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ANNEX I

of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme 2016 for Article 5 of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace to be financed from the general budget of the Union

**Action Document for Countering Terrorism**

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<th>1. Title/basic act/ CRIS number</th>
<th>Countering Terrorism CRIS number: 038-875 financed under IeSP</th>
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<td>2. Zone benefiting from the action/location</td>
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<td>4. Sector of concentration/ thematic area</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism</td>
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<td>5. Amounts concerned</td>
<td>Total estimated cost: EUR 26 000 000</td>
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<td>6. Aid modality(ies) and implementation modality(ies)</td>
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<td>Component A: CFT/AML - Indirect management with Member State agency</td>
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<td>7 a) DAC code(s)</td>
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<td>Participation development/good governance</td>
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<td>9. Global Public Goods and Challenges (GPGC)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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¹ Includes Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244.
SUMMARY
In accordance with the Multi Annual Indicative Programme 2014-17, the overall objective of the Action is to disrupt terrorist networks and the activities of recruiters to terrorism, cut off terrorist funding and bring terrorists to justice while continuing to respect human rights and international law.

Component A Anti Money Laundering/Countering the Finance of Terrorism: This action on anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) will contribute to counter the finance of terrorism by supporting countries in the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) and South/South East Asia to monitor, disrupt and deny the financing of terrorism and money-laundering, especially related to Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) and designated terrorist organisations.

Component B Prison Deradicalisation: This component aims to increase the capacity of selected countries to effectively manage violent extremist prisoners and to prevent radicalisation to violence in their prison systems.

Component C Support to CAPRI: This action supporting the Counter Terrorism Associated Prosecution Reform Initiative (CAPRI) will contribute to fight against terrorism in Pakistan by enhancing the capacities of the Punjab Forensic Science Agency with a focus on the Fingerprint, DNA and Ballistics disciplines.

1 CONTEXT
1.1 Sector/Country/Regional context/Thematic area
Terrorism is a threat to all States and to all peoples. It poses a serious threat to security, to the values of democratic societies and to the rights and freedoms of citizens. Fighting terrorism is among the priorities identified in the European Security Strategy and the EU Council Conclusions on Security and Development. Moreover, in their statement of 12 February 2015, the members of the European Council agreed to further reinforce action against terrorist threats, in full compliance with human rights and the rule of law.

Component A - AML/CFT
One driver of the threat of terrorism and one which the EU and other international partners are seeking to address is its financing. Terrorist groups nowadays are increasingly well financed through various sources such as illicit trafficking, extortion, looting, robbery, kidnapping for ransom and other illicit means. These illicit activities are giving terrorist groups increased access to resources and the ability to engage new recruits who in turn can be used in terrorist acts against the EU and its partners. At the global level, four (4) regions stand out when it comes to threats assessment and the need for support and attention from donors, the four re-

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gions being 1) the Middle East and North Africa (MENA\textsuperscript{5}) region as well as Gulf States 2) South/South East Asia, 3) the Horn of Africa region and 4) West Africa.

The MENA-region is facing an extremely complex and volatile security situation. The continuing strife in the MENA region stems from political turmoil and a terrorist threat emanating from a number of actors. This presents a range of economic, political and social challenges for relevant actors in the counter-terrorism sphere.

Terrorism is also not new to South/South East Asia. Since the 1990s, the residual challenge posed by sub-state militant extremism has risen in reaction to both the force of modernisation pursued by many South East Asian governments and the political influence of radical Islam. The most worrisome networks are in Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia.

**Component B - Prison Deradicalisation**

With ever-increasing numbers of terrorists imprisoned across the globe, effectively managing this specific prison population and ensuring that violent extremist radicalisation does not spread through the system have become key priorities for many governments. Certain prisons have become incubators for radicalisation and recruitment, whilst others, through implementing good prison standards and practices of positive treatment, have managed to contain the problem and promote reform. From Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, whose alleged torture during his time in an Egyptian prison in the early 1980s is said to have made him even more fanatic, to the more recent 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris and Copenhagen that both involved perpetrators that are suspected to have radicalised to violent extremism whilst incarcerated, radicalisation to violent extremism in prisons poses a realistic threat – although the full scale and scope of the phenomenon is hard to determine. Given increased numbers of FTF serving prison sentences, including often short sentences, development of de-radicalisation, disen-gagement and rehabilitation programmes is crucial to prepare for their release.

**Component C - CAPRI**

Pakistan continues to face high levels of terrorist, religious and sectarian, political, criminal and ethnic or tribal violence. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, 7,789 civilians were killed in terrorist violence 2012 to 2014. The Government of Pakistan launched a National Internal Security Policy in 2014, followed by a National Action Plan in the aftermath of the December attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar, to tackle the root causes of terrorism and extremism. Implementation has so far, however been limited.

The Pakistan Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS) identifies Pakistan to be experiencing a rule of law crisis characterised by failure to protect fundamental rights, a dysfunctional criminal justice system that struggles to prosecute terrorists and lack of access to justice seriously undermining the relationship between citizens and the state.

Conversely, the JACS finds that stronger rule of law is essential for effectively reducing terrorism by tackling it consistently and comprehensively “as a crime not a ‘war’” and by helping “create the norm that law matters for ordinary citizens.”

### 1.1.1 Public Policy Assessment and EU Policy Framework

With increasing concerns about the conflict in Syria and Iraq and the security concerns deriving from the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) who have come from over eighty countries, including EU Member States, the EU has developed a Strategy to address the problem of counter-terrorism and foreign fighters. In February 2016 the European Commission

\textsuperscript{5} For this action defined as Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia.
presented its Action Plan to strengthen the fight against the financing of terrorism⁶. The Action Plan represents a step forward in this regard, building on existing EU rules to adapt to new threats such as the emergence of Da'esh/ISIL and the return of FTF in a more effective and comprehensive manner. Two main courses of action have been identified and include further disrupting the revenue sources of terrorist organisations by targeting their capacity to raise funds in the first place, and further detecting and preventing these organisations from moving funds and assets, ensuring that such movements can be traced and disrupted.

The EU’s counter-terrorism strategy for Syria and Iraq, with particular focus on foreign fighters was endorsed on 20 October 2014 by the Foreign Affairs Council. The Strategy mentions as an important element to support countries implementing UNSCR 2170 and 2178 and related resolutions. Priority countries mentioned include all the MENA countries. The immediate objective of the EU engagement is to ensure that the threat does not grow, i.e. stem the flow of new recruits, and that the threat does not spread further beyond the Syria/Iraqi borders. At the same time it is recognised that mitigation is not enough, and that a coherent approach and wider range of tools are called for. The Strategy is founded on the EU’s criminal justice-based approach to tackling terrorism while protecting human rights, on the clear premise that the rule of law and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms are the foundation of the fight against terrorism for the EU. The Strategy outlines a series of concrete recommendations across the pillars of the wider EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2005) on Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Respond, as well as on matters related to providing military support and engaging with key partners. It also highlights the need for effective co-ordination between the internal and external counter-terrorism agenda and it notes that the strategy on Iraq and Syria should be mainstreamed into the relevant Council working groups, including regional groups. In the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions of 9 February 2015 on Counter-Terrorism, the Council decided to step up, as a matter of urgency, its external action on countering terrorism in particular in the MENA region. The Council Conclusions call for accelerated implementation of the EU Regional Strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Da'esh/ISIL threat adopted on 16 March 2015. The EU’s counter-terrorism strategy for Syria and Iraq, with particular focus on foreign terrorist fighters, was endorsed on 20 October 2014. It highlighted the need to strengthen partnerships with key countries of the MENA region as well as the League of Arab States, support capacity building including on the implementation of UNSCR 2178, countering radicalisation and violent extremism, and promote international and regional cooperation.

UNSCR 2253 of December 2015 also updates and adapts the UN sanctions regime against Al Qaida, putting the fight against Da'esh/ISIL and their financing at the forefront of the efforts carried out by the international community to combat terrorism. The UNSC also emphasises and develops detailed listing criteria for Al Qaeda, ISIL and related entities and individuals, expanding on "recruiting" and "support activities" to include Internet hosting and related services, as well as travel-related funds for Foreign Terrorist Fighters.

Following attacks in France and elsewhere in the autumn of 2015, the issue of terrorism including countering its financing was discussed by EU ministers in council meetings in both the Justice & Home Affairs (JHA) and the Foreign Affairs (FAC) formations. In her letter to President Tusk following the FAC meeting on 14 December 2015 HRVP Mogherini high-

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lighted “[…]countering the financing of terrorism (especially oil and cultural goods smuggling[…])” as one of the EU’s thematic priorities of its external counter-terrorism efforts.

**Component A - AML/CFT**

Countering the financing of terrorism is a core component of the EU’s strategy in the fight against terrorism. As terrorists and their supporters constantly modify their ways to collect, move and gain access to funds, the EU needs to adapt its instruments and measures to deprive them from the possibility to engage in criminal activity. The EU has developed a range of measures that aim at cutting off terrorists' access to funding. For instance, the Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive expressly extends the scope of the anti-money laundering regime to terrorist financing and the Fourth Directive adopted in 2015 will make it ever more difficult for terrorists to use the financial system for funding their activities.

AML/CFT efforts are governed by the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The Commission is a member of the FATF and actively contributes to its work as well as to the implementation of the FATF Recommendations in the EU. In addition, relevant UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) such as UNSCR 1373, UNSCR 1455 and UNSCR 2178 as well as and Council of Europe instruments, such as the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism, play an important role in this context; the Commission supports EU Member States in implementing these.

Council Conclusions on the topic were adopted by the JHA Council on 20 November 2015 and the Council underlined the importance of accelerating the implementation of counter-terrorism measures. The Council invited the Commission to present proposals to strengthen the powers of, and cooperation between Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs), to ensure their fast access to information to combat money laundering and terrorist financing in conformity with FATF, to strengthen controls of non-banking payment methods as well as freeze terrorist assets throughout the Union. In its Action Plan on Terrorist Financing, the Commission announced that it will make proposals in those fields, especially to reinforce preventative measures tackling terrorist financing risks, strengthen controls on cash movements and enhance the legal framework on customs and trade in order to fight against illegal trade and trafficking of cultural goods. The ECOFIN Council endorsed this Action Plan and also set out its priorities to prevent the financing of terrorism in February 2016 by accelerating cooperation between authorities responsible for clamping down on terrorist financing.

The EU has a long-standing commitment to the countries in the MENA region. In 1995, the EU negotiated a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership with twelve Mediterranean Partner Countries with the ambitious objective of creating a regional free trade agreement by 2010 and carrying out corresponding governance reforms under the Barcelona Declaration launching the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. The commitments are embodied in a variety of on-going initiatives including the European Neighbourhood Policy which offers support for political and economic reform in each individual country in due respect for its specificities; and support for the Union for the Mediterranean initiative to encourage regional cooperation among the countries of the MENA region themselves and with the EU. CTF/AML is the key area of CT cooperation between the EU and the Gulf Cooperation Council. CTF/AML and implementation of the FATF standards is also an important area of EU counter-terrorism discussions with Turkey.

The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) is an informal process of dialogue and cooperation bringing together the EU member states and the EU itself with 21 Asian countries and the ASEAN Secretariat. After the 9-11 terrorist attacks, the fight against international terrorism has be-
come a priority for ASEM. The most recent ASEM summit was held in Milan in 2014 with a specific focus was on how to tackle the root causes of security threats and on fighting terrorism. The situations in the Middle East, Syria and Iraq as well as the regional security environment on both continents were discussed, and EU and Asian leaders recognised that the recent developments have a direct impact on international and regional peace and security, but also on the economic development and future prosperity of Europe and Asia. More recently, during the 12th ASEM Foreign Ministers' Meeting (ASEM FMM12) in Luxembourg, EU and Asian leaders reaffirmed their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and expressed their will to support international cooperation on countering terrorism and violent extremism as well as on de-radicalisation. They further underscored the importance of endorsing new approaches and developing more effective legal tools to counter terrorism.

The next ASEM Summit in Ulaanbaatar, which will celebrate the 20th anniversary of the ASEM process, will also tackle the issue of terrorism, both by dedicating a section of the final Chair's Statement to this issue and by providing a venue for a discussion of the issue during the Summit itself. In addition, Malaysia has proposed to host an ASEM symposium on countering radicalisation.

In its Communication titled “A new partnership with South East Asia” the Commission in 2003 proposed to revitalise the EU's relations with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the countries of South East Asia. The need to develop these relations further builds on the Commission’s 2001 Communication on “Europe and Asia, a Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships”, since endorsed by the Council and the Parliament. The Communication from 2003 identified “Supporting regional stability and the fight against terrorism” as one of six strategic priorities, and outlined actions by which the EU's relationship with ASEAN and the countries of South East Asia could be improved: “A strong ASEAN is probably the best guarantee for peace and stability in the region. The EU can contribute through using ASEAN and ASEM as frameworks for conducting policy dialogue, and through providing its expertise in regional integration, if asked. The EU stands ready to continue support to actions in the area of conflict prevention and conflict settlement. Regarding terrorism, the EU is prepared to assist countries in taking measures against international terrorism without prejudice to the respect by the countries concerned of basic human rights principles and peaceful political opposition.”

The Commission presented in February 2016 its Action Plan to strengthen the fight against terrorist financing. The external relations chapter foresees to "Strengthen support to third countries in complying with UNSCRs legal requirements and FATF recommendations" as well as to "support countries in the MENA and South East Asia regions to monitor, disrupt and deny the financing of terrorism."

Component B - Prison Deradicalisation

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2 ASEM FMM 12 Chair’s statement: http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eas/docs/151106_02_statement_on_asem_foreign_ministers_meeting_en.pdf
3 COM/2003/0399 final
4 COM/2001/0469 final
5 COM/2003/0399 final
EU HoSG in the statement on counter-terrorism of 12 February 2015 called for initiatives related to "rehabilitation in the judicial context to address factors contributing to radicalisation, including in prisons". In October 2015, the Commission, in cooperation with the Presidency and with the support of the EU CTC, organised a High Level Ministerial Conference on "Criminal justice response to radicalisation", including radicalisation in prison and development of rehabilitation, de-radicalisation and disengagement programmes inside and outside of prison (alternatives). Council Conclusions on the topic were adopted by the JHA Council on 20 November 2015. The Conclusions invite "the EU to promote criminal justice response measures to radicalisation leading to terrorism and violent extremism, internationally and to assist third partners in this respect, duly taking into account the local circumstances and security and public safety concerns".

Recognising that the growing threat posed by violent extremist and terrorist groups requires a unified response, the UN Secretary-General has developed a comprehensive UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (A/70/674). The Plan emphasises the strong risks of radicalisation in prisons, particularly as a result of inhumane detention conditions and inhumane treatment on inmates and stresses the need for safeguards to be put in place to prevent the spread of extremist ideology in prisons. Moreover, the Plan encourages Member States to consider the need to reform national penitentiary systems to prevent and counter radicalisation in prisons based on human rights and the rule of law.

In its Presidential Statement 11 of 2015, the Security Council “notes with concern that terrorist recruitment efforts, in particular by ISIL, appear to be increasingly targeting women and youth and stresses the need for Member States to more effectively identify and work with relevant local communities and civil society leaders to develop comprehensive solutions to the threat of recruitment and radicalisation to violence, notably through programs at schools and in prisons and recognising the role that victims of terrorism can play in countering radicalisation, and develop robust social-media campaigns and counter-messaging efforts to blunt terrorist narratives and online recruitment attempts.”

CTITF was also asked to set out a prioritised list of capacity building and technical assistance programmes to be implemented by CTITF Entities and the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) over the next 24 months. The Council encouraged Member States to provide “needed financial and other assistance to CTITF and UNCCT” to implement the FTF Implementation Plan. The Plan, currently being finalised, emphasises the need to support prison de-radicalisation capacity building as part of the global efforts to counter the FTF phenomenon.

**Component C - CAPRI**

Most criminal proceedings in Pakistan rely on eye witness and confessional evidence. Without adequate protection and inconvenienced by multiple adjournments, witnesses often do not attend court and trials fail. Conviction rates are very low. This leads to poor public confidence in the criminal justice system and has contributed to the Government of Pakistan’s 2015 decision to introduce Military Courts for terrorist cases.

Support aiming at improving the capacities of Pakistan and at facilitating cooperation in combating terrorism is in the interest of the stability of the whole South Asia region. A priority in the EU approach is to assist the transition from essentially military methods towards a more comprehensive approach, including capacity-building for civilian authorities coupled with integration of core principles of rule of law, good governance and human rights.

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13 PRST/2015/11 (emphasis added)
1.1.2 Stakeholder analysis

Component A - AML/CFT

The issue of terrorism has, in various forms and incarnations, been a recurrent phenomenon in the MENA and South East Asia regions for many years. The findings of the identification missions for this action underline that terrorism remains a real concern throughout the region, both in terms of “human security” and in terms of threats against the development, stability and security of state and state structures and is recognised as such by government representatives and by ASEAN/APEC/ASEM heads of state.

Missions undertaken during the identification phase for this Action concluded that the MENA and South East Asia region are two regions that need the most support to reach a satisfactory level of compliance with international AML/CFT standards. Both regions are also in need for assistance to build their capacity to put the necessary measures in place to monitor, disrupt and deny the financing of terrorism, especially as it relates to FTFs and designated terrorist organisations, not least Daesh, so that countries from South Asia and the MENA regions are better able to comply with relevant UNSCRs that have been adopted on these pressing threats to international peace and security. The identification phase also confirmed that the issue of asset recovery needs to be addressed more efficiently in both regions. One can create solid AML/CFT systems on paper, but only if the proceeds of the crime are finally deprived the perpetrators, the system proves to be efficient. Therefore, this component needs to take into account crime links to Gulf States as well as to Turkey.

Component B - Prison Deradicalisation

The prison population is only likely to grow as countries prosecute and potentially incarcerate the thousands of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) that will return from conflict zones like Syria and Iraq in the coming years. The challenge of adequately managing terrorism offenders and addressing violent extremist radicalisation through actions in prisons will need to be addressed sooner rather than later.

Violent extremist prisoners can network in prisons, radicalise other prisoners, gain access to a large pool of potential recruits, or coordinate violent extremist crime outside prison. This may include, *inter alia*, producing and distributing ideological literature and/or propaganda within and beyond the prison population; using prison visits to communicate with followers in the outside world; providing reinforcement and support to fellow prisoners who were punished for subversive activities in prisons; and/or engaging in active resistance to the prison authorities through refusing to cooperate in the prison’s regime, intimidating prison staff and management and instigating violent clashes with prison staff.¹⁴ Such scenarios not only undermine prison security and safety, but also compromise one of the core objectives of imprisonment, i.e. the protection of society from crime. Furthermore, they undermine the rehabilitative objective of imprisonment by corroding prison initiatives to prepare and skill prisoners to lead law-abiding lives upon their return to society. Rehabilitation, de-radicalisation and disen-gagement programmes need to be developed for terrorist inmates, in particular FTF, as well as alternatives to prison sentences.

Countries have adopted a variety of approaches: from segregating terrorism offenders in separate high-security wings to dispersing them among the general prison population; from placing them under a strict detention regime to providing various opportunities for rehabilitation interventions, self-development and reform; and from providing limited religious and cultural

¹⁴ *See RAND Corporation Europe (2008), quoted above, pp. 27-36.*
services and interactions with the wider community to allowing volunteers from the community to provide services and family members to engage with the prisoner.

**Component C - CAPRI**

The Punjab Forensic Science Agency was established in 2007. It is providing forensic services in fourteen forensic disciplines. The scientific analysis undertaken at Agency assists investigating agencies in successful investigations and replaces oral evidence with the empirical testimony in courts of law. Over the course of thirty months, the European Union supported CAPRI project has made a quantifiable impact (See Figure A) on the Counter Terrorism (CT) Forensic capability in Pakistan through strengthening the capacity of the Punjab Forensic Science Agency (PFSA). In large part, this was through the deployment of an expert forensic mentor who has helped the PFSA identify and produce evidence which has been properly admitted in subsequent prosecutions. The EU project has been complemented by the UK’s CAPRI Programme which has developed the capabilities of the police to collect forensic evidence, prosecutors to use the evidence and judges to understand the significance of the evidence. With the Government of Pakistan’s implementation of the National Action Plan (NAP), it is important that the programme continues to build on its success. The PFSA is not yet in a position fully to develop itself so further expert assistance is required.

1.1.3 *Priority areas for support/problem analysis*

**Component A - AML/CFT**

South East Asia and the MENA region are two regions that need much support to reach a satisfactory level of compliance with international AML/CFT standards. Both regions also need assistance to build their capacity to put the necessary measures in place to monitor, disrupt and deny the financing of terrorism, especially as it relates to FTFs and designated terrorist organisations, not least Daesh, so that countries from South Asia and the MENA regions are better able to comply with relevant UNSCRs that have been adopted on these pressing threats to international peace and security. The FATF and Counter-ISIL Finance Group (CIFG) also reported about the scale and sources of funding for ISIL/Daesh. There is a risk that those funds may be moved to Daesh-affiliated groups in other regions – or just secretly stored until they are used for terrorist purposes. Hence preventative measures are necessary to avoid that those funds are integrated into the international financial system. Missions to regions as well as the deskwork and analysis conducted during the formulation phase have also confirmed that the issue of asset recovery needs to be addressed more efficiently in both regions. Asset recovery actions are an important part of a global effort to address terrorism by restricting capabilities to recruit and operate, and eventually vitiate their ability to remain relevant. The FATF Recommendations require jurisdictions to implement measures that will freeze or, if appropriate, seize terrorist-related funds or other assets without delay in accordance with relevant United Nations resolutions. In terms of geographic areas to cover by this intervention, as already mentioned, the MENA as well as the South/South East Asia regions are in focus, considering crime links to the Gulf states and Turkey. On the specific issue of asset recovery, however, a global intervention would be relevant.

**Component B - Prison Deradicalisation**

Violent extremist prisoners (VEPs) can network in prisons, radicalise other prisoners, gain access to a large pool of potential recruits, or coordinate violent extremist crime outside prison. This may include, inter alia, producing and distributing ideological literature and/or propaganda within and beyond the prison population; using prison visits to communicate with followers in the outside world; providing reinforcement and support to fellow prisoners who were punished for subversive activities in prisons; and/or engaging in active resistance to the
prison authorities through refusing to cooperate in the prison’s regime, intimidating prison staff and management and instigating violent clashes with prison staff. Such scenarios not only undermine prison security and safety, but also compromise one of the core objectives of imprisonment, i.e. the protection of society from crime. Furthermore, they undermine the rehabilitative objective of imprisonment by corroding prison initiatives to prepare and skill prisoners to lead law-abiding lives upon their return to society. Rehabilitation, disengagement and de-radicalisation programmes need to be developed in prisons to prepare inmates for release, as well as outside of prisons as alternative to incarceration (management of returnees). Risk assessment procedures need to be developed. Several countries in the MENA region have expressed interest in EU support and cooperation in this area.

Component C - CAPRI

The proposal is to continue support to the PFSA with a focus on the Fingerprint, deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and Ballistics disciplines. These disciplines have a direct influence on the prosecution of terrorism and other serious crime cases including sexual violence. Further funding support would sustain mentoring and utilise short-term experts to deliver niche and specialised training. Through direct support to these disciplines, the PFSA could achieve international accreditation within three years. Fingerprints, in particular, are an area of weakness in Pakistan. DNA and ballistics are on the verge of becoming powerful forensic intelligence tools – further support should ensure that they reach full potential.

2 Risks and Assumptions

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<th>Risks</th>
<th>Risk level (H/M/L)</th>
<th>Mitigating measures</th>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of political will and leadership support as each of the results outlined in this fiche requires buy-in from senior officials working in the partner countries covered.</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>The action will be implemented in the context of UNSCR 2178 co-sponsored by most if not all partner countries themselves.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The security situation in Daesh-frontline states and potentially in other countries in the concerned regions is volatile and uncertain.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Beneficiary countries will be engaged at an early stage to ensure commitment to the project’s objectives. To this end, close and regular dialogue will be established with relevant national authorities to ensure adequate national measures are put in place under this programme.</td>
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Assumptions
- No further deterioration of the current (already difficult and volatile) security situation, in particular in the concerned regions
- Access possible to relevant information from the FATF, Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), Global Coalition against ISIL, the UN and other stakeholders
- Necessary political will at the national and regional level to engage with the EU and the project.
- Identified partner countries willing to engage with the project and initiate pilot projects including sharing its experiences with the regional level.
- MENA, Gulf, Turkey and South/South East Asia governments and politicians ready to engage with the project including requesting training and technical assistance from the project.
- Relevant international entities and Member States ready to take part in the execution of the activities.
3 LESSONS LEARNT, COMPLEMENTARITY AND CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

3.1 Lessons learnt

The research for the identification of these actions, including field visits, found that a number of capacity building activities are being undertaken in the regions with the support of multiple donors, including the EU. The projects are mostly country-specific but a number of region-wide ongoing or planned projects are also registered. Many of these activities are relevant to these actions, for example in the area of promoting access to justice and strengthening the Rule of Law.

The conclusions of the research to a very high degree correlates with, as well as confirms, the analysis of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism in its letter to the President of the Security Council dated 7 November 2014 setting out the gaps in Member States’ capacities to implement Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005) that also may hinder the abilities of States to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters pursuant to Security Council resolution 2178 (2014). Accordingly, these actions aim to provide opportunities for enhanced donor coordination as well as improved information among - and within - ministries and other relevant actors in recipient countries.

The EU has a longstanding engagement in the covered regions and a considerable experience on cooperation and support exists for projects that are often more counter-terrorism-relevant than counter-terrorism-specific. In relation to counter-terrorism and CVE the EU has developed its engagement in the regions considerably over the past six to seven years which is reflected in various high level Declarations, Communications and Council Conclusions and an intensification of high level dialogue meetings.

3.2 Complementarity, synergy and donor coordination

These interventions have been designed to ensure coordination with the EU funded capacity building projects financed through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) - Articles 3 and 4 covering respectively non-programmable measures in relation to crisis response and programmable measures in the areas of conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness. They have also been designed in coordination with other on-going or planned regional (notably the programme “Countering radicalisation and Foreign Terrorist Fighters”) or bilateral programmes under ENI.

The “CT MORSE” programme under IcSP will contribute to address the coordination challenges stemming from the significant increase in EU engagement on Counter Terrorism. The actions will secure continuity and complementarity of actions already financed at the national level and by other donors, including international organisations, such as UNODC. The Counter-Financing sub-working group (EU is a member) of the Global Coalition against ISIL/Daesh presents an obvious platform for coordinating capacity building assistance with other donors. At country level the new Security/Counter-Terrorism attachés in EU Delegations in a number of MENA-countries will act as “ambassadors” of the Actions in this region and ensure close coordination with relevant international partners including one particular EU Member State initiating AML/CFT projects in the MENA-region (Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq) and deploying an regional Counter-Terrorism coordinator to Amman in early 2016.

3.3 Cross-cutting issues

The activities of these actions will be implemented according to the following principles: gender neutrality in its employment and outsourcing actions, and gender balance in all of its committees, workshops and training interventions; participatory approach on direct involve-
ment of civil society and the private sector; promotion of good governance issues; visibility ensured notably by publicity campaigns and publications valorising programme results.

Additional principles governing these actions implementation include those related to the adequate protections of human rights and respect for due process throughout all project activities. Appropriate vetting of all subcontractors is necessary to assure that human rights standards are maintained. All assistance and training aspects must include precautionary measures to assure international human rights standards and norms are met, this is particularly important given perpetration and allegation of human rights violations outlined in the mapping report. Given the objectivities of the activities themselves, elements concerning the respect of human rights and due process, but also more broadly will obviously be integral parts of the training and awareness-raising activities.

In providing technical assistance and capacity building programming, the issue of corruption should be carefully considered, in particular with regards to the control and audit of programmatic funds. Programme implementers must observe regulatory measures to mitigate funds transfers to politically exposed persons or other individuals or entities that may abuse programmatic arrangements. Corruption is of specific concern in the region. To mitigate the challenges posed by endemic corruption, anti-corruption actions will be comprehensively integrated into all parts of the training and awareness-raising activities.

To ensure compliance of the proposed action with the obligations stipulated in Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No 230/2014, a clear human rights perspective will be incorporated throughout the different stages of the project cycle (project design/formulation; monitoring of implementation; evaluation) on the basis of the operational guidance developed to this end by the European Commission (https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/operational-human-rights-guidance-eu-external-cooperationactions-addressing-terrorism-organised_en). Any potential flow-on risk on the respect of human rights should be constantly monitored and mitigating measures need to be foreseen.

Similarly, Article 10 of the IcSP regulation requires that the measures adopted under the regulation are implemented in accordance with International Humanitarian Law (IHL). In order not to impede humanitarian action, any counter-terrorism measures should explicitly exclude from their ambit activities that are exclusively humanitarian and impartial in character and that are conducted without adverse distinction. An example of good practice would be including a humanitarian exemption clause in relevant legislation.

4 DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION

4.1 Objectives/results and Options

The overall objective of all components, in accordance with the IcSP Multi Annual Indicative programme 2014-17; is to disrupt terrorist networks and the activities of recruiters to terrorism, cut off terrorist funding and bring terrorists to justice while continuing to respect human rights and international law.

Furthermore, for component A, the objective is also to introduce enhanced measures against serious organised crime related to AML/CFT in the targeted regions, through enhancing the capacity and capability to fight money laundering.

Component A – Anti-money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT)

To contribute to counter the finance of terrorism by supporting countries in MENA and South/South East Asia to monitor, disrupt and deny the financing of terrorism and money-
laundering, especially related to FTFs and designated terrorist organisations. To achieve the overall objective, the proposed component is intended to reach three specific but mutually interlinked and reinforcing objectives:

a) To increase compliance with relevant UNSCRs and FAFT recommendations by MENA and SEA countries, especially related to FTFs and designated terrorist organisations, not least Daesh.

b) To enhance national, regional and international cooperation on asset recovery thereby depriving perpetrators the proceeds of the transnational organised crime and thus also countering the possibilities to finance terrorism.

c) To improve monitoring and regulation of the informal financial sector and the control of cash flows.

**Component B - Prison Deradicalisation**

Increase the capacity of selected countries to effectively manage violent extremist prisoners and to prevent radicalisation to violence in their prison systems

This proposal seeks to support the management of violent extremist prisoners and the prevention of radicalisation to violence in prisons in line with international standards and norms. In order to maximise impact, the geographic focus of the project is proposed to be a limited number of selected beneficiary countries in the Middle East and Gulf, North Africa and in Asia.

In all beneficiary countries, the project will implement a dual approach, i.e. (i) to prevent the progression to violent extremism [focus on those prisoners who may be vulnerable]; and (ii) to effectively manage violent extremist prisoners and develop rehabilitation, disengagement and/or de-radicalisation programmes.

**Component C - CAPRI**

Contribute to fight against terrorism in Pakistan by enhancing the capacities of the Punjab Forensic Science Agency with a focus on the Fingerprint, DNA and Ballistics disciplines.

The proposed support would sustain mentoring and utilise short-term experts to deliver niche and specialised training. Through direct support to these disciplines, the PFSA could achieve international accreditation within three years. Fingerprints, in particular, are an area of weakness in Pakistan. DNA and ballistics are on the verge of becoming powerful forensic intelligence tools.

The following outcomes would be achieved:

a) International accreditation (ISO17025 for Laboratory and ISO17020 for Crime Scene Practitioner), specifically focussed on three disciplines.

b) Increase in successful prosecutions in the Anti-Terrorism Courts related to a significant improvement of procedures in the criminal justice chain, specifically the interface between the laboratory, police and prosecutors leading to better evidence being presented in court and the proper use of expert witnesses.

c) Rise in crime scenes attended by the Regional Crime Scene Satellite Facilities in Punjab and an integrated policy to ensure successful transfer of evidence from these facilities to the main laboratory

**4.2 Main Activities**

**Component A - AML/CFT**
RESULT 1: A Global/Trans-regional component on CFT, Asset Recovery and capacity building, in particular to support the implementation of the CFT-relevant aspects of UN Security Resolutions (2170, 2178, 2199 and 2249), but also to fight other types of serious crime. Specific activities are planned to include inter alia, and not limited to:
- Strengthen cooperation to guide long-term partnerships between regional governments, civil society, private business and the international community in addressing CFT/AML gaps.
- Activities aimed to build trust, enhance collaboration and information-sharing with the private sector on CFT/AML related challenges.
- Activities aimed to ensure that civil society is effectively engaged in the debate on anti-money laundering and combatting terrorism financing notably on the regulation of the non-profit sector to prevent it from being abused for terrorist purposes.
- Draft guidelines and share best practices on how to combat the illicit trafficking of cultural goods and its use for terrorist financing, including support to capacity building on how to give specific attention to protect cultural heritage and increase international police cooperation against trafficking of cultural goods.
- Widen the scope of the StAR Baseline Study on the Global application of non-conviction based forfeiture to include also a number of non-OECD countries (approximately 10 countries).

RESULT 2: South/South East Asia Regional Component on dealing with AML/CFT and Asset Recovery. Specific activities are planned to include inter alia, and not limited to:
- Awareness Raising and practical training on AML/CFT and asset recovery to be delivered in the South/South East Asia region on core issues including bank records analysis, tracing and securing funds in foreign jurisdictions, drafting proper MLA requests, and obtaining a final confiscation order.
- Support to FIU’s and asset recovery offices and structures.
- Series of trainings for border and customs officials on identifying and providing information that could facilitate the implementation of relevant UNSCRs designed to prevent the financing of terrorism.
- Crosscutting: Legislative drafting assistance to support the implementation of UNSCR 2170, 2178, 2199 and 2249 related to the countering of the financing of ISIL etc.
- Explore support to deploy and implement "goAML", the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) standard software system available for Financial Intelligence Units to counter Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering.
- Explore support for the establishment of an FIU.net like system in the region.
- Explore support to introduce registers on beneficial ownership for legal entities and legal arrangements to enable FIUs, AROs and law enforcement to identify more easily ultimate beneficial owners.

RESULT 3: MENA Regional Component dealing with AML/CFT and Asset Recovery and the cross cutting issue included for awareness raising and trainings on specific actions for the implementation of UNSCR 2170, 2178, 2199 and 2249 related to the countering of the financing of ISIL, ANF and AQ as well as countering other types of serious crimes. Specific aspect focused on the possible development of a regional CARIN-style asset recovery network for the MENA region. Specific activities are planned to include inter alia, and not limited to:
- As regards the support to a regional Asset Recovery Network there is a need for a measured step-wise approach in a region where countries still need to develop trust at the country-to-country level. As mentioned previously it is therefore suggested that it is being assessed also during the implementation phase exactly how to develop the...
right structure on this subject. To prepare for this the following activities will be part of the intervention:

- Providing support to the Arab Forum on Asset Recovery (AFAR) to develop technical expertise and to increase the level of co-operation in relation to specific asset recovery operations.
- Building trust within the forum to promote the eventual development of a CARIN-style network that would function as a hub for establishing and maintaining contacts as part of a co-operative group in the area of criminal asset identification and recovery.
- Providing support to national Asset Recovery Offices (AROs) in Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia and as appropriate in Iraq and Libya.
- Trainings and awareness raising on asset recovery, with a specific focus on extended confiscation and value confiscation.
- Specialised guidance and trainings on assessing and addressing ML and CFT risks in the informal financial sectors, with a particular focus on cash.
- Trainings for border and customs officials on identifying and providing information that could facilitate the implementation of relevant UNSCRs designed to prevent the financing of terrorism.
- Onsite and remote IT support for the development of interagency asset recovery networking and information sharing at the national level.
- Explore support to deploy and implement "goAML", the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) standard software system available for Financial Intelligence Units to counter Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering.
- Explore support for the establishment of an FIU.net like system in the region.
- Explore support to introduce registers on beneficial ownership for legal entities and legal arrangements to enable FIUs, AROs and law enforcement to identify more easily ultimate beneficial owners.
- Cross-cutting element focused on awareness raising and trainings on specific actions for the implementation of UNSCR 2170, 2178, 2199, and 2249 related to the countering of the financing of ISIL. Specific action will include trainings for customs and border officials to ensure that they understand and use UN Sanctions lists and avail themselves of operating procedures and tools (including Interpol’s I 24/7).

**Component B - Prison Deradicalisation**

Specific activities are planned to include inter alia, and not limited to:

- Fostering cooperation amongst relevant national stakeholders. 15
- Train frontline prison staff on, inter alia, dynamic security and prison intelligence.
- Enhancing individual assessments of prisoners upon admission.
- Initiating and promoting prion-based disengagement programmes for VEPs.
- Support the development of a national rehabilitation and social reintegration strategy and corresponding programmes for VEPs.
- Strengthening the social reintegration of VEPs following release.
- Support to establish post-release services for prisoners and former VEPs, in particular, in close coordination and consultations with relevant agencies in the community.
- Exploring alternatives to imprisonment for FTFs in suitable cases.
Component C – CAPRI

Specific activities are planned to include inter alia, and not limited to:

- Support to achieve international accreditation (ISO17025 for Laboratory and ISO17020 for Crime Scene Practitioner), specifically focused on three disciplines namely ballistics, fingerprints and DNA.
- Support the Cross Agency Forensic Advisory Board development.
- Support the Integration of the Regional Labs.
- Support to increase forensic capacity.
- Support to develop PFSA as a National Centre of Excellence.
- Support to drive implementation of a National Forensic Strategy.
- Support to improve report/statement writing work.
- Support to develop the PFSA customer communication policy.
- Support to ensure human right compliant disclosure work.

4.3 Intervention logic
See Annex 1.

5 IMPLEMENTATION

5.1 Financing agreement
In order to implement the actions proposed, it is not foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with the partner countries, referred to in Article 184(2)(b) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012.

5.2 Indicative implementation period
The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in section 4.1 will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements implemented, is 72 months from the date of adoption by the Commission of this Action Document.

Extensions of the implementation period may be agreed by the Commission’s authorising officer responsible by amending this decision and the relevant contracts and agreements; such amendments to this decision constitute technical amendments in the sense of point (i) of Article 2(3)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014.

5.3 Implementation modalities for an action under project modality

Component A: CFT/AML - Indirect management with a Member State agency

In accordance with Article 58(1)(c) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012, this action will be implemented in indirect management with Expertise France.

This implementation entails to manage and be responsible for the execution of the programme.

This implementation is justified due to the combined nature of the activities foreseen (provision of capacity building and technical assistance to strengthen relevant actors against terrorism in accordance with the principles of rule of law as well as budget-implementation tasks) but also in order to reinforce the nexus between the internal and the external dimensions of the EU's security policy and to avoid duplication and overlap with similar activities.

Expertise France, supported by other EU Member States agencies, is best placed to cover the wide range of fields of expertise required to perform interventions in the diverse fields of in-
formation sharing, capacity building, law enforcement, and regional cooperation while ensuring confidentiality.

The entrusted entity would carry out the following budget-implementation tasks: acting as contracting authority concluding, monitoring and managing contracts, carrying out payments, and recovering moneys due; management of procurement procedures for hiring staff, purchasing goods and equipment, hiring consulting services, and any other relevant transactions.

**Component B - Prison Deradicalisation - Indirect management with an international organisation (UNODC)**

The envisaged implementation modality is indirect management with a single contract with an international organisation, notably the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

UNODC is the UN body mandated to assist Member States in their fight against illicit drugs. UNODC is the custodian of the 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and of the UN drug control conventions of 1961, 1971 and 1988. In 2014, the General Assembly requested UNODC to help to establish international networks and partnerships among Member States in the area of international cooperation in criminal matters. UNODC is dependent of the UN Secretariat, as confirmed during the 5th FAFA working group in April 2008, and it is covered by the four pillars analysis performed for the UN Secretariat.

UNODC will be in charge of the overall designing, planning, coordination, implementation and monitoring of the proposal for both substantive and administrative matters.

The proposed project is a joint initiative of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). UNODC will work in close collaboration with the UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT), in close consultation with the UN Counter Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) particularly as to rely on CTED's assessments of Member States’ capacities and efforts in fighting terrorism, radicalisation to violence and incitement to commit terrorist acts, thereby providing for an ideal combination of relevant UN mandates and expertise.

The total budget of the overall **Prison Deradicalisation** action will be EUR 7.5 million, EUR 4 million from the EU, EUR 3 million from UNCCT, and possibly EUR 1 million to be mobilised through other donor support by UNODC.

The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre was established in 2011 to support Member States in the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The Centre engages with 38 CTITF entities and it has supported and implemented more than 30 capacity building projects worldwide in the areas of rehabilitating and reintegrating violent extremist offenders, ensuring human rights while countering terrorism and enhancing cooperation between regional counter-terrorism centres. Furthermore, the Centre is implementing a project on Enhancing the Understanding the Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) phenomenon in Syria which explores the motivations of individuals travelling to Syria and Iraq to fight, including in terms of their radicalisation process.

UNCCT has recently developed its Five-Year Programme (2016-2020) aimed at responding to the needs of Member States for impactful capacity building to implement the all four pillars of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. In 2016, the Centre will, *inter alia*, focus its

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16 Resolution 69/193
17 Final Report International Organisations – completion of compliance analysis with internationally accepted standards, 7 March 2008.
18 A/RES/66/10 of 18 November 2011.
programming on supporting requesting Member States in developing national PVE strategies and capacity building programmes and projects on engagement of youth, religious leaders and CSOs with emphasis on communities vulnerable to the appeal of terrorism in line with recommendations proposed in the UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, including as it relates to radicalisation and de-radicalisation. In addition, the Centre will emphasise activities that support Member States’ capacities to manage FTFs in prison settings and prevent radicalisation of other inmates, and promote regional cooperation among Member States in countering the FTF phenomenon.

Working together, UNODC and UNCCT are therefore well placed to assist Member States in addressing the issue of violent extremism in prisons. They should reach out to other relevant actors with experience in the area such as the RAN-Center of Excellence, UNICRI and the ICCT in The Hague.

The entrusted international organisation is currently undergoing the ex-ante assessment in accordance with Article 61(1) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012. The Commission’s authorising officer responsible deems that, based on the compliance with the ex-ante assessment based on Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1605/2002 and long-lasting problem-free cooperation, the international organisation can be entrusted with budget-implementation tasks under indirect management.

**Component C: CAPRI - Direct management with Member State agency**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject in generic terms, if possible</th>
<th>Type (works, supplies, services)</th>
<th>Indicative number of contracts</th>
<th>Indicative trimester of launch of the procedure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support to the Counter Terrorism Associated Prosecution Reform Initiative (CAPRI)</td>
<td>Services</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Q4/2016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The implementation method for this component will be direct management with the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and other UK Government Offices through the signature of service contract.

The direct award of these service contracts (negotiated procedure) is based on Article 242 1 b) of the Commission Regulation No 1995/2006 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Financial Regulation No 1268/2012, and the corresponding RAP 966/2012, "where the services are entrusted to public sector bodies […] and relate to activities of an institutional nature […]". The negotiated procedure is furthermore justified by the confidentiality and sensitivity linked to the subject matter (e. g. terrorism), as well as for the special nature of the services involved (Article 242 1 h) IR) (e. g. counterterrorism).

**5.4 Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants**

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act and set out in the relevant contractual documents shall apply.

The Commission’s authorising officer responsible may extend the geographical eligibility in accordance with Article 9(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 on the basis of urgency or of unavailability of products and services in the markets of the countries concerned, or in other duly substantiated cases where the eligibility rules would make the realisation of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult.
5.5 Indicative budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component A – AML/CFT</th>
<th>16 000 000</th>
<th>Indicative third party contribution, in currency identified (in USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Component B - Prison deradicalisation</td>
<td>4 000 000</td>
<td>4 000 000 (from UNCCT and UNODC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component C - CAPRI</td>
<td>2 500 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>22 500 000</strong></td>
<td><strong>4 000 000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.6 Organisational set-up and responsibilities

Component A: The implementation of this project will be coordinated and led by a Member State agency.

Component B: The implementation of this project will be coordinated and led by UNODC.

Component C: The implementation of this project will be done through a service contract.

5.7 Performance monitoring and reporting

The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation of this action will be a continuous process and part of the implementing partner’s responsibilities. To this aim, the implementing partner shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for the action and elaborate regular progress reports (not less than annual) and final reports. Every report shall provide an accurate account of implementation of the action, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (outputs and direct outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators, using as reference the logframe matrix (for project modality) or the list of result indicators (for budget support). The report shall be laid out in such a way as to allow monitoring of the means envisaged and employed and of the budget details for the action. The final report, narrative and financial, will cover the entire period of the action implementation.

The Commission may undertake additional project monitoring visits both through its own staff and through independent consultants recruited directly by the Commission for independent monitoring reviews (or recruited by the responsible agent contracted by the Commission for implementing such reviews).

5.8 Evaluation

Having regard to the nature of the action, an ex-post evaluation will be carried out for this action or its components via independent consultants. It will be carried out for accountability and learning purposes at various levels (including for policy revision), taking into account in particular the fact that this will be the first large-scale, trans-regional action financed by IcSP focusing on cybersecurity.

The Commission shall inform the implementing partner at least two weeks in advance of the dates foreseen for the evaluation missions. The implementing partner shall collaborate efficiently and effectively with the evaluation experts, and inter alia provide them with all necessary information and documentation, as well as access to the project premises and activities. The evaluation reports shall be shared with the partner country and other key stakeholders. The implementing partner and the Commission shall analyse the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, in agreement with the partner country, jointly decide on the follow-up actions to be taken and any adjustments necessary, including, if indicated, the reorientation of the project.
The financing of the evaluation shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing decision.

5.9 Audit

Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation of this action, the Commission may, on the basis of a risk assessment, contract independent audits or expenditure verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements. The financing of the audit shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing decision.

5.10 Communication and visibility

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU.

This action shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action, to be elaborated at the start of implementation and supported with the budget indicated in section 5.5 above.

In terms of legal obligations on communication and visibility, the measures shall be implemented by the Commission, the partner country, contractors, grant beneficiaries and/or entrusted entities. Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in, respectively, the financing agreement, procurement and grant contracts, and delegation agreements.

The Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Action shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action and the appropriate contractual obligations.
## APPENDIX - INDICATIVE LOGFRAME MATRIX (FOR PROJECT MODALITY) ²⁰

The activities, the expected outputs and all the indicators, targets and baselines included in the logframe matrix are indicative and may be updated during the implementation of the action, no amendment being required to the financing decision. When it is not possible to determine the outputs of an action at formulation stage, intermediary outcomes should be presented and the outputs defined during inception of the overall programme and its components. The indicative logframe matrix will evolve during the lifetime of the action: new lines will be added for including the activities as well as new columns for intermediary targets (milestones) for the output and outcome indicators whenever it is relevant for monitoring and reporting purposes. Note also that indicators should be disaggregated by sex whenever relevant.

### Overall objective:
To disrupt terrorist networks and the activities of recruiters to terrorism, cut off terrorist funding and bring terrorists to justice while continuing to respect human rights and international law.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results chain</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baselines (incl. reference year)</th>
<th>Targets (incl. reference year)</th>
<th>Sources and means of verification</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase in positive assessments by relevant national and international organisations.</td>
<td>Data from recent reports from FATF, UN etc. (2016)</td>
<td>Reporting by relevant national organisations (FAFT, CTED etc.) of recipient countries fulfilment of AML/CFT legislation</td>
<td>Political will and security stability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Component A: CFT AML

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific objectives(s): Outcome(s)</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baselines (incl. reference year)</th>
<th>Targets (incl. reference year)</th>
<th>Sources and means of verification</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R1: Increased compliance with relevant UN-SCRs and FAFT recommendation by MENA and SEA countries thereby improving their measures to monitor, disrupt and deny the financing of terrorism and money-laundering, especially related to FTFs and designated terrorist organisations, not least Daesh.</td>
<td>Progress in terms of AML/CFT relevant legislation.</td>
<td>Project reports FAFTs reports</td>
<td>Political will and security stability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2: Enhanced national, regional and international cooperation on asset recovery thereby depriving perpetrators the proceeds of the transnational organised crime and preventing the financing of terrorism.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R3: Improved monitoring and regulation of the informal sector and the control of cash flows.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

²⁰ Mark indicators aligned with the relevant programming document mark with "*" and indicators aligned to the EU Results Framework with "**"
### Component B: Outputs of the Prison Derad Component (Indicators, Baselines, Targets and Sources and means of verification to be developed during the inception phase)

| R1 | Prevent the progression to violent extremism [focus on those prisoners who may be vulnerable]; and R2 | Effectively manage violent extremist prisoners and develop rehabilitation, disengagement and/or de-radicalisation programmes. |
| To be developed for each country | To be developed for each country | To be developed for each country | Project report UNODC reports | Political will and security stability |

### Component C: CAPRI (Indicators, Baselines, Targets and Sources and means of verification to be developed during the inception phase)

| R1 | International accreditation (ISO17025 for Laboratory and ISO17020 for Crime Scene Practitioner), specifically focussed on three disciplines achieved. R2 | Increased successful prosecutions in the Anti-Terrorism Courts related to a significant improvement of procedures in the criminal justice chain, specifically the interface between the laboratory, police and prosecutors leading to better evidence being presented in court and the proper use of expert witnesses. R3 | Project report Pakistan EU political dialogue | Political will and security stability |
| Previous project reports | Previous project reports | Previous project reports | Pakistan EU political dialogue | Political will and security stability |

R1) Prevent the progression to violent extremism [focus on those prisoners who may be vulnerable]; and R2) Effectively manage violent extremist prisoners and develop rehabilitation, disengagement and/or de-radicalisation programmes.

To be developed for each country