This action is funded by the European Union

ANNEX

of the Commission Implementing Decision on the AAP 2016 in favour of Iraq to be financed from the general budget of the European Union

Action Document for Breaking the Cycle of Sectarian Violence

| INFORMATION FOR POTENTIAL GRANT APPLICANTS |
| WORK PROGRAM FOR GRANTS |

This document constitutes the work program for grants in the sense of Article 128(1) of the Financial Regulation (Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012); in the following sections concerning grants awarded directly without a call for proposals: Section 5.3.1

| 1. Title/basic act/CRIS number | Breaking the Cycle of Sectarian Violence, financed under the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) - CRIS number: MIDEAST/2016/39345 |
| 2. Zone benefiting from the action/location | Iraq |
| 4. Sector of concentration/thematic area | Rule of Law |
|  | Human Rights |
| 5. Amounts concerned | Total estimated cost: EUR 10 000 000 |
|  | Total amount of EU budget contribution EUR 10 000 000 |
| 6. Aid modality(ies) and implementation modality(ies) | Project Modality |
|  | Direct management – Grant – direct award |
| 7 a) DAC code(s) | 15150, 15153, 15160, 15220, 16061, 22010, 22030 |
| b) Main Delivery Channel | 20000 - NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (NGOs) AND CIVIL SOCIETY |
| 8. Markers (from General policy objective) | Not | Significant | Main |

1 Official Development Aid is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRIS DAC form)</th>
<th>targeted</th>
<th>objective</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation development/good governance</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<td>Aid to environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender equality (including Women In Development)</td>
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<td>Trade Development</td>
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<td>Reproductive, Maternal, New born and child health</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RIO Convention markers</th>
<th>Not targeted</th>
<th>Significant objective</th>
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<td>Biological diversity</td>
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<td>Climate change adaptation</td>
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9. Global Public Goods and Challenges (GPGC) thematic flagships

N/A

**SUMMARY**

Iraq’s communities treat each other with suspicion. Thirty years of instability, sanctions and conflicts have affected the mindset of the population and is close to being embedded in the *modus operandi* of the country per se. Sunni communities feel disenfranchised and marginalised. Kurds are perceived to be using the chaos to gain politically and economically, and the Shia becoming more resentful of both Kurds and Sunnis. Other persons belonging to minorities, at the core of the Iraqi social and historical fabric, are gradually marginalised. The suspicions and the harshly mentality are being exploited for narrow political gains in the fragile democracy of Iraq.

From a much wider perspective, for a long time, international relations tended to ignore the subject of “religion” – possibly deemed too politically sensitive and/or detrimental. However, the relationship between religion, peace, conflict and diplomacy has emerged in the last twenty years. Many conflicts are branded as “religious” and often seen as a key cause of conflict. There also appears to be a strong correlation between the emergence of religiously-motivated conflict and situations of state failure², and Iraq is no exception.

The media plays an important role in both manifesting and instigating sectarian divisions, often with divisive and violent undertones. A quantitative study carried out by BBC Media Action in December 2012 in Iraq’s southern provinces shows that when asked what sources of information respondents trusted most, 70% said they trust religious leaders “a lot”. This came just after family and friends at 81% and ahead of Iraqi channels at 40%. Tribal leaders, by comparison enjoyed only 34% of total trust and Iraqi politicians just 18%³.

The proposed initiative is, therefore, a two-pronged approach, tackling the two key influencers that have been fuelling sectarian violence as well as being used as pawns in the hands of those who stand to benefit from the circle of violence: religion and media.

The proposal consists of two components, each distinct but with clear interlocking elements.

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² British Academy 2015, The Role of Religion in Conflict and Peace building, UK
³ Quantitative survey in 9 southern provinces commissioned by BBC Media Action from ORB December 2012
The first component will support existing Iraqi media outlets in Iraq in improving the flow of accurate information and building resilience in the face of violent divisive narratives, and will be implemented by BBC Media Action. This element aims to support local and national radio and national television to provide non-politicised content that will allow Iraqi audiences to take a more informed and more resilient stance in the face of adversity.

The second component will harness the role of religion on conflict and its contribution to the creation of an enabling environment for dialogue and debate addressing religion as a driver for peace in Iraq, under the auspices of the British Council. Both interventions cross the government/Civil Society Organisations/religious leadership divide, effectively tackling the peacebuilding/social cohesion, media and religion at a more “localized” level. As a result, the chances of disrupting the violence cycle which seems to permeate Iraqi society, may gradually increase and lay the foundations for a sustained respite, at least for a start.

1 CONTEXT

1.1 Sector/Country/Regional context/Thematic area

Iraq has experienced more than 30 years of – alternating – open war, armed conflict and sanctions, most recently with the lightning rise of Da’esh⁴ and intensified fighting and large-scale displacement since January 2014. As a result, Iraq is now contending with one of the largest humanitarian crises in the world, with 3.2 million internally displaced persons across Iraq and over 8.7 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. This has been exacerbated by the continuing influx of thousands of refugees from Syria, mostly to Iraq’s Kurdistan Region. There was a marked deterioration in human rights as armed conflict intensified between government security forces and Da’esh fighters. The latter of which committed serious crimes such as war crimes, including ethnic cleansing of religious and ethnic minorities through a campaign of mass killings of men and abduction and sexual and other abuse of women and girls. The symptoms of the current crisis are political: lack of unity and lack of interest from Baghdad vis à vis Sunni regions and an acute lack of “justice/fairness” – perceived or not by the Iraqi population. Iraq has historically been one of the cultural, religious and political centres of the Middle East⁵, but today it is in a severely weakened state, and its voice is virtually absent from the regional political debate. In the past 10 years or so, Iraq has been on a transitional path from an authoritarian system to one of elected government. However, this transition is not complete and in spite of the steps taken, many of the levers of power that were established in the previous regime remain crucial factors in the country’s politics. Amid an ongoing crisis over power-sharing, violence has been rising.

Islamist political parties and extremist groups remain a dominant feature, representing political and sectarian demands in an unstable environment. They represent the importance of asserting an ‘Islamic’ identity and value for many in Iraqi society. However, the struggles are not conducted along neat Shia versus Sunni or Islamist versus secular dividing lines. Nevertheless, issues of identity, rights and interests have often found sectarian expression in a period of upheaval and transition. One of the most dramatic changes has been the emergence of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) with strong economic ties to Turkey. The disputes between the Central Government and the KRG have emerged as problems of vital interest for the Kurds, for the country and for the wider region. The so-called Islamic State spread into northern Iraq in June 2014, which saw the collapse of the Iraqi Security Forces. This has presented major challenges to the broader stabilization agenda in Iraq and the need to understand the structural factors and conflict dynamics that feed Iraq’s instability.

⁴ Throughout the Action Document, Da’esh and Islamic State (IS) shall be used intermittently.
⁵ Spencer, Kinninmont, Sirri (2013), Iraq Ten Years On, Chatham House, UK
However, it is not just a case of the State failing to protect its citizens. Economic development has also been constrained by the difficulties in establishing rule of law, and the State struggles to provide basic services. Despite hundreds of billions of dollars flowing into Iraq, mainly from the US, an estimated 60% of Iraqi households lack one of the 3 essential infrastructure services of safe drinking water, sanitation, or access to consistent electricity supply while corruption and violence continue to constrain investment6.

A recent survey conducted by the Stabilisation Network in Dubai found that religion and ethnicity are somewhat difficult to assess within the research they conducted in Iraq. This follows the experience of previous surveys when asking directly about these two characteristics resulted in high levels of non-response. In particular, when asked about religion, many Iraqis will only state ‘Muslim’ and then refuse to specify whether they consider themselves Sunni or Shiite, most likely due to the complexity of issues surrounding identity7.

On the media front, Iraq’s media both instigates and reflects extreme ideologies, violent views and divisive narratives. Politically-owned media uses and disseminates misinformation to promote the interests of their paymasters. In a study commissioned by BBC Media Action, as part of an EU-funded project in early 2015, one female Sunni respondent from Diyala summarised by saying “all the channels change information as they please. They don’t tell things as they are, so we are lost…”. Very few media outlets remain that are local, represent homogenous communities with no sectarian slant, and that attempt to provide a platform for public service and constructive community dialogue.

Significant international effort went, over the years, into trying to improve journalistic capabilities and encourage independent, non-partisan sources of information for the Iraqi people. However, the commercial market never developed sufficiently and the only media outlets that continued to exist are those funded by political parties and other regional political players.

1.1.1 Public Policy Assessment and EU Policy Framework

The stability of Iraq is negatively affected by a range of policies and practices, including violations of human rights (in particular use of the death penalty and torture) and restrictions on freedom of expression and press (violence against journalists), freedom of assembly and labor rights, freedom of movement, women's rights and persons belonging to minority rights. Following credible elections in 2014, rising levels of terrorist violence, corruption, and organizational dysfunction undermined effective protection of human rights. The most important drivers for these violations are politically and ideologically motivated sectarian and ethnic killings, exacerbated – and tragically to be sustained in the foreseeable future – by IS, coupled with retaliatory measures and abuses by government actors and a variety of armed groups which do not fall under its sovereign control (Popular Mobilization Forces).

The development of an independent media landscape plays a key role in the context of the Iraqi Prime Minister Al Abadi’s reform agenda aiming at addressing institutional weaknesses, curb corruption, bureaucracy and promoting transparency and accountability. The Prime Minister has also urged the promotion of a national reconciliation and overcome sectarian cleavages.

Having adopted the Multi-Annual Indicative Programme 2014-17, the Commission has identified 3 priorities for actions in the support to Human Rights and Rule of Law: a) Support to the democratic development of Iraq including through enhanced functioning of parliamentary democracy, b) Improve the national Rule of Law and Human Rights protection system in order to increase the performance of public institutions and strengthen monitoring capabilities of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and c) Promote the principle of judicial independence and sustain the SSR

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6 Ibid
7 The Stabilisation Network, A Structural Target Audience Analysis in Iraq, Dubai
process. In proposing Human Rights and Rule of Law, the EU remains committed to key areas of the Agenda for Change, and is in line with the political interests of the EU, as described in the Council Conclusions of 22 April 2013 underlining that ‘the EU reiterates its continuing commitment to support Iraq’s transition towards a sustainable democratic system, including through targeted assistance advancing good governance and the rule of law’. In the Council Conclusions of 14 December 2015, the EU recalls the importance of “respect of international human rights, preventing sectarian violence, defusing sectarian tensions and preserving the multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-confessional character of the Iraqi society”.

In this connection, EU’s counter-terrorism policy adopted in 2005 and regularly updated has four main pillars: prevent, protect, pursue, and respond. Across all these pillars, the strategy recognizes the importance of cooperation with third countries and international institutions. One of EUs priorities in the field of counter-terrorism is to identify and tackle the factors, which contribute to radicalisation and the processes by which individuals are recruited to commit acts of terror. The European Network of Experts on Radicalisation (ENER) has been established to facilitate dialogue between academics and policy makers.

The Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) was set-up by the European Commission in 2011. The EU’s Radicalisation Awareness Network has identified a broad spectrum of alternative narratives, which can be delivered to and by different target audiences. One of those methods is through religious alternative narratives delivered by religious leaders, institutions and communities to basically highlight the same issue as a moral alternative narrative, but convey a message of crimes and atrocities being against religious values.

In Iraq, as evidence and perceptions suggest, religion is used along sectarian lines to incite violence. Against this backdrop, Iraq finds itself in a critical position whereby it needs assistance with developing the sort of “content” that would be effective in countering the sectarian/obtuse narrative and rumours in an engaging manner and with the use of local voices, adding both credibility and ownership for maximum impact. Informed engagement with localised mainstream media is a critical part of any counter-narrative initiatives. Local voices, representing their communities and speaking on their behalf are going to be more trusted than external voices, whether Iraqi or otherwise.

Specifically, encouraging local non-politicised and non-sectarian media who, by their very existence, counter the effect of “propagandist” channels, can have the desired impact. At the same time on a more “hopeful” note - despite images of triumphant IS fighters and emboldened Shiite militias, the majority of Iraqis believe in Iraq as a state, and as a place where Sunnis and Shites can and should co-exist peacefully. The desire for an inclusive Iraq still resonates with Iraqis throughout the country, and this small window of opportunity needs to be capitalized on.

1.1.2 Stakeholder analysis

As this action is constructed around two distinctive but interlocking components, and taking into account its scope, several layers of stakeholders have been identified, each of which have an overarching role in the general objective of the action. The project is unique in that it aims to bridge the gap between stakeholders within the state institutions and in positions of government, stakeholders within civil society organisations and the religious leadership and institutions, and those who fall into the “silent majority” category. The intervention would culminate in improving the capacity of officials to communicate more effectively, improving the influence of civil society organisations to mobilise opinion and demand accountability and inclusivity, and improving the flow of accurate information to the “silent majority” so that they are better able to make informed decisions both as citizens and as members of their own distinct community within the overall

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8 EU Radicalisation Awareness Network, Collection of approaches and practices, 2015
The intervention is designed to tackle issues that have been the cause of frustration and have led to chronic instability in Iraq in the last decade. The following list, though not exhaustive, provides a reasonable snapshot on the stakeholders:

- The Iraqi Government: Government officials, at both regional and federal levels – further tapping into existing relationships from past and current EU-funded activities, namely in the fields of healthcare, migration and displacement, communications, media, planning and security. Specifically, the project will liaise closely with officials in charge of government communications, including the spokespersons for the Ministry of Interior, the Armed Forces and the Cabinet of Ministers.
- The Council of Representatives, and its influential parliamentary committees, such as the Defence and Security Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee. In addition, there are currently good working relationships of EU with the Culture and Media, Human Rights, Legal and Higher Education Committees. Members of these committees will be called upon to participate in activities proposed through this action.
- Local Government at governorate and provincial levels, as well as local security officials. While addressing counter-narratives, two identified partner radio stations involved in this initiative have strong ties with these officials, covering the KRI and the southern provinces in particular, where the communities are most homogenous.
- Iraqi Civil Society Organizations (CSO), active in the field of freedom of expression and belief, are key players to lead the action together with the international NGOs as both participants and beneficiaries of some activities. A sense of ownership of this action will need to be developed by all Iraqi CSOs which have a sincere interest in peacebuilding. In particular, the media element of this project will be channelled by two well-established local radio outlets and the Iraqi state television, with behind the scenes support from BBC Media Action. This would serve to strengthen the capacity of these organisations to sustain the intervention post-project term.
- Iraqi youth activists are instrumental in this action, as their empowerment would greatly strengthen their capacity to plan and implement project activities involving youth as protagonists of positive change.
- Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and hosting communities, including women, who are primarily affected by sectarian violence, discrimination and prejudice, and the economic consequences of violence and displacement.
- Communities where IDPs shall return, which may be fearful of revenge and may be hostile towards return of IDPs, in some cases to keep using their properties, but need to be primary actors in making return possible.
- Religious and community leaders and members are to be invited to take part in project activities.
- Independent High Commission for Human Rights of Iraq.
- Islamist political parties and extremist groups remain a dominant feature in Iraq, representing political and sectarian demands in an unstable environment. They represent the importance of asserting an ‘Islamic’ identity and value for many in Iraq.

1.1.3 Priority areas for support/problem analysis

Iraq’s communities treat each other with suspicion – 30 years of instability, sanctions and conflicts have affected the mindset of the population, and is close to being embedded in the modus operandi

[6]
Sunni communities feel disenfranchised and marginalised. Kurds are perceived to be using the chaos to gain politically and economically, and the Shia are becoming more resentful of both Kurds and Sunnis, and the other persons belonging to minorities, at the core of the Iraqi social and historical fabric, are gradually marginalised. The suspicions and the harshly mentality on all sides are being exploited for narrow political gains in the fragile democracy of Iraq.

If new space for a more constructive dialogue between government and citizens and across the divided communities is created and sustained, then the government of Iraq may be better able to communicate its national plans more effectively, secure buy-in and ensure that it is more responsive and fair to all communities. Similarly, if through this dialogue citizens are able to make officials more accountable, they are more likely to have faith in a shared future and demonstrate greater tolerance as part of a solution that benefits all citizens.

From a much wider perspective, for a long time, international relations tended to ignore the subject of “religion” – possibly deemed too politically sensitive and/or detrimental. However, the relationship between religion, peace, conflict and diplomacy has emerged in the last twenty years. Many conflicts are branded as “religious” and often seen as a key cause of conflict. There also appears to be a strong correlation between the emergence of religiously-motivated conflict and situations of state failure, and Iraq is no exception. However, religion can also be seen as a driver of peace and seen as a necessary instrument for achieving peace and be included in conflict resolution work. Gaining greater insights into how religion influences conflict in Iraq will open up the space to discuss religion’s influence in peace and stability.

The media plays an important role in both manifesting and instigating sectarian divisions, often with divisive and violent undertones. On last count, there were 35 Iraqi TV and 27 Iraqi radio outlets, in addition to an overwhelming number of regional Arabic channels, broadcasting content which is widely followed in Iraq. Of the many channels, there seems to be around 30 television channels dedicated to Shia religious content and around 20 broadcasting Sunni religious content, some of which relies heavily on demonising other religions and other sects within Islam. Iraqi audiences are, therefore, overwhelmed with content which competes for their attention, either from a religious, political or ethno-sectarian perspective. Across the region, between 2011 and 2015, Sunni channels went up from 43% to 55%, Shia from 5% to 11% and Christian from 3% to 9%.

Iraqi audiences have access to some credible media, but they continue to turn to outlets that reflect deep-set conspiracies that feed into hard-done-by victim narrative (evident among all communities). Despite rationally understanding that not all media can be believed, once audiences consume a mix of information and misinformation, they cannot, or would not, separate the two. They tend to turn back to media they consider to be part of them, reflecting their sect, religion and ethnicity.

The Iraqi government recognises the damaging effect of misinformation and rumours and has been prioritising “psychological warfare” in their fight against IS. But recognising the problem is not the same as coming up with the right solution. The interpretation of what the Iraqi government needs to do in order to tackle this is, invariably, crude. Many believe that the so-called psychological war needs to be fought through counter-rumour. Fighting one inaccuracy with another, they cause greater confusion and distrust not only among Sunni and Kurdish communities, who continue to be suspicious of the central Shia-led government, but also among the Shia. Despite the current government’s apparent candid and media-friendly style, the Iraqi state’s communications apparatus has yet to understand that consistency and credibility of its media message is critical to its success.

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9 British Academy 2015, The Role of Religion in Conflict and Peace building, UK
10 Data extracted cautiously from BBC Monitoring reports and from a research by Northwestern University Qatar: [http://www.qatar.northwestern.edu/news/articles/2016/03-media-industries-report.html](http://www.qatar.northwestern.edu/news/articles/2016/03-media-industries-report.html)
## Risks and Assumptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risks</th>
<th>Risk level (H/M/L)</th>
<th>Mitigating measures</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deterioration in national security affects the ability of staff to</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Activities need to be sustainable without presence on the ground of international NGOs’ staff or consultants, except for few locations like KRI or South Iraq. Working with local NGOs will enable long term, sustainable local programming. Plan to enable activity but without face to face delivery for limited elements of program. This could be achieved through meetings and facilitated workshops/trainings using virtual technology (e.g. Skype, share screen technology, global webinar systems) depending on available IT technology and connection. The face-to-face activity can also be moved to third locations if need be.</td>
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<tr>
<td>move to project delivery locations or undertake activity.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Individuals, groups or organizations involved in project are</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>All measures will be taken to avoid giving strong visibility to key staff working on the project. Share assessment of risk and controls as well as duty of care and any support available should unwanted media attention/targeting result. In case threats are received, CSOs will coordinate with Iraqi authorities in order to guarantee safety to the affected person and/or apply the EU guidelines for the protection of Human Rights Defenders.</td>
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<td>targeted and subject to pressure, abuse or attack.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reliable partners among local NGOs cannot be found in all Iraqi</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Not all governorates need and can to be included in all project activities, but key people will be identified even in provinces where the NGOs have weaker links, and will be invited to participate in activities in other locations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>provinces.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraqi actors feel that the proposed peacebuilding approach is</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Full ownership of the action needs to be developed among local NGOs and provincial authorities, and possibly the national government (and KRG) as well, by designing project activities with them. Religious leaders’ and public support will be openly sought</td>
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<td>imposed from abroad and originates from Western mentality.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The conflict keeps escalating and makes it impossible to work on</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Even when conflict is at a peak, some local actors will work to prepare peace-making, and some forces within institutions and communities will try to resist violence through dialogue with other factions. The project will put special emphasis in identifying and supporting these actors, and increase efforts to strengthen trauma recovery of victims.</td>
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<td>reconciliation and coexistence among Iraqi communities, or to plan</td>
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<td>for return of IDPs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Residual, unintended risks associated with breach of privacy or</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Media partners will be given strict guidelines on how to protect the identities of program participants, and especially children, victims of gender-based violence and anyone at risk of reprisals.</td>
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<td>exposing participants to unintended danger by publicising details in</td>
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<td>the media.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Media formats fail to engage audiences and/or become tired and/or do not achieve the desired impact</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>A provision for strong editorial support from dedicated. Formats are deliberately not finalised in order to allow for audience testing and adapting of programs as needed. Programs are expected to change style and approach, using a mix of genres.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Media content created by the project fails to reach IS-held areas (FM signal are blocked, internet is shut down, satellite dishes are banned) | M | It is unlikely that IS will be able to shut down all media completely. The intervention is specifically designed to place content on all platforms and with different outlets. 
NB: a new transmitter has been installed in February 2016 to ensure reach of Radio Nawa into Mosul. |
| Longer term sustainability of media partners | L | The two partners chosen have been operating for 13 years in unpredictable circumstances yet both managed to find a combination of donor funding and advertising revenue to sustain them to date. BBC Media Action has already secured funding to ensure the continued operation of the partner stations while this proposal is being considered (15 months in total). |
| Editorial integrity of the content | L | MOMD (Al Mirbad Organization for Media Development, a locally registered NGO) in particular was chosen as a partner for its editorial integrity and experience in checking sources. BBC Media Action has been working with this partner for 12 years and have therefore tested its editorial practices over an extended period of time. 
A slightly higher risk is associated with Radio Nawa, but this is mitigated by ensuring that content is produced mostly by MOMD. The project also envisages an editorial oversight from an editorial expert with experience in Iraq and its media, to scrutinise editorial practices and monitor content. |

**Assumptions**

- Iraqi and Kurdish institutions will support or, in some cases, tolerate project activities, without jeopardising them in major ways. The EU and UNAMI will support NGOs in liaison with the Iraqi government and KRG to this end.
- Work with local organizations will be done collaboratively so that the agenda and focus for the program is set by stakeholders and provide support based on the demands that are in line with the project purpose, and thus not viewed or perceived as “western-imposed”.
- Risk will be managed as part of the project management plan and through a clear process for escalating and reporting risks and monthly monitoring.
- Continued openness from security forces and government communications officers.
- The power-sharing in Iraq does not collapse entirely and the country slips into an all-out civil war.

**Media access in IS-held areas:**

- Internet remains available in Mosul, though weak and too expensive for the reach for
many. Radio is receivable, though FM signals are weak. Satellite dishes have not been blocked and continue to be the main source of information and entertainment.

- It remains challenging to assess if and when IS might take offense to some or all of these media and how and if it might target anyone associated with particular content whether producing or watching/consuming it.

3 LESSONS LEARNT, COMPLEMENTARITY AND CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

3.1 Lessons learnt

The action’s coverage is Iraq in its entirety, thus no one group feels isolated and minimised, and it should reserve special attention to participation of all persons belonging to minorities, of marginalized/poor communities and grassroots social movements.

The action is designed to address systematic structural issues, not just personalities. Ownership should remain with individuals who should not feel it is being enforced from the outside, aiming at eradicating the “western-imposed” perception. At grassroots level, since very few CSOs exist to hold the government accountable, these should be encouraged to develop norms of engagement and accountability between government and civil society. Flexible strategies and dedicated support and empowerment through a lot of guidance and on the job training are needed for the youth, swaying away from the “one-off” trainings with little or no impact. Youth ownership of implementation strategies is key in ensuring motivation and commitment. Awareness-raising on sectarianism and persons belonging to minority rights promotion can best be done in mixed groups where majorities are exposed to the experiences of the minorities. In some cases, however, persons belonging to minority are so isolated that they need to learn to talk amongst themselves first before they are able to deal with other groups. Young women persons belonging to minority in particular, who often face multiple discriminations, need to be protected and empowered.

3.2 Complementarity, synergy and donor coordination

The proposed action has its origins in the in-country developments of late, which have been depleting Iraq of its core and essence. Moreover the action is built on the past and current synergies – be they at institutional level, such as the rolling out of UNDP Local Area Development Programme strengthening good governance in Iraq by improving delivery of public services, or building the capacity of the Human Rights related Committees in the Council of Representatives and the Independent High Commission for Human Rights in Iraq, or at a more “localized” level as in the EU-funded CSOs grants. The latter of which forms the keystone of this action. A common theme amongst the two components is to support and empower young people to directly participate and engage in peacebuilding at a local and national level. These strategies call for building coalitions and platforms to debate, discuss and avenues for personal expression to share views and ideas on peace, reconciliation and healing and utilise networks through community-based organizations and education institutions. Addressing the need for the provision of fair and accurate information and helping audiences be resilient in the face of rumour-mongering misinformation demonising other communities/religions, is another theme expressed in all interventions. Through constructive two-way communication, creating media platforms and building civil dialogue, both components are engaging in alternative narratives promoting peace and stability. In particular, they are targeting citizens voices that are not normally heard within the current mainstream and embracing a more inclusive policy to engage a wider representation of society.

[10]
The first component of the action is built upon the existing project "Consolidating Media Freedom in Iraq", aiming to improve the legal and regulatory framework to enable media freedom and free expression and develop media ethics and portrayal of human rights issues.\(^{11}\)

The approach and the ideas for the media intervention were discussed with the British Embassy in Baghdad. The British Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) is providing a total of approximately EUR 1.8M during this time to ensure the continued operations of the two Iraqi partners, Radio Al Mirbad and Radio Nawa, while this intervention is being developed. The two partner radio stations were supported over the years through significant investments from international donors (including the US State Department, UK Department for International Development - DfID, the Finnish Embassy, UNDEF). By working through these partners the project benefits from having no set up costs. The vast majority of the funding will go directly to the action, especially as much of the research and development will take place under FCO funding. This approach will ensure that EU funding can be mobilised directly for the action, allowing the development of a critical television element which would be unique to this intervention, with the potential to secure a very significant reach and impact.

The second component of the action is strictly linked to the regional project "Young Arab Voices",\(^{12}\) jointly launched by the British Council and the Anna Lindh Foundation in 2011 with the purpose of developing skills and opportunities for youth-led debate enriching the pluralistic democratic dialogue existing in the Arab region.

3.3 Cross-cutting issues

The proposed action attempts to deal with issues of attitudes, perceptions and mind-sets in order to dispel a victim mindset that their own community is being disadvantaged in order to appease another. A strong theme running through all the components are the alternative narratives for peace building rather than some of the mainstream narratives inciting violence based on sectarian and religious divides.

A cross-cutting theme is the ambition to create safe spaces for inter-generational dialogue and debate and ensure that these discussions have platforms at local, provincial, national and international level.

In line with the EU Gender Action Plan 2016-2020, the EU is committed to gender equality and the importance of ensuring women and girls are included in peace building and security. This action recognizes the complexity of this issue and has taken on board gender concerns throughout the programming to ensure their voices and participation are included.

4 DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION

4.1 Objectives/results

4.1.1 Overall objective:

This programme is relevant for the Agenda 2030. It contributes primarily to the progressive achievement of SDG 16: "Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels".

The overall objective is to break the cycle of sectarian violence in Iraq.

Specific objectives are:

\(^{11}\) EU-funded project, "Consolidating Media Freedom in Iraq", implemented by BBC Media Action (Budget: EUR 1,125,986)

\(^{12}\) http://www.youngarabvoices.org/
1. Iraqis engage more effectively in the dialogue with local and central government, access accurate information and be more resilient in the face of divisive rumours and sectarian narratives.
2. Iraqis have a stronger voice in international and national discussions related to conflict resolution and peace building in Iraq, thus contributing to the identification of relevant practices and strategies.

4.1.2 Results
1.1 Public service broadcasting on Radio Al Mirbad is improved;
1.2 Public service broadcasting on Radio Nawa is improved;
1.3 Content for IS-held areas, IDPs and host communities is created and broadcasted;

2.1 The analysis on the religion’s relationship to conflict is prepared;
2.2 Young men and women’s skills for dialogue and debate are developed;
2.3 The constructive role of religion in peace processes is promoted;
2.4 Dialogue on Religion is promoted;
2.5 A communication strategy is developed.

4.2 Main activities
The action consists of two components, in line with its specific results, mentioned in paragraph 4.1.2.

The indicative list of activities to be implemented is the following:

Component 1 - Supported, improved and trusted local media platforms and content, through which Iraqis can engage more effectively in the dialogue with local and central government, access accurate information and be more resilient in the face of divisive rumours and sectarian narratives. – BBC Media Action

This component is designed to work specifically with two radio partners that have shown continuous commitment to professional and impartial output with the objective of providing a public service. In the case of Radio Al Mirbad, it capitalises on extensive training, editorial support and oversight provided by BBC Media Action in the last twelve years. Radio Al Mirbad also works with BBC Media Action to provide further production and editorial support to Radio Nawa, which have not benefitted from the same level of editorial support and scrutiny previously.

The action is designed to be delivered by the two radio partners but with editorial support from BBC Media Action’s team of editorial development advisors (with specific and detailed understanding of Iraqi media and politics). The project does not envisage training for trainings sake, and will focus, instead, on the development of effective formats, working side by side with the Iraqi partners. BBC Media Action will also provide daily editorial scrutiny of outputs and carry out programme reviews on a regular basis.

Module 1: Public service broadcasting on Radio Al Mirbad (Basrah), including phone-in, interviews and cross community contributions, and the creation of a new strand of
programming to tackle rumours, using a mix of factual research, humour, voices from the public and interviews with officials.

1.1 Production and broadcasting of at least 12 hours of original public service content daily on Radio Al Mirbad, reaching approximately 2 million weekly listeners and online followers (estimated at more than 350,000 fans on Facebook and significant visitors to www.almirbad.com mobile app, to be carried out by MOMD (Al Mirbad Organization for Media Development, a locally registered NGO), BBC Media Action’s partner in the project.

1.2 Production and broadcasting of a program genre that would take a light-hearted look at the rumours, try to dissect them and balance them out with facts. The program would gather local voices telling what they heard this week – from the plausible to the utterly ridiculous – and try to strip these down and provide context and substantive information to assist people to make up their own minds. This will be jointly developed by MOMD and BBC Media Action experts and broadcast on MOMD on a weekly basis, along with a web/social media element.

1.3 Audience testing – BBC Media Action would carry out audience testing to measure impact of the program-online elements on consumers13.

**Module 2: Public service broadcasting on Radio Nawa (Kurdistan Region of Iraq – KR-I)**

2.1 The rebroadcasting of programs.

2.2 Audience testing in Nawa’s transmission area – carried out by BBC Media Action.

**Module 3: creating and broadcasting content for IS-held areas, IDPs and host communities**

3.1 Further research to understand the work of media actors inside IS-held areas will take place. In particular, BBC Media Action is aware of Radio Al-Ghad, operating out of Erbil and aiming its programs at Mosul14.

3.2 Development – of a content and of a special service for those under IS control in Mosul. The intervention would be carried on Radio Nawa’s transmitter which reaches into the city centre.

3.3 The intervention will connect between the IDPs, those left behind inside, and the host communities. Very much mindful of the sensitivities shrouding this action, the project intends to act with extreme caution to mitigate the risk of reprisals to individuals and the risk to project activities being banned.

**Component 2 – An enabling environment where religion and local traditional customs can play a positive role in conflict prevention and peace building. – British Council**

**Module 1: Religion’s relationship to Conflict – ‘bottom up’ Conflict Analysis**

1.1 A desk-top literature review of current published resources and grey literature.

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13 All audience testing will be fully representational of Iraqi society and disaggregated by gender, age, sect and socio-economic background.

Since the development of this submission, BBC Media Action has developed the format with Radio Al Mirbad with the support of a weekly programme review board, where the topics were discussed. Initial feedback from audiences has been encouraging. For example, one short video clip produced from the programme has attracted 350,000 views in the space of 48 hours and generated about 700 comments, nearly all positive. Please also note that, in order to continue to address public need, the treatment will be renewed on a regular basis through regular editorial assessments by BBC Media Action and MOMD.

14 Some of this research has already been done while this action is being considered. Based on this, and bearing in mind the uncertainty over the continued hold over Mosul, it is intended that this module will be tweaked, in line with developments on the ground, to address the need to communicate with the communities while still under IS, as well as across the communities if and when IS are no longer in control. It is expected that a long period of re-integration, reconstruction and reconciliation will ensue.
1.2 A conflict analysis will be developed using quantitative and qualitative methodology including specifically designed tools for this purpose and based on principles of participation by beneficiaries. This analysis will serve a dual purpose: a) an analysis generated by the target groups to further develop understanding of the relationship between religion and conflict and b) to help with a flexible and ‘learning by doing’ approach to programme management by identifying likely impacts on the conflict of project activities and therefore take steps to ensure a ‘Do No Harm’ strategy.

1.3 Analysis and Reporting.

1.4 Publication of the findings.

Many conflicts are framed in terms of religion and there are few scholars, policy makers and political commentators who would claim religion is inessential to conflicts. However, where they differ is to what extent is religion a primary cause of conflict\textsuperscript{15}. Religion is usually considered to be a powerful force promoting violence or peace, therefore this module will promote understanding by delving into the relationship between religion and conflicts but framed within wider historical, cultural, economic and political contexts. However, action also matters so it will also look at power relations, group identities and framing. Current research and analysis is dominated and generated by professionals and with mainstream individuals, organisations and institutions. Therefore this module will support research and analysis generated by representatives of the project’s target group, namely young people, women and community members whose opinions, perceptions, definitions and ideas do not have a strong voice in the current narrative on religion and conflict in Iraq. Importantly the research and analysis will help identify some key features, and examine if and how they intersect with each other as well as with other factors shaping conflict and peace making specifically in Iraq.

This module will develop a deeper understanding of the thematic area particularly from the point of view of the target group as this is essential to modify and adapt the materials and approach for the following modules, particularly Module 2: Young Arab Voices.

**Module 2: Young Arab Voices (YAV)**

2.1 Community Debates - The Community Debates program aims to develop young men and women’s skills for dialogue and debate. This will be delivered through a trained local network of facilitators using high quality Master Training materials and resources. The program will be monitored and evaluated including a capacity building component in such areas of “community debate” methodology, facilitation skills, monitoring and evaluation and public speaking and presentation alongside a learning culture of sharing good practice amongst the debating hubs established.

2.2 Debate into Action - Young people provided with different mechanisms and channels to debate with elders and leaders exercising their rights for public voice. This will be through the collation and analysis of issue-based debate contents and aligning thematic debate topics for advocacy impact including opportunities for YAV to participate in national and international events. This will also include a digital media sphere enhancing the youth debate to a wider audience. Recent research estimates 50% of people use social media in Iraq and mainly young people\textsuperscript{16}. Therefore, in consultation with the BBC Media Action project, a communications strategy will be developed to include both traditional forms of information sharing (radio, TV, print) along with digital media.

\textsuperscript{15} Centre for Religion, Conflict and the Public Domain, Faculty of Theology & Religious Studies, University of Groningen, the Netherlands

\textsuperscript{16} The Stabilisation Network, A Structural Target Audience Analysis in Iraq, Dubai
The British Council’s “Young Arab Voices” debating program has achieved a significant community impact since its inception in 2011 following the “Arab Spring”. A review conducted in 2014 concluded that YAV’s had a considerable influence in helping to build more democratic societies, young people used skills to debate and listen, addressed rising gender equality, created more debating platforms, and facilitated a diversity of opinions. This was achieved in country contexts with little or no debating culture, where young people lack a voice, and education is characterised more by learning by memorizing rather than critical thinking.

The current model used looks at debate and discussion on a new and emerging concept of ‘democracy’ in countries mainly governed by previous regimes and authoritarian rule. The idea is not to impose a western concept of democracy but allow debate and discussion for young people to consider ideas about democracy within the context of their own country. This has proven to be an effective model to facilitate community debates through a local network of facilitators trained by the British Council and international/regional organizations delivered through schools, campuses and community based partners. A similar methodology - catered to the realities on the ground – will be used, while changing the focus of the debates from democracy to conflict and religion. This module may also contribute to critical debate and thinking in the lead up to the next elections in Iraq which were last held in 2014. To focus on the target groups of young people, women and local communities from different regions, the project will implement this activity through Iraqi Education institutions, a wide range of CSOs and community based partners.

**Module 3: Promote the constructive role of religion in peace processes**

3.1 Organise trainings, study visits and seminars

This module aims to emphasis religious values contributing to peace and community cohesion. Complementing Modules 1 and 2 above, study visits and seminars will be held to facilitate a process of enquiry enabling European and Iraqi scholars the opportunity to draw out from religious texts common factors, which promote harmony and social unity. It is not suggested that the role of religion in conflicts should not be explained away but this module is an opportunity to consider which ideas in religious texts are an impediment to living peacefully. This will also assist Iraq in taking part in international initiatives in the field of interfaith, intra-faith and cross-cultural relations. It is envisaged this module will assist with the development of training materials and curricula for schools, universities, and leaders in state, non-state/faith based organisations, CSOs and thematic Iraqi and international networks that reflect the diversity of regions within Iraq. This module will also assist in influencing the critical thinking options proposed in Module 4.

**Module 4: Promote Dialogue on Religion – policy responses/recommendations**

4.1 Using research from the above modules, conduct an analysis on the broad based thinking/perceptions on how religion is currently influencing conflict in Iraq.

4.2 Review any current and relevant national and regional policies, projects, programs and activities using above analysis (including those the EU are funding).

4.3 Convene dialogue on religion between leading educators of Iraq, the region, and Europe.

4.4 Produce and publish policy briefs and recommendations.

Triggering and initiating dialogue amongst key stakeholders to bring in ‘appropriate practices’ and consider strategies in how religion in Iraq can contribute to the peace process. Such analysis would be expected to portray the degree to which religion is relevant to particular
situations in Iraq, and thus to identify targeted policy responses. Throughout the project, meetings will be held to review information coming from the project and prepare positions to engage with a broad base of interested parties including policy makers, religious leaders, community leaders, academics, CSOs, development agencies, existing donor funded programmes, think tanks, Iraqi diaspora, and international NGOs.

A regional dialogue meeting will take place between leading educators in Iraq, the region, and Europe. The dialogue meeting will develop a greater understanding of how educational curricula is taught and fosters tolerance and inclusion towards living peacefully in shared societies, and contribute towards knowledge-based development in Iraq, the region, and Europe.

Facilitators and participants from Young Arab Voices and those engaged in Module 3 will participate in these workshops, meetings and discussions and present project messages and analysis.

This module is based on a non-confrontational approach designed to forward thinking on constructive peace building that outlines the problems and also solutions that could be tailored to relevant actors such as the EU, UN, regional bodies, government, humanitarian agencies, and local civil society.

**Module 5: Communications and dissemination**

5.1 Develop a Communications Strategy

A key element for the project will be how to best utilise learning and outcomes gleaned through implementation. The project will develop a Communications Strategy to consider appropriate forms of disseminating information. In consultation with BBC and BC’s local communications network, the project will develop communication materials and use both traditional media and social media. This would include published reports and brochures, project website, and some audio-visual tools to capture learning of the project and demonstrate the impact of the project. However, a critical element would be connecting information on understanding religious values promoting peace and social cohesion from an Iraqi perspective to an international audience. The project will develop a communications strategy to connect participants horizontally with each other and also vertically with Iraqi’s in IDP refugee camps, Iraqi’s living in Europe and relevant policy making circles. To the end, the project has initiated discussions with the EU Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) which is a European based network providing a platform for practitioners to gather and share best practices in countering radicalisation. The project will work with the EU RAN to assist with facilitating international channels for the communication of Iraqi views amongst their 8 thematic working groups. These vertical and horizontal connections will enable participants to have a stronger voice in international and national discussions related to conflict resolution and peace building in Iraq. Sustainability will be considered through exploring the creation of youth platforms within Iraq to engage and communicate with Government, the region and wider Europe.

4.3 Intervention logic

The two interventions, although distinct are clearly interlocked given their scope and the nature of issues they will be tackling. In an effort to “think outside the box” and adapt the EU’s intervention to new realities, hence new approaches, breaking the cycle of sectarian violence is articulated around these two components, which will in turn feed off on each others’ findings and hopefully give a holistic picture on concerns currently happening in Iraq and how these can be addressed – not in an ad-hoc fashion but tentatively in a more sustained and far-sighted one. One prerequisite stipulates that both Government and Civil Society well need to work together to target, design and deliver programs and messages, whereby all narratives enounced in this action are drivers of peace:
Component 1 - The suspicions between Iraq’s communities and the hard-done-by mentality on all sides are being exploited for narrow political gains in fragile settings. Bridging the “mistrust” gap, a new space for a more constructive dialogue between government and its citizens and across the divided communities needs to be created and sustained, allowing in turn the government to communicate more effectively its national plans, to secure buy-in and ensure that it is, and is seen to be, more responsive and fair to all communities. This would provide for greater community cohesion and resilience in the face of violent extremist narratives that threaten the fabric of the country and reduce the chances of defeating IS. It is vital to bear in mind the importance of local voices and the need to make communities resilient to the damaging effect of the confused, confusing and conflicting narratives.

Component 2 - The role of religion in conflict and peace building has often been seen in binary terms: it is seen as a source either of violence or of reconciliation. This obscures the complexity of the subject. As a starting point for meaningful analysis, the intervention aims to find a workable definition of ‘religion’ and its influence in Iraq. BC aims to do this through a major component in research, a model to debate the findings of the research, and a process to share and examine how religion is currently influencing policy makers in broader concepts of peace building, conflict prevention and transition in line with the EU’s position on SSR. This intervention by its approach is moving away from a traditional technical capacity building approach and focusing on addressing structural problems currently preventing change. As results are not known and neither are they likely to be simple, the process adopted will be one of understanding complexity and learning creating the opportunity of bringing together people with different religious interpretations to a greater coherence of understanding of religion and conflict or ‘religious violence’.

The action is focussing on the following principles:

Working with youth: recognising that, according to UN figures, nearly half of Iraq’s population is under the age of 19. The hidden impact of the on-going conflict is the one that threatens not only the wellbeing of people, but the future of an entire generation. Shrinking opportunities for increasingly disenfranchised youth and few chances for young people to make their voices heard further hamper recovery and reconciliation.

Working through Iraqi partners: The media element in particular will be overseen by BBC Media Action, but implemented wholly by two existing Iraqi radio stations with a long tradition of public service. This means that ownership of the initiative will be seen as local and will highlight the EU’s approach in supporting Iraqi institutes and the Iraqi people, avoiding accusations of meddling in Iraqi affairs.

5 IMPLEMENTATION

5.1 Financing agreement

In order to implement this action, it is foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with the partner country referred to in Budget Article 184(2)(b) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012.

5.2 Indicative implementation period

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in section 4.2 will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements implemented, is 60 months from the date of entry into force of the financing agreement.

Extensions of the implementation period may be agreed by the Commission's authorising officer

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17 EU 2013, Assessing the EU’s Approach to Security Sector Reform, Directorate-General for External Policies, Policy Department
18 http://iq.one.un.org/Facts-and-Figures

[17]
responsible by amending this decision and the relevant contracts and agreements; such amendments to this decision constitute technical amendments in the sense of point (i) of Article 2(3)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014.

5.3 Implementation modalities

5.3.1. Grant: direct award (direct management)

a) Objectives of the grant, fields of intervention, priorities of the year and expected results:

Both components of the action "Breaking the Cycle of Sectarian Violence" will be implemented through a direct award.

b) Justification of a direct grant

Under the responsibility of the Commission's authorising officer responsible, the grant may be awarded without a call for proposals to the following entities:

**BBC Media Action** has been working continuously in Iraq since 2004, managing several high-profile projects (EU, DfID and US State Department grants) that have supported the establishment and development of Radio Al Mirbad, one of the few independent media outlets in the country, trusted by its audience as a non-partisan, inclusive and reliable source of dialogue and information. In addition to its record in Iraq, BBC Media Action has a wide experience in producing media content in a large number of world countries, including several in the Middle East.

**British Council** has extensive experience, working with regional institutions and civil society in the field of cultural relations. Furthermore, it benefits from significant experience delivering large scale education programs in Iraq, thanks to its dedicated team of professional staff, together with a network of committed consultants (both international and local), who are able to deliver future education programs in Iraq. The British Council has also excellent relationships and networks with Ministries at central and regional level, with scholars, schools and other stakeholders. The British Council is strongly invited to act in partnership with national and international organisations for the implementation of project's activities.

Under the responsibility of the Commission's authorising officer responsible, the recourse to an award of a grant without a call for proposals is justified because a crisis situation is acknowledged in Iraq in line with the Article 190 RAP.

c) Essential selection and award criteria

The essential selection criteria are the financial and operational capacity of the applicant.
The essential award criteria are relevance of the proposed action to the objectives of the call; design, effectiveness, feasibility, sustainability and cost-effectiveness of the action.

d) Maximum rate of co-financing

The maximum possible rate of co-financing for this grant is 100% of the eligible costs of the action. If possible, a lower percentage of co-financing could be negotiated with the British Council and BBC Media Action.

In accordance with Articles 192 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 if full funding is essential for the action to be carried out, the maximum possible rate of co-financing may be increased up to 100 %. The essentiality of full funding will be justified by the Commission's authorising officer responsible in the award decision, in respect of the principles of equal treatment and sound financial management.

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19 During the formulation phase, the EU Del will explore the possibility of co-financing.
(e) Indicative trimester to conclude the grant agreement

1st trimester 2017

5.4 Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act and set out in the relevant contractual documents shall apply.

The Commission's authorising officer may extend the geographical eligibility in accordance with Article 9(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 on the basis of the urgency or unavailability of products and services in the markets of the countries concerned, or in other duly substantiated cases where the eligibility rules would make the implementation of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult.

5.5 Indicative budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU contribution (amount in EUR)</th>
<th>Indicative third party contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Component 1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Grant: direct award to the BBC Media Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>Component 2</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Evaluation &amp; Audit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communication &amp; visibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contingencies</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10 000 000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.6 Organizational set-up and responsibilities

In light of the inter-linkages within the framework of the action, one single Steering Committee, chaired by the EU, will be organized for both components. In addition to the EU, the British Council and BBC Media Action, the Steering Committee will include representation from the Iraqi authorities and Community-based Partners Steering Committee meetings will be formally convened twice every year for the duration of the project (as well as on an ad hoc basis as needed). Steering Committee meetings will be an opportunity for the EU, the British Council, BBC Media Action and project stakeholders to review and adjust the overall strategy and implementation of the project, review outputs, assess the potential for impact and suggest revisions as required. Terms of reference and membership will be jointly drafted by the British Council and BBC Media Action for approval by the EU in the first three months of the projects.

5.7 Performance monitoring and reporting

The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation of this action will be a continuous process and part of the implementing partner's responsibilities. It will reflect and align with the characteristics of the programme, and will also take into account the specifics of the different contexts and themes that the Action addresses. In particular, the monitoring will:

- Be user and needs-focused;
- Draw from a range of tools and methods to effectively capture and present qualitative and quantitative results and evidence;
- Enable timely and effective programme monitoring and oversight, and facilitate strategic decision making;
- Use local expertise and knowledge to ensure effective and efficient planning and implementation;
- Where feasible, align with global best practice in MEL for adaptive programme and strive to present innovative ways of monitoring flexible and adaptive programmes, whilst ensuring rigour.

Monitoring, review and evaluation of the implementation of this action will be mainly carried out through the analysis of the content of broadcasted programmes, audience focus group surveys, policy maker reports, which will be initiated by the implementing partner.

During the inception phase, the implementing partner will define or update the baselines and targets of each project.

To this aim, the implementing partner shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for the action and elaborate regular progress reports (not less than annual) and final reports. Every report shall provide an accurate account of the implementation of the action, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (outputs and direct outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators, using as reference the logframe matrix (for project modality) or the list of result indicators (for budget support). The report shall be laid out in such a way as to allow monitoring of the means envisaged and employed and of the budget details for the action. The final report, narrative and financial, will cover the entire period of the action implementation.

The Commission may undertake additional project monitoring visits both through its own staff and through independent consultants recruited directly by the Commission for independent monitoring reviews (or recruited by the responsible agent contracted by the Commission for implementing such reviews).

5.8 Evaluation

Having regard to the nature of the action, a final evaluation will be carried out for this action or its components via independent consultants, contracted by the Commission.

It will be carried out for accountability and learning purposes at various levels (including for policy revision), taking into account in particular the impact of innovative projects.

The Commission shall inform the implementing partner at least 30 days in advance of the dates foreseen for the evaluation missions. The implementing partner shall collaborate efficiently and effectively with the evaluation experts, and inter alia provide them with all necessary information and documentation, as well as access to the project premises and activities.

The evaluation reports shall be shared with the partner country and other key stakeholders. The implementing partner and the Commission shall analyse the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, in agreement with the partner country, jointly decide on the follow-up actions to be taken and any adjustments necessary, including, if indicated, the reorientation of the project.

Indicatively, one contract for evaluation services shall be concluded under a framework contract in the last year of the implementation of this action.
5.9 Audit

Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation of this action, the Commission may, on the basis of a risk assessment, contract independent audits or expenditure verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements. Indicatively, one contract for audit services shall be concluded under a framework contract in the last year of the implementation of this action.

5.10 Communication and visibility

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU.

This action shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action, to be elaborated at the start of implementation and supported with the budget indicated in section above.

In terms of legal obligations on communication and visibility, the measures shall be implemented by the Commission, the partner country, contractors, grant beneficiaries and/or entrusted entities. Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in, respectively, the financing agreement, procurement and grant contracts, and delegation agreements.

The Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Action shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action and the appropriate contractual obligations.
APPENDIX - INDICATIVE LOGFRAME MATRIX (FOR PROJECT MODALITY)

The activities, the expected outputs and all the indicators, targets and baselines included in the logframe matrix are indicative and may be updated during the implementation of the action, no amendment being required to the financing decision. When it is not possible to determine the outputs of an action at formulation stage, intermediary outcomes should be presented and the outputs defined during inception of the overall programme and its components. The indicative logframe matrix will evolve during the lifetime of the action: new lines will be added for including the activities as well as new columns for intermediary targets (milestones) for the output and outcome indicators whenever it is relevant for monitoring and reporting purposes. Note also that indicators should be disaggregated by sex whenever relevant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results chain</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baseline (incl. reference year)</th>
<th>Targets (incl. reference year)</th>
<th>Sources and means of verification</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Specific objective(s):

1. Iraqis can engage more effectively in the dialogue with local and central government, access accurate information and be more resilient in the face of divisive rumours and sectarian narratives.

2. Iraqis have a stronger voice in international and national discussions related to conflict resolution and peace building in Iraq, thus contributing to the identification of ‘appropriate practices’ and strategies.

Outcome(s)

1.1 Existence of established and trusted public service radio offering a moderated, non-sectarian civic discussion between citizens and local government
1.2 The role of the Iraqi state broadcaster plays an improved role as a uniting factor for Iraq’s communities.
1.3 World Press Freedom Index

2.1 Number of citizens participating in discussions related to conflict resolution and peace building organised by the implementing partner

1.1 Existence of established and trusted public service radio offering a moderated, non-sectarian civic discussion between citizens and local government
1.2 Iraq’s state broadcaster (IMN) is struggling to represent the country’s diverse communities.

2.1 Number of citizens participating in discussions related to conflict resolution and peace building organised by the implementing partner: 0 (2016).

1.2 IMN will provide nationwide TV outputs that support national cohesion and dispel rumors.
1.3 Higher rank in the World Press Freedom classification compared to 2016

Assumptions

1.1 Two radio stations (Al Mirbad and Nawa) will reach Iraqi audiences with Arabic and Kurdish services that provide accurate information and help dispel rumours.
1.2 IMN will provide nationwide TV outputs that support national cohesion and dispel rumors.
1.3 Higher rank in the World Press Freedom classification compared to 2016

Results chain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results chain</th>
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<th>Targets (incl. reference year)</th>
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<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

1.1 Report of broadcast content audible off air carried out under the project
1.2.1 Programs observed on air on IMN
1.2.2 Audience attitudes tested through audience research by BBC Media action’s appointed external agency.
1.3 World Press Freedom reports

2.1.1 Minutes of the meetings
2.1.2 List of participants in the discussions

Sources

HTTPS://INDEX.RSF.ORG/
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outputs</th>
<th>1.1 Public service broadcasting on Radio Al Mirbad is improved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.1 Number of broadcasting hours.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.2 Number of new format and programs produced and</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>broadcasted.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1.1.3 Number of listeners and online followers disaggregated</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>by sex.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1.1.4 Number of audience testing reports initiated by the</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>project.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1.1.1 Radio Al Mirbad risks shut down and its content lost to</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>audience by the end of 2016 (low value)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.2 Number of new format and programs produced and</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>broadcasted: 0 (2016).</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.3 Currently on air, reaching approximately 2 million</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>weekly listeners and online followers estimated at more</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>than 300,000 fans on Facebook (January 2016)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1.1.4 Number of audience testing reports initiated by the</td>
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<td></td>
<td>project: 0 (2016)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.1 Twelve hours of broadcasting on Radio Al Mirbad in</td>
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<td></td>
<td>9 southern provinces</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1.1.2 To be defined by the implementing partner during the</td>
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<td></td>
<td>inception phase of the project</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.1 Radio Al Mirbad reports on broadcasting hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.2 Programs observed on air on IMN</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.3.1 Internet/social media analytics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.3.2 Communication and media Commission report</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.4 Audience focus groups surveys carried out by the</td>
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<td></td>
<td>project</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Iraqi &amp; Kurdish institutions, CSOs and security forces will</td>
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<td></td>
<td>support project activities.</td>
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<td>- Work with local organizations will be done collaboratively.</td>
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<td>- The power-sharing in Iraq does not collapse entirely and</td>
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<td></td>
<td>the country slips into an all-out civil war.</td>
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<td>- Media access in IS-held areas:</td>
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<td>- Internet remains available in Mosul.</td>
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<td>- Radio is receivable.</td>
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<td>- Satellite dishes have not been blocked and continue to</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>be the main source of information and entertainment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Outputs | 1.2 Public service broadcasting on Radio Nawa (KR-I) is improved | 1.2.1 Number of broadcasting hours.  
1.2.2 Number of new format and programs produced and broadcasted.  
1.2.3 Number of new listeners and online followers disaggregated by sex.  
1.2.4 Number of audience testing reports initiated by the project. | 1.2.1 Radio Nawa risks shut down and their content lost to audience by the end of 2016: currently one hour in Arabic and two hours in Kurdish daily (low value)  
1.2.2 Number of new format and programs produced and broadcasted: 0 (2016)  
1.2.3 Number of new listeners and online followers disaggregated by sex: 0 (2016)  
1.2.4 Number of audience testing reports initiated by the project: 0 (2016) | 1.2.1 Four hours of same in Kurdish and two hours in Arabic on Radio Nawa across the whole of Iraq. | 1.2.1 Radio Nawa reports on broadcasting hours  
1.2.2 Programs observed on air on IMN.  
1.2.3.1 Internet/social media analytics.  
1.2.3.2 Audience focus groups surveys carried out by the project  
1.2.3.3 Communication and media Commission report. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Outputs | 1.3 Content for IS-held areas, IDPs and host communities is created and broadcasted | 1.3.1 Number of new format and programs produced and broadcasted.  
1.3.2 Number of new listeners and online followers disaggregated by sex. | 1.3.1 Number of new format and programs produced and broadcasted: 0 (2016)  
1.3.2 Number of new listeners and online followers disaggregated by sex: 0 (2016) | To be defined by the implementing partner during the inception phase of the project | 1.3.1 Programs observed on air on IMN  
1.3.2.1 Internet/social media analytics.  
1.3.2.2 Audience focus groups surveys carried out by the project  
1.3.2.3 Communication and media Commission report. |
| Outputs | 2.1 The analysis on the religion’s relationship to conflict is prepared | 2.1.1 Number of research publications (including gender perspectives) initiated by the project. | 2.1.1 Number of research publications (including gender perspectives) initiated by the project: 0 (2016). | To be defined by the implementing partner during the inception phase of the project | 2.1.1.1 Project reports |
| Outputs | 2.2 Young men and women’s skills for dialogue and debate are developed | 2.2.1 Number of debate clubs (and participants disaggregated by sex) initiated by the project. 2.2.2 Number of master facilitators and training participants (disaggregated by sex) engaged under the project. 2.2.3 Number of public debates which bring together young people (disaggregated by sex) and established leaders organised by the implementing partner | 2.2.1 Number of debate clubs (and participants disaggregated by sex) initiated by the project: 0 (2016) 2.2.2 Number of master facilitators and training participants (disaggregated by sex) engaged under the project: 0 (2016) 2.2.3 Number of public debates which bring together young people (disaggregated by sex) and established leaders organised by the implementing partner: 0 (2016) | To be defined by the implementing partner during the inception phase of the project | 2.2.1 Project reports 2.2.2 List of participants 2.2.3 Project reports |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Outputs | 2.3 The constructive role of religion in peace processes is promoted | 2.3.1 Number of seminars, workshops, trainings and study visits initiated by the project | 2.3.1 Number of seminars, workshops, trainings and study visits initiated by the project: 0 (2016) | To be defined by the implementing partner during the inception phase of the project | 2.3.1 Project reports |
| Outputs | 2.4 Dialogue on Religion is promoted | 2.4.1 Number of national and international learning exchanges for intra-faith, interfaith and cross-cultural relations through seminars, events and study visits initiated by the project. 2.4.2 Number of participants in intra-faith, interfaith debates (disaggregated by sex) engaged under the project. | 2.4.1 Number of national and international learning exchanges for intra-faith, interfaith and cross-cultural relations through seminars, events and study visits initiated by the project: 0 (2016) 2.4.2 Number of participants in intra-faith, interfaith debates (disaggregated by sex) engaged under the project: 0 (2016). | To be defined by the implementing partner during the inception phase of the project | 2.4.1 Project reports 2.4.2 List of participants in the debates |
| Outputs | 2.5 A communication strategy is developed | 2.5.1 Number of new reports and brochures published | 2.5.1 Number of new reports and brochures published: 0 (2016). | To be defined by the implementing partner during the inception phase of the project | 2.5.1 Project reports |