“Evaluation of the implementation of the African Peace Facility as an instrument supporting African efforts to manage conflicts on the continent”

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<td>Analysis for Economic Decisions</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFISMA</td>
<td>African-led International Support Mission to Mali</td>
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<td>AfSOL</td>
<td>African Solutions</td>
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<td>AGA</td>
<td>African Governance Architecture</td>
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<td>AMANI AFRICA</td>
<td>&quot;Peace in Africa&quot; training and exercise cycle of the ASF</td>
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<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Union Mission to Sudan /Darfur</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>AP</td>
<td>Action Programme</td>
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<td>APF</td>
<td>Africa Peace Facility</td>
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<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AUC</td>
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<td>AULO</td>
<td>African Union Liaison Office</td>
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<td>AUPG</td>
<td>African Union Partners' Group</td>
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<td>AUPSD</td>
<td>African Union Peace and Security Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2C</td>
<td>Commission-to-Commission (that is AU Commission and European Commission)</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>CB</td>
<td>Capacity Building</td>
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<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Continental Early Warning System</td>
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<td>CMC</td>
<td>Crisis Management Concept</td>
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<td>COACP</td>
<td>Committee on African, Caribbean and Pacific states</td>
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<td>COAFR</td>
<td>Africa Working Party Council</td>
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<td>CODELACOC</td>
<td>Conférence des Délégations de l'Union européenne en Afrique de l'Ouest et Centrale</td>
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<td>COM</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPCC</td>
<td>Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability</td>
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<td>CRIS</td>
<td>Common RELEX Information System / Current Research Information System</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<td>DCI</td>
<td>Development Cooperation Instrument</td>
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<td>DG DEVCO</td>
<td>Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>Directorate General for Joint Research Centre</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<td>EA-SA-IO</td>
<td>East Africa – Southern Africa – Indian Ocean</td>
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<td>EASF</td>
<td>Eastern Africa Standby Force</td>
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<td>ECDPM</td>
<td>European Centre for Development Policy Management</td>
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<td>ECOMIB</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Guinea Bissau</td>
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<td>ECOMIG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in The Gambia</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<td>European Peacebuilding Liaison Office</td>
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<td>ERM</td>
<td>Early Response Mechanisms</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>European Union Capacity Building Mission</td>
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<td>EUNAVFOR</td>
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<td>European Union Special Representatives System</td>
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<td>EUTF</td>
<td>European Union Trust Fund</td>
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<td>EUTM</td>
<td>European Union Training Mission</td>
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<td>EQ</td>
<td>Evaluation Question</td>
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<td>FPI</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Instrument</td>
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<td>G5</td>
<td>Group of 5 Sahel countries: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger</td>
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<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</td>
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<td>HLP</td>
<td>High Level Panel</td>
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<td>HoA</td>
<td>Horn of Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>High Representative</td>
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<td>HRVP</td>
<td>High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Head Quarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBF</td>
<td>Institut Belge de Formation, d'Assistance Technique et de Transfert de Technologies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICGLR</td>
<td>International Conference of the Great Lakes Region</td>
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<td>IcSP</td>
<td>Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>ID</td>
<td>Institutional Development</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>IOC</td>
<td>Indian Ocean Commission</td>
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<td>IPSS</td>
<td>Institute of Peace and Security Studies</td>
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<td>ISG</td>
<td>Inter-Services Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFF</td>
<td>Multiannual Financial Framework</td>
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<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali</td>
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<td>MISCA</td>
<td>African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic</td>
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<td>MNJTF</td>
<td>Multinational Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>MS</td>
<td>Member States</td>
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<td>MST</td>
<td>Mission Support Team</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NIP</td>
<td>National Indicative Programme</td>
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<td>JAES</td>
<td>Joint Africa-EU Strategy</td>
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<td>JC</td>
<td>Judgement Criteria</td>
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<td>JCC</td>
<td>Joint Coordination Committee</td>
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<td>JFA</td>
<td>Joint Financing Agreement</td>
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<td>JNR</td>
<td>Joint narrative reports</td>
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<td>LCBC</td>
<td>Lake Chad Basin Commission</td>
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<td>P&amp;S</td>
<td>Peace and security</td>
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<td>PANAF</td>
<td>Pan-African Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLANELM</td>
<td>Planning Element</td>
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<td>RBM</td>
<td>Results-Based Monitoring</td>
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<td>RCA</td>
<td>Republic of Central Africa</td>
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<td>RCI-LRA</td>
<td>Regional Cooperation Initiative for the elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities</td>
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<td>RECLO/REC-LO</td>
<td>REC Liaison Officer</td>
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<td>RIP</td>
<td>Regional Indicative Programme</td>
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<td>RM</td>
<td>Regional Mechanism</td>
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<td>ROM</td>
<td>Results Oriented Monitoring</td>
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<td>RoL</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
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<td>PANAF</td>
<td>Pan-African Programme</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCRD</td>
<td>Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>PMT</td>
<td>Programme Management Team</td>
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<td>PMU</td>
<td>Programme Management Unit</td>
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<td>PoW</td>
<td>Panel of the Wise</td>
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<td>PRISM</td>
<td>Prevention of conflicts, Rule of law/SSR, Integrated approach, Stabilisation and Mediation</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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<td>Peace and Security Department</td>
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<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
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<td>Peace Support Operations Division</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SAP</td>
<td>Systems Application and Products</td>
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<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>ToR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<td>SP</td>
<td>Support Programme</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UNOAU</td>
<td>United Nations Office to the African Union</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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Executive Summary

1.1 Background

This “Evaluation of the implementation of the African Peace Facility (APF) as an instrument supporting African efforts to manage conflicts on the continent” covers the period 2014-2016 and two of the three areas supported by the APF, i.e. support to African-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and to capacity building of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The third area, the Early Response Mechanism, was already evaluated in 2015. Previous APF evaluations were conducted in 2006, 2011 and 2013. The current study builds on this record and looks in particular at the outcome of the 2013 evaluation.

The APF was created in response to the AU’s Maputo Summit (July 2003) call for support for African efforts to promote peace on security on the continent. The EU Council in November 2003 responded positively and the Peace Facility started in mid-2004 with an initial Euro 250 million for 3 years from the 9th European Development Fund (EDF). It quickly showed its worth as an instrument based on the principle of supporting ‘African solutions to African problems’. Since then the APF has provided a total of over Euro 2.3 billion for this purpose.

APF support has not only enabled the deployment of PSOs such as AMISOM in Somalia or AFISMA in Mali, but has also helped the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) as a formal platform for policymaking and debate, contributed to the validation of the African Standby Force, and provided quick support to mediation, confidence-building and conflict prevention activities in situations of emerging conflict.

To date, the bulk of APF funding (90%) has been spent on PSOs, and particularly on troop stipends for AMIS in Darfur and then AMISOM. In 2015, concerns on the sustainability of funding required for PSOs and the relatively low investment in capacity and institutional development led the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC), to request a more balanced use of APF funds. It wished to see increased support for APSA capacity-building and mediation activities and reduced funding to PSOs so as to move beyond crisis-driven financing towards a more sustainable institutional solution.

1.2 Methodology

The evaluation was organised around seven evaluation questions agreed with the steering group led by DG DEVCO and the EEAS. The team used a simple contribution analysis approach with mostly qualitative data from official documents, literature and interviews and some limited quantitative data. The work followed a standard process of four phases: Inception, Desk study, Field missions and Synthesis. The Desk phase involved interviews in both the main centres where the APF is managed, that is, Brussels and Addis Ababa.

Field visits were made to five PSOs: (i) Bamako for AFISMA, (ii) Bangui for MISCA, (iii) Bissau for ECOMIB, (iv) Mogadishu for AMISOM, and (v) N’Djamena for the MNJTF. An additional mission was undertaken to Abuja (ECOWAS) to gain insights from of a REC. The team thus visited a range of different operations:

- Two former PSOs that were rehatted to UN PKOs (AFISMA and MISCA).
- One large, long term PSO, AMISOM, involved in military operations and statebuilding.
- A small, long term PSO implemented by a REC, ECOMIB, providing an international presence and security reassurance in an on-going politically tense situation.
- One new PSO (MNJTF) where the APF has so far made only a limited contribution.
- The headquarters of one REC, ECOWAS, a major partner of the APF alongside the AU though, because of its strength, not fully comparable to other RECs.

1.3 Findings

The evaluation questions covered the areas of (i) Relevance, (ii) Impact and effectiveness, (iii) Efficient management of the APF, (iv) Capacity building and institutional development, (v) Complementarity of EU actions, (vi) African ownership and sustainability and finally (vii) Partnership, EU value added and complementarity with other donors.
The APF is widely seen as a relevant instrument both to address peace and security in Africa and to promote EU policy priorities. It underpins the AU’s ability to respond to peace and security crises on the continent. The instrument’s strategic focus has evolved over the evaluation period, though, given the absence of other major donors, it remains difficult to move away from PSOs as the dominant use of funds.

The contributions of the APF can be linked to mostly positive as well as some negative effects on the implementation of the APSA. Desk research and stakeholders from different backgrounds agree that the APF was a key factor in making the APSA function during the period evaluated while building on past achievements. With several PSOs examined there is consensus that the APF funding was effective in contributing to peace and stability.

Some progress in streamlining the management of the APF was made in recent years but difficulties remain. Both partners agree that the overall process is not working as well as could be hoped. Despite real efforts to improve efficiency actors readily identify areas of frustration where improvements are still required. Particular sources of frustration include recruitment and procurement processes on the AUC side and EU procedures that continue to be perceived as cumbersome and excessively bureaucratic. Yet, at the same time, actors in the system are able to point to improvements and relations between the two institutions do appear to be mutually appreciative.

The APF has clearly helped African efforts to establish and run PSOs with troop allowances and operational costs and to build up the APSA institutions that enable African management of conflict on the continent. The EU has also shown itself willing to support AU efforts to look for alternative funding and to consistently work within the framework provided by the continental and regional institutions rather than seeking alternative structures or processes.

It is difficult to say to what extent the APF has helped to make the partnership on peace and security between African and international partners stronger and more effective during the evaluation period. It is clear, however, that the partnership works, progresses and that the EU plays a distinctive, central and unique role in supporting the APSA and its evolving concept.

### 1.4 Conclusions and Recommendations

The Conclusions and Recommendations are clustered in five groups relating to the (i) relevance of the APF, (ii) the AU-EU partnership, (iii) the capacity needed to make this partnership work, (iv) the pros and cons of complementarity with other international and European partners and (v) ownership and sustainability. As this evaluation, was requested by the European Commission, the recommendations are directed towards the EU and AU member states to further strengthen the implementation of the APF with African partners until the year 2020. Suggestions for follow up actions are provided in a separate Action Document.

#### 1. Relevance

1. **The APF is an uncontested and highly relevant instrument in support of peace and security in Africa. Its approach remains coherent with evolving AU and EU policies.**

This conclusion builds on evidence across the evaluation and confirms the findings of the 2013 Evaluation. The APF was particularly relevant for funding PSOs, where it can support areas that other international actors, notably the UN, could not. The scale of the APF funding is highly appreciated, but makes efforts to reduce it substantially difficult to achieve.
2. The strategic focus of the APF has been successfully adapted in the past but discussions between the AU and the EU need to continue to adjust the role to new realities so as not to risk undermining APSA

The EU clearly helped to promote more ownership and showed its ability to adapt to new African priorities. Where the UN was better placed to engage in the medium and longer term, APF funding was stopped. While the APF is flexible enough to adapt to evolving thinking on the APSA, there is a risk in supporting more ‘centrifugal’ processes, such as with the MNJTF and the G5 Sahel Joint Force, which can push the AUC and RECs, central pillars of the APSA, aside. Such innovations should thus be balanced with support to the institutions that guarantee the sustainability of African action on peace and security.

Recommendation 1 on Relevance

The APF should continue to build on the priorities and dynamics emerging from intra-African policy discussions on the APSA and go on investing in it as a valuable institutional asset and framework through which to promote peace and security in Africa. Thus the EU should:

- Strengthen its dialogue with the RECs/RMs as well as with AU member states about policy and implementation of such operations under the APSA framework.
- Be sensitive to potential “centrifugal tendencies”, which can push the central pillars of the APSA (AUC and RECs) to one side and possibly undermine the APSA.
- In support of African mediation and preventive diplomacy activities, provide diplomatic and operational assistance to African institutional actors, such as AU Special Envoys, and to civil society organisations when addressing conflict and security issues.

2. Partnership

3. The APF makes the EU an enabler as well as a financier

The EU is more than just a payer. The scale of APF funding, its predictability and the EU’s long-term commitment have made it an enabler, a position that no other international partner, except for the UN, can match. Support has been provided to policy innovations as well as PSOs and helped to put political decisions into operation. It is provided from the background, recognising that the AU is in the driving seat. The recent invitation to the EU to sit on the governing board of the AU’s Peace Fund, as one of only two non-African members, indicates recognition of and appreciation for the EU’s role.

4. Positive as well as negative unintended effects can be noted from the APF

The integration of troops from AU PSOs into the two UN missions MINUSMA (Mali) and MINUSCA (CAR) prompted the unintended effect of learning on the limitations of transitioning AU troops into UN operations providing useful lessons for a more effective AU-EU-UN partnership in the future. There is evidence of in-mission learning by TCCs. The EU decision to reduce APF support for troop stipends accelerated reflection on alternative and sustainable African sources of finance. One of the unintended effects of the scale and flexibility of the APF is the dependence and complacence it can create.

5. The EU-AU partnership on P&S is solid but during most of the evaluation period, it has proved difficult to deepen the partnership

The APF has shown its value as an important tool to shape the partnership between the EU and the AU. This has not always been appreciated during the evaluation period, witness the more distant relationship with the EU under the past AUC Chairperson, but recent statements and mutual visits by the current AUC Chairperson and the EU’s HR/VP show improvements. Though this gradually improving and trusted joint engagement is fragile as not all African actors support the more recent enhanced focus on peace and security within the AUC.
Recommendation 2 on Partnership

Use the APF to strengthen the political, strategic and operational partnership between the EU and the AU and other partners in support of peace and security in Africa. Promote it as a highly valuable instrument to further sharpen and develop this partnership:

- Continue investing in high-level political dialogue, combined with regular strategic, operational and implementation-related dialogue with the AUC and the RECs.
- Use this dialogue to address the contradictory perceptions of the EU, on the one side, that it is not sufficiently respected by African actors for its support role, and of AU actors, on the other, that the EU at times pushes its own agenda too much.
- The EU should be more aware of the political weight it has that comes with the scale of its funding, its predictability and its long-term commitment, and use this weight in a targeted manner in dialogue with African and other international partners.
- Use the APF partnership as a basis for joint action with other international partners, such as the UN and other strategic actors supporting the APSA.

3. Capacity

6. The EU has made progress on managing the APF more efficiently, but centralised management also involves some trade-offs

The EU generally worked constructively to improve its support to the APF and reinforced its capacities in support of a more efficient implementation and management. Recent changes to the staffing of the EUD-AU, that involves splitting up the APF team and absorbing its staff into other teams in the Delegation, need to be monitored closely to ensure there is no loss of coordination and expertise on peace and security. While attention was focused on the HQ and the EU Delegation to the AU the involvement of regional and national EUDs remained more in the margins leading to some disconnects and incoherence.

7. The effectiveness of the APF can be broadly confirmed

Most evidence of APF effectiveness comes from the field level, from ECOMIB, MISCA and AMISOM in particular. As for the APSA, some areas could be effectively supported, but the APSA Support Programme funding for capacity building has not resulted in more effective change on a broader scale, such as the support to the AULOs shows.

8. AUC financial management has improved, but overall the picture is mixed

Improvements in the APF management at the AUC as well as ECOWAS were noted in the domain of financial management. Problems with communications, human resources management and mobilisation at the AUC and AULOs were mentioned regularly and the failed AUC pillar assessment on procurement still prevents the AUC from operating through a contribution agreement with the EU. Some major efficiency problems were encountered with the provision of assets and services to the MNJTF due to weaknesses in AUC procurement.

9. The APF focused clearly on APSA capacity building and there are some improvements but so far, overall, the results so far are rather poor

Following the recommendations of the APF 2013 evaluation, particular attention was paid to a more tailored approach to reinforce capacities in support of promoting the APSA. This led to specific projects such as the Joint Salary Fund, the support to AULOs, both funded together with other partners, and military training centres. Some improvements could be noted, such as the improved finance department capacity within ECOWAS. Yet there appears to be a lack of common vision, strategy and leadership within the AUC on how to address capacity development more comprehensively, resulting in little guidance for international partners on what to support and what not.
10. There are limited signs that the AUC and RECs are effectively translating institutional reform plans into more systemic institutional and operational change

A more planned and orderly process at the institutional level that would channel the Kagame proposals into real reform is not yet apparent. The APSA Roadmap 2016-2020, although jointly developed in response to an evaluation of the APSA, is seen by some as too complex a document, difficult to work with and therefore less helpful as an operational instrument. As a result, it has not yet achieved a level of ownership, nor a momentum for reform within the AUC and the RECs on which to build and implement a strong capacity development strategy.

Recommendation 3 on Capacity
Sharpen the common sense of purpose and vision for capacity development and continue to invest through the APF in the internal capacity of the EU, the AUC and the RECs needed to make the APSA work:

- Maintain the support to APSA capacity building but, in dialogue with African partners, be more selective and focused, and introduce an incentive approach to enhance institutional performance. Accompany this with dialogue, training and advice.
- For PSOs, focus support more on policing and on civilian components and assist with specialised training to support the building of expertise in these domains.
- Having strengthened EU headquarters and the EUD-AU to better manage the APF, extend this strengthening to relevant EU regional and national delegations to ensure better complementarity between the different types of EU support.
- Ensure the former responsibilities of the EUD-AU P&S Unit remain well coordinated despite their separation into several different units.

4. Complementarity

11. Mostly positive results were noted on complementarity between the APF support for peace and security with that of EU member states

PSOs funded through the APF were complementary to PSOs in Mali, Chad, CAR and Somalia undertaken or supported by EU member states and vice versa. Joint agreements with EU member states led to basket funding in support of AUC salaries and of the AULOs but limited coordination in the area of APSA capacity building, overall, was identified as an area for EU and EU member states to further improve on complementarity.

12. EU internal complementarity at the operational level can be further improved

At different levels in the EU institutions there is evidence of concrete efforts to improve and shape complementarity. The ‘comprehensive approach’ is widely evoked and the programming of funds from the EDF, IcSP, EU Trust Funds and ECHO as well as CSDP missions to ensure complementarity with APF is progressing, though the very complexity of this exercise does not always achieve optimal results. Similar progress has been made on the complementarity of APF funding with regional programming (RIPs) on peace and security. Yet there is also evidence that more attention could be paid to the linkages between military and civilian aspects of PSOs and with stabilisation, resilience and development work.

13. Shaping joint action between the EU and other partners is complex but has been partially successful

In view of the 40+ partners supporting the APSA, some of them in a highly non-transparent and un-coordinated manner, shaping complementarity for a meaningful support is challenging. The EU Delegation to the AU should be complimented for bringing some systematic information sharing and exchange into this myriad of support actions through its proactive chairing of the AU Partners Group (AUPG) on Peace and Security, but the EU as a whole, including member states, could do more to ensure all EU support is properly coordinated and complementary.
### Recommendation 4 on Complementarity

Further invest in optimising the complementarity of the APF with other support provided to peace and security in Africa, be it through other EU financing mechanisms, EU member states or international partners:

- Use the APF to leverage a more harmonised and aligned support from EU member states and, to the extent possible, also with other international partners.
- Use the APF and other EU funding instruments together to ensure more adequate linkages are made between the military, policing and civilian aspects of PSOs as well as with support for stabilisation, humanitarian work, resilience and development.
- Strengthen efforts to better coordinate the EU’s capacity support through the APSA Support Programme with the inputs provided by other international partners.
- Work closely with the UN in New York and Addis Ababa to build on relevant experience in support of peace and security in Africa and invest in a more effective triangular cooperation between the UN, the AU and the EU.

### 5. Ownership and Sustainability

#### 14. The APF has supported African ownership but sustainability is still far on the horizon

Growing efforts to increase African ownership and sustainability in the area of peace and security are clearly noticeable, as evident in the Kaberuka report on African financing and the Kagame report on the institutional reform of the AU. These high-level reform initiatives appear to translate into a growing awareness among diverse African stakeholders that alternatives to the foreign funding for PSOs have to be found, and that an exit strategy for the hugely expensive AMISOM is needed. Several African countries have started to change their legislation in support of an import levy for the financing of the AU Peace Fund, but it is still too early to tell to what extent the ambitious reform agenda and funding targets will be met.

#### 15. Evidence for long-term impact exists but is thin

From the field findings it would be difficult to conclude that the APF led to longer-term impact, except for the case of AMISOM where a very slow but gradual change towards stabilisation can be noted, despite occasional violent attacks still occurring. Only little impact on making the AUC and RECs more sustainable as peace and security institutions was noted.

### Recommendation 5 Ownership and Sustainability

Working closely with the UN and other strategic partners, seek to let African counterparts increase their lead role in setting agendas and identifying needs to promote ownership, sustainability and decision-making power over coordination and solutions:

- Remain alert to ongoing institutional reform efforts to make the APSA more self-financed by African states and support such reform efforts.
- Engage with the AUC and RECs/RMs on further developing the AU’s strategic planning so that the AUC has the basis on which it can better coordinate the various inputs of international partners to the APSA and ensure complementarity.
- To get thinking and practice on African ownership and sustainability more grounded in support and dialogue at different levels and among different African communities, as well as dialogue between these communities and the EU.
- Regularly discuss with African actors at continental, regional and national levels, long-term approaches and strategies to scale down or exit from PSOs.
1 Introduction

Purpose of the evaluation

This Final Report presents the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the “Evaluation of the implementation of the African Peace Facility as an instrument supporting African efforts to manage conflicts on the continent” that covers the period 2014-2016. The evaluation covers two of the three areas supported by the African Peace Facility (APF), i.e. support to African-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and support to capacity building of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The third area, the Early Response Mechanism, was excluded as it had already been evaluated in 2015. It is the latest stage in an overall well-documented process of APF support to the AU’s peace and security work. Previous evaluations of the APF were conducted in 2006, 2011 and 2013. The current study builds on this tradition and looks in particular at the recommendations formulated in the 2013 evaluation.

The main objective of the APF’s 2014-2016 Action Programme (AP) is “Responding to the priorities of the Africa-EU strategic cooperation on peace and security and building on lessons learned and past experience, the AP will continue to offer comprehensive, predictable and timely support to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa”. The AP recognises that the bulk of APF funding will continue to be crisis-driven as in the past, but puts mediation, conflict prevention and early phases of post-conflict peacebuilding to the forefront as well for limited and targeted support through the APF.

Looking ahead in a context of intense EU policy debate

The purpose of this evaluation is not only to look back, but also to look ahead. Both the EU and the AU are going through periods of change that may have implications for the APF in the future. In the near future, the EU will be embarking on discussions for a next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) after 2020, which will include designing a new set of EU external action financing instruments. Discussions on the new MFF are set to take-off in early 2018. Furthermore, the EU is currently in a process of implementing the 2016 EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy, and has recently adopted a new European Consensus on Development, in which the promotion of peace is one of the four overarching priorities. At the same time, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, which underpins funding used for the APF through the European Development Fund (EDF), comes to an end in 2020 and needs to be renegotiated. Among various other issues and challenges, the MFF discussion will raise the question whether the EDF should remain outside the EU budget (as it currently is), or rather be integrated into it. This would have far-reaching implications for the extent to which EDF funding can be used to finance peace and security activities, and particularly PSOs.

What is more, the prospect of withdrawal of one of the EU member states, highly active in peace and security in Africa, will also imply a reconfiguration of European involvement.

Equally, as the EU has become more politically sensitive to the effects in Europe of dynamics in Africa through the transmission belts of international terrorism and increased migration and forced displacement flows, the European perceptions on the role of the APF may well change going forward. As such, the EU is increasingly expressing its ambition to become not merely a payer, but also a stronger player when it comes to peace and security in Africa.

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African policy development

From its side, the AU is exploring ways to step up its financial ownership over PSOs to create a more equitable and strategic partnership on peace and security, while also looking for alternative sources of external support, e.g. through UN assessed contributions. In this context, the 2016 Kaberuka report on financing for peace in Africa is key. The report aims to operationalise the AU Peace Fund, with clearer rules, governance structure and vision on how to raise adequate funds. This includes a plan to cover 100% of the AU’s operational budget, 75% of its programme budget and 25% of the peace support operations budget through own resources, in a move to increase African ownership. Within the AU Peace Fund, three windows are foreseen: one for preventive diplomacy and mediation, a second one for institutional support and a third one for PSOs. While the intention is to cover the first two windows fully through own resources, the plan foresees coverage of 25% through AU resources for the third window, while the remaining share should be covered through UN assessed contributions by 2020 (interview with AUC official, 14 June 2017). In order to mobilise sufficient resources, the plan proposes a 0.2% levy on imports. Several African countries have already passed legislation to implement the recommendations of the Kaberuka report, and others are in the process of doing so, signalling some momentum towards more African ownership. While overall the EU has been supportive of the Kaberuka plan, other partners have expressed concerns on its feasibility. Within the AU, some Member States have expressed doubts about the viability of the Kaberuka proposals.

Moreover, in January 2017, Rwandan president Paul Kagame presented a report to other African Heads of State, on AU reform. The report formulates some recommendations to make the AU better prepared to fulfil its mandate and respond to global events. These notably include proposals for the AUC to focus on key priorities with continental scope and formulate a clear division of labour between the AU, the RECs/RMs and the AU member states, realign and streamline the AU institutions, build a more affective AU management and mobilise sustainable finances. A number of these points could have potentially major implications for the way the APSA is organised and the respective roles of the RECs and the AUC in this area.

Finally, in early 2017 new leadership took office at the AUC, led by AUC Chairperson Moussa Faki. Mr Faki is widely seen as a supporter of a strong AU-EU partnership, as was apparent during the visit of HR/VP Mogherini to Addis Ababa in March 2017, reciprocated by a visit of Mr Faki to the EU institutions in May 2017. The next EU-AU Summit, which will review the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), is scheduled for November 2017 in Abidjan (Côte D’Ivoire) and will be a key moment to further deepen the Africa-EU partnership, including on peace and security matters.

While the EU remains the most important partner of the AU, especially in the domain of peace and security, other partners are involved as well. These notably include countries such as the USA, Japan, Norway, Turkey, the Gulf States as well as China and India more recently (e.g. China contributed USD 100 million to AMISOM). In addition, the AU and the UN signed a new partnership on peace and security in 2017. The UN increasingly acts not only as a legitimiser of African-led PSOs, but also as a part funder, providing a basis for exploring options for trilateral cooperation between the AU, the UN and the EU.

In short, this is a critical juncture for a thorough reassessment of the nature and scope of EU cooperation with African institutions on peace and security.

This report

This Final Report does a number of things. First it explains the methodology employed in the evaluation. Second it presents the findings against seven evaluation questions agreed at the start. These are followed by a set of conclusions and finally recommendations. The annexes include standard reference information (ToR, List of Interviewees and a Bibliography in Annexes 7.1 to 7.3). There are also cases studies of two key and very different PSOs that the APF is supporting in Annex 7.4 that are intended to illustrate specific issues. As discussed, two other documents intended for future reference will be added to the Annexes of the next draft of the report, that is proposals for (i) an Action Document for follow-up and (ii) a Log frame and monitoring framework.

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2 Profile of the APF

Over its 13-year history, the APF has become firmly established as a key building block of the EU-Africa partnership on peace and security and an important contributor to the operationalisation of the AU’s continent wide African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).

The APF was created in response to a call made by African heads of state at the AU’s Maputo Summit in July 2003 for support for their efforts to establish peace on security on their continent. This was quickly followed by EU Council approval in November 2003. The Peace Facility started in mid-2004 with an initial allocation of Euro 250 million for 3 years from the 9th European Development Fund and quickly showed its worth as an instrument to help strengthen peace and security efforts on the African continent based on the principle of ‘African solutions to African problems’. Over the intervening years the APF has provided a total of over Euro 2.3 billion for this purpose (Euro 1.9 bn up to 2016).

This total amount has been deployed over three elements: (i) support for African-led peace support operations (PSOs), (ii) capacity-building support to the AU and REC/RMs in the domain of peace and security, and (iii) provide emergency support for conflict prevention and mediation efforts of the AU and RECs through an Early Response Mechanism (ERM). APF support has thus not only enabled the deployment of PSOs such as AMISOM in Somalia or AFISMA in Mali, but also has helped the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) to be established as a formal platform for policymaking and debate, contributed to the validation of the African Standby Force, and has provided quick support to various mediation, confidence-building and conflict prevention activities in situations of emerging conflict.

To date, the vast majority of APF funding (some 90%) has been spent on PSOs, of which a large share covered funding of troop stipends for AMISOM. However, concerns about the sustainability of funding required for PSOs and the proportionally low investment in capacity and institutional development led the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) in 2015, to request a more balanced use of APF funds by increasing support for APSA capacity-building and mediation activities and reduce funding to PSOs so as to move beyond crisis-driven financing towards more sustainable institutional capacity-building. The EEAS and European Commission therefore started gradually reducing the share of APF funding for PSOs towards a target of 65 percent. This has also triggered debate on how to ensure proper exit strategies for the APF. In light of this, a decision was already taken to introduce a cap of eighty percent of total troop stipend costs for AMISOM to be covered by the APF. It has also seen shifts in support from financing troop stipends for troop contributing countries (TCCs), towards financial support to the procurement of enabling capabilities such as vehicles, medical services or communication and information systems though this has been limited especially with AMISOM. Another recent trend is the provision of APF support for PSOs embedded outside the official APSA bodies, pointing to a flexibilisation of support to African peace and security activities. Cases in point are the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram, politically led by the Lake Chad Basin Commission and approved by the AU, or more recently, the Joint Force of the G5 Sahel.

The two graphs below, taken from the APF Annual Report for 2016, show how much of the APF funding was spent on PSOs and relative to Capacity Building since the start. The increasingly high costs of AMISOM are also apparent. Comparing the two graphs it is also apparent that funding for CB only really started as the AMIS operation in Darfur came to an end and before spending on AMISOM reached its peak.

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11 Member state official at an ECDPM seminar on 24 June 2016
Figure 1: APF funding for PSOs and CB (EDF9, EDF10 and EDF11)

Source: Graphs extracted from the APF Annual Report 2016
Table 1: APF commitments for PSOs, CB and ERM (EDF9, EDF10 and EDF11)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PSO</th>
<th>Capacity-building</th>
<th>ERM</th>
<th>Audit Evaluation</th>
<th>Technical Assistance</th>
<th>TOTALS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9th EDF</td>
<td>326.50</td>
<td>18.20</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td></td>
<td>347.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10th EDF</td>
<td>618.80</td>
<td>97.60</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>11.90</td>
<td></td>
<td>743.30</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>11th EDF</td>
<td>1,328.7</td>
<td>111.00</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,461.20</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*(in Millions of Euros) - Source: DEVCO*

From Table 1 above, showing APF commitments under the three EDFs concerned, it is apparent that PSOs dominate spending and it is only under EDF10 which coincided more or less with the end of AMIS and the start up of AMISOM that spending on CB rose above 10%. That combined with expenditure on ERM, which also started in this period, pushed PSO spending down to 83% of the total.

The legal base for the APF rests on Article 11 on “Peace-building policies, conflict prevention and resolution” of the ACP-EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) which enables its financing from the EDF. The CPA’s primary purpose is to support development, but it recognises that peace and security are essential ingredients for development, a point also taken up in Javier Solana’s European Security Strategy\(^\text{13}\) agreed by the EU Council at much the same time in December 2003. So while EU Member States were concerned about the use of ‘development funds’ for peace and security purposes in the APF, they accepted the link being made and have since reaffirmed it in subsequent statements, such as the Council Conclusions in 2007 on security and development or again in June 2011, and most recently in July 2017 with the recognition of the reality of the security-development nexus and the importance of promoting peace in section 2.4 the new European Consensus on Development\(^\text{14}\). Thus while, over the years, the argument on peace and security as a necessary condition for development and the case for the use of funds from the EDF for the purposes of supporting African-led peace support operations has continued to be accepted, there remains a concern that this should really be financed from an another source explicitly dedicated to this purpose. So far, however, the EU has not had a dedicated instrument of the scale to provide the level of funding required.

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\(^{14}\) Council Conclusions on the new European Consensus on Development, Ref.9459/17, Brussels, 19.5.2017.
3 Methodology

3.1 Evaluation process

The evaluation team followed a simple contribution analysis\textsuperscript{15} approach using essentially qualitative data collected from official documents, literature and interviews and some limited quantitative data where this was available. The team went through a relatively standard process of four main phases: Inception, Desk study, Field missions and Synthesis with reports produced at each stage. These were then discussed with DG DEVCO and the EEAS before being finalised. The Desk Phase involved interviews in both the main centres where the APF is managed that is Brussels and Addis Ababa.

Field missions were conducted to five centres with different PSOs as indicated in the ToR: (i) Bamako for AFISMA, (ii) Bangui for MISCA, (iii) Bissau for ECOMIB, (iv) Mogadishu for AMISOM, and (v) N’Djamena for MNJTF. An additional mission was undertaken to Abuja (ECOWAS) to gain insights from the level of a REC. This selection meant the team visited a good variety of different operations:

- Two former PSOs that were closed down during the evaluation period and rehatted into UN PKOs (AFISMA and MISCA).
- One large, longer term PSO, AMISOM, that is still involved in military operations as well as accompanying statebuilding activities.
- One small, longer term PSO implemented by a REC, ECOMIB, that is essentially providing an international presence and security reassurance in an on-going politically tense situation.
- One new PSO (MNJTF) where the APF has so far made only a limited contribution.
- The headquarters of one REC, ECOWAS, that has been a major partner of the APF alongside the AU and responsible for several PSOs.

Two members of the team went on each mission so as to improve data collection, and the teams varied for each mission, which encouraged further exchange and reflection between members. The full five person evaluation team was present during the visit to Addis where it was also accompanied by a sixth consultant with extensive work experience with the AU in peace and security.

Given the tight timetable for the study the field missions had to be conducted in late July and early August thus coinciding with a period when many EU and other international staff could be on leave. However, it proved possible to work round this constraint and where necessary some informants absent during visits were engaged by email and Skype calls. The visit to Addis was brought forward and included in the Desk Phase to avoid clashing with the lead up period to the mid-year AU Summit.

The team had regular exchanges with the evaluation manager at DEVCO, which was of great help in the smooth running of the evaluation according to schedule. The same officer helped the team collect additional material. In all places visited, EU Delegation staff were very helpful in making the evaluation feasible and successful.

3.2 Data collection and analysis

As indicated above the evaluation team conducted interviews in six different countries in Africa as well as in both the main centres, Addis Ababa and Brussels, where the APF is administered and at the UN in New York. In total some 180 persons were interviewed (Annex 7.2). Numerous documents both official and non-official were also consulted.

All evidence was systematically recorded and triangulated with multiple sources so as to test its solidity and assess the weight it could be given in the analysis. To further strengthen the quality of the exercise all analysis was read and commented on by several members of the team. A quality assurance expert also kept the process and outputs under regular review.

3.3 Evaluation questions

The Evaluation Questions (EQs) were developed during the Inception Phase in consultation with the officials at DEVCO and EEAS. The choice was made for a maximum of seven questions and 28 judgment criteria. Based on the requirements of the ToR they were designed to address key areas of APF performance as well as provide the basis for forward thinking. They were also chosen to take into account the longer-term concerns of the current 2014-2016 APF-AP. At the same time, they had to link to the five main themes of the findings of the previous 2013 Evaluation, not least because these form one basis for the APF-AP.

The ToR expects the assessment to apply the evaluation criteria of both the OECD DAC and the EU. The evaluation is also expected to assess “the extent to which “the recommendations made in these [2013 Evaluation Thematic Areas] have been translated into the 2014-2016 Action Programme” …and… “the actions DEVCO and EEAS intended to undertake as a follow-up to the 2013 APF evaluation have actually been carried out” (ToR, p.8).

The Evaluation Questions thus sought to address a series of topics and standard evaluation criteria as shown in Table 2 from the Inception Report:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>Efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Relevance and strategic focus</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Impact and effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Efficiency, decision-making and</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>management of the APF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Capacity building and institutional</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Complementarity of EU funding and</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>political tools in supporting the APF</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6 African ownership, AU-RECs</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>collaboration, funding and sustainability</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7 Partnership, EU value-added and</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>complementarity with other partners</td>
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This range of seven topics covers all the points raised by the ToR except for the question of cross-cutting issues which was not raised as a concern by the 2013 Evaluation. The first four areas allow for the assessment of performance of the APF itself. The fifth topic brings in EU performance with the additional measures EEAS/DEVCO can deploy to support the work of the APF. The final two areas of enquiry provide additional elements required to build perspectives for the future. These are first the African inputs to APSA and second those of external partners (including the EU). Together these different elements provide the building blocks on which the on-going international partnership on African peace and security can be constructed.

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16 Cross-cutting issues did not emerge as an area of concern in the 2013 Evaluation. In the interests of narrowing down the evaluation somewhat, it was agreed not to cover the issue in the current evaluation.
3.4 Limitations

The tightness of the timetable for the evaluation dictated by the institutional calendar has been one of the main constraints for the evaluation team. This has meant that some of the phases had to be conducted at moments that were not ideal (e.g. the holiday season), but the widespread willingness of officials and interviewees to adapt and accommodate the team has meant work has proceeded without too much difficulty.

The lack of quantitative data has been another limitation. This had to be counterbalanced by placing greater emphasis on rigour and variety in the collection of qualitative data so as to allow good scope for triangulation and a solid basis on which to build valid conclusions.

Finally, the evaluation team was not able to visit several RECs and most of the evidence collected on their involvement with the APF comes from ECOWAS for which a headquarters visit was made as well as the visits to PSOs in which ECOWAS was involved (AFISMA and ECOMIB) and operations in its geographical area in which it was not involved (MNJTF). At the same time ECOWAS is the REC in Africa with the most experience of peace and security work so does provide a good basis for judging what is possible for a REC in this area. The evaluation’s conclusions and recommendations on the APF working with RECs should therefore be seen in this light rather than as representative of the reality of all RECs.
4 Evaluation findings based on the EQs

4.1 EQ1 – Relevance and strategic focus

To what extent is the APF a relevant instrument for supporting African efforts to address peace and security on the continent as well as for EU policy priorities and has its strategic focus (in terms of short and medium term priorities) been sharpened and brought up to date during the evaluation period?

Rationale

The criterion of relevance is a key one for performance assessment so, even though the relevance of the APF has been regularly confirmed by different commentators, it is important to check in each evaluation. Relevance is also closely tied to strategy and focus. The second ‘challenge’ area identified by the 2013 Evaluation was on the need to sharpen the strategic focus of the APF. The Recommendations emphasised that the APF could not do everything and greater focus would help improve impact. Other recommendations included suggestions that APF support should be closely linked on one hand to AU cross-departmental thinking on, for instance, the security-governance and on the other to EU’s policies and its ‘comprehensive approach’.

Response to EQ1

The APF is widely seen as a relevant instrument both to address peace and security in Africa and to promote EU policy priorities. It underpins the AU’s ability to respond to peace and security crises on the continent. The instrument’s strategic focus has evolved over the evaluation period, though, given the EU’s unique position on funding APSA, it remains difficult to move away from PSOs as the dominant use of funds.

The relevance of the APF seems to be as strong as ever and it does adapt to evolving policy priorities of both AU and EU (diverse PSOs) at national, regional and continental levels. There is apparently no other donor willing and able to replace the EU with the scale of funds available in the APF and to maintain this level of support over time. This is a general finding across all the specific cases examined. The EU is thus seen as more than just a funder but also as an enabler and on-going partner, which is often of utmost importance in many specific cases.

Discussions on a new, more strategic focus for the APF are taking place among European actors and there is clearly dialogue between African and European actors but no distinct conclusions are yet emerging. What is apparent however is that with no other actor identified as willing to provide the large scale and reliable support required to keep PSOs operational, except that is for the UN itself, it would seem that the value added and niche of the APF is precisely in this area. At the same time there is clearly a willingness to adapt to new types of PSOs and not only support large military operations such as AMISOM and AMIS in the past. The new political leadership at the AUC is seen as a positive factor in its willingness to engage more with the EU. Exit strategies for the two PSOs visited (AMISOM and ECOMIB) are being explored, but with limited success. Rehating to the UN is one exit option for the EU in some cases and there are some lessons to be learnt on how this might be done better, but it does not address the core issue of how to close down a PSO.

There is some evidence of more focus for the APF after the 2013 Evaluation and the EU imposing cuts on AMISOM have prompted considerable discussion. In particular this has encouraged a promising debate on alternative sources of funding on two fronts (AU MS levy and UN assessed contributions) though it is early days yet. On the other hand there has been little success pulling in other international partners at a serious level though efforts have been made. There are also positive reactions to the idea of triangular AU-UN-EU relationship.

The scale of APF is highly appreciated but it also makes it harder to replace. However, the recognition that EU funding will decrease is growing in African circles and with it a commitment to implementing the Kaberuka report’s recommendations. Efforts are being made to link the APSA and AGA, which should ensure APF policy, is consistent with the AGA. APF funding through the RECs or particularly to groups of African states (instead of just via AU) is seen as potentially undermining the spirit of APSA if this is not properly coordinated with the AUC.
**JC1.1 - The APF addresses a real and widely recognised need in sustaining African institutional ability to tackle peace and security on the continent**

**Judgement**

The APF clearly addresses a real and widely recognised need and it sustains the AU's ability to respond to peace and security crises on the continent. There is no other partner willing to provide funding on this scale, so promptly and over time. The relevance of APF seems to be as strong as ever and it addresses evolving policy priorities of both AU and EU, evident, for instance, in the diversity of PSO and other peace operations it is used to support. At the same time there is scope for further fine-tuning the support provided in specific circumstances.

**Justification**

The relevance of the APF is widely recognised by officials in both the AU and the EU. At present there is no other source of funds on this scale and even if the UN assessed contributions system is fully agreed it will continue to need to draw on EU funds. The EU thus underpins the AU's ability to respond to peace and security crises on the continent. Various other partners and other actors including CSOs confirm the continuing relevance and value of the APF to African peace and security needs. The scale of the EU support is one factor and the historical relationship also adds value but it is more than that: the EU makes it possible for the APSA to operate and both AU and EU have a common interest in the peace and security being solved. The EU is thus more a partner and enabler. The fact that the EU is invited to join the governing board of the AU Peace Fund, as one of only two non-African members (along with the UN), is indicative of this status.

The field visits to five PSOs in different countries confirmed across the board the relevance of the APF and provided good insights. In the case of AFISMA the APF provided support on time and using the right approach to the African institutional and operational capacities, though at the same time its support was seen by some as being perhaps rather too focused on the upper echelons of the military staff rather than those that are directly involved in operational activities. In AMISOM the APF has clearly been instrumental in enabling the fight against Al-Shabaab and supporting the establishment of Somalia's government institutions by creating an enabling environment that allowed the government to move back to Mogadishu even though bombing incidents still do occur. This level of stability could not have been achieved without the APF. With ECOMIB the APF enabled ECOWAS to undertake an intervention that was initially widely seen in 2012 as essential, though opinions are divided whether the force is still needed in a prolonged crisis that is now more political than military. However, the APF support has enabled ECOWAS and the regional states behind it, to continue to show their concern at a crisis that is still far from over. More widely there is good evidence to show that APF support to ECOWAS has enabled it to strengthen its capacity (e.g. establishment of PAPS financial unit) to respond to peace and security challenges in the region. The APF’s ability to respond quickly was commented on positively though some criticisms were also made about the ineligibility of certain types of military expenditure and the lack of retroactivity (though in practice retroactivity up to the date of the request is allowed), which meant partners had to be careful what they pre-financed. The MISCA operation was another example of a PSO that was only possible with APF support. The prompt support meant that operation was able save lives and fill a gap that no other actor could have creating the space in terms of both time and conditions on the ground that the UN needed to deploy its own MINUSCA. Finally the APF is also seen as relevant in its relatively limited support for the MNJTF in the Lake Chad area, despite the practical problems with procurement processes. Some observers however, felt it could perhaps have been extended to include more peacebuilding and post-conflict elements.
JC 1.2 - Serious consideration and follow-up has been given to the recommendation of the 2013 Evaluation Report that the strategic priorities of the APF should be more focussed and consist of three elements: (i) APSA development as the ‘big issue’, (ii) Within that framework a focus on activities where the APF has a comparative advantage, and (iii) Support to the AU to identify other actors to address any gaps.

Judgement

Serious consideration has indeed been given to the need to focus the use of APF funds more on the institutional development of APSA than on PSOs. However, for the time being PSOs still take up over 90% of the APF funds and it has proved difficult to make the switch given the very real needs in this quarter. This in itself suggests to many stakeholders that the comparative advantage of the APF is precisely that it is able to fund troops allowances though it is also flexible enough to respond to some other needs (though not military expenditure per se) and can be used in a complementary manner to what other donors can provide. It also does support the APSA at both the continental and regional levels. Effectively therefore support to APSA is the central issue for the APF even though the more formal development of the APSA through specific capacity building and institutional development funding is not the ‘big issue’ as hoped.

At the same time the EU has implemented a 20% cut to troop allowances in AMISOM, thereby proactively setting a limit to the funding for this largest APSA PSO, and it seems that this has prompted more movement in the search for alternative funding for PSOs. In particular, the Kaberuka Report has suggested a 0.2% levy on imports, which up to 20 African governments are looking into seriously even though some practical obstacles still need to be overcome. Equally the debate on using UN assessed contributions is, after quite some years, gathering some new momentum that looks promising although this may be curtailed by US attitudes to the UN. On the other hand, efforts to lobby other partner countries to contribute to the Peace Fund have not been so successful. The EU has also been willing to support each of these initiatives.

Justification

Discussion has taken place on the EU side about the strategic focus of the APF including involving the EU member states notably through Council Working Groups. Though it also seems that in COAFR MS often stick to their positions and do not enter into a real debate. Both sides seem to agree that dialogue between the AU and the EU has improved recently with new leadership in place but it could be further improved and there is little evidence yet on how this may impact on strategic focus of the APF.

A Financing Agreement for the period of the evaluation (2014-2016) was signed in 2014. The three main activities it lists [(i) PSOs, (ii) operationalisation of the APSA, and (iii) the ERM] are not prioritised in quite the same way as suggested by the Evaluation. However, the importance of APSA development is further stressed in subsequent paragraphs in the same section of the Agreement (section 1.2). PSOs take up the vast bulk of the funds but cuts to AMISOM have been implemented. While there is a discussion among EU actors on how to balance PSO and APSA development funding there is no agreement yet on how this might be achieved and there are no figures yet as to whether the cuts to AMISOM have resulted in more funding for capacity building.

Evidence suggests that there is indeed follow-up being given to the recommendation. The measure that has attracted the most attention has been the decision to cut the funding for troop allowances by 20% which is in line with this recommendation as it potentially reduces the share going to PSOs and makes more funds available for APSA development and operationalisation. There is also growing recognition of the need to find alternative sources of funding and a commitment to therefore take the proposals of the Kaberuka report seriously.

Steps have been taken on various fronts to identify other partners. Commissioner Chergui is reported to have travelled to meet various possible partners (incl. China, Turkey, Gulf States…) but with very limited success. The EU HRVP has also raised the question with the Chinese Minister of Defence during a recent trip to Beijing. On another front the discussion on whether UN assessed contributions could be used to finance AU PSOs has apparently gained some real momentum, prompted in part by the Kaberuka report on the Peace Fund, though some questions still remain on practicalities.
At the level of the different PSOs visited by the evaluation team it was apparent that there was little thinking on the overall strategic orientation of the APF, nor indeed often, on the strategic orientations for the future of individual PSOs. Overall the evidence gained reinforced the view that the APF was very relevant and that one aspect of its value added was precisely that it was just about the only source of external funding for troop allowances and logistics but it was also flexible enough to fund other more specific needs where there gaps in funding from other sources.

In certain quarters there was a debate about whether the APF should fund RECs directly or channel funds through the AUC and there is a 2008 MoU between the AUC and the RECs on this question. At the same time it is clear that AU work on peace and security in many cases involves a close cooperation with the RECs. ECOWAS is involved, or is an interested party, in a number of the PSOs visited (AFISMA, ECOMIB, MNJTF) and it was clear that this REC had been able to strengthen its capacity for peace and security work as a result. One very specific example was that of AFISMA where APF funding had enabled the creation of the PAPS Finance Unit that ECOWAS was then able to rely on for other PSOs.

The APF thus does have a comparative advantage on funding PSOs and it is able to support the APSA at both continental and regional levels. Almost universally stakeholders confirmed the value of APF support and did feel it was managed in such a way as to allow complementarity with other contributions where these are forthcoming.

**JC 1.3 - The focus of the APF is coherent with other policies of both the AU (e.g. APSA-AGA link) and the EU (e.g. evolving priorities of EU external action) in the face of the changing nature of conflict and tensions in Africa**

**Judgement**

There is a considerable consistency between the APF and other policies both of the AU and the EU. These are also regularly updated to reflect changing circumstances. What is less clear is the extent to which such policies are jointly formulated. At the high-level policy dialogue since the agreement of the JAES in 2007 this has been the norm but there is a lack of evidences as to whether this is also the norm at the level of planning and operational documents. There are mixed views on how best the EU should work with the RECs without undermining the role of the AUC in providing continental coordination on PSOs.

**Justification**

Efforts to link APSA and AGA are being made notably with a stronger emphasis on the implementation of the PCRD.

EU policy documents show a strong continuing commitment to collaborating with the AU and RECs on Peace and Security in Africa.

There is a track record of joint Africa-EU policy documents particularly at the aspirational level (e.g. the JAES). However, at the operational planning level efforts are certainly made to achieve joint plans but it is less clear such documents are always formulated jointly.

There is evidence of coherence between the actions supported by the APF and wider AU and EU policies in all the PSOs visited, though this does vary from one context to another. A particularly strong example is AMISON where both the AU and the EU have extensive wider policy interests in the Horn of Africa region (security concerns such as trafficking, forced displacement, irregular migration, smuggling, piracy) related to the important geo-strategic location of Somalia. For the EU specifically AMISOM is part of the EU’s Comprehensive Approach and RIP for the region and closely linked to the Atalanta operation. But equally in the Central African region, APF support to MISCA in CAR is coherent with security and development concerns of neighbouring states (stability along their borders), of ECCAS (peace and security), of the AU (stability, human rights abuse) and the EU (support to a fragile state and the stability of the wider region). For West Africa, APF support for AFISMA, ECOMIB and, to a more limited extent, MNJTF can all be related to the EU’s support to ECOWAS and their mutual interests in maintaining peace and security in the region. The MNJTF area of operation also includes Chad, which falls under ECCAS.

There are mixed views on whether the EU should also deal directly with RECs on the use of the APF to fund PSO operations. At present AU endorsement is required for REC PSOs and the EU has long standing
relations with the RECs. But some AU Member States feel there is a good case in terms of efficiency for more flexibility and direct EU support to the RECs. On the other hand, there is also a need to ensure coherence across Africa and some AUC officials feel there are dangers in the AUC not being involved in such arrangements at the very least to ensure consistency.

**JC 1.4 - Plausible exit strategies for PSOs and for capacity building activities have been formulated and are being actively considered and/or implemented in specific cases**

**Judgement**

There is some discussion on exit strategies among both African and European actors and evidence from each field visit indicates that these occur differently in each specific case dependent on circumstances. No general pattern emerges, but rehating to a UN operation is clearly one option that is considered regularly. Such transfers do raise issues both in terms of the planning and implementation so as to ensure all elements are properly covered. For instance, in the case of MISCA the UN was initially unwilling to take over the civilian element, which created considerable uncertainty for those involved. One specific issue is the question of the requirements of the UN in terms of troop capacity standards that are generally higher than the standards prevalent in AU PSOs. In the cases of the rehating of both AFISMA and MISCA this was an issue. In turn this raises the question of whether enough is done on capacity building in the AU PSOs supported by the APF. If such rehating to the UN is to become common place, then it would seem valuable to take a more systematic approach to PSO capacity building in order to prepare them more adequately for such transfers.

It is clear from various examples that designing and implementing plausible exit strategies is not easy. In the case of Somalia the EU’s decision to cut back on troop allowances has however started to provoke more debate on sustainability though, so far, it is couched more in terms of finding alternatives sources of support rather than on a real exit strategy for the PSO.

**Justification**

There is certainly some discussion on exit strategies and not just among EU actors, but also among African actors. The financial sustainability question is a major factor pushing this discussion and the Kaberuka report on financing the AU and its Peace Fund is an important factor in this.

A range of different examples on exit strategies emerged from visits to PSOs. For two of them, AFISMA and MISCA, rehating to a UN force was the exit strategy for the APF but not for the PSO itself. Although both these transfers were generally satisfactory both revealed inadequacies in the strategy and preparation. For example with the transfer from MISCA to MINUSCA no provision had been made to transfer the civilian element and many officials were left hanging for a period of months. In both cases there were also capacity issues due to the higher troop capacity standards of the UN. Two other cases examined, ECOMIB and AMISOM, illustrated, for very different reasons, the difficulties of devising other types of exit strategies in cases where the causes of tension are complex and run deep. In such circumstances the availability of the APF to continue providing support over time is much appreciated.

In the case of ECOMIB a proposal for an exit strategy was made by the ECOWAS Commission earlier in 2017 but this was not accepted by its member states. The next hope is that national elections in 2018 may provide the opportunity for another attempt. ECOWAS did provide good evidence of where APF support had resulted in institutional capacity development for the REC. ECOWAS is also better placed than most regional organisations in Africa to capitalise on opportunities for institutional development as it has some of its own financial resources that help ensure continuity. For the MNJTF there is no concrete dialogue yet on post-conflict stabilisation and as the conflict is still relatively young it is really too early to be talking about exit strategies. Finally for Somalia, an exit strategy has been formulated in the Joint UN/AU Review, which indicates that AMISOM should reduce to a core presence after the elections in 2022. In the meantime a gradual reduction is to start in 2018. There is thus a recognised need for continuity over several more years and an acknowledgement that premature withdrawal would be disastrous. The EU has started to reduce the level of its contribution and this has helped to accelerate a debate on alternative sources of funding.
4.2 EQ2 – Impact and Effectiveness

What demonstrable impact and effects (positive and negative changes) resulted directly or indirectly from the APF intervention in the evaluation period?

Rationale

The ToR asks for an assessment of the positive and negative changes produced by the intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. Making such an assessment in a comprehensive manner is difficult not least because impact is always hard to evaluate precisely, but also because over such a short evaluation period there may be limited evidence that can be used for this assessment. Yet impact is a key criterion for this evaluation. This EQ therefore invited the team to first enumerate the effects that could be identified and reasonably linked to the contribution of the APF support. It then also asked for an assessment against the expected effects as identified in the intervention logic formulated for the evaluation.

Response to EQ2

The contributions of the APF can be linked to mostly positive as well as some negative effects on the implementation of the APSA. Desk research and stakeholders from different backgrounds agree, that the APF was a key factor in making the APSA function during the evaluation period while building on achievements from the pre-evaluation period. For several PSOs examined there is consensus that the APF funding was effective in contributing to peace and stability.

There is evidence that the contributions of the APF can be linked to mostly positive as well as some negative effects on the implementation of the APSA. For three out of the five PSOs visited in the context of this evaluation there is consensus among stakeholders that the APF funding was effective in contributing to peace and stability. These are MISCA, ECOMIB and AMISOM albeit progress in the latter case has been slow. The funding to AFISMA however was too short to identify any significant effects, and APF support arriving on the ground for MNJTF was so minimal that no serious positive impact can really be attributed to the APF. The decision to channel support for the MNJTF through the AUC was unsatisfactory and was criticised by a range of stakeholders at headquarters as well as field level and in that sense it has also a negative impact. The APSA Capacity Building Programme in support to the institutional structures of the AU was qualified as essential to keep the organisation running at headquarters as well as field level and to uphold communication between the AUC, RECs and country offices. However, very mixed messages were recorded about unsatisfactory human resources management throughout the AU structures and the AULO offices (e.g., no strong efforts made to fill positions; acknowledgement that the professional level in some AULO offices is not satisfactory), both showing that the extent to which the APF support can contribute to a more effective functioning of the APSA has its limits.

Overall, the delivery of the APF is reasonably in line with the Theory of Change on which the APF support is built. Looking at the APF support from a Pan-African level, the funding has contributed to peace and security across different parts of African and has helped to make the APSA, at institutional as well as field-level, indispensable. Several unintended effects caused by the APF were noteworthy, mostly linked to the sheer funding volume of the APF and the impact it has on the policy discourse between the EU and the AU. Most pertinent has been the discussion on the 20% cut for AMISOM, which caused outrage in some African (policy) communities, while others saw it as a relevant step, although not intended, in support of the Kaberuka proposals to reduce the dependency on external funding for peace and security in Africa. The strong EU presence in funding peace and security brings also along some potential reputational risks as in the case of the MNJTF. The abuses caused by some TCC soldiers of MISCA in CAR should be mentioned in this context as well.

There is a regular dialogue between the COM and the AU about progress (this dialogue intensified during the evaluation period), various formal and informal monitoring mechanisms are in place and data and recommendations from evaluations and assessments are used to feed this dialogue. But information received from headquarters as well as the county level shows that the follow-up to this dialogue and the agreements reached are mixed. There is room for improving the link between reporting, analysis, learning, dialogue and implementation.
JC 2.1 - A strong level of consensus exists among different types of stakeholders on the effects that they attribute partially or entirely to the APF

Judgement

There is a reasonably strong consensus among different stakeholders that the overall effects of the APF in support of peace and security in Africa have been positive. This relates to the institutional level, i.e. the functioning of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) at the Pan-African level as well as to the deployment of African PSOs throughout different parts of the continent. Though it was noted that in some specific areas and operations the management of the support could have been better thereby reducing effectiveness. Effectiveness is also influenced by context and the nature of the conflict which has shown that African PSOs, like in Mali, were not strong enough to shoulder an effective response or missed experience and capacity to integrate as effectively as they might with international follow-up actions, like in the case of MISCA.

The effectiveness of the APSA Capacity Development Support is mixed. Some of the APFs funding helped to enhance the performance of the AUC, e.g. in the domain of financial management or the structuring of systems, but there are questions about human resources management and the effectiveness of AULOs in different conflict countries. REC LOs at the Addis level, however, have facilitated the exchange between the AUC and RECs, though they could not solve the more structural problems in this relationship, such as the mandate of RECs and issues of subsidiarity.

Justification

At the pan-African level, there is widespread agreement that the APSA has been an effective instrument in support of peace and security in Africa. Research, interviews and evaluation reports, as well as conferences (e.g., the 2012 Cairo Conference on 10 years of APSA) support this finding. One can attribute this in good measure to the APF as one of the predominant funding channels in support of the APSA. PSOs and APSA capacity development activities could not have been undertaken without the financial support of the APF. The APF covers some 67% of the international partners’ support for the AU in 201517, which makes this finding plausible.

An analysis of the AU and RECs/RMs engagement in conflict prevention and conflict resolution over 2013-201518 shows that the AU and RECs/RMs together addressed nearly 90% of all wars on the continent (through diplomacy; mediation and/or PSOs); that the AU and RECs/RMs engagement in mediation efforts has gradually increased; that the combination of diplomatic and mediation measures (by AU and RECs/RMs) has also increased; that the pre-election engagements of the AU and RECs/RMs were particularly useful and contributed in most cases to an orderly electoral process; and that in over 70% of the peace agreements, the AU and RECs/RMs played a role, though often in a supporting capacity, only. Major problems implementing these activities include the unresolved subsidiarity question concerning the AUC and REC responsibility for engagements and the lack of African funding for solving P&S problems in Africa.

Desk research, interviews and field visits broadly confirm the effectiveness of the APF in support of very different peace and stabilisation efforts throughout the continent, though there are also some less positive cases. From an overall perspective, the intense support provided to AMISOM through the APF resulted in a pushback of Al-Shabaab and the creation of a very initial level of stabilisation in selected areas of Somalia, which laid the ground for the elections of a government in early 2017. The results achieved are still highly fragile but compared to the situation pre-2014 identifiable improvements have been realised. In summary, there is piecemeal but gradual improvement of the situation in Somalia, which would not have been possible without the support, provided to AMISOM through the APF.

ECOMIB had a demonstrable impact on the stabilisation of the country, in particular during the period 2012 to 2014 when the national elections were held. Since then, the country remained relatively stable (no coup d’état, no political murders) but the stabilisation process stalled with the re-emergence of the political-institutional crisis in 2016. As for MISCA, at an overall level, there is general consensus among stakeholders

that the operation was vital in establishing and even imposing peace alongside the Operation Sangaris which led to conditions for the UN to deploy MINUSCA. At the same time, the re-hatting of African troops under the UN-banner has created a series of issues (doctrine19, poor equipment levels, low level of training, troop behaviour and abuses) that is having an impact on the effectiveness of MINUSCA to this today.

Research on AFISMA shows that it was a relevant and prompt response to a rapidly emerging crisis but that it was not strong enough to counter the sudden violence of the jihadist forces. AFISMA was able to hold its ground for a period of six months, with the support of the APF, but due to its insufficient overall capacity was unable to protect Mali effectively from worse. This experience points also to the overall limited operational capacities of ECOWAS to manage and lead such complex operations. While ECOWAS has been an effective player in the case of ECOMIB, see above, the AFISMA case shows that this regional organisation is limited in its ability to take on more complex responses. The ECOWAS Standby Force was declared fully operational in 2015 but interviews pointed out that in reality this is far from being the case allowing the organisation to respond only to less complex conflict situations.

There appears to be broad consensus that the support provided through the APF to the MNJTF was, so far, not very effective. The ability of the AUC to channel the available resources to concrete support actions on the ground has been disappointing. This relates to the largely deficient capabilities of the AUC’s procurement department to process the demands for logistics and camps into tenders, purchases and deliveries. Questions were raised throughout the evaluation why both parties, the AUC as well as the EU, did not choose to work through a procurement agent mobilised from the outside.

The experience shows also more broadly that progress to introduce institutional and management reform, funded partially through the APSA Capacity Building Programme, is difficult and slow. The Joint Narrative Reports of the AUC’s Peace and Security Department (for the years 2012 to 2016) give an elaborate list of the activities and outputs undertaken in the various domains of work and how useful these apparently were. But they do not contain more detailed analysis about effectiveness, the extent to which these outputs have resulted in sustainable outcomes and how performance could be improved. Various APSA-related evaluation reports indicate substantial room for improvement if it comes to human resources management, procurement capacities and the cross-sector and departmental coordination and cooperation within the AUC, but also at the level of RECs/RMs and within Liaison Offices of the AU in conflict countries. Appreciation was however expressed on financial management at the level of the AUC where performance has substantially improved compared to a few years back. The capacity building support to ECOWAS to enhance its finance division, funded under the grant for AFISMA, was also cited as very effective.

**JC 2.2 - Consistency exists between the identified effects achieved and the expected effects listed in the APF’s theory of change and intervention logic**

**Judgement**

Overall, the effects, which the evaluation team has identified, correspond reasonably closely with the intervention logic of the APF. At the institutional level, funding helped to reach common political positions and to implement common approaches in support of P&S in Africa. It kept the APSA operational and functioning so that results and improvements as well as more stability in African crisis regions could be achieved.

At the level of PSOs, there is broad consistency between the identified effects achieved and the expected effects listed in the APF’s theory of change witness to the evaluation team’s findings from AMISOM, MISCA and ECOMIB. The funding to AFISMA contributed to a limited extent to the peace and security in Mali but the intervention period, six months, was too short to measure any serious effects. The evaluation team could not attribute any positive effect to the APF’s support to the MNJTF, simply because the financing did not (yet) lead to the delivery of assets or services on the ground (except for medical services contracted with APF funding), however the delays have had a negative impact on the image of the APF.

The APF support had and also still has some unintended effects with the effect of advancing policy and practice in dealing with peace and security in Africa. Most pertinent has been the discussion on the 20% cut

19 In the case of MINUSCA, MISCA’s former Force Commander (FC) was nevertheless appointed as Deputy FC raising questions because the UN does usually not appoint representatives from neighbouring countries to avoid conflict of interests.
on the stipends for the AMISOM operation, the changes introduced were heavily criticised by some African stakeholders as they were seen as a step to prevent or hinder the achievement of the goals of the APF and thereby working against the very logic of the APF’s intervention. Though other stakeholders saw it as a healthy push for a discussion on reducing the dependency on external funding for African PSOs and about approaches to eventually exit from ongoing engagements, Somalia in particular.

**Justification**

At the political level, common positions and agreement on common approaches to resolve the challenges of peace and security in Africa have been reached (see Africa-EU Summit 2014 and APF Annual Reports 2014 to 2016), the APSA architecture has remained operational and it mostly functions despite the hick-ups and shortcomings identified above. As a consequence of these various efforts, the majority of Africa is largely at peace today (compared to some 15-20 years ago) but one can see, in particular after 2010, a steady rise of violent conflicts in selected regions of the continent. Most conflict-related casualties in African have become concentrated in a relatively small number of countries, including, among others, Nigeria and other countries adjacent to the Lake Chad, Somalia, South Sudan, DRC, CAR and Burundi.

A good level of consistency exists between the effects listed in the APF intervention logic and what can be observed in CAR for the APF financed MISCA. However, the concerns at the UN resulting from cases of sexual exploitation and abuse by troops could potentially also come with reputational costs for the EU as the main financial enabler of MISCA. In Guinea Bissau, the intervention through ECOMIB led to an initial stabilisation of the country, but encountered a backlash with the renewed political and institutional crisis unfolding as of 2016. For AMISOM, there is consistency between the identified effects and those listed in the APF’s theory of change. AMISOM continues to provide the security umbrella needed to further the political process in Somalia and there has been progress, in particular in the areas of state-building, governance and security-sector reform. But, as mentioned above, the process is tedious and slow. For the MNJTF, there is so far no consistency between the identified effects and those listed in the APF’s theory of change.

Several effects not clearly listed in the intervention logic are recorded. The APF contribution ceiling placed on stipends for AMISOM uniformed personnel has become an issue of intense debate. This funding has become hugely expensive over the past few years, which led EU Member States to pressure for a policy of reducing and eventually exiting its support from this operation. On the other hand the ceiling placed on support to stipends has been heavily criticised by AU and AUC officials and stakeholders. The announcement of the EU was like a “shock-therapy” (as one interviewee described it). This has created, and is still creating a distance between certain quarters of the AU (in particular those who have to deal with the implementation of the PSOs) and the EU and the partnership overall.

But the evaluation team did witness different views concerning this matter within the AUC as well as among African stakeholders monitoring the implementation of the APSA. The cut in funding has in fact stimulated and given added urgency to a wider discussion about overcoming, or at least reducing the dependence on external funding for African PSOs and other activities in support of peace and security in Africa. Several interviewees also made the point that Africans realised that they have to seek a way out of a situation, which they do not want to continue forever. The discussion was reinforced by the parallel experience of seeking substantial support for the APSA from alternative sources of funding, such as the Chinese Government or the Gulf States, but all efforts to achieve this remained largely unsuccessful.

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JC 2.3 - The partners use the mechanisms they have set in place to monitor the impact of APF-supported interventions and maintain a regular dialogue on progress achieved

**Judgement**

Various formal and informal monitoring mechanisms exist at different levels to monitor progress, performance and impact of APF supported interventions. Most of the monitoring is done on the job, or in the context of coordination meetings with colleagues from other organisations. Monitoring happens also through monitoring missions and (joint) evaluations. It appears that the EU at HQ and at the level of EU Delegations (in as far as they have an APF-related management responsibility) are well informed about progress and the effects of the APF funded activities. The same applies for the AUC and ECOWAS while the extent to which the AULOs are equally well informed can’t be judged.

Evaluations and assessments have been used as inputs for monitoring-related dialogue and discussions about changes or adaptations of the support provided. But the effectiveness of the joint follow-up dialogue to implement the findings and decisions of this monitoring is rather mixed. There is scope for improving the regular reporting from simple output monitoring to an exercise that analyses effectiveness and discusses ways to improve performance.

**Justification**

At the political level, the COM and the AUC have set up a Joint Coordination Committee (JCC), which should meet once per quarter and function as a political decision organ. This Committee existed since the beginning of the cooperation but it has been difficult to organise meetings regularly. There is also the APF Steering Committee (APF SC) to monitor the implementation of the APF more specifically. The APF SC has met regularly and has gradually incorporated the role and purpose of the JCC. Suggestions have been made to merge these two Committee meetings to reduce institutional overload and overhead costs.

The AU’s Peace and Security Department reports annually via a Joint Narrative Report on the activities carried out, though these reports do not contain any analysis of successes or failures, nor any points for discussion or clarification during a potential follow-up dialogue. It is a mere activity reporting, but not a learning-focused exercise. Beyond these mechanisms, there are regular Steering Committee Meetings to monitor and decide on the implementation of the Joint (donor) Financing Arrangement for “Support to the Employment of AUC Personnel Working in the Peace Security Programme” which is also supported by the EU through the APF.

There is room for improvement on the extent to which information and data on the impact of the APF is followed up and acted upon by both the AU and the EU officials. During the reporting period, several (joint) evaluations were undertaken on the support to AU (military) training centres, one assessment on the relevance and effectiveness of the APF (by the Court of Auditors) and on the effectiveness of the support to AULOs. Concerning the latter, follow-up discussion between the AUC and the AULO donor support group (EU, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, UK) took place. This resulted in a decision to update the respective mandates of the AULOs in conflict countries (some of them are seriously out-dated), the closing down of two offices and the strengthening of offices in other places. As a result of this evaluation, the AUC closed down only one AULO office (Comoros), it did not close the second AULO office (due to political pressures from the concerned country to maintain the status quo and it did not revise the mandates of the AULOs.

In 2015, the AU with strong support from the EU and German cooperation undertook an overall assessment of the APSA. This resulted in the formulation of the APSA Roadmap 2016 to 2020. While the AUC formally agreed to work with this Roadmap, the AUC have so far not given any strong signals that they take ownership of this document use it for planning and monitoring purposes. Despite a strong involvement of the AUC and the RECs in the drafting, including extensive interviews with key stakeholders throughout the APSA institutional structures, it was qualified as a too complex document to work with. Indeed, the AUC rather makes regular and extensive reference to the “African Union Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by Year 2020”, while the APSA Roadmap does not figure at all during public events or discourse.
4.3 EQ3 – Efficient Management of the APF

EQ3: To what extent have the AU-EU partners succeeded in improving the efficiency of the APF, its decision-making processes and the management of the implementation of the APF?

Rationale

Efficiency is another important criteria in the assessment of performance. The 2013 Evaluation had two sets of recommendations relating on the one hand to APF decision making and on the other to the support the EU provided to APF management. Efficiency of different aspects of APF implementation is therefore a recurrent concern, which this EQ seeks to address.

More specifically the 2013 Evaluation report suggested that the EU should revisit its processes for APF financial decision making, as well as the protocols for the approval of Early Response Mechanism (ERM) projects. While the ERM specifically is not to be covered in this evaluation (as that was the subject of another specific evaluation in 2015), the general point about stream-lining APF decision making is a topic worth examining as this is often an area where partnerships can come unstuck particularly if the different decision making processes of each partner are not synchronised. This EQ is therefore pitched at a more generic level. The 2013 Evaluation Report also recommended that the EU seek to further decentralise APF programme management in line with the principle of subsidiarity and that EU and AUC/RECs/RMs managers develop a practice of working more closely together on a daily basis. The human resources available to the APF should also be reassessed in relation to the tasks to be undertaken and additional resources were to be provided as appropriate.

This EQ therefore focuses on the efficiency of the management of the APF taking into account decision-making processes, decentralisation and the adequacy of human resources.

Response to EQ3

Some progress was made in recent years but difficulties remain. Both partners agree that the overall management process is not working as well as could be hoped. Despite real efforts to improve efficiency actors readily identify areas that cause frustration where improvements are still required. Particular areas of frustration include recruitment and procurement processes on the AUC side, EU procedures that continue to be perceived as cumbersome and excessively bureaucratic and some tensions on the EU-AU interface. Yet at the same time actors in the system are able to point to improvements and relations between the two institutions do appear to be appreciative and professional.

Poor communication, poor recruitment practices and a critical shortage of staff on the AU side contributes to a lack of efficient management at the AUC, which also affects peace and security.

The APF contributed to the further development of the APSA roadmap, and supported various assessments. Financial and communications systems, manuals and guidelines for the ‘experts pool’ indicate improved tools for better management. The valuation could not properly evaluate their applicability and usage in the short evaluation period. Feedback on the overall level of efficiency include:

- On the AU side: financial management is better, but with some areas of concern. Bottlenecks in finance and a problematic procurement system results in EU money that cannot be spent. There remain critical shortage of skills and staff in key positions. In the PMT only 2 out of 9 funded positions have been filled. Contracting modalities are generally not conducive to continuity, partly because the funding of many positions is not secure. Some stakeholders report improved efficiency and institutional strengthening in spite of an outdated and cumbersome recruitment process.

- On the EU side: Increases to headquarters staff took place during the evaluation period in 2016. Staffing in the EUD-AU was restructured in the past year according to changes planned four years ago. The APF team has been reinforced. There are mixed results on decentralisation, which increased over the evaluation period. New PSO financing remain centralised in Brussels. The perception in the AUC however, remains that decision making processes appear to be becoming increasingly centralised with a diminishing role for the EUD-AU. Procurement problems are pushing the EU to consider direct management.

- AU-EU interface: Generally good levels of trust exist and balanced solutions are found, notwithstanding occasional tensions. The AU and EU dialogue on political issues is less strong but regular management exchanges do occur and there is a high frequency of contact between staff.
The relationship is hampered by some lack of mutual understanding on a variety of management issues. The challenge is less about the ability to manage, but more about the trust needed to build mutually beneficial relationships and avoid purely transactional relationships.

- There are low levels of efficiency on M&E, despite good intentions and efforts made to put in place relevant systems such as the APSA 2017-2020 Roadmap, Action Plans and logframes.
- For the RECs there are mixed results. A year-long delay in EU funding for RECs/RMs in 2015 under the APSA Support Programme caused real difficulties. The inability of many RECs to do CB activities delayed the Roadmap implementation. This caused frustration with EU management.

**JC 3.1: The APF has a widely recognised reputation for efficient management with internal and external stakeholders able to justify their views on the subject with examples**

**Judgement**

Some improvements to APF management efficiency have been made in recent years through the introduction of a Roadmap, Action plans and logframes. Yet difficulties remain.

Documented delays caused by the prolonged procedures remain a concern for both AUC and EUD. AUC staff noted in 2015 there was no approved funding for the APSA SP CB component. The EUD is concerned with inefficiency in the AUC specifically regarding staff recruitment, and low levels of capacity in procurement. It does acknowledge improvements in financial management and reporting on the AUC side. This was indicated by a successful pillar assessment in four out of five areas in 2015.

The operationalisation of APSA continued and there were improvements in retaining some key staff and in the deployment of long and short-term consultants. Several assessments were undertaken as well as staff contributing in other peace and security related assignments. Capacity Building support continued without major new initiatives in 2014 and 2015. Procurement is widely seen as problematic not least in the 2015 EU pillar assessment of the AUC. Bottlenecks in finance and slow procurement result in EU money that cannot be spent in time. A critical shortage of skills and staff in key positions in the AU remain. Frequency of contact between staff at the EU and between EU and AU does seem high.

An M&E system is being put in place but was not functioning in the evaluation period. A detailed implementation plan is still required to give effect to the Roadmap.

**Justification**

The APF support to the AU and RECs/RMs in the two areas covered by this evaluation (support to PSOs and Operationalisation of the APSA) are best considered separately:

Financial support to African-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs): Various efficiency issues arose in the different PSOs. More specifically for different PSOs:

- The APF’s reputation for efficiency with MISCA is mixed among those who were directly involved. Consistent management systems do seem to have been developed over time even though there were initial difficulties in making them work well. Various difficulties initially regarding MoUs with TCCs were apparently worked through and an efficient process was eventually operating smoothly. A serious effort was made by the AU and UN to organise a smooth handover from MISCA to MINUSCA in September 2014.
- There is considerable evidence of inefficiency in AMISOM. This includes significant delays in approval and disbursement of funds from the APF. This is sometimes linked to delays in discussions with EU member states on APF replenishment. It is also due to the short term ad-hoc and reactive approach to financing AMISOM in tranches of less than a year each and subject to constant delayed approval. No evidence was found that active steps were taken to improve efficiency of APF management for AMISOM.
- ECOWAS officials consider the EU as a difficult partner because of high demands in terms of reporting, a heavy bureaucracy and the need to be able to provide pre-financing. This was illustrated by APF support to AFISMA. Money for troop stipends was channelled through ECOWAS, from where it was distributed to TCCs. However, since ECOWAS was not able to collect evidence of payment from all TCCs (notably non-ECOWAS member state Chad), costs were deemed ineligible for the EU.
Comments from AFISMA were also mixed. According to observers, it took too long to mobilise the support when AFISMA was started. On the other hand, the transfer of responsibilities from AFISMA to MINUSMA went surprisingly fast and smoothly according to external observers, though this was attributed by some to the driving force of France.

The funding of the MNJTF is not considered efficient. The faulty procurement process created huge delays and frustrations among stakeholders. There were multiple complaints, indicating that the chosen management arrangement for the procurement of assets through indirect management by the AUC HQ, which did not have adequate procurement capacity, was not efficient for this mission. The establishment of a logistical base within the MNJTF, the MST, has however had positive effects, though its full potential could not be fully exploited due to the overall procurement problems in supporting the MNJTF.

Operationalisation of APSA Capacity Building support continued without major new initiatives in 2014 and 2015 (see also JC4.3). The recommendations of the 2013 evaluation, suggested that the APF capacity building support to provide substantial support for AUPSD staff salaries is not efficient. The practice continues, however. The contribution of the APF is acknowledged as substantial in the formulation of the APSA Roadmap. Support to AULOs continued, however with visible capacity limitations and without a review of all AULOs mandates. The planned training exercises, AMANI I & II Africa, for the ASF were undertaken, however with variable levels of efficiency and significant delays on procurement of equipment (3CIS). The poor execution suggests a failure of shared objectives, planning, monitoring, communication and reporting between EU and AU. (AMANI is discussed in more detail in JC4.3).

Monitoring and Evaluation: The APF 2017-2018 Action Programme, which includes an indicative logical framework, may start to measure the impact and effectiveness of its support to APSA operationalisation component on the basis of the roadmap indicators. Monitoring of APF actions has been stepped up following the reinforcement of the APF team at HQ since July 2016. The APF was included in 2015 in the DEVCO Result Oriented Monitoring (ROM) programme. Logical frameworks have also been added to new PSOs 2016.

Coordination: A Joint Coordination Committee (JCC) was established to monitor the implementation of the APF although there was no meeting since June 2014. The JCC is jointly chaired by the AUC and the EU and includes representatives of the RECs/RMs. Regular meetings and exchanges on implementation/operational issues take place between the relevant departments of the AUC and Commission services, the EEAS and the EU Delegation to the AU in Addis Ababa The AU PSC – EU Political and Security Committee meetings are held annually.

JC 3.2: The principle of subsidiarity is systematically followed in APF programme management with the EUDs for the AU and relevant RECs responsible where possible and appropriate and a clear division of tasks with the APF team in DEVCO is operating smoothly.

Judgement:

As PSOs continue to be managed from Brussels the principal movement on decentralisation occurred with the APSA Support Programme. The APSA SP was in the past managed from HQ (APSA SP I and II), but the current APSA SP III is being delegated to EUD. This has facilitated close coordination with AUC. There is also a need for close coordination with RECs and regional EUDs to clarify division of labour and reporting lines. The working relations between the different counterparts were clarified by EUD-AU at the start of APSA III implementation.

For the APF as a whole the development of continental wide networking, ensuring coherence and complementarities between continental and regional peace and security activities will take time and trust to develop.

The decentralisation of APF management over the reporting period brought a greater measure of empowerment of the EUD-AU. Adequacy of staffing at EUD/APF is expected to increase with recruitment initiated, but with different responsibilities and some restructuring. The APF team will be dissolved and its staff will be merged into the political and operational departments. All new CB/APSA operationalisation programmes have been devolved to the Delegation. The ERM continues to be centrally managed but the Delegation assessment of initiatives proposed by the AUC is required before taking a decision. An Inter-
service agreement clarifying division of roles between DEVCO/EEAS/EU Delegation to the AU/ Regional Delegations was finalised and has started to be applied in 2017. PSOs under the APF are managed from HQ and only monitored by the local EU Delegation which does at times lead to poor levels of information on APF projects in the EUDs.

Stakeholders views of management challenges seem to suggest these are often less about the ability to manage on a day to day basis, but more about the trust needed to build mutually beneficial relationships and avoid purely transactional ones. This is especially true in building trust between the AU and the EU. In these circumstances decentralisation is important precisely because it should encourage more frequent contact, more personalised relationships and greater trust.

**Justification**

The general rule for decentralisation is that CB is managed from EUDs while PSOs are managed from Brussels. The APSA Support Programme, JFA Salaries and JFA AULOs are monitored and implemented from Addis by the EUD-AU.

During 2014 and 2015, APF funding continued to be delivered through Contribution Agreements, Delegation Agreements or Grant contracts. All new CB/APSA operationalisation programmes have been devolved to the delegation. The ERM continues to be centrally managed but the Delegation assessment of initiatives proposed by the AUC, and opinions from relevant EU Delegations, are required before decisions are taken jointly by the COM and the EEAS. As of the approval of the 2014-2016 Action Programme, only new PSOs require a separate Commission Financing Decision. This approach is maintained for the 2017-2018 Action Programme. Under the 11th EDF, Commission decisions concerning the APF are no longer submitted to the EDF Committee for its opinion. Experience under the previous EDFs proved that this step had no added value considering that the proposed APF actions are discussed by relevant Council WGs and PSC before the Commission takes its decision.

The main challenge is less about the ability to manage, but more about the trust needed to build mutually beneficial relationships and avoid purely transactional ones. The main source of discontent from the AU side, is not so much EUD management, but resentment of the approaches of the COM in Brussels which are seen as distant and not understanding of local conditions. This is especially true in potentially sensitive areas such as financial management and complex regulations.

There is a mixed picture on decentralisation of APF management to other EUDs for REC/RMs. On the one hand the DEVCO/EAAS follow-up matrix envisages increased capacity and empowerment of relevant EUDs for improved follow-up, yet the role of headquarters still remains very visible. Thus all PSOs under the APF are managed from HQ and only monitored from the EU Delegation, but the ability of EUDs to really follow and monitor closely varies considerably:

- For instance, AMISOM is managed by DEVCO D3, which contracts and provides oversight of finances. The EUD-AU only does monitoring and facilitation. The relevant REC is IGAD but it is not involved in AMISOM.
- APF funding to ECOWAS-led PSOs is managed from Brussels. The role of the EU Delegation in Abuja to ECOWAS is to provide assistance and facilitation as required. ECOWAS submits its requests directly to the EU headquarters but sends them in parallel to the AU for endorsement.
- Supporting the MNJTF is done centrally from Brussels. Monitoring by the EUD in N'Djamena was difficult during the period 2015-2016 due to insufficient EUD staff. This has since been corrected. No REC is involved in MNJTF as its field of action overlaps the area of two different RECs: ECOWAS and ECCAS.
- The location of MISCA is in a country where the local EUD has no responsibility for either MISCA or the relevant REC. EUD Gabon does however have previous knowledge and involvement of the APF through previous PSOs in CAR and MICOPAX under ECCAS leadership.

An Inter-service agreement DEVCO/EEAS clarifying division of roles between DEVCO/EEAS/ Delegation to the AU/ Regional Delegations has been finalised and is being applied starting in 2017.

Additional APF related positions have been created at the EUD-AU, though not all positions are filled. Operational staff were increased by five, but these do not all relate to the APF. Support staff working on the APF were reduced, though this is partly counterbalanced by increases at HQ. There are 4 political officers and a Head of Political section. There is an officer for capacity building.
The EUD Peace and Security section disappeared in September 2017. Staff were moved to either political or operational sections. There are concerns this will result in fewer resources and visibility for peace and security work. Programmes will be managed at operations section.

On the AUC side, the Programme Management Team (PMT) is part of the PSD, staffed with AUC staff only and no technical assistance. PMT is supposed to coordinate all inputs from involved bodies at the AUC in relation to ERM and APSA but currently only has 2 out of 9 positions filled. The slow recruitment process in AUC is holding implementation back. Some of the most qualified people in the AU are funded through secondments from international agencies or NGOs into APSA and AGA, to circumvent AUC recruitment procedures/quotas.

To recruit or replace a person at the AUC, takes 12 months. There is high turnover and many vacancies. The current regulatory framework in terms of recruitment does not take into account the needs of PSOs, which are not looking for permanent staff, but for flexibility.

**JC 3.3: Day-to-day practice and working arrangements between relevant EU managers and AU/RECs/RM managers have been strengthened and are efficient**

**Judgement**

Levels of communications between EU services and AUC/RECs/REM do appear to be good. In general staff revealed a good understanding of the functioning of the EU financing architecture, including of the APF, which was further cultivated among staff members through regular trainings on EU funding. But comments were made that exchanges concerning management could be more regular.

It appears there is a reasonable degree of communication between EU services and AUC/RECs and a number of formal meetings do take place. Interviews on both sides suggest some familiarity with how counterparts on each side actually work but also what appear to be some fairly subjective impressions based on limited knowledge. By and large day-to-day working arrangements do appear to work satisfactorily.

**Justification**

Political and financial support to AU/RECs/RMs was discussed at the C2C meeting in April 2016 as well as at PSC2PSC meetings in October 2015 and 2016. Dialogue with RECs on peace and security resulted in the inclusion of a focal sector of cooperation on peace and security in each EDF11 regional programme. APF issues and in particular complementarity in continental and regional support to APSA are addressed at the APSA Steering Committee (EU/AUC/RECs), at regional meetings with RECs and EU Delegations (High level meetings with East and Southern Africa RECs, CODELACOC for West and Central Africa) as well as during bilateral meetings between EEAS/DEVCO senior management and RECs representatives (Secretary Generals, Ambassadors to the EU).

For ECOMIB day-to-day practice and working arrangements between EU and REC seem to work fine, overall. The management of AMISOM is dependent on the mandate it receives from the UNSC. This limits what the EU and the AU can do in terms of troop numbers, requests by UNSC for AMISOM to facilitate humanitarian assistance, support by AMISM to train the Somali police and military in spite of many actors already doing that.

Overall there is a good working relationship between EUD staff and MNJTF staff, as well as between EUD staff based in Addis Ababa and the AU. But comments were made that exchanges between MNJTF and the EUD in N'Djamena concerning management could be more regular. Not all stakeholders of the MNJTF understand why APF funding is not directly channelled into the region.

While interaction between ECOWAS PAPS and the EU Delegation to ECOWAS is limited with regards to APF-funded interventions, ECOWAS PAPS staff referred to direct and regular contacts with the EU Delegation in Addis as well as with Brussels staff regarding the management of budgets. Some ECOWAS staff revealed a good understanding of the functioning of the EU financing architecture, including of the APF, which was further cultivated among staff members through regular trainings on EU funding.
JC 3.4: The EU’s approach to the management of the APF supports and enhances the AU’s and RECs’ management of APSA.

Judgement

The APSA Roadmap provides the framework to inform management processes but has some significant weaknesses and in particular could do with a stronger overall orientation. The AU is still struggling with procurement. Sub-delegation to regions could be better but overall the APF is an instrument that unites Africa in the way it deals with AU and the RECs. Some stakeholders suggest that the APF should remain focussed on the AU and that support to RECs be done through the RIPs, but others recognise that this would reduce flexibility.

The EU supports AUC financial management and the institutional transformation process. The AU has made considerable progress as a result. Yet overall it would seem there is a lack of synergies. Actors on both sides grumble that the ‘management process’ is not working well. AU and RECs staff complain about heavy EU procedures and EU staff about lengthy delays at the AUC. Given the prevailing recruitment procedures at the AUC, the envisaged PMT arrangement is not performing to the expectations placed in it. The implementation period passed without a capable coordinating unit.

The APF unites Africa in the way it deals with the AU and RECs. If the APF deals directly with RECs many officials fear the current co-ordination will disappear. Reserving the APF for use via the AU and funding the RECs only via RIPs and the APF might help harmonise decision-making between RECs-AU. At the same time other African actors argue the AU cannot do everything and it is useful for the EU to fund RECs directly in PSO work albeit with the AU maintaining oversight and legitimacy.

The APSA Roadmap provides the framework to inform management processes but has some significant weaknesses. In particular, it simply presents APSA as a collection of separate components and programs. It does not have an overarching perspective. The 2015 APSA evaluation argues that the Roadmap lacks an overall set of goals and priorities. It does not tackle common organisational challenges (e.g. coordination and sustainability). The respective management processes of the EU and the AU/RECs do not appear to be closely synchronised as interviewees identify problems and bottlenecks.

Financial management is among the acknowledged improvements. Measures to strengthen AUC financial management and AU-EU cooperation were jointly adopted. The EU supports this institutional transformation process and provides technical assistance and general institutional support to the AUC. This has included improvements on internal systems, upgrading accounting standards and putting in place appropriate tools such as a procurement manual. As a result of the joint efforts, the AUC has made considerable progress. Yet efforts to further enhance the financial management of the APF funds are still needed.

Financing through the APF helped to strengthen the financial management capacities of ECOWAS (PAPS), at a central level in Abuja. No information was available about how this helped to strengthen its capacities at decentralised levels, for instance at AFISMA in Mali. For MNJTF the EU’s approach to the management of the APF support ultimately did not enhance the management of the PSO. The approach chosen was based on the AUCs initial refusal to recruit a procurement agent. Yet the AU is still struggling with procurement and sub-delegation to regions. AU procurement standards are too high for its own capacity to deliver, but it is resistant to interference by external actors.

The approach by DEVCO to its funding for AMISOM has remained essentially the same, even though the local, regional and global changes since 2007 has been significant and should perhaps have provoked a review of the intervention logic.

There are some arguments that the EU is too soft in its approach and this does not help the AU. The EU commits money, and needs to put monitoring mechanisms and enhance long-term capacity. Another opinion from a regional actor argues that the AU is more flexible with APF support.

4.4 EQ4 – Capacity Building and Institutional Development

To what extent and how have the capacity building and institutional development programmes supported by the APF under the APSA Support Programme become more effective during the evaluation period as well as better coordinated and more complementary with the contributions of other partners?
Rationale

Support to capacity building and institutional development (CB&ID) for the APSA are core tasks for the APF not least because constraints in this area are routinely identified as an obstacle to the further development of the APSA. The previous evaluation put considerable emphasis on enhancing capacity building efforts recommending a thorough needs assessment in partner organisations be done which would then form the basis for an overall strategic plan for institutional development. It also called for strategic alignment with other EU efforts to support APSA at the regional level (e.g. RIps) and cooperation with other donors on capacity building (CB). One detailed recommendation referred to a minimum threshold for institutional capacity before support was obtained and a graduated scale for increasing support (‘more for more’). Finally more precise monitoring of capacity levels over time was recommended. Recommendation 16 also suggested the inclusion of an M&E element in the capacity building work.

This EQ therefore seeks to prompt a thorough investigation into progress achieved with the APSA Support Programme since 2013. The recommendation on a needs assessment and the emphasis on monitoring over time suggest that an assessment of effectiveness should be the key evaluation criteria here. At the same the expectation was that the proposed institutional development plan would also consider the contributions of other partners and those of the EU at other levels (RECs etc.) hence the additional emphasis on coordination and complementarity.

Response to EQ4

APSA-SP made mixed progress on the 2013 Evaluation Recommendations on CB&ID: (i) tailored approach, (ii) partner coordination, (iii) minimum thresholds on Institutional Development and (iv) setting benchmarks. There are clear intentions to improve the efficiency of the programme implementation with some concrete steps taken to do so: an institutional assessment was conducted in 2014 and an APSA Roadmap was formulated. However, there is also a sense that the activities undertaken are fragmented and monitored more as a set of outputs than as clear contributions to an agreed set of outcomes. As a result the capacity building and institutional development work carried out appears to suffer from a lack of overall sense of direction and common purpose.

Particular areas of concern include:

- There appears to be a lack of a common strategy and vision on CB. The APF is a financing instrument and it is sometimes perceived as performing its functions when it is disbursing funds.
- The focus is on seminars, workshops and trainings and not closely related to improvements in management and institutional development.
- A high proportion of funds is also spent on salaries, which does provide immediate solutions for capacity questions, but is not equivalent to institutional development unless there is a clear plan for sustainable funding of these posts.
- There is frequent confusion between activities/outputs (e.g. training sessions) and outcomes (i.e. results and lasting impact on capacity and institutional development).
- There are visible steps taken towards the establishment of M&E system through detailing log frame and RBM. The log frame designed at the start of the programme did not provide a reliable basis for programme evaluation. GIZ is for instance developing an M&E system for the AU to monitor implementation of the 2016-2020 APSA Road Map.
- AULOs in conflict areas are generally not meeting expectations as efficiently as they might and not all mandates are up to date. A particular problem being that mandates that have been updated in 2016 still do not fully reflect changing circumstances.
- The AULOs were not intended to be permanent structures. The LO network has become overstretched and has not had sufficient resources to effectively support 14 LOs operating in fragile and conflict affected countries. A number of LOs are understaffed and lack critical capacities.
- Peacekeeping training centres have been resource driven and did not produce skilled technical staff available for missions or for AUC.
- The understaffed PMT does not play its role fully. The capacity of the Secretariat of the PSC is inadequate. Additional professional and administrative staff are required in light of the growing workload. Notable progress has been made in strengthening financial management and reporting in
PSD. There is weak evidence on the existence of records for trained personnel, except for military officers.

- While reports note a ‘shortage of funds’ during the 2015/16-implementation period, the rate of financial utilisation of APF allocations remained low. This appears to relate to various problems, notably delays in disbursement and a lack of stakeholder own funds to prefinance.

**JC 4.1 - With the support of the APF a more tailored approach to capacity building and institutional development for APSA has been developed and put into practice. It includes an M&E element.**

### Judgement

There are clear intentions to create a more tailored approach and improve the efficiency of the programme implementation following the 2013 evaluation (e.g. formulation of relevant Action Plans and reports) but as yet the proposals formulated have not all been put into practice.

An institutional assessment in the area of peace and security was done in 2014. It identifies improved M&E as an important issue across a number of strategic objectives. Tangible improvements are yet to be demonstrated beyond the evaluation period. Results and outcomes were constrained by late budget transfers (for the 2015 APSA SP II bridging programme). The APF support to Capacity Building is now based on the 2016-2020 APSA Roadmap, which establishes five clear strategic priorities, specific objectives and outputs to be achieved. It was agreed to increase synergies between political dialogue and cooperation and to promote contributions from the private sector and civil society.

Logical frameworks have also been added to new PSOs starting in 2016. The log frame designed at the start of the programme did not provide a reliable basis for programme evaluation. The Action Programme 2017-2018 includes an indicative logical framework, which will be further developed following the APF mid-term evaluation programme for 2017. There are also visible steps taken to establish an M&E system through detailing log frame and RBM. Yet the envisaged M&E system has not yet materialised due to the weak PMT, which remains understaffed.

Many of the AULOs continued to support countries in transition and engage in political dialogue and reconciliation and humanitarian assistance. The right quality, number and calibre of human resource need to be engaged. With guidance from the AUC headquarters, the development of guidelines, standard operating procedures and frameworks for four of the six pillars of the PCRD Policy, have been discussed and will be initiated in early 2017.

### Justification

The APSA Support Programme III and the 2017-2018 Action Programme of the APF are fully aligned with the Roadmap. The document establishes five clear strategic priorities, specific objectives and outputs to be achieved: (i) Conflict Prevention and early warning, (ii) Crisis management and conflict resolution, including African Standby Force (ASF) and mediation, (iii) Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD), (iv) Strategic security issues and (v) Partnership and coordination.

An institutional assessment for peace and security was done in 2014. The design is informed by the conclusions and recommendations of the 2013 evaluation. In that study the assessment team argued strongly that the new APSA Roadmap for 2016-2020 should not be drawn up by external consultants, arguing that Roadmaps of this kind are organisational plans that set out objectives, strategies, priorities and timelines. As a matter of sound organisational practice and in order to ensure ownership by the AUC, they should be drafted internally. This assessment then received a further boost from the September 2014 Report that the AU wrote for the Ban Ki-Moon High Level Panel (HLP) on peace operations. The AU report for the panel explains how it sees the AU-UN partnership on capacity building not simply as about financing, but as a strategic partnership. Based on the HLP report, the AU started looking into the option of financing UNSC-mandated, African-led operations.

An External Mid-Term Evaluation on 'Sustaining and strengthening African Union’s Liaison Offices in post-conflict countries’ was conducted from October 2016-January 2017. The conclusion reached was that despite significant shortcomings in some Liaison Offices and a range of implementation challenges, these offices have made important contributions to peacebuilding and are valued by national governments and the
international community. In practice, the CB component of the APF in fact allows the AU (AUC, RECs/RMs) to tailor its institutional structures according to its own priorities. Thus for example, MISAHEL received funding through the APF contribution to the Joint Financing Agreement to support the AU Liaison Offices. In AFISMA, the office had more capacity compared to the later MINUSMA when the AU became less involved. Equally it appears that ECOWAS also puts effort into recruiting capable personnel in their offices in Guinea Bissau.

There is an increased interdepartmental collaboration on PCRD through formulation of joint activities in support of countries emerging from conflict, as well as an increased engagement of AULOs in support of peacebuilding, post-conflict reconstruction and development at the national level through the support to the implementation of PSPs in several post-conflict countries.

The right quality, number and calibre of human resources need to be engaged for AULOs. They were created based on a PSC assessment of situation in the field, yet their mandates are not regularly revised. Mandates that are not up to date also lead to a poor distribution of funds. Support to salaries and other operational costs of the AU Liaison offices is now done through joint programming in coordination with other development partners.

A conscious follow-up process to the 2016-2020 APSA Roadmap has also been agreed. The intention is that given that some of the technical expertise provided in the past have not always been efficient, the AU and EU are expected to jointly identify, where needed, the working mechanisms and structures required to implement the agreed actions and reach the expected results. It was agreed to increase synergies between the political dialogue and cooperation and to promote contributions from the private sector and civil society.

Capacity building is a long-term process, raising an issue of continuity. The APSA Support Programme amongst other budget lines, supports salaries, per diems and consultancy fees. This raises the question whether there is not too much emphasis on allowing institutions to function rather building up effective institutions. Most of the GIZ APF Expert Pool was used for CB needs and this proved to be efficient in terms of delivering required services. The APF engaged in a dialogue with the AUC to identify capacity building gaps hampering the implementation of AUC finances, administration and human resource strategies.

Capacity Building efforts are not always well aligned with the needs of the APF supported PSOs. While all functioning RECs are supported by the APSA support programme it appears some have no CB activities. In 2016 EAC received training in Mediation diplomacy and international law as well as in election management. ECCAS received training in small arms and light weapons and maritime security but not with APF funding. The ECOWAS ASF reported substantial training received. Military training is provided by a number of organisations, including the RECMS themselves as well as third countries and the UN. Training for the police and civilian training relies heavily on UN training especially for the police component. It is not clear whether, inefficiencies aside, the APF plays a significant role in providing relevant training to the AU and the RECs.

The Roadmap also identifies improved M&E as an important issue across a number of strategic objectives. Logical frameworks have also been added to new PSOs starting in 2016. The Action Programme 2017-2018 includes an indicative logical framework, which has been further developed following the APF mid-term evaluation programme for 2017. EUD-AU has initiated discussions with the AUC in order to further improve the Log frame Monitoring of the CB support programme in order to possibly allow a better measurement of any achievement.

JC 4.2 - The APSA Support Programme contribution is aligned with other support provided for APSA capacity building and institutional development both by the EU itself (e.g. through RIPs) and by other partners

Judgement

The APSA SP programme, coordinated through the APSA Steering Committee, demonstrates alignment with the APSA Roadmap. Relevant regional Delegations and Geographical units are associated with the formulation of APF and APSA Support Programmes as well as with the monitoring and follow-up. On-going efforts are made to create complementarities with RIPs and other EU support. Equally DEVCO D.3 is routinely associated with the identification and formulation phases of programmes implementing RIPs in the Peace and Security area through participation in Quality Support Groups as well as exchanges through the
informal network on complementarity. EUD-AU is also involved. The latest examples are their input into the RIPv.s for SADC and ECOWAS.

**Justification**

Commendable intentions were demonstrated on maintaining coordination with other EU initiatives and basic coordination mechanisms are in place: relevant regional EU Delegations and geographical units are associated with the formulation of the APF APSA Support Programmes. Instructions have been issued by DEVCO management (DDG note July 2015, and follow-up DG note December 2016) on concrete measures to ensure complementarity between APF and RIP programmes (transfer of salaries, alignment of objectives). DEVCO D.3 is routinely associated with the identification and formulation phases of programmes implementing RIPv.s in the Peace and Security area through participation in Quality Support Groups as well as exchanges through an informal network on complementarity.

Clear intentions were also evident in the design phase and some RECs (such as, ECOWAS) reportedly have one unit for the planning and implementation of all EU support including the RIP. The main costs in 2016 were related to human resources, therefore it is impractical to report on indicators during this evaluation period. For the APSA support programme the approvals at the start of each implementing period regularly took longer than expected. This called for delayed implementation of annual work plan Activities. For 2016 a number of RECs reported “No activities reported due to lack of funds”. In COMESA, for example, minimum progress was made because funding was only approved for staff. The programme was forced to borrow funds from other programmes. The creation of the PMU within ECOWAS has also been instrumental in coordinating peace-and security related RIP funding with APF capacity building.

There are indications that the support provided under AFISMA was aligned with other APSA capacity building support though the information received on the AFISMA experience are only related to the finance sector. There is no information about the extent to which the APF support was aligned with support provided through RIPv.s or NIPv.s. At the same AFISMA does provide an illustration of how complementarities with other partners were directly sought, notably through the inclusion of a special condition in the AFISMA grant agreement requiring the secondment by France of four national experts to work in the PAPS finance cell to provide sound financial management. The APSA Support Programme has not established any direct linkages with the LCBC (formally, it is not an entity recognised under the APSA), the politically mandated regional organisation under which the MNJTF functions.

The most visible working arrangement is the Joint Financing Agreements covering salaries of AUC/PSD staff and AULOs. Commendable efforts were reported with regards to maintaining coordination with other EU initiatives and other actors through the AU Partners Group this also involves Capacity Building. The purpose of this approach is to strengthen complementarity between the donors. For APSA this is more challenging. The EUD-AU is sharing a lot of information to encourage coordination, but the reciprocity shown by other donors is not as good as expected. At the same time some interviewees did feel that a more adequate mapping of similar initiatives was needed and others felt there was an unsatisfactory level of coordination. The EUD also requested the AUC to explain the complementarity between the various elements of APSA funding they receive but no further details were apparently received.

In addition, there are some discussions with GIZ to reinforce complementarity of CB programmes in the field of peace and security with the intention to further extend this process to other donors.

**JC 4.3 - Capacity building support funded by the APF has resulted in a growing pool of expertise that is regularly used in the APSA and has helped create institutional memory**

**Judgement**

There are both successes and failures based on the information available. However, it is clear that no list of person trained exists, so although the overall picture emerging is one of poor retention rates and inadequate systems to identify and keep track of personnel trained it is not possible to check this accurately. Yet it does appear that in some RECs a critical mass of staff with the capacity necessary to support forces does exist. At the same time the Secretariat of the PSC is clearly inadequately staffed. Additional professional and administrative staff are required in light of the growing workload.
The APF has supported the salaries for about 170 PSD and related staff, as well as a pool of experts (long/short-term) and a number of positions within the AU LOs. It has also maintained support for continued operations for peace and security related work, as well as various services through long/short term experts. Experts deployed through the APSA work for institutions in peace and security related initiatives and contribute to institutional efficiency of the AUC/RECs/RM. From the AMISOM visit there seems to be a small flow of experienced people into AU-PSOD from AU and UN PSOs and PKOs. It is likely that this is the case for all AU supported PSOs and peace and mediation initiatives. However, some RECs were not able to fully utilise the opportunity due to lack of resources to pre-finance salaries and reportedly lost some of the experts.

Equally retaining institutional memory is a continuing concern. While the salary support contributed to maintaining the institutional memory of the AUC, the database for a ‘growing pool of experts’ seems to be restricted to trained military officers.

**Justification**

No overall list of person trained exists, so although the overall picture emerging is one of poor retention rates and inadequate systems to identify and keep track of personnel trained it is not possible to check this accurately. The evidence indicated that, at best, the information regarding graduates of training course is dispersed through the various organisations and not collated into a single database. There are anecdotal accounts of a roster of experts which can be drawn upon for deployments, but despite multiple enquiries no copy of this was forthcoming.

In some RECs it would appear that a critical mass of staff exists with the capacity needed to support forces. ECOWAS, for example, and the AU are very different on Capacity Building, with more positive results at the REC level.

The APSA Support Programmes reported on increased capacities in the ECOWAS Standby Force general staff, the ECOWAS Liaison Office to the AU and the Early Warning system. Middle managers from ECOMIB underlined that collaboration by troops from different countries helps them to build trust and to enhance operational practices and knowledge although they did not directly link this to APF CB received. The TCCs experience with the APF funded MISCA and the decision to rehat the force to the UN has meant that a new group of African countries have been introduced to working as TCCs for the UN. This has not been without problems on capacity issues but some of them have been retained to work with MINUSCA and are being pushed to up their standards. The long-standing support provided to the AULO has resulted in some diplomatic and practical expertise. At AMISOM there seems to be a small flow of experienced people into AU-PSOD.

From information gathered during the evaluation it seems none of the 200-250 people, mostly from the RECs, trained through a senior leadership training in 2015 were deployed. In-mission training may contribute to alleviating this tendency. Of about a hundred people trained through the two AMANI exercises conducted in 2014 and 2015, only 20 people actually participated in the final exercise, an attrition rate of 80%.

The Panel of the Wise receives support, yet when mediation is needed, members of the PoW are rarely used. An interview with an ambassador justified this by saying that the PoW is supposed to be working quietly in the background. Mediation is also paid for by IGAD, COMESA, EAC, ICGLR and EASF.

A variety of comments were made that could not be triangulated, as this information is not systematically reported. For instance, one interviewee suggested that trained officers, once in their respective member state, are unlikely to come back for services, as they become a resource for their own country. There are also suggestions that trained staff are often lost to the system, yet it is also possible that while they may get lost in one part of the system and they may also reappear in another. Another interviewee suggested that the same people often receive the same training more than once. In the absence of a full list of staff trained it is difficult to verify these claims. Written reports show replacements and separation of trained officers from PSOD, as well as screening and placing on the AUC roster, while discussions at the EUD revealed that tracing those trained officers has not been practical, as member states prefer to keep the trained manpower and send new ones whenever there exist opportunities.
JC 4.4 - Institutional development is identified by actors involved as a clear objective for the APSA Support Programme and steps have been taken to strengthen the institutional capacity of the APSA

Judgement

Clear indications exist in reports that relevant efforts are made to address institutional capacity and specifically from the APSA SP III budget allocation. Actual results at the level of outcomes are constrained by weak reporting by the AU and a PMT that is not performing its monitoring function.

Much of the evidence on CB&ID is at the level of outputs that are easily counted and very little is available detailing outcomes. This may be due to confusion over different understandings of CB and institutional development, with some sources seeming to suggest that it is enough to demonstrate that outputs such as training seminars occur and little attention is paid to more substantive capacity outcomes. It may also be because the APF is a financing instrument that is seen as performing its functions when it is disbursing funds thereby causing confusion between activities and outcomes. The evaluation specifically did not find any strong evidence of programmatic institutional development initiatives systematically filtering down to implementation level and being put into practice during the evaluation period. Most of the activities planned for 2016 did not take place because of a reported “lack of funds” on the part of the RECs. This appears to be largely due to a delay in the disbursement of funds. Activities were usually implemented the following year, once the funds had been received.

The APSA Support Programme supports institutional strengthening of the EASF PLANELM by funding allowances as well as expenses relating to official travel. The staff under the ECOWAS Standby Force was able to carry out relevant activities pertaining to the strengthening of the Civilian, Police and Military component geared at operationalising the ECOWAS Standby Force.

Justification

There appears to be different understandings of CB involved. Although planning documents do spell out a strategy reports, which list outputs and no outcomes, seem to suggest that some actors see CB only as providing funds for management and activities such as seminars, workshops and training missions. Reports for the period show that a considerable portion of capacity building initiatives focus on maintaining the functions of AUC through the support for staff salaries, meetings, travel, etc. Capacity building and institutional development programmes supported by APF aim to contribute to systems development such as review of policies, preparations of guidelines, institutional set-ups and review of training needs. However implementation seems somewhat ad-hoc and the evaluation specifically did not find any strong evidence of these initiatives filtering down to the ground level and being put into practice during the evaluation period. Most of the activities planned for 2016 did not take place because funds were received late and the activities were postponed to the following year.

However, positive evidence for institutional development occurring does include strengthening the finance section and reported accomplishments in some RECs (e.g. ECOWAS). On the other hand, the APSA SP III shows budget allocation for relevant capacity building actions (equipment, training, assessment, development of manuals/guidelines, etc.), consuming about 48% of the total CB budget. These are legitimate expenses for capacity building. However, they need to be clearly linked to a proper long-term vision and strategy for the targeted institutions and their planned capacity development, otherwise they will not achieve the outcomes desired.

In the midst of such acknowledged efforts, the capacity building related actions were visibly constrained due to weak AUC PMT, which was unable to coordinate sharing of experiences, put in place relevant training strategies, and support efficient implementation and coordination functions of the Programme.

The APSA Support Programme does support institutional strengthening for RECs/RMs. For instance in the EASF PLANELM it funds the allowances of nine Staff Officers; seven military, one police and one civilian, as well as expenses relating to official travel to carry out various activities related to the project. The Programme also supports routine maintenance of equipment and motor vehicles purchased under the Project. As part of strengthening EASF’s institutional capacity in administrative and financial management, two professional and five support staff are financed under the APSA Bridging Programme. The staff continue to undertake their
functions towards full operationalisation of EASF by enhancing proper financial and administrative management in addition to reporting and monitoring of the APSA Programme as well as other Projects funded under bi-lateral agreements between EASF and other partners. EASF’s program, administrative and financial management capacities were strengthened through sustenance of staff involved in programme implementation and reporting. This has ensured satisfactory periodic financial and progress reporting in accordance with prescribed formats. Staff funded under the Programme with EASF Secretariat representatives and the Liaison Officer have regularly participated in the Programme related meetings organised by AUC. The EASF Planning Element positions are filled by seconded trained Officers from Members States capable of facilitating the full operationalisation of ASF.

In 2016, with a fully staffed Project Management Unit situated within the ECOWAS Peace Fund, the PMU contributed to an enhanced coordination within ECOWAS and between ECOWAS and the AUC. The APSA SP supported the payment of salaries and emoluments of six Officers. The staff under the ECOWAS Standby Force was able to carry out relevant activities pertaining to the strengthening of the Civilian, Police and Military component geared at operationalising the ECOWAS Standby Force, which is one of the pillars of the African Standby Force. The APSA SP supported the Staff Remuneration (Salaries of 3 Programme Officers/Analysts and 1 P2 Situation room officer) who contributed to the delivery of quality data and information processing and analysis as well as the definition of appropriate response proposals that were submitted to the ECOWAS authorities. But ECOWAS continued financing payment for 77 field reporters.

**JC 4.5 - A good balance has been found between the need to ensure capacity building and institutional development on the one hand and the need to deliver efficient and timely support (to PSOs) on the ground.**

**Judgement**

Available reports do not show a shortage of funds for capacity building initiatives, but the manner in which it is utilised may not be optimal. The rate of financial utilisation is lower than the amounts allocated partly due to late disbursement and presumably lack of absorption capacity. The AU Support Programme looks at institutional capability when there is also a need to look at complementarity. The belief is that this is the first step to building capacities. There appears to be an inadequate focus on creating effective institutions. Much of the CB seems to be partner driven. Perhaps as a result the AUC does not appear to review its policies and their relevance for long-term objectives. There also appears to be no overall capacity and institutional development strategy covering all the programmes involving APSA SP, AU SP and JFA salaries for AULOs. Equally there seem to be insufficient human and financial resources to effectively support 14 LOs, despite discussion having taken place between the AUC and the AULO donor support group on the need for rationalisation.

Some capacity building and institutional development seems to have happened in-mission in spite of the lack of adequate support or a strategic vision but this underlines the importance of the lesson that the AU’s peace missions’ doctrine should be centred on an integrated and mutually reinforcing relationship among operations, institution-building, logistical support, and politics.

The ECOWAS PAPS Finance Department however, shows that equal attention was given to the timely support to PSOs on the ground as well as to institutional development. The AFISMA capacity-building component can be seen as a useful effort to find a better balance between timely PSO support and capacity building. Equally, notable progress has been made in strengthening financial management and reporting in the AU PSD.

**Justification**

Most of the CB work is partner-driven and seems to lack focus possibly due to a shortage of staff that are consequently overworked. Perhaps as a result the AUC does not regularly review policies and their relevance and long-term objectives. Efficient and timely support to AMISOM has been lacking in terms of finances. Some capacity building and institutional development seems to have happened in-mission in spite of the lack of adequate support or a strategic vision. The AMISOM experience underlines that the design of the AU’s contemporary peace missions’ doctrine should be centred on an integrated and mutually reinforcing relationship among operations, institution-building, logistical support, and politics.
The 2016 AU Joint Narrative Report makes several references to lack of funding for CB, as well as for all actions of the PSC. Nevertheless, the rate of financial utilisation remained significantly lower than the allocation (below 50%). Available evidence thus does not show a shortage of funds for capacity building initiatives rather it seems that poor cash flow has constrained activities. The manner in which CB budgets are used may not be optimal, aggravated by late disbursement and a lack of absorption capacity. The AULO in conflict areas put significant strain on resources. The LOs were not intended to be permanent structures. The LO network has become overstretched and has not had sufficient human and financial resources to effectively support 14 LOs operating in fragile and conflict affected countries. A number of LOs are understaffed and lack critical capacities. This risks undermining the role of the AU and damaging its reputation and credibility. Several mandates have not been revised. The AULO evaluation recommended that the mandates in Sudan and several overlapping mandates Mali/CAR and Burundi/CAR/DRC be revised. Reinforcing AULO should be accompanied by political backing and a tailor-made capacity-building process to staff.

The AU Support Programme looks at institutional capability when there is also a need to look at complementarity. Even in the AUSP 80% of funds are spent on activities (seminars, trainings). Another focus area of CB is providing funding for staff of AU and RECs. The belief is that this is the first step to building capacities. There is not enough focus on capacity building of institutions. It’s more about keeping structures/capacities alive, not really ‘building’ them. There seems to be no overall CB strategy involving APSA SP, AU SP and JFA salaries for AULO and synergies between the three are not as strong as they could be.

Notable progress has been made in strengthening financial management and reporting in PSD. Additional staff have been recruited in the PSD Finance Division, although it seems there is still a shortage of financial staff and capacity. The implementation of International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) for sound financial management of donor contributions is ongoing and was expected to be operational in 2015.

The experience with the ECOWAS PAPS Finance Department initially funded through AFISMA shows that equal attention was given to the timely support to PSOs on the ground as well as to institutional development. Though the AFISMA period was too short to judge whether this balance continued in the longer term. Yet the AFISMA capacity-building component can be seen as a useful effort to find a better balance between timely PSO support and capacity building. This has also resulted in supporting new institutional structures within the MNJTF (MST and the civilian component). Neither the LCBC (it is not a REC or an RM or any other legally recognised entity) nor the AULO could have assumed this role.
4.5 EQ5 – Complementarity of EU Actions

To what extent and how have the various EU inputs to promoting peace and security in Africa through both the AU and the RECs and including the use of different funding instruments (NIPs, RIPS, IcSP, Trust Funds, etc.) and political tools been operating in a more complementary fashion in support of the APF during the evaluation period?

**Rationale**

The EU supports peace and security in Africa in a multiplicity of ways and at different levels, with funding not just from the APF but also from the national and regional indicative programmes and from other instruments. Equally it is constantly involved in political dialogue on peace and security across Africa and supports efforts towards peacebuilding and conflict prevention with funding as well as through various CSDP missions, special envoys, etc. Conclusion 6 of the 2013 APF Evaluation Report focuses on this and argues that the impact of the APF support could have been considerably greater if there had been greater complementarity in these deployments. Complementarity and coherence between the EU inputs and policies on peace and security in Africa are the key evaluation criteria here. But this question also has important implications for the sustainability of the APF effort and it is also related to the second Theme on Strategic Focus of the recommendations of the 2013 Evaluation Report.

**Response to EQ5**

There has been important progress in the coordination of programming of the various EU inputs to promoting peace and security in Africa. This is particularly true for the coordination of the programming of the APF with RIPS and the EU Trust Fund. Efforts are clearly made to promote an integrated approach and there are also various good examples of both headquarters and field level coordination leading to some degree of complementarity, but at the same time some of these efforts do appear ad-hoc rather than systematic.

A good example is provided by the coordination of programming at headquarters, which was facilitated through the DEVCO Quality Support Groups. Good practices such as the EEAS-managed Inter-Service Group on Lake Chad or the Inter-Service mission to CAR also provide good examples of coordination of various EU bodies and instruments, which could be further systematised and applied to other regions as well. Efforts are also on going to improve complementarity of RIPS and the APF at REC levels through joint assessments with regional delegations and RECs, but it is too early to verify their impact.

National EU delegations appear to be less involved in the programming of the APF, although some ad-hoc efforts to coordinate with activities under the NIPs and other EU instruments were detected. The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa adds a new layer of complexity, although there is evidence of good coordination between the APF team and the DEVCO staff managing the EUTF at the Brussels level, as well as instances of consultation of EUDs on identification of projects. Despite various efforts, the centralised nature of management of APF support to PSOs and human resources constraints at EUD level continue to limit opportunities for better coordination, as information exchange between headquarters and field levels appeared to be limited in some cases. Further efforts to more systematically involve (regional) delegations in the coordination are needed to avoid overlaps. The AMISOM and MISCA cases also provide illustrations of what complementarity between APF support and CSDP can mean in practice, although there appears to be scope for improvements in day-to-day coordination.

**JC 5.1 - The APF team at DEVCO and relevant EUDs increasingly coordinate the programming of EDF and other resources devoted to peace and security in Africa including NIPs, RIPS and EU Trust Funds**

**Judgement**

Coordination and harmonisation of the APF and the RIPS have improved greatly in the last years at Brussels level. Considerable efforts to involve EU Delegations in the process have been made, although further improvements are still be possible. The DEVCO Quality Support Groups are a good platform to allow formal coordination and quality control between staff involved in RIP and APF programming to ensure complementarity. Current Service-Level Arrangements also foresee systematic information exchange and coordination through regular VTCs between DEVCO, EEAS and the EUD to the AU, where DEVCO D3 has
a recognised coordination mandate. In theory, these coordination efforts can involve regional delegations when deemed relevant. In practice, findings suggest that staff at the EUD to ECOWAS often have limited knowledge on the APF and face human resources restrictions to monitor and coordinate with APF initiatives in support of ECOWAS and PSOs. However, recent decisions have been made to better involve regional delegations in the APF programming, including in the Quality Support Groups. Coordination with national delegations was overall more limited and ad-hoc (partly because NIPs rarely have peace and security aspects). The political, institutional or security environment was in some situations not conducive to complementary actions through NIPs, yet flexible solutions were generally found. Nevertheless, deeper day-to-day coordination with EUDs would be welcomed by stakeholders, where relevant and possible.

**Justification**

Under the 11th EDF, almost all African RIPs include a priority to fund activities on peace and security, whereas the APSA Support Programme III has a stronger emphasis on RECs. This has the potential of enabling greater complementarity, but also risks a degree of overlap with APF-funded activities.

DEVCO D3 is mandated to lead coordination between DEVCO, EEAS and the Delegation to the AU through biweekly videoconferences. In addition, the current service level arrangement for the APF also requires at least one annual coordination meeting organised by the Delegation to the AU, involving DEVCO and EEAS to discuss APF implementation.

Evidence points to coordination between APF and RIPs having improved since 2014. During the last programming phase, approval from the DEVCO Quality Support Group involving the DEVCO regional geographic units was required for the APSA Support Programme III, providing a mechanism for quality control and coordination with RIPs. Similarly, APF staff has been invited since 2016 to participate in the Quality Support Groups for the RIP peace and security programmes. Regional Delegations were also systematically involved in these efforts. Further efforts were triggered by joint DEVCO-EEAS proposals, communicated in early 2015 to the regional Delegations to the AU, involving DEVCO and EEAS to discuss APF implementation.

Findings from the field visit to Abuja nevertheless point out that exchanges with the regional EUD to ECOWAS could still improve. While the delegation of management of the APSA Support Programme to the EUD in Addis has facilitated dialogue with the AUC, it also requires a stronger coordination with regional EUDs given the higher attention given to RECs and the established collaboration with ECOWAS on matters of peace and security. Yet findings point out that the regional EUD has only limited information on APF funding flows to ECOWAS. Human resources constraints also limit their ability to monitor APF activities and coordinate activities. A more prominent role for regional delegations is nevertheless foreseen under the APSA Support Programme III, which is a promising step forward.

Coordination with national EUDs on APF matters was found to be more limited, largely because NIPs only rarely have a focus on peace and security. Nevertheless, evidence of good efforts was found in most cases. In CAR, complementarity of APF support to MISCA and other EU-funded projects was greatly facilitated by a joint EEAS-Commission Inter-service mission to Bangui in June 2013, coordinated with the EUD in Bangui. The EUD team was found to have engaged at least in loose coordination with APF support to MISCA, to the AU and to ECCAS, although closer day-to-day dialogue was considered welcome. In the context of the MNJTF, findings pointed to regular coordination meetings between the APF team and the EUD in N’Djamena, although there was only limited evidence of a more comprehensive dialogue between Brussels and the EUDs in the region concerning the use of the APF, RIPs and NIPs. In the case of Somalia, a more comprehensive approach was facilitated by the EU strategy for Somalia and the Horn of Africa and the EU Special Representative. The EDF contribution to the Somalia Stability Fund illustrates complementary use of resources in the context of AMISOM support. In Mali, only limited evidence could be found of coordination with the EUD during the time of AFISMA, yet despite recent efforts to better coordinate the various EU external action instruments in Mali, non-EU stakeholders still confirmed their views of fragmented EU action in Mali.

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21 Ref: Ares (2015)2496130
Instability and unpredictability on the ground can be a potential stumbling block for complementarity between programmes, as evidenced by the refusal of EU headquarters to complement APF support to the Defence and Security Sector Reform process in Guinea Bissau due to the unstable political situation in the country. Flexible solutions have nevertheless been found in other cases. While the 11th EDF NIP in CAR was not signed till June 2017, the lack of funds was resolved through a EUR 119 million support package under the 11th EDF Bridging Facility as a transitional measure.

EU-AU political dialogue often covers the use of EU resources for peace and security, but with limited attention to how various instruments can be used more comprehensively (more details under JC 5.4).

**JC 5.2 - DEVCO/EEAS officials responsible for programming other EU funding instruments (Trust Funds, IcSP, EiDHR, etc.) that impact on P&S, conflict prevention and peacebuilding, coordinate closely with the APF and relevant EUDs.**

**Judgement**

Good practices exist, but the overall picture appears to be mixed. There is a strong policy drive for close coordination among all EU external action instruments responding to conflict and crisis through the Comprehensive Approach and, more recently, the Integrated Approach. While important steps in the operational coordination of APF and RIPs were reported (see JC 5.1), less evidence has been found of an institutionalised coordination with other EU funding instruments in the domain of peace and security. Good practices exist nonetheless, as illustrated by the Inter-Service Group on Lake Chad, the Inter-Service Mission to Bangui in 2013 and regular exchanges and visits in the context of Somalia and the Lake Chad region. Evidence on good coordination with the EU Trust Fund Sahel and Horn of Africa windows at the Brussels level has also been found. Field visits to Abuja yielded evidence of a rather weak coordination, largely resulting from limited human capacities.

The AMISOM and the MNJTF cases reveal examples of complementary use of EU instruments (IcSP and EUTF). In Somalia, this was facilitated by the EU Horn of Africa Strategy and Somali Compact as reference frameworks, whereas in Chad it is less clear whether it was the result of coordinated programming efforts. Findings on CAR also revealed examples of complementarity use of the IcSP and EDF with APF support. The DCI’s Pan-African Programme’s support to civil society engagement in the peace and security domain offers another example of complementary use to the APF.

An important need for information exchange exists in the domain of military expertise. Under the arrangements in place at the time of this evaluation, DG DEVCO did not have a military expert in the house, but instead relied on expertise within the EEAS, both at the Brussels level and at the EUD to the AU. The current arrangements appear to be working well, although some argue for having proper security expertise within DEVCO.

**Justification**

The EU Global Strategy prioritises an Integrated Approach to Conflicts and Crises. In June 2017, Member States welcomed a joint EEAS-COM paper on the Integrated Approach in PSC. The Integrated Approach will succeed the Comprehensive Approach in 2018. Based on a shared analysis of a country/region context, the Integrated Approach requires the EU institutions to further strengthen its cooperation with member states and the way it brings together institutions, expertise, capacities and instruments, in mediation, conflict prevention, peacebuilding, crisis response and stabilisation in order to contribute to sustainable peace. Within EEAS, the PRISM Division has been tasked with promoting the Integrated Approach.

Mechanisms such as the Inter-service group on Lake Chad, managed by the EEAS and further including staff from DEVCO, FPI and CPCC, provide a good platform for coordination among different EU instruments at headquarters level. Likewise, a frequent and regular inter-service coordination existed at Brussels level on CAR following an inter-service mission to Bangui in June 2013. This has led to the adoption of an IcSP stabilisation package with funding for mediation efforts and restoration of police capacities. A regular exchange with staff in charge of the EUTF Sahel window was also reported. In the absence of military expertise within DEVCO during the period evaluated, DEVCO also benefited from the military and security expertise within the EEAS (both at Brussels and EUD Addis levels) on APF matters (e.g. assessment of APF
requests, support in planning and monitoring of PSO support). Still, some have argued that the presence of military expertise within DG DEVCO would be helpful for better operational cooperation.

Field visits revealed in some cases overall good coordination both between the field and headquarters level, and between different instruments in the field itself. This was notably evidenced by findings in Chad (good level of coordination between EUD staff managing different funds and regular exchanges with APF staff in Brussels) and Somalia (good attempts to coordinate involving headquarters and different EUDs, including consultation of field staff on EUTF programming).

In CAR, analysis of documents also revealed good efforts to promote complementarity between APF support to MISCA, the EDF-funded REJESEP project in support of the judicial police and stabilisation projects in support of the police and the gendarmerie under the IFS/IcSP. Weaknesses in coordination between EUD and Brussels staff responsible for the APF and the Békou Trust Fund (which was set up when MISCA was about to be handed over to the UN) were nevertheless found. Findings at the regional delegation in Abuja also revealed flawed information flows to EUD, a lack of consultation on decisions taken in Brussels regarding the APF and limited human resources to monitor all EU actions.

The case studies on the ongoing MNJTF and AMISOM missions also revealed various examples of EUTF and IcSP projects with a peacebuilding, security or conflict management dimension complementing APF support. In the case of AMISOM, complementarity was fostered by the Somali Compact serving as an overarching framework. In the case of the MNJTF, there were fewer indications that complementarity with APF funds were by design. Interviewees also argued that IcSP and EUTF projects were not sufficiently focused on the longer-term processes of stabilisation and change in the absence of a broader stabilisation strategy, and expressed a concern of over-concentration of resources in the Lake Chad region at the expense of other parts of the country.

A key finding on complementarity of instruments relates to support to civil society. While the APF as such is not designed to give direct support to CSOs, the Pan-African Programme (PANAF) under the DCI plays a complementary role in this respect, as it covers support for civil society engagement under its peace and security envelope. A staff member of DEVCO D3 also functions as contact person for PANAF projects on civil society in the domain of peace and security, illustrating complementary use of different instruments.

**JC 5.3 - APF officials and the relevant EUDs implementing the APF coordinate activities closely with CSDP missions and proactively link the APF to other support to P&S in Africa**

**Judgement**

Evaluation findings are insufficient to formulate a conclusive judgement concerning all support provided by the EU to P&S in Africa. APF activities and CSDP missions are complementary in broad terms, but only limited evidence could be collected on day-to-day coordination in the field. CSDP missions that are deployed in the same country or region where APF-supported PSOs are active focus on building national security capacities (military or civilian), whereas APF support takes a regional or continental focus. The deployment of EUFOR RCA, which served as a bridging operation between MISCA and the UN-led MINUSCA also is a good example of complementary use of EU resources. Moreover, the AMISOM case revealed complementarity with the EUTM Somalia operation, which conducts its training operation in AMISOM-owned, APF-funded training facilities. The identification process for CSDP operations is led by the EEAS, with the Commission services playing a secondary role through their contribution to the operational planning. Mechanisms such as the Inter-Service Group on Lake Chad are therefore useful for a proper coordination between Commission-funded activities under the APF on the one hand, and CSDP missions on the other. However, there is no evidence that such practices are sufficiently institutionalised. Findings from the field on coordination between CSDP missions and APF administrators were very limited, although the secondment of EUCAP Sahel staff to the EUD in Chad should be noted as good practice and base for regular exchange.

**Justification**

In several instances during the period evaluated, CSDP missions have been deployed in the same theatres as African-led, APF-supported PSOs. This was notably the case in Somalia (EUTM Somalia, EUCAP Nestor and EUNAVFOR Atalanta), the Sahel region (EUCAP Sahel Mali, EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUTM Mali) and the
Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA, later succeeded by EUMAM RCA and EUTM RCA, which did not run in parallel to MISCA). With the exception of EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUFOR RCA, these CSDP missions have a mandate to engage in capacity building or training of national armed forces, police, coast guards or other civilian security forces. As such, they are in broad terms complementary to the regional and continental approach taken by the APF through its support to AMISOM, MISCA and AFISMA.

The APF 2014-2016 Action Programme puts great emphasis on the need for coordination of operations and activities in Brussels and in the field, also with other partners active in supporting peace and security in Africa (p. 6 of the Action Programme). As regards CSDP, the nature of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is such that it can only be implemented where other EU instruments cannot be used. As such, complementarity with the APF should be guaranteed. Since the Commission has no right to initiate activities under the CFSP, but can only manage delegated funding, it does not play a leading role in dialogue, definition or planning, which is instead done by the EEAS. Still, practices such as the Inter-service Group on Lake Chad managed by the EEAS (see JC5.2) provide a platform at Headquarters level to coordinate between all EU instruments and tools in the domain of peace and security, including the APF and CSDP.

Field visits yielded only limited evidence on coordination with CSDP, largely as a result of the usually short-term nature of CSDP operations and the consequent unavailability of staff. Findings from the AMISOM case nevertheless provide a good example of the complementary support to the General Dhagabadan Training Center (GDTC) in Mogadishu. The GDTC is owned by AMISOM and receives support from the APF for operational costs and equipment. It is also being used by the CSDP mission EUTM Somalia, which conducts its training activities at the GDTC Facilities. Findings in CAR suggested a degree of coordination between the APF-funded MISCA and the CSDP operation EUFOR RCA, which was partly deployed to bridge the gap between MISCA and MINUSCA. Coordination was also found to be strong between the EUTM RCA mission and the EUD in CAR, although this succeeds the period of the MISCA operation. Little evidence was found on specific coordination between CSDP mission staff and APF officials. In the context of the MNJTF, a basis for coordination with CSDP missions in the region existed through the presence of seconded experts from EUCAP Sahel at the EUD in Chad. Evidence of tangible exchanges and coordination with other international partners supporting the MNJTF were also identified. No evidence could be found on coordination with CSDP missions in the context of AMISOM and AFISMA due to the unavailability of informants.

**JC 5.4 - EU-AU political dialogue takes a holistic approach to EU-AU cooperation on P&S in Africa in terms of themes, types of action, levels of engagement, authorities involved (regional and national) and resources to be deployed**

**Judgement**

EU-AU political dialogue is strong and aims to take a holistic approach, although there is room for improvement. There is overall a good effort to engage in high-level political dialogue, as evidenced by discussion at Africa-EU Summits, the recurring debates on peace & security in the College-to-College and PSC-to-PSC meetings. A good and regular exchange on APF implementation between the EUD and the AUC was also found to take place at working level. Still, findings suggest that political dialogue tended to be focused too much on financing issues, rather than taking a more strategic, holistic approach to peace and security challenges, although recent improvements on this have been noted.

Dialogue increasingly happens in broader frameworks involving other international partners as well, such as the UN. This is evidenced by the AUPG in Addis Ababa and several partner coordination frameworks at field level. These provide platforms for more holistic approaches to EU-AU cooperation, embedded in a wider international engagement.

A recent joint Commission-EEAS Communication has proposed a stronger strategic and holistic EU-Africa partnership through intensified coordination and dialogue and the establishment of a collaborative platform shared among European, African as well as UN and international actors at the higher level.


Justification

The Africa-EU Summit in 2014 adopted the 2014-2017 Roadmap for the Africa-EU partnership, which introduced a dedicated priority on peace and security cooperation. It takes a holistic approach by committing to jointly strengthen the operationalisation of the APSA and improve predictability and financial sustainability of African peace and security activities at AU- and REC-level.

Peace and security activities have also been a recurring topic at the EC-AUC College-to-College meetings. Other meetings include the visit of the EU’s HR/VP Mogherini, and the then newly appointed AUC Chairperson Moussa Faki in March 2017, as well as other high-level conferences of EU and AU partners with regard to specific regional conflicts (e.g. the London conference on Somalia in 2016). A joint Commission-EEAS Communication published ahead of the 2017 AU-EU Summit in November 2017 confirms an EU interest in further deepening this political dialogue. It lays out a vision for a stronger strategic EU-Africa partnership based on increasing cooperation on common interest and based on frequent political interaction, and with conflict prevention, crisis response and peacebuilding as one of the strategic objectives.

In addition, annual joint consultative meetings between the AU PSC and the EU PSC continued to take place between 2014 and 2016, with discussions focused on specific countries, regions or crises. Continental cooperation on peace and security issues was also debated, although less attention was given to the REC-level. However, the APF’s Joint Coordination Committee, jointly chaired by the COM and the AU tasked with the political steering of the APF, has not met since 2013, resulting in weak joint political coordination. In addition, an APF steering committee has been established in 2015 for the monitoring of APF implementation, which has been convened three times.

In addition, political dialogue between the EU and the AU often happens jointly with other relevant international partners (especially the UN) in areas where the EU channels support through the APF. Still, while the EU, together with the UN and P5 countries, was invited to some sessions of the AU PSC, this practice became more limited in more recent years as AU PSC member states wanted to focus their discussions on internal matters, rather than on political issues with international partners. At the working level, the AU Partners Group (AUPG) is an important forum for dialogue with the AUC on specific actions involving the AU’s main international partners on matters of peace and security (see EQ7). It is, however, argued by some that the debate within the AUPG remains often too diplomatic and fails to tackle the difficult questions that require dialogue and coordination (e.g. in relation to terrorism and migration).

The depth of political dialogue in the field varies from case to case. One overall impression is that bilateral political dialogue between the EUDs and the AULOs in several countries is generally weak. Some cases point out that political dialogue tends to take place embedded in broader dialogue involving other partners. For instance, EU and AU officials in CAR are both involved in regular coordination sessions of the ‘G5’ group involving other major actors such as the UN. Likewise, dialogue in the context of Somalia largely happens in the context of the Somali Compact and the National Security Architecture, involving the Somali Government and the UN. These provide platforms for more holistic approaches to EU-AU cooperation, embedded in a wider international engagement.

Despite evidence of regular meetings and improved relations at both political and working level, stakeholders argued that political dialogue between the EU and AU was too formalised and heavily focused on financing issues. A wider debate on thematic issues and the broader objective of peace, including on the more contentious issues, would be welcomed. As a case in point, the EU decision to introduce a cap on AMISOM troop stipends was felt by TCCs to have been insufficiently subject to political dialogue including the AU, RECs and TCCs, even if EU stakeholders pointed out that the decision was communicated well in advance. Moreover, despite several existing fora for dialogue involving the EU and the AU, based on evidence collected, regular political dialogue involving the RECs appears to be very limited.

22 Roadmap 2014-2017
23 COM press releases, 21 April 2015; 5 April 2016
24 Various Joint Communiqués published between 2014 and 2016
4.6 EQ6 – African Ownership and Sustainability

To what extent and how has the support of the APF and the EU helped, or perhaps hindered, African efforts to increase ownership of the APSA, make progress on mobilising African fund, raise levels of awareness and support from AU member states and improve collaboration and synergies between the AU and RECs on APSA implementation?

Rationale

The question of African ownership of the APSA is a key issue for sustainability and for the AU-EU partnership on APSA. The issue is not so much about leadership or indeed about the provision of troops, but more about the mobilisation of resources and the active support of AU member states for APSA as the recent Kagame and Kaberuka reports makes clear. Equally the RECs play a central part in the implementation of the APSA and thus the quality of the collaboration between them and the AU – also a question of ownership and a mutual sense of shared responsibility – is central to the future success and further development of the APSA. The EU has also recognised it can support the efforts of the AU institutions to build up the sense of African ownership and this has been of the objectives of the APF in recent years. This issue also impinges directly on the first thematic area for recommendations in the 2013 Evaluation Report, which focuses on the nature of the AU-EU partnership on the APSA.

Response to EQ6

The APF has clearly helped African efforts to establish and run PSOs by funding troop allowances and operational costs and for building up the institutions in the APSA (African Peace and Security Architecture) to enable African management of conflict on the continent. The EU has also shown itself willing to support AU efforts to look for alternative funding. The EU has also been willing to consistently work with the framework provided by these institutions at both continental and regional levels rather than seeking alternative structures or processes.

Through the APF, the EU supports the AU and other African regional organisations and mechanisms in finding ‘African solutions to African problems’ and seeks to ensure that ‘APF’s support will have the greatest impact in building lasting institutional capacities.’ 25 The APF has helped African efforts to establish and run PSOs (AMISOM, AFISMA, ECOMIB, MNJTF, MISCA) by providing resources to pay for troop allowances and operational costs. The EU is also seen to have provided constructive support to the implementation of the Kaberuka proposal by supporting the team put in place by the AU HR for the Peace Fund and committing political support in the course of WTO negotiations to take away legal hurdles relating to the raising of import levies.

It also seems clear the Kagame and Kaberuka reports have prompted a new drive to increase ownership and strategic vision and depict innovative initiatives towards putting in place AU funding mechanisms. Their approval at the recent AU Summit demonstrates a consensus on increasing African ownership on APSA. The 2016 decision to operationalise the AU Peace Fund was a promising step reflecting the prevalent level of enthusiasm, and more importantly, in terms of the ongoing efforts towards institutionalising the mobilisation of own resources.

Yet, the AU Peace Fund remains at this point in the design phase, and it remains unclear when a clear implementation plan will be put forward. The AU Peace Fund will also face a lot of challenges in its implementation. Questions remain on whether it will attract enough money, and whether there will be enough capacity and expertise to make it operational.

In the meantime, African countries and particularly, but not only, neighbouring countries among the respective PSO engagement countries have been willing to contribute troops, some logistics and equipment and cover some of their own costs (often driven by their own national interest). There exist various visible efforts to mobilise resources, including cases where member states’ approval of fund or budget allocation and assignment of seconded staff. Generally, the period saw increased effort from the AU, RECs and MS with regards to resource mobilisation. Progress has been reported in covering ‘staff salary costs’ from AU MS contributions through the JFA mechanisms, which now reportedly amounts to about 50% of the total budget. ECOWAS has also used its community levy for several years to assume an increasing share of its

administrative costs, and its member states have shown willingness to commit financial contributions to ECOMIB. Still, steps towards increased responsibilities and ownership remain ad-hoc in nature, rather than the result of a clear plan.

The partial failure of Pillar Assessments (AUC and REC/RMs) were setbacks for increasing ownership, depicting the need for continued and systematic capacity development supports to enable viable African ownership. In the midst of the clear intents demonstrated by the EU towards building enhanced AU ownership, lack of technical capacities at the AUC contributed to the delays in the implementation of the relevant Support Programmes. Ensuring the corresponding capacities remain essential in preparing the AU for increased and meaningful level of ownership. There is also a need to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the ongoing capacity development support initiatives under the APF/APSA Support Programmes, in such a way that prevailing capacity limitations are addressed in the course of implementation through the provision of relevant support.

**JC 6.1: Growing and increasingly sustained AU member state commitment to APSA through various different types of support at both continental and REC levels is apparent**

### Judgement

The fact that the establishment of the Peace Fund has its legal basis through relevant provisions on AU Assembly of states decision and the PSC protocol substantiates the growing and sustained commitment to APSA. The Kagame and Kaberuka reports endorsed by the AU summit continue to be appreciated during discussions with AU MS Embassies in Addis Ababa. Some of the AU Member States have passed legislation (or are in the process of doing so) committing to the contribution as proposed by the Kaberuka plan, illustrating that the very dynamics around the Kaberuka report reflect a growing ownership and commitment. At RECs/RM level, there is evidence that some made significant moves towards demonstrating ownership. However, more recent cases (MNJTF and G5 Joint Force) show the need for more creative solutions outside the official APSA bodies in the absence of resources or political consensus at AU- or REC/RM-level.

The AUMS continued the contribution of troops for various peace support operations (both AU- or REC-led) and sustained significant loses. It is also worth mentioning that there exist a widespread perception that commitments demonstrated by Governments of those TCCs is linked to their national security interests, maintain large number of army and also evade international pressure for failing to meet obligations on democracy and human rights violations.

### Justification

The legal framework for establishing the Peace Fund is based on; AU Assembly decision 605(XXVII) of 17-18 July 2016, which proposed ‘instituting and implementing a 0.2 percent levy on all eligible imported goods into the continent to finance the AU operational, programme and peace support operations budgets starting from 2017;’ as well as ‘an expert study on fund-raising from private sector and resource-based extraction industries.’ Moreover, Article 21(4) of the PSC Protocol also foresees the establishment of a Revolving Trust Fund when the Peace Fund will be made operational, providing the legal basis for sustainable functioning of the peace fund mechanism.

There is visible evidence of growing and increasingly sustained African ownership of APSA both at continental and RECs/RMs level. Operations such as ECOMIB are expressions of such regional ownership, showing a clear commitment of ECOWAS member states to jointly address regional conflict, security and political challenges (although ECOWAS often feels insufficiently credited by international partners for its efforts). In CAR and Somalia, neighbouring countries have continued troop and equipment contributions to successive operations, whether under REC, AU or UN authority, although AMISOM TCCs have appeared less willing to contribute funds.

The MNJTF, and more recently the G5 Joint Force, are particular cases. African countries in the region proved committed to jointly tackle security challenges in the region, but in the absence of either a single REC spanning the whole area of operations (MNJTF) or of a full commitment of ECOWAS member states and AU financial resource (G5 Joint Force), more innovative solutions had to be found outside the recognised APSA structures through regional bodies that do not necessarily have the mandate, expertise or political weight to carry leadership over PSOs. Thus in some cases, AU Member States have demonstrated ownership even in
the absence of a clear regional/continental coordinating mechanisms.

On a more practical level, many African states have over the years since the AMIS operation in Darfur (2004-2007) provided troops for APSA PKOs and have sustained substantial losses of life (e.g. Burundi has lost some 1,600 soldiers in AU PSOs over the past decade, out of an army of 27,000).

On the other hand, lack of institutional capacity at both the AU and RECs/RM means that some planned actions remain unattended to or require partners’ supports to fill existing gaps, which demands external accountability that may in turn be perceived as compromising the level of ownership. In the midst of the perceived strong will for increased ownership from the AU and its Member States, there still remains a need to develop adequate capacity, for which the available support facilities has not yet been fully taken up, well before 100% ownership can be claimed. Accordingly, adequate and demonstrated capacity for appropriate levels of ownership along with political will from AU MS remain essential for the implementation of the Kaberuka proposal.

Delays in implementing the APF support of the APSA remains an issue for discussion. The programme meant to contribute to improving the capacity of the AUC as well as those RECs did not deliver the required results, as AUC HQ failed to put in place the Project Management Team, which in turn constrained the drafting of the delegation agreement and the consequent delays in the implementation of both the Bridging and APSA III SPs. While the agreed modality for the recruitment of the PMT is meant to provide increased opportunity towards exercising ownership for the AU, the planning process for the respective implementation arrangements failed to adequately consider related risks and mitigation measures under circumstances should the AU fail to deploy the necessary staff. Giving 100% of ownership without the demand for result therefore exhibited inefficiency.

Alongside the visible levels of demonstrated commitments however, it is clear that contributing troops is not without benefits for the countries concerned. Through participation in AMISOM, troops from Burundi benefited from increased salary packages ($1,032 a month until end of 2015), international training opportunities and the chance to deploy elsewhere, notably in the UN operation26. Through its engagement in AMISOM the Government of Burundi keeps former rebels and troops happy regardless of how the country is run or how well the government’s own budget is spent. Moreover, the fact that frontline states among the troop contributing countries, at times act unilaterally (typically Ethiopia, Kenya, Angola, etc.) demonstrates the weight of national security interests in their decisions. Similarly, motivations for engagement of ECOMIB among TCCs are political (wish to end history of coup d’états), security-related (risk of Guinea Bissau remaining an important hub for international narcotics-trafficking or becoming a centre for jihadist activities) and geo-political (no interest in seeing the country fall again under lusophone influence from another big country in Africa, i.e. Angola).

Furthermore, the APF support however is not free from unintended effects. Governments among those TCCs who failed to meet obligations on democracy and respect for human rights, have good chances of being bypassed. Burundi and Ethiopia represent typical cases where opposition and International Human Rights groups repeatedly complain that ‘the participation in AMISOM outweighs the repeated failure to meet obligations on democracy and respect for human rights…’

**JC 6.2: African efforts to mobilise resources in a sustainable manner for APSA work across the continent are bearing fruit**

**Judgement**

With the Kaberuka Report and the initial positive reactions it has met, there now exist visible indications for on-going efforts to mobilise own resources, as well as from other partners. There are already cases where member states have started to pass the necessary legislation27 in response to the Kaberuka proposals and have reportedly earmarked budgets.

The Kaberuka report and AU reforms created great excitement as a way to demonstrate ownership. But doubts have also been expressed on whether the timeline of the Kaberuka proposal is realistic. The 0.2%

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26 Thierry Vircoulon, “Au cœur de la crise burundaise IV : la rente du maintien de la paix en question” International Crisis Group on 11 July 2017. The report also indicates that ‘Salaries in Burundi range from $80 per month for troops to $250-300 per month for senior officers’.

27 Recent reports suggest that up to 20 African countries have passed such legislation
levy is for funding AU budgets (100% operational, 75% programmes and 25% for PSOs). It is envisaged that the Peace Fund will support at least some PSOs not exceeding the period of six months. The steps to realise the Peace Fund however realistically require more time to deliver results, so the outcome is far from clear.

Efforts made to increase financing opportunities now look to take the right direction. The ‘Joint UN-AU Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security’ signed on 19 April 2017 underlines the ‘willingness of the two organisations to consider options to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing the AU-led UNSC authorised peace support operations, as part of their partnership in the areas of peace and security.

The implementation of APSA should be seen in the broadest terms possible. AU Member States already fund substantial portions of it at the national and regional levels. ECOWAS has been using a community import levy for some time now, with encouraging results. TCCs to various PSOs have also shown continued commitment through contributions (mostly through troops and in-kind, but also financially e.g. in the case of ECOMIB).

**Justification**

The request to the Kaberuka commission was a result of growing awareness that the independence of the AU depended on the ability of AU Member States to finance the institution themselves. Kaberuka therefore took a broader perspective on financing of the whole organisation. It proposes that the Peace Fund needs an independent governance structures and eligibility criteria. The question of how Africa takes ownership of peace and security should also be seen in the global context of current geopolitical shifts.

While the implementation of the Peace Fund is not yet tested, challenges could be expected considering existing trends. Based on available data on the annual contributions assessed for AU member states, the average annual payment rate for AU MS contribution, as per amounts assessed from 2011 to 2015, stands at 67% (USD 83.3 million/year). While the average annual arrears for the same period stands at 33% amounting to USD 57 million/year. A considerable number of AU MS (30 countries) default either completely or partially. During 2016, the assessed contribution from member states amounts to 40% of the AU budget (of the total US$416 million). The fact that 65% of AU MS contributions came from five countries – South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Libya and Algeria is also pertinent. The remaining funds (60% of the total budget) came from international donors. Would the implementation of Kaberuka proposal make any different? This is yet to be seen, as the contributions are expected to be initiated during 2017, for which no data is currently available.

Moreover, a review of relevant documents on the current status of implementation of the proposal do not necessarily guarantee immediate results, but rather point to the need for the AUC and the relevant authorities to pay further attention to several unresolved issues. A case in point is the report of the 2nd Meeting of Ministers of Finance Committee held on 05 October 2016, which indicates that there are several more steps to be taken in the implementation of the Kaberuka proposal. In short, there is still a long way to go to make the Peace Fund fully operational, and the outcome is currently far from clear.

Promising efforts are nevertheless seen at the REC level. ECOWAS has for a long time been using a community import levy of 0.1% to mobilise own resources for peace and security though no other REC has ever been able to follow suit. This has proven its value e.g. in allowing the West-African REC to deploy and sustain AFISMA in Mali for at least a few months on own resources, while also building up administrative capacities to manage peace and security activities in the region. ECOWAS has also been active at UNGA level to mobilise additional international support for AFISMA, which appears to have been successful overall (even if the AU pledge did not fully materialise). ECOWAS member states have also co-financed their engagement in Guinea-Bissau since 2012. While ECOMIB is a relatively small engagement, for the resource-short ECOWAS countries this is a considerable burden, which they have continued to uphold over the past five years. Countries have also sustained direct contributions, though these tend to be more focused on troops (including the daily costs of their deployment) or in-kind support rather than financial commitments.

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28 African Union, ‘Background Paper on Implementing the Kigali Decision on Financing the Union’ September 2016 (Final%20Report/Ref%200ma%20AU/31955-file-background_paper_on_implementing_the_kigali_decision_on_financing_the_union.pdf)

AU talks with the UN are also on-going on a widened partnership for peace and security, including on matters of financing APSA. In general, while the discussions with the UN have progressed well the Trump administration’s attitude to the UN are making these less likely to succeed. This and other evidence suggests that the implementation of the Kaberuka proposal is yet to take some more time in the face of the current level of institutional organisation.

A summary from a report30 presented on the Seventy-first session of the General Assembly, provides evidence on the scale of conflict in Africa and is indicative of the level of involvement of the international community:

‘…more than half of the United Nations peacekeeping missions currently deployed are in Africa. Those missions alone account for 83 per cent of all uniformed personnel deployed by the United Nations and 86 per cent of the financial resources approved for United Nations peacekeeping operations. The United Nations also provides considerable support to the African Union Mission in Somalia, through the United Nations Support Office in Somalia. In fact, the United Nations has provided support to most of the operations mandated or authorised by the African Union since its establishment in 2002’. Following prolonged negotiations between the UN and AU, an agreement was reached between the two parties ‘based on a recognition that African peace and security challenges are too complex for any single organisation to adequately address on its own’.

The “Joint UN-AU Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security” signed on 19 April 2017 recognises not only the increasing need for financing PSOs, but also institutional capacity development needs. The partnership implementation mechanisms and processes include; collaboration towards strengthening APSA, support implementation of AGA, developing arrangements for predictable and sustainable funding of African PSOs authorised by UNSC, and assessing and addressing institutional capacity development needs of the partnership in particular in the areas of mission management and support among others.

**JC 6.3: The EU has actively supported AU efforts to encourage practical AU member state involvement in APSA**

### Judgement

The APF support is highly valued by national peace and security actors. The APF has clearly helped AU member states’ efforts to participate in PSOs run by the AU or the RECs (AMISOM, AFISMA, ECOMIB, MNJTF, MISCA) by providing resources to TCCS to pay for troop allowances and operational costs. Although the EU started to support some of the peace support operations after missions were initiated, the support helped to maintain continued operation.

For example, EU support has helped to maintain a strong regional engagement and ownership for addressing the difficult political-institutional as well as security situation in Guinea Bissau. Moreover, the EU also supported the AU HR, which is seen to contribute towards increased participation of AU member states for the implementation of Kaberuka proposal. The EU has also indicated some openness to providing political support for the AU member states in any WTO discussions on the Kaberuka proposals should this be required.

### Justification

EU support has helped to maintain a strong regional engagement and ownership and is highly valued by regional actors. The APF has clearly helped African efforts to establish and run PSOs (AMISOM, AFISMA, ECOMIB, MNJTF, MISCA) by providing resources to pay for troop allowances and operational costs.

APF support was critical for addressing the difficult political-institutional as well as security situation in Guinea Bissau. The EU support through the APF allows ECOWAS to take the lead since 2015. The AFISMA institutional capacity-building element is an illustration of how APF funding has helped ECOWAS set up necessary structures, which could then be sustained through ECOWAS own resources.

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As for the MNJTF, given the complex African institutional situation in the region, the absence of a strong regional organisation and the relative neglect of this region by the AU and its member states (for three of the four principal TCCs to the MNJTF, this region is a remote hinterland since many years) the APF funding is the best way possible to respond to the needs at this particular point in time. The institutional setting is not conducive for creating ownership for a regional approach, although there is political willingness among these TCCs to engage militarily.

Similarly, without the support from the APF, AMISOM would not have gone so far. The support has enabled its sustainability. The TCCs mobilised a military response through own resources. International support came only thereafter. The initiative taken by the TCCs can be seen as an expression of political awareness that African funding could be mobilised for PSOs.

The EEAS has publicly expressed support for the Kaberuka report, calling it ‘an important step towards a system of African Union “own resources”’. Furthermore, DEVCO is supporting the team put in place by the AU HR for the Peace Fund (through covering the salary for Dr. Kaberuka), which has drafted concrete proposals for the AU to achieve financial sustainability that were endorsed at the AU summit in July 2016. Kaberuka’s team is now working on measures to implement those proposals. The EU is apparently currently drafting a reaction to the proposals. EU MS and institutions interviewed in Addis Ababa exhibit adequate level of awareness on APSA and the APF, pursuant to their closer engagement with AUC/APSA and existing relevant coordination forums.

**JC 6.4: A clear plan exists and is followed, for the AU/RECs to progressively assume responsibility for staff positions and the operating costs of key components of the APSA that have been funded from the APF in the past**

**Judgement**

At the planning level, APSA and APF documents show a reduction of EU funding for peace support operations by 15% annually starting from 2015 (see Figure 1), although many would doubt its immediate realisation. Most of the contacted stakeholders believe that AUC may need more time to be able to assume ownership of APSA. While the Kaberuka report contains concrete proposals, its operationalisation is still in the design phase, with little concrete planning so far. Encouraging efforts are however reported with regard to progressively increasing AU contribution for short term staff salary through JFA mechanism. The new contribution from AU MS for short-term staff has now reportedly reached to 50% (USD 6 million). Yet, rather than being the result of a clear plan towards full ownership and responsibility, such small steps remain ad hoc in nature and are often characterised by intense debate and tensions intra-AU, intra-AUC and between the AUC and RECs.

The AU has signed a strategic framework with the UN. The strategic framework provides opportunities to financing pertinent staff positions. The new AUC Chairperson has also expressed interest in involving the EU with UN in a trilateral framework. Yet, this remains very much in the political/conceptual phase without concrete proposals currently on the table.

**Justification**

A contribution of more than USD 6 million was reportedly made by AU MS in 2017, which is still expected to be increased in 2018. Currently, more than 50% of PSD short-term staff at the AU Headquarters are paid using these Member States’ funds. This is a tremendous improvement on 2015, when all short-term staff of the Department were paid using partner-funds. The Kaberuka report provides objectives to increase own resources, but overall progress in its implementation has remained slow so far, and has not resulted in any type of planning for the AU to improve their human resources and relating responsibilities, nor to take more responsibilities for operations. All is still very much in the discussion phase. Against this background, and in the absence of a clear plan, it remains unclear to what extent one can expect a gradual takeover of responsibilities at the AU level.

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32 Minutes of the 11th Steering Committee Meeting on the Joint Financing Arrangement for Support to the Employment of AUC Personnel working in the Peace and Security Programme held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 27 April, 2017
The continued discussions between the AU and UN are among the ongoing efforts in the mobilisation of more sustained alternative funding. The UN is also showing willingness towards increasing the support for the operationalisation of APSA. The UNSC meeting on 20 September 2017, passed a resolution (2378) to ‘strengthen AU’s capacity within the framework of APSA… underlining the importance of accelerating the operationalisation of the African Standby Force and calls upon the United Nations and Member States to continue to support within the existing means the strengthening of the African Standby Force’s readiness as the overarching framework for African peace support operations’.

There is also evidence that some of the RECs/RM deployed staff based on contributions from respective member states, including through assignment of seconded staffs. At RECs/RM level, ECOWAS and SADC made significant moves towards demonstrating ownership. According to the ECOWAS LO, ECOWAS pays for all its own employees, although EU sources reveal that about 70% of the same is financed from APF sources. The period also shows increased financial allocation from the AU Member States to covering salaries for short term PSD staff being financed under the JFA. The initiative to deploy AFISMA in Mali initially came from ECOWAS. The initial stages of the deployment were financed by ECOWAS from its own resources through its community import tax.

An assessment was done in 2008 by experts who concluded that ECOWAS needed stronger structures to support peacekeeping missions. Before that, it only had one person available to manage financing of operations, including AFISMA. The AFISMA grant agreement with the EU therefore foresaw a capacity-building tranche to create a financing department in the PAPS, including for the recruitment and training of personnel. Since ECOWAS at that time had not passed the pillar assessments, additional staff support came from the AU as well as from France. While the AFISMA grant has reached an end, ECOWAS is committed to using its own resources (through the import levy) to continue operating the Financing department and pay for salary staff.

In AMISOM, staff positions such as the AMISOM Police Commissioner are paid by the AU with funds that come from RECs or member states, while the EU/APF covers the allowances of AMISOM troops; salaries and allowances for the police component of the mission; death and disability compensation for military and police personnel; international and local staff salaries; operational costs of the mission's offices in Nairobi (Kenya) and Mogadishu (Somalia) and costs for AMISOM Quick Impact Projects (QIPs).

A debate on the future funding of AMISOM has been prompted by the EU decision to cap stipends at 80%, expecting TCCs to cover the remaining 20% of stipends through own resources or alternative partner contributions. So far no clear plan exists for resolving the shortfall and even less for progressively taking full responsibility for the positions.
4.7 EQ7 – Partnership, EU Value-Added and Complementarity with Other Partners

To what extent and how has the partnership in support of the APSA, been strengthened and made more effective through complementary contributions from both African and international stakeholders during the evaluation period? Within this partnership, to what extent and how has the EU’s contribution from the APF provided a distinct value-added?

Rationale

Since its establishment the AU has argued that the APSA, while led and run by Africans, is also the framework for an international partnership for peace and security in Africa. The EU, through the APF but also through substantial contributions from EU member states, has been a strong supporter from the start. The number of partner contributions has however grown and the constraints on African contributions are now better known. How this partnership now works and what is the EU’s distinct contribution are therefore key consideration for future planning and the sustainability of the APSA. Moreover, the 2013 Evaluation Report’s fifth conclusion warned that the gains of the APSA rested on precarious foundations in terms of uncertainty over the various contributions from different partners. Equally its first set of recommendations suggested the Africa-EU partnership on peace and security and the APSA should be strengthened giving African states a greater stake and inviting the EU member states and institutions to intensify their interactions with the actors on the Africa side. It was proposed that a plan be formulated for the AU to progressively assume responsibility for staff positions and the operating costs and steps be taken to increase awareness among AU member states about long-term engagement in support for the APSA.

Response to EQ7

It is difficult to say whether and to what extent the partnership on peace and security between African and international partners has been strengthened and made more effective during the reporting period. It is clear, however, that the partnership works, is progressing and that the EU plays a distinctive, central and unique role in supporting the APSA and its evolving concept.

The EU is recognised and valued for its predictable, long-term and large-scale financial support through the APF. The very existence of the APF as a substantial fund in support of the APSA helps other international partners to group around this support and thereby to strengthen the partnership (though there is room for improvement in coordination and division of labour, as mentioned below). The appreciation is highest for supporting African-led PSOs with a ‘tough’ mandate for which the UN cannot be called upon, or for complementing efforts by AU member states and international bilateral donors, which happens in the case of the MNJTF. The value added of the EU for the AUC and REC capacity support is acknowledged and valued by African stakeholders within the institutions, in particular, though effectiveness, as discussed earlier, is not optimal.

The partnership between the EU and the AU has not been all easy during the evaluation period and cooled down under the past Chairperson whose mandate terminated towards the end of the reporting period for this evaluation. The failed pillar assessment, conducted by the EU in 2014-2015, did not help to strengthen the partnership. There were also high expectations within the AUC that other international partners, China, Russia and the Golf States in particular, could provide substantial support to peace and security and help to reduce the predominant role of the EU. The widening of this partnership was fully supported by the EU but efforts taken by AUC officials to mobilise substantial funding from these alternative sources in support of the APSA remained unsuccessful. From a selected number of interviews it appears that the tide has turned under the new AUC Chairperson and that there is a re-appreciation of the EU’s support to the AU overall, including the support it provides through the APF. Though it is too early to tell whether this approach is widely shared within the AUC and the RECs, in particular because views on this new approach vary across the AU. For example, the EU noted with surprise that, despite AMISOM consuming some 80% of total APF funding, the EU was invited only as an observer and not as a full partner in the recent AU-UN joint review of AMISOM.

The support to the APSA has grown from a handful of international partners in the years 2005/2006 to over 40 today. The EU has clearly welcomed other actors to join in the APSA support, including non-traditional donors like China and the Golf States. It has also been constructive in promoting African states to take a
greater stake in and more responsibility for making APSA work. This can also be noted from the visits made to five PSOs. Though the transition of PSOs to the UN, in the case of AFISMA and MISCA, has resulted in a reduced role and engagement of the AUC, ECOWAS and ECCAS in these countries. The absence of a REC or a strong regional African organisation in the Lake Chad region to guide the MNJTF works also against a strengthening of the partnership under the APSA.

Various formal and informal mechanisms exist to exchange at different political and technical levels. But in the absence of strong AUC and REC coordination, which would give each partner its place and could ensure that no overlaps in support exist, a clear division of labour of the respective partner inputs is difficult. For example, there is no reliable overview of who is doing what, when and at what scale of funding though there are several areas where a selected number of donors have been teaming up, such as for the basket funding for AUC salaries. Political and technical AUPGs for sub-areas of the APSA exist but these do not go beyond the sharing of information. The EU’s chairing of the technical AUPG on P&S is highly valued and seen as a prime place for obtaining reliable and up-to-date information about the status quo of the AU-led PSOs. The EU appears to have no leverage to go beyond this role, nor would it be appreciated for supporting the coordination of the AU’s operation, which is politically in the hands of the AU’s PSC and technically in the realm of the AUC and the RECs.

JC 7.1 - The EU (Institutions and member states) engage more directly and frequently with the AUC, RECs and AU member states on peace and security as part of a wider international partnership.

Judgement

It is difficult to judge whether the EU engaged more directly and frequently during the evaluation period compared to the period ending in 2013. It is clear however, that the period 2014 to early 2017 experienced different phases of engagement and collaboration at the political level. Post-2014, the relationship and intensity of exchange between the AU and the EU cooled down, informed by a wish of the AU to widen its partnership and to focus on an all-African development agenda 2030, beyond P&S. This process evolved despite efforts to bridge the EU-AU gaps, for example through PSC-2-PSC meetings. With the change of the AUC leadership in early 2017, the door was opened more widely again for direct political engagements between the AUC and the EU and for a refocusing on matters concerning P&S.

At the level of Addis Ababa-based stakeholders, diplomatic and political exchanges during the reporting period between the AUC and international partners were downscaled – mainly from logistical and efficiency reasons, but also due to staff changes within the AUC, as appears from our interviews. This has taken place against the background of a general ‘cooling down’ of relations between the AUC and the EC. The failed pillar assessment through which the AUC would have become an EU partner able to operate more independently (and able to execute projects through EU indirect management) added to this cooling down. At the working level, the exchange between officials from the EUD and the AUC has remained intense and constructive but was mostly built on regular informal personal exchanges as well as meetings between their respective offices. The EU’s prominent role in the technical AUPG allowed it to keep an intense working contact and to play a bridging function (on PSO’s in particular) between the AUC and other (mostly smaller) international partners supporting the AU on P&S. Various international stakeholders praised the EU for this work.

The evaluation team could note regular and intense exchanges between the EU and western-oriented international partners on most of the APF supported PSOs (though to a lesser extent in the case of ECOMIB due to the stalled political-institutional crisis in the country). Exchanges with the AU, the RECs and the AU member states are frequent when operations were, or are, ongoing (AMISOM, AFISMA, MISCA, MNJTF) though there is no evidence that the exchange with African institutions was more direct or frequent compared to the previous evaluation period. Notable is the overall reduced exchange with AU structures for Mali and CAR since the transition of AFISMA and MISCA to the UN.
Justification

The partnership between the AUC and its 40-plus international partners, including the EU, is characterised by a range of regular, formal and informal, exchanges at the political, diplomatic and technical levels. Questions should be raised, however, on to what extent all these exchanges are clearly and regularly coordinated. Strong coordination mechanisms at the level of the AUC to bring key partners together and to direct their contributions towards particular priorities do not exist. From the information received, it appears that the coordination process is rather organic and strongly informed by the engagement of international partners with a high stake in promoting the APSA. A similar picture emerged from the ECOWAS visit showing that the organisation does not take a leading role in coordinating partners’ activities. Rather, each partner, including the EU, sticks to its own planning cycles and systems resulting in a rather fragmented international partner engagement.

Important formal fora for these exchanges are the diplomatic as well as technical AU Partner Group (AUPG) meetings for different topics of the APSA. The EU has taken the lead on the technical AUPG meeting for Peace and Security, which takes place every two weeks. Attended by some 50 persons from a variety of international partners, it is seen as the principal and trusted place to share and to get up to date information on the PSOs. Speakers are primarily AUC officials from concerned technical departments. Such information-provision meetings provide however no space for discussions or more in-depth exchanges to coordinate the respective engagements. Exchanges at the working level between AUC officials and international partners, which provide significant support to the APSA are regular and constructive though this depends also on personalities and trust built between partners.

Broader (policy and political) coordination meetings take place at the ambassadorial level, either in groups among a (limited) number of international partners or settings that include representatives of the AU and/or the AUC. Access for EU diplomats to the AUC was reported to be significantly limited since May 2013, with the EU losing its status of a ‘privileged partner’ – access to AU Summits and AU PSC meetings were limited. Coordination and exchanges at highest political level, between the former AUC Chairperson and the EU’s political leadership existed but were reportedly not good. Under the new AUC Chairperson, taking office in January 2017, the AUC is opening up again.

As for the field and REC level, there is evidence of intense and frequent exchanges with international partners from MISCA (in particular with France and the UN), AMISOM (facilitated through the Somali Compact) and ECOWAS. The same applies for the MNJTF (in particular France and the UK) though the lack of funding arriving on the ground has made the EU a less prominent player so far. In the case of ECOMIB, exchanges with international and regional partners exist but are hampered by the overall stalled political-institutional situation in the country. AFISMA is a bit of an outlier due to the particular security situation in Mali in 2012/2013. Large-scale international support for peace and security in Mali arrived only when AFISMA was taken over by MINUSCA. Exchanges with the AUC, ECOWAS and ECCAS on AFISMA and MISCA have been regular during their implementation but the handing over to the UN in both cases has led to a gradual reduction of exchanges with African institutional actors during the evaluation period. Exchanges with the AU and ECOWAS on ECOMIB are ongoing but rather limited due, in particular, to the stalled governance in Guinea Bissau.

International partners recognise the importance of the EU and many engage with it in various funding contexts. By virtue of its prominent presence in the APSA (in terms of funding but also through its Delegation to the AU and regular working contacts with the AUC) the EU is an obvious “giant” among the AU’s supporters and is reckoned with. China, the Gulf States and Russia appear to recognise the EU as an important actor on peace and security but there are no signs of collaboration with the EU despite clear messages sent by the EU that collaboration would be welcome.

There is little evidence of joint programming of international support to APSA, though there are some basket-funding arrangements, which international partners contribute to. For example, the support to the AULO’s, which is funded, by the EU, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and the UK or the support to the Joint AUC Salary Fund to which a range of international partners contribute. An important “pre-programming” exercise took place with regard to the APSA Assessment 2015, which the EU and the German Cooperation strongly

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33 These are: African Union, EU, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Norway, the Netherlands
supported and coordinated. This was followed by the formulation of the APSA Roadmap 2016-2020. While based on extensive consultations with African stakeholders, African ownership of this Roadmap is not very evident so far. Though it has become the current reference for international partners for possible areas of engagement.

**JC 7.2 - Within this wider international partnership the EU has a distinct recognised role that is respected and valued by other partners (international and African).**

### Judgement

African and international partners interviewed for this evaluation all expressed an appreciation for the EU’s role in supporting P&S. Its distinct role as a complementary actor to the implementation of the APSA is recognised, respected and, given the substantial financial support which it can mobilise, seen as a clear added value. This applies to the EU’s support of PSOs as well as to the implementation of the APSA support programmes. The EU is also valued for its ability to provide support where others are unable to deliver. The evaluation team has no view about the extent to which China, Russia, Turkey or the Gulf States see the EU’s role either negative or positive.

The AU’s AMISOM operations were mentioned during nearly all interviews conducted as the prime example where operations could not have been undertaken without the support of the EU. At the same time, questions were raised in the EU, why the EU was not invited as a full partner in the recent AU-UN joint review of AMISOM. Most comments on the support provided to the other PSOs have been equally very positive. On the other hand, as discussed before, support to the MNJTF has not yet arrived on the ground, which created frustrations and let to questions about the effectiveness and added value of the AU-EU partnership.

A limited number of interviews with African and international partners also suggest that the appreciation for the EU’s support has grown more recently again because the AUC has been unable to attract substantial funding in support of the APSA from other international donors like China or the Gulf States. There is recognition that the EU, despite some current difficulties in relation to administration and accountability issues, has been an important partner because its support is predictable, is long-term and has a scale of funding which can make a difference.

### Justification

African and international partners alike have a clear view on the EU’s distinct role and added value in the partnership. The EU is seen as the most important and financially biggest supporter to the APSA and stakeholders systematically voiced high appreciation for the EU’s support of PSOs. Three arguments were brought forward. The support allows African-led PSOs to come in quickly on a transition basis (quicker than PSOs of the UN) after which they can be handed over to the UN. This was the case for MISCA (CAR) and AFISMA (Mali). Second, there are PSOs with a ‘tougher’ mandate, comprising for example counter terrorism engagement, which the UN cannot do. The EU support to AMISOM in Somalia does cater for such African-led operations. A third argument mentioned was complementarity, such as in the case of the MNJTF. The latter benefits from a strong ownership and engagement of the concerned African states (Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Cameroon plus Benin) and bi-lateral French, British and American financial (in the case of the UK) and in-kind contributions to the MNJTF. The EU’s substantial funding will allow the AU to procure logistical support to complement the efforts taken by others and thereby recognise the added value of the EU.

It is fair to say that there is an overall consensus on the EU’s value added in support of P&S, in particular for PSOs, among African as well as international partners. So EU stakeholders reacted with some surprise recently when being notified that the AU and the UN would conduct a joint review of AMISOM to which the UN cannot do. The EU support to AMISOM in Somalia does cater for such African-led operations. A third argument mentioned was complementarity, such as in the case of the MNJTF. The latter benefits from a strong ownership and engagement of the concerned African states (Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Cameroon plus Benin) and bi-lateral French, British and American financial (in the case of the UK) and in-kind contributions to the MNJTF. The EU’s substantial funding will allow the AU to procure logistical support to complement the efforts taken by others and thereby recognise the added value of the EU.

It is fair to say that there is an overall consensus on the EU’s value added in support of P&S, in particular for PSOs, among African as well as international partners. So EU stakeholders reacted with some surprise recently when being notified that the AU and the UN would conduct a joint review of AMISOM to which the EU is only invited as an observer. Acknowledgement of the added value of the EU’s support to the APSA capacity building is widely shared among those who are familiar with it (e.g. the support provided to the AULOs or RECLOs to the AU was unknown to most interviewees). Overall, among stakeholders who are well informed and working closely with the EU, the EU’s role in support of peace efforts is well known and respected, but beyond this community, the EU’s role in this area is not a widely understood.

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34 The EU is the major funder of AMISOM, which consumes some 85% of total APF funding. This raised the question at the EU as to whether the EU support from the APF is sufficiently appreciated.
The team’s visits to the PSOs and ECOWAS mostly confirm the above picture. All stakeholders interviewed on AMISOM agree that the current relative peace is attributed to the reliable and considerable APF funding. It reduced the military threat from Al Shabaab to the extent of creating and enabling environment for humanitarian assistance and a political space for holding elections. The APF was also recognised as the only real supporter of AFISMA at a time when other international support did not arrive promptly. The picture was similar for MISCA were the EU is widely recognised and welcomed. For ECOMIB and ECOWAS stakeholders valued the quality, impact and complementarity of the EU support though interviewees at ECOWAS expressed some disappointment that EU funds cannot be used for military equipment. Heavy bureaucratic EU procedures, compared to other international donors were also mentioned. The role of the EU in support of the MNJTF appears to be clear to all actors in the region. Problems caused through the procurement arrangements for the delivery of assets and services have been attributed to the AU but there were also questions raised about the added value of the EU in this case.

**JC 7.3 - The EU-Africa partnership around the APF and APSA provides space for other partners to play useful roles thereby facilitating the diversification of the resource base for APSA**

**Judgement**

The partnership between the EU and the AU in support of the APSA is non-exclusive. Other partners are solicited to join this partnership which has been an approach taken since the initiation of the APSA. The partnership of a handful of international supporters in the years 2005/2006 has meanwhile grown to a group of 40+ international actors who subscribe to the goals of the APSA and support it. Efforts were made during the reporting period by the AUC to bring the non-traditional donors with substantial support into the group of international partners, i.e. China, Russia and the Gulf States in particular. These efforts were supported by the EU formally as well as informally as some interviewees reported and led to limited support by China and the Gulf States but this did not result in joint approaches, nor any form of coordination in support of P&S in conflict-prone regions. Substantial support, similar to what the EU was able to provide, did not materialise which has become a learning curve for the AUC. This overall picture was confirmed during field visits. Other partners are welcome to join the EU-AU partnership, such as the MNJTF experience shows, or, as in the case of MISCA, have been solicited to take over and continue the missions, which the partnership had started with APF funding. There are also positive cases where APF funding helped to team up with the support provided by other international and regional actors as in the case of ECOMIB.

**Justification**

From the interviews, there is no indication that the APF support to APSA is perceived as exclusive and that no other stakeholders should join this engagement in support of the APSA. On the contrary, there is evidence that the EU’s APF funding is put in a basket with bilateral (mostly European) donors’ support – witness to the joint funding arrangements for the AULO (JFA AU LOs) or the Joint Funding Mechanism for AUC salaries (JFA Salaries). The field visits confirm these findings. The EU may have a critical role and it is appreciated that it works extensively through African partners be they national, regional or continental but this involvement is not seen as exclusive.

From official EU documents (e.g., the APF Three-Year Action Plan 2014-2016 or the Africa-EU Summit Roadmap 2014-2017) there is clear evidence that EU promoted other donors to join in the support of the APSA and to broaden the partnership. The APF Three-Year Action Plan, for example, spells out: “Through the APF, the EU will aim at building a wide-ranging coalition of African and international partners...”.

Interviews also informed that the AUC Commissioner on P&S made efforts in bringing China, Russia and the Gulf States into the support of the APSA, which was highly welcomed by the EU.
JC 7.4 - A formal or informal but accepted division of labour exists between partners on the support they provide to the APSA.

Judgement

At the level of the AUC, there is a broadly accepted division of labour between the partners supporting the APSA but the level of coordination among the 40-plus partners is vague and the information exchange and the level of coordination about who is doing what and about the scale of support provided by each partner is sub-optimal. Exchanges with China, Russia, Turkey or the Gulf states about their contributions is scanty or completely absent despite efforts from Western supporters to connect. Information from the country visits, in particular for countries where a smaller group of partners is involved, looks more positive but there is clearly room for improvement in most cases. This overall critical judgement needs to be understood against the Paris Aid Effectiveness principles, which the donors have (informally) committed to when joining the AUPGs (see annex to AUPG information). A formal process whereby international partners exchange written information about their support to the APSA does not exist, nor is it solicited, prioritised or facilitated by an under-capacitated AUC. The limited role of ECOWAS in guiding international partners on regional priorities has also been noted. Interviews with donor representatives confirm that the existing practice can lead to duplications and there appears to exist some unease about this situation. But there have been no concrete initiatives by any of the partners to go beyond the sharing of information or the collaboration around particular topical issues (such as the donor support for the Joint Salary Fund). The EUD to the AU should be complimented for having shared detailed information with other international partners on the APSA capacity support, a practice which has not been reciprocated by other donors. Its positive role in facilitating information exchange on peace and security through the AUPG meetings should also be mentioned.

Justification

There is a general agreement about the different roles, which international partners can play in support of the APSA. The EU, as the biggest financing power, is the obvious player in support of the PSOs and for providing capacity building support. Western bilateral donors like Germany, Japan, UK or the USA take a lesser but still substantive support and smaller donors come in with limited support activities such as payments into the Joint Financial Agreement for salaries, target support for mediation or the organisation of (occasional) training activities. Expectations about substantial funding from China have been high but remain so far unrealised. This is supported by financial figures available from research35 that provide an overview of the respective contributions of the principal AUC supporters. Information about the contributions from China is scanty. There is also no discussion about a division of labour at the level of the AUC, nor REC, nor country level with representatives from China, Russia, Turkey or the Gulf states despite attempts by the EU and other Western supporters to reach out and connect.

While there is general agreement on a broad ‘division of labour’ there is no clear coordination mechanism, nor a stated formal agreement among donors on who is engaging in which domain. International partners somehow know what colleagues from other donors are doing in support of peace and security, facilitated by the EU’s lead on the AUPG, but no one interviewed for this evaluation could provide an overview of activities and funding for the respective 40+ international supporters. The ‘open door policy’ in support of the APSA, promoted by the AU and supported by the EU, has resulted in many international partners joining the Architecture (including a recognition that big as well as small actors can play a supporting role). But interviews indicate that it has also created an awareness among international donors that too many donors, some of them entering the arena with small-scale training activities only, leads to high coordination costs and an overburdened AUC administration.

At the field level, for concrete activities to be implemented, intense (informal) exchanges about the respective roles and division of labour take place. This has been noted from the APF’s support to MISCA and AFISAM, including the transition to the UN thereafter, AMISOM and the MNJTF. As for ECOMIB, there is a broad division of labour though the engagement appears fragmented and little coordinated. In the case of ECOWAS, coordination among international actors is regular and overall well informed, but in the absence of operational planning and guidance from ECOWAS, attempts to agree on an effective division of labour seem to have been mostly unsuccessful.

The evaluation team has no information about formal MoUs of international partners with the AU in support of the APSA. MoUs between international partners at field-level to clarify their respective support with regard to particular activities appear to be scarce (such as in the case of the MISCA). Though there are joint donor funding arrangements, such as the EU and other donors’ co-funded support for the AULOs or the Joint Salary Fund. Regular meetings to put these arrangements into practice take place. Information collected through interviews does not indicate an outright dissatisfaction with the division of labour among partners. Though there appears to be a sense of unease as an overview of who is doing what does not exist. For the EU’s APF support to capacity development, the EUD to the AU is clearly not satisfied with the information provided by other donors. The exchange of annual work plans, for example, providing information on funding and activities of the respective partner for the year to come, is not practiced. Contrary to the approach and habits by other donors the EUD started to share its work plan, for which it should be complemented, and it expects others to do the same.
5 Conclusions

These conclusions are derived from the broad findings per EQ plus findings pertaining to some overarching issues, which the team has identified. References to the five broad thematic findings of the APF’s 2013 Evaluation are inserted where appropriate. In line with the focus of the current evaluation, there are no observations and conclusions made on the ERM, which was however also funded from the APF during the evaluation period.

The Conclusions are clustered in five groups relating to the (i) relevance of the APF, (ii) the AU-EU partnership, (iii) the capacity needed to make this partnership work, (iv) the pros and cons of complementarity with other international and European partners and (v) ownership and sustainability.

1. Relevance

1. The APF is a highly relevant instrument in support of peace and security in Africa. Its relevance is uncontested and its approach remains coherent with evolving AU and EU policies.

- This conclusion builds on findings across the evaluation, supported by interviews in Brussels, Addis Ababa, Abuja, New York and all five PSOs visited and it confirms the findings of the 2013 Evaluation.
- The APF was particularly relevant for funding PSOs, where it was shown to be capable of supporting areas, which other international actors, notably the UN, could not support.
- The scale of the EU’s funding through the APF (for PSOs and Capacity Building alike) was highly appreciated by stakeholders indicating that efforts to reduce it substantially will be difficult to achieve.

2. The strategic focus of the APF has been successfully adapted in the past but discussions between the AU and the EU need to continue to adjust the role to new realities so as not to risk undermining APSA

- Over the reporting period, the EU clearly helped to promote more ownership and showed its ability to adapt to new priorities set by the African Union, RECs and AU member states.
- Where other actors, notably the UN, were better placed to engage in the medium and longer term, such as in the cases of AFISMA (Mali) and MISCA (CAR), APF funding was stopped and used for other priorities.
- While the APF is flexible enough to adapt to evolving conceptual thinking about the APSA, there is a risk in supporting more ‘centrifugal’ processes within Africa, which can push the AUC and RECs, central pillars of the APSA, on to the side lines. There is a risk that this might become the case for the MNJTF and the recently decided G5 Sahel Joint Force.
- Such innovation therefore needs to be carefully balanced with the need to support the institutions that can guarantee the sustainability of African action on peace and security.

2. Partnership

3. The APF makes the EU an enabler over and above its role as a financier

- Through this instrument, the EU shows its ability to be more than just a payer. The scale of APF funding, its long-term commitment and its predictability have put the EU into an enabling position, which no other international partner, except for the UN, can reach.
- Support has been provided to policy innovations as well as new AU PSOs and thereby helped to put political decisions into operation. This support is provided from the background, recognising that the AU, while having a regular dialogue on priorities with the EU as well as other international partners, is in the driving seat.
- Two examples of this are the EU decisions to support the MNJTF and the G5 Sahel Joint Force with EUR 50 million each. This gave an important signal that the EU took the planned operations seriously which was a decisive factor in encouraging the main stakeholders to continue.
- Another prominent example is the EU’s leverage when exercising the 20% cut on troop stipends in AMISOM. This prompted outrage but also encouraged some more thoughtful reactions among African stakeholders in support of the Kaberuka financing reform proposals.
The recent invitation to the EU to sit on the governing board of the AU Peace Fund as one of only two non-African members, along with the UN, that have emerged from the Kaberuka proposals indicates recognition of and appreciation for the EU’s role.

4. **Positive as well as negative unintended effects can be noted from the APF**
   - The integration of troops from AU authorised PSOs into the two UN missions MINUSMA (Mali) and MINUSCA (CAR) prompted the unintended effect of deeper learning about the limitations of transitioning AU troops into UN operations (problems with troop behaviour; capacity gaps; equipment problems and different doctrines).
   - Such partially negative experiences can be used for shaping more effective AU-EU-UN partnerships in the future. Learning within the UN on future collaboration and transitions has started.
   - There is evidence of in-mission learning by TCCs, providing more rapid and relevant reaction to new security challenges requiring a PSO, a pool of trained staff, and TCCs with militaries trained and capable of supporting PSOs.
   - The EU decision to reduce APF support for troop stipends in AMISOM accelerated reflection on alternative and sustainable African sources of finance. This also brought out that one of the unintended effects of the scale and flexibility of the APF is the dependence it can create and along with that a danger of complacency. The very scale of the APF makes it hard to replace but equally raises the stakes in terms of the need to find alternative sustainable sources of funds.

5. **The EU-AU partnership on P&S is solid but during most of the evaluation period, it has proved difficult to deepen the partnership**
   - The APF has shown its value as an important tool to shape the partnership between the EU and the AU and make it durable.
   - This has not always been appreciated during the evaluation period, witness the more distant relationship with the EU under the past AUC Chairperson, but recent statements and mutual visits by the current AUC Chairperson and the EU’s HR/VP indicate improvements.
   - Though this gradually improving and trusted joint engagement is fragile as not all African actors, and particularly those from areas outside the Sahel and Horn of Africa regions, support the more recent enhanced focus on peace and security within the AUC.
   - The leadership changes during the evaluation period moreover show that the institutional relationship between the EU and the AU can be influenced strongly by individuals within a reasonably short period of time.

3. **Capacity**

6. **The EU has made progress on managing the APF more efficiently, but centralised management also involves some trade-offs**
   - The EU generally worked constructively to improve its support to the APF and reinforced its capacities in support of a more efficient implementation and management (e.g., more staff, regular consultations and communication, clarifying roles and responsibilities within EU).
   - Recent changes to the staffing of the EUD-AU, that involve splitting up the APF team and absorbing its staff into other teams in the delegation, need to be monitored closely to ensure there is no loss of coordination and expertise on peace and security.
   - Attention was focused on the HQ and the EU Delegation in Addis Ababa (in line with the centralised implementation of the APF) whereas the involvement of regional and national EUDs (with the exception of the EUD in N’Djamena which was substantially strengthened) remained more in the margins leading to some disconnect and incoherence on programming and implementation.
   - The AMISOM case study also shows that centralised management does not necessarily facilitate a smooth coordination on the implementation of activities financed through other EU instruments.

7. **The effectiveness of the APF can be broadly confirmed**
   - Most evidence of APF effectiveness comes from the field level, from ECOMIB, MISCA and AMISOM in particular. AFISMA’s period was too short to extract any firm conclusions about its
effectiveness and MNJTF does not allow for any judgment, simply because no substantial funding has arrived on the ground yet.

- As for the APSA SP, some areas could be effectively supported, such as the domain of finance at AUC and REC level or the APSA financing reform (Kaberuka Commission). But the APSA SP’s funding for capacity building has not resulted in more effective change on a broader scale, such as the support to the AULOs shows.

8. **AUC financial management of the APF has improved, but overall, the picture is mixed**

- Improvements in APF management at the AUC as well as ECOWAS were noted in the domain of financial management. Problems with communications, human resources management and mobilisation at the AUC and AULOs were mentioned regularly and the failed AUC pillar assessment on procurement still prevents the AUC from operating through a contribution agreement with the EU.

- Some major unexpected efficiency problems were encountered with the provision of assets and services to the MNJTF highlighting severe weaknesses within the AUC which appear to relate to efficiency issues (i.e., the poor functioning of the AUC procurement department) but might have deeper institutional causes.

- This case also indicates that the European Commission and the AUC could have done better in jointly assessing the institutional capacity of the AUC for implementing the APF support to the MNJTF, particularly as the AUC had not yet passed the procurement component of the pillar assessment.

9. **The APF focused clearly on APSA capacity building and there are some improvements but so far, overall, the results are rather poor**

- Following the recommendations of the APF 2013 evaluation, particular attention was paid to a more tailored approach to reinforce capacities in support of promoting the APSA at AUC, REC and field level. This led to specific projects such as the Joint Salary Fund, the support to AULOs, both funded together with other partners, and military training centres. Some improvements could be noted, such as the improved finance department capacity within ECOWAS.

- There appears to be a lack of common vision, strategy and leadership within the AUC on how to address capacity development more comprehensively, resulting in little guidance for international partners on what to support and what not. Consequently, a range of rather poorly connected activities is apparent (e.g., workshops and trainings mostly little connected to improvements in management and institutional development) resulting also in the funding of capacity substitution, for example at the level of AULOs.

10. **There are limited signs that the AUC and RECs are effectively translating institutional reform plans into more systematic institutional and operational change**

- A more planned and orderly process at the institutional level that would channel the Kagame proposals into real reform is not yet apparent.

- The APSA Roadmap 2016-2020, although jointly developed in response to an elaborate evaluation of the APSA, is seen by some as too complex a document, not easy to work with and therefore less helpful as an operational instrument. As a result, it has not yet achieved a level of ownership nor a momentum for reform within the AUC and the RECs on which to build and implement a strong capacity development strategy.

4. Complementarity

11. **Mostly positive results were noted on complementarity between the APF support for peace and security with that of EU member states**

- PSOs funded through the APF were complementary to PSOs in Mali, Chad, CAR and Somalia undertaken or supported by EU member states (mainly UK and France) and vice versa.

- Joint agreements with other EU member states led to basket funding in support of AUC salaries and of the AULOs, but limited coordination in the area of APSA capacity building overall, was identified as an area for EU and EU member states to further improve on complementarity.
12. EU internal complementarity at the operational level can be further improved

- At different levels within the EU institutions there is evidence of concrete efforts being made to improve and shape complementarity. The ‘comprehensive approach’ is widely referred to and the programming of funds from the EDF, IcSP, EU Trust Funds and ECHO as well as CSDP missions to ensure complementarity with APF is progressing, though the very complexity of this exercise does not always achieve optimal results.
- Similar progress has been made on the complementarity of APF funding with regional programming (RIPs) on peace and security.
- While there has been complementarity of EU action at the broader strategic level, the case of the MNJTF shows that too little attention has been paid to the linkages between the military and civilian aspects of PSOs and their linkages with stabilisation, resilience support and development.
- There are questions as to whether the current reshuffling of the staff EUD-AU P&S Unit and the organisational separation of some of its different elements will improve the future functioning of APF management.

13. Shaping joint action between the EU and other partners is complex but has been partially successful

- In view of the 40+ partners supporting the APSA, some of them in a highly non-transparent and un-coordinated manner (e.g. China), shaping complementarity for a meaningful support to the APSA and PSOs is challenging.
- The EU Delegation to the AU should be complimented for bringing at least some systematic information sharing and exchange into this myriad of support actions through its proactive chairing of the AU Partners Group (AUPG) on Peace and Security, but the EU as a whole could do more to ensure all EU support is properly coordinated and complementary.
- However, it has been difficult to reach beyond the exchange of information in these AUPG meetings though other joint initiatives with like-minded (and mostly EU) partners are functioning and collaboration is constructive such as in the case of the Joint Salary Fund.

5. Ownership and Sustainability

14. The APF has supported African ownership but sustainability is still far on the horizon

- Growing efforts to increase African ownership and sustainability in the domain of peace and security are clearly noticeable, as evident in the Kaberuka report on African financing and the Kagame report on the institutional reform of the AU, both launched during the evaluation period.
- These high-level reform initiatives appear to translate into a gradually growing awareness among diverse African stakeholders that alternatives to the foreign funding for PSOs have to be found, and that an exit strategy for the hugely expensive AMISOM will be needed before long.
- Several African countries have reportedly changed, or started to change, their legislation in support of an import levy for the financing of the Peace Fund as suggested by Kaberuka, but it is still too early to tell to what extent the ambitious reform agenda and funding targets will be met.

15. Evidence for long-term impact exists but is thin

- From the field findings it would be difficult to conclude that the APF led to (longer-term) impact, except for the case of AMISOM where a very slow but gradual change towards stabilisation can be noted, despite very violent attacks still occurring occasionally.
- Only little impact of making the AUC and RECs more sustainable was noted from the APSA SP (see also below, strengthening of finance capacities).
6 Recommendations

From these conclusions, the evaluation team has derived a series of recommendations grouped in the same clusters as the conclusions. These relate to the (i) relevance of the APSA for peace and security in Africa, (ii) the partnership between the EU and the AU to make support to the APSA effective, (iii) the capacity needed to make this partnership work and (iv) the pros and cons of complementary engagement with other international and European partners and (v) ownership and sustainability. In line with the genesis of this evaluation, commissioned by the European Commission, the recommendations are directed towards the EU and EU member states to further strengthen the implementation of the APF with African partners until the year 2020.

Follow up actions linked to the recommendations are provided in the Action Document in the next chapter.

1. Relevance

The APF should continue to build on the priorities and dynamics emerging from intra-African policy discussions on the APSA and go on investing in it as a valuable institutional asset and framework through which to promote peace and security in Africa

- Given more peace operations are taking place outside the immediate reach of RECs/RMs, strengthen the EU dialogue with the latter as well as with AU member states about policy and implementation of such operations under the APSA framework.
- Be sensitive to potential "centrifugal tendencies" both from within Africa and from outside, which can push the AUC and RECs, central pillars of the APSA, to one side that might undermine the APSA and the very involvement of the AUC and RECs in addressing peace and security in Africa.
- In support of African mediation and preventive diplomacy activities, provide diplomatic and operational assistance to African institutional actors, such as AU Special Envoys and their missions, and civil society organisations when addressing conflict and security issues.

2. Partnership

Use the APF to strengthen the political, strategic and operational partnership between the EU and the AU as well as with other partners in support of peace and security in Africa and continue to promote it as a highly valuable instrument to further sharpen and develop this partnership

- Continue investing in high-level political dialogue in support of this partnership, combined with regular strategic-operational and implementation-related dialogue at the level of the AUC and the RECs.
- Use this dialogue to address the contradictory perceptions of the EU on the one side, that it is not sufficiently respected by African actors for its support role, and of AU actors on the other, that the EU at times pushes its own agenda too much.
- The EU should be more aware of the political weight it has that comes with the unmatched scale of its funding, its predictability and its long-term commitment, and use this weight responsibly and in a targeted manner in negotiations and dialogue with African partners and other international partners.
- Use the APF partnership as a basis for joint action with other international partners, such as the UN and other strategic actors supporting the APSA (e.g., joint evaluations; harmonisation and alignment of support; designing joint funding mechanisms).

3. Capacity

Sharpen the common sense of purpose and vision for capacity development and continue to invest through the APF in the internal capacity of the EU, the AUC and the RECs needed to make the APSA work

- Maintain the support to APSA capacity building but, in dialogue with African partners, be more selective and focused, and introduce an incentive approach to make the institutional structures perform better. Accompany this incentive approach through dialogue, training and advice.
- Provide capacity building support in particular to PSO mission support structures at the level of the AUC, RECs/RMs and at the operational levels.
- For PSOs, focus support more on policing and on civilian components and assist with specialised training to support the building of expertise in these domains.
Strengthen reporting capacities for better accountability and learning at the levels of the AUC, RECs/RMs and the operational levels.

Having strengthened EU headquarters and the EU Delegation to better manage the APF, extend this strengthening to EU regional delegations and, where appropriate, national delegations to ensure better complementarity between the different types of EU support provided to peace and security, resilience and development.

Ensure the various former responsibilities of the EUD-AU P&S Unit remain well coordinated amongst themselves despite their separation into several different units in the Delegation, so as to ensure continuing good complementarity between them.

Recognise that the evaluation period, 2014-2016, is rather short to see substantial capacity changes and that a longer time frame is needed to see the effects of institutional capacity support.

4. Complementarity

Further invest in optimising the complementarity of the APF with other support provided to peace and security in Africa, be it through other EU financing mechanisms, EU member states or international partners:

- Use the APF to leverage a more harmonised and aligned support among the support activities provided through EU member states and, to the extent possible, also with other international partners.
- Use the APF and other EU funding instruments together to ensure more adequate linkages between the military, policing and civilian aspects of PSOs and their linkages with stabilisation, humanitarian assistance, resilience support and development are made.
- Strengthen efforts to better coordinate the EU’s capacity support through the APSA Support Programme with the inputs provided by other international partners.
- Work closely with the UN at the level of New York and Addis Ababa to build on relevant experience in support of peace and security in Africa and invest in learning and good practices to forge a more effective triangular cooperation between the UN, the AU and the EU.

5. Ownership and Sustainability

Working closely with the AU, the UN and other strategic partners, continuously seek to let African counterparts increase their lead in setting agendas and in identifying needs, so as to promote ownership and sustainability and more decision-making power over coordination and solutions

- Remain alert to on-going institutional reform efforts to make the APSA more self-financed by African states and support such reform efforts, such as Dr. Kaberuka and his team, constructively, while being clear on the limits in the support, which the EU can provide to PSOs through the APF, in particular.
- Engage with the AUC and RECs/RMs on further developing the AU’s strategic planning so that the AUC has the basis on which it can better coordinate the various inputs of international partners to the APSA and ensure complementarity.
- To get thinking and practice on African ownership and sustainability more grounded in support and dialogue at different levels and among different African communities, as well as dialogue between these communities and the EU.
- Regularly discuss with African actors at the pan-African, regional and national levels, long-term approaches and strategies to scale down or exit from African peace support operation.
## 7 Action Document for follow-up

### APF evaluation – Action Document 2018 to 2020 and Observations Recommendations 2013 evaluation

This document builds on the recommendations of the main report and suggests for each recommendation a number of actions, which the EU, together with the AU and international partners could undertake to further improve the implementation of the APF. In the second part, the document lists the recommendations of the APF evaluation of 2013 and shares observations about the extent to which these recommendations have been followed up during the reporting period.


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<td><strong>1. Relevance</strong></td>
<td>The APF should continue to build on the priorities and dynamics emerging from intra-African policy discussions on the APSA and go on investing in it as a valuable institutional asset and framework through which to promote peace and security in Africa</td>
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| 1.1 - Given more peace operations are taking place outside the immediate reach of RECs/RMs, strengthen the EU dialogue with the latter as well as with AU member states about policy and implementation of such operations under the APSA framework. | ▪ Include APF issues in the agenda of the annual EU-RECs/RMs meeting  
▪ Include APF issues in the agenda of the PSC to PSC meetings, such as the implications for the APSA framework of PSOs initiated by AU member states  
▪ Include APF issues in the policy dialogue between the EU and AU member states and coordinate this policy dialogue between EU Brussels and EU Delegations  
▪ Ensure the AU is kept regularly informed about all EU dialogue with both the RECs/RMs and the AU member states |
| 1.2 - Be sensitive to potential ”centrifugal tendencies”, which can push the AUC and RECs, central pillars of the APSA, onto the side lines, both from within Africa and from outside, in response to violent conflict that might undermine the APSA and the very involvement of the AUC and RECs in addressing peace and security in Africa. | ▪ First four bullets, same as under 1.1  
▪ Regularly undertake exchanges at EU level, involving different levels in Brussels and the EU Delegations, to analyse the evolving nature of the APSA and its consequences on the EU-AU partnership on peace and security.  
▪ In case of an Africa audit or an evaluation of the current APSA framework and its suitability in dealing with new security challenges on the continent, provide support and assistance to such an initiative. |
| 1.3 - In support of African mediation and preventive diplomacy activities, provide diplomatic and operational assistance to African institutional actors, such as AU Special Envoys and their missions, and civil society organisations when addressing conflict and security issues. | ▪ Assist African mediation and preventive diplomacy initiatives aimed at the resolution of high-intensity conflicts where PSO's are operating diplomatically as well as operationally (through the APSA capacity support programme), with a view to ensuring durable and inclusive conflict resolution, including through peace agreements.  
▪ Assist in increasing the meaningful participation of African civil society actors in mediation efforts, from the early stages onwards, so that linkages between track 1 (high level), track 2 (meso-level) and track 3 (local/community level) mediation activities can be established.  
▪ Strengthen and support efforts that ensure the full involvement of women's groups, in mediation processes led by African institutional actors, through diplomatic and operational support, such as technical capacity building and logistical support; and in coordination with existing continental support structures such as PanWise and the recently established FemWise. |
## 2. Partnership

Use the APF to strengthen the political, strategic and operational partnership between the EU and the AU as well as with other partners in support of peace and security in Africa and continue to promote it as a highly valuable instrument to further sharpen and develop this partnership

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| **2.1** - Continue investing in high-level political dialogue in support of this partnership, combined with regular strategic-operational and implementation-related dialogue at the level of the AUC and the RECs. |  ▪ Use the existing high-level dialogue mechanisms (High-level EU-AU dialogue; PSC to PSC meetings; EU-RECs/RMs meetings) and the existing senior official meetings, like the APF Steering Committee meetings.  
  ▪ Given the many questions from African and European stakeholders, including from the UK, consider including in this dialogue a discussion on the likely consequences of Brexit on the funding of PSOs and APSA capacity building and, if appropriate, include the UK Government in this dialogue both before and after the planned departure of the UK from the European Union.  
  ▪ Establish in addition meeting mechanisms for urgent peace and security issues, such as suddenly appearing conflicts and crises. The platforms, proposed by the EU ahead of the EU-AU Summit, could be considered for that.  
  ▪ Create joint AU-EU platforms for learning on outcomes of partnership actions and invite strategic partners, including the UN, USA, Japan and China, to such platform meetings. |
| **2.2** - Use this dialogue to address the contradictory perceptions of the EU, on the one side, that it is not sufficiently respected by African actors for its support role, and of AU actors, on the other, that the EU at times pushes its own agenda too much. |  ▪ Address these perceptions at the level of the EU-RECs/RMs meetings, the PSC to PSC meetings, the high-level policy dialogue and in the context of the regularly held senior officials/senior executives meetings.  
  ▪ Meet more frequently between the AU PSC and the EU PSC than the current once-per-year practice.  
  ▪ Re-establish the past PSC-to-PSC practice of undertaking joint field visits for enhancing the mutual understanding about progress on the ground.  
  ▪ From time to time, invite the AU to meetings of the EU PSC and of the Africa Working Party (COAFR) in Brussels, similarly to the current practice that the EU is, on occasion, invited to meetings of the AU PSC in Addis Ababa. |
| **2.3** - The EU should be more aware of the political weight it has that comes with the unmatched scale of its funding, its predictability and its long-term commitment, and use this weight responsibly and in a targeted manner in negotiations and dialogue with African partners and other international partners. |  ▪ Undertake regular reviews to collect information and analyse how the EU has informed, enabled and co-directed the AU policy on peace and security to better understand its impact and to better understand how this role is seen by African partners.  
  ▪ Use this analysis for in-house reflection and strategic planning to set out its path of engagement at the level of the AUC and the RECs/RMs. |
| **2.4** - Use the APF partnership as a basis for joint action with other international partners, such as the UN and other strategic actors supporting the APSA (e.g., joint evaluations; harmonisation and alignment of support; designing joint funding mechanisms). |  ▪ Establish regular dialogue and learning platforms to promote joint planning, implementation and monitoring of APF related activities and invite other international and African partners, including civil society actors, to join.  
  ▪ For evaluations, programming and funding strive to operate more jointly with other partners so as to facilitate better coordination under the lead of the AUC and RECs/RMs and to promote more harmonised and aligned approaches.  
  ▪ Extend this dialogue to key African national governments acting on peace and security, recognising the important role they play in the hierarchy of APSA institutions. |
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| 3.1 - Maintain the support to APSA capacity building but, in dialogue with African partners, be more selective and focused, and introduce an incentive approach to make the institutional structures perform better. Accompany this incentive approach through dialogue, training and advice. | ▪ Include APF capacity building support and complementary support provided through other EU sources and other international partners, a standard agenda item for the various dialogue mechanisms mentioned above.  
▪ Undertake a joint assessment of training needs at the level of the AUC and RECs/RMs and also explore how ad-hoc type military initiatives, in particular the MNJTF and the G5 Sahel Joint Force could benefit from such training. Learn from positive examples, such as in ECOWAS.  
▪ Focus APF capacity building more, e.g. by targeting a selected number of military training institutions for support. Experiment with the planned incentive system in support of these training institutions (based on a tendering/call for proposal approach) and explore to what extent this approach could be applied to other domains as well, such as AU Liaison Offices for particular positions or projects.  
▪ Accompany this incentive approach through a specific training and advice facility which could be deployed at the pan-African level, but with a mandate to service APSA’s institutional structures at different levels.  
▪ Monitor the use of training support to ensure that it is used as an opportunity for personnel development of relevant staff instead of using travel and per diem for training as a reward system for AU staff members.  
▪ Test the use of short-term and long-term staff exchanges between a limited number of key officials of the AU and the EU to enhance mutual understanding of the respective institutional context and working practices. |
| 3.2 - Provide capacity building support in particular to PSO mission support structures at the level of the AUC, RECs/RMs and at the operational levels. | ▪ In dialogue with African partners, put more emphasis on mission support for better operational coherence, and assist efforts made by African actors to harmonise their approaches among African actors and with the UN, e.g. in the domain of equipment, troop standards, doctrine, conduct, etc.  
▪ Discuss with the AU the scope for reassessing and possibly adapting the AUC’s procurement system in terms of the specific needs of PSOs. This could include the establishing a dedicated section within PSOD to deal with procurement matters.  
▪ Provide communication-related support to AUC, RECs/RMs as well as other African institutional entities involved with the implementation of PSOs, for example the creation of videoconference facilities to enable rapid exchanges and meetings between African policy makers and practitioners but also with the UN, the EU and AU member states.  
▪ To improve communication and coordination between regions where there is no REC directly responsible for a PSO, such as in the case of the Lake Chad, discuss with the AUC the setting up of Liaison Offices at the level of AU headquarters, for example for the LCBC/MNJTF.  
▪ For the G5 Sahel Joint Force, which is implemented by five states with different interests located in different parts of the Sahel, monitor the capacity building support to the G5 Secretariat closely in coordination with international partners, to ensure that this new type of PSO is able to deliver on its mandate. |
| 3.3 - For PSOs, focus support more on policing and on civilian components and assist with specialised training to support the building of expertise in these domains. | ▪ In dialogue with the AU, RECs/RMs and AU member states promote more attention to policing and civilian capacities within peace operations.  
▪ Provide technical assistance through institutional strengthening, training, counselling/advice to the establishment of units dealing with civilian protection (to integrate perspectives on human rights, international humanitarian law, sexual abuse, management of detainees), stabilisation (to integrate perspectives on security and governance, |
### 3. Capacity

**Sharpen the common sense of purpose and vision for capacity development and continue to invest through the APF in the internal capacity of the EU, AUC and RECs needed to make the APSA work**

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<td>conflict management, quick impact projects) and humanitarian support (to integrate perspectives of civilian-military coordination, security of internally displaced people and refugees).</td>
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<td>▪ Support police related activities, for example doctrine development, planning, conduct of policing tasks, training of local police and institutional support.</td>
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<td>3.4 - Strengthen reporting capacities for better accountability and learning at the levels of the AUC, RECs/RMs and the operational levels.</td>
<td>▪ Focus the reporting on APF related activities for PSOs as well as capacity building on outputs and outcomes (the latter is for example missing in the Annual APSA Support Programme reporting).</td>
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<td>▪ Use particularly the outcomes reporting as a learning tool for dialogue and, if needed, the adaptation of ongoing support programmes.</td>
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<td>▪ Clarify with partners the difference between output and outcome reporting and the benefits one can draw from this differentiation as not all staff within the AUC and RECs/RMs are fully conversant with this distinction.</td>
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<td>3.5 - Having strengthened EU headquarters and the EU Delegation to better manage the APF, extend this strengthening to EU regional delegations and, where appropriate, national delegations to ensure better complementarity between the different types of EU support provided to peace and security, resilience and development.</td>
<td>▪ Keep in place sufficient EU staff at AUC and REC level to regularly monitor, understand and analyse changes within the complex African institutional ecosystem that supports peace and security.</td>
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<td>▪ Strengthen EU staff levels in RECs to ensure a better coordination and complementarity between APF supported peace and security activities and those supported by the EU but also through other international partners through regional programmes.</td>
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<td>▪ For African PSOs implemented outside the direct responsibility of a REC, ensure that country-based EU Delegations are sufficiently capacitated to ensure complementarity between country programmes and the activities funded through the APF.</td>
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<td>3.6 - Ensure the former responsibilities of the EUD-AU P&amp;S Unit remain well coordinated in their different aspects despite their separation into several different units in the Delegation so as to ensure continuing good complementarity between them.</td>
<td>▪ Review internally the functioning of the restructured set-up at the level of the EU Delegation to the AU after one year to assess the extent to which coordination and complementarity of activities has improved and benefitted the support provided to the AU.</td>
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4. Complementarity

Further invest in optimising the complementarity of the APF with other support provided to peace and security in Africa, be it through other EU financing mechanisms, EU member states or international partners.

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| 4.1 - Use the APF to leverage a more harmonised and aligned support among the support activities provided through EU member states and, to the extent possible, also with other international partners. | ▪ Discuss, and if undertaken, support a High-Level Strategic Review of African PSOs, similar to the one that UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon appointed in 2014 to review UN peace operations.  
▪ As a lead supporter of the APSA, promote the holding of an annual strategic meeting in support of more harmonised and aligned approaches among key international partners and the AUC, chaired and directed under the guidance of the AU.  
▪ Continue chairing the AU Partner Group on Peace and Security in Addis Ababa, continue to use it as a communication platform and, in addition, use it as the point of departure to discuss and agree upon more common approaches and operations, such as joint evaluations, joint planning and basket funding.  
▪ Discuss with EU member states present in Addis whether the EU group could not set a stronger example on complementarity within the broader AUPG. |
| 4.2 - Use the APF and other EU funding instruments together to ensure more adequate linkages between the military, policing and civilian aspects of PSOs and their linkages with stabilisation, humanitarian assistance, resilience support and development are made. | ▪ For African peace operations implemented outside the framework of a REC, ensure that APF support receives more complementary support through the NIPs and ensure this support’s coordination with APF funded activities.  
▪ Ensure more complementarity between the activities funded by the APF and EU support provided through RIPs, NIPs, the IcSP and, given their strong focus on rehabilitation and resilience, the EU Trust Funds in particular.  
▪ Establish regular mechanisms of exchange and coordination between CSDP missions, EU military advisers, EU Special Representatives and African military actors for regions and PSOs for which the APF is providing support.  
▪ Continue to support EU humanitarian assistance (ECHO) and its cooperation with military actors (supported through the APF) under the overall coordination of UN-OCHA.  
▪ For the Lake Chad region, dialogue in a more strategic manner with the LCBC member states, in particular Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon (i.e. in a coordinated EU dialogue which involves EU Brussels, the EU Delegation to the AU and EU Delegations in the region), in support of a stronger role of the LCBC to lead stabilisation efforts, including the linkages between military and civilian activities.  
▪ Explore options to institutionally strengthen the LCBC with regard to its tasks to coordinate stabilisation efforts, in particular in the civilian domain. |
| 4.3 – Strengthen efforts to better coordinate the EU’s capacity support through the APSA Support Programme with the inputs provided by other international partners. | ▪ Build on the positive experience of the Joint Salaries Fund and collaborate more closely with all EU member states present on the support provided to APSA capacity building.  
▪ Use a lead donor system where appropriate and support this lead through joint areas of collaboration and resource pooling. |
| 4.4 - Work closely with the UN at the level of New York and Addis Ababa to build on relevant experience in support of peace and security in Africa and invest in learning and good practices to forge a more effective triangular cooperation between the UN, the AU and the EU. | ▪ Consider strengthening EU presence at the level of the EU Delegation in New York to ensure that triangular exchanges on UN-AU-EU cooperation are followed closely and that exchanges between EU Brussels, the EU Delegation to the AU and EU member states in the UNSC and other EU member states supporting the APSA, are regular and intense.  
▪ Support efforts by the UN and AU to improve the practice of transferring AU led peace operations to UN led peace operations. For examples, through learning exercises, training, dialogue about conduct and/or operational coherence. |
## 5. Ownership and sustainability

**Working closely with the AU, the UN and other strategic partners, continuously seek to let African counterparts increase their lead role when setting agendas and identifying needs to promote ownership and sustainability, and give more decision-making power over coordination and solutions.**

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<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Suggested actions</th>
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| 5.1 - Stay alert to ongoing institutional reform efforts to make the APSA more self-financed by African states and support such reform efforts, such as Dr. Kaberuka and his team, constructively, while being clear on the limits in the support, which the EU can provide to PSOs through the APF, in particular. | ▪ Through high-level dialogue between the EU, the AU and the UN, provide support to the Kaberuka reform package on financing peace and security in Africa.  
▪ If appropriate, assist with high-level dialogue at the level of the WTO and relevant UN member states to help communicate the objectives of the Kaberuka reform.  
▪ Where necessary, provide financial support to facilitate further dialogue among African stakeholders on the financing reform. |
| 5.2 - Engage with the AUC and RECs/RMs on further developing the AU’s strategic planning so that the AUC has the basis on which it can better coordinate the various inputs of international partners to the APSA and ensure complementarity. | ▪ Support the AUC and RECs/RMs to develop the AU’s strategic document ‘Silencing the Guns by 2020’ into a planning and monitoring document so that the variety of activities in support of peace and security can be well coordinated, financed and implemented.  
▪ Discuss with the AUC and other international partners to what extent the APSA Roadmap 2016-2020 can be used as a foundation for better strategic and operational planning and monitoring or whether alternative approaches need to be explored. |
| 5.3 - To get thinking and practice on African ownership and sustainability more grounded in support and dialogue at different levels and among different African communities, as well as dialogue between these communities and the EU. | ▪ Provide support for regular dialogue and learning about the APSA, peace support operations and other support to peace and security actors of the AUC, RECs as well as African think tanks and civil society organisations, such as the IPSS, African women networks, etc.  
▪ After two EU evaluations of the APF, one in 2013 and the present one, undertake the next evaluation as a joint exercise with the AUC to assess progress and to identify issues for mutual discussion, and for discussion mutually with other strategic partners. |
| 5.4 - Regularly discuss with African actors at the pan-African, regional and national levels, long-term approaches and strategies to scale down or exit from African peace support operations. | ▪ Use the existing high-level dialogue mechanisms (High-level EU-AU dialogue; PSC to PSC meetings; EU-RECs/RMs meetings) and the existing senior official meetings, like the APF Steering Committee meetings.  
▪ Extend this dialogue to relevant strategic partners, including the UN, the USA and EU member states, which are strongly supporting the APSA. |
## Part II - Recommendations APF Evaluation 2013, and observations from APF evaluation 2017

### 1. Deepening the Africa-EU dialogue

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<tr>
<td>1. Stronger and more direct EU dialogue with the Member States of the AU and the RECs/RMs at both policy and political levels.</td>
<td>A stronger dialogue with the AUC and ECOWAS could be noted. No information could be found about a stronger dialogue with the other RECs/RMs and AU member states.</td>
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<td>2. The EU &amp; AU explore options to develop a plan to progressively assume responsibility for staff positions and the operating costs of key APSA components.</td>
<td>Regular exchanges between the EU and the AU happened about staff pay in the context of the Joint Salary Fund but no information could be found about the development of a plan based on which the AU would take over more responsibilities for staff positions and operating costs.</td>
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<td>3. Ensure awareness of the APF/APSA among key stakeholders (including African Member States) and promote longer-term engagement in support of APSA.</td>
<td>The joint APSA evaluation, concluded in 2015 with support by the EU and the German cooperation, as well as the process leading to the formulation of the APSA Roadmap (2016-2020) helped to ensure awareness among key stakeholders about the APF and the APSA. The Kaberuka report on the financing of the AU and African PSOs promoted a longer-term engagement of APSA but this process took place outside the Africa-EU dialogue.</td>
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### 2. Sharpening the APF’s strategic focus/prioritisation

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<td>4. EU should work with the AU/RECs/RMs to clarify and sharpen the strategic orientation &amp; focus areas of the APF. This prioritisation exercise should consist of three elements (i) keeping APSA development as its ‘big picture’ issue, working with its African partners and other donors to ensure a coherent strategic framework for its long-term development; (ii) focusing on activities where APF has a comparative advantage and (iii) supporting AU efforts to identify other actors who are better placed to address the gaps.</td>
<td>The EU did work with African institutional actors throughout the evaluation period to sharpen the strategic orientation and to focus the APF support. This was difficult at times, in particular during the period of the former Chair of the AUC, but improved during the last part of the evaluation period – in particular with regard to the ‘big picture’ issues. Witness to the experiences in CAR and in Mali, the APF support was terminated for areas where other actors had a comparative advantage.</td>
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<td>5. APF, AUC and the RECs/RMs should conduct a process for determining the strategic priorities of APF funding for the 2014-2017 period in order to identify the highest priority categories of activities to be funded by the APF.</td>
<td>There is no information about a particular process conducted to determine the strategic priorities of the APF funding for the 2014-2017 period but there is evidence that regular dialogue and exchanges took place at different levels to ensure that priorities were addressed, for example the support of the APF to the MNJTF.</td>
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<td>6. The EU should support current efforts within the AU to encourage cross-departmental thinking and strategies to achieve a more integrated response the security-governance nexus.</td>
<td>The evaluation team could not collect any specific information in relation to this recommendation. Though linkages between security and governance were discussed during the APSA evaluation and were addressed subsequently in the APSA Roadmap 2016-2020.</td>
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<td>7. APF is integrated into ‘comprehensive’ EU approaches to dealing with African conflict at the continental, regional and national levels and that the APF activities which the EU chooses to finance benefit from adequate and appropriate programme support both at Brussels and Delegation levels.</td>
<td>The APF is integrated into the comprehensive thinking and action at the EU policy level, in particular in Brussels and Addis Ababa. Awareness about the APF at the EU regional and national is present but comprehensiveness of EU programme support, in terms of linking more strongly with the APF supported activities, can be further improved.</td>
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### 3. Streamlining EU/APF decision making

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<td>8. The EU should modify the provision on financial decision-making in the APF Three-Year Action Programme, which stipulates that every action requires a separate decision.</td>
<td>The evaluation team is aware that, under the 11th EDF, Commission decisions concerning APF are no longer submitted to the EDF Committee for its opinion. However, the extent to which this has led to a streamlining in decision-making could not been assessed by the team.</td>
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<td>9. The EU should work with the AU to establish a clearer protocol for the ERM-approval process. In addition, the EU should encourage the AU to continue to reinforce its own capacity to manage the ERM in view of i) improving the speed and efficiency of its response to requests from RECs/RMs; ii) encouraging RECs/RMs to take more advantage of available opportunities to use ERM funding; iii) achieving better quality reporting on initiatives that receive ERM funding.</td>
<td>This recommendation falls outside the ToR of the current evaluation, which excludes the ERM from the review.</td>
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<td>10. The APF should examine the feasibility of providing support tailored to mediation processes, which generally unfold over a period of time and whose needs are difficult to foresee at the outset (i) amending the current ERM programme to allow for multiple grants to the same mediation process and lengthening the timeframe of the grant, or ii) creating a new window that would have the same flexibility, rapid response and simplified procedures as the ERM but allow multiple requests and longer timeframes.</td>
<td>This recommendation falls outside the ToR of the current evaluation, which excludes the ERM from the review.</td>
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### 4. Strengthening APF capacity building

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<td>11. APF partners (EU/AU/REC/RMs) should adopt a more tailored approach to capacity building (CB) based on a thorough needs assessment of partner institutions in the area of peace and security and informed by an overall strategic plan for institutional development, drawing on and updating earlier institutional (organisational/functional) and 4-pillar reviews as appropriate.</td>
<td>This recommendation was followed up from various angles. Steps were taken to improve APF capacity building through the APSA evaluation (2015) and the formulation of the APSA Roadmap (2016-2020). Other capacity building related assessments were the evaluation of the AU Liaison Offices and the support to AU military training centres. Finally, a pillar assessment was undertaken.</td>
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<td>12. The EU should work to strengthen APF alignment with other EU and non-EU funders (such as the RIPs, the €30 million AU Support Programme, the African Development Bank, bilateral donors) in order to strengthen critical core institutional capacities, to develop a strategy for providing the requisite assistance.</td>
<td>The EU has worked to align APF support with other EU and non-EU funders but the extent to which this has led to a strengthened APF alignment, compared to the period pre-2013, could not be assessed.</td>
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<td>13. The EU should explore the options for establishing i) a minimum threshold of institutional capacity that would have to be attained before APF funding could be accessed and ii) a graduated scale of institutional capacity that would enable APF beneficiaries to receive progressively larger amounts of APF financing and/or certain categories of APF financing.</td>
<td>The evaluation could not find any information regarding this recommendation.</td>
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<td>14. Monitoring of APF-supported capacity building should incorporate ‘bench-marks’ to help clearly identify when and where capacity has been built, and a system should be established to more systematically track capacity built with APF support.</td>
<td>While the implementation of the APF supported capacity building was monitored, the evaluation team has no information about the formulation of any ‘bench-marks’ or a system that would have allowed the EU and the AU to more systematically track capacity changes.</td>
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## 5. Enhancing EU programme support

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<td>15. EU should explore options to further decentralise aspects of APF programme management (particularly relating to capacity building, both of APSA and PSO planning and financial management) including issues relating to accessing/managing APF (including ERM) and other EU resources. These should either be devolved to the AU EUD in Addis or to relevant regional EUDs where appropriate political/security/military expertise exists.</td>
<td>The EU has managed the implementation of the APF centrally during the evaluation period but has reinforced its staff at headquarters as well as the Addis Ababa level to ensure a better decentralise aspects of the APF programme management. Regional and national EU Delegations were involved for the implementation of new APF funded activities, for example the MNJTF or ECOMIB.</td>
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<td>16. DEVCO’s APF unit should work with the other APF partners to integrate an M&amp;E element into capacity building (CB) programmes in order to provide mid-term corrections and to understand the long-term impact of APF investments.</td>
<td>The evaluation did not find any evidence of the integration of an M&amp;E element into capacity building programmes. But the APSA Roadmap (2016-2020) included indicators with a view to better monitor APSA support, including APF funded support to PSOs and capacity building. So far, however, the APSA Roadmap has not been used for any monitoring, nor the introduction for any changes of the APF support.</td>
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<td>17. The EU should assess options to ensure closer day-to-day contact between relevant EU and AU/REC/RM managers. Where advantageous, the EU should devolve greater responsibility to the relevant EU Delegations/Heads responsible for relations with the AU and the RECs/RMs.</td>
<td>The evaluation team could collect information showing that the day-to-day contact between the EU Delegation to the AU and AU managers is intense. Regular exchanges between the EU Delegation in Abuja and ECOWAS could be noted, but no information was found on the exchanges between the EU and other RECs/RMs. No information is available about the extent to which more responsibilities for the relations with the AU/RECs/RMs were devolved compared to the period pre-2013.</td>
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<td>18. EU monitors and provides consistent support and guidance for AU programme oversight/advisory activities at the REC/RM level by decentralising this function to the relevant EUD.</td>
<td>The evaluation team could not find any evidence about a systematic oversight/advisory activity on the implementation of the APF funded activities to EU Delegations at the REC/RM level.</td>
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<td>19. Ensure that DEVCO APF ambitions are matched by an appropriately sized APF management team.</td>
<td>The APF management team was substantially increased at the level of DEVCO and the EU Delegation to the AU. The effects of this were also noted by some EU member states (e.g., better and quicker reporting compared to pre-2013 period).</td>
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<td>20. The Commission APF Unit should review its policy on communications and information sharing with EUDs on APF issues, and adopt a more systematic approach to updating EUDs.</td>
<td>There is evidence that DEVCO organises regular videoconference exchanges, which include different services at the headquarters level as well as EU colleagues at the regional and national levels.</td>
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