

UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development - Public Consultation on revising the European Consensus on Development

Fields marked with * are mandatory.

(1) Introduction

The year 2015 was a strategic milestone for global governance, poverty eradication and sustainable development. It marked the target date of the UN Millennium Development Goals and a point to reflect on the progress made to date and the challenges ahead in addressing their unfinished business. 2015 also saw a series of landmark international summits and conferences over the course of the year (the [Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030](#), the [Addis Ababa Action Agenda](#), the [2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development](#) and the COP 21 [Paris Agreement](#) under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change) which have collectively re-cast the way the international community, including the EU, will work to achieve sustainable development and poverty eradication for many years.

Importantly, and in contrast to the Millennium Development Goals, the 2030 Agenda, including its seventeen Sustainable Development Goals, is a universal Agenda which applies to all countries. It reflects many core European values and interests and provides an international framework for tackling global challenges such as climate change. The EU response to the 2030 Agenda is moving ahead in a range of ways:

- Firstly, as part of EU efforts to implement the 2030 Agenda, the [Commission Work Programme for 2016](#) announces an initiative on the next steps for a sustainable European future which will explain how the EU contributes to reaching the Sustainable Development Goals and map out the internal and external aspects of EU policies contributing to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals.
- Secondly, the High Representative will present the [EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy](#) that is expected to steer the different EU external policies contributing to the global vision of a more stable, prosperous and secure world. It should set out the strategic direction for the full range of EU external action, and as such will help guide EU implementation of the 2030 Agenda in external action.
- Thirdly, the EU will review its development cooperation policy. Existing leading policy documents (including the [2005 European Consensus on Development](#) and the [2011 Agenda for Change](#)) are currently framed around the Millennium Development Goals and need to adapt to incorporate the 2030 Agenda. Given its direct relevance to the EU's overall relations with developing countries, this review will be carried out in full consistency with the ongoing work on the future of the partnership between the EU and the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, under a post-[Cotonou](#) framework.

Views from this consultation will be used to inform the way forward on the initiatives above and in particular the revision of the European Consensus on Development and other external aspects of 2030 Agenda implementation. The consultation seeks your views on **how development policy, in the context of EU external action as foreseen by the Lisbon Treaty**, should respond to the range of landmark 2015 summits and conferences, and also to the rapid changes happening in the world.

Replies can include views which could apply only to the EU institutions and also to both the EU and its Member States – it would be helpful to clarify this in your response. This open public consultation will run for 12 weeks from 30 May 2016 to 21 August 2016. A brief summary and analysis of all consultation contributions will be published by November 2016 and all individual contributions will also be made available on the consultation website (unless respondents ask for their contributions not to be published).

(2) Information on respondents

- * 2.1 Received contributions may be published on the Commission's website, with the identity of the contributor. Please state your preference with regard to the publication of your contribution.

Please note that regardless of the option chosen, your contribution may be subject to a request for access to documents under [Regulation 1049/2001](#) on public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents. In such cases, the request will be assessed against the conditions set out in the Regulation and in accordance with applicable [data protection rules](#).

- I do not agree that my contribution will be published at all
- My contribution may be published but should be kept anonymous; I declare that none of it is subject to copyright restrictions that prevent publication
- My contribution may be published under the name indicated; I declare that none of it is subject to copyright restrictions that prevent publication

- * 2.2 Are you registered in the EU's Transparency Register?

Please note: Organisations, networks, platforms or self-employed individuals engaged in activities aimed at influencing the EU decision making process are expected to register in the transparency Register. During the analysis of replies to a consultation, contributions from respondents who choose not to register will be treated as individual contributions (unless the contributors are recognised as representative stakeholders through Treaty provisions, European Social Dialogue, Art. 154-155 TFEU).

- Yes
- No

- * 2.2.1 If yes, what is your registration number?

0878397912-17

- * 2.3 Name (entity or individual in their personal capacity)

European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO)

2.5 What type of stakeholder are you?

- Government institution / Public administration
- University / Academic organisation
- Civil society (including Non-Governmental Organisation, specialised policy organisation, think tank)
- International organisation
- Private sector or private company
- Citizen/private individual
- Other

2.6 Please specify

The European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) is the independent civil society platform of European NGOs, networks of NGOs and think tanks which are committed to peacebuilding and the prevention of violent conflict. EPLO's mission is to influence the EU to be more active and more effective at promoting peace and preventing violent conflict throughout the world.

* 2.7 What is your place of residence (if you are answering as a private individual) or where are the headquarters of your organisation situated (if you are answering on behalf of an organisation)?

- In one of the 28 EU Member States
- Other

2.8 Please specify

Brussels, Belgium

(3) Context: why a change is needed

The EU and its Member States are determined to implement the 2030 Agenda through internal and external actions as well as contribute to the successful implementation of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, given the strong interlinkages. In this context, our policies, should take into account changing global conditions and trends, to ensure that they remain fit-for-purpose across the time-horizon to 2030.

The global landscape has changed significantly compared to the time of adoption of the Millennium Development Goals. While much has been achieved, with more than one billion people having been lifted out of extreme poverty since 1990, great challenges remain and new ones are emerging. At global level, more than 800 million people still live on less than USD 1.25 a day. The world is witnessing multiple conflicts and security tensions, complex humanitarian and global health crises, deteriorations of human rights, environmental degradation, resource scarcity, urbanisation and migration. Migration flows across the world will continue to have important impacts, and present both a risk and an opportunity. The EU needs to address global security challenges, including tackling the root causes of conflict and instability and countering violent extremism. Climate change can continue to amplify problems and can severely undermine progress. Important changes include demographic trends, a new distribution of wealth and power between and within countries, the continuing globalisation of economies and value chains, an evolving geography of poverty and a proliferation of actors working on development. Projections also suggest important challenges are ahead (for example, continuing unprecedented urbanisation, and other demographic challenges including ageing societies for some and the potential for a demographic dividend for others). Continued attention will be given to a democratic, stable and prosperous neighbourhood. A revision to EU development policy should take into account these trends (including anticipating those that will remain central in future) whilst retaining a core focus on eradicating poverty and finishing the job started by the Millennium Development Goals.

Finally, the EU Consensus needs also to adapt to the Lisbon Treaty, which provides for all external action policies to work within the frameworks and pursue the principles of objectives of Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union. In particular, coherence between the different parts of EU external action and between external and internal policies is crucial.

The EU will need to address these new global challenges, many of which require coordinated policy action at the national, regional and global levels. The 2030 Agenda provides a framework which can guide us in doing so.

3.1 There is a range of key global trends (e.g. changing geography and depth of poverty; challenges related to climate change, political, economic, social, demographic, security, environmental or technological) which will influence the future of development and the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. Which of these do you think is the most important?

Conflict will be one of, if not the central challenge, to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In 2015, the 'States of Fragility' Report issued by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) indicated that without effectively addressing conflict, we are unlikely to meet the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 1 on ending extreme poverty. Indeed, poverty is becoming increasingly concentrated in fragile and conflict-

affected contexts; 43% of people living on less than USD 1.25/day currently live in such states and by 2030, potentially 62%. Overall, one-and-a-half billion people live in areas affected by fragility, conflict, or large-scale, organised criminal violence.

How willing donors and partner governments are to increasingly coordinate and integrate peace and, more specifically, peacebuilding objectives into their ordinary programming of health, education, infrastructure, etc. and preparedness to ensure that these support broader frameworks for social cohesion, and economically and politically inclusive states, will be determining factors in the effectiveness and above all, sustainability of development efforts in the next 20 years. The SDG 16 on peaceful and inclusive societies was a landmark recognition of the connection between development and peace. There are a lot of peace-related targets across the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs – all of these need to be implemented in a coherent manner if we are to achieve sustainable peace. A conflict-sensitive approach is needed in all of the European Union's (EU) development efforts, including those focusing on implementing the 17 SDGs.

There are other considerations that also potentially challenge the impact of development and peacebuilding assistance. EPLO would like to highlight the following aspects:

- The short-term security imperatives linked to long-standing issues which are now increasingly being felt in Western countries (e.g. refugee flows and terrorism) risk leading to a blurring between development and security-focused co-operation (e.g. development funds being used to provide capacity building assistance and equipment to military actors in third countries) and potentially to the deprioritisation of long-term development and peacebuilding visions and strategies.
- Domestic political upheavals in the EU Member States (MS) risk leading to more closed societies which are unwilling to contribute to global public goods, or even to the rise of xenophobia and nationalism. These factors, combined with geopolitical shifts and general uncertainty, risk returning foreign policies to the prioritisation of hard-security 'Realpolitik' approaches guided by a narrow interpretation of national interests.
- In fragile and post-conflict environments, development processes are frequently interrupted and set back by violence and unresolved conflicts, weak institutions/rule of law and/or corruption. Conflict analysis which fails to take into account local and marginalised voices, such as children, women, people with disabilities, etc. can miss the multiple drivers and competing narratives of conflict, and reinforce patterns of exclusion.
- The Gender, Peace and Security (GPS) agenda tends to be narrowly constructed as focused on women and girls. As a sub set of GPS, the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda tends, itself, to be narrowly understood as being about 'making war safer for women' rather than about preventing conflict and challenging violence as a tool to achieve individual and

collective political objectives. WPS often remains a tick box exercise or an add-on rather than a core element within many programmes. For example, past efforts have focused on adding women in political and security sectors without ensuring that their engagement was meaningful, or without challenging the gendered nature of those processes.

- With rising numbers of fragile contexts and some 600 million young people currently living in fragile and conflict-affected zones, the role that young people play is becoming more relevant to the sustainability and success of peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts, including preventing violent extremism. The adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) is an urgent call to action to the development, humanitarian and peacebuilding sectors to consider setting up participation, protection and prevention mechanisms that enable young people to be meaningfully involved in peace processes and in dispute/conflict resolution.

- The shrinking space for independent civil society organisations (CSOs) is a very worrying trend which takes different forms, including reduced funding for CSOs which act as 'watchdogs', limited independence for CSOs which receive public funds, limited rights to strike and to assemble and demonstrate peacefully, persecution by authoritarian governments and other forms of violence, including killing of activists.

3.2 How should EU policies, and development policy in particular, better harness the opportunities and minimise the negative aspects of the trend you identified in the previous question?

- In a period of uncertainty and prolonged crisis, the EU must make the political case for long-term investment in peace and development as global public goods which can help to manage the negative impacts of globalisation and serve as a shared, common international agenda to address geopolitical shifts. The call to action to seriously invest politically and financially in conflict prevention efforts, embedded in the 2015 reviews of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture and Peace Operations, and even the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) outcomes document, must be heeded by the EU.

This should be done inter alia by:

- prioritising long-term development and peacebuilding interventions which are informed and designed by tools such as conflict sensitive approaches and conflict analysis which aim to tackle the root causes and drivers of conflict;
- rejecting short-term securitised approaches to migration while working to improve the response to protracted displacement and preventing further such situations by addressing the root causes of conflicts and instability which drive forced displacement;
- putting people at the center of EU policies and interventions, notably by supporting and engaging with citizens, local communities, faith

leaders and grassroots-level CSOs in order to generate policies which are context-sensitive and serve long-term stability;

- pursuing principled diplomatic engagement with third countries based on democratic norms, human rights and the rule of law in order to promote political systems which are able to manage conflict and broader developmental change peacefully;

- establishing sufficient political independence for the institutions which are tasked with promoting long-term peacebuilding and development in order to avoid co-option into serving short-term crisis response and security objectives.

- All EU development interventions which are undertaken in fragile and /or conflict-affected countries and regions must be conflict- and gender-sensitive, and respect the 'do no harm' principle. Addressing the security-development nexus in fragile environments should be underpinned by a long-term commitment which prioritises the establishment of the rule of law and democratic institutions, and addresses the underlying drivers of conflict and fragility, including justice and reconciliation issues, while empowering women, children, youth and marginalised groups as key actors for peace, in line with the provisions of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States.

- The EU should prioritise inclusive, joint conflict analyses in which local actors play a key role. Gender analysis should be integrated as a standard element of any conflict analysis and should not be treated as a separate process or an optional extra. Such analyses would also help to build relationships and increase communication between the EU and the communities where EU delegations (EUDs) operate. It should ensure that people who are affected by violence, injustice and/or exclusion - especially young people who are sometimes most vulnerable to radicalisation - are not reduced to being mere 'recipients' but are empowered and engaged as meaningful partners.

- The EU should ensure that the WPS agenda is as much about conflict prevention, and meaningful participation of women, as it is about the protection of women. Peacebuilding and development efforts should help to address unequal gender norms, such as militarised masculinities and femininities, which can fuel conflict and insecurity. This includes engaging both men and women in promoting more positive and progressive notions of masculinity and femininity in society (e.g. by supporting nonviolent masculine gender norms).

- The EU should strengthen the capacity of CSOs to engage meaningfully with partner country governments in order to participate effectively in policy processes, conduct oversight, and improve transparency and accountability. The EU should empower organisations and networks, including faith communities and religious leaders who play a key role in development, to become more resilient agents of change.

- The EU should endorse and take action to implement the UNSCR 2250 which creates a framework for nations to engage and empower youth as workers of peace through five pillars: participation, protection, prevention, partnerships, and disengagement and reintegration. Harnessing the active

involvement of youth represents an effective strategy for reaching better outcomes in preventing radicalisation and extremism, which can lead to a lasting peace. Prevention requires constructing strategies aimed at creating inclusive and enabling environments where youth becomes integral to societal cohesion. Prevention strategies therefore need to emphasize diversity and tolerance in societies. In this context, the EU and its MS are urged to recognize youth as part of the solution and to help foster collaboration between the international community, local governments and CSOs.

(4) Priorities for our future action: what we need to do

Implementation of the 2030 Agenda will require sustained EU efforts to promote a more just world, including a strong focus on the need to address gender equality and women's empowerment. Peace, inclusiveness, equality and good governance including democracy, accountability, rule of law, human rights and non-discrimination will need particular emphasis. The 2030 Agenda also requires recognition of the close interconnectedness between poverty, social issues, economic transformation, climate change and environmental issues.

To achieve poverty eradication, EU development policy will need to take into account key demographic and environmental trends, including challenges related to climate change, and concentrate effort on least developed countries and fragile states. The EU will also need to strengthen our approach to fragility and conflict, fostering resilience and security (as an increasing proportion of the world's poor are expected to live in fragile and conflict affected states) and to protect global public goods and to maintain our resource base as the prerequisite for sustainable growth. Peace and security, including security sector reform, will have to be addressed also through our development policy, as will the risks and opportunities related to migration flows. Tackling social and economic inequalities (both within and between countries) is a crucial element of the 2030 Agenda as is addressing environmental degradation and climate change. Job creation will be an important challenge in which the private sector has to play an active role. Finishing the job of the Millennium Development Goals requires identifying and reaching those people throughout the world who are still not benefitting from progress to ensure that no one is left behind.

To achieve lasting results, EU development policy will need to foster transformation and promote inclusive and sustainable growth. Drivers of inclusive sustainable growth, such as human development, renewable energy, sustainable agriculture and fisheries, and healthy and resilient oceans should be an important part of our efforts to implement the new Agenda as will efforts aimed at tackling hunger and under-nutrition. Implementation of the 2030 Agenda will require a multi-dimensional, integrated approach to human development. Implementation will also require us to address vectors of change, such as sustainable urban development and relevant use of information and communication technology. Our development policy will have to engage and identify new ways of partnering with the business in order to achieve sustainable and inclusive growth, industrialisation and innovation. Implementation of the 2030 Agenda will also require cooperation with partner countries and regions on science, technology and innovation. In all aspects of our external action, the EU will need to ensure that our approaches, including development cooperation, are conducive to achieving the 2030 Agenda's Sustainable Development Goals and that the EU intensifies efforts to promote pursue coherence between our policies and our internal and external action.

4.1 How can the EU better address the links between achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, the Paris Agreement on climate change and addressing other global sustainable development challenges?

Climate change is playing a growing role in fuelling insecurity and conflict in the Global South inter alia by increasing resource scarcity, competition over land use, urbanisation and displacement. It acts as a threat multiplier, exacerbating existing tensions and divisions, especially in already fragile situations. To improve its efforts to address the links between climate change and other global sustainable development challenges, the EU should:

Policy:

- Commit to fostering more effective synergies between peace, humanitarian and development actions, especially in fragile and/or conflict-affected countries, as a first step towards a holistic and sustainable EU development policy framework.
- Foster the integrated and effective implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement, and follow up on commitments for the World Humanitarian Summit through a cross-institutional approach facilitated by relevant structures in the EU institutions.
- Enhance coordination between the internal-external dimensions of policy coherence for development (PCD).

Capacity building and partnerships:

- Commit to developing the capacities to identify multidimensional and interconnected risks and drivers of conflict through gender-sensitive context, risk and conflict analysis, and to translate the analysis into conflict- and gender-sensitive programmes at all levels, including as it relates to conflict, climate and disasters.
- Strengthen the resilience and effectiveness of partner countries' governance structures to deliver sustainable outcomes on addressing climate change.
- Support inclusive policies and partner country ownership of development strategies and enhanced accountability as regards partner countries' national systems.

Programming:

- Fulfil the financial commitments related to addressing climate change foreseen by the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development, especially in conflict-affected and fragile contexts.
- Ensure that adequate financing is in place for the least developed countries (LDCs). The SDGs and the Paris Agreement commitments will not be met without significant investment in LDCs. Investing in vulnerable groups will be critical for achieving inclusive, equitable and sustainable development.
- Provide financial resources and capacity building to assist developing countries with respect to both mitigation and adaptation to climate change in accordance with articles 9 and 11 of the Paris Agreement.

4.2 How should the EU strengthen the balanced integration of the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development in its internal and external policies, and in particular in its development policy?

- A balanced integration of the different dimensions of sustainable development can be reached through better use of PCD. Policy planning and implementation should be coupled with a more strategic and efficient use of finances, and a greater emphasis on accountability.
- The traditional donor-recipient framing of development co-operation needs to be expanded. Global development policy will increasingly need to take the universality of the 2030 Agenda seriously. With aid dependence in decline in many parts of the world which are nonetheless at risk of conflict, the EU will not be able to shape debates on best practice and policy in other countries unless it can demonstrate that it is taking action at home. Thus, the EU must acknowledge that SDG 16 also applies to Europe. This means that the EU should be receptive to lessons learned in the Global South and their applicability to policy in Europe. Only through such an outlook can the EU expect to engage in meaningful dialogue with middle-income and emerging countries.
- More broadly, the 2030 Agenda highlights 'peace' as one of the five cross-cutting priorities underpinning the SDGs. The EU needs to harness action on all 17 goals and 169 targets as a means for addressing root causes of conflict, and place the 'leave no one behind' commitment at the heart of its implementation strategy.
- The EU should support multi-stakeholder partnerships which bring together communities focusing on areas such as development, environment, peacebuilding, human rights (including women's rights). Achieving results will increasingly require partnerships with civil society, private sector, parliaments, local governments, diplomats and military officials. The EU can use the 2030 Agenda as a platform to pull together relevant constituencies in order to catalyse action on specific yet interlinked problems.
- The EU needs to make significant investments in data gathering capacities, both within national statistical systems (when they are independent in accordance with international standards) but also among multilateral agencies, civil society and citizens themselves with the overall aim of creating pluralistic data ecosystems. Made up of goals and targets, data will be the currency of accountability in the 2030 Agenda. What matters is not only what or who is counted, but also who is empowered to do the counting.

4.3 What are the main changes you would like to see in the EU's development policy framework?

- The revision should take into consideration new global challenges, address the EU's implementation of the SDGs and reiterate underlying values such as respect for human rights, rule of law and democracy. It should also pay special attention to the inclusion and meaningful participation of women, children, young people and other marginalised groups, as well as to the promotion of the rights of people with disabilities.

- The priority for the EU should be sustainable peace and conflict prevention through bottom-up, people-focused and long-term strategies independent of short-term crisis response and/or immediate domestic political imperatives. The EU should consider its development policy as an investment in global stability and conflict-sensitivity should be prioritised as a cross-cutting theme throughout the revised European Consensus on Development (ECD).

- The EU external action should help to generate political buy-in to address the issues contained in the 2030 Agenda and its goals for the next 15 years. This includes mapping priority SDG targets against existing priorities in third countries (identified through conflict analysis and inclusive and regular consultation), raising awareness of the 2030 Agenda's commitment to peace, working with data producers on developing national and local indicators for SDG 16, and supporting stakeholders to take part in monitoring efforts. In terms of the follow-up and review of the 2030 Agenda, the EU should encourage its partner countries to actively consult with their citizens, civil society and the private sector on whether national development plans are setting the right priorities and proceeding in the right way.

- In line with the 'Peace Promise' on humanitarian, peacebuilding and development actor collaboration which was developed under the banner of the WHS and was endorsed by numerous UN agencies, the World Bank and many humanitarian and development NGOs, and building on the call by the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS) where all major EU donors are represented, the EU should make a commitment to ensuring that all humanitarian action applies a conflict sensitive approach while ensuring the integrity of the humanitarian principles.

- The EU should integrate a gender perspective in all of its development efforts. More specifically, conflict analyses which include gender analysis as a standard and integrated element are the first and crucial step towards ensuring that peacebuilding efforts are gender-sensitive. This will also require ensuring that a gender perspective is integrated into all efforts to implement the 2030 Agenda. For example, although SDG 16 does not include any references to gender or women, its targets call for inclusive decision-making and equal access to justice for all. It is vital that a gender perspective is mainstreamed across all targets whether through specific indicators addressing gender inequalities or through the use of disaggregated data.

4.4 In which areas highlighted above would you expect to see greater consistency between development policy and other areas of the EU external action in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda?

EU external action as a whole must be more consistent and coherent. Commitments to long-term, sustainable development and peace should not be deprioritised in favour of more pressing political objectives. Greater consistency with development policy is required especially in the following areas:

- Migration and displacement (while clearly distinguishing between responses required for people affected by displacement versus proper management of migration to maximise its benefits for development)
- Violent extremism (This issue will continue to demand responses from the EU. Each intervention must be weighed against its potential risks to long-term stability.)
- Trade and investment in the extractive industries
- Humanitarian assistance (including support to refugees and displaced persons)
- Diplomatic partnerships (including on climate change issues)

4.5 In which areas does the EU have greatest value-added as a development partner (e.g. which aspects of its development policy, dialogue or implementation arrangements or in which category of countries)?

- As a political project, the EU is an example of sustaining peace and prosperity through openness.
- Beyond its borders, the EU has a political role to play in many contexts through its good offices but its development resources and capability must be more effectively brought to bear on the challenge of conflict. This is especially the case when we look at the factors that promote peace. Ultimately, peaceful societies are those in which men and women from different groups and sectors of society are able to access the means and opportunities for justice, safety, well-being, economic empowerment and political voice, which are the constituents of positive peace.
- The EU has value-added as a principled diplomatic partner and in pursuing rights-based development co-operation focused on peacebuilding, governance and justice, and on supporting local CSOs. It can mobilise substantial resources and the significant influence of the combined voices of its MS and civil society.
- The EU should lead by example in implementing the political commitments which were made in the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS), the Stockholm Declaration on Addressing Fragility and Building Peace in a Changing World, and the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA).
- In terms of geographical focus, the EU has significant value-added as a development partner in fragile and conflict-affected countries.
- It should use its influence at the country-level to promote the conditions for peace in conflict-affected and fragile settings.
- It should also champion a new commitment to political and financial investment in conflict prevention as called for by the 2015 reviews of the UN peacebuilding architecture and peace operations, and in the outcomes document of the World Humanitarian Summit.

4.6 How can the EU refine its development policy to better address inequalities – including gender inequality – in the context of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda?

The EU must promote the values of the 2030 Agenda based on equality, in order to comply with the commitment to leaving no one behind.

- Gender and peace are closely linked: peace is critical to promote gender equality, and gender inequality can also undermine peace and drive conflict and violence. In addition, unequal, patriarchal gender norms and systems of power lie at the heart of gender inequality, and can drive conflict and insecurity. Thus, efforts to address gender inequality and patriarchal norms should be part of every policy and programme. The EU should carry out thorough conflict analyses, which include gender analyses as an integral element. There is also a need to empower women and to promote them as decision-makers to ensure their effective and meaningful participation in political and peacebuilding processes.

- If we are to realise the full potential of gender interventions, it will be essential that a broader, more inclusive approach which looks at how gender identities interact with one another to restrain or promote violence is more fully applied – for example, perceptions of masculinity that motivate people to participate in violent behaviour. By highlighting the masculinised and militarised assumptions behind the present international security paradigm, and by using gender as a tool for analysing unequal power relations, we can aim to address the exclusion of women – and most men – from the decisions that affect their lives and reshape what it means to build security around an understanding that supports peace and equality for people of all genders.

- The EU should implement relevant policy documents (i.e. the UNSCR 2250 on YPS, the Comprehensive approach to the EU implementation of the UNSCR 1325 on WPS and the EU Gender Action Plan 2016-2020), increase in-house expertise and dedicated resources, and integrate CSOs' expertise into gender-related policies and programmes.

- The burden of violence and insecurity is itself unequal – the most marginalised and poorest people in the world bear the brunt of it – and it is an obvious factor which perpetuates economic, social and political inequality. Vertical inequality is associated with higher levels of interpersonal violence, whereas horizontal inequalities between social groups (ethnic, religious, etc.) are known drivers of conflict. In order to address this, the EU should adopt and mainstream people-centred approaches and foster inclusive development and equal access to opportunities for growth.

- In fragile contexts, the EU should prioritise children and young people because they are often excluded from development initiatives. This is a prerequisite for eliminating extreme poverty and for achieving the other SDGs. Targeting children and youth in a fragility-sensitive design and implementation of the revised ECD would also stimulate intergenerational change.

4.7 How can the EU development policy make a stronger contribution to the security of people? How can EU development policy contribute to addressing the root causes of conflict and fragility and contribute to security and resilience in all the countries where we work?

- The revised ECD should explicitly refer to human security (i.e. a people-centred concept focusing on the security of the individual and society at large rather than just state security, which focuses on the territorial integrity of the state). It should provide for more effective joint action – including through more funding – on conflict prevention, placing peacebuilding on an equal footing as state-building and emphasising human security. Ensuring human security and a positive, sustainable peace will require addressing root causes of violence and insecurity inter alia by supporting governance, access to justice and economic opportunities for all, inclusive decision making, tackling corruption etc.
- EU programmes should support those activities which are not covered by traditional development funding, including those actions which address the attitudes and behaviour of people involved in armed conflicts and which promote a ‘culture of peace’ and contribute to trust-building and reconciliation between opposing groups.
- People-centred approaches should be included throughout the programming cycle. Consultative processes should be carried out throughout programmes in order to ensure that both the design and the implementation reflect local concerns and needs. These processes should be carried out in a gender-sensitive manner, for example by understanding and addressing potential gender-specific barriers to women and men’s equal participation. It could also include holding separate consultations with men and women in cases where local gender norms would make it difficult for women to speak openly about their security concerns in a mixed-sex environment. In addition, people-focused indicators should be identified from the outset for use in monitoring and evaluation exercises. In this context, it is important to manage expectations, to be clear about objectives and desired outcomes, and to report back regularly (including in the local language). Finally, it is important to ensure that lessons learned and findings are incorporated into subsequent decision-making.
- A number of tools can assist with the adoption and mainstreaming of people-centred approaches. For instance, conflict analyses and community-based assessments can assist with the identification of stakeholders, security problems and barriers to improved security and justice delivery. Moreover, adopting a theory-of-change approach can allow donors to unpack how they plan to increase the focus on improving service delivery to citizens and the role citizens can play in it.
- Interventions should be based on a strategic, problem-solving approach, with clear objectives, benchmarks and monitoring. Strategies should not be so detailed that they limit flexibility but they should ensure a shared understanding and commitment to the programme. More specifically, programme structures should reflect objectives in order to ensure that they

receive equal attention.

- Given that security sector reform (SSR) raises various sensitive issues, the mainstreaming of people-centred approaches requires giving sufficient attention to attitudinal and behavioural change within partner governments. Cross-government sensitisation, training and lesson learning must be promoted in order to ensure normative and structural commitment to people-centred approaches to security. When this is absent, the risk is that the EU simply strengthens the hands of ‘toxic’ allies, further entrenching the status quo and thus shoring up instability for the future. Such awareness raising about why and how to foster people-centred security interventions should also target the donor community, including emerging donors.
- SDG 16 should also be used to direct political support to change-makers at national level, whether they are justice ministers, human rights defenders, or businessmen working on strengthening the rule of law.
- The EU should involve civil society in monitoring and engaging with security and justice providers in partner countries in order to ensure that the security concerns and needs of a broad range of actors, including women, children and other vulnerable groups are heard, and to provide training and awareness raising on international humanitarian law and international human rights law to local actors. These training and awareness raising activities should complement theoretical knowledge with scenario-based exercises replicating real-life situations as, in practice, humanitarian and human rights law is not always understood and applied correctly.
- Finally, the EU should provide financial and political support to local CSOs which address human rights violations in order to bring these issues to the attention of national governments and, if no action is taken, to the relevant international fora. Political support is particularly important as many CSOs are increasingly under threat in numerous countries in which the EU provides development aid.

4.8 How can a revised Consensus on Development better harness the opportunities presented by migration, minimise the negative aspects of irregular migration on the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and better address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement?

As a starting point, the revised ECD must make a clear distinction between ‘migration’ and ‘forced displacement’, while ‘irregular migration’ does not belong in the EU’s development policy at all. Migration is a fundamental feature of human existence; it therefore does not have general ‘root causes’ to ‘address’. It should be managed effectively for the benefit and safety of all involved and in full respect of human rights, and with a view to harnessing its well-documented positive contributions to development, while minimising the impact of its drawbacks, but never at the cost of stifling

mobility or restricting people's access to protection from persecution or harm.

Forced displacement requires a three-pronged approach that addresses the needs of affected populations, including host communities, provides durable solutions, and - importantly - aims at preventing the crises and conflicts that drive displacement in the first place. The revised ECD should indeed aim to address the root causes of such displacement, albeit in a holistic approach that aims to prevent situations of fragility on their own terms and not solely as potential drivers of displacement, recognising that conflict and crises have many negative consequences, including for those who cannot flee.

Meanwhile, the classification of migration as 'irregular' is not relevant to development policy as it is a classification made by authorities based on national border and home affairs policy. By contrast, any person can objectively be deemed displaced when forced from their home. This would be the case even in the absence of an authority regulating their status relative to the state. Moreover, the determination that a person has moved 'irregularly' does not amount to a determination of status that is meaningful on the basis of international law as is, for example, the status given to refugees under the Geneva Convention. 'Irregular', as applied to the movement or residency status of individuals, is therefore not a matter for development policy (except to the extent that people deemed by a state to have irregular status must still be able to claim their rights).

With regard to addressing forced displacement:

- There is a risk that the focus and prioritisation of the EU's response to migration towards Europe could have a distortionary effect on development policy if it is used as leverage to attain short-term state security objectives. Instead, increasing political, economic and social inclusion as well as accountability will help in efforts to address the root causes of forced displacement.
- The revised ECD must prioritise supporting sustainable development and long-term peace in countries affected by instability and conflict. Only through this type of approach will the EU be able to address the root causes of forced displacement. In addition, it is crucial that this approach frames EU external action as a whole. If it does not, it risks countering EU development and peacebuilding objectives and reversing impacts in partner countries.
- Establishing 'toxic' partnerships on migration control risks reinforcing certain repressive regimes which are or may, in the future, be responsible for significant refugee outflows and internal displacement. To prevent this, these regimes should instead be held accountable for their actions. The establishment of such partnerships also risks providing legitimacy to these regimes internationally at a time when greater scrutiny of their domestic policies is required.
- The revised ECD must clearly distinguish between development aimed

at addressing forced displacement and people-centred management of migration and security co-operation aimed at addressing irregular migration. In this context, using development funds to build the capacities of military actors and to provide them with equipment to manage migration raises the concern that donor interests are being prioritised over those of people in partner countries. This also contradicts the well-established and fundamental principle of aid working impartially to advance the well-being and rights of people in the face of violence and abuse by all conflict actors, including security services. In addition, this approach threatens to squeeze development budgets at a time of soaring global humanitarian and developmental needs. The ECD must therefore guarantee and safeguard the impartiality of aid in order to prevent it from being used to respond to the EU's own political and security interests.

(5) Means of implementation: how do we get there?

The principle of universality underpinning the 2030 Agenda will require a differentiated approach to engagement with countries at all levels of development. Official Development Assistance will continue to play an important role in the overall financing mix for those countries most in need (particularly the Least Developed Countries). The EU and its Member States should continue to progress towards achieving their commitments. However, in all countries our development cooperation will need to take account of other sources of finance, including by leveraging other (non-Official Development Assistance) sources of finance for poverty eradication and sustainable development. The delivery of the 2030 Agenda means that our work helping countries raise their own resources (domestic resource mobilisation), the provision of aid for trade, blending* and partnering with the private sector should be priority areas of focus. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda, an integral part of the 2030 Agenda, provides a framework for our efforts, including for our work supporting the right enabling policy environment for sustainable development in our partner countries. The implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement on climate change under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change should be closely coordinated given the strong interlinkages. Engagement with middle income countries, notably the emerging economies, will be important to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, considering the role they can play in promoting global public goods, what they can achieve within their respective countries on poverty eradication and sustainable development, and the example they can set within their regions as well as their role in regional processes. Here differentiated partnerships can play an important role (examples include different forms of political, economic, and financial investment as well as cooperation in science, technology and innovation). Specific attention and focus should also be given to Least Developed Countries, as acknowledged by the Addis Ababa Action Agenda.

The EU's implementation of the 2030 Agenda provides an opportunity for enhancing consistency between the different areas of the EU's external action and between these and other EU policies (as outlined in the Lisbon Treaty and in [EU's Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and crises](#)). The EU will continue to pursue [Policy Coherence for Development](#) as a key contribution to the collective effort towards broader policy coherence for sustainable development. In our external action, the EU needs to consider how we can use all policies, tools, instruments at our disposal coherently in line with the integrated nature of the 2030 Agenda.

* Combining EU grants with loans or with equity from other public and private financiers with a view to leveraging additional resources.

5.1 How can EU policies, and EU development policy in particular, help to mobilise and maximise the impact of the increasing variety of sustainable development finance, including in particular from the private sector?

- Diaspora groups and the remittances they provide are the largest source of external financing for many developing countries. In 2012, remittances amounted to USD351 billion compared to the USD125.6 billion provided by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members. The volume of remittances is likely to increase as financial transfers become easier and 18 million migrants and eight million refugees leave conflict-

affected and fragile states each year. In many contexts, diaspora groups have far surpassed states as the main financiers of armed rebellions, but they can also be potential financiers of peacebuilding. The EU should assess options to limit the former and maximise the latter.

- Domestic revenue-raising in conflict-affected and fragile states is increasingly seen as an area for deeper focus, above and beyond the linkage to IFFs. According to the OECD, only 0.07% of all aid is targeted towards building accountable tax systems in fragile states, despite the fact that investments in this sector can yield impressive returns. Nonetheless, the role of the state in taxing its society must be understood as inherently political; supporting capacities to do so in the absence of legitimacy and an inclusive political settlement may drive conflict.

- The private sector has, for many years, been understood to be a key stakeholder in the wider ecosystem of stability and peace in conflict-affected and fragile states. While the private sector is increasingly interested in partnering in development, more work needs to be done to leverage its role in fragile states. Firstly, only 6% of foreign direct investment (FDI) to developing countries goes to fragile states. Secondly, the private sector's role in a range of economic sectors means that conflict-sensitive business practice could deliver significant dividends. A reference to 'the business of peace' in the revised ECD could create a reference point for more substantive engagement in the future.

- Natural resources play a vital role: three-quarters of FDI to fragile states goes to just seven countries, all of which are resource-rich. There is a robust body of evidence which suggests that when other conflict risk factors are present, the international demand for certain natural resources can have a significant impact on both the risk and nature of conflict. The EU should consider how it could support existing initiatives to limit the negative impacts of natural resource flows.

- The links between international financial flows, company operations and conflict dynamics have been explored extensively in recent years. Evidence from many conflict-affected and fragile states indicates that investment which is not sensitive to fragile or conflict-affected contexts can exacerbate pre-existing tensions and create new ones. In order to ensure that investment and trade do not impede the objectives related to peace and security, the EU should take steps to ensure that investment and trade actions at the very minimum do no harm but also have a positive impact on the conflict context. This requires that the potential positive and negative impacts of investment and trade decisions on the conflict context are examined in detail. Mechanisms to ensure the application of conflict sensitivity principles should be established and should not be limited to situations of conflict and fragility.

- The EU should also look into options to balance private sector involvement with more sustainable national resource mobilisation by partner countries, and reinforce public-private partnerships for development. These efforts should be consistent with the Addis Ababa Action Agenda in the

adoption of which the EU and its MS played a key role.

- IFFs are estimated to have an annual value of between USD1 trillion and USD1.7 trillion. IFFs are bound up with conflict economies and leech away resources from weak states. This is a vicious circle: weak institutions, weak property rights and low growth encourage people to send their money abroad, and this leaves countries ill-resourced to address their structural problems. Those who gain from IFFs often have an interest in corroding institutions. In some contexts, political elites have instrumentalised cycles of instability not only to hold on to power, but also to extract resources from society. Their ability to transfer illicitly-gained resources safely abroad leaves them with low financial stakes in stability at home. This is problematic given that addressing IFFs will require action at the national level, including through the creation of effective laws as well as the institutions and capacities to enforce them. The EU should prioritise support for actors with sufficient political will to drive such processes or, at the very least, those who can help catalyse such will. The EU needs to assess how Europe's own financial systems enable the activities of actors who have little interest in creating enabling environments for development.

5.2 Given the evolving availability of other sources of finance and bearing in mind the EU's commitments on Official Development Assistance (e.g. [Council Conclusions from 26 May 2015 on "A New Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015"](#), and *inter alia*, paragraphs 32 and 33), how and where should the EU use its Official Development Assistance strategically and to maximise its impact?

The EU should consider the conflict- and gender-sensitivity of its ODA due to its potential to either increase conflict or contribute to peacebuilding:

- Since 2007, 53% of total ODA has been allocated to countries which are currently on the OECD's list of fragile states, and this trend is set to continue. At the same time, only a select group of states received the bulk of this aid. The EU needs to ensure that all its aid both contributes to building peace and catalysing development.

- Increases in ODA in conflict-affected contexts will not, on their own, catalyse peace or poverty reduction. A consensus has been built through the 'New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States' on how aid can be more effectively delivered in these contexts. The New Deal principles should be reflected in the revised ECD. Recent lessons from the implementation of the New Deal should also be taken into consideration. These include the limitations of an exclusive focus on institution- and state-building in situations in which there is insufficient commitment to inclusive, fair, responsive and accountable state-society relations.

- While an effective, legitimate and accountable security sector in partner countries is critical, genuine peace and human security are

underpinned by justice, inclusion and political freedoms. Supporting SSR and taking into account the security-development nexus involves much more than the provision of capacity building assistance and equipment to the security sector, including the military, in third countries. Instead of supporting standalone 'securitised' interventions, EU development cooperation should promote people's well-being and peaceful societies.

- A balanced interpretation of the principle of 'ownership' is needed which does not equate financial support for peace and development solely with support for state institutions. Sustainable peace is the bedrock of development but it cannot be built by states alone: viable states have a strong and active citizenry, thriving civil society and healthy state-society relations. When considering ownership, it is important to clarify that the ultimate beneficiaries of financing for development should be the people whose lives are affected by poverty, conflict, fragility and marginalisation and not just partner country governments. This is especially important in contexts where the state is a direct or indirect actor in a conflict, or is perceived as such by conflict-affected, vulnerable communities, and/or when the central government is incapable or unwilling to ensure the rights of its citizens. In such circumstances, normative documents which assert 'ownership' of development processes exclusively by the state can be highly problematic and counter-productive.

- More flexibility is needed to cope with contexts in which disbursements, risks and results management are challenging donors' traditional models. A number of issues should be addressed to help ensure that the EU's financial support to partner country governments achieves its desired objectives, and that further developments in this area contribute to stronger state-society relations and long-term peace. There is a need to link fiduciary risk assessment with 'do no harm' assessments, to ensure that finance-related decisions are informed by context dynamics and do not end up fuelling conflicts or undermining progress towards positive change. Risk assessments should be inclusive in order to ensure that they reflect the complexity of these settings.

- Civil society should have a role in shaping how development financing is used. Such an approach requires that the EU and partner countries go beyond one-off consultations and adopt ongoing, structured participatory processes and dialogue with actors who are genuinely representative of wider society. Similarly, mutual accountability mechanisms should not be established between the donor and the partner country only. They should focus on accountability towards people on the ground, which also involves helping states to build their accountability towards the society. While everyone wants aid to be effective and to demonstrate results, people in EU partner countries want to be able to say what success of EU aid means for them and whether current aid programmes are achieving lasting results.

- The EU should commit to maintaining a safe and enabling environment for CSOs, including the full participation of women's groups, not only to perform service delivery functions, but also to participate fully in planning, monitoring and evaluating development activities. The EU should

contribute to the development and sustainability of vibrant civil societies through direct funding, by establishing mechanisms of dialogue and coordination with CSOs, and by ensuring that partner country governments respect and protect civil society's independence and safety. The EU and its MS should also encourage and provide incentives to states in order to honour this commitment.

5.3 How can the EU better support partner countries in mobilising their own resources for poverty eradication and sustainable development?

- The EU should take action to regulate EU companies which operate in partner countries by:
 - establishing the legal accountability of leading firms for the actions of their sub-contractors all along the production and distribution chains;
 - including mandatory due diligence and transparency obligations to shed light on various supply chain components and hence allow monitoring and accountability.

- The EU should lead on or engage seriously with international processes to tackle IFFs, including through eliminating secretive tax havens, increasing transparency on company ownership, facilitating information sharing on taxes, enabling the return of stolen assets, and identifying and sanctioning transfer mispricing. It should also ensure that measures to tackle IFFs do not have unintended consequences: this dilemma was illustrated in 2013 when a major UK bank blocked remittances to Somalia upon which many poor people in the country depend. Another challenge relates to gathering data: while sound methodologies exist, greater investment in building capacities to measure and track IFFs could pay off. (NB/ See also the recommendations on taxation and IFFs provided in the answer to Question 5.1.)

5.4 Given the importance of middle income countries to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, what form could differentiated partnerships take?

- It is necessary to recognise the impact which development processes can have on conflicts. The EU should support middle-income countries (MICs) in taking more conflict-sensitive approaches to development also as a means to ensure equitable and sustainable growth.
- The 2030 Agenda should be used as a basis for multi-stakeholder co-operation between donor agencies from Western countries but also other relevant government departments from donor countries, emerging donors, civil society and private sector actors.

5.5 Given experience so far in taking into account the objectives of development cooperation in the implementation of EU policies which are likely to affect developing countries (e.g. [Policy Coherence for Development: 2015 EU Report](#)), how should the EU step up its efforts to achieve Policy Coherence for Development, as a key contribution to the collective effort towards policy coherence for sustainable development? How can we help ensure that policies in developing countries, and internationally contribute coherently to sustainable development priorities?

- The EU should not dismiss development priorities in favour of political, security and commercial interests.
- The EU and its MS should commit to Identifying ways to link and implement the outcomes of the Post-2015 Frameworks (e.g. the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the SDGs) and the new UN Peacebuilding Architecture Resolution as they relate to conflict, crises and emergencies to promote policy and practice coherence.
- The EU must be able to think and act coherently across three levels: bilateral, multilateral and domestic. It must aim to ensure that domestic policies are in line with its bilateral engagement in conflict-affected countries as well as with its multilateral priorities or commitments. For example, efforts to curb corruption in fragile states must be aligned with domestic financial regulation alongside multilateral action on IFFs. (NB/ See also the recommendations for coherence between internal and external EU policies provided in the answer to Question 3.2.)

(6) The actors: making it work together

An important feature of the new Agenda is that all governments, developed and developing, will need to work with a wide range of stakeholders (including the private sector, civil society and research institutions) to improve the transparency and inclusivity of decision-making, planning, service delivery, and monitoring and to ensure synergy and complementarity.

The EU must continue to work collaboratively with others and contribute to a coordinated approach. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda puts national plans for implementation (including associated financing and policy frameworks) at the centre. To maximise our impact, EU development policy should be based on a strategic and comprehensive strategy for each country, which also responds to the country-specific context.

Our partner countries' implementation of the 2030 Agenda will inform our overall engagement and our development cooperation dialogue with them and will help shape our support for their national efforts. The EU should also help partner countries put in place the necessary enabling policy frameworks to eradicate poverty, tackle sustainable development challenges and enhance their policy coherence.

There is a need for a renewed emphasis on the quality of development cooperation, including existing commitments on aid and development effectiveness made in Paris, Accra and Busan* and through work with the [Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation](#).

An updated EU development policy should also provide a shared vision that guides the action of the EU and Member States in development cooperation, putting forward proposals on how to further enhance coordination, complementarity and coherence between EU and Member States. Strengthening [Joint Programming](#) will be an important part of this. Improving the division of labour between the EU and its Member States in order to reduce aid fragmentation will also contribute to increased development effectiveness.

* See [Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action](#) and the [Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation](#)

6.1 How should the EU strengthen its partnerships with civil society, foundations, the business community, parliaments and local authorities and academia to support the implementation of the 2030 Agenda (including the integral Addis Ababa Action Agenda) and the Paris Agreement on climate change?

- The revised ECD should ensure that donors, partner country governments and CSOs begin to collaborate on shared approaches to participatory processes for measuring and assessing progress on the implementation of the SDGs (including whether the right priorities are set), and proceeding the right way.
- Given the central role of civil society in developing the 2030 Agenda, the EU should also consult CSOs in drawing up its implementation strategy, as recommended by the European Parliament (EP) in its resolution of 12 May 2016 on 'Follow-up and state of play of the Agenda 2030 and Sustainable Development Goals'.
- The EU should facilitate the deeper engagement of CSOs in policy dialogue and monitoring activities. In this context, international CSOs with demonstrable and solid experience in oversight work could support local CSOs through training.
- The EU should continue to defend the role of CSOs as crucial, autonomous and independent partners and important defenders of democracy and human rights, and condemn any attempt to use public funds to impose political control over them. It should provide funding to CSOs in MICs to ensure that they can maintain an independent voice since many of them are struggling as donors stop providing ODA to MICs.
- The EU should continue to implement the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation and the International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness, and, in particular, the commitments to enable CSOs to exercise their roles as independent development actors, with a particular focus on enabling environments, consistent with agreed international rights.
- EUDs should promote proactive engagement and partnership with CSOs. The EU Country Roadmaps for Engagement with Civil Society should be recognised and used as a tool for better policy dialogue and overall strategic engagement with a range of civil society actors at the country level.
- Multi-stakeholder partnerships should involve civil society as key strategic partners.

6.2 How can the EU promote private sector investment for sustainable development?

- Inclusive, context-sensitive economic growth is a precondition for reducing fragility and fighting poverty. Hence, investing in income-generating activities and local private sector development is an important strategy to achieve peace dividends. This is particularly relevant for young people, whose lack of skills and prospects for employment is one of the most urgent social challenges in fragile contexts.

6.3 How can the EU strengthen relations on sustainable development with other countries, international financing institutions, multilateral development banks, emerging donors and the UN system?

- Given that 193 UN MS have signed up to the commitments and language of the SDGs, including SDG 16, change-makers in partner countries have new levers to pull and the EU has a legitimate basis to support them. The scale of this engagement provides a solid basis for multi-stakeholder co-operation with signatory countries as well as with international financing institutions, multilateral development banks, emerging donors and UN funds, programmes and agencies.
- Ultimately, progress on SDG 16 and other SDGs will come down to domestic political leadership at the level of both state and society. Consensus within the development and peacebuilding communities on the need to 'work politically' will be meaningless if it is interpreted only as understanding local politics and working with the grain of the status quo. Matching financial and technical support with domestic actors which are trying to drive positive change should be part and parcel of EU's development programming.
- The EU should adopt the strategic objective of using its potential leverage within the UN system to promote the integration of conflict sensitivity and a proactive approach to peacebuilding by UN funds, programmes and agencies.
- The EU's work and partnerships for aid effectiveness should continue to be guided by the commitments included in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation and the Nairobi Declaration for Development Effectiveness.

6.4 How can the EU best support partner countries to develop comprehensive and inclusive national plans for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda?

- The EU must lead on providing support to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. By promoting universal values but also by considering the social and economic context of different countries, the EU can ensure harmonisation and a comprehensive development of national implementation plans.
- The EU should support partner country governments by facilitating learning exchanges in which to address challenges and exchange lessons learned and good practices.
- The EU should build horizontal and vertical networks, looking beyond single thematic issues and targets, to galvanise relevant communities around the 2030 Agenda. Additionally, there is a critical need to make the vertical connection between policy-makers at international and national levels, and the perspectives of those most affected by injustice, violence and/or exclusion.

6.5 What are the best ways to strengthen and improve coherence, complementarity and coordination between the EU and the Member States in their support to help partner countries achieve poverty eradication and sustainable development?

- As national ownership is key to achieving sustainable development, EU MS should show political leadership in the formulation of development strategies and the integration of the SDGs in national policy plans and processes. Better coordination is required in those EU MS in which SDG-related responsibilities are shared between different ministries.
- National indicator frameworks for the follow-up and review process, which will form the basis for reviews at regional and global levels, should be well articulated and take into account different national realities, capacities and levels of development.
- The need for an overarching strategy is particularly acute in areas in which the EU has shared competence with the EU MS. The EU's strategy for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda must therefore specifically address coherence between implementation at both national levels and the EU level.

6.6 How can EU development cooperation be as effective as possible, and how can we work with all partners to achieve this?

- The 2030 Agenda was designed to address the interlinkages and interdependencies which underpin today's global challenges. It therefore requires a whole-of-government approach which puts the well-being of people and planet at its core, with economic and financial systems to support them. The EU should promote the meaningful participation of all parts of society, including women, youth and other marginalised groups.

6.7 What further progress could be made in EU Joint Programming, and how could this experience be linked with other EU joined-up actions in supporting countries' delivery of the 2030 Agenda?

- The EU should proactively integrate conflict sensitivity into its own economic development projects and those which it supports through the UN and development banks. This should also apply for countries in situations of fragility.
- It is important to recognise that meaningful consultation, changing attitudes and behaviours, and creating trust between communities and their security providers takes time. It is therefore unrealistic to assume that results will be achieved quickly. EU programming cycles and procedures should therefore be more flexible and long-term, especially in conflict-affected and fragile contexts.

(7) Keeping track of progress

The EU will need to contribute to the global follow-up and review process for the 2030 Agenda. Keeping track of progress in a systematic and transparent way is essential for delivering the 2030 Agenda. The EU is actively contributing to the setting up of a Sustainable Development Goal monitoring system at global, regional and national level. Demonstrating results and impact from our efforts and the promotion of transparency will be important priorities for EU development policy, as part of a wider move to strengthen accountability, follow-up and review at all levels.

7.1 How can the EU strengthen its own use of evidence and analysis, including in the development field, to feed into its regular review on the Sustainable Development Goals to the UN?

- The planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of EU development policy and programming should be based on a thorough analysis of power dynamics, economy, justice, human rights, security and well-being, and the interactions between them, and the formal and informal capacities of societies to manage and resolve conflicts without violence.
- The EU and its MS should continue to provide input into relevant discussion fora (e.g. the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing, the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, etc.) and take the lead in advancing an overarching strategy for the implementation, monitoring, accountability and review framework of the SDGs in a participatory and inclusive way, both at home and abroad. Such participatory approaches should explore innovative practice drawing on emerging research to maximise the learning potential from evaluations, and to ensure that programmes are accountable to both donors and to beneficiaries.
- The EU should establish a common data sharing mechanism for the EU and EU MS to exchange information and statistics which would support the UN in reviewing the implementation of the SDGs.

7.2 How can the EU help to ensure the accountability of all actors involved in implementation of the 2030 Agenda, including the private sector? How can the EU encourage a strong and robust approach to the Follow Up and Review of the 2030 Agenda from all actors?

- The EU should support the creation of platforms for action at regional and global level for the meaningful inclusion and participation of women, children, young people and other marginalised groups in ensuring accountability for the delivery of the SDGs.
- The EU should strengthen civil society's key role in this process. Regularly consulting and communicating (through appropriate channels) with civil society, marginalised communities and faith leaders/groups could help to facilitate the effective implementation of the 2030 Agenda.
- The EU should lead by example by continuing to share its aid data with the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI).
- Finally, the EU should ensure full transparency and accountability in the management of all public finances. The increasing use of trust funds should not be pursued before putting in place mechanisms to ensure transparency and consultation of relevant stakeholders to ensure country and regional ownership.

7.3 How should EU development cooperation respond to the regular reviews on progress of the partner countries towards the 2030 Agenda goals?

N/A

Contact

EuropeAid-CONSENSUS-CONSULTATION@ec.europa.eu
