This action is funded by the European Union

ANNEX 1

of the Commission implementing Decision on the financing of the special measure part 2 in favour of Iraq for “demining” and “local development” for 2018

Action Document for Explosive Hazard Mitigation in areas liberated from Da'esh, Iraq

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Title/basic act/CRIS number</th>
<th>Explosive Hazard Mitigation in areas liberated from Da'esh, Iraq Financed under Development Cooperation Instrument¹ CRIS number: MIDEAST/2018/041-354</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Zone benefiting from the action/location</td>
<td>Iraq The action shall be carried out at the following location: areas liberated from Da'esh control and their surroundings as need is identified in the following governorates Anbar, Ninewa, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din, and Diyala.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Programming document</td>
<td>NA/Special measure for Iraq 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Sector of concentration/thematic area</td>
<td>Stabilisation/Reconstruction DEV. Aid: Yes²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 5. Amounts concerned | EU support is part of a multi-donor action 
Total amount of EU budget contribution: EUR 10,000,000

This action is parallel co-financing by³:
Australia: AUD 4,100,000
Finland: EUR 500,000
Japan: USD 4,500,000
UK/DFID: GBP 5,700,000
France: EUR 500,000
New Zealand: NZD 450,000

| 6. Aid modality and implementation modality | Project Modality Indirect management with United Nations Mine Action Service - UNMAS (as part of the UN Secretariat) |
| 7. a) DAC code(s) | 15220, 15250, 16050 |
| b) Main Delivery Channel | 41126 - UNMAS |

² Official Development Aid is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective.
³ As of July 2018.
8. Markers (from CRIS DAC form) | General policy objective | Not targeted | Significant objective | Main objective
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
Participation development/good governance | ☐ | ☒ | ☐ |
Aid to environment | ☒ | ☐ | ☐ |
Gender equality (including Women In Development) | ☒ | ☐ | ☐ |
Trade Development | ☒ | ☐ | ☐ |
Reproductive, Maternal, New born and child health | ☒ | ☐ | ☐ |
RIO Convention markers | Not targeted | Significant objective | Main objective
--- | --- | --- | --- |
Biological diversity | ☒ | ☐ | ☐ |
Combat desertification | ☒ | ☐ | ☐ |
Climate change mitigation | ☒ | ☐ | ☐ |
Climate change adaptation | ☒ | ☐ | ☐ |
9. Global Public Goods and Challenges (GPGC) thematic flagships | N/A |
10. SDGs | SDG 16 |
SUMMARY:
The presence of explosive hazards in areas liberated from Da'esh in Iraq occupation in Iraq remains a main protection concern and will continue to impede security, humanitarian and stabilisation and early recovery efforts if not appropriately addressed. The UNMAS programme in Iraq, or “UNMAS Iraq”\(^5\), is implementing a multi-year comprehensive response to address the problem of explosive hazards (EH), including improvised explosive devices (IEDs). UNMAS Iraq is working closely with the UN system and the Government of Iraq as an enabler of stabilisation, mindful that explosive hazard survey and clearance are necessary precursors to allow stabilisation and early recovery initiatives to safely begin. UNMAS Iraq is a key facilitator of humanitarian assistance, particularly in Mosul and surrounding areas. This response includes survey assessments, explosive hazard management operations, coordination, as well as engagement with, and capacity enhancement of, relevant authorities.

Given the volatile environment, the project scope and relevance will remain the same but the response or solution may require adjustment based on the actual operational experience.

This programme reflects one of the themes of the EU Consensus for Development: peace. It is also relevant for the Agenda 2030. It contributes primarily to the progressive achievement of Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) 16: "Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and

\(^4\) Gender equality and issues related to Gender in Mine Action Programming will be taken into consideration in all phases of the project and adherence to these initiatives will be requested from all implementing partners

\(^5\) UNMAS Iraq is a programme implemented by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) in accordance with the Financial Regulations and Rules of UNOPS, but under the overall oversight and strategic direction of the United Nations Mine Action Service, a UN Secretariat entity.
inclusive institutions at all levels”.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BAC</td>
<td>Battle Area Clearance</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>Civil Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMSEC</td>
<td>Council of Ministries Secretariat</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTS</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>Danish Demining Group</td>
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<td>DMA</td>
<td>Directorate for Mine Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>EH</td>
<td>Explosive Hazard</td>
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<tr>
<td>EHM</td>
<td>Explosive Hazard Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEDPOL</td>
<td>Federal Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>FFS</td>
<td>Funding Facility for Stabilisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>Handicap International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEDD</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device Disposal</td>
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<tr>
<td>IHSCO</td>
<td>Health and Social Care Organization in Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>IKMAA</td>
<td>Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMAS</td>
<td>International Mine Action Standards</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>IP</td>
<td>Iraqi Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISF</td>
<td>Iraqi Security Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCMC</td>
<td>Joint Coordination and Monitoring Centre</td>
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<td>KRG</td>
<td>Kurdish Regional Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>KR-I</td>
<td>Kurdistan Region of Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>KSF</td>
<td>Kurdish Security Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Mines Advisory Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<td>MoHE</td>
<td>Ministry of Health and Environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOP</td>
<td>Ministry of Peshmerga</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSB</td>
<td>Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOC</td>
<td>National Operations Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Norwegian People's Aid</td>
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<td>NTS</td>
<td>Non-Technical Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPPBA</td>
<td>Office of Programme, Planning, Budget and Accounts</td>
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<td>PCWG</td>
<td>Protection Cluster Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>QA/QC</td>
<td>Quality Assurance/ Quality Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>RMAC</td>
<td>Regional Mine Action Centres</td>
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<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN VTF</td>
<td>UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMI</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>UN Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council resolution</td>
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</table>
1. **CONTEXT**

1.1 **Country/Regional context/Thematic area**

Extensive conflict involving Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Kurdish forces and Da'esh has had profound consequences on human security in Iraq. Although the military intervention has now come to an end, the extent of the crisis is still impacting upon the nation challenging the response capacity of the Government of Iraq, the United Nations (UN), and international community.

Although strategic towns have been liberated from Da'esh occupation and the ISF have been carrying out military clearance, many explosive hazards continue to be reported in these areas, particularly IEDs, which have been used extensively by Da'esh prior to their departure and often hidden within residential buildings and along main access routes into urban areas, including Mosul and other strategic locations such as Hawija (Kirkuk), Tal-Afar (Ninewa), Fallujah and Ramadi (Anbar), Baiji (Salah al Din). The insecurity of sites where IDP (Internally Displaced Persons) camps are located and the presence of IEDs in areas of return is a major protection concern; civilians are returning voluntarily to find their homes and public facilities significantly affected. It may be the case that temporary housing is established on the outskirts of town limits, until houses can be cleared of explosives and rehabilitated, thereby allowing families to safely return home. Mine action organisations continue to report that civilians are practicing ‘self-help’ measures to mitigate explosive hazards in and around their homes. The scale of the problem and the clearance operations required in urban locations is immense and complex. For example, it took seven months to clear IEDs from a university in Ramadi. The presence of explosive hazards continues to present a fundamental impediment to humanitarian, stabilisation and early recovery interventions, as well as hampers social development and attempts at economic recovery.

The complexity and magnitude of IEDs fabricated and used in Iraq is unprecedented, with the Coalition and Iraq security services (military and police) suffering heavy losses as a result of the employment of such devices as part of various asymmetrical campaigns over the last three and a half years. However, the ongoing situation in Iraq has also seen Da'esh employ vast numbers of IEDs emplaced like that of a conventional military minefield. It is therefore essential that any entity engaged in IED Disposal (IEDD) operations (or in associated high-risk search tasks) is both adequately trained and appropriately equipped to undertake these inherently high-risk activities. In addition to IEDs, Da'esh also had large-scale production facilities for mortar ammunition and other types of ammunition. Such facilities now must be cleared, with the associated explosives and ammunition recovered destroyed.

On 9 December 2017, the Iraqi armed forces announced in a statement that Iraq has been totally liberated from Da'esh. Nevertheless, it is anticipated that the group will remain capable of carrying out insurgent attacks for the foreseeable future.

The declaration of full liberation combined with upcoming elections has significantly influenced the Government’s ability, and willingness, to facilitate the safe and voluntary return of people to their homes. On 17 November, the Government Displacement and Migration Parliamentary Committee released a press statement indicating that the Government of Iraq is committed to return all displaced families and IDPs to their districts, before holding the upcoming elections on 12 May 2018,
with the exception of those not legally allowed to return (representing approximately 3% of displaced families). While the Government of Iraq strives to facilitate the safe, dignified and voluntary return of displaced people to their home districts; a number of challenges could potentially derail the election process, including security concerns in the areas of returns of IDPs.

Although Da'esh has been militarily defeated, the continued presence of pockets of fighters has an impact on security and access. While the scale of the contamination problem will become clearer over time; it is recognised that comprehensive civilian explosive hazard management responses are required as essential first steps to address the problem.

The civilian population will continue to face the consequences of explosive hazards, in terms of casualties and impact on physical, psycho-social and livelihood, for decades to come. Explosive hazards impact civilians when they live in an area under conflict, while fleeing their homes to safer areas, and when returning home. Safe returns of displaced Iraqis cannot take place without explosive hazard management to mitigate the threats posed by explosive hazards on lives and limbs of civilians and to promote safe behaviour.

1.1.1 Public Policy Assessment and EU Policy Framework

In terms of public policy in Iraq, it must be noted that the relationship with the ISF is critical to the removal and disposal of explosive hazards. In areas under administration of the national mine action authority, the Directorate for Mine Action (DMA), the Ministry of Defence (MoD) ISF is the only entity legally permitted to use 'energetics' or explosives. Therefore, all other entities must rely on the support from ISF for the disposal of explosive hazards, once located and rendered safe. In other areas, mine action operators can use 'energetics' but may need the support of the Peshmerga or the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA) depending on the location. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Iraq has been working closely with the ISF to ensure that items that are found are safely removed and rendered safe within these regulations.

The renewed United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/2367 (14 July 2017) for United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) references the threat of hazardous explosive devices and welcomes efforts by Member States to support the Government of Iraq and its partners in addressing the need to provide risk education, appropriate threat assessments, and conduct clearance of areas of such devices. It also encourages Member States to continue such support. The overall aim of the UN Mission, as mandated by the Security Council, is “to build a secure, stable, federal, united and democratic nation, based on the rule of law and respect for human rights.”

Security Council Resolution S/RES/2365 on mine action and explosive hazard threat mitigation provides a solid basis for the work of UNMAS Iraq and its partners in Iraq, stressing the importance of undertaking appropriate measures to mitigate the danger effectively and noting that partnership and cooperation are central to the success of mine action, particularly between national authorities, UN, regional organisations, civil society and private sector, as well as humanitarian, civilian and law enforcement personnel.

The UNMAS Iraq strategy is aligned with the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and the UN Integrated Strategic Framework. In addition,
UNMAS has provided input to the Government Reconstruction Framework, Poverty Reduction Strategy and participates in the Security Sector Reform partner consultations. UNMAS has also coordinated within the UN system to ensure mine action requirements are considered and included across the Recovery and Resilience Programme, a joint UN- Government of Iraq initiative to bridge the period until the new UNDAF in 2020.

The EU, in support of Germany's co-chairing of the Stabilisation Working Group, has been leading\(^6\), for two years, the coordination efforts on international support to civilian explosive hazard management in liberated areas in Iraq. While international attention to this critical issue is growing, especially in the context of the reconstruction of Mosul, funding shortfalls remain a concern.

Furthermore, the EU chairs the Explosive Hazard Management Sub-Working Group in support of humanitarian and stabilisation that brings together the donor community and UNMAS Iraq to discuss strategic concerns and resource mobilisation. This forum provides an opportunity for donors to highlight priorities and for UNMAS Iraq to raise areas of strategic concern. The EU has also offered support to advocate on UNMAS Iraq’s behalf to the Government, should the need arise.

In the Council conclusions on Iraq, adopted by the Council at its 3591\(^{\text{st}}\) meeting held on 22 January 2018, the EU recognised the efforts of UNMAS Iraq to advocate to the Iraqi government to “remove any remaining bureaucratic and practical obstacles to the full deployment of the national and international resources available for EHM in Iraq. It also calls on its international partners to step up their financial support to EHM efforts as an essential precursor to further stabilisation and reconstruction work.”

The EU supports cross-pollination between EU-funded partners and connects UNMAS with other partners involved in the Mine Action sector. There are possibilities for UNMAS to support this initiative once the lead agency is identified and will continue to follow up for possible areas of collaboration.

In complementarity with other EU support, the UNMAS programme addresses the needs and challenges identified in the “EU strategy for Iraq”. Close collaboration among EU services has ensured coordination between UNMAS and other EU partners such as the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and Handicap International (HI)\(^7\) both funded through the Madad Fund and EU humanitarian assistance.

The EU’s biggest contribution is in designing a new model to mitigate the complex and multi-layered threat that still risks jeopardising Iraqi and international stabilisation, early recovery and reconstruction efforts. In essence, this new approach - referred to as the "blended solution" - concentrates on coordination and synchronisation of cost-effective efforts by military actors, national authorities, commercial entities and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), across a spectrum of activities, from "harder" clearance operations at one end to "softer" risk education at the other. Focus on outcome instead of delivery of output is contributing coherently to the desired effect to ensure IDPs not only return home safely, but remain in place. Iraqi national authorities are now much more able to set priorities, and international donors have

\(^6\) EU DEL chairing the Donor Coordination Group for Explosive Hazard Management (EHM).

\(^7\) It should be noted that, as of February 2018, MAG, HALO Trust and HI are not yet registered with the Central Government of Iraq and are therefore not able to operate in all areas of Iraq (such as Mosul city).
been able to focus funding away from piecemeal projects, and instead into more orchestrated EH programmes.

The EU also has a comprehensive approach to the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security framework – United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) 1325, 1820 and subsequent resolutions. These resolutions outline that a gender perspective, encompassing both women and men, should inform EU external actions in order to achieve a comprehensive response to the threats faced by the civilian population in times of conflict and in its aftermath.

1.1.2 Stakeholder analysis

While Iraq continues to possess a pre-existing capacity base dealing with explosive threats, these capacities are limited among civilian entities, with the majority of available and qualified assets prioritised on the front line. A large number of national explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operators have been killed in action and this existing capacity becomes increasingly scarce in liberated areas, and in all law enforcement units. The relevant institutions and organisations are mapped below.

National Authorities

The national authority for mine action, the DMA is under the Ministry of Health and Environment (MoHE). DMA regulates civilian mine action in Iraq. DMA maintains sectoral oversight of mine action nationwide, and oversees Regional Mine Action Centres (RMAC) in North, South and Middle Euphrates. UNMAS Iraq coordinates and cooperates closely with all relevant national authorities and mine action implementing partners.

The Kurdistan region has a regional counterpart institution, the IKMAA based in Erbil and under the Office of the Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. IKMAA is responsible for all traditional Mine Action (MA) activities in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I). The organisation maintains a consistent level of staff, who are experienced in traditional MA activities and have access to training facilities located in both Soran (north of Erbil) and Sulimaniyah (east of Erbil).

Iraqi EOD Assets

Over time and with international assistance, the Government of Iraq has assumed a wide range of EOD and IEDD assets designed to assist in the mitigation of the threat posed by explosive threats to varying levels of proficiency. Historically, a significant amount of training and equipment has been provided to the Government of Iraq in terms of developing a sustainable capacity, however today there is little evidence that such assets are being used to support the current stabilisation efforts within the newly liberated areas, or those who have been trained have been killed or injured in action.

Government of Iraq Managed Assets:

1. The National Operations Centre (NOC) provides the national focal point for all current operational tasking conducted by the ISF, Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) and the Federal Police (FEDPOL) together with the other actors involved in the ongoing offensive operations and stabilisation efforts. This NOC also acts as the conduit for the passage of information relating to the clearance of affected areas. It should be clarified that a cohesive coordination mechanism does not yet exist within Iraq. The NOC reports to the Office of the Prime Minister.
2. The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Centre (JCMC) focuses on humanitarian crisis management and response to concerns such as the IDP situation in Iraq, identification and construction of IDP camps, implementation challenges of the UN in humanitarian response, returns, coordination, and essentially supporting all humanitarian crisis management and response issues generally. The mandate of the JCMC is to coordinate responses to humanitarian crisis, either man-made or natural. The JCMC is a separate office that reports to the Council of Ministries Secretariat (COMSEC). At the national level, there is a JCMC staff member embedded in each ministry. At the Governorate level, there is a JCMC staff member, usually technical, who focuses on coordination under the Governor’s office, specifically with the Governorate-level ministry offices. The NOC and JCMC are headed by the same individual to increase information sharing between the two entities and ensure consistent messaging to the Prime Minister’s office. However, the NOC and JCMC have very different mandates; the first security focused and the latter humanitarian focused.

3. The MoD has combat engineers as their primary EOD asset and who have received training in basic demolition, EOD and fundamental IEDD procedures. For Mine Action entities to function in Iraq they must establish and maintain a relationship with the MoD EOD teams in order to coordination demolitions of recovered explosive hazards.

4. The CTS are a highly specialised force, who have received basic IED awareness training, but do not have an IEDD capability within their organisation.

5. The civil defense force (CDF) has the primary function of providing a fire fighting response under the control of the local Governor. However, they do have EOD teams responsible for the identification and rendering safe of conventional munitions only. The unit is prevented from active involvement in IEDD activities by national (Government of Iraq) caveats. During a trip to Hawija, Kirkuk in January 2018 UNMAS was shown a stockpile of 12,000 items that had been recovered by ISF and CDF.

6. The Iraqi Police (IP) is a locally recruited law enforcement entity, which retains a limited conventional EOD capability. However, the unit remains unsupported in terms of developing an IEDD capability at this time. UNMAS has been supporting the IP with ‘First Responder’ training which focuses on training local police to safely identify, mark and report explosive hazards and liaise with MoD EOD teams for destruction.

**Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I) Managed Assets:**

1. Ministry of Peshmerga (MoP) is referred to as the Kurdish Security Forces (KSF) and consist of both regular and militia units. Within this structure it is the KSF combat engineers who conduct EOD/IEDD related activities. Although the unit remains limited in its technical capability, it is receiving extensive training in IED awareness, high risk search and IEDD by coalition instructors.

2. Ministry of Interior KR-I have ownership of all local law enforcement entities as well as the Kurdish CDF, but with the local Governor retaining control over the latter.
Again, the CDF in the KR-I are responsible for fire-fighting with an additional role for conventional EOD activities. The level of training, capabilities and scaling of specialist equipment within this unit remains unknown at this time.

3. In addition to the Government of Iraq’s JCMC there is the Kurdistan Regional Government’s Joint Crisis Coordination (JCC) Center. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has a Partnership Programme is to support the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in building up a strong and efficient crisis management network with both centres as the coordinating bodies. Responsible for coordinating one of the region’s largest and most complex humanitarian operations, the two crises centres will cooperate to reach to millions of displaced people ensure that humanitarian assistance reaches more than three million people who have been forced to flee their homes this past year because of violence and conflict through prioritisation, planning and targeting, as well as resource mobilisation.

**Other actors:**

Commercial EOD organisations exist within Iraq, but are largely focused on the traditional MA activities in support of the oil and gas industry and other commercial clearance contracts. A recent briefing indicated that there are 6 companies who are in possession of both the required registration and IED accreditation documents to legally operate within Iraq to clear IEDs. Due to the situation in Al Anbar Governorate, a number of such organisations are now benefiting from international partnerships and evolving their IEDD capacity. As of February 2018, there are 6 commercial companies with IED accreditation are: the national Danube, Al-Fahad, Al-Khaleej Al-Arabi (Arab Gulf Company), ABC company (national), Ain Al-Sakar (Eagle Eye Company) (national) and the international Optima Group.

**Humanitarian sphere**

Humanitarian Mine Action NGOs, both international and national, have made a significant contribution to the clearance of conventional threats within Iraq. Many of the organisations have remained within Iraq for many years and are well established with relevant national authorities. NGO registration is issued by the Directorate of NGOs (DNGO) and once a NGO has received their registration, they can then approach the DMA to obtain relevant accreditation. Each individual activity requires separate accreditation. For example, an NGO can be accredited to carry out risk education but not clearance. Even within the category of clearance, an NGO needs to be separately accredited for each type of clearance, for example an NGO can be accredited to clear landmines but not IEDs or to carry out manual clearance of mines but not to use mechanical means of clearance. Although many do not have an integral IEDD capacity, several organisations are actively recruiting IEDD specialists to further develop their capacity regarding the changing threat identified within Iraq. As of February 2018, there are no NGOs that possess IED clearance accreditation from the DMA. The EU will work with the UN with a view to facilitate the inclusion of any accredited INGO's in the programme.

The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in Iraq is responsible for the overall coordination of the protection response among humanitarian actors through a dedicated protection “cluster” or working group. UNMAS is the designated coordinator for mine action within the Protection Cluster Working Group (PCWG); it
is actively engaged with these agencies and partners, and functions as the coordinator for the Mine Action Sub-Cluster in Iraq. In this regard, UNMAS Iraq provides leadership coordination for UN agencies, funds and programmes, as well as mine action partners to exchange information, increase efficiencies, and promote overall coherence in prioritisation, resource mobilisation, and operations.

As the Mine Action Sub-Cluster lead, under the Protection Cluster, UNMAS Iraq works closely with identified partners to coordinate activities in Humanitarian Mine Action, specifically focused on the humanitarian emergency. UNMAS Iraq’s coordination as the chair of the Mine Action Sub-Cluster in Iraq, established under the Protection Cluster, promotes close cooperation, exchange of information and expertise with a wide range of humanitarian partners of the UN system, national and international NGOs and mine action authorities. The 12 NGO members of the Mine Action Sub-Cluster are: Fondation Suisse de Déminage (FSD), Handicap International (HI), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Danish Church Aid (DCA), Mine Impact Relief (MIR), Danish Demining Group (DDG), Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), Danish Church Aid (DCA), HALO Trust, Spirit of Soccer, Iraq Health and Social Care Organization (IHSCO), Baghdad Organization, Information Management and Mine Action Programmes (iMMAP), Orchard Association for Children Protection and Education (OACPE), and Maysan Organisation.

From October 2016, UNMAS Iraq was asked to provide technical advice and explosive threat mitigation support on all UN inter-agency assessment missions, including United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), International Organization for Migration (IOM), UNDP, UNHCR and Cluster partners, to enable the identification of suitable sites for IDP camps and for aid distribution points to support civilians fleeing Mosul. In 2017, several partners have been implementing survey and clearance operations, risk education and victim assistance in Ninewa Governorate until a political shift in October 2017 resulted in suspension of all activities in what was formally called the ‘grey area’. As of February 2018, MAG, DDG, NPA and FSD are the only international NGOs with registration to work in federal Iraq.

**International Community**

UNMAS Iraq is funded bilaterally through contributions to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) for Mine Action Assistance. Current donors include: Czech Republic, Denmark, EU, Finland, Germany, Japan, Portugal, Republic of Korea, the UK, and Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency / Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (MSB/SIDA). UNMAS anticipates pledged funds from Japan and Australia. Furthermore, negotiations are underway with Canada and UK/DFID Global Mine Action Programme as well as in-kind contributions from New Zealand).

**Civil Society**

Civil society organisations and local NGOs, including women’s organisations, associations, and groups, particularly those involved in front line response are a valuable source of information. UNMAS Iraq provides IED awareness training to local NGOs providing humanitarian interventions as requested. Good coordination

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8 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency.
will be particularly important with NGOs also working on Non-Technical Survey (NTS) and Mine Risk Education, in order to avoid duplication.

1.1.3 Priority areas for support/problem analysis

This programme is relevant for the Agenda 2030. It contributes primarily to the progressive achievement of SDG Goal 16 (Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels), but also promotes progress towards Goal 5 (Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls). This does not imply a commitment by the country benefiting from this programme.

The presence of explosive contamination in liberated areas will continue to impede security and stability and humanitarian efforts if not appropriately addressed. The anticipated impact of the response is to provide an enabling environment for humanitarian, stabilisation and recovery operations to release areas for longer term recovery to take place. UNMAS is best placed and mandated to build national and regional capacities to coordinate and manage an appropriate response to support stabilisation and humanitarian assistance. Focussing at the strategic level UNMAS Iraq will work directly with respective authorities to develop effective and sustainable systems and processes, such as the development of national standards and operational guidelines to support future work and the roll out of a future survey and clearance needs, as required, within Iraq and in the region.

2. Risks and Assumptions

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<tr>
<th>Risks</th>
<th>Risk level (H/M/L)</th>
<th>Mitigating measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security restrictions preventing from supporting regional counterparts or deploy assessment teams in liberated areas</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>The security situation will be closely monitored and activities and their locations will be adapted if necessary. If certain priority locations are inaccessible, alternate priority locations which are permissible will be located.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct attacks against authorities and capacities supported through this project</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>The security situation will be closely monitored along with the national and regional authorities to try to avoid deploying regional capacities in high risk areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct attacks against implementing partners</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>The security situation will be closely monitored to ensure maximum security to all personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project is not fully supported by DMA/IKMAA</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Full engagement with DMA and IKMAA will be ensured, along with UN senior leadership and the international community; it will be envisaged to embed personnel within the national authorities to provide technical assistance and ensure buy-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official agreement is not gained from the MoD for appropriate entities to conduct clearance operations and destroy items found</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Solutions as to how to engage the MoD to be able to coordinate with the ISF for demolition support. One such option is to embed engineers into civilian operational teams. This has been agreed in principle with the relevant authorities and has been field tested on a small number of tasks. The relationship is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official approval is not gained from the NOC for civilian entities to enter liberated areas to conduct the proposed action</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Successful deployment of clearance capacities and operational implementation has required negotiations at the highest political level with the Government of Iraq;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual costs vary outside of tolerance levels from budget</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>UNMAS Iraq built its budget as per current market prices. Any major variance from budget would be shared with the donor with suggested adaptations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient budget to implement the address the IED threat</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Relevant partners and stakeholders are regularly consulted and complementary budgetary support will be sought.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of gender awareness and sensitivity increase existing gender inequalities and women’s exclusion</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Ensure gender analysis prior to the implementation of the intervention to identify the relevant gender issues and address the appropriately</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delays in project implementation in some of the targeted Governorates as a result of the elections in 2018</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>The post-election phase and the political stability of Iraq will be closely monitored through the EU and development partners’ political dialogue with Government of Iraq, this will be assessed at the inception phase. The timetable of the activities will be revised, with activities eventually starting first in those Governorates that are settling easily after elections. A flexible design will be adopted in case of critical situation in some Governorates.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Assumptions**

- Minimum required funding is met in timely manner to support operational needs, including core programme staff and administrative costs
- Available international and local operational capacities to implement in liberated areas
- NGOs and commercial organisations are appropriately accredited from national/regional authorities to conduct project activities
- Cooperation of the Government of Iraq, KRG and other national/regional authorities
- A security and political environment that appropriate entities are able to operate in to support the project implementation
- Official approval from the NOC for organisation to gain access to liberated areas and conduct EH interventions
- Appropriate visas obtained and the arrival/clearance of specialised equipment in Iraq in timely manner
- MoD agreement for appropriate entities to conduct clearance operations and destroy items (including IEDs) found
- Stakeholders are aware of the importance of the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security framework as well as the EU comprehensive approach on Women, Peace and Security and are taking gender issues into account in the implementation of the intervention
3. LESSONS LEARNED, COMPLEMENTARITY AND CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

3.1 Lessons learned

Based on lessons learned from past experience, the EU engagement in the sector and consultative processes with NGOs and the international community, focus is needed at both operational and strategic level. There are key areas that are impeding EH response activities in Iraq for which advocacy at both UN and development partners advocacy is required. In specific:

1. *The need to increase the number of operators in federal Iraq:* Qualified implementing partners are unable to operate in Government of Iraq controlled areas (mainly due to access to liberated areas’ or lengthy national registration and accreditation processes.

2. *The need to increase the availability of explosives or ‘energetics’ for civilian entities:* The risk to safety of civilian operators/organisations is increased by the inability to utilise ‘energetics’ (as referred to in Iraqi legislation but herein after referred to as explosives) to remotely disable explosive hazards. Changes to the regulations rest with the Iraqi Ministry of Defence.

3. *The need to import equipment needed for high risk operators:* The clearance in liberated areas is hindered by increasingly sophisticated IEDs inhibiting safe clearance, especially in urban areas, and a lack of mechanical assets. Assesments of western Mosul neighbourhoods indicate significant explosive contamination. UNMAS will seek to incorporate large plant mechanical assets in 2018 however at the same time will continue to work together with the Government of Iraq to identify options to import high tech equipment.

4. *The need to increase access to sites for ‘humanitarian’ clearance:* A minimum of five authorisation letters (with a validity limited to only 15 days) are required for operational teams to conduct activities in Mosul. Through joint meetings with counterparts such as the Federal Police in Mosul to discuss operations in Mosul Old City, UNMAS was able to improve access in many cases.

5. *Information management:* Enhance the collection, entry, analysis and availability of EH information: Information management also continues to be a challenge, given the number of actors and the fluidity of the situation, different from a traditional mine action context. Ensuring that all actors are using the same reporting formats and terminology has been difficult.

6. *Concerns around clearance of residential areas:* 21% of IDPs who are not planning to return back to their area of origin cite the presence of explosive hazards and IEDs as their primary concern to be addressed. The MoD and the Ministry of Interior (MoI) are the only entities clearing private houses but have limited capacity to respond to the increasing number of requests for house clearance by people returning home resulting in “self-clearance”. Currently only 2% of the owners of properties damaged or destroyed as a result of the conflict with Da'esh have received

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compensation from Government of Iraq\(^\text{10}\). There is a notable absence of a reliable civilian explosive hazard reporting mechanism to the ISF and DMA in addition to the concern that civilians may be uncomfortable to contact security forces for clearance.

7. **Storage (stockpiling) of recovered/rendered safe EHs:** Civilian operators do not have the ability to carry out demolitions of items that are found and/or rendered-safe. Therefore, these items are consolidated in central locations for subsequent disposal by the ISF. The limited capacity of the ISF, to keep up and destroy the stockpiles in a timely fashion, poses a danger to civilian operators and people returning to their homes, particularly curious children.

3.2 **Complementarity, synergy, and donor coordination**

This action would complement other donor contributions that are currently supporting the UNMAS programme in Iraq. Given the significant resources required to sustain and expand operations in 2018 and onward, at the strategic level UNMAS will lead and coordinate the EH response effort and communication to the donor community; and at the operational level it will coordinate with national authorities to ensure that support and resources adequately cover the gaps and provide a response where they are most urgently needed.

Furthermore, the EU chairs the Coalition's Explosive Hazard Management Sub-Group in support of Stabilisation that brings together the donor community and UNMAS Iraq to discuss strategic concerns and resource mobilisation. In addition to this forum, UNMAS holds donor briefs in Erbil approximately every two months. Under the UNDP-led Funding Facility for Stabilisation (FFS), UNMAS Iraq coordinates the tasking of assets, in coordination with DMA where needed, to respond to requests to clear critical infrastructure therefore ensuring coordination of the right assets in the right place at the right time. While on standby for stabilisation tasks, organisations may receive tasks directly from the Governorate level (Governor, Mayor, or Ministry) after which completion, a report is provided to DMA. In areas administered by KR-I, prioritisation and tasking is carried out by IKMAA.

UNMAS Iraq works through multiple entry points to implement and support explosive threat mitigation activities. Under UN senior leadership, UNMAS Iraq liaises closely with authorities at central, governorate and district levels, and continues to support a coordinated civilian survey and clearance response to address explosive hazards with mine action authorities, MoI, MoD, NGOs, and commercial partners to enable assistance in areas liberated Da'esh and to support the safe, voluntary and dignified return of displaced people.

MAG and HI, both funded through the Madad Fund, are both members of the Mine Action Sub Cluster. UNMAS is already seeking opportunities with the Madad project and will look at geographic complementarity.

3.3 **Cross-cutting issues**

Close and sustained engagement with national and regional authorities to ensure that gender and diversity are taken into account and will work to ensure that women, men, boys and girls from diverse groups benefit equally from all mine action activities.

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\(^{10}\) UN Habitat, July 2017.
implemented in Iraq will be ensured. Gender and diversity influence the way in which a person is affected by explosive contamination – including their risk of becoming a victim, the ability to access medical and support services, and their long-term recovery and reintegration. In addition to this, because of the distinct patterns, roles and responsibilities, action activities need to be sensitive to gender and diversity in order to be effective and efficient. In this project, a gender lens will be applied both internally and externally. Gender and diversity will be considered internally during recruitment processes, as a systematic discussion point in strategic planning. In addition, senior management will encourage staff to include a gender and diversity-focused objective within their personal workplace action plans and will explore options for gender sensitivity and gender mainstreaming training.

Any contracts and grant processes will be mainstreamed to include gender and diversity – bidding organisations will have to demonstrate how their projects take gender and diversity into account during all phases of the planning cycle including the collection and analysis of sex and age disaggregated data, as relevant, through the application of the recommendations outlined in the Gender and Mine Action Programme’s Grants and Contracting Toolkit.

4. DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION

4.1 Objectives/results

**Overall objective (Impact):** To improve the safety of the population that remained in or is returning to areas liberated from Da'esh, so that:

- Humanitarian, stabilisation, and development initiatives are enabled; and
- IDPs confidently and safely return to liberated areas.

**Specific Objective (Outcome):** The impact of explosive hazards in liberated areas has been reduced through EH response and enhanced strategic coordination.

**Output 1:** The response to explosive hazards is coordinated and delivered in liberated areas.

**Output 2:** Capacity within the relevant coordination centres/mine action authorities for increased strategic coordination is enhanced.

4.2 Main activities

**Output 1:** The response to explosive hazards is coordinated and delivered in liberated areas.

a) Assessments and Survey: These assessments and surveys are undertaken in areas suspected of contamination with EH in order to gain a better picture of the nature and scale contamination. In some cases, operational staff are deployed to very specific areas identified by UN agencies or government authorities that have been prioritised for rehabilitation (eg. a school, water plant, electrical station), and in other cases, operational staff deploy to a general area to get a better sense of the contamination. Assessments and survey will be conducted in liberated areas with specialised survey capacities to support stabilisation and humanitarian efforts. As a result, agreed upon priority locations will be surveyed for follow up clearance activities, if appropriate

11 The “Results Chain” corresponds to the Logframe.
and required. UNMAS Iraq will also support various UN missions to assess the explosive hazard risk at various priority sites, including those planned for use for IDP camps, field hospitals, and routes for IDPs. The locations of these survey assessments are plotted onto a map, updated weekly, to be shared with relevant partners and to facilitate operational planning.

b) **Explosive hazard management operations**: Depending on the nature and scale of the contamination as determined through survey assessments, an appropriate clearance capacity (such as Battle Area Clearance - BAC, high-risk search, mechanical assets, rapid response capacity and IEDD) may be deployed in liberated areas. This capacity also includes Community Liaison component. Community Liaison member will collect information of suspected hazards and inform them to their team for further clearance operations. Community Liaison also provides risk awareness messages to community centres. UNMAS Iraq supports a ‘blended approach’, which includes contracts with EOD/IEDD third-party contractors, high-risk search capacity (i.e. through third-party contractor), and grants with NGOs. Explosive items that are located and are considered “safe to move” or are rendered safe are moved to a designated controlled detonation site. When explosives are required, the UNMAS Iraq teams identify the location of the item, mark it to ensure that civilians are aware of the risk and report it to the ISF EOD teams to ensure they can be destroyed safely. Civilian entities are not permitted to utilise explosives in Iraq.

Output 2: Capacity within the relevant coordination centres/mine action authorities for increased strategic coordination is enhanced

a) Coordination with MA authorities for Explosive hazard management operations:

UNMAS will continue actively coordinating a sustainable EH response in Iraq by enhancing national, regional and local capacity, contributing to the development of national mine action standards and technical IED guidelines, establishing coordination structures in collaboration with national and regional authorities, and facilitating cross-ministerial coordination, tasking and prioritisation functions. UNMAS acts as the focal point for the mine action sector, engaging with the Government of Iraq, national mine action authorities (NMAAs), the international and humanitarian community, the coalition as well as mine action organisations.

4.3 **Intervention Logic**

Contamination left behind in areas liberated from Da'esh is enormous, and prevents safe post-conflict reconstruction and returns of civilians. While the contamination is extensive, the UNMAS Iraq interventions initially focus on prioritised locations, in most cases identified by UN actors or local government officials, to search, clear where needed, and declare safe key locations needed for stabilisation, humanitarian response and, by extension, enabling the safe return of IDPs.

These interventions are a critical first step to enabling safe returns, linking the work of UNMAS Iraq to other sector interventions that enable returns in liberated areas in Iraq. The beneficiaries, primarily civilian populations in liberated areas with an explosive hazard threat, will then be able to return, and safely access critical services once they return home.
5. **IMPLEMENTATION**

As a result of the graduation of Iraq as upper-middle income country, the Commission has authorised the application of the exception clause provided for in Article 5(2)(b)(ii) of the (EU) No. 233/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation for the period 2014-2020 (the DCI Regulation) to Iraq.

5.1 **Financing agreement**

In order to implement this action, it is foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with the partner country.

5.2 **Indicative implementation period**

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in section 4.2 will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements implemented, is 24 months from the date of entry into force of the financing agreement.

Extensions of the implementation period may be agreed by the Commission’s authorising officer responsible by amending this decision and the relevant contracts and agreements; such amendments to this decision constitute technical amendments in the sense of point (i) of Article 2(3)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014.

5.3 **Implementation modalities**

Both in indirect and direct management, the Commission will ensure that the EU appropriate rules and procedures for providing financing to third parties are respected, including review procedures, where appropriate, and compliance of the action with EU restrictive measures affecting the respective countries of operation\(^\text{12}\).

5.3.1 **Indirect management with an international organisation**

This action may be implemented both in indirect management with UNMAS. This implementation entails a EH response including core funding (personnel, travel and operating expenses) and indirect costs for project support costs (technical advice, administrative support, and oversight for delivery). This implementation is justified because of the comparative advantage UNMAS enjoys in the specific Iraqi context, coupled with its pivotal role within the Global Coalition framework and its unique capacity in carrying out stabilisation actions in a volatile environment. Furthermore, the project addresses the needs of the “EU strategy for Iraq”, in complementarity with the Madad fund.

The entrusted entity would carry out the following budget-implementation tasks:

- Launching call for tenders and for proposals;
- Definition of eligibility, selection and award criteria;
- Evaluation of tenders and proposals;
- Award of grants, contracts;
- Acting as contracting authority concluding, monitoring and managing contracts;

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• Carrying out payments, and recovering moneys due.

This implementation entails the funding of survey assessments, explosive hazard management, capacity enhancement and coordination among stakeholders in the field. This implementation is justified because of the role and function UNMAS is mandated within the specific Iraqi context.

The entrusted international organisation is currently undergoing ex-ante assessment. In anticipation of the results of this review, the Commission’s authorising officer responsible deems that, based on the compliance with the ex-ante assessment based on Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1605/2002 and long-lasting problem-free cooperation, budget-implementation tasks can be entrusted to UNMAS, as part of the UN Secretariat.

If negotiations with the above-mentioned entrusted entity fail, that part of this action may be implemented in direct management.

Both in indirect and direct management, the Commission will ensure that the EU appropriate rules and procedures for providing financing to third parties are respected, including review procedures, where appropriate, and compliance of the action with EU restrictive measures affecting the respective countries of operation\textsuperscript{13}.

5.4 **Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants**

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act and set out in the relevant contractual documents shall apply, subject to the following provisions.

The Commission’s authorising officer responsible may extend the geographical eligibility in accordance Article 9(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 on the basis of urgency or of unavailability of products and services in the markets of the countries concerned, or in other duly substantiated cases where the eligibility rules would make the realisation of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult.

5.5 **Indicative budget**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU contribution (amount in EUR)</th>
<th>Indicative third party contribution, in USD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Management with UNMAS, including core funding (personnel, travel and operating expenses) and indirect costs for project support costs.</td>
<td>EUR 9 900 000</td>
<td>USD 16 190 512\textsuperscript{14}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit</td>
<td>EUR 100 000</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>EUR 10 000 000</td>
<td>USD 16 190 512</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{14} Australia: AUD 4,100,000; Finland: EUR 500,000; Japan: USD 4,500,000 UK/DFID: GBP 5,700,000; France: EUR 500,000; New Zealand: NZD 450,000.
5.6 Organisational set-up and responsibilities

For the implementation of this action, UNMAS Iraq Senior Programme Manager will provide overall guidance for the implementation of this project. This will be complemented by administrative, logistical, and overall support from UNMAS and UNOPS.

The EU, in support of Germany's co-chairing of the Stabilisation Working Group, has been leading, for two years, the coordination efforts on international support to civilian explosive hazard management in liberated areas in Iraq. Furthermore, the EU chairs the Explosive Hazard Management Sub-Working Group in support of humanitarian and stabilisation that brings together the donor community and UNMAS Iraq to discuss strategic concerns and resource mobilisation. This forum provides an opportunity for donors to highlight priorities and for UNMAS Iraq to raise areas of strategic concern. The EU has also offered support to advocate on UNMAS Iraq’s behalf to the Government, should the need arise.

There is no Steering Committee in this action, as the FFS joint UNDP- Government of Iraq Steering Committee identifies the tasks in the affected Governorates and then provides the prioritised list to UNMAS, who in turn coordinates the implementing partners in collaboration with the Government of Iraq. It should be highlighted that the EU sits at the FFS Steering Committee.

The UNMAS programme in Iraq falls under the overall direction of UNMAS HQ in New York. This action will be delivered with support from an implementing partner, UNOPS, who will engage third-party organisations and necessary personnel in accordance with its regulatory framework to implement this project, on behalf of UNMAS.

5.7 Performance monitoring and reporting

Financial risk management: Donor contributions are formalised through agreements signed by the United Nations Secretariat Controller and recorded in the United Nations Integrated Management Information System. Income and expenditures are subject to United Nations financial reports, certified by the United Nations Office of Programme, Planning, Budget and Accounts (OPPBA) and sent to donors. Starting in 2014, OPPBA publishes annually, instead of biennially, audited financial statements of the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (UN VTF) income and expenditures. This information is also reflected in UNMAS Annual Reports together with programmatic achievements. Interim reports as well as additional reports may be submitted as specified in contribution agreements. UNMAS is a member of the International Aid Transparency Initiative through the United Nations Office for Project Services. The UN VTF is subject to United Nations internal and external audit and oversight mechanisms through the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services and the United Nations Board of External Auditors elected by Member States.

Monitoring: All project components will be monitored internally by implementing partners and externally by UNMAS. UNMAS internal monitoring system tracks progress in terms of expenditures, resource use, implementation of activities and delivery of results and compliance. A quarterly review of progress against the project work plan will be carried out by UNMAS Iraq with UNMAS HQ and UNOPS personnel in New York. Weekly, monthly, and; quarterly reporting will be completed
by the programme to monitor progress toward project objectives using the indicators identified in the Log Frame Matrix (LFM). Age and gender disaggregation is systematically included in reporting and data capture, as relevant. The project will be monitored for gender sensitivity and gender sensitive indicators, such as number of women reached through risk education, will be monitored, as applicable.

The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation of this action will be a continuous process and part of the implementing partner’s responsibilities. To this aim, the implementing partner shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for the action. All reports shall provide an accurate account of implementation of the action, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (outputs and direct outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators, using as reference the log frame matrix (for project modality) or the list of result indicators (for budget support). The report shall be laid out in such a way as to allow monitoring of the means envisaged and employed and of the budget details for the action. As per the contractual agreement, the final report, narrative and financial, will cover the entire period of the action implementation.

Quality Assurance/ Quality Control (QA/QC): UNMAS Iraq will conduct regular site visits (as and when security permits) and conduct quality control/ quality assurance of all activities on a regular basis. The proposed action will be implemented in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and draft national standards and procedures relevant to explosive threat mitigation, where they exist.

Reporting:
The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation of this action will be a continuous process and part of the implementing partner’s responsibilities. To this aim, the implementing partner shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for the action and elaborate baseline studies where needed, regular progress reports (not less than annual) and final surveys and reports. Every report shall provide an accurate account of implementation of the action, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (outputs and direct outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators, using as reference the log frame matrix (for project modality) or the list of result indicators (for budget support). The report shall be laid out in such a way as to allow monitoring of the means envisaged and employed and of the budget details for the action. The final report, narrative and financial, will cover the entire period of the action implementation.

The Commission may undertake additional project monitoring visits both through its own staff and through independent consultants recruited directly by the Commission for independent monitoring reviews (or recruited by the responsible agent contracted by the Commission for implementing such reviews). The third party monitor could, among others, be tasked with visiting all locations where activities of the project will be taking place with the aim to assess in pre-set intervals, the progress of the project against its stated objectives and timeframe. Monitors may also visit the end beneficiaries (targeted populations) and conduct surveys of assessing the impact of the actions. Furthermore, constant monitoring will feed the observations made back to the Contracting Authority in order to timely identify challenges and shortfalls.
5.8 Evaluation

Having regard to the nature of the action, a final evaluation will be carried out for this action or its components via the implementing partner. It will be carried out for accountability and learning purposes at various levels (including for policy revision), considering, in particular, the nature of the action.

The evaluation reports shall be shared with the partner country and other key stakeholders. The implementing partner and the Commission shall analyse the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, in agreement with the partner country, jointly decide on the follow-up actions to be taken and any adjustments necessary, including, if indicated, the reorientation of the project.

5.9 Audit

Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation of this action, the Commission may, on the basis of a risk assessment, contract independent audits or expenditure verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements.

Indicatively, one contract for audit services shall be concluded under a framework contract in the three months following the implementation period.


5.10 Communication and visibility

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU.

This action shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action, to be elaborated at the start of implementation and supported with the budget indicated in section 5.5 above.

In terms of legal obligations on communication and visibility, the measures shall be implemented by the Commission, the partner country, contractors, grant beneficiaries and/or entrusted entities. Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in, respectively, the financing agreement, procurement and grant contracts, and delegation agreements.

The Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Action shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action and the appropriate contractual obligations.
APPENDIX - INDICATIVE LOG FRAME MATRIX (FOR PROJECT MODALITY) \(^{15}\)

The activities, the expected outputs and all the indicators, targets and baselines included in the log frame matrix are indicative and may be updated during the implementation of the action, no amendment being required to the financing decision. When it is not possible to determine the outputs of an action at formulation stage, intermediary outcomes should be presented and the outputs defined during inception of the overall programme and its components. The indicative log frame matrix will evolve during the lifetime of the action: new lines will be added for including the activities as well as new columns for intermediary targets (milestones) for the output and outcome indicators whenever it is relevant for monitoring and reporting purposes. Note also that indicators should be disaggregated by sex whenever relevant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results chain</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Targets (incl. reference year)</th>
<th>Sources and means of verification</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall objective: Impact</td>
<td>Stabilisation and humanitarian interventions are enabled in areas liberated from Da'esh to support the safe, dignified and voluntary return of displaced people. The Governments strategic coordination mechanisms are strengthened to ensure a common approach to further survey and clearance of explosive hazards.</td>
<td>1. # of IDPs (disaggregated by sex) safely returning to affected cities ((^{**}) EU RF L1 # 7; L2 #5)</td>
<td>Baseline to be established at start of project / inception phase</td>
<td>TBD following baseline</td>
<td>- IOM, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNOCHA reports - UN, MoI, FFS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific objective: Outcome(s)</td>
<td>The impact of explosive hazards in liberated areas has been reduced.</td>
<td>1.1 Quantity of land assessed fit for use by communities through assessments and Non-Technical Survey</td>
<td>Baseline to be established at start of project / inception phase</td>
<td>1.1.TBD following baseline.</td>
<td>The security in newly re-taken areas allows the recovery and stabilisation process, the resumption of regular socio-economic activities including civilian travel and livelihoods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.2 # of Non-Technical Survey reports verified and submitted to the Government of Iraq database.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.1 Daily, Weekly and monthly update from implementing partners, information from health centres, hospitals and/or local/national authorities.</td>
<td>Security and physical access for operations to deploy in liberated areas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{15}\) Mark indicators aligned with the relevant programming document mark with '\(^{*}\)' and indicators aligned to the EU Results Framework with '\(^{**}\)'.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outputs</th>
<th>O1. A response to explosive hazards is delivered in liberated areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.1. # of m² surveyed by UNMAS with the support of this action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.2. # of assessments to support UN missions undertaken with the support of this action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.3. # of explosive devices and hazards (and components) found rendered safe with the support of this action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.4. # of joint QA/QC visits carried out by UNMAS and the Directorate for Mine Action (DMA)/IKMAA with the support of this action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.1 Zero sqm cleared under the EU action (2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.2. Zero assessments to support UN missions initiated by the EU action (2017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.3. Zero explosive hazards (and components) found by the EU action (2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.4. Zero joint visits carried out in conjunction with demining authorities (2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.1. Targets to be identified during the inception phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.2. Targets to be identified during the inception phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.3. Targets to be identified during the inception phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.4. Targets to be identified during the inception phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-1.1.1. Daily, Weekly and monthly update from implementing partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.2. Assessment reports prepared by UNMAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.3. Daily, Weekly and monthly update from implementing partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.4. Joint visit reports prepared by UNMAS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| O2 Capacity within the relevant coordination centres/mine action authorities for increased strategic coordination is enhanced | 2.1 # of coordination meetings with the government |
|                                                                 | 2.1 Zero coordination mechanisms with the government organised under the EU action (2018) |
|                                                                 | 2.1 Target to be identified during the inception phase |
|                                                                 | 2.1 Internal reports and minutes of the meetings |
| | Security and physical access for operations to deploy in newly liberated areas |

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