

## ANNEX I

of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme 2014 for the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace - Global and trans-regional threats.

### Action Document for Countering Terrorism

#### 1. IDENTIFICATION

Title/Number	Countering Terrorism CRIS number: IcSP/2014/35316		
Total cost	Total estimated cost: EUR 28 000 000. Total amount of EU budget contribution: EUR 28 000 000		
Aid method / Method of implementation	Project approach: Direct management - grants for components A and C; Direct management - procurement of services for component D; Indirect management for component B.		
DAC-code	na	Sector	na

#### 2. RATIONALE AND CONTEXT

##### 2.1. Summary of the action and its objectives

This comprehensive Counter-Terrorism (CT) programme aims to provide support to the fight against terrorism at local, national and regional levels. Following earlier Counter-Terrorism actions initiated under previous programmes (AAP 2008-2013), the present actions focus on combatting terrorist radicalisation, supporting CT-focussed rule of law, aviation security, and CT monitoring.

The four actions are: "Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism" (STRIVE) Global; "Counter-Terrorism Law Enforcement in the Horn of Africa" (CT LE HoA), "Civil Aviation Security (CASE)"; and "Counter-Terrorism Monitoring, Reporting and Support Mechanism (CT MORSE)".

##### 2.2. Context

Terrorism poses a serious threat to all. Fighting terrorism is among the priorities identified in the European Security Strategy<sup>1</sup> and the EU Council Conclusions on Security and Development<sup>2</sup>. In response to the terrorist threat, the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) have developed complementary strategies to contribute to global security. The EU's Counter-Terrorism Strategy<sup>3</sup> promotes democracy, dialogue, human rights and good governance. It is organised around four pillars - prevention, protection, pursuit, and response - which constitute a comprehensive and proportionate response to the terrorist threat. The EU adds value to counter-terrorism efforts through promoting the implementation of international norms and legal instruments to fight terrorism, through political dialogue (including in co-operation with international and regional organisations) and through targeted technical assistance. Prevention and fighting terrorism has been included in the Multiannual Indicative Programme 2014-2017 of the

<sup>1</sup> A secure Europe in a better world – European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003.  
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>

<sup>2</sup> Council Conclusions on Security and Development November 2007  
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&t=PDF&gc=true&sc=false&f=ST%2015097%202007%20INIT&r=http%3A%2F%2Fregister.consilium.europa.eu%2Fpd%2Fen%2F07%2Fst15%2Fst15097.en07.pdf>

<sup>3</sup> The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy – Prevent, Protect, Pursue, Respond  
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&t=PDF&gc=true&sc=false&f=ST%2014469%202005%20REV%204&r=http%3A%2F%2Fregister.consilium.europa.eu%2Fpd%2Fen%2F05%2Fst14%2Fst14469-re04.en05.pdf>

Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace.

For all actions under this Action Document, particular attention will be paid to Article 10 (on Human Rights) of the Regulation establishing an Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP). In this regard the Commission will ensure that measures are implemented in accordance with international law, including international humanitarian law and in accordance with the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, as well as the operational guidance which shall be developed to ensure that human rights are taken into consideration in the design and implementation of counter-terrorism assistance.

The Commission shall carefully monitor the implementation of the measures referred to in this Article in order to ensure compliance with human rights obligations and shall include information in this respect in its regular reporting. The CT MORSE action (component D below) will include this requirement as an important aspect of its work.

### **2.2.1. *STRIVE Global (component A)***

Since the adoption of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism in 2005, the EU has stressed the importance of preventing terrorism by addressing radicalization and recruitment. Aside from the internal aspect of disrupting existing terrorist networks and preventing new recruits, EU Counter-Terrorism action plans for third countries or regions also call upon the EU and Member States to identify the best means of addressing these challenges. The prevention of terrorism in third countries needs further reflection and merits additional resources. It is only through preventing terrorism that the threat can ultimately be addressed sustainably. The EU will increase its support to Prevent/Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programming, as part of a comprehensive response to the global threat of terrorism, as stressed in the Commission's Communication: "*Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU's Response*".<sup>4</sup>

Reflecting the international consensus on the need to bolster this work globally, two new mechanisms for funding and cooperation on Prevent/CVE have recently been established. The Hedayah Centre of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism was established in December 2012 as an initiative launched through the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). Hedayah is a "think" and "do" tank which promotes evidence-based practice, research and the implementation of community engagement. The US and Turkey in their capacity as chairs of the GCTF are sponsoring the setting up of a Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) which will seek to support nationally agreed upon grass-roots Prevent/CVE interventions piloted by government and non-government actors. The Global Fund is due to be operational from mid-2014. Both mechanisms represent an opportunity to reflect the EU emphasis on Prevent/CVE as part of an overall EU CT strategy in a comprehensive and coherent manner, as well as the commitment to the multilateral CT action under the GCTF.

Whereas the support through Hedayah will allow for a direct engagement on actions which have EU priority, the Global Fund is seen as an important new initiative to be supported. The European Commission will participate in the Steering Board of the Fund once it is established. GCTF member countries, including a number of EU Member States, have emphasised the strategic importance of providing financial support to the Fund as a contribution to countering terrorism. It is expected that also donors from the private sector will join the fund.

Both complementary initiatives are of value to the EU's support to CVE initiatives globally – whether at community or at grass root level. Work will be done both with relevant national or regional bodies active to develop CVE strategies.

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<sup>4</sup> COM(2013)941final

### **2.2.2. Counter-Terrorism Law Enforcement Horn of Africa (component B)**

The programme follows the European Council strategic framework for the Horn of Africa: "mitigating security threats emanating from the region"<sup>5</sup> and is in line with the African Union (AU) Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999) and the AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (2002).

The Horn of Africa, which for the purposes of this action includes Yemen, is vulnerable to the threat of terrorism. Porous borders, proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, weak security institutions, ineffective law enforcement and poorly functioning judicial institutions are major concerns. Moreover, the sub-region has experienced prolonged and severe intra- and inter-state conflicts, which has perpetuated instability, political isolation and poverty. Over 50 % of the population in the sub-region lives below the poverty line and the quality of social services such as education raises concerns. Economic, social, governance and political factors combine to provide an environment which is vulnerable to terrorist exploitation and the growth of violent extremism.

In recent years Al-Shabaab, which is designated by the UN Security Council as a proscribed terrorist group, has been increasingly viewed as a threat not only to Somalia, but to the greater sub-region as exemplified by their involvement in the large-scale attack on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi. Similarly, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula or "AQAP" has an ongoing destabilizing impact across the Gulf of Aden, particularly in Yemen where it is carrying out a series of assassinations and high-profile attacks.

Each country of the sub-region has its own particular capacity and capability gaps in relation to the prevention and combating of terrorism. While some countries are experiencing rapid economic growth (most notably Kenya and Ethiopia), they continue to be hampered by weak governance and dysfunctional criminal justice systems. Others, such as Yemen and Somalia, are the most underdeveloped and poor states in the sub-region, and have very limited capacity to effectively implement the rule of law domestically or engage their partners in the region in matters of security. There is a critical need to ensure that sub-regional law enforcement and criminal justice institutions have the capacity to deliver adequate national and regional responses to the terrorist threat which is often cross-border in nature. Significant gaps in technical skills and requisite resources have stymied the internalization of best practices in criminal justice oriented responses to terrorism. More support is also needed in the area of promoting and protecting human rights as part and parcel of an effective CT response.

### **2.2.3. Civil Aviation Security - CASE (component C)**

With the rise of global threats across the world, in particular targeting Civil Aviation, the international aviation community has had to strengthen measures for internationally structured prevention and response. This is particularly evident in the case of countries in Africa north of Equator as well as the Arabian Peninsula, which is the geographical scope of this action.

At the international level, Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) have been issued by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). The ICAO security standards remain the common basis for internationally recognised minimum requirements, as established in ICAO's Annexes (essentially Annex 17). However, given developments in the threat, the EU, the US and several others decided to enhance aviation security beyond ICAO standards at operational, supervisory and regulatory levels (e.g. EU Regulation 300/2008).

The European Union promotes aviation security in a number of initiatives. As an example, following an attempt by AQAP to bring down an aircraft with a bomb concealed in cargo, concerns about the potential risks of air cargo led to the introduction of new Air Cargo Regulations in February 2012. These Regulations affect all Air Carriers flying air cargo and mail into Europe. These regulations detail standards for a secure supply chain when transporting cargo and mail into the EU from third countries. Failure to meet these standards would expose a

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<sup>5</sup> Council Conclusions on the HoA: <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st16/st16858.en11.pdf>

vulnerability that could be exploited by terrorists; and ultimately could lead to all air cargo from a particular country being refused entry to the EU, with the associated significant economic consequences for the country concerned.

The initiative for Air Cargo and Mail Carrier Operating into the European Union from a Third Country Airport (ACC3) is drafted in such a way that the carrier has the responsibility for ensuring that the correct screening methods are applied to consignments loaded onto the aircraft provided that controls have not been applied by local cargo handling facilities (RA3, KC3) themselves subject to secure supply chain vetting. During the introduction of the standards, air carriers were required to sign a declaration indicating that such basic aviation security standards were applied. This is being superseded by an independent verification system validating the foreign activities and certifying air carriers and cargo handling facilities as ACC3s, RA3s or KC3s respectively. The EU aims to enshrine this secure supply chain monitoring system into ICAO SARPs eventually. In March 2014, AFCAC (African Civil Aviation Commission) agreed to cooperate with the EU on linking ACC3 audit findings to capacity building activities to be provided by the EU.

Enhancing the capacity of partner countries to meet these and other security standards requires support to establishing or reforming national bodies with sufficient awareness for security issues and skills to implement mitigation measures capable of protecting aviation from unlawful interference based on international standards. It also requires that the national bodies are adequately organised and staffed for defining and implementing aviation security measures and conducting regular quality control inspections in order to ensure the appropriate resilience capacity. In spite of the encouraging progress noted in many African states over the past years, actual implementation of innovative and effective security measures as well as maintenance of sustainable practices in aviation security still requires external support, in particular in exchanging best practices with developed nations.

#### ***2.2.4. Counter-Terrorism Monitoring, Reporting and Support Mechanism – CT MORSE (component D)***

The EU engagement on Counter-Terrorism is growing in political importance, geographic scope and monetary terms including through actions implemented by the IcSP. For example, the EU is an active contributor to the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and its working groups as well as to the UN Counter-Terrorism strategy framework. The opportunity of this increased engagement needs to be underpinned by solid delivery on CT programmes including through increased monitoring and quality support.

Particular attention has to be paid to ensure the coherence of IcSP CT projects within the overall EU CT cooperation (internal coherence) and with respect to any other relevant initiative undertaken by others (external coherence). In the same way, there needs to be regular liaison and information sharing between EU CT actions to bring forward a comprehensive EU CT Programme. Actions would benefit from targeted expertise that can assist the collection, analysis and sharing of best practice from emerging CT cooperation. Synergies should also be sought between the EU internal and external CT work in areas such as prevention and fight against radicalisation, for instance through the existing Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) and the future Internal Security Fund (ISF) Police external dimension.

### **2.3. Lessons learnt**

Apart from a specific review of the CT Sahel project, there are no assessments, monitoring results or evaluations of other previous CT projects under the then Instrument for Stability (IfS) long term component, and therefore, only general lessons can be drawn.

Previous Commission evaluations of support to the Security and Justice Sector<sup>6</sup> on the one hand, and Conflict Prevention and Peace building<sup>7</sup> on the other, note the need for greater context specific and flexible EU responses to conflict and security issues. The Commission Justice Security Sector Reform Evaluation also notes the importance of involving and engaging non-state actors and civil society more in relation to EU interventions in this area, and this should be reflected in activities going forward under this action.

The improvement of cooperation and trans-national mutual aid is a key factor of counter-terrorism actions because of the mobility of the target groups on the one hand and because of the benefit to pool actions and means on the other hand.

Cooperation needs to incorporate elements of flexibility to allow interventions to adapt to changes in the project operating environment while maintaining a focus on the objective of long-term institutional strengthening. Initiatives undertaken by other EU actors and the international community at large necessitate strong emphasis on complementarity and added value. This should include assessments of the absorption capacity of partner countries. The commitment of the relevant partner countries to engage in security sector cooperation is a precondition for support.

### **2.3.1. *STRIVE Global (component A)***

At present few systematic initiatives are being carried out by any country or organization to assess the impact of Prevent/Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programming. This is a weakness in current Prevent/CVE programming. In order to attain evidence-based recommendations robust impact assessment tools should be developed while maintaining operational flexibility of implementing actors. Prevent/CVE actions will largely be undertaken at the community level and best practice will be much linked to a specific context which will be a challenge in terms of developing best practice.

Hedayah serves as an international hub for the sharing of information and good practice related to Prevent/CVE and is, therefore, well placed to be a collection and dissemination point for lessons learned. Since its establishment it has established a network of Prevent/CVE points of contact and stakeholders which includes decision-makers from countries and regions concerned by violent extremism. In 2014, Hedayah will formally document its network by establishing a global database of CVE practitioners and their activities.

The combination of strong relationships with NGOs and governments puts Hedayah in a unique position. This is further enhanced by its geographical location in Abu Dhabi and apolitical and international outlook.

The Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund will be able to draw upon lessons learned from other partners, including Hedayah, in the process of defining its precise scope.

### **2.3.2. *Counter-Terrorism Law Enforcement Horn of Africa (component B)***

A comprehensive approach is needed in the Horn of Africa to effectively counter terrorism. Field research indicates that there is uneven and uncoordinated support across the criminal justice and security sectors in and between countries in the greater Horn of Africa which puts in jeopardy the achievement of results.<sup>8</sup> There is considerable and understandable attention to hotspots where, however, security concerns make delivery of assistance challenging. Somalia is one of the countries that would benefit the most from raising the level of capacity and capability within law enforcement to deal with specific CT measures. A focus on Somalia can spill over into positive security dividends for the sub-region overall. More support is needed to support and reform weak and corrupt elements of the criminal justice system. Additional support is also needed in the area

<sup>6</sup> Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Justice and Security System Reform: [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation\\_reports/2011/1295\\_docs\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/2011/1295_docs_en.htm)

<sup>7</sup> Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace-building: [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation\\_reports/reports/2011/1291\\_vol1\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/reports/2011/1291_vol1_en.pdf)

<sup>8</sup> Regional Law Enforcement mapping report, January 2014, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark

of promoting and protecting human rights, where there are concerns about the lack of attention to human rights to ensure that increased military capacity in the name of countering terrorism over the past 15 years is not going to be used as an instrument of suppression or repression in violation of human rights norms.

### **2.3.3. *Civil Aviation Security - CASE (component C)***

From feedback received from the various projects and initiatives in Africa, there is a consensus to declare that efficiency of some of the past assistance initiatives was hampered by Beneficiaries' lack of high level political involvement to ensure funding and staffing key security areas. The security environment did not support improvement and long term sustainability of adequate aviation security. This is mainly due to a lack of security culture, which results in weakness of the National Aviation Authorities, as well as insufficient regulatory and oversight capacity.

International aviation security audits often identify deficiencies in the clarity and implementation of security instructions; in qualification and certification of security staff and managers; quality control and oversight; and the capacity to resolve security concerns.

Areas of concern and regulatory non-compliances were reported as for example, breaches in mandatory security controls, staff / equipment unable to comply with basic security requirements for cargo and mail. Any implementation of new security objectives need to be accompanied by mentoring at the appropriate level (manager to manager, screener to screener). Current or past experiences of similar schemes established either with individual States or with regional organisations have shown the importance of long-term relations, sustainable connections with experts' networks, and the need to give constant and careful attention to local circumstances.

To successfully and sustainably improve the security situation in priority countries, the adoption of a top down approach will be needed, complemented by provision of assistance / support actions lower down. To achieve this, high level involvement on both sides (EU and partner countries) will need to be ensured.

### **2.3.4. *Counter-Terrorism Monitoring, Reporting and Support Mechanism - CT MORSE (component D)***

The delivery of a solid EU action on CT depends on the ability to coherently implement high quality interventions. Similarly, good operational data and analytical support can feed the further development of EU CT policy and strategy, especially in emerging policy areas such as Prevent/CVE. A general lesson from previous IcSP work is the need to allocate sufficient resources for this monitoring, coordination and analysis support function.

The CT MORSE mechanism is intended to address the coordination challenges stemming from the significant increase in EU engagement on Counter-Terrorism globally – be it from the IcSP or under other EU external financial instruments. The mechanism mirrors similar initiatives under the IcSP Critical Maritime Routes programme or under the Cocaine Route Programme.

More specifically, the mechanism will support the coordination, exchange of information and development of best practices between all EU funded CT actions and provide a platform for coordination with other actions conducted in this area – thus allowing a maximum of coordination and synergy among the various initiatives.

This mechanism will also strengthen the support of the EU participation in the GCTF framework, through the provision of support in organising meetings, visits etc. within the GCTF framework, in particular in areas linked to the Working Group co-chaired by the EU.

## **2.4. *Complementary actions***

The long-term IcSP CT programme aims to fully contribute to the implementation of the comprehensive approach through current EU development and security strategies.

#### **2.4.1. *STRIVE Global (component A)***

This action will help to launch the operational activity of Hedayah on a larger scale. Given its unique collaborative, independent and international approach, it will also allow Hedayah to share the lessons learned from its activities with a large number of global partners.

At present, there are a number of specific complementary activities that are being developed by Hedayah. These include:

- CVE trainings for Senior Officials: raises awareness and imparts skills.
- Workshop on the Development of National CVE Strategies: shares best practice on CVE national strategy development and general CVE approaches. The workshop will also seek to encourage strategy development in more vulnerable states. It will conclude with an action plan for collaboration between governments (and Hedayah) to encourage the implementation of more holistic approaches to CVE.
- Training in CVE and community policing through a train-the-trainer approach: introduces new strategic approaches and non-coercive techniques to reduce the threat of terrorism.
- CVE and Education: builds the capacity of teachers to prevent radicalisation in vulnerable countries. The training will focus on various approaches to counter-radicalisation and will again result in cascade training by participants in their home country.
- Capacity Building Projects in West Africa (pipeline): training community actors and police. This programme will see Hedayah working with local groups in Burkina Faso to design three CVE projects that seek to divert local youth away from violent extremism.
- New CVE training product, produced jointly with the Centre for Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation: The introduction to CVE training curriculum will offer a suite of options, including short presentations, interactive seminars and five-day modules. This material will form the basis of training for a number of different audiences and is a response to the numerous requests to introduce CVE concepts and approaches to new groups.

The action will complement on-going regional and national CVE actions funded by the EU, EU Member States or other international partners. In particular, it will establish cooperation with the IcSP funded STRIVE Horn of Africa and STRIVE Pakistan projects and ensure the sharing of best practice and lessons learned within the GCTF.

#### **2.4.2. *Counter-Terrorism Law Enforcement Horn of Africa (component B)***

The Counter-Terrorism Law Enforcement Programme will complement and build on on-going actions implemented at the national and regional levels by a wide range of actors including Interpol and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

The EU has in place a number of projects directly or indirectly of relevance and importance for the action, including but not limited to:

- The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) mission EUCAP NESTOR which includes strengthening the legal framework in participating countries and civilian police assistance.
- The Instrument for Stability project Critical Maritime Routes Law Enforcement Capacity Building (CRIMLEA) implemented by Interpol.
- The European Development Fund programme to promote Regional Maritime Security aiming inter alia at strengthening of regional capacity to mitigate illicit financial flows in Eastern Africa.
- In addition, EU support to civilian policing assistance is also provided through the vehicle of UNDP's Rule of Law and Security programme to Somalia and under the short-term component of the IcSP to Yemen where there is potential for a longer term action to follow.

- On Somalia, EU is the largest donor and was an integral partner in developing The Somali Compact as a result of an inclusive process to determine the priorities of Somalia for the next three years (2014-16). In March 2013 Federal Government of Somalia and representatives of the Somali Federal Parliament, Somali civil society, the UN and the EU established a High Level Task Force to support the process. EU continues to play a lead role in donor working groups and efforts to enhance monitoring of human rights and humanitarian law, in particular through a lead role in the security and justice working groups.
- There are a number of on-going and planned interventions funded under the short-term component of the IcSP in Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen focused on stabilisation, peace-building, security sector and recovery. Consideration is being given to possible immediate activities that could be supported in Kenya so as to feed into the implementation of this action on Counter-Terrorism law enforcement.

EU Member States are engaged in several actions of which a project to support the setting up of a Mogadishu Major Crimes Centre in Somalia, spearheaded by UNODC and supported by the UK, is of particular relevance to this action. The UK has also been undertaking programmes to train judges and prosecutors in the south-central Somalia. The EU co-chairs the Horn of Africa working group of the GCTF which includes EU Member States.

The UN is active in areas of interest to the action mostly through UNODC's East Africa Regional Office in Nairobi. UNODC provides technical support for activities within its area of operation, which in the context of counter-terrorism, translates into law enforcement and legal capacity building in accordance with international instruments and conventions.

The United States is engaged in CT issues in the region and is involved in a series of programmes addressing civilian law enforcement capacity but also military capacities in key countries such as Yemen and Somalia. The US has indicated an interest in working closely with the EU and any EU projects could benefit substantially from close coordination with the US.

### **2.4.3. Civil Aviation Security - CASE (component C)**

The general status of aviation security in Africa and the Middle East is of major concern for the international organisations (ICAO, ECAC) as well as for the EU Member States. Consequently, many support initiatives have been provided in the area, on regional or bi-lateral basis. Currently the following relevant initiatives were identified:

- On a bilateral basis, ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organisation) provides assistance to countries<sup>9</sup> in the region for development of their National Civil Aviation Security Programmes, as well as further initiatives of "State Improvement Plan". These actions are closely linked to the results of latest Universal Security Audit Programmes (USAPs) and are followed by ICAO Headquarters in Montreal.
- European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) - West African Economic and Monetary Union WAEMU (UEMOA in French) security cooperation has led to the adoption of a directly applicable regulation on aviation security (with content similar to EU requirements) and the implementation of an inspection programme for all WAEMU States. This initiative is financed by ECAC and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and proved to be successful. WAEMU has recruited a permanent Officer to manage their security activities.
- Euromed Aviation is an EU (ENPI) funded regional project. It focuses on supporting an open, healthy and competitive aviation market, promoting improved aviation safety and security, securing the environmental friendliness of air transport and backing regional air traffic management cooperation and harmonisation. The Beneficiaries are: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria and Tunisia. The project

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<sup>9</sup> Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Chad & Swaziland.

started in 2012 and ends in 2014<sup>10</sup>.

- ASACA (Support Project to strengthening civil aviation security in Africa) is a regional initiative developed under funding from the French Government, managed by CRASAC (Regional Office for assistance to the Civil Aviation Security). Its mission is to strengthen and coordinate cooperation in Africa<sup>11</sup> on airport security, fight against illegal immigration and fight against terrorism. CRASAC reports successful achievements in building up local training skills, cooperating with local institutions and delivering OJT (On the Job Training). The ASACA project will end in 2014.
- The EU (EDF) funded project “Improvement of Aviation Security in Africa” forms a component of a larger intra-ACP project: Support to the Air Transport Sector and Satellite Service in Africa. The Beneficiaries are seven priority countries: Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Mauritius, Namibia and Seychelles. The project started in 2013 and ends in 2015.

The projects described above all have a regional dimension. Besides these initiatives, several actions were conducted by EU Member States and by the USA, including equipment supply, technical assistance, and training - on a bilateral basis.

The general feedback from past initiatives was often disappointing, due to insufficient involvement of the national bodies, lack of organisation, and poor sustainability of the actions undertaken. However, well-organised, state-driven cooperation activities (see above) have often led to tangible and measurable outcomes, such as the establishment of a regional aviation security audit system.

#### ***2.4.4. Counter-Terrorism Monitoring, Reporting and Support Mechanism - CT MORSE (component D)***

This action will enhance coherence and complementarity within the EU CT cooperation itself and with respect to any other relevant initiative undertaken by others.

#### **2.5. Donor coordination**

The CT programme involves EU Member States’ judicial and law enforcement agencies in project preparation and implementation to ensure synergies between EU and EU Member States' agencies expertise and to ensure the highest possible standards and to promote EU visibility. At a political level, coordination with EU Member States is ensured in the different relevant Council Working Groups, notably on Terrorism (COTER), on relations with Africa (COAFR), on Africa, Caribbean, Pacific (ACP) and in the framework of the Multidisciplinary group on Organised Crime (MDG). The EU’s Counter-Terrorism Coordinator is regularly informed of the CT programme. The importance of coordinating with relevant services and Task Forces within the EU is recognised.

At the level of EU Delegations in third countries, coordination among various EU instruments supporting security sector cooperation is mainly ensured by the Head of the EU Delegation. Coordination at the field level with EU Member States is assured through the EU Heads of Mission meeting where appropriate and possible. The EU Delegation coordinates also on the ground with other bilateral and international stakeholders.

Technical coordination in the field of aviation security is ensured through ICAO, IATA, ECAC (European Civil Aviation Conference), as well as ASECNA (Agence pour la Sécurité de la Navigation aérienne en Afrique et à Madagascar), ACAC (Arab Civil Aviation Commission), AFCAC (African Civil Aviation Commission), and AACO (Arab Air Carriers Organisation).

In terms of counter-terrorism coordination relevant for the Horn of Africa, the existing donor

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<sup>10</sup> Following a previous Euromed Aviation 1 Project implemented from 2007 to 2011.

<sup>11</sup> The Beneficiaries are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cabo Verde, Comoros, Congo, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Senegal, Chad & Togo.

coordination mechanism established in Nairobi and run by the US which focuses on Kenya and its regional partners will be utilised as necessary. Furthermore the GCTF Horn of Africa Working Group (co-chaired by the EU) also allows other donors within the GCTF to share information and best practices about their own projects implemented in the sub-region.

Donor coordination also takes place within the UN counter-terrorism strategy framework combined with political and technical dialogue and exchange of information with EU Member States. Coordination with African countries is sought in the framework of the political and technical dialogue with the African Union (AU) and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Finally, the European Union is actively engaged in the GCTF framework.

### **3. DETAILED DESCRIPTION**

#### **3.1. Objectives**

In accordance with the Multi Annual Indicative programme 2014-17, the overall objective is to disrupt terrorist networks and the activities of recruiters to terrorism, cut off terrorist funding and bring terrorists to justice while continuing to respect human rights and international law.

##### ***3.1.1. STRIVE Global (component A)***

The specific objective of this component is to work globally with local state and non-state partners to develop and implement interventions that have a demonstrable impact on the threat posed by radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism.

##### ***3.1.2. Counter-Terrorism Law Enforcement Horn of Africa (component B)***

The specific objectives of this component target the core elements of the criminal justice process:

1. To enhance capacity to prepare cases by improved ability to collect, coordinate, disseminate and use intelligence as actionable evidence. (Core element: Case preparation)
2. To enhance capacity to develop cases by enhanced skills amongst prosecutors and enhanced ability amongst states to cooperate with their counterparts and neighbors in the region on matters of extradition and mutual legal assistance. (Core element: Case development)
3. To enhance case integrity by strengthened application of due process and international human rights standards when countering terrorism at each stage of the process of bringing terrorists to justice. (Core element: Case integrity)

##### ***3.1.3. Civil Aviation Security – CASE (component C)***

The specific objective of this component is to develop sustainable and adaptive mitigation systems against the failure of security, in order to prevent or deter the terrorist exploitation of aviation in the selected partner countries concerned in Africa, and the Arabian Peninsula.

##### ***3.1.4. CT Monitoring, Reporting and Support Mechanism- CT MORSE (component D)***

The specific objective of this component is to strengthen the global delivery, coordination and coherence among the various CT projects financed by the European Union as well as to reinforce the EU engagement within the Global Counterterrorism Forum framework.

#### **3.2. Expected results and main activities**

##### ***3.2.1. STRIVE Global (component A)***

The expected results are:

### **1. Strengthened capacity of security sector and law enforcement authorities to engage with civil society in fighting radicalisation to terrorism.**

There is a need to engage proactively with partner country authorities to build their capacity to implement Prevent/CVE work as part of their counter-terrorism response. “Hard” counter-terrorism measures alone cannot address the appeal of terrorist recruiters. This result is tailor-made to work with senior security and law enforcement officials in selected countries to build their knowledge and acceptance of Prevent/CVE approaches that are relevant to the local environment. This will be followed-up with pilot projects on the ground with officials to encourage the practice of new non-coercive methods.

### **2. Strengthened capacity of civil society organisations to deliver actions that prevent and counter terrorism.**

Effective Prevent/CVE work requires engagement with vulnerable communities and groups to identify and operationalize local solutions to the drivers of radicalisation. Support will be provided to the identification, design, implementation and evaluation of a number of specific actions in selected countries within pre-defined subject areas, e.g. youth, prisoners, women, diaspora.

### **3. Strengthened capacity of media to contribute to a responsible and pluralistic media environment that challenges terrorism.**

Drawing upon the same action model as described under Result 2, this component will focus on engagement with the media as a conduit for messaging and shaping of public opinion. Support will be channelled to the identification, implementation and evaluation of a number of specific actions in selected countries with the media sector.

### **4. Increased understanding of the drivers of radicalisation to terrorism among vulnerable groups, including region-specific assessments that will direct the design of initiatives.**

Research into the drivers of radicalisation and violent extremism in respect particularly to support the implementation of activities under result 2 as well as future actions.

The above results will be achieved through cooperation with Hedayah and the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund. While both mechanisms focus on community engagement their emphasis and articulation with national governments will differ and thus provide fitting and complementary vehicles for channelling EU support to this growing policy area.

With the IcSP grant, Hedayah will solicit ideas and develop project proposals for specific actions under the defined result areas above. These proposals will be prepared on the basis of expert conclusions on the gaps in PREVENT/CVE capacity that are emerging from the work of Hedayah and other partners.

The final project proposals will be subject to a validation process in which the European Commission will play a key role. The relevant Validation Committee inter alia will have to ensure that proposals are in line with the overall EU support actions on the ground in third countries.

The IcSP grant is provided to Hedayah for sub-granting purposes. This support will thus not be providing direct support to the operation of Hedayah, rather using this Centre of Excellence which is unique globally, as a mechanism to support PREVENT/CVE actions around the world. The EU is part of the overall Steering Board of the Hedayah Centre.

The Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) is being set up as a non-profit making foundation under Swiss law. The purpose of GCERF is to attract, manage, disburse, and monitor resources from a broad range of public and private donors to local organizations that will make a sustainable and significant contribution to countering violent extremism (CVE) at the grass-roots level, while complementing on-going national and other private sector efforts in this field. The IcSP grant is provided to GCERF for sub-granting purposes in line with the defined result area 2 above.

### **3.2.2. Counter-Terrorism Law Enforcement Horn of Africa (component B)**

The four expected results are designed to support critical counter-terrorism relevant capacity building. The first result is focused on Somalia due to its critical importance for the security of the sub-region while the remaining three results are regional in character:

#### **1. Improved capacity of national authorities in Somalia to collect, analyze and strategically use counter-terrorism intelligence.**

This result should be achieved through the development and operationalization of a blue-print for a fit-for-purpose Counter-Terrorism Information Facility under the Ministry of National Security in Somalia with a mandate to enhance CT law enforcement efforts with a focus on intelligence. As a first step, support would be provided to the identification and sharing of best practices and models from other countries on facilities which enhance the collection, receipt, analysis, coordination and sharing on CT intelligence as well as coordinate on CT-related policy. Secondly, CT practitioners would train relevant authorities on how to operationalize the Information Facility, including through the development of Standard Operating Procedures. Thirdly, technical support would be provided to the Information Facility. The need for a CT Information Facility has been identified as a key priority by Somali government counterparts and international partners to enable improved capacity for collecting, analysing, coordinating and disseminating counter-terrorism related intelligence.

#### **2. Improved regional counter-terrorism related law enforcement and prosecution.**

This component will focus on strengthening skills at national and regional levels in areas such as the gathering of criminal intelligence, constructing criminal cases, investigation techniques, and improved prosecutorial capacities. The result is designed to respond to a concrete need for hands-on practical training for intelligence officers, investigators and prosecutors for countries across the region to support an increase in CT prosecutions. Emphasis will be placed on the capacity to collect and utilise intelligence as actionable evidence in CT court cases.

#### **3. Enhanced regional cooperation on Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) and extradition.**

A firm legal basis for cross-border interaction between law enforcement and justice institutions is necessary for engaging in effective cooperation against transnational threats such as terrorism. In the sub-region, the IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) conventions on Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition (2009) provide for an adequate legal framework for this cooperation. Yet, in a sub-region with a record of limited interstate trust and cooperation and weak legal and judicial systems, a challenge to implement this framework legally and practically remains. This result will focus on concrete measures to help countries in the sub-region to build cross-border and inter-agency confidence, raise awareness of how they can use extradition and mutual legal assistance and build capacities to improve the prosecution and adjudication of terrorism cases. Training will be provided to competent authorities, such as Public Prosecutors, on the benefits of ratifying the regional instruments and on the use of informal and formal mechanisms for sharing and requesting case relevant information with their counterparts in the region. The core task of the programme will not be bent on pushing for ratification of the conventions per se. It is however a fair assumption that with increased awareness in the sub-region of the importance of these tools to increase convictions in CT cases, there is momentum for ratification.

#### **4. Increased understanding among law enforcement and judiciary officials across the region of effective counter-terrorism measures and the respect for human rights as mutually reinforcing.**

The unintended consequence of some of the external assistance to counter-terrorism measures in the Horn of Africa and especially in Yemen has been the negative impact on the human rights compliance of the institutions supported. It is of fundamental importance that EU counter-terrorism support is based on human rights, international humanitarian law and democratic values. To this end, this result will focus on delivering training and guidance to law enforcement and

judiciary authorities on promoting and protecting human rights across the sub-region as part of the CT response. It will emphasize the responsibility of states to protect their citizens against terrorism in a manner that is firmly based upon rule of law principles, on clear and fair law enforcement procedures and on an independent judiciary. It will also highlight that there cannot be any contradiction between effective counter-terrorism and the upholding of human rights standards and principles. The action will build upon existing best practices when carrying out capacity building that is in keeping with relevant European Union policy instruments as well as key international human rights standards in the criminal prosecution of terrorist offences. The result will pay particular attention to terrorism investigations, evidence collection and interrogation methods and issues of arrest and detention which have emerged as key in consultations with stakeholders.

### **3.2.3. Civil Aviation Security - CASE (component C)**

The expected results are:

#### **1. Creation of a viable and self-sustaining security culture within the beneficiary states, allowing an efficient operation of the Aviation Security systems, and readily adaptable to emerging threats.**

Sustainable cooperation will be established between beneficiaries and capacity building providers representing the EU aviation authorities and practitioners, in order to assess the beneficiaries' needs, assess the sustainability of the projects, link potential capacity building providers to beneficiaries, manage the requests for capacity building, and define details (content, timeframe, etc.) of capacity building actions. A number of mentoring actions will be provided in order to contribute to a true change in aviation security culture in the beneficiary states. Notably, mentoring of higher level management will be carried out within the structure(s) responsible for compliance and policy on aviation security, including communications and knowledge transfer on threats, risks and mitigation. Furthermore, mentoring of selected airport security managers as well as security controllers will be provided to cover the fundamentals of security management, compliance, communication and application of security methods and controls. Additionally, guidance for state aviation security inspectors will be ensured in order to enhance the level of knowledge of aviation security strategy and practical application (e.g. identification, reporting, sustainable rectification of deficiencies).

In respect to the identification of support measures EU aviation security validation reports<sup>12</sup> shall be taken into account. Where these reports identify shortcomings and deficiencies in the way security is managed they provide the basis for support leading to rectification measures helping a country to ensure unobstructed transport of cargo by air.

#### **2. Review and adjustment of aviation security legislation and regulations at national level within the beneficiary states.**

The legislative component of the programme will assure review of the existing aviation security legislation in the beneficiary states and propose related improvements. A particular attention will be paid to the harmonisation of security standards and requirements at national level for each beneficiary country based on findings resulting from ICAO USAP reports. More particularly, the activities will be based on the analysis of existing gaps in the aviation security legislation that weaken the overall objective of mitigating the threats. Workshops gathering governmental authorities and civil aviation institutions will be organised, and technical assistance with the aim of assisting in the identification of mitigating actions will be provided. Further technical assistance will be provided to design and draft legislation and regulations in aviation security to

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<sup>12</sup> Independently and objectively drafted assessments of the air cargo security situation at a given airport or the premises of an operator (airline or local cargo handling facility) requested by EU legislation under the ACC3 regime.

enable the identified mitigations. The technical assistance will ensure that international and national obligations are met.

**3. Viable and self-sustaining Aviation Security Quality Assurance systems are developed, implemented, and their maintenance ensured.**

Identification of suitable key performance indicators will be performed to assess the effectiveness of the aviation security quality control capacity (e.g. reaction time to deficiency and incident resilience, etc.). This action will be accompanied by mentoring of management responsible for the quality control/assurance at state level for aviation security which will be conducted in order to ensure the transfer of knowledge and best practices in aviation security quality control systems. In the same time, technical assistance on the implementation of state quality control systems will be carried out.

**4. Compliance with international baseline Aviation Security standards is achieved, and certain standards exceeding the baseline are implemented based on the assessment of the security threats in each beneficiary state.**

Through legislative and operational improvements, compliance with international standards will be achieved. Furthermore, a thorough review of security risks in the beneficiary states will result in elaboration of action plans aiming at tackling country-specific security threats. This will notably concern the viability and robustness of the air cargo and mail security system, as well as the protection of airport infrastructures. Technical assistance in the field of air cargo and mail security will be carried out with aim of achieving compliance with international best practices (e.g. secure supply chain and security controls including screening) as well as of identifying specific risks related to the intrinsic vulnerability of the air cargo and set up systemic mitigation measures. Where required, the help to develop critical airport infrastructure protection strategy, crisis management and contingency planning will be provided.

**3.2.4. Counter-Terrorism Monitoring, Reporting and Support Mechanism - CT MORSE (component D)**

The expected results are:

**1. To support the coordination, exchange of information and development of best practice between all EU CT actions and provide a platform for coordination with other actions conducted in this area.**

This result will involve activities such as the setting up of an information portal for EU CT actions and maintaining an up-to-date programme matrix of actors and programmes in the CT field to allow for synergies to develop.

**2. To monitor, follow-up and provide quality support as necessary to all the components of the IcSP CT Programme through desk analysis and missions in the field.**

This result will allow for the provision of tailor-made support to the efficient implementation of EU CT actions globally. Particular attention will be made to providing reports and advice on human rights compliance.

**3. To strengthen the support of the EU participation in the GCTF framework, through the provision of support in organising meetings, missions etc. within the GCTF framework, in particular in areas linked to the Working Group co-chaired by the EU.**

These actions will lead to an increased liaison between the EU and national/international stakeholders as well as beneficiaries; an increased awareness of the appropriateness and effectiveness of the EU response under the concerned IcSP programme; increased delivery of the EU response; and complementarity with activities under other geographic and thematic financial instruments.

### **3.3. Risks and assumptions**

The projects take place in countries with a volatile political situation which translates into serious security conditions including physical risks for the experts. This is an issue of particular concern for activities foreseen in Somalia, South Sudan, the Sahel, and Yemen. A number of other specific risks will present themselves, for example:

- The lack of political will and leadership support. Security sector reform requires high levels of buy-in and support from senior officials;
- The lack of awareness of security threats, notably in the field of civil aviation;
- The lack of willingness to cooperate among multiple institutions on the national level, and between countries;
- Difficulties in accessing classified and sensitive information necessary for the collection of data;
- Frequent staff turnover as a result of rapid political and administrative changes;
- Weak absorption capacity.

These risks are mitigated by the establishment of stringent monitoring mechanisms that will detect implementation difficulties at an early stage including taking appropriate corrective measures.

Work is assumed on:

- The availability of a minimum level of political stability; legitimate democratic institutions in the partner countries concerned including their willingness to cooperate with the EU;
- The willingness and capacity of non-state partners (CSOs, academic, think tanks) to work together with the EU.

### **3.4. Cross-cutting issues**

Projects in the area of CT cut across many different sectors and issues, ranging from human rights, gender equality and good governance. All activities of the projects will be carried out in conformity with the principles of good governance, internationally recognised human rights standards, international humanitarian law as well as taking into account gender equality and the possible impact of the actions on the respect of human rights, good governance and gender issues will be constantly monitored and adequate measures will be carried out where relevant and necessary.

Particularly, care will be taken towards law enforcement and judiciary agencies' respect of human rights and integrity standards. Training to intelligence officials, law enforcement and judiciary agencies will contain a component on human rights, integrity and gender issues.

### **3.5. Stakeholders**

The stakeholders will be the main State institutions and organisations in third countries involved in the fight against terrorism (including aviation security), as well as universities and research institutions, regional and international organisations. In addition, civil society organisations, media and community groups will be targeted as partners particularly in the work undertaken under Component A (STRIVE Global). Stakeholders related to this action will be primarily located in the targeted countries.

The final beneficiaries are the citizens of the targeted countries who will benefit from increased security and reduction in terrorist activities. At least indirectly, the citizens of the EU will benefit from the enhanced capacities to prevent, protect, pursue, and respond to terrorism, hence enhancing the internal security of the EU.

## **4. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES**

#### **4.1. Financing agreement**

In order to implement this action, it is not foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with the partner country, referred to in Article 184(2)(b) of the Financial Regulation.

#### **4.2. Indicative operational implementation period**

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in sections 3.2 and 4.3 will be carried out, is 48 months, subject to modifications to be agreed by the responsible authorising officer in the relevant agreements.

#### **4.3. Implementation components and modules.**

##### ***4.3.1. Grant: direct award (direct management, Component A and C)***

For **Component A (STRIVE Global)** the implementation method will be a direct grant to the Hedayah Centre and a direct grant to the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund.

For **Component C (CASE)** the implementation method will be a direct grant to the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC).

(a) Objectives of the grant, fields of intervention, priorities of the year and expected results

The objective of the two grants to be awarded under Component A (STRIVE Global) is: To work with local state and non-state partners to develop and implement interventions that have a demonstrable impact on the threat posed by radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism.

In order to support the achievement of the objective of the actions, and in particular in this case where the implementation of the actions requires financial support to be given to third parties, the Beneficiary may award financial support to third parties. As the main purpose of the actions under component A is financial support to third parties no maximum amount for sub-granting will apply. The Description of the Actions for these two grants shall define the types of entities eligible for financial support and include a fixed list with the types of activity which may be eligible for financial support. The criteria for the selection of the third party recipients of this financial support, including the criteria for determining its exact amount, shall also be specified in the Description of the Actions.

The objective of the grant to be awarded under Component C (CASE) is to develop sustainable and adaptive mitigation systems against the failure of security, in order to prevent or deter the terrorist exploitation of aviation in the selected partner countries concerned in Africa, as well as the Arabian Peninsula.

(b) Justification of a direct grant

Under the responsibility of the authorising officer by delegation, the two grants under Component A (STRIVE Global) and the grant under Component C (CASE) may be awarded without a call for proposals to the International Centre of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) – Hedayah, the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund and ECAC respectively.

Under the responsibility of the authorising officer by delegation, the recourse to an award of a grant without a call for proposals is justified because of the de facto monopoly of the three bodies. The direct award is furthermore justified by the specific characteristics of the action that require a particular type of body on account of its technical competence, its high degree of specialisation or its administrative power.

(c) Essential selection and award criteria

The essential selection criteria are financial and operational capacity of the applicants. The essential award criteria are relevance of the proposed action to the objectives of the call; design, effectiveness, feasibility, sustainability and cost-effectiveness of the action.

(d) Maximum rate of co-financing

The maximum possible rate of co-financing for these grants is 100% of the eligible costs of the actions. The maximum possible rate of co-financing may be up to 100 % in accordance with Article 192 of the Financial Regulation as full funding is essential for the action to be carried out.

(e) Indicative trimester to contact the potential direct grant beneficiaries: 04/2014.

#### 4.3.2. Procurement (direct management, Component D)

Subject	Type (works, supplies, services)	Indicative number of contracts	Indicative trimester of launch of the procedure
<b>Comp. D:</b> Counter-Terrorism Monitoring and Support Mechanism	Services	1	04/2014

A maximum of 20% of this amount can possibly be allocated for supplies.

#### 4.3.3. Indirect management (Component B)

Component B: These actions with the objective of enhancing the capacity to prepare cases by improved ability to collect, coordinate, disseminate and use intelligence as actionable evidence; to enhance capacity to develop cases by enhanced skills amongst prosecutors and enhanced ability amongst states to cooperate with their counterparts and neighbours in the region on matters of extradition and mutual legal assistance; and to enhance case integrity by strengthened application of due process and international human rights standards when countering terrorism at each stage of the process of bringing terrorists to justice will be implemented in indirect management in accordance with Article 58(1) (c) of the Financial Regulation. To avoid duplication of activities and taking advantage of existing partnerships by other actors active in the field, this action will be implemented in indirect management with EU Member States public bodies which meet the necessary criteria for this contracting modality.

The potential identified organisations include: BTC CTB (Cooperation Technique Belge); DANIDA (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs); GiZ (DE); DFID (UK Department for International Development); FEI (France Expertise International); FIIAPP (Fundacion Internationaly para Iberoamerica de Administraciony Politicas Publicas); IT MoFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy); NL MoFA (NL Ministry of Foreign Affairs); SIDA (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency).

The change of management mode from indirect to direct management, whether partially or entirely is not considered a substantial change.

#### 4.4. Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants

Subject to the following, the geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act shall apply.

#### 4.5. Indicative budget

	Amount in EUR	Third party contribution (see above)
<b>4.3.1. Direct grants (direct management) - Components A and C</b>	<b>14,000,000</b>	-
Component A – International Centre of Excellence for CVE - Hedayah	4,900,000	-
Component A – Evaluation and audit - Hedayah	60,000	-
Component A – Communication and visibility - Hedayah	20,000	-
Component A – Contingencies - Hedayah	20,000	-
Component A – Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund -	1,920,000	-

GCERF		
Component A – Evaluation and audit - GCERF	40,000	-
Component A – Communication and visibility - GCERF	20,000	-
Component A – Contingencies - GCERF	20,000	
<b>Component A - TOTAL</b>	<b>7,000,000</b>	-
Component C – Civil Aviation Security - CASE	6,820,000	-
Component C - Evaluation and audit	100,000	-
Component C - Communication and visibility	40,000	-
Component C - Contingencies	40,000	
<b>Component C - TOTAL</b>	<b>7,000,000</b>	-
<b>4.3.2. Procurement (direct management) - Component D</b>	<b>3,000,000</b>	-
Component D – CT MORSE	2,920,000	-
Component D - Evaluation and audit	40,000	-
Component D - Communication and visibility	20,000	-
Component D - Contingencies	20,000	
<b>Component D - TOTAL</b>	<b>3,000,000</b>	-
<b>4.3.3. – Indirect management</b>	<b>11,000,000</b>	
Component B - Counter-Terrorism Law Enforcement HoA	10,820,000	-
Component B - Evaluation and audit	100,000	-
Component B - Communication and visibility	40,000	-
Component B - Contingencies	40,000	
<b>Component B - TOTAL</b>	<b>11,000,000</b>	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>28,000,000</b>	

#### 4.6. Performance monitoring

Close monitoring will be ensured throughout programme implementation by the European Commission. A mid-term Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM) might be envisaged in the course of implementation. The Counter-Terrorism Law Enforcement programme in the Horn of Africa (Component B) foresees an independent mid-term review which to the extent possible should assess trainee comprehension and performance following the delivery of training. EU Delegations will also be called to closely supervise activities on the ground. Indicators of output, outcome and impact to measure progress will be developed prior to the implementation of the different components.

#### 4.7. Evaluation and audit

An evaluation and an audit may be carried out at the end by independent experts. For the evaluation, a final decision will take into account confidentiality and sensitivities given the subject matter. Indicators referred to above for the measurement of progress will also be used for the possible final evaluation.

#### 4.8. Communication and visibility

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU. Nonetheless, confidentiality of some of the output and activity might lead to specific arrangements restricting circulation and information. This action shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action, to be elaborated before the start of implementation and supported with the budget indicated in section 4.5 above.

The measures shall be implemented either (a) by the Commission, and/or (b) by the partner country, contractors, grant beneficiaries and entrusted entities. Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in, respectively, financing agreements, procurement and grant contracts, and delegation agreements. The Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Action shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action and the appropriate contractual obligations. With regard to indirect management with UN agencies, Joint Visibility Guidelines between the EU and UN shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action and the appropriate contractual obligations.