Mid term evaluation of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)

DRAFT Report

January 2017
This report has been prepared by

Consortium composed by

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# Acronyms

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<td>AAP</td>
<td>Annual Action Programme(s)</td>
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<td>BWC</td>
<td>Biological Weapons Convention</td>
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<td>BWC ISU</td>
<td>Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central Africa Republic</td>
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<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear</td>
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<td>Critical Infrastructure</td>
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<td>Convention on the Rights of the Child</td>
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<td>Corporate Social Responsibility</td>
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<td>Civil Society Dialogue Network</td>
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<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DG ECHO</td>
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<td>EAM</td>
<td>Exceptional Assistance Measure</td>
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<td>Europe’s New Training Initiative</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<td>EPLO</td>
<td>European Peace-building Liaison Office</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>European Resources for Mediation Support</td>
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<td>IcSP</td>
<td>Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced People</td>
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<td>IfS</td>
<td>Instrument for Stability</td>
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<td>IHR</td>
<td>International Health Regulation</td>
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<td>IP</td>
<td>Implementing Partner(s)</td>
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<td>Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance</td>
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<td>Interim Response Programme(s)</td>
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<td>ISTC</td>
<td>International Science and Technology Center</td>
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<td>INTERPOL</td>
<td>International Criminal Police Organization</td>
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<td>JC</td>
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<td>Kimberley Process Certification Scheme</td>
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<td>LAS</td>
<td>League of Arab States</td>
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<td>LDDR</td>
<td>Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Disaster Assistance</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal(s)</td>
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<td>MIP</td>
<td>Multi-annual Indicative Programme(s)</td>
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<td>Mediation Support Unit</td>
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<td>MTE</td>
<td>Midterm Evaluation</td>
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<td>NAP</td>
<td>National Action Plan</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>NT</td>
<td>National Team</td>
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<td>OC</td>
<td>Organised Crime</td>
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<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>OPCW</td>
<td>Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAMPF</td>
<td>Policy Advice, Technical Assistance, Mediation, Reconciliation and Other Areas of Assistance</td>
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<td>PBP</td>
<td>Peace-Building Partnership</td>
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<td>Post-conflict needs assessment</td>
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<td>PI</td>
<td>Partnership Instrument</td>
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<td>SALW</td>
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<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty of the European Union</td>
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<td>TOC</td>
<td>Theory of Change</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNDPA</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNODA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>UNICRI</td>
<td>United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>VP</td>
<td>Vice President</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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<td>WPS</td>
<td>Women Peace and Security</td>
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1. Executive Summary

About the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace

The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) is the EU External Financing Instrument (EFI) dedicated to implementing EU priorities in the areas of crisis response, conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness, and threats to peace, international security and stability. Its goal is to preserve peace, prevent conflicts, strengthen international security, and assist populations affected by natural or man-made disasters. The Instrument complements humanitarian aid and long-term cooperation instruments, other EU actions (such as those under the Common Foreign and Security Policy) and actions of Member States. Its budget for 2014-2020 is EUR 2,338,719,000.

IcSP assistance falls under three Articles described in the IcSP Regulation:

- **Article 3 – Assistance in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis to prevent conflicts.** These non-programmable, short-term rapid actions (duration of up to 18 months, with possible extensions) enable timely and flexible EU responses to prevent conflict, support post-conflict political stabilisation and early recovery in situations of crisis, emerging crisis or disaster. 70% of IcSP funds are for Article 3 actions.

- **Article 4 – Assistance for conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness.** These programmable, long-term assistance (over 18 months) measures strengthen EU and partner civilian expertise for peace-building, conflict prevention, and address pre- and post-crisis needs. 9% of IcSP funds are for Article 4 programmes.

- **Article 5 – Assistance in addressing global and trans-regional threats and emerging threats.** These programmable, long-term assistance measures address specific global and trans-regional threats and emerging threats to law and order, security and safety of individuals, critical infrastructure, public health; and risk mitigation and preparedness. 21% of IcSP funds are for Article 5.

The Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) manages IcSP Article 3 actions and Article 4 programmes. Programmes under Article 5 are managed by DG International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO, Unit B5).

Evaluation objectives and parameters

The overall objective of the IcSP Midterm Evaluation (MTE) is to assess whether the Instrument is fit for purpose to deliver EU resources towards EU external policy. The MTE provides the external relations services of the European Union and the wider public with an independent assessment of the IcSP, including complementarities/synergies between it and other EFIs. The MTE also informs: (a) the next programming and implementation steps of the IcSP; and (b) the Impact Assessment for the next generation of Instruments (proposal due mid-2018) and the final evaluation of EFIs from 2014 to 2020.

The scope of the MTE includes: (a) the achievement of the objectives of the IcSP, taking into account the evolving international context and EU priorities; (b) the implementation of the principles, programming and operations of the IcSP; (c) the complementarities/synergies of the IcSP in relation to other EFIs, funds, and funding modalities; and (d) the IcSP application of the Common Implementing Regulation (CIR).

The MTE covers the period 2014-2016 and is an instrument-wide evaluation, rather than one focused on particular IcSP Articles, programmes or projects. It addresses specific questions (and a number of sub-topics)
related to: relevance; effectiveness, impact and sustainability; efficiency; added value; coherence, consistency, complementarity, and synergies; and leverage.

Context

The global peace and security context of the IcSP is fast evolving. The Instrument responds to a number of recent and emerging threats and trends, such as the rise of hybrid conflicts, the securitisation of development and peace, and the highest recorded levels of refugee and migration flows. The IcSP is also part of the global peace and security architecture; a collection of structures, norms, capacities and procedures created to avert and resolve violent conflicts and threats to international security, which remains incomplete and at times fragile, and faces a number of challenges. Beyond those mentioned above, challenges include uneven regional peace and security capabilities, a peace-making and peace-building methods deficit, and often weak coordination among a multiplicity of actors and instruments.

As an EU instrument, the IcSP operates within the framework of EU policy and priorities. Internationally, the EU is committed to Agenda 2030 and the IcSP addresses several elements of the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16. At the core of EU policy, however, is the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), and particularly Title V and Article 21, which sets out the broad principles of the Union’s external actions. Key EU peace and security priorities are given in a number of documents, including the recent “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy” (2016) (the ‘Global Strategy’), and the European Commission’s Proposal for a new European Consensus on Development (November 2016).

As such, a meaningful evaluation of the IcSP must merge an understanding of the Instrument within a global peace and security framework, with an assessment of the Instrument’s contribution to EU priorities. It will assess its delivery on its objectives, and principles in terms of its own activities (projects, programmes, and operations) as well as in relation to regulatory requirements, complementarities and synergies with other EU EFIs.

Methodology, process and tools

The IcSP MTE has used a mixed-methods methodology to enable an instrument-wide evaluation and triangulate evidence. The evaluation framework includes a set of numerators (the IcSP intervention logic, specific evaluation questions, hypotheses/judgement criteria and indicators) and denominators (internal (EU) and external (global) baseline, and endogenous/exogenous factors that affected IcSP performance), which enabled the evaluation team to understand how the IcSP has performed and the impact of contextual dynamics on the Instrument.

The evaluation involved an extensive review of a wide range of documents (decisions, action documents, previous evaluations, annual reports, and other documents), key informant interviews with numerous stakeholders, data from a consolidated survey administered to EU Delegations for all EFI mid-term evaluations, and field visits that covered eight partner countries to validate preliminary findings. The baseline for the MTE required additional research and the preparation of several outputs, which are given in the annexes to this report.

Key challenges

An instrument-wide evaluation comes with a number of practical and conceptual challenges. These include: data over-abundance in some areas and scarcity in others; extrapolating macro-level conclusions on topics such as impact and sustainability; striking a balance between a sufficiently deep understanding of individual IcSP interventions / projects and maintaining a broad view to assess performance of the instrument as a whole; and the application of a methodology that has its origins in evaluating developmental interventions to what in essence is a largely political instrument where intended outcomes are often political.
Main responses to evaluation questions

In relation to the main evaluation questions, the IcSP MTE findings are as follows:

Relevance IcSP actions and programmes balance EU priorities and beneficiary country needs. The Instrument (across Articles 3, 4, and 5) responds to the priorities set out in the TEU. It supports the EU's Global Strategy, notably the pillars of security, state and societal resilience in the EU's South and East, integrated approaches to conflicts and crises, cooperative regional orders, and global governance. The Instrument, however, faces challenges in its capacity to address the rise of hybrid conflicts and threats (Articles 3, 4, and 5), and the strategic underpinnings of its support are not fully articulated.

Effectiveness, impact, and sustainability IcSP actions and programmes are effective, and across Articles 3, 4, and 5, the Instrument has delivered on its commitments. Actions and programmes translate EU political priorities into interventions. However, political commitments to intervene in particular countries or in relation to particular issues have led to difficulties in identifying suitable actions.

The political effectiveness of IcSP actions and programmes is difficult to measure. Nonetheless, contributions are seen to deepen political dialogue with beneficiary governments. Available data on mainstreaming shows good results on conflict prevention, democracy and good governance, but more limited mainstreaming of gender and human rights. IcSP processes, as managed by FPI and DEVCO, have led to the identification of effective actions and programmes. However, albeit not atypical for interventions in this field and not limited to EU interventions, the designs of actions and programmes (metrics) are at times overly complex and their effectiveness may be enhanced by adopting approaches that are more realistic.

In terms of impacts, implementing partners have by and large adjusted Article 3 actions in challenging environments to achieve a number of outcomes. Programmes under Articles 4 and 5 build on many previous initiatives under the IfS, and have also yielded important outcomes. Most projects initiated under the IcSP are still ongoing today and evaluations of actions and programmes have yet to be undertaken in many cases. This makes it difficult to assess IcSP contributions to addressing root causes, bolstering EU and partner capacities, and addressing threats. The future final IcSP evaluation will be able to generate insights on impact as the Instrument’s monitoring systems are now operational. The evaluators note that results under Article 3 may follow greater emphasis and investment in seizing windows of opportunity for peace. Articles 4 and 5 contributions to the global peace and security architecture can benefit from the elaboration of an explicit strategic framework to guide further investments in this area.

Sustainability of IcSP actions across all Articles is helped by the emphasis placed on capacity-building. There is scope to bolster sustainability in Article 3 actions by requiring in the design phase the formulation of exit or transition strategies. Aid effectiveness principles are applied where relevant in Article 3 actions, and broadly across Article 4 and 5 programmes.

Efficiency The percentage of administrative costs to total budget is appropriate across all Articles. Budget execution (time taken from commitments to payments) is also appropriate across Articles 3, 4, and 5. However, there are cases in Article 3 where delays are seen in the period between needs identification and commitments. While these delays are often justifiable, there remains scope for improvement. There is insufficient evidence to draw conclusions on the justifiability of costs.

Flexible management procedures that accelerate contractual procedures and direct contracting of implementing partners are key aspects of the IcSP Regulation that promote efficiency. The IcSP Regulation enables implementing partners to extend actions by 6 + 6 months when delays occur due to unforeseen external circumstances, through no-cost extensions. This helps implementing partners cope with implementation delays and backlogs, even if contributions may be limited of this modality to financial efficiency. The IcSP is fully aligned to the Common Implementing Regulation (CIR).
**Value added** Among the EU’s EFIs, funds and funding modalities, the IcSP remains an important resource for short-term crisis response through non-programmable actions (Article 3), longer-term peace-building (Article 4), and capacity building to address global and trans-regional as well as emerging threats (Article 5). It is also an important driver of the EU’s efforts to mainstream conflict-sensitivity in other EFIs. The IcSP is broadly complementary to and appreciated by Member States and other donors. There are a number of examples, such as in the counter-terrorism and fighting organised crime programmes under Article 5, where the IcSP has created entry-points and taken risks that other donors could or would not do.

In a global context of increased securitisation of peace and development, the promotion of European values (support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law as laid out in the TEU) in actions is an important value added of the IcSP. However, actions in securitised sectors (Counter-Terrorism/Countering Violent Extremism (CT/CVE) and stabilisation) under Article 3, and (CT/CVE, organised crime, cyber security, and stabilisation) under Article 5 involve risks to EU cross-cutting priorities (such as human rights, democracy, and the rule of law). These actions need to be subject to the greater application of conflict sensitivity and ‘do no harm’ approaches.

The IcSP is also an important source of funding for many international organisations, European and partner country civil society in a period with significant funding cuts.

**Coherence, consistency, complementarity, and synergies** Actions and programmes under Articles 3, 4, and 5 are aligned to meet the objectives of the IcSP. However, there is variation in how joined-up actions and programmes are across these Articles.

Synergy between IcSP actions and other EU EFIs, funds and funding modalities is an important prerequisite for effectiveness, impact and sustainability (mostly but not solely with respect to Article 3). As such, more than three quarters of Article 3 decisions make explicit reference to other EFIs. Among the EU’s EFIs there appears to be significant and growing programming on peace and security, which partly results from efforts to mainstream conflict prevention. Peace and security programming is seen in the DCI, ENI, IPA II, EIDHR, as well as in the EDF and funding modalities such as the EU Trust Funds (EUTFs). No evidence was found to suggest significant overlap or duplication between IcSP actions and peace and security programming of other EFIs. Beyond EU EFIs, there is evidence of functional interfaces between the IcSP and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions, as well as with Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO). The IcSP complementarity to EU humanitarian aid is in rapid political action that may enable crisis abatement, address challenges to the delivery of relief, or prepare the transition from humanitarian to development assistance.

Although small compared to other EU EFIs, the IcSP is currently amongst one of the largest funds globally dedicated to peace and stability. There is little evidence of systematic coordination between the IcSP and other (EU and non-EU) peace and security funding instruments.

**Leverage** It is difficult to isolate the contribution of the IcSP to leverage political dialogue or change from that of other actions. Leverage results from a combination of factors, actors and circumstances. Nonetheless, the IcSP has contributed to EU policy and political dialogue with beneficiary governments in several countries. Such policy and political dialogue in turn has contributed to a range of outcomes for IcSP actions and programmes. An important area of leverage is in catalysing additional donor funding for IcSP actions. There is some indication that IcSP funding has been complemented with parallel financing by other donors. The IcSP appears not to have fully leveraged its position to engage in strategic dialogue with other global financing instruments on how to coherently address systemic peace and security challenges.

**Conclusions and recommendations** The IcSP plays an important role in non-programmable short-term crisis response actions (Article 3), programmable longer-term peace-building (Article 4) and interventions related to global and trans-regional as well as emerging threats (Article 5). It is an Instrument of critical
relevance to the EU; also as a key vehicle to deliver on the EU’s external priorities, and its relevance will increase in the years to come.

However, for the Instrument to continue to be fit for purpose there are several strategic and resourcing questions to be considered: (a) how can the IcSP leverage its position with other global peace and security funds to address systemic challenges? (b) how should the IcSP address EU security priorities, while promoting the values and principles of the TEU, and in a context of growing global securitisation of peace and development? (c) how can the IcSP bolster the design of its actions and programmes to be more responsive to current dynamics of modern organised violence?

High-level and technical recommendations made in the MTE are given below:

**High-level recommendations**

- European Commission, EEAS, European Parliament, and European Council: (a) Ensure IcSP continuity post 2020; and (b) consider a stronger political focus for a future IcSP.
- EEAS and European Commission: Develop an EU EFI, EDF, and EUTF strategic framework that sets strategic directions and principles for efforts to strengthen the global and regional peace and security architecture and address the global funding deficit for peace and development.
- European Commission, EEAS, and European civil society: Define how the IcSP manages negative knock-on effects of the securitisation of peace and development.
- European Commission: Apply conflict sensitivity and a ‘do no harm’ approach to actions and programmes in securitised sectors.
- European Parliament and European civil society: Track and report on securitisation trends in the IcSP and other EU EFIs, EDF and EUTFs.

**Technical recommendations**

**FPI and DEVCO B5:**
(a) Ensure analytical grounding of IcSP actions and programmes;
(b) Discourage over-ambitious metrics in IcSP actions and programmes;
(c) Enhance mainstreaming of human rights and gender;
(d) Require explicit Theories of Change in IcSP actions/programmes;
(e) Regularly liaise with DCI, ENI, IPA II, EIDHR, as well as EDF and EU Trust Funds personnel to develop effective interfaces between complementary activities;
(f) Identify mechanisms to better exploit synergies between the IcSP and other EFIs/EU interventions;
(g) Where appropriate, promote policy and political dialogue by EUDs with beneficiary governments on IcSP actions and programmes;
(h) Consider absorbing funds from other EU EFIs to bolster IcSP peace and security actions and programmes;
(i) Bolster strategic dialogue between the IcSP and other (non-EU) global peace and security funds and initiatives;
(j) Provide guidance for EU personnel and implementing partners on hybrid conflicts and threats.

**FPI:**
(a) Improve, where necessary and possible, speed and flexibility in Article 3 actions;
(b) Create a facility under the IcSP to fund small actions without a formal decision-making procedure;
(c) Identify opportunities for greater investment under Article 3 to seize windows of opportunity for peace;
(d) Require transition or exit strategies for Article 3 actions.
2. Introduction

2.1. About the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)

The IcSP supports EU external action policies and strategies in the areas of crisis response, conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness, and threats to peace, international security and stability. It operates mainly in crisis and conflict or disaster affected contexts and addresses specific threats or emerging threats to regional and international security. Its ultimate goal is to preserve peace, prevent conflicts, strengthen international security, and assist populations affected by natural or man-made disasters. The Instrument supports the transition from crisis and instability to more stable situations. It complements humanitarian aid and long-term cooperation instruments, other EU actions (such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy) and the activities of Member States.

The IcSP provides short- and long-term assistance under:

- **Article 3 – Assistance in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis to prevent conflicts.** These are non-programmable, short-term rapid actions (duration of up to 18 months, with possible extensions of 6+6 months). They enable timely and flexible EU responses to prevent conflict, support post-conflict political stabilisation and early recovery in situations of crisis, emerging crisis or disaster. They contribute to fostering the conditions for implementation of EU assistance and cooperation policies and programmes, when opportune financial assistance cannot be provided through other EU financing instruments. Activities cover a wide range of sectors: dialogue and reconciliation, mediation, confidence building; support to democratic institutions; rule of law; transitional justice; SSR and DDR processes; infrastructure rehabilitation and reconstruction; employment generation; demining; CT/CVE; migration; stabilisation etc. The Article 3 share of total IcSP funds is 70%.

- **Article 4 – Assistance for conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness.** This is programmable, long-term assistance (over 18 months) that strengthens EU and partner civilian expertise for peace-building, conflict prevention and addresses pre- and post-crisis needs. Interventions may cover early warning, conflict analysis, capacity-building for mediation, dialogue, civilian stabilisation missions, to mention some. The Article 4 share of total IcSP funds is 9%.

- **Article 5 – Assistance in addressing global and trans-regional threats and emerging threats.** This is programmable, long-term assistance to address specific global and trans-regional threats and emerging threats to law and order, security and safety of individuals, critical infrastructure, public health (e.g. terrorism, cyber-crime, the effects of climate change, organised crime etc); and risk mitigation and preparedness (e.g. border management; Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear risks; dual use exports control etc.). The Article 5 share of total IcSP funds is 21%.

The Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) manages actions under Article 3 and Article 4 programmes, while DG International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO, Unit B5) manage activities under Article 5.

The IcSP budget for 2014-2020 is EUR 2,338,719,000.
The IcSP portfolio for 2014 to October 2016 consists of 321 contracts/projects, which also includes those issued under administrative management decisions (e.g. audit contracts, facilities, support services, studies and research, including projects supporting conflict analysis). Of these 71.7% are under Article 3 (231 contracts); 9.6% are under Article 4 (31 contracts); and 18.6% are under Article 5 (59 contracts), which is broadly in line with the IcSP regulation.

Data for 2014 to October 2016 shows commitments of EUR 417,339,448 for Article 3 (76.9%), EUR 34,902,151 for Article 4 (6.4%), and EUR 90,427,254 for Article 5 (16.6%). The total disbursement rate to grantees and contractors across Articles in this period is 49.8%. Implementing organisations are spread relatively evenly between private companies (27.6%), UN agencies (21.1%), and NGOs (20.3%). Other international organisations and Member State agencies constitute 14.7% of total contract implementers.

2.2. Scope of the Midterm Evaluation

The IcSP Midterm Evaluation (MTE) assesses whether the Instrument is fit for purpose to deliver EU resources towards EU external policy from 2014 to 2016. It considers the place of the IcSP, its complementarities and synergies, within the wider set of External Financing Instruments (EFIs). The MTE assesses the Instrument at the mid-point of its implementation cycle and is one of several evaluations that cover the EU’s External Financing Instruments (EFIs), the European Development Fund (EDF) and EU Trust Funds (EUTFs). It comes ahead of the Midterm Review Report, as set out in Article 17 of the Common Implementing Regulation (CIR), which is due at the end of 2017.

The scope of the evaluation is the Instrument as a whole, and not its specific projects and programmes. Such an Instrument-wide approach enables recommendations to be made for the future design of EU EFIs. The evaluation is designed as a result to go beyond themes and the country/regional and institutional coverage of Articles 3, 4 and 5.

The IcSP MTE will be used to inform the Impact Assessment for the next generation of Instruments (proposal due mid-2018) and the final evaluation of EFIs from 2014 to 2020. It also informs the next programming and implementation steps of the instrument. The users of the IcSP MTE include the European Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Council of the European Union, and the European Parliament (EP).

2.3. Structure of the MTE Report

The report has four main sections beyond this introduction:

- Section 3 describes the methodology used and highlights the evaluation process and tools, as well as the key challenges and caveats.
- Section 4 presents the evaluation findings.
- Section 5 draws conclusions on the IcSP Intervention Logic, and evaluation questions.
- Section 6 provides recommendations.

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1 Includes projects under ESF.
2 It should be noted that for most contracts currently under provisional or committed/decided status, data on contract implementers is not yet available; hence, it has not been taken into account in this statistical breakdown.
3 These include the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), Partnership Instrument (PI), IcSP, Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation, and the Greenland Decision. Also evaluated is the European Development Fund (EDF) and the Common Implementing Regulation (CIR).
3. Methodology

3.1. Overview

The IcSP MTE methodology is designed to enable an instrument-wide assessment and has been adjusted to the Instrument's political nature. It involves a mixed-methods approach that applies the standard evaluation criteria used in EU evaluations to an Instrument that aims to achieve a range of political impacts. The methodology was also designed to assess the assumptions that underpin the Instrument’s scope, the nature of its interventions, and how it fits within the global peace and security context. The evaluation framework, which details the conceptual approach taken and the tools and processes used by the evaluators is described in the Annex and briefly summarised below. Key challenges and caveats to the evaluation are given at the end of this section.

3.2. The Evaluation Framework

This evaluation uses a mixed-methods methodology, drawing on a numerator/denominator approach where findings in relation to the IcSP intervention logic, theories of change, hypotheses/judgement criteria and indicators (numerator-level), were further nuanced and evidenced by considering an internal (EU) and external (global) baseline, and by considering endogenous/exogenous factors that affected IcSP performance (denominator-level).

The core assumption that underpins this Instrument-level evaluation is that a meaningful assessment must merge an understanding of the IcSP within the global peace and security framework, with an analysis of the Instrument’s contributions to EU priorities and its delivery on objectives, principles, programmes, operations, regulatory requirements, and complementarities and synergies with other EU EFIs.
3.3. Evaluation Process and Tools

The evaluation has involved five phases: (i) project inception; (ii) desk-based data gathering to develop preliminary findings and hypotheses; (iii) validation of preliminary findings and hypotheses in field missions; (iv) data synthesis and development of conclusions and recommendations; and (v) an Open Public Consultation (OPC) phase. This Draft Report is the output of the fourth phase ready for presentation in the fifth phase, after which the report will be finalised.

The evaluation involved an extensive review of a wide range of documents (decisions, action documents, previous evaluations, annual reports and other documents), key informant interviews (KIIs) with a wide range of stakeholders, data from a consolidated survey administered to EU Delegations for all EFI mid-term evaluations. The evaluation team undertook seven field visits, that covered eight partner countries (Morocco, Jordan, Georgia, Kenya/Somalia, Turkey, Colombia, and Niger), to validate preliminary findings.

Additional research was also carried out to build the evaluation baseline, including good practice notes on Article 3 focus sectors, a desk study on emerged peace and security threats/trends, and on the global peace and security architecture, policy and event timelines, and two case studies (in conjunction with the country visits) on migration and EFI synergies.

3.4. Key challenges and caveats

General and conceptual challenges Methodological challenges for evaluation are operational and conceptual. They include: (a) defining and building the evaluation baseline; (b) data over-abundance in some areas and scarcity in others; (c) conceptual problems with regard to identifying/attributiong the degree to which IcSP interventions have contributed to results (causality); (d) the application of a methodology that has its origins in evaluating developmental interventions to a largely political instrument where intended outcomes are often political; and (e) the need to strike a balance between reaching sufficiently deep enough to
understand how individual IcSP actions / programmes have achieved results while maintaining a sufficiently broad view to understand and assess how the instrument as a whole has been working.

With regard to evaluating whether the IcSP is “fit for purpose”, the most important challenge was to understand how the instrument fits into the broader array of EU and other donor instruments and mechanisms aimed at crisis management and prevention, post-crisis stabilisation, capacity building and responses to trans-regional, global and emerging threats. Increasingly, other bilateral and regional instruments and financing mechanisms are engaged in areas that the IcSP has been set up to support. As a relatively small EU financing instrument (compared to other EU EFIs), the evaluators needed to look for evidence that the IcSP added value from its unique features; its niche and flexibility, speed in decision making and action, ability to take risks and pilot new approaches, and ability to engage with local partners (governments as well as civil society organisations). But equally, if these features define the unique contribution of the IcSP, then attention needs to be paid to whether and how it interfaces with other EFIs, funds and funding modalities.

**Data gaps and weaknesses** Interventions under the IcSP commenced in 2014, alongside ongoing activities that were being financed under its forerunner, the Instrument for Stability (IfS). The majority of projects initiated under the IcSP are still ongoing today, outcomes are still being delivered and evaluations of projects and programmes have yet to be undertaken. This made it difficult to assess impact and sustainability.

With regard to Article 3 interventions, the evaluation team drew from Financing Decisions taken during the period from 2014 to 2016 a statistically significant sample of 56 projects from a total of 231 projects (aiming for a 5% margin of error at a 95% confidence level). The sample was stratified to ensure balanced regional coverage, a spread in budget allocations, diversity in implementing agencies (including direct management), and coverage of key focus sectors. Related Financing Decisions and action documents, and, where available, interim-, final- and End of Year reports were analysed. This approach was chosen to ensure a high degree of confidence in the findings across Article 3 interventions.

For programmable activities under Articles 4 and 5, all decisions (31 for Article 4; 3 for Article 5 involving 59 contracts) were reviewed, as well as data available on ongoing projects. Evaluation reports, on the other hand, as a rule concerned actions initiated previously under the IfS. The evaluators nevertheless used data from mid-term and final (as well as some ex post) evaluations of these IfS projects; this was justified as partner countries and their institutions, implementing bodies, thematic project directions and management systems applied by DEVCO showed continuity between the IcSP and the IfS. Also, in some cases such as the CBRN CoE initiative, it is practically impossible to separate certain IfS from IcSP activities. Some of the conclusions in relation to Article 5 are based on recently-adopted guidance documents (for example in the CT/CVE/OC area with regard to human rights standards), which the team could only assess per se, without there being data as yet on how these guidelines are being implemented on the ground.

**Caveats** Despite the limitations indicated above, the evaluators have confidence in their findings. This is based on: (a) feedback from EU Delegations and a range of other stakeholders, which showed a fair level of consistency in their assessments and views; (b) the continuity in programmable actions with previous interventions and programmes (Articles 4 and 5); and (c) the overall consistency of the findings based on data gathered from a variety of sources.
4. Evaluation Findings

4.1. The context of the IcSP

The peace and security landscape The IcSP is implemented in a context of evolving peace and security trends and a developing global peace and security architecture. Its relevance, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, added value, and how ‘fit for purpose’ it is as an instrument derives in part from its responsiveness to these trends and the contribution it makes to the global architecture.

Much is written about emerged (and emerging) threats, and peace and security trends. The best summary, perhaps, is that while the causes of war and instability are old and recognisable, their dynamics today are new. In a reflection on recent conflicts in Syria, Mali, and Libya, a 2014 Clingendael research paper notes, “The main problems for the international community emerging from this most recent wave of conflicts – their intractability, the risk of an unpredictable spill-over of organised violence and the limited relevance of existing global security institutions – derive in large part from the evolutionary dynamic of modern organised violence, rather than the initial causes.”

This evolutionary dynamic, which has accelerated over the last 15 years is best understood by talking about ‘emerged threats’, which are described in Box 1.

However, the evaluators note is also an evolutionary dynamic fuelled by three over-arching peace and security trends that relate to hybrid conflicts, securitisation and mass displacement.

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**Box 1: Emerged peace and security threats**

There is a growing consensus both in the literature and from key informant interviews that emerged peace and security threats today include fragmented conflicts, criminalised conflict, extremism and terrorism, and climate change.

The fragmentation of violent conflict has two main (and interlinked) dimensions. The first is that today’s ‘new wars’ are highly localised. For example, the conflict in Northeastern Nigeria is often interpreted as between Boko Haram and the Nigerian state. However, it is rooted in conflict fault-lines within communities and towns, between ethnicities, and groups within ethnicities. The second relates to the fragmentation of armed groups. This can be seen in the proliferation of non-state armed groups, the engagement of criminal and extremist groups in conflict, and consequently “in the decentralized multiplication of fronts and factions engaged in conflict.”

The notion of criminalised conflict gained traction in 2004 with Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler’s research on “greed and grievance in civil war” and work on “armed violence” defined by the OECD/DAC as “the use or threatened use of weapons to inflict injury, death, or psychosocial harm which undermines development”. The difference between the two is illustrated by conflicts in the DRC or Somalia (criminalized conflict) and violence in Jamaica or parts of Mexico (armed violence situations). Consequently, a definition of criminalised conflict is, “a violent conflict situation characterised by the widespread use by armed groups of illicit economic activities to fund insurgent activities or otherwise derive personal gain”.

Extremism and terrorism is often framed in terms of events seen unfolding in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, and Palestine; but also more recently in attacks in Norway, Turkey, France, the United Kingdom, Belgium and Germany. Definitions of extremism and terrorism (but terrorism in particular) are contentious, and definitions used will either serve to extend or contract the list of countries seen as affected by it. Situations where terrorist acts (e.g. mass atrocities, symbolic killings, such as public beheadings, etc.) or violence is used against civilians or civilian targets by armed groups are numerous – and span currently or in the recent past Africa (Sudan, Somalia, Sudan, Nigeria, etc.), Asia (Afghanistan, Thailand (South), Pakistan, etc.), Europe (Russia (North Caucasus)), Central and Latin America (Mexico and Colombia), and the MENA region (Iraq, Syria, Yemen).

Climate change is seen as a conflict and security threat multiplier and magnifier, although how it does so (and will in the future) is subject to debate. Research by Sol Hsiang and Marshall Burke (2014), which reviews a variety of case studies and types of conflict concludes that “it seems likely that climatic changes influence conflict through multiple pathways that may differ between contexts” [and] “there is considerable suggestive evidence that economic factors are important mechanisms, especially in low income settings where extreme climate often quite directly affects economic conditions through agriculture.”

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5 Idem
The first trend, which in part flows from the emerged threats, is the rise of hybrid conflicts, defined as "violent conflicts or situations of widespread violence where elements of grievance, greed, and/or extremism are intertwined – and where climate changes may play a role", but also that involve a mix of internal country and cross-border dynamics. The prevalence of hybrid conflicts in many countries (e.g. Northeastern Nigeria, Syria/Iraq, Mali, Somalia, Afghanistan/Pakistan, etc.) has important implications for assumptions that underpin our (often grievance-premised) understanding of peace and security.

The second, and perhaps contentious, trend is the securitisation of development and peace (see Box 2). Respondents interviewed distinguished between actions on the security-development nexus (greater attention in development to insecurity, which is in line with thinking on the need to build peace in order to promote development; the need to address security issues as part of broader peace-making and peace-building efforts (e.g. through DDR and SSR efforts); and the need to strengthen civilian oversight and management of security forces) and securitisation trends, particularly the shift in development (and peace-building) from a human security focus to alignment with national security interests (such as those in the CT/CVE, organised crime, and cybersecurity fields); and active use of development and peace-building approaches to stabilise localities following military action (e.g. "hot stabilisation" of areas taken from insurgents).

A number of respondents argued that securitisation has increased over the last 15 years, and that this has an “unwelcome and negative impact on key development areas, such as social development, human rights and governance reform". The evaluators note a number of risks associated to securitised activities, including problem over-simplification, amplified trauma and new conflict fault-lines, lost neutrality, negative effects on EU cross-cutting priorities, and operational dilemmas. Risks, however, are common in all interventions in conflict-affected areas (see Figure 2).

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8 See https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_publication_docs/INTA91_1_08_Fisher_Amnder%200.pdf

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Box 2: What is ‘securitisation’ of peace and development?

The concept of ‘securitisation’ in international relations was first developed in 1998 by Copenhagen school researchers such as Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan. It sees security as a ‘speech act’, i.e. it is not a question of whether a threat is real or not, but how a certain issue (e.g. migration, terrorism, etc.) can be socially constructed as a threat.

Based on interviews and a review of IcSP actions and programmes, the evaluators use a different, but complementary view of "securitisation"; which covers actions and programmes that are aligned to national security interests (of EU Member States and partner countries) and supportive of partner country government stabilisation objectives. Within the IcSP portfolio, CT/CVE, organized crime, cyber security, and stabilisation (and sometimes migration) activities are seen as securitised.

The evaluators, however, consider such actions and programmes often necessary, but note that when not designed using a conflict-sensitive and ‘do no harm’ approach, they may face a number of challenges:

- The "terrorism", ‘crime’ or “migration” label at times leads to over-simplified problem definitions; and consequently to a narrow set of responses to issues with deeper and broader dynamics.
- In some contexts, counter-terrorism or counter-crime campaigns resemble counter-insurgency campaigns and inflict the same scars on communities. They often lead to new conflict fault lines being formed, deepened social trauma, and new grievances that make future stability and peace harder to achieve.
- Alignment of development and peace-building activities to stabilisation objectives through ‘hot stabilisation’ actions closely associate those to one party of the conflict. It has implications, therefore, for how neutral a party (and the projects it funds) are seen in the eyes of conflicting parties.
- The execution by partner governments of counter-terrorism and counter-crime operations, or efforts to tackle migration may involve human rights violations. Direct or indirect support of these operations may expose a donor to allegations of complicity in those rights violations.
- Operational dilemmas are seen in securitized actions; i.e. footage from filmed focus group discussions on violent extremism may put participants at risk; border closures may lead migrants to take more dangerous routes; etc.
The third trend relates to **refugee and migration flows**. According to UNHCR data, the number of refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs, returnees and stateless persons are the highest in recorded history. Refugee and migration flows to Europe have received a great deal of political attention, but population movements in source regions dwarf these numbers. As explained in an EU Trust Fund study on migration in the Horn of Africa, “[they] move across what are often short distances, and many remain displaced and in conditions of political and economic insecurity for decades. Mass displacement itself can be a trigger for further instability, creating a spiral in which people become trapped”. The impact of mass displacement on stability, of course, is not new – and is not necessarily a driver of instability. Indeed, Kenya has hosted refugees for 20 years from Sudan/South Sudan and Somalia and remains stable. However, the size of current mass displacements and the complexity of its drivers may potentially make migration and internal displacement a contributor to instability in different parts of the world.

There is much literature on the global peace and security architecture (see Box 3), and this literature is not summarised here. Rather, three key observations (or perceptions) made during KIIs (largely EU and UN officials, and European civil-society groups) are given, along with related evidence from the literature.

**The 20th and 21st century divide** A continued weakness in the global peace and security architecture noted in the literature and by interviewees is the use of 20th century methods of peace-making and peace-building in the 21st century context of hybrid conflicts. The challenges for the EU that follow are described in the 2016 report of the Berlin Report of the Human Security Study Group:

“EU policies are mostly directed at stabilisation on classic peace-making lines; they involve the provision of humanitarian assistance, mediation among the warring parties, and ‘post-conflict’ reconstruction. Where the warring parties are extremist criminalised groups, such policies are easily subverted. Humanitarian assistance is channelled into a predatory war economy; top-down mediation ends up entrenching the positions of the warring parties; and reconstruction provides further opportunities for those parties to enrich themselves at the

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9 See [https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B8GXUDmZVqWITkRXTndxN09IN0E/view](https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B8GXUDmZVqWITkRXTndxN09IN0E/view)
expense of ordinary citizens.”

More instruments, but not enough funding, and less coherence? Funding commitments for conflict, peace and security work from all sources (OECD members and other countries) has averaged USD3.66 billion a year in the period 2007-2014; with peaks in 2011 (USD4.05 billion) and lows in 2014 (USD3.26 billion). Large parts of this finance flows from funding instruments focused on this sector; the largest instruments including the UK’s Conflict Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), the IcSP, and the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF).

However, significant finance for conflict, peace, and security work may indeed be insufficient to address the magnitude of current challenges. Furthermore, interviewees and studies show that funding is hampered by a number of factors including challenges associated to: multiple institutional mandates and budget lines, thus complicating efforts to ensure joined-up approaches; a focus on risk avoidance rather than context-specific risk management, which address donor fiduciary and reputational risks rather than the risks of state failure and a return to conflict. Few agreed upon crisis-specific strategies, and when these are in place, they often lack clear prioritisation. Finally, incoherence across instruments where instrument designs “are often based on specific institutional mandates and operating procedures rather than on effective delivery approaches. This has resulted in both duplication and a fragmentation of efforts”.

Increased, but still limited in-country coordination between development partners, host governments, and civil society groups. There have been significant advances in in-country coordination in fragile states, through initiatives such as the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, collaboration between the UN, EU, and World Bank on Post Conflict and Post Disaster Needs Assessments (PCNAs and PDNAs), as well as other national-level coordination frameworks/mechanisms. Most interviewees, however, agree that a fundamental weakness in the global peace and security architecture remains limited in-country coordination between development partners, host governments, and civil society groups.

The peace and security policy context Beyond the global peace and security context of the IcSP, the Instrument’s performance is determined by how well it achieves its stated objectives taking into account an evolving international context and EU priorities.

Internationally, the EU is committed to Agenda 2030 and the IcSP addresses several elements of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16. Specifically:

- Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere
- Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all
- Significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organised crime.

At the core of the EU priorities that the IcSP supports is the Treaty of the European Union, particularly Title V and Article 21 (see Box 4). Article 21 of the Treaty has been followed by a number of external action strategies and policies (see Annex for a timeline of peace and security strategies and policies).

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The most recent of these strategies is the “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy” (2016) (referred to as the ‘Global Strategy’), which sets out the principles and priorities for EU action on peace and security. The Global Strategy’s principles include unity, engagement, responsibility, and partnership. Priorities encompass:

- **The security of the Union** with a focus on security and defense, counter-terrorism, cyber security, energy security and strategic communications.

- **State and societal resilience in the EU’s East and South**, including an enlargement policy, closer ties with and support to neighbours, a multifaceted approach to resilience in its surrounding regions, and a more effective migration policy.

- **An integrated approach to conflicts and crises** that is premised on pre-emptive peace, security and stabilisation, conflict settlement, and working to break the political economy of war and to create possibilities for legitimate sustenance to exist.

- **Cooperative regional orders**, which includes a European security order, the promotion of a peaceful and prosperous Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa, closer ties across the Atlantic, deepened economic diplomacy and scaled up security role in Asia, and ensuring that the Arctic remains a low-tension area.

- **Global governance** with reforms in the UN, including the Security Council, and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). These include investing in the UN’s peacekeeping, mediation, peacebuilding and humanitarian functions. Implementation of EU commitments on sustainable development and climate change, promoting an open and rules-based economic system, widening the reach of international norms, regimes and institutions, developing rules to ensure security and sustainable access to the global commons, and partnering with states and organisations, but also with the private sector and civil society.

In addition, the European Commission’s Proposal for a new European Consensus on Development (November 2016) sets out a number of priorities for its support to peaceful and inclusive societies, democracy, effective and accountable institutions, rule of law and human rights for all. These are aligned to SDG 16 and cover the promotion of inclusive societies and accountable, democratic institutions; commitments to the rule of law, addressing the nexus of fragility, conflict, humanitarian crisis, and migration; support for the resolution of crises and conflicts, and building peace; a focus of development cooperation in countries
affected by fragility and conflict; and commitments to coherence in humanitarian action, development cooperation, and disaster risk reduction; and strategic engagement on migration issues.\textsuperscript{13}


4.2. EQ 1 – Relevance

4.2.1. Summary assessment

Under the relevance heading, the MTE Terms of Reference (TOR) requires an assessment of the extent that the overall objectives and design of the IcSP respond to: (a) EU priorities and beneficiary needs identified at the time the Instrument was adopted; and (b) current EU priorities and beneficiary needs, given the evolving challenges and priorities in the international context. Information sought includes congruence/divergence of the Instrument against the evolving EU and global context, and the extent to which IcSP actions and programmes respond to global challenges.

The evaluators find:

- IcSP actions and programmes balance EU priorities and beneficiary country needs. Some improvements are needed in Article 3 projects to better ground and time actions to the contexts they are implemented in.

- The IcSP (across all Articles) responds to the priorities set out in Article 21 of the Treaty of the European Union. It supports the Global Strategy, notably the realms of security, promoting state and societal resilience in the EU’s South and East, takes an integrated approach to conflicts and crises, supports cooperative regional orders, and promotes global governance.

- The IcSP (across all Articles) plays an important role in the global peace and security architecture and addresses key peace and security threats and trends.

- Challenges for the Instrument include its capacity to address the rise of hybrid conflicts (Articles 3 and 4), and a not fully articulated strategic framework for support to the global peace and security architecture (Articles 4 and 5).

4.2.2. Judgement Criteria

JC1.1: The objectives and implementation of the IcSP in 2014, when the Instrument was adopted, were and remain today aligned with the evolving EU priorities, strategies and external action policy.

Article 3

The evaluators find that Article 3 actions\textsuperscript{14} respond to EU objectives and strategies. IcSP decisions support and are aligned with EU external action political objectives and priorities. These are expressed in related Council Conclusions, EU wide strategies adopted by the Council (e.g. Security and Development Strategy for the Sahel; European Agenda on Migration, etc.), and policy frameworks agreed within broader regional or international frameworks (e.g. the EU-Africa Partnership, UN Resolutions).

The AGAMI project in Niger or the provision of boats to the Turkish Coast Guard are illustrative examples of IcSP supporting EU political priorities and deliverables in relation to the migration agenda, while providing a bridging function for longer-term support through other EU instruments and mechanisms.

No evidence has been found to suggest misalignment with IcSP objectives under Article 3.

Article 4

The evaluators also find that Article 4 programmes respond to EU objectives and strategies.

- Under the Annual Action Programmes (AAPs) 2014/15 there are 18 programmes (FDs: 37362; 37925 and 39363) for Article 4 that contain the objectives of strengthening the capacity of the EU and its partners to prevent conflict, build peace and address pre- and post-crisis needs in close co-ordination with international, regional and sub-regional organisations, and state and civil society actors.

- A review of Article 4 interventions finds them supportive of policy statements on the specific drivers of instability such as the illegal trade of conflict minerals\textsuperscript{15} or the role of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in key regions. Actions are generally aligned to longstanding EU conflict prevention efforts\textsuperscript{16} and are designed to promote the mainstreaming of both conflict prevention and crisis management across EU EFIs\textsuperscript{17}. They also support the five priority areas as set out in the IcSP strategy paper and Multi-annual Indicative Programmes\textsuperscript{18}.

No evidence has been found to suggest misalignment with IcSP objectives under Article 4.

Article 5

The evaluators find that the programmes implemented under Article 5\textsuperscript{19} reflect the adaptations made in the EU’s foreign and security policy in response to increasing global complexity\textsuperscript{20} and mirror advances and activities under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as framed by Article 21 of the Treaty of the

\textsuperscript{14} The number of Article 3 actions for 2014 are 106 with a contracted amount of €140,512,101.93; in 2015 there were 163 actions with a contracted amount of €219,094,729.21; and 2016 there are 42 actions with a contracted amount of €89,263,513.75.

\textsuperscript{15} EU Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council (2014), “Responsible sourcing of minerals originating in conflict-affected and high-risk areas Towards an integrated EU approach”

\textsuperscript{16} EU Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention (2011)

\textsuperscript{17} EU Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council (2013) The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises

\textsuperscript{18} Commission decision adopting the IcSP Thematic Strategy Paper 2014-2027, MIP 2014-2020, and Annex (only applies to Arts. 4 and 5)

\textsuperscript{19} Since 2014, 59 Article 5 contracts have been launched at a value of EUR 90,427,254.

European Union. A review of Article 5 programmes shows that it has fostered a growing toolset and partnerships needed to address evolving threats.

No evidence has been found to suggest misalignment with IcSP objectives under Article 5.

**JC1.2: The objectives of the IcSP as set in its Regulation, and the design of IcSP decisions are in line with partner country needs and priorities, as identified by key local stakeholders**

### Article 3

The evaluators find evidence of alignment of IcSP Article 3 actions with relevant national priorities and strategies of beneficiary countries (e.g. Niger Strategy on security and development in the Sahel-Saharan areas adopted in 2011 and focus on vulnerable populations in Diffa\(^\text{21}\)). However, there is also evidence of actions aimed at mitigating the local impact of national policies triggered more by EU political priorities than national ones. In Niger, the EU’s focus on the control of illegal migration has contributed to differences between the Government of Niger and decentralised authorities in the region of Agadez, generating new needs that compete for resources and political attention from the partner country. Although, there is a shared interest by the Government of Niger, which is concerned primarily by the security risks arising from criminal networks involved in trafficking refugees and migrants, the impact of EU efforts to address migration flows expose tensions between the interests and priorities of central State actors and local authorities and communities, to whom the illegal traffic of migrants provides an economic lifeline and lucrative business\(^\text{22}\). EU Trust Fund actions aimed at providing local economic alternatives to trafficking were not yet in place when the first impacts of the IcSP action were felt.

Sampled Article 3 actions suggest that 75-80% of these show evidence of context and conflict analysis, although this cannot be confirmed as these analyses are not available in Commission databases accessed. Country knowledge, however, is built over time by IcSP personnel, particularly those deployed over time in countries where actions are implemented, and built into IcSP actions, which often include context analysis, thematic studies or contribute to deepen contextual knowledge.

There is room to improve, in some cases, speed (from identification of need, to the preparation of actions, and contracting of implementing agencies) in Article 3 actions. This may impact the relevance of affected actions when context changes affect the relevance of the original design of actions.

Although there is evidence in project documentation and KII’s of local stakeholder consultation in the definition of a number of actions, there are significant variations determined by who the implementing partners are, their capacity, and how present or rooted they are in the local context\(^\text{23}\). In some contexts, the IcSP is providing support to national bodies in charge of coordinating peace-building interventions (e.g. in Niger) and supporting local capacities of state and civil society actors to address terrorism, illicit trafficking and the effects of migration flows. The evaluators note through interviews requests from CSDP missions (e.g. Somalia) for the IcSP to build capacity and address equipment needs.

### Article 4

The evaluators find that Article 4 interventions typically involve the participation of a variety of stakeholders in regular dialogue. For example, the on-going dialogue process between EU policy makers and civil society through the Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN)\(^\text{24}\) is helpful in aligning Article 4 decisions with the

\(^{21}\) FD 38655; EU-Niger NIP 2014-2020; Mid-term evaluation of the IfS programme in Niger, 2013  
\(^{22}\) Discussions on the AGAMI project at the Steering Committee meeting in Niamey, 15/11/2016.  
\(^{23}\) For instance, in Niger national or country based NGOs were more effective in communicating and maintaining the engagement with local authorities/community level actors than bigger/international organisations, who have on the other hand better entry points with Government.  
\(^{24}\) The Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN) is co-financed by the European Union (IfS/IcSP) and EPLO, and managed by EPLO in cooperation with the European Commission (EC) and the European External Action Service (EEAS).
priorities of local stakeholders. The CSDN is a mechanism for dialogue between civil society and EU policymakers on issues related to peace and conflict. The European Peace-building Liaison Office (EPLO) manages the CSDN and helps ensure that civil society groups participate in design processes such as the Annual Action Programmes (AAPs).

Further evidence of the participation of stakeholders in regular dialogue can be found in other programmes such as “Gender and Transitional Justice” (AAP 2014) where the programme consults with a large groups of stakeholders involved in mainstreaeming gender such as UN WOMEN, and CSO women’s groups. The “Strengthening the Kimberly Process – Conflict Prevention and Governance in the Diamond Sector” (AAP 2014) programme also facilitates dialogue between civil society and host governments in a unique multi-stakeholder structure.

**Article 5**

The evaluators find that context analysis is a core element in the design of Article 5 interventions.

Consultations with local stakeholders are evident in the Centres of Excellence (CoE) system, which involves setting up inter-ministerial National Teams, National Focal Points (NFP) and Regional Secretariats. They hold two or more regional roundtable meetings per year, and is today complemented by an active process of conducting national needs assessments by partner countries who in turn develop and adopt National CBRN Action Plans (supported by Joint Research Centre (JRC) and the UN[25]). A planning matrix maintained by JRC shows that of the 55 partner countries that participate in the CoE initiative, and others which are considering joining it and have participated in some of the activities, 33 have completed national needs assessments and 10 have adopted national action plans. This data compares favourably with the experience from other (global) needs assessments and action plan initiatives, such as UNSC Resolution 1540.

A review of evaluation reports, as well as available programme and project reports and descriptions, also confirms that early involvement of local stakeholders (including competent national authorities and CSO) is common practice in other Article 5 programming.

**JC1.3: The objectives of the IcSP match the principles and policy objectives set out in the TEU (Title V, Article 21)**

**Article 3**

The evaluators have found no digression under Article 3 from the findings of the final IfS evaluation; Article 3 interventions respond to EU strategies and policies and are consistent with the provisions of TEU Title V Article 21.

Article 3 actions that address CT/CVE, migration and stabilisation are at greater risk of indirect negative knock-on effects on human rights, rule of law, international law, and good governance, notwithstanding attention to mainstreaming those principles. The risk of harm increases when actions involve close direct or indirect support with beneficiary government security institutions that are engaged in counter-insurgency, counter-trafficking or counter-terrorism operations. On the other hand, it is part of the mandate and scope of the IcSP to access and influence such institutions with associated risks. When ‘do no harm’ approaches are built into IcSP actions in these sectors, the risk of knock-on effects decreases[26]. There is awareness in FPI and DEVCO B5 of such risks and there are efforts to mitigate potential negative effects.

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26 An example of applied ‘do no harm’ thinking was seen in a CT/CVE project in the Middle East. Focus group discussions were planned with youth groups, and if good research practice was to be upheld, these were going to be filmed. The risk of footage being used for intelligence gathering purposes by government was noted by the implementing partner. A decision was made to rapidly transcribe filmed footage with non-attribution of statements, and then destroy footage once this was done.
Article 4

The AAPs reviewed confirm that IcSP Article 4 interventions are in line with the EU commitments in TEU Title V Article 21. There is no evidence of non-alignment.

Article 5

The evaluators find the objectives, priorities and programme directions/contents of Article 5 responsive to EU strategies and policies and consistent with the provisions of TEU Title V Article 21. Mechanisms are in place and have been applied to adapt the implementation of Article 5 in the light of changing strategic orientations and objectives. As with Article 3, programmes in CT/CVE, organised crime and cybersecurity risk having negative knock-on effects which can be addressed by applying conflict sensitivity and ‘do no harm’ approaches.

4.3. EQ 2 - Effectiveness, Impact, and Sustainability

4.3.1. Summary assessment

Under the effectiveness, impact, and sustainability heading, the MTE Terms of Reference require an assessment of the extent to which the IcSP delivers results against the Instrument’s objectives, and specific EU priorities. Information sought is on: (i) the results delivered; (ii) how well the IcSP has translated political priorities into interventions; (iii) the political effectiveness of funding; (iv) mainstreaming of EU policy priorities; (v) how processes have led to the identification/formulation of effective interventions; (vi) the flexibility and adaptability of the Instrument; (vii) contributions to addressing root causes of insecurity and conflict; (viii) contributions to creating structural dynamics in support of building peace; (ix) contribution to strengthened EU and partner capacities in conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness (Article 4) and global and trans-regional threats and emerging threats (Article 5); (x) dialogue with key stakeholders in programming and monitoring under Articles 4 and 5; (xi) levels of sustainability across Articles 3, 4, and 5; and (xii) the promotion of aid effectiveness (partnership, coordination, and harmonisation).

The evaluators find:

- IcSP actions and programmes are effective, and across Articles 3, 4, and 5, the IcSP has delivered on its commitments. Actions and programmes translate EU political priorities into interventions.

- Political commitments to spend in particular countries or on some issues have led to difficulties in identifying suitable actions, although no evidence was found to suggest that the quality of subsequent actions has been negatively affected.

- Funding allocations have been politically responsive. Political effectiveness, however, is difficult to measure. Nonetheless, contributions are seen to deepen political dialogue with governments of partner countries.

- Data on mainstreaming shows contributions to conflict prevention, democracy and good governance, but less on gender and human rights.

- Processes have led to the identification of effective responses. However, in line with a relatively widespread trend in the sector, the metrics of actions and programmes are at times overly complex and their effectiveness would gain from adopting more realistic approaches.
With non-programmable Article 3 actions, implementing partners have by and large adjusted actions to achieve a number of outcomes. Programmes under Articles 4 and 5 build on previous initiatives under the IfS, and have also yielded important outcomes.

Most projects initiated under the IcSP are still ongoing today.27 Evaluations of actions and programmes in many cases have yet to be undertaken and this makes it difficult at this stage to assess contributions to addressing root causes, EU and partner capacities, and trans-regional and emerging threats. Future evaluations will be able to address these issues as monitoring systems are in place and impact assessment is part of the design of programmable Article 5 actions.

Enhanced results under Article 3 may follow greater emphasis and investment in seizing windows of opportunity for peace (see Box 5). Under Articles 4 and 5, contributions to the global peace and security architecture (see Box 3 above) can benefit from the elaboration of a strategic framework to guide further investments in this area.

Sustainability of IcSP actions across all Articles is helped by the emphasis placed on capacity-building. There is scope to aim for greater sustainability in Article 3 actions by requiring in the design phase the formulation of exit or transition strategies.

Aid effectiveness in Article 3 follows emphasis placed on partnerships, although actions are non-programmable. In Articles 4 and 5, attention is given to ownership, coordination and harmonisation.

4.3.2. Judgement Criteria: Effectiveness

JC2.1: The IcSP has delivered on the commitments set out for the Instrument and contributed to advance EU political priorities.

Article 3

The evaluators find that technical and financial assistance has been delivered under Article 3 towards the objectives and exceptional situations foreseen in the IcSP Regulation. Evidence shows (see JC1.1) that this assistance has contributed to EU priorities, and enabled in some cases deepened political and policy dialogue with beneficiary governments. This dialogue, in turn, has often enhanced both the effectiveness and impacts of these actions. In other cases, political commitments to spend in particular countries or on some issues have led to difficulties in identifying suitable actions. There is no evidence to suggest that compromises have been made on the quality of subsequent actions, although pressure to comply with timing of EU political deliverables has in at least one case left little time for engagement with local stakeholders.

Article 4

The evaluators find interventions under Article 4 closely aligned, through the AAPs for 2014/15, with the commitments set out in the Regulation. Programmes aligned with the priorities outlined in the IcSP strategy paper and Multiannual Indicative Programming have been effectively implemented. There is no evidence under Article 4 that political priorities have negatively affected the effectiveness of IcSP programmes.

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27 Article 3 actions were mostly still under way at the time of this MTE. Actions under Articles 4 and 5 are long-term (36 months) actions and programmes adopted in 2014 have yet to reach the point when their mid-term evaluation is due.
Article 5

The evaluators find that Article 5 programmes deliver outcomes in EU priority areas given in Article 5 of the Regulation. The programme portfolio over the past three years has covered all priority areas as delineated in paragraphs 2(a)-(d) and 4(a)-(f) of Article 5. The effectiveness of the outcomes delivered depends on a range of factors, including absorption capacity of the partner countries involved, quality of the work of the implementers and overall programme management. The regional nature of the programmes can facilitate cooperation when bilateral issues complicate work in sensitive security areas. Past assessments that Article 5 programmes deliver the planned outcomes continue to apply.

There is no direct evidence to suggest that EU political decisions or priority setting on Article 5 programme themes have negatively affected effectiveness. However, political priority setting on budget allocations has meant a cut in human resources available at DEVCO B5 for the IcSP, which may have implications for future effectiveness. The evaluators have found that a number of Article 5 projects have broken new ground (for example in relation to programmes on critical infrastructure protection and CT/CVE). As other EFIs or donors follow into these thematic or geographical areas, the evaluators question whether the Article 5 engagements should continue and refocus to strongly emphasise the security dimension of the intervention, or whether transition strategies are needed towards alternative funding streams.

JC2.2: IcSP decisions mainstream policy priorities of the EU (e.g. gender, human rights, governance, etc.) and other crosscutting issues highlighted in the IcSP Regulation and the CIR

Article 3

The evaluators did not find data disaggregated by article on the mainstreaming of several EU cross-cutting priorities. A review of aggregated data, which includes actions under Article 3, is given under the cross-cutting heading below. In terms of explicit conflict prevention objectives and guiding principles, 79% of Article 3 actions reviewed included such objectives/guiding principles and covered topics such as reconciliation, conflict mitigation and dialogue.

Article 4

A review of the AAPs for 2014-16 shows that programmes in the area of democracy and good governance account for over 50%. All programmes contain conflict prevention elements or are focused on conflict prevention. Only 11% of the programmes tackle gender equality and empowerment of women directly, but all programmes contain elements of these areas. Programmes that address environmental (not climate change) issues account for 22% of the total. While there are no dedicated programmes exclusively focused on human rights, a rights-based approach crosscuts all programmes. The evaluators have found that the annual programming of sub-delegated Calls for Proposals directed at local actors in the area of conflict prevention and peace-building helps Article 4 interventions to further mainstream crosscutting issues across the Article by picking up main themes such as gender-mainstreaming, women peace and security, and women and children’s rights. The Gender Facility also helps to mainstream gender for both Articles 3 and 4.

Article 5

The evaluators find that most Article 5 interventions have good governance as a primary objective. Specific programmes have developed a particular mechanism to help with promoting good governance, such as the CoE system with its Governance Team (now in Phase III). In other cases, good governance is built into programme design and addressed together with partner countries in the design and implementation phase of specific projects.

One programme specifically addresses the security implications of climate change. Other crosscutting policy priorities, such as gender equality, human rights, and climate change (with the exception mentioned before),
are normally not the primary focus area of Article 5 programmes. However, as programmable long-term interventions, these activities take account of these crosscutting issues, and a review of the AAPs, available project documentation as well as interviews with DEVCO confirm that attention is being paid to them.

Mainstreaming and superimposing crosscutting issues, such as human rights, is particularly important in the programme areas dealing with counter terrorism and organised crime. DEVCO commissioned a study (with reference to Article 10 of the IcSP Regulation) to develop guidelines in this respect (the Operational Guidance on the preparation and implementation of EU financed actions specific to countering terrorism, organised crime, and cyber security in third countries) and has included dedicated research in the CT/CVE programme portfolio.

**Cross-cutting**

Mainstreaming of EU cross-cutting priorities, where possible, in the programming of IcSP actions across articles is an obligation stipulated in the IcSP Regulation (art.2(4)). Decisions and action/programme documents include a section on cross-cutting issues that identify how and which priorities are covered. However, an accurate assessment of how these are effectively implemented would require a more in-depth analysis of actions/programmes that is beyond the scope of this evaluation. According to the statistical data available (not disaggregated by Article), mainstreaming appears strong on good governance, appropriate on climate relevance, as per the 20% EU target for climate change action expenditure, and weaker on human rights and gender, although there appears to be significant differences across Articles 3, 4, and 5.

- 89% of overall IcSP commitments (Articles 3, 4, and 5) in 2015 are marked as supportive of good governance.
- A human rights marker is not available in the Statistical Dashboard for IcSP actions/programmes. However, 11% of actions/programmes in 2014-2016 are coded for human rights under DAC criteria. In 2015, 15% of the Instrument actions (IIs and IcSP) reported ‘mainstreaming of human rights’ as ‘other sector of intervention’ alongside the main sector focus of the actions.
- 16.6% of IcSP commitments (Articles 3, 4, and 5) in 2015 are marked for gender equality. Gender mainstreaming is, however, stronger in articles 4 and 5 programmes.
- 19.9% of IcSP commitments (Articles 3, 4, and 5) in 2015 are marked as climate relevant.

**JC2.3: IcSP decision-making and programming processes are conducive to the timely identification and implementation of interventions and their adaptation, where and as required.**

**Article 3**

Article 3 actions remain among the most rapidly deployable among EFIs, which also partly explains the widespread use of the IcSP at EUD-level. The CIR Survey indicates that the IcSP is the third most used EFI. Nonetheless, several respondents see there is scope for further streamlining and acceleration of the decision-making process related to the adoption of decisions and approval of changes to contracts. The time between adoption of decisions and contracting can vary considerably (from one day to 12 months), and in some cases implementation started prior to the signing of the contract (e.g. JCRP II in Sudan). While for many crisis actions it is in principle important to ensure fast contracting for timely implementation, its urgency depends on the nature of the actions (e.g. equipment/supplies vs. mediation support). Contracting speed is also dependent on the readiness if implementing partners to kick-off with implementation, or that the necessary conditions are met.

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30 It is found in all AAP interventions under article 4; and it is a significant objective for 2 of 6 programme areas in AAF 2015, and 3 out of 5 programmes in the 2016 AAF under article 5.
Actions reviewed for focus areas are generally in line with good practice (see Annex), although some improvements can be made in making theories of change more explicit and elaborating risk identification further in the design of actions. There are adjustments to Article 3 actions during implementation and this is to be encouraged in fast changing crisis contexts.

**Article 4**

The evaluators find that Article 4 decision-making and programming processes have led to the appropriate design and implementation of interventions. Priorities are set in AAPs (country and themes) and based on the IcSP strategy paper and Multiannual Indicative Programmes in consultation with EUDs. In the 18 Article 4 programmes reviewed, Theories of Change (ToC) are clearly formulated and monitoring is on-going at HQ level. In terms of risk management, all of the programmes have reasonable risk management matrices, monitoring and management plans and mid-term evaluations built into the design. However, it is not clear from the data gathered from the implementation of the programmes to what extent the intentions of the design of the programmes are implemented throughout the programme cycle.

**Article 5**

The evaluators note that Article 5 decision-making and programming processes are responsive to opportunities and adapt where necessary during implementation. In programme areas implemented outside the CoE system, decision-making and programming follow DEVCO processes. They build on long-term partnerships (essential for any type of collaboration in security-sensitive thematic areas) and contextual analysis. But there are also programmes that have chosen a more adaptive and iterative decision making approach to manage uncertainties and fluidity in the recipient partner countries and allow for adaptation of the programme design if and when necessary. It should be noted that in one case reviewed (STRIVE) an adaptive approach to decision making was chosen during the inception phase to validate the choice of partners and test the feasibility of project activities.

**4.3.3. Judgement Criteria: Impact**

JC2.4: IcSP decisions contribute toward the overarching goal of stability and peace by: (a) responding to situations of crisis or emerging crisis, often complementing EU humanitarian assistance; (b) addressing root causes of insecurity and conflict; and (c) achieving EU policy objectives.

**Article 3**

The evaluators find that Article 3 actions are responsive to crises and EU policy objectives. The evidence of its contributions to stability and peace is still nascent and accruing. However, available evaluations suggest some positive outcomes. For example, in Sudan’s border regions with South Sudan, Article 3 support to micro-level peace processes have contributed to stability and peace outcomes that have lasted for more than a year. Article 3 investments in seizing windows of opportunity for peace appear relatively modest (the Syria Transition Programme is an example). A review of the Article 3 portfolio shows that 18 actions (7%) have promoted or sought to seize windows of opportunity for peace. There is consensus among respondents that the identification and engagement in such windows may yield important results and add value.

The evaluators find that there is a greater potential for cumulative impacts (i.e. building on the results of previous actions and consolidate outcomes overtime) in countries that have benefited from multiple Article 3 actions over time. Whereas there are examples of possible cumulative impacts (such as COBERM in Georgia, which started in 2010 and has become a long-term engagement that builds confidence at grass-root level when at present, there is no progress in addressing a political solution with regard to Georgia and
Abkhazia as well as South Ossetia), the evidence is insufficient to draw findings on as these impacts can only be assessed over a longer time frame.

Article 4

Several Article 4 programmes are focused on addressing root causes of insecurity and conflict, and respond to Article 21 of the TEU, which aims to “preserve peace and prevent conflicts”. Some programmes are continuations of phases started under IfS AAPs such as the ENTRI, ERMES and PCNA/PDNA support. These help to build and enhance capacity to respond to and prevent crises through better trained staff for deployment to CSDP and other civilian stabilisation missions or, in the case of ERMES, where mediators can be deployed quickly to mediate in an emerging crisis. Other programmes help strengthen and support international and regional organisations to preserve peace and prevent conflicts, such as UN agencies, OSCE, OECD, AU, and League of Arab States.

The absence of an explicit strategic framework that guides efforts to strengthen peace and security architectures, along with limited funds under Article 4 to resource strategic directions, weakens impact in this area.

Article 5

There are several examples (such as capacities built under Article 5 that were redeployed during the international response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa) where long-term Article 5 interventions have resulted in capacities that are deployable on short notice for responses to emerging crisis situations. The main contribution of Article 5 programmes is in support of EU policy priorities. Programming of Article 5 interventions involve sequencing of certain projects in the CT/OC/CI areas that creates cumulative effects. A different methodology was chosen by the CoE CBRN Initiative, which has developed standing structures at national and regional levels (NFPs, NTs, RSs) and tools (NAQ, NAP, regional roundtables) that are meant to build on past achievements.

JC2.5: IcSP decisions contribute to the building of capacity in the EU and of organisations engaged in crisis response and peace building in partner countries/regions

Article 3

Capacity building, involving beneficiary groups such as civil society and government, is a common component across Article 3 actions reviewed. It features to varying degrees in 86% of the actions reviewed. Although there are examples of Article 3 actions that successfully built capacities for peace of EU and other organisations, it is too early to evaluate these and draw conclusions on the impacts of efforts. From in-country actions reviewed, the Haute Autorité pour la Consolidation de la Paix (HACP) in Niger is one noteworthy example for how consecutive Instrument programmes have strengthened the capacity of a local peacebuilding structure, boosted its legitimacy and the recognition of its role in the Government of Niger and among international partners.

Article 4

All Article 4 programmes for 2014-2016 support capacity building; 60% of programmes have this as their main focus, while 40% contain capacity-building actions. Some Article 4 programmes are in their second or third phases (ENTRI and ERMES). Respondents indicate that strengthened capacities at the regional level (e.g. OECD, OSCE, and League of Arab States) offers the EU important leverage, which in itself is an impact. Support under Article 4 to regional and UN agencies (such as UN WOMEN, UNDPA and UNDP) is seen by interviewees as a useful contribution to the global peace and security architecture. However, as mentioned above, there is no overarching strategic framework to guide this support.
Article 5

The evaluators note that capacity-building contributions are at the core of Article 5 programmes. Programmes implemented under the CT/OC/CI/CC portfolio are centrally managed or handed over to implementers such as Interpol, UNODC or regional actors. In the CBRN risk mitigation field, equally, there is a stated intent to strengthen national and regional capacity.

For example, under the CoE Initiative, essentially all the activities and technical support areas contribute to capacity-building in the field of CBRN risk mitigation, but also in crisis management. A search at the CoE Portal31 under all 59 CoE Projects returns 19 projects that build capacity in crisis management or 32% of all CoE projects. If one only accounts for CoE projects started on or after 1 January 2014, there are 10 on-going and one approved CoE projects (42%) in this thematic area out of a total of 24 CoE projects32. This increase in strengthening crisis response capacity (with respect to CBRN risks) reflects an overall trend in the CoE project portfolio from general awareness raising and networking towards more focused training and equipment delivery.

A review of past evaluation reports shows by and large positive feedback with regard to the contribution of Article 5 to capacity building. Weaknesses relate to difficulties in delivering equipment as part of the capacity building measures (administrative issues including delays in procurement; asynchrony of project and procurement cycles), and more is needed in terms of institutional strengthening, training and exercises.

4.3.4. Judgement Criteria: Sustainability

JC2.6: Results of IcSP interventions are more likely to endure beyond the funding period where key local stakeholders have been involved in the design of the actions from the outset, and local mechanisms and capacities strengthened.

Article 3

Article 3 actions are non-programmable and often focused on crisis response, which means they are not designed to be sustainable. However, it is not necessarily a relevant requirement for every action (e.g. one off support activities) or may be given greater attention at a later stage in selected actions. Nonetheless, the evaluators have found examples of actions (e.g. Sudan) that have outlived funding. An assessment of factors that contribute to more sustainable Article 3 actions include capacity building, implementation within broader multi-actor response frameworks, early planning of sequencing with other EFIs or donors, co-financing, ownership of actions by key local stakeholders; or synergy with previous actions. A key challenge identified in measuring sustainability for Article 3 actions is their political (as opposed to developmental) nature and over-ambitious metrics in the design of actions. However, there is consensus among respondents that integrating thinking at the design stage of actions on exit or transition strategies, where appropriate, will add value.

Article 4

In long-term capacity building programmes such as ENTRI and the European Union Police Services Training Programme II (EUPST II), the evaluators find evidence that training yields outcomes that outlive funding. Under the CIP system, capacity building has been a strong element of the IcSP interventions, but there is insufficient evidence to draw conclusions on the extent to which these are sustainable. Among the Article 4 programmes reviewed, over 50% contain elements that address sustainability issues although a sustainability

31 See https://cbrn-coe.jrc.ec.europa.eu/Projects/ProjectAnalysisTool.aspx
32 A search at the CoE Portal under all 59 CoE Projects returns 19 Projects that aim at building capacity in crisis management (7 completed, 11 on-going, one approved) – amounting to 32 % of all CoE projects. If one only accounts for CoE projects started on or after 1 January 2014, there are 10 ongoing and one approved CoE projects in this thematic area out of a total of 24 CoE projects, or 42 %
strategy is not always explicit. It is not clear from the AAPs to what extent activities are embedded or aligned with National Action Plans in countries where interventions take place. However, data from the field visits showed in Colombia, for example, that the Article 4 UN WOMEN Gender and Transitional Justice programme also aligns with the National Action Plan.

**Article 5**

All of Article 5 programmes and projects that started after 1 January 2014 are still ongoing and it is premature to comment on the sustainability of their outcomes. There is, however, evidence from previous programme activities (under the IFS) that point towards results that have outlived funding or found subsequent alternative funding.

Sustainability approaches are embedded in the programming approach for Article 5 and include the involvement of key local stakeholders in the design phase as a key principle. The CoE system has taken this approach one step further and encourages partner countries to embed the activities and results into their own institutional programmes and action plans. In the area of CT, OC and CI, the evaluators note that projects are implemented with close involvement of the competent authorities of partner countries as a means of embedding results into national systems and protocols.

All Article 5 interventions address sustainability in programme design.

**JC2.7: IcSP interventions (Articles 3, 4, and 5) promote some principles of aid effectiveness more than others (i.e. partnership, ownership, coordination, and harmonisation)**

**Article 3**

Although the IcSP Regulation mentions compliance with aid effectiveness principles only in relation to the programmable component of the IcSP, many Article 3 actions also apply some of these principles to the extent they engage with and target civil society actors and/or local authorities, and work at community/provincial level, promoting partnership and ownership at that level. Partnerships between local and international actors were seen in 66% of actions surveyed.

Where the IcSP works through local actors that are recognised as legitimate by both state and civil society actors, it has in some cases been able to combine top-down and bottom-up approaches, pay due attention to central versus decentralised dynamics and sensitivities, promote ownership at different levels, and address both strategic and operational aspects.

The short-timeframe of Article 3 actions and political commitments generate pressures to act quickly, at times at the expense of more thoughtful and carefully prepared approaches, especially where the views of beneficiary country priorities and local stakeholders differ or may not be fully aligned with EU’s interests.

**Article 4**

The evaluators find that aid effectiveness principles are prevalent in Article 4 programmes. The principles set out in the Paris Declaration, Busan Agreement and Accra Agenda are reflected in Article 4 interventions where partnership, ownership, coordination and harmonisation are prioritised.

**Article 5**

Similarly, principles such as creating partnerships, promoting ownership and ensuring coordination with other donors / partners are part of the programming and implementation approach under Article 5. There are also
attempts to promote harmonisation (ISO certification where applicable, the work of the OSA team in the CoE system, Human Rights guidelines and promotion of research in the CT/CVE area).

For example, in the CBRN field, the CoE system is an example of a long-term programme that creates ownership (National Team formation and partner countries setting out their strategies in national needs assessments and national action plans) and provides a platform for donors to align with these strategies using local systems.

Cross-cutting

Across articles, the principles of local ownership and coordination are present in the design of actions, and specifically in connection to context relevance and sustainability. The notion of ownership changes across articles depending on the nature of activities and targeted stakeholders. The evaluators find no evidence that clearly draws causality between the CIR and the application of aid effectiveness principles across IcSP (all Articles) actions or programmes.

4.4. EQ 3 - Efficiency

4.4.1. Summary assessment

Under the efficiency heading, the MTE Terms of Reference require an assessment of the extent to which the IcSP is delivering efficiently. Information sought is on: (i) the ratio of administrative costs to budget; (ii) budget execution (time taken from commitments to payments); (iii) efficiency in design, implementation method, timely and flexible delivery; (iv) justifiability of costs; (v) efficiency gains in the IcSP compared to the IfS; (vi) administrative/management areas that can be simplified; (v) alignment of the IcSP with the CIR; and (vi) the functioning of IcSP performance monitoring processes and results indicators.

The evaluators find:

- The percentage of administrative costs to total budget is appropriate across all Articles.
- Budget execution (time taken from commitments to payments) is satisfactory across Articles 3, 4, and 5. However, there are cases in Article 3 where delays are seen in the period between needs identification and commitments. While these delays are often justifiable, there remains scope for improvement.
- Aspects of the IcSP Regulation that promote efficiency include flexible management procedures to accelerate contractual procedures and direct selection of implementing partners. However, the evaluators have identified cases where the value added of IcSP flexibility was not fully exploited.
- The evaluators were not able to access sufficient evidence to draw conclusions on the justifiability of costs.
- The possibility under the IcSP Regulation to extend IcSP Article 3 actions by 6 + 6 months through no-cost extensions helps implementing partners cope with implementation delays and backlogs. However, its contributions to financial efficiency are limited.
- The IcSP is fully aligned to the CIR.
- New reporting tools for Articles 3 and 4, and a Manual of IcSP Outcome Indicators were developed in 2015. Theories of change are also more widely used to stimulate thinking and analytical feedback on
change processes. Monitoring in crisis or conflict affected contexts remains, however, a significant challenge, not least because of security restrictions and access limitations.33

4.4.2. Judgement Criteria

JC3.1: IcSP interventions are delivered in a timely manner and deliver ‘value for money’

Article 3

The evaluators find that speed and flexibility remains a defining characteristic of Article 3 actions, when compared to other EU EFIs. Examples from Turkey (support to TCG as a deliverable of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan) and Niger (AGAMI project in Agadez as a deliverable of the EU Agenda on Migration) show rapid (roughly six months) follow up with Article 3 actions to EU political decisions and commitments. When the benchmark considered is the date of presentation of an action to the PSC, 64% of projects were adopted in 2015 within three months of a crisis, compared to an average of 69% for the period 2011-2013 under the IfS, which shows consistency34.

There are some cases where Article 3 actions have suffered delays. Such delays are due to a number of factors: delayed deployment of identification missions; negotiations with the beneficiary on support parameters; contextual changes requiring re-design; lengthy negotiations at higher levels with UN agencies over new contractual procedures and templates; reduced readiness of implementing partners; and protracted budget negotiations with implementing partners. When such delays happen, they may have knock-on effects on relevance, effectiveness, and impact.

The total duration of Article 3 actions up to 30 months (with two no cost extension of six months each now permitted) or 36 months (through a 2nd EAM or and IRP in cases of protracted crisis or conflict) is welcomed by implementing partners, many of whom see it as enabling actions to have greater impact.

In terms of budget execution (from commitments to payments), the evaluators found a general level of satisfaction among implementing partners. The evaluators have insufficient evidence to draw conclusions on the justifiability of costs.

Article 4

Long-term interventions under this Article are subject to regular contracting procedures through the AAPs. There are no final reports for projects that commenced after 1 January 2014 and it is therefore difficult to determine project completion timeframes. Respondents note that any implementation delays are usually associated to in-country security situations, late mobilisation of technical expertise or complicated/lengthy mobilisation processes linked to high-level missions.

The evaluators have found no significant complaints among implementing partners in relation to budget execution. The evaluators have insufficient evidence to draw conclusions on the justifiability of costs.

33 A cross-cutting aspect not captured by the judgement criteria formulated by the evaluators, but relevant to note, is related to IcSP improvements of its monitoring and reporting tools, which seek to capture both quantitative and qualitative data.
34 DB 2017, IcSP Working Programme Statement (reporting on activities in 2015)
**Article 5**

Interventions under Article 5, too, are subject to regular contracting procedures through the AAPs. No final reports of Article 5 projects commenced after 1 January 2014 were available for review for efficiency assessments.

There is evidence of delays of project implementation in the initial phases of some Article 5 actions, but these are typically not administrative delays from project approval to contracting, but rather extensions of inception periods. In regional projects, national needs assessments for participating partner countries are often undertaken sequentially by implementers, creating delays. There are proposals to improve the quality of these initial assessments by more strongly involving local experts, which may also shorten inception periods. The evaluators note that a number of CT/OC/CI projects are phased projects and thus create a strategic long-term engagement between the EU, implementers and the partner countries involved.

No significant complaints are noted by the evaluators on budget execution under Article 5 programmes. The evaluators have insufficient evidence to draw conclusions on the justifiability of costs.

**Cross-cutting**

The percentage of administrative costs for the management of the IcSP in relation to total commitments in 2014-2016 is 1%, which is appropriate.

The evaluators note that there is no facility under the IcSP to allow for small actions to be decided without a formal decision-making procedure (such as with Policy Advice, Technical Assistance, Mediation, Reconciliation and Other Areas of Assistance (PAMPF)). This has negative effects on efficiency; if they are to be undertaken, they require the same processes to be followed as large decisions.

**JC3.2 CIR and IcSP regulations facilitate the adaptation of IcSP management systems whenever necessary to achieve efficiency gains**

**Article 3**

Financing decisions under Article 3 of the IcSP Regulation are now required to provide greater definition (e.g. purpose of the action, what is to be supported, and who implements them) compared to the IfS. Although this provides greater clarity, some interviewees expressed concerns that it may also limit Instrument flexibility, although the evaluators have not found evidence of that.

Many implementing partners welcome the possibility under the IcSP Regulation to extend IcSP actions by 6 + 6 months through no-cost extensions. The evaluators note that this option helps implementing partners cope with implementation delays and backlogs, allowing them to cope with implementation and disbursement pressures that may put a strain on their capacities. It was also suggested during interviews that staff/organisational costs during the extension periods are at times offset by a reduced investment in activities.

**Article 4 and Article 5**

Articles 4 and 5 are programmed using Comitology processes, which the Commission also applies in traditional development programmes. The IcSP Regulation enables direct award contracts; which permit faster and more targeted contracting procedures when needed.

**JC3.3: The CIR has allowed the EU to respond more rapidly through the IcSP than would have been possible through other EFIs.**
The evaluators find no direct evidence that the CIR has had any impact in this regard.

### 4.5. EQ 4 - Added Value

#### 4.5.1. Summary assessment

Under the added value heading, the MTE Terms of Reference requires an assessment of the extent to which the IcSP adds value compared to interventions by Member States or other key donors and partners. Information sought is on IcSP added value in terms of size of engagement, particular expertise and weight in advocacy.

The evaluators find:

- Among the EU’s EFIs, the IcSP remains an important resource for non-programmable short-term crisis response actions (Article 3), and programmable longer-term peace-building (Article 4), and interventions related to global and trans-regional as well as emerging threats (Article 5). It is also an important driver of the EU’s efforts to mainstream conflict-sensitivity in other EFIs.

- The IcSP is broadly complementary to and appreciated by other donors and Member States. There are a number of examples, such as in the CT/OC programmes under Article 5, where the IcSP has created entry-points and taken risks that other donors could or would not do.

- The most cited value added areas of the IcSP are its speed, flexibility to adapt to evolving contexts, and political influence/leverage, but other comparative advantages are also frequently mentioned (e.g. direct contracting ability, bridging function, expertise/niche role; possibility to engage with specific stakeholders).

- In a global context of increased securitisation of peace and development, the promotion of European values (support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law as laid out in the TEU) is an important value added of the IcSP.

- There is need for greater emphasis on conflict sensitivity and ‘do no harm’ in securitised actions and programmes (CT/CVE, organised crime, cyber security, stabilisation) in order to reduce the risks of indirect negative effects.

- The IcSP is an important source of funding for many groups in a period with significant funding cuts to the United Nations and European NGOs.

#### 4.5.2. Judgement Criteria

**JC4.1:** The IcSP contributes to or complements actions of other donors, particularly Member States, in terms of financial inputs, speed of delivery, policy areas, stakeholders’ engagement, expertise, impacts on stability and peace, and political influence.

**Article 3**

The evaluators find that amongst EUD respondents, over 90% rate the IcSP (all Articles) as complementing the actions of Member States and other donors. Other donors and Member States interviewed during the validation phase view Article 3 actions largely favourably.
A key value added of Article 3 actions is in the policy and political dialogue it enables with beneficiary governments. Such dialogue is, as mentioned above, also a key driver for effectiveness and impact of Article 3 actions. Of Article 3 actions reviewed, 27 (48%) were deemed likely to have enabled such policy and political dialogue to happen. There was not enough data available on the other 29 to determine whether this was likely or not.

Additional data from the CIR survey shows that 50% of EUD respondents note that IcSP actions (all Articles) have helped relations with beneficiary countries.

The Article 3 cases where the IcSP comparative strengths are questioned are normally those where speed and flexibility have failed. The CIR survey flags EUD difficulties with the use of IcSP Article 3 support in Zimbabwe and Afghanistan.

**Article 4**

As with Article 3, Article 4 actions are seen by EUDs as complementing the actions of other donors.

The evaluators note that documentation and respondents suggest that a key added value of Article 4 is the capacity for peace-building it builds. End of Year Reports for Article 4 flag the comparative value added to be for funding where no other EFIs can be deployed, and where important peace-building/disaster management initiatives (such as the PCNA and PDNA) are progressed. Around two thirds of the projects covered by End of Year Reports are internally assessed to have high added value and one third average or low added value.

**Article 5**

The evaluators note that Article 5 interventions have significant interfaces with interventions of Member States and other donors. Examples include the use of expert facilities involving experts and institutions of EU Member States, and complementarity with EU Joint Actions and Council Decisions. The particular added value of Article 5 flagged during interviews is that it can fund actions that other EFIs cannot, or could not in the past (e.g. CT, OC, dual use export control and other areas under the CBRN risk mitigation envelope).

Examples of added value with respect to other donors are evident from collaborations in the Working Groups on export and border controls, as well as the G7 / Global Partnership actions in biosecurity and nuclear security. Both Science Centres (ISTC, STCU) have a long history of close collaboration with other funding partners (USA, Canada and some other States) and partner and host countries.

Partners (beneficiaries and donors), past evaluations, as well as reports of workshops under Article 5, are fairly consistent in their assessment of its added value, emphasising the focus on soft measures, tailoring to partner country needs and context, technical competence, and high quality.

**JC4.2: The IcSP promotes European approaches and values** in contributing to: (a) building capacity of organisations engaged in crisis response and peace-building; and (b) addressing specific global and trans-regional threats to peace, international security and stability.

**Article 3**

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35 See, for example, projects 319543; 319000; 355056; 353003; 328885 and projects: 319000; 319542; 356247.


37 As specified in the TEU, these include: “consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law”.
Most surveyed Article 3 interventions refer to EU principles (or values); particularly to good governance and human rights. Many of these principles are mainstreamed within the action, and actions will often directly or indirectly promote them.

It is not possible to comprehensively verify with available documentation whether the promotion of European values is followed through in the implementation of actions, as this would require an assessment of actions and it is too soon to have a significant body of IcSP evaluations to draw on. In actions related to CT/CVE, organised crime, cybersecurity, and stabilisation, EU principles/values may not be aligned to how beneficiary institutions (often governments) use the support provided or conduct project-related activities. The evaluators note that where the risk management framework of such actions is not conflict sensitive and does not consider potential adverse impacts on human rights, the potential for non-alignment and other risks is likely to be higher. The number of actions under Article 3 in securitised sectors has fluctuated in 2014-2016; from 8.98% in 2014, to 12.06% in 2015, and 7.89% in 2016.\(^\text{38}\) The systematic application of conflict sensitivity and ‘do no harm’ approaches in securitised sectors is necessary.

**Article 4**

For Article 4, the evaluators found evidence to suggest that EU principles and values are well-integrated in programmes. The linkages that are being created through programmes between the EU and the UN system and regional organisations (OECD, OSCE, League of Arab States) enables the promotion of EU cross-cutting priorities. Article 4 programmes also reflect Council Conclusions on the EU’s comprehensive approach.

There have been no funding allocations for programmes in securitised sectors under Article 4.

**Article 5**

Past evaluations as well as feedback from regional partners have linked IcSP interventions with European values (particularly a democracy and a rule-of-law based approach). This has helped engage with partner countries, which have highlighted this as an advantage over interventions by other donors.

As with Article 3 actions, there may be risks of non-alignment between CT/CVE, stabilisation and organised crime programmes and cross-cutting priorities such as human rights. It is a risk that increases in CT/CVE and organised crime programmes that directly or indirectly strengthen law enforcement and security agencies in ‘rights-challenged’ third countries. The evaluators recognise, however, that interventions can firmly promote EU cross-cutting priorities, and be implemented in partnership with law enforcement, judicial and in some cases military actors (e.g. response to Ebola outbreak in West Africa; CVE activities associated with progress insecurity sector reforms).

Article 5 funding for programmes addressing terrorism and violent extremism, organised crime, cyber security, security, and stabilisation grew from 64.9% of total allocations in 2014 to 70.94% in 2015. Figures for 2016 were unavailable.\(^\text{39}\)

**JC4.3: The IcSP delivers projects and outcomes that other EU Instruments (including Trust Funds\(^\text{40}\)) or EU Member States cannot deliver.**

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\(^{38}\) Calculations are based on a review of Article 3, 4, and 5 actions that address CT/CVE, organised crime, cyber security, and stabilisation. Actions involving dual use are included under stabilisation, in addition to stabilisation specific actions. Administrative expenses and conferences are not included.

\(^{39}\) Idem

\(^{40}\) Taking into account that experience with Trust Funds is still relatively recent and information on advantages and impact may still be limited.
The evaluators find several comparative advantages in Article 3 actions in relation to other EU EFIs. Respondents to the CIR Survey indicate: (i) the speed and flexibility that allows the EU to intervene in a timely manner and bridge funding gaps (72%); (ii) political influence/leverage (64%); and (iii) a thematic specificity that allows the IcSP to fund activities other EFIs sometimes cannot fund (48%). Responses to the CIR Survey and KIIs indicate other significant comparative advantages of Article 3, which include: (a) access to local actors and mobilisation of civil society capacities, allowing the IcSP to implement actions in conflict areas and countries under sanctions where other EU EFIs are absent; and (b) a peace-building lens and conflict-sensitive approaches to security, humanitarian and development activities. However, the evaluators note that valuable peace and security programming is also seen in DCI, ENI, IPA II, and EIDHR, as well as in the EDF and EU Trust Funds. This is discussed below in Section 4.6.

In responses to the CIR Survey, Article 4 rates higher than Article 3 and 5 in terms of political influence/leverage (86%). Speed and flexibility rate lower than for Article 3, but still high (67%) taking into account the programmable nature of the Instrument, while thematic specificity rates higher (57%) in terms of value added than Article 3.

It is too early to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of Article 4 programmes vis-à-vis several new EUTFs. There is some evidence to suggest synergies between Article 4 work on PCNA/PDNA and the Central African Republic Trust Fund. The evaluators have found potential synergies, particularly in the areas of peace-building and crisis preparedness between the IcSP and EUTFs on migration, where large EUTF budgets are needed to address issues that span the humanitarian-development-security nexus. Here Article 4 programmes, with their emphasis on soft skills and relatively small funding allocations, can address gap issues that Trust Funds cannot. These may be small-scale early and timely interventions aimed at specific target groups such as mediations through ERMES to prevent conflict from escalating.

Thematic expertise and political influence/leverage (71% and 57%, respectively) are identified as the most significant comparative advantages of Article 5 by EUDs in the CIR Survey.

A recurring theme noted by the evaluators is the niche role of Article 5 programmes in non-DAC interventions covering CT/CVE and OC, as well as certain programmes in CBRN risk mitigation (e.g. P2P programme on dual use export controls, border controls, redirection of scientists, capacity for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, support to ISTC and STCU International Science Centres). In other areas (such as critical infrastructure or CT in Sahel), the IcSP has had an initial advantage by moving into geographical zones where other donors were absent.

4.6. EQ5 – Coherence, Consistency, Complementarity and Synergies

4.6.1. Summary assessment

Under the coherence, consistency, complementarity, and synergies heading, the MTE Terms of Reference requires an assessment of the extent to which the IcSP facilitates consistency, complementarity and synergies both internally between its own set of objectives and programmes, and vis-à-vis other EFIs. Information sought is on: (i) internal coherence within the IcSP actions and programmes; (ii) how the IcSP
assists affected populations differently from humanitarian assistance; (iii) consistency with EU external action policies; (iv) complementarity with other EU EFIs and bilateral cooperation of EU Member States and other donors; (v) the ability of the IcSP to enable the EU to respond faster than other EFIs; (vi) complementarity and consistency with CFSP actions; and (vii) alignment of long-term components with other actors.

The evaluators find:\footnote{Findings on complementarity with other donors, IcSP speed, and alignment of long-term components are covered under other evaluation questions above, and the evaluation question on leverage below.}

- Within the IcSP, there is variation in how joined-up actions and programmes are under Article 3, 4, and 5. Although actions and programmes under each article are aligned to meet the objectives of the instrument itself, they also have been used in furtherance of certain objectives of other instruments: there are some cases where the instrument has been used to ‘gap fill’, as a forerunner for interventions by other (larger) instruments, and as a funding instrument of last resort.

- The IcSP tackles the political context and/or socio-economic impacts of crisis situations, promotes stabilisation and prevents conflict; its complementarity to EU humanitarian aid is in rapid political action that may enable crisis abatement, address challenges to the delivery of relief, or prepare the transition from humanitarian to development assistance.

- Synergy between IcSP actions and other EFIs is an important prerequisite for effectiveness, impact and sustainability (in particular in Article 3 actions). More than three quarters of Article 3 decisions make explicit reference to other EFIs, although the follow-through of intent to foster synergies is variable during implementation.

- Beyond EFIs, there is evidence of functional interfaces between the IcSP and CSDP missions, as well as with ECHO.

- Among the EU’s EFIs there appears to be significant and growing programming on peace and security, which partly results from efforts to mainstream conflict prevention. Peace and security programming is seen in the DCI, ENI, IPA II, EIDHR, as well as in the EDF and EU Trust Funds. No evidence was found to suggest significant overlap or duplication between IcSP actions and peace and security programming of other EFIs, the EDF and EUTFs.

- The IcSP is currently among the largest funds globally dedicated to peace and stability. Systematic coordination between the IcSP and other (EU and non-EU) peace and security funding instruments appears limited.

4.6.2. Judgement Criteria

JC5.1: IcSP decisions, programmes or interventions are internally coherent and consistent with the objectives of the Instrument

Article 3

The evaluators find Article 3 decisions to be consistent with IcSP objectives. There is a degree of consensus among respondents that other EFIs should play a greater programming role in protracted crises (e.g. Iraq), which would enable Article 3 to dedicate greater resources to actions that require speed, the opening of spaces for engagement, and launching initiatives in countries and areas where other EFIs are absent. Within Article 3, the evaluators find internal coherence and examples of actions that build on and aim to consolidate effects or expand previous (IfS) actions (such as FD 37573; FD 37613; FD 386551).
Article 3 coherence is supported by the decision-making process for its actions (see Annex for an illustration of current decision-making processes). The evaluators find that Article 3 decision-making processes involve adequate consultation and coordination mechanisms for synergies within the IcSP at HQ level. At EUD level, coordination is more variable, with some EUDs reporting limited coordination across Article 3, 4, and 5 – and others effective coordination. The restructuring into regional IcSP hubs is likely to enable greater coherence in coordination at a regional level.

Article 4

The evaluators find Article 4 decisions to be consistent with IcSP objectives. A comparison of the current AAPs 2014-2016 under Article 4 with AAPs from the IfS 2007-2013 shows evidence that programmes build on previous IfS interventions. Some of the programmes are in their second or third phases: ENTRI trains (largely European) staff in preparation for their deployment as part of EU or other international civilian stabilisation missions and builds technical expertise; CSDN and support for EPLO enables the EU to have a continuous dialogue with peacebuilding INGOs and NGOs at the European policy level; ERMES, an initiative started under the IfS, trains and deploys European mediators and complements on-going support for the UN Mediation Support Unit (MSU). There are clear links in programmes with UN agencies, AU, OSCE and OECD.

Article 4 coherence is supported by the decision-making process for its programmes (see Annex for an illustration of current decision-making processes).

Building technical capacity is at the core of Article 4 and covers topics such as mediation, early warning and conflict sensitivity that are complementary to crisis response interventions. The evaluators note the need to bolster systematic links between work on these issues and Article 3 actions. In relation to Article 5, the evaluators found some evidence of links, such as in the 2016 AAP support to the League of Arab States (LAS) and connections with the Centres of Excellence.

Article 5

Article 5 decisions have been found to be internally coherent and consistent with IcSP objectives. They are often long-term phased / sequenced programmes (CT, OC, CI), or in some cases strategic long-term investments (CoE, dual export controls, Science Centres). Ad hoc interventions, such as the Ebola response (mobile laboratories, waste management, controls at border crossing points) or the support for the removal of Syria’s chemical weapons in 2013 and 2014, were found to exploit past partnerships and reached back into capabilities developed under previous interventions.

In relation to Article 5 programmes and Article 3 actions, a joined-up approach (with the exception of CT/CVE actions) means connecting trans-regional initiatives (Article 5) with often country-specific (Article 3) actions. This is challenging, but an example was the financial support to the OPCW for the removal of chemical weapons from Syria (financed under Article 5 but an action that responded to a worsening crisis, similar to actions that typically come under Article 3). The evaluators note that this complementarity can be further optimised.

The evaluators find that Article 5 decision-making processes support internal coherence (see Annex for an illustration of current decision-making processes). They involve Thematic Multi-Annual Papers that develop broader thematic concepts and programme directions aligned with long-term objectives of the IcSP, interservice consultations with regard to AAPs, and annual work plans (CT/OC/CI/CC) as well as projects/tenders (ISTC, STCU, P2P, CoE) that build on these long-term objectives.

JC5.2: The IcSP promotes complementarity and synergy between IcSP programmes and the interventions of other EU EFIs (including EDF and Trust Funds).
Article 3

A review of Article 3 actions shows evidence of complementarity with other EFIs in 84% of the cases; with 16% of the sample showing intent but not identifying other EFIs. The main EFIs linked to Article 3 actions are EIDHR, DCI, ENI, IPA II, as well as the EDF and EUTFs. There are also identified synergies with the Internal Security Fund, ECHO, and CSDP missions.

The evaluators note that there appears to be significant and growing programming on peace and security in the EIDHR, DCI, ENI, IPA II, and the EDF and EUTFs. This is seen as a beneficial outcome of efforts to mainstream conflict prevention across EU EFIs, EDF and EUTFs and should be encouraged, along with approaches across instruments (i.e. through the application of 'do no harm' and conflict sensitivity principles) that help ensure gains achieved are not undone. The evaluators have not been able to find data available to quantify the monetary value of this programming or trends, although the Africa Peace Facility (funded by the EDF) has contracted in excess of EUR1.45 billion in the period 2003-2014, and EUR750 million for 2014-2016.42 There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that a better interface needs to be established between Article 3 and EU Trust Funds, as the latter begin in earnest to fund peace and security initiatives.

A more detailed assessment of programming from other EFIs on peace and security is necessary to draw implications for the IcSP. However, if such programming is growing, then more developed coordination mechanisms will be needed among EFIs, the EDF and EUTFs on this topic.

Article 4

There is evidence in the AAPs 2014-2016 that complementarity and synergies with other EFIs were anticipated and built into programme design. For example:

- AAPs link the Article 4 Call for Proposals in selected countries to projects financed by DCI’s ‘Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities’ programme.
- The IcSP End of Year report for “Ensuring access to justice for witness/victims through strengthening existing and establishing new witness support for networks across BiH”43, notes that this project links to IPA I and II funded in-country (on-going interventions) in the justice sector (e.g. budget support to Prosecutor’s Office and Courts dealing with War Crimes, rehabilitation and reconstruction of Courts and Prosecutor premises).
- The IcSP End of Year report for “The Global Crisis Response Programme”44 notes that the programme “complements the EU Strategy on Citizen Security in Central America and the Caribbean that foresees support to regional networks to put in place a more effective crisis response and early warning capability. It also aims to strengthen the inter-connectivity and cooperation of international and regional crisis centres with the EU Situation Room…. these synergies were a fundamental part of the project from the design phase, and are part of a larger effort which includes similar activities with ASEAN and the League of Arab States”.

Article 5

The evaluators find that Article 5 interventions in the area of nuclear security are complementary to activities in nuclear safety under the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC). There is significant overlap in the objectives pursued under the two instruments in a number of technical areas (CBRN Centres of Excellence covering both natural and man-made risks related to RN materials) and in some cases

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42 See http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/continental-cooperation/african-peace-facility_en
43 Contract 2014/355-056
44 Contract 359467
overlapping geographical coverage (e.g. Uranium mining and related transport in Central Africa with CoE project 60 and INSC activities in the same region / mining areas related to safeguards and nuclear safety). The evaluators also note that Article 5 and INSC interventions are managed by the same unit (DEVCO B5). As such from a technical and managerial perspective, suggestions by respondents to integrate INSC into Article 5 should be explored.

The evaluators see additional thematic complementarity between Article 5 activities on CT/OC/CS activities and ENI programmes on human rights and security sector reform. An example from field visits includes potential synergies between Article 5 activities on export controls and CBRN risk mitigation, and ENI activities related to integration into the EU internal market. In relation to EIDHR, there is potential synergy on Article 5 CT and OC activities, and the application of a human rights lens.

The evaluators note recommendations by DEVCO respondents to draw on other funding modalities, such as EU Trust Funds, to follow on IcSP interventions. An Article 5 example is work on protection of critical infrastructure (maritime routes) where the IcSP can set in motion certain activities but the follow up and expansion of such measures goes beyond the capacity of the IcSP. Other examples where this synergy is being developed in the area of counter-terrorism and fighting organised crime include WAPIS in West Africa, Ameripol in Latin America and STRIVE in the Horn of Africa. These examples underscore the utility of adopting a more systematic approach towards promoting complementarity and creating better interfaces between the IcSP and other EUTFs.

Cross-cutting

Across IcSP Articles, 55% of the EUDs using the IcSP noted it is used in conjunction with other EU external action Instruments (CIR Survey)\(^4^5\).

JC5.3: The IcSP promotes complementarity and synergy between IcSP programmes and interventions and EU foreign and security policy (CFSP) activities.

Article 3

The evaluators find that a third of Article 3 actions reviewed are linked to or part of broader EU multi-actor response frameworks, ranging from coordinated actions with EU Member States, alignment with EUCAP or EUTM, or part of EU-Pakistan Counter-Terrorism Dialogue. For the remaining 66% of actions, EU frameworks were not relevant.

Evidence of coordination between Article 3 actions and CSDP missions is found in some countries (e.g. Somalia), but the depth of coordination varies. Respondents indicate that coordination between the IcSP and CSDP missions in particular has been frustrated by the IcSP’s previous inability to fund ‘soft’ support initiatives to military forces. This may now change with the CBSD amendment to the IcSP Regulation\(^4^6\).

Article 4

Evidence from interviews and documentation suggests that Article 4 interventions enable synergy between the IcSP and EU CFSP activities. This takes a number of forms, such as through the ENTRI programme, where pre-deployment training is provided for staff of CDS missions or staff being deployed to UN, OSCE or

\(^4^5\) The way the CIR Survey question is formulated does not allow for clarity of the results. It asks respondents to “indicate which of the instruments used in your Delegation complement or duplicate actions of other EU external action instruments”, but the response does not distinguish between ‘complementarity’ or ‘duplication’.

AU civilian stabilisation missions. Another example is the support provided to police training under EUPST II, which trains police and gendarmerie staff for potential deployment as part of CSDP or other civilian stabilisation missions. Thematically, Article 4 funding of women, peace and security, PCNA/PCDA, natural resources and conflict, as well as support to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme in the AAPs 2014-2016 promote complementarity with EU foreign policy activities.

Article 5

The evaluators find that Article 5 CT/OC activities, as well as those related to cyber crime, critical infrastructure and the security aspects of climate change, are developed and implemented within the wider CFSP framework and with support of relevant Member States. The same can be said about activities in the areas of export controls and CBRN risk mitigation. With regard to CBRN risk migration, the CBRN CoE initiative is increasingly a platform for coordination and synergy, and now used to a greater extent by other EU actors.

Article 5 programmes involve a range of mechanisms to promote complementarity with other donor programmes (EU and external) in pursuance of EU CFSP objectives. A review of strategic and programming documents under Article 5 IcSP has not revealed any inconsistencies with CFSP activities.

JC5.4: The IcSP promotes complementarity and synergy between IcSP programmes and interventions and other actors/donors (including Member States).

Article 3

A review of Article 3 actions shows integration into regional (e.g. Somali Compact, IGAD, etc.) or international (UN Country Team strategies, International Contact Group, Recovery and Peace-building Assessment, etc.) strategies of 63% of actions. For 10% of actions, such integration was not relevant; and for 27% there was no integration. The evaluators find some consensus among respondents that such integration into broader response frameworks enhances the effectiveness, impact, and sustainability potential of these actions.

Article 3 actions in focus sectors for the MTE47, that are most often coordinated with Member States and other non-EU partners, are in CT/CVE (Tunisia, Lebanon, Somalia, and Pakistan) and migration (Niger, Turkey and Jordan). CT/CVE actions are also ones where there may be coordination difficulties due to limited information exchange. There is inadequate evidence on synergies with Member States and other non-EU partners when it comes to DDR and transitional justice.

Article 4

The evaluators find that Article 4 programmes involve consultations with Member States. A number of Article 4 programmes draw in other donors (such as USAID in the Kimberley Process certification scheme; the World Bank/EU and UN in PDNA and PCNA; OSCE and the AU in the ENTRI III programme). The evaluators do not have a robust enough evidence base to draw conclusions with regard to the annual sub-delegated CfP for civil society actors in conflict prevention and peace-building under Article 4, but note that in two countries (Colombia and Somalia) there was no evidence of misalignment between funded actions and other EU and Member States activities.

Article 5

The evaluators find close ties between Article 5 programmes on CT, OC, and export controls, with activities of Member States that implement bilateral programmes in these sectors. There also is close coordination with

47 CT/CVE, DDR, migration, and transitional justice
the US in many thematic areas at both strategic and working levels. Examples include the coordination through the export control and border monitoring working groups, which link back to the respective US outreach programmes in these fields (USEXBS and other initiatives) as well as through the G7 / Global Partnership mechanisms in such areas as chemical and biological safety and security.

With regard to UN and international organisations, and in the fields of CT and OC, the evaluators find coordination with (and in certain cases implementation by) organisations such as UNODC or Interpol. In the CBRN risk mitigation field, the CoE provides a by-now well-accepted and effective platform that involves a number of international organisations as partners at the programming as well as implementing ends, such as IAEA, WHO, OPCW, Interpol, and BWC-ISU.

The evaluators found no direct evidence of inconsistencies between Article 5 programmes and those of Member States and other international organisations, but note that there remains space for closer coordination.

Cross-cutting

Across Articles, 70% of the EUDs that use the IcSP noted it is applied in conjunction with actions of other actors/donors (CIR Survey).

4.7. EQ - Leverage

4.7.1. Summary assessment

Under the leverage heading, the MTE Terms of Reference requires an assessment of the extent to which the IcSP has leveraged further funds and/or political or policy engagement.

The evaluators find:

- It is difficult to isolate the contribution of actions/actors to leverage political dialogue or change in general, and even more so of an Instrument with limited financial capacity. Leverage is more likely to be the result of a combination of factors, actors and circumstances.

- Nonetheless, the IcSP has contributed to EU policy and political dialogue with beneficiary governments in several countries. Such policy and political dialogue in turn supports a range of outcomes in IcSP actions and programmes. However, the use of the IcSP to contribute to policy and political dialogue with beneficiary governments is not consistent and depends on the timeliness and relevance of actions, as well as EU political will to engage in such dialogue.

- An important area of leverage is in catalysing additional donor funding for IcSP actions. There is some indication that IcSP funding has been complemented with parallel financing by other donors, but less so when it comes to co-financing and joint programming. Examples exist in several countries where donors have built upon previous IcSP (and past IfS) actions.

- As among the largest financing instruments globally for peace and security, the IcSP appears not to have fully leveraged its position to engage in strategic dialogue with other global players on how to coherently address systemic challenges.

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48 As for the question regarding complementarity with other EFIs, the CIR Survey question does not distinguish between ‘complementarity’ or ‘duplication’.
4.7.2. Judgement Criteria

JC6.1: The IcSP has enabled the EU to make strategic use of policy and political dialogue to leverage change

Article 3

IcSP leverage or political influence is considered important by 16 EUDs (out of 25 using Article 3) (64%) in the CIR Survey as one of the main comparative advantages of the Instrument.

The evaluators note from the CIR survey that there are a number of pre-requisites for the IcSP to generate opportunity for strategic engagement. These include rapid funding, flexibility, advocacy, engagement in actions by senior EUD staff, consultation and coordination with development partners, timeliness of actions, technical expertise at EUD-level, size of action, coordination with other EFIs, and alignment with beneficiary country needs.

There are several examples of Article 3 use for strategic positioning and engagement, which have been evidenced by respondents in Somalia, Niger, Colombia, and Turkey.

The evaluators find evidence that Article 3 interventions in Jordan and Somalia have been effectively used to deepen EU policy and political dialogue with partner countries. Respondents in these countries see this kind of dialogue as both a useful consequence of IcSP actions, but also necessary for the successful implementation of these actions as engagement with beneficiary governments can help move agendas forward and address implementation challenges.

Article 4

IcSP leverage or political influence is mentioned by 18 EUDs (out of 21 using Article 4) (86%) in the CIR Survey as one of the main comparative advantages of the Instrument.

The evaluators note that Article 4 programmes generate a variety of leverage opportunities for the EU:

- Programmes such as support for the Kimberley Process and OECD due diligence initiative on conflict minerals strengthen EU influence on these topics. 49

- ERMES allows the EU to deploy and train its own mediators and resources the UN Mediation Support Unit, which in turn offers insight and leverage of dialogue/mediation processes.

- Support to the League of Arab States (LAS) crisis response capability enables dialogue on crisis issues and management with the League.

The evaluators also note that Article 4 programmes contribute to greater EU influence with a variety of international organisations such as the UN, World Bank, OSCE, and OECD, as well as regional bodies (AU, League of Arab States).

Article 5

IcSP leverage or political influence is mentioned by four EUDs (out of seven using Article 5) (57%) in the CIR Survey as one of the main comparative advantages of the Instrument.

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49 For example, the action has a global scope but has a particular focus on the African Great Lakes region and this complements other Article 4 interventions such as the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. Both interventions are aimed at ensuring the implementation of efficient domestic controls on the production of, and trade in, natural resources to prevent conflict minerals from being a source that fuels conflicts in areas such as the Great Lakes region, Colombia and consequent links to India/China.
As with Article 4, Article 5 interventions open opportunities for a broader political exchange and the discussion of policy objectives on key topics with institutional partners and beneficiary governments. Examples include:

- The setting up of National CBRN Teams by the partner countries (inter-ministerial arrangements involving actors that often had little contact in the past). EU support is seen by many interviewees as essential (CoE governance team, workshops promoting the concept; collaboration with UNICRI; guidance documents) and has promoted political and policy dialogue between the EU and partner countries.

- The work on cybercrime and the creation of multi-agency national project teams has enabled the EU to promote key policy priorities, such as the ratification of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime (ratified by two countries as a result of the GLACY project engagement and support).

- In the CT area, actions support and feedback to the operationalisation of CT dialogues, and the heroin route programme that interfaced with regional players in ECO, which amongst others opened up additional avenues for interaction with Iran.

**Cross-cutting**

The evaluators note the following lessons learnt:

- The IcSP contributions to leverage in 'strong' states (e.g. Nigeria) and middle-income countries that are not dependent on external aid (e.g. Turkey) depend on entry points chosen and the political outcomes sought. Examples include resourcing the Turkish coast guard to signal EU support on migration challenges faced, on expanding options/developing new approaches to address issues (e.g. CVE) through the development of national strategies.

- Where the Instrument is used mainly for the purpose of bridging long-term EFIs that have greater financial capacity but are slower in deploying resources, the effectiveness and role of the Instrument is acknowledged, but its 'political footprint' is naturally on what comes next.

- Where the Instrument is used to respond primarily to EU political interests and deliver rapidly on political commitments (such as in Turkey and Niger), its political value depends fundamentally on the extent to which the actions undertaken respond to shared interests of the partner country.50

- IcSP leverage/political influence seems to be greater where the Instrument acts through local actors, who have the legitimate/internal political recognition and take ownership of the conflict prevention and peace building agenda.

- Visibility and leverage are not necessarily a 'win-win' match, especially if the purpose is to enhance ownership by local actors.

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50 In the case of Niger, despite differences in perspective and priorities, there is common ground on issues linked to migration. However, the approach and the priorities set by the EU are not consensual between national actors in Niger. The IcSP, as part of wider EU action on this topic, is clearly contributing to internal debate and EU-Niger dialogue on migration, but more for the tensions arising from the pilot action on migration in Agadez in preparation of the mobilisation of the EU Trust Fund.
JC6.2: The IcSP funds have catalysed additional resources – from government, international organisations, and other donors.

Article 3

The evaluators find that 35% of Article 3 actions included reference to parallel financing of other donors and 2% that were co-financed. For 63% there was no data on parallel or co-financing. There is some evidence of other donors building on IfS actions (Turkey and Niger), but insufficient data has been found to draw any conclusions.

Article 4

Beyond co-implementation (and co-funding) of some Article 4 programmes (such as the PCNA/PDNA initiative or the crisis response capability of the Arab League) by other international organisations, evidence remains limited when it comes to additional resources being leveraged by Article 4 programmes from Member States, with the exception of German engagement in follow-up to the early warning programme. However, End of Year reports indicate that under the annual sub-delegated Calls for Proposals for civil society actors on conflict prevention and peace-building, projects occasionally attract other donor funds.

Article 5

The evaluators find that some programmes under Article 5 depend on in-kind co-funding by other donors (Member States, as well as partner countries). To that extent, they have leveraged additional resources or provided frameworks within which other donors could contribute both financially and in-kind. An example is the CoE system that has leveraged financial commitments by the partner countries hosting Regional Secretariats. The Science Centres (ISTC, STCU) similarly are well-established platforms for coordinated interventions by multiple donors, and have mechanisms to attract external additional funding through partner projects. The Science Centres are co-funded by the EU and other partners (US, Canada, commitments by the host countries) and implement, amongst others, partner projects funded by outside partners. This has become an attractive way of organising scientific collaborations and for commercialisation efforts.
5. Conclusions

5.1. The emerging IcSP Theory of Change and Intervention Logic

The emerging Theory of Change (TOC) underpinning the IcSP and its Intervention Logic (IL), based on MTE findings, is described below. A visual of the TOC and IL is provided in the Annex. The TOC and IL explain the logical path that links IcSP inputs, outputs, outcomes and impact. Assumptions for the Instrument to be able to contribute to the overall goal and specific objectives set by the IcSP Regulation are identified, along with potential risks. Assumptions are listed for IcSP outcomes, outputs, activities and inputs. The requirements and pre-conditions for IcSP deployment, and cross cutting priorities and EU principles that direct IcSP actions and programmes are also listed.

5.1.1. Impact

The overall objective (impact level) of the IcSP is to support EU’s external action prime objectives of preserving peace, preventing conflicts, strengthening international security and assisting populations affected by natural or man-made disasters, as laid out in Article 21 of the TEU and reiterated in the IcSP Regulation. The Instrument is global and works at different levels (community, national, cross-border, regional, international), focuses primarily (but not solely) on fragile, emerging crisis, and conflict or disaster affected contexts (70% of its resources) where needs for action are significant, opportunities exist for EU action, and EU principles, political interests and strategic priorities are clearly defined. It also addresses specific threats or emerging threats to international security. IcSP specificity and relevance derives from its modus operandi, scope and areas of intervention, and its responsiveness to both EU political interests or strategic priorities and partner country needs, mainly with the aim of leveraging dialogue and entry points for EU external action.

As part of the broader EU system and toolbox, the IcSP contributes towards a coherent and comprehensive EU external action. IcSP interventions have to be consistent with and support EU principles, priorities and policies. Screening and discussion in the PSC (Council meetings), alignment to EEAS early warning, and EU inter-service formal and/or informal consultations or joint work with other relevant services are required to ensure consistency, complementary and generate synergies with other EU external actions/instruments. The IcSP bridges and enables consistency across EU humanitarian aid, long-term cooperation policies, diplomatic action, and the CFSP. Coordination with Member States (subsidiarity principle) is addressed through in-country formal and informal coordination at EUD level, and at HQ through the PSC/Member State representations. Decision-making and design of interventions must also take into consideration European Parliament views.

5.1.2. Outcomes

The IcSP supports EU external action by contributing to three main specific objectives and outcomes as laid down in Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the IcSP Regulation51.

SO1: Assistance in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis to prevent conflicts (Article 3).

Outcomes: Through the IcSP, the EU helps preserve, establish or re-establish stability, the conditions essential to the proper implementation of EU external policies and actions, and early recovery in situations of crisis or emerging crisis through effective and timely responses in accordance with Article 21 of the TEU, and seizing windows of opportunity to promote the peaceful resolution of crises and conflicts.

There is evidence of such outcomes. IcSP actions have been largely responsive to context and EU political priorities, made swift contributions to stability and to a comprehensive EU response in situations of crisis and emerging crisis, addressing the security and development nexus, linking and complementing EU support through other instruments and tools (including CSDP missions) that have in some instances leveraged political dialogue with partner country authorities and funding by other donors. Conflict-sensitive approaches have been developed and attention is paid to mainstreaming key cross-cutting principles (e.g. human rights, gender equality), but challenges persist especially in more securitised sectors (e.g. CT-CVE and stabilisation).

SO2: Assistance for conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness (Article 4).

Outcomes: Through the IcSP, the EU contributes to preventing conflicts and enhancing local resilience to crisis and conflict through strengthened EU and partners’ civilian expertise, capacities for peace, and local initiative/grassroots-based solutions to address pre- and post-crisis situations.

Contributions have been made to strengthening EU and partners’ capacities, in particular those of civil society in conflict-prone and post-conflict contexts, to prevent conflict, build peace, enhance crisis preparedness and address post-crisis needs; and to mainstream gender equality. Global governance and regional orders have been supported, but more funding is required for this work and an explicit strategic framework needs to be formulated to guide efforts to bolster the global peace and security architecture.

SO3: Assistance in addressing global and trans-regional threats and emerging threats (Article 5).

Outcomes: Threats to peace, international security and stability addressed; and global peace and security architecture and regional orders reinforced.

Threats to law and order, to security/safety of individuals, to critical infrastructure (e.g. organised crime, counterterrorism/violent extremism; cybersecurity); to public health (e.g. ebola); risks related to CBRN agents and materials; global and trans-regional effects of climate change are addressed through the IcSP. Contributions are made to strengthening global governance and regional orders, and thus the global peace and security architecture. Guidance on how to ‘do no harm’, and mainstream cross-cutting issues (e.g. human rights) in key focus areas has been developed, but challenges persist especially in more securitised sectors (e.g. CT-CVE, organised crime, cyber security, stabilisation).

Assumptions. Achieving such outcomes depends on a variety of factors/conditions at different stages of IcSP actions or programmes, namely:

- Political interest and will to create/seize opportunities for leveraging EU action/support;
- Rapid identification of action, decision-making and effective use of flexible procedures enabling adapted and timely responses to situations of crisis/emerging crisis (Article 3);
- Formal/informal coordination mechanisms/processes with other EU instruments/actors that enable the IcSP to fill gaps or bridge other EU funding in a timely way;
- Conflict-sensitivity and context/thematic analysis inform the design and overall approach of the IcSP;
- Local ownership and responsiveness of actions to context needs/priorities;
- Other EU external action instruments, policies, actors (including Member States) and/or non EU partners build on, continue or expand IcSP interventions where relevant (e.g. EIFs and EUTF programming on peace and security).

**Risks** identified in IcSP efforts to deliver on its outcomes include:

- Political and time pressures may undermine EU principles and/or context relevance and ownership;
- Contextual changes and internal and external challenges (political, security, capacity, financial) may prevent effective implementation and monitoring (e.g. conflict-sensitive/timely adaptation of actions);
- The failure to respond quickly enough or absence of flexibility to adapt actions or seize windows of opportunity for peace (Article 3);
- Duplication/lack of coordination with other EU/non-EU actions/policies that may undermine synergies, potential catalytic effects or sustainability of outcomes.

**Requirements and pre-conditions**

In accordance with the IcSP Regulation, the decision to use the Instrument must meet some requirements and pre-conditions:

- There must be political priority/relevance and consistency with EU relevant policy/strategic frameworks;
- Actions/programmes must be eligible under the legal and thematic scope set by Regulation;
- Actions/programmes must be realistic/feasible and complementary to EU political measures and assistance;
- There must be demonstrated value-added in using the IcSP instead of other instruments (i.e. response cannot be provided by other EIFs or not as quickly as needed);
- Actions/programmes should be coordinated with other EU and non-EU activities and actors.

### 5.1.3. Outputs

Once a decision is made to use the IcSP, the type of assistance that can be funded to achieve the intended objectives is broad and cuts across sectors, as detailed in Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the IcSP Regulation. The key outputs of IcSP interventions can be as varied as the type of activities or processes it supports, i.e. the steps that turn inputs into outputs.

Under article 3, they can range from: trainings held; risk/conflict analysis or participatory assessments conducted; mediation/ or peace processes facilitated; dialogue and reconciliation meetings, social services or livelihood activities organised; legislation drafted; infrastructure built or other peace dividends delivered; equipment provided; etc with the assistance of the IcSP in crisis or emerging crisis contexts. Under art. 4, outputs may include know how transferred; information or best practices shared; trainings or other services provided; risk, threat or needs assessments conducted; dialogue meetings held, etc aimed at supporting peace-building, crisis preparedness and conflict prevention. Under art. 5, outputs can take the form of
provision of mentoring and/or technical assistance to law enforcement and judicial and civil authorities; trainings and technical support delivered for countering terrorism/cybercrime, etc; threat or vulnerability analysis; national/regional structures created (e.g. charged with implementing at national level regional/global initiatives); international meetings for the exchange of best practices; legislation, national plans/systems and capacities for risk mitigation and preparedness developed (e.g. Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear agents and materials; dual use exports control); etc.

Assumptions at outputs level include:

- Outputs are realised as planned, and are timely and relevant to all stakeholders involved;
- Outputs have no negative unintended impacts
- Target groups have the means/capacities to take benefit of the outputs
- Outputs are complementarity or support other actions by EU or non-EU actors.

5.1.4. Activities

IcSP activities include technical and financial assistance under EAMs and IRPs for Article 3; and actions and programmes under Thematic Strategy Papers and Multiannual Indicative Programmes for Articles 4 and 5:

- Article 3 activities can include dialogue/confidence building initiatives; mediation; activities; mentoring or trainings to public entities/civil society for oversight of political/security institutions; voters’ education prior to election processes; provision of non-lethal equipment, infrastructure or trainings (e.g. human rights, international law, etc) to the police or judiciary in the framework of SSR processes or CVE; financial support to transitional justice courts; infrastructure rehabilitation and reconstruction; socio-economic activities for the reintegration of former combatants under DDR processes; demining; livelihood activities or social services to refugees and host populations; or other.

- Article 4 activities can include: early warning, risk or conflict analysis; trainings to EU civilian stabilisation missions; mediation facilitation; financial/technical support to dialogue/civic engagement for peace building processes; etc.

- Article 5 activities may include facilitation of exchange of information and best practices between global and transregional networks on threats and emerging threats (e.g. terrorism, cyber-crime, organised crime; etc.); trainings/accompaniment of national actors for the development of capacities and national plans for risk mitigation and preparedness (e.g. with regard to CBRN agents and materials; dual use exports control, redirection of scientists previously engaged in weapons programmes, preparedness for disaster preparedness and response); studies/analysis of threats or emerging threats, etc.

EU Principles and cross-cutting issues

Throughout the planning or programming and implementation stages, IcSP actions/processes must comply with and promote EU principles, and mainstream crosscutting priorities (democracy and good governance; human rights and humanitarian law; non-discrimination; gender equality and empowerment of women; conflict prevention; and climate change). EU principles underpin all IcSP decisions and increasing attention to

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52 EU principles of democracy, rule of law, universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law (art. 21 of the TEU).
mainstreaming cross-cutting issues are visible at the design and planning/programming level, but there are risks of unintended impacts arising from urgent political priorities and in securitised actions/programmes.

**Assumptions** related to the successful implementation of IcSP activities include:

- Activities and context are closely monitored for timely and relevant adaptation to contextual changes;
- Implementing partners are willing to take risks and use the rapid and flexible procedures allowed by the IcSP;
- Activities are aligned with EU priorities and external action policies/strategies and, when relevant, connected to political/diplomatic action and longer-term support;
- Local stakeholders participate and take ownership of the activities;
- Implementation is in accordance with IcSP and CIR regulations and consistent with EU principles, aid effectiveness principles (e.g. local ownership; partnership; coordination) and cross-cutting issues are effectively mainstreamed where relevant;
- There is shared interest or political will and management incentives to coordinate and seek complementarity/synergies with others (e.g. Member States, UN, international organisations, civil society organisations, donors, other actors).

**5.1.5. Inputs**

Inputs for IcSP actions generally include: time, human and financial resources (70% of which are channelled to crisis response actions as per the main focus and scope of the Instrument); EU internal consultation (e.g. PSC meetings) and coordination processes (including comitology in the case of IRPs); the actual planning (decisions/programmes and actions documents); and stakeholder consultations.

**Assumptions** at inputs level include:

- An IcSP organisational structure and human resources policy in place, which is operational and effective;
- Adequate capacity of IcSP staff and at HQ to manage, monitor implementation and provide guidance to EUDs and IPs as relevant;
- Rapid and flexible procedures for decision-making and contracting allowed by the IcSP Regulation are used effectively (for Article 3 in particular);
- Availability of implementing partners with the necessary contextual knowledge, capacities and expertise;
- Programming/planning is informed by dialogue with civil society (in accordance to Instrument-specific definition), partner countries/regions and Member States;
- Crosscutting issues and a conflict sensitive approach informs the design/programming process.
5.2. Relevance and Added Value

The IcSP (across all Articles) is a key vehicle of the EU’s support for SDG16, and is critical for the implementation of the European Commission’s Proposal for a new European Consensus on Development and the EU’s Global Strategy. It meets the priorities set out in Article 21 of the Treaty of the European Union.

The evaluators conclude that the IcSP is true to its Regulation, and adequately balances EU priorities and beneficiary/partner country needs. Improvements are needed in better contextual and conflict analysis (particularly in relation to hybrid conflicts and threats) of actions and programmes; as well as to ensure consistency in the rapid deployment of Article 3. There is also a need to ensure that actions and programmes on sectors such as CT/CVE and stabilisation (Article 3), and CT/CVE, organised crime, and cyber security (Article 5) are based on conflict sensitivity and ‘do no harm’ approaches in order not to have indirect negative effects on human rights, rule of law, international law, and good governance.

In a context of what the evaluators agree is greater securitisation of peace and development, the IcSP needs to prioritise non-securitised sectors, carefully manage, if not restrict, its investments in securitised sectors that are closely aligned to beneficiary/partner country national security interests. In addition, it should actively promote European values as laid out in the Treaty of the European Union to enhance its relevance and value added.

The IcSP remains complementary to the EU’s other EFIs, the EDF, and EUTFs through its short-term crisis response actions (Article 3), longer-term peace-building (Article 4), and programming related to global, trans-regional and emerging threats (Article 5). It has been instrumental in mainstreaming conflict-sensitivity in other EFIs, and the EDF and EUTFs. KIIIs and field visits indicate that the Instrument is appreciated by Member States and other donors.

The evaluators affirm that value added areas of the IcSP, which also boost its relevance, are its speed, broad scope, flexibility to adapt to evolving contexts, and political influence/leverage. Other comparative advantages include its direct contracting ability, bridging function, the niche it fills, and its capacity to engage with a diverse set of stakeholders.

The evaluators find that the value added and relevance of Articles 4 and 5 remains underutilised, particularly in relation to the need for a stronger global and regional peace and security architecture. Underutilisation is due to limited funding under these articles and the need for a clear strategic framework on the contribution the IcSP can make to the global and regional peace and security architecture.

5.3. Efficiency

Speed and flexibility in terms of scope and action are the defining features of IcSP, which enable the Instrument to deliver on its objectives, and determine the Instrument’s relevance, effectiveness, and impact. These features are particularly important for Article 3 actions.

IcSP efficiency is enhanced by flexible management procedures that allow acceleration of contractual procedures and the direct selection of implementing partners. The evaluators conclude that efficiency opportunities offered in the IcSP Regulation are used adequately, but that there is some room for improvement. However, the absence of a facility (such as the PAMPF) that allows for small actions to be decided without formal decision-making processes is problematic.
The budget execution and the percentage of administrative costs to total budget is considered appropriate across all Articles. In relation to the CIR, the evaluators conclude that there is no evidence to suggest that the CIR has brought efficiency gains to the IcSP.

The evaluators see potential to increase the economy of the Instrument by better exploiting synergies with other EFIs, the EDF and EUTF, and EU interventions. This could be done by integrating some of the functions (for example, those of the IcSP and the INSC), by increasing the degree and quality of joint programming (Articles 4 and 5), including with Member States, and through funding transfers to the IcSP from other EFIs (such as ENI) for peace and stability actions and programmes.

### 5.4. Effectiveness, Impact, and Sustainability

IcSP actions and programmes generally are assessed as effective. Across all Articles, the IcSP has delivered on the commitments set out for the Instrument. The IcSP has yielded a number of outcomes and several impacts are noted at country-level. However, in a context where multiple actors are active, and with a limited number of end of action/programme evaluations available, it is not possible to draw firm conclusions on IcSP impacts and sustainability.

The evaluators find the IcSP responsive to Agenda 2030, the European Commission’s Proposal for a new European Consensus on Development, and the EU’s Global Strategy.

The IcSP has delivered on the commitments set out for the Instrument, although better mainstreaming of cross-cutting EU priorities is required on human rights and gender issues. Furthermore, the evaluators note four areas which if addressed will contribute to greater IcSP effectiveness, impact, and sustainability:

- The IcSP (under Article 4 and 5) contributes to the strengthening of the global peace and security architecture. However, investments in this architecture lack resources and a fully articulated strategic framework.

- The IcSP (under Article 3) promotes an integrated approach to conflicts and crises. Actions that help seize windows of opportunity for peace remain modest. A strategy that is proactive in identifying and seizing such windows of opportunity is likely to enhance Article 3 impacts further.

- Although Article 3 actions do not necessarily always need to be sustainable, there is scope to aim for sustainability by requiring in the design phase the formulation of exit or transition strategies.

- Although sustainability is part of the programming, monitoring and evaluation systems applied to Article 4 and 5 programmes, the efforts that are being made to strengthen sustainability must increase and it remains important to encourage partner countries to embed the outcomes of these interventions in their strategies, governance mechanisms and systems.

### 5.5. Coherence, Consistency, Complementarity and Synergies, and Leverage

The evaluators note significant and growing programming on peace and security by other EU EFIs, such as the DCI, ENI, IPA II, EIDHR, as well as in the EDF and EUTFs. There is no evidence to suggest significant duplication between IcSP and other EFIs. Rather, efforts are seen to join-up IcSP actions/programmes with other EFIs, the EDF and EUTFs in areas of complementarity, or where actions initiated under the IcSP are continued under other funding streams. Greater programming on peace and security in other EFIs, the EDF and EUTFs needs to be encouraged and presents opportunities for the IcSP to dedicate itself more strongly to political interventions, and specific thematic action that other EFIs (and EDF and EUTFs) cannot (as yet) or
are not suited to cover. Functional interfaces are seen between the IcSP and some CSDP missions, as well as with ECHO.

The evaluators conclude that the IcSP has contributed to a broadened and deepened policy and political dialogue with beneficiary countries. In addition, the evaluators find that the IcSP has catalysed additional donor funding for a number of actions.

The IcSP has retained a strong EU focus when it comes to synergies and leverage. As one of the largest international sources of funding for political action on peace and security, the Instrument has not fully leveraged opportunities to engage with other (non-EU) Instruments on pressing global issues and priorities.

5.6. The IcSP: Fit for Purpose?

The evaluation concludes that the IcSP has played an important role in addressing threats to international (and the EU’s) peace and security. It is an Instrument of critical relevance to the EU, which is likely to grow in the years to come. The IcSP is aligned to Agenda 2030 and the European Commission’s Proposal for a new European Consensus on Development; and supports the implementation of the EU’s Global Strategy.

However, the peace and security landscape is fast evolving and characterised by newly emerged threats and trends that challenge increasingly weakened global governance structures and cooperative regional orders. For the Instrument to continue to be fit for purpose there are several strategic and resourcing issues to be considered:

- There is a need to consider how the IcSP can leverage its position to engage in strategic dialogue with other global peace and security funds and initiatives on how to coherently address systemic challenges in the global peace and security architecture.

- An important part of these systemic challenges is the alignment of funding to increasingly securitised agendas, as well as an overall decrease in funding for organisations working on peace and stability. In practice, this translates into weakened delivery vehicles (international and civil society organisations) and peace and security architectures needed to deliver on IcSP objectives.

- Securitisation trends globally are likely to become even more pronounced. IcSP investments in securitised sectors are appropriate at current levels, but it is important for the Instrument to find the right balance between non-securitised and securitised action/programmes in its contributions to EU security priorities and global commitments. This balance needs to include an appreciation of the importance of actions and programmes that place greater attention in development to the causes of insecurity; address security issues as part of broader peace-making and peace-building efforts (e.g. through DDR and SSR efforts); and strengthen civilian oversight and management of security forces.

- The prospect of weakened IcSP delivery vehicles and peace and security architectures, which follows decreased funding for the UN, regional and other international organisations, and European and beneficiary country civil society requires a concerted effort to counter-balance this trend.

- The rise of hybrid conflicts and threats means that conceptual and technical prisms that underpin the design of IcSP actions and programmes need to be revisited. To be fit for purpose, the IcSP requires the development of methods and processes, also among implementing partners that are responsive to “the evolutionary dynamic of modern organised violence, rather than the initial causes”.

6. Recommendations

6.1. Relevance and added value

[FPi and DEVCO B5] Ensure analytical grounding of IcSP actions and programmes Better contextual and conflict analysis (particularly in relation to hybrid conflicts and threats) as well as mapping of related donor and partner countries activities is needed in Article 3, 4, and 5. The IcSP should set minimum standards for such analyses, require contextual and conflict analysis (where relevant and possible) for its actions and programmes, and store these analyses in its central databases. This requires closer cooperation on analysis between FPI, DEVCO, and the EEAS.

[European Commission] Apply conflict sensitivity and a ‘do no harm’ approach to actions and programmes in securitized sectors Within the IcSP, actions and programmes in sectors such as CT/CVE and stabilisation (Article 3), and CT/CVE, organised crime, stabilisation, and cyber security (Article 5) carry risks of negative effects on human rights, rule of law, international law, and good governance. These are risks that may also follow programming in securitised sectors by other EFIs, the EDF and EUTFs. In order to avoid such risks, the European Commission should mainstream a conflict sensitivity and ‘do no harm’ approach in the design of such actions/programmes, and ensure monitoring by implementing partners of action/programme activities with indirect harm potential.

[European Parliament and European civil society] Track securitisation trends in the IcSP Securitisation creates risks in IcSP actions and programmes, as well as more broadly within EU peace and development work. At the same time, it responds to important concerns and enables action to address threats more robustly. In order to ensure that negative knock effects and risks associated to securitisation are minimised, funding within the IcSP (and other EFIs, EDF, and EUTFs, for that matter) allocated for securitised sectors should be tracked and reported on.

6.2. Efficiency

[FPi] Improve, where necessary and possible, speed and flexibility in Article 3 actions Establish a task force within FPI to review Article 3 actions where speed and flexibility has been suboptimal and develop remedial and actionable recommendations within the IcSP Regulation. Options to consider are to:

- Revise and clarify the text of IcSP rules in order to avoid divergent interpretations.
- Simplify rules on taxes/tax exemption and/or less favored nation rule, or negotiate in advance with partner governments an agreement for tax exemption for the duration of the actions. Alternatively, consider taxes as eligible expenses, as tax exemption negotiation and procedures are often time consuming and cause delays in implementation of short-term actions.
- Make some financing decisions more flexible and defined more broadly; consider larger packages with sets of actions within a decision budget ceiling.
- Devolve some IcSP decision-making powers to EUDs (for example, increase the financial threshold when changes to contracts are justified to cope with contextual changes; define types of changes to contracts that do not require HQ signature).

[FPi and DEVCO B5] Discourage over-ambitious metrics in IcSP actions and programmes IcSP personnel and implementing partners should be discouraged from designing actions and programmes with

54 Similar issues also apply to some Article 4 and 5 programmes and solutions found by the EUTFs may be usefully considered.
over-ambitious metrics that carry unrealistic expectations and promises. Guidance may need to be developed for implementing partners to ensure metrics are well informed of context and conditions, and to make actions/programmes efficient and effective within a realistic framework.

[FPI] Create a facility under the IcSP to fund small actions without a formal decision-making procedure FPI should explore the re-establishment of a PAMPF-like facility, aligned to the IcSP Regulation that enables it to fund small actions without requiring time-consuming and formal decision-making processes.

6.3. Effectiveness, Impact, and Sustainability

[FPI] Identify opportunities for greater investment under Article 3 to seize windows of opportunity for peace FPI should develop guidance to IcSP focal points and implementing partners that explains the value added seen by the IcSP in identifying and seizing windows of opportunity for peace in countries affected by protracted conflict. Encourage and increase funding for actions in this area.

[FPI and DEVCO B5] Enhance mainstreaming of human rights and gender While mainstreaming in the IcSP of cross-cutting EU priorities is strong on good governance and appropriate on climate relevance, it needs to be bolstered on human rights and gender. FPI and DEVCO B5 staff need to work closer with IcSP focal points and implementing partners to improve human rights and gender mainstreaming in actions and programmes.

[FPI] Require transition or exit strategies for Article 3 actions Integrate into the design and decision templates for Article 3 actions a transition/exit strategy component.

[FPI and DEVCO B5] Require explicit Theories of Change in IcSP actions/programmes FPI and DEVCO B5 should integrate into the design and decision templates for IcSP actions and programmes (across all Articles) a theory of change component; align ToCs to M&E systems.

6.4. Coherence, Consistency, Complementarity/ Synergies, and Leverage

[FPI and DEVCO B5] In light of increased programming on peace and security in DCI, ENI, IPA II, EIDHR, as well as in the EDF and EUTFs, FPI and DEVCO B5 should regularly liaise with DCI, ENI, IPA II, EIDHR, as well as EDF and EU Trust Funds personnel to develop effective interfaces between complementary activities, more clearly define the specific contribution of IcSP actions, and improve joint programming.

[European Commission, EEAS, European Parliament, and European Council] Consider a stronger political focus for a future IcSP FPI and DEVCO B5 should assess and monitor levels and trends of peace and security programming in DCI, ENI, IPA II, EIDHR, as well as the EDF and EU Trust Funds in the period 2017-2018. If programming increases over this period, depending on levels, an argument can be made and parameters set for a stronger political focus of a future IcSP.

[FPI and DEVCO B5] Where appropriate, promote policy and political dialogue by EUDs with beneficiary governments on IcSP actions and programmes FPI and DEVCO B5 should actively liaise with EUDs in countries where actions and programmes are implemented and encourage (where feasible and valuable) greater related policy and political dialogue with beneficiary countries.

[FPI and DEVCO B5] Identify mechanisms to better exploit synergies between the IcSP and other EFIs/EU interventions FPI and DEVCO B5 should explore and identify ways of integrating functions across EFIs (such as between the IcSP and INSC) and increase the degree and quality of joint programming with other EFIs.
Consider absorbing funds from other EU EFIs to bolster IcSP peace and security actions and programmes. Better synergies and results may follow a reallocation of funds to the IcSP from, for example, ENI for actions and programmes in the European neighbourhood. FPI and DEVCO B5 should explore the interest for such reallocations with DG NEAR primarily, but also other EFIs if other EFI MTEs recommend this, and propose how such reallocations can happen.

6.5. A ‘fit for purpose IcSP’

Ensure IcSP continuity post 2020. Given peace and security trends, the value of the IcSP as vehicle of implementing EU priorities, the IcSP should be maintained as an EU EFI.

Bolster strategic dialogue between the IcSP and other (non-EU) global peace and security funds and initiatives. FPI and DEVCO B5 should engage in strategic dialogue with other (non-EU) global peace and security funds and initiatives to ensure synergies in efforts to address systemic challenges in the global peace and security architecture.

Define how the IcSP manages negative knock-on effects of the securitisation of peace and development. The balance of EU security priorities and a principled approach to peace and security through the promotion of European values as laid out in the Treaty of the European Union, needs clearer articulation. The European Commission, EEAS, and European civil society should co-convene a meeting that brings together the United Nations, regional organisations, European and non-European peace-building organisations, EU officials involved in peace and security, Member State representatives, and experts in CT/CVE, organised crime, cybersecurity, climate change related security issues, and stabilisation to define how this balance can best be achieved.

Develop an EU EFI, EDF, and EUTF strategic framework that sets strategic directions and principles for efforts to strengthen the global and regional peace and security architecture and address the global funding deficit for peace and development. Building on the Global Strategy and the Commission’s Proposal for a New European Consensus on Development, the IcSP should fund a research and strategy formulation process that yields an evidenced strategy to guide efforts by EU EFIs, EDF, and EUTFs to strengthen the global and regional peace and security architecture, and financing of key United Nations agencies, international and regional organisations, and civil society organisations working on peace and development. Based on the emerging strategy, IcSP funds under Articles 4 and 5 should be increased through additional funding and not reallocation of existing funds. A specific core funding facility should be established to bolster support to the peace and security entities of international organisations (United Nations departments/agencies, other international organisations and regional organisations), and European and beneficiary country peace-building civil society organisations.

Provide guidance for EU personnel and implementing partners on hybrid conflicts and threats. The IcSP should commission the development of a manual that provides analytical and design guidance to EU staff and implementing partners on how to address hybrid conflicts and threats. This guidance should be rolled out in training modules and also serve as a resource in the formulation of EU peace and security strategies.