

# Final Report Volume 2: Annexes

## “Evaluation of the implementation of the African Peace Facility as an instrument supporting African efforts to manage conflicts on the continent”

April – December 2017

Framework Contract EuropeAid/132633/C/SER/Multi  
Lot 12: Humanitarian Aid, Crisis Management & Post Crisis assistance  
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Shaping the Future

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# 1 Annexes

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## 1.1 Extract from the Terms of Reference (ToR)

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### SPECIFIC TERMS OF REFERENCE

#### **Evaluation of the implementation of the African Peace Facility as an instrument supporting African efforts to manage conflicts on the continent.**

#### **FWC BENEFICIARIES 2013 - LOT nr.12 : Humanitarian aid, Crisis Management & Post- crisis assistance.**

#### **EuropeAid/132633/C/SER/multi**

### 1. BACKGROUND

#### **AFRICAN CONTEXT**

The African continent continues to be marked by conflicts of various nature (with roots in ethnic tensions, deficient governance, lack of respect for human rights, hunger, poverty, impacts of climate change, disputes around access to natural resources) that not only hamper economic and social development, but also drive population displacement. Terrorism, violent extremism and organized crime have, over time, been added to the more "classical threats" to peace and security, as new symptoms of a deeper structural instability. Unless the root causes and underlining threats to security, as well as active conflicts, are addressed, the economic, human and social development of Africa will continue to be hampered. A comprehensive approach to peace and security in Africa needs a broad regional policy framework, covering different aspects of peace and security as well as clear and accountable role-sharing between the national, sub-regional, continental and multilateral levels.

The promotion of peace and security is one of the key objectives enshrined in the AU's constitutive act adopted on 11 July 2000, which also articulates the link between security and development in its preamble.

In order to achieve this objective, the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU PSC) created the African Peace and Security Architecture in 2002. The APSA provides a continental framework within which the AUC, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs)<sup>1</sup> contribute to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in Africa. The APSA relies on the functioning of key institutions such as the AU PSC, supported by the AU Commission (AUC), a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), an African Standby Force (ASF) and a Peace Fund<sup>2</sup>. RECs and RMs constitute the building blocks of this architecture, collaborating closely with AUC to ensure a common and tailored African response is delivered.

In addition, APSA aims to harmonise, streamline and implement actions regarding cross-cutting and thematic peace and security issues such as SSR, PCRD, counter-terrorism, SALW, maritime safety and security, etc.

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<sup>1</sup> Currently, the following organisations are part of the APSA by virtue of having signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the AU: the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Economic Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Common Market of East and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), the North Africa Regional Capability (NARC), the South African Development Community (SADC), North African Regional Capability (NARC) and the Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM).

<sup>2</sup> The Peace Fund, made up of AU member states and partners contributions, intends, following the adoption of the "AU Plan Securing predictable and sustainable financing for Peace in Africa" at the 27<sup>th</sup> AU Summit (2016), to fully fund the functioning of the AU Commission, cover 75% of programmes and allow the AU to fulfil its pledge to cover 25% of peace support operations in Africa by 2020.

The AU's Agenda 2063<sup>3</sup> outlines the strategic framework for the socio-economic transformation of the continent over the next 50 years. Its aspiration 4, "a peaceful and secure Africa", aims at putting in place functional mechanisms for peaceful prevention and resolution of conflicts in such a way that by 2020 all guns will be silent. This is a commitment that has been developed in the AU initiative "Silencing the guns by 2020" adopted in 2014.

The 2016-2020 APSA Roadmap is the strategic document paving the way for future collaboration between the AU, the RECs and the RMs in achieving the goals of the "Silencing the guns by 2020" initiative. It identifies five strategic priorities: conflict prevention, crisis and conflict management, post-conflict reconstruction and peace building, strategic securities issues, and coordination and partnerships.

When crises arise and quick reactions are needed African-owned and African-led peace support initiatives have been put forward. The AU missions in Sudan/Darfur (AMIS), Somalia (AMISOM), the Central African Republic (MISCA), for the elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA) as well as the ECCAS mission in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX), the ECOWAS mission in Mali (AFISMA) and Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB), and the IGAD monitoring and verification mission in South Sudan (MVM/CTSAMM), are some examples of African-led peace support operations deployed over the past 10 years, often in very hostile environments and extremely sensitive political contexts.

## THE EU RESPONSE

The very foundation of the European Union (EU) lies in efforts to overcome divisions and promote peace. Article 21 of the Lisbon Treaty establishes the aim to preserve peace, prevent conflict and strengthen international security as a core aim of the EU's external action. The EU Global Strategy defines peace and security as one of the vital interests of the EU. It also links internal and external security: "Our security at home entails a parallel interest in peace in our neighbouring and surrounding regions. It implies a broader interest in preventing conflict, promoting human security, addressing the root causes of instability and working towards a safer world". Within that framework, the Global Strategy adopts an integrated approach to conflicts as one of the five priorities of the EU's external action. This requires the EU to intervene at all stages of the conflict cycle, acting promptly on prevention, responding responsibly and decisively to crises, investing in stabilisation, and avoiding premature disengagement. The EU recognises that it cannot solve conflicts alone. Sustainable peace can only be achieved through comprehensive agreements rooted in broad, deep and durable regional and international partnerships.

The new European Consensus on Development<sup>4</sup> considers security and development as important and complementary aspects of EU relations with third countries. This reflects recognition that unless security issues are dealt with, the EU faces an ever-increasing demand for humanitarian aid and an inability to tackle deep-seated poverty in insecure areas. More recently, the security situations have also led to an increasing flow of migrants/refugees to Europe from several African countries.

The EU has a wide array of external policies, instruments and tools at its disposal to address political and security challenges in Africa, ranging from diplomacy (statements, demarches, mediation, facilitation of dialogue, participation in relevant international fora) and EU external cooperation instruments (both thematic – DCI PANAF, IcSP and geographical – EDF RIPs/NIPs), to actions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including regular political dialogues with third countries and international organisations, restrictive measures (sanctions), appropriate measures on development cooperation under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, EU Special Representatives, disarmament and non-proliferation activities, and civilian and military crisis management missions under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

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<sup>3</sup> The Agenda 2063: The Africa we want was agreed in the Solemn Declaration on the 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Organization of African Unity/African Union adopted by African Heads of States and Governments on 25 May 2013.

<sup>4</sup> Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the regions, *Proposal for a new European Consensus on Development*, 22 November 2016.

The resolve of African partners to promote peace and security on the continent has been strongly supported by the EU from the outset, both politically and financially. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), adopted in Lisbon in 2007, defined peace and security as one of the eight areas of partnership (the Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership). The intent of the partnership is to support “African solutions for African problems”. The fourth Africa-EU Summit held in Brussels in April 2014 adopted the Roadmap 2014-2017, which refocused the implementation of the JAES on five priority areas, including peace and security.

**The JAES roadmap 2014-2017** sets out key areas of cooperation and specific objectives for the implementation of the peace and security priority area, namely:

- ) Enhancing political dialogue on peace, justice, and reconciliation to implement common approaches to peace and security challenges in Africa;
- ) Strengthening the operationalization of the AU's capacities: the African Peace and Security Architecture by training African forces, strengthening AU institutions and improving coordination with Regional Economic communities and Regional Mechanisms;
- ) Increasing cooperation on addressing root causes of conflicts: terrorism, transnational crime, human and arms trafficking.
- ) Tackling maritime security threats: fighting maritime piracy and waste dumping
- ) Consolidating the human rights dimension in peace and security crisis management
- ) Improving the mobilization of AU resources to support the EU's APF.

The African Peace Facility (APF) is the main tool for implementing the Africa-EU Peace and Security Cooperation. This cooperation consists of three inter-linked priorities: Enhanced dialogue on challenges to peace and security, operationalization of the African Peace Security Architecture (APSA), and Support to Peace Support Operations (PSOs) in Africa. Through the APF, financed by the EDF (9<sup>th</sup>, 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup>) for a total envelope of more than € 2.2 billion, the EU has been at the forefront of international support to the APSA and providing, in parallel to political backing, substantial and predictable funding to African peace support operations. The APF is a pan-African instrument in nature. Undertakings at national levels (e.g. training and funding of purely national actors) are not eligible for funding. Instead, the financial support must be requested by and provided to the AU and/or the African RECs/RMs included in the APSA.

For the 2014-2016 action programme alone, € 1.051 billion has been allocated through the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF while the 2017-2018 action programme estimates an EDF contribution of €535 million. These funds aim to continuously enable the AU and the RECs/RMs to strengthen their role, take responsibility for the stability of the continent and emerge as internationally recognized, major players in the political and security areas.

## THE AFRICAN PEACE FACILITY

### Objectives

The general objective of the APF is to contribute to the African peace and security agenda through targeted support at the continental and regional level in the area of conflict prevention, management and resolution, and peace building. The APF addresses peace and security priorities jointly defined in the Partnership, in respect of the underlying principles of the JAES (ownership, partnership and solidarity). The APF's current specific objectives respond to the priorities laid out in the 2014-2016 action programme.

### Beneficiaries

The direct beneficiaries of the APF are the African Union (AU), the African regional economic communities/regional mechanisms (RECs/RMs) with a mandate in peace and security as well as the relevant institutions/structures within or related to the APSA.

The final beneficiaries are the people of the African states who will be less affected by conflicts and who will live in a safer environment.

### Budget

In accordance with the thematic scope of the APF and the priorities of the Joint Partnership, the APF envelope under the 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> EDF is allocated as follows:

Operations/Actions	FUNDS COMMITTED			TOTAL
	10 <sup>th</sup> EDF (2008-2013) (Million Euros)	11 <sup>th</sup> EDF (AP 2014-2016) (Million Euros)	11 <sup>th</sup> EDF (AP 2017-2018) <sup>5</sup> (Million Euros)	
Peace Support Operations	618.9	961.2	441.0	2021.1
<b>Capacity building programmes</b>	98.0	55.0	57.0	210
<b>Early Response Mechanisms</b>	15.0	15.0	20.0	50.0
<b>Audit, Evaluation, Technical Assistance, communication.</b>	11.5	5.0	2.0	18.5
<b>Contingencies</b>	17.8	15.0	15.0	47.8
<b>TOTAL</b>	751.2	1051.2	535.0	2347.4

### Eligibility

An indicative list of eligible expenditure includes: per diems, salaries for the civilian component of peace support operations, rations, medical consumables and facilities, transport, travel, fuel, troop allowances, and communication equipment. The following constitutes an indicative list of non-eligible expenditure: ammunition, arms and specific military equipment, spare parts for arms and military equipment, salaries for soldiers and military training for soldiers.

<sup>5</sup> The 2017-2018 Action Programme is currently in preparatory phase. The amounts mentioned are thus subject to change.

## Decision-making process

As a general rule, the formal decision-making process for each operation funded by the APF is launched upon a request from the AU and/or from a sub-regional organisation (RECs)/RMs. When a sub-regional organisation takes an initiative, this initiative shall require the political approval of the AU. Peace operations funded by the APF should be consistent with UN principles and objectives. In this respect, endorsement in the broadest sense should be sought from the UN system, in accordance with the UN charter and in particular chapters VII and VIII. While seeking this UN endorsement, the decision making should, however, be flexible enough to go ahead with funding. Procedures that will apply to APF-funded interventions are the following:

### *Standard procedure*

Upon a request from the AU or a sub-regional (RECs/RMs), the EEAS and Commission present a joint information note on the intervention envisaged including recommendations to the relevant Council preparatory working groups and seek approval of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) on political appropriateness of the intervention requested.

For support to new peace support operations, once the request has been endorsed by the PSC, the Commission launches its internal decision-making process. In case of (i) an extension or renewal of support to an existing peace operation or (ii) support to the APSA operationalization, no Commission decision will be needed.

### *Early Response Mechanism*

The ERM finances, for a period of up to 12 months, interventions that, by their nature, require immediate support. Upon a request from the AU or a sub-regional organisation (RECs/RMs), the EEAS and Commission assess the request and decide jointly on the appropriateness of funding the request. No new Commission decision is needed to finance activities under the ERM. The PSC and the relevant Council working groups are kept informed on activities supported by the ERM.

### *Audit, monitoring, evaluation, technical assistance, lessons learned and visibility*

Operational activities such as audit, monitoring, evaluation, technical assistance, lessons learned and visibility are decided by the Commission in consultation with the EEAS and are not submitted to the decision-making process required for substantive APF interventions.

## Aid delivery

Depending on the compliance of the beneficiary organisation (AU or RECs/RMs) with the applicable pillar assessment, the European Commission delivers APF financing to beneficiaries either through direct management (grants and procurement) or indirect management to the African Union Commission.

## Evaluation and monitoring

The COM is responsible for the implementation of the APF and prepares **annual reports**.

In 2005-2006, the APF underwent a **first mid-term evaluation** that concluded that "the APF had been a very positive initiative which allowed the EU to support African work on peace and security in a practical, flexible and highly relevant manner respecting the principle of African ownership. Even if there was scope for further improvements, the overall efforts made to use the APF effectively had a real impact and already after only a year and a half there was identifiable progress towards the overall objectives of peace and security for development in Africa."

In November 2007, a stakeholder assessment was undertaken through a "**Lessons Learned**" exercise, followed by a **seminar** in Djibouti. Overall, the first phase of the APF was valued a success with a number of important PSOs that could be funded. However, even if the APF significantly contributed to a better cooperation between REC/RM and AUC and enhanced the relationship, the dialogue between the EU and the AU as well as with the REC/RMs should be strengthened. Absorption capacity of the African partners and financial management capacities were identified as key questions in the focus.

In 2010, a **first ever African assessment of the APSA** was concluded. The report assessed the progress made by the African union, the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms in the operationalization of the APSA. It also identified specific gaps, needs and priorities, with a particular focus on key components of the APSA (PSC, CEWS, ASF, PoW and Peace fund). A similar exercise was undertaken in 2014.

In 2011, the **first phase of an APF evaluation** exercise was conducted, in line with the provisions of Article 12 (f) of Council Regulation No 617/2007 of 14 May 2007 on the implementation of the 10th European Development Fund. The main objective was to concentrate on the procedures of the APF and the sources of funding. The final report of this assessment provides a set of lessons learned and recommendations to improve the support to the AU-EU peace and security partnership.

The **second phase of this APF evaluation** was conducted in 2013 and aimed at reviewing the overall implementation of the APF as an instrument for African efforts to manage conflict on the continent. The final report recognized the positive impact of the APF in allowing for more African ownership on peace and security matters on the continent and recommended a strategic shift of the APF from almost exclusive support to PSOs to longer-term operational and structural capacity building.

In 2015, an evaluation of Early Response Mechanism (ERM) under the African Peace Facility was conducted, to identify lessons from the ERM's implementation with a view to enhancing the effectiveness and accountability of EU support for the ERM. The evaluation highlighted the positive nature and impact of the ERM's design but pointed out constraints related to the bureaucratic nature of EU aid processes as well as capacity constraints facing the AU and RECs/RMs as well as ongoing challenges between them.

Article 15 of the Council regulation 2015/322 of 2 March 2015 on the implementation of the 11<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund provides that "at the end of the first pluriannual action programme, the Union and its Member States will review the results and procedures of the African Peace Facility and will discuss options regarding future funding possibilities". In that context, and in order to put the African Peace Facility on a sounder footing, the Union and its Member States will hold discussions addressing both the issue of funds for peace support operations, including those financed from the EDF, and the issue of sustainable Union support to African-led peace support operations beyond 2020. **In addition, the Commission will conduct an evaluation of the Facility no later than 2018**". This evaluation intends to answer the requirement of the Council regulation.

## 2. DESCRIPTION OF THE ASSIGNMENT

### ➤ Objective

The objective of the evaluation is to provide an overall independent assessment of the performance of the African Peace Facility (APF) for the period 2014-2016 and, on this basis, draw key lessons and recommendations in order to improve current and future support through that instrument.

The evaluation should serve policy decision-making and project management purposes. The main users of this evaluation are DG DEVCO, the EEAS, EU delegations in the APF beneficiary regions; the AU and the REC/RMs. The evaluation should also generate results of interest to governmental and civil society partners and the EU member states.

Evaluators will hence follow a two-step approach.

### 1. Assessment of "performance" of the APF for 2014-2016 and progress in challenge areas

First, the evaluation will provide an assessment of what has been achieved through the APF for the period 2014-2016 with regards to Peace Support Operations and capacity-building, taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the 2013 APF evaluation.

This entails:

(i) Reconstructing the intervention logic of the APF, including a description of the chain of results from inputs through to impact as well as the underlying assumptions on which the logic of intervention is based.

(ii) Deriving from this and for the selected APF activities carried out during the 2014-2016 period, formulating and applying evaluation questions in order to assess the performance of the APF through ten evaluation criteria:

- ) **Relevance:** the extent to which the APF activities carried out during the 2014-2016 period were compliant (i) with the general priorities of the EU's foreign policy and its commitments within the framework of the Joint-Africa EU Strategy on Peace and Security and (ii) with the objectives and priorities set by the AU and RECs/RMs.<sup>6</sup>
- ) **Effectiveness:** the evaluation team shall identify all recorded *results and impacts*, including any unintended ones, and compare these to the intended results and/or impacts put forward in the 2014-2016 APF action programme.
- ) **Efficiency:** for the activities which were effective, it will be necessary to question to what extent funding, human resources, regulatory and/or administrative resources contributed to, or hindered the achievement of the objectives and results at both EU and AU/REC level.
- ) **Impact:** the evaluation team shall provide an assessment of the positive and negative changes produced by the intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. This involves the main impacts and effects resulting from the APF intervention, with a specific emphasis on the period 2014-2016 on the security and development environment of Africa.
- ) **Sustainability:** (i) an analysis of the extent to which the activities carried out during the period 2014-2016 are likely to be maintained over time, notably having in mind that financing peace support operations is extremely expensive and very difficult to plan ahead; and (ii) an analysis of the extent to which the results and impacts of said activities are being, or are likely to be maintained over time.
- ) **3 Cs (coordination, complementarity and coherence):** co-ordination/complementarity with other EU instruments for Africa (EDF-RIPs/NIPs, IcSP actions, DCI PANAF program, EU Trust Fund, CSDP missions) and with EU Members States' own policies + coherence with EU policies for Africa<sup>7</sup> (including the Member States' own policies).
- ) **Added value of the EU intervention:** Added value of the APF with regards to other interventions directed at fostering peace and security in Africa for the period 2014-2016.
- ) **Key cross-cutting issues and more specifically the issue of human rights:** Verification should be undertaken, on the one hand, of the extent to which account has been taken of such a priority in the 2014-2016 Action Program and, on the other hand, of the extent to which such issue has been reflected in the activities carried out during the evaluation period.

In parallel to the applying the evaluation questions, measuring progress with regards to the recommendations formulated in the 2013 APF evaluation. The APF 2013 evaluation formulated recommendations in five areas:

- ) **Deepening the EU-Africa partnership:** EU was advised to engage on a regular basis with AU Member states and RECs/RMs at a political level in order to lay the grounds for a continuous dialogue on ways to consolidate achievements of the APF in the mid and long-term.
- ) **Refine the strategic focus of the APF:** EU was advised to work with the AU/RECs and RMs in order to refine the strategic orientation of the APF by continuing support in areas/activities where it is best placed to deliver and leave other areas to other actors better suited.
- ) **Rationalize the decisional process of the EU/APF:** EU was advised to amend the provision referring to financial decision-making in the three year action program, which stipulates that each action requires a distinct decision. The objective of this modification was to accelerate the approval process of contracts without strategic importance, such as the renewal of support to PSOs.

<sup>6</sup> The latter point concerns the issue of African ownership, one of the founding pillars of the Africa-EU partnership.

<sup>7</sup> Questions could be: Is the APF supportive to the broader framework of EU foreign policy objectives and in particular to EU development cooperation and CSDP? Is there any room for improvement in the cooperation with other EU activities?

- ) **Reinforcement of capacities of the APF:** It was advocated that APF partners (EU/AU/RECs/RMs) adopt a tailored approach to reinforce capacities in the area of peace and security, on the basis of a thorough evaluation of the needs of partner institutions. In that regard, the EU was advised to work on realigning the APF on other donors' support, whether EU (RIPs) or else (AU support programme, AFDB, bilateral donors, etc.).
- ) **Reinforce EU Support to the Program:** EU was advised to explore options that would allow for the decentralization of certain aspects of the APF management, especially with regards to the everyday management and monitoring of activities of the AU and RECs/RMs financed by the APF. It was also suggested that DG DEVCO pushes for an increase of the APF management team.

The evaluation team will assess the extent to which the recommendations made in these areas have been translated into the 2014-2016 Action Programme, as it was intended – i.e. are they reflected upon in the objectives, intended results and the logframe (appendix 2 to the AP 2014-2016).

The evaluation team will then assess the extent to which the actions DEVCO and the EEAS intended to undertake as a follow-up to the 2013 APF evaluation have actually been carried out.

EEAS and DEVCO produced a follow-up note in which they laid down priorities to be pursued for each area of recommendations. For each priority, a concrete set of actions was put forward in order to advance in the implementation of the recommendations.

The evaluation team will analyse whether said actions have actually been undertaken for the period 2014-2016 and whether they yielded the intended results. In the case that such actions have not been pursued, the evaluation team will offer an explanation as for why. In the event that the evaluation team has, through its assessment of the APF achievements for the period 2014-2016, encountered new challenges, it will regroup them under thematic recommendation areas for which concrete actions will be formulated in the prospective part of the evaluation.

## 2. Production of a concrete and actionable document to implement recommendations

Second and based on the findings of the first step, the evaluation will offer concrete and actionable follow-up as well as new recommendations to address the remaining and new challenges faced by the APF.

To that end, the evaluation team will draw an action document containing:

- ) Follow-up recommendations for thematic areas, identified in the 2013 APF evaluation, for which progress still needs to be made.
- ) New recommendations, aggregated into subsequent thematic areas, to address new challenges identified during the first step of the evaluation.
- ) For each area of recommendations, a concrete set of actions to be undertaken by both the EU and the AU in order to see measurable progress.
- ) Suggestions to integrate the recommendations into further APF-related action documents will be formulated.

The evaluation team will also review in the light of its findings the logical framework of the APF draft Action Programme 2017-2018 and recommend the necessary changes. In particular the evaluation team will produce a reviewed monitoring framework for the Action Programme, including:

- ) A proposed set of indicators, baselines, targets and sources of verification to improve the APF monitoring framework.
- ) Data collected that will be translated into concrete baselines

### ➤ Requested services

The evaluation of the APF will include four phases: (i) an Inception Phase, mainly devoted to structuring and preparing the evaluation approach and methodology; (ii) a Desk phase, focusing on gathering and analysing existing data and information (through literature/document reviews and interviews), in order to provide preliminary answers to evaluation questions formulating and planning the regional seminar; (iii) a Field Phase, including the preparation and conduct of field missions and (iii) a Synthesis Phase, focusing on drafting the Final Report and other required documents.

For each phases, the evaluation team is required to provide certain services according to an indicative timeline.

## 1.2 List of interviewees

Institution / Name	Function
<b>European Commission</b>	
BROUANT Olivier	ECHO Head of Office
HEFFINCK Johan	ECHO Somalia Head of Office
VERNA Luc	ECHO Head of Office
BRAUN Albrecht	DEVCO D3 Program Manager
BUSE Katharina	DEVCO D3 Program Manager
LAPORTE Vincent	DEVCO D3 Program Manager
ADRIAEN Charlotte	DEVCO E2 Deputy Head of Unit Development Coordination and Regional cooperation West Africa
AL-UTAIBI, Janet	DEVCO Geo Desk - Regional cooperation officer Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean (IGAD & EAC)
DEKENS Jean-Pierre	DEVCO Geo Desk coordinator for DRC
HOEFKENS Ivo	DEVCO Geo Desk Head of Section Regional Cooperation Eastern Africa
KRENGEL Robert	FPI - Head of FPI 2
<b>European External Action Service</b>	
BARRIOS Cristina	EEAS Policy Officer
BUSUTTIL John	EEAS Policy Officer
LOT Benoit	EEAS Peace and security advisor
MUDFORD Hugh	EUCAP Somalia - Strategic Maritime Adviser
TROPIANO Valentina	EUCAP Somalia - Planning Officer
DEMEYER Céline	EUCAP Sahel - Liaison and Coordination Officer
ABOKI Maurice	EUSR for the Sahel - Political advisor
CUSIN Benoit	EUTM Political advisor
TEMPOREL Col. Hervé	EUTM Chef du Détachement ATF
BELLOT Laurent	EUTM RCA - Military Advisor, Chef de Bataillon
BROCAS Simon	EUTM RCA - Political Advisor
GARCIA BLAZQUEZ Gen. Fernando	EUTM RCA - Force Commander, Major-General
<b>European Union Member States</b>	
LAPIERRE Marie	COAFER French representative
SCHULTING Gerard	COAFER Dutch representative
GARNIER, Frédéric, Col.	French Embassy Defence Attaché
PICHON Col. Frédéric	French Embassy Attaché de Défense
SADOULET David	French Embassy Premier Conseiller
SUREY Eole	French Embassy in Kenya Counselor Somalia
ANDREIAS Col. Thomas	German Embassy - Defense Attaché
GUELLIL Gabriela	German Embassy - Ambassador
SCHÄFFER Barbara	German Embassy - Development Attaché
AMELUNG Annika	GIZ Project leader
KIRCHNER Ludwig	GIZ Head of programme
LANGHEINE Rico	GIZ Directeur de Portefeuille de la GIZ au Tchad

Institution / Name	Function
MAI Gerhard	GIZ Coordinator
STACHE Anja	GIZ Directrice Programme “Gestion durable des ressources en eau”
MENGUELE Francois	GIZ Mali - Programme Director Decentralisation and State Reform Progr
CAVALIER Jean-Baptiste	Operation Barkane - Chef de Bataillon
DUKE Carsten	Operation Barkane - UK Liaison Officer - Cellule de Coordination et de Liaison
TALLIANDIER Col. Benoît	Operation Barkane - Chef de la Cellule de Coordination et de Liaison
LUNDBERG Maria	Swedish Embassy - First Secretary Regional Co-operation, Governance, Peace and Security
BARKER Chris	UK Embassy - Political Counselor
<b>African Union Commission</b>	
BAH Sarjoh	AUC Head of Crisis Management and PCRD PSOD
BAM Sivuyile	AUC Head of Peace Support Operations Division
BISKUT Ms.	AUC Senior Finance Officer
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## 1.4 Case study reports (MNJTF & AMISOM)

As part of the methodology for this evaluation, it was agreed to look at the issue of complementarity in a bit more depth. The following two case studies have therefore been compiled to enrich the findings of the evaluation in relation to EQ5 (focusing on the complementarity of the APF with other EU instruments).

Complementarity in the context of the APF is understood as the multiplicity of ways the support provided by the EU through the APF complements and is coordinated with other sources of funding (provided by the EU and other funding partners) in support of peace and security in Africa (including the way this funding helps to support efforts towards building resilience and shaping the preconditions for development). The analysis is based on a limited amount of information, which could be researched in the context of this evaluation. In the case of the MNJTF, it is mainly based on documents for EU Trust Fund financed projects. Some observations will be made on the complementarity of the APF with the support provided by other funding partners, which is the subject of EQ7, though this point is only discussed in the margins for both cases.


Each case is structured along the following lines. A first section gives an introduction to the respective PSO. A section follows this on the challenges, which the PSO encounters, and another on EU complementarity. A final section provides some observation to be taken account of in answering EQ5, the conclusions and the recommendations of this evaluation.

### Case study on the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)

#### Introduction

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) is a 10,000 strong military operation launched by Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Benin, to counter Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region. The AU authorised the MNJTF in February 2015. It was initiated under the political umbrella of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) which is a sub-regional organisation established by Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon Central African Republic and Libya in 1960s. Initially aimed at fostering joint utilisation of natural resources in the Lake Chad Basin, by the end of the 1990s, LCBC had expanded its mandate to cover security cooperation and has established the Multinational Joint Security Force (MJSF) to deal with cross border banditry (see Figure 1 for the institutional architecture). It is based on this existing structure and with recognition of the regionalisation of the Boko Haram threat particularly in the Lake Chad Basin that four out of the LCBC's six members (Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, Chad) and Benin, which is not a member of the LCBC, established the MNJTF under the political guidance of the LCBC.

Figure 1: MNJTF Institutional Architecture



Source: Assanov et al. 2016:5, ISS

Formally, the LCBC is mandated to provide civilian leadership of the mission. The LCBC Executive Secretary provides an interface between the military command, the AU Peace and Security Department (PSD) and the MNJTF command. De facto, as we will discuss in the next section, the LCBC provides very little civilian leadership and no operational support to the MNJTF due to lack of capacity and experience in both. The LCBC is not a fully recognised Regional Economic Community (REC) like Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). It is therefore not an AU-mandated subsidiary institution in the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). This limits the LCBC's ability to receive direct funding and engage in peace and security issues as part of the APSA. Despite its structural, legal and operational limitations however, the LCBC has fostered bilateral coordination among the national contingents of MNJTF and enabled a setting where countries can quickly deploy troop movements in neighbouring states.

**Mandate of the MNJTF:** This PSO is mandated to “create a safe and secure environment in the areas affected by the activities of Boko Haram and other terrorist groups ... facilitate the implementation of overall stabilisation programmes by the LCBC Member States and Benin in the affected areas, including the full restoration of state authority and the return of internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees; and facilitate, within the limit of its capabilities, humanitarian operations and the delivery of assistance to the affected populations”<sup>1</sup>. The MNJTF functions as an integrated regional force with joint patrols or operations, but from time to time there are also national contingents, which are not part of the MNJTF, that operate alongside the MNJTF in the same region. National contingents under the MNJTF are financed by their respective countries, operate under their own national flags and report to their own capitals, while LCBC is formally mandated to coordinate intelligence, allow for joint planning and garner technical and financial support.

Given LCBC's capacity constraints, the AUC is de facto the primary partner of the MNJTF.<sup>2</sup> The AUC is responsible for providing logistical support such as transport, IT and communications equipment. The APF, as explained in the introduction to this Final Report, has been made available to the AU in support of various PSOs, including an amount of EUR 50 million for the MNJTF. The money has been made available to fund equipment and services plus a limited number of personnel while, contrary to AMISOM, the costs for troop stipends are not covered by the APF in support of the MNJTF. In addition to the support provided through the EU, the MNJTF receives in-kind support from France and the USA, like training, and financial and logistical support from the UK.

## Challenges

### Launching the civilian and police components

The MNJTF was set up to fight Boko Haram in an area, which is up until today considered a conflict zone. Despite military gains achieved by the MNJTF in the last two years, Boko Haram continues to operate from remote areas of the Lake Chad region. Further, though instituted as a Force with military and civilian components, MNJTF lags behind in its efforts to fully launch the latter. A police component has been discussed but has not been established. The Force also has a Mission Support Team (MST) based in N'djamena that provides daily logistical support (transport), IT and communications equipment<sup>3</sup>.

**Staffing:** At the time of the evaluation, the funding of the MNJTF enables it to pay the salaries of a limited number of key staff plus allowances for 95 military staff. There are 24 positions for the civilian component and 21 positions for the MST. The civilian component (comprising issues such as civil protection, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), human rights) still lacks a coordinator and only 9 out of 24 positions have been filled so far. The responsibility for mobilising personnel for this section lies with the five TCCs. So far, many candidates proposed by the TCCs have been rejected by the AU as they did not fulfil the basic criteria set in the job descriptions (due to a lack of effort by TCCs, as one interviewee mentioned). The MST is fully functional and operating under a coordinator though not all positions have been filled so far (of the 21 positions foreseen, only 13 are currently filled and 8 still to be recruited). Staff

<sup>1</sup> Report Of The Chairperson Of The Commission On The Implementation Of Communiqué Psc/Ahg/Comm.2(Cdlxxxiv) On The Boko Haram Terrorist Group And On Other Related International Efforts. African Union. 3 March 2015. <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-489-rpt-boko-haram-03-03-2015.pdf>

<sup>2</sup> Assanov et al. Assessing the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram. Institute for Security Studies. September 2016. <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/war19.pdf>

<sup>3</sup> Assanov et al. ISS, September 2016;5.

mobilisation for the MST is the responsibility of the AUC. The leadership of the military operations is in the hands of a Nigerian Major-General who reports formally to the Head of the Mission, which is the Executive Secretary of the LCBC.

**Strategy:** Various interviewees highlighted that the MNJTF's principal attention goes to the deployment of military operations. This is also attested to by an analysis of the language used in AU communiqués and reports, which tend to focus on the need to “neutralise” Boko Haram. While the *“need to complement the military and security operations against the Boko Haram terrorist group by sustained national and regional efforts, to improve livelihoods, promote education and job creation, as well as ensure the protection of human rights, particularly those of women and girls”<sup>4</sup>* and *“addressing root causes of the Boko Haram insurgency and, in the longer term, of supplementing military action with development projects, which focus, among other [things], on socio-economic development of the communities liberated from the Boko Haram terrorist group”<sup>5</sup>* can be found in official documents, there is no clear strategy outlining how this will actually be done. Post-conflict peacebuilding, reconciliation, and supporting local community resilience are areas of work that clearly lack the strategic focus as well as the technical and financial investment they need. In a well-functioning scenario, this civilian component should be the connector with the LCBC and international partners to promote stabilisation, resilience building and development.

### Lack of coordination and capacity

**Institutional weakness of the LCBC:** As outlined above, the LCBC has the political as well as the technical mandate from its six member states to promote regional development around the Lake Chad. Four of its members are part of the MNJTF (Chad, Nigeria, Cameroon and Niger) the other two are Libya and the CAR which are largely dysfunctional states. Interviewees described the LCBC as institutionally very weak, though it has gained a EUR 85 m support from the African Development Bank for regional development, managed through a PMU at the LCBC. GIZ provides supports on organisational strengthening and supports a project focusing on the environment. There are firm plans by the German Government to close this project by 2019.

The LCBC planned to organise a conference on the issue of “stabilisation in the Lake Chad region”, an issue which is a key concern of all actors that the evaluation team talked to in N'Djamena. This initial conference should clarify the needs in the domain of stabilisation and help to mobilise the interest of international partners to support these efforts. After several attempts, starting in late 2016, an initial event took place in November 2017. According to observers, the two-day conference was well organised and focused on the discussion and design of a regional strategic stabilisation framework. Representatives of the AU, the LCBC, the LCBC member states and international partners attended the event.

**Institutional weakness of the AUC:** Procurement of equipment, which falls under AUC's role in the division of labour, is lagging behind severely and has limited the operations of the MNJTF to date. The interviews also pointed to a communication and coordination gap at different levels: between the various departments of the AUC departments, between AUC, LCBC and with the Force.

## Reviewing EU complementarity

### EU support

As mentioned above, the EU has made EUR 50 m available to support the MNJTF through the African Peace Facility (APF). EUR 31,670,000 has been transferred to the AU so far. Roughly 90% of this amount is dedicated to the provision of supporting equipment and services, including vehicles, generators, communication equipment, medical services, construction of buildings and flight services in support of the MNJTF at HQ level and in its four sectors of operation. The EU contribution also helps to facilitate operational coordination among the affected countries in the fight against Boko Haram. This includes support to facilitate the conduct of joint/coordinated patrols and other type of operations, supporting the institutionalisation of civil-military coordination; prevention of illicit arms transfer and ammunition; as well as supporting efforts to bring to justice those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity<sup>6</sup>. The

<sup>4</sup> AUPSC 9 December, 2016. <http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/press-statement-of-the-peace-and-security-council-on-the-ongoing-efforts-to-neutralize-the-boko-haram-terrorist-group>

<sup>5</sup> AUPSC April 21, 2017. <http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/press-statement-of-the-680th-psc-meeting-of-mnjtf>

<sup>6</sup> Delegation Agreement n° 2016/373983

funding agreement between the EU and the AU starts on 1 July 2016 and spells out an initial implementation period of 19 month, which has been extended until the end of 2018.

## EU funding and complementarity

The EU supports regional stabilisation through a range of instruments and projects as listed in the Table 1 below. To get more insights into the complementarity of MNJTF's activities and activities funded through other EU sources in support of stabilisation, peacebuilding, resilience and development (and vice versa), the evaluation team's original approach was to take a closer look at the various initiatives funded by the EU through the EDF, EIDHR, IcSP and the EU Trust Fund (Sahel window). DEVCO could make available to the evaluation team (see Table 1) a number of EU Trust Fund financed project documents currently implemented in Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Due to the rather recent start of these projects, there are no evaluation reports or any ROMs available so far. As a result there were fewer documents available than the evaluation team had hoped to find. The documents obtained, however, provide sufficient information to make a number of pertinent observations with regard to complementarity, as we will discuss below.

**Table 1: EU Trust Fund supported initiatives in region**

Document number	Implementer	Period	Amount	Theme
T05_EUTF-SAH-CM-03 Cameroon	AFD	20/09/2016 - 20/06/2018 21 months	Euro 10 m	Economic development and youth employment
T05_EUTF-SAH-NG-09 Niger	UNHCR	Start date not known 26 months	Total: Euro 13 m TF: Euro 12 m	Strengthening resilience through rehabilitation and development
DoA DRC T05_EUTF-SAH-NG-01-01 Nigeria	DRC	01/01/2016 - 31/12/2017 24 months	Euro 5.5 m	Stability (resilience), socio-econ recovery, conflict mediation capacities
DoA T05_EUTF-SAH-NG-01-02 IRC Nigeria	IRC	1/12/2016 - 1/12/2018 24 months	Euro 4 m	Service delivery and livelihoods
DoA NRC-T05_EUTF-SAH-NG-01-03 Nigeria	NRC	1/11/2016 - 1/11/2018 24 months	Euro 2.123 m	Resilience and co-existence
DoA T05_EUTF-SAH-NG-03-01 Nigeria	DFID/ British	2017-2018 48 months	Euro 21 m	Conflict management (local and regional)
DoA DRC T05_EUTF-SAH-TD-01 Chad	Oxfam	Start date unknown 48 months	Total: Euro 15 m TF: Euro 15 m	Employment, food security
DoA DRC T05_EUTF-SAH-TD-05 Chad	Cognitia	Start date unknown 36 months	Total: Euro 10 m TF: Euro 10 m	Supporting local security (forces)
T05-EUTF-SAH-TD-02-01 Chad	GiZ	10/2016 - 9/2019 36 months	Total: Euro 20.3 m TF: Euro 18.0 m	Strengthening resilience and peaceful coexistence
T05-EUTF-SAH-REG-05- RESILAC Regional	AFD		Total Euro 35 m TF: Euro 30 m	Economic development and social inclusion

*Note: Five of these ten projects analysed focus on livelihood creation, economic development and basic service delivery (under the term 'resilience') with an amount of Euro 71 m. Four projects, worth a total of Euro 46.72 m, have more robust, social cohesion and peacebuilding components while one project worth Euro 10 m has a solid focus on local security and stabilisation.<sup>7</sup>*

<sup>7</sup> It should be noted however, that the categories created here, i.e. peacebuilding on the one hand and economic development/livelihood creation, are not mutually exclusive. In fact, projects with strong peacebuilding and social cohesion components have economic development and livelihood creation aspects to a large extent, while those that focus on economic development and service delivery might also have activities that can fit into conflict management/prevention or social cohesion, though lacking strategic coherence.

In reading the project documents related to the initiatives listed in Table 1, attention was given to the way these projects have been designed to address issues of peacebuilding and social cohesion, livelihood development, conflict sensitivity, and the extent to which they are complementary with other externally funded initiatives and with policies and activities undertaken by the respective national governments. These issues are pertinent as they are geared towards shaping the preconditions for transitioning towards stabilisation and development. The evaluation team is conscious that ‘the proof of the pudding is in the eating’, that is in the way these projects will be implemented in practice. However, the following broad observations, can be noted upfront:

- Most project documents pay specific attention to complementarity questions, including the creation of linkages, complementarities and alignment with the national policies and activities of the respective countries. The documents also pay attention to complementarities with other initiatives funded by the EU, (particularly the EUTF) as well as by other international partners in the target areas. However, there is rather limited information available on *how* these complementarities are going to be promoted.
- Projects that focus on establishing or providing sector services (like health), building economic resilience and enhancing food security are predominant. In these projects, livelihood creation (most notably ‘cash for work’) and service delivery are presented as approaches to achieve resilience and economic development. The extent to which such service oriented projects, funded for a particular period, will be sustainable and will effectively follow up on the APF supported activities of the MNJTF is questionable.
- Further, where referring to ‘resilience’, there is a tendency to focus primarily on economic resilience while overlooking other types of resilience (environmental, political/conflict, psycho-social etc.) or assuming these will automatically flow from the former, without considering how the necessary processes could be put in place or how to transition from instability towards resilience and development.
- Similarly, there seems to be a conflation of concepts when it comes to ‘peacebuilding, social cohesion and resilience’. EU Trust Fund projects reviewed draw their relevance for the funding by referring to these concepts interchangeably and projecting them as expected outcomes, while lacking sound strategies on how they are meant to be complementary to the APF support.
- Out of the 10 projects reviewed, four explicitly address questions of social cohesion and peacebuilding through concrete processes and strategies (these projects are implemented by DRC, NRC and DIFD/British Council in Nigeria<sup>8</sup> and a project in Chad, implemented by GiZ). In the other cases, there is an assumption that projects in particular sectors will lead to more peace and stability.
- The majority of projects focus on the achievement of particular goals (in the short-term, which might be due to the objectives of the EU Trust Fund approach). How these activities are to be embedded in a longer-term process is not elaborated in these documents.
- Conflict sensitivity is approached as a cross-cutting issue. Seven projects<sup>9</sup> indicate their interventions will be based on a thorough conflict analysis and/or that their activities will be implemented in a conflict-sensitive manner to ensure no harm is done, which is supporting complementarity with the APF.
- The various projects provide potentially very relevant information and lessons learnt for the civilian component of the MNJTF. None of these projects, however, mention that active contact or forms of collaboration will be sought with this component of the MNJTF. One project, working specifically on strengthening the capacity of local security forces in Chad, mentions the relevance of its intervention towards MNJTF’s overall purpose in the region.<sup>10</sup>
- There is only one project, which reflects a very comprehensive understanding of building social cohesion and resilience. It has several aspects (both as ends and strategies) of what

<sup>8</sup> Three projects are in Nigeria and one in Chad (see table 1 above for project references)

<sup>9</sup> Four of these projects are in Nigeria and run by DRC, NRC, IRC, and DIFID/British Council; two are in Tchad run by GiZ and Oxfam and one is a regional program run by ADF.

<sup>10</sup> Project implemented by Cognetia

can be considered peacebuilding, grassroots based social reconstruction and strengthening of local capacities. The strategies it uses such as dialogue, trust building, collaboration across groups, reliance on local structures etc. show its commitment to long-term change processes rather than impressive "quick-fixes" that most of the other projects seem to emphasise.<sup>11</sup>

## Main take-aways for EQ5 and the recommendations

**The good intentions on complementarity need to be carried through to implementation:** The observations above suggest that there are good efforts made across the interventions to put complementarity into practice. At the same time the focus is rather more on the shorter term, which raises questions on the extent to which these investments will connect to longer-term processes of change and stabilisation. These might be addressed through other EU funding which the evaluation team could not review, e.g. EDF, IcSP or EIDHR funded activities.

**Pay more attention in projects supporting peacebuilding and rehabilitation to the civilian components of PSOs and vice versa:** Another point emerging is that efforts are made to address peacebuilding and sector rehabilitation but that more attention could be paid in the interventions to help strengthen the social fabric of conflict affected and fragile areas and thereby be complementary to the support provided initially through the APF. The limited up-front attention of these projects with the civilian component of the MNJTF should be an issue of attention as this component is meant to address at the local level human rights issues, the protection of civilians and stabilisation efforts, which are potentially relevant to connect with through the resilience projects.

**For a conflict-prone and highly fragile environment like the Lake Chad region, design a PCRD strategic orientation and action plan:** In addition to taking quick and genuine steps towards setting up the civilian component of MNJTF, the AU, LCBC, EU and other partners should follow up without delay on the November 2017 stabilisation conference to design a post-conflict peacebuilding strategy for the Lake Chad Basin. While EU's NIPs, RIPs and TF are laudable and do contribute towards stabilising and developing the Lake Chad region, effecting real and deep-rooted change in the Lake Chad Basin will require more than financial allocation. It will need a broadly agreed strategic orientation and action plan with well thought-out processes, means and action plans that are designed in a consultative manner and which will be implemented by multiple stakeholders including civil society organisations. Here, cross sectorial collaboration among peacebuilding, development and humanitarian actors will be necessary in order to leverage value-adds of each sector and employ robust processes to achieve well-defined ends. Activating the civilian and police components of the MNJTF would be an immediate step that can contribute to a more comprehensive stabilisation plan for the region.

## Case study on the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM)

### Introduction

The EU is Somalia's main development partner. More than half of the EU's total assistance focuses on development aid and more particularly on governance, education and economic development. The remainder of funds are spent on Peace and Security. AMISOM is the main recipient of these funds through the APF.

This case study will provide a brief overview of the challenges facing AMISOM, a brief mapping of the most important support provided to Somalia by the EU and international partners and a brief overview of the coordination framework within which all actors support the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in its recovery and state-building efforts. The coordination framework forms the basis of ensuring complementarity between the various EU instruments as well as with international partners. The UN is the key international partner for all actors in Somalia.

<sup>11</sup> Interestingly, while it talks about displacement and the impact of conflict on youth's engagement in armed groups or migration, the overall narrative and focus of the project is social-rehabilitation and transformative social change - which also sets it apart from the other projects which tried very much to tie their work to the EU's policy agenda of combatting irregular migration.

Full political recovery for Somalia is supported through the reforms needed to ensure full re-engagement with the International Financial Institutions, access to multilateral finance and debt relief. This will also help laying the foundations for more inclusive, stable politics including a roadmap to a more inclusive electoral process in 2020. For the period 2014-2020, the EU and its Member States' cooperation includes development, humanitarian aid and peacekeeping operations, which jointly amounts to €3.4 billion. The Security Pact agreed at the London Somali conference in May this year, reflects the commitment taken by the SFG and FMS to build up their own security forces and institutions.

There is a direct relationship between the EU and the AU in the form of the Joint Africa–EU Strategy (Roadmap 2014–2017), which includes a strong partnership on peace and security. This agreement underlines the EU's continued commitment to financing The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It is widely agreed that AMISOM is still an essential provider of security in Somalia. Numerous peace initiatives have been made in attempts to stabilise Somalia since the government collapsed in 1991. Their success was limited. Established in 2007, AMISOM changed the security landscape significantly. The foundations for restoring peace in the country have improved. It achieved significant, although limited, success in reducing insecurity in Somalia. AMISOM evicted the militant insurgent group, Al-Shabaab, from almost all major urban centres in South Central Somalia, including the capital city Mogadishu. The Somali National Army (SNA), with the support of AMISOM, captured Mogadishu on 9 December 2012. Other liberated areas include Baidoa and the port cities of Marka and Kismayo. AMISOM, working with the Somali government, is seen as the central pillar of stability in Somalia.

Despite this success, Somalia still has some way to go before it can achieve sustainable peace. AMISOM is a peace-enforcement mission that by July 2017 had about 22,000 troops from Ethiopia, Burundi, Kenya, Uganda, and Djibouti. The mission is critical for the continuation of the political process and financial support remains vital for AMISOM to fulfil its mandate. EU funds are used to cover the deployment allowances of AMISOM troops, salaries and allowances of the AMISOM police and civilian components, death and disability compensation for military and police personnel; as well as headquarters costs.

#### **Mandate:**

AMISOM was created by the African Union's Peace and Security Council on 19th January 2007 with an initial six month mandate. Since then the mandate has been extended periodically. AMISOM's primary objective shifted in recent years from reducing the threat posed by Al-Shabaab to enabling the Somali security forces to gradually take over security responsibility.

The UNSC Resolution 2372 of 30 August 2017 extends the mandate until 31 May 2018. The UNSC reiterated its determination to support efforts to reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab, and underlining its commitment to support an inclusive Somali-led political peace and reconciliation process and recognised that the FGS has the primary responsibility to protect its citizens and build its own national security forces. It also commended the decision by the FGS to make security sector reform a priority for the next four years; reaffirmed the strong commitment of international partners to support the FGS and Federal Member States; recognised that a more stable Somalia is of vital importance to ensuring regional security and expressed its support for a transfer of security tasks from AMISOM to the Somali security forces in a gradual and conditions-based manner.

The UNSC requested stakeholders including international partners, to recognise that the long term objective for Somalia in terms of AMISOM, is that Somali Security Forces assume full responsibility for Somalia's security and requested a decrease in AMISOM's force strength in light of progress on the ground. It asked AMISOM to reduce the level of uniformed personnel to a maximum level of 21,626 by 31 December 2017, to include a minimum of 1,040 police personnel including five Formed Police Units, with a further reduction of uniformed personnel to 20,626 by 30 October 2018 and to enable the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces. AMISOM has to continue to reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; to secure key supply routes and to conduct targeted offensive operations against Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups. AMISOM should also reconfigure as security conditions allow, in favour of police personnel within the authorised personnel ceiling. The civilian component should be fully operational to support AMISOM's military and police tasks. There should be a comprehensive assessment of AMISOM by 15 April 2018. The UNSC welcomes the support of the international community for peace and stability in Somalia, in particular the European Union for its substantial contribution, reiterates its call for new and existing donors to support AMISOM and stresses the

need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing for African Union-led peace support operations and requesting increased oversight and accountability. The importance of swift implementation of the National Security Architecture is underlined.

## Challenges

The EU is one of the main financial contributors to AMISOM having committed more than €1.5 billion between March 2007 and December 2017. The process of transferring over €1 billion in periodic tranches between two large international organisations involves multiple layers of bureaucracy. The process can take about seven months and involves a wide range of actors, many of whom have no interaction with one another. The process of securing EU financing for AMISOM takes around seven months per contract (sixteen of which were concluded between 2007 and the end of 2016) and requires sign off from all 28 EU member states as well as the production of narrative and financial reports, accounting details and new bank accounts for each tranche and an independent external audit.

Recent AU initiatives aimed at financing 25% of its own peace and security initiatives by 2020 is unlikely to solve the financial crisis concerning AMISOM. AMISOM is an atypical PSO that has evolved "sui generis" and continues to chart its own trajectory politically and militarily. AMISOM is excluded from current discussions around funding PSOs from the AU Peace Fund, due to its expense, long-standing nature and lack of a viable exit strategy in the short term. An alternative approach is needed and will almost certainly involve the UN as well as a cost reduction and drawdown of the mission over the short and medium term, whilst also developing a viable exit strategy.

The AMISOM initiative needs to be sustained if it is to effectively deliver fully on its mandate. The mission has been supported by various partners who have provided the necessary resources. The Somali government forces have complemented AMISOM operations through the provision of vital human intelligence and troops. The lack of sustainable funding poses a serious challenge for AMISOM in terms of continuity of its operations, the provision of the required capabilities and logistical support. There are several possible sources, including the UN Trust Fund, direct donor support and United Nations Support Office for Somalia (UNSOS). AMISOM is a heavy financial and management burden for the AU. UNSOS and the support from the EU have made a difference, but are still not meeting all the needs of the mission. AMISOM can foster a gradual transition of security responsibility to Somali security forces, through training and mentoring and is mandated to do so. Yet the challenge for AMISOM is that its ability to leave Somalia successfully also depends on factors that are beyond its full control:

- Reliance on international partners to provide the mandated capabilities;
- Reconfiguration to enable it to defeat rather than simply degrade Al-Shabaab;
- Inadvisability to leave until Somalia has its own capable, legitimate and inclusive security forces;
- Uneven and slow development in building the national security forces
- Dependence on a sustainable political settlement in Somalia.

The international community's limited presence in Mogadishu and much more so in the rest of South Central also hampers regular interaction and feedback between Somalis and donors. Security rules and lack of infrastructure limits the day-to-day engagement that is necessary for building confidence and common understanding of priorities. This almost certainly makes cooperation more difficult but a certain pragmatic optimism is evident amongst the international actors. Some senior officials even have the confidence to suggest that the international community are becoming less risk averse. If this is matched by a reciprocal increase of confidence and trust on the part of the Somali community in the value of external support, as is hinted at by stakeholders, the prospect for positive outcomes over the medium term is realistic, although there will almost certainly be a series of setbacks.

## Reviewing EU complementarity

### Complementarity and Coordination Frameworks

EU engagement on development is implemented, in conjunction with the UN, through an innovative “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States” and its successor the “New Partnership for Somalia.” The “New Deal” framework was developed in 2011 to better manage risks, increase the use of country systems, and increase the predictability of aid.

The FGS and EU hosted a conference in Brussels on 16 September 2013 to endorse the New Deal Compact. The Compact promised “a new political, security and development architecture framing the future relations between Somalia, its people, and the international community.” It was intended to increase the alignment of international assistance to Somalia’s own national peace-building and state-building priorities. It consists of five peace-building and state-building Goals (PSGs), and subsets of three to four priorities per goal. These are: (1) legitimate and inclusive politics, (2) security, (3) justice, (4) economic foundations, and (5) revenue and services.

The Compact did involve a series of trade-offs between political and technical imperatives for both Somali and international actors. The Compact may have created a paradigm shift in the rhetoric around local ownership and leadership but it is nevertheless an innovative approach to the state-building effort in an environment of instability and insurgency that is necessarily an uncertain process.

At the London Somalia Conference on 11 May 2017, Somalia and the international community agreed on a Security Pact as well as endorsed the New Partnership for Somalia based on the principle of mutual accountability, which will now replace the Compact. It is probably too early to tell what the exact impact of the New Deal was within the broader dynamics in the country, but it is an overarching document with a long-term vision that has earned general acceptance as a coordination, planning and implementation framework, at least by the most important actors. The Somali Compact was weak on the specifics of Security Sector Reform (SSR). This may have been corrected through the National Security Architecture agreed upon at the London Somali Conference in May 2017. The National Security Architecture details how the international community and Somalia will work together to respond to the most pressing political, economic, security and development challenges facing the country. It follows a Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS) which co-ordinates efforts in the field of SSR at national and federal level.

The Federal Government has set out that security reform is a priority for the next four years. The International Community intends to continue to provide sustainable support. This political agreement underpins and is central to achieving sustainable security reform and a transition of primary responsibility of security from AMISOM to Somali security forces. The Security Pact (NSP) adopted in June 2016, sets out a vision of affordable, acceptable and accountable Somali-led security institutions and forces, with a view to transferring the primary responsibility for the provision of security from AMISOM to Somali security forces. The NSP also sets the framework for security institutions and decision making in Somalia.

There have been efforts by DEVCO to create more coherence in a mission that was not initially conceived from a shared analysis. The New Partnership for Somalia now forms an agreed security architecture and analysis of the best engagement and eventual disengagement in AMISOM.

The centralised management of the APF is not helpful to coordination between different EU instruments (especially the RIPS and NIPS) and with EU-AU and as a result a comprehensive approach to Somalia, that includes close cooperation with AMISOM, is not easy. The distinction between civilian and military nature of projects places limitations on coordination and cooperation with ECHO as well, which especially, tries to stay close to its humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality. The EUCAP capacity building project for maritime security is likewise civilian in nature and avoids too close coordination with military missions although they do share resources and coordinate well on the ground.

The EUD-Somalia does provide political guidance to FGS, which in turn can support an exit strategy for AMISOM. Relations in this area are also closely linked to the Somali Government’s Economic Recovery Plan. The Recovery Plan forms part of the Compact and now of the New Partnership for Somalia. It may be a sufficiently innovative and flexible instrument to deal with the unique security challenges in Somalia that have, until recently, been perhaps more complex than large multilateral institutions have been able to respond to.

All partners also endorse the New Policing Model agreement on a federal model for the justice sector. The New Policing Model sets out the framework for how policing will be governed and delivered in Somalia, with a division of responsibilities between the federal level and the states. It sets out to integrate regional and federal forces into a coherent National Security Architecture and defines four key areas of reform:

- The number of Somali military and police security forces;
- The civilian oversight role of the executive over the armed forces;
- The distribution of Somali security forces at the Federal and State level;
- A realignment of Somali National Army sectors to reflect the political dispensation;
- Efficient command and control of Somali Security Forces;
- Greater clarity in the division of roles and responsibilities between the Federal and state level.

The document clearly sets out the vision to transfer the responsibility for the provision of security from AMISOM to Somali security forces, defining milestones until the year 2027. The agreement furthermore details key tasks and responsibilities of different security actors, their distribution and composition. In May 2017, for example, Somali police chiefs from the federal government and member states also approved a new standardised police recruit curriculum.

### **Main EU funding**

The agreed frameworks bring more clarity for the formulation of the National Indicative Programme for Somalia (NIP), but for all major decisions all 28 Member States need to be on board. The focus of the 2014-2020 NIP is on Governance, Resilience and Education. Arts, Somali culture and education are supported as soft actions to help fight violent extremism.

The NIP brings together a set of instruments with a wide and comprehensive approach. For the period between 2014 and 2020, the EU provided €286 million to help the country achieve its development goals. The programme has been drawn up to reflect the priorities of the Somali Compact. This funding is complemented by other allocations from the EU budget, covering specific issues such as: democracy and human rights, boosting local government, training, food security, and energy and water supplies. A further €200 million from the EUTF was announced at the London conference in April 2017.

In the RIP (which covers IGAD, EAS, COMESA and SADC) there are no security interventions for IGAD, but there are some discussions, albeit still at an early stage, to complement it with possible projects on migration and resilience. The RIP does have €1.3 billion approved in 2014 for seven years. The focus of RIP is on peace and security, economic development, natural resource management with a small component for cross-cutting issues.

The EU Training Mission (EUTM) has been involved in training the Somali National Army since 2010. It cooperates closely with UNSOM and AMISOM, sharing resources and skills, and is mandated until 31 December 2018. It follows a three-pillar approach of training, mentoring and advising.

Programmes for the region are also planned supporting IDPs and refugees and establishing the rights for IDPs through building institutions, frameworks and laws supporting migration. There is also a need to establish mechanisms for managing migration at the Federal level. This will be supported by the EDF with the Somalia Stability Fund (SSF) (started and managed by DFID). The EU contributes €4 million to this fund which has €64 million in total. The SSF has three pillars: support the work of AMISOM, state building and stabilisation and conflict prevention and management.

There is a strong interest for action in early stabilisation together with the UK. DFID also provided Quick Impact Project (QIP) support to AMISOM, but there is no longer any funding for this. The EUD though, would like to focus on the early phases of recovery for which QIPs are an important component. The link with AMISOM is important and an efficient intervention in the area of recovery which will provide an avenue for AMISOM to draw down and exit.


The UN considers integrated missions as those that comply with three purposes: security, strengthening of political institutions and economic and social recovery. The EU considers complementarity as several actions using the available resources encompassing defence, development and diplomacy. The EU has all the instruments necessary to implement a comprehensive approach, which gives it an advantage over many

other actors. The UN approach is similar and this provides the basis for strong cooperation between the two organisations.

The wide acceptance of the New Security Architecture, by all the main actors in Somalia, combined with close cooperation at all levels, from the political roles played by the Special Representatives of both the UN and the EU to Somalia, the close alignment of projects through the UN's integrated mission, with many EU projects implemented through UN agencies and participation in the civil-military cooperation mechanisms, all contribute to increased complementarity. Close working relationships on the ground further enhances the opportunities to identify common goals and work towards them.

It is not possible to provide more than a very brief snapshot of the full extent of EU support to Somalia and the Horn of Africa. An attempted mapping exercise highlighted the complexity rather than illuminate the extent of involvement of the various EU instruments active in the country and the region and the role of international partners. The figure below gives a simplified overview of all the actors both EU services and working groups (in blue) and other international (in yellow).

**Figure 2: Key EU and non-EU actors involved in initiatives in Somalia and the Horn of Africa**



## Ways forward

Somalia is an especially protracted and complex conflict environment, which has evolved through a number of phases. Rival warlords tore the country apart into clan-based fiefdoms in the 1990s. The two relatively peaceful northern regions of Somaliland and Puntland effectively broke away. An important feature since 2006 has been the emergence of a variety of Islamist movements seeking to establish an Islamic state. These range from traditionalist sufi orders, to progressive Islamist movements, groups such as Al Itihad Al Islamiya pursuing a regional or global agenda and finally Al-Shabaab, with links to Al Qaeda and ISIS. This all stretches the ability of international actors to intervene in a meaningful manner. Nevertheless incremental political and economic progress has been achieved by 2012 in south central Somalia.

Somalia is finally moving from the end of a political transition to stabilisation and transformation phases. The most recent elections of February 2017 have brought a President into office, who apparently enjoys cross-clan support. It has a young parliament with reasonable representation of women. The Provisional Constitution is due for a process of revision in 2017. Regional administrations, the National Federal

Parliament and civil society will all be involved in the formulation. The new Federal Constitution will set a framework for the national elections in 2020.

The EU should focus on matters that are vital to the long-term interests of Somalia and address the issue of funding as part of a strategic examination of peace and security.

In particular the EU could usefully:

- Assist African mediation and preventive diplomacy initiatives aimed at the resolution of the conflict so that AMISOM can better operate diplomatically as well as operationally with a view to ensuring durable and inclusive conflict resolution, including through peace agreements,
- In dialogue with African partners, put more emphasis on mission support for better operational coherence, and assist efforts made by African actors to harmonise their approaches among African actors and with the UN,
- Support police related activities, for example doctrine development, planning, conduct of policing tasks, training of local police and institutional support.

The EU and AU should work together to:

- Assist in increasing the meaningful participation of Somali civil society actors in mediation efforts,
- Strengthen and support efforts that ensure the full involvement of women's groups in mediation processes through technical capacity building and logistical support and in coordination with existing continental support structures.
- Create joint AU-EU platforms for learning on outcomes of partnership actions and invite strategic partners, such as the UN or the USA, to such platform meetings.
- Undertake regular reviews to collect information and analyse how the EU has informed, enabled and co-directed the AU policy on peace and security to better understand its impact and to better understand how this role is seen by partners.
- Extend this dialogue to key African national governments (especially the TCCs) acting on peace and security, recognising the important role they play in the hierarchy of APSA institutions.

There are results to be seen on a number of different fronts. A new and seemingly more confident government has been elected peacefully. The recent drought response reached more people quicker, resulting in a very dramatic drop in mortality compared to the drought in 2011. About 90% of the country is safe enough in principle to start establishing the minimum structures of the state. Al Shabaab is not part of the political process and has been reduced to an insurgent threat that resorts to occasional localised, if sometimes serious, attacks.

The comprehensive frameworks developed for Somalia seem to play an important role in reducing the suspicion that Somalis have of foreigners, allowing them to set the agenda and the pace of change. This is widely accepted amongst all the main players and there is reason to be optimistic that the approach adopted is the most feasible one and the one that will continue to allow Somalia to make progress in small steps.

## 1.5 Log frames and monitoring framework

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### Building log-frames for the APF

#### Background

Conventional wisdom dictates that a log-frame needs to be constructed at the start of the planning of a project, along with an intervention logic (theory of change). The APF, however, started as an ad hoc, pragmatic response to specific conflicts in Africa. Over time it organically became more structured and formalised, with the addition of action plans and Roadmaps. The need for more systematic use of log-frames has been recognised from 2014 and they have been used at different levels: for instance (i) for the MNJTF PSO and (ii) for the APF draft Action Programme 2017-2018. The latter suffers from the weakness that the different levels of objectives are not clearly linked. Thus its Overall Objective makes a brief reference to Sustainable Development Goal 16 and the Silence the Guns by 2020 initiative: *“Contribute to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development (SDG 16) by supporting African led efforts to silence the guns by 2020 and therefore reducing deaths and forced displacement due to violent conflict in the continent.”* Yet neither the Specific Objectives nor the Outputs then naturally flow from the Overall Objective and make no reference to existing Roadmaps and Action Plans (AU and APSA Support Programme). In addition, the indicators are either weak or not filled in and are not specific enough to provide a strong indication of progress made, if any. In other words the log-frame lacks a coherent vision of what success looks like, i.e. what changes the intervention hopes to achieve.

Individual project documents, Roadmaps and Action Plans within the APF usually state one or more overarching aims, presented as goals, purposes or objectives that cannot be traced back to the log-frame. In addition, these are often expressed using vague language and do not correspond to specific changes that the projects will bring about or contribute towards. This makes it difficult to establish an appropriate overall log-frame, since it is difficult to decide how to measure progress if it is not sure what changes need to be measured. Even when a project is clear about the changes it wishes to achieve, it is sometimes not expressed in a way that is easy to monitor and evaluate.

#### Approach

With this in mind a more comprehensive log-frame outline has been developed (See proposed log-frame post 2018 below). This log-frame uses the Intervention logic as a starting point. The Overall Objective, *“Peace & Security in Africa provide conditions for Development and Poverty Reduction”*, accurately reflects the ambitious nature of the APF. Specific Objectives and Outputs are then derived from the Intervention logic. The three pillars of the APF - supporting PSOs, Capacity Building and the Emergency Response Mechanism - were also considered as the basis for Outputs. It was found that these are too general for monitoring purposes as many of the activities of the APF, especially its support for APSA, would need to be shoehorned into these pillars, making the difficult task of identifying meaningful indicators almost impossible.

An initial attempt to identify indicators, baselines and targets from the APSA III Roadmap and Action Plan highlighted a number of issues that hamper the ability to design a log-frame that is relevant, realistically related to the work that APF managers in the EU (Delegations and Brussels), the AU, and PSOs do on a day-to-day basis and meaningful to all actors (political, strategic and operational).

A more flexible approach is suggested in the rest of this document. From the available documentation it is clear that designing a log-frame for Peace & Security interventions is a very hard task. UNDP, DPKO, OECD/DAC documents do highlight these difficulties and although they do offer possible solutions it was found that transferring the suggestions into a log-frame by framing clearer Indicators, Baselines and Targets involves making assumptions and working within the shortcomings of the different sources of information that result in a log-frame that is rigid, too generic and without enough focus to serve as a useful management tool. Some of the cells in the proposed post-2018 log-frame have therefore been left blank for now as it is felt they will require further discussion with the actors involved. Other cells contain suggestions as guidelines that will also require further discussion.

The APSA III Action Plan presents a number of features that make it difficult to derive Indicators and Targets. These include over-emphasising output indicators at the expense of outcome indicators; confusing

indicators, targets and objectives; failing to predict when targets will create perverse incentives; choosing indicators for which information is difficult, expensive or impossible to collect; failing to reliably signal the need for disaggregated data; and over-relying on quantitative indicators presumably because they are perceived as easier to measure and more objective.

An important consideration for selecting indicators is to decide if the role of the APF needs to be “*attributed*” to changes in that indicator or if the APF “*contributed*” to the changes measured. For the purpose of either one - attribution or contribution - it is only important that the questions asked then determines the effect of the APF. This can be at the level of Results, Outcomes, Impact or the Overall Objective. The indicators that answer these questions are bound to change over time and different questions will have sufficient (good enough) credibility and relevance to different actors.

What follows below are some considerations on choosing indicators and targets for conflict interventions which should be kept in mind as discussion to further develop the log-frame advances. Table 2 below also provides some useful good practice ideas from the OECD on choosing indicators and targets in the context of SSR work. At the same this has limits as such guidelines can in practice also prove to be too normative to translate into practical indicators.

**Table 2: Good practice in using indicators and targets**

- Invest time in the process of choosing indicators and targets. Reflect on all the options available to measure each result and refine targets and indicator sets over time as the programme, the understanding of partners, and the availability of information change.
- Identify appropriate indicators at outcome level. Ensure that the programme does not only monitor outputs and that there is sufficient emphasis on changes at outcome level.
- Minimise perverse incentives. Remember that “what gets measured gets done”. Choosing to measure one indicator may mean that the programme de-prioritises other important actions and results. Routine measurement of certain indicators can have perverse results. For example, measuring the number of insurgents arrested can lead to innocent young men being arrested on spurious grounds. Measuring the number of participants in training can lead to unsuitable candidates being selected for training.
- Use multiple indicators or “baskets” of indicators to measure results at higher-level outcome and impact levels. A balanced set of indicators that measure different aspects and that may combine quantitative and qualitative measures is more likely to cancel out biases. Using proxy indicators can add nuance and a sense of relevance.
- Use a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods to measure indicators. Quantitative indicators are often easier to collect and measure. However, quantitative indicators often do not give the full picture, and not every change that is important can easily be expressed in numerical format. Do not be afraid to use qualitative indicators where these are more appropriate.
- Ensure that indicators and targets can reflect the needs and participation of various groups.

Consider how to measure changes that are relevant to women, youth, the poor and the vulnerable, especially by disaggregating data and checking for measurement biases for/against certain groups.

- Make your indicators gender-sensitive. Measure whether men and women are equally participating in the programme activities, and insist on sex- and age-disaggregated data whenever feasible. Think about whether you need specific indicators to address the different security and justice needs of women, men, boys and girls (for example, looking at the types of human rights violations to which each group is most vulnerable).
- Promote partnership, inclusion and ownership in setting and using indicators and targets.

Wherever possible, indicators and targets should be agreed jointly between the AU, the partner government and the international supporting organisations, and ideally with the participation of other local stakeholders and beneficiaries (this may include organisations that represent specific communities, such as women’s organisations, religious leaders, disability rights groups, etc.).

- Choose indicators that can be measured. When identifying indicators, consider whether this information is already available, and if not, how easy it will be to collect it given the context and the resources that are available.
- Test indicators. Test indicators to make sure they are valid and appropriate measures of the result you want to achieve.
- Keep it simple. Try to measure what is most important and do it as simply and cheaply as possible. Wherever possible, use information that is already available and that is routinely collected. Build on existing information systems, particularly those of national institutions.

## Considerations for building log-frames for conflict interventions

Creating a log-frame for conflict interventions is hampered by the fact that stakeholders differ in their interpretations of what conflict prevention and peacebuilding is. Conflict is also very dynamic and responds to all interventions in a very unpredictable way. Many donor-funded programmes and policies are undertaken on the assumption that progress towards liberalisation, economic growth, prosperity, human rights and democracy contribute to peace. Evidence shows that while some of those efforts do contribute to peace, others have negative or negligible effects on any particular conflict.

Donors must avoid focusing too heavily on log-frames at the expense of project specific and country M&E frameworks, which are the tools that are familiar and relevant to managers and stakeholders. This is a familiar challenge in all spheres of aid and development, but it is particularly pronounced in conflict interventions because of the dynamic and unpredictable nature of conflict and the range of actors involved. The environment makes it hard to access information and to establish formal indicators and targets that are reliably applicable over time and space. It is not possible to identify clear agreement with all main stakeholders on what to measure as impacts and outcomes and how to do it. In practice it can be necessary to define some indicators and targets without the agreement of all local stakeholders.

Indicators are often confused with targets. Targets are the change(s) that the intervention wishes to achieve; indicators are pieces of information that are used to measure change and performance, to indicate whether a target has been reached. This distinction is often not well understood, and it is common to see indicators presented in ways that also include the target.

This distinction is important because indicators do not automatically need to be linked to specific targets, and in some cases it may not be appropriate for a project to set a specific target during design or even during initial implementation. This may be the case if further information needs to be gathered (such as baseline data) or if it is not sensible to set a specific target until the project has had time to develop or if its objectives may change over time (mandates changing for a PSO, objectives for training and CB changing in response to changes in needs). In such circumstances, it is only possible to identify the indicator (what information is required), and also determine in what way one expects the indicator to change, without setting precise targets.

For measuring conflict related interventions it may be more feasible to set baselines and targets, with the input of stakeholders, only at the time that progress need to be measured. This will also make it possible to measure impact and outcomes from the perspective of specific stakeholders (donors, recipient institutions, countries, communities, women), for specific purposes that may be identified or prioritised from time to time.

This may be the best time for deciding what the changes to measure should be and to agree how to measure these changes. In order to keep track of the changing nature of conflict and the very many different ways in which communities, countries and regions respond to conflict, the best indicators, baselines and targets are perhaps best identified as close to the time of measurement as possible.

Indicators already being used to measure progress in conflict, stability, security, justice and peace-building will have different relevance and priority depending on the type and phase of the conflict and to different stakeholders.

It is necessary to be pragmatic. In some cases, the view that impacts must occur at high levels and be clearly attributable may be grounded in a specialised interpretation of impact assessments that are not realistic. Such an interpretation is not defensible, given that the scope for many interventions can be very narrow and that a variety of methods for acquiring valid evaluation evidence exist that are applicable at different levels.

Not all effects are equally worth investigating for a conflict prevention and peace-building measurement of impact and outcome. The most important effects to investigate are those that relate in non-trivial ways to the conflict and to its key elements. Every component of an intervention will have impacts on the conflict. A clear definition of specific conflict-relevant impacts (and not just outcomes or outputs) should make them easier to identify and assess, for both managers and evaluators.

In order to assess the impacts of interventions, they must not only assess direct and intended effects, but also determine whether those effects have an important impact on the conflict dynamic, as identified in a

valid up-to-date conflict context analysis. Too often evaluation is based on an international policy agenda rather than the realities of a particular conflict or a particular level of institutional capacity.

The tendency to develop universal indicators in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, especially in relation to Global Peace may be counter-productive. Predetermined indicators may have a straightjacket effect, preventing creative and flexible responses to changing circumstances. There is still too much debate about what “peace” is to strictly define indicators of progress toward that goal. Furthermore, “universal” indicators may simply not be relevant or useful in a particular context.

It may be easier to identify valid indicators in context once stakeholders have gained a good understanding of the conflict and then set robust and clear goals. Attempts to identify trackable indicators can cause actors to focus on small objectives and to undertake activities that are limited in relation to the overall conflict, and unlikely to have significant impacts on conflict prevention or peacebuilding. Institutions can tend to adapt programmes to fit pre-set indicators, and these programmes then do not respond to changing circumstances. Specifying indicators in the log-frame design phase can limit the ability to respond flexibly and effectively to the dynamics of a conflict, making interventions rigidly pursue inappropriate directions.

Because of the use of log-frames, there may be an overemphasis on quantifiable indicators even though conflict prevention and peacebuilding often involves non-quantifiable outcomes and impacts. Social science assessments have increasingly reliable tools for assessing the quality of social relations. These could be identified and utilised in monitoring and evaluating interventions to complement or replace quantitative measures, whenever these are not available, updated or sufficiently informative. This will encourage a more flexible and evolving notion of indicators, some of which may be determined by stakeholders over the implementation period.

Since conflict prevention and peace-building evaluations occur in the context of conflict, it follows that the approaches and processes of the evaluation are themselves interventions that may impact the conflict or recovery. This can best be understood by thinking about the indicators from a perspective of the situation with regard to the conflict at the time of measurement of impact and outcomes.

It can therefore be desirable that a log-frame does not contain lists of standard indicators and that the cells for indicators, baselines and targets be left empty until greater clarity is available. Standard indicators are often inadvisable because they are not context-specific, are unlikely to be locally owned, and because conflict is too complex to be measured with a simple list of indicators.

There are also a number of indicators available that do not directly aim to measure progress in conflict, stability, security, justice, and peacebuilding but which could be regarded proxy indicators on these themes.

Rather than being a standard, unchanging list of indicators, using existing databases would be much more detailed and flexible. Database users would be able to contribute whenever they had something to offer, not only when indicators sets are being drafted. The indicators in the database would also improve over time as lessons are learned and indicators are updated and revised.

A distinction needs to be made between universal (global, regional) versus local (country level or conflict specific) indicators. Universal key issues may be considered progressive in one context, they could have unintended consequences in another. Universal indicators can fail to account for the complexities of local political, cultural and historical context. Country level indicators are more relevant to unique local circumstances. Locally designed and owned indicators can often be aggregated up to a global level and spread from country to country to create a global set of common indicators for specific purposes.

It is not possible to get a full picture of how indicators are changing over the course of the programme unless it is clear what the situation was at the start. This should be the “baseline,” but such a point can be very difficult to establish in advance and there may well be different concepts of a “starting point” for different types of interventions (training, PSOs, Emergency Response) and for different indicators. A “starting point” for a donor may be the start of the intervention but for the recipient it would be the start of the conflict. Wherever possible, managers should seek to use existing information for baselines, not only because this is cheaper, but also because repeated use and refinement of existing material is more likely to be sustainable than undertaking stand-alone studies for each intervention. Potential baseline data can often be collected in the pre-design phase, even though at that point it will not be certain which indicators will be chosen.

Establishing baselines can be problematic for conflict interventions, since they often deal with difficult contexts where little reliable information is available.

It is advisable to leave the baseline and target columns empty during the design phase and the initial phases of implementation, and then collect more information as the project evolves and the areas where it contributes to impact and outcomes become clearer. At the outset there is a need to consider what form of baseline is possible to establish, whether existing baselines are adequate or can be derived from existing databases or whether a stand-alone study is the best way to do this. Considerable information is generated about the conditions that exist when the interventions are being planned, even if this is not always systematically captured. It is often based primarily on the perceptions and experience at the time of planning and is usually mostly qualitative. In difficult contexts this analytical baseline may be the most that it is possible to gather, and it may be good enough for the needs of the initial phase. It may also be possible to recreate a baseline by collecting data from other sources relating to the time immediately before the intervention started.

Theories of change are seldom made explicit during the planning or implementation stages of a project, and are usually only explored at the evaluation stage. In many cases, conflict interventions are designed more in line with the ideas and models of international specialists than local needs and realities. Consciously reviewing the theory of change during the implementation phase can help to refine project design, since it often reveals untested assumptions and/or a lack of creative thinking, and encourages more context-specific approaches.

Global targets and indicators can play an important role in fostering collaboration, aiding prioritisation, and informing and directing flows of resources to particular contexts or problems if these limitations are understood.

### Sources of Possible Indicators

Following is an annotated list of some existing sources from which to derive indicators.

- For the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): <http://www.isdgs.org/> and <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/>

Sixteen of the seventeen goals might be contingent on achieving SDG 1, Ending Poverty. SDG1 provides possible proxy indicators that can be easily measured. The agenda that SDG16, Peace & Security, address is all encompassing. It will be difficult to derive any indicators applicable to specific conflicts or for the overall objective of the APF.

- World Bank Data: <https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators> and <https://data.worldbank.org/region/fragile-and-conflict-affected-situations>

The primary World Bank collection of development and conflict indicators is compiled from officially recognised international sources. It presents the most current and accurate global development data available (2017 updates for Somalia, Chad and CAR, for example, were available from September and October 2017). It includes national, regional and global estimates and has a consistent and publicly available methodology. World Bank regional data is divided into Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa and Middle East, which makes it difficult to aggregate data for Africa as a whole.

- Conflict and violence indicators: Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE); Minorities at risk project (MAR); Uppsala Data Conflict Program (UDCP); Heidelberg Conflict Barometer; and Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED).
- Peace-building indicators: Everyday Peace Indicator Project; 'New Deal' technical working group common indicators; Globally-Accepted Indicators for peacebuilding (GAIN); Global Peace Index.
- Stability indicators: Fragile States Index; Political Stability Index; Index of State Weakness in Developing World.
- Justice: Rule of Law Index; UN Rule of Law Indicators; Harvard Kennedy School – Indicators in Development: Safety and Justice.

The quality of evidence available on these indicators is highly variable. Some databases are very new, dating from 2012 or 2014. While some organisations have produced comprehensive guidance on the

methodological strategies behind their indicators, others fail to identify the data used to inform their systems, or how achievements are assessed. The status of indicators (whether they are currently being used or not) is often unclear, and there are a limited number of applications from which lessons can be drawn.

### Attached log-frames

The following pages reproduce the proposals for the two Log frames for the APF Action Programme 2017-2018 and for the APF Action Programme post-2018. For ease of use these can also be consulted online at the following URLs:

- [Log frame for the APF Action Programme 2017 - 2018](#)<sup>12</sup>
- [Log frame for the APF Action Programme post-2018](#)<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> [https://drive.google.com/a/ecdpm.org/file/d/1Ktba\\_C8txbYwjOWiC2VJrsdAO4kpUqxS/view?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/a/ecdpm.org/file/d/1Ktba_C8txbYwjOWiC2VJrsdAO4kpUqxS/view?usp=sharing)

<sup>13</sup> <https://drive.google.com/a/ecdpm.org/file/d/1jncnnNE0TrY1I4yqCTaEeTbrt653iY4R/view?usp=sharing>

Log frame for the APF Action Programme 2017 - 2018

	Intervention logic	Indicators	Baselines (incl. reference year)	Targets (incl. reference year)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions (Opportunities & Risks)
<b>Overall Objective</b>	Contribute to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development (SDG 16) by supporting African led efforts to silence the guns by 2020 and therefore reducing deaths and forced displacement due to violent conflict in the continent.	<p><b>Conflict related:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>% reduction in excess mortality</li> <li>% reduction in refugees and IDPs</li> <li>% reduction people affected by humanitarian crisis</li> <li>% reduction in famine</li> <li>% reduction in mortality from cholera, diarrhoea and water borne disease</li> </ul> <p><b>Poverty related:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>% reduction people affected by humanitarian crisis</li> <li>% reduction in food insecurity</li> <li>% reduction of maternal and neonatal mortality</li> <li>% reduction on &lt;5yr mortality</li> <li>% reduction in childhood mortality</li> <li>% increase in access to primary health care</li> <li>% reduction of people displaced</li> </ul> <p><b>Development related:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Increase in years of life expectancy</li> <li>Increase in number of children in primary, secondary and tertiary education</li> <li>Increase in number of mothers with access to pre-natal care</li> <li>% reduction in preventable childhood diseases</li> <li>% reduction in preventable diseases</li> <li>% reduction in unemployment rate</li> <li>% reduction in crime rate</li> <li>Increase in number of undisputed elections</li> </ul>	Demographic data (pre-dated by about 5-10 years to obtain verified data from which long-term trends can be measured). Indicators are selected based on criteria that are easy to measure, is measured in almost all countries, are unambiguous and shows a clear correlation with conflict.	Based on the indicators chosen targets need to be set over a realistic timespan - two years, five years, ten years depending on realistic estimates of the rate of change. It will be different for different types of indicators. Changes in conflict related indicators will show up in the data sooner than changes in development related indicators.	UN, WHO, UNHCR, ICRC, World Bank and IMF reports. Country specific reports. Verified by media reports. Academic, Think Tank & Research Reports	<p><b>Opportunities:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conclusive peace negotiations for existing conflicts (medium)</li> <li>Continued socio-economic development on continental and global level. (medium)</li> <li>Continued increase in democratic processes. (medium)</li> <li>Increased ability to manage the effects of climate change. (low-medium)</li> <li>Increased ability to identify new and emerging threats. (??)</li> </ul> <p><b>Risks:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Unpredictable natural disasters from a combination of sources: climate change, drought, floods and unpredictable movement of people as a result. This disrupts the economic activities of people in hard-hit areas. (medium-??)</li> <li>Limited resources to support major needs in P&amp;S as well as poverty reduction and development. (medium)</li> <li>Failure to capitalise on economic and democratic improvement and communicating peace gains. (low-medium)</li> </ul> <p><b>Mitigated Strategies</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Updated Conflict Analysis/Conflict Vulnerability Assessments on a continental and global scale with Contingency Plans.</li> <li>Formation of national and regional disaster preparedness plans.</li> <li>Peace advocacy initiatives with partners in areas of risk.</li> <li>Operational plans for humanitarian action on the continent.</li> <li>Enhanced capacity of RECs, AU, EU and UN as emergency responders.</li> </ul>
<b>Specific Objective: Impacts</b>	To effectively support the AUC and RECs/RMs in implementing the Africa peace and security agenda and to address in a comprehensive ("continuum") manner conflicts on the African continent	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of conflicts effectively managed by the AU/REC/RM.</li> <li>Number of potential conflicts prevented by AUC/REC/RM</li> <li>No. of conflict-affected areas reporting on progress of their rehabilitation and development</li> <li>No. of communities engaging in dialogue, healing and reconciliation initiatives</li> <li>No. of disputes/conflicts peacefully settled</li> <li>Availability of implementing partners that can provide technical assistance</li> </ul>	These indicators will be qualitative rather than quantitative. Baselines need to be set against the dates of prior evaluations and progress reports.	Targets need to be set on semi-annual, annual and multi annual time-frames in the short and medium term.. Stagnation and setbacks will occur and need to be taken into consideration when setting targets.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reports from other peace-building programs</li> <li>Peace pacts/agreements</li> <li>Reports from media</li> <li>Feedback from communities</li> <li>Programme progress, monitoring and evaluation reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strengthen local capacities to anchor and coordinate development assistance;</li> <li>Participate in regional/provincial coordinative mechanisms;</li> <li>Establish an environment more responsive to community economic development initiatives that promote or advance human security and peace-building;</li> <li>Private sector and other external resource providers view local conditions as conducive to business.</li> </ul>
<b>Outputs</b>				<b>Expected Results</b>		
	Strengthened AUC's and RECs institutional capacities result in the targets of the APSA roadmap 2016-2020 being met.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of Roadmap strategic priority indicator targets being met</li> <li>Financial commitments are met in regular and predictable tranches;</li> <li>Partnerships are established with clear and complimentary areas of responsibilities;</li> <li>M&amp;E system is functioning and reporting is done on time to facilitate timely payment of tranches</li> </ul>		1. Predictable and sustainable funding for African-led PSOs available.	APSA Roadmap 2016-2020 implementation reports and evaluations.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mitigating Strategy</li> <li>Revisions to the Roadmap are done timely and are effective. Revisions do not derail existing efforts that are producing results.</li> <li>Strengthening of advocacy for support to peace-building to private sector as part of corporate social responsibilities</li> <li>Governments engages on appropriate policy level action</li> <li>Programmes prepare catch-up plans to respond to delays</li> <li>Programme work closely with other initiatives concerned with strengthening and main-streaming alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and the justice system</li> <li>Systems and procedures are supportive of joint programming</li> <li>Regular updates to and by donor community on progress and the peace situation</li> <li>Local leaders are involved on promotion of gender rights and women's welfare</li> <li>Effective advocacy among the security sector and other armed groups for peace-building initiatives.</li> </ul>
	Through preventive diplomacy, the AU and the RECs/RMs have managed to avoid and/or contain an increasing number of conflicts in their initial stages in a timely manner.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of successful preventive interventions by AU/RECs/RMS against total number of interventions .</li> <li>Frequency of EWS tools and methodologies being used to monitor, collect and analyse data</li> <li>Number of timely and coordinated mediation interventions by the AU/RECs/RMs</li> </ul>		2. Dialogue to reach common positions and implement common approaches on challenges of African P&S is enhanced.	ERM reports Uppsala ConflictData Program batdeaths dataset, IISS Armed Conflict Database	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Commitment to invest more on preventive diplomacy and mediation</li> <li>remains high on the AUC agenda</li> </ul>
	African-led PSOs have been instrumental in ending and/or containing conflicts through early and effective deployment of African troops in full respect of international HR and humanitarian law.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of HR violations committed by AU/REC/RM led PSOs</li> <li>Percentage of PSOs reaching their objective within the planned period.</li> <li>Average time for a PSO to be deployed once a crisis has erupted</li> </ul>		PSOs rehating as PKOs PSO reducing in size PSOs with police and civilian components being dominant components Political process kick-started	PSO reports Reports by CSOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Continuous commitment by AU MS to provide troops.</li> <li>Sufficient quality pre-deployment training and equipment of PSO troops.</li> </ul>

## Log frame for the APF Action Programme post 2018

	Intervention logic	Indicators	Baselines (incl. reference year)	Targets (incl. reference year)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions (Opportunities & Risks)	Mitigating Strategies and Key Actions
<b>Overall Objective</b>	Peace & Security in Africa provide conditions for Development and Poverty Reduction	<p><b>(Indictive sample indicators)</b></p> <p><b>Conflict related:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>% reduction in excess mortality</li> <li>% reduction in refugees and IDPs</li> <li>% reduction people affected by humanitarian crisis</li> <li>% reduction in famine</li> <li>% reduction in mortality from cholera, diarrhoea and water borne disease</li> </ul> <p><b>Poverty related:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>% reduction people affected by humanitarian crisis</li> <li>% reduction in food insecurity</li> <li>% reduction of maternal and neonatal mortality</li> <li>% reduction on &lt;5yr mortality</li> <li>% reduction in childhood mortality</li> <li>% increase in access to primary health care</li> <li>% reduction of people displaced</li> </ul> <p><b>Development related:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Increase in years of life expectancy</li> <li>Increase in number of children in primary, secondary and tertiary education</li> <li>Increase in number of mothers with access to pre-natal care</li> <li>% reduction in preventable childhood diseases</li> <li>% reduction in preventable diseases</li> <li>% reduction in unemployment rate</li> <li>% reduction in crime rate</li> <li>Increase in number of undisputed elections</li> </ul>				<p><b>Opportunities:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conclusive peace negotiations for existing conflicts (medium)</li> <li>Continued socio-economic development on continental and global level. (medium)</li> <li>Continued increase in democratic processes. (medium)</li> <li>Increased ability to manage the effects of climate change. (low-medium)</li> <li>Increased ability to identify new and emerging threats. (??)</li> </ul> <p><b>Risks:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Unpredictable natural disasters from a combination of sources: climate change, drought, floods and unpredictable movement of people as a result. This disrupts the economic activities of people in hard-hit areas. (medium-??)</li> <li>Limited resources to support major needs in P&amp;S as well as poverty reduction and development. (medium)</li> <li>Failure to capitalise on economic and democratic improvement and communicating peace gains. (low-medium)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Continued updated Conflict Analysis/Conflict Vulnerability Assessments on a continental and global scale with Contingency Plans.</li> <li>Formation of national and regional disaster preparedness plans.</li> <li>Peace advocacy initiatives with partners in areas of risk.</li> <li>Operational plans for humanitarian action on the continent.</li> <li>Enhanced capacity of RECs, AU, EU and UN as emergency responders.</li> </ul>
<b>Specific Objective: Impacts</b>	Principles of Ownership, Solidarity & Partnership on P&S are enhanced	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evidence of cooperation between AU, RECs/RMs and Member States in the development and retention of PSO capabilities</li> <li>Evidence of cooperation between AU, RECs/RMs and Member States in the planning and deployment of operations</li> <li>Evidence of systems and procedures which enable the deployment of PSOs</li> <li>Evidence of timely deployment of operations within the context of relevant frameworks</li> <li>Evidence of effective planning and management of operations.</li> </ul>	These indicators will be qualitative rather than qualitative. Baselines need to be set against the dates of prior evaluations and progress reports.	Targets need to be set on semi-annual, annual and multi annual time-frames in the short and medium term.. Stagnation and setbacks will occur and need to be taken into consideration when setting targets.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consultation minutes and reports</li> <li>PSC decisions and reports</li> <li>AUC decisions and reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strengthen local capacities to anchor and coordinate assistance;</li> <li>Participate in regional/provincial coordinative mechanisms;</li> <li>Establish an environment more responsive to community economic development initiatives that promote or advance human security and peace-building;</li> <li>Private sector and other external resource providers view local conditions as conducive to business.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A generic framework for monitoring and evaluation of Peace-Building, reconciliation and conflict resolution;</li> <li>A menu of indicators for use in assessing inputs, processes and outcomes with an emphasis on outcomes in terms of results and impacts;</li> <li>Detailed recommendations for the application of the framework in the relevant context</li> <li>An outline of potential methodologies to be employed in the collection and analysis of each of the data items. This aspect will also include a discussion of the benefits and costs of the various methodologies suggested;</li> <li>Practical guidance on the application of the indicators in a simple form and layout.</li> </ul>
	Incidence, duration & intensity of violent conflict in Africa is reduced	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of conflicts effectively managed by the AU/REC/RM.</li> <li>Number of potential conflicts prevented by AUC/REC/RM</li> <li>No. of conflict-affected areas reporting on progress of their rehabilitation and development</li> <li>No. of disputes/conflicts peacefully settled.</li> </ul>	These indicators will be qualitative rather than qualitative. Baselines need to be set against the dates of prior evaluations and progress reports.	Targets need to be set on semi-annual, annual and multi annual time-frames in the short and medium term.. Stagnation and setbacks will occur and need to be taken into consideration when setting targets.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Transformation of conflict-affected and conflict-vulnerable areas is sustained; and community efforts to develop and advance their own initiatives for peace and human security are harnessed</li> <li>Government (national, regional and local) has capacity and is consistent in implementing the peace agenda and peace and development efforts</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A generic framework for monitoring and evaluation of Peace-Building, reconciliation and conflict resolution;</li> <li>A menu of indicators for use in assessing inputs, processes and outcomes with an emphasis on outcomes in terms of results and impacts;</li> <li>Detailed recommendations for the application of the framework in the relevant context</li> <li>An outline of potential methodologies to be employed in the collection and analysis of each of the data items. This aspect will also include a discussion of the benefits and costs of the various methodologies suggested;</li> <li>Practical guidance on the application of the indicators in a simple form and layout.</li> </ul>

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Outputs				Expected Results			
	<b>1. Support provided to African-led PSOs:</b>	Financial commitments are met in regular and predictable tranches; Partnerships are established with clear and complimentary areas of responsibilities; M&E system is functioning and reporting is done on time to facilitate timely payment of tranches		1. Predictable and sustainable funding for African-led PSOs available. 2. Dialogue to reach common positions and implement common approaches on challenges of African P&S is enhanced.	AU Reports; APSA and APF evaluations.	Technical assistance to post-conflict Member States provided through the identification of relevant expertise making use of the PCRDRoster of experts Liaison Offices and field offices contribute to the enhancement of MS capacities through peace strengthening projects Selected Member States are supported in the implementation of PCRDR processes (security, Transitional Justice, Governance, Gender, Humanitarian, socio-economic development) National and local stakeholders are engaged in the development of PCRDR policies and strategies Evidence of PCRDR Assistance requests addressed by AU and REC	Understand the operational context in which funding bodies operate; • Understand the interaction between interventions and the context; and • Allow funding bodies to act upon the understanding of this interaction, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive impacts.
	1a. Operations	Determined from PSO specific logframe		See APSA III Roadmap Log-Frame Objective 5; Outputs 1.1-1.5 for details. There are very detailed expected results outlined that can simply be followed.	Project progress, monitoring and terminal reports Community baseline and end-line surveys Development Plans Interview with participants Training reports	Compliance with PSO specific log-frame. No national chain of command interferes with the work of the mission Command. Support to mission to conduct joint multinational operations in the Area of Operations in order to secure the civilian population. Authority to conduct operations effectively transferred to Force Commander by TCCs. Number of joint/coordinated operations conducted by missions. HQ staff in place. Number and quality of transport and communication assets available to mission.(s). AUC able to timely deliver assets to mission. Mission HQ is able to facilitate operational coordination among the affected countries	Commitment and desire by AU and REC/ RM leadership to logical and systematic planning, deployment and management procedures for PSOs Relevant AUC Departments and Divisions (plus those at RECs/RMs) understand their roles in supporting PSOs and are willing to support the central role of the Peace and Security Department to ensure more effectively planned, deployed, managed and liquidated PSOs Partners (multilateral and bilateral) to the AU and RECs/RMs desire to continue cooperation in support of African PSO capabilities and capacities
	1b. Post conflict	Determined from specific post-conflict environment and needs.			Project progress, monitoring and terminal reports Community baseline and end-line surveys Development Plans Interview with participants Training reports		Conflict-prone areas require complementing support to sustain their transformation into peaceful, resilient and developing communities.
	1c. DDR & peace-building				Project progress, monitoring and terminal reports Community baseline and end-line surveys Development Plans Interview with participants Training reports	Will and capacities among Member States to embark on SSR + DDR processes Availability of funds and of qualified human resources (military and civilian)	Develop and operationalise SSR + DDR policy and best practice documents Develop SSR + DDR assessment tools, guidance notes, best practices, evaluation templates, training modules and other SSR + DDR implementation tools (SSR + DDR Policy) Assist in the mobilization of funding and other resources for implementation of SSR + DDR process in MS (SSR + DDR Policy) Assist in assessment, implementation, monitoring and evaluating SSR + DDR processes in MS (SSR + DDR Policy) Assist MS in holding national, local, and other stakeholder meetings to build consensus on implementation of SSR + DDR policies promote implementation of regional and national security policies and strategies based on democratic principles, human security needs, respect for human rights and international humanitarian law (by national and regional stakeholders) Conduct SSR + DDR training workshops with RECs, MS, and other relevant stakeholders (SSR + DDR Policy) RECs to provide financial support for institutional capacity building, integrated M&E systems which can be linked to early warning and situational analysis (SSR + DDR Policy)

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Outputs			Expected Results			
1d. Training activities			<p>Training to military component</p> <p>Pre-deployment</p> <p>In-mission</p> <p>Special skill</p> <p>Training to police component</p> <p>Law enforcement in areas of conflict</p> <p>Cross-border and international policing</p> <p>Organised crime</p> <p>Police formed units/stabilisation</p> <p>Financial crime/corruption</p> <p>Basic policing/community policing</p> <p>Crime prevention</p> <p>Community relations</p> <p>Training civilian/justice component</p> <p>Case tracking</p> <p>Conditions of detention</p> <p>Prosecution</p> <p>Prison conditions</p> <p>Amnesty, parole and peace building</p>	<p>Project progress, monitoring and terminal reports</p> <p>Community baseline and end-line surveys</p> <p>Development Plans</p> <p>Interview with participants</p> <p>Training reports</p>	<p>Will by all stakeholders to participate in the development of, and be held accountable to, a training certification system</p> <p>Suitability of the system, and the ability to implement it at the required levels</p>	<p>Sufficient number of candidates are interested in becoming members of the roster, and apply</p> <p>Application procedures are transparent and open to those who are interested</p> <p>The roster database which underpins the system works to the degree required</p> <p>Screening and selection standards are implemented</p> <p>Training and skills enhancement pro- grammes are targeted at ASC personnel according to their areas of expertise and expected deployment roles and responsibilities</p>
1e. Capacity Building				<p>Joint Work plans highlighting role and responsibility of each actor</p> <p>Monitoring reports</p>	<p>Will and capacities of actors working on the AGA and other governance aspects to collaborate</p> <p>Will from Member States to be involved in conflict analyses highlighting the long- term structural causes of conflicts</p>	<p>Existence of a strategy document that highlights guiding principles and expected results from CB</p> <p>Evidence that this strategy document highlights and clarifies key coordination components and procedures</p> <p>Agreement between the AU and RECs/ RMs to use this strategic document as a basis for future deployment of operations</p>
<b>2. APSA Operationalisation</b>	<p>Ensure updated and relevant Roadmap;</p> <p>Number of Roadmap strategic priority indicator targets being met;</p> <p>Focus on activities where the APF has a comparative advantage;</p> <p>Enhance national and REC level management of APSA;</p> <p>Progress to create institutional memory;</p> <p>Work towards better ownership.</p>		<p>1. APSA Architecture is operational and functioning effectively. 2. Dialogue to reach common positions and implement common approaches on challenges of African P&amp;S is enhanced.</p>	<p>Project progress, monitoring and terminal reports</p> <p>Community baseline and end-line surveys</p> <p>Development Plans</p> <p>Interview with participants</p> <p>Training reports</p>	<p>Opportunities</p> <p>Cooperation from the security sector and former combatants.</p> <p>Cooperation among UN agencies, donors and other stakeholders</p> <p>No major and organized resistance to the participation of women who are encouraged to participate in political and peace processes.</p> <p>Risks</p> <p>Fiscal and security factors constrain involvement of implementing partners.</p> <p>Exaggerated reports on peace and order conditions affect the perception of the private sector and other external resource providers.</p> <p>Possible resistance to collaborate among former adversaries hamper peace-building initiatives.</p> <p>Peaceful options are not successfully pursued by government.</p> <p>Perceived policy inconsistencies concerning peace.</p> <p>Lack of capacity hamper efforts of communities to seek access to justice</p> <p>Local factors hamper women participation.</p>	<p>Mitigating Strategy</p> <p>Revisions to the Roadmap are done timely and are effective.</p> <p>Revisions do not derail existing efforts that are producing results.</p> <p>Governments engages on appropriate policy level action</p> <p>Programmes prepare catch-up plans to respond to delays</p> <p>Systems and procedures are supportive of joint programming</p> <p>Regular updates to and by donor community on progress and the peace situation</p> <p>Local leaders are involved on promotion of gender rights and women's welfare</p> <p>Effective advocacy among the security sector and other armed groups for peace-building initiatives.</p>
2a. Capacities for conflict prevention			<p>Dialogue to reach common positions and implement common approaches on challenges of African P&amp;S is enhanced. Map out all processes</p> <p>AU &amp; RECs engage in in peace building/state building situations, including monitoring of peace agreements, preventive diplomacy, human rights, transitional justice and reconciliation, election support, DDR/ SSR etc.</p> <p>Engage with all AU/REC actors involved in post-conflict situations (as per the mapping) in order to develop a strategy on how to cooperate and create synergies</p> <p>Develop guidelines where necessary in order to make sure that do no harm approach and conflict sensitivity is assured; that interventions address or take into account long term structural causes of conflict and are in accordance with post-conflict needs</p>	<p>Project progress, monitoring and terminal reports</p> <p>Community baseline and end-line surveys</p> <p>Development Plans</p> <p>Interview with participants</p> <p>Training reports</p>	<p>Database in place at AUC level</p> <p>Frequency of positive feedback to requests for deployment in AU peace support operations</p> <p>Evidence of PCRD Assistance requests addressed by AU and REC</p>	<p>Existence of a strategy document that highlights guiding principles and expected results from coordinating the work</p> <p>Evidence that this strategy document highlights and clarifies key coordination components and procedures</p> <p>Agreement between the AU and RECs/ RMs to use this strategic document as a basis for future deployment of operations</p>

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Outputs			Expected Results			
2b. Planning and management of PSOs and post-conflict stabilisation	Evidence of improved interaction among peace networks, local and national government agencies, the security sector, media, academia, private, and religious sectors in promoting peace and development		SOPs/guidelines developed, validated and adopted PSOs mandates inclusive of arms management components PSOs acquiring the skills necessary to implement SALW control interventions including response to SALW/GBV	Project progress, monitoring and terminal reports Community baseline and end-line surveys Development Plans Interview with participants Training reports	Technical support to PSOs in developing SOPs and guidelines to manage and account for weapons Technical support to PSOs in streamlining SALW control into ConOps and mission mandate Training and operational support to PSOs in implementing mandated SALW control interventions	Commitment of PSOs/TCC/PSC to accountability in arms management Commitment by donors to support arms management components of PSO mandates
2c. African Standby Force	Existence of planning and deployment guidelines, policies and procedures aligned to current realities and developments Evidence of formal approval of guidelines, policies and procedures		The capacities of planning elements as well as the required systems, processes and policies to adequately plan, deploy, manage, sustain and terminate PSOs at the scale and pace with which deployments are being mandated.	Availability and utilisation of comprehensive policies and SOPs Mission planning documents and templates Monitoring and Evaluation reports Lessons learned and best practise reports	Commitment and desire by AU and REC/ RM leadership to logical and systematic planning, deployment and management procedures for PSOs Relevant AUC Departments and Divisions (plus those at RECs/RMs) understand their roles in supporting PSOs and are willing to support the central role of the Peace and Security Department to ensure more effectively planned, deployed, managed and liquidated PSOs Partners (multilateral and bilateral) to the AU and RECs/RMs desire to continue cooperation in support of African PSO capabilities and capacities	
2d. Enhanced AU-REC/RM collaboration	Evidence of regional peace and security strategies designed and implemented in line with the AU policy framework Evidence of common programming, including formulation of common objectives , between AUC departments and between AU and RECs/RMs; Evidence of common positions on APSA framework between AU and RECs/RMs;		Dialogue to reach common positions and implement common approaches on challenges of African P&S is enhanced.	Programme documents. Amount and quality of common positions. Examples of implementation of subsidiarity principle. Programme documents		
<b>3. Emergency Response Mechanism supported with immediate and temporary funding</b>	Direct conflict prevention interventions by AU/RECs/RMs (preventive diplomacy) are timely, coordinated and effective Evidence of structural prevention responses/interventions Evidence of APSA stakeholders cooperation in preventive actions Evidence of use of early warning reports by decision makers		1. Dialogue to reach common positions and implement common approaches on challenges of African P&S is enhanced.	Requests and Work plans highlighting role and responsibility of each actor Monitoring reports	Effective, coordinated and timely direct and structural prevention of conflicts and crises by the AU and RECs/RMs. Evidence of enhanced capacity of CEWS and EWS of the RECs/RMs to individually and collaboratively monitor, collect and analyse data on the basis of tools and methodologies developed Conflict prevention interventions (direct and structural) are informed by systematic/joint early warning and analysis	Strong AUC leadership and coordination Member States compliance with AU Assembly decisions Consultation with Ad Hoc Ministerial Committee