This action is funded by the European Union

**ANNEX**

of the Commission Decision on the individual measure in favour of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to be financed from the 11th European Development Fund

Action Document for EU Support to Democratic Governance in Nigeria (EU-SDGN)

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**INFORMATION FOR POTENTIAL GRANT APPLICANTS**

**WORK PROGRAMME FOR GRANTS**

This document constitutes the work programme for grants in the sense of Article 128(1) of the Financial Regulation (Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012), applicable to the EDF by virtue of Article 37 of the Annex to Regulation (EU) No 323/2015 in the following sections concerning calls for proposals: 5.4.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Title/basic act/CRIS number</th>
<th>EU Support to Democratic Governance in Nigeria (EU-SDGN) CRIS number: NG/FED/039-181 Financed under the 11th European Development Fund</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Zone benefiting from the action/location</td>
<td>West Africa, Nigeria The action shall be carried out at the following location: Federal and all States</td>
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<td>4. Sector of concentration/thematic area</td>
<td>Sector 3: Rule of Law, Governance and Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Amounts concerned</td>
<td>Total estimated cost: EUR 26 500 000 Total amount of EDF contribution EUR 26 500 000 (5% of envelope A)</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Aid modality and implementation modalities</td>
<td>Project Modality: - Direct Management – grants – direct award – procurement of services - Indirect Management with the Republic of Nigeria</td>
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<td>7. a) DAC code(s)</td>
<td>15151 (Government and civil society, general)</td>
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<td>b) Main Delivery Channel</td>
<td>10000 Public Sector Institutions</td>
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<td>8. Markers (from CRIS DAC form)</td>
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<td>Biological diversity</td>
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<td>Combat desertification</td>
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<tr>
<td>Climate change mitigation</td>
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<td>Climate change adaptation</td>
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</table>

9. Global Public Goods and Challenges (GPGC) thematic flagships

N/A

10. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

SDG 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels

SUMMARY

Following the 1999 elections that returned the country to civilian rule, Nigeria has conducted four general elections in 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015 with varied and mixed outcomes. While the 1999 and 2003 general elections were perceived as largely flawed by Nigerians and the international community¹, the 2007 general election was condemned for falling "far short of basic international and regional standards for democratic elections".²

The 1999, 2003 and 2007 elections were also marred by violence while the 2011 and 2015 elections showed strong improvement thanks in part to EU and global donor support in this area. Nevertheless, the trajectory for the 2019 elections will depend on continued reform on a large range of issues involving the three arms of government - executive, legislature, judiciary, as well as varied stakeholders such as the Electoral Management Body (EMB), political parties, security agencies, media, religious and traditional institutions, civil society organisations and international development partners.

Following the course of the 10th EDF and the Election Support Programme implemented by the UNDP, a new follow-up project (learning lessons from its predecessor) is now proposed for the 2016 to 2019 electoral cycle given that it is a priority for the EU to continue supporting the process of electoral and democratic reforms that enhance the capacity of Nigeria’s national institutions to discharge their statutory duties in an efficient, unbiased and non-partisan manner. The new project "EU Support to Democratic Governance in Nigeria" (EU-SDGN) aims to contribute to the reinforcement of democracy in Nigeria through building strong, effective and legitimate democratic institutions. The project will be implemented from 2017 to 2021, accompanying the 2016-2019 electoral cycle, and will be anchored in the priorities of the Nigerian government and the recommendations of the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) on the 2015 General Elections as further detailed by the expert Identification and formulation mission to Nigeria. It will focus on five thematic areas of support: i) the Electoral Management Body (EMB); ii) the National Assembly; iii) the Political Parties; iv) Media; v) Women, Youths and Marginalised Citizens; Civil Society Organisations and other Non-State Actors.

The project would be implemented through a combination of direct management, direct grant contracts, and grants awarded through call for proposals in indirect management mode. A suspension clause will be applied to allow for the launch of the call for proposals. The Financing Agreement will also provide for an allocation (EUR 600 000) "Support to strategic initiatives" in indirect management mode to allow the EU to respond to unforeseen developments and opportunities that may advance the aims of the action.

¹ EU EOM 1999 and 2003
² EU EOM 2007
CONTEXT

1.1. Sector/Country/Regional context/Thematic area

Nigeria is located at the extreme eastern corner of the tropical zone of West Africa along the Gulf of Guinea. With an estimated population of 177 million composed predominantly of young persons, Nigeria is the seventh most populous country in the world, the most populous in Africa (25% of the population), and the dominant population in West Africa (50% of the population).

Following years of economic growth in the aftermath of the country’s return to civil rule in May 1999, Nigeria rebased its economy in April 2014. As a result, the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew from USD 460 billion in 2013 to USD 514 billion in 2014, becoming the largest economy in Africa and 26th largest economy in the world. However, volatility in the oil market impacts directly on the Nigerian economy, given its near total dependence on revenue from oil and gas exports, with falling oil prices in 2015 resulting in significant strain on national treasury, resulting in Nigeria becoming the second largest economy in Africa, after South Africa.

Thus, despite its economic and political weight, and an important contributor to regional and global peace and security, Nigeria grapples with significant constraints in realising its full potential. The country is hobbled by poor economic governance, weak democratic institutions, lack of inclusive development, glaring inequalities, corruption and insecurity. The non-delivery of the so-called “dividends of democracy” in a country with a median age of 18.2 years has proven to be rather combustive, resulting in high level of youth unemployment and frustration that underpin the Boko Haram insurgency and terrorist attacks in many parts of the North, the separatist agitation for the actualisation of Biafra in the South-east, the Niger Delta Avengers in the south-south, as well as rather high incidences of crime and criminality across the country.

The system of governance is premised on a federal system consisting of the Federal government, 36 State governments plus a Federal Capital Territory (FCT) administration and 774 Local Government Areas (LGAs).

The two main Nigerian political parties are Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and All Progressives Congress (APC). PDP was established in 1998 and was the ruling party until 2015. APC was established in 2013 from a merger of the main opposition parties. In a historical turn, Muhammadu Buhari of APC won the presidential elections, and APC won 18 out of the 26 gubernatorial positions in the 2015 elections. The next general elections are due in 2019. Maintaining unity in President Buhari's own party, the All Progressives Congress (APC), until then will be a test. The former ruling party, the People's Democratic Party (PDP), also suffers from internal frictions. The outcome of the 2019 elections will therefore depend heavily on whether the APC is able to remain united while demonstrating to voters that it has been more effective than the previous government in improving the lives of ordinary Nigerians. Given that we expect a mixed outcome on this, the next elections are likely to be close between the APC and the PDP.

The implementation of some recommendations of the Electoral Reform Committee and the inauguration of a new EMB in June 2010 brought some noticeable improvements to the 2011 general elections. Although the elections threw up old and new challenges, it was adjudged as "an important step towards strengthening democratic elections in Nigeria". The 2015 elections meant a significant step forward in the consolidation of the democratic process, seeing the peaceful transition of power from the ruling party to the opposition party for the first time in Nigeria’s history. Nevertheless, the elections were far from perfect, marred by "incidence of violence, abuse of incumbency at state and federal levels, and attempts at manipulation". The enhancement of the democratic and political governance practices has proved to be a learning curve for Nigeria since 1999. Certainly, some reforms, including key recommendations of the EU EOM on the 2015 general elections are desirable towards the 2019 general elections. These reforms relate to a broad range of issues involving the three arms of government - executive, legislature, judiciary, as well as varied stakeholders such as the Electoral Management Body (EMB), political parties, security agencies, media, religious and traditional institutions, civil society organisations and international development partners.

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3 http://www.indexmundi.com/nigeria/demographics_profile.html
4 http://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria
5 EU EOM 2011
6 EU EOM 2015
1.1.1 Public Policy Assessment and EU Policy Framework

**National policy framework**

As a member of the United Nations, the African Union and ECOWAS, the Federal Republic of Nigeria has ratified most of the international, continental and regional instruments which provide for fundamental human rights in a democratic state, and has made significant progress in incorporating these core values into the national normative framework. However, until recently, the management of the electoral process was not considered credible by national and international stakeholders. This informed the adoption of a new policy framework after 2007, seeking to engage in a process of electoral reform in order to enhance the capacity of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Consequently, concerted efforts were made to engage in the review of relevant sections of the 1999 Constitution and the 2007 Electoral Act. Furthermore, attempts were made to address a number of institutional and structural challenges of the Independent National Electoral Commission with the establishment of the Electoral Reform Committee (ERC) in 2007. This resulted in a widely accepted Uwais Committee Report, which introduced positive changes to the electoral framework and continues to serve as a reference point for Nigeria’s electoral process.

This was followed in October 2012 by the establishment of the Registration and Election Review Committee (RERC) that recommended the unbundling and institutional restructuring of INEC. The implementation of the recommendations of the ERC and RERC Committees has significantly improved the ratings of the country’s election quality, and currently, Nigeria is seen as one of the countries in Africa that has made significant progress in developing its democratic and political governance practices. Despite some weaknesses in INEC operations and the challenges of organising elections in a multi-ethnic and diverse religious and cultural environment plagued by political tensions, Nigeria has demonstrated some maturity to hold a fairly credible election and peaceful transition of power with the 2015 general elections. This is considered as a milestone towards democratic consolidation by all stakeholders and observers.

**The Framework of the European Union/Nigeria Cooperation**

The European Union - African, Caribbean and Pacific (EU/ACP) Partnership ("Cotonou") Agreement of 2000 and its two revisions in 2005 and 2010 constitute the legal basis for the partnership between EU and Nigeria. Article 6 of the treaty defines electoral assistance as a key action for promoting the core values of promotion of human rights, democratic principles and rule of law. Articles 8 to 13 of the revised agreement on the use of political dialogue constitute perhaps the most important instrument to assess progress in the area. In June 2009, the EU and the Government of Nigeria signed the Nigeria-EU Joint Way Forward which gives an overview of the guidelines on principles, modalities and subjects for enhanced political dialogue and collaboration on a range of issues, including good governance, human rights, security and migration, followed on a yearly basis through ministerial and senior official dialogues. The EU Agenda for Change (2012), and the European Consensus for Development guides EU development assistance and prioritises a more strategic, targeted and results-oriented approach, and reinforces focus on democracy, good governance and human rights. In March 2016, it was agreed to expand the level of engagement to include a local level political dialogue between the Government of Nigeria, the EU Delegation in Nigeria and EU Member States.\(^7\)

This action corresponds to focal sector "Rule of Law, Governance and Democracy" under the EU-Nigeria National Indicative Programme 2014 -2020, seeking to contribute to specific objective 2 under the focal sector: "To contribute to the reinforcement of democracy in Nigeria". The NIP is aligned to Nigeria's own development policies and strategies such as Vision 20:2020, the Transformation Agenda and the Medium Term Expenditure Framework and Fiscal Strategy Papers developed under previous administrations.

1.1.2 Stakeholder analysis

Several stakeholders have key roles in enhancing credibility and transparency of the electoral process in Nigeria. These stakeholders include:

\(^7\)Sixth Nigeria-EU Ministerial Dialogue, Brussels, 15 March 2016
1. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)

The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) is an independent and autonomous Electoral Management Body (EMB) established by Section 153(1F) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. It has a broad and exclusive mandate which includes the conduct of elections into all elective positions at federal and state levels, registration, regulation and monitoring of political parties, registration of persons qualified to vote, voter and civic education and conduct of referendum. One major principle of the Commission is to carry out all its functions independently, free from any external interference in line with the provisions of Nigerian Constitution. The Electoral Management Body is independent from external resources to cover its electoral operations and most of the budget resources allocated to the elections is directly channelled from the federal budget to Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). The cost of elections in Nigeria, estimated at about USD 8 per voter for the 2015 general elections is quite high. However, in spite of a certain anxiety, INEC was able to secure its budget request of N108.852 billion (USD 547 million @ USD 1 to N199)24 from the Government to cover its electoral operations for the 2015 general elections.

However, INEC has always been confronted with funding gaps in some key areas of its operations which are critical to enhance its credibility, efficiency and effectiveness. This explains why the Commission continues to seek the support of the International Development Partners in augmenting its work in key areas of urgent and/or unanticipated needs where there may be a budgetary shortfall or no budgetary provision. While the general elections of 2015 were perceived by all and sundry as largely genuine and democratic, INEC demonstrated some weaknesses in addressing specific issues in the area of election administration, internal and external communication, voter registration, prosecution of election offences and supervision of political parties. Aware of these lapses and against the background of the lessons learned from the 2015 elections, the EU Delegation met various departments, directorates and units of INEC in March 2016 to identify certain keys areas that require specific and urgent support from international development partners to advance the electoral process. These key areas are the improvement in strategic planning, operational and training delivery capacity, enhanced internal communication mechanism and engagement with external stakeholders, support of the periodic continuous voter registration system and cleaning of the voter register, efficient liaison with the security agencies to secure the electoral operations and the setting up of the prosecution electoral offence unit and strengthened mechanism to oversee and monitor the activities of registered political parties.

2. The Forum of State Independent Electoral Commissions of Nigeria (FOSIECON)

The Forum of States Independent Electoral Commissions of Nigeria (FOSIECON) comprising the Independent Electoral Commissions of the 36 states of the federation has an exclusive statutory mandate to organise, undertake, and supervise elections into elective offices in the 774 Local Government Council in Nigeria. In comparison to INEC which is largely independent and benefits from a strong financial autonomy through the National Assembly within a clear electoral framework, FOSIECON members are constrained in their operation by lack of resources, clarity, consistency and certainty regarding the Constitutional and electoral framework based on acceptable model laws and guiding principles for the conduct of Local Government Elections. This programme aims to support FOSIECON to enhance its institutional capacity to effectively organise and conduct credible local government elections by enhancing its relationships with the relevant stakeholders of the electoral process. As the third tier of government, democratically elected representatives into local government brings decision-making closer to the people at the grassroots and therefore stimulate programmes and services that better address local needs.

3. The National Assembly

Established by Sections 47 – 49 of the 1999 Constitution, the National Assembly (NASS) consists of two chambers; the Senate and the House of Representatives with powers to make laws. NASS also has broad oversight functions and it is empowered to establish standing committees of its members to scrutinise bills and the conduct oversight functions over government institutions and officials. There are 54 Standing Committees in the Senate and 84 Standing Committees in the House of Representatives of the Eight Assembly (2015-2019), constituted along the lines of government ministries, agencies and departments. Many of the recommendations in the EU EOM report on the 2015 general elections require primary legislation from NASS. The National Assembly requires technical support especially at the Committee level in order to improve the quality of its law-making
and oversight responsibilities. It is also important to open up the activities of the National Assembly to public scrutiny and promote citizens’ access and participation in the legislative process.

This need is especially critical at the Committee level to enable them to use evidence from a wide range of sources to inform their reports and recommendations in order to improve the quality of law-making and oversight responsibilities. This programme aims to support the capacity of the NASS to better discharge its legislative function in compliance with democratic principles and standards to engage in electoral reforms and good governance. Such support will be channelled to the relevant Standing Committees of the National Assembly which have been identified by the experts through several organisations, ranging from international organisations, governmental agencies and non-state actors with established capacity to undertake an efficient legislative support programme in Nigeria.

A noticeable feature of the 2015 general elections is the progressive decline of elected women and youth into eligible positions despite their population and activism. Issues such as: 1) Women empowerment in politics; 2) Youth empowerment in politics; and 3) Inclusivity of marginalised groups in the political process should be addressed.

4. Political Parties

Political parties in Nigeria are confronted with various challenges militating against their development. Indeed, only two of the existing 29 political parties in the country can be described as political parties based on the criteria of continuity, nationwide organisation, desire to exercise power and consistent efforts to garner significant popular support. This has some implications for the effectiveness of party structures and processes, as many of the existing political parties are confronted with funding challenges, inadequate staffing and weak organisational and operational capacity. Consequently, the decision making process, resource allocation and the nomination of candidates for elective and appointive political positions are controlled by a few members with strong financial wherewithal, instead of a consensus process. Furthermore, the affairs of political parties are mostly lacking in transparency and accountability, resulting in intense intra-party conflicts and emergence of factions and splinter groups. Therefore, it is important to provide necessary support towards the management and administrative structure of political parties by strengthening intra- and inter-party dialogue, promoting reforms and inclusiveness, and mainstreaming gender, the youth, and people living with disabilities in the political process to ensure that political parties are committed to democratic principles and adhere to democratic values in their actions.

5. The Media and Non-State Actors

The 1999 Constitution guarantees the freedom of expression for the media, whilst the Freedom of Information Act of 2011 guarantees citizens’ right to public information. However, Nigerian media institutions are mostly controlled by the government and do not always provide fair and ethical coverage of the electoral processes. Not only is their coverage often biased towards the party controlling the Federal and State government, in some cases, they are known for disseminating information that is potentially capable of promoting electoral violence. It is for this reason, amongst others, that the various EU EOM reports have highlighted the importance of support actions in addressing the loopholes in the media sector. This is with the objective of ensuring that journalists are trained to provide a fair and impartial electoral coverage, and are sensitised on the need to blackout hate speeches that are capable of encouraging electoral violence. A key lesson learnt from the previous electoral support programme and various consultations with stakeholders is that the legal and operational environment governing media broadcast and access in Nigeria needs to be strengthened to ensure that the public and private service broadcast industry keep to a professional code of conduct. Complimentary to this is the capacity of the media regulatory body, the National Broadcasting Commission, to effectively discharge its mandatory function in terms of monitoring and imposition of sanctions on erring media organisations. It is important that the NBC has the required capacity, independence and autonomy to regulate the broadcast industry in a non-partisan manner. The on-going attempt at the reorganisation of the Commission provides a unique opportunity for the EU to engage in this process.

The engagement of non-state actors in the electoral cycle is a prerequisite to promoting inclusive, peaceful and transparent elections. Civil Society in Nigeria is vibrant and involved in various key areas of intervention and advocacy such as electoral reform, civic and voter education, promotion of youth and women, people living with disabilities, promotion of transparency and accountability in the public sector. However, many if not all the CSOs depend entirely on external resources to sustain their
activities all along the electoral cycle. This project, as with the predecessor project, will continue to promote and deepen the engagement of various civil society organisations in Nigeria in a bid to facilitate effective civic and voter education programmes. In Nigeria, a number of non-state actors and CSOs are skilled enough to engage in activities relating to domestic electoral observation, but most of their actions are restricted to Election Day observation rather than the entire electoral process. This area of intervention is not traditionally funded by government and many CSOs are weakened by lack of adequate resources and are unable to bear the indirect cost to undertake election observation along the electoral cycle. It was strongly recommended by the EU EOM report on the 2015 general election that future elections project should allocate resources directly to CSOs, particularly those operating at the grassroots to engender better deliveries.

1.3 **Priority areas for support/problem analysis**

The starting point of the problem analysis was based on preliminary consideration of existing policy and key documents of reference. They are the National Indicative Programme (NIP), the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the last EU EOM and final project report and evaluation reports of the 10th EDF support to electoral cycle project. The entire process of the problem analysis was carried out in close consultation and cooperation with electoral stakeholders, meeting them both bilaterally and in structured focal group discussions. It was a brainstorming exercise through which problems were identified and connected in cause-effect relationship. Priority areas for support in the run up to the 2019 elections include the following:

**1. Legal Framework**

In spite of various attempts to enhance the legal framework since 2011, noticeable shortcomings in the current legal framework constitute significant obstacles to improvements in the electoral process. Some of these were already highlighted by the EU EOM in relation to each of the sectors in which the recommendations are grouped. These include, but are not limited to i) a lack of regulation for party primaries, which would require a constitutional amendment to allow for independent candidacy for all elected positions (EU EOM recommendation 7) ii) lack of coercive measures to increase the participation of women into such primaries which is hampering the emergence of women as candidates for elective positions. EU EOM recommends (29) political party policies as well as consideration of quota for women, iii) lack of legal enforcement mechanisms empowering INEC to sanction non-compliance of political parties with campaign and campaign finance regulation framework (EU EOM recommendation 10), iv) lack of specific provision for organising the vote for certain categories of voters including, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), the Diaspora, Election Officials and Security Personnel v) lack of provisions prescribed into the Electoral Act regarding provisional delays in pre-election court hearing (EU EOM recommendation 23), vi) non-compliance of the Electoral Act with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, vii) lack of coercive measures to increase the participation of people living with disability and the exclusion of certain categories of voters from the vote (EU EOM recommendation 30).

**2. Electoral Administration**

In addition to the technical and procedural weaknesses in INEC’s operations, there is a need to address certain fundamental issues in line with recommendations 1-3 of the EU EOM on election administration. These include: i) enhancing INEC’s administrative structure countrywide, with emphasis on improving the capacity in planning and internal communication. Procedural shortcomings were evident in the last elections, in particular during collation and from analysis of polling unit results, ii) enhancing stakeholders’ engagement and cooperation with State Independent Electoral Commissions (SIECs), iii) addressing disparities in the size of constituency boundaries, iv) the creation of additional polling units due to demographic changes. INEC is also required to enhance its planning and operational capacity to prosecute electoral offences in collaboration with the security agencies, v) the periodic review of the voter register to remove names of the deceased and register new voters\(^6\), vi) the enhancement of the quality of biometric data capture and finger recognition during polling, as well as the transparency of the polling, counting and collation processes, vii) the majority of the high volume of pre-election petitions left pending till after elections, due to the lack of time limits for filing and adjudicating, compromising the right to a timely remedy.

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\(^6\)It is projected that about 5 million persons will come of voting age yearly following the last continuous voters registration exercise in 2014, potentially pushing the number of registered voter to around 110 million towards the 2019 elections
3. National Assembly
Several issues need to be addressed to enhance the capacity of the National Assembly (NASS) to proactively engage and contribute to Nigeria’s democratic process. The key areas to be addressed include: i) capacity of NASS and targeted NASS Committees to efficiently undertake their legislative duties and oversight functions with particular focus on electoral reform, ii) the legislative capacity and skills of women legislators, iii) NASS’s engagement with the INEC and relevant electoral stakeholders iv) citizen/public access to NASS members and activities for transparency and accountability, v) lack of provision for independent candidacy, vi) insufficient campaign finance regulations, vii) absence of provisions empowering INEC to sanction campaign violations, viii) weak transparency requirements for the publication of results, ix) voters and civil society organisations unable to file petitions against the results.

4. Political Parties
The electoral cycle remains vulnerable to the actions and inactions of the political parties, with a lack of adequate resources, organisational and operational capacity, as well as a lack of internal party democracy and accountability. The inability of the political parties to conform to required democratic principles and practices is largely due to very poor enforcement mechanisms in place to address the violation of political party code of conduct and other regulations. The proposed areas of intervention, in line with EU EOM recommendations 10 and 11, will include strengthening the capacity of political parties to adopt democratic leadership and best practices in conflict management, strategic planning, party finance and campaign finance regulations and special provisions to promote women, youth and PWDs in eligible positions.

5. The Media and Civil Society
Specific issues need to be addressed which include the professionalism of media practitioners, especially female journalists, ii) diversification of media platforms to deepen and deliver civic and voter education, iii) awareness creation in the use Freedom of Information Act for increased accountability, iv) strengthened capacity of the National Broadcasting Commission to perform its mandate, as well as the engagement of media in promoting women, youth and marginalised groups in politics, in line with EU EOM recommendations 14-17. Civil society is limited in its interventions as civic and voter education remains a huge challenge. This is demonstrated in the low voter turnout of only 44 percent of registered voters. This is attributable to the fear of electoral violence, the unprofessional behaviour of security agencies on electoral duties, lack of institutional capacity of the CSOs advocacy and lobbying activities and inadequate conduct of civic and voter education activities and election monitoring and observation.

2 RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Risks</th>
<th>Risk level</th>
<th>Mitigating measures</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Government's lack of commitment in adopting required policy reforms in improving the electoral system.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>The EU should intensify the political dialogue especially through Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement, and provide support to the key institutions involved in the electoral reform process.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Post electoral violence as witnessed following the 2011 elections could be repeated, undermining the quality and integrity of the electoral process.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>The EU should provide support to the key security agencies and INEC in mapping hot spots and formulating adequate mitigating measures. CSO engagement in identifying and addressing potential hotbeds of electoral violence would also be explored.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The National Assembly lacks the will, commitment and competence to undertake required institutional reform and necessary constitutional and legal framework for improving the electoral system.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Engage NASS to improve technical capacity and provision of required support to key Committees of NASS dealing with constitutional and legal framework for deepening democracy and democratic governance.</td>
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</table>
3 LESSONS LEARNT, COMPLEMENTARITY AND CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

3.1 Lessons learnt

The action will build on the lessons learnt under the 10th EDF "Support to the electoral cycle 2011-2015" project. Complementarity and synergy with other donors was largely pursued within the framework of the 10th EDF project, as it laid important foundations for the 11th EDF by building relationships with other donor partners as well as key Federal and State organisations. A major success of the 10th EDF project was its ability to pool donor funds together in addressing a common objective.

However, the 10th EDF Electoral project was also marred by considerable delays in procurement processes. A key lesson learnt in the implementation of the 10th EDF project (EUR 20 million) is that the EU had limited ability to manage the project and UNDP in the implementation of the project. This is because the implementation modality provided limited tools and techniques for working closely with UNDP. The limits and weaknesses of these tools also limited EU engagement in furthering project efficiency and effectiveness, as well as national ownership and sustainability.

Another lesson learnt is that the project suffered from important weaknesses in results-based management (RBM) which had negative effects on project implementation (efficiency and effectiveness) and impact. The project was widely criticised as not sufficiently transparent and open. The impact is difficult to specify given the weaknesses in RBM. Project processes often focused on discrete activities and outputs important to the electoral cycle in Nigeria. This emphasis however led to less of a focus on reaching output goals and impact, and less of an emphasis on outcomes and sustainability. Implementation by UNDP was also criticised by Development Partners, stakeholders, and partners as consistently not taking activities through to their logical conclusions and insufficiently following through on the results of project activities. Activity selection was seen as unstructured, with the project able to pursue a host of unconnected or lightly-connected events, even within the same component, rather than planning, building towards, and reaching an end point through connecting activities for cumulative or exponential effect. On sustainability, stakeholders’ consultations should always precede any planning process in order to ensure a shared understanding on the prioritisation of interventions and to facilitate ownership of project outcomes. Further interventions should place more focus on the state level by adopting a bottom up approach. Finally, more initiatives should focus on strengthening inter-governmental collaboration between government ministries, agencies and CSOs.

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<th>Assumptions</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Low</th>
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<td>The political situation remains fairly stable with the containment of the insecurity arising from insurgency, emergent separatist agitations and other socio-religious and ethnic tensions and conflicts. The Government demonstrates its willingness to participate in the project and various government Ministries, Departments and Agencies, CSOs, traditional and religious leaders are aligned with the government policy. Required funds are made available by the Government to the main stakeholders, including INEC, the security agencies and public/civic enlightenment agencies. INEC remain largely neutral and impartial and benefits from the confidence of the stakeholders. Expertise is made available on time to build the capacity of the various stakeholders.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Direct support for training, capacity building and awareness to the political parties and to organisations liaising with the political parties.</td>
<td>INEC requires an accurate budgetary timeframe based on a four-year period in planning for the 2019 general elections and regular consultation with key actors involved into the preparation, allocation and disbursement of INEC budget.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Despite some important lessons learnt and clear shortcomings of the 10th EDF project, it is undeniable that further support for the 2019 elections is vital to sustain the gains made in the last electoral cycle, and the EU-SDGN marks a new chapter in EU support for elections in Nigeria with a comprehensive and targeted approach at the key needs and priorities towards the conduct of the 2019 elections.

3.2 Complementarity, Synergy and Donor Coordination

Other providers of electoral assistance in the Nigerian governance sector include DFID through a mix of delivery mechanisms including the Democracy in Nigeria Project (DDiN 2), working mostly through national partners, and the USAID/DFID cooperative agreement that supports the Consortium for Elections and Political Processes comprising of International Foundation for Electoral Systems, National Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute. The UK and US interventions support the work of key national stakeholders including INEC. Other international partners that provide various degree of electoral support include Open Society for West Africa, (OSIWA) MacArthur Foundation and Ford Foundation through the provision of bilateral grants to some governmental institutions and agencies and CSOs.

Coordination and collaboration amongst international development partners providing assistance to the Nigerian electoral process has been developed and maintained over time, with two levels of coordination currently in existence. The first level of coordination is at the level of EU Heads of Mission and the heads of like-minded missions, including five EU heads of missions, Canada, US, Australia, Korea, Mexico, Turkey and India amongst others. This group is convened by the EU Delegation and chaired by the Head of Delegation, with specific focus on joint political messaging and working as one. This group has been used on several occasions, to engage with the highest levels of government, and meets on a quarterly basis. Coordination is also pursued within the framework of the Elections Technical Coordination Meetings comprising major international development partners that are engaged in electoral assistance to Nigeria. Essentially, the meetings provide a platform to share information on work plans and activity outputs within the electoral cycle based on varied perspectives, approaches and implementation strategies. Thus, the platform promotes cooperation amongst participating entities in engaging with INEC and other relevant electoral stakeholders to promote effectiveness and mitigate duplication of efforts in the design and implementation of electoral support activities. Available information indicates that UKAID/DFID will continue its implementation of the Democracy in Nigeria Project (DDiN 2) well into 2019 with focus on legislative support, especially strengthening women participation in parliament and support to the National Situation Room, while USAID will continue its support for the election reform project in the area of support to the EMBs and specific CSOs involved in electoral reform and parallel vote tabulation (PVT). Canada has mentioned that future support to elections and democratic process is unlikely based on the priorities of the new government.

Given its cordial relationships with various Nigerian agencies, the EU is well positioned to advance the course of democratic governance in Nigeria with a project that ensures strong added-value and complementarity with other donor activity. A strong emphasis on donor coordination and complementarity will be maintained by the 11th EDF project, and this would be ensured by the management structures explained in section 5.7 below. Within the framework of the 11th EDF, the EU will provide long term institutional strengthening and capacity building support to targeted CSOs working in the EU focal sector areas, including elections. EU-SDGN is designed to complement EU-Act, which will focus on strengthening the capacity of CSOs to effectively participate in service delivery, taking into account cross cutting issues such as exclusion of women, children and persons with disabilities. Direct linkages will be established between the CSOs supported through this EU-SDGN project and the EU-Act project to ensure complementarity of purpose and value for money.

3.3 Cross-cutting issues

This project formulation was undertaken in close consultation with the national stakeholders and particularly in liaison with over 40 Civil Society Organisations such as the Election Monitor and Transition Monitoring Group whose main objective is to advocate for more inclusive participation of vulnerable groups in the electoral processes. Thus, many activities are centred on the support to basic human rights and fundamental freedom that are a prerequisite for credible, inclusive and transparent electoral process. The action also aims at facilitating the integration of gender equality concerns across
4 DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION

4.1 Objectives/results

The overall objective of the project is the reinforcement of democracy in Nigeria. The project is articulated through five components aiming to achieve the following specific objectives (outcomes):

SO1 - Specific Objective 1: Improved quality of electoral administration in Nigeria

ER - Expected Results (Outputs)

1.1 INEC’s strategic planning, policy framework and operational capacity and systems strengthened
1.2 INEC’s capacity for efficient internal communication, including transmission system, and engagement mechanisms with stakeholders enhanced
1.3 INEC’s periodic voter registration system strengthened and improved quality of the register of voters
1.4 INEC Electoral Offences Unit enhanced to prosecute electoral offences
1.5 INEC supported in drafting legislative proposals for electoral reform, new constituency delimitation, increase number of polling station
1.6 INEC polling station staff better trained
1.7 FOSIECON’s institutional capacity and collaboration with stakeholders enhanced

SO2 - Specific Objective 2: The National Assembly effectively discharges its legislative function in compliance with democratic principles and standards

ER - Expected Results (Outputs)

2.1 NASS and targeted NASS Committees improve on legislative duties and oversight functions
2.2 NASS engagement with key stakeholders for the review and adoption of inclusivity and other election related legislations strengthened
2.3 Citizens’ access to NASS and NASS engagement with their constituencies improved
2.4 Capacity of elected female, youths and persons with disabilities increased

SO3 - Specific Objective 3: Pluralism, tolerance, internal democracy and equality of opportunity of political parties and the political party system enhanced

ER - Expected Results (Outputs)

3.1 Political parties review and establish internal democracy and public order responsibilities
3.2 Political parties adhere to legal requirements on funding and campaign finance
3.3 Inter-Party Advisory Council engagement with INEC and relevant stakeholders strengthened
3.4 Political parties guarantee involvement of women, youths and persons with disabilities in the political process

SO4 - Specific Objective 4: The Media, including radio and social media, provides fair, accurate and ethical coverage of the electoral process

ER - Expected Results (Outputs)

4.1 Professionalism of media practitioners, especially women, enhanced
4.2 Media platforms to diversify and deepen civic and voter education enhanced
4.3 Media awareness and use of FoI Act for increased accountability
4.4 Nigerian Broadcasting Commission strengthened to perform its mandate
4.5 Media engagement in promoting women, youths and marginalised groups in politics improved

SO5 - Specific Objective 5: CSOs and relevant agencies contribute to enhancing the electoral process

ER - Expected Results (Outputs)

5.1 Initiatives for peaceful and non-violent electoral process promoted
5.2 Inclusive and non-partisan domestic monitoring and observation along the electoral cycle enhanced
5.3 Advocacy for inclusivity of women, youths and PWD in the electoral process improved
5.4 Civic and voter education promoted
5.5 Professionalism of Security Agencies for electoral duties supported
5.6 CSOs liaison with the INEC, the National Assembly, political parties and security agencies strengthened

In addition, funds will be reserved for "Support to strategic measures" (call for proposals/direct grants/services/FWC) in indirect management to allow the EU Delegation to respond to unforeseen development and opportunities that could contribute further to the objectives of the action. This is based on lessons learned under the 10th EDF where an additional EUR 15 million had to be committed to support strategy measures. Possible activities to be funded by this budget line include monitoring and preparations for unforeseen off cycle elections, strategic support to INEC with changing political situation or voter education related activities.

4.2 Main activities

Specific Objective 1:
Formulation and implementation of the 2016–2020 Strategic Plan of Action and the 2016 to 2019 Election Project Plan; technical assistance for development of policy and legal framework for boundary delimitation, constituency delineation and creation of additional polling units, including support for local consultations and data gathering to base decisions; technical assistance for creation/reconfiguration of additional polling units; technical assistance and support for the review, formulation and implementation of legal and constitutional framework on election, including: timely legislation to effectively enfranchise IDPs; monitoring internal party elections, party nomination processes, monitoring electoral campaigns, sanctioning non-compliance with campaign regulation framework; review of the delays prescribed into the Electoral Act regarding pre-election judiciary court hearings; support to the decentralisation of periodic and extended voter registration process and issuance of Permanent Voters’ Cards to the Polling Unit level in light of rapid democratic growth; strengthening of the voter register optimisation process for the production of a clean register of voters; integration of operational, procurement and logistics systems for seamless deployment and retrieval of electoral personnel and materials; establishment of Electoral Offences Unit in the INEC Legal Departments at National and State offices; increasing cooperation and coordination between INEC, the Police and relevant stakeholders on the identification, arrest and prosecution of electoral offenders; reorganisation and strengthening of the INEC Political Party Monitoring mechanism.

Specific Objective 2:
Support the recruitment of technical expertise to the NASS through training, drafting of rules and other parliamentary guides, and technical advice to the NASS members, including a focus on understanding of electoral frameworks; provision of direct technical advice to targeted NASS committees for the drafting of laws and technical expertise to the NASS members on specific issues related to the legislation, including a focus on electoral legislation, protecting IDP rights, enfranchising the diaspora, supporting women, youth, disabled persons, minorities representation, oversight of public accounts and public procurement, protection of human rights; organisation of consultative meetings between NASS, INEC and election stakeholders on the electoral reform process; organisation of workshops and public hearings on amendments to the Constitution and the Electoral Act, including a focus on electoral legislation, protecting IDP rights, enfranchising the diaspora, supporting women, youth, disabled persons, minorities representation, oversight of public accounts and public procurement, protection of human rights; trainings for the House of Representatives Committee on Public Petitions and the Senate Committee on Ethics, Privileges and Public Petitions in carrying out their duty of receiving and responding to citizens’ complaints against rights violations and administrative injustice by government departments and agencies; training on gender budgeting and mainstreaming for female elected officers; implementation of internship programme placing youths and young professionals in various Committees and Units of the National Assembly.

Specific Objective 3:
Support to the Political Parties Leadership and Policy Development Centre of the National Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies to promote strengthening the leadership and organisational capacities of
political parties; training and capacity building for party executives on Election Alternate Dispute Resolution; training for functionaries of political parties on political administration, financial and accountability; production and dissemination of a New Code of Conduct for Political Parties, including promotion of equitable access to media and avoidance of hate speech; support the organisation of the annual Political Summit, at which political parties and other stakeholders such as INEC will discuss topical political issues and examine emerging issues; strengthening of networks of CSOs that bring women together to enable a gender-based perspective and response to political conflict and violence; periodic workshops for Political Parties to strengthen the participation of women, youths and marginalised groups.

Specific Objective 4:
Training of station managers and editors on strategies to developing and implementing electoral codes of conduct, developing elections coverage plans including plans for resource sharing, innovation in coverage (e.g. use of mobile, citizen journalists, etc.); in-depth capacity training for journalists to foster development to partner stations in the pre- and electoral cycle period with a wider focus on long-term political accountability, inclusion and participation; organisation of platforms of media experts to review and update of “The Nigerian Media Code of Election Coverage”; support effective implementation of Freedom of Information Act; the use of related new and social media platforms to publish information and model reports to create awareness and active citizen’s participation in the electoral process; organisation of Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with media stakeholders, including new and social media platforms on trends and challenges in fair, accurate and ethical coverage of electoral processes; targeted technical expertise, training and capacity development for NBC Staff on the media monitoring project, legal and regulatory framework and broadcasting standards; organisation of sensitisation media campaigns promoting inclusion and strengthening women, youths and PWD leadership and political participation.

A number of activities are foreseen at the inception phase of the project, including required baseline surveys, capacity gaps and needs analysis, review of the log frame, establishment of action plans, operational methodologies and budgets specific to each key project beneficiary according to their mandate, at federal and state level, development of monitoring and evaluation systems with performance indicators and monitoring benchmarks.

Specific Objective 5:
Support platforms and projects to monitor political conflict and violence and management of a system of early warning for preventive action; including support the CSOs platform and the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR); support projects to monitor the use of hate speech during the electoral campaign; to monitor political conflict and violence, manage a system of early warning and advocate for preventive action; promotion of regular and periodic National Stakeholders Consultative Forum on peaceful and non-violent election; support for projects coordinating and harmonising CSOs election observation platforms for deployment, information gathering and information sharing; support for training on accurate reporting on both qualitative aspects of processes and results; support women, youth, PWD, CSOs undertake capacity development initiatives to strengthen the capacity of under-represented groups and marginalised persons interested in politics, with a focus on support for monitoring elections, monitoring and advocating for legislative changes; conduct campaign on civic and voter education campaign awareness on electoral reform issues to popularise the issues for reform and build citizens consensus and pressure that will influence policy and lawmakers to help achieve these reforms; develop civic and voter education materials, content and messaging that are structured and tailored to reach the maximum number and diversity of voters at the grassroots levels, including women, youth, and PWD.

4.3 Intervention logic
Anchored in the recommendations of the 2015 EU EOM report, and national priorities and policies, this action works according to three intertwined and mutually reinforcing strategies, and will run along the 2016-2019 electoral cycle.

First, it seeks to strengthen the administration of the electoral process by technical assistance to Nigeria’s Electoral Management Bodies, particularly INEC given its broad and exclusive mandate to deliver elections at the federal and state level, as well as FOSIECON which has exclusive statutory mandate for the delivery of elections into the 774 local government councils in the 36 States.
Second, it aims to contribute to **strengthening the democratic system** by supporting key democratic institutions such as the National Assembly, political parties and media, including the National Broadcasting Commission, the media regulatory body, to more effectively exercise their roles.

Third, it seeks to contribute to **an enabling environment** for legitimate, inclusive and peaceful elections by support to (i) reform of the legislative and policy framework, (ii) security agencies and ability to tackle electoral impunity and (iii) support to civil society organisations.

Specialised CSOs or organisations will be targeted to deliver specific capacity building activities and assist the key actors in addressing critical loopholes which need to be addressed in the electoral process, including transparency and accountability of the key public and policy actors towards citizens.

5  **IMPLEMENTATION**

The project will be implemented in both direct and indirect management mode through a combination of: (i) an award of a direct grant contract in direct management mode for implementation of all activities relating to the specific objective 1 (INEC), (ii) an award of 3 direct grant contracts in indirect management mode for the implementation of activities under specific objectives 2-5, (iii) calls for proposals to civil society organisations in indirect management mode to implement activities under specific objective 5. In addition, funds will be reserved for "**Support to strategic measures**" (call for proposals/direct grants/services/FWC) in indirect management to allow the EU Delegation to respond to unforeseen development and opportunities that could contribute further to the objectives of the action. Possible activities to be funded by this budget line include monitoring and preparations for unforeseen off cycle elections, strategic support to INEC with changing political situation or voter education related activities. A suspension clause will be applied to allow for the launch of the call for proposals under specific objective 5 (SO5).

5.1.  **Financing Agreement**

In order to implement this action, it is foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with the partner country, referred to in Article 17 of Annex IV to the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement.

5.2  **Indicative implementation period**

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in Section 4.2 will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements implemented, is 60 months from the date of entry into force of the financing agreement.

Extensions of the implementation period may be agreed by the Commission’s authorising officer responsible by amending this decision and the relevant contracts and agreements; such amendments to this decision constitute non-substantial amendment in the sense of Article 9(4) of Regulation (EU) No 322/2015.

5.3  **Implementation of the budget support component**

Not applicable.

5.4  **Implementation modalities**

5.4.1  **Grants: direct award for the implementation of all activities relating to specific objective 1 (INEC) (direct management)**

(a) Objectives of the grants, fields of intervention, priorities of the year and expected results:

- Management of specific objective 1 of the project, including the day to day implementation of project activities, monitoring and evaluation, and administrative and financial reporting.

(b) Justification of a direct grant:

Under the responsibility of the Commission’s authorising officer responsible, the grant may be awarded without a call for proposals to European Centre for Electoral Support (ECES). Under the responsibility of the Commission’s authorising officer responsible, the recourse to an award of a grant without a call for proposals is justified because of the institution's technical competence and
specialisation in election administration, Article 190 (f) of the RAP. In the past four years, ECES has signed over 60 contracts in support of electoral processes and strengthening of democratic institutions. Furthermore, ECES has a wealth of experience and expertise in electoral support projects stemming from nearly all regions across the globe. ECES has implemented activities in more than 35 countries mainly in Africa and the Middle East. In addition to this, the personnel of ECES have acquired extensive field experience which can count on a specific knowledge bank from its well established network in over 70 countries around the world.

(c) Essential selection and award criteria:

The essential selection criteria are financial and operational capacity of the applicant. The essential award criteria are relevance of the proposed action to the objectives of the call; design, effectiveness, feasibility, sustainability and cost effectiveness of the action.

(d) Maximum rate of Co-financing

The maximum possible rate of co-financing for grants under this call is 95%. The rate may be higher if the auto-financing capacity of the targeted beneficiaries is weak.

In accordance with Articles 192 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012, if full funding is essential for the action to be carried out, the maximum possible rate of co-financing may be increased up to 100%. The essentiality of full funding will be justified by the Commission's authorising officer responsible in the award decision, in respect of the principles of equal treatment and sound financial management.

(e) Indicative trimester to conclude the grant agreement:

The Indicative trimester to conclude the grant agreement is second trimester 2017.

5.4.2 Indirect management with the partner country

A part of this action, objectives 2 to 4, may be implemented in indirect management with the National Authorising Office (NAO) of Nigeria in accordance with Article 58(1)(c) of the Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 applicable in accordance with Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2015/323 according to the following modalities:

The NAO will act as the contracting authority for the procurement and grant procedures. The Commission will control ex ante all the procurement and grant procedures. Payments are executed by the Commission.

5.4.3 Procurement (direct management)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject in generic terms, if possible</th>
<th>Type (works, supplies, services)</th>
<th>Indicative number of contracts</th>
<th>Indicative trimester of launch of the procedure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communication and visibility</td>
<td>Services</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2nd trimester 2017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.5 Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act and set out in the relevant contractual documents shall apply.

The Commission’s authorising officer responsible may extend the geographical eligibility in accordance with Article 22(1)(b) of Annex IV to the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement on the basis of urgency or of unavailability of products and services in the markets of the countries concerned, or in other duly substantiated cases where the eligibility rules would make the realisation of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult.
5.6 **Indicative budget**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDICATIVE BUDGET</th>
<th>EU contribution (EUR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>5.4.1 Direct Management</strong></td>
<td>13 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specific Objective 1</strong>: INEC and other electoral management bodies enhanced in their capacity to deliver their mandate</td>
<td>13 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5.4.2 Indirect Management</strong></td>
<td>12 200 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specific Objective 2</strong>: National Assembly effectively discharges its legislative function in compliance with democratic principles and standards</td>
<td>3 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specific Objective 3</strong>: Pluralism, tolerance, internal democracy and equality of opportunity of political parties and the political party system enhanced</td>
<td>2 700 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specific Objective 4</strong>: Media, including new and social media provides fair, accurate and ethical coverage of the electoral process</td>
<td>2 600 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specific Objective 5</strong>: CSOs and relevant agencies proactively participating in the enhancement of the electoral process</td>
<td>3 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support to strategic initiatives</strong></td>
<td>600 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technical Service Contract (for the preparation and evaluation of call for proposals and other related activities)</strong></td>
<td>300 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5.9 Evaluation 5.10 Audit</strong></td>
<td>400 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5.11 Communication and Visibility</strong></td>
<td>400 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contingencies</strong></td>
<td>500 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRAND TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>26 500 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.7 **Organisational set-up and responsibilities**

The overall responsibility for the implementation of the programme lies with the National Authorising Officer who will serve as the contracting authority for all contracts under this project with the exception of activities under component 1, which will be implemented in direct management mode by the EU Delegation. The EU Delegation to the Federal Republic of Nigeria representing the European Commission will have permanent oversight on the overall progress of implemented activities under the project.

**Governance structure**

(i) **A Project Steering Committee** comprising the National Authorising Officer, the EU Delegation and certain beneficiaries of the project will meet twice yearly or as required to assess, monitor and supervise the overall implementation of the project at the highest level. The Project Managers of the various components will participate and represent their teams in the Steering Committee in non-decision-making capacity. The Committee will be chaired by the National Authorising Officer and will be responsible for providing policy and strategic direction and exercise of general oversight, including financial oversight and approval of funding allocations within the overall budget.

(ii) **A Donor Coordination Committee** comprising international development partners including bilateral and multilateral agencies, certain diplomatic missions and key international non-governmental organisations will meet quarterly, or as required, to ensure coordination and complementarity within and among development partners to improve effectiveness of democratic support and prevent duplication and/or overlap in activities among the community of the donors.
(iii) A Technical Committee chaired by INEC comprising the European Union Delegation, the NAO, selected stakeholders and the project team will meet monthly to discuss technical issues on the implementation of the project, share information on electoral issues and identify and respond to new and emerging challenges.

5.8 Performance monitoring and reporting

All contracts implementing this action would have specific results framework that will be monitored by dedicated monitoring and evaluation specialists on an ongoing basis. The Delegation and the National Authorising Officer will oversee the compilation of the information at the programme level. The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation will be a continuous process and part of the implementing partner’s responsibilities. To do this, the implementing partners shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for the action and elaborate regular progress reports (not less than annual) and final reports. Every report shall provide an accurate account of implementation of the action, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (outcomes and direct outputs) as measured by corresponding indicators, using the log frame matrix as reference. The report shall be laid out in such a way as to allow monitoring of the means envisaged and employed and of the budget details for the action. The final report, narrative and financial, will cover the entire period of the action implementation. The Commission may undertake additional project monitoring visits both through its own staff and through independent consultants recruited directly by the Commission for independent monitoring reviews (or recruited by the responsible agent contracted by the Commission for implementing such reviews).

5.9 Evaluation

Having regard to the nature of the action, mid-term and final evaluations will be carried out for this action by the Commission. A mid-term evaluation will be carried out for problem solving and learning purposes. A final evaluation will be carried out for accountability and learning purposes at various levels (including for policy revision).

The Commission shall inform the implementing partner at least 1 month in advance of the dates foreseen for the evaluation missions. The implementing partner shall collaborate efficiently and effectively with the evaluation experts, and inter alia provide them with all necessary information and documentation, as well as access to the project premises and activities.

The evaluation reports shall be shared with the partner country and other key stakeholders. The implementing partner and the Commission shall analyse the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, in agreement with the partner country, jointly decide on the follow-up actions to be taken and any adjustments necessary, including, if indicated, the reorientation of the project. Indicatively, two contracts for evaluation services shall be concluded under a framework contract for both the mid-term and final project evaluations.

5.10 Audit

Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation of this action, the Commission may, on the basis of a risk assessment, contract independent audits or expenditure verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements. Indicatively, at least one contract for audit services shall be concluded under a framework contract.

5.11 Communication and visibility

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU. This action shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action to be elaborated at the start of implementation and supported with the budget indicated above.

In terms of legal obligations on communication and visibility, the measures shall be implemented by the Commission, the partner country, contractors, grant beneficiaries and/or entrusted entities. Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in, respectively, the financing agreement, procurement and grant contracts, and delegation agreements. The Communication and Visibility
Manual for European Union External Action shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action and the appropriate contractual obligations.

For this project, an amount of EUR 400 000 EUR is allocated for the communication and visibility purpose.
APPENDIX 1 - Indicative Logframe matrix

The activities, the expected outputs and all the indicators, targets and baselines included in the logframe matrix are indicative and may be updated during the implementation of the action, no amendment being required to the financing decision. When it is not possible to determine the outputs of an action at formulation stage, intermediary outcomes should be presented and the outputs defined during inception of the overall programme and its components. The indicative logframe matrix will evolve during the lifetime of the action: new lines will be added for including the activities as well as new columns for intermediary targets (milestones) for the output and outcome indicators whenever it is relevant for monitoring and reporting purposes. Note also that indicators should be disaggregated by sex whenever relevant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention logic</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baselines (incl. reference year)</th>
<th>Targets (incl. reference year)</th>
<th>Sources and means of verification</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall objective/</td>
<td>The reinforcement of democracy in Nigeria.</td>
<td>The level of citizens’ confidence in the rule of law and public institutions and structures of governance</td>
<td>Nigeria ranked 34	extsuperscript{th} out of 54 countries on the Mo Ibrahim index for governance in Africa</td>
<td>Mo Ibrahim International Index for governance in Africa 2016 and 2020</td>
<td>All stakeholders remain committed to electoral reform and the reinforcement of democracy in Nigeria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific Objective: Outcome</td>
<td>SO1 Improved quality of electoral administration in Nigeria</td>
<td>SO1 Extent to which general elections are considered free and fair</td>
<td>SO1 Procedural shortcomings were evident during the 2015 general elections, in particular during collation and from analysis of polling unit results.</td>
<td>SO1 Only small sporadic anomalies are recorded for the 2019 elections and the results of the 2019 general elections are accepted by all stakeholders without any reserve; as free, transparent, fair, peaceful and inclusive</td>
<td>SO1 INEC, EUEOM, Domestic observers’ reports, Surveys, Monitoring and field mission reports, Media, Police and other Stakeholders reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SO2 The National Assembly effectively discharges its legislative function in compliance with democratic principles and standards</td>
<td>SO2 Number of legislative reform bills enacted and percentage of EU electoral Observation Mission recommendations requiring legislative action addressed.</td>
<td>SO2 An amendment to the electoral act was signed into law on the eve of the last general elections but it failed to address majority of the recommendations made by the 2011 EU Electoral Observation Mission</td>
<td>SO2 EUEOM mid-term review mission report</td>
<td>SO2 EUEOM mid-term review mission report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SO3 Pluralism, tolerance, internal democracy and equality of opportunity of political parties and the political party system enhanced</td>
<td>SO3 Proportion of reforms adopted by political parties in their various party manifestos addressing pluralism, internal democracy and equality of opportunity</td>
<td>SO3: lack of pluralism, internal democracy and equality of opportunity has been a major problem of the Nigerian political parties. In the run up to the 2015 elections there were several instances of bias against female candidates and youth aspirants. Also, party primaries often lacked a minimum level of transparency.</td>
<td>SO3:political parties website, INEC reports, Project Reports</td>
<td>SO3:political parties website, INEC reports, Project Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SO4 The Media, including radio and social media, provides fair, accurate and ethical coverage of the electoral process</td>
<td>SO4:Percentage of news items on elections promoting fair, accurate and ethical reporting</td>
<td>SO4 By late 2017, at least the 2 major political parties review their party manifestos to address issues on internal democracy and equality of opportunity. 50% party primaries conducted in 2018 record high level of transparency evidenced by a general acceptance of the elections results.</td>
<td>SO4 NBC reports, project reports</td>
<td>SO4 NBC reports, project reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SO5 CSOs and relevant agencies contribute to enhancing the electoral process</td>
<td>SO5 Percentage increase in the number of CSO and agencies contributing to the enhancement of the electoral process</td>
<td>SO5 Project reports, CSO reports</td>
<td>SO5 Project reports, CSO reports</td>
<td>All stakeholders remain committed to electoral reform and the reinforcement of democracy in Nigeria.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9 Indicators aligned with the relevant programming document are marked with '*' and indicators aligned to the EU Results Framework with '***'.

[19]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention logic</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baselines (incl. reference year)</th>
<th>Targets (incl. reference year)</th>
<th>Sources and means of verification</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 1/Outputs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 INEC strategic planning, policy framework and operational capacity and systems strengthened</td>
<td>1.1 Design, adoption and implementation of a strategic plan and policy framework for INEC, including an operational strategy and system analysis. 1.2. Proportion of INEC and LGA offices equipped with functioning internet and intranet. Number of INEC offices where information desks are manned during office hours. Number of days taken by INEC to respond to public queries on its website. 1.3 Percentage of young voters registered. Percentage of deceased persons removed from register. Percentage of double voter entries corrected. 1.4. Proportion of reported offences treated by the INEC Unit of Electoral offences in the period 2017-2019 in comparison to 2012-2015. 1.5 The leadership capacity of FOSIECON in the conduct</td>
<td>Dominated by the incumbent political party, with little content on the activities of the opposition parties. The media was also used to intimidate and smear opposition political parties in an attempt to influence the voting public. <strong>SO5:</strong> Whilst the Nigerian CSO network remains vibrant, there is a need to further diversify and deepen civil society engagement in preparation for the 2019 elections.</td>
<td>Adopted and implemented by the Nigerian Broadcasting Commission to sanction erring media houses and ensure elections reportage is fair, accurate and ethical <strong>SO5:</strong> By first quarter 2018, the CSO networks are increased, further diversified and strengthened, particularly at the grassroots level</td>
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<td>of local elections</td>
<td>1.6 Number of electoral reform proposals drafted by INEC and passed to the National Assembly for consideration and passage.</td>
<td>admitted by all that INEC lacks mechanisms for monitoring and sanctioning electoral offences, which is de facto non-existent and (INEC official figures show low levels of arrests and prosecutions.) admitted by all that INEC lacks mechanisms for Monitoring and sanctioning electoral offences, which is de facto non-existent and (INEC official figures show low levels of arrests and prosecutions.)</td>
<td>anomalies such as clerical mistakes and missing names have been corrected. At the end, 80% of eligible voters are registered.</td>
<td>1.4 by end 2018 50% of the reported electoral offences cases caused by perpetrators during the election periods are addressed by the Electoral offences Unit to the courts and then recorded to INEC archives</td>
<td>1.5 The Mid-term review 2018 shows that FOSIECON has got a regular platform liaising with the INEC and NASS and that there are strong discussions to amend its Constitution to address lacunas in its legal framework</td>
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<td>1.7 Number of polling staff trained, disaggregated by gender</td>
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<td>1.6 A consolidated list of proposals drafted by INEC and presented to the National Assembly by the end of 2017.</td>
<td>1.7 By end of 2018, all polling staff trained, with training of trainers also completed</td>
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<td><strong>Outcome 2: Outputs</strong></td>
<td>2.1: NASS and targeted NASS Committees capacitated to improve on legislative duties and oversight functions.</td>
<td>2.1. Percentage of NASS members trained on legislative drafting and oversight functions. Percentage of NASS members with established constituency offices – please make this easy to measure</td>
<td>2.1. By the eve of the elections in 2015, over 60% of electoral laws which required legislative reform had not been enacted. Violence Against Persons Prohibition Act passed at federal level, not domesticated in focal states.</td>
<td>2.1. Electoral reform concluded by NASS by end 2018. 2.2. By mid-2018 100% of the laws pertaining to elections and political processes provide for non-discrimination against women and disadvantaged groups and are totally aligned with international standards. 2.3. Before the end of the 8th Assembly in 2021, a framework for engagement with constituencies is in place. 2.4. In 2018 and mid-2020, % of the elected NASS Members trained in legislative oversight and various capacity building programmes aimed at improving their legislative functions especially women, youth and PWD</td>
<td>Sustained commitment from the National Assembly and key stakeholders.</td>
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<td>2.2: NASS engagement with key stakeholders for the review and adoption of inclusivity and other election related legislations strengthened</td>
<td>2.2. Number of legal provisions pertaining to elections drafted by the NASS committees for plenary consideration and adoption by NASS - this seems easy to measure</td>
<td>2.3. There is an acknowledgement, both from members of parliament and public, including CSOs, that NASS needs to enhance its procedures for more transparency toward the public</td>
<td>2.4. Few female and young legislators with the capacity to effectively engage,</td>
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<td>2.3: Citizens’ access to NASS and NASS engagement with their constituencies improved.</td>
<td>2.3. Number of public hearings held per year</td>
<td>2.4. Number of female, youth, and PWD legislators skilled to perform their legislative duties in a professional manner</td>
<td>2.5. By the end of 2018, % of the elected NASS and targeted NASS Committees capacitated to improve on legislative duties and oversight functions.</td>
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<td>2.4: Capacity development of elected female, youths and Persons with Disabilities increased</td>
<td>2.4. Number of female, youths and Persons with Disabilities increased</td>
<td>2.5. By the end of 2018, % of the elected NASS and targeted NASS Committees capacitated to improve on legislative duties and oversight functions.</td>
<td>2.6. By the end of 2018, % of the elected NASS and targeted NASS Committees capacitated to improve on legislative duties and oversight functions.</td>
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<td><strong>Outcome 3: Outputs</strong></td>
<td>3.1: Political parties imbibe internal democracy and public order responsibilities</td>
<td>3.1 Number of political parties with institutional structures reflecting internal democratic norms and procedures judged to be transparent, inclusive and accountable.</td>
<td>3.1. An assessment of political parties made in 2013 concluded that they lacked clear legal framework and had a poor working relationship with NEC</td>
<td>3.1. By end 2018, at least 60% of registered political parties have institutional structures which reflect internal democratic procedures, judged to be transparent, inclusive, and accountable</td>
<td>Sustained commitment of the political parties</td>
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<td>3.2: Political parties adhere with legal requirements on funding and campaign finance.</td>
<td>3.2. No system in place to monitor and enforce compliance with requirements on funding and campaign finance</td>
<td>3.2. A transparent system aimed at monitoring and enforcing compliance is instituted by early 2019</td>
<td>3.2. Electoral Act, INEC reports. 3.3.10th EDF Project progress reports, INEC reports.</td>
<td>Sustained commitment of the political parties</td>
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<td>3.3: Inter-Party Advisory Council (IPAC) engagement with INEC and relevant stakeholders strengthened</td>
<td>3.3. Monthly, Quarterly and Annual reports, stakeholder reports</td>
<td>3.3. By 2018 Political parties attend IPAC activities, especially in relation to the review,</td>
<td>3.3. Project progress reports</td>
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<td>3.4 Political parties guarantee involvement of women, youths and person with disabilities in the political process.</td>
<td>3.3. By 2018 Political parties attend IPAC activities, especially in relation to the review,</td>
<td>3.3. By 2018 Political parties attend IPAC activities, especially in relation to the review,</td>
<td>3.3. Project progress reports</td>
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<td>Sustained commitment from the National Assembly and key stakeholders.</td>
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<td>dialogue and periodic consultation with INEC. 3.4. Proportion of women, youth and persons with disabilities who are fielded as candidates by political parties.</td>
<td>circumscribes inter-party dialogue 3.4. The proportion of women, youth and PWD among elected officials at all levels significantly decreased compared with 2011 elections</td>
<td>validation and adoption of the Code of Conduct for Political Parties 3.4. Political parties give concessions by way of waiving or reducing the high application fees and establish a quota in party manifestos in order to promote women, youth and people with disabilities in the political process</td>
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**Outcome 4/Outputs**

4.1: Professionalism of media practitioners, especially women enhanced. 4.2: Media platforms to diversify and deepen civic and voter education enhanced. 4.3: Media awareness and use of FoI Act for increased accountability. 4.4: NBC strengthened to perform its mandate 4.5 Media engagement in promoting women, youths and marginalized groups in politics improved

4.1. Proportion of media organizations which after training, focus on fair and balanced coverage of elections 4.2. Establishment of a media platform on elections coverage across media houses 4.3 Level of public awareness and knowledge on FoI. 4.4. Level of compliance by broadcasting industry with the requirement of the Nigeria Broadcasting Commission Code. 4.5 Proportion of radio and television and newspapers disseminating civic and voter education to enhance the participation of women, youth and PWD at least once a month

4.1 Several cases of unethical/bias in elections coverage were recorded in the lead up to the 2015 elections. 4.2. Tbd inception phase 4.3. During the elections of 2015, there were only two instances where the FoI act was utilised. 4.4. During the 2015 electoral campaign, the Federal and state government controlled media gave clear advantages to incumbents over their opponents and the NBC, with the regulatory body largely unable to address such bias 4.5 In 2015, there were very few programmes produced for or by people with disabilities, women and youth in countrywide election broadcasts

4.1. By mid-2018, media organisations focus on fair and balanced coverage of elections 4.2. by 2018, ICT and new media assume a more prominent role in disseminating and promoting debate on democracy and electoral matters based on the number of twitter conferences organised around electoral issues and electoral discussions/debates disseminated through new media. 4.3. By mid-2019, at least 15% increase in the use of the Act in investigative reporting on elections. 4.4. By mid-2018, a sanction mechanism to encourage compliance is devised, supported and enforced by the NBC. 4.5 Media organisations dedicate at least 1 hour of air time per month in the promotion of women, youths and marginalized groups in politics by 2019

4.1. Media content analysis and monitoring by the project by mid-2018 4.2. CSO reports; Media reports; project progress reports 4.3. CSO reports; Media reports; project progress reports 4.4. CSO reports; Media reports; project progress reports; NBC reports 4.5 Media content analysis and monitoring

Media owners and Editors are committed to improving the content of reporting
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<td>5.1 Initiatives for peaceful and non-violent electoral process promoted</td>
<td>5.1 Number of initiatives created as &quot;rapid response measures&quot; to address political violence during the whole electoral cycle</td>
<td>5.1 There were only wo initiatives created to address conflict situations in the 2015 elections</td>
<td>5.1 by 2018, an efficient early warning mechanism is set up which enables various initiatives to control and decrease the escalation of electoral violence</td>
<td>5.1 INEC, Media and other stakeholders reports</td>
<td>The government, politicians and other key stakeholders are committed to ensuring peaceful, transparent and non-violent elections.</td>
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<td>5.2 Inclusive and non-partisan domestic monitoring and observation along the electoral process improved</td>
<td>5.2 Number of domestic observers able to monitor the entire electoral process, including the collation exercise</td>
<td>5.2 During the election of 2015, citizen observers were only present in two out of 23 ward collation centres observed by the EU EOM</td>
<td>5.2 In 2019, non-partisan, neutral and independent citizen observers are present at least in half of the ward collation centres that will be observed by EU EOM.</td>
<td>5.2 Domestic Observation, CSO, EUEOM, INEC, Media reports; Security agencies reports</td>
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<td>5.3 Advocacy for inclusivity of women, youths and PWDS’s in the electoral process improved</td>
<td>5.3 Level of CSOs engagement to promote women, youths and PWD participation in the political process</td>
<td>5.3 by mid-2018 at least a 20% increase in the advocacy platforms on inclusivity of women, youth and PWDS in electoral process</td>
<td>5.3 by mid-2018 at least a 20% increase in the advocacy platforms on inclusivity of women, youth and PWDS in electoral process</td>
<td>5.3 Domestic Observation, CSO, EUEOM, INEC, Media reports; Security agencies reports</td>
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<td>5.4 Scope, depth and latitude of civic and voter education promoted</td>
<td>5.4 Number of registered voters reached through civic and voter education campaigns and Number of hits on INEC’s website</td>
<td>5.4 by 2019 40% increase in voter education audience owing to geographical coverage and the use of new media</td>
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<td>5.4 Domestic Observation, CSO, EUEOM, INEC, Media reports; Security agencies reports</td>
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<td>5.5 Professionalism of Security Agencies for electoral duties supported</td>
<td>5.5 Percentage of deployed security agents who are trained</td>
<td>5.5 by early 2019, 100% security agents to be deployed for election duties are identified and trained</td>
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<td>5.5 Domestic Observation, CSO, EUEOM, INEC, Media reports; Security agencies reports</td>
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<td>5.6 CSOs liaison with the INEC, the National Assembly, political parties and security agencies strengthened</td>
<td>5.6 At least one institutionalised framework with the objective of ensuring constant dialogue and feedback is established between the CSOs and others stakeholders in the electoral process attributed to the CSOs’ interventions</td>
<td>5.6 There is an increased level of collaboration between CSOs and others stakeholders to enhance the credibility and transparency of the electoral process towards the 2019 general elections</td>
<td>5.6 Project reports, INEC, Media reports;</td>
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