headquarters**

The Commission and the HR will establish a permanent informal inter-service SSR task force, with representatives from relevant thematic EEAS and Commission services, which will advise and support EU Delegations, EEAS and Commission services and CSDP missions. It will contribute to ensuring coherence and complementarity of EU SSR activity and support the planning and design of SSR development cooperation projects and CSDP planning documents. Its role should also be reflected in the next edition of the crisis management procedures. It will develop methodological tools, standards, procedures and practices for EU SSR activities and provide training, inter alia by supporting the European


35 JOIN(2015) 16
Security and Defence College (ESDC). The task force will oversee the monitoring, evaluation, learning framework and risk management mechanisms.

**In the field**

Responsibility for the coordination of security sector support on the ground rests with the Head of the EU Delegation in the partner country or region in question. Where a CSDP mission is present in the country, the Council is invited to ensure that its mandate allows it to assist the EU Delegation on SSR-related issues. In this respect, the head of the mission will be available to advise the Head of Delegation.

EU Delegations and Member State diplomatic missions should share information and analysis, participate in joint analysis and contribute to the formulation of SSR coordination matrices.

Where the EU has a particularly significant and diversified security sector engagement and relevant coordination structures are not in place, it will seek to establish *coordination task forces* for security sector support at country level (with the political and operational sections of EU Delegations, CSDP missions, Member States and, where possible, relevant partners such as the UN, the World Bank and non-EU countries involved in the security sector).

**Action box**

A permanent informal inter-service SSR task force will be established to oversee EU SSR activities.

*The ESDC’s SSR training curricula should be updated to take account of this EU-wide strategic framework. Also, cooperation between the ESDC and relevant Commission training services should be strengthened to reflect the EU-wide approach.*

*Instructions to Heads of Delegation will include the task to ensure the local coordination of all EU stakeholders in security sector dialogue and support. This will not impact on the CSDP missions’ line of command.*

*The mandate of CSDP missions should include the provision of technical advice to EU Delegations.*

*In countries where the EU has a significant SSR commitment, it should be ensured that the Delegation has appropriate security sector expertise.*

### 4. AREAS OF ENGAGEMENT

The EU may support all components of the security sector, including the military, within the limits of EU legislation through the following activities (non-exhaustive list):

- **Institutional support**

  Support for security and justice institutions includes assistance in developing partner countries national defence, security and justice policies and strategies, national coordination mechanisms, administrative, communication and operational procedures, internal accountability mechanisms, human resources planning and management, information and data, and budgeting and financial management systems, in full compliance with human rights principles and compliance with international humanitarian law.
Institutional support may include assistance in the planning of reforms which should be tailored and context-sensitive and aim to help partner states assess their own needs, and express and achieve their vision by setting realistic short-, medium- and long-term outcomes. It should help them allocate human, technical and financial resources as appropriate. In so doing the EU will also engage with non-state and civil society actors.

The EU should ensure that its efforts to strengthen institutions generate direct short-term benefits for the population in terms of improved security service provision.

- **Training**

EU support includes building the capacity of national or regional training institutions. This may include technical assistance and mentoring, assessing training needs, developing new curricula and ‘training the trainers’. EU training assistance will specify the knowledge, skills and/or attitudes it is intended to pass on, so as to promote behavioural change in security sector personnel, units and institutions. It will also seek to ensure that training is valued in terms of career perspectives and that staff perform the duties for which they have been trained.

Support may be linked to dialogue on and support for national human resource management systems involving the identification of profiles needed by security and justice institutions, fair and transparent recruitment and promotion, etc.

Where there is a need to restore basic justice and security services rapidly, the EU may provide training directly, in particular through CSDP missions. As far as possible, it will do this in cooperation with national training institutions, with a view to strengthening them and eventually handing over responsibility for the training.

- **Equipment**

The EU can provide non-lethal equipment\(^\text{36}\) to security sector actors. This will be done within a broader security support framework for the country. The EU will need to seek appropriate guarantees that equipment will not be used to violate human rights, fundamental freedoms or the rule of law. To avoid the risk of equipment becoming unserviceable, abandoned, unaccounted for or misused, the existence and functioning of logistical support and registry/tracing chains will be assessed and, where required, support will be provided to improve their effectiveness. The development of basic good practice in the area of equipment management will be an integral part of any equipment package to ensure its maintenance, re-supply and disposal.

- **Support for oversight mechanisms**

The EU should support the establishment or strengthening of effective civilian control and oversight, *inter alia* by:

- promoting and supporting the formulation and enforcement of relevant legislation and procedures; and
- increasing the capacity of independent complaints and civilian oversight institutions and mechanisms.

--JOIN(2015) 17 final

\(^{36}\) JOIN(2015) 17 final
Beneficiaries may be national legislative bodies and independent or quasi-independent bodies such as ombudsmen, human rights institutions or commissions, anti-corruption commissions, independent police complaints commissions, and judicial authorities in their role of overseeing law enforcement agencies, etc.

The EU should promote the active participation of civil society in these oversight mechanisms and, where relevant, support civil society initiatives to monitor the conduct of the security forces. It will also promote the freedom of the media and strengthen its capacity to report responsibly on the security sector.

- **Community security**

Where violence and conflicts are linked to political, social and economic issues that are strictly local or national security forces are unable to provide vital security services, the EU can finance support initiatives whereby the population is provided with security and justice benefits through a community security approach, involving (official and/or traditional) local authorities, where possible, the residents of the communities and neighbourhoods in question and local security forces. The aim will be to improve the security of local communities, resolve conflict and address local root causes of violence, and ultimately to ensure that national authorities are able to address security and conflict problems at local level.

- **Links between SSR and other areas of engagement**

  **Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants**

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) refers to a set of interventions in a process of demilitarising official and unofficial armed groups by disarming and disbanding non-state groups or downsizing armed forces and reintegrating them into civilian life. DDR processes should respond to immediate security needs and help lay the foundations for longer-term stability in a country or region. They should therefore link in with an overall peace process and preferably with a broader SSR. In conflict and post-conflict contexts, EU SSR and DDR support will balance the need to restore basic security services as an urgent stabilisation measure with the need to avoid hindering longer-term stability by, for instance, legitimising non-inclusive security forces.

  **Transitional justice**

Transitional justice encompasses “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation”. Transitional justice measures should ultimately help to re-establish and strengthen the rule of law.

In post-conflict and transition countries, SSR as a component of institutional reform can contribute to prevent conflict from flaring up again; it thus helps to ensure accountability and respect for human rights and prevent future violations.

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37 EU concept for support to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), approved by the Commission on 14 December 2006 and by the Council of the European Union on 11 December 2006

38 UN Security Council, document S/2004/616
Council conclusions on support to transitional justice\textsuperscript{39} underline the importance of SSR.

\textit{Small arms and light weapons (SALWs)}

The availability of SALWs is often a key factor in triggering and spreading insecurity. ‘Residual conflicts’ sustained by the illicit spread of SALWs often blur the dividing line between armed conflict and criminality\textsuperscript{40}. SALW control is intrinsically linked to SSR efforts, not least in limiting the perceived or actual need or propensity of individuals or communities to provide for their own defence.

5. **MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION**

The implementation of this policy framework will be regularly monitored and evaluated. Each year an inter-service team composed of EEAS and Commission representatives, with the support of external consultants where needed, will review the EU’s overall engagement in the security sector in at least one priority country.

The evaluation criteria will be based on the objectives and principles outlined in this Joint Communication, on the shared monitoring and evaluation guidelines and on the actual implementation of the relevant risk management framework.

The relevance of the EU’s engagement will also be evaluated, on the basis of criteria such as:

- the quality and comprehensiveness of its analysis of the security sector;
- its responsiveness to urgent crises and emerging opportunities; and
- consistency between EU support, broader EU security and development goals and the security goals of partner countries.

Evaluations will be made publicly available. Recommendations will be drafted and follow-up action will be monitored. The evaluations will also be used to gather best practices and lessons identified, to be fed into EU staff training and reflections on EU financial instruments. This will help to improve internal procedures and the efficiency of the support.

The overall performance of this strategic framework will be evaluated within five years’ time.

\textit{The European Commission and the High Representative invite the European Parliament and the Council to endorse and support the approach set out in this Joint Communication and to engage fully in the move towards more coherent and effective EU engagement in assisting SSR in its partner countries.}

\textsuperscript{39} Council conclusions on the EU’s support to transitional justice, 16 November 2015 (13576/15)

\textsuperscript{40} EU strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition, Council conclusions (5319/06)