This action is funded by the European Union

ANNEX 1

of the Commission Implementing Decision on the financing of the Annual Action Programme in favour of Myanmar/Burma for 2018 part 2

Action Document for EU Peace Support in Myanmar/Burma – PEACE IV

INFORMATION FOR POTENTIAL GRANT APPLICANTS

WORK PROGRAMME FOR GRANTS

This document constitutes the work programme for grants in the sense of Article 110(2) of the Financial Regulation in the following section concerning calls for proposals: 5.3.1 – Grants – call for proposals “Support to the conflict affected territories and the peace process in Myanmar/Burma” (direct management).

| 1. Title/basic act/CRIS number | EU Peace Support in Myanmar/Burma – PEACE IV  
|                               | ACA/2018/040-879  
|                               | Financed under the Development Cooperation Instrument |
| 2. Zone benefiting from the action/location | Myanmar/Burma  
|                                               | The action shall be carried out at the following location: Yangon, Nay Pyi Taw and the ethnic states of Myanmar/Burma |
| 3. Programming document | Addendum No 1 to the Multiannual Indicative Programme (2014-2020) for Myanmar/Burma¹ |
| 4. Sector of concentration/thematic area | Peace-building support  
|                                               | DEV. Aid: YES |
| 5. Amounts concerned | Total estimated cost: EUR 109 857 573  
|                                               | Total amount of EU budget contribution: EUR 20 000 000  
|                                               | This action is co-financed in joint co-financing by other donors contributing to the Joint Peace Fund for the amount of EUR 60 560 202.  
|                                               | In addition, the Joint Peace Fund received previous EU contributions totalling EUR 28 823 687  
|                                               | This action is co-financed by potential grant beneficiaries for an |

¹ C(2018)4741 of 20 July 2018
indicative amount of EUR 473 684
This action is tentatively co-financed in joint co-financing by Italy, Sweden and Australia contributing to the Women and Girls First phase 2 programme for an amount to be determined.

| 6. Aid modality(ies) and implementation modality(ies) | Project modality  
| Direct management – grants – call for proposals  
| Indirect management with an International Organisation (UNOPS and UNFPA) |

| 7 a) DAC code(s) | 15220 – Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution;  
| 15230 – Post conflict – peace-building |

| 7 b) Main Delivery Channel | 41119 – United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)  
| 41502 – United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)  
| 20000 – Non Governmental Organisations and Civil Society |

| 8. Markers (from CRIS DAC form) | General policy objective | Not targeted | Significant objective | Main objective |
| Participation development/good governance | ☒ | ☐ | ☐ |
| Aid to environment | ☒ | ☐ | ☐ |
| Gender equality (including Women In Development) | ☒ | ☐ | ☐ |
| Trade Development | ☒ | ☐ | ☐ |
| Reproductive, Maternal, New born and child health | ☒ | ☐ | ☐ |

| RIO Convention markers | Not targeted | Significant objective | Main objective |
| Biological diversity | ☒ | ☐ | ☐ |
| Combat desertification | ☒ | ☐ | ☐ |
| Climate change mitigation | ☒ | ☐ | ☐ |
| Climate change adaptation | ☒ | ☐ | ☐ |

| 9. Global Public Goods and Challenges (GPGC) thematic flagships | Spotlight Initiative to eliminate violence against women and girls |

| 10. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) | Main SDG 16: Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies;  
| Secondary SDG 1: End poverty in all its forms everywhere; SDG 5: Gender Equality |

**SUMMARY**
Efforts to bring about a sustainable and inclusive end to Myanmar/Burma’s decades long civil war commenced in 2011 under the previous nominally-civilian Government. Initially, bilateral ceasefire agreements were signed with 14 of the 16 Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs). Multilateral negotiations were also undertaken for a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), which was signed in October 2015 by the Government, the Armed Forces (Tatmadaw) and eight EAOs (out of 16 EAOs that were part of the negotiating team). The EU co-signed the NCA as a formal witness to the peace process. In February 2018 two additional smaller EAOs joined the NCA.

Since the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK), swept to victory in historic democratic elections in 2015, the peace process and national reconciliation efforts have repeatedly been declared as the top priority for the Government. Nevertheless, significant challenges remain to finding a lasting political settlement to ethnic and inter-communal conflicts. The evanescent implementation of the NCA as well as progress in advancing a comprehensive political dialogue has been slow to materialise. Progress in the national political dialogue process has been limited and contested. Peace efforts are being undermined by intensified fighting in several ethnic states and involving both NCA-signatory and non-signatory EAOs.

Since taking up office, the Government has taken some initiatives to address the serious inter-communal tensions, in particular between Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State. In August 2017, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) staged coordinated attacks on security installations in Rakhine State. The incident was met with disproportionate use of force by the armed forces, which resulted in a new displacement of more than 800,000 Rohingya from northern Rakhine State into Bangladesh, drawing widespread international attention.

The overall objective of this action is to contribute to lasting peace and national reconciliation, security, stability and sustainable development in Myanmar/Burma. The action aims at providing support to peace process stakeholders to continue nationally-led peace negotiations and progress on the formal implementation of the NCA, including the ceasefire monitoring mechanism and the national political dialogue. Additionally, this action aims at providing support to displaced populations and host communities by strengthening the humanitarian-development-peace/security nexus, linking relief with rehabilitation and socio-economic recovery (LRRD) in conflict-affected areas and protracted situations of displacement and inter-communal violence. Simultaneously, the precarious situation of women and girls affected by sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) will be addressed.

The EU intends to further increase aid effectiveness in the area of peace through an additional contribution to the Joint Peace Fund (JPF2), delivering coordinated international financial and technical assistance to the peace processes. The action will aim at women’s meaningful participation in the implementation and monitoring of the ceasefire agreement (NCA), further peace negotiations, peace-building and reconciliation. The systematic integration of gender perspectives on making the peace process more inclusive and peace agreements and outcomes more sustainable. As part of the support for socio-economic recovery in conflict-affected areas, a strong emphasis will be given to Rakhine State in order to alleviate inter-communal tensions and address serious human rights concerns.

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2 Implemented by UNOPS, the JPF was set up in December 2015. For more details see sections 1.1 and 3.2 - https://www.jointpeacefund.org/.
1 CONTEXT

1.1 Sector/Country/Regional context/Thematic area

Political, economic and social situation

Following more than fifty years of military rule, Myanmar/Burma has embarked upon a remarkable transition in 2011, followed by historic democratic elections in November 2015 and the accession to power of the NLD-led Government in April 2016. From the beginning of the reform process, the EU, alongside other international partners, has been providing support to this multi-dimensional transition in a spirit of cooperation and partnership. However, Myanmar/Burma continues to face considerable challenges in achieving inclusive and sustainable peace and addressing serious human rights concerns, as illustrated by continued fighting in ethnic areas and the recent Rohingya exodus into Bangladesh following reports of serious human rights abuses by the armed forces in Rakhine State.

With regards to core international human rights conventions, Myanmar/Burma has ratified CEDAW, CRC, CRPD and most recently ICESCR. In November 2017, CEDAW requested the government to submit an "Exceptional Report on the Situation of Women and Girls from Northern Rakhine State" by 28 May 2018. It is only the fourth time an exceptional report has been requested by the Committee since holding its first session in October 1982. The Committee called for information concerning cases of sexual violence, including rape, against Rohingya women and girls by security forces; and to provide details on the number of women and girls who have been killed or have died due to other non-natural causes during the latest outbreak of violence. It also requested information on investigations, arrests, prosecutions, convictions and sentences or disciplinary measures imposed on perpetrators, including members of the armed forces, found guilty of such crimes. Myanmar/Burma did not present the aforementioned report by the deadline. The Government sent a draft report to CSOs for consultation purposes in July 2018, and is expected to submit the final report to CEDAW in August 2018. Regarding further reporting obligations on the implementation of international human rights conventions, Myanmar/Burma has so far failed to submit the latest CRC report, which was due in February 2017, as well as the latest CRC-OP-SC report, which was due in February 2014. Myanmar/Burma's latest Universal Periodic Review (UPR) took place in November 2015, one week after the general elections. Out of the 281 recommendations, Myanmar/Burma accepted 124, 88 would be examined and 69 noted. Its mid-term report, due in May 2018, is yet to be submitted. Myanmar/Burma's accession to core international human rights conventions has been on the agenda of all four EU-Myanmar Human Rights Dialogues since 2014, which were led by the EU Special Representative for Human Rights.

Sector context: policies and challenges in the peace process

Myanmar/Burma is one of the world's most heterogeneous countries in terms of ethnicity and religion with 135 officially recognized ethno-linguistic groups. Since the earliest years of independence through to the present day, the country has faced intra-ethnic tensions and conflict. Post-colonial Myanmar/Burma has never been at peace or entirely under central Government control. During the 1960s-1980s, several EAOs were able to carve out

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effectively independent micro-states with their own governments, service provision and foreign policies, and this remains the case in certain areas. Myanmar/Burma's transition necessarily involves simultaneous comprehensive legal, economic and democratic reforms.

The NCA, a text agreed by all negotiating parties (Government, Tatmadaw and 16 EAOs) in March 2015, continues to provide the main path for Myanmar/Burma's peace process. However, only ten out of 16 EAOs involved with negotiating the text have so far signed the NCA. Crucially, around 80% of ethnic armed combatants remain outside the formal peace process.

The NCA envisages a peace architecture comprised of a tripartite (Government, Tatmadaw and EAO) Joint Implementation Committee Meeting (JICM) as the highest joint decision-making mechanism. Two major committees then lead the process at the Union level, with the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC-U) and the tripartite Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC), with the latter leading and coordinating a multi-year national political dialogue process. Membership includes Government representatives, EAOs and members of political parties who won seats in the 2015 election. The Tatmadaw is currently focused on the JMC-U, whilst the NLD leads in the UPDJC.

The NLD has declared peace and national reconciliation as one of its top priorities. The State Counsellor's Ministry led by ASSK is the focal ministry and a Peace Commission (PC) was established to lead negotiations with signatory and non-signatory EAOs. The Peace Commission has separate subcommittees for negotiation with NCA-signatory and non-signatory EAOs. In 2016, the Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC) was dismantled and replaced by the National Reconciliation and Peace Centre (NRPC). Unlike the MPC, the NRPC is a governmental institution under the State Counsellor's Ministry. It serves as the Secretariat to the Peace Commission. The NRPC functions as a new institution in terms of staff and premises and despite financial and technical support provided by the EU through the JPF, their capacities remain quite weak. NCA-signatory EAOs are today represented by the Peace Process Steering Team (PPST) and the Peace Process Working Team (PPWT), with a secretariat office based in Yangon. During 2017, evolving ethnic alliances have produced an increasingly fragmented landscape of ethnic armed actors bound together in shifting alliances. The United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) – a four-member non-signatory bloc – has been in periodic negotiations with the Government since the NCA was signed. Their demands largely relate to assurances on the structure of the JMC and potential role of

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5 The MPC, funded by the EU since its inception with a total of EUR 8.5 million, was a quasi-governmental institution that acted as the Secretariat to the previous Government's Chief Negotiator. Support was provided to formal and informal negotiations, and meetings with diverse stakeholders. Between 2012 and 2016, the MPC supported on average 75 dialogues/meetings per month.

6 Financial and technical support to NCA-S EAO peace process participation and the establishment and running costs of the NCA-S EAO Office is being provided by the JPF. The PPST/PPWT members are: All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABDSF), Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), Chin National Front (CNF), the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), the Karen National Union (KNU), KNU/Karen National Liberation Army-Peace Council (KNU/KNLA-PC), Pa-O National Liberation Organisation (PNLO) and the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS). The two recent signatories that joined the NCA, the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) have not formally joined this office yet, although they will probably do so in the coming months.

7 Founded in 2011, the UNFC is an umbrella of various non-signatory groups. In 2017, the UNFC started to disintegrate after months of internal tensions over whether to sign the NCA. During 2017, the Kachin Independent Army (KIA), Wa National Organisation (WNO) and the Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP) formally requested to withdraw their membership, leaving only the Arakan National Council (ANC), the Karemni National Progressive Party (KNPP), the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) in the formerly seven-member alliance.

8 Financial and technical support to UNFC EAO peace process participation is being provided by the JPF.
internationals. In February 2018, the NMSP and LDU signed the NCA, decreasing the role and negotiating position of other UNFC members. Meanwhile, a parallel seven-member non-signatory alliance, the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC) was formed and led by the powerful United Wa State Army (UWSA). It includes the outlawed Northern Alliance of four EAOs currently engaged in active conflict with the Tatmadaw\(^9\).

The agreed Framework for Political Dialogue (FPD) outlines a multi-layered process, with national and subnational consultation and dialogue processes led by different actors (including Government, political parties and EAOs). Union Peace Conferences (UPC) are periodically convened as part of the national political dialogue process to agree on policy options for inclusion in the Union Peace Accord (UPA), which will eventually form the basis of Constitutional change. Since January 2016, three UPCs have been convened, with the last one held in July 2018. China plays a pivotal role in the peace process and has an influential position in Myanmar/Burma’s wider transition efforts.

In advance of the UPC, pilot national dialogues are held in several states and regions of Myanmar/Burma, organised by EAOs, Government, local authorities and also jointly by the UPDJC. A first CSO Forum was also convened in February 2017. There are several challenges, including in gaining permissions for some ethnic-based dialogues. Nevertheless, these subnational consultation and dialogue events represent the commencement of a critical aspect of the national political dialogue process in Myanmar/Burma.

As regards the NCA-implementation more broadly, there is growing disillusionment on the part of a number of signatory EAOs. Lack of joint decision-making, barriers to national dialogues and limited progress in the development of interim arrangements are all key concerns. Without careful management, these simmering inter- and intra-ethnic divisions threaten to jeopardise future negotiations and the sustainability of existing and future ceasefires, peace agreements and implementation mechanisms. There is also a need to address serious inclusion concerns with regards to national dialogues, women, youth and civil society participation. This is an area which requires substantial investment in capacity development of participants and the groups they represent (including achieving a 30% gender quota agreed to at the first UPC). The capacity of key actors remains low and development of key peace process support and implementation mechanisms remains nascent.

As the most inclusive and supported multilateral negotiation process in Myanmar/Burma to date, the NCA process remains a significant opportunity to establish a comprehensive and sustainable settlement to conflict, including robust joint ceasefire monitoring mechanisms at national, state and local levels. However, an inclusive and meaningful political dialogue process in Myanmar/Burma would likely need to last many years to enable the substantive participation of a broader spectrum of stakeholders than were involved in NCA negotiations as well as greater breadth and depth of discussion on key issues.

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\(^9\) The seven northern groups are operating under the umbrella of the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultation Committee (FPNCC). Originally, the FPNCC made it clear that it pursues a different ceasefire and political process but will not sign the NCA without proposed changes. Following a series of meetings with the Chinese Special Envoy and the Peace Commission, a strategic move forward from the current deadlock in negotiations with the Government and Tatmadaw cannot be excluded. The FPNCC EAO groups are: the Arakan Army (AA), Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/KIA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDA/ Kokang), National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA/Mongla), SSPP and United Wa State Party/Army (UWSP/UWSA).
**Sector context: Rakhine State**

The situation in Rakhine State poses one of the greatest challenges to Myanmar/Burma’s democratic transition. The Rohingya are a Muslim minority group who reside in Rakhine State. Full citizenship for the Rohingya remains highly controversial in Myanmar/Burma. Successive Governments have labelled the population as ‘Bengali’ to stress their alleged foreign origin, and neither Rohingya nor Bengali is included among the country’s 135 officially recognised distinct ethnic groups.\(^\text{10}\)

The plight of the stateless Rohingya population has been the focus of renewed international attention during 2017 and 2018. On 25 August 2017 – months after their initial emergence in October 2016 – ARSA launched attacks on 30 Border Guard Police (BGP) posts and an army base. These attacks were swiftly followed by a severe military response which did not discriminate between militants and civilians and included clearance operations and widespread burning of villages. This was orchestrated by the Tatmadaw, BGP and ethnic Rakhine civilians. Human rights groups have documented numerous unlawful killings, rape and other forms of sexual violence against women and children, widespread burning of tens of thousands of Rohingya homes and other structures. This builds on the structural discrimination and previous chapters of violence and instability in the history of the Rohingya in Rakhine State.\(^\text{11}\) To date more than 800,000 Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh. They are housed in rapidly growing and overstretched camps near Cox’s Bazar, creating a major humanitarian crisis. Large scale returns are not considered likely in the short-term, nor is this considered advisable (see risks section). This results in significant needs in Bangladesh as well as Myanmar/Burma for the foreseeable future. Approximately 320,000 Muslims remain in central Rakhine State (many of whom are Rohingya); 120,000 remain confined to camps since violence in 2012. These populations are extremely vulnerable to resurgence in inter-communal tensions as anti-Muslim sentiment is rife. Current needs of the remaining populations in northern Rakhine State centre on food, protection, health, education, water and sanitation.

In August 2016, a Rakhine Advisory Commission (RAC), chaired by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was set up by the Government. The RAC released a final report endorsed by the Government on 24 August 2017 (the day before the ARSA attacks triggered the most recent wave of violence and displacement). The report includes recommendations on economic and social development, citizenship, freedom of movement, humanitarian access, discrimination and segregation. Since 2016, a number of committees have also been established to address conditions in Rakhine State. In May 2016, the Government established a Central Committee on Implementation of Peace and Development in Rakhine State, chaired by ASSK, with a mandate to work on issues related to security and citizenship. In December

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\(^\text{10}\) In many ways, the listed 135 official groups form the benchmark for official participation in the peace process. This further separates the conflict in Rakhine State from other conflict resolution processes in Myanmar/Burma. There is currently minimal appetite from any groups, including EAOs and civil society, for increased alignment of the processes.

\(^\text{11}\) In 2012, intercommunal violence broke out between Buddhist Rakhine and Muslim Rohingya communities and left some 240 people dead and 140,000 people displaced and living in IDP camps. Violence targeting other Muslim citizens spread to other parts of the country in 2013 and tensions further increased in 2014 after the alleged killing of 48 Rohingya by security forces. Serious concerns remain about the rise of hate speech, often instigated and led by radical nationalist Buddhists. In October 2016, tensions in Rakhine increased following attacks on Border Guard Police (BGP) posts in northern Rakhine State by ARSA. In response, State security operations were deployed in several townships with large Rohingya populations. At this time some 75,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh. Some 1,000 people were reportedly killed during these security clearance operations.

2016, the Government announced the establishment of a Union-level Commission of Inquiry into alleged human rights violations and abuses by the military and security forces. The first report of the Commission of Inquiry stated that there was no evidence to verify reports of human rights abuses. Continued lack of access has prevented any independent verification but satellite imagery analysis, alongside eyewitness interviews collected by international rights groups, suggest systematic destruction of property in villages. In November 2017 Myanmar/Burma and Bangladesh signed a repatriation agreement stating that returns must be voluntary. However, the situation on the ground is not yet conducive for return, due to a lack of security and absence of clarity on legal status. As a result, large-scale long-term confinement of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh's camps is a likely scenario. This would create significant pressures on Bangladesh and poses risks for regional relations and global security including radicalisation and violent extremism.

The EU-tabled resolution to the UN Human Rights Council of March 2017\(^\text{13}\) decided to dispatch an independent and impartial international fact-finding mission to establish the facts and circumstances of alleged grave human rights violations by military and security forces in particular in Rakhine State. The Myanmar/Burma Government has not granted the mission access to the country.

In October 2017, the Government announced the creation of a national fund for Rakhine State under the direction of ASSK, the Union Enterprise for Humanitarian Assistance, Resettlement and Development (UEHRD). The role of the UEHRD is to work with different ministries in line with the recommendations of the RAC, to provide humanitarian assistance, and to promote resettlement and socio-economic development. The fund has reportedly so far received more than USD 20 million from domestic (predominantly private sector) sources. The UEHRD's focus has so far been on infrastructure and food security. There is currently no formal coordination mechanism between the UEHRD and the international community. Some development partners (notably Asian donors) have made direct cash or in-kind contributions to the UEHRD.

The EU and other development partners continue to assess carefully the situation, seeking to evaluate responses in a range of scenarios and take a long-term approach to tackling the underlying political, social and economic drivers of conflict in Rakhine State. To this end, coordinated by the UN Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator and keeping the RAC recommendations as main reference, development partners have formulated the "Strategic Framework for International Engagement in Rakhine". It is still unclear how the framework will be operationalised, but most likely a common initiative/action (possibly a Multi-Donor Trust Fund) will be sought.

There remains a significant trust deficit in many Rakhine State communities regarding support from western development partners, which is often perceived to only address the needs of the Rohingya. An increasingly widespread strand of popular nationalism has been strengthened by events in 2017 which raises concerns for future inter-communal violence and has potential negative spill over effects for the ongoing peace process. Meanwhile, the backdrop of the 2020 elections raises the chances that development assistance in Rakhine State will be used as a tool of the government to win support from Rakhine communities. Combined, the international community faces challenges in providing needs-driven support in

Rakhine State that minimises the risk of ‘doing harm’. A highly flexible and responsive approach will therefore be required during 2018 and beyond.

**Sector context: development in the ethnic areas**

Ethnic areas consistently demonstrate lower levels of development across a range of indicators. This action therefore seeks to support the delivery of basic services (peace dividends) and implement confidence-building activities in conflict affected areas. Myanmar/Burma continues to have large IDP populations, some of which are the result of long term displacement and escalation of conflict. Estimates suggest that as of January 2018 there are 241,000 IDPs in camps or camp-like situations due to armed conflict and inter-communal violence in the ethnic states. The need for broader development is also pressing, not least to address long-held grievances regarding inequality between central and more remote areas mainly inhabited by ethnic nationalities. Prior to the surge in Rohingya refugees since August 2017, there were 479,706 refugees in neighbouring countries, many of whom remain to be resettled, integrated or voluntarily returned to Myanmar/Burma. As of March 2018, there are 99,886 verified refugees from Myanmar/Burma residing in Thailand.

The situation in the south-east (Kayah, Kayin, Mon and Tanintharyi) is considered more stable (although recent fighting has occurred between the Army and the KNU). A mixture of NCA signatory and non-signatory EAOs is operational in these areas. This is the region from where the majority of the Myanmar/Burma refugees in Thailand originate. Numerous international and national NGOs are implementing community-level activities and livelihood and rehabilitation support in the areas of return. As a signal of positive socio-political and security developments within Myanmar/Burma spontaneous returns began in October 2016, although numbers are still very low.

As of January 2018, an estimated 120,00 people remained displaced in Kachin and northern Shan States, with many of the displaced (about 43% in Kachin State) residing in areas outside of Government control with limited humanitarian access. In north-eastern Myanmar/Burma, the situation has become protracted and remains tense and volatile with continuing conflict triggering further displacement.

The lack of livelihood opportunities is a major challenge for IDPs in camps in non-Government controlled areas. Several communities rely solely on humanitarian and development aid to survive. This perpetuates a lack of food security, and increased protection risks as food purchase and income generation often requires cross-border travel to China and force IDPs to take higher risks. Local organizations are underfunded and struggle to respond to new displacements. Limited livelihood opportunities, labour market saturation, market fluctuation and the unpredictable nature of the conflict result in extremely fragile livelihoods and low levels of resilience. Continued close proximity of armed personnel (Tatmadaw and EAOs) to civilians also creates serious continued protection concerns. These include lack of access to humanitarian services, gender-based violence, forced recruitment including of children, forced labour, lack of documentation, land grabbing, human trafficking and serious risks associated with landmines.

**1.1.1 Public Policy Assessment and EU Policy Framework**

The Council conclusions of the EU for Myanmar in 2016 sets the framework for EU policy and support to the ongoing reforms in the country. The EU has pledged to support the peace process on all sides and has established a regular political dialogue involving all concerned stakeholders to a) achieve sustainable peace in Myanmar/Burma by addressing longstanding
differences in an inclusive way; b) consolidate democratic achievements, including gender equality; c) strengthen human rights and the rule of law; and d) adhere to international agreements.

The Council conclusions of October 2017 further reaffirmed the EU and its Member States’ strong engagement to support the country's democratic transition, peace, national reconciliation and socio-economic development. However, the conclusions also underlined human rights concerns, particularly related to harm to civilians in Rakhine State. The conclusions reiterated EU readiness to support the government of Myanmar/Burma in the swift and full implementation of the recommendations of the RAC. Most recently, Council conclusions were published in February 2018 in response to continued lack of progress in resolving the Rohingya crisis. In April 2018, the EU’s arms embargo was further strengthened and targeted restrictive measures imposed on senior military officers involved with human rights violations in Rakhine State.


1.1.2 Stakeholder analysis

- In April 2016 the NLD-led Government has taken overall responsibility for the peace process. However, the new NRPC lacks capacity and experience for conducting credible negotiations with all EAOs. The forthcoming elections scheduled for 2020 will increasingly provide an important backdrop for domestic politics, including as regards the relationships between the civilian Government, the Tatmadaw and the EAOs. Events in both the peace process and Rakhine State have evidenced the internal power struggles that are one of the greatest threats to the country’s stability moving forward. The creation of a Government-chaired committee to implement the RAC recommendations exemplifies ongoing efforts by the NLD Government to exert control over the situation.

- The Tatmadaw is a key actor in the peace process and national politics. They continue to hold 25% of Parliamentary seats, three critical Government ministries and several key powers under the 2008 Constitution. They also form part of Government delegations in major peace process bodies. Local commanders have been closely involved in the negotiation of bilateral ceasefires in their areas, and senior generals were part of the negotiations of the NCA. Traditionally, the Tatmadaw has perceived itself as the sole guarantor of national unity and sovereignty, and has historically been adamantly opposed to any discussion on federalism, which it perceives as a threat to Myanmar/Burma’s territorial integrity. In this context, commitments at the UPC to a federal democratic union are significant. Nevertheless, the unwillingness to discuss details or alternative wording from the 2008 Constitution is symptomatic of their ongoing resistance to structural change required to reach a lasting negotiated settlement to conflict. During 2017, the role of the Tatmadaw and security forces in committing acts of violence and human rights abuses in Rakhine has drawn widespread international condemnation. Domestically however, the events and reactions have conversely generated a resurgence of support for the Tatmadaw.

- There are more than 16 major EAOs (excluding a significant number of smaller splinter groups and ethnic-based militias), 10 of which have signed the NCA. The EAOs’ goals vary greatly, as does their strength and local support. During the two years of NCA
negotiations, important progress was made in shaping a common negotiating position. However, the previous mobilization by 16 EAOs to negotiate as a block was compromised following differing strategies and the partial signing of the NCA by only eight groups. This fostered an environment of reduced trust between groups and has created different levels of participation requirements and eligibility. Signatory and non-signatory EAOs have different status. Seven non-signatory EAOs have engaged in separate bilateral peace negotiations with the Government and in April 2017, the FPNCC, which includes the militarily most powerful groups and the majority of those that remain in active conflict. The FPNCC position is that it will not sign the NCA as it stands as they seek to negotiate certain amendments. There have been no formal negotiations between the Government and the FPNCC to date. Different UPCs have included participation of different non-signatory groups, but never in a decision-making capacity. As a result, two years of NCA implementation, and over 20 months of national political dialogue have occurred in the absence of many EAOs. This has potentially negative implications for the inclusivity and sustainability of agreements already reached as part of the UPA.

- **Political parties** have so far had limited formal involvement in the peace process and were largely absent from ceasefire negotiations. However, they have been participating in all UPCs. Several ethnic political parties have close links to EAOs, but there is also a competition element. Ethnic political parties were not able to realise significant gains during the November 2015 elections due to the ‘First-past-the-post’ electoral system. Ethnic political parties do not necessarily represent EAOs (signatory or non-signatory) but do sometimes represent the interests and grievances of ethnic communities in their respective areas. Substantive involvement and participation of representatives of a wide range of political parties (elected or otherwise) in subnational dialogues is also important. Political parties are relatively under-resourced in comparison to other stakeholders, thereby limiting their substantive participation in the political dialogue process.

- Many ethnic **civil society organisations** are working with EAOs, particularly in support of social service delivery and other support for local communities. Meanwhile they can challenge the top-down, authoritarian structures of EAOs and, in this respect, play a critical role in local democratisation processes. This is particularly the case for a number of well-established and effective ethnic women’s organisations, such as those included in the Alliance for Gender Inclusion in the Peace Process (AGIPP). The current format for formal civil society participation in the political dialogue process is relatively constrained. CSOs are key for other areas related to resettlement, reconstruction and social development in ethnic areas.

- Local **ethnic communities** have suffered immensely from the armed conflicts and are a major driver of the push for peace. In some areas, EAOs enjoy significant popular legitimacy; yet in others local communities generally resent all armed groups. Regarding the situation of the **Rohingya** minority, during 2017 widespread public and national media support for anti-Muslim sentiment has grown as well as support for the actions of the Government and Tatmadaw, including amongst non-Bamar communities. Moderate voices are limited in public discourse although promisingly there have been some important statements by CSOs on civilian protection concerns in Rakhine State.

**1.1.3 Priority areas for support/problem analysis**

Despite the NCA and other bilateral agreements, a high degree of ethnic-religious tension persists. Implementation of the NCA since October 2015 has resulted in the establishment of
various structures (UPDJC, JMC) whose proper implementation needs to be strengthened and improved at all levels. Ongoing support thought the JPF to strengthen conflict parties’ administrative capacities remains necessary, as well as building technical knowledge and soft skills to effectively develop strategies, negotiate and enable evidence-based policy making.

The national peace architecture has a very limited participation of women. The quota of 30% women’s participation in the UPC has not yet been met. This action targets women's rights in the peace process, carefully taking into consideration the priorities of women, boys and girls. Increased participation of women at all levels (track I and II) and the role of women in conflict mediation and peace negotiations will be addressed through different ways with this action.

Other aspects will be also tackled with this action such as gender equality and women’s and girls’ rights and empowerment; prohibition of Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) and an end to impunity for perpetration by parties to the conflict; treatment of sexual violence committed after the ceasefire agreement as a breach; attention to gender issues in IDP camps and in reintegration; increased substantive participation of women and youth in political dialogue processes at the national and subnational level; women’s equal representation with men in decision-making roles at conflict and ceasefire monitoring, early warning, and early response mechanisms; peace-building, reconciliation and equal representation with men in decision-making roles in political dialogue mechanisms and the systematic development and use of gender analysis across national and international support to the peace process.

Meanwhile, high level of SGBV against girls and women is seen as likely to continue by remaining Rohingya in Myanmar/Burma and Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. An increase in forced and risky abortions is also likely for women who were raped during the period of the violence and clearance operations. This will require support to programs addressing physical and psycho-social trauma, to prevent and protect from further violence to take place and to address the issues of stigma related to sexual violence and the situation and legal status for the children born out of rape. Gender perspectives will need to be systematically mainstreamed across all support to Rakhine State. Interventions addressing violence against women and girls in Rakhine communities also require continued support. Assistance for any credible repatriation process of refugees from Bangladesh should also be addressed with this action and based upon gender analysis.

In Myanmar/Burma, inter-communal tensions remain high and anti-Muslim sentiment in particular has grown in 2017. For this reason, few moderate voices remain, the space for even limited public dialogue of these issues has reduced and interfaith dialogue faces many challenges. Ongoing denial of any wrongdoing by the military and security forces and the government's resistance to allow independent investigations into alleged human rights abuses are particularly worrying and increasingly affecting international relations. Any transformation of the Buddhist nationalist discourse has to come from within. Following the spike in tensions and violence, nuanced social cohesion approaches are required. There is also a need for trust building between government and communities and intra- and inter-communal dialogue among various parties. Civil society, in particularly Rakhine civil society, is a critical actor for this.

The suffering of civilians and forced displacement of ethnic minorities by Myanmar/Burma’s military goes beyond the human rights violations against the Rohingya Muslims. While approaching seven years of displacement and despite ongoing and often increasing needs, displaced persons in northern Myanmar/Burma face decreasing aid and protection services. This is also the case in other regions where better peace dividends are required. A strong
conflict sensitive approach will be applied to all projects funded under this action and a robust conflict analysis with a strong participatory approach will be required for each implementing partner funded under this action.

2 RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risks</th>
<th>Risk level (H/M/L)</th>
<th>Mitigating measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The peace process fails and has serious repercussions on the Government, particularly on the decentralisation process.</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Momentum in the peace process will be maintained through mediation and conflict mitigation measures. A wide range of stakeholders will need to be involved in case this is required. At this time NCA-signatory EAOs, Government and Tatmadaw all continue to show a commitment to the process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Further division between EAOs: The advantages associated with signing the NCA in terms of donor support, training, etc., but also the possibility of going forward with the political dialogue process, may further increase the divide between signatory and non-signatory groups.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>2017 and early 2018 has shown that fragmentation of EAOs has not undermined efforts to negotiate for peace, however it has had implications for the future of the NCA. It also has an effect on the negotiating position of the EAOs, in particular those with less military strength. Support from the JPF to NCA signatory and non-signatory EAOs to maintain their peace process engagement is an important mitigation measure. The JPF grants also enable regular contact between the NCA signatories and some non-signatories. Mediation measures could also be explored, especially concerning inclusion of the FPNCC EAOs in formal peace process negotiations (China is currently leading this role).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Government’s approach to peace is dominated by fostering the expansion of economic development and service delivery to areas that are not under their control.</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>The approaching 2020 elections increase the risk that development assistance will be used as a means to win popular support by different actors. Donor support should explore protocols to govern interim arrangements in NCA-signatory areas in order to mitigate this.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of commitment to gender equality, women’s rights, protection and meaningful participation further marginalizes women in Myanmar/Burma, and leads to agreements that do not factor in the needs and realities of half the population.</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Given that leadership in Government, EAOs and Myanmar/Burma society in general is dominated by men, few women have been elevated to decision-making positions. Mitigating measures include: a) action on women meaningful participation in peace process and gender based violence; b) JPF commitment to 15% of all its funding being directed towards actions and activities focussed on gender; c) systematically setting the integration of gender perspective and analysis targets across all EU peace funding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak capacity of national actors, including the Government, EAOs, political parties and CSOs results in major constraints for the implementation of the peace process.</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Capacity gaps exist on all sides, but are more pronounced amongst those stakeholders that were historically under-resourced (EAOs and political parties). Combining technical support with capacity building and soft skills trainings is essential. A priority for all sides is increasing capacity to engage in evidence-informed policymaking. Careful attention should be paid when selecting implementing partners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government responses in Rakhine State are either heavily constrained by the military, or results in a breakdown in civil-military relations in Myanmar/Burma.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>There have been very few meetings between ASSK and the Commander-in-Chief since August 2017. A number of forthcoming processes will require cooperation between the Government and Tatmadaw (i.e. UN fact finding mission, implementation of the RAC recommendations and repatriation of Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh). Alongside financial and technical assistance, diplomatic engagement with both the civilian Government and the military will be essential.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased tensions and anti-Muslim sentiments lead to intercommunal violence in Rakhine State or Myanmar/Burma.</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Since the crisis in northern Rakhine State there has been a relatively high risk of intercommunal violence in central Rakhine State (where some Rohingya remain) and in other areas of Myanmar/Burma (where anti-Muslim sentiment is high). As mitigation, the EU will permanently use conflict sensitivity measures and conflict sensitivity analysis across its portfolio and will remain flexible to adapt support as the context evolves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continued or renewed armed conflict and/or intercommunal violence in some areas could make it impossible to deliver the kind of peace-support envisioned by this action.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Renewed efforts may be required to promote the humanitarian-development nexus in the affected areas, as well as to any new IDPs or refugees. It will also be essential to monitor assistance given to any repatriated refugees. Returns to northern Rakhine State will increase the risk of intercommunal violence in those areas. There is also the risk that international support to Government-led responses in Rakhine State inadvertently supports further human rights abuses. Advocacy measures for improving access from development and humanitarian actors should continue in order to provide services effectively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future ARSA attacks lead to renewed conflict in Rakhine State.</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Analysts predict major ARSA attacks as unlikely but not impossible. The protracted displacement to overstretched camps in Bangladesh could provide a base for a regrouped effort. The EU should utilise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Further security activities, investigations and vetting by security forces in Rakhine State perpetuate further human rights abuses against the Rohingya.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accurate intelligence with the aim to mitigate any rise in violent extremism.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assumptions

- It is implicitly assumed that more key EAOs will join the NCA, which in turn will establish the confidence on all sides needed to move forward with an inclusive National Political Dialogue and an inclusive Peace Accord.
- The Government remains committed to the implementation of previously-endorsed recommendations of the RAC.
- The Government will cooperate constructively with development partners allowing the reforms to progress effectively and efficiently with international funding to support a peaceful transition.

3 Lessons learnt, complementarity and cross-cutting issues

3.1 Lessons learnt

- Be realistic about what international aid can accomplish in the peace process. External actors can support but should not lead transitions to peace and intercommunal reconciliation, as these processes must be locally owned. Meanwhile, lower trust in traditional international donors and an increase in the role of non-traditional actors further limit the political and technical influence of the EU and Member States.

- Diversify aid modality methods and implementing partners. In line with OECD best practice in Transition Financing, various possible tools and aid modalities will have to co-exist in order to achieve a shared and common goal. Combining multiple aid delivery methods (Multi-Donor Trust Funds, bilateral grants and direct technical assistance) is the best possible way for achieving a high number of goals simultaneously. Similarly, the JPF cannot respond to all challenges faced by the peace process and the intercommunal violence and therefore, bilateral projects can sometimes be more efficient than working exclusively through a Multi-Donor Trust Fund.

- Improve the humanitarian–development–peace nexus. Aid systems in Myanmar/Burma are traditionally compartmentalised, with strong divisions between humanitarian and development systems. This limits effectiveness in protracted situations of displacement like Rakhine, Kachin and Northern Shan States. International actors in Myanmar/Burma should adopt a long-term, non-linear approach to the peace process and the intercommunal violence. Quick wins are difficult to achieve.

- Foster interactions between EAOs and Government representatives at all levels, avoiding support to peace elite negotiations only. This can strengthen mutual trust and confidence among various actors in localised contested areas. If Government and EAOs are both committed to any particular political reform, momentum can be built between critical partners.
• **Promote tangible benefits for people in conflict affected zones.** Recognising the highly-localised needs across Myanmar/Burma’s diverse geographical and political landscape is important for delivering effective support to populations and achieving transformative outcomes. Programming approaches, aid modalities and implementing partner selection needs to match the contexts and needs in different ethnic areas and difference parts of Rakhine State. This includes implementing activities in various local languages to ensure relevance and accessibility.

• **Recognise the critical role of gender in addressing fragility.** Better analysis of women’s engagement in the peace process as well as documentation of the impact of conflict on women (such as SGBV) can help to address the attention required for various gender issues. At this time, peace process parties also require significant support to operationalise their gender commitments, and to increasingly be held accountable for realising their verbal commitments.

• **Adapt to the specific participation constraints of beneficiaries.** Programmes aimed at women can face specific implementation constraints. In particular, the availability of beneficiaries in conflict areas and Rakhine State can be particularly challenging for women who also engage in income generation activities and domestic duties. Implementing partners can adjust programming to address these barriers, for instance by providing childcare during activities.

• **There is a need to engage more with non-traditional partners.** In both the peace process and support to Rakhine State, the roles of China, ASEAN nations, India and Japan is increasingly important. Substantial financial commitments from Myanmar/Burma’s (predominantly ethnic Bamar) private sector have been made to support the peace process and Rakhine. Lack of engagement and coordination between OECD donors and non-traditional actors risks undermining transformational outcomes and conflict sensitive approaches. Ongoing engagement efforts need to be strengthened and reinforced.

### 3.2 Complementarity, synergy and donor coordination

In 2016, the Government announced the formation of a Joint Coordination Body (JCB) for peace process funding. Membership of the JCB includes Government, Tatmadaw, NCA signatory and non-signatory EAOs. It is currently the only formal body where all these parties are represented and have decision-making power. Nevertheless, the JCB is not fully operational and has not provided coherent or jointly agreed strategic priorities to the international community. Many elements of the JCB mandate, structure and process remain to be defined and jointly agreed by the parties. The JCB has not formally met since February 2017 and is not functioning as a joint mechanism.

The most sophisticated instrument for aligned support to the peace process is the **Joint Peace Fund (JPF)**, which was established in November 2015 as a multi-donor platform to provide coordinated support to the peace process. Whilst the JPF governance structure was at one time envisioned to include EAOs and Government, the only functioning body at the governance structure is the Fund Board, which currently comprises representatives from contributing donor countries. Until now, the JCB body has replaced the High Level Committee (HLC) that was foreseen under the initial JPF governance structure. During this period, the JPF has funded multiple activities such as the UPCs, support to the NRPC, UPDJC, NCA-signatory
and some non-signatory EAOs and their office structures, technical assistance to the JMC\textsuperscript{14} and has appraised a significant amount of peacebuilding proposals whose operational activities have started recently. The main goal of the JPF is to provide long-term support to national efforts in order to achieve a final and sustainable settlement to ethnic armed conflict. With more than USD 100 million pledged by eleven donors and USD 76 million committed so far, the JPF is supporting the participation of the national parties to the NCA, working through the agreements, structures and processes determined by them. The JPF is highly adaptable and flexible.

There are two main groups seeking to coordinate international support to the peace process in Myanmar/Burma:

- **The Peace Support Group** (PSG) was initiated in 2012 at the request of the previous government to provide a common platform for dialogue between the Government and the donor community, and to better coordinate international support for the peace process. The PSG includes development partners active in supporting peace in Myanmar/Burma, as well as the UN and the World Bank. Most of the PSG members are active contributors to the JPF. The EU is a very active member of this group. Nonetheless under the current administration the role of the PSG has decreased;

- **The International Peace Support Group** (IPSG) is an informal coordination network of over 20 international NGOs (many of them funded by the EU), most of which provide expert analysis and/or capacity development in support of the peace process. It meets monthly, followed by a briefing to interested donors.

With respect to Rakhine State, the Government has taken some measures towards the implementation of a limited number of recommendations established in the RAC through the UEHRD (i.e. closure of some IDP camps and humanitarian access) but there is no clear prioritised, time-bound government work-plan to steer a systematic implementation process.

Another important contribution to social harmony in Myanmar/Burma is the Paung Sie Facility (PSF – previously known as the Peace Support Fund, funded by the United Kingdom, Sweden and Australia). From 2014-2016 the PSF provided funding to the peace process and inter-communal harmony. Its current goal is to enhance social cohesion by supporting locally driven, catalytic initiatives and ideas. Other prominent bilateral donors supporting peace are Norway, Japan, United States, United Kingdom, Australia and Switzerland. All of them are JPF contributors.

The World Bank, UN and EU are discussing a Recovery and Peace Building Assessment (RPBA) with a view to eventually develop a relief-to-recovery-to-development plan for Rakhine State that would help structure and prioritise the response across Government ministries and for all relevant stakeholders. The plan would also provide the foundation to mobilise technical and financial support from the international community.

The UN has prepared a Strategic Framework for International Engagement in Rakhine offering international partners a proposed framework towards principled and constructive engagement. This engagement is in support of all communities in Rakhine and in support of

\textsuperscript{14} The UN has set-up a Myanmar/Burma-based UN platform to serve as a conduit for international assistance to the JMC and provide coordinated financial, institutional and technical capacity building in support of the JMC’s mandate and functions vis-à-vis the NCA. This local project structure is currently managed by UNDP Myanmar.
national and state institutions that are working to achieve a peaceful, fair and prosperous future for the people of Rakhine.

All EU interventions are closely coordinated with ECHO\textsuperscript{15} and other relevant humanitarian actors (UK, US, AU, CH) in order to ensure the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, address the existing protracted displacement and gradually end dependence on humanitarian assistance by fostering self-reliance and enabling the displaced to live in dignity as contributors to their host societies, until voluntary return or resettlement options become possible.

The action intends to support phase 2 of the Women and Girls First programme, with phase 1 co-financed a.o. by AU, FI, IT, SE and UN, and implemented by UNFPA to protect the rights of the most vulnerable women and girls in Kachin, Kayin, Mon, Northern Shan and Rakhine States.

3.3 Cross-cutting issues

As in many peace processes gender equality is one of the most prominent cross-cutting issues. A strong effort will be made both to encourage and support increased participation of women in peace negotiations and in decision-making bodies, and to ensure that gender issues, including violence against women, are properly addressed and in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions on Women, Peace and Security. A GBV component of the action will contribute to preventing and responding to violence perpetrated against women and girls in Myanmar/Burma, and to realizing their sexual and reproductive health and rights. Women and girls of childbearing age in Myanmar/Burma carry extraordinary burdens as deep poverty and gender discrimination are compounded by armed conflict and inter-communal violence. One more practical way to address these issues is to require implementing partners to demonstrate their proven track-record on incorporating gender aspects in peace support programmes. The EU will also set gender inclusion targets across all peace funding and support to Rakhine State and other ethnic areas. This action is consistent with the NSPAW 2013-2022, as well as the EU Gender Action Plan (GAP) 2016-2020. Detailed activities and approach on gender issues are further detailed in sections 1.1.3 and 4.

Few of the anticipated activities are likely to have significant environmental consequences, but this will be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Still, development as aimed for by this action includes economic development which will raise challenges in relation to environmental consequences as well as the management of and control over natural resources. Concerns of indigenous peoples and ethnic populations are considered through inclusive participatory planning. Ethnic communities will have the opportunity to design and develop proposals for interventions addressing their specific concerns.

Governance and human rights are overarching concerns while addressing ethnic grievances. The action will consider the status of the target groups as well as the concerns of the different ethnicities in the areas of intervention. Control over abundant natural resources and weak governance are among the root causes of the conflict.

\textsuperscript{15} Joint analysis, situational updates, assessments and interventions with ECHO (searching for LRRD connections) are being explored in most conflict-affected areas of the country and a Myanmar Nexus Plan of Action (NPoA) is under preparation.
4 DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION

4.1 Objectives/results

The overall objective of the action is to contribute to lasting peace, security, stability and sustainable development in Myanmar/Burma.

The specific objectives are:

1. Successive milestones of the peace process are reached, including effective progress in terms of women's participation in this process.
2. Improved socio-economic recovery in conflict-affected areas and areas affected by inter-communal violence with a special focus on gender.

Expected results:

**Result 1.1:** The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), or other inclusive negotiations for peace agreements, is effectively monitored by the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Mechanism (JMC).

**Result 1.2:** An inclusive national political dialogue process reaches a broad consensus on the key principles and elements of a comprehensive peace accord establishing a democratic federal union.

**Result 2.1:** Prompt, effective and efficient delivery of assistance for repatriation, recovery and gender-sensitive development in conflict-affected areas or areas affected by inter-communal tensions and violence.

This programme is relevant for the Agenda 2030. It contributes primarily to the progressive achievement of SDG Goal 16, but also promotes progress towards Goal 1. This does not imply a commitment by the country benefiting from this programme.

4.2 Main activities\(^{16}\)

Indicative activities for Result 1.1: (i) support for establishing new institutions or strengthening existing institutions required to monitor and sustain the ceasefires (JMC); (ii) support for the activities of these institutions, including training of staff, monitoring, liaising, conflict analysis and dispute resolution; (iii) provision of expert advice on the organisation and conduct of ceasefire monitoring; (iv) provision of international monitors/observers (as requested by relevant authorities); (v) gender and conflict analysis (e.g. research on causes of conflict, but also stakeholders, dynamics, scenarios at national level but also the different conflicts in the different conflict areas); (vi) collation and communication of relevant information to the public; (vii) provision of mine action activities; (viii) additional ad-hoc activities to facilitate confidence building; (iv) technical and financial support to ongoing peace negotiations with non-signatory EAOs; (v) training and broader capacity development (including soft skills) of participants in ceasefire monitoring committees, and ongoing ceasefire negotiations and women, peace and security at the national and subnational level.

Indicative activities for Result 1.2: (i) support, including technical, for new or existing institutions required to guide, manage and support the national political dialogue (in particular the UPDJC); (ii) support for activities of these institutions, including training of staff, meetings, research and consultations with constituencies; (iii) training in gender analysis, gender sensitive approach, gender responsive budgeting and mainstreaming of gender.

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\(^{16}\) All activities mentioned below are indicative and will be eligible for Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) reporting.
perspective; (iv) training and broader capacity development (including soft skills) of participants in the dialogue to support development of evidence-informed policy positions; (v) provision of expert advice on the organisation of national dialogue processes and solutions to substantive issues; (vi) provision of international observers; (vii) research supporting identification of evidence-informed solutions to substantive issues; (viii) facilitation of broader confidence-building between the Government, the Tatmadaw, EAOs, political parties and civil society groups; (ix) collation and communication of relevant information to the public; (x) support for inclusion and empowerment of women in the dialogue process; (xi) support to increase the substantive inclusion of civil society, including women’s organisations, in the national political dialogue process; (xii) support to initiatives to increase the substantive participation of youth in the peace process and national dialogue process.

Indicative activities for Result 2.1: (i) support for the establishment of new structures to manage needs assessments, with a special emphasis on Rakhine State; (ii) support for pre-assessment consultations with local stakeholders (EAOs and ethnic communities), data collection (including sex desegregated and gender sensitive), analysis and validation, and the formulation of repatriation and recovery strategies; (iii) training of data collectors; (iv) establishment of a funding mechanism to facilitate rapid implementation of priority projects identified by needs assessments, including in conflict-affected areas in the ethnic States; (v) projects in Rakhine State promoting intercommunal dialogue and interfaith cooperation; (vi) financial and technical support to implementation of the RAC recommendations; (vii) support to programs addressing physical and psycho-social trauma, (viii) support to individual mental health and psychosocial interventions through integrated sexual and reproductive health rights (SRHR) and SGBV response and prevention programmes; (ix) empowerment of women; (x) funding of priority projects, including assistance on resilience to the most vulnerable populations; (xi) support for transitional governance arrangements in former conflict-affected areas; (xii) support to return of refugees and IDPs, reconciliation; (xiii) and oversight of development projects to ensure that negative social or environmental impacts are minimal.

4.3 Intervention logic

External support can play an important role in the peace process by providing technical knowledge and financial resources, in combination with diplomatic/political outreach to support a peace agreement that is durable. The ultimate goal of this action is to support national efforts to achieve a final and sustainable settlement to ethnic armed conflict, including repatriation of Rohingyas from Bangladesh and alleviating inter-communal tensions and violence. The activities and results in section 4.1 reflect the vision and roadmap agreed by all relevant stakeholders, having a direct relationship with the NCA, and the participation of the national parties to the agreement. By implementing the range of activities illustrated under results 1 and 2, the action should be able to provide the main expected outcomes.

Whilst international support to vulnerable communities and peace-building initiatives in Rakhine State has long faced restrictions, the current context necessitates that the EU approach in 2018 remains flexible and responsive to the shifting political context and specific needs of vulnerable populations. Opportunities to provide support to communities will also be dependent on the access granted to the international community by the Government. At this time it is unclear how effectively or fully the Government will commit to implementing the RAC recommendations. In addition, no independent fact finding or verification has been permitted. Finally, any support to repatriation of the Rohingya or citizenship documentation
programmes will need to be carefully evaluated to ensure efforts are in line with the MoU between Bangladesh and Myanmar/Burma and in accordance with international law.

A mix of implementation modalities (call for proposals and indirect management with one or more international organisations) will allow coherent and effective aid to the emerging needs of the peace process, plus rapid and flexible delivery to the eventual repatriation of Rohingyas. While activities under the JPF will support the NCA dialogue and monitor its implementation (peace architecture and ceasefire monitoring) the ones managed by UNFPA as well as the ones identified under the call for proposals aim to improve service delivery in areas where parties have signed the NCA as well as Rakhine State (peace dividends). For Rakhine State, a strong emphasis will be given in order to follow closely the RAC recommendations. In line with the recommendation expressed by the European Court of Auditors in its 2018 Special Report on EU Assistance to Myanmar/Burma, Rakhine State is included in the call for proposals, particularly since the JPF does not target intercommunal violence as such. Due to the extremely complex and volatile environment where the actions will take place, and in order to minimise implementation risks, a maximum level of flexibility will be required in the choice of implementing partner(s) under the call for proposals. The ultimate aim is to support the peace process and the intercommunal violence as a transition towards the use of the country's own systems for aid delivery in the future.

5 IMPLEMENTATION

5.1 Financing agreement

In order to implement this action, it is not foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with the partner country.

5.2 Indicative implementation period

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in section 4.1 will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements implemented, is 60 months from the date of adoption by the Commission of this Action Document.

Extensions of the implementation period may be agreed by the Commission’s authorising officer responsible by amending this decision and the relevant contracts and agreements; such amendments to this decision constitute technical amendments in the sense of point (i) of Article 2(3)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014.

5.3 Implementation modalities

Both in indirect and direct management, the Commission will ensure that the EU appropriate rules and procedures for providing financing to third parties are respected, including review procedures, where appropriate, and compliance of the action with EU restrictive measures affecting the respective countries of operation.

5.3.1 Grants: call for proposals 'Support to the conflict affected territories and the Peace Process in Myanmar/Burma' (direct management)

(a) Objectives of the grants, fields of intervention, priorities of the year and expected results

The objectives and expected results of the grants will be peace, reconciliation, reintegration, rehabilitation and sustainable development of Myanmar/Burma, as described in sections 4.1 and 4.2.

(b) Eligibility conditions

In order to be eligible for a grant, the applicant must:

- be a legal person,
- be a specific type of organisation such as: non-governmental organisation, public sector operator, local authority, international (inter-governmental) organisation;
- be directly responsible for the preparation and management of the action with the co-applicant(s) and affiliated entity(ies), not acting as an intermediary.
- be established in a Member State of the European Union or in an eligible country for funding under the DCI Regulation, as stipulated in Article 9 of the Common Implementing Regulation (CIR). This obligation does not apply to international organisations.

Subject to information to be published in the call for proposals, the indicative amount of the EU contribution per grant is ranging from EUR 1 000 000 to EUR 9 000 000 and the grants may be awarded to sole beneficiaries and to consortia of beneficiaries (coordinator and co-beneficiaries). The indicative duration of the grant (its implementation period) is 48 months.

(c) Essential selection and award criteria

The essential selection criteria are financial and operational capacity of the applicant.

The essential award criteria are relevance of the proposed action to the objectives of the call; design, effectiveness, feasibility, sustainability and cost-effectiveness of the action.

(d) Maximum rate of co-financing

The maximum possible rate of co-financing for grants under this call is 95% of the eligible costs of the action.

If full funding is essential for the action to be carried out, the maximum possible rate of co-financing may be increased up to 100 %. The essentiality of full funding will be justified by the Commission’s authorising officer responsible in the award decision, in respect of the principles of equal treatment and sound financial management.

(e) Indicative timing to launch the call

First trimester of 2019.

5.3.2 Indirect management with an international organisation

A part of this action may be implemented in indirect management with the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). This implementation entails the whole contract management cycle of the JPF that the EU and other donors (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States) are already funding for the implementation of the peace process described above. Indirect Management with UNOPS is the best option to ensure a fully integrated and coherent implementation of the

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18 To be determined on the basis of the organisation’s statutes, which should demonstrate that it has been established by an instrument governed by the national law of the country concerned and that its head office is located in an eligible country. In this respect, any legal entity whose statutes have been established in another country cannot be considered an eligible local organisation, even if the statutes are registered locally or a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ has been concluded.
action. This implementation is justified because UNOPS has an established presence and extensive experience in the management of multi-donor trust funds co-financed by the EU and other donors in Myanmar/Burma. UNOPS is in charge of the implementation of the JPF since 2015.

The entrusted entity would carry out the following implementation tasks: procurement and grant award procedures, signing and executing the resulting procurement contracts and grant contracts, notably accepting deliverables, carrying out payments and recovering the funds unduly paid.

5.3.3 Indirect management with an international organisation

A part of this action may be implemented in indirect management with the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). This implementation entails the management of activities to (1) support individual, family and community capacity and resilience to participate in structures established by the programme which foster peace through active democratic processes; leading to harmony and peace in the home and community; and (2) build the capacity of national, local and community institutions to support the implementation of policies and administration of justice addressing women’s human rights including the right to live a life free from violence and safety in conflict and emergencies; contributing to a peace and reconciliation in society. Links will be made between this project and the Spotlight Initiative\(^\text{19}\). This implementation is justified because UNFPA is the mandated UN agency for GBV issues, women’s empowerment and population dynamics, and has an established presence (over 40 years) in Myanmar/Burma in the area of gender equality. UNFPA currently implements the Women and Girls First programme. UNFPA in Myanmar/Burma chairs or co-chairs key coordination structures to support gender equality such as the Government led Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment “Non” Sector Cooperation Group, GBV Coordination Working Group (at the national level as well as in Kachin, northern Shan and Rakhine), Law Drafting Committee for the Protection of Women against Violence Law and the UN Gender Theme Group.

The entrusted entity would carry out the following implementation tasks: procurement and grant award procedures, signing and executing the resulting procurement contracts and grant contracts, notably accepting deliverables, carrying out payments and recovering the funds unduly paid.

5.4 Changes from indirect to direct management mode due to exceptional circumstances

In case the components of the action under sections 5.3.2 and/or 5.3.3 of this Annex cannot be implemented in indirect management due to circumstances outside of the Commission's control, the alternative implementation modality in direct management would be as per section 5.3.1.

5.5 Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act and set out in the relevant contractual documents shall apply, subject to the following provision.


[23]
The Commission’s authorising officer responsible may extend the geographical eligibility in accordance with Article 9(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 on the basis of urgency or of unavailability of products and services in the markets of the countries concerned, or in other duly substantiated cases where the eligibility rules would make the realization of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult.

5.6 Indicative budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementation modality</th>
<th>EU contribution (amount in EUR)</th>
<th>Former EU contributions (EUR)</th>
<th>Indicative third party contribution, (in EUR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.3.1 – Call for proposals &quot;Support to the conflict affected territories and the peace process in Myanmar/Burma&quot; (direct management)</td>
<td>9 000 000</td>
<td></td>
<td>473 684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.2 – Indirect management with UNOPS (Joint Peace Fund)</td>
<td>6 000 000</td>
<td>28 823 687</td>
<td>60 560 202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.3 – Indirect management with UNFPA (GBV activities, Women and Girls First Program)</td>
<td>5 000 000</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not yet known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>20 000 000</strong></td>
<td><strong>28 823 687</strong></td>
<td><strong>61 033 886</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.7 Organisational set-up and responsibilities

For the JPF, it was foreseen that a High Level Committee (HLC) would be set up to provide strategic direction and review overall progress. This committee would have three co-chairs, each appointed from within the respective stakeholder constituencies: Government, EAOs and contributing donors. In the absence of a HLC, all of the roles and authorities of the Committee are delegated to the Fund Board on an interim basis, until the joint governance structures are established. Additionally and as indicated in Section 1.1.2, the JCB is temporarily fulfilling some of the functions originally foreseen under the HLC, although notably it is not discussing strategic priorities for peace process support. Since it is unclear whether the HLC will be finally established, the JPF is for the time being operating in close consultations with the JCB and with all parties and stakeholders involved in the peace process in order to ensure proper coordination, transparency and efficiency.

EU will be represented in the UNFPA Women and Girls First phase 2 programme steering arrangements.

5.8 Performance monitoring and reporting

The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation of this action will be a continuous process and part of the different implementing partner’s responsibilities. To this aim, the implementing partners shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for the action and elaborate regular progress reports (not less than annual) and final reports. Every report shall provide an accurate account of implementation of the
action, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (outputs and direct outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators, using as reference the logframe matrix. Implementing partners will be requested – during projects inception phase – to undertake a baseline study as well as to define target data and carry out a final study where necessary. The report shall be laid out in such a way as to allow monitoring of the means envisaged and employed and of the budget details for the action. The final report, narrative and financial, will cover the entire period of the action implementation.

The Commission may undertake additional project monitoring visits both through its own staff and through independent consultants recruited directly by the Commission for independent monitoring reviews (or recruited by the responsible agent contracted by the Commission for implementing such reviews).

5.9 Evaluation

Having regard to the importance of the action, mid-term and final evaluations will be carried out for the various components via implementing partners.

Mid-term evaluations will be carried out for problem solving and learning purposes, in particular with respect to the chosen implementing modality and its efficiency and effectiveness in supporting the peace process in the right way.

Final evaluations will be carried out for accountability and learning purposes at various levels (including for policy revision), taking into account in particular the volatile peace process in Myanmar/Burma. Final evaluation will assess progress towards expected results by comparing start/end points as defined in the inception phases.

The evaluation reports shall be shared with the partner country and other key stakeholders. The implementing partners and the Commission shall analyse the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, in agreement with the partner country, jointly decide on the follow-up actions to be taken and any adjustments necessary, including, if indicated, the reorientation of the project.

The financing of the evaluation shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing decision.

5.10 Audit

Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation of this action, the Commission may, on the basis of a risk assessment, contract independent audits or expenditure verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements.

The financing of the audit shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing decision.

5.11 Communication and visibility

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU.

This action shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action, to be elaborated at the start of implementation. Appropriate budget will be allocated for this purpose under each contract signed under sections 5.3.1, 5.3.2 and 5.3.3.
In terms of legal obligations on communication and visibility, the measures shall be implemented by the Commission, the partner country, contractors, grant beneficiaries and/or entrusted entities. Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in, respectively, the financing agreement, procurement and grant contracts, and other agreements.

The Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Action shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action and the appropriate contractual obligations.
APPENDIX - INDICATIVE LOGFRAME MATRIX (FOR PROJECT MODALITY)

The activities, the expected outputs and all the indicators, targets and baselines included in the logframe matrix are indicative and may be updated during the implementation of the action, no amendment being required to the financing decision. When it is not possible to determine the outputs of an action at formulation stage, intermediary outcomes should be presented and the outputs defined during inception of the overall programme and its components. The indicative logframe matrix will evolve during the lifetime of the action: new lines will be added for including the activities as well as new columns for intermediary targets (milestones) for the output and outcome indicators whenever it is relevant for monitoring and reporting purposes. Note also that indicators should be disaggregated by sex whenever relevant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results chain</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baselines (incl. reference year)</th>
<th>Targets (incl. reference year)</th>
<th>Sources and means of verification</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall objective: Impact</td>
<td>To contribute to lasting peace, security, stability and sustainable development in Myanmar/Burma</td>
<td>1. Status of National Peace Accord. 2. Status of ongoing negotiations for amending structure of governance 3. Annual number of violent deaths per 100,000 / number of deaths as a result of the ethnic conflict 4. Annual number of victims of armed clashes. [EU RF Level 1 #7]**</td>
<td>1. On-going negotiations with 11 EAOs non-signatories of the NCA, code of conduct and framework for political dialogue [EU RF Level 2 #5] 2. Deed of Commitment 12th February 2015 committed Government and military to the federal concept. 3. Based on UNODC data, in 2015 there were 2.4 cases per 100,000 / Based on open data sources (not fully accurate): – 297 in 2017 4. TBD in inception phase from JMC data</td>
<td>1. At least 6 new signatories to the NCA by end of 2020. 2. Full implementation of the political dialogue process between 2018 and 2020. Amendments to the Constitution and other legal reforms based on final conclusions adopted by the UPDJC 3. 15% reduction of number of violent deaths per 100,000 by end of year 2021 / 50% reduction of number of deaths as a result of ethnic conflict 4. 90% reduction in victims of armed clashes by 2022.</td>
<td>1. Reports by the Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM) 2. Reports by the UPDJC. Constitutional and legal reforms on various topics related to the political dialogue. 3. Reports by JMC, National Police, Myanmar Peace Monitor and UNODC. 4. Reports by the JMC</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific objective(s)/Outcome(s)</td>
<td>5. Perceived levels of interaction between members of different communities in Rakhine State compared to a year ago</td>
<td>5. Increased 14% Same 35% Reduced 35% Don’t know 14% n/a 1% (2016)</td>
<td>5. Interactions with members of another religion in Rakhine State have increased by 25% by the end of 2021.</td>
<td>5. Rakhine Needs Assessment II from the Centre for Diversity and National Harmony and follow-up study.</td>
<td>6. Economic development / growth indicators in ethnic areas.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Specific objective(s)/Outcome(s):

1. Successive milestones of the peace process are reached, including effective progress in terms of women’s participation in this process.

1.1 Number of bilateral ceasefire agreements signed.

1.2 Number of signatories to the NCA.

1.3 Number of IDPs and refugees (disaggregated by sex).

1.1 14 out of 19 bilateral ceasefire agreements signed.

1.2 10 out of 19 EAOs signed the NCA.

1.3 By Dec 2017 UNHCR estimated that there were 635,000 IDPs in Myanmar/Burma and 102,607 refugees in Thailand. There were also more than 700,000 new refugees in Bangladesh

1.1 5 new bilateral ceasefire agreements signed by end 2022.

1.2 At least sixteen EAOs sign the NCA by end of 2022.

1.3 25% less IDPs by 2021 (disaggregated by sex).

1.1.1 Joint ceasefire monitoring mechanisms by EAOs.

1.2 Reports by recipient institutions on NCA implementation.

1.3 UNHCR Country reports.

Peace and stability in certain regions of the country will contribute positively to other development objectives, including democratisation, broad-based economic development and human security.

De-escalation and cessation of
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. Improved socio-economic recovery in conflict-affected areas and areas affected by the intercommunal violence with a special focus on gender</th>
<th>1.4 (GAP Indicator 9.6.) N# of individuals (male/female) directly benefiting from EU supported programmes that specifically aim to support civilian post-conflict peace building and/or conflict prevention (EURF Level 2 no 5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.4 TBD in inception period.</td>
<td>1.5 Women's participation in the national dialogue process is less than 30%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 TBD in inception period.</td>
<td>1.5 At least 30% of women are participating effectively at the UPDJC and at the political dialogue by 2020. Ideally there are 30% or women at the JMC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Project surveys conducted by JPF and other EU-funded implementing agencies.</td>
<td>1.5 UPDJC, KMC and AGIPP reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>armed hostilities will build the confidence needed on all sides to start negotiations of a national peace accord, dealing with the underlying causes of armed conflict, as well as to scale up efforts to promote recovery and development in former conflict-affected areas</td>
<td>1.6 Annual number of returnees into local communities (disaggregated by sex).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 By Dec 2016, there are 2238 returnees from Thailand to their original places in the Southeast. As per Rakhine, Kachin and Shan, baselines need to be determined in the inception phase.</td>
<td>1.6 By end of 2023 there is a reduction of 25% of refugees from Thailand and a 30% reduction of IDPs from Kachin and N. Shan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 By Dec 2016, there are 2238 returnees from Thailand to their original places in the Southeast. As per Rakhine, Kachin and Shan, baselines need to be determined in the inception phase.</td>
<td>1.6 UNHCR and IDMC reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 By Dec 2016, there are 2238 returnees from Thailand to their original places in the Southeast. As per Rakhine, Kachin and Shan, baselines need to be determined in the inception phase.</td>
<td>2. Data contained in the Township development index developed in 2017 by The Asia Foundation, that measures multi-dimensional poverty at the local level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Data contained in the Township development index developed in 2017 by The Asia Foundation, that measures multi-dimensional poverty at the local level.</td>
<td>2. Improved economic development/growth indicators year on year in conflict-affected areas and in selected townships targeted by the project (s).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Improved economic development/growth indicators year on year in conflict-affected areas and in selected townships targeted by the project (s).</td>
<td>2. Specialised reports by TAF, the ADB, WB and other well respected think tanks and institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outputs</td>
<td>1.1 The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, or other inclusive negotiations for peace agreements, are effectively monitored by the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Coordination Mechanism (JMC).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.1 Status of the joint ceasefire monitoring mechanism (JMC).</td>
<td>1.1.1 Status of functional codes of conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.2 Status of functional codes of conduct</td>
<td>1.1.2 Approved Code of Conduct in early 2017 (revised periodically)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.3 Status of an appropriate dispute resolution mechanism that documents and reports armed clashes to the relevant authorities and stakeholders, in designated areas.</td>
<td>1.1.3 Standard Operating Procedures and Dispute Resolution Mechanisms approved by the JMC need TBD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.4 Level of effectiveness of Government/Tatmadaw-EAO liaison mechanisms.</td>
<td>1.1.4 EAOs have 30 Liaison Offices functioning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 An inclusive national political dialogue reached a broad consensus on the key principles and elements of a comprehensive peace accord establishing a</td>
<td>1.2.1 Number of Union Peace Conferences celebrated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.1 Three Union Peace Conferences and 4 Subnational conferences organised by July 2018.</td>
<td>1.2.1 6 Union Peace Conferences are organised by end of 2020 with a new political settlement agreed by all parties that is conducive for Constitutional amendments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.1 6 Union Peace Conferences are organised by end of 2020 with a new political settlement agreed by all parties that is conducive for Constitutional amendments.</td>
<td>1.2.1 UPDJC reports; Constitutional amendments; New legal frameworks adopted under the areas covered by the UPDJC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.1 JMC launched at the National level. 4 Regional JMC Committees established. Local JMC to be established (final numbers undefined yet).</td>
<td>1.1.1.1 NCA implementation reports and briefings by the JMC. BNI reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.1 All JMC at Regional and local level are established (final target to be determined by the JMC).</td>
<td>1.1.2 Reports by JMC and civilian ceasefire monitoring organisations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.2 A Code of Conduct that is not contested and is agreed by all parties.</td>
<td>1.1.3 Reports by JMC and civilian ceasefire monitoring organisations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.3 Effective dispute resolution is in place and more than 75% of complaints are resolved peacefully by end of 2022.</td>
<td>1.1.4 Governments/EAOs reports, documents and press releases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.4 Effective liaison offices and liaison mechanisms between the Government, Tatmadaw and EAOs in place by end of 2021.</td>
<td>1.1.4 UPDJC reports; Constitutional amendments; New legal frameworks adopted under the areas covered by the UPDJC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustained high-level commitment of Government, Tatmadaw and EAOs to end armed hostilities.</td>
<td>Sustained high-level commitment to resolve differences through political means.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal use of violence by local armed groups for economic purposes.</td>
<td>Sufficient symbolic and substantive concessions are made to allow compromise solutions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Sustained high-level commitment of Government, Tatmadaw and EAOs to end armed hostilities. | Sufficient political will in Parliament – and, in case of solutions requiring constitutional
<p>| 2.1 Prompt, effective and efficient delivery of assistance for repatriation, recovery and gender sensitive development conflict-affected areas or areas affected by intercommunal tensions and violence. | 1.2.2 Level of satisfaction on national dialogue process (disaggregated by ethnic groups and male/female) | 1.2.2 Surveys are being conducted on this specific topic by the JPF and other implementing partners – final baseline TBD at a later stage. | 1.2.2 At least 70% of the participants and the population is satisfied with the final results of the political dialogue. | 1.2.2 National and sub-national surveys conducted by the JPF / others. | amendments, in the broader population – to reach a national peace accord. |
| | 1.2.3 Percentage of participants in the national dialogue process from ethnic groups and male/female | 1.2.3 Baseline under construction by the UPDJC | 1.2.3 TBD in inception period | 1.2.3 UPDJC Reports / NRPC reports. | 1.2.4 Constitutional and legal reforms. |
| | 1.2.4 Number of constitutional amendments, laws and policy changes developed with the support of this action. | 1.2.4 TBD in inception period | 1.2.4 TBD in inception period | | |
| | 2.1.1 Status of peacebuilding needs assessments carried out in former conflict-affected areas, using appropriate methodology and with results shared among all relevant stakeholders. | 2.1.1 Joint needs assessment currently being negotiated amongst donors. | 2.1.1 Joint needs assessment completed and results shared with all the involved stakeholders by end of 2020. | | |
| | 2.1.2 Level of participation of local communities in development management committees (disaggregated by sex). | 2.1.2 TBD in inception period. | 2.1.2 TBD in inception period. | | |
| | 2.1.3 Number of formal and/or informal | 2.1.3 0 (2018) | 2.1.3 At least 2 formal or informal effective | | |
| | | | | | |
| | 2.1.1 Joint needs assessment being conducted by end of 2020 in ceasefire areas. Action plans that will emerge from the Joint Needs Assessment. Donor reports. | | | | |
| | 2.1.2 Surveys conducted by this action with local communities. | | | | |
| | 2.1.3 Reports by implementing | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2.1.4 Status of arrangements for formal and/or informal transitional mechanisms established with the support of this action.</th>
<th>2.1.4 There are no formal or informal transitional mechanisms adopted by February 2018.</th>
<th>2.1.5 At least one robust mechanism is in place by end of 2021.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1.5 (GAP Indicator 9.7). Number of EU funded humanitarian targeted actions that respond to GBV</td>
<td>2.1.5 UNFPA and other implementing partners have GBV actions in place.</td>
<td>2.1.5 Reports by implementing partners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.6 Support to individual mental health and psychosocial interventions through SRHR and SGBV response and prevention programmes</td>
<td>2.1.6 Lifetime physical and/or sexual intimate partner violence: 17%; Physical and/or Sexual Intimate Partner Violence in the last 12 months: 11%. Gender Equality Indexes: 80</td>
<td>2.1.6 Reports from Ministry of Health and Sports and ICF. Myanmar Demographic and Health Survey</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>