Thematic Evaluation of the European Commission support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building (CPPB)

Evaluation for the European Commission

Dissemination Seminar

Brussels, 7 November 2011

Thematic Evaluation of the European Commission support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building (CPPB)

A consortium of
Particip-ADE–DRN-DIE–
ECDPM-ODI

particip

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DRN
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Researchers'
Network

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Agenda

- **Evaluation approach**

- **Conclusions**

- **Recommendations**

Agenda

- **Evaluation approach:**

  - **Presentation of the inventory**

  - **A challenging evaluation**

  - **Main lines of the proposed approach**

- **Conclusions**

- **Recommendations**

Evaluation subject, purpose and scope

| Subject	**Commission's support to CPPB as defined by the 2001 COM** (Only activities under first EU pillar) → **an evaluation at strategy level** (not a project evaluation or an admin/management audit)
Purpose	• **Provide an overall independent assessment** of Commission's past and current support – for internal services and wider public • **Identify key lessons for improving** current and future Commission strategies and programmes
Scope	• **2001-2010** • **All third countries (ACP, ALA, ENP),** except countries under DG ELARG • **Community thematic and geographical BL, EDF, other financial instruments,** except humanitarian relief (DG ECHO)

Over the 2001-2010 period the Commission support to CPPB has increased significantly to reach levels close to 1bn/year

Funds contracted by the Commission to CPPB (2001-2010)

€m

Total: €7.7bn

From the Commission General Budget €5.8bn

From the EDF €1.9bn

year

Source: CRIS and ADE analysis

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4 countries, major recipients of Commission's funds for CPPB interventions, received 54.5% of the funds

ACP, ENP-MEDA and Asia received each ~30% of CPPB funds

LATIN AMERICA €0.2bn

MULTI REGION €0.2bn

ENP-TACIS €0.3bn

ACP €2.5bn — 33%

ASIA €2.1bn — 27%

4%

3% 3%

**ENP - MEDA** €2,3bn — 30%

Source: CRIS and ADE analysis

Note: **ACP**: African, Caribbean and Pacific countries ; **ASIA**: Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Indonasia, Laos, Philippines, Thailand, Viet Nam ; **ENP - MEDA**: Jordan, Lebanon, West Bank and Gaza Strip, Israel, Algeria, Egypt, Lybia, Morocco ; **ENP - TACIS**: Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirghyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tadzhikistan, Ukraine ; **MULTI REGION**: covering several regions or unspecified location

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51% of the funds were channelled through international organisations (mainly UN and WB)

Development
agencies
€0.1bn

Remaining [1]
€0.1bn

Regional
organisations
€0.5bn

Total 2001-2010
€7.7bn

2%

7%

Private
companies
€0.8bn

10%

International
Organisations
€3.9bn

Civil Society
Organisations
(CSOs)
€0.9bn

12%

51%

17%

State/Public
authorities
€1.3bn

Total 2001-2010
€7.7bn

Multisector
€0.3bn

Environment &
natural resources
€0.2bn

Economic support and
trade cooperation
€0.4bn

Other [1]
€0.09bn

Security sector
€0.5bn

2%

3.5%

5%

Rapid intervention
€1.7bn

23%

Reconstruction &
infrastructure
€0.97bn

7%

13%

17%

Democracy, rule of
law and
civil society
€1.3bn

13%

16%

Population flows and
human trafficking
€1bn

Peace consolidation and
prevention of future conflict
€1.2bn

Other [1] : Anti-drug actions €0.06bn and Health and communicable diseases €0.03bn
Source: CRIS and ADE analysis

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A subject with a specific complexity in itself

Behind the concept of CPPB are different sub-categories that constitute sectors / themes in their own right, receiving substantial funding

The 2001 Communication from the Commission participates to a "paradigm shift": a close interaction between CPPB and development cooperation

The context is key:

- Conflict (prone) and post conflict situations are often very different;
- Strategies need to be responsive to specific and often changing situations
- Difficult to reflect sensitive, rather implicit, political objectives

Support to CPPB becomes virtually all encompassing

**One size fits all does not work**

Two key features of the approach

Focusing the evaluation on what is at the heart of the Commission's strategy to CPPB: having an **integrated approach towards CPPB**:

- To what extend was this implemented and with what results?

- What means were made available by the Commission to have such an integrated approach

Build to a large extent the evaluation around **country case studies** complemented with other sources of information

The key dimensions of the "integrated approach"

- How?
- Different time dimensions (when?)
- Different types of activities (what?)
- Activities of different actors (who/with whom?)
- Different geographical dimensions (where?)

Coverage of the dimensions of the Integrated Approach by Evaluation Questions

EQ1	Mainstreaming
EQ2	Root causes
EQ3	Short term prevention
EQ4	Geographical aspects
EQ5	Coordination & complementarity
EQ6	Commission VA
EQ7	Means
EQ8	Timeliness and cost-effectiveness

EQ 7

EQ 8

How?

EQ 3

Different time dimensions

(when?)

EQ 1 EQ 2

Different types of activities

(what?)

EQ 5

EQ 6

Activities of different actors

(who/with whom?)

EQ 4

Different geographical dimensions

(where?)

The above was developed in the preparatory phase

Two preparatory studies

Preliminary study

- Inventory and typology of Commission funding in the field of CPPB;
- Regulatory framework;
- Reconstruction of the intervention logic.

-Focusing the evaluation on the examination of the Commission integrated approach towards CPPB
- Building the evaluation around country case studies

Concept study

- Clarification of the concept of the integrated approach (the "what" and the "how");
- Set of 8 Evaluation Questions;
- Specific evaluation approach to structure the EQs;
- Methodology for the evaluation;
- Selection of countries for case studies.

The evaluation process consisted of distinct phases, each with specific activities and deliverables

01/09	09/10	12/10	04/11	10/11	11/11

Structuring Phase	**Desk Phase**	**Field Phase**	**Synthesis Phase**	**Dissemination Seminar**

RG RG RG RG   RG   RG   RG   DS

Tasks

Structuring Phase	Desk Phase	Field Phase	Synthesis Phase	Dissemination Seminar
• Regulatory framework • Inventory and typology of funds • Reconstruction Intervention Logic • Definition of integrated approach • Set of structured Evaluation Questions (incl. conceptual and analytical background) • Methodology and country selection	• 8 Country case studies [1], incl. intervention-level study • General-level study • Meta-analysis of evaluation reports • CSP/RSP review • Interviews Brussels • Formulation of findings, hypotheses and information gaps	• Survey to EUD staff • 4 focused country visits (Bolivia, Sierra Leone, Timor Leste, WB&GS)	• Drafting country case studies • Drafting answers to evaluation questions • Drafting conclusions and recommendations • Drafting the final report	• **Dissemination in Brussels**

Delive-rables

Structuring Phase	Desk Phase	Field Phase	Synthesis Phase	Dissemination Seminar
• **Preliminary and concept studies**	• **(Draft) Desk report**	• **Field Phase Presentation**	• **(Draft) Final Report**	• **Dissemination Presentation**

RG: Steering Committee meeting in Brussels ; DS: Dissemination Seminar

[1] Bolivia, Central African Republic, Georgia, Ivory Coast, Kyrgyz Republic, Sierra Leone, Timor Leste, and WB&GS

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Information collection through a variety of sources and tools

8 country case studies
- Desk phase: analysis of overall CPPB strategy and selected interventions
- Field phase: in 4 countries

General level documents and interviews
(e.g. general CPPB publications, EC strategy documents, think tank reports, etc.)

Inventory of 2001-2010 interventions identified as CPPB

CSP/RSP review (34)

Meta-analysis of country/regional/thematic evaluations

Survey to 50 EUDs (72% response rate)

Triangulation

Overall 75% of CPPB funding was covered by the main evaluation tools

Total support to CPPB (100% of funding)

36 countries (63% of funding)

16 countries & 3 regions (63% of funding)

8 countries (33% of funding)

12 countries (18% of funding)

Survey to EUD

Meta-analysis

- **General-level documentary analysis**
- **Interview at HQ**
- **Analysis of the inventory**

CSP/RSP review

Country case studies
- **Country and intervention-specific documentary analysis**
- **Interviews at HQ and in the field**
- **Field missions (to 4 countries)**

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Conclusions and Recommendations are based on a strong analytical and factual basis

Report sections

- Recom. → Chapter 6
- Conclusions → Chapter 5
- Answers to the Evaluation Questions → Chapter 4
- Findings & Analysis → Chapter 4
- Facts → Vol. 2 Annexes

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Agenda

- **Evaluation approach – *reminder***

- **Conclusions**

- **Recommendations**

11 Conclusions in 4 clusters

Overall Commitments towards CPPB

> C 1: Importance of CPPB within Commission

> C 2: Integrated approach

Strategy issues

> C 3: Commission's role in conflict contexts

> C 4: Commission's reactive approach to CPPB

> C 5: Alignment with national authorities

> C 6: Use of Channelling

Results & Impacts

> C 7: Commission Value Added

> C 8: Overall impact of Commission support on CPPB

> C 9: Commission role in CPPB hampered by its mandate and differing positions with EU MS

Means & Implementation

> C 10: Gap between policy commitments and means

> C 11: Timeliness challenged by conflict context

C1: Since 2001, the Commission has operated a substantial shift towards support to CPPB by developing its funding, policy framework and instruments (1/2)

Based on Inventory, Regulatory framework, EQ1,2,3,7

Commission's financial support to CPPB significantly increased over the period

2001: €120m

Peaks: 2006 & 2007: €1bn

2010: €962m

Total: €7.7bn

EC: often **one of major donors** in countries supported

Commission considerably strengthened its policy framework in CPPB

- 2001 COM: introduction of the objective of **mainstreaming conflict prevention** into all development programming

- After 9/11, **security** issues took on higher profile, impacting the agenda of CPPB: link between security and development, new approaches focused on SSR, SALW, DDR, etc.

- 2007: **fragility** agenda

Specialised sectoral assistance

- **Instruments targeting CPPB-related matters** (food security, EIDHR, etc.)

- **Design of one specific ST instrument with simplified procedures** (RRM, then IfS)

Possibility to use flexible procedures in crisis situations

Long-term geographical assistance that could be used to address both ST and LT prevention although its **appropriateness** for conflict-affected countries **sometimes questioned**

Wide range of instruments

Non-financial instruments (with the **Council**): political dialogue, high-level mediation through EU Special Representatives, deployment of EU observers, deployment of civilian crisis management missions (E/CSDP missions), and use of preventive sanctions

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C2: There was a gap between the Commission's policy commitments towards an integrated approach for CPPB support and the actual implementation of this approach

Commission has taken initiatives to ensure that 4 dimensions of integrated approach were taken into account, but with varying degrees of success and globally not to the extent to which it committed itself.

Conceptual orientations at policy level have generally not been appropriated at operational level and were not always univocal and shared at strategic level

What?
Approach to conflict analysis, conflict sensitivity and mainstreaming was not systematised or structured (no documented conflict analyses, awareness of "do no harm" but not formalised)

When?
Often quick reaction to conflicts that had broken out, but challenges remained for transition to long term prevention (weaknesses of local capacities, premature transition to development)

Where?
Attention to geographical features of conflict, but synergies between different levels of intervention (local, national, regional) remained underexploited

Who?
Initiatives to enhance coordination at different levels (e.g working groups), but this resulted generally **more in exchange of information than in enhancing complementarities**

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11 Conclusions in 4 clusters

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C3: The ambition of the Commission regarding its role in conflict (-prone) and post-conflict countries and regions was not always clear and its support often remained wedded to a developmental perspective rather than operating a shift towards a genuine CPPB perspective with a clear and prioritised strategy

Based on EQ 2

Spirit of 2001 COM: CP should be at the heart of the strategy….

… But precise role of EC in conflict countries was to a certain extent blurred

- **Mainstreaming was not widespread and CPPB not at the heart of the strategy**

  → **In most cases,** support aimed at best at **mitigating the consequences of conflict** or at **addressing** more **development-related needs** in a specific conflict context

Not yet in line with the paradigm shift required to address the challenges of a conflict (-prone) or post-conflict context

C4: The Commission generally had a reactive rather than a pro-active approach to conflict

Lack of proper and documented conflict analysis	Limited structured EC knowledge of conflict + extent to which EC support was properly informed by conflict context
Approach to structural stability	EC support aimed more at mitigating consequences of root causes rather than at directly tackling them
EC early warning system: not sufficiently comprehensive and operationally useful	Existence of several EC early warning mechanisms but either not known about or widely used to plan and implement responses
Reaction mostly after eruption of conflict, but often quick	•Combined various financial and non-financial instruments in rapid response to crisis situations; •Designed specific ST instruments and procedures but flexibility and appropriate speed of these questioned in a number of cases

C5: The conflict (-prone) or post-conflict context challenged the relevance of the alignment of Commission support on the strategies and policies of national authorities

Based on EQ5

2005 Paris Declaration: commitment to align with partner countries' strategies

Posed specific challenges, which were accentuated or typical in a conflict (-prone) or post-conflict context:

- **National development strategies did not always exist** ;
- **Capacities of national partners** were often weakened;
- **Not always clear with whom to align**;
- **National authorities sometimes a major party to conflict**;
- For political reasons, **in some cases national authorities considered that the conflict context was part of the past and that it was necessary to enter into a developmental phase**, whereas the Commission (and other actors) considered this was too early

EC decided in some countries not to enter into a logic of mere alignment (out of line with the needs of the country which rather required sustained support for CPPB)

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C6: The Commission channelled half of its financial support through international organisations, allowing it to intervene in a coordinated manner in contexts where otherwise it would not have been present, but which also made it vulnerable to the drawbacks of the use of this aid modality

Based on Inventory, EQ5

Commission channelled 51% of its CPPB funding

- *Mainly WB and UN*
- *3 countries (Afghanistan, WB&GS and Iraq) accounted for 60% of the total amount channelled*

+

- **Intervene in countries where going alone** would have been **difficult** and risky;
- Adopt a **coordinated approach** with the international community to conflict affected areas;
- Provide a **critical mass of funding** to support reconstruction and rehabilitation;
- **Re-start its cooperation** with countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan.

-

Perception of a **donor driven approach** and **impaired efficiency** under specific circumstances (e.g weak government capacities)

11 Conclusions in 4 clusters

Overall Commitments towards CPPB

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Results & Impacts

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> **C 8: Overall impact of Commission support on CPPB**

> **C 9: Commission role in CPPB hampered by its mandate and differing positions with EU MS**

Means & Implementation

> **C 10: Gap between policy commitments and means**

> **C 11: Timeliness challenged by conflict context**

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C7: Through its support in conflict (-prone) and post-conflict countries and regions the Commission provided different types of value added that differentiated it from most other actors

6 types of Commission's added value

Perceived less strong "political profile"	Facilitated dialogue with all parties in the country/region + led in some cases EUMS to confer on the EC the mandate to represent them
Reliability	Continued presence + capacity to establish a long-term partnership
Critical mass of financial support	Wide geographical and sectoral coverage + political leverage though not often applied
Wide array of instruments	Action in the short-term and in the long-term and in different sectors
Thematic experience in fields impacting on CPPB	
Credibility in promotion of peace & democracy	

C8: In some cases the Commission played a key role in mitigating the impact of root causes, notably through a largely integrated approach. The Commission's support also generally had a positive contribution to conflict mitigation, stabilisation, reconstruction and rehabilitation. But the overall impact of its support in terms of CPPB remains impossible to predict.

Based on EQ 2,3,5

ST support	*Significant financial resources (23% of total CPPB contracted funds) **+ political dialogue***	*Generally, positive contribution to reconstruction and rehabilitation, peace consolidation, stabilisation*
LT support	*Generally not geared to working "on" the conflict and to tackling the root causes as such*	*Cases of clear contributions in terms of **mitigating the consequences of root causes**, notably **through a largely integrated approach*** •*WB&GS* •*Ivory Coast (election process)* •*Sierra Leone (contribution to GoSLe efforts to create bureaucracy and macro stability (parallel DFID/EC involvement); positive transition through LRRD;*	*Taking into account of each one of 4 dimensions with varying degrees* •*WB&GS (IA)* •*Ivory Coast & Sierra Leone: no explicit conflict sensitive approach and tackling of root causes*

C9: The Commission was hampered in the role it played with respect to CPPB by its mandate and differences in priorities among the EU MS

Commission played an increasing role in the international scene in the field of CPPB…..

… but role it could play on the international political scene limited by:

- **Absence of mandate** to intervene in CPPB (unlike the UN) and no clear-cut competence-sharing between Commission and Council

- **Differing positions among EUMS** in some cases, although generally they broadly took the same approach

- **No sufficient exploitation of the leverage offered by the critical mass of financial resources**, notably due to the lack of or difficulty of having a common European voice on foreign policy matters

11 Conclusions in 4 clusters

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C10: The Commission's institutional set-up, its human resources policy and its tools and guidance for CPPB were not commensurate with its policy commitment and the level of its funding for CPPB (1/3)

Based on EQ 5,7

Institutional set-up

Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the coherence and effectiveness of the EU's approach to CPPB were challenged by the complexity of the EU's institutional set-up in the area of external affairs.

- **No clear-cut competence-sharing** between the Commission and the Council in the area of external affairs;

- **No clear division of roles** between the Commission and the Council and between the Commission and the EUSR;

- **Fragmentation of CPPB issues across the various Commission DGs.**

Human Resources policy

Commission did not have a human resources policy that was designed to govern interventions in conflict (-prone) contexts

- **no dedicated human resources policy favouring the hiring of specialised and experienced CPPB staff** to work on conflict issues or in conflict countries;

- **no specific pool of CPPB experts** that the Commission could easily and rapidly mobilise;

- **training** in HQ in various CPPB-related fields (**not compulsory**, **generally not attended by staff from EUD and from geographical units in HQ**).

CPPB was insufficiently considered in the career development of officials (performance review, promotion and incentives)

Knowledge management in CPPB within the Commission has been poor

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C10: The Commission's institutional set-up, its human resources policy and its tools and guidance for CPPB were not commensurate with its policy commitment and the level of its funding for CPPB (3/3)

Tools and Guidance

Commission had limited operational tools and guidance for interventions in post-conflict or conflict (-prone) contexts and these were used only rarely

- EC **developed a series of tools and guidance for CPPB**
  - Country Conflict assessments and Country Conflict indicators;
  - EC Checklist on root causes of conflict;
  - guidance from the inter-Service Quality Support Group (iQSG) to give CSPs a conflict focus;
  - set of guidelines on CPPB-related sectors.

- **Toolbox did not allow EC to bridge gap btw high-level policy commitments and their concrete implementation:**
  - lacked **operationality;**
  - lacked **clarity and comprehensiveness;**
  - **not widely used or known of** within the Commission.

C11: The timeliness of the delivery of Commission CPPB support has often been impaired by insufficient anticipation of difficulties specifically related to the conflict or conflict (-prone) context, as well as by heavy Commission procedures, although at times the latter were also appreciated for their "protective" function.

Based on EQ 8

Delays have often been recorded

Usual explanatory factors *(e.g defects in design, lengthy preparatory phase, etc.)*

+

Specific challenges posed by conflict situation often underestimated / not well anticipated *(e.g difficulties of working in a conflict situation; sensitivity of some CPPB projects)*

Timeliness also impeded by heavy Commission procedures, though appreciated at times for their "protective" character

- **Multi-annual programming does not allow rapid adaptation**
- **Length of decision-making procedures for programmes (even through IfS)**

But

Stringency of procedures appreciated in conflict context *(accountability, control and transparency requirements)*

In some cases, deliberate choice *of implementing aid through* ***centralised management to remain owner of implementation, control and audit of funds***

Agenda

- **Evaluation approach – *reminder***

- **Conclusions**

- **Recommendations**

8 Recommendations in 3 clusters

Commission's overall role and approach

R 1: Strengthen Commission position as key player in CPPB

R 2: Strengthen the integrated approach

Specific strategy issues

R 3: Clarify role to play in conflict countries by focusing on crisis management efforts and on tackling directly the root causes

R 4: Leverage Commision's financial weight with non-financial support

R 5: Relevance of alignment

Means & Implementation

R 6: Make appropriate means available

R 7: Maintain "protective" character of procedures but make them swifter

R 8: Better anticipate conflict-related challenges

Recommendation 1
(Commission's overall role and approach)

Overarching Recommendation

R1: Commission should strengthen its position as key player in CPPB

- *Why?:*
    - EC accumulated **substantial experience** and ensured its **policy and instrumental framework** increasingly fitted
    - EC has **assets to offer** in the field of **CPPB**;
    - EC **can make successful contributions**
- *How?*
    - **Further develop** its **support** to CPPB

See further recommendations

Recommendation 2
(Commission's overall role and approach) (1/2)

R2: Strengthen the Integrated Approach

- Ensure **clarification and common understanding of concepts** among EEAS and Commission staff, including at operational level:
  - Consult and then **provide a set of clear univocal definitions of key concepts** in a single document
  - Ensure **dissemination** of these definitions to all actors concerned
- Develop and implement a **systematic and structured approach to conflict analysis, mainstreaming and "do no harm":**
  - Develop a **brief and user-friendly** *vademecum* (e.g specific guidance on how to ensure conflict sensitivity, "do no harm" approaches and mainstreaming)
  - Make **use of guidance compulsory** in EEAS and EC support in conflict countries
- Create a **comprehensive, easy and flexible early-warning system** and make sure it is **used:**
  - **Rationalise current early-warning mechanisms**, in particular decide which early-warning mechanisms are critical and useful
  - **EEAS: potential platform** to create a comprehensive EWS

Commission HQ, EUD and High Representative

Recommendation 2
(Commission's overall role and approach) (2/2)

R2: Strengthen the Integrated Approach

• **Strengthen the synergies** between the different geographical levels of intervention
    • Analyse where the support could benefit from such synergies as part of conflict analysis, inform programming and monitor results at various levels
• Make sure that **coordination mechanisms** at all levels, but especially between the Commission, the EEAS, the EU Council and EU MS, **go beyond a mere exchange of information** and aim at enhancing complementarities at strategy and implementation levels **and** that they **allow** :
    • **Clear division of roles btw actors** (based on respective added value);
    • **Coherent political positions of partners, no duplication of support, maximisation of synergies**

Commission HQ, EUD and High Representative

Recommendations 3, 4 and 5 (Specific strategy issues)

R3: Clarify the role to be played in conflict countries by focusing on crisis management efforts and on tackling the root causes directly

- Sustain crisis management efforts; and

- Tackle directly the root causes of conflict through a clear and prioritised strategy geared to CPPB going beyond mere "classic" development

Commission HQ, in coord. with High Representative

R4: Leverage Commission's financial weight with non-financial support

EEAS and EUD representing the EU = potential positive developments

- Leverage existing capacities and entry points for EC/EEAS to be more proactive and take the lead

- Active engagement in coordination structures and strategies of the international community

- Join up national efforts with dialogue and participation in global/regional fora (AU, UN)

- Concerted dialogue and mediation strategies with national authorities & CSO

Commission HQ, in coord. with High Representative

R5: Relevance of alignment

- Examine on a case by case basis **how far EC should align its activities with national priorities**

- **Reserve the right to distance itself from such priorities** (dialogue with civil society and other country actors important**)**

Commission HQ and EUD

Recommendations 6, 7, and 8 (Means and implementation)

R6: Make appropriate means available	R7: Maintain protective character of procedures but make them swifter	R8: Better anticipate conflict-related challenges
• **Design and implement a specific human resources policy** for intervening in post-conflict contexts (recruitment policy in EUD; training and sharing of experiences -with conduct of political dialogue by senior staff-) • **Provide mechanisms to ensure effective knowledge management** (institutional memory: archive of files and hand-over of responsibilities; lesson-learning btw EUD) • **Provide a focused set of workable tools and guidance** (limited in number; clear and practical; drawing on existing best practice; used) • **Develop and implement monitoring frameworks** (define specific indicators to monitor effects of programmes on conflict situation)	• **Maintain protective character of procedures** • **Smooth out procedures and methods of aid implementation** (use of annual programming, change of focal areas, reallocation of programmed funds; use of flexible procedures for programming ; speed up decision-making for IfS)	• **Adopt a conflict-sensitive approach** • **Adapt expectations** with respect to **timeliness** and **rapidity of disbursements** *Commission HQ, EUD*

Commission HQ, EUD, High Representative   *Commission HQ*

Additional information and contact details

Available material:

- **Preliminary study** to the Evaluation of the European Commission's support to conflict prevention and peace building :
  http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/2009/1266_docs_en.htm

- **Concept study** of the European Commission's Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building :
  http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/2010/1277_docs_en.htm

- **Thematic evaluation** of of the European Commission's Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building:

  http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/2011/1291_docs_en.htm

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