**EN**

**ANNEX VI**

of the Commission Implementing Decision on the financing of the annual action programme to be financed from the general budget of the Union for Article 5 of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace for 2019

**Action Document for CBSD**

**ANNUAL PROGRAMME**

This document constitutes the annual work programme in the sense of Article 110(2) of the Financial Regulation and action programme/measure in the sense of Articles 2 and 3 of Regulation N° 236/2014.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Title/basic act/ CRIS number</th>
<th>Capacity-Building for Security for Development (CBSD) CRIS number: 2019/041-845 financed under the IcSP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Zone benefiting from the action/location</td>
<td>Burkina Faso and Benin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. SDGs</td>
<td>Main SDG: SDG 16 &quot;Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels&quot;. Other significant SDGs: SDG 3 &quot;Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages&quot; and SDG 5 &quot;Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Sector of intervention/ thematic area</td>
<td>CBSD DEV. Assistance: NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Amounts concerned</td>
<td>Total estimated cost: EUR 6 300 000 Total amount of EU budget contribution EUR 6 300 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Aid modality and implementation modality</td>
<td>Project Modality Direct management through: Grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 a) DAC code(s)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Main Delivery Channel</td>
<td>10000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Markers (from CRIS DAC form)</td>
<td>General policy objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participation development/good governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aid to environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender equality and Women’s and Girl’s Empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trade Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reproductive, Maternal, New born and child health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RIO Convention markers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1 Official Development Assistance is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective.
Capacity-Building for Security for Development (CBSD) aims to assist partner countries in exceptional circumstances to prevent and manage crises by themselves in order to contribute to sustainable development. One of the critical actors in these situations is the armed forces, who can enable security and restore infrastructure.

In Burkina Faso, the CBSD action will support the establishment of forward operational bases in threatened regions in order for the armed forces to have stand-by light aircraft as close as possible of the operation area. This work will be complemented by the delivery of the necessary equipment, training and mentoring.

In Benin, the CBSD action will aim to prevent the establishment of armed and terrorist groups in Northern Benin, by supporting the army to control the parks and react if necessary. This action will reinforce capacities of a river unit on the border with Niger, of light aviation in the North and of a land unit dedicated to operations in remote areas, through the delivery of equipment and light infrastructure, and the provision of training and mentoring.

1. CONTEXT ANALYSIS

1.1 Context Description

Burkina Faso

In Burkina Faso, the security situation deteriorated dramatically during 2018, with a significant increase in areas affected by terrorist attacks, an increase in the number of attacks and the number of casualties. Since the summer of 2018, a new front has emerged in the southeast of the country, on the border with Niger, Benin and Togo, which has been added to the Northern Front with Mali and Niger (the Burkina Faso region of the "Sahel"). These attacks remain recurrent, to the extent that the presence of the State and public services (schools in particular) becomes problematic, with a growing number of displaced persons. In total, there were more victims of terrorist attacks in 2018 in Burkina Faso than in the previous two years.

This deterioration of the security situation is, moreover, part of a context in which the State is being rebuilt, with an ongoing reorganization of security and armed forces.

Indeed, the Burkinabe authorities have made significant efforts to reform the security apparatus and try to curb the terrorist threat, such as the adoption of a military programming law and a strategic plan for the 2018-2022 for the reform of the armed forces. The organization of a National Security Forum in October 2017, the creation of a National Intelligence Agency (Agence Nationale de Renseignement ANR), the launching of an Emergency Plan for the Sahel (Plan d’Urgence pour le Sahel PUS) and were all supported by the EU (IcsP project PARSIB and budget support through EUTF). However, a comprehensive reform of the security sector is still expected.

These efforts will only bear fruit in the medium term, the security forces are currently unable to cope with the scale of the threat, which is why the Burkinabe authorities expressed on each occasion the need for support by international partners.

Benin
Although renowned for its stability, Benin is currently facing a real terrorist threat in its northern part, as revealed by a study on the risks and potential factors of radicalization and violent extremism in four departments located in the northern part of Benin (Alibori, Borgou, Atacora and Donga) in 2018, as part of the Program for the Prevention of Violent Extremism in West Africa and in the Lake Chad Basin (PPREVUE-II).

This terrorist threat is linked to both exogenous factors (participation of Benin in the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram, and deterioration of the security situation in South-East Burkina Faso, a border area with Benin), and endogenous factors (risk of radicalization of the local population due to religious, socio-economic, political factors, in a context of state failure that fosters feelings of abandonment, frustration and exclusion among at-risk populations).

In such a context, France decided at the end of December 2018 to recommend its citizens not to enter a 10 kilometres wide strip all along the border with Burkina Faso and Niger (declared as «red zone»), while the W park was already not recommended. Moreover, the US shared the same recommendations to US citizens.

The Beninese government pays particular attention to the two protected natural areas (Pendjari Park and W Park, see Annex I) bordering with Burkina Faso and Niger, which are vital tourist and economic hubs for this region and the country as a whole. The slightest attack in this area would seriously damage the economy and reputation of Benin, as the Head of State has made it a priority to make the country a preferred tourist area, particularly because of the very rich wildlife in these two national parks.

Thus, although this terrorist threat has not yet materialized on Beninese soil, the Beninese authorities have already taken a number of measures such as the drafting of a national strategy to combat radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism and the creation of a National Commission to implement it. At the regional level, the chiefs of staff of Benin, Burkina Faso, Niger and Togo met on several occasions at the end of 2018 to agree on a memorandum of understanding to conduct operations in this border area.

1.2 Policy Framework (Global, EU)

The EU subscribed to the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 on ‘peace and justice’. The UN recognises the link between security and development, and underlines the importance of just, peaceful and inclusive societies. SDG 16 focuses on the need to “strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacities at all levels, in particular in developing countries, for preventing violence and combatting terrorism and crime”.

The European Council Conclusions of 19/20 December 2013 emphasised “the importance of supporting partner countries and regional organisations, through providing training, advice, equipment and resources where appropriate, so that they can increasingly prevent or manage crises by themselves”. On 5 July 2016, the Commission adopted the Joint Communication on the “Elements for an EU wide strategic framework to support security sector reform” (SSR), as well as a legislative proposal to extend the Union’s assistance to security actors, including the military, in partner countries. This initiative is known as "Capacity-building in support of security for development (CBSD)". On 14 November 2016, the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) adopted the Council Conclusions on this Joint Communication.

As a result, an amendment to the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace was adopted in 2017, enabling CBSD. This amendment allows the EU to work with military actors, in exceptional circumstances, when the involvement of the military is needed to achieve development objectives.

The new element of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace constitutes an additional 100 million EUR to support military actors in fragile contexts where there is no civilian actor that can perform the tasks and where there is a major threat to the functioning of state institutions. Each
project must be carefully framed within a wider context of EU support to the security sector. Support should only be provided where there is consensus between the partner country and the EU that the involvement of military actors is essential, in order to achieve development goals.

There are strict criteria set out in the legislation that govern whether or not CBSD activity is permissible. CBSD support to the military can include training, mentoring and advice, supply of non-lethal equipment, and assistance with infrastructure improvements. CBSD funding cannot be used to finance recurrent military expenditure, the purchase of arms, ammunition or lethal equipment, or to support training that is designed to contribute to the fighting capacity of the armed forces.

1.3 Public Policy Analysis of the partner country/region

See 1.4 below.

1.4 Stakeholder analysis

Burkina Faso

- **Government of Burkina Faso**: The government of Burkina is fully aware of the importance of the terrorist threat, as evidenced by the declaration of the state of emergency in 14 of the country's 45 provinces.

- **The Armed Forces of Burkina Faso (FAB)**: The operational capability of FABs is notoriously insufficient to cope with the magnitude of the threat. The fall of the Compaore regime and the resulting reorganization of the armed forces (including the dissolution of the Presidential Security Regiment) are one of the reasons for this operational weakness. Indeed, the military units currently in the front line are those that have been abandoned under the Compaore regime. They are characterized today by a lack of equipment, insufficient individual and collective tactical know-how, and organizational problems of the operational chain (command and control, logistics, human resource management, intelligence, ...). A new Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (CEMA) was appointed in January 2019.

- **Burkina Faso internal security forces**: Like the armed forces, Burkinabe's internal security forces face a great number of difficulties of all kinds that severely limit their operational capacity. They are essentially composed of the National Police and the Gendarmerie, whose willingness to work together can sometimes be questioned. The territorial network of these internal security forces is also very unequal throughout the country. (1 for 758 people, as international standard is 1/400) and there is no presence of security forces in 36% of communes. Burkina Faso has 350 territorial departments. Currently, 85 of them have at least one Police station and one Gendarmerie unit, 109 have one Gendarmerie unit or one Police station, while 156 of them do not have any Internal Security force unit deployed. The security vacuum benefits the criminal and terrorist groups, who have hardly any limitations in their movements. As a response to this lack of presence, private militias "koglweglos" have taken up charge of local police duties with drifts in regards to the respect of human rights. Another problem is the poor coordination of security and defence forces.

- **International Stakeholders**: FABs benefit mainly from the support of three States: France, the United States and Belgium, in the form of individual training, equipment and occasionally operational support. Nevertheless, within the FAB, the Burkinabe battalion of the G5 Sahel Joint Forces enjoys wider support from the international community, including the European Union.

- **Civil Society Organizations and Community Leaders, particularly representing women**: Civil society is particularly active in Burkina Faso and has played a key role in the Transition. During this period, it was involved with the military in the National Transition Council. Their mobilization capacity, especially through youth and women, and the generally favourable
environment in which these organizations operate should enable them to play a role in the
democratic control of the armed forces.

- **Spoiler stakeholders**: In Burkina Faso the jihadist cells have significantly improved their
capabilities against the security forces in 2018 (due to interactions with foreign terror groups).
The situation has consequently deteriorated, with an impressive acceleration in last December
and January 2019. Humanitarian access to people in need (over 85,000 internally displaced as of
end of January) is severely disrupted and the number of schools closed has dramatically risen.
Terrorists are now threatening and/or are already present in parks, where the level of security is
decreasing fast, also encouraging poaching activities (with consequences in Benin, where
wildlife protection as well as tourism could soon be affected).

**Benin**

- **Government of Benin**: The Beninese government has taken stock of the reality of the terrorist
threat in northern Benin and has begun to express its concerns to its partners (including the
European Union) and to take measures to deal with this threat. Having first mobilized the
internal security forces, notably by creating the Special Border Surveillance Units (USSF), the
Beninese government is now conscious of the need to mobilize the armed forces in the most
remote areas, particularly in the W park.

- **The Beninese Armed Forces (FAB)**: The Beninese armed forces can be characterized by major
structural weaknesses that have been accentuated in the last two years because of the
government's desire to prioritize the internal security forces. This translates into units that are
forced to cope with deficiencies in terms of equipment, infrastructure, operating budget and
training. The set-up in the north of the country is made up of 2 Inter-Armed Battalions (BIA):
the 6th at Nattitingou (North-West), including 130 men at Tanguieta, and the 7th at Kandi
(North-East) including about 60 men. The FAB also have a river unit on the border with Niger,
which carries out border surveillance and protection missions in place of the Republican police.
Finally, the FAB had an ultralight plane that had been operated from Kandi, but this one is out
of order.

- **The Republican Police**: The Republican Police is the result of the merger of the National
Police and the National Gendarmerie. It is deployed throughout Benin with a component
dedicated to border surveillance (the USSF, including 150 men deployed in Malanville).
Republican police is generally better equipped than the FAB (especially with respect to land
mobility), while having only light weapons, insufficient to deal with armed groups such as those
currently operating in Burkina Faso.

- **African Parks Network (APN)**: APN is a very important security provider in the North of the
country since this organization was entrusted with the management of the Pendjari Park in 2017
and should be entrusted with that of the W in 2019. APN supported the creation of unit of 105
rangers, well equipped, to control the Pendjari Park and deter poachers and other harmful
groups for the park and its fauna (miners for example). It also has two ultralight aircrafts to
monitor the park.

- **ABeGIEF**: Within the state apparatus, the Beninese Agency for Integrated Management of
Border Areas (ABeGIEF) plays a key role as coordinator of actions that are conducted in border
areas.

- **International stakeholders**: The main partners of the Beninese army are the French, American
and Belgian military cooperation, which deploy either permanent advisers within the FAB (FR
in particular) or training missions for limited periods.

- **Civil Society Organizations and Community Leaders, particularly representing women**: Civil society organizations also play an important role in Benin, where they enjoy a relatively
favourable environment. They are, moreover, a key player in the fight against violent extremism in the North of the country.

- **Spoiler stakeholders - armed and terrorist groups**: So far no armed attack has taken place on Beninese soil. Nevertheless, the weakness of the control system in the W park does not allow denying or confirming the incursion of armed terrorist groups currently stationed in South-East Burkina (see previous page).

1.5  **Problem analysis/priority areas for support**

*Burkina Faso*

In Burkina Faso, the authorities are currently facing an expansion of the threat of armed terrorist groups. Operating until the middle of 2018 in the north of the country, these armed groups have since the summer of 2018 greatly expanded their area of action and now lead attacks also in the East, South and West of the country. These armed groups primarily target the symbols of the State such as security forces, schools, courts, local or customary authorities, in order to make the state lose control of its territory.

Sometimes enjoying the complicity of a part of the population, discreet and mobile, these armed groups force the authorities to disperse their forces throughout the territory, in areas sometimes where the internal security forces were not present. These armed groups thus keep the initiative so far and have armaments (light machine guns, rocket launchers) superior in range and capacity to those of the security forces. The use of armed forces to confront terrorist armed groups is therefore required.

Moreover, the inability of the defence and security forces to protect the population encourages the latter to create their own self-defence groups and even fuels ethnic tensions, particularly between Mossi and Fulani, as evidenced by the Yirgou’s events (Sanmatenga Province, North Region) at the beginning of January 2019, which caused almost 200 deaths among Fulani civilians. Faced with a diffuse but well-armed adversary, and having insufficient defence and security forces to control a very important territory, the Burkinabe authorities cannot take the initiative and are not able to ensure the protection of the population. Quality intelligence is crucial to prevent terrorist actions by defence and security forces or to optimally support their intervention after an attack. This allows them to avoid dispersing the defence and security forces, and to concentrate efforts where necessary.

One of the key components of this intelligence network is the unarmed aerial reconnaissance capability, which can detect suspicious movements, identify weapons carriers, detect IED poses, and guide the intervention of security and defence forces. This air reconnaissance capability also has a large number of civilian capabilities such as counting wild animals, support for first responders in the event of natural disasters, or inspection of structures (dams), for example.

That is why, with the support of French cooperation, the authorities of Burkina have decided to equip their air force with this air observation capability. It includes an unit of ultra-light motorized aircrafts (ULM) based in Ouagadougou and Bobo Dioulasso (see Annex I). Only the air force has such a capacity, which it can put at the disposal of security forces at their request. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of this unit is currently limited because of the small number of available devices (5 in December 2018, including one close to its end-of-life), and, more importantly because of the lack of available bases. Thus, because of the size of the territories, each aircraft taking off from Ouagadougou takes an average of two hours of flight to reach its area of operation. Thus, on a mission of 7 hours potential flight, only 3 hours are actually spent flying over the area of operation.

It is therefore important to reinforce this air observation capacity by allowing the ULM to position themselves closer to the areas of operations in order to reinforce the number of hours of flight above the zones of action of the terrorist armed groups.
Benin

Benin is often cited as an example in Africa for its stability and democratic life. Victim of organized crime, Benin has so far not been confronted with terrorist actions, and this threat was, until 2017, not considered serious by the national authorities. However, two factors have led the Beninese authorities to take the terrorist threat seriously and adapt the security apparatus. The first is Benin's participation in the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram, and its neighbourhood with Nigeria. The second factor is the extension of the area of activity of the Sahelian armed terrorist groups in south-eastern Burkina Faso, which are now evolving near the border with Benin, as illustrated by the attack and the destruction of the camp of Arly National Park (see Annex I) on December 8, 2018.

To this deterioration of the security context in the Sahel and to the porosity of the borders with its neighbours are added internal factors (religious, socio-economic or political) which make the North of Benin particularly vulnerable to the outbreak of radicalization phenomena as revealed by the study on the risks and potential factors of radicalization and violent extremism in four departments of the northern Benin².

This terrorist threat is all the more taken seriously by the Beninese authorities, as the parks of the Pendjari and W, bordering Burkina Faso and Niger, are conducive to the discreet installation of armed groups (large plant cover and very limited means of communication), which can then be used as a rear base to conduct terrorist actions, as is happening in neighbouring Burkina Faso. The very small presence of the sovereign defence and security forces in this area forced the government to rely on a private organization, such as African Parks Network, in charge of the management of the Pendjari since 2017, and the W from mid-2019, to maintain security in this area. Despite the professionalism of this organization, the rangers it has recruited are trained in the fight against poaching, and do not have the necessary weapons to successfully confront armed terrorist groups.

Thus, in order to be able to curb the risk of the installation of armed groups in its national parks, Benin must have armed forces able to effectively monitor the most remote areas and to intervene rapidly with a sufficient level of force. Such a disposal will be all the more effective if it is put in place before the presence of armed terrorist groups becomes too important and out of control.

2. RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risks</th>
<th>Risk level (H/M/L)</th>
<th>Mitigating measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Too high level of insecurity too deliver unforeseen activities</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Increase the operational effectiveness of the armed forces by improving the chain of command from strategic to tactical level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Running costs for sustaining supported armed forces are not allocated by the partner country.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Continue dialogue with partner governments to ensure that they meet their commitments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient national political commitment to deployment of armed forces in remote areas</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Continue dialogue to ensure that plans are fully inclusive and locally owned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reputational risk, including violations of human rights or sexual violence by members of the armed forces.</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Ensure that armed forces have gender and human rights training, and that effective disciplinary procedures for individuals are in place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk of non-intervention.</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Regional insecurity may continue to increase in the absence of external support to the national administration.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

² Study made in four departments Alibori, Borgou, Atacora et Donga in 2018, as part of the Program for the Prevention of Violent Extremism in West Africa and in the Lake Chad Basin (PPREVUE- II)
Assumptions

- Enhanced intelligence collection leads to more efficient interventions from armed and security forces thanks to good cooperation and sharing of information.
- Regional protection from the armed forces facilitates the effective functioning of the civilian administration and accelerates economic development.
- Sufficient revenue in the national budget is allocated to armed forces to cover the costs not covered in these actions.

3. LESSONS LEARNT AND COMPLEMENTARITY

3.1 Lessons learnt

Lack of legislative and budgetary reform, coupled with chronic underfunding and overreliance on aid flows from donors, are challenges to be addressed by complementary and integrated EU action. This has direct implications for the structuring, and effective command, of the security forces.

A security response must be part of a wider response, consisting of stabilisation efforts that promote reconciliation, enhance the legitimacy of the State Authorities, and provide the population with infrastructure and services, such as access to justice, education, health and governance and employment opportunities. Special attention to be dedicated to the respect of human rights par security forces.

All EU action needs to be anchored in continuous political dialogue between the EU and the partner country authorities. This is crucial as it allows buy-in and secures national and/or regional ownership of all interventions. It should build on the prominent role the EU has and should contribute to enabling the timely implementation of plans. There can be no externally imposed solutions to the security sector. Political emphasis has to be placed on increasing local responsibility and ownership. Constant delays in conducting necessary constitutional and legislative reforms pose great challenges for effective implementation of meaningful activities in the field of SSR.

3.2 Complementarity, synergy and donor coordination

Burkina Faso

The envisaged CBSD action is complementary to security support actions financed under the EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) supporting an improvement in border management (‘Programme Gestion intégrée des Espaces frontalières’ - 35 M€), and an increased presence and capacity of internal security forces (‘Appui budgétaire pour la mise en oeuvre du programme d'urgence Sahel du Burkina Faso’- 50M€). A Budget Support is also in preparation (20-30 M€) which will in particular target vulnerable areas in Burkina Faso through indicators at security level. The operational bases for the envisaged CBSD action in North-West and East of Burkina Faso correspond to the intervention zones of the mentioned EUTF projects that will benefit from light aviation services. In addition, two other EUTF decisions target prevention of violent extremism and franco-arabic education in the North and East of Burkina Faso. The EUTF supports Franco-Arab schools and Koranic households to improve educational conditions and girls' school attendance rates by working with the Ministry of National Education and Literacy and the Swedish NGO Diakonia (€9.5M). In addition the EUTF supports Burkinabe civil society to promote religious dialogue and development of the pastoral economy (7 projects for a total amount of 7M) in order to prevent and counter spread of violent extremism.

Under IcSP Art 3, the « Programme d'appui à la réforme du secteur de la sécurité au Burkina Faso » (PARSIB, €5.2M; Sept16-Nov18) aims to strengthen the internal security service capacity to anticipate and counter terrorist threats, including by promoting human rights and democratic values, and contributes to the preparation of the security sector reform process. A second phase (€3M, 12 months) started in Dec 18 to further support internal security service capacity and the SSR process in Burkina Faso. Under the same instrument, the EU is finalising the formulation of a programme in support of Burkinabe defence and security forces operating in the areas where this action will
support the deployment of light aviation.

Under Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), two experts are present within the EU Delegation in Burkina-Faso. They are advisors for the delegation and the local counterparts on internal security and defence matters. They can be reinforced for punctual and targeted advisory or training activities by personnel from EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUCAP Sahel Mali, notably in support of the Burkinabe internal Security Forces. They have been consulted during the initial work on the identification of this project. Moreover, these two security experts will be available to liaise with the Burkinabe authorities or any implementing partner, and to contribute to the monitoring, if requested.

Moreover, this CBSD action will build upon the support already provided by the French military cooperation which has deployed a one long term expert to mentor the already existing Burkinabe light aviation capacity.

**Benin**

Within the NIP, the delegation is currently finalising the preparation of an action for a total of 6 M€ which aims to prevent the rise of radicalization in border areas at risk in Northern Benin, through empowered Civil Society Organisations. Support to armed forces in Northern Benin will perfectly complement this action.

Moreover, French and Belgian military cooperations are currently assessing how to better support the government’s willingness to launch cross border military cooperation through the memorandum of understanding between neighbouring countries of the W Park and the Togo concerning the implementation of a joint operational coordination in the fight against terrorism. This action will create synergies between EU and Member States actions in support of this MOU.

Finally, US AFRICOM supports the USSF, through dedicating training and equipment, including a police river unit in charge of the securitisation of the port and the Benin coast. Nevertheless, the government does not foresee to deploy this police unit on the river along the border with Niger, which will still be under the control of the military.

4. **DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION**

4.1 **Overall objective, specific objective(s), expected outputs and indicative activities**

The **overall objective** of the proposed action is to restore or preserve peace and security in Benin and Burkina Faso in order to contribute to sustainable development.

The **specific objective** of the proposed action is to strengthen the efficiency of Burkinabe and Beninese defence forces, including light aviation and in remote areas.

**Burkina Faso**

**Expected Output:**

An operational system of light aircraft bases with a national coverage is established.

**Activities:**

1. Provide infrastructure support allowing the building or the renovation of forward operational air bases, tentatively in Fada N’Gourma, Ouahigouya and Gaoua (see Annex I), able to accommodate light aviation capacities close to their areas of operation.

2. Provide ultralight aircrafts and basic equipment to operationalize the forward operational air bases.

3. Provide training and mentoring for pilots, mechanics and air bases managers.

**Benin**
Expected Output:
An operational detection and intervention security system is established in Northern Benin.

Activities:
1. Provide light infrastructure support to accommodate Beninese armed forces operating in remote areas in Northern Benin.
2. Provide the necessary equipment to operationalise the land, river and light aircraft components of the Beninese armed forces operating in remote areas in Northern Benin.
3. Provide training and mentoring for the three components.

4.2 Intervention Logic

Burkina Faso

Given the size of the territory to be controlled, the limited number of forces available, and the discretion and mobility of armed terrorist groups, the defence and security forces have lost the initiative and are constantly in response to the attacks of these terrorist groups. In order to regain the initiative, it is necessary that the authorities have an aerial observation capability that facilitates the detection of suspicious activities or groups, as well as the intervention of the defence and security forces. Such a capacity requires sufficient planes and pilots, who can operate closer to the areas of operation in order to preserve the potential of the aircraft on the one hand, and to reduce delays of intervention, on the other hand. Such a capacity will increase the efficiency of the armed and security forces by being more proactive, which is essential to restore peace and security in the country. The main assumptions for these results to be achieved are that the Burkinabe government continues to support the armed forces as necessary and the intelligence collected by light aviation will be largely disseminated through a strong coordination mechanism between defence and security forces.

Benin

While Benin has so far been fortunate to be spared from terrorist attacks, the fact remains that protected natural areas in the north are potential refuges for armed terrorist groups operating in the southeast of Burkina Faso, who may attempt to settle there in order to escape the security pressure of Burkina Faso. It is therefore important that Benin, which is currently deprived of it, has a detection and intervention capacity even in the most remote areas of its territory in order to avoid the installation of armed terrorist groups whose nuisance capacity has no longer to prove. The setting up of such a capacity is all the more urgent as, like the fight against fire, the more rapid the intervention is, the more likely it is to succeed. Such a capacity will increase the efficiency of the Beninese armed forces, particularly in remote areas, which is essential to maintain peace and security all over the country. To achieve that it is nevertheless essential that enough financial and human resources are dedicated by the Beninese government to these forces.

In the long term, more efficient Burkinabe and Beninese defence and security forces will be instrumental to restore security in Burkina Faso and preserve peace in Benin and hence contribute to sustainable development in both countries.

4.3 Mainstreaming

It is essential that the armed forces are trained to act professionally and respect human rights and International Humanitarian Law. Hence, HR and IHL will be part of the curriculum deployed under this action. As a principle, there should also be ethnic diversity in deployed armed forces, although for certain specific regional deployment (such as in Northern Benin), it may be appropriate to rely on soldiers from the region to facilitate acceptation by local population.

On gender, training of armed forces on cultural differences and gender sensitivity in anticipation in their contacts with local populations will help to avoid misconducts in contact of women. One thing
that could help would be to have more women in the security forces engaged during operations in order to ease contact with the female civil population. The project will make sure that the participation of women security forces in field operations will be encouraged by the hierarchy in Burkina Faso and Benin.

Moreover, if the number of women involved in operations increases, there will need to be some form of complementary measure (separate accommodation and facilities for example) in order to ensure that their security needs are identified and catered for appropriately.

4. 4 Contribution to SDGs

This intervention is relevant for the 2030 Agenda. It contributes primarily to the progressive achievement of SDG 16 - the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, the provision of justice to all, and building effective, accountable institutions at all levels, while also contributing to SDG 3 "Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages” and SDG 5 "Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls”

5. IMPLEMENTATION

5.1 Financing agreement

In order to implement this action, it is not foreseen that a financing agreement will be concluded with the partner country.

5.2 Indicative implementation period

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in section 4 will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements implemented, is 64 months from the date of adoption by the Commission of this Financing Decision.

Extensions of the implementation period may be agreed by the Commission’s responsible authorising officer by amending this Decision and the relevant contracts and agreements.

5.3 Implementation modalities

The Commission will ensure that the EU appropriate rules and procedures for providing financing to third parties are respected, including review procedures, where appropriate, and compliance of the action with EU restrictive measures.

5.3.1 Grants: (direct management)

(a) Purpose of the grant(s)

The purpose is to strengthen the efficiency of defence and security forces, including light aviation and in remote areas in Benin and Burkina Faso.

(b) Justification of a direct grant

Under the responsibility of the Commission’s authorising officer, the grant may be awarded without a call for proposals to the Direction de la Coopération Sécurité et Défense (DCSD) of the French ministry of Foreign Affairs..

Under the responsibility of the Commission’s authorising officer, the recourse to an award of a grant without a call for proposals is justified because the action has specific characteristics that require a particular type of body on account of its technical competence, its high degree of

3 www.sanctionsmap.eu Please note that the sanctions map is an IT tool for identifying the sanctions regimes. The source of the sanctions stems from legal acts published in the Official Journal (OJ). In case of discrepancy between the published legal acts and the updates on the website it is the OJ version that prevails.
specialisation or its administrative power, on condition that the actions concerned do not fall within the scope of a call for proposals (Article 195 (f) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046). DCSD is best placed to implement of the proposed action owing to their proven track record, experience and technical expertise in capacity-building in the security sector in exceptional circumstances.

5.4 Indicative budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU contribution (amount in EUR)</th>
<th>Indicative third party contribution, in currency identified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.3.1. Burkina Faso and Benin - Grant (direct management)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Component Burkina Faso</td>
<td>3 800 000</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Component Benin</td>
<td>2 500 000</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants – total envelope under section 5.3.1</td>
<td>6 300 000</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.7. - Evaluation</td>
<td>Covered by another decision</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.8. - Audit</td>
<td>Covered by another decision</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.9. – Communication and visibility</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingencies</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>6 300 000</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

France and Belgium will support this action in kind, notably with human resource made available for the project. This support can indicatively be evaluated up to 1 100 000 EUR for France and 100 000 EUR for Belgium.

5.5 Organisational set-up and responsibilities

DEVCO B5 in close coordination with relevant services in HQ (FPI, DEVCO D1, EEAS), and the Delegations to Benin and Burkina Faso, will be responsible for the contracting and monitoring of implementation of this intervention.

The implementing partner will be responsible for the execution of the programme in close coordination with the Belgian military cooperation and close relationship with Burkinabé and Beninese armed forces authorities. It will also establish a solid coordination mechanism with CSDP missions (where necessary), and any other possible stakeholder intervening in the same field of action.

5.6 Performance and Results monitoring and reporting

The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation of this action will be a continuous process, and part of the implementing partner’s responsibilities. To this aim, the implementing partner shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for the action and elaborate regular progress reports (not less than annual) and final reports. Every report shall provide an accurate account of implementation of the action, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (outputs and direct outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators, using as reference the Logframe matrix.

SDGs indicators and, if applicable, any jointly agreed indicators as for instance per Joint Programming document should be taken into account.

The report shall be laid out in such a way as to allow monitoring of the means envisaged and employed and of the budget details for the action. The final report, narrative and financial, will cover the entire period of the action implementation.

The Commission may undertake additional project monitoring visits both through its own staff and through independent consultants recruited directly by the Commission for independent monitoring reviews (or recruited by the responsible agent contracted by the Commission for implementing
Furthermore, detailed annual work-plans will be presented at the beginning of each year for the approval of the European Commission and of the Project Steering Committee. The approved work-plan will provide for monitoring and review on a continuous basis. The project will incorporate a management system to ensure that tasks are completed in the appropriate sequence and time schedule.

5.7 Evaluation

Having regard to the nature of the action, a final evaluation will be carried out for this action or its components via independent consultants contracted by the Commission. It will be carried out for accountability and learning purposes at various levels (including for policy revision).

The evaluation reports shall be shared with the partner country and other key stakeholders. The implementing partner and the Commission shall analyse the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, in agreement with the partner country, jointly decide on the follow-up actions to be taken and any adjustments necessary, including, if indicated, the reorientation of the project. The financing of the evaluation shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing decision.

5.8 Audit

Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation of this action, the Commission may, on the basis of a risk assessment, contract independent audits or expenditure verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements. The financing of the audit shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing decision.

5.9 Communication and visibility

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU.

This action shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action, to be elaborated at the start of implementation. In terms of legal obligations on communication and visibility, the measures shall be implemented by the Commission, the partner country, contractors, grant beneficiaries and/or entrusted entities. Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in, respectively, the financing agreement, procurement and grant contracts, and delegation agreements. The Communication and Visibility Requirements for European Union External Action (or any succeeding document) shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action and the appropriate contractual obligations.
ANNEX I

1/ LOCATION OF THE CURRENT BURKINABÉ AIR BASES AND OF THOSE THAT COULD BE SUPPORTED THROUGH THE PROJECT

2/ LOCATION OF CROSS-BORDER NATURAL PARKS IN NORTHERN BENIN
## APPENDIX - INDICATIVE LOGFRAME MATRIX (FOR PROJECT MODALITY)

### SUMMARY OF COMMENTS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall objective: Impact</th>
<th>Results chain</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Sources and means of verification</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Overall objective: Impact | Restore or preserve peace and security in Benin and Burkina Faso to contribute to sustainable development | Countries position on the Global Terrorism Index  
Number of violent incidents with armed terrorist groups in Burkina Faso and in Beninese natural protected areas. | Annual report of the Global Terrorism Index.  
Official data from Burkina Faso and Benin (TBC) | |

| Specific objective: | Strengthen the efficiency of Burkinabe and Beninese defence and security forces, including light aviation and in remote areas | Burkina Faso: Average time for light aircrafts to reach their area of operation  
Benin: Number of members of terrorist armed groups decisively prevented from committing further harm. | Data from the project  
Official data from Benin | Enhanced intelligence collection leads to more efficient interventions from armed and security forces thanks to good cooperation and sharing of information  
Regional protection from the armed forces facilitates the effective functioning of the civilian administration and accelerates economic development.  
Sufficient revenue in the national budget is allocated to armed forces to cover the costs not covered in these actions. |

### Outputs:

| Outputs: | O1: An operational system of light aircraft bases with a national coverage is established. | 1.1. Number of Forward Operational Air Bases (FOAB) able to accommodate light aircrafts  
1.2. Number of operational equipment provided (disaggregated by type)  
1.3. Number of airbase staff (pilots, mechanics, air base managers) with increased technical knowledge (disaggregated by sex) | 1.1.2 Progress reports  
1.3 Project database of trainees | Staff trained by the action remains in their post and has an opportunity to apply what they have learned |
| Outputs: | O2: An operational detection and intervention security system is established in Northern Benin. | 2.1. Number of operational equipment provided (disaggregated by type)  
2.2 Number of military staff trained on use of equipment and operational know-how (disaggregated by sex) | 2.1 Progress reports  
2.2 Project database of trainees | Staff trained by the action remains in their post and has an opportunity to apply what they have learned |