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The opinions expressed in this document represent the authors’ points of view which are
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Table of contents

Volume 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................... VII
1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 24
  1.1 Key methodological steps ............................................................................................... 24
2 AFGHAN CONTEXT ............................................................................................................ 27
  2.1 Aid funds ....................................................................................................................... 29
3 EU SUPPORT TO AFGHANISTAN 2007-2016 ................................................................. 30
  3.1 Overview of the EU funds 2007-2016 ......................................................................... 32
4 RESPONSES TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS ............................................................. 34
  4.1 EQ1 Relevance and responsiveness .............................................................................. 36
  4.2 EQ2 Results ................................................................................................................... 41
  4.3 EQ3 Aid management .................................................................................................... 49
  4.4 EQ4 Aid modalities ........................................................................................................ 51
  4.5 EQ5 Gender .................................................................................................................. 55
  4.6 EQ6 Coherence, coordination and complementarity ....................................................... 57
  4.7 EQ7 Do no harm ........................................................................................................... 60
5 CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................. 63
6 RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................................................... 70

Volume 2:
Evaluation Matrix

Volume 3:

Annex A: ToR
Annex B: Overall Afghan Context
Annex C: Inventory DEVCO
Annex D: Inventory ECHO
Annex E: List of selected projects
Annex F: Bibliography
Annex G: People Met
ACRONYMS

ADB  Asian Development Bank
AHDP II Animal Health Development Programme II
ANA  Afghan National Army
ANDS Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ANHDO Afghanistan National Horticulture Development Organization
ANNGO Afghan National Nursery Grower’s Association
ANP  Afghan National Police
ANPDF Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework
AOGs Armed Opposition Groups
ARED Afghanistan rural Enterprise Development Program
ARTF Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
ASGP Afghan Sub-national Governance Programme
AUP  Aid to Uprooted People
A&RD Agriculture & Rural Development
BOMNAF Border Management in Northern Afghanistan
BPHS Basic Package of Health Services
BS  Budget Support
CAPD Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development
CDCs Community Development Councils
CNTF Counter-narcotics Trust Fund
CRIS Common RELEX Information System
CSO Civil Society Organisation
CSP Country Strategy Paper
DCI Development Co-operation Instrument
DEVCO European Commission’s Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
DFID Department for International Development
DG  Directorate General
DP  Development Partner
D&A Democracy & accountability (sector)
EAMR External assistance management report
EC  European Commission
ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Office
EEAS European External Action Service
EIDHR European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
ELECT II Support to Credible and Transparent Elections
EPHS Essential Package of Hospital Services
EQ  Evaluation Question
EU  European Union
EUD European Union Delegation
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU MS</td>
<td>EU Member States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEWE</td>
<td>Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GfRoA</td>
<td>Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HPS</td>
<td>Horticulture Private Sector Development Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarter</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDLG</td>
<td>Independent Directorate of Local Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced People</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFS</td>
<td>Instrument for Stability</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>Inspector General’s Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL</td>
<td>Intervention Logic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-ANDS</td>
<td>Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC</td>
<td>Judgement Criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCMB</td>
<td>Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSDP</td>
<td>Justice Service Delivery Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LA</td>
<td>Lattanzio Advisory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIVE-UP</td>
<td>Local Integration of Vulnerable and Excluded Uprooted People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LoGo</td>
<td>Local Governance Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOTFA</td>
<td>Law and Order Trust Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRRD</td>
<td>Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAIL</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEW</td>
<td>Ministry of Energy and Water</td>
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<tr>
<td>MGSP</td>
<td>Municipal Governance Support Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIP</td>
<td>Multi-annual Indicative Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISFA</td>
<td>Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoF</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
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<td>MoIA</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoPH</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Health</td>
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<tr>
<td>MGSP</td>
<td>Municipal Governance Support Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDTF</td>
<td>Multidonor Trust Funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTE</td>
<td>Mid Term Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NABDP</td>
<td>National Area Based Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPP</td>
<td>National Priority Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRM</td>
<td>Natural Resource Management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NSA  Non-State Actors - Local Authorities
NSP  National Solidarity Programme
ODA  Official Development Assistance
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAR  Public Administration Reform
P-ARBP  Panj-Amu River basin Project
PHDP II  Support to Afghan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation & Livestock to Contribute to Strengthen the Planting Material and Horticulture Industry
PPP  Public-Private Partnerships
PRT  Provincial Reconstruction Teams
P&RoL  Police & Rule of Law
RD  Rural Development
RG  Reference Group
ROL  Rule of Law
ROM  Results Oriented Monitoring
SBC  State-Building Contract
SEHAT  System Enhancement for Health Action in Transition Project for Afghanistan
SMAF  Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework
SME  Small and Medium Enterprise
SWAp  Sector-Wide Approach
TA  Technical Assistance
TOR  Terms of Reference
TMADF  Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework
UK  United Kingdom
UN  United Nations
UNODC  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNAMA  United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
US  United States of America
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
WB  World Bank
Executive Summary

Scope
The evaluation covers the European Union’s (EU) cooperation with Afghanistan during the period 2007-2016. Based on the Terms of Reference, the following were assessed:

- Relevance and flexibility of the strategy;
- Effectiveness – results of cooperation in the focal sectors: “Agriculture & Rural Development”; Health; “Policing & Rule of Law”; “Democratisation & Accountability”;
- Efficiency – aid modalities and channels of delivery;
- Coherence, coordination and complementarity – among donors, between development and humanitarian assistance, and political cooperation;
- EU added value;
- Potential negative effects, and
- Cross-cutting issues (gender).

Methodology
The evaluation adopted a systematic approach that used different building blocks to gradually construct a response to the evaluation questions and, on this basis, draw conclusions and formulate recommendations for the future. Information and data was collected through 70 face-to-face and distance interviews (a mission to Kabul was conducted in June 2017) and review of approximately 150 documents. Around 30 projects, covering all focal sectors, were closely reviewed. The evaluation was overseen by a reference group comprising various EU Services.

Context
Afghanistan remains a deeply fragile and conflict-affected country. It is one of the poorest countries in the world and is highly dependent on foreign aid. Current economic projections by the World Bank predict low annual growth rates of below 4 percent until 2021. Afghanistan’s difficult topography, vulnerability to climate change, and growing population (3 percent a year) impose additional constraints on development thus increasing the level of poverty. According to the Afghanistan Poverty Status Update 2017, absolute poverty increased from 36 percent in 2011-12 to 39 percent in 2013-14 resulting in an additional 1.3 million Afghans living in poverty. Moreover, the level of international development assistance to Afghanistan has decreased since 2010-2011.

In 2007-2015, the Official Development Assistance commitments to Afghanistan from OECD/DAC donors amounted to EUR47.9b. Afghanistan received 85 percent of this through bilateral cooperation. The USA, the largest bilateral donor, provides 45 percent of total support, while support from EU institutions (including development and humanitarian assistance) and EU Member States accounts for 27 percent overall (EUR13b). Over the period covered by the evaluation, the EU committed EUR2.09b to Afghanistan for development assistance, of which 46 percent was allocated to the Policing & Rule of Law and Democratisation & Accountability sectors, 23 percent to the Agriculture & Rural Development sector, and 17 percent to the Health sector.

Conclusions
Conclusion 1: The streamlining of the EU country programme had multiple benefits: it responded to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s priorities, EU aid principles and international commitments, and made portfolio supervision easier – but at times, the transition affected the delivery of results.

The EU has gradually streamlined its Afghanistan portfolio, moving from multiple contracts for projects towards fewer, larger contracts, and an increased proportion of the funding being contributions to multi-donor trust funds, i.e. the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund and the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan.

The increased proportion of support provided on-budget responds well to government priorities and donor commitments, with the EU being well above the 50 percent minimum proportion of support to be provided on-budget. The increased use of national systems helps to strengthen the government. The reduced number of contracts and the increased delegation of management to international organisations has made it easier for the EU Delegation to manage a large country programme and release staff
resources for a proactive engagement in policy dialogue. However, the transition has not been without its challenges. The extent to which the changes will fully lead to the anticipated enhanced strategic dialogue with the government is highly dependent upon staff at the EU Delegation focusing on strategic advocacy rather than project supervision. This skills transition does not currently appear to be fully in place.

Conclusion 2: The transition towards on-budget interventions and delegated cooperation was generally well justified, and a good mix of modalities and delivery pathways was maintained and further improved over time.

Overall, the shifts towards increasing the on-budget proportion of support and delegating management to international organisations has yielded a number of benefits and is in line with the government priorities and international donor commitments.

However, the use of a mix of on-budget and off-budget interventions (incl. projects under direct management) was, and continues to be, necessary. The EU Delegation has, in general, ensured that there has been a good mix, e.g. by using off-budget interventions and other measures to address important gaps and challenges. The scope for, and relevance of, further increasing funding for on-budget interventions is questionable due to low government absorption rates coupled with declining spending rates.

Government procurement processes are slow, and the limited capacity of some ministries to effectively access funds through the Ministry of Finance is often a constraint. Moreover, on-budget interventions are generally unsuitable for strengthening the independent advocacy and watchdog capacity of civil society as such support is under the government control. Acknowledging this, the EU is planning additional support for Civil Society Organisations in the justice sector.

The government has neither the capacity nor the access to fully deliver services across the entire country. The private sector is also not yet sufficiently developed to fully provide services, so in the coming years, Non-Governmental Organisations will continue to play an important role in service delivery. However, there is clear scope for increased private sector-based service provision, as the EU support for improving veterinary and planting material sectors has clearly demonstrated.

Conclusion 3: EU funded programmes have led to tangible outcomes and impacts when (i) good implementing partners had been selected, (ii) the programmes were well-designed with gender taken into account, and (iii) there was a strong stakeholder ownership. These conditions were sometimes, but not always, in place. Commendable results were achieved in the Agriculture & Rural Development and Health sectors, but less so in the Democratisation & Accountability and Policing & Rule of Law sectors. Direct negative effects have largely been avoided.

Some good results have been achieved, especially in the Agriculture & Rural Development and Health sectors. Institutional capacities and policy frameworks have been improved, which has positively affected service delivery, particularly with regard to access to health services and some agricultural services. This, in turn, has contributed to improving people’s lives by enhancing agricultural productivity and incomes (in specific locations), reducing maternal and child mortality rates, and improving local governance.

However, the implementation of the new policies has been slow and sustainability, generally, is yet to be achieved. In the Democratisation & Accountability and Policing & Rule of Law sectors, EU-funded interventions have produced mixed results, with improvements mostly associated with EU-funded capacity development and service delivery projects in the areas of public sector management and budgeting. The impact of interventions that sought to increase civic engagement and citizen participation in the democratic process was limited.

The EU has largely been successful in mobilising strong implementing partners for its programmes. Programmes in the Agriculture & Rural Development and Health sectors were, in general, appropriately designed whereas this was often not the case in the Democratisation & Accountability and Policing & Rule of Law sectors, where technical solutions to complex political problems were
often promoted. Some programmes highly dependent on politics were not adequately designed to adapt to changes in the political situation and would have benefited from improved contingency planning. The complicated political and governance environment hindered results in the Democratisation & Accountability and Policing & Rule of Law sectors for all donors. EU support to the Agriculture & Rural Development and Health sectors was consistent, developing over time and building on gained experience.

Gender mainstreaming was not consistently applied and hence results were variable. Where gender issues identified in the initial analysis were reflected in programme objectives, and there was monitoring of gender sensitive indicators, good results were achieved, e.g. in the Health sector. In the Democratisation & Accountability and Policing & Rule of Law sectors, gender was not given sufficient attention and few sustainable results have been achieved.

The achievement of results was closely linked to stakeholder and, especially government, ownership and leadership. Where stakeholders had a shared vision and pulled in the same direction, good results were achieved; where this was lacking, progress was slow. Moreover, EU support in the Agriculture & Rural Development sector has proven that the private sector can be an important partner for enhancing service delivery. Similarly, EU support to small and medium enterprises has provided new income opportunities, especially for women.

EU programmes largely avoided direct negative effects, but the overall high level of international development assistance (including EU contributions) together with weak accountability mechanisms has created opportunities for corruption.

A general shortcoming at the programme level is that the monitoring has been mainly output oriented, with less attention given to tracking and verifying outcomes and impacts.

With respect to risk mitigation, little attention was paid to identifying and mitigating risks to programme beneficiaries; instead, risk mitigation generally focused on external factors impacting project performance.

**Conclusion 4: The continuity and reliability of EU support was an added value – as was the relative independence from geopolitical interests.**

A major added value of EU support has been its reliability and continuity, which is widely appreciated by stakeholders, and which has led to tangible outcomes and impacts. The need for continuity is further evidenced by the inability of the government to mobilise sufficient domestic revenues, so achieving sustainability of the results requires a medium-to-long-term engagement. Continued support is required until the Afghan economy is sufficiently strong to provide an adequate tax-base for the government to deliver services.

The large scale of support from the EU also enabled substantial engagement at the sector level, an approach favoured over more piecemeal interventions. The reliability of EU support was also linked to the relative independence from geopolitical or domestic interests which have influenced the aid provided by many bilateral donors (although the recent focus on migration is mainly driven by the domestic priority placed on curbing irregular migration to Europe). EU support was never linked to the military engagement in Afghanistan.

**Conclusion 5: The EU’s proactive engagement in advocacy and dialogue was widely appreciated, even when the advocacy was not directly linked to funding.**

The EU Delegation engaged proactively in advocacy and policy dialogue. While it can be difficult to attribute changes specifically to dialogue, there are examples of the EU Delegation’s advocacy leading to tangible results, such as the agreement of ministries and development partners on the “National Comprehensive Agriculture Production and Market Development Program”. The EU has even gained wide recognition for leading dialogue in areas where there is no direct linkage to EU funding, e.g. the EU is recognised as a leader on anti-corruption due to its advocacy efforts although the EU has not funded anti-corruption projects for several years. Nonetheless, there is little doubt that the overall scale and visibility of the EU’s engagement as a major donor in Afghanistan has given the EU’s voice significant clout and
provided an opportunity to promote EU principles and values. The indicators of the “State-Building Contract” and the “Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework” linked to the disbursement of performance-based tranches have created opportunities for dialogue around these with the government. There is scope to further enhance the synergy between dialogue and financing through the selection of sector-specific indicators for the performance-based tranches of the state-building contract.

**Conclusion 6: The EU has contributed to improving coordination in a highly complex context, although coordination across the EU’s own machinery has been a challenge.**

With the presence of a very large number of donors and large volumes of development assistance, donor coordination in Afghanistan is complex. A large number of coordination fora and mechanisms further complicates coordination and result in it being time-consuming. Nonetheless, overall donor coordination has improved considerably between 2007 and 2016, with it being more effective in some sectors than others. The EU has been proactive in promoting donor coordination, particularly in the “5+3 Group” (comprising large donors) and through promoting coordination among EU Member States. At the programme level, coordination and synergies are often pursued with those programmes funded by other donors. The various policies and strategies for EU’s cooperation – for development assistance, humanitarian relief, and political cooperation – were coherent and no contradictions in the engagement were found. However, the EU appears to have been somewhat more successful in coordinating with other donors than with coordinating the engagements of different parts of its own machinery. EU strategies for internal coordination and synergies in Afghanistan are ambitious and have proven to be difficult to translate into practice, in part because real scope for synergies is not always present. However, coordination between the European Commission’s Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development and the EU Special Representative’s office improved in 2016.

**Main recommendations**

**Recommendation 1: Ensure that a balanced and mutually reinforcing mix of aid modalities and pathways is maintained.** Continue to use different modalities (budget support and projects) and delivery pathways (on-budget and off-budget, trust-funds/delegated cooperation, and direct contracting) in a balanced and mutually reinforcing manner, taking into consideration the strengths and weaknesses of each. This should be done with a view towards:

- strengthening the government’s service delivery and good governance;
- enhancing the functionality of civil society and the private sector;
- delivering tangible and sustainable improvements to the lives of all poor Afghan men, women, boys, and girls;
- ensuring that identified gender issues are properly reflected at the programme level, in strategic performance indicators; and
- promoting the integration of other crosscutting concerns into economic development, including environment and resilience.

**Recommendation 2: Implement clear strategies for strengthening civil society’s transparency-related role and continue to support NGO service delivery, following the EU CSO Roadmap.**

In line with the EU’s stated commitments, strengthen the accountability and transparency-related role of civil society as per the strategies outlined in the Civil Society Organisations Roadmap, while also facilitating better state-civil society relations.

As a temporary measure, and in combination with a gradual transfer of service delivery responsibilities to the government and the private sector, continue supporting the short-to-medium term NGO delivery of services where the government cannot reach adequately.

**Recommendation 3: Support private sector development.** Increase the efforts to strengthen the private sector, vis-à-vis: a) delivery of services in economic sectors (e.g. agriculture, water infrastructure operation and maintenance), and b) strengthening small and medium enterprises and entrepreneurs, with a
special emphasis on building exports and job creation, including for women.

**Recommendation 4: Enhance the capacity of the EU Delegation to manage a new type of country programme, with emphasis on strategic dialogue and advocacy.** Ensure that the EU Delegation has the required staff capacities and skills available to effectively engage in evidenced-based strategic dialogue with the government at the overall and sector levels and continue with the current approach to ensuring visibility.

**Recommendation 5: Advocate for a streamlined coordination and dialogue structure.** Promote a clear understanding of the gaps in, and challenges faced within, the current coordination and dialogue landscape, and advocate for a simplification fewer, well-planned fora and mechanisms.

**Recommendation 6: Use impact indicators and monitoring strategically as tools for enhancing aid effectiveness.** Strengthen impact monitoring at programme level and increase the attention paid to analysis of risks to beneficiaries. Establish strategic performance indicators for budget support and large-scale programmes vis-à-vis tackling key barriers affecting EU programmes, and link the indicators to dialogue with, and incentives for, the government.
خلاصه اجرایی

حدود و تغییر ارزیابی

این ارزیابی با تمرکز بر همکاری‌های اتحادیه اروپا با افغانستان در طی سال‌های 2007 تا 2016 انجام شده است. موضوعات ذیل بر اساس شرایط لایحه وظایف محور و ارزیابی قرار گرفته‌اند:

- مربوط بودن و انعطاف‌پذیری ستراتیژی؛
- مؤثریت - نتایج همکاری در سекторهای محوری و مهم: "زراعت و انکشاف دهات"؛ صحت؛ "پولیس و حاکمیت قانون"؛ "دموکراتیزه شدن و حسابدهی"؛
- کارایی - روش‌های مساعدت و مدارک کمک رسانی؛
- اسهام‌ها، هماهنگی و تکمیل بودن - در میان تمویل‌کنندگان، بین مساعدات انکشافی و انسان دوستانه و همکاری‌های سیاسی؛
- ارزش اضافی اتحادیه‌ای؛
- تأثیرات منفی بالقوه و موضوعات مشترک (جنسیت و روش ارزیابی (متودولوژی))

روش ارزیابی (متودولوژی)

این ارزیابی با انتخاب یک روش سیستمیکی انجام شده است که در آن از عناصر متعدد برای صورت‌پیگیری تدریجی پاسخ‌ها به پرسش‌های ارزیابی استفاده شده است. این روش شامل تحلیل هماهنگی و تکمیل بودن و تأثیرات منفی بالقوه موضوعات مشترک (جنسیت و روش ارزیابی (متودولوژی)) است.

نتایج ارزیابی

نتایج ارزیابی اینکه کشور شدتی به ثبات و حمایت به سمت افزایش و ترغیب به سمت سازمان‌های جدید می‌باشد که در پی فقر ترین کشورهای جهان قرار داشته و اکتشاف شدید به سمت بهتری یافت گردید. این به پیش راه‌های اقتصادی و فنی باید جهت جهاد نهادهای افغانستان ضروری می‌باشد.

افغانستان کاملاً یک کشور شدیداً زیادی به ثبات و حمایت به سمت سازمان‌های جدید می‌باشد که در پی فقر ترین کشورهای جهان قرار داشته و اکتشاف شدید به سمت بهتری یافت گردید. این به پیش راه‌های اقتصادی و فنی باید جهت جهاد نهادهای افغانستان ضروری می‌باشد.
اسلامی افغانستان و اصول اسکایل و تعهدات بین المللی اتحادیه اروپا پاسخ داده و کار نظره بر عملکرد و کار پیشنهاد را آسان ساخته اما گاهی از اوقات روند گذران و انتقال بر چگونگی عرضه نتایج اگر کار یک است.

احتمالاً اروپا عملکرد و کار پوشه خویش در افغانستان را تدریجاً با گذار از عرضه قراردادهای پروژه‌های زیرگروه به مجاری درست قرارداد و مدار قرارند و جوهر الی به صندوق های "چندین تمولی" از جمله صندوق وجوه پزاسی افغانستان و صندوق وجوه پایه افغانستان (افکا)، کارسازی و اماده نموده است.

مقدر افزايش سماسته آی در داخل بودجه ای پاسخ درستی به اولویت های دولت و امکان تمویل کننده‌ها می باشد که اتحادیه اروپا در عرضه این نوع مساعدت ها از حداقل 50 درصد بسیار فراتر رفته است. افزایش میزان کاربرد سیستم های ملی به تقویت دولت کمک می کند. کاهش تعداد قراردادها و واگذاری مسئولیت های مدیریت بیشتر به سازمان های بین المللی تا هیئت اتحادیه اروپا در افغانستان بتواند برنامه کشوری خویش را به طور آسان تر می‌تواند و منابع انسانی خویش را به مشارکت فعال در گفتمان بالیسی سوق دهد. با این حال، روند انتقال نیز قلش های خاص خود را داشته است. اینکه تغییرات به طور مداوم بودجه ای توسط دولت می‌کند. کاهش تعهد قراردادها و ایجاد سمتی برای هیئت اتحادیه اروپا در افغانستان به شکلی‌ای که در اولین انتقال، دولت ممکن است بهبودهایی در بخش‌های مختلفی از ساختار و سیستم‌های دولتی که در دسترس قرار داشته، او از مصرف و کارآمدی توسط دولت استفاده کند. یکی از این اهداف، دانشگاه‌های نوکیا و دانشگاه‌های دیگر در مورد امکان‌پذیری و بهبود منابع توانمندی و امکان‌پذیری برای مداخلات داخل بودجه ای به بودجه آورده است.

نتیجه دوم: گزاره سوز مداخلات داخل بودجه ای و همکاری تطبیق شده عمومها به خویش توجه شده بود و ترکیب ملی‌زبانی از روش‌های مساعدة و ساختن خدمات رسانی حفظ شده و مورد تلاشی قرار گرفته و به گذر زمان بهبود پیشرفت یافته بود.

بی‌بی‌بی‌بی-بی‌بی، گزاره سوز مداخلاتی موثر است که به سود از افزایش میزان سرمایه‌های دولتی و بهبود ملی‌زبانی بوده.

1 on-budget support

2 Off-budget
نتیجه سوم: برنامه‌های اتحادیه‌ای تحت تأمین اتحادیه با ارائه میراث بخشی به شرکت‌های خود، به شرکت‌های بخشی در سطح ارائه خدمات عمومی، نیازمندی‌ها و مشکلات خاصی را تا حدی در نظر می‌گیرد. این اتفاق به شکل‌های مختلفی در سطح خدمات عمومی و استراتژیک جهانی، و کارآفرینی در میان سطح‌های دیگری از جمله کشورهای پیشرفته و دارای بودجه‌های بالا، وجود دارد.

برخی از برنامه‌های ایالات متحده از دسترسی به برنامه‌های ارائه خدمات عمومی به ویژه در زمینه‌هایی از جمله سیاست‌گذاری و حکومتی، پیروزه موفقیت‌ها و نتایج اخیر در سطح خدمات عمومی و استراتژیک جهانی وجود دارد. این اتفاق به شکل‌های مختلفی در سطح خدمات عمومی و استراتژیک جهانی، و کارآفرینی در میان سطح‌های دیگری از جمله کشورهای پیشرفته و دارای بودجه‌های بالا، وجود دارد.

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یکی از کاستی‌های عمومی در سطح برنامه‌ها این است که کار نظارت اساساً متمایل بر نتیجه یا حاصل (output) بوده و توجه کمی به پیگیری و اثبات بازده یا تأثیر (outcome) و تاثیرات (impacts) صورت گرفته است.

در بخش کاهش خطرات نیز توجه اندکی به شناسایی و تخفیف خطرات موجود برای مستندی برنامه‌ها صورت گرفته است؛ در عوض روند کاهش خطرات عموماً روی عوامل بیرونی تاثیرگذار بر عملکرد پروره تمرکز بوده است.

نتیجه چهارم: تداوم و اعتماد بر ۳ پشتیبانی اتحادیه اروپا یکی از ارزش‌های اضافی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی: ارزش اضافی مهمی که به واسطه پشتیبانی‌های اتحادیه اروپا فراهم شده است، به مانند استقلال نسبی از منافع جئوپلیتیکی:
روند وقت گیر باشد، یا این حال، میزان هماهنگی عمومی در بین تمویل کنندگان در سال‌های ۲۰۰۷ و ۲۰۱۶ به میزان چشمگیری بهبود یافته است. در بعضی سکتورها مؤثریت بیشتر دارد. نتایج اخیر نشان می‌دهد که میزان هماهنگی عمومی در بین سال‌های ۲۰۰۷ و ۲۰۱۶ به‌طور چشم‌گیری بهبود یافته است. در برخی سکتورها، مؤثریت بیشتری دارد.

اتحادیهٔ اروپا در عرصهٔ بهبود هماهنگی در میان تمویل‌کننده‌ها، ویژه در "گروه ۵ + ۳" (که متشکل از تمویل‌کنندگان بزرگ می‌باشد) و همچنین از افزایش میزان هماهنگی در میان دولت‌ها و سازمان‌های اقتصادی و سیاسی، عملکرد ملی‌کننده است. هماهنگی و تشریک مساعی در سطح برنامه‌ها غالباً با درنظر‌گرفتن برنامه‌های سایر تمویل‌کنندگان صورت می‌گیرد. پایلی‌ها و سازمان‌های ملی‌کننده که با ارائه شرایطی بهینه و هماهنگی اروپایی برای ما می‌آورند، این سطح هماهنگی را بهبودبخشیدن به اتحادیه اروپا ـ برای انسجام، نمایشگری و هماهنگی سیاسی ـ نیازمندی مغلوبیت هستند. همچنین هیچ گونه تضادی در بین آنها وجود نداشت.

بهبود خدمات رسانی دولت و حکومت‌داری خوب؛

بهبود عملکرد جامعه مدنی و سکتور خصوصی;

ایجاد بهبودی های اقتصادی و پایدار در زندگی تمام مردان، زنان، پسران و دختران افغانستان;

محصول امکاناتی از اینکه مطالعات، تحلیل‌های نزدیک به هماهنگی در میان تمویل‌کنندگان زیست در صورتی که به جنسیت به درستی در سطح برنامه‌ها و در شاخصهای عملکردی سازمان‌های خاص ممکن‌سازی می‌شود، و

توسعه و تشویق شامل سازی دیگر مطالعات مشترک،

از جمله محتویاتی و انعطاف‌پذیری‌های در روند انشعاب استثماری،

پیشنهاد دوم: تطبیق سازمانهای مالی با طبقاتی نقل

جامعه مدنی در ایجاد شفافیت و ادامه دادن به پیشینه‌ی از خدمات رسانی توسط موسسات غیردولتی ضمن نهایت کردن نقشه راه تکامل اروپا از تغییرات جامعه مدنی مطابق به تعهدات تعیین شده شرط تکامل اتحادیه اروپا، نقش جامعه مدنی در کمک‌رسانی در شرایطی، برای تأیید نقش جامعه مدنی در سطح راه‌های نهادهای جامعه مدنی، تقویت شود و در عین زمان روابطین دولت و جامعه مدنی به شکل بهتری تسهیل گردند.

در مواردی که دولت توانایی پوشش خدماتی کافی داشته‌باشد، پیشنهاد اولیه از خدمات رسانی توسط موسسات غیردولتی در کوتاه مدت و میان مدت، به‌عنوان یک اقدام مؤقتی تکمیل بخشیده شود و ضمناً مسئولیت‌های خدماتی رسانی به شکل تدریجی به دولت و سکتور خصوصی مکمل گردید.

پیشنهاد سوم: پشتیبانی از سکتور خصوصی انشعاب داده شود.

تلاش‌های موجود در راستای تقویت سکتور خصوصی در عرصه‌های مالی افغانستان باید افزایش یابد. سکتورهای اقتصادی (برای مثال، مصرفی و دغدغه‌ی زیربنای زراعت و آب) تقویت صدای‌های کارآفرینان (متخصصان) گذشته و میتوانوست و ضمانت‌های تأکید رشد صنعتی و اشتغال زایی برای گروه‌های مالی مختلف از جمله زنان.

pie3 Mutually reinforcing
pie4 Strategic performance indicators
pie5 Cross-cutting concerns
pie6 Resilience
پیشنهاد چهارم: ارتقای ظرفیت هیئت اتحادیه اروپا در افغانستان در بخش مدیریت برنامه کشوری جدید ضمن تأکید بر گفتگو و دادخواهی استراتژیک، اطمینان حاصل شود که هیئت اتحادیه اروپا در افغانستان مهارت ها و ظرفیت های انسانی لازم را در اختیار دارد تا بتواند در گفتگو و دادخواهی و مبتنی بر شواهد با دولت در سطح عمومی و همچنین در سطح سکتورها مشارکت مؤثر داشته باشد و با روابط فعلی به شکل قابل ملاحظه مشارکت خویش ادامه دهد.

پیشنهاد پنجم: دادخواهی برای کارآمدسازی ساختار هماهنگی و گفتگو. پشتیبانی لازم برای درک همه جانبه جایه ها و کاستی های "دورنمای فعلي گفتگو و هماهنگی" قرار گرفته و سپس برای ساده سازی، برنامه ریزی بهتر و کاهش تعداد مکانیزم های هماهنگی دادخواهی صورت گیرد.

پیشنهاد ششم: استفاده از شاخص های تأثیر و نظارت استراتژیک به عنوان وسیل و شیوه های بهبود مؤثریت کمک می‌کند. ها روند نظارت بر تأثیرات در سطح برنامه‌ها تقوتی شود و به تحلیل خطرات برای مسئولین برنامه‌ها توجه بیشتر صورت گیرد. برای پشتیبانی های بودجه‌ای و برنامه‌های دارای مقیاس بزرگ، شاخص‌های عملکردی استراتژیک در مورد مهار نمودن موانع عمدته تأثیرگذار بر برنامه‌های اتحادیه اروپا وضع گردد و این شاخص‌ها به موضوعات گفتگو با دولت و انجیزه‌های دولت ارتباط داده شوند.

9 Impact indicators
اجراییوی لنیز
د ارزونی لمنه
۱. د نماینده او انعطاف
۲. د ارزونی له اسلامی ۷۰۰۲ سالو، ۶۱۰۲ تریاموند وروید
۳. د ارزونی له اوپژی پر تمرکز
۴. لنډی موضوعات د ارزونی د چنین لپاره
۵. د ارزونی له مثرباکی
۶. د ارزونی له کار
۷. د تابعیت په اصلی نړیوالو ژمنو ته ځواب ویلی
۸. د اسلامی جمهوریت مبتنی
۹. د اسلامی ژمنه کړی
۱۰. د اسلامی سکورت ته خانگی شی.
فعالیتونو چې د څارنې کار اسانه کړی، خو ځینې وختونه د تیپیدو او لیږدیو پروژو د یادلو او ورائیدو کولو پر خانگونکی اغیز کری. 

اروپایی تولنی چې افغانستان کی خیل پروگرامونه په تدریجی توګه اصلی جریان ته راسم کړ او چې لږ شمېر لویو قراردادونو قیان د څو چنده پروژو د قراردادونو اصلی جریان ته واچاوه او په دغه ترڅ کې یې د لویو قراردادونو شمیر را ښکته کړ او یو زیات مالی وجوه یی د افغانستان د بیارغونې وجوه او د افغانستان د پولیسو وجهی صندوقونو (څو متموله) ته د لا ډېرې بودجې په ځانګړي کولو سره، اغیزناک کړ.

پر بودجې باندی د مدارست 10 د نسبت زیاتېل د دولت لومړیتوبون او د بوډونار زیمن هه مناسب خوآب اې دی اروپایی تولنی دغه شن مدارست وی ورادول کولو سره له دغه 50 ښورونه تلی ده. دی ملی سیاستونو کې کار اوونکی سره د کچه لوپلود، د دولت له پیمانه سره مترسکل، د مرستو او نورو پروگرامونه په دغه دې مداخلې د درستې پر ژمنو او د پوهېدو له دغه مداخلې د اړین کې له وګورئ. مینیاې کې د ځینې وزارتونه د مالیې وزارت له لارې تمویلي بودجې د دې مداخلې د عدلی سکټور کې د مدني ټولنې بنستونو د لا ډېر ملاتړ له پاره پروګرامونه جوړوي. دولت نه د هیواد په هره برخه کې د خدمتونو پوره وړاندې کولو او د هیواد ټولو برخو ته د خدمتونو ورودی کولی لاسرسی لري. خصوصی سکټور هم لیکن خپل مهم رول لوبولو ته ادامه ورکړي. مګر بیا هم، دې ته په ځای کې اروپایی تلکې له پرمختګونو سره خپل مهم رول لوبولو ته ادامه ورکړي.
Independent Evaluation of the EU Cooperation with Afghanistan

Final Report
June 2018

Page XX

12 Outcome
13 Impact

14 gender mainstreaming
موجود نه و، د پایلو په اړه د پرمختګ یون هم ځنډ لې. پر دې سربیره، د کرښنې او د کلاید د بیلابوغيه یه برخو کی د اروپايي تولني مرستو ثابت کری چې دچ خصوصي سکتور کولای شی د خدمتونو د روسی ادیبو یه برخه کی د مهم همکار یه توجه عمل وکړی. له خوا، له چونکه او منځنیو تصدیو خدغه د اروپايي تولني متا از هلیکو توجه ویا د برخه د عیان نوی فرصتونو چمتو کړی. 

د اروپايي تولني پرورانمونو په پرچمه که د مستقیم منفي اغیزو له خطرندونو مختلفو کری دی. د ریورو او پرختیایی مرستو د تولیزی ادایی د ديپلوا او او حساب ورکونکی د مکانیزموونو د کرکودیا په خپر سمال که هم بوازی اروپايي تولني ته خانګری نه دي، خو د فسادو منځ ته راته کیږي وی فرصتونه زیږولی. 

د خطونو کومولو په برخه د اکثریت اخستونکو له برخه زه لرلی، په پراخه کچه ستایل شوې. له بېلګې سپاره کیږي د اروپايي ټولنې ته دوام او اطمینان خپلواکي مدیرکیږي. د بېلګې تړلی اړخیزونو او پرختیایی مشارکت دی. 

د اروپايي تولني پلاستی په حق غوښنې او خبرو او تړلی په خپلو هلو او د کتونو سره مخکې وړلو په خاطر هم له پراخې ستاینې شوې. 

د اروپايي تولني پلاستی په حق غوښنې او خبرو او تړلی په خپلو هلو او د کتونو سره مخکې وړلو په خاطر هم له پراخې ستاینې شوې. 

15 Reliability

16 Visibility
ورکونه له لارې د ځان بساینې چوکاټ
» په څېر شاخصونه چې د فعالیتونو پر بنسټ قسطونه هره ورکړې سره اړیکه لري، د دغو مسایلو په اړه یې له دولت سره د خبرو له پاره فرصتونه کړي دی. د دولت جوړونې قرارداد د فعالیتونو پر بنسټ قسطونو له پاره د هر سکټو د اړوندو شاخصونو په ټاکنې سره به کولای شو د خپلرولو او تمویل ترمنځ همغږي نوره هم ډېره کړو.

پنجمه پایله: اروپایي تولنې په بېجې وضیعت کي د همغږي او نسجمنی له بندې سره مرسټه کي ده؛ که خه هم اروپایي تولنې په تول حسابمنکي کي د همغږي رامنځه چې له کول دوبلو ستوتنزمن او نکونکي کار دی.

د موجود کن شمیر او پراختیایي مرسټ لور کې چې له کو سره، د افغانستان د برونارو ترمنځ د همغږي رامنځه چې له کول، پېچلي کار دي. له بېل خوا د همغږي د تاکید او میناکیزيون شمیر هم خارښ کار نه پېچلي کري د او د لامل شوې دی چې دغه پرېسې زيات وخت نوښې. مګر با ده، له 2007 تر 2014 م کاله پوری د موجود ان ترمنځ د همغږي دبیلو په خانگی توجه د "3+0 حل" (چې له ستور دبیلو خو جنړ شوي دی) ترمینځ او همدارنه د خیل غو دبیلو ترمنځ د همغږي په دبیلو کي فعال روپولویي دی. د برپورګرامونو ترمنځ همغږي او د تجریب شرکولو تر ندې هره د موجود پورپورګرامونو له په کتی ترسه کيږي. هغه گڼ پلاسی او ښارنيزی چې اروپايي تولنې ته د انسجام ورکولو په موخه د پراختیایي، انساندوستانه مرسټ او سیاسی همغږي له پاڼه دندو شوي دی، له بېلی خه یې پرېسې یې ترمنځ می خپله برخه راز تکرا نه شته کېږي، خو پیا مه، داسی ښارکاری چې دبیلو د موجودو دبیلو تولنې په همغږي چې د اروپایي تولنې دبیلو په خپر ورکولو، د خپل جوړونې د نورو خپر او د کانونیبندی ته همغږي له "هده شرکولو لله باره د ادویی او میناکیزيون په ټریبون لور خپرولو د چې له پاڼه له چې له خپلرولو او تمویل ترمنځ د چکړي، او د برخه لري.

17 متعیین کننده
18 اقتصادی پراختیا
19 انسامن
20 په ځیر کار

لومرې وړاندې: داد دی ترلاسه شی چې [یې پره یې پې توجه له مرسټداویه اړه ختو او ترخپاره کې] له خشکه توازن او متقابل خوا په خپلونکي

تربکیمن تڼخ که راکی.

17 Mutually reinforcing
18 Strategic performance indicators
19 Cross-cutting concerns
20 Resilience
پیاوری شی او یا پروگرامونه چکه اخستونه له پاره د خطرنون تحلیل ده بیره پامتره وشي. د بیودجوي ملایر او لوی میکس لرونکو پروگرامونو له پاره دی، د اروپایی تولنی پر پروگرامونو د اغیز لرونکو سترو خندونو د اری کولو له پاره د ستراتیژیکو کونو شاخمونه وضع شی او دغو شاخمونو ته له دولت سره د خپرو او دولتی انگیزه یې خبر موضوعاتو سره اریکه ورکول شی.

دریم ورندیز: د خصوصی سکتور له پراختیا خڅه ملایر. په لاندی برخو کي د خصوصی سکتور د پیاوریتی له پاره شته هلی خلی دیری شی: الف) د اقتصادی سکتورونو کي خریدونو ورندی کول (ننک، د کرکی او اویو د زیبینماو ساتنې او مدرپیت)، او ب) د برخو په چند د بیلابیل دلو له پاره د کارموني او د صادراونو په وړی د نینکار سره یو چنی او کوچنی او منخیرو تصدیق او کارگاریکو (نشیبی) پیاوری کول.

غلوم ورندیز: پر ستراتیژیکو خپرو اترو او حق غوښتنی د تینکار ترخنکه، د هیواد په کې د پروگرامون و مدریت په برخه کي په افغانستان کي د اروپایی تولنی د لاوی یې کښیتی لورول. باید دی ترلاسه شی چي په افغانستان کي د اروپایی تولنی پلانونه له ارزوم انساني مهارتونو او اغیزمنونو خره برخمن دی تر خو خو کوکل شی له دولت سره په ستراتیژیک او د شوامه له مخی خپرو اترو کي په عموسي کچه او همدانه د سکتورونو په کې اغیزمناک کدون ولی او د اوسنی تګلارې له مخی د خپلو خرکندرولو له ادامه ورکړي.

پنځم ورندیز: د همغړی او خپرو اترو د جوښنې د اغیزمنئیا له پاره حق غوښتنه، «د خپرو اترو او همغړی د اوښنئی دوره» د نیمگونه او ننکو ده اخیری درک له پاره لازم ملایر دی چمنتو په وروسته بي د ساده کولو د حق غوښتنی د همغړی د مکانیزموون سهمر کمومله له پاره غوره پلاز جور شی.

شپږم ورندیز: د مرسته د کونتووب د وتسلیمو او لارو چارو په تهکه د ستراتیژیکو اغیزمنو21 او خاوېره له شاخمونه خره که اخستی. د پروگرامونه په کې په اغیزمو د خاریز مهیر د باید

21 Impact indicators
1 INTRODUCTION

The current document is the Final Report which presents the findings for the Evaluation of European Union’s Cooperation with Afghanistan, as required by the Terms of Reference (ToR). The ToR outline two main purposes for the Evaluation of the European Union (EU)'s cooperation with Afghanistan:

- to provide the relevant external cooperation services of the Commission, and the wider public, with an overall independent assessment of the Commission’s past and current cooperation, and
- to identify key lessons in order to improve the current and inform future choices cooperation strategy and delivery.

The rationale for this evaluation is to provide the necessary evidence to inform decision-making processes in a series of events which will take place in the next two years, including the 2018-2020 mid-term review of the Multi-Annual Indicative Programme (MIP).

The scope of the evaluation covers:

- all of European Commission’s Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO)'s cooperation with Afghanistan during the period 2007-2016, and in particular cooperation in the sectors of the current MIP: Agriculture & Rural Development (A&RD); Health; Policing & Rule of Law (P&RoL), and Democratisation & Accountability (D&A);
- European External Action Service’s (EEAS) cooperation (in so far as it relates to development in Afghanistan);
- European Special Representative to Afghanistan (EUSR);
- the interaction of DEVCO’s interventions with those of the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO) in Afghanistan (without specifically evaluating ECHO's interventions);
- spending and non-spending activities conducted over the evaluation period;
- all EU financial instruments and channels relevant to the country during the evaluation period, and
- the quality and effectiveness of EU engagement in donor coordination and policy dialogue with the government.

The focus of the evaluation is on those factors that have helped the effectiveness of EU cooperation, as well as those which hindered it, in order to draw lessons and provide recommendations that will inform and improve the design of future strategies and actions in Afghanistan. These factors include, but are not limited to:

- relevance and flexibility of the strategy;
- effectiveness – results of cooperation in the four focal sectors;
- efficiency – aid modalities and channels of delivery;
- coherence, coordination, and complementarity – donor coordination;
- coordination between development and humanitarian assistance;
- security-development nexus;
- EU added value;
- potential unintended negative effects, and
- cross-cutting issues (especially gender).

1.1 Key methodological steps

The methodology applied for this evaluation is based on the methodological guidelines developed by the DG DEVCO Evaluation Unit. The evaluation process adopted a systematic approach that uses different building blocks to gradually construct a response to the Evaluation Questions (EQs)
and to formulate key conclusions and forward-looking recommendations. The evaluation comprised the following phases and steps:

- During the **inception phase** the Evaluation Team gained an understanding and overview of the object of the evaluation, mapped the actions of the EU support to Afghanistan, and developed the inventory DEVCO and ECHO interventions in Afghanistan (see Volume 3 for further details of the inventory).

- During the **desk phase**, the team drafted the desk report based on evidence from the documentation available, i.e. more than 150 documents including EU documents: External assistance management reports (EAMR), Council communications, Results Oriented Monitoring reports (ROM), project reports, Annual Report etc., government documents, Trust Funds documents, other evaluations, and phone or face-to-face interviews (overall up to 70 interviews to DEVCO, EEAS and ECHO staff, NGOs, government representatives, and other donors). (See Volume 3 for the list of persons met and bibliography).

- During the **field phase**, the team completed the data collection through interviews in Kabul, direct observation particularly for the case studies (up to 30 projects covering the focal sectors have been studies in-depth), and collected information on how outputs have been used to validate or revise the preliminary findings and hypotheses formulated in the desk report. The field visit was carried out in June 2017.

- The **synthesis phase** was devoted to further analysing the data collected and answering the EQs and formulating conclusions and forward-looking recommendations.

- The final step was a **dissemination seminar**. The purpose of the seminar was to present results and validate and discuss conclusions and recommendations.

The data collection and analysis was structured in two steps (see Figure 2):

- **Identification, collection, and processing of information** relevant to all Indicators. All information collected is presented in Volume 2 (see Annex: Evaluation Matrix).

- **Analysis and synthesis of the information** at the levels of the EQs, judgement criteria (JCs) (Volume 1), and Indicators (Volume 2).

During the evaluation process, the team followed a structured data collection process as outlined in the Figure 1 below.

**Figure 1: Data analysis process**

The evaluation faced the following **limitations**:

- The information available in EU databases and from other Directorates General (DGs) was not always easily retrievable. The availability of documents on relevant interventions differed considerably. For some interventions, Common RELEX Information System (CRIS) information is sketchy, while others are well documented.

- Limited information was available on interventions which have only recently commenced.
• Programme indicators and monitoring are generally activity and output oriented and not adequately capturing outcomes and impacts. These are often captured in an anecdotal manner, leaving gaps in the availability of quantitative data on outcomes and impacts, especially for the A&RD and governance sectors.

• Security concerns restricted the movement of the Evaluation Team, e.g. no field visits were conducted outside Kabul. The data collection was therefore limited to interviews in Kabul and a desk review of documents. This limitation particularly affected the data collection for specific issues, such as assessing the impacts and outcomes (EQ2, although some external project evaluations and ROM contributed with independent views and evidence), and the analysis of negative effects (EQ7).
2 AFGHAN CONTEXT

This chapter provides a brief overview of the background of the economic, political, and social context of Afghanistan during the evaluation period and development assistance actions and commitments throughout the period. Detailed information is provided in Annex B (Volume 3) of this report.

Afghanistan remains a deeply fragile and conflict-affected country. The long years of war have hollowed out state institutions, led to widespread disenchantedment with the ruling elite, and produced millions of displaced people. The job of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) has been made more difficult by ongoing conflict with insurgency and general insecurity and criminality, including illegal drug trafficking. Rule of law remains weak, with GIRoA exhibiting high levels of corruption and low capacity. Infrastructure has improved greatly but remains poor; the government collects only a small proportion of revenue relative to its spending. Agriculture is the economic backbone of Afghanistan; one quarter of the GDP is derived from agriculture and more than 50 percent of the Afghan households depend fully or in part on agriculture for their livelihood. Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world with an increasing level of poverty. According to the Afghanistan Poverty Status Update 2017, absolute poverty increased substantially from 36 percent in 2011-12 to 39 percent in 2013-14 resulting in an additional 1.3 million Afghans living in poverty. The country is highly dependent on unprecedented volumes (albeit declining) of foreign aid, development aid, and military assistance. Current economic projections by the World Bank (WB) predict low annual growth rates – below 4 percent until after 2020. Moreover, the context is challenging for private sector development and investments due to several constraints, including insecurity and corruption. At the same time, the country's difficult topography, vulnerability to climate change, and growing population (currently at 3 percent per annum) have imposed additional constraints on development. Although Afghanistan is rich in minerals and gas, lack of technical expertise and adequate infrastructure, coupled with conflict, make it difficult for the country to mine and benefit from its natural resources.

The international military engagement following the events of September 11, 2001 has framed the context for delivery of development assistance. The timeline in Figure 2 (below) indicates major events from 2001 through to the present.

Despite the political, social, and economic challenges faced by Afghanistan, by 2014 the EU Strategy in place at the time (2014-2016) noted that considerable political, security, economic and developmental progress had been made, but that the gains were mostly fragile and reversible. Even in the most optimistic scenario, Afghanistan would, in the coming years, remain a fragile state with some of the world’s lowest human development indicators, be dependent on international financial assistance, and be prone to outbreaks of violent conflict.

Following finalisation of the EU Strategy (2014-2016), two major events occurred during 2014. Firstly, the withdrawal of international military forces impacted the security situation and conflict-related violence increased. Secondly, the 2014 presidential elections involved a lengthy election process.

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22 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Agricultural Sector Review, the World Bank, 2014
24 “Today, Afghanistan is in far better shape in terms of human development than it was in 2001: Access to primary healthcare has increased from 9 percent of the population to more than 57 percent; Life expectancy has increased from 44 to 60 years; School enrolment has increased 10 times since 2001, with over 8 million students enrolled in schools, 39 percent of whom are girls. Women hold 27 percent of seats in parliament; The country’s public financial management system is regarded as stronger than other fragile states and many low-income countries; GDP per capita reached USD590, from USD120 in 2001, and current revenue represents 10.5 percent of GDP, from 3.3 percent in 2001, according to the World Bank (2016).” EEAS Fact Sheet 24, July 2017.
25 These observations were in line with evaluations conducted around that time, such as Norway’s and Canada’s evaluations in 2014 and 2015 respectively.
progress that paralyzed the country politically, and international mediation was necessary to reach a conclusion acceptable to the major parties. The impact of these events reverberated through to the end of the evaluation period in 2016. The EU’s support occurred in a context of economic decline and responsibility for security shifting to GIROA. After 2015, the new government had to bring forward a set of policies that would take account of these realities, for example by emphasising self-reliance.

**Figure 2: Afghanistan Timeline 2001-2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Afghan facts and International agreements</th>
<th>EU cooperation framework</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>December 2001 – Bonn Agreement</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lay out of a framework for the political transition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establishment of an interim authority</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2002 – Multilateral Engagement</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mainly reconstruction aid</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ISAF starts</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2003 – Afghan Constitution</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2004 – Presidential Elections</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2006 – Afghan Compact</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Three key areas and benchmarks for reconstruction</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2008 – Afghan National Development Strategy</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Focused on security, governance, economic growth</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2009 – Presidential elections, widespread irregularities</strong></td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taliban resurgence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2010 - Agreement on Transition Process</strong></td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NATO’s intention to transition responsibility for security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Kabul Process - Introduction of the National Priority Programs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Agreement on 80% alignment and at least 50% on-budget support</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2012 Chicago Summit</strong></td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Addressing withdrawal of ISAF combat troops by Dec 2014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2012 – Tokyo Conference</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal of most International Troops</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2014 – London Conference</strong></td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Transformation Decade 2015-2024</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2016- Warsaw Summit on Afghanistan</strong></td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2016 - Brussels Conference on Afghanistan</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• SMAF update and revision (endorsed a set of 24 new deliverables)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Presentation and endorsement of the ANPDF 2017-2021 by the development partners</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: This timeline is based on the figure on page 13 of the “Synthesis Report – Summative Evaluation of Canada’s Afghanistan Development Program”, March 2015.

The GIROA’s recent commitment with donors to pursue new policies for development and self-reliance can be summarised in the following milestones:
2012. At the Tokyo Conference in 2012, the government presented its vision to achieve self-reliance through transformation over the next decade and the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) established a new relationship between the government and donors. The government committed to a series of reforms in five areas (elections, improved public finance management, anti-corruption measures, human rights, and inclusive growth) and donors pledged to improve aid effectiveness and maintain the level of aid commitments by providing USD16b in development assistance between 2012 and 2015.26 This included alignment of 80 percent of aid with the National Priority Programmes (NPPs) and channelling at least 50 percent of development assistance through the national budget.

2014-2015. Consequently, GIRoA presented an ambitious reform agenda at the London Conference on Afghanistan (2014) and the Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework (SMAF) (2015). The reform agenda focused on economic growth, macro-economic stability, good governance, and poverty reduction, and allowed donors to align their support with the government's vision.27

2016. Two important conferences were held, namely the NATO Summit in Warsaw (July) and the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan (October). In July 2016, the countries contributing to the Resolute Support mission and the President and Chief Executive of the National Unity Government met to reaffirm their mutual commitment to ensure long-term security and stability in Afghanistan. Although the level of commitment for military support to Afghanistan was much lower than at its peak, NATO and its operational partners committed to sustain the Resolute Support mission beyond 2016, including ongoing financial and operational support to the Afghan Security Institutions and enhancing the Enduring Partnership between NATO and Afghanistan. In October 201628, more than one hundred countries and international organizations gathered in Brussels to renew their partnership with Afghanistan. Building on the commitments made at the 2012 Tokyo Conference and 2014 London Conference, the international community and the EU+MS recommitted to providing lower but still substantial financial support to Afghanistan as it moves toward self-reliance during its Transformation Decade (2015-2024). Charting the path forward, the government unveiled its reform agenda with a new development strategy, the 2017-2021 Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework (ANPDF) which was endorsed by the international community. Participants also endorsed a set of 24 new deliverables under the SMAF which measure progress in development and reform in 2017-2018.

2.1 Aid funds

Between 2007 and 2015, the Official Development Aid (ODA) commitments to Afghanistan from OECD/DAC donors amounted to USD53.6b29 (EUR47.9b).30 In terms of overall trends over the evaluation period, ODA commitments steadily increased from 2005 to 2010 when it reached a peak...
of USD7.2b, and then decreased from 2011 (see Figure 3 below). Afghanistan receives 84 percent of ODA through bilateral cooperation (see Figure 4) with the USA contributing 45 percent of total ODA. The other major bilateral donors are Japan (included in the non-EU states) and Germany (included in the EU Member States), covering both 8 percent of the total ODA. The EU institutions (including DEVCO and ECHO) follow with respectively 6 percent. It is worth noting that the EU together with the EU MS cover 27 percent of the overall ODA committed during the period 2007-2015, for a total amount of USD14b.

Figure 3: Total ODA Commitments to Afghanistan by top four donors – 2005-2015, USDm

Figure 4: Total ODA Commitments to Afghanistan by donor type – 2007-2014

3 EU Support to Afghanistan 2007-2016

For the period 2007-2013, the reference for EU support was the EU Country Strategy Paper (CSP) 2007-2013. The CSP was informed by lessons learned during the early years such as:

i) the multiplicity of international actors meant that the early spread across a wide range of sectors and provinces should be reduced;

ii) the emphasis on providing immediate humanitarian assistance to refugees should change to tackling long-term development and migration challenges;
iii) human resource development needed to be at the core of support so as to improve governance;
iv) reducing poppy cultivation required delivery of a wide range of services to an area rather than a narrow focus on alternative livelihoods as a single sector or programme; and
v) multilateral trust funds would continue to be a necessary vehicle for channelling substantial budgetary support in the medium term.

The guiding principles for the new CSP therefore emphasised:

i) greater harmonisation with other donors in the spirit of the Paris Declaration, and a focus in sectors where the EU could add value;
ii) mainstreaming of counter-narcotics objectives;
iii) enhancing GIRoA capacity by utilising government structures for implementation, programme areas cutting across the key policy areas of counter-narcotics, security sector reform, and the establishment of rule of law; and
iv) incorporating the EU Communication on Conflict Prevention (2001), giving attention to regional integration, electoral and parliamentary processes, security sector reform, and administration of justice.

The response strategy concentrated on three focal sectors, i.e. rural development, governance, and health as well as three non-focal sectors: social protection, mine action, and regional cooperation. According to the CSP 2007-2013, the overall amount allocated during this period was forecast to be up to EUR1.2b. In terms of sector distribution, the focal sectors of health, rural development, and governance had allocations of 18 percent, 25 percent, and 39 percent respectively, compared with the non-focal sectors of social protection and mine action (each 4-5 percent) and regional cooperation (1-2 percent) (See Chapter 3.1 and Volume 3 Annex C Inventory for further detail). The issues of gender, human rights, environment, and counter-narcotics were also identified as cross-cutting. The emphasis on counter-narcotics was justified by its unique significance in the Afghanistan context and its effect on reconstruction and stabilisation efforts.

For the period 2014-2020, the reference for EU support is the MIP 2014-2020. The MIP establishes the strategic objectives of the EU cooperation in Afghanistan and identifies the sectors and indicative actions for the period 2014-2020. The indicative allocations for this period are up to EUR1.4b (EUR146m more than in the previous strategic period). The MIP is aligned with the EU strategy for Afghanistan 2014-2016 (see below). To achieve those objectives, the MIP emphasises the EU commitment to aid effectiveness principles, also in line with the Agenda for Change and the EU international commitments particularly the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation and the New Deal for Engagement with Fragile States. The MIP acknowledges that Afghanistan is a pilot country covered by the New Deal.

The MIP identifies four focal sectors: agriculture & rural development; health; policing & rule of law; democratisation and accountability with focus on elections, civil society and public financial management. These focal sectors are aligned with the five peacebuilding and state-building goals of the New Deal, which are: legitimate politics; security; justice; economic foundations; revenues and services. The MIP also identifies cross-cutting priorities: gender sensitivity and human rights; sustainable economic growth and job creation; anti-corruption and transparent management of public finances; and counter-narcotics.

The EU Strategy for Afghanistan 2014-2016 adopted by the Council of the European Union provides an overarching framework for the support provided by the EU and EU MS to Afghanistan, 31

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31 "The EU (as well as 13 EU Member States) endorsed the New Deal for engagement in fragile states, one of the main Building Blocks of the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in November 2011. The New Deal commits its signatories to support inclusive country-led and country-owned transition out of fragility and through the Peace and State-building goals (PSGs), as well as the FOCUS and TRUST principles which together provide a framework that builds strong partnerships between FCAS and their international partners”. [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/fragility-and-crisis-management/framework-engagement_en](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/fragility-and-crisis-management/framework-engagement_en)
and in particular for ensuring that support is better coordinated. Its overarching strategic goal is “the development of Afghanistan’s institutions to provide the resilience needed to safeguard progress to date and provide the platform for a more effective and ultimately sustainable Afghan state”. The overall strategic objectives are: promoting peace, stability and security; reinforcing democracy; encouraging economic and human development; fostering rule of law and respect for human rights.

3.1 Overview of the EU funds 2007-2016

Figure 5 presents the distribution of committed (EUR2.09b), contracted (EUR1.98b) and paid (EUR1.2b) amounts throughout the evaluation period 2007 – 2016 by EU, DEVCO. Table 1 below presents the sectoral distribution of the contracted amount during the evaluation period.

In addition to the DEVCO funds, Afghanistan received during the period 2007-2016 through ECHO a total allocated amount of EUR305.6m for 238 projects, see Figure 6 below.

Figure 5: EU-DEVCO Committed/Contracted/Paid amount to Afghanistan by year, 2007-2016 – EURM

![Graph showing committed, contracted, and paid amounts to Afghanistan by year.](image)

Source: DWH/CRIS and own elaboration

32 The figure presents the committed, per year of decisions and the contracted and paid amounts per year of contract.
Table 1: EU-DEVCO Contracted amount by sector and “strategic” period (EUR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of sector</th>
<th>2007-2013</th>
<th></th>
<th>2014-2016</th>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sector</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focal</td>
<td>A&amp;RD</td>
<td>352,165,516</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>107,065,701</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P&amp;RoL</td>
<td>423,717,228</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>90,218,087</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D&amp;A</td>
<td>132,118,397</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>273,070,180</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>258,698,417</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>76,267,787</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-focal</td>
<td>Social protection</td>
<td>32,083,027</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>149,696</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Refugees repatriation</td>
<td>55,297,545</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>29,888,666</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional cooperation</td>
<td>68,515,475</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4,550,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mine</td>
<td>21,750,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-cutting &amp; Thematic</td>
<td>Food security</td>
<td>47,628,060</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>8,300,447</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3,375,189</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Administrative costs</td>
<td>1,854,706</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,118,737</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,402,128,816</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>585,704,043</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EC Datawarehouse and own elaboration

Figure 6: ECHO committed amount by year 2007-2016 – EURM

Source: EU database and own elaboration

More details on the actual disbursements are provided in Volume 3 of this report.
4  RESPONSES TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS

A total of seven evaluation questions (EQs) were formulated and for each EQ a number of judgement criteria (JC) and indicators were defined. Each EQ is linked to one or several of the five OECD/DAC evaluation criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability), as well as the EU evaluation criteria of EU’s added-value 3Cs (coherence, coordination, and complementarity) and cross-cutting issues. These linkages are illustrated in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N.</th>
<th>Evaluation Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EQ1</td>
<td>Relevance and responsiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has the EU’s assistance to Afghanistan corresponded to the need in Afghanistan in light of the evolving country context, and the EU’s own political priorities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ2</td>
<td>Results through sectors (JC Rural dev, Governance/Rule of law, Health)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To what extent has the EU support contributed to improving institutional capacity, policy frameworks and service delivery in the four sectors (governance, rule of law, health and A&amp;RD) – and to tangible improvements in the lives of Afghans?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ3</td>
<td>Aid management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has EUD’s capacity and management been appropriate for ensuring efficient and effective aid delivery in Afghanistan?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ4</td>
<td>Aid modalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are EU’s aid modalities and channels appropriate for ensuring efficient aid delivery in Afghanistan?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ5</td>
<td>Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To what extent has the EU contributed to gender equality and women’s empowerment in the four focal sectors?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ6</td>
<td>Coherence, coordination and complementarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has EU development cooperation been coherent and achieved synergies with the support provided by other development partners and EU’s humanitarian and political engagement?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ7</td>
<td>Do no harm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has the EU’s assistance to Afghanistan avoided having any significant negative effects?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each EQ is linked to one or several of the five OECD/DAC evaluation criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability), as well as the EU evaluation criteria of EU’s added-value 3Cs (coherence, coordination, and complementarity) and cross-cutting issues. These linkages are illustrated in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Added value</th>
<th>3Cs</th>
<th>Cross-cutting issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EQ1 on relevance and responsiveness</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ2 on results</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ3 on Aid management</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ4 on Aid modalities</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ5 on gender</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>XX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ6 on coherence, coordination and complementarity</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td></td>
<td>XX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ7 on do no harm</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The criterion is largely covered by the EQ X The criterion is partially covered in the EQ

33 The EQs were discussed and agreed upon with the Evaluation Unit and the Reference Group.
The EQs have been defined to provide a broad coverage of the underlying intervention logics of EU’s cooperation with Afghanistan and its position in the broader Afghan development context, as shown in Figure 7 below.

**Figure 7: Overall intervention logic for the EU’s cooperation with Afghanistan 2007-2016**
### 4.1 EQ1 Relevance and responsiveness

**EQ 1 – Has the EU’s assistance to Afghanistan corresponded to the need in Afghanistan in light of the evolving country context, and the EU’s own political priorities?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary response to the evaluation question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• EU assistance to Afghanistan was aligned with the development policies and priorities of GIRoA: the CSP 2007-2013 with the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), the MIP 2014-2020 with the TMAF (Tokyo Mutually Accountability Framework), and SMAF (Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework). Notably, EU support adhered to the TMAF agreement that international donors would align 80 percent of aid with the National Priority Programmes (NPPs) of the Afghan government. EU interventions were also aligned with the global New Deal and the Paris Declaration. This close alignment was reflected in strategy and programme documents and appeared to have been a strong consideration in EU programming across all four focal sectors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The guiding principles of EU assistance were to utilise GIRoA structures where feasible in implementing programmes, and to provide continued support to existing national programmes. This was consistent with the Afghan approach to build greater ownership of the development process. For example, during the evaluation period, the EU committed EUR507m to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), the single largest source of on-budget financing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The suitability of EU-supported interventions to the political and operating context in Afghanistan was mixed. For example, EU-funded interventions in A&amp;RD and health have been well-designed around relevant priorities. By contrast, in governance-related sectors, several interventions required major redesigning, due to both weak initial design and a challenging context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The deteriorating security situation shaped the operating context in Afghanistan over the course of the period under evaluation. EU-funded interventions continued under the increasing insurgent activity, with some experiencing delays to deliverables, restrictions on the movement of foreign staff, and limited access to parts of the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• A number of EU programmes addressed two of the drivers of migration: insecurity and employment. The EU focus on migration from 2015 has resulted in the funding of several initiatives aimed at addressing migration-related challenges, including integration of returnees, but it is too soon to assess their relevance or effectiveness.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EU strategies were aligned with GIRoA policies and priorities and responded to changes in those policies.** The CSP and MIPs were formulated with consideration of the development policies and priorities of GIRoA, namely the ANDS, the TMAF, and the SMAF. For example, the MIP 2011-2013 reinforced key action areas arising from the Kabul Conference, which included new national programmes in Rural Development (RD), agriculture, and governance. Under the MIP 2014-2020, EU support to the Health sector was aimed at improving and expanding basic health care delivery services, which was in line with the strategic objective for the health and nutrition sector in the ANDS. In the D&A sector, EU funding to the Support to Credible and Transparent Elections (ELECT II) demonstrated alignment with a key deliverable of TMAF, which was to conduct credible, inclusive, and transparent Presidential and Parliamentary elections in 2014 and 2015. EU support to the Local Integration of Vulnerable and Excluded Uprooted People (LIVE-UP) programme also demonstrated alignment with a GIRoA priority as in 2014, President Ghani announced a priority focus on displacement in his inaugural speech.

A key change in GIRoA policies was a request that donors align funding with national programmes, shifting from project mode. The EU supported the implementation of existing national programmes.

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and from 2011 onwards, EU support was directed towards NPPs established under ANDS. EU support was to a large and growing extent directed to multi-donor trust funds (mainly Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund – ARTF – but also Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan - LOTFA) and contribution agreements with international organisations in line with GiRoA priorities outlined under the ANDS and donor commitments (TMAF), i.e. provision of “on-budget” support and provision of support for GiRoA recurring costs. One example from the A&RD sectors is the Panj-Amu River basin Project (P-ARBP) which shifted from service contracts with an international firm to a contribution agreement with ADB. During the evaluation period, up to EUR907m of the total contracted amount was channelled through trust funds, accounting for 50 percent of the total amount, directed towards ARTF (EUR507m) and LOTFA (EUR400m). (I-111, I-112, I-412)

In the A&RD and Health sectors, funding for interventions was increasingly channelled through the ARTF in line with GiRoA priorities to increase funding for on-budget interventions. In the A&RD sector, funds channelled through ARTF shifted from 20 percent in 2013 to 84 percent in 2015. In the Health sector, where for several years no funds were channelled to trust funds, 71 percent was directed at trust funds in 2013, and 84 percent in 2015 and 2016. In the P&RoL and D&A sectors, 65-92 percent of funds were consistently directed at trust funds during the evaluation period (except in 2010), see figures above.

One example of the positive impact of this shift is that it enabled the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) to decide on capacity building needs and priorities through the System Enhancement for Health Action in Transition Project for Afghanistan (SEHAT). I-111, I-121, I-122, I-412

**EU support to Afghanistan was consistent with overall donor agreements to which the EU was a party, including the ANDS and the TMAF.** The EUD was actively involved in establishing structures that would ensure the delivery of the TMAF commitments. Under the MIP 2014-2020, EUR22m was set aside for incentive allocation within the context of the framework. Similarly, in LOTFA VI, the EUD worked closely with the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) and Member States to ensure the overall coherence of EU efforts in police reform. In the governance sector, EU support to sub-national governance, as outlined in the CSP 2007-2013 and MIP 2014-2020, was aligned with the Governance, Rule of Law, and Human Rights sector of the ANDS, contributing to the National Priority Programme (NPP) for Local Governance. These focal sectors under the MIP 2014-2020 also aligned with the five peacebuilding and state building goals of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. The CSP 2007-2013 made high-level reference to applying the principles of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in the implementation of the CSP. The MIP 2007-2010 acknowledged that the timing for the finalisation of the MIP, which occurred prior to the completion of the ANDS, was in contradiction with the Paris Declaration on donor coordination. To address this, the EU pursued close cooperation with GiRoA during its work on the ANDS to ensure the documents aligned with donor agreements. (I-131, I-131, I-412)

**The strategic focus of EU support across all four sectors has generally been consistent and in line with EU strategies and political interests throughout the period under evaluation.** The move towards increased use of trust funds and contribution agreements is in line with EU’s strategy for support for Afghanistan and the intention to move towards budget support and a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) in the Health and A&RD sectors. The wider EU policy environment had some impact on the strategy towards Afghanistan cooperation. In the CSP 2007-2013, the EU policy regarding trade and drugs policies impacted on the strategy with Afghanistan in which the activities outlined in the CSP aligned with broader EU efforts on demand reduction.

The EU’s political interest in more regional cooperation, identified as a principle of cooperation in the Afghanistan Compact, a cross-cutting issue in the ANDS, and a key area of the Towards Self-Reliance vision, was reflected in diverse interventions. Through the “Heart of Asia” Process, which addresses regional cooperation as an important element for shifting political focus away from conflict and towards encouraging trade and transit, the EU helped build capacities at MoFA’s Regional Cooperation Directorate (RCD) to lead the country’s efforts in promoting regional cooperation.
The EU committed to contributing EUR23m to regional programmes supporting:

(i) improved border management along Afghan frontiers in collaboration with neighbouring countries;
(ii) increased capacities to counter narcotics trade while facilitating legal trade both at the border and through enhanced commercial information sharing; and
(iii) improved efficiency of trade and customs' administration and thus revenue collection.

In accordance with the Istanbul Process, “Border Management in Northern Afghanistan” (BOMNAF) supports initiatives for joint patrolling of mutual borders and encourages the hosting of cross-border joint trainings. BOMNAF has not delivered a number of small-scale outputs that do not seem to have matched the funding and years absorbed, with conflicting assessments of whether this approach is worth continuing. In the area of counter-narcotics, the EU provided support to United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)’s Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries, which focuses on regional law enforcement cooperation, cooperation on legal matters, drug dependence among vulnerable groups, and trends and impacts. The EU has also recently funded regional interventions to address migration-related and development challenges. (I-112, I-131, I-132, I-412)

**With respect to the context of formal politics in Afghanistan at the national and sectoral level, changes to EU strategies were appropriate.** For example, the CSP 2007-2013 promoted a concentration of support to specific sectors (aligning with the Paris Declaration), in contrast to the previous approach that promoted involvement in a wide range of sectors. This was supported by a shift from an immediate post-crisis environment to longer-term BPHS (Basic Package of Health Services) development support, which was more conducive to a greater division of responsibilities amongst three main donors, the EU, USAID, and the WB. At the sectoral level, EU support to MoPH adapted to the capacity of the ministry, as evidenced by the shift in support from the provision of BPHS to include the Essential Package of Hospital Services (EPHS) and capacity building for the ministry. EU support to LOTFA, which focused on police salaries, has also been appropriate given a lack of capacity to reform the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MoIA) and an operating context in which the international community pushed the Afghan National Police (ANP)’s counter-insurgency role. (I-111, I-112)

**EU political advocacy appropriately emphasised anti-corruption in response to the increasingly conducive climate for change following multiple cases of corruption.** Anti-corruption efforts featured minimally in the CSP 2007-2013, whereas the MIP 2011-2013 identified tackling corruption as a goal of the governance sector. In contrast, the MIP 2014-2020 specifically outlined efforts to combat corruption within the governance sector. The increased emphasis in EU dialogue and messaging appeared to result from greater attention and perceived opportunities for anti-corruption following the election of President Ghani, as well as public attention to multiple cases of identified fraud. This approach was appropriate given the EU’s shift towards direct funding to the Ministry of Finance under the State-Building Contract (SBC). The EU is recognised as a leader on anti-corruption due to its advocacy efforts and dialogue engagement, although the EU has not provided significant support for anti-corruption projects for several years (beyond a limited number of projects in support of CSOs working on GIRoA transparency and accountability). (I-112, I-132, I-711, I-713)

**EU-supported interventions often showed some adaptability to developments in the operating context, including growing insecurity, but some interventions were already hampered by weak initial design and planning, resulting in entire programme redesign.** EU support to public financial management under the State Building Contract supports GIRoA in managing its financial security; this flexible approach enables GIRoA to respond to emerging needs as required by the context. In the Health sector, a comparison of processes used by different partners in implementing the BPHS and EPHS was used as the basis for developing a more consistent approach that could be adapted to the context by implementing NGOs. In the governance sector, the EU's support for public administration reform evolved after the previous approach was found to perform poorly. Despite EUR1.8b of support to Public Administration Reform (PAR) from 2002-2011
from the EU alone, donor engagement was unable to build sustainable institutional capacity at the level required to manage the increasing challenges of transition, with EU projects demonstrating failures that were consistent with overall challenges in the sector. Lessons learned led to a shift in delivery of PAR support primarily to the WB-administered Capacity Building for Results (CBR) Project, which was launched in early 2012.

In the policing sector, EU’s strategy on policing has consistently favoured an aim of “civilianising” the ANP. However, this has not been achieved because of the operating context in which short-term security goals were prioritised, with the ANP push to militarise in order to fight the insurgency. According to interviews with EU officials, there is now increased political will to transition the police to a more civilian role, including buy-in from GIROA and the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A). LOTFA Phase VII envisages adapting to this changing context. Other examples of adaptability include:

- the Fight against Trafficking Programme, which was completely restructured ahead of its second project phase, and
- the Justice Service Delivery Project (JSDP) which adapted its design to mitigate the impact of the low levels of success in rule of law reforms in rural communities by concentrating on service delivery that made social and governance changes palatable to rural inhabitants.

This shows responsiveness to the operating context, though the weak rule of law context arguably should have been anticipated. The Afghan Sub-national Governance Programme (ASGP) was reportedly hampered by a lack of political will to move devolution forward, as well as a scope that was too geographically broad, according to interviews and an evaluation. In light of these lessons, changes were made to ASGP, as well as the design of the new Local Governance Project (LoGo) programme, including at the request of partner IDLG. (I-121, I-122)

The shift to indirect management of programmes to reduce management tasks for the European Union Delegation (EUD), was made partly in response to the security restrictions that made it impossible for EUD to monitor implementation on the ground. Programme deliverables were affected by growing insecurity. For example, staff working to implement the BOMNAF intervention were unable to conduct regular field visits to the Kunduz area due to insecurity. In the A&RD sector, Panj-Amu River basin Project (P-ARBP)’s activities were delayed (but still implemented) by growing levels of insecurity in project areas which affected field missions, while some activities in the National Area Based Development Programme (NABDP) could not be implemented. In the Health sector, implementation progress was affected by insecurity to a limited extent, with some delays or cancelled activities. In 2014, the ARTF developed a supervision strategy to map options and introduce flexibility to ensure supervision in a difficult security context. The EUD reports several cases where logframes were changed and the location of activities were changed in response to growing insecurity. (I-122, I-412, I-421, I-433).

In line with priorities set out in the MIP 2014-2020 and the CSO Roadmap 2015-2017, EU-funded actions supported implementing NGOs in the A&RD and Health sectors and, to a lesser extent, supported NGOs and civil society organisations in the governance sector. For A&RD, NGOs were involved in the P-ARBP in community mobilisation, capacity development, and setting up community institutions on social water management and upper catchment and rangeland management. In the Health sector, NGOs have implemented the BPHS and EPHS and there has been engagement with other NGOs to support projects in social protection. In the D&A sector, EUD funding supported international and national NGOs and civil society organisations, with funding aimed largely at capacity building and promoting the role of civil society. Support for strengthening

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35 An external evaluation from 2012 found that the attempted “whole of government” approach to PAR, with multiple donors funding multiple PAR programmes, was poor, with little evidence of a consistent strategy.
36 Funded on-budget through the ARTF, the CBR was intended to rationalize all major development partner assistance for PAR into one operation in order to reduce independent donor interventions, increase government ownership, and provide a mechanism through which to draw capacity into the core service in a manner that provides more institutional sustainability.
37 Programme evaluation of Afghanistan Sub National Governance Programme – I (ASGP I) 2006 to 2010
civil society’s advocacy and watchdog functions occurred through thematic instruments. In the future, this will also be supported through geographic funding under the MIP. One component of LoGo (Local Governance Project - Afghanistan) was aimed at improving civil society’s capacity for oversight of local governance but it is too early to assess impact as the intervention is recent and ongoing. The EUD developed a CSO Roadmap as a strategy for supporting civil society and has aligned programme funding with the goals of the roadmap; several interviewees noted the importance of the roadmap for both facilitating financial actions (including toward smaller organisations) and coordinating political actions. Early achievements include discussions between government and CSOs on the difficulties found in the legal framework, and the signature of a Memorandum of Understanding between the government and the secretariat of Civil Society Joint Working Group to consolidate cooperation. (I-212, I-222, I-231)

**Although they were not designed to specifically address drivers of migration, a number of EU supported programmes addressed two of the drivers: insecurity and unemployment.** In the A&RD sector, interventions supported job creation and income generation in rural areas, improved agricultural skills, and promoted livelihoods opportunities. Other EU-funded interventions were directed at improving security and promoting the rule of law in Afghanistan. Preliminary advancements in addressing insecurity saw Afghanistan transform from a post-crisis setting to a fragile country.

The narcotics trade is a primary threat to stable political development and security and the Fight Against Trafficking programme supports a common regional approach to the illegal drugs trade and organised crime. Similarly, local governance programmes and support to the election process all aim to promote political stability. From this position, GIRoA should be more capable of responding to security threats in their country.

EU support contributed to addressing some of the identified root causes of migration, but evaluations suggest that increased insurgent activity and instability in the country offset most progress made in these areas. Programmes with a focus on migration, principally under the Aid to Uprooted People (AUP), continued supporting Internally Displaced People (IDPs), returnees, and refugees without major adjustments to the programme design and approach. Existing programmes with indirect connections to addressing root causes also continued in a similar vein. LIVE-UP, whose objective was to improve the living conditions of uprooted Afghans (IDPs and returnees) and their host communities, continued to focus on increasing capacity within Afghanistan to integrate returnees. (I-121, I-122, I-141, I-142, JC21)

**The EU focus on migration from 2015 has resulted in the funding of some migration-related interventions, but it is too early to assess their effectiveness and results.** The EU has committed to the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development which recognises the importance of cooperation in sustainable development as well as a regional approach to migration issues. The EU has adopted a regional approach in funding several interventions: “Improving reintegration of returnees in Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan,” a EUR92m regional programme, was adopted in 2016 with the objective to support the sustainable reintegration of returning migrants and to enhance the sustainability of reintegration. Moreover, the EU has funded “Addressing migration and forced displacement challenges in Asia and the Middle East”, a EUR195.7m programme aimed at addressing the challenges posed by protracted forced displacement and migration. Stakeholder consultations were carried out in advance, but little evidence was available to demonstrate that the design of these interventions was informed by (research) data, and it is too early to assess their effectiveness. (I-121, I-132)

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38 CSO-LA, EIDHR
39 DCI
Migration in Afghanistan and EU response

The EU Strategy document 2014-2016 highlighted the challenges posed by migration and the return of refugees and failed asylum-seekers, mainly coming from countries in the region. This challenge has intensified over the latter years of the evaluation period, which coincided with a surge of Afghans (and other nationalities) migrating to Europe. This has become a pressing issue in the relationship between GiRoA, the EU, and Member States. Domestically, Afghanistan faces the threat of losing skilled labour as educated people depart to study and settle abroad making them mostly unavailable to contribute their skills and experience to rebuilding the country. Development Assistance that can help to retain or attract Afghans to deploy their skills domestically creates the potential for a virtuous circle of growth, jobs stability, and investment by Afghans in their own country. Afghanistan is also facing the competing challenge of assisting returning migrants (including forced and voluntary returns) to reintegrate and contribute to the development of Afghanistan. This poses additional economic and social challenges. The EU’s response, as stated in the strategy, was to “strengthen international cooperation to address problems caused by uncontrolled and illegal immigration […] and to facilitate returns to Afghanistan while respecting the 1951 Geneva Convention”\(^41\); this has resulted in the funding of several regional programmes.

Looking forward, the EU will continue to address migration more directly, as the new EU strategy\(^42\) includes migration within the four priority areas together with 1) promoting peace, stability, and regional security, 2) strengthening democracy, the rule of law and human rights, and promoting good governance and women’s empowerment, and 3) supporting economic and human development.

4.2 EQ2 Results

EQ 2 – To what extent has the EU support contributed to improving institutional capacity, policy frameworks and service delivery in the four sectors (governance, rule of law, health and A&RD) – and to tangible improvements in the lives of Afghans?

Summary response to the evaluation question

- EU support has contributed to increased capacity in institutions and, as a result, to improved service delivery. Examples of the improvements that support has contributed to include: a) significantly enhanced access to and utilisation of health services across the country, b) strengthened animal disease prevention and veterinary services, c) enhanced access to quality planting material, d) improved local and municipal revenue collection, and e) improved public sector budgeting processes.
- There is a mixed picture across the four sectors with regard to the effectiveness of policy development and the capacity for the implementation of policy. Support in the A&RD sector focused on enhancing service delivery, through a combination of capacity building and institutional reforms, including promoting public-private partnership as a means to enhance service delivery, generally with good results. In the Rule of Law sector, the focus of support was primarily on service and capacity development, rather than on policy and major institutional reform. In the Health and A&RD sectors, there was progress in policy development, although the Ministries’ capacities to implement has lagged behind. In the governance sector, progress in policy development resulted in Cabinet approval of the Sub-national Governance Policy.

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\(^{41}\) Council Conclusions on Afghanistan, Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, Luxembourg, 23 June 2014

\(^{42}\) Adopted in October 16th, 2017 and is based on a Joint Communication on Elements for an EU Strategy on Afghanistan Elements for an EU strategy on Afghanistan, 24.7.2017 JOIN (2017) 31
• EU support has contributed to improving people’s lives and livelihoods in all four sectors, albeit to varying degrees. Examples of improvements include some enhancements to agricultural productivity and income generation in project sites, reductions in maternal and child mortality rates, and modest improvements in aspects of local and national governance.

• The results achieved are not yet sustainable. This is due, in part, to the need for continued institutional reform and to continued capacity constraints in some ministries and a lack of ownership, as well as GIRoA’s inability to collect sufficient revenue to cover its running costs. As a result, there is a need for continued donor support to maintain achievements. While improvements in capacities and functionality have been achieved in the A&RD sector, there is still a significant need for further capacity development. In the Health sector, policies have been put in place nationally, but the Ministry’s ability to oversee their implementation by partners at the provincial level needs further strengthening. While a large number of international partners in the P&RoL sector have supported the ANP to achieve a change of approach, there is a lack of agreement amongst these partners on what the overall approach to civilian policing should be. Support efforts have been affected by high levels of corruption and limited Ministry capacity.

Agriculture & Rural Development

EU support for the A&RD sector contributed to enhancing the service delivery to agricultural producers. Enhanced service delivery was achieved through a combination of capacity building and institutional reforms. The EU-funded and co-funded actions targeted the enhancement of the institutional capacity at national and sub-national levels to ensure improved delivery of services to rural Afghans. Overall, this strategy has worked well with clear improvements in service delivery capacities and functionality. Institutional reform was promoted in relation to embedding the provision of certain agricultural services in Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) and transferring other services to the private sector in relation to animal health, horticulture, and the seed sector (e.g. with the establishment of a seed certification system), with MAIL assuming a regulatory role. Support was also provided vis-à-vis policy development for improved services delivery, such as the drafting of acts and regulations for animal health and veterinary services (AHDP II43). These reforms contributed to strengthening animal disease prevention and veterinary services (AHDP II) and enhancing the access to quality planting materials (e.g. the project “Support to Afghan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation & Livestock to Contribute to Strengthen the Planting Material and Horticulture Industry” – PHDP II44). Tangible improvements were achieved in disease detection and vaccination and disease prevention campaigns (as described in progress/completion reports, evaluation and ROM reports, and validated in stakeholder interviews).

Another important area of EU engagement was supporting the introduction of integrated basin management in Northeast Afghanistan (Panj-Amu River Basin) in order to enhance agricultural productivity, catchment protection, and ensuring sustainable management of water resources (see Case 1 below). EU support strengthened the capacity of MEW at central and provincial level to implement the Water Law and Water Sector Policy. The Panj-Amu River Basin Programme (P-ARBP) also strengthened community-level water management institutions (e.g. vis-à-vis water allocation and conflict resolution).

The National Solidarity Programme (NSP), which was a flagship programme under the ARTF, mobilised and strengthened tens of thousands of Community Development Councils (CDCs) and reached, through the CDCs, communities with investments in both economic and social infrastructure. However, the level of engagement with CDCs varied45 as did the capacities of the CDCs. The extent to which NSP had tangible impacts on agricultural productivity and incomes is unclear. Similarly, the National Aras Based Development Programme (NABDP) contributed to an

43 Animal Health Development Programme II
44 Support to Afghan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation & Livestock to Contribute to Strengthen the Planting Material and Horticulture Industry
45 Some CDCs received two rounds of block grants and associated capacity support, others only received one round.
enhanced district level capacity to deliver services and infrastructure to rural population. (I-211, I-212)

EU support promoted Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) as a means to enhance service delivery and stimulated private sector development with good results. An important element of enhancing agricultural service delivery was the focus on promoting PPPs. For example, veterinary health care was outsourced to private veterinary field units in six provinces with over 1,000 units provided with training and equipment (AHDPII). This model was later rolled out in a total of 19 provinces with support from other donors. EU support also helped to enhance the involvement of Afghan National Nursery Grower’s Association (ANNGO) in the certification and regulation of horticulture planting materials (ANNGO currently supports 30 nursery grower associations in 26 provinces, assisting around 1,000 nursery growers and, as a result, quality planting material is now available on the market with approximately 3m certified fruit tree saplings produced annually). EU support stimulated private sector development, e.g. with rural business opportunities created for nursery growers and private veterinary service providers. Moreover, support for the seed sector facilitated the establishment of over 100 private seed production companies. (I-211, I-213, I-612)

EU support contributed to enhanced agricultural productivity and rural income generation. Improved agricultural productivity was achieved through a combination of infrastructure development, improved agricultural and natural resource management practices, and to a lesser extent through Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) development and improving market access. Significant investments were made in rural infrastructure. Investments in irrigation infrastructure expanded the area under irrigation (e.g. 147,018 ha under NSP III, 57,598 ha under P-ARBP I, and 560 ha under NABDP) which, in turn, increased agricultural productivity. Moreover, investments were also made in other types of economic infrastructure such as rural energy, roads, market places, and facilitating both market access and value addition as well as social infrastructure, e.g. water supply and schools (ARTF, NABDP). EU has also helped enabling farmers to enhance production through capacity development and better access to inputs, e.g. farmers in 26 provinces are now using improved planting materials and thereby obtaining higher yields and better product quality (HPS, PHDP II), and improved practices vis-à-vis water management has enabled farmers in Northeast Afghanistan to achieve significant yield increases (see Case 1 below). New income opportunities have also been provided through facilitating access to new markets which has led to exports of cherries to Dubai (HPS) and enabled the export of small quantities of certified saplings to Tajikistan, Pakistan, and India (PHDP II). Moreover, more than 100,000 SMEs/rural entrepreneurs, of which 64 percent are women, were provided with employment opportunities support for the development of business plans, and access to finance from loans and saving groups (Afghanistan Rural Enterprise Development Program – AREDP). The results described above are captured clearly in progress reports and other documentation and confirmed by interviews. (I-212, I-213)

Case 1: Improved water resources management in the Panj-Amu River Basin, Northeast Afghanistan

The challenge: Afghanistan is an arid county so agricultural production, food security, and rural livelihoods depend on irrigation to a significant extent. Northeast Afghanistan has the most significant water resources in the country and is considered “the bread-basket of Afghanistan”. However, during the decades of conflict before 2001, irrigation infrastructure deteriorated and broke down. Agricultural productivity is generally low, agricultural potential is under-utilised, and thus poverty is widespread. Moreover, the mountainous upper catchment areas are significantly degraded due to unsustainable natural resources management (NRM) practices; the natural vegetation has been removed and erosion, landslides, droughts, floods, and downstream siltation are significant problems.

46 Under ARTF, A-RBP, K-RBP, P-ARBP, and NABDP
47 Horticulture Private Sector Development Project
48 Afghanistan rural Enterprise Development Program, funded by ARTF
The significant change: GIRoA is introducing integrated water resources management (IWRM) and a basin approach in Afghanistan, and in 2009 passed a new Water Law. This entails the establishment of basin and sub-basin institutions and enhanced participation of communities in local water resource governance through water user associations (WUAs). Related regulations and procedures have also been passed, including procedures for basin agencies and WUAs. However, the implementation of IWRM and the 2009 Water Law is still not fully taking place due to capacity constraints with GIRoA and local stakeholders, and planned Basin Councils are not yet in place. Good progress has been made in the Panj-Amu River Basin, a Basin Agency and 98 WUAs have been established. Irrigation infrastructure has been constructed/rehabilitated and the area under irrigation as well as yields have increased. Natural Resource Management (NRM) associations have been formed in a number of upper catchment areas and are engaged in improving NRM, which enhances incomes while protecting the water supply for downstream irrigation.

EU’s role and added value: The EU has made a major contribution to these significant changes. EU has been supporting the process since 2004 with a series of programmes, i.e. KRBP (Kunduz River Basin Programme), ARBP (Amu River Basin Programme), P-ARBP I (Panj-Amu River Basin Programme) and now P-ARBP II. These programmes have provided technical capacity development and technical advisory for the Ministry of Energy and Water (MEW) at central and basin levels, supported the formulation of the Water Law and related regulation, and provided capacity development for the establishment of the Basin Agency. Moreover, the EU-funded programmes have financed the construction and rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure, e.g. P-ARBP I covered 57,598 hectares with irrigation where agricultural production was significantly increased. The formation and capacity development of the 98 WUAs and of NRM committees was also done under the EU-funded programmes and they were supported in the development of management plans. The WUAs are handling the local water distribution and resolving disputes over water. The NRM committees are engaged. The EU also engaged in dialogue with MEW and MAIL to facilitate the transition to IWRM at the policy level. The long-term and continuing presence and continuity of EU support was a significant added value with continuity being important to results achievement.

Other factors: A major challenge to the IWRM process has been a still unresolved dispute between MEW and MAIL over their respective roles and mandates vis-à-vis water management as well as the roles of the MEW WUAs vs. the MAIL Irrigation Associations. This has seemingly negatively influenced the interest of MAIL, and therefore also their level of engagement in the upper catchment NRM activities. Moreover, challenges related to the change in the modalities from P-ARBP I to P-ARBP II (see EQ4) caused a two-year hiatus in implementation, which was only partly mitigated by an EU bridging grant. Other donors have also supported the transition to IWRM, e.g. ADB and CIDA finance a programme in the Hari-Rud Basin.

Health

There have been significant improvements in both access to and utilisation of health services across Afghanistan as a result of support from the EU and other donors. Significant improvements have been achieved in the availability of health facilities and in the quality of the health services provided; these improvements have been maintained across all provinces in 2015-16\(^{49}\). There were also significant improvements in the utilisation of these health services in important areas such as skilled antenatal care and skilled birth attendance. In 2003, the proportion of women receiving skilled antenatal care was 5 percent, while the Afghanistan Health Survey showed that in 2015 this proportion was 61 percent. Similarly, the proportion of women delivering used skilled birth attendants decreased to 6 percent in 2003 from 58 percent in 2015. The EU provided support to the BPHS (Basic Package of Health Services) in a number of provinces, making a direct contribution to these improvements. For example, in Nangarhar Province, support enabled an increase in the number of female health workers which, in turn, increased the number of safe deliveries and thus

\(^{49}\) Balanced Scorecard Reporting, 2015 and 2016
contributed to reductions in maternal and child mortality and morbidity, as well as contributing to greater vaccination coverage. (I-222)

**EU support has contributed to policy reform and improved policy frameworks.** The EU also played a leading role in relation to prison health, mental health, and disability. Sector development planning has been improved and led to consistently improved access to and utilisation of health services across the country. In particular, EU played a leading role in ensuring that prison health was transferred to MoPH and that mental health and disability were included in BPHS and EPHS (see Case 2 below), as confirmed in evaluation reports and in a range of interviews with stakeholders. Moreover, MoPH has increasingly been able to take on oversight responsibilities from donors. Donors have worked in a coordinated manner, firstly to develop efficient and effective approaches to service delivery in the Health sector and secondly, to ensure that MoPH has the capacity and ability to take on a national stewardship role. However, while the policy framework has improved, MoPH’s ability to ensure its implementation still lags behind, as is recorded in reviews and evaluations. (I-221)

**The capacity of the MoPH remains uneven, with a need for continued support in overseeing the delivery of health services and social services being affected by a lack of ownership by GIRoA.** The results of EU’s direct support are mixed. The transfer of prison health from the Ministry of Justice to MoPH worked well. Moreover, the functioning of MoPH has improved, sustainability depends on continued support, as evidenced in reviews and evaluations. EU support has contributed to the development of policies, but MoPH’s ability to oversee implementation requires improvement and there are signs that these capacity issues have negatively impacted on service delivery. In terms of the uptake of some health services, specifically the use of contraceptives by women, initial improvements have not been maintained. The BPHS/EPHS Implementers Comparison Study (2013) indicates contraceptive prevalence rates of 5 percent in 2003, 16 percent in 2007, and 22 percent in 2010, but the Afghanistan Health Survey in 2015 estimated that only 16 percent of women used a modern method of contraception.

There are concerns about sustainability, particularly linked to the utilisation of services and to the sustainability of capacity in the Health sector. Considerable efforts have been made to build capacity within the health systems, with the training of thousands of health workers and ensuring the capacity of MoPH to procure health services nationwide. Nevertheless, there is considerable demand for these health services. For example, in Nangarhar Province there were issues around the increasing over-utilisation of the hospital and increased number of emergency and casualty cases with patients bypassing the primary level health facilities and self-referring. This has resulted in the use of limited resources for ordinary care, compromising the quality of health services.

Concerns about sustainability also affect social protection services. Until 2010-2011, the EU provided direct support to NGOs providing social protection services. However, these projects did not succeed in demonstrating effective models of service provision and were thus unsustainable. The two sample projects delivered by NGOs achieved their outputs and provided support to their intended beneficiaries: a) support to street children to encourage them to attend formal education, and b) support to women and their children in prison. The services developed for street children were not taken up by GIRoA and so were not sustained. The support to women and their children in prison continues through continued donor support. In both cases the lack of sustainability is due to a lack of ownership by GIRoA and a lack of willingness to invest sufficient resources, as is described in reviews and evaluations and confirmed in interviews. (I-211, I-222)

**Case 2: The Inclusion of Mental Health and Disability Services in the Delivery of the BPHS and EPHS**

The challenge: There is a high prevalence of mental health disorders in the Afghan population which, along with disability, constitutes a major part of the total burden of diseases in the country. It is also estimated that at least 2.7 percent of the population (around 750,000 people) is affected by severe disability. Both mental health and disability services were integrated into the BPHS and EPHS packages in 2005 and 2009 respectively. Nevertheless, problems remain and a lack of mental health professionals is a major bottleneck given that most of the services are located in...
major cities. There is a clear need for training for disability professionals, such as physiotherapists and orthopaedic technicians, in order to provide accessible services.

The significant change: Mental health was incorporated as part of the EPHS and BPHS, particularly in the primary health care services, from 2003. From 2010, the Mental Health Department of MoPH developed a National Mental Health Strategy and oversaw the implementation of training modules for the integration and follow up of Mental Health and Psychosocial Care into BPHS. In 2006, a Disability Rehabilitation Unit was established within MoPH. The Unit has since managed to get approval for the Disability and Rehabilitation Strategy of the Health Sector in 2011, has finalised and implemented the technical guidelines for rehabilitation services for BPHS-EPHS providers, and has continued to train health staff in a number of provinces in disability and rehabilitation.

EU’s role and added value: The EU support has consisted of providing international expertise to establish and develop strategies for the mental health and disability sections of MoPH and the provision of training for field staff in these two areas, with the training of large number of Psychosocial Counsellors, Orthopaedic Technicians, and Physiotherapists. EU support has been effective due to the consistency of focus and funding over a long period and the flexibility of use of funds, such as the use of off-budget funds for training much needed staff. The EU has used its experience and its well-established track record to advocate for and influence the incorporation of the Mental Health Services as part of the contracts for BPHS and EPHS with NGOs in WB and USAID supported provinces. The EU has similarly worked hard to create consciousness among health care administrators and professionals on disability awareness and the need for physical rehabilitation and psychosocial rehabilitation.

Other factors: Throughout the period of the evaluation, the EU has been the only major donor focused on mental health and disability in the Health sector. Major factors affecting the sector are the continuing constraints on trained staff and the lack of sustainable resources to be able to provide health services. The training of staff is ongoing as there continue to be problems with recruiting and retaining skilled staff, particularly for remote and conflict-affected areas. Throughout the period of the evaluation, the government has failed to provide sufficient resources to support the Health sector. This issue is compounded by pressures for BPHS and EPHS providers to deliver a greater range of basic health services using the same resources, with little scope to increase resource availability from government.

Democracy & Accountability and Policing & Rule of Law

EU support from 2007-2016 has contributed to modest improvements in the governance sectors. EU-funded interventions have produced mixed results, with improvements mostly associated with EU-funded capacity development and service delivery projects in the areas of public sector management and budgeting. For example, capacity building at the sub-national level through Local Governance Project (LoGo) sought to improve the capacities of 34 Provincial Councils to oversee service delivery and introduced revenue planning in 40 municipalities. The Municipal Governance Support Programme (MGSP) established data models for municipal tax collection and tax collection targets and conducted municipal finance self-assessments across all five provinces. The Afghanistan Subnational Governance Programme (ASGP) was also instrumental in supporting the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), including in establishing a capacity building unit and programme. With respect to policing, EU support to LOTFA contributed to promoting police community partnerships for enhanced local security, with the Community Policing Secretariat launched in 2012 with a mandate to develop a national community policing policy; however, this was only a very small part of LOTFA, which was principally directed towards paying salaries of Afghanistan National Police (ANP) and Central Prisons Department (CPD) staff. Other tangible improvements are yet to be seen as the shift toward capacity-building is very recent. Generally, there appears to have been progress made at the output level with limited positive developments at the outcome level; for example, an external evaluation found that while many activities under ASGP I were conducted and some progress was made on the outputs, “there was no benchmarked verifiable evidence that it reached the intended outcome to ensure public services.”
Additionally, a number of projects (e.g. ASGP and the Fight Against Trafficking from/to Afghanistan) did not appear to be prepared for predictable risks, which limited improvements, and required major redesign. (I-232, I-233)

**EU support contributed, to some extent, to improved oversight of state institutions by civil society or oversight bodies during the period under review, but the impact of interventions that sought to increase civic engagement and citizen participation in the democratic process was limited.** Supporting civil society was a focus of the D&A focal sector in the MIP 2014-2020, and an EU Country Roadmap (2015-2017) was developed for engagement with civil society; during the period in review, the EU participated in advocacy and CSO coordination bodies. One component of LoGo was aimed at improving civil society’s capacity for oversight of local governance, but there is little evidence of significant impact so far. In 2014 and 2015, the EU provided several grants (>EUR0.5m each) aimed at supporting the “watchdog” role of civil society or oversight bodies, including support to the media. It is too soon to determine the impact of these interventions. The EU’s continuing commitment to CSO engagement is demonstrated through the 2016 Call for Proposals under CSO-LA programme which aims to support the development of organic CSO coalitions to develop a joint vision and advocacy strategy. During the evaluation period, EU activities also supported the work of independent bodies such as the Independent Electoral Commission, supported by the ELECT II programme and the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG). However, these were not civil society organisations, nor did they provide any oversight mechanism to government activities. Further, according to evaluations, they appeared to be influenced to some degree by government bodies. On the other hand, EU-funded interventions engaged more significantly with citizen participation and civic engagement. The MGSP targeted towards improving the functioning of Municipal Advisory Boards, which present an opportunity for citizen participation and engagement in municipal affairs. Technical support and training was provided to the IDLG under LoGo, which increased the IDLG’s capacity to orient local governance across the country by opening spaces for communities’ participation. It is too soon to assess whether this has resulted in tangible improvements. The ELECT II programme sought to strengthen the capacity of citizens to use the electoral process to keep the government in check. To some extent, the programme increased this capacity by reducing the rate of voter fraud experienced during the 2009-2010 elections. However, the prevalence of vote fraud suggests the capacity of citizens to perform an oversight role during the electoral process remains limited. (I-231)

**An unfavourable operating environment negatively impacted the results of EU support.** A lack of political commitment to devolution by GIRoA may have impacted on the effectiveness of public sector management at the sub-national level. Rural sub-national governments in particular were challenged by a lack of financial devolution. In the policing sector, EU’s support to improving the capacity of the ANP to engage in civilian policing did not achieve significant impact due to its involvement in counter-insurgency activities, which was supported by some donors other than the EU. *(This issue was discussed in programme documents and interviews.)* However, there is now a growing consensus among EU donors and other stakeholders (GIRoA, CSTC-A) in favour of the civilianisation of the ANP because of the change in military strategy. (I-232, I-233)

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**Case 3: Reducing Corruption in the ANP through Payroll Support**

**The challenge:** Afghanistan does not collect sufficient revenues to pay the number of police that the government and its international supporters believe it needs. In many parts of the country, police face non-state armed groups and have been asked to play a counter-insurgency role in the military strategy of the government and international forces. The ANP has expanded in an attempt to fill those roles, but the quality of policing remains low. A further complication is that powerbrokers and local warlords are incentivised to insert themselves in the police chain of command due to the nature of police activity in Afghanistan, which involve weapons and activities like establishing checkpoints. These incentives and the political untouchability of people associated with the Ministry of Interior make the police payroll extremely vulnerable to corruption.
**The significant change:** The Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA) was established in 2002 as a mechanism to enable the international community to mobilise resources to support the ANP. Supporting an internationally-backed structure to pay police salaries has mitigated massive risks associated with corruption, with having unpaid police officers in the field, and with a reduced armed state presence in contested areas. International engagement in the police payroll increased the likelihood that police stayed in the field and reduced the scope for corruption (although it did not eliminate it). The registration, disbursement, and follow-up on salaries also inculcates a sense among officers that they are part of a national force, rather than purely serving at the pleasure of a local commander.

**EU’s role and added value:** Since 2002, the EU has been actively involved in the rule of law sector and is one of the largest contributors to LOTFA, contributing EUR403m in disbursements as of July 2016. The EU’s contribution has supported LOTFA in paying the salaries of more than 150,000 ANP officers and 6,000 Central Prison Department (CPD) guards. The EU’s support enabled officers in all 34 provinces to be paid in a timely and transparent manner, and the regular release of funds to MoF in the form of quarterly advances has contributed to the overall effectiveness of police functions and led to improved security. Overall, LOTFA has helped to enlarge the ranks of the ANP and enabled these officers to remain active in the field, providing security services, and countering insurgency forces.

**Other factors:** It is plausible that a lack of international support to police salaries would simply have led the government to pay police out of the general budget, so an absence of EU support would not have meant an absence of police. However, there would probably have been fewer in number and/or less effective. A major factor of influence has been the US-led military strategy that has required the police to be a militarised counter-insurgency force. Foreign military engagement with the police has contributed directly to their budget, equipment, and operations. It has also oriented government interlocutors towards these foreign military actors. All of these factors have reduced the scope for “civilianising” the police force.
4.3 EQ3 Aid management

EQ 3 – Has EUD’s capacity and management been appropriate for ensuring efficient and effective aid delivery in Afghanistan?

Summary response to the evaluation question

- In the 2007-2013 period, the EUD faced severe difficulties in recruiting and retaining international staff and was confronted with a deteriorating security situation which affected the ability of staff to travel and resulted in the relocation of staff to Brussels for most of 2012. The EUD found ways to maintain the oversight of a very complex programme and to continue to monitor the delivery of the programme, despite security issues. While the EUD maintained the oversight of the portfolio, these capacity issues had an effect on policy dialogue, despite the use of external expertise. While the EUD was able to make contributions to policy dialogue, both nationally and sectorally, there were demands for more significant contributions to both dialogue and donor coordination.
- Efforts were made from 2010 onwards to change the way the development cooperation was delivered, although these efforts were not consistent across the programme. In the health and A&RD portfolios a significant shift was made from directly contracting support to provision of support through the ARTF, with supervision/monitoring delegated to the WB. The direct result of this was that the EUD was able to focus more time and effort on policy dialogue and coordination, both things that were noted by other donors.
- From 2014, with staff capacity freed up, the EUD has been able to engage more effectively in coordination and policy dialogue. One significant example was the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan in 2016 where the EU reaffirmed its political commitment to the stabilisation and subsequent development of Afghanistan and which led to some further important results, such as agreement on the SMAF indicators. The more recent SBC budget support provides new opportunities for policy dialogue with GIROA at the strategic level.

Recruiting and keeping sufficient staff has been problematic for the EUD. From 2007 to 2013 the EUD faced difficulties in finding international staff to work in Afghanistan and in retaining experienced staff. This had severe impacts on the capacity of exiting staff due to their increased workloads. The deteriorating security situation from 2007 onwards has impacted on the ability of the Delegation to manage the portfolio and oversee project implementation, with external expertise used in dialogue processes while monitoring was increasingly carried out using indirect methods. In 2012, the security situation became so hazardous that all DEVCO staff were temporarily relocated to Brussels, a situation that lasted for the whole year and continued to have effects into 2013. While the situation has improved to a certain extent, significant difficulties in recruiting and keeping experienced staff remain, affecting the EUD as well as its partners and other donors, as described in the EUD’s own reporting and confirmed in interviews. (I-311)

After a significant rationalisation of the portfolio, from 2014 onwards, the EUD was able to both manage the portfolio more effectively and focus on the roles that it should be able to assume. From 2010 onwards, significant efforts were made to address the issue that the portfolio was too dispersed. Good examples of both the efforts made and the results achieved can be found in the A&RD and Health portfolios. In 2011, efforts were made by the EUD, in close coordination with the relevant ministries, to substantially rationalise and streamline the overly complex portfolios. The results of the changes to the portfolio management were realised by 2013 when the number of contracts was reduced and a transition from direct management by the EUD to an increased use of indirect management carried out by international organisations. The analysis of the portfolio shows a decrease in the number of new contracts signed each year, from a peak of 90 contracts in 2010 to 56 in 2015 and 40 in 2016, and a steady decline in the total number of contracts managed from a peak of 335 in 2012 to 132 in 2016. The proportion of EU support through multi-donor trust funds (ARTF, LOTFA) increased significantly from 40 percent in 2007-2012, to 56.5 percent in 2014 and 71-74 percent in 2015. In 2014 and 2015, the efforts to streamline the portfolio and to utilise modalities that reduced the pressure on delegation staff began to pay off. In both years over 70
percent of the portfolio was implemented through indirect management, releasing EUD staff resources to engage in sector coordination and policy dialogue, with clear evidence from the inventory and confirmation in interviews. (I-311, I-312, I-412)

Some contributions were made by the EUD to policy dialogue and coordination in 2007-2013, albeit unevenly due to capacity constraints. From 2007 to 2010 there was an uneven capacity to respond effectively to the call for more significant contributions from the EUD to policy dialogue and coordination, especially in relation to the trust funds. The EUD faced considerable limitations, such as the constraints in recruiting of policy-oriented staff. This had the effect of confining the EUD to what was described in one Management Report as a “second league of those donors just following what has been decided by others based on a clearly different policy agenda”. Despite the limited capacity, the contributions made were improved, such as to the drafting of sector strategies under the ANDS framework as documented in EUD reporting. Contributions were also made at the sector level, including police reform, customs, justice, statistics, public health, agriculture, and latterly in the support to elections and local governance. In the health, rule of law, and democracy & accountability sectors the EUD commissioned evaluations, data collection, and reviews of significant existing support to assess progress made in these programmes and to identify recommendations for taking further support forward. There are good examples in all of the sectors where findings were shared widely and where recommendations have been taken forward. Clear and direct links between the results of these assessments and policy dialogue are confirmed by evidence from evaluations and interviews. The EU-supported comprehensive “Afghanistan Living Condition Survey” conducted by the Central Statistics Organization contributes to enabling GIRoA and development partners to make informed decisions in development planning and policy-making. The 2012 Afghanistan Joint Health Sector Review was commissioned by the EU and was used in policy dialogue with the MoPH to influence the development of subsequent EU funding of the Health sector, working with other donors through the ARTF and providing joint support to the System Enhancing for Health Actions in Transition (SEHAT) Programme. (I-312, I-321, I-322, I-611)

The changes to the portfolio enabled the EUD to engage more effectively in policy dialogue from 2013. The EUD was able to play a more active role in policy dialogue, as documented in EUD reporting and confirmed by interviews with both government and other donors. This, in turn, enabled the EUD to look forward, setting out the key ‘outward facing’ roles that the EU can and should play, including leading and actively contributing to policy dialogue with the government, particularly in the EU focal sectors, and taking a lead role in aid effectiveness, e.g. through the Brussels Conference in 2016. Important outcomes at the sector level, which stakeholders attribute to the EUD’s advocacy, include the contribution made in the Health sector to a more coordinated approach, with the ARTF being used as the funding stream, and the establishment and endorsement of the agricultural NPP “National Comprehensive Agriculture Production and Market Development Program”. More recently, the State Building Contract (SBC) budget support has provided the EU with a valuable entry point for a more strategic and political focus in the policy dialogue with the Ministry of Finance (MoF). (I-322, I-221, I-413)

Visibility of EU Development Support

Since 2014, considerable efforts have been made by the EUD to improve the visibility of the EU’s support to Afghanistan. An innovative approach, based on a communications strategy for the EUD, has been taken with a baseline survey recording perceptions of EU support and pooling a number of programmes into a single fund for visibility. This fund has been used for central contracts to professionally develop and produce materials, such as a photo archive and high-quality video production, and to organise events both in Kabul and in the provinces. The approach taken in Afghanistan has been recognised as an example of good practice in the EU and there are plans to replicate the approach elsewhere.50

50 Interview 212.
4.4 EQ4 Aid modalities

Are EU’s aid modalities and channels appropriate for ensuring efficient aid delivery in Afghanistan?

Summary response to the evaluation question

- EU support is gradually moving from a project approach with multiple contracts under direct management towards a programmatic approach with fewer, larger contracts with an increased use of contribution agreements where the management is sub-delegated to international organisations and especially trust funds (ARTF, LOTFA). This transition has at times had some challenges causing some disruption to delivery.
- EU support is increasingly focusing on using GIROA systems for delivery. A large and increasing proportion of support is provided on-budget (e.g. through trust funds), and in 2016 a State Building Contract (SBC) was signed for budget support provided directly to GIROA. While there are significant advantages to providing support on-budget, such as increased GIROA ownership, better coordination and strengthening of national systems, there are also dis-advantages as funding for on-budget interventions tends to be less flexible and procurement more time consuming, negatively affecting implementation speed and the achievement of results. This in turn can negatively impact the reputation of GIROA.
- Government ownership and leadership was systematically sought and promoted, (a notable example being the use of trust funds delivering through GIROA), but not always fully achieved. When real GIROA ownership and commitment was not in place, it negatively affected implementation and caused delays and in some cases led to cancelled outputs and components.
- Overall, the partners contracted by EU for support delivery (grant recipients, service providers, international organisations) were well selected and, for the most part have performed well, albeit with a few notable exceptions.

EU support has gradually shifted towards increased use of indirect management and trust funds, which are now dominant elements of EU support. During the period under evaluation, EU support has been streamlined significantly with a major move towards fewer and larger contracts, increasing the share of support provided as indirect management and to multi-donor trust funds (ARTF, LOTFA). In 2007, 40 percent of EU’s support was channelled through trust funds; by 2015 the share had risen to 71-74 percent. The number of contracts in support to CSOs under thematic instruments has reportedly been reduced from over 50 in 2015 to around 25 in mid-2017 to prevent fragmentation, in line with the approach identified in the CSO Roadmap. (1-412)

The rationale behind the shift was clearly articulated; it was aligned to delivery of EU’s commitments to GIROA, in line with EU’s preference for moving towards SWAp and budget support, and was better adapted to the EUD’s internal capacity. However, the transition has not been without challenges. The rationale behind the transition from numerous contracts under direct management to indirect management and trust fund support is threefold. Firstly, it is conducive for alignment with development partners’ agreements with GIROA and commitments towards supporting national priorities (NPPs) providing most support on-budget and contributing to GIROA’s recurrent budget, as per the Paris Declaration (2005), the Afghanistan Compact (2006), the Kabul Process (2010), and the TMAF (2012). Secondly, supporting the large multi-donor trust funds can facilitate donor-coordination and a gradual move towards SWAp and budget support (in the Health and A&RD sectors). Lastly, it is better adapted to the EUD’s capacity to operate in a very difficult context, ensuring that a level of monitoring of implementation on the ground can take place in a high-risk environment by using the systems and capacities of multilateral institutions (WB, UNDP, ADB) and it reduces the administrative and oversight burden on the EUD, releasing much-needed staff resources for a more strategic engagement with GIROA and other development partners.

However, from a results-delivery perspective, the transition has not been without challenges. In the case of P-ARBP, the shift from service contracts with companies and grant agreements with NGOs...
to a single contribution agreement with the ADB for P-ARBPII resulted in a two-year gap period and a partial implementation hiatus for an otherwise well-performing programme (which had also been characterised by a high degree of continuity between different phases). Nonetheless, the negative effects were partly mitigated with a bridging service contract. Whether the programme will perform as well under the new setup remains to be seen.

On-budget has a number of advantages, such as alignment with GiRoA goals, enhanced GiRoA ownership, strengthening GiRoA systems, and better coordination (and therefore less duplication). However, there are some disadvantages compared to off-budget support, such as slow and cumbersome procurement and thus less flexibility to react to emerging needs and opportunities (confirmed in several interviews). Moreover, GiRoA’s absorption capacity is insufficient, as evidenced by low and declining spending rates. Hence, the service delivery to communities may be negatively affected and impact may be lower, at least in the short to medium term. The move towards on-budget interventions and shifting the balance more towards high-level government engagement to push on-budget interventions could risk being at the expense of the attention paid by donors to capacity development for civil society, which needs continued and political influence; the flagship (failure) on capacity development (Tawanmandi) showed that this would require further attention. An additional risk is that if funding for CSOs/NGOs is channelled through GiRoA, the advocacy and watchdog role played by some CSOs/NGOs could be compromised due to the dependence on GiRoA for funding. In a situation where the public oversight bodies have demonstrably failed (e.g. on elections), there is justification for continued support for constructive civil society approaches to these topics. As a means to address this issue, the EUD foresees an increase in the support provided to civil society in the justice sector (AAP 2017). (I-412)

**With the State Building Contract (SBC) package, the EU is providing budget support directly to GiRoA for the first time. The EUD assessed that GiRoA was ready for this, but budget support is still associated with considerable risk.** The SBC package will provide GiRoA with budget support in 2017-2018. The EUD has duly carried out assessments of the four budget support eligibility criteria (policies and reforms, stable macro-economic framework, public financial management, and transparency and budget oversight). The EUD assessments generally confirm budget support readiness, and some of the tranches are conditional upon achievement of agreed milestones. However, corruption remains endemic in Afghanistan (with a global ranking of 169 of 176 countries in 2016), so there is still considerable risk associated with the provision of budget support, as also evidenced by the corruption within MoIA/ANP related to LOTFA-funded salary payments (see EQ7). Nevertheless, the EUD’s impression so far is that GiRoA is strongly committed to the SBC and the EUD intends to fund complementary measures under the new GiRoA-WB PFM programme; thereby offering complementary technical assistance, capacity building, and specific PFM interventions to mitigate fiduciary risks. The EU is also supporting GiRoA budget through the SMAF Incentive Mechanism, but this support is channelled through the ARTF ad hoc window and risk is thus reduced by the use of WB fiduciary mechanisms. Moreover, the EU is considering blending as a means to stimulate agribusiness development, job creation, exports, and thereby economic growth. (I-412, I-413, EQ7)

**Grant recipients and service providers were generally well selected and, for the most part, performed well.** International partners (firms, NGOs, international organisations) usually managed projects well\(^{51}\), with the UNDP-managed ASGP and the micro-hydropower component of the NABPD as exceptions. Financial resources were usually managed transparently and efficiently. Moreover, the Technical Assistance (TA) provided by international consulting firms under service contracts was generally of a high quality, according to interviewed stakeholders and available ROMs and evaluations, although recruitment of qualified experts was at times a challenge due to the security situation in Afghanistan. The national partners were also well-selected, e.g. the use of Afghanistan National Horticulture Development Organization (ANHDO) for the implementation in HPS, was very appropriate given ANHDO’s role and position in the horticulture sector. A few issues were experienced with national implementing partners; ANHDO’s board of directors interfered in day-to-

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\(^{51}\) Based on an assessment of the sample projects
day management of HPS, but the issue was eventually resolved after action was taken (see EQ7), and there was a case of staff of the Independent Election Commission embezzling project funds in ELECT II (election support). Many interventions were affected by delays, but in the case of international partners, these were rarely caused by issues related to the performance of the implementing partners or capacity (as confirmed by available evaluations, ROMs, and interviews). However, a general shortcoming in many interventions (especially in the A&RD sector) was weak monitoring of the achievement of outcomes and impacts; the monitoring was often largely limited to activities and outputs. This has, for example, been a longstanding issue for the programmes under ARTF (except for ARTF support for the Health sector). With an output and activity focus, monitoring is not providing strategic and results-oriented guidance for the implementation, and needs and opportunities for reorientation to enhance results may have been missed. In contrast, the release of performance-based tranches of SBC and SMAF support are directly linked to the progress achieved vis-à-vis the targets for agreed outcome and impact indicators. The SBC indicators are linked to the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) Framework and also to the revenue collection from the extractive industries, whereas the SMAF has several indicators agreed between GIRoA and development partners in relation to governance, PFM, institutional reform, gender, as well as some more sector-specific indicators. (I-421, I-422, I-424, EQ7)

**Significant attention was given to the promotion of GIRoA leadership; this approach generally worked well and was conducive for implementation, but in some cases insufficient ownership and limited commitment to devolution negatively affected implementation.** In general, the EU funded projects promoted GIRoA ownership and a gradual transfer of leadership to GIRoA, as evidenced by a) the introduction of the Transition Project focusing on enhancing MAIL’s capacity to provide or regulate agricultural services; and b) the general trend for UNDP (the recipient of several contribution agreements) to increasingly implement through its national implementation modality with GIRoA being responsible for implementation and reducing the use of direct implementation by UNDP. However, for ELECTII, the national implementation modality likely enabled IEC staff to misappropriate funds (see EQ7), so direct implementation by UNDP will be reintroduced.

While GIRoA proactively engaged in projects in some cases, in other cases, especially in the A&RD sector, the GIRoA counterpart did not engage sufficiently nor in a timely manner. This, coupled with GIRoA capacity constraints, was the main factor causing delays and implementation shortcomings (according to a several available progress, evaluation and ROM reports, and confirmed by interviews with GIRoA staff and other stakeholders). One example is AHDP-II, where the Steering Committee did not meet, activities were delayed, and one component was cancelled due to little progress. Project design shortcomings were another factor. Moreover, project staff were generally not retained after project completion. (I-421, I-423)

**The trust funds have generally been conducive for GIRoA ownership and alignment of donor support with key GIRoA-donor agreements.** As GIRoA is responsible for the implementation of the programmes funded by ARTF and LOTFA and, since both trust funds are focused on supporting the implementation of ANDS and the NPPs, overall GIRoA ownership is high. However, line ministries felt that their positions were not always taken into account adequately by the ARTF fund manager (the WB). The use of national systems for delivery, combined with the fiduciary standards of international organisations, has made ARTF the vehicle of choice for provisions of on-budget interventions and thus a key mechanism for donors, including the EU, for meeting their obligations under TMAF and SMAF. LOTFA has not been able to achieve the same level of donor commitment, seemingly due to weaker performance than ARTF. Both trust funds have demonstrated an ability to adapt to change and respond to GIRoA requests. However, donors, including the EU, are to a significant extent, “preferencing” (soft earmarking) their support for ARTF for specific programmes. This is, to some extent, undermining the trust fund principle and enhancing rigidity/reducing flexibility but, at the same time, it allows the EU support to be aligned with the MIP. (I-433, EQ1, JC61)

**ARTF has generally been well managed, but LOTFA has faced challenges.** Overall, ARTF management arrangements have performed well with both GIRoA and donors committed to ARTF. ARTF has a central role in the delivery of on-budget interventions and high-level GIRoA-donor agreements; the use of national systems for delivery is a key factor behind this.
Overhead/transaction costs are low, financial control mechanisms are in place, and transparency and accountability is high (as confirmed by progress reports, available evaluations, and interviews with GIRoA and development partner staff). Moreover, the use of contractors, e.g. for technical inputs, has generally worked well. LOTFA has been less well-managed than ARTF; donor-commitment has not always been as strong (e.g. short-term funding horizons, focus by donors on bilateral measures in this sector), and there have been weaknesses in UNDP’s management. According to interviewees, for example, no agreement had been made on how to manage what donors and UNDP report was USD400-600m of unspent funds at the end of 2016. In 2012, LOTFA was affected by fraudulent activity (see EQ7). Nevertheless, it should be noted that compliance and effectiveness of LOTFA has improved over the years. Impact and outcome monitoring has generally been insufficient for both trust funds, other than for ARTF support to the Health sector, where outcome tracing is done systematically. (I-432, I-433, EQ7).

**Overall, implementation timeliness has been relatively good for ARTF and LOTFA, but the use of national systems has caused delays.** The overall timeliness of EU co-funded ARTF programme, has, for the most part, been good, i.e. in the cases of AREDP\(^{52}\), MISFA\(^{53}\), NSP\(^{54}\), NRAP\(^{55}\), and SEHAT\(^{56}\). However, GIRoA capacity constraints and weaknesses in GIRoA systems have caused delays, e.g. cumbersome procurement processes, major delays in disbursements of CDC block grants from MoF under NSP, and delays in payment of contractors under NRAP. Similarly, LOTFA implementation has been negatively affected by weaknesses in GIRoA and MoIA administration; the payment of ANP salaries has overall been timely, but remains a challenge. (I-431, I-433)

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\(^{52}\) Afghanistan rural Enterprise Development Program  
\(^{53}\) Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan  
\(^{54}\) National Solidarity Programme  
\(^{55}\) National Rural Access Program  
\(^{56}\) System Enhancing for Health Actions in Transition
4.5 EQ5 Gender

EQ5. To what extent has the EU contributed to gender equality and women’s empowerment in the four focal sectors?

**Summary response to the evaluation question**

- There are a number of examples where the EU has contributed to progress towards gender equality results, such as in the Health and D&A sectors. In Health, in particular, there have been significant improvements in access to and utilisation of key maternal and childcare health services. In Governance, there has been an increase in the participation of female candidates in the 2013 provincial elections, while in rural development there have been successful efforts such as the inclusion of women in Community Development Councils (CDCs) and support to woman rural entrepreneurs.

- Despite support over a number of years from donors, including the EU, to develop gender capacities in ministries and departments, there are relatively few examples of successful results. While there have been some practical changes, such as increases in the numbers of female staff in health services and the police, there is still a need for continued support to ensure that gender issues are understood and are taken forward as policy objectives and indicators. The EUD’s coordination and high-level advocacy on strategic gender issues in policy and political dialogue, such as around the implementation of the Elimination of Violence against Women Law and the development of the National Action Plan on the UN Security Council Resolution on Women, Peace and Security (Resolution 1325), were particularly noted by the donors and civil society.

- One of the key factors for the patchy results achieved across the EU’s programmes was the lack of consistent gender mainstreaming in programmes in the four sectors. While gender was analysed in each sector, often identifying significant issues, there was limited follow up in the objectives and indicators of the programmes. There was also a tendency to either make very general statements about the inclusion of gender, thus relying on implementing partners to take gender issues forward, or to focus on specific and often limited gender issues. Nevertheless, there has been progress in each sector that can be built on.

**Progress on addressing gender in policies and legislation was uneven across the sectors.** Good progress was made in the Health sector, where there has been a consistent focus on gender by donors, including the EU, over a long timeframe. Significant efforts aimed at ensuring gender equality in access and utilisation of health services, particularly ensuring access to maternal and childcare services, were confirmed in evaluations and interviews. There was also progress in rural and economic development, e.g. with the inclusion of women in Community Development Councils (CDCs) through the EU supported NSP, as set out in programme assessments. However, progress was more limited in the P&R&L sector with changes to legislation, such as the Elimination of Violence against Women Law, actively supported by the EU. But progress was mixed in the D&A sector. Nonetheless, as a result of changes in policies supported by the EU, some gains were made in female participation as candidates in the election process in 2014, while changes to government policy reduced the number of reserved seats for women in Provincial Councils in 2013. (I-512, I-222)

**EU support did not lead to significant increases in GIROA’s capacity to address gender.** A recent sector assessment suggested that gender awareness in the MoPH is still very limited, with the need for continued support from donors. There appears to be a similar situation in the other ministries and government agencies that have been supported by donors, albeit with some change, such as increases in the numbers of female frontline staff in the Health sector and the ANP, a view confirmed in numerous donor assessments and in interviews. Despite continued active support from donors with the EUD playing a lead role, there are examples of setbacks in policy and legislation, such as the introduction of the Shia Personal Status Law and the change in the 2013 Electoral Law.

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57 Afghanistan Joint Health Sector Review, 2015, Evaluation of EU Support to GEWE, 2015
deciding the number of reserved seats for women in Provincial Councils from 25 to 20 percent. These, and other examples, show the need for continued work to implement commitments on gender. (I-513)

Gender and Women’s rights in Afghanistan

Afghanistan is ranked 150 out of 152 countries for Gender Inequality Index, with some of the worst results against key gender indicators in the world. The maternal mortality rate is 460 per 100,000 live births. The adolescent birth rate is 86.6 per 1,000 women aged 15–19 and, although more girls have had access to education over the past decade than in any other time in Afghan history, there is still a significant gap between girls’ and boys’ access to education, with the literacy rate estimated 39 percent for males and 12 percent for females.58 Although the overall situation for Afghan women has improved since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, levels of violence against women are high, particularly in rural areas. Over the past fifteen years, Human Rights Watch and other international organisations have expressed concern for women’s rights in Afghanistan and have highlighted that the implementation of the Law on Elimination of Violence Against women has been poor. Although many women suffer from violence in family or cultural environments, many have also suffered violence from the ongoing infighting in the south, east, and northern parts of the country.59

As a result, the government is not only under pressure to provide security to Afghan nationals, but specifically to make greater efforts to improve the situation of women across the country. The Council of the EU in 2014 called on the new president to focus on human rights, in particular the rights of women.60 The government has been responsive through ensuring that gender is included in the new NPPs on Human Resources Development and through the National Action Plan on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. A Country gender profile was finalised in 2016, with the aim of guiding the efforts of the EU, USAID, UN agencies, and other donors in tracking progress and developing their own gender strategies.61

Serious efforts at promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment (GEWE) in policy dialogue by the EU began in 2014 and have already generated results. Before 2014 the EU strategy focused on the inclusion of gender at the programmatic level. The EU strategy from 2014 included a commitment to increasing the participation and representation of women in all levels of public office. There are also references to a focus on women’s rights in the human rights dialogue in 2014 and 2015, with specifics set out in agreed deliverables and indicators. Evidence from interviews with staff from GiRoA, EUD, and other donors show that efforts have been made by the EUD to take a more active leading role on strategic level issues, such as the implementation of the Elimination of Violence against Women Law and the development of the National Action Plan on the UN Security Council Resolution on Women, Peace and Security (Resolution 1325), efforts that are particularly appreciated by other donors. (I-511)

There was a clear commitment to mainstream gender into EU funded actions in the sectors, but this commitment has not been fully taken forward. There are clear commitments to the principle of ensuring that gender issues are fully taken into account in the overarching strategic statements and in the analysis for each of the sectors in the EU strategies. At the same time, most of these statements are general in nature, stating that gender as a cross-cutting issue should be considered, or in the case of the sectoral analyses, focus on specific issues such as women forming a high proportion of casual seasonal labour in the agricultural sector. In most cases, there is little

58 Gender Inequality Index: Human Development Reports, Table 5 - http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii
61 Afghanistan Gender Country Profile, USAID, September 2016 – Draft prepared for workshop
evidence that the specific gender issues identified in the strategies form the basis of elements of the EU funded programmes. For the Health sector, for example, it is stated that assistance could include support for female managers and leaders but, in the health programme, the main focus has been on support female health workers. In the A&RD sector, the focus on women’s participation is only a very limited part of the strategy, although there are indications that the situation has improved. The NSP, for example, now specifically considers women in terms of decision-making and the provision of community grants and examples of support to women entrepreneurs under the AREDP. In the P&RoL and D&A sectors there are varying examples. The former includes the indicator “number of procedures initiated for harassment of female police officer per year”, while the latter includes the general statement that the cross-cutting issues to be mainstreamed in this sector include human rights (in particular gender equality and women’s empowerment). The evidence for these views are clear in a range of reviews and evaluations and are all confirmed in interviews with EUD staff and implementing partners. (I-521, I-522)

4.6 EQ6 Coherency, coordination and complementarity

Has EU development cooperation been coherent and achieved synergies with the support provided by other development partners and EU’s humanitarian and political engagement?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary response to the evaluation question</th>
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<tr>
<td>The EUD engaged proactively in donor coordination, with particular attention given to leading the coordination of EU Member States, and thereby contributed to the significant improvements achieved in donor coordination. But the engagement was, at times, limited by staff capacity constraints. Many EU funded programmes pursued and achieved synergies with programmes funded by other donors. Synergies were mainly achieved in the A&amp;RD and Health sectors; diverging donors’ views limited the scope for synergies in the P&amp;RoL sector, and a lack of coordination hampered synergies in the D&amp;A sector.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The EU is committed to ensuring that development cooperation is coherent with the EU overall mandate and coordinated with EU’s humanitarian assistance and political cooperation and achieving synergies – but in practice, coordination has proven difficult and been more limited. Synergies were only achieved to a modest degree, and in many cases the scope for synergies was limited.</td>
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In general, donor coordination in Afghanistan improved from 2007 to 2016 with the EU contributing to this development. The development assistance landscape in Afghanistan is highly complex with large volumes of development assistance and the engagement of numerous donors. A project approach was pursued and GIRoA and development partners were unable to effectively coordinate at the overall and sector levels. However, in general coordination gradually improved over time, albeit with significant differences between the sectors, e.g. with three important elements for the move towards better coordination and a more programmatic approach, i.e. the introduction in 2010 of 22 NPPs and the TMAF in 2012, and the large multi-donor Trust Funds (ARTF, LOTFA) although these were established prior to the period evaluated. These have, to a certain extent, brought development partners together and become major drivers of coordination, cooperation, and achieving synergies. Moreover, the so-called 5+3 and 5+3+3 structures comprising the major donors (5), important contributors to ARTF (+3), and major multilateral agencies (+3), remain important platforms for coordination. The EU has participated proactively in the 5+3 and 5+3+3 discussions as well as broader donor-GIRoA coordination and has aligned to all donor agreements (see EQ1). With the bulk of EU funding going through the Trust Funds, they have since 2013 been important platforms for EU for engagement in sector-level coordination (see EQ3). The EUD was also co-leading Agriculture Donors NPP2 Working Group with USAID. Moreover, the EUD has advocated for enhanced coordination of donors providing budget support (WB, USAID, EU) vis-à-vis the selection of performance criteria and indicators. However, donor coordination in relation to support for sub-
national governance remains insufficient and is fragmented due to diverging objectives; strong donor preference related to military engagements meant that donors opted for multiple approaches for support, including frequent earmarking to specific provinces. Several stakeholders found that there are too many coordination fora and meetings, that structures should be simplified, and that it is overly time consuming and thus difficult to participate regularly in all of them (there are 75 donor donor-government or donor-only groups and fora, and in the A&RD sector alone there are 12 fora/groups\(^{62}\)). (I-611, EQ1, EQ3)

EU proactively promoted coordination, especially by leading coordination for EU Member States. However, efforts were, at times, affected by internal capacity constraints and attempts to promote joint EU programming have so far been unsuccessful. The EU Delegation led, or participated in, numerous working groups and coordination fora, with a particular emphasis on EU Member States. Actors in the sectors generally share the view that the EUD is a constructive and proactive partner seeking to promote solutions to challenges, as consistently confirmed by interviews. The EU is engaged in regular discussions with EU Member States in various contexts, a notable forum being the monthly EU Heads of Cooperation meetings. However, the pursued joint programming for EU Member States has only gained traction since mid-2016 (with a focus on migration and returnees); it was previously not a priority for the Member States and is still in a nascent stage. Moreover, the capacity of the EU Delegation varied. Prior to 2013, a major limitation was staff constraints combined with the need to manage a very large and complex portfolio. However, after 2013 (confirmed by EAMR reports and interviews), the portfolio was streamlined with fewer, larger contracts and a move to delegating the management of the support to partners, such as the partners managing the multi-donor Trust Funds (WB, UNDP, ADB). This released staff resources to engage more deeply in sector coordination and policy dialogue. (I-611, I-624, I-311, I-312)

EU supported actions often, but not always, proactively pursued synergies with other programmes. The proactive pursuit of synergies at the programme level was particularly pronounced for the A&RD sector where there are several examples of programmes benefitting and building on support and results from each other (synergies were identified in project progress documentation). A prominent example is the EU funded ADHPII and programmes funded by the WB, ADB, and USAID which carried out joint activities where experts from one programme provided inputs for other programmes. Moreover, approaches developed by one programme were in some cases upscaled or replicated by another, e.g. the Sanitary Mandate Contract Scheme developed by ADHPII was expanded with co-funding from the WB funded National Horticulture and Livestock Project. LOTFA’s coordination with other programmes improved over time and some synergies were achieved, e.g. with United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). However, ARTF funded programmes were not sufficiently coordinated with other large RD initiatives implemented by other ministries than MRRD. Similarly, donor support in the governance sector, especially in relation to sub-national governance, was fragmented and remained insufficiently coordinated despite coordination efforts made by EU funded programmes (and by others), and thus only few, if any, synergies were achieved. Similarly, in the P&RoL sector, diverging views of donors hampered the potential for synergies and even led to programmes contradicting each other; e.g. the EU actively supported the ANP Police to transition to a civilian police force while the US encouraged involvement in counter-insurgency efforts. In the Health sector, EU support and leadership influenced other donors to provide support for basic health services. (I-612)

Synergies between DEVCO and ECHO were, in practice, modest and mainly achieved in Health, although there were clear intentions to ensure that EU development assistance and humanitarian assistance was well coordinated. The DEVCO and ECHO strategic documents mention that EU development aid would closely work with the humanitarian interventions:

- in the Health sector through the EPHS and BPHS interventions;
- in food/nutrition and LRRD (linking relief, rehabilitation, and development); and

\(^{62}\) Source: EUD mapping of existing donor-only and donor-government working groups, August 2016
• for the assistance to IDPs and refugees through the AUP programmes.

However, while ECHO was consulted during programme design, the coherence and synergies actually achieved at the programme level where somewhat limited (progress documentation rarely refer to DECVO-ECHO synergies achieved, as confirmed by interviews). Even DEVCO funded LRRD programmes for the transition from humanitarian aid to development assistance had no linkages to ECHO during implementation. However, in the Health sector, various humanitarian assistance NGOs supported by EU specifically mention coordination with BPHS implementing partners. This was given more attention by ECHO than by DEVCO, with ECHO working around DEVCO’s efforts by providing complementarity services in remote areas63 (i.e. water, sanitation, and shelter for returnees, and food assistance, education and health services in emergency). It is worth noting that it is easier for ECHO to align to DEVCO than vice-versa since ECHO’s instruments are more flexible and its engagement is more reactive, whereas DEVCO programming is longer-term (confirmed by interviews). However, the scope for potential synergies was also in some cases limited and, in these cases, there was little reason for attempting to achieve synergies. Efforts were coordinated in relation to the funding provided by both DEVCO and ECHO to UNHCR and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), where overlaps were avoided. Moreover, EUD advocacy has also covered ECHO messages, e.g. vis-à-vis ensuring that BPHS contracts included funds allocated for IDPs and returnees and vis-à-vis inviting ECHO to donor meetings in the Health sector. (I-621, I-622)

**EU cooperation strategies are overall aligned at the strategic level, but synergies have not been fully achieved at the implementation level.** EU development efforts outlined in the CSP and MIPs are, in general, aligned to the political commitments set out in the EU Council Action Plans 2009 and 2014-2016; they all pursue the ultimate goal of stabilisation and inclusive development in Afghanistan. Both the MIP 2007-2010 and the EU Action Plan 2009 paid particular attention to strengthening the sub-national level institutions. Moreover, all areas identified by the EU Council Plan 2014-2016 are also mentioned by the 2014-2020 MIP. The October 2016 conference in Brussels reaffirmed the EU political commitment in Afghanistan to support the stabilisation and subsequent development of the country focusing on the same key areas as the EU Council Plan 2014-2016 and the MIP 2014-2020 (fight against corruption, economic growth, poverty reduction, strengthening democratic institutions, human rights, women and children). Unlike in other countries, EEAS did not have a political section in Afghanistan, as the political cooperation fell under the EU Special Representative to Afghanistan (EUSR), although the Head of Delegation and Deputy Head of Delegation reported to EEAS. However, EEAS, DEVCO, and other EU services are moving towards closer coordination with the future establishment of joint committees under CAPD (Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development). The EUSR function is discontinued and, from August 2017, the political cooperation falls fully under EEAS. Coordination and cooperation between the EUSR Political Section and the DEVCO Development Section was mainly on an ad hoc and inter-personal basis rather than fully institutionalised (confirmed by interviews), although regular, more structured coordination meetings were introduced in mid-2016, to further coordinate and promote joint action. While the full potential for synergies was thus not fully utilised, a notable example of synergy is the inclusion of mining transparency indicators in the SBC, which reinforces the EUSR Offices’ advocacy and awareness raising on illegal mining and mining regulation. (I-623)

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63 According to the Humanitarian Implementation Plan (ECHO) 2012, DG ECHO interventions worked around DEVCO capacities, e.g. ECHO decided to phase out health interventions due to the increasing engagement in the sector by the EUD, but also other donors (World Bank, USAID). However, in 2012, ECHO decided to intervene again in the Health sector due to the decrease in coverage of the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS).
4.7 EQ7 Do no harm

Has the EU's assistance to Afghanistan avoided having any significant negative effects?

Summary response to the evaluation question

- Acknowledging the limitations of this study, EU support appears to have largely avoided causing any direct, significant negative effects to the people of Afghanistan, but has likely contributed to the potential for negative effects to arise, most notably by contributing to a system that creates opportunities for corruption. In general, the large influx of development assistance to Afghanistan has contributed to a system that enables corruption, and project-specific interventions to combat corruption (including in EU-funded projects) have not proven successful. From this experience, it is clear that a broader approach implemented with a high degree of government ownership is necessary to combat this system; the indicators and incentives built into the State Building Contract are an example of appropriate efforts to mitigate risks of corruption and non-performance.

- The EU supported interventions did not directly harm the credibility of GIRoA and government institutions; however, GIRoA did suffer credibility loss in a small number of instances. To some extent, such risk was identified within the programmes and mitigation measures were attempted. Potential negative effects of corruption and interference in implementation activities were recognised and mitigated under the BOMNAF programme. On the other hand, although the ELECT II programme made efforts to reduce and deter voter fraud, voter fraud did occur and undermined the credibility of the 2014 presidential elections.

- Often, little attention was paid to identifying and mitigating risks to programme beneficiaries. Risk mitigation generally focused on external risks impacting project performance, or internal issues. A significant exception is the MGSP, which clearly articulated risks arising from programme implementation and the potential for the programme to have a negative effect on communities. The programme outlined mitigation measures and demonstrated that the risks were being monitored.

EU support to the governance and police sectors did not directly create significant negative effects for Afghan people but may have contributed to the potential for negative results to arise. The AGSP assisted all levels of governments across municipalities, provinces, and districts regardless of their level of stability. On some occasions, this resulted in support being provided to warlords or informal power structures, which tacitly undermined democratic structures (this risk was acknowledged by several partner stakeholders and identified as a negative impact in other evaluation reports64). Further, the structure may have created an unfavourable environment for reform since staff were incentivised to stall transition to GIRoA-led processes (this concern was raised in an external evaluation). In the Health sector, there were tensions between staff whose salaries were increased by donors and staff who did not receive such increases. In the policing sector, female police officers may have been put in dangerous situations without proper protections or a responsive complaints mechanism (this concern was raised by two interviewees). This resulted in high attrition of female police officers. In the A&RD sector, no negative effects resulting from NABDP was identified, but there was a risk of elite capture (I-711, I-712).

The large influx of development assistance to Afghanistan (including EU contributions) has, in general, created opportunities for corruption. There are significant surpluses in most core channels of development funding in Afghanistan; the country lacks the capacity to productively absorb the available development money and is struggling with the nuts and bolts of implementation. Evidence for this includes low execution rates in the government’s development budget and multiple examples in the sample of projects rescheduled over longer time periods. According to evaluation interviews with donor officials, government officials, and implementing partners, this situation

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increases the risk that money is wasted or diverted to corruption. Similar conclusions are reached by civil society analyses, other evaluations, and specialised auditors such as the US SIGAR.\(^\text{65}\) (I-713)

The EU supported the improvement of the performance and capacity of the ANP under LOTFA, but weak control and oversight mechanisms resulted in corruption, which negatively affected the credibility of the fund, the ANP and GIRoA. The control mechanisms in the ANP were too weak to effectively protect against possible fraudulent practices. The flawed system to collect attendance data, which informed payroll data, facilitated corrupt behaviour in people receiving payment for days not worked. The payment of funds to ghost employees was acknowledged by both LOTFA and the EU in 2007 and was a source of the large-scale fraud which occurred in 2012. LOTFA leadership members facilitated and participated in corruption; when donors have attempted to address issues such as reducing the number of ghost employees, the MoIA has on occasion threatened to withhold payments from junior officers in retaliation. While the EU support did not create the systems through which fraud occurred, the increase in funding and lack of effective mitigation measures to remove ghost employees contributed to enabling fraudulent officers to do harm, and the scale of the fraud was only possible due to the volume of assistance provided (as noted in interviews, studies, and evaluations\(^\text{66}\)). The public nature of the fraud incidents also likely affected the credibility of the police and GIRoA. (I-711, I-712, I-713)

EU-supported interventions have contributed to producing negative effects on government ownership in the governance and rule of law sectors. As noted by interviewees and external evaluations and reports, the presence of multiple donors and implementing organisations working on PAR and sub-national governance distorted the labour market and created a parallel, “secondary” civil service. Moreover, misdirected financial support overwhelmed the absorptive and administrative capacity of Afghan institutions creating more pressure on donors, implementing partners, and Afghan institutions to employ qualified Afghans. With demand outstripping supply, staff could benefit from multiple salary top-ups from donors and were thus motivated to leave their institutions. According to LOTFA programme documents, ownership issues of LOTFA also arose because of unclear governance structures between the MoIA, and UNDP/LOTFA as the implementer of the fund. LOTFA was not perceived as a support unit to the MoIA, but as a UNDP unit. (I-712, I-713)

Some programmes in the governance sector identified risks arising from programme implementation and implemented mitigation strategies to reduce potential negative effects. The MGSP identified the misuse of sub-national project funds and increased pressure on urban vulnerable poor arising because of the project. The MGSP risk identification table clearly identified potential significant negative risks and outlined the results of risk monitoring. The effectiveness of this as a tool has not been thoroughly tested given implementation commenced recently. The ELECT II programme identified strategies to mitigate political and privacy risks associated with electoral or voter fraud. Mitigation strategies were implemented to deter and detect fraud, which reduced the instances of voter fraud by 65 percent from the levels detected in 2009 and 2010. The programme also identified potential privacy risks arising from the potential abuse of E-Tazkera (electronic biometric identity cards) data and the lack of a data protection policy, in line with international standards; EU funding to e-Tazkera was subsequently suspended. Risk monitoring measures were implemented by the EU delegation to the elections, with mitigation measures aimed at awareness-raising of the potential problem. Some infrastructure sub-projects under the NABDP were cancelled before implementation due to issues such as conflicts and elite capture. (I-721, I-722)

The approach to risk management within the remaining sample interventions focused on external risks impacting project performance with minimal attention paid to risks impacting programme beneficiaries or risks arising from implementation. In particular, this type of risk identification appears to be absent from sample programmes in the A&RD and Health sectors. In the

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governance sectors, key risks do not appear to have been considered. No documents available suggest the EU considered the major risks of doing harm in supporting law enforcement actors when they lack effective political direction and institutional capacity for mitigating or responding to corruption, clientelism, and human rights abuses, e.g. a lack of well-thought out deployment strategies and a functioning complaints mechanism may have put female police officers in dangerous situations without proper protections. When external risks were identified, few practical measures were suggested or appear to have been undertaken to reduce these risks, e.g. the MIP 2014-2020 is the only EU CSP or MIP during the evaluation period that acknowledges corruption within the ANP. While the document acknowledges the impact of the corruption, there is no indication that any shifts in approach were considered. (I-721)

Some programme interventions were adjusted in response to significant negative effects, though recognition and response were not always timely. The ARTF strengthened its guidelines for the financing of its Incentive Program in response to the Kabul Bank crisis. As a result of the crisis, the ARTF was put under pressure because of its role in funding GIRoA’s recurrent budget. The response of the ARTF was to institute further safeguards in an effort to protect itself from a similar instance occurring in the fund. The systems in place within LOTFA were effective at responding to fraudulent activity, but the detection was slow, with the fraud occurring over a number of years before it was identified in 2012. It had continued undetected – reportedly including through UNDP External Audits – and was conducted by UNDP service contractors involving payments to ghost employees. In response, donors, including the EU, ceased payment to the fund until assurances could be given. In addition, LOTFA was redesigned to include stronger oversight mechanisms, the creation of a dedicated fiduciary management office, more stringent monitoring and evaluation systems and increased support to the MoIA’s Office of the Inspector General. UNDP’s project office identified fraud occurring in ELECT II, resulting in the cessation of the remainder of funds; further, the next phase of the programme was adjusted to return to a direct implementation modality. (I-722, I-723, I-731)

Lessons were identified and documented across EU-supported interventions; the extent to which the associated recommendations were adopted is sometimes, but not always, clear. Within the Health sector, lessons from a study of the approaches used to implement the BPHS and EPHS programmes were incorporated into the design of future contracts. The study compared approaches of the EU, USAID, and the WB to contracting out and covered monitoring, reporting, and auditing of contracts. The conclusions of the study were used to inform the contracting out approach under the ARTF for BPHS and EPHS across Afghanistan. This likely increased the efficiency and effectiveness of the approach. Under the ASGP, recommendations in 2009 to improve coordination recommended beneficiaries and customers participate in donor coordination sessions. Given the continued coordination challenges that arose under the ASGP, it is unclear if this occurred. (I-732)

The SBC and its supporting documents show learning about what can work in the Afghan context. There are major risks associated with providing budget support to Afghanistan, which the preparations for the SBC acknowledge. The EU has contributed through consultations with GIRoA on the Public Financial Management Reform Roadmap and financially to the ARTF’s project on public financial management. Combined with these initiatives, the indicators and incentives built into the SBC are appropriate efforts to mitigate risks of corruption and non-performance. However, it is too early to assess whether they are in fact working well and the EUD has the capacity to sufficiently monitor and enforce the contract. (I-722, I-413)

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67 BPHS/EPHS Implementers Comparison Study, 2013
5 CONCLUSIONS

The findings of the evaluation have led to six main conclusions, which cut across the seven EQs. Combined, these conclusions cover the evaluation criteria as illustrated in the figure below.

Figure 8: Conclusions and evaluation criteria

C1: The streamlining of the EU country programme had multiple benefits: it responded to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s (GIRoA) priorities, EU aid principles and international commitments, and made portfolio supervision easier – but the transition at times affected the delivery of results.

C2: The transition towards on-budget interventions and delegated cooperation was generally well justified, and a good mix of modalities and delivery pathways was maintained and further improved over time.

C3: EU funded programmes have led to tangible outcomes and impacts when: good implementing partners had been selected, the programmes were well designed with gender taken into account, and there was a strong stakeholder ownership – these conditions were sometimes, but not always, in place. Results were achieved in the A&Rd and health sectors but less so in the D&A and Proll sectors. Direct negative effects have largely been avoided.

C4: The continuity and reliability of EU support was an added value – as was the relative independence from geopolitical interests.

C5: EU’s proactive engagement in advocacy and dialogue was widely appreciated – even when the advocacy was not directly linked to funding.

C6: The EU has contributed to improving coordination in a highly complex context, although coordination across the EU’s own machinery has been a challenge.
Conclusion 1: The streamlining of the EU country programme had multiple benefits: it responded to GIRoA priorities, EU aid principles and international commitments, and made portfolio supervision easier – but at times, the transition affected the delivery of results.

This conclusion is based on EQs 1, 3 and 4

Over the years, the EU has worked at streamlining its Afghanistan portfolio, with the aim of moving from multiple contracts (often with NGOs and consulting firms) for projects under direct management of the EUD towards fewer, larger contracts, and with an increased proportion of the funding managed by international organisations on behalf of the EU, particularly through contributions to multi-donor trust funds (ARTF, LOTFA). A more recent development is the provision of budget support for GIRoA, both with disbursements directly to GIRoA through the SBC, but also indirectly through the SMAF and migration incentive programmes. At the sector level, the EU has a medium-term ambition of introducing SWAps and providing sector budget support, especially in the Health and A&RD sectors, though the sectors are not yet ready for this.

The streamlining of the portfolio has had a number of benefits. The increased proportion of support provided on-budget responds well to GIRoA’s priorities and donor commitments outlined in the ANDS, the NPPs, and the TMAF with the EU being well above the 50 percent minimum proportion of support to be provided on-budget. Moreover, the use of multi-donor trust funds and the move towards SWAps and budget support is in line with the Paris Declaration, with the latter also being fully aligned with the EU’s principle of favouring budget support over projects, when feasible. The increased use of national systems contributes to strengthening both the existing systems and the capacity of GIRoA. At a more practical level, the reduced number of contracts and the increased delegation of management to international organisations make it easier for the EUD to manage its large country programme in Afghanistan. The EUD’s management capacity has been affected by staff constraints and, due to the security situation, difficulties in recruiting qualified personnel. However, the shift in the portfolio released staff resources after 2014 thereby enabling a more proactive engagement in policy dialogue and advocacy. The SBC also provides new opportunities for EU-GIRoA dialogue at the strategic level. As such, the intentions and rationale behind the portfolio transition have, in general, proven valid.

However, the transition has not been without challenges and has, in a few cases, caused a disruption in implementation. For example, while P-ARBP1 was implemented through a series of contracts with an international consulting firm, national construction companies, and NGOs. This model worked well overall and delivered tangible results. However, P-ARBP11 oversight is now delegated to ADB through a single contribution agreement, and due to issues related to differences between EU and ADB rules and systems, P-ARBP11 was delayed considerably, causing a two-year gap from the completion of P-ARBPI to the commencing of P-ARBPI1. This gap was partly covered through a bridging grant, but continuity was nonetheless disrupted, and a number of processes were affected. While the change has had the benefit of moving the support on-budget and facilitating management for the EUD, there seem to be no major benefits vis-à-vis programme delivery and the achievement of results.

More generally, the extent to which the release of staff capacity and the creation of new opportunities will fully lead to an enhanced strategic dialogue with GIRoA will depend on the extent to which EUD staff, particularly national staff, are able to assume a new and less clearly defined role with a focus on strategic advocacy, rather than the previous supervision of the delivery of clearly defined project outputs and spending. However, strategic advocacy skills do not appear to be fully in place yet. And in the Afghan context it is difficult to attract and retain qualified staff. In the case of the trust funds, the EU and the other donors are not fully coordinating and utilising the opportunity they provide for strategic dialogue, but have tended to engage in discussions on programme implementation and reporting.
**Conclusion 2:** The transition towards on-budget interventions and delegated cooperation was generally well justified, and a good mix of modalities and delivery pathways was maintained and further improved over time.

This conclusion is based on EQs 3, 4 and 7

Overall, the shifts towards increasing the on-budget proportion of support and delegating management to international organisations or fund trustees (as well as the recent introduction of budget support), yielded a number of benefits. These shifts are, in general, well justified, as they are in line with GIRoA priorities and international donor commitments (see Conclusion 1), and supported the implementation of the ANDS and the NPPs. Moreover, the use of trusts funds and sub-delegation has benefitted from the capacities and fiduciary systems of international organisations (e.g. the WB), facilitated donor coordination, and provided a forum for dialogue with GIRoA and other development partners.

However, it is also clear that the use of a mix of on-budget and off-budget interventions (including projects under direct management) was, and continues to be, necessary. The EUD has, in general, ensured that there has been a good mixing, e.g. by using off-budget interventions and other measures to address important gaps and challenges.

The absorption capacity of GIRoA is low and spending rates are declining so the scope for, and relevance of, further increasing funding for on-budget interventions is questionable. Another challenge for on-budget interventions is that GIRoA procurement processes are slow (although ARTF sometimes uses the WB procurement system), which can impede implementation and the delivery of results. The limited capacity of some ministries to effectively access funds through MoF is often a constraint; hence the technical level GIRoA staff often prefer off-budget interventions.

Moreover, on-budget interventions are generally unsuitable for strengthening the independent advocacy and watchdog capacity of civil society as such support is under GIRoA control. Nonetheless, the SBC has been used by the EUD to create space for engaging civil society in dialogue with GIRoA and there is a real need for capacity development support for NGOs and CSOs. Acknowledging this, the EU is planning to provide additional support directly for CSOs in the justice sector.

GIRoA has neither the capacity nor the access to fully deliver services across the entire country due to insurgents controlling large parts of Afghanistan. The private sector is also not yet sufficiently developed to fully provide services. In the coming years, NGOs will continue to play an important role in service delivery – although there is clear scope for increased private sector-based service provision, as the EU support for improving veterinary services and access to planting material has clearly demonstrated.
Conclusion 3: EU funded programmes have led to tangible results when (i) good implementing partners had been selected, (ii) the programmes were well designed with gender taken into account, and (iii) where there was a strong stakeholder ownership. These conditions were sometimes, but not always, in place. Results were achieved in the A&RD and Health sectors but less so in the D&A and P&RoL sectors. Direct negative effects have largely been avoided.

This conclusion is based on EQs 2, 4, 5 and 7

The Afghanistan country programme is one of the largest EU country programmes. It is implemented in an unusually complex context, where insecurity is a major concern and the situation has been deteriorating over the years, poverty levels are high, the bio-physical environment is harsh, and the capacities of stakeholders are still low. Nonetheless, some good results have been achieved, especially in the Health and A&RD sectors. Institutional capacities and policy frameworks have been improved. This has had a positive effect on service delivery, especially when it comes to enhancing access to both health and some A&RD services in certain parts of the country, such as access to veterinary services, planting materials, roads, and water infrastructure. This, in turn, has contributed to improving people’s lives (at least in specific locations) by enhancing agricultural productivity and income generation, reducing maternal and child mortality rates, and improving local governance. However, it is also clear that there are still major constraints and challenges which need to be addressed; the implementation of the new policies is slow, and sustainability has generally not been achieved yet. In the D&A and P&RoL sectors, EU-funded interventions have produced mixed results, with improvements mostly associated with EU-funded capacity development and service delivery projects in the areas of public sector management and budgeting. The impact of interventions that sought to increase civic engagement and citizen participation in the democratic process was limited.

For the most part, the EU has been successful in mobilising strong implementing partners for its programmes, including NGOs, the private sector and international organisations. In the Health and A&RD sectors EUD support has been well-designed, consistent, and responding to relevant sector priorities and issues; and has developed over time, building on the experience that has been gained through implementation. Evaluations carried out at key moments in this support have been used to draw out this experience in the development of new phases of support, often working in coordination with other donors, such as in the Health sector. However, in the Governance-related sectors, the programme design and execution were problematic, with technical solutions to complex political problems often being promoted. By their nature, the objectives in the rule of law and democratisation sectors are less tangible than in the Health and A&RD sectors, and require political strategies that can adapt to a shifting environment. Carried out alone, delivering outputs and activities are insufficient, and do not even necessarily contribute, to strengthening rule of law and democracy. Some programmes highly dependent on politics (such as NSP and MSGP) were not adequately designed to adapt to changes in the political situation and would have benefited from improved contingency planning. The complicated political and governance environment hindered results in the DA and P&RoL sectors for all donors.

There has been a mixed picture with regard to the coverage of gender across the country programme with some good examples, e.g. the Health sector support, and other examples where gender has not been consistently addressed. The programme in the Health sector was, in general, appropriately designed, with maternal and child mortality rates being identified at the start and made a major focus of service delivery. Implementation was carried out by NGO partners who took the focus on gender as an important objective in the programme seriously, and progress against gender sensitive indicators was monitored regularly, with good results being achieved as a result. In the A&RD sector gender issues were also addressed, albeit to a more limited degree with a focus on specific issues. For example, support for SME development and access to finance have provided new income opportunities, especially for women. In the governance-related sectors, gender issues were not adequately addressed, with technical solutions to complex political problems often being promoted, such as support for women police officers, without consideration
of the cultural and institutional changes needed to ensure that women who were recruited could serve effectively. Overall, gender mainstreaming was not consistently applied across the programmes, and therefore results were patchy. While significant gender issues were identified in the initial analysis, often these were not sufficiently followed up with clear gender objectives and indicators, or there was a reliance on implementing partners to take gender issues forward, or there was a focus on specific and often limited gender issues. At the same time, there has been sufficient progress in each of the sectors that can be built on.

The ability to achieve results has also to a significant extent been linked to the degree of stakeholder ownership, especially GIRoA ownership, which has been uneven. Progress has been slow where GIRoA ownership and leadership has been insufficient (e.g. due to staff constraints, such as unfilled senior management positions). Where partners and stakeholders had a shared vision and were pulling in the same direction, e.g. in the Health sector or in relation to the provision of planting materials, good results have been achieved. In cases where there has not been such a shared vision, progress has been slow, for example, the implementation of the Water Law which has been affected by a dispute between MEW and MAIL. The private sector has proven an important partner for enhancing service delivery. In the A&RD sector, for example, the engagement in public-private partnerships and in supporting the development of the private sector has proven a viable and replicable model for enhancing service delivery. It has also shown that improved service delivery to the Afghan population (at least in the economic sectors) need not depend entirely on the government, which has to tackle several significant challenges with limited capacity.

Unrealistic timeframes and high levels of donor funding in Afghanistan compared to absorption capacity in combination with insecurity posing a major challenge for programme oversight have created a different kind of programme risk – and engaging in the Afghan context is inevitably associated with significant risk. EU programmes have largely avoided specific negative effects. However, while not specific to the EU, interviewees and independent experts report that the overall level of international development assistance to Afghanistan has created opportunities for corruption. Providing high levels of development funding in an environment with pervasive corruption and weak accountability mechanisms increases the risk that money is diverted or wasted, such as in the cases of LOTFA and ELECT II. The fiduciary risks associated with the budget support provided under the SBC are significant. In response to this risk, the EUD is planning to provide complementary support for the new GIRoA-WB PFM programme and further PFM-related capacity building and technical assistance.

A general shortcoming in projects, large programmes, and the trust funds is that the monitoring has been mainly activity and output oriented, with less attention given to tracking and verifying outcomes and impacts. EU has supported impact monitoring at the higher level, e.g. through the support for the “Afghanistan Living Condition Survey”, but a significant gap remains at the programme level, making it difficult to attribute changes to EU support. This undermines the credibility when the programmes report being successful. The results-monitoring shortcoming also means that the programme monitoring cannot be fully used to inform policy dialogue at the more strategic level. Moreover, insufficient attention was paid to identifying and mitigating risks to programme beneficiaries, instead, risk mitigation generally focused on external risks impacting project performance (with the exception of the ASGP) or on internal issues.
Conclusion 4: The continuity and reliability of EU support was an added value – as was the relative independence from geopolitical interests.

This conclusion is based on EQs 1, 2 and 4

One major added value of EU support has been its reliability and continuity, which is widely appreciated by stakeholders. A good example is the support for basin/water resources management in Northeast Afghanistan, where more than a decade of engagement has led to tangible outcomes and impacts at the policy, institutional, and community levels. This example also illustrates the implications of disruption in the support, with the two-year partial hiatus between P-ARBP I and P-ARBP II negatively affecting a number of community-based associations established. The continuous and reliable support in the Health sector has similarly led to tangible outcomes and impacts. In short, it takes time to achieve sustained change, significantly longer than what can be achieved by a single three to five-year programme. The need for continuity is further exacerbated by the inability of GIRoA to mobilise sufficient domestic revenues to cover its running costs. Achieving sustainability of the results requires a medium to long-term engagement, with support continued until the Afghan economy is sufficiently strong to provide an adequate tax-base for GIRoA to deliver services to the Afghan population.

The scale of support, with EU being one of the largest donors to Afghanistan, has also enabled a substantial engagement at the sector level, rather than more piecemeal interventions. The reliability of EU support is also linked to another factor, i.e. the relative independence from geopolitical or domestic interests (although the recent focus on providing support related to migration is mainly driven by the EU's domestic political priority placed on curbing irregular migration to Europe), which has influenced the aid provided by many bilateral donors as evidenced by geographic preferencing for provinces where donor-countries had deployed their troops. This has meant that some provinces were underserved while in other cases, development assistance was used as a means to make the troop presence more palatable to the local population. In contrast, EU support was never linked to military engagements.

Conclusion 5: The EU’s proactive engagement in advocacy and dialogue was widely appreciated – even when the advocacy was not directly linked to funding.

This conclusion is based on EQs 1, 3, 5 and 6

The EUD engaged proactively in advocacy and policy dialogue in the sectors and at the overall level. While it can be difficult to attribute changes to dialogue, there are examples of the EUD’s advocacy leading to results. For example, the EUD facilitated the agreement of ministries and development partners on the agricultural NPP "National Comprehensive Agriculture Production and Market Development Program", with the advocacy closely linked to EU financial support through grants for both ARTF and GIZ for the implementation of the NPP.

The EU has also gained wide recognition for leading dialogue in areas where there is no direct linkage to EU funding. For example, the EUD has led the dialogue and donor advocacy in relation to gender and human rights after 2014, despite the mainstreaming of gender in EU’s programmes being no more sophisticated than in the programmes supported by other donors. Again, while the EU has only provided limited support for anti-corruption projects for several years, it is still recognised as a leader on anti-corruption due to its advocacy efforts and dialogue engagement. However, while there is not always a direct link between EU programming and its visibility and recognition in relation to advocacy, there is little doubt that the overall scale and visibility of engagement as one of the largest donors in Afghanistan has given the EU’s voice significant clout and therefore an opportunity to promote EU principles and values.

In contrast to the mostly output-oriented programme monitoring, SBC and SMAF indicators are outcome/impact orientated and the disbursement of performance-based tranches is linked to the
achievement of agreed targets against these. This creates opportunities for dialogues with GIRoA. The SBC indicators have been agreed directly between EU and GIRoA, but they are mainly related to macro-fiscal public financial management and not to EU thematic objectives and priorities in the specific focal sectors. Some of the SMAF indicators are related to the EU focal sectors but have been agreed between GIRoA and the donor community more broadly. However, while the EU can have influence even in areas for which it is providing no funding, there is also scope for further enhancing the synergy between dialogue and financing, such as through the selection of sector-specific indicators for the performance-based tranches of EU budget support.

**Conclusion 6:** The EU has contributed to improving coordination in a highly complex context, although coordination across the EU’s own machinery has been a challenge.

**This conclusion is based mainly on EQs 1 and 6**

Donor coordination in Afghanistan is complex due to the presence of a very large number of donors, international organisations and NGOs and with large volumes of development assistance (though it has declined with the troop withdrawal). Moreover, the restricted movement of international personnel due to insecurity is a further challenge. Nevertheless, donor coordination has improved considerably between 2007 and 2016, due largely to the introduction of NPPs, the presence of large multi-donor trust funds (ARTF, LOTFA, AITF), and the 2012 TMAF agreement. There is, however, still room for improvement. Some sectors and provinces are experiencing donor crowding (e.g. the Governance-related sectors), a large number of coordination fora and mechanisms further complicates coordination and makes it time-consuming, e.g. in the A&RD sector, and the ARTF donors still do not work in a fully coordinated manner. Coordination works better in some sectors than others; the Health sector is particularly well coordinated, whereas the governance-related sectors remain fragmented with diverging donor views.

The EU has been proactive in promoting donor coordination, particularly through its active participation in the 5+3 group of large donors and through promoting and facilitating coordination among EU Member States, though it is only recently that these are beginning to show an interest in EU joint programming. At the programme level, attempts have often been made at coordinating and pursuing synergies with programmes funded by other donors.

The various policies and strategies for EU’s cooperation – for development assistance, humanitarian relief, and political cooperation – with Afghanistan were coherent, focusing on stabilisation, inclusive development, and good governance. No cases of contradictions in the engagement were found. However, overall, the EU appears to have been somewhat more successful in coordinating and ensuring synergies with other donors than with coordinating the engagements of different parts of the EU machinery (e.g. DEVCO, the EUSR’s Office, and ECHO). For example, ECHO had no involvement during the implementation of DEVCO’s LRRD (linking relief, rehabilitation, and development) projects, although ECHO had been consulted during the design process. EU strategies for coordination and synergies in Afghanistan are ambitious and have proven to be difficult to translate into practice, in part because there is not always real scope for synergies. Coordination between DEVCO and the EUSR has, however, improved and became more structured in 2016. Closer coordination between DEVCO, EEAS (which by mid-2017 is taking over the responsibilities of the EUSR), and other parts of EU is anticipated with the planned establishment of joint committees. In relation to DEVCO-ECHO coordination, ECHO ensured that their efforts in the Health sector were complementary to DEVCO's support by focusing on remote areas; indeed, it is easier for ECHO to align to DEVCO than vice-versa, since ECHO’s instruments are more flexible, whereas DEVCO programming is longer term.
6 Recommendations

Recommendation 1: Ensure that a balanced and mutually reinforcing mix of aid modalities and pathways is maintained.

Continue to use different modalities (budget support and projects) and delivery pathways (on-budget and off-budget, trust-funds/delegated cooperation, and direct contracting) in a balanced and mutually reinforcing manner, with consideration to the strengths and weaknesses of each. This should be done with a view towards a) strengthening GIRoA’s service delivery and good governance, b) enhancing the functionality of civil society and the private sector, c) delivering tangible and sustainable improvements of the lives of all poor Afghan men, women, boys, and girls, and d) promoting the integration of cross-cutting concerns, including gender, environment, and resilience into economic development.

This recommendation is linked to:

- Conclusion 1, which indicates that the transition from direct management to delegated cooperation and from off-budget to funding for on-budget interventions was well justified but, in some cases, negatively affected the delivery of results.
- Conclusion 2, which indicates that a) the various aid modalities and pathways have different strengths, are appropriate for different purposes, and can be mutually reinforcing, and b) that GIRoA is unable to fully absorb the large volume of on-budget interventions provided leaving little scope for further increasing the on-budget proportion of EU assistance.
- Conclusion 3, which indicates that poor programme design in the governance-related sectors, including unrealistic timelines and insufficient risk management, lessened the impact of programmes and did not always ensure that corruption was avoided.
- Conclusion 4, which indicates that the continuity and reliability of the EU’s support is a significant added value and is conducive for achieving results.
- Conclusion 5, which indicates there is significant scope for strengthening the mainstreaming of gender (and other cross-cutting issues) in EU funded programmes.

Main implementation responsibility:
EUD, DEVCO, GIRoA and implementing partners.

Possible actions include:
- Carry out an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the available modalities and aid pathways at the overall and sector levels.
- Develop clear strategies at the overall and sector levels for the use of different modalities and pathways (for what, why, and when) and how they can reinforce each other.
- Map TA and capacity development needs for each sector at different levels and identify where particular attention should be given and support directed, based on the importance in the social, economic and environmental dimensions.
- Support sector ministries in the transition from off-budget to on-budget programmes (taking lessons into consideration, e.g. from the MAIL Transition Project).
- Develop clear and realistic transition strategies for each programme for future transitions from off-budget to on-budget interventions and/or delegated cooperation to avoid gaps and processes going into hiatus, and taking the time needed for planning, formulation, and approval processes into consideration.
- Invest more resources in ensuring that the design and implementation of current and new programmes is done well, including designing adequate risk management systems and investing in appropriate staff.
• Ensure that gender issues are properly reflected at the programme level in strategic performance indicators, and ensure these indicators are monitored.

**Recommendation 2: Implement clear strategies for strengthening civil society’s transparency-related role and continue to support NGO service delivery, following the EU CSO Roadmap**

In line with the EU’s stated commitments, strengthen the accountability and transparency-related role of civil society while also facilitating better state-civil society relations, as per the strategies outlined in the CSO Roadmap. Additionally, and as a temporary measure, continue supporting in the short- to medium-term NGO delivery of services where GIRoA cannot adequately reach, in combination with a gradual transfer of service delivery responsibilities to GIRoA and the private sector.

This recommendation is linked to:

- Conclusion 2, which indicates that a) the ongoing trend of providing an increased proportion of financing on-budget can negatively affect the independence of NGOs and their ability to hold GIRoA accountable unless specific measures are taken to support capacity development for civil society, and b) that NGOs still have a critical role to play vis-à-vis service delivery to the Afghan population.
- Conclusion 3, which indicates that NGOs have been valuable implementing partners for EU-funded programmes.

Main implementation responsibility:
EUD, EU MS, civil society representatives and GIRoA.

Possible actions include:

- Continue advocacy for a shared vision and coordinated implementation efforts among donors, GIRoA, and civil society itself on the role of civil society in Afghanistan in the short, medium, and long term.
- Monitor implementation efforts to strengthen the advocacy and watchdog roles of civil society.
- Elaborate joint strategies at the sector level for a) working with civil society on the short- to medium-term provision of services in areas where GIRoA and the private sector currently cannot provide services and where GIRoA currently cannot reach, and b) a realistic gradual transition of responsibility to GIRoA (which will require significant capacity development) and the private sector.
- Develop and implement off-budget programmes for the implementation of the joint strategies.

**Recommendation 3: Support private sector development**

Increase the efforts to strengthen the private sector, vis-à-vis: a) delivery of services in the economic sectors (e.g. agriculture, operation and maintenance of water infrastructure), and b) strengthening SMEs and supporting entrepreneurs, with a special emphasis on building exports and job creation, including for women.

This recommendation is linked to:

- Conclusion 2, which indicates that the private sector is not yet sufficiently developed to deliver services to the Afghan population on a large scale, while GIRoA is also unable to fully provide services.
Conclusion 3, which indicates that EU support has shown that the creation of space and a role for the private sector can improve service delivery, and that SME development can provide income opportunities for women.

Conclusion 4, which indicates the economic base in Afghanistan is unable to generate sufficient domestic revenue for the delivery of key services to the population.

**Main implementation responsibility:**
EUD, GIROA, implementing partners, and private sector umbrella organisations.

**Possible actions include:**
- Gather and analyse the lessons learned in the EU-funded A&RD programmes on engaging the private sector in service provision and draw conclusions on options for future engagement.
- Gather and analyse the lessons learned in supporting rural entrepreneurs and job creation, e.g. with access to finance, and draw conclusions on options for future engagement.
- Engage the private sector in affordable yet cost recovering water infrastructure operation and maintenance aspects, which water user associations cannot handle.
- Analyse the legal and policy barriers and incentives for private sector development, including exports. Engage in policy dialogue with GIROA and private sector umbrella organisations on removal of barriers and provision of incentives, and provide TA, drawing on EU and international experience.

**Recommendation 4:** Enhance the capacity of the EUD to manage a new type of country programme, with emphasis on strategic dialogue and advocacy

*Ensure that the EUD has the required staff capacities and skills available to effectively engage in evidenced-based strategic dialogue with GIROA at the overall and sector levels and continue with the current approach to ensuring visibility.*

**This recommendation is linked to:**
- Conclusion 1, which indicates that the EUD does not have the capacity to fully utilise the enhanced opportunities provided by the reduced contract management and the budget support for engaging more strategically with GIROA.
- Conclusion 5, which indicates that the proactive engagement of the EUD in advocacy and dialogue is a significant added value, with the engagement of the EUD appreciated by GIROA and development partners and with the EUD having significant convening power.

**Main implementation responsibility:**
EUD and DEVCO.

**Possible actions include:**
- Review EUD staff job descriptions and adapt to the current and medium-term needs of the country programme.
- Train EUD staff on how to engage in strategic policy dialogue and how to use budget support, programmes, and trust fund engagements in the dialogue.
- Continue to develop and use the central communications and visibility strategy for the EUD.
- Establish an Afghanistan helpdesk with political and technical experts, which can provide TA and ongoing capacity development for the EUD at the overall and sector levels.
Recommendation 5: Advocate for a streamlined coordination and dialogue structure

Promote a clear understanding of the gaps and challenges in the current coordination and dialogue landscape and promote a simplification with well-planned and fewer fora and mechanisms.

This recommendation is linked to:
- Conclusion 5, which indicates that the EUD has significant convening power in its advocacy and dialogue.
- Conclusion 6, which indicates that there is room for improving coordination, that there are too many dialogue fora and mechanisms, and that the EUD is able to positively influence coordination.

Main implementation responsibility:
EUD, GIRoA, UNAMA, and 5+3 group.

Possible actions include:
- Analyse the ToRs of the different coordination and dialogue fora, compare the objectives outlined in the ToRs with the actual discussions taking place and results achieved, and identify overlaps/duplication between the various fora.
- Engage GIRoA and development partners in discussions on the roles and functionality of the different fora, and options for simplifying and making the structure more effective and results oriented.

Recommendation 6: Use impact indicators and monitoring strategically as tools for enhancing aid effectiveness

Strengthen outcome and impact monitoring at programme level, increase attention paid to analysis of risks to programme beneficiaries, establish strategic performance indicators for budget support and large-scale programmes at the sector level vis-à-vis tackling key bottlenecks and barriers affecting EU programmes, and link these performance indicators to dialogue with, and incentives for, GIRoA.

This recommendation is linked to:
- Conclusion 3, which indicates that SBC performance indicators and performance-based tranches are used strategically to influence GIRoA, but not in relation to EU’s thematic priorities in at the focal sector level.
- Conclusion 3, which indicates that, at the programme level, monitoring has mainly been output oriented and that outcome-impact monitoring has been insufficient – while at the same time, the EU has significant experience in strengthening sector/macro-level impact monitoring.
- Conclusion 5, which indicates there is scope for further use of SBC performance indicators to enhance synergy effects between EU financing and advocacy.

Main implementation responsibility:
EUD, DEVCO, implementing partners, and GIRoA.

Possible actions include:
- Ensure that programme designs include appropriate outcome-impact monitoring, including monitoring potential risks to programme beneficiaries.
- Provide TA and capacity development for implementing partners on the development and implementation of outcome-impact monitoring systems.

- Link performance indicators and performance-based tranches for the SBC and SMAF, and Migration Incentive Programmes to solving critical sector-level issues, including those that are negatively affecting the achievement of the objectives of EU-funded programmes (e.g. solving the MEW-MAIL mandate dispute regarding water resource management).

- Link performance indicators and performance-based tranches for the SBC and SMAF, and Migration Incentive Programmes to important advocacy areas for the EU, both in relation to development cooperation and political dialogue (e.g. gender, anti-corruption measures, and mining/extractive industries).