of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme 2016 for Article 5 of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace to be financed from the general budget of the Union

**Action Document for Fighting Organised Crime**

| **1. Title/basic act/ CRIS number** | Fighting Organised Crime  
CRIS number: 038-875 financed under IcsP |
<table>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2. Zone benefiting from the action/location</strong></td>
<td>Miscellaneous countries¹</td>
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</table>
| **4. Sector of concentration/ thematic area** | Fight against organised crime and illicit trafficking of drugs and smuggling of migrants  
DEV. Aid: YES |
| **5. Amounts concerned** | Total estimated cost: EUR 7 500 000  
Total amount of EU budget contribution EUR 7 500 000 |
| **6. Aid modality(ies) and implementation modality(ies)** | Project Modality  
Component A: Indirect management with UNODC (in partnership with INTERPOL and World Customs Organization (WCO)  
Component B: Direct management with EU Agency (Frontex) |
| **7 a) DAC code(s)** | 15210 - Security system management and reform |
| **b) Main Delivery Channel** | 10000 - PUBLIC SECTOR INSTITUTIONS |
| **8. Markers (from CRIS DAC form)** | General policy objective  
Not targeted  
Significant objective  
Main objective |
| Participation development/good governance | ☐  
☐  
X |
| Aid to environment | ☑  
☐  
□ |
| Gender equality (including Women In Development) | ☐  
X  
□ |
| Trade Development | ☑  
☐  
□ |

¹ Includes Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244.
SUMMARY

Component A: Airport Communications Project (AIRCOP) – Phase IV is the fourth phase of a successful action which the EU has been funding under the IcSP since 2011, aiming at creating inter-agency drug interdiction task forces (JAITFs) at selected international airports in Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa and connecting them to international law enforcement databases to ensure the real-time transmission of operational information with the overall objective of fighting drug trafficking and transnational organized crime. Remarkable achievements have been obtained so far, but some gaps still need to be filled (i.e. intelligence-led policing, post-seizure investigation, data collection, information exchange, working methodology, profiling of passengers, inspection of air cargoes and postal mail) in order to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the JAITFs and contribute to the disruption of criminal networks. In light of the valuable expertise in this domain and of the positive experience so far, it is proposed to implement this action in indirect management with UNODC (in partnership with INTERPOL and the WCO). It is also recommended continuing entrusting all capacity-building activities to experts from EU Member States.

Component B: Promoting evidence-based strategic capacity building and information sharing in the fight against Organised Crime addressing the Smuggling of Migrants: The specific objective of the proposed action is to increase the analytical, preventive and operational capacities of third countries' authorities in the fight against criminal networks responsible for migrant smuggling and to build meaningful trust and networking amongst key countries and regions that will enable them to cooperate and share information (trans-) regionally while ensuring compliance with human rights and the rule of law. The proposed Action's approach is in line with the IcSP’s security orientation and programming principles, while it seeks to strengthen the internal-external security nexus in support of the implementation of the European Agenda on Security, the European Agenda on Migration and the EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling. In light of high level of specialisation and competence, existing networks and relevant aspects of its mission, it is proposed to implement this action in direct management with Frontex, supporting therefore the consolidation and expansion of the Africa Frontex Intelligence Community (AFIC), also mobilising experts from EU Member States in capacity-building activities.

1 CONTEXT

1.1 Sector context/Thematic area

Transnational organised crime is a multi-faceted phenomenon and manifests itself in different activities including drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings, in firearms and money laundering. Over the years, serious and organised crime has evolved in a dynamic and ever
evolving phenomenon. Although it is difficult to measure the exact size of illicit markets, evidence drawn from law enforcement activity across the world suggests they are very large in both scale and impact. Serious and organised crime has a significant impact on the growth of the legal economy and society as a whole. The investment of criminal proceeds and trade in illicit commodities is interlinked with tax avoidance and money laundering that strengthens criminal enterprises run by or associated with Organised Crime Groups (OCGs). Particularly in developing countries and in post-conflict situations, organised crime patronage networks serve as a source of instability that undermine positive changes in the area of stability, governance and socioeconomic development or even endanger post-conflict transitions. Together with corruption they have a devastating impact on the rule of law and hinder equal access to public services.

Component A: Airport Communications Project (AIRCOP) – Phase IV

Despite the global efforts in fighting drug trafficking, the volume of cocaine smuggling from Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) to Europe continues to be significant. The trafficking routes are many and diverse, i.e. air, sea and land through Central America, the Caribbean and West Africa. As cocaine, and other illicit goods, may be moved several times before being eventually shipped to their final destination, law enforcement agencies may receive key information in the process. The culture of intelligence gathering and information sharing is not yet rooted in regular working networks, thus the need for the Airport Communications Project (AIRCOP)'s collaborative approach, linking source, transit and destination countries.

Trafficking in drugs is one of the major sources of revenue of organised crime. Along the so-called cocaine route, from the countries in the Andes through the transit countries in Central America, the Caribbean, West, South and North Africa, to Europe, the drug trade feeds into and supports organised crime in all its aspects exacerbating extreme violence, instability and the chronic weakening of state institutions.

Recent drug trends in West Africa have indicated significant magnitude of trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychoactive substances. Cocaine trafficking remains a significant concern with evolving modes of transportation through airports while cannabis is widely cultivated in the region.

Despite the fact that few direct commercial passenger flights exist between West Africa and LAC, the threat of drug couriers is nonetheless present, notably through so-called “rebound” airports (“spill-over” effect). The same “reversal” of drug routes and itineraries was noticed for Southern and Eastern parts of Africa and the Middle East.

Component B: Promoting evidence-based strategic capacity building and information sharing in the fight against Organised Crime addressing the Smuggling of Migrants

Many countries in the world are affected by trafficking in human beings and the smuggling of migrants, whether as a country of origin, transit or destination for victims trafficked or migrants smuggled by profit seeking criminals. Trafficking in human beings and the smuggling of migrants (facilitation of irregular migration) are both forms of organised crime but these terms are often used interchangeably and/or confused. Albeit the two are often interlinked, legally a clear distinction is necessary as it has serious implications for the treatment and support provided to individuals/victims if they are incorrectly identified. International and EU law set out clearly the key differences between human trafficking and human smuggling and migrant smuggling:

- **Trafficking in human beings (THB)** entails "the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation (...)”.

- **Smuggling of migrants (SoM)** consists of "the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident (...)”.

Proper identification is crucial to ensure that victims of human trafficking receive the assistance they are in need of and entitled to. The distinction between these two types of crimes can however become blurred in practice: persons who use the services of smugglers take considerable risks can also become victims of violence, and in certain cases, given their vulnerable situation, become victims of human trafficking.

Given the magnitude of migratory movements, preventing and combatting the smuggling of migrants and related cases in human trafficking represents a major challenge both for the EU and third countries. Professional facilitators and/or organised criminal groups use land, sea and air routes (or a combination of them), but their itineraries can evolve rapidly due to competitive smuggling networks, national policies or border controls. *Modus operandi* and patterns are extremely diversified, depending on political, economic, geographical, technical and linguistic factors. Moreover, the characterisation of a country as a "transit point" or a "final destination" can be ambiguous, as in reality countries can be both at the same time.

### 1.1.1 Public Policy Assessment and EU Policy Framework

**Component A: Airport Communications Project (AIRCOP) – Phase IV**

The present action is in line with the EU Drugs Strategy 2013-2020 and the EU Action Plan on Drugs 2013-2016 (2013/C351/01), as well as the European Pact to Combat International Drug Trafficking – Disrupting Cocaine and Heroin Routes. This policy framework balances supply and demand approaches through measures within the EU, at external borders and with international partners, while being deeply rooted in the principle of regional ownership.

AIRCOP is further consistent with current EU priorities. In recent years EU efforts have aimed at converging security and development agendas, including through the provision of technical assistance. Since 2009, under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, the European Union has committed almost €50 million over more than 40 countries along the cocaine route through the flagship EU Cocaine Route Programme (CRP), of which AIRCOP is part. Within the CRP, the multi-faceted challenges posed by organised crime and drug trafficking in particular are addressed through a number of complementing projects which provide support and technical advice, build capacities and encourage coordination between the states situated along the entire route in three main domains, namely the interception of illicit flows of drugs, the fight against money laundering and improved information sharing. AIRCOP is also consistent with the priorities and orientations of regional organisations in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean.

With regards to the African component, the project is in line with one of the four key priorities of the African Union Plan of Action on Drug Control (2013-2017), namely “Countering drug trafficking and related challenges to human security”, with both INTERPOL and UNODC cooperation partners in the implementation of the Plan. The Project is also consistent with the “Political Declaration on the Prevention of Drug Abuse, illicit drug

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4 Article 3, Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants, supplementing the same above mentioned Convention.
trafficking and organized crime in West Africa” and the related Regional Action Plan (2008-2015)5 adopted by the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS), and in particular with its thematic area n.3 focusing on effective law enforcement and national/regional cooperation against the high level increase in drug trafficking and organised crime (supported by the EU under the 10th EDF and implemented by UNODC).

With regard to the Latin America and Caribbean component, the project is consistent with four objectives of the Hemispheric Drug Strategy and Plan of Action 2011-2015 of the Organization of the American States (OAS), namely Institutional Strengthening, Supply Reduction, Control Measures and International Cooperation. Additionally, it contributes to the crime control and criminal justice components of the Security Strategy of Central America (ESCA) of the Central American Integration System (SICA), to the EU-supported Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Crime and Security Strategy 2013, the EU-CELAC Action Plan 2015-2017 and the EU-LAC Coordination and Cooperation Mechanism on Drugs as well as the EU Strategy on Citizen Security in Central America and the Caribbean.

Finally, in the framework of UNODC mandate as custodian of the three UN Drug Control Conventions of 1961, 1971 and 1988, AIRCOP contributes to strengthen Member States’ cooperation and to support their national agencies in working together and intensifying their international cooperation to counter the world drug problem and criminal activities related to drugs, as urged by Commission on Narcotic Drugs by resolution 56/16 of 2013.

Component B: Promoting evidence-based strategic capacity building and information sharing in the fight against Organised Crime addressing the Smuggling of Migrants

The EU has taken decisive steps with the adoption of the "Facilitators package" consisting of Directive 2002/90/EC and Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA6 to tackle facilitated irregular migration (migrant smuggling), as well as with the adoption of the Directive 2011/36/EU on presenting and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims.

The legislative framework is accompanied by a comprehensive policy framework with external dimension:

- The recent adoption by the European Commission of a Communication on the European Agenda on Security [COM(2015) 185 final, 28.4.2015] identifies three priority areas for EU action: fighting terrorism and preventing radicalisation; disrupting organised crime, and cybercrime. The fight against SoM and THB are two of the main issues covered under the organised crime priority.

- The European Agenda on Migration [COM(2015) 240 final, 13.05.2015] aims at addressing migration in a comprehensive way as well as at mainstreaming migration into all the policy areas, both internal and external. The EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling (2015 – 2020) [COM(2015) 285 final, 27.05.2015], sets out the specific actions necessary to implement the two Agendas in the area of migration. It has four priorities: (a) Enhanced police and judicial cooperation; (b) Improved gathering and sharing of information; (c) Enhanced prevention of smuggling and assistance to vulnerable migrants; (d) Stronger cooperation with third countries. Priorities (b) and (d) highlight the need for more information sharing and joint analysis with third countries (such as the Africa Frontex Intelligence Community), as well as the further strengthening cooperation with third countries, including financial and technical support to improve the

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5 A new Action Plan is being developed by ECOWAS for the period 2016-2019, with technical support from UNODC.
6 Directive defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence and Framework Decision on the strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence.
collection, sharing and analysis of data on migrant smuggling between countries of origin, transit and destination.

- The EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings 2012-2016 and the Action Oriented Paper on strengthening the EU external dimension on action against trafficking in human beings.
- The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) is the overarching framework of the EU external migration and asylum policy which identifies as one of its four pillars the prevention and reduction of irregular migration and THB.

On the basis of the GAMM, the EU is carrying out a broad dialogue with several regions. For eastern flows, the most relevant migration cooperation framework is the “Budapest Process”. In April 2013, the adoption of the Istanbul Ministerial Declaration on “A Silk Routes Partnership for Migration” has extended the scope to the Silk Route region.

Specifically for Africa, policy dialogue on migration and mobility takes place at bilateral, regional and continental levels:

- At continental level with the African Union: a key political declaration on migration and mobility, implemented by an Action Plan (2014-17) was endorsed at the EU-Africa Summit in April 2014. It reiterated the parties shared commitment to, amongst others, fight irregular migration and to address all its relevant aspects, including the smuggling of migrants as well as to enhance cooperation to address THB.
- At regional level, with policy dialogues with countries along the western migratory route (Rabat Process) and the eastern migratory route (Khartoum Process). The regional dialogues are implemented by concrete action plans and financial resources.
- At bilateral level, with specific agreements concluded with Morocco, Tunisia, Cape Verde and Nigeria. These agreements are implemented by concrete actions that aim to contribute to institutional and legislative reforms and capacity building.

Most recently, in November 2015 at the Valletta Summit, European and African Heads of State and Government adopted a comprehensive Valletta Action Plan, covering 5 pillars deemed relevant to address irregular migration and forced displacement. In particular priority 4 "Prevention of and fight against irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings" is relevant. In addition, 25 EU Member States have signed the contribution agreement for the innovative EU Emergency Trust Fund which was established by the Commission [C(2015) 7293 final, 20.10.2015] to address the root causes of destabilisation, irregular migration and forced displacement by promoting economic and equal opportunities, strengthening resilience, security and development. The Trust Fund covers countries that are among the most fragile and those most affected by migration. They fall under three groups: The Sahel region and Lake Chad area, the Horn of Africa, and North Africa.

The relevance of efficiently addressing trafficking and smuggling within the scope of development cooperation is underlined in the 2013 Commission Communication on Maximising the Development Impact of Migration [COM(2013) 292 final, 21.05.2013], while complementarities exist with the EU’s Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy (2012) and its accompanying Action Plan which for the period 2015-2019 reaffirms that the “Migration/trafficking in human beings (THB)/smuggling of

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7 Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, the Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal.
8 Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda.
9 Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt.
migrants/asylum policies” are key aspects for fostering better coherence of the EU’s human rights policy and nexus with these cross-cutting thematic areas.

From an international perspective, the key legal instrument is the **United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC)**, including its Protocols to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; and against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air.

### 1.1.2 Stakeholder analysis

**As regards component A**, beneficiary authorities are those having direct competencies in: a) controlling in- and outflows of persons and cargoes; b) airport drug law enforcement; or c) more generally, in law enforcement at international airports. The relevant counterpart agencies at selected international airports include: Customs; National Police Service; National Immigration Service; INTERPOL National Central Bureaux (NCBs); Airport authorities; National Drug Agencies.

As law enforcement institutional and organisational arrangements remain governmental prerogatives, the national agencies concerned will be leading the decision-making process regarding what form of JAITF and inter-agency cooperation tools and procedures are best suited to their national security architecture.

**As to component B**, key stakeholders will be the competent governmental authorities, including ministries, law enforcement services (police, border authorities), judicial and prosecutorial authorities. Within these organisations, key duty bearers, policy makers and implementers will be identified and engaged by the Action. Participation will be based on relevance and potential impact but an important consideration will be those institutions that capture data and represent vulnerable and under-represented interests (including women).

The final beneficiaries of the action will be smuggled migrants and the actual and potential victims of trafficking and the local communities, generally, the society in the target countries who will ultimately benefit from reducing the adverse effects of smuggling/trafficking.

For both components, other stakeholders include relevant non-governmental organisations as well as other donors and international/regional organisations, such as IOM, ICMPD, UNODC, UNDP, INTERPOL, African Union, Regional Economic Regional Economic Communities in Africa (RECs), etc. At EU level there are several layers of relevant stakeholders, including the EU Delegations, EU Member States' embassies and immigration liaison officers deployed in third countries, relevant EU Agencies, namely Frontex, Europol and Eurojust, European Migration Liaison Officers as well as EU experts, who will provide expertise and good practice.

### 1.1.3 Priority areas for support/problem analysis

**Component A: Airport Communications Project (AIRCOP) – Phase IV**

The AIRCOP Project was launched in 2011 as part of the EU's Cocaine Route Programme, financed under Regulation (EU) No 1717/2006. The Project initially focused on the West Africa Region and Brazil (AIRCOP I 2010-2014), and it was further extended to selected countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, South and North Africa (AIRCOP II and III 2011-2016).

Currently, AIRCOP covers 26 countries in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. **10**. 16 JAITFs are so far operational In addition, 2 K-9/dog anti-drug units have been established,

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10 Current geographical scope: Africa: Benin, Cabo Verde, Cameroon (Douala and Yaoundé), Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria (Lagos and
and 1465 officials trained, including 210 women, through 74 training and mentoring activities and 10 joint operations. This has enabled the JAIFTs to seize 1127 kg of cocaine, 778 kg of cannabis, 126 kg of heroin, 747 kg methamphetamine and 1.5 tons of counterfeit drugs resulting in 480 seizures (for an estimated 100 M EUR value in Europe retail price) and 543 arrests. The number of seizures and arrests conducted by JAIFTs at selected airports has increased by 78% since the launching of AIRCOP project.

What is more, AIRCOP beneficiary countries concurred that the project improved national inter-service cooperation (Police, Customs, Immigration, Airport Authorities, etc.) and operational communication between JAIFTs, partner organisations and law enforcement agencies of partner countries in Europe, which proved to be successful in the fight against illicit trafficking. All in all, and in terms of indirect benefits, the 7.8 M€ total EU contribution in AIRCOP has yielded seizures of an estimated value of over 100M€ according to the European retail price.

Despite these achievements, more needs to be done: air routes and modus operandi of illicit trafficking are constantly changing. The increased use of postal express mail, baggage on rush and rip off, etc. have been recorded, inter alia, as emerging methods of drug trafficking by air. Criminal organisations quickly adjust to counter-trafficking methods and. JAIFTs officials are constantly exposed to innovative concealment methods and new type of drugs. The latest technologies in terms of detection equipment and tools could further improve JAIFTs’ interdiction capacity, subject to the national specificities and capabilities. Airline companies also play a major role in the successful performance of JAIFTs’ task in targeting passengers and goods, and share the common goal of promoting improved and safer air transportation. Still, constraints in terms of privacy and commercial and law enforcement priorities challenge the daily working relationship between airlines and JAIFTs.

The following domains have been identified as requiring further support: data collection, classification of information and usage; dissemination and exchange of information; working methodology; intelligence led-policing; monitoring of the extent of post-seizure investigations; multi-disciplinary approach on local, national and regional level; profiling, inspections of shipments and luggage or body checks; aircargo and postal mail.

In light of the changing dynamics and constant evolving of trafficking routes, the proposed component envisions a high degree of flexibility vis-à-vis the geographical scope of the action (the list of countries might be subject to changes). Activities at airports will be prioritized based on WCO and INTERPOL updated statistics on illicit trafficking routes, threat analysis and risk profiles.

Component B: Promoting evidence-based strategic capacity building and information sharing in the fight against Organised Crime addressing the Smuggling of Migrants

In recent years there has been a surge in illegal migration from Africa towards Europe, as well as the huge rise compared to previous years of arrivals through Turkey to the Greek Aegean islands, which is coupled with tragic events of hundreds of persons dying in the Mediterranean sea. The instability across North Africa and the Sahel, the continuous war in Syria and the situation in Libya are some of the reasons explaining the unprecedented increase in migratory flows towards the European Union, exacerbating the flows caused by the traditional root causes of migration, which aside escaping conflict, include escaping poverty, Abuja), Senegal, South Africa and Togo. Latin America and the Caribbean: Panama, Dominican Republic (Santo Domingo and Punta Cana), Jamaica (Kingston and Montego Bay), Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, Peru and El Salvador.
seeking livelihood opportunities and trying to build a better life, as well as seeking protection from persecution or serious harm.

The smuggling of migrants is a constantly evolving phenomenon. Routes are not static but are likely to change and are in themselves not fixed, with people using different legs if, and when, necessary. The main routes used by smugglers and traffickers towards Europe are four: *Western Mediterranean Route; Central Mediterranean Route* and *Eastern Mediterranean Route* from Africa, as well as the *Western Balkan Route* which has a combined reach for smuggling/trafficking of persons both from the East but also for persons from Africa.

A further compounding aspect of this challenging phenomenon is the role of corruption in enabling organised smuggling/trafficking groups. The latter capitalise on opportunities for corruption to facilitate their outlawed activities, they seek to infiltrate and influence the state itself, therefore further weakening governance and eventually feeding instability.

In analysing the smuggling phenomenon, the recent "*Study on smuggling of migrants: Characteristics, responses and cooperation with third countries*" (September 2015), undertaken for the European Commission's Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs, draws on the main conclusions, challenges and existing gaps in addressing the issue.11

The EU response to migrant smuggling networks is outlined in the EU Action Plan against Migrant Smuggling 2015-2020, which is particularly focused on reinforcing investigation and prosecution of smugglers, improving information gathering, sharing, and analysis, better preventing smuggling and enhancing cooperation with third countries. The last point stresses the need for close cooperation with third countries along the entire smuggling route, including through provision of capacity building in the areas of developing national and regional strategies; setting up integrated border management systems; strengthening police and criminal justice responses; and improving the collection, sharing and analysis of data.

In addition, the Action Plan clearly recognizes the importance that the EU Agencies play in implementing the actions foreseen. It specifically stipulates that "the Africa Frontex

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11 These include: (a) There is an active market for migrant smuggling services: Price, quality and risk vary across routes and suppliers are able to differentiate between customer needs, commanding higher prices from more affluent customers who want a less risky journey; (b) There are strong communication networks: Social media, pay-as-you-go phones and other forms of communication enable information to be shared quickly between buyers, between sellers and between buyers and sellers; (c) The business model for the supply of smuggling services is network based: Groups or “cells” of actors/facilitators communicate to enable movement of people from one country to another, from source to destination. These networks are complex, shifting, emergent and resilient. Routes are a manifestation of the journey of the migrant through the network and are best seen with hindsight; (d) Where the intensity of smuggling activities is greatest, smuggling networks cluster to form Hubs: within Hubs, the degree of professionalism, vertical hierarchical organisation, and cross-border contacts within any smuggling network increase with size and profits rise. There is also evidence of strong links with other illicit markets and organised crime within the Hubs; (e) Operational activities to tackle supply are likely to be more effective if they are comprehensive and, based on the business model analysis, if targeted at the Hubs; (f) Coordination of activities across agencies and borders is essential: Cooperation can increase the effectiveness of policies if agreements can be reached quickly and can be collectively targeted at the Hub. Bilateral operations are currently used because they can be activated quickly but may have the disadvantage of simply displacing smuggling activities; (g) Policies and related activities that only tackle the supply of migrant smuggling could drive up prices or increase risks faced by migrants; (h) Supply appears to expand relatively easily: Very loose networks are made by anybody willing to exploit migrants, and it is very easy to enter these networks “whilst there are some specific people who control the transfer process, but many others can benefit and make profit on the passage of migrants”; (i) Migrants become particularly vulnerable to exploitation and human rights violations when migrants run out of money: Several migrants report that at a certain point during the journey, usually when they reached an isolated desert area, the smugglers kidnapped and abused them to extort a ransom from their relatives in exchange for their release and onward travel.
Intelligence Community (AFIC) should be further developed as a platform for information-sharing and joint analysis with third countries. The launch of similar platforms in other key regions should be considered. AFIC was set up in 2010 to provide a framework for regular knowledge and intelligence sharing in the field of migrant smuggling and other border security threats between Frontex and African countries. AFIC activities are aimed at conducting joint risk analysis and thus provide hands-on, learning-by-doing capacity building to the African partners. Its current membership includes the following African countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo DRC, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Morocco, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Togo, Senegal, Sierra Leone, with observers: Angola, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Kenya, Tunisia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan. The concept of this collaboration was broadly based on the model of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network and the two already established similar regional networks with the Western Balkans (WB-RAN) and Eastern partnership countries (EB-RAN).

The proposed action shall address the smuggling phenomenon in line with the IcSP's programming principles of trans-regionality and added-value (instrument of "last resort"). The IcSP Thematic Strategy Paper 2014-2020 identifies trafficking in human beings, including the smuggling of migrants, as one of its priorities under the Fighting Organised Crime theme. The support of African partners in enhancing their situation awareness, intelligence and preventive abilities is key in addressing the smuggling of migrants. As such, the support to AFIC and its expansion to the rest of the African continent coupled with concrete capacity building activities fits the IcSP's priorities as it combines information sharing, analytical work, as well as technical and institutional capacity building for relevant authorities with the possibility of involving different regions. All these elements are crucial for identifying and cracking down organised crime smuggling groups, especially since the routes are quickly shifting, therefore a wide, coordinated, inter-regional geographical coverage should be the ultimate goal with the potential replication of AFIC in other another priority region not currently covered (such as South Asia and the countries under the so-called "Silk Route").

2 RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS

For the good implementation of the activities, it is assumed that beneficiary countries will demonstrate good political will and be disposed for sub-regional, regional and trans-regional cooperation and exchange of information. Another assumption is that states that have not yet done so will consider ratifying or acceding to relevant international and sub-regional legal instruments and implement them into their domestic jurisdiction (such as the UNTOC). It is also assumed that beneficiary countries will ensure sustainability and durability to the project by making available the necessary human, financial and material resources to make use and maintain the expertise, potential equipment and applications provided.

Close cooperation with the relevant stakeholders in the Beneficiary Countries is crucial in order to address and mitigate potential risks. A participatory approach should be applied throughout the Implementation Phase, including with relevant local stakeholders in the decision-making process in the form of national multi-disciplinary teams that actively participate in the projects' activities.

Component A: Airport Communications Project (AIRCOP) – Phase IV

<table>
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<th>Risk</th>
<th>Identification</th>
<th>Probability (H/M/L)</th>
<th>Impact (H/M/L)</th>
<th>Mitigating measures</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corruption within the</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Mitigation measures and procedures already in place: A national</td>
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beneficiary structures.

coordination structure (National Focal Point) is set up in each country to interface between the airport services and the relevant ministries to ensure prompt follow up and smooth implementation of the project. Further, the Project Steering Committee can decide to suspend activities in a specific country based on the report of the NFP.

Degradation of the security situation in a beneficiary country.  
M  H  Mitigation procedures already in place: The Project Steering Committee can decide to suspend activities in a specific country (ex. activities suspended in Mali in 2012 and resumed in 2014 once the security situation allowed).

Inter-agency rivalry negatively affecting cooperation.  
M  H  Mitigation measures already in place: In establishing the JAITF, the implementing partner support governments in the development of inter-agency cooperation agreements (inter-service decrees, ministerial decrees, presidential decrees, depending on the national architecture) incorporating working procedures and adequate budgetary provisions for airport inter-service interdiction units.

Political interference in judicial proceedings prevents them from being initiated or from progressing.  
M  H  Mitigation procedures already in place: The Project Steering Committee can decide to suspend activities in a specific country.

Limited availability of JAITF staff (frequent turnover, part time staff, vacant posts).  
M  M  Mitigation measures already in place: The MOU/Letters of agreement signed between UNODC and the governments for the participation in the project include the provision of minimum 3-year assignments for the JAITF officials.

No MoU or no legal binding document is signed for the creation of JAITFs or it takes a long time.  
M  M  Mitigation procedures already in place: Implementation of UNODC-WCO-INTERPOL joint assessment missions. The aim of these missions is to assess the feasibility and advisability to conclude an agreement with the participating country for the implementation of the project. Based on the mission findings, a final decision is taken by the PSC, in agreement with the EU, on the inclusion of the country in the project.

No effective inter-agency cooperation at airports emerges from the creation of JAITFs or not all law enforcement agencies present at the airport are participating to the joint units.  
H  H  Mitigation measures already in place: In establishing the JAITF, UNODC support governments in the development of inter-agency cooperation agreements (inter-service decrees, ministerial decrees, presidential decrees, depending on the national architecture) incorporating working procedures and adequate budgetary provisions for airport inter-service interdiction units.

Assumptions

- The Governments of the beneficiary countries are committed to cooperate both at a national and regional level.
- A basic level of knowledge exists so that capacity building is possible;
- Trained personnel is assigned to JAITFs on a long-term basis;
- Corruption is absent;
- Inter-agency rivalries have minimal effects in operations;
- Airlines and airport authorities are willing to cooperate;
- Sustained political will to implement the project and to fight illicit trafficking;
- Stable security environments in beneficiary countries.

Component B: Promoting evidence-based strategic capacity building and information sharing in the fight against Organised Crime addressing the Smuggling of Migrants

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Risks</th>
<th>Risk level (H/M/L)</th>
<th>Mitigating measures</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political instability and insecurity in the beneficiary countries that will disrupt the projects activities.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Flexibility in projects activities to allow for varying levels of engagement and focus to avoid an overhaul of project implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of commitment by the beneficiary</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Engagement will be pursued with those partners</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
country authorities to cooperate. demonstrating clear political will and commitment to change management.

Corruption within the beneficiary structures. H Promotion of national inter-agency teams to mitigate the risk through internal checks and balances. Continuous monitoring and engagement at medium and high political level.

Frequent government restructuring, lack of clear delineation of duties and responsibilities between relevant agencies and changes to government agenda reducing strategic outlook on addressing migrant smuggling. L Risk assessments and strong involvement of implementers will mitigate this risk. In addition, for the selection of priority countries, engagement will be pursued only with those demonstrating clear political will and determination for change management.

Challenge to conduct needs assessment from both beneficiary and implementer perspective, and not only from one side. M Ensure a multi-stakeholder approach with frequent agreement/alignment between beneficiary and implementer/donor.

Lack of willingness to commit to the rule of law and human rights aspects. M Development of a human rights risk mitigation project strategy, while closer engagement will be pursued with those partners demonstrating clear political will and determination for change management.

Weak institutional capacity and/or low political will to cooperate among neighbours remain a constant challenge to effectively cooperate in addressing smuggling. M Through increased awareness, peer pressure for action and other means, this risk will be mitigated.

Lack of synergies between this Action and other relevant capacity building programmes at national and regional level. L Regular coordination with EU HQ services, EU Delegations and engaged EU MS and other donors in countries where the activities take place will be pursued.

Assumptions

- The Governments of the beneficiary countries are committed to cooperate both at a national and regional level.
- All institutions involved in the Project are committed to the overall objective and purpose of the Action throughout the duration of the Implementation Phase and ready to develop a working cooperation agenda.
- The responsiveness, financial and technical capacity of the beneficiary countries will not decline in the forthcoming years.
- Sufficient capacities at national and (sub-)regional levels can be mobilised for participation in the activities.

3 LESSONS LEARNT, COMPLEMENTARITY AND CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

3.1 Lessons learnt

Component A: Airport Communications Project (AIRCOP) – Phase IV

Lessons learned from previous phases of AIRCOP highlight the necessity of a strong political commitment by national authorities to the objectives of the Project, as well as the need to fully involve airlines and other private operators at an early stage, and to ensure a regular presence on the ground to support and monitor the activities and the results obtained.

In addition, while the Project has had successful operational interdiction actions at airport level, the post-seizure investigations are still challenging. It remains essential to ensure a consistent transition from the front-line enforcement to up-stream investigation. This can be done through enhanced coordination with judicial institutions in beneficiary countries and with projects and programmes focused on up-stream investigations.

Finally, fostering integrity of the units tasked with intercepting drug shipments and passengers carrying drugs is an integral part of the success of the Project. Integrity along the criminal justice chain is essential to ensure that those apprehended end up being prosecuted, convicted and serving sentences. To mitigate this risk, it is necessary to develop a tailored approach as the basis for technical assistance and joint actions against drugs and crime. This includes working with countries in both regions to integrate in capacity building activities concepts from local regulations and policies, hands-on training recreating real scenarios, and awareness raising on relevant international standards, as well as implementing Codes of Conduct and
whistle blowing procedures.

**Component B: Promoting evidence-based strategic capacity building and information sharing in the fight against Organised Crime addressing the Smuggling of Migrants**

There are several common lessons learnt from past actions implemented in the framework of IcSP's fighting organised crime priority. Working at a regional and trans-regional level poses significant challenges given the multitude of countries and actors involved, with different levels of capacity and commitment, different regulatory frameworks and priorities, including sometimes inadequate or total lack of national legislation on some of the areas related to the fight against organised crime. It is therefore important to ensure resources are flexible enough to allow for adaption to the different needs and stages of readiness in each partner country/region. It is important to engage with authorities that demonstrate clear political will and provide for an environment ready to embrace such changes. In ensuring ownership, such support would allow capacity building in both policy making and operational levels. A demand-driven approach on the basis of a comprehensive needs assessment is therefore necessary. Projects focusing more on operational cooperation seem to bring results that are more promising.

The establishment of long term relationships between EU law enforcement agencies and counterparts in third countries, e.g. via mentoring, is considered crucial and can strengthen the link with the external aspects of internal security policy. In line with the lessons-learnt from the EU experience internally as well as from the success of the AFIC building up cooperation with third countries, orientation of activities should lean towards more support for intelligence-led investigation techniques and threat/risk assessment capabilities, coupled with mentoring. In order to avoid a gap from an increased law enforcement capacity and weak judicial process, support to the capacities of prosecution and judicial cooperation is important. Linked to this is importance of incorporating human rights safeguards in the design and implementation of such actions.

Challenges include tensions between countries and fragility can hamper regional cooperation and negatively impact the execution of activities. Moreover, capacity shortages and frequent staff rotation in beneficiary institutions and agencies may also limit progress or significant consolidation of results from external assistance actions. Specifically for the case of migrant smuggling, a significant challenge is that the organised crime networks involved in smuggling are often more fluid in structure and hierarchy and therefore even more difficult to trace and dismantle than those engaging in THB. The criminal activities vary from small and medium-sized operations to full-scale ("full package") operations of the traditional organised crime enterprise structures. The latter model is the one that usually has a more than regional scope and capacity and involves major SoM hubs (indicatively, Nigeria, Senegal, Turkey, Jordan).

### 3.2 Complementarity, synergy and donor coordination

A significant number of EU programmes are directly or indirectly relevant to capacity-building and law enforcement activities for fighting organised crime. Many of the actions under the current proposal build on past and on-going activities and will be complementary to other EU initiatives at national or regional level, EU member states activities, and actions from international organisations or donors. An overview of donor coordination (within the EU and with third actors) on each specific project within this broader area of support by the IcSP will be provided in the relevant project descriptions of each action.

**Component A: Airport Communications Project (AIRCOP) – Phase IV**

This action will seek complementarity and synergies with a number of relevant EU and non-EU funded actions and initiatives. These include: the other on-going components of the IcSP
Cocaine Route Programme, namely SEACOP, CRIMJUST, GAFILAT-EU and CORMS; the IcSP-funded REPT project on the illicit production of and trafficking in falsified medicines; the EU-funded (and UNODC-implemented) project to support the ECOWAS Praia Action Plan; the EU-funded COPOLAD II; the upcoming EU-funded action on transnational organized crime in Africa (DCI-PANAF); the EU-funded Operation Westbridge/Euroguards in West Africa; the Regional Support Unit for Civil Aviation Safety (CRASAC – Cellule Régional d’Assistance à la Sureté de l’Aviation Civile); UNODC National Integrated Programmes (NIP); the UNODC GLOG80 Global Container Control Programme; the UNODC-driven Regional Anti-Corruption Academy for Central America and the Caribbean; INTERPOL Whiteflow; WCO COPES Compendium of Customs Operational Practices for Enforcement and Seizures; Project Rubix Cube; the French-funded ALCORCA project and "Appui à la Lutte contre le trafic de Cocaine en Afrique de l'Ouest (ALCAO)"; the French Customs Ailes Africaines; the FONTANOT Group; the Group Airports of the Group Pompidou.

In addition, in line with previous phases, the action will be implemented in close cooperation with European Member States, whose law enforcement agencies will continue being in charge of conducting all of the training and mentoring activities. Participating EU MS have included so far: French Customs and Police, Belgian Customs and Federal Police, Italian General Directorate for Anti-Drug Services, Portuguese Customs and Police, Spain National Police, UK Border Force and National Crime Agency and the Dutch National Police.

**Component B: Promoting evidence-based strategic capacity building and information sharing in the fight against Organised Crime addressing the Smuggling of Migrants**

In general, coordination with the EU Member States is ensured in the relevant Council Working Groups. Coordination in the different strategy frameworks is combined with political and technical dialogue and exchange of information with EU Member States.

In the last decade the EU funded through its external instruments more than 60 projects dedicated to migrants' rights, more than 150 on irregular migration, including over 100 projects principally addressing or with a component on human trafficking. Complementary funding originates from geographical and thematic instruments.\(^\text{12}\)

Programmes being implemented under various EU funding mechanisms are providing support for the Khartoum Process or for related activities. These include:

- **Global Action to Prevent and Address Trafficking in Persons and the Smuggling of Migrants** (€11 million, DCI GPGC);
- **Support for the EU-Africa Dialogue on Migration, Mobility and Development** (€18.5 million, DCI Pan-African Programme);
- **Enhancing African capacity to respond more effectively to transnational organised crime** (€15 million, DCI Pan-African Programme);
- **Addressing Mixed Migration Flows in East Africa** (€6 million, DCI GPGC);
- **Migration EU Expertise (MIEUX)** (EUR 6 million; DCI GPGC);
- **ACP-EU Action on Migration** (EDF);

\(^{12}\) Such as the European Development Fund, the Development Cooperation Instrument's Thematic Programmes: Global public good and challenges (DCI GPGC) and Civil society organisations and local authorities (CSOs/LAs), the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).
- Relevant actions financed and implemented in the framework of the EUTF, such as Better Migration Management - Khartoum Process (€40 million); Facilitating movement of persons in the IGAD region for enhanced integration (€10 million); Renforcement de la gestion durable des conséquences des flux migratoires (25 million).
- Support for EU law enforcement cooperation with Khartoum Process countries (Internal Security Fund on police cooperation).

Particular attention shall be given in ensuring coordination and non-duplication of activities with actions financed under the EUTF. Information exchange on new EUTF actions on migration flows as they are developed must be ensured. Aside from the trans-regional focus of information and intelligence sharing under this component, in terms of activities with a country-specific capacity building outlook, prioritisation shall be given to countries that are not covered by the EUTF.

IOM, UNODC, UNHCR, INTERPOL and several local and international NGOs are delivering a number of related initiatives. Additional efforts will be made at inception phase to map projects in the target countries, including projects funded by other donors.

3.3 Cross-cutting issues

The possible impact of the project on the respect of human rights, good governance and gender issues will be constantly monitored and corrective measures will be put in place where relevant and necessary.

Specifically to Component A, as regards gender-related issues, although illicit trafficking is predominantly run by men, women are increasingly playing the mules' role. This threat is best addressed by female officers (for both search and interview). As such, throughout the implementation of the action, it will be made sure that equal access to the foreseen activities is granted and that female officers are included in all the training, mentoring and other operational activities linked to the project, as a means to increase effectiveness of the interventions. In a similar vein, beneficiary countries will be advised on their recruitment policies for staff and on development of standard operating procedures in line with gender equality principles and guidelines as to fair and non-discriminatory treatment. Similarly, for Component B, the gender perspective in the context of migrant smuggling is quite significant especially as women and children are particularly vulnerable groups, requiring special assistance and protection. Moreover, women migrants are even more vulnerable to becoming victims of trafficking, which is a gendered phenomenon. For this reason capacity building measures in the fight against migrant smuggling should incorporate a gender sensitive approach.

In addition, the action under Component A will fund the creation and operationalization of JAITFs. However, in order to ensure the appropriate legal, institutional and economic ownership/sustainability, MoUs/inter-ministerial decrees (or equivalent) will be signed in parallel between national law enforcement agencies and define the format, composition and budgetary provisions for the units. Throughout implementation, national authorities will also be sensitized and encouraged to provide units created under the project with adequate budgets allowing for continued operations and maintenance of procured equipment. It will also be made clear that such provisions are key for starting activities in the beneficiary countries.

For both Components, in providing technical assistance and capacity building, the issue of corruption should be carefully considered. Programme implementers must observe regulatory measures to mitigate funds transfers to politically exposed persons or other individuals/entities that may abuse programmatic arrangements. Anti-corruption activities should be comprehensively integrated into the training and awareness raising activities.
To ensure compliance of the proposed action with the obligations stipulated in Article 10 ("Human rights") of Regulation (EU) No 230/2014, a clear human rights perspective should be incorporated throughout the different stages of the project cycle on the basis of the operational guidance developed by the European Commission (https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/operational-human-rights-guidance-eu-external-cooperation-actions-addressing-terrorism-organised_en). Any potential flow-on risk on the respect of human rights should be monitored and mitigating measures need to be foreseen.

4 DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION

4.1 Objectives/results

The overall objective of Components A and B, in accordance with the IcSP Multi Annual Indicative programme 2014-17, is to prevent and fight organised crime, including the illicit trafficking in drugs and the smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings.

**Component A: Airport Communications Project (AIRCOP) – Phase IV**

The specific objective of the proposed component is to consolidate and build drug-interdiction capacities at selected international airports in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean and connecting them to international law enforcement databases to ensure the real-time transmission of operational information. It will build on the results achieved over previous phases and focus its activities in indicatively twenty-eight international airports in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean.

Beneficiary countries will be selected upon consensus between UNODC, INTERPOL, WCO, and the Contracting Authority and based on criteria including: interest and requests expressed by the concerned countries; JAITFs’ performance so far and local needs; strategic importance of the country in terms of illicit trafficking routes, etc.

The component will promote coordination, intelligence and information sharing between services at national and international level as well as an intelligence-led approach to countering drug trafficking and organized crime. It will also provide law enforcement officers from beneficiary countries with tools and methods for proactive profiling and targeting operations.

While focusing primarily on drugs trafficking, the JAITFs have a potential of interdicting other proceeds of crime, including CITES, money flows, counterfeited medicines and suspicious passengers involved in human trafficking / terrorism as global phenomenon in countering transnational organised crime.

The detailed outputs of the proposed component are:

**Output 1:** Joint Airport Interdiction Task Forces /Interdiction Units effectively operate to combat drug related crime in airport settings;

**Output 2:** Enhanced capacity of law enforcement officials in selected airports to exchange real-time operational information on countering illicit trafficking and organized crime at national, regional and international level.

**Component B: Promoting evidence-based strategic capacity building and information sharing in the fight against Organised Crime addressing the Smuggling of Migrants**

The specific objective of the proposed action is to increase the analytical, preventive and operational capacities of third countries' authorities in the fight against criminal networks responsible for migrant smuggling and to build meaningful trust and networking amongst key countries and regions that will enable them to cooperate and share information (trans-) regionally while ensuring compliance with human rights and the rule of law.
In line with the external aspects of the EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling and in order to meet the specific objective, the proposed action will be designed to deliver three results, described hereby:

Result 1: Increased capacities of beneficiary countries in undertaking risk, strategic and operational analyses/assessments on irregular migration flows, border security and smuggling/trafficking networks that will enhance the situational awareness and preventive abilities of the competent authorities;

Result 2: Enhanced inter-agency and inter-regional information sharing structures and networking of authorities in this area, that will strengthen confidence and trust building between countries of origin, transit and destination countries with a view to establish direct cooperation channels, paving the way for a network of risk analysis offices, thus contributing to improved border management amongst them;

Result 3: Improved operational capabilities through promoting and targeting joint investigation teams that can lead to joint operations in dismantling OC networks engaged in SoM and THB that will increase the operational capacities of the partner counties (including improving the detection of THB victims as they cross borders).

All of these results are mutually reinforcing, building on a national, regional and transregional approach, promoting EU best practice, ensuring compliance with human rights as well as facilitating synergies with the EU policy cycle for organised and serious international crime and the European Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats (EMPACT) and particularly with the Operational Action Plans on Facilitated Illegal Immigration and Trafficking in Human Beings (OAPs).

In addressing the security-development nexus and the mandate of the EU’s "Agenda for Change" and in line with the EU’s commitments in relation to the aid effectiveness agenda (2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2008 Accra Agenda for Action, 2011 Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation), particular focus should be placed on local ownership in the pursuit of sustainable results. The elaboration of an assessment involving all relevant national stakeholders in establishing their needs should be the basis for the engagement with third countries in every result area described above.

In achieving the above-mentioned results, support to existing structures that have rendered positive results with a view expand them is the preferred choice in order to avoid duplication of efforts and capitalise on existing results. As such, the selection of Frontex due to the existing AFIC structure it has launched and consolidated is considered optimal. The geographical focus of the proposed action will entail the African continent, applying a phase approach, initially with those African partners that are already AFIC members and its gradual expansion to the rest of the continent. In view of the divergent smuggling flows, a subsidiary potential replication of AFIC in another priority region not currently covered (such as South Asia and the countries under the so-called "Silk Route") may be considered, if appropriate, in consultation with Frontex and relevant EU services.

4.2 Main activities

Component A: Airport Communications Project (AIRCOP) – Phase IV

The key activities actions foreseen under this component are the following:

- Identify a National Focal Point for each JAITF to be created or existing interdiction unit to be empowered;
- Prepare letters of agreement or equivalent for signature by the respective Ministries and UNODC for the implementation of AIRCOP;
Conduct joint UNODC-INTERPOL-WCO needs assessment missions to evaluate the level of drug interdiction at selected international airports;

Support national authorities in establishing and sustaining the JAITF or in empowering existing interdiction units, including the development of inter-agency cooperation agreements incorporating working procedures and adequate budgetary provisions for airport interdiction units;

Establish/empower Joint Airport Interdiction Task Forces/Interdiction Units to fight illicit trafficking on all airport platforms (passengers, cargo, mail);

Support negotiations on shared or pooled facilities with airport authorities, airlines, and any other relevant local agency to host the interdiction units;

Support JAITFs/interdiction units in reaching cooperation agreements with airline companies;

Procure essential computer, communication and photographic equipment, inspection/detection and testing tools;

Prepare a training programme for each JAITF/Interdiction Unit on intelligence collection and sharing, and additional risk profiling with a focus on identifying passengers, suspicious airfreight and passengers, postal packages, general aviation and airport crime;

Conduct practical on-site training at airports;

Provide specialised mentoring conducted by airport interdiction specialists at airports;

Provide complementary national/regional specialised training on air freight, general aviation, airport crime, counterfeit documents, profiling and behavioural analysis, anti-dog handling, passengers control related to integrated border management, etc.;

Evaluate all training and equipment components.

Install WCO CENcomm for the established JAITFs and further adapt it to the needs of existing JAITFs;

Provide equipment for the installation of INTERPOL I-24/7 at selected airports;

Create access to CENcomm and I-24/7 and train staff on their use.

Organise WCO COCAIR VI operation, including a training session for participating airports, an Operational Coordination Unit coordinating the operation on the ground, a debriefing session and a press conference to present the results achieved;

Conduct other joint operations and good practices exchange programmes for the JAITFs created under AIRCOP. Extension of the participation to European countries and other potential AIRCOP countries is foreseen.

Component B: Promoting evidence-based strategic capacity building and information sharing in the fight against Organised Crime addressing the Smuggling of Migrants

To achieve the results mentioned above, main activities will indicatively include:

creation and cultivation of a risk analysis capability at local and regional level within the AFIC, based on the Common Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM) establishing thus the foundation for interoperability within the AFIC and also with European partners;

improvement of the technical capacity of the AFIC to collect and analyse information by providing them with the necessary technical equipment;

national, regional and inter-regional training modules and mentoring cycles addressing the concerned stakeholders (also via a train-the-trainers approach) particularly in undertaking risk, strategic and operational analyses/assessments;

providing technical assistance in preparing incident reports and intelligence analysis reports especially for the assessment on routes and modus operandi of the criminal networks;
– workshops between the risk analyst representatives of the countries concerned to share information in view of producing an annual strategic risk analysis report;
– facilitation of operational meetings promoting inter-agency and trans-national cooperation in actual cases;
– proposal, promotion and support joint investigations teams, that would lead, where appropriate, to joint operations;
– incorporation of modules on human rights and gender sensitive approaches.

4.3 Intervention logic

**Component A: Airport Communications Project (AIRCOP) – Phase IV**

Counterpart capacities, namely Joint Airport Interdiction Task Forces (JAITFs), have been established to a certain extent and are to be further strengthened under the present project. The underlying global assumption is that better equipped and trained law enforcement personnel at international airports having the necessary means to communicate key information to counterparts in other locations on in and outbound flights will be a major step in combating drug trafficking in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and will contribute to making the most vulnerable countries less attractive to drug traffickers, therefore also reducing the likelihood of usually associated crimes, such as corruption and violence.

In line with the lessons learned from AIRCOP I, II and III, the need for stronger political commitment must be emphasized, as well as the need to fully involve airline companies and other private operators at an early stage. The use of EU Member States expertise, as well as that of other relevant international organizations, will play a key role in the training and mentoring of relevant law enforcement agencies at participating airports.

**Component B: Promoting evidence-based strategic capacity building and information sharing in the fight against Organised Crime addressing the Smuggling of Migrants**

Considering the ever evolving smuggling and trafficking routes and the dynamic and flexible modus operandi of organised crime groups involved in smuggling activities, this action should have a higher degree of flexibility vis-à-vis its geographical scope of the action in order to respond to actual needs of third countries and the reality on the ground. It is expected that through a phased approach, the countries with high political commitment would encourage changes in and between their (sub)-regions and start cooperation on the basis of trusted partnerships that the action shall promote with the ultimate aim to foster progressive (trans-) regional cooperation.

A coordination mechanism should be established involving relevant EU stakeholders (DEVCO, EUTF, DG HOME, DG NEAR, EU Delegations) in order to create synergies with relevant actions and avoid duplication.

5 IMPLEMENTATION

5.1 Financing agreement

In order to implement this action, it is not foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with the partner country, referred to in Article 184(2)(b) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012.

5.2 Indicative implementation period

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in section 4.1 will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements implemented, is 72 months from the date of adoption by the Commission of this Action.
Extensions of the implementation period may be agreed by the Commission’s authorising officer responsible by amending this decision and the relevant contracts and agreements; such amendments to this decision constitute technical amendments in the sense of point (i) of Article 2(3)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014.

5.3 Implementation modalities

Component A: Airport Communications Project (AIRCOP) – Phase IV

- Indirect management with an international organisation

The envisaged implementation modality is indirect management with an international organisation, notably the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which is currently undergoing the ex-ante assessment in accordance with Article 61(1) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012. The Commission’s authorising officer responsible deems that, based on the compliance with the ex-ante assessment based on Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1605/2002 and long-lasting problem-free cooperation, the international organisation can be entrusted with budget-implementation tasks under indirect management.

UNODC is the UN body mandated to assist Member States in their fight against illicit drugs. UNODC is the custodian of the 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOK) and of the UN drug control conventions of 1961, 1971 and 1988. In 2014, the General Assembly requested UNODC to help to establish international networks and partnerships among Member States in the area of international cooperation in criminal matters. UNODC is dependent of the UN Secretariat, as confirmed during the 5th FAFA working group in April 2008, and it is covered by the four pillars analysis performed for the UN Secretariat.

UNODC will be in charge of the overall designing, planning, coordination, implementation and monitoring of the proposal for both substantive and administrative matters.

INTERPOL and the World Customs Organisation (WCO) will be partners in the implementation of the present action.

As administrator of the I-24/7 database and communication system, INTERPOL will provide access to its databases to the JAITFs and will contribute to the organization of joint exercises on exchange of information/intelligence to support further investigative processes and to intensify surveillance and control at international airports.

As administrator of the CENcomm real-time secure communication system, WCO will provide access to the system (including system administration and maintenance) to the JAITF and partner countries. In addition, WCO will organize the annual COCAIR operation where all AIRCOP airports participate.

The entrusted international organisation is currently undergoing the ex-ante assessment in accordance with Article 61(1) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012. The Commission’s authorising officer responsible deems that, based on the compliance with the ex-ante assessment based on Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1605/2002 and long-lasting problem-free cooperation, the international organisation can be entrusted with budget-implementation tasks under indirect management.

13 Resolution 69/193
Component B: Promoting evidence-based strategic capacity building and information sharing in the fight against Organised Crime addressing the Smuggling of Migrants:

- **Grant: direct award to European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union - Frontex (direct management)**

(a) **Objectives of the grant, fields of intervention, priorities of the year and expected results:** The specific objective is to increase the analytical, preventive and operational capacities of third countries' authorities in the fight against criminal networks responsible for migrant smuggling and to build meaningful trust and networking amongst key countries and regions that will enable them to cooperate and share information (trans-)regionally while ensuring compliance with human rights and the rule of law.

(b) **Justification of a direct grant:** Under the responsibility of the Commission’s authorising officer responsible, the grant may be awarded without a call for proposals to Frontex.

Under the responsibility of the Commission’s authorising officer responsible, the recourse to an award of a grant without a call for proposals is justified because of its technical competence and high degree of specialisation (Article 190.1(f) RAP), while also ensuring the promotion of EU best practice and the strengthened synergies between the internal and external aspects of the migration/security nexus as prescribed by the EU Agendas on Security and Migration.

(c) **Essential selection and award criteria:** The essential selection criteria are the financial and operational capacity of the applicant. The essential award criteria are relevance of the proposed action to the objectives of the call; design, effectiveness, feasibility, sustainability and cost-effectiveness of the action.

(d) **Maximum rate of co-financing:** The maximum possible rate of co-financing for this grant is 100%. In accordance with Articles 192 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 applicable by virtue of Article 37 of (EU) regulation n° 323/2015 if full funding is essential for the action to be carried out, the maximum possible rate of co-financing may be increased up to 100%. The essentiality of full funding will be justified by the Commission’s authorising officer responsible in the award decision, in respect of the principles of equal treatment and sound financial management.

(e) **Indicative trimester to conclude the grant agreement:** First trimester of 2017.

As an integral part of its mission, Frontex builds cooperation with countries outside the EU. These relationships represent a valuable tool for effectively tackling irregular migration and cross-border crime. In this context Frontex constantly develops a reliable and effective network of partnerships at the operational level with the relevant authorities of non-EU states. In addition, Frontex has experience in implementing technical assistance projects in third countries (ex. Promoting the participation of Jordan in the work of EASO as well as the participation of Morocco and Tunisia in the work of EASO and Frontex, ENI; and Eastern Partnership Integrated Border Management Capacity Building Project, ENI). Frontex also provides advice and actively participates in other EU-led initiatives involving cooperation on border related activities with countries beyond the EU, such as the Migration and Mobility Partnerships, the Eastern Partnership Initiative or the Building Migration Partnerships.

Involvement of expertise from other relevant EU Decentralised Agencies, such as EUROPOL, and EUROJUST, should be pursued to the extent possible subject to their mandate, priorities, procedures and resources and in coordination with their partner Directorate General of the European Commission.

If negotiations with the above-mentioned entrusted entity (Frontex) fail, this action may be
implemented in direct management (service contract) with an EU Member State agency.

<table>
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<th>Subject in generic terms, if possible</th>
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<th>Indicative trimester of launch of the procedure</th>
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<td>Services</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Q4/2016</td>
</tr>
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</table>

5.4 Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act and set out in the relevant contractual documents shall apply.

The Commission’s authorising officer responsible may extend the geographical eligibility in accordance with Article 9(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 on the basis of urgency or of unavailability of products and services in the markets of the countries concerned, or in other duly substantiated cases where the eligibility rules would make the realisation of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult.

5.5 Indicative budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5.5.1. Component A - Indirect management with IO</th>
<th>EU contribution (amount in EUR)</th>
<th>Indicative third party contribution, in currency identified</th>
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<tr>
<td>Evaluation, Audit</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>0</td>
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5.6 Organisational set-up and responsibilities

Component A: Airport Communications Project (AIRCOP) – Phase IV

**National Focal Points:** Close collaboration and coordination between the UNODC Project Team and the national authorities is key for the creation of Joint Airport Interdiction Task Forces. National coordination structures, the AIRCOP National Focal Points (NFPs), are set up in each country to interface between the airport services and the UNODC Project team; to facilitate information exchange at national level; and to support the establishment/empowerment of JAITFs/ existing interdiction units. National Focal Points and Heads of the JAITFs participate in relevant AIRCOP activities, including regional workshops and international meetings.

**Steering Committee:** At project level, overall guidance for the implementation will continue to be provided by the Project Steering Committee, tentatively composed of UNODC, INTERPOL, WCO and the European Commission.

The Committee is tasked to:

- Review and approve annual work-plans;

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15 In case negotiations with the above-mentioned entrusted entity (Frontex) fail, this action may be implemented in direct management (procurement: service contract) with an EU Member State agency.
• Review and approve the list of participating countries;
• Validate corrective measures proposed by UNODC;
• Supervise project monitoring and evaluation activities;
• Ensure consistency with other initiatives relevant to AIRCOP in the regions covered by the project;
• Discuss obstacles met during implementation and propose solutions.

**AIRCOP International Meetings:** AIRCOP International Meetings foresee the participation of AIRCOP beneficiary and associated countries (AIRCOP National Focal Points and Heads of the JAITFs). These meetings aim at exchanging experiences and good practices in the fight against illicit trafficking via air routes, creating links between AIRCOP countries and strengthening the coordination of actions and the sharing of information between JAITFs. The regular Meeting further aims at identifying any challenges and proposing viable operational solutions in order to ensure the effective implementation of the AIRCOP project.

**Component B: Promoting evidence-based strategic capacity building and information sharing in the fight against Organised Crime addressing the Smuggling of Migrants:**

The responsibilities of the implementing partner will include, *inter alia*:

**In relation to the inception phase of the Action:**
• Undertaking a comprehensive needs-assessment and a stakeholder mapping of the beneficiary countries;
• Defining a working plan of activities jointly with the beneficiary institutions;
• Identifying the most appropriate experts/institutions for the transfer of their know-how;
• Designing a human rights risk mitigation strategy;
• Formulating the communication and visibility strategy.

**In relation to the implementation phase of the Action:**
• Undertaking the tasks of each activity by mobilising the appropriate and necessary expertise and promoting EU best practice;
• Organising events of strategic dimension at a national, regional and transregional level;
• Setting up a system of indicators in order to follow up the activities and measure the results;
• Reinforcing the collaborative links of the beneficiary countries' relative institutions/bodies amongst themselves and with their counterparts in the EU;
• Promoting the dissemination of good practices and the results of the Action;
• Ensuring coordination with other donors.

In order to guarantee a strategic orientation of the programme, the Contracting Authority will create and co-chair the Steering Committee with the implementing partner. This Committee will also be tasked with issuing opinions and recommendations on the working plan submitted by the implementing partner, ensuring the relevance of the indicators measuring the results of the Action as well promoting synergies with relevant actions of the EU and its Member States and coordination with the programmes and projects financed by other donors.

**5.7 Performance monitoring and reporting**

The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation of both Components will be a continuous process and part of the implementing partners' responsibilities. To this aim, the implementing partners shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for their respective component and elaborate regular progress reports (not
less than annual) and final reports. Every report shall provide an accurate account of implementation of the respective action, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (outputs and direct outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators, using as reference the logframe matrix (for project modality). The reports shall be laid out in such a way as to allow monitoring of the means envisaged and employed and of the budget details for the action. The final reports, narrative and financial, will cover the entire period of the actions’ implementation.

The Commission may undertake additional project monitoring visits both through its own staff and through independent consultants recruited directly by the Commission for independent monitoring reviews (or recruited by the responsible agent contracted by the Commission for implementing such reviews).

Furthermore, detailed annual work-plans will be presented at the beginning of each year for the approval of the European Commission and of the Project Steering Committee. The approved work-plan will provide for monitoring and review on a continuous basis. The project will incorporate a management system to ensure that tasks are completed in the appropriate sequence and time schedule.

5.8 Evaluation

Component A: Airport Communications Project (AIRCOP) – Phase IV

Having regard to the importance of the component, an evaluation will be carried out for this component via an implementing partner.

A final external independent project evaluation will be carried out. It will cover the entire period of the project implementation and will be conducted during the last trimester of implementation in accordance with modalities jointly set between UNODC Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU), the European Union and partner organisations. The final evaluation will seek to measure the achievements of the proposed action and determine to which extent have initial objectives been met and planned outcomes realized. The evaluation will add to organizational learning by informing on the shortcomings and challenges encountered in project implementation and identifying the lessons learned and best practices stemming from these experiences.

The evaluation reports shall be shared with the partner countries and other key stakeholders. The implementing partners and the European Commission shall analyse the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, in agreement with the partner countries, jointly decide on the follow-up actions to be taken and any adjustments necessary, including, if indicated, the reorientation of the project.

Component B: Promoting evidence-based strategic capacity building and information sharing in the fight against Organised Crime addressing the Smuggling of Migrants:

Having regard to the importance of the action, a final evaluation will be carried out for this action via independent consultants. It will be carried out for accountability and learning purposes at various levels (including for policy revision).

The Commission may, during implementation, decide to undertake a mid-term evaluation for duly justified reasons (including for assessing the continuation of support to the particular action) either on its own decision or on the initiative of the partner.

The Commission shall inform the implementing partner at least one month in advance of the dates foreseen for the evaluation missions. The implementing partner shall collaborate efficiently and effectively with the evaluation experts, and inter alia provide them with all
necessary information and documentation, as well as access to the project premises and activities.

The evaluation reports shall be shared with Frontex and when appropriate with the partner countries and other key stakeholders. The implementing partner and the Commission shall analyse the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, in agreement with the implementing partner and the partner countries, jointly decide on the follow-up actions to be taken and any adjustments necessary, including, if indicated, the reorientation of the project.

The financing of the evaluation shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing decision.

5.9 Audit

Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation of this action, the Commission may, on the basis of a risk assessment, contract independent audits or expenditure verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements. The financing of the audit shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing decision.

5.10 Communication and visibility

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU.

This action shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action, to be elaborated at the start of implementation and supported with the budget indicated in section 5.5 above.

In terms of legal obligations on communication and visibility, the measures shall be implemented by the Commission, the partner country, contractors, grant beneficiaries and/or entrusted entities. Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in, respectively, the financing agreement, procurement and grant contracts, and delegation agreements.

The Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Action shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action and the appropriate contractual obligations.
APPENDIX 1: INDICATIVE LOGFRAME MATRIX (FOR PROJECT MODALITY)

The activities, the expected outputs and all the indicators, targets and baselines included in the logframe matrix are indicative and may be updated during the implementation of the action, no amendment being required to the financing decision. When it is not possible to determine the outputs of an action at formulation stage, intermediary outcomes should be presented and the outputs defined during inception of the overall programme and its components. The indicative logframe matrix will evolve during the lifetime of the action: new lines will be added for including the activities as well as new columns for intermediary targets (milestones) for the output and outcome indicators whenever it is relevant for monitoring and reporting purposes. Note also that indicators should be disaggregated by sex whenever relevant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results chain</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baselines (incl. reference year)</th>
<th>Targets (incl. reference year)</th>
<th>Sources and means of verification</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall objective: Impact</td>
<td>Prevent and fight organised crime, including the illicit trafficking in drugs and the smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings</td>
<td>1. Increased number of successfully adjudicated cases (domestic and international)</td>
<td>To be determined during the inception phase by the implementation partners (UNODC for C1 and FRONTEX for C2)</td>
<td>National reports/statistics</td>
<td>Target countries will ensure sustainability and durability by making available the necessary human, financial, and material resources. The responsiveness, financial and technical capacity of the target countries will not decline in coming years. Actions will not be disrupted by adverse events, such as political instability, a fragile security situation, natural hazards, public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Increased number of arrests and dismantlement of organised crime networks (drugs, migrant smuggling)</td>
<td>3. Increased number of MoUs/agreements for exchange of information in the fight against organised crime amongst relevant countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific objective(s): Outcome(s)</td>
<td>Component 1 (AIRCOP): To consolidate and build drug-interdiction capacities at selected international airports in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean and connecting them to international law enforcement databases to ensure the real-time transmission of operational information.</td>
<td>1. Number of seizures</td>
<td>1.111/2015 (16 countries)</td>
<td>National reports/statistics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Number of arrests</td>
<td>2.150/2017 (22 countries)</td>
<td>2.170/2018 (28 countries)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component 2 (FRONTEX): To increase the analytical, preventive and operational capacities of third countries' authorities in the fight against criminal networks responsible for migrant smuggling and to build meaningful trust and networking</td>
<td>1. Number of joint risk analysis concluded</td>
<td>To be determined during the inception phase by FRONTEX</td>
<td>AFIC Reports</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Number of periodic (annual) risk analysis reports covering the migration/smuggling routes</td>
<td></td>
<td>To be determined during the inception phase by FRONTEX</td>
<td>National reports/statistics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[26]
amongst key countries and regions that will enable them to cooperate and share information (trans-) regionally while ensuring compliance with human rights and the rule of law.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outputs</th>
<th>Component 1 (AIRCOP) - Output 1: Joint Airport Interdiction Task Forces /Interdiction Units effectively operate to combat drug related crime in airport settings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Number of Letters of Agreements/MoUs (or equivalent) creating JAITFs signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Number of participating law enforcement agencies per JAITF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Number of officials per JAITF (incl. women)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Number of personnel trained and/or mentored on airport interdiction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Number of JAITFs equipped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Number of consistent information exchanges among JAITFs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Number/quantity of seizures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. 16 letters (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. 15 officials (1 woman) per JAITF (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. 200 (20 w) (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. 16 JAITF equipped (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. 80 exchanges (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. 111 seizures (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. 21 letters (2017); 24 letters (2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. 3/count. (2017-18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. 15 officials per JAITF (2 women) (2017-18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. 200 (25 women) (2017); 200 (30 women) (2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. 21 JAITFs equipped (2017); 24 JAITFs equipped (2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. 120 exh. (2017); 180 exh. (2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mission reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Copies of signed Letters of Agreements/MoUs (or equivalent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Detailed lists of participating law enforcement agencies per JAITF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A training programme per country elaborated Mentoring evaluations and mentors’ reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reports on post-seizure investigations available to UNODC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reports on joint operations Evaluations of training and equipment use received by UNODC UNODC financial and substantive report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extracts of JAITFs activity reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Basic knowledge exists to be further expanded through capacity building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trained personnel remains assigned to the JAITF Equipment and knowledge are used to their full potential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Airlines and airport authorities are willing to cooperate with JAITF Equipment and knowledge are used to their full potential Inter-agency rivalry does not prevent cooperation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Component 1 (AIRCOP) - Output 2:
Enhanced capacity of law enforcement officials in selected airports to exchange real-time operational information on countering illicit trafficking and organized crime at national, regional and international level

| 1. | Number of CENcomm installations |
| 2. | Number of i-24/7 installations |
| 3. | Number of access to I24/7 and WCO CENcomm AIRCOP |
| 4. | Number of Joint Operations |
| 5. | Number of pre-operational training/meetings |
| 6. | Number of participating countries |
| 7. | Number of Officers who attend pre-operational training/meetings (incl. number of men and women) |

| 1. | 16 CENc (2015) |
| 2. | 6 i-24/7 (2015) |
| 3. | 40 (2015) |
| 4. | 2 (2015) |
| 5. | 4 (2015) |
| 7. | 60 with 6 women (2015) |

Conclusions on practical implementation

- Officers from participating airports are sent to the basic training session
- Data and messages exchanged through CENcomm
- Lists of items seized are sent to WCO
- WCO financial and substantive report
- INTERPOL financial and substantive report

Equipment and knowledge are used to their full potential

Trained personnel remains assigned to the operation

No corruption cases emerge during the operation

## Component 2 (FRONTEX) – Result 1:
Increased capacities of beneficiary countries in undertaking risk, strategic and operational analyses/assessments on irregular migration flows and smuggling/trafficking networks that will enhance the situational awareness and preventive abilities of the competent authorities.

| 1. | Number of personnel trained from beneficiary countries |
| 2. | Number of strategic and operational information exchanges between beneficiary countries |
| 3. | Number of contributions to periodic (annual) strategic risk analysis report covering the migration/smuggling routes through the beneficiary countries |

To be determined during the inception phase by FRONTEX

Project update reports

National government reports, including Statistical Office (NSO) reports with data provided by relevant Ministries / Border Authorities / Law Enforcement Agencies

Political will and minimum existing trust from national authorities to cooperate and share information (including actionable intelligence) amongst them

Trained staff remain within their institutions beyond the capacity building exercise

Inter-agency rivalry does not prevent cooperation

Ability of the implementing partner to mobilise timely the right expertise for the roll out of activities

Sufficient capacities at national and (sub-)regional levels can be mobilised for participation in the activities.
### Component 2 (FRONTEX) – Result 2:

Enhanced inter-agency and inter-regional information sharing structures and networking of authorities in this area, that will strengthen confidence and trust building between countries of origin, transit and destination countries with a view to establish direct cooperation channels, thus contributing to improved border management amongst them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Number of (non-EU) participating countries and observers to AFIC</th>
<th>1. 27 including observers (2016)</th>
<th>1. 40 including observers (2020)</th>
<th>Annual AFIC Report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Number of workshops and meetings organised bringing together the relevant stakeholders in view of developing certain joint products e.g. annual risk analysis report.</td>
<td>2. To be determined during the inception phase by FRONTEX</td>
<td>2. To be determined during the inception phase by FRONTEX</td>
<td>Project update reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Number of joint trainings on risk analysis methodologies and tools bringing together the relevant beneficiary countries of a region</td>
<td>3. To be determined during the inception phase by FRONTEX</td>
<td>3. To be determined during the inception phase by FRONTEX</td>
<td>National government reports, including Statistical Office (NSO) reports with data provided by relevant Ministries / Border Authorities / Law Enforcement Agencies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Component 2 (FRONTEX) – Result 3:

Improved operational capabilities through promoting and supporting joint investigation teams that can lead to joint operations in dismantling OC networks engaged in SoM (and THB) that will increase the operational capacities of the partner countries (including improving the detection of THB victims as they cross borders).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Number of joint trainings on integrated border management bringing together the relevant beneficiary countries of a region</th>
<th>To be determined during the inception phase by FRONTEX</th>
<th>To be determined during the inception phase by FRONTEX</th>
<th>Annual AFIC Report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Number of personnel trained from beneficiary countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Project update reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Number of joint operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Regional organisations’ reports</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Political will and minimum existing trust from national authorities to cooperate and share information (including actionable intelligence) amongst them
- Trained staff remain within their institutions beyond the capacity building exercise
- Inter-agency rivalry does not prevent cooperation
- Ability of the implementing partner to mobilise timely the right expertise for the roll out of activities
- Sufficient capacities at national and (sub-)regional levels can be mobilised for participation in the activities.

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