

## **UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development - Public Consultation on revising the European Consensus on Development**

Fields marked with \* are mandatory.

### **(1) Introduction**

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The year 2015 was a strategic milestone for global governance, poverty eradication and sustainable development. It marked the target date of the UN Millennium Development Goals and a point to reflect on the progress made to date and the challenges ahead in addressing their unfinished business. 2015 also saw a series of landmark international summits and conferences over the course of the year (the [Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030](#), the [Addis Ababa Action Agenda](#), the [2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development](#) and the COP 21 [Paris Agreement](#) under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change) which have collectively re-cast the way the international community, including the EU, will work to achieve sustainable development and poverty eradication for many years.

Importantly, and in contrast to the Millennium Development Goals, the 2030 Agenda, including its seventeen Sustainable Development Goals, is a universal Agenda which applies to all countries. It reflects many core European values and interests and provides an international framework for tackling global challenges such as climate change. The EU response to the 2030 Agenda is moving ahead in a range of ways:

- Firstly, as part of EU efforts to implement the 2030 Agenda, the [Commission Work Programme for 2016](#) announces an initiative on the next steps for a sustainable European future which will explain how the EU contributes to reaching the Sustainable Development Goals and map out the internal and external aspects of EU policies contributing to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals.
- Secondly, the High Representative will present the [EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy](#) that is expected to steer the different EU external policies contributing to the global vision of a more stable, prosperous and secure world. It should set out the strategic direction for the full range of EU external action, and as such will help guide EU implementation of the 2030 Agenda in external action.
- Thirdly, the EU will review its development cooperation policy. Existing leading policy documents (including the [2005 European Consensus on Development](#) and the [2011 Agenda for Change](#)) are currently framed around the Millennium Development Goals and need to adapt to incorporate the 2030 Agenda. Given its direct relevance to the EU's overall relations with developing countries, this review will be carried out in full consistency with the ongoing work on the future of the partnership between the EU and the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, under a post-[Cotonou](#) framework.

Views from this consultation will be used to inform the way forward on the initiatives above and in particular the revision of the European Consensus on Development and other external aspects of 2030 Agenda implementation. The consultation seeks your views on **how development policy, in the context of EU external action as foreseen by the Lisbon Treaty**, should respond to the range of landmark 2015 summits and conferences, and also to the rapid changes happening in the world.

Replies can include views which could apply only to the EU institutions and also to both the EU and its Member States – it would be helpful to clarify this in your response. This open public consultation will run for 12 weeks from 30 May 2016 to 21 August 2016. A brief summary and analysis of all consultation contributions will be published by November 2016 and all individual contributions will also be made available on the consultation website (unless respondents ask for their contributions not to be published).

## (2) Information on respondents

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- \* 2.1 Received contributions may be published on the Commission's website, with the identity of the contributor. Please state your preference with regard to the publication of your contribution.

Please note that regardless of the option chosen, your contribution may be subject to a request for access to documents under [Regulation 1049/2001](#) on public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents. In such cases, the request will be assessed against the conditions set out in the Regulation and in accordance with applicable [data protection rules](#).

- I do not agree that my contribution will be published at all
- My contribution may be published but should be kept anonymous; I declare that none of it is subject to copyright restrictions that prevent publication
- My contribution may be published under the name indicated; I declare that none of it is subject to copyright restrictions that prevent publication

- \* 2.2 Are you registered in the EU's Transparency Register?

Please note: Organisations, networks, platforms or self-employed individuals engaged in activities aimed at influencing the EU decision making process are expected to register in the transparency Register. During the analysis of replies to a consultation, contributions from respondents who choose not to register will be treated as individual contributions (unless the contributors are recognised as representative stakeholders through Treaty provisions, European Social Dialogue, Art. 154-155 TFEU).

- Yes
- No

- \* 2.2.1 If yes, what is your registration number?

BE-2007-DPH-2711236772

- \* 2.3 Name (entity or individual in their personal capacity)

11.11.11 vzw

2.5 What type of stakeholder are you?

- Government institution / Public administration
- University / Academic organisation
- Civil society (including Non-Governmental Organisation, specialised policy organisation, think tank)
- International organisation
- Private sector or private company
- Citizen/private individual
- Other

2.6 Please specify

Coalition of the Flemish North-South Movement

\* 2.7 What is your place of residence (if you are answering as a private individual) or where are the headquarters of your organisation situated (if you are answering on behalf of an organisation)?

- In one of the 28 EU Member States
- Other

2.8 Please specify

Belgium

**(3) Context: why a change is needed**

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The EU and its Member States are determined to implement the 2030 Agenda through internal and external actions as well as contribute to the successful implementation of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, given the strong interlinkages. In this context, our policies, should take into account changing global conditions and trends, to ensure that they remain fit-for-purpose across the time-horizon to 2030.

The global landscape has changed significantly compared to the time of adoption of the Millennium Development Goals. While much has been achieved, with more than one billion people having been lifted out of extreme poverty since 1990, great challenges remain and new ones are emerging. At global level, more than 800 million people still live on less than USD 1.25 a day. The world is witnessing multiple conflicts and security tensions, complex humanitarian and global health crises, deteriorations of human rights, environmental degradation, resource scarcity, urbanisation and migration. Migration flows across the world will continue to have important impacts, and present both a risk and an opportunity. The EU needs to address global security challenges, including tackling the root causes of conflict and instability and countering violent extremism. Climate change can continue to amplify problems and can severely undermine progress. Important changes include demographic trends, a new distribution of wealth and power between and within countries, the continuing globalisation of economies and value chains, an evolving geography of poverty and a proliferation of actors working on development. Projections also suggest important challenges are ahead (for example, continuing unprecedented urbanisation, and other demographic challenges including ageing societies for some and the potential for a demographic dividend for others). Continued attention will be given to a democratic, stable and prosperous neighbourhood. A revision to EU development policy should take into account these trends (including anticipating those that will remain central in future) whilst retaining a core focus on eradicating poverty and finishing the job started by the Millennium Development Goals.

Finally, the EU Consensus needs also to adapt to the Lisbon Treaty, which provides for all external action policies to work within the frameworks and pursue the principles of objectives of Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union. In particular, coherence between the different parts of EU external action and between external and internal policies is crucial.

The EU will need to address these new global challenges, many of which require coordinated policy action at the national, regional and global levels. The 2030 Agenda provides a framework which can guide us in doing so.

### 3.1 There is a range of key global trends (e.g. changing geography and depth of poverty; challenges related to climate change, political, economic, social, demographic, security, environmental or technological) which will influence the future of development and the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. Which of these do you think is the most important?

The biggest challenge is that all global trends mentioned by the EC are interlinked. There is an increasing need for coordination and coherence as no policy stands on its own in an interconnected world where ecological, economic and social challenges go hand in hand. The revised EU Development Consensus needs to be forward-looking and visionary, and remain relevant beyond the next couple of years. Respecting the key principles of the 2030

Agenda is crucial: human rights, planetary boundaries and leaving no one behind.

Selecting a trend could be dangerous since it may serve to obscure the fundamental root causes of many of the symptoms (or challenges) the EC cites, namely the power structures that underpin society, the economy and global governance. In the first place it is necessary to reorganize the existing power structures that hinder the development of major parts of the population and to look for policies to overcome these. As 11.11.11 we highlight the global power imbalances at play since they have allowed a small number of rich countries, wealthy elites and transnational companies to determine the economic system which rules the world and which in turn deepens and widens the gaps between the 'haves' and the 'have nots' - be they between countries or within any given country. To tackle this negative global trend, the revised EU Development Consensus should put global power imbalances at the centre of the analysis of problems and solutions and emphasize democratic ownership. For this, the EU should systematically use a human rights approach.

The fundamental function of the economy should be to serve people and the planet, not the other way around. The premium set on GDP-measured economic growth has fostered a consumerist culture across the world for those who can afford to participate in it - a culture that has been fed and sustained by ever-increasing global integration. However, the benefits of globalisation are unevenly distributed as a result of those unequal power relations between and within countries, and between poor host countries and the transnational companies that operate in them. It has allowed market mechanisms to determine the prices for energy, raw materials, labour or the disposal of waste: prices which do not reflect the real social and environmental costs of these goods and services. Profits are channeled for the benefit of a few rather than for society and the planet as a whole. This trend has been reinforced by the failure to enforce international conventions and agreements for the protection of the environment and human rights and by the lack of safeguards at all levels to prevent business enterprises from becoming complicit in or tacitly benefiting from human rights violations.

One other flagrant result of our current economic paradigm is climate change, which is putting at risk all progress in human development, sustainable development, peace, security and the very survival of the planet on which we all depend. Climate change also disproportionately hits people living in poverty in developing countries, especially women and girls. It is paramount to make the link between climate change and poverty eradication, looking specifically at adaptation, loss and damage, gender equality, human rights and food security. A transformational approach is urgently required which necessitates actions from all institutions, businesses and sectors of society and

across all policy areas. We need to transform all sectors to low carbon development, increase resilience to impacts and ensure the necessary steps are taken to limit temperature increases to 1.5° C without generating massive negative impact on people depending on natural resources in the Global South. And when addressing resilience and adaptation, we need to make sure they are

equitable and gender-transformative, thus able to address structural barriers to gender equality in policies and practices

### 3.2 How should EU policies, and development policy in particular, better harness the opportunities and minimise the negative aspects of the trend you identified in the previous question?

Economic progress is needed in a very large number of countries. However, most economies today are built on a premise that equates the growth of a country's GDP with progress, even though GDP is only the monetary value of all officially recognised goods and services that a country produces. It does not take into consideration, for example, the creation of pollution, of inequality, or other social and health costs of producing those goods and services. So GDP does not reflect the well-being of people. One key way to minimize the negative aspects of growth would therefore be to move towards a more comprehensive notion of economic progress and find alternative measures of such progress. Any new model must be based on the well-being of people and planet and will therefore necessarily be a composite indicator. The EC must therefore follow up on the work done on alternative measures of progress and must work with other regions to propose new measures and to ensure that, globally, the economy is reoriented towards people and planet.

Ever-increasing levels of consumption are unsustainable consumption patterns that put untenable pressure on the capacity of our planet to sustain us. It will be critical for high and upper-middle income countries to decrease their consumption levels, in order to allow for poorer countries (and people) to increase theirs, without adding pressure on our planet.

Creating alternative models cannot be achieved without quality global citizenship education and changes in education content and methods. The EU should further invest in this sector with the view to promote values inherent to just societies, and educate citizens to become responsible and environmentally-friendly consumers.

The EU should also design a comprehensive package of measures covering all aspects of sustainable consumption and production that it would implement in Europe, bearing in mind the interlinkages across sectors and the importance of addressing the whole supply chain. In particular, the EU should establish a binding resource efficiency target with the aim to reduce EU resource. It should support technological and other solutions to enable absolute decoupling of resource and energy use from economic activity and work with the private sector to facilitate technology transfer to developing countries. A key principle which will contribute enormously to minimizing the negative effects of EU policies or practices is Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD). The EU must commit to develop and implement a binding PCSD policy and appropriate mechanisms, covering all 2030 Agenda areas. PCSD prescribes that the EU and its Member States must assess ex ante the impact their policies and actions will have on other people's prospects for sustainable development and other countries' ability to realize human rights

within planetary boundaries. The EU must commit to mitigate any potentially negative impact and provide redress for those impacts that are proven detrimental to groups of people or other countries.

The EU trade and investment policy is of particular note in this regard. Trade is a driver of poverty reduction and greater sustainable development only if it is managed for that purpose. In reality, trade policy is leading to a 'race to the bottom' with each country trying to impose fewer and lower social, environmental, economic and fiscal conditions in order to attract investment and enhance competitive advantage. Trade and investment agreements and how they are negotiated today, with little or no parliamentary oversight or public debate, must be reformed so that they become agreements based on mutual support and public need. Ultimately people living in poverty cannot compete with rich country traders in a free trade scenario, nor even enter those relationships because of a lack of access. The usual character of trade practice today, in which big companies at the top end of supply chains enjoy the greatest power to dictate conditions to enterprises lower down in the supply chain, also needs to be addressed in order to promote sustainable and equitable trading relationships.

The following measures are also needed:

- Incorporating the externality costs of production, consumption and waste disposal, i.e. their social, gender and environmental impacts;
- Introducing a European legally binding corporate accountability framework in the field of human rights and environmental protection outside the EU, including redress and compensation mechanisms; and supporting efforts for a UN treaty on business and human rights at international level;
- Applying the polluter pays principle;
- Introducing regulation to ensure in-country payment by companies of their fair share of tax;
- Ending harmful subsidies such as those which harm biodiversity and small-scale and family farmers in Europe and in developing countries.

#### (4) Priorities for our future action: what we need to do

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Implementation of the 2030 Agenda will require sustained EU efforts to promote a more just world, including a strong focus on the need to address gender equality and women's empowerment. Peace, inclusiveness, equality and good governance including democracy, accountability, rule of law, human rights and non-discrimination will need particular emphasis. The 2030 Agenda also requires recognition of the close interconnectedness between poverty, social issues, economic transformation, climate change and environmental issues.

To achieve poverty eradication, EU development policy will need to take into account key demographic and environmental trends, including challenges related to climate change, and concentrate effort on least developed countries and fragile states. The EU will also need to strengthen our approach to fragility and conflict, fostering resilience and security (as an increasing proportion of the world's poor are expected to live in fragile and conflict affected states) and to protect global public goods and to maintain our resource base as the prerequisite for sustainable growth. Peace and security, including security sector reform, will have to be addressed also through our development policy, as will the risks and opportunities related to migration flows. Tackling social and economic inequalities (both within and between countries) is a crucial element of the 2030 Agenda as is addressing environmental degradation and climate change. Job creation will be an important challenge in which the private sector has to play an active role. Finishing the job of the Millennium Development Goals requires identifying and reaching those people throughout the world who are still not benefitting from progress to ensure that no one is left behind.

To achieve lasting results, EU development policy will need to foster transformation and promote inclusive and sustainable growth. Drivers of inclusive sustainable growth, such as human development, renewable energy, sustainable agriculture and fisheries, and healthy and resilient oceans should be an important part of our efforts to implement the new Agenda as will efforts aimed at tackling hunger and under-nutrition. Implementation of the 2030 Agenda will require a multi-dimensional, integrated approach to human development. Implementation will also require us to address vectors of change, such as sustainable urban development and relevant use of information and communication technology. Our development policy will have to engage and identify new ways of partnering with the business in order to achieve sustainable and inclusive growth, industrialisation and innovation. Implementation of the 2030 Agenda will also require cooperation with partner countries and regions on science, technology and innovation. In all aspects of our external action, the EU will need to ensure that our approaches, including development cooperation, are conducive to achieving the 2030 Agenda's Sustainable Development Goals and that the EU intensifies efforts to promote pursue coherence between our policies and our internal and external action.

#### 4.1 How can the EU better address the links between achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, the Paris Agreement on climate change and addressing other global sustainable development challenges?

The Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement are interdependent. Without sustainable development, the threat of climate change cannot be averted and without action on climate change mitigation and adaptation, development achievements will be stalled or reversed. Both the 2030 Agenda

process and the UNFCCC process reached agreements in 2015 focusing on different aspects of a just transition to low emission, climate-resilient sustainable development.

One of the main aims of the negotiations leading up to the adoption of the 2030 Agenda was to develop a comprehensive, ambitious and integrated framework, such that all 3 dimensions of sustainable development are represented. It will be critical to measure and ensure that progress in one area of the framework does not undermine progress elsewhere in the framework in any way. This means that how a target is reached is as important as whether it is reached. It also means that it is important to make sure that financial support in one area is not done at the expense of the other.

Keeping global warming below 1.5°C could contribute to the achievement of the 17 SDGs since adverse climate change impacts harm people living in poverty first and foremost. To achieve these goals, the international community will have to rapidly shift to sustainable and genuinely renewable energy for all and industrialised countries to massively scale-up climate action and financial support to poor countries. This requires reassessing all policies in light of the 1.5°C goal.

The EU has a huge responsibility and can play a critical role as the biggest ODA donor in the world and by accelerating its own transition to a low carbon society. Genuine solutions that do not have a negative impact on access of local communities to natural resources in the Global South must be put in place. In this regard, the EU should advocate for an international mechanism, or put in place a European one, to review progress made with regard to national contributions and scale up ambition on a regular basis.

European countries need to adjust their climate plans in line with the Paris Agreement and as an essential pre-requisite to achieve the SDGs. When it comes to implementing the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement in particular at the national level, there needs to be an integrated cross-ministerial effort. Implementation in silos would set countries up for failure to achieve either the climate or sustainable development goals; worse still, the two could be traded off against each other. The use of climate-sensitive indicators at the national level in many different sectors can also facilitate integration of the two.

In order to address the links between the SDGs and the Paris Agreement, the EU needs to deeply reform its production and consumption model, looking at the natural resources footprint of Europe and setting targets to diminish it, as well as to engage firmly and urgently in an ambitious circular economy. Furthermore, the EU should accept its differentiated responsibility as a major historical carbon emitter. The EU's financial markets should be regulated to ensure finance serves a truly green and low carbon economy, and respects human rights. Binding rules must be imposed on investors to make that happen.

The EU should also reject false solutions to climate change, such as Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) that entail high risks for local communities' access and control over natural resources in the Global South, such as land.

In external action, locally-driven, participatory tools and methods should be used to inform development practitioners and decision-makers on the best course of action when it comes to addressing the impacts of climatic shocks

and shifts. It is crucial to increase the adaptive capacity of vulnerable people and communities, and promote climate resilience for the poor in food security, human settlements, and ecosystems. Technology transfer and capacity building need to be supported in partner countries in order to advance their own national sustainable development policies.

#### 4.2 How should the EU strengthen the balanced integration of the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development in its internal and external policies, and in particular in its development policy?

To be truly successful the EU must balance the integration of the four dimensions of sustainable development. Currently insufficient attention is paid to the governance dimension. We appreciate the EU's work to incorporate some aspects pertaining to governance in the 2030 Agenda, but in almost any policy area there is a governance angle, whether it be decision-making in international fora, trade agreements between the EU and a third country, supporting countries to defend human rights and democracy at home, etc. In order to strengthen the balance of all the dimensions of sustainable development, there has to be the real political will to do so across the whole EU – both EU institutions and EU Member States – and at all levels. Political will is necessary to put in place or strengthen the right mechanisms and processes, such as impact assessments, and raise awareness of both the new line and the means to achieve it.

The linkages and interdependencies between all four areas of sustainable development are well-known now: the chances of achieving lasting progress for all in the social arena are close to zero if it is not combined with considerable change in both the economic, environmental and governance domains. However, there are also very positive associations between the interdependencies once one starts making change in the right direction. The political will to incorporate all four dimensions of sustainable development in all policies going forward, together with the principles that would guide this, should be set out in an overarching EU implementation strategy for the 2030 Agenda. The Commission must be clear that the strategy covers both internal and external policies and the role of the Member States as well as that of the EU institutions. Attention will most particularly need to be paid to all policies of an economic or financial bearing.

Some key tools to the new approach will ensure the balance of the 4 dimensions. One such tool is a revision of the EC's approach to PCD to ensure it is now PCSD. Impact assessments will need to be reviewed and criteria for all 4 dimensions – and the interlinkages between them – must be included in such assessments. A particular focus on respect for human rights, gender equality and planetary boundaries will be critical. In addition to putting in place the mechanisms for ex-ante and ex-post assessments, the EU must commit to mitigate any potentially negative impact it may have and to provide redress for those impacts that are proven to have been detrimental to groups of people or other countries.

The 2016 climate and environmental mainstreaming guidelines for programming of international development cooperation are a valuable mechanism for use at all stages of the programming process, including in political dialogue. The implementation of these guidelines should improve integration. An assessment of their use should be undertaken in 3 years' time.

### 4.3 What are the main changes you would like to see in the EU's development policy framework?

Following the spirit of the 2030 Agenda, the EU should move to a development policy which puts transformative and systemic change for people and planet at the core while aiming to reduce global power imbalances between people and countries. The revised European Consensus on Development should root EU development policy in eliminating poverty and promoting human rights and in achieving the four dimensions of sustainable development (social, environmental, economic and governance) within planetary boundaries.

EU development policy needs to retain a strong and independent role. The EU needs to ensure greater coordination, cooperation and complementarity of its policies, in order for each policy to

perform their individual functions. 11.11.11 is especially concerned by the recent initiatives to subvert development policy and development cooperation for the benefit of internal security, migration management and border control.

Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD) is a key tool and principle in the EU's development policy framework to ensure that EU policy-making as a whole adopts the crucial principle of sustainable development and take into account the impacts of its policies on poorer people and their environment in an interdependent world. The EU has been a strong promoter of Policy Coherence for Development globally and should continue in this role. The 2005 Consensus brought about clear and concrete commitments for PCD, and we expect the EU to take this even further with PCSD.

In addition to PCSD, the EU and the Member States need to ensure that development policy is supported by all the required means of implementation – both financial and non-financial. The Member States should recommit to the target of allocating 0.7 % of GNI to ODA, with at least 0.2 % targeted to LDCs.

With regard to financing for development, a gender responsive planning and budgeting must be adopted as this is critical to address gender inequality. Making gender equality and women's empowerment a reality requires dedicated and consistent funding. Funding for gender equality and women's and girls' empowerment is needed, both in and outside the EU. This can be promoted through both effective mainstreaming of gender equality as well as financing of targeted gender equality interventions. The 3-pronged approach, high-level dialogue, mainstreaming, and targeting is key, as are human and financial resources.

In addition, DEAR (Development Education and Awareness Raising) and GCE (Global Citizenship Education) must also be prominent in the revised European Consensus on Development. Indeed, the success of the 2030 Agenda hinges on investment in DEAR and GCE, both in terms of ensuring proper means to achieve the Agenda, by spurring strong participation of civil society in the delivery of the SDGs. To further develop the EU's approach and support, a new European Consensus on DEAR is needed.

#### 4.4 In which areas highlighted above would you expect to see greater consistency between development policy and other areas of the EU external action in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda?

There is clearly a need for greater consistency between EU development policy and other external action, especially with security, neighbourhood, migration, climate, energy, and trade and investment policies. The overarching ambition of the EU's external action should be to address the root causes of today's global challenges, rather than focusing solely on short-term, case-by-case reactions and crisis management of symptoms such as conflicts, forced displacement or famines. In line with Article 208 of the Lisbon Treaty, EU external action should be coherent with EU's development cooperation objectives, therefore grounded in sustainable development, international human rights, humanitarian law, gender equality and respect for planetary boundaries. The EU must put these principles into practice rather than simply use them as window-dressing for the introduction of its policies. The EU indeed needs a root cause approach to situations of fragility and to resilience. Thus, tackling human rights violations, climate change, inequality and extreme poverty, supporting inclusive and transparent democratic governance and a strong civil society, promoting gender equality and providing opportunities for youth should be at the heart of the EU's vision to address fragility and reduce the lack of security for people. Migration has many drivers. People may be on the move in search of new livelihood opportunities, an education or to reunite with family, while the above-mentioned root causes can all trigger migration out of necessity (to be distinguished from migration out of choice) and forced displacement. Any attempt to manage migration externally should take into consideration the complex and multi-faceted reality based on its root causes; be evidence- and rights-based; and ensure that the benefits of migration are supported while the risks to people are mitigated.

On climate, the EU should pursue efforts to use the High Ambition Coalition, formed in the run-up to Paris, to support the timely signature, swift ratification as well as the full implementation by all Parties of the Paris Agreement. Its role in other international processes must be strengthened in order to find long-term solutions to greenhouse gas emissions from the maritime, aviation and other industries. The EU must also continue supporting the poorest and most vulnerable countries in dealing with climate change mitigation and adaptation, and with the growing impact of climate change. The EU should take the lead in setting ambitious targets for reductions in carbon emissions, increased use of renewable energy and improved energy efficiency. The EU should revise its trade and investment agreements where they limit developing countries' ability to develop a fair and sustainable domestic economy. The EU should also play an important role in reforming some of the global rules, including the international investment regime. Human rights clauses included in trade and association agreements should also be more systematically activated, including in cases of environmental degradation, land grabbing and population displacement. In line with its PCSD obligation, the EU should also ensure that its other policies guide other financial flows, both public and private, to sustainable development or at minimum that they do not undermine it. To this end the EU should apply the PCSD lens

especially with respect to the way international financial architecture functions.

Finally, the EU should ensure that the Council Conclusions on the Gender Action Plan 2016-2020 are applied in all aspects and components of its external action, including development and humanitarian aid. The Guidance note on the EU Gender Action Plan 2016-2020 for DEVCO HQ and EUD operational staff and ECHO's Gender-Age Markers are good practices and tools that can be used and adapted to other areas of the EU external action. SDG 5 also offers guidance on how to promote gender equality and achieve more equitable and sustainable development results. Moreover, in the field of Women, Peace and Security, the EU should adhere to the commitments under UN Resolution 1325.

#### 4.5 In which areas does the EU have greatest value-added as a development partner (e.g. which aspects of its development policy, dialogue or implementation arrangements or in which category of countries)?

The EU has greatest added value in:

The Human Rights-Based Approach - the EU is a key player at both UN and country levels in promoting human rights, democracy and good governance. Human rights principles must guide policy development and practice in all development cooperation directed towards the realisation of the SDGs in all sectors: climate mitigation and adaptation, health, education, governance, labour, social and economic security. A human rights based approach ultimately means looking at power relations between people and promoting empowerment, supporting people at the community level to be able to realise their rights and have a chance of a decent life.

- Its commitment to Policy Coherence to Sustainable Development. This should be further strengthened by developing and implementing a binding PCSD policy, whereby positive policy impacts for sustainable development outside EU are ensured - or at minimum that no EU policy has negative impacts which undermine sustainable development in other countries or other countries' ability to realise the human rights and well-being of all their people within planetary boundaries.

- Effective development cooperation: The EU has spearheaded the implementation of the effectiveness principles in development cooperation. The Rome and Paris conferences on aid quality and the 2005 Consensus are a clear testimony to this leading role by the EU. Moreover, EU Member States have led the GPEDC over the past few years, the UK and The Netherlands in particular. As a major aid and development cooperation bloc, EU's record can influence global trends in this area.

- Its global presence, with EU delegations in positions to assume a 'neutral' broker role in bilateral dialogue with fragile States/conflict countries, taking on roles which individual Member States often cannot, due to the government's stance or historical ties.

- Its capacity to provide substantial level of concessional finance to support large scale, long term projects, or to provide general and sectoral

budget support while at the same time opportunities to support small-scale actions through specific programmes.

- The range of cooperation instruments and modalities at its disposal to adapt to the context and capacities of partner countries, in particular a combination of geographic and thematic cooperation instruments that allows a flexible cooperation with a broad range of actors at different scales.
- A commitment to coordinate with other EU donors, to promote a division of labour and joint programming at country level and to align EC aid with partner country development plans.
- A commitment to provide 0.7% of their GNI for ODA to support sustainable development in developing countries and commitments for additional climate finance.
- Its support to the multiple roles of civil society in line with the objectives of the EC Communication of 2012 and its work on roadmaps for engagement with civil society.
- EU commitment to mainstream gender equality and implement targeted actions in development cooperation and EU external action, by improving the gender dimensions of existing priorities in political dialogue and programming in partner countries (e.g. the revised Gender Action Plan).

Since the adoption of the Agenda for Change and more recently in the context of the response to refugee movements, we have observed a shift in EU development priorities. There is a high risk of erosion of EU added value due to the following trends and decisions:

- Shift in EU development priorities and diversion of resources from human development, human rights, food security and environment protection to growth and business, EU security and border control-related interests.
- Tendency to impose cooperation priorities on its partners and to by-pass the principle of democratic ownership and the outcome of consultations at country level and/or not sufficiently feeding back to participants in consultations what was/was not taken on board and why.
- Tendency to privilege large programmes and projects in order to limit the number of contracts and administrative work (linked to staff reduction in HQ and in EU delegations).
- Tendency to privilege certain modalities, in particular blending of grants with non-concessional loans and private finance and to reduce the number of cooperation modalities. This has a de facto consequence on the range of actors taking part in EU cooperation as well as the EU's ability to reach the poorest communities.
- In programming, a lack of specific gender considerations that contribute to the achievement of specific gender objectives, disaggregated by sex and age. The EU should ensure and monitor that implementing partners are capable of contributing to the attainment of gender equality and of including a gender analysis in all development and humanitarian programmes.
- Differentiation of bilateral aid to partner countries based on GDP or specific security and economic interests of the EU.

#### 4.6 How can the EU refine its development policy to better address inequalities – including gender inequality – in the context of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda?

Regarding fighting inequality - which is increasingly recognized as key challenge for the future as well as explicitly taken forward within the 2030 Agenda, the EU should explicitly address decent work and social protection in the revised Development Consensus. 73% of the world's population does not have access to social protection and is therefore pushed further in poverty. Decent work and social protection can be advanced through peer to peer learning, sharing best practices, improving social dialogue, good governance and ensuring ratification of ILO conventions.

Inequality of power translates into inequality of wealth, decision-making and well-being, which in turn fuels further inequalities and injustice. The EU development policy alone is not sufficient to address that major challenge. The gap between the rich and the poor is spiralling out of control

The revised Development Consensus will need to do more in breaking down the extreme inequalities that exist between and within countries. Delivering the SDGs cannot be viewed as a technocratic exercise; it is fundamentally political. We will only reach the goals if power is redistributed and marginalization addressed.

The revised Consensus must ensure that:

- The concentrated power of vested interests is challenged and properly held to account - be it among agribusiness, energy or pharmaceutical companies or in the financial sector.
- The voice and power of the most vulnerable and marginalized people and communities - including small-scale food producers, disabled people, vulnerable workers and above all women - are strengthened so that they can claim their rights and hold their governments to account

National and international financing rules are made fair and target the reduction of economic and social inequality, and ending poverty.

- Tax dodging is clamped down on through the creation of a global tax body that shapes global tax rules and includes all governments.
- EU governments set out clear timetables to meet the aid promises to commit to 0.7 percent of GNI backed with a commitment to reach 0,2% of GNI aid to the poorest countries within the next five years, alongside provision of new and additional resources for international climate finance in line with commitments at the UNFCCC.
- Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development is fully implemented; at the moment there are still glaring inconsistencies in EU policies like trade, investment, tax and arms.
- Private finance cannot, and should not, substitute for the role of governments in their obligation to respect, protect and fulfil human rights and to provide basic services. Addressing funding gaps at a national level through strengthened and fairer taxation, and aid as required, is imperative for universal public service provision.
- Multiple discrimination on the grounds of age, ethnic and racial


origin, religion and belief, sexual orientation, and disability among other factors should be addressed in EU responses. It is critical to address inequalities in an intersectional perspective, taking into account that marginalized groups are not homogeneous and that many individuals suffer from multiple discriminations.

- In line with Agenda 2030 gender equality and women's and girls' rights must be integrated throughout the policy, with specific commitments in all development areas. The 3-pronged approach, i.e. high-level dialogue, mainstreaming, and targeting, is key, as are human and financial resources. Mainstreaming has been a popular tool within EU development cooperation in the last ten years, but has proven to be very ineffective. It must be coupled with targeted actions based on context specific, systematic analysis and appropriate programming and budget, as well as policy dialogue in order to ensure an active contribution from the EU.

- Financial guarantees must be translated not only by incrementing and diversifying the funding for gender equality but also by building a strong system of gender-sensitive budgeting. Participation and proper consultation with civil society and notably organisations defending women's and human rights will provide the experience to implement policies and programmes, in addition to fostering the accountability of the EU.

- Gathering transparent and accessible information, which includes data disaggregated by sex and age as well as disability and other factors of discrimination, is critical to ensure EU accountability towards citizens, partners and the international community. Reporting should be done towards expected results in order to effectively assess efforts and progress.

**4.7 How can the EU development policy make a stronger contribution to the security of people? How can EU development policy contribute to addressing the root causes of conflict and fragility and contribute to security and resilience in all the countries where we work?**



Human security, as defined in the UN GA resolution 66/290 adopted in September 2012, provides a good basis for a development-centred approach to security challenges. Human security promotes a people-centred approach to advancing peace, security and development within and across nations is grounded in human rights, and is prevention-oriented. While we agree that development policy has an impact on peace, security (including security sector reform) and migration, any approach needs to be with human security and human rights at the centre.

The principles of “universality” and “indivisibility”, enshrined in human rights law, should be reflected explicitly. The EU must make sure that its policies do not consolidate undemocratic and patriarchal power structures but instead encourage participation and rule of law. Doing so would contribute to marginalization of certain segments of society, a sense of powerlessness, and ultimately anger and resentment.

EU actions in fragile contexts ultimately have to be oriented towards overcoming the root causes of poverty, creating social justice, stabilizing and building democratic and well-functioning states and institutions, containing violence in general and gender-based violence in particular, and the necessity to create a culture of peaceful conflict transformation within and between societies. It is of utmost importance to support civil society initiatives in this regard and to promote civilian conflict transformation and conflict prevention. In situations where civil society is at risk, the EU is expected to use the full range of its diplomatic and financial instruments to make sure that human rights defenders are protected and CSOs are in the position to play their role as actors of development, reconciliation and conflict prevention.

The EU should further recognize and commit to support in the long-term the role of women as leaders in resilience building, crisis preparedness, early warning and response, as this has proven very effective. For this, the EU should support women’s social and economic empowerment and ensure protection from violence against women is prioritized at the onset of each emergency response. More particularly, the EU should provide direct funding and training to women’s organizations to support their active engagement.

There should be no further erosion of the civilian character of development cooperation and ODA through the inclusion of military or quasi-military expenditures or the channeling of aid through military actors. Currently the EU often reacts too late, which leads to more suffering and requires more funding in terms of humanitarian and development response than prevention and building resilience does. Therefore we see an important role for the EU on the political side, to ensure the wins of development cooperation are not lost.

The EU should also address its responsibility in conflict-prone areas by regulating EU based national and transnational companies and by strengthening the European Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and strengthening delivery and post-delivery controls of EU arms exports.

Last but not least, in order to tackle root causes of conflicts, the EU needs to seriously address its own footprint on natural resources, since increasing scarcity is contributing to fuelling conflicts.

The EU also needs to improve its coordination regarding fragile States and conflict areas through better coordination within the EU and with Member States and developing best practices to support fragile States.

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#### 4.8 How can a revised Consensus on Development better harness the opportunities presented by migration, minimise the negative aspects of irregular migration on the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and better address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement?

The EU should ensure that migration is a choice and not a necessity by tackling the root causes of forced migration which include human rights violations, extreme poverty and inequalities as well as climate change and natural disasters. The EU should exclude any conditionality based on migration control in the allocation of development aid and facilitate safe mobility by opening and safe and regular channels to Europe.

Well-managed migration and human mobility are recognized in the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development as potential development enablers. Real political commitment is needed to ensure safe, orderly and regular migration, with full respect for human rights. A comprehensive approach to migration, including through a development angle, is paramount.

Ensuring effective migration governance and respect of the human rights of migrants is a core responsibility of countries of origin, transit and destination.

Migration must be addressed through a human right-based approach and not from a narrow security perspective. The revised Consensus must therefore emphasise that development cooperation must focus on fighting poverty and inequality, and promoting human rights, for the benefit of people in need.

11.11.11- together with the European Confederation CONCORD, advocates for a migration-sensitive development cooperation that looks at both how migration and development policies need to be linked in order to benefit migrants, the countries of origin as well as destination and transit and mitigate the risks. However, we caution against the view that is gaining ground by which EU development cooperation would serve as a tool in controlling migration towards the EU. EU cooperation strategies and aid must not be used to pursue the EU's border control objectives.

The revised Consensus on Development should clearly exclude any conditionality of ODA based on migration control indicators. ODA cannot be used to finance border securitisation and deterrence of migrants and refugees or to buy ODA recipients' willingness to enact readmission agreements. This approach is not in line with the Lisbon Treaty, nor does it respect development cooperation as a tool focused on alleviating poverty in the context of sustainable development.

The revised EU Development Consensus needs to envisage support to the EU's partner countries in enabling legal migration, improving protection, and supporting diaspora engagement. That being said, supporting partner countries should not in any way entail engaging with repressive regimes or in conflict areas in order to outsource the migration management and the international protection.

Fighting against irregular migration like smuggling and trafficking in human

beings is not actually a development dimension of migration, neither is readmission or involuntary return. Instead, the EU should support partner countries and regional bodies in integrating development dimensions into their national and regional migration policies. This means increased awareness for labour mobility, development of comprehensive integration policies and legal and practical means to improve the situation of migrants and their rights by signing and ratifying international conventions such as the ILO conventions on migrant workers, but also by insuring good working conditions and social protection for migrant workers. Also, racism and xenophobia need to be actively addressed, through Global Citizenship Education programmes and other actions. Reducing the economic and social costs of migration will impact positively on development. This includes further cooperation on facilitating remittances for development benefits but also, importantly, addressing the costs resulting from skills shortages due to emigration or recruitment costs.

## (5) Means of implementation: how do we get there?

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The principle of universality underpinning the 2030 Agenda will require a differentiated approach to engagement with countries at all levels of development. Official Development Assistance will continue to play an important role in the overall financing mix for those countries most in need (particularly the Least Developed Countries). The EU and its Member States should continue to progress towards achieving their commitments. However, in all countries our development cooperation will need to take account of other sources of finance, including by leveraging other (non-Official Development Assistance) sources of finance for poverty eradication and sustainable development. The delivery of the 2030 Agenda means that our work helping countries raise their own resources (domestic resource mobilisation), the provision of aid for trade, blending\* and partnering with the private sector should be priority areas of focus. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda, an integral part of the 2030 Agenda, provides a framework for our efforts, including for our work supporting the right enabling policy environment for sustainable development in our partner countries. The implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement on climate change under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change should be closely coordinated given the strong interlinkages. Engagement with middle income countries, notably the emerging economies, will be important to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, considering the role they can play in promoting global public goods, what they can achieve within their respective countries on poverty eradication and sustainable development, and the example they can set within their regions as well as their role in regional processes. Here differentiated partnerships can play an important role (examples include different forms of political, economic, and financial investment as well as cooperation in science, technology and innovation). Specific attention and focus should also be given to Least Developed Countries, as acknowledged by the Addis Ababa Action Agenda.

The EU's implementation of the 2030 Agenda provides an opportunity for enhancing consistency between the different areas of the EU's external action and between these and other EU policies (as outlined in the Lisbon Treaty and in [EU's Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and crises](#)). The EU will continue to pursue [Policy Coherence for Development](#) as a key contribution to the collective effort towards broader policy coherence for sustainable development. In our external action, the EU needs to consider how we can use all policies, tools, instruments at our disposal coherently in line with the integrated nature of the 2030 Agenda.

\* Combining EU grants with loans or with equity from other public and private financiers with a view to leveraging additional resources.

## 5.1 How can EU policies, and EU development policy in particular, help to mobilise and maximise the impact of the increasing variety of sustainable development finance, including in particular from the private sector?

The increased varieties of resources potentially available to address the 2030 Agenda heighten challenges in terms of consistency. The 2005 Consensus recalls that aid effectiveness commitments must be applied “to all development cooperation components”; this fundamental approach remains true in the present scenario. In particular, greater private sector accountability, policy clarity and consistency, and an enabling environment for civil society organisations, womens organisations and trade unions, are essential for promoting a responsible and accountable role of the private sector in financing sustainable development. The EU and Member States should apply the development effectiveness principles to all projects where public finance is used in conjunction with private finance. Such principles should be applied in conjunction with the respect international human rights and environmental law and standards, show additionality, share risk and minimize debt, ensure transparency, accountability and participation and deliver good corporate governance.

The principles should be used both in the process of project and programme design and development as well as in any monitoring and accountability mechanisms.

International finance for sustainable development should build on existing financing principles and commitments such as the Monterrey Consensus, the Doha Declaration, the Paris Principles on aid effectiveness, the Accra Agenda for Action, the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, the Bali Principles and the existing financing agreements under the Rio Conventions. We regret that despite these international commitments being made and reaffirmed, progress is still limited in their effective implementation.

5.2 Given the evolving availability of other sources of finance and bearing in mind the EU's commitments on Official Development Assistance (e.g. [Council Conclusions from 26 May 2015 on "A New Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015"](#), and inter alia, paragraphs 32 and 33), how and where should the EU use its Official Development Assistance strategically and to maximise its impact?

ODA should be focused on addressing poverty, inequality and sustainable development through programmes based on democratic ownership and accountability. The EU should recognize and value that ODA is the only type of development flow with such particular focus; it should refrain from using such resources to cover in-donor costs, such as refugee costs, or from investing in areas such as PPPs or blending unless they can demonstrate proved development impact and are based on transparent criteria. ODA should also be focused on people most in need regardless of the income category their country falls into, it be LDCs or MICs. ODA is a catalyser of global public goods and domestic resources, both by direct support to e.g. universal health coverage, but also by enhancing countries' capacity to increase domestic resources (i.e. support for a pro-poor tax system).

5.3 How can the EU better support partner countries in mobilising their own resources for poverty eradication and sustainable development?

Corporate tax avoidance is a major challenge to domestic resource mobilisation in developing countries, which thereby lose an estimated USD 200bn every year. To effectively tackle this problem, the EU must first of all ensure that the European and Member States' national tax legislation does not produce negative spill over effects on third countries. The EU must undertake an extensive spill over analysis of EU and Member States' taxation policies and improve regulations in relation to tax transparency (incl. introducing public Country-by-Country Reporting for all large multinational companies) as well as anti-BEPS (Base Erosion and Profit Sharing) measures (including strong national Controlled Foreign Company Rules and Interest Limitations Rules). EU Member States must revise and renegotiate bilateral tax treaties with developing countries which unfairly limit developing countries' rights to collect tax. The EU must also actively support the creation of an intergovernmental tax body under the auspices of the UN in order to ensure fully inclusive and equitable governance in the area of international tax standard setting. Technical cooperation programmes supporting developing countries' tax administrations capacity, financed by the EU and the Member States must comply with the highest standards of aid and development effectiveness.

There is a need to simplify regulations currently preventing small-scale entrepreneurs to register in the formal economy, to provide incentives and opportunities for moving from insecure livelihoods in the informal economy to decent work in the formal economy, contributing to domestic resource mobilization.

The impact of unsustainable and/or illegal resource extraction for example in timber or fisheries not only results in further environmental degradation and natural resource loss but also represents a loss in revenues and to the economy of the country concerned. For example, according to a recent UNEP-Interpol report, environmental crime is growing at an alarming pace, two or three times faster than global growth as measured by GDP. Illegal logging, often associated with corruption and organised crime, has an estimated value of USD 50-152 billion annually. Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing has become a global problem that depletes fish stocks, damages marine ecosystems and jeopardises the livelihoods of some of the world's most vulnerable coastal communities. Up to 30% of the global seafood catch that arrives on our plates comes from these unregulated sources and the UN estimates that illegal fishing strips economies of more than USD 23 billion every year, with the biggest impact on poorer countries without the capacity to monitor and regulate.

Initiatives such as FLEGT (Forest law enforcement, governance and trade) and the EU IUU regulation (the regulation combats illegal fishing) can help reduce illegal activities which result in loss of revenues but EU also needs to support governments, communities and legitimate businesses to put in place the necessary measures to regulate and monitor at local and national levels and to prevent illegal goods and commodities from entering the EU for consumption in Europe.

5.4 Given the importance of middle income countries to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, what form could differentiated partnerships take?

People living in poverty matter wherever they live. Hence, with regard to development cooperation, poor people living in middle income countries (MICs) cannot be ignored and the EU cannot assume that the MIC governments will be willing and able to deal with eradicating poverty and fulfilling the principles of the 2030 Agenda and the commitment to leave no one behind. MICs should not be viewed as a homogenous group, since each country has specific development challenges and contexts. The EU should not assume that all middle-income countries will be able to meet their economic development needs by means of domestic resources and access to markets. MICs cannot be denied by default access to aid. The allocation of aid should therefore not only be based on income status alone, the decision also needs to be based on inequality and vulnerability dimensions. There is also a need to recognize the complementary roles of governments and CSOs in MICs, and when phasing out ODA in some MICs, to at least retain contributions channelled through CSOs in those countries.

Aid should increasingly be used as a game-changer in MICs, where external official concessional funding will be more limited. Practical examples include: support for improving tax systems and combating tax evasion; changing power relations in society through political education and active citizenship, democratization of institutions and fight against corruption, supporting poor and vulnerable people to claim their rights and hold their governments to account; supporting human rights defenders, gender equality and fight against discrimination.

5.5 Given experience so far in taking into account the objectives of development cooperation in the implementation of EU policies which are likely to affect developing countries (e.g. [Policy Coherence for Development: 2015 EU Report](#)), how should the EU step up its efforts to achieve Policy Coherence for Development, as a key contribution to the collective effort towards policy coherence for sustainable development? How can we help ensure that policies in developing countries, and internationally contribute coherently to sustainable development priorities?

Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD) has been recognised as a critical means of implementation in the 2030 Agenda. Integrated policy making and identifying links between policy areas is a prerequisite for achieving the SDGs both within the EU and in the EU's partner countries. Ensuring positive policy impacts for sustainable development outside the EU - or at minimum ensuring that EU policies have no negative impacts which undermine sustainable development in other countries or their ability to realise the human rights and well-being of all their people within planetary boundaries - thus remains as valid and necessary an approach as ever. PCSD remains a legal obligation for the EU and its Member States under Article 208 of the Lisbon Treaty.

EU work on PCSD in the context of the 2030 Agenda should aim, especially, to ensure a stronger evidence base for PCSD and to increase political awareness and commitment towards PCSD. The evidence base can be built by increasing and expanding the use of ex ante and ex post impact assessments and by ensuring they are participatory and look effectively at the impacts of EU policies across all sectors on environment and people living in poverty and left behind. This has not often been the case so far. There is a clear need for regular external, independent impact evaluations. Results of impacts assessments and analyses of existing policies should be regularly discussed in the Council and the Parliament. The EU should also commit to mitigate any potentially negative impact its policies may have and to provide redress for those impacts that are proven to have been detrimental to groups of people or other countries

The past experiences and lessons in promoting PCD – as it has been known to date – should be scrutinized and documented. The Commission will have to play an active role in bridging the EU's implementation plans for the 2030 Agenda by breaking down the silos and building on the links in internal and external policies. The expertise within the Commission and among key stakeholders, including civil society and research institutions, to analyse external impacts of EU policies should be utilized to the maximum.

The EU should improve its monitoring and reporting practices on PCSD. The biennial EU PCD reports have been instrumental in identifying important areas of concern in the EU and Member States. The reports have however been unable to identify real changes in policies, progress in policy impacts in developing countries, or in the application of EU PCD mechanisms. We therefore believe those reports should be expanded and adapted in order to be appropriate for the concept of Sustainable Development.

The reporting should have a strong linkage with the evidence base generated through impact assessment and evaluations. We also see a need for greater reporting on PCSD at the level of partner countries. EU Delegation reports are critical to this end and their reporting on PCSD should be transparent and made public. PCSD should also be included in EU country strategy papers, which now mainly focus on development cooperation in the partner country rather than the impacts of EU policies on that country

The EU can support the creation of local civil society participation, democracy and rule of law, thus helping EU partner countries to ensure policy coherence themselves. However, we find it important that support to partner countries' policies be kept separate from the EU's own PCSD agenda, the focus of which should be on the EU's own policies and for which the legal obligation is clearly set out in the Lisbon Treaty.

## (6) The actors: making it work together

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An important feature of the new Agenda is that all governments, developed and developing, will need to work with a wide range of stakeholders (including the private sector, civil society and research institutions) to improve the transparency and inclusivity of decision-making, planning, service delivery, and monitoring and to ensure synergy and complementarity.

The EU must continue to work collaboratively with others and contribute to a coordinated approach. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda puts national plans for implementation (including associated financing and policy frameworks) at the centre. To maximise our impact, EU development policy should be based on a strategic and comprehensive strategy for each country, which also responds to the country-specific context.

Our partner countries' implementation of the 2030 Agenda will inform our overall engagement and our development cooperation dialogue with them and will help shape our support for their national efforts. The EU should also help partner countries put in place the necessary enabling policy frameworks to eradicate poverty, tackle sustainable development challenges and enhance their policy coherence.

There is a need for a renewed emphasis on the quality of development cooperation, including existing commitments on aid and development effectiveness made in Paris, Accra and Busan\* and through work with the [Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation](#).

An updated EU development policy should also provide a shared vision that guides the action of the EU and Member States in development cooperation, putting forward proposals on how to further enhance coordination, complementarity and coherence between EU and Member States. Strengthening [Joint Programming](#) will be an important part of this. Improving the division of labour between the EU and its Member States in order to reduce aid fragmentation will also contribute to increased development effectiveness.

\* See [Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action](#) and the [Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation](#)

## 6.1 How should the EU strengthen its partnerships with civil society, foundations, the business community, parliaments and local authorities and academia to support the implementation of the 2030 Agenda (including the integral Addis Ababa Action Agenda) and the Paris Agreement on climate change?

Civil society is a crucial actor in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, in service delivery, oversight, accountability and advocacy roles. Civil society is instrumental in defending civic space, promoting the rule of law and transparency, ensuring the participation of people and reaching the most marginalised and vulnerable people. The EU should thus ensure participation and engagement with civil society in the design, implementation, monitoring, review and accountability of policies. The EU

should support local and international civil society organisations in Europe and in partner countries with appropriate and predictable levels of funding. It should also work with partner governments to ensure that civil society has the necessary 'enabling environment' to fulfil its functions. Civil society is diverse. It includes farmer organisations, NGOs, associations, diaspora organisations etc. A special attention should be given to women's rights organisations and/or civil society's organisations whose focus is to empower women and girls in order for them to define the issues that are important to them, develop their own strategies and advocate on their own behalf. More particularly, women's civil society organisations - and when possible, girls' organisations - should be systematically included in programming, regardless of the sector of intervention.

Parliaments and political parties should act as guardians for democratic political participation, and are essential elements of democratic accountability towards people. The EU should continue supporting democratic parliaments in ensuring transparency, accountability and peaceful cross-party dialogue in partner countries. Local authorities play an important role in ensuring the participation of people in decisions which concern them at grassroots level and in ensuring that accountability becomes a reality. The EU could seek partnerships with local authorities to ensure that services reach those most in need and that people have an opportunity to participate in monitoring and review of the 2030 Agenda at local level.

Sustained support for research is key if we want to foster innovation in order to tackle global challenges. Funding for independent research untied from private and for profit interests needs to be preserved. Research institutions and academia also provide valuable evidence on impacts of policies that should be better gathered and utilised in order to promote Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development.

Foundations and other donors have emerged to play an important part in sustainable development funding. Better coordination, complementarity, and aligning procedures are necessary, however, in order not to increase the administrative burden in the field. Foundations and donors should respect development objectives, aid and development effectiveness principles, human rights and the environment and not use their money, influence and power to control civil society.

Partnerships with the private sector are important, but the regulation and accountability of these even more so. There must be clear and binding rules to ensure corporate behaviour respects human rights and planetary boundaries and truly contributes to implementing the 2030 Agenda i.e. corporate social and environmental accountability and not corporate social responsibility alone. Accountability and monitoring mechanisms are needed, as well as clear criteria and safeguards when leveraging private finance with ODA.

Finally, successful implementation of the 2030 Agenda requires active global citizenship. The 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement need to be communicated to the people to ensure both sustained support and the required behaviour changes. The EU can play an important facilitating role in providing financial support to civil society and local authorities through the Development Education and Awareness Raising (DEAR) programme in Europe and through the CSO-LA and other programmes in partner countries. This would

enable European CSOs working on the areas of Development Education, Awareness Raising and Global Citizenship Education to facilitate the Agenda 2030 implementation in Europe and engage the European public into achieving the SDGs both locally and globally.

## 6.2 How can the EU promote private sector investment for sustainable development?

The first question is what kind of private sector investment to promote: the EU must prioritise investment in SMEs in developing countries, which hold the best potential for more and decent work that benefits many. Then the question is when to promote private sector investment in developing countries as part of the EU development policy, especially when using public finance, including ODA. Given the track record of some companies on human rights violations, and the EU obligation to promote human rights in its external relations, private sector investment in developing countries should be promoted only when certain conditions are met, and in compliance with the highest standards for social and environmental sustainability. In spite of small positive steps in some sectors (e.g. textiles, palm oil), in too many global value chains (GVCs), many private players involved do not respect international standards, or develop their own (lower) voluntary initiatives, with the approval of EU Member States, e.g. soy, biofuels.

The EU needs to adopt a consistent and principled approach when using aid to leverage private finance and avoid the resurgence of tied aid practices. The EU should ensure that sustainable development objectives are not undermined by commercial motivations or the interest of the EU and its Member States to use ODA to support their own private sector. Debt sustainability for borrowers and the countries in which they operate must be carefully considered too. In the field of essential public services, States have obligations to protect, promote and fulfil the right to health and the right to education. The private sector involvement in health and primary education has been demonstrated to further entrench inequality and eroded in the long term the capacity of host governments to provide quality free public services by diverting scarce resources away from public support. The EU must avoid repeating these mistakes. In the field of agriculture, targeted interventions to support local SMEs in the agro-food sector, to promote value addition in developing countries and to support farmers' cooperatives are very important, as well as improving access to territorial markets. The EU should also promote production and investment models that do not result in large-scale transfer of tenure rights to investors but should encourage partnerships with local tenure right holders, as per the UN Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure (VGGT). All relevant EU and EIB policies and instruments must involve strong and binding safeguards to prevent land grabbing and free, prior and informed consent from all affected local communities. The EU should promote the role of the local private sector for the realisation of the SDGs, by developing financial instruments that really target the lowest segment of SMEs, those that are most vulnerable and lack access to finance, e.g. through easily accessible

guarantee schemes (e.g. first loss guarantees), and insurance products. Technical support is also needed for local banks and investment funds to develop tailored financial products for the smallest SMEs that involve high investment risks. GVCs are often confining workers in developing countries to dirty, low-paid and low-skilled jobs, and freedom of association is often denied. The EU should play a leading role in strengthening accountability mechanisms across the supply chain and imposing binding human rights obligations on its companies operating abroad. A due diligence obligation should apply to Transnational Companies operating in developing countries, as well as to local business enterprises. The private sector should adhere to the EU standards regarding the promotion of gender equality and women's empowerment in external action. Partners should be asked to provide information on their projects gender impact. Where EU development aid is intervening in GVCs, the human rights based approach commands the EU to support those with less power in the chain - e.g. smallholder farmers, in order to strengthen their bargaining power. A balanced development of the private sector requires a sound legal and policy enabling environment for CSOs, and trade unions in particular, to make sure power imbalances are being addressed. Moreover, the EU could play a constructive role in helping to reduce intra-regional trade barriers, while maintaining asymmetrical trade preferences for LDCs and lower MICs. 11.11.11 is concerned about the potentially grave consequences of the Economic Partnership Agreements that would deprive African countries of the policy space they need to make their own economies more competitive and to protect the vulnerable segments of their population. EU Aid for Trade should focus much more on supporting value-added in the countries, diversification, local content, knowledge transfer, and workers' rights with a focus on women and access to remedies.

### 6.3 How can the EU strengthen relations on sustainable development with other countries, international financing institutions, multilateral development banks, emerging donors and the UN system?

Development cooperation may be operationalized through a variety of modalities and financial tools, from project aid to budget support, from grants to blending finance. Each single option may reflect relationships with different sets of development partners, from multilateral organisations to partner countries and new donors. The EU should address such a variety of relationships on different levels: by upholding the key effectiveness principles and by utilizing the global forums that are designed to preside over development partnerships. The development cooperation landscape has changed since the European Consensus was endorsed in 2005 and now presents challenges that require greater effort by the EU. But, even in the face of the changes that have occurred, the EU's commitment to leading on the implementation of the effectiveness principles including by close cooperation with the UN and multilateral players, as affirmed in the 2005 Development Consensus, still holds true. Over the past ten years, it has emerged that new donors may seek to define their own development cooperation frameworks at a time when more joint efforts would be required to make sure that all development actors push in the same direction. The EU should therefore play an active role in multilateral institutions such as both the UN Development Cooperation Forum and the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, which are the two major global forums where development partnerships can be defined on the basis of common principles of effective cooperation. In such efforts, the EU should value the potential benefits stemming from genuine multi-stakeholder partnerships whereby all relevant actors can partake in development processes.

#### 6.4 How can the EU best support partner countries to develop comprehensive and inclusive national plans for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda?

The EU should encourage partner countries to develop, in consultation with national and local civil society, comprehensive and inclusive national plans, that take into account international commitments, treaties and conventions and respond to the national and local needs and context.

Participatory monitoring should be incorporated in the process for national plans, as it adds critically important contextual information on the quality of service-delivery inputs, improves understanding of the link between inputs and outcomes and can lead to timely action to improve service delivery. It also gives local communities and people a greater sense of ownership, and develops accountability mechanisms in the form of 'shadow reporting' or citizens' generated data to provide oversight of the data that the official system provides. Creating this kind of system will deliver crucial data for the international community and change the incentives of national governments to respond to domestic as well as international priorities when setting sustainable development strategies.

The EU should also ensure that its own policies and cooperation facilitate the implementation of the local plans and do not restrict realizing the Sustainable Development Agenda in developing countries. Democratic ownership and alignment must be respected and the EU should play a facilitating role by supporting and strengthening local governmental and civil society capacities in policy analysis and data collection and in monitoring and reporting. The EU also has a responsibility at international (UN) level to promote and support the establishment of strong review and reporting mechanisms enforcing accountability of all actors (starting with themselves).

However, for EU support in this domain to be legitimate and credible it is of utmost importance for the EU to adopt its own ambitious, inclusive and comprehensive implementation strategy covering both external and internal policies and to put in place accountable and inclusive mechanisms of reporting at both EU and Member States levels.

## 6.5 What are the best ways to strengthen and improve coherence, complementarity and coordination between the EU and the Member States in their support to help partner countries achieve poverty eradication and sustainable development?

The EU should push for more implementation of EU joint programming while improving the realisation of joint strategies. There are also other various policies and action plans to improve coherence, complementarity and coordination between the EU and the Member States, including the CSO Roadmaps, the Human Rights Country Strategies, the Gender Action Plan, EU Resilience Action Plan, and the EU Food Security Policy Framework. These allow for creating a situation analysis on a given topic together with key stakeholders including civil society, and should be used to the full extent both in the Joint Programming exercises and between programming phases, in order to identify gaps and needs in reaching the most vulnerable and tackling inequality.

Experiences from the implementation of these various policies and plans should be collected and compared to identify and disseminate best practices both between policy areas and between countries and regions. The EU and the Member States should especially look for ways to improve transparency, participation and dialogue processes with civil society in the implementation of these policies at country level. Joint monitoring missions involving the EU Delegations, the Member States and civil society should be carried out to build ownership of all stakeholders.

Recognising the pressure to minimise donor administration costs, the EU and the Member States should consider different arrangements for pooled funding to ensure support to local civil society by smaller grants.

## 6.6 How can EU development cooperation be as effective as possible, and how can we work with all partners to achieve this?

The effectiveness agenda is a well-established framework that comprises principles, commitments and indicators. As the 2030 Agenda calls for adjustments to accommodate new goals and ambitions (for instance in the area of peace and inequality), the relevance of the effectiveness cornerstones has been reasserted, starting with country ownership. How aid is delivered, and the policies and practices of donor governments, can have a huge influence on what they achieve. For example, they determine how poor people are included – or excluded – from decisions about priorities and resource allocation that affect their lives. Moreover, development efforts can only be effective if they can be coordinated and brought under the umbrella of development strategies designed and owned by the people in developing countries. In order to do so, it is necessary to share information about the goals, beneficiaries and target sector so that different projects can be coordinated and no one is left behind. It is also important to make all this information publicly available in order to enable mutual accountability. Therefore EU should not diminish its efforts to implement the internationally agreed effectiveness frameworks. In this context, the ultimate goal of the EU should be to put development effectiveness principles at the centre of the development debate, where they belong. In order to do so, all EU Member States need to explain how they are going to deliver on the development effectiveness targets and demonstrate progress against the indicators devised by the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC). At the international level, the EU needs to promote the development effectiveness principles by strengthening the GPEDC. Given its constituency and the nature of this role, the GPEDC needs to be better connected to other international development bodies and processes.

## 6.7 What further progress could be made in EU Joint Programming, and how could this experience be linked with other EU joined-up actions in supporting countries' delivery of the 2030 Agenda?

EU institutions are failing to implement joint programming in a way that it leads to greater harmonisation of development efforts in partner countries. Progress has been made in some areas, such as by developing a single strategy for partner countries throughout the EU, identifying priority sectors and agreeing on some division of labour among the Member States. However the efforts now should be focused on joint modalities for delivering aid, delegated cooperation, or monitoring and evaluating mechanisms.

One of the most essential parts of EU joint-up actions is the Civil Society Roadmaps process. EU Joint Programming should have much greater focus on protecting space for civil society as crucial component of democratic system and underpinning sustainable development. Civil society should be considered important partners in Joint Programming, in order to ensure that the most marginalised will also be reached and that no one is left behind.

Existing policies such as the Gender Action Plan 2016-2020 integrate joint programming and this will be critical to the success of the EU action in the field of gender equality and in addressing the SDGs more broadly. Joint programming is particularly important to address social norms in the long-term as no actor alone can bring consistent and sustained change over time.

## (7) Keeping track of progress

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The EU will need to contribute to the global follow-up and review process for the 2030 Agenda. Keeping track of progress in a systematic and transparent way is essential for delivering the 2030 Agenda. The EU is actively contributing to the setting up of a Sustainable Development Goal monitoring system at global, regional and national level. Demonstrating results and impact from our efforts and the promotion of transparency will be important priorities for EU development policy, as part of a wider move to strengthen accountability, follow-up and review at all levels.

### 7.1 How can the EU strengthen its own use of evidence and analysis, including in the development field, to feed into its regular review on the Sustainable Development Goals to the UN?

The EU should make effective use of its research agencies across the whole range of SDG areas (for example, European environment agency, European Institute for Gender Equality, etc.) as well as the policy relevant research generated through programmes such as Horizon 2020. EU evaluations of funding instruments and programmes and reports and studies on Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development should inform assessments and reviews but research, assessments and analysis from others, including civil society, should also be invited and taken into account. For the EU it is critical to ensure that the leave no one behind principle is reviewed both in Europe and in development cooperation. This requires collecting disaggregated data on marginalised and vulnerable groups, and reviewing how those have been reached. Shortcomings in leaving no one behind are easily hidden behind aggregated data. Moreover, the work of the Inter-Agency and Expert Group on Sustainable Development Indicators can be used as a source to adequately monitor the achievement of the SDGs, taking into account its main principle of data disaggregation: “Sustainable Development Goal indicators should be disaggregated, where relevant, by income, sex, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability and geographic location, or other characteristics, in accordance with the Fundamental Principles of Official Statistics”.

A key accountability tool, as mentioned before, will be the ex-post impact assessments (of PCSD) to verify that no EU policy is undermining people’s human rights and sustainable development pathway, or poorer countries’ abilities to realise their people’s human rights within planetary boundaries. The EU should continue to report regularly on PCSD, and improve the quality of its reporting by relating it to the whole 2030 Agenda, and by examining whether the linkages, or interdependencies, between sectors have been respected. Specific attention must be paid to how a target is reached, not just whether it is reached, since any action should not simultaneously set progress back in another area. The reports should include policy changes in order to show how Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development has actually improved from previous situations.

The EU should also use the evidence and analysis that emerge from monitoring various action plans and policies, such as the Action Plan for Human Rights and Democracy the Gender Action Plan, and the Food Security Policy Framework to feed in to its regular review. Specific gender transformative criteria must be applied to ensure that the gaps are being closed between girls and women and boys and men. In development cooperation the EU should continue to move away from monitoring mainly on spending, to generating evidence and analysis on impact towards the Sustainable Development Goals and the principles of 2030 Agenda. The EU should be careful in making sure that this does not entail funding only programmes and interventions which are likely to produce tangible and visible results in the short term. Longer-term impacts on reducing poverty and closing the gap on inequalities should remain priority.

Clearly, if the evidence demonstrates that some areas are being overlooked, or certain groups of people are being left behind, the EU should use the review to examine the main obstacles to greater progress and to suggest how it will improve its policy and action going forward.

## 7.2 How can the EU help to ensure the accountability of all actors involved in implementation of the 2030 Agenda, including the private sector? How can the EU encourage a strong and robust approach to the Follow Up and Review of the 2030 Agenda from all actors?

It is important to note that monitoring and review do not equate to accountability, which includes the notion of responsibility and of redress. Despite a laudable set of principles that countries should aspire to respect when developing “follow up and review” processes, the 2030 Agenda does not propose robust mechanisms which allow civil society and individuals to hold international institutions or their governments to account for implementation. Robust, independent accountability mechanisms from local to regional level are necessary. Additionally, recognising that sustainable development challenges and solutions rarely sit within national borders but require coordinated efforts, the EU must develop a means to differentiate between parts of the 2030 Agenda for which Member States are primarily responsible, and those for which an EU lead is necessary. Different processes and mechanisms will need to be put in place for each of these cases. Accountability must also incorporate the concept of Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development.

In order to enhance the global accountability system, the EU should take a leadership role in the global follow-up and review process, and especially in the High-Level Political Forum. The EU should soon decide on how it will report on its progress to the rest of the world. The EU must set an example in transparent and credible reporting so that the HLPF would serve its purpose in ensuring real accountability and not just in sharing good experiences.

It is key that States remain the primary duty-bearers for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, but that each and every actor, including the private sector or civil society, which is officially involved in any partnership to achieve the Agenda be held accountable - through appropriate, binding mechanisms - for their role.

The EU should support the efforts towards a UN treaty on business and human rights and adopt an adequate legal framework at EU level imposing binding due diligence obligation in the field of human rights for European companies operating abroad, with sanctions in case of breach. Access to justice for victims of corporate human rights abuses should be facilitated. The EU should also improve safeguards, criteria and benchmarks as well as monitoring mechanisms when leveraging private investments in developing countries.

### 7.3 How should EU development cooperation respond to the regular reviews on progress of the partner countries towards the 2030 Agenda goals?

Partner countries are expected to adjust the global indicators set to their national contexts and adopt a complementary set of national indicators. The national indicators sets should be adopted respecting the key principles of Agenda 2030, especially ensuring that no one is left behind. The EU should support capacity development in its partner countries in this respect. This should entail that national statistics authorities have the required capacity to collect and analyse disaggregated data (including by sex and age) with a focus on the most marginalised. The EU should also support sectoral management information systems to the same end. Support to information system should be an essential element in EU's bilateral programmes in order to monitor effectiveness and progress in closing the gaps in equality between people and countries. In addition, given the crucial role, that civil society plays –as widely acknowledged–, the EU should include capacity building of civil society for the monitoring and evaluation of SDG implementation into its funding strategies.

The EU should also support peer-learning exercises and initiatives, which aim to disseminate information on impact and cost-effectiveness of various programmes and approaches. Ongoing efforts for example from Scaling-up Nutrition and the Networked Information System for Nutrition should be closely scrutinised to this end.

The EU should support partner countries in national reporting to the High-Level Political Forum. The EU and its Member States have to show leadership in this respect by presenting transparent, self-critical and credible reports to the HLPF reflecting how they have succeeded in following the key principles and commitments to the Means of Implementation of Agenda 2030. The reporting and review framework of Agenda 2030 will only work if all countries, including the EU, take it seriously.

## Contact

EuropeAid-CONSENSUS-CONSULTATION@ec.europa.eu

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