

**"FICHE CONTRADICTOIRE"**

**Evaluation of the European Union's Co-operation with Yemen 2002-2012**

*(For full details of the recommendations please refer to the Main Report)*

Recommendations:	Responses of Services:	Follow-up (one year later):
<b>To EU Headquarters</b>		
<p><b>R.1 Senior Management of DEVCO and EEAS should agree, and communicate a clear leadership position on the shared priority that they accord to Yemen</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Clarify expectations regarding formulation and implementation of a comprehensive approach by EU and MS</li> <li>• Clarify Yemen's location within EU organisational and funding structures in a manner which better reflects Yemen's needs and priorities</li> <li>• Consider putting Yemen under 'special measures' within EU structures</li> </ul>	<p>The evaluation covered the period 2002-2012. In the meantime HQ established a fully staffed and devolved EU Delegation in Sana'a, working hand in hand with the Member States' Embassies at the political, policy and implementation levels. The importance of Yemen is fully acknowledged in the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020, which tripled the indicative financial envelope dedicated to the country. DEVCO, European External Action Service (EEAS) and the EU Delegation to Yemen work closely in the formulation of the programming documents to fully reflect the policy and development policies of the country and of the EU. Coordination with EU Member States, including through the possible updating of the EU comprehensive approach towards Yemen.</p> <p>The deterioration of the security situation in May 2014 led to the decision to temporarily evacuate the Delegation to Brussels, a decision later replicated by most other diplomatic missions present in Yemen. The beginning of large scale widespread fighting and aerial bombardments by the Saudi-led coalition in March 2015 put a hold on short term perspectives for a swift return of EU Delegation expatriate staff to Sana'a. Discussions are ongoing to ensure the most efficient relocation of human resources.</p> <p>A number of 'special measures' are being considered since the outbreak of large scale combats, increasing the EU's ability to adapt its response strategy with added flexibility.</p>	<p>The Delegation is still evacuated in Brussels but a Joint EEAS/DEVCO decision has been taken to reallocate the staff to Amman during 2017 in order to facilitate dialogue with UN and all other relevant donors already working for Yemen from Jordan. Programming is closely coordinated with other Commission services (ECHO in particular) and EU Member States working in the country.</p> <p>Since September 2016 the cooperation section has enlarged responsibilities dealing with Yemen and Iraq. Special measures and in particular flexible procedures have been extended until June 2017 as the situation has not improved.</p>

<p><b>R.2 DEVCO and EEAS should require and support the development of a comprehensive strategy for EU and EU Member States in Yemen, consistent with joint communication of December 2013 (priority 1)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Delegation should revisit and update 2009 recommendations regarding moving towards a comprehensive EU approach</li> <li>• Include a plan for formulating a comprehensive strategy by 2016 within which there should be greater emphasis on joint programming with MS and other donors</li> <li>• Strategy should pay attention to GCC Governments' perspectives</li> <li>• DEVCO and EEAS should actively track progress and achievements against these recommendations</li> </ul>	<p>The 2009 comprehensive EU approach is reflected in the multiannual indicative programme 2014-2015. The war situation brought to a halt the implementation of the activities. The update of the 2009 comprehensive EU approach for Yemen and the drafting of a new MIP cannot be developed until there is a clear path for transition, stabilization/reconstruction, and an in-depth analysis of the needs of Yemen.</p> <p>The services (DEVCO, EEAS and Delegation) are working on approaches allowing the implementation of actions in a flexible, fast and of immediate impact in Yemen.</p>	<p>The Delegation has prepared a medium and long term strategy that is in the process of approval within DEVCO. This document explains how the EU should continue supporting Yemen despite the challenging security situation in the country and proposes the most appropriate modalities of cooperation for Yemen in light of the present security constraints in Yemen. The intention is to regularly analyse the situation on the ground and update the strategy, in close coordination with other relevant partners.</p>
<p><b>R.3 DEVCO and EEAS should ensure a significantly increased investment in, and use of, contextual analysis and evaluation at national, sector and problem levels (priority 2)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide clear statement of shared expectations for contextual analysis and evaluation, clarifying organisational arrangements for commissioning and use of both</li> <li>• Ensure the systematic use of contextual analysis and evaluation as an integral part of political engagement and development co-operation</li> <li>• Delegation should invest in building up a body of analysis and evidence to strengthen the relevance, responsiveness and accountability of EU co-operation and to contribute to more sustainable institutional expertise in fragility. The approach should include pooling of analysis and conduct of joint evaluations with EU Member States, building national capacity</li> </ul>	<p>As explained above, the worsening of the security situation from 2013 hampered the implementation of activities such as evaluation, audit and even the mission of this 2002-2012 country evaluation. Contracts already signed for the purpose of evaluations (and audits) could not be implemented due to the refusal of sending experts to such a volatile environment.</p>	<p>The Delegation has regular contacts with all EU services (EEAS, DEVCO, ECHO, and FPI). EU MS are constantly involved in policy analyses and development work; any intervention is previously coordinated with all of them in ad hoc meeting and regular institutional meetings (MOG).</p> <p>The delegation has agreed some strategic interventions with UN agencies and is closely following the implementation in order to safeguard EU interests and EU visibility. Finally the delegation works closely with ECHO to work in "LRRD" and towards a humanitarian-development nexus. It is in fact clear that only a coordinated intervention of all EU services and more in general between all donors can produce a medium long term</p>

and strengthening beneficiary feedback.		relief in Yemen.
<b>TO DELEGATION</b>		
<p><b>R4 The Delegation, with the support of DEVCO and EEAS Services in Brussels, should develop an organisational strategy to strengthen the Delegation’s capability to play its central role in delivering and co-ordinating EU dialogue action and support.</b></p>	<p>The Delegation is fully staffed and devolved. As soon the security context will permit, dialogue with Yemeni partners on the ground should resume.</p>	<p>The Delegation is still evacuated in Brussels but a joint EEAS/DEVCO decision has been taken to reallocate all staff to Amman during 2017 (date TBC) in order to facilitate dialogue with UN and all other relevant donors already working for Yemen from Jordan. The staffing of the delegation is ongoing and it will be hopefully concluded in the framework of the rotation exercise 2017.</p>
<p><b>R.5 The Delegation should develop a set of principles for national capacity development consistent with the New Deal, including –</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Clear position on the most appropriate mix of international and national Delegation staff</li> <li>2. A long term plan for building capacity in government to facilitate and co-ordinate EU support.</li> <li>3. A long term plan for building capacity in local NGOs to design and manage EU-funded projects, including through partnerships with international NGOs</li> <li>4. Explicit treatment of the trade-offs between the exigencies of meeting basic human needs in the short term and building national capacity in the longer term, in line with fragile states principles</li> <li>5. Render national capacity development a cross-cutting issue in all results oriented monitoring missions and in all strategy and programme evaluations.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. This recommendation has to be seen in the context of a decision on the future location of the DEVCO staff of the Yemen Delegation.</li> <li>2. A long term plan will be developed in parallel to political and security developments.</li> <li>3. It can be expected that following the war in Yemen the NGO landscape will be seriously affected. The Post-Crisis Needs Assessment (PCNA) will be looking in all aspects of capacity and capacity building. Partnerships can be stimulated via the design of guidelines of CfP</li> <li>4. See point 2 above. Also the PCNA to be collectively developed between donors and whatever remains of the country institutions will serve for addressing this recommendation.</li> <li>5. Once results oriented monitoring (ROM) missions and strategy and programme evaluations start to take place again, security permitting, this recommendation can be looked into.</li> </ol>	<p>Issues to be revisited once a stable peace process allows accessing normally the country and partners. Nevertheless the overarching goals indicated in R5 remain valid and a priority whenever the situation allows it.</p>

<p><b>R.6 Current development programmes, including those under preparation, should each be reviewed for their conflict sensitivity (priority 3)</b></p>	<p>This will anyway be done as currently no new programmes are prepared or launched. A PCNA will assist in satisfying this recommendation and suspended projects will need to be reviewed before resuming.</p>	<p>The Delegation has focused on reactivating suspended decision. This is performed through the following steps:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. identify possible area of intervention (resilience, identifying islands of stability, DDR, RPBA);</li> <li>2. Identify most appropriate partners still working and with a field presence in the country;</li> <li>3. Propose riders to suspended decisions adapted to the working conditions of the ongoing civil conflict in the country;</li> <li>4. Sign contracts;</li> </ol> <p>Organise remote monitoring activity (from Brussels and Amman).</p>
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