Shaping the Future of Geopolitics

Foresight and Strategic Game Changers
Hard and Soft Power in a Changing World

November 2017
Foreword

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On behalf of the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS), it is a great pleasure to welcome you to the 2017 Annual Conference, which convenes under the timely theme of ‘Global Trends to 2030: the Making of a New Geopolitical Order?’. Once again, the two-day event is hosted by the European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC) and the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS).

Drawing on the insights of the 2015 ESPAS report on ‘Global Trends to 2030: Can the EU meet the challenges ahead?’, we look forward to hosting thought leaders, global foresight practitioners, and strategists from around the world to explore the latest and most pressing trends shaping geopolitics in the coming decade and beyond.

In today’s turbulent world, where governments and international organisations are increasingly faced with more uncertainty and volatility, this year’s event will zoom into emerging challenges and opportunities relevant to the European Union, highlighting the importance of strategic foresight and anticipatory governance in policy- and decision-making.

Forward-looking approaches are all the more important in a world of ‘Geopolitical Recession’, where multilateralism and the rules-based international order are under pressure, and new actors and technologies have the potential to be real geostrategic game changers.

Against this backdrop, how can Europe ensure that it holds its future in its own hands? What must it do to better prepare for an uncertain future and tackle new security challenges?

Given the wide array of issues covered throughout the sessions, we have set out to capture some of the valuable insights of our guests in a short collection of insightful, forward-looking essays. Our aim is simple: to ensure that our speakers’ contributions are able to reach beyond the conference’s immediate audience and to stimulate strategic thinking about the key trends that will take place around the world by 2030, and their possible implications for the EU.

We are therefore tremendously grateful that, amidst their heavy professional, academic and personal commitments, our speakers generously responded to our request for contributions. The result is a unique collection of over 30 original short essays addressing the different themes of this year’s Annual Meeting.

Along with the ESPAS leadership, including the ESPAS Honorary President, James Elles, I sincerely hope that you will enjoy this collection of think-pieces and that they may trigger further dialogue and reflection on how to prepare for the future, shape better policies and build up resilience.

Sincerely,
Acknowledgments

Many people contributed meaningfully, both intellectually and practically, to the organisation of the 2017 Annual ESPAS Conference, and to the preparation of this accompanying publication. I would like to take this opportunity to express my heartfelt gratitude to them.

First and foremost, I would like to warmly thank our speakers and contributors. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank the members of the ESPAS Steering Group and their collaborators for a partnership that has been growing ever stronger: Klaus Welle, Anthony Teasdale and Frank Debié from the European Parliament, Jim Cloos and Leo Schulte Nordholt from the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU; Christian Leffler and Alfredo Conte from the European External Action Service (EEAS); Jiří Buriánek and Béatrice Taulègne from the Committee of the Regions; Luis Planas and Pierluigi Brombo from the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and, of course, James Elles, ESPAS’ Honorary President.

Even more so, I wish to genuinely acknowledge the contributions of all the members of the ESPAS teams across all participating institutions who worked untiringly for this year’s conference and this publication: Danièle Réchard, Leopold Schmertzing, and Freya Windle-Wehrle have been the pillars of the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS). Julia Clerck-Sachsse, Simonetta Cook, Francesco Fusaro and Béatrice Taulègne from the European External Action Service (EEAS), the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), and the Committee of the Regions respectively.

At the EPSC, I would particularly like to express my gratitude to Ricardo Borges de Castro, Ruby Gropas, Leonardo Quattrucci, Natacha Faullimmel, and Anne-Sophie Deman who have steadily carried through the entire process over this past year; Paweł Świeboda, who has always had purposeful and insightful suggestions; Agnieszka Skuratowicz, Mihaela Moldovan, Cristina Ruiz, Claudia Rodriguez Garza, Michèle Tahon, Aurélie Therace, Kim Hoang Lê, and Isabelle Declere who oversaw the full organisation of this event from the start and ensured that this all came together; Jonáš Jančařík, who set up our website and orchestrated our online presence; Annick Hilbert, who created this year’s ESPAS design and beautifully laid out this publication; Rachel Smit for her sharp editing; and of course Carmen Tresguerres, who has worked closely with all to ensure that we always strive for more and better.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreword</strong></td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Acknowledgments</strong></td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foresight and Strategic Game Changers</strong></td>
<td>05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preparing for the Future: Survival Strategies for a World on Steroids</strong></td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stefanie Babst, Duncan Cass-Beggs, Puruesh Chaudhary, Jeanette Kwek</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Through the Eyes of Others: Global Trends to 2030</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benoni Belli, Tarek Osman, Chu Shulong, Dmitri Trenin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geopolitics 4.0: Emerging Challenges; New Actors</strong></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aaron Maniam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foresight for Policy: Charting Our Way in an Uncertain Future</strong></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angela Wilkinson</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What if Connectivity Were the New Geo-Strategic Game Changer?</strong></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parag Khanna, Ulrich Schulte-Strathaus, Kristin Shi-Kupfer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What if ‘Winter Were Coming’? Is Europe Prepared for the Security Challenges to Come?</strong></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolfgang Ischinger, Rob Leslie, Rob Wainwright</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hard and Soft Power in a Changing World</strong></td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Future of Strategic Rivalry and War</strong></td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florence Gaub, Justin Vaisse, Tomáš Valášek, Wolfgang Wosolsobe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geopolitics of Environmental Change</strong></td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiří Buriánek, Sabrina Schulz, Katarzyna Zysk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Rules in a ‘Might is Right’ World</strong></td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heather Grabbe, Simon Serfaty, Christian Strohal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geopolitics of an Economically Interdependent World</strong></td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Gros, Luca Jahier</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Future of Leadership</strong></td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESPAS Young Talent Network</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Europe Towards 2030</strong></td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPSC, EPRS, Council Secretariat, EEAS, CoR, EESC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Biographies of Contributors to ESPAS 2017</strong></td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Foresight
and Strategic
Game Changers
Imagine a large international company getting ready to take a decision with far-reaching, strategic implications. The new project will affect the company’s future scope of operations and geographical reach, its value on the stock exchange, and future investment funds. How will the company’s Board of Directors prepare for such a critical decision?

In all likelihood, it will pay close attention to the potential risks facing the project and kick-start a robust forecasting process aimed at examining whether the project is realistic and to what extent the company will be able to achieve its goals. Certainly, part of this effort will be to anticipate and analyse global risks that could pose a threat to the success of the firm’s new endeavour.

In short, the company’s Board of Directors will spend considerable time, resources, and effort to conduct strategic foresight and plan for the successful implementation of their critical decision.

By contrast, many national governments, public corporations, and international organisations often find it much harder to use foresight as a tool for strategic planning and risk assessment when preparing for political decisions. There are many reasons for this reluctance: some policymakers tend to think that they cannot afford to make time for topics that are not directly reflected in their weekly diaries; others confuse foresight with predictions, arguing that efforts to predict the future are futile and even frivolous. A third group is driven by the fear that foresight analyses and forecast scenarios could leak to the public and be used against them. And finally, there are those in governments and public institutions who generally feel more comfortable with the status quo. Why bother - so the argument goes - and attempt to anticipate the future a decade in advance, when coping with the current reality is already so complicated?

Of course, there are limits to comparing private enterprises to public institutions. Strategic decision-making in the business world is not always a success story; and not all public institutions are averse to change. Also, business leaders have a different relationship to their investors and stakeholders than elected leaders to their voters.

Yet in an exceptionally dynamic, interconnected, and global world long-term thinking is critical to framing strategies and preparing for the unforeseen challenges. This ‘golden rule’ applies both to the political and business worlds.
But it is a hard thing to do. Attempting to grasp the future is also difficult because we all carry inherent assumptions about people, places, motives, dynamics and many other issues in our heads, often without being aware of these assumptions.

However, challenging our own assumptions about future developments is vital if we do not want to become complacent or simply driven by world events.

Strategic foresight is not a magic formula that lifts some of the burden from policymakers and bureaucrats when juggling a large number of pressing policy issues simultaneously. But when used professionally, systematically and inclusively, it can be a very effective tool to identify the forces and factors that drive global changes, anticipate threats and mitigate risks, and identify opportunities for influencing the course of events. It is a capacity that organisations on every level of society should develop to distinguish important signals from noise and to prepare for uncertainty and disruption. Navigating states, institutions, and people through our fast-changing global environment is an enormous challenge. Strategic foresight can help inform and support political decision-making, in particular when national governments and international organisations get ready to take decisions with far-reaching strategic consequences.

Duncan Cass-Beggs, Counsellor for the Strategic Foresight, General Secretariat, OECD

Strategic Foresight and Anticipatory Government: Policymaking in an Era of Rapid Change and Unprecedented Unpredictability

Accelerating technological transformation, demographic and environmental shifts, and rising social, political and geopolitical uncertainties are combining to create what is potentially an unprecedented global scale and pace of change. In this context of rapid change and rising uncertainty, organisations are seeking ways to better anticipate, prepare for, and adapt to the future.

A key ingredient of effective anticipatory government is strategic foresight – that is, the exploration of a range of plausible alternative futures and their implications for policy. Most governments already have some form of strategic foresight capacity, ranging from scanning and foresight units in individual departments, to dedicated centres of excellence that coordinate foresight and systems thinking across governments, to mandated scenarios development processes, ministers or parliamentary committees for the future.

However, effective anticipatory government cannot be achieved by just a few loci of foresight activity. Rather, foresight needs to work as an integrated system and be fully embedded into the overall machinery and culture of governance.

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is working to advance this goal in three key ways. First, by strengthening the use of strategic foresight and new approaches across the organisation so that, ultimately, all policy analysis and advice looks
Only through ongoing exploration and global dialogue will humanity be able to imagine the kind of futures that are possible, and design policies today that help shape the future that we want.

working with governments, leading foresight practitioners, and other partners worldwide to strengthen global capacity for governance in an era of rapid change. And finally, by bringing a stronger future focus – including an exploration of critical uncertainties and alternative scenarios – to global dialogue on key policy issues.

Underpinning all these efforts is the conviction that thinking about and preparing for the future requires active participation and dialogue. Societies and decision-makers in all areas need to explore what rapid change and a range of different plausible futures could mean for them. Only through ongoing exploration and global dialogue will humanity be able to imagine the kind of futures that are possible, and design policies today that help shape the future that we want.

Puruesh Chaudhary, Founder, Foresight Lab, Pakistan

If ever humanity succeeds, it will be because it has realised that it has suffered enough.

Pakistan appears to be improving in the next 10 years. It sits at the heart of civilisational forces that have a deep sense of the history of languages and scriptures that are the building blocks of their traditions and culture, enabling them to shape their destinies.

Amidst this reality – and, being a nation-state – Pakistan’s value proposition is not in what it was yesterday, or what it is today, it is in the journey that it is embarking on. Examining and inferring from the emerging canvas of threats and the spectrum of opportunities, this could potentially either lead to global anxieties on unfounded grounds of fear as competing interests dominate the region, or in her [i.e. Pakistan] becoming an entity which creates multiple pathways towards serving humanity.

The geopolitical dynamics today are really just a struggle to understand the meaning of what the potential global ‘order’ might be in 2100. In this case, a stroke of intellectual wisdom can be found in ‘The Harmony of Civilisations and Prosperity of All – Values and Order in a Changing World’ that carefully addresses the contours of the mental processes required for a new order to emerge in this chaos. The question becomes ‘why this?’, and ‘why not what we have already?’ Well, for one, humanity deserves better. And, as the world continues to move towards greater connectivity, the seed for a paradigm shift has been sown, in a world where the paradigm for over the last century was empowered on the sediments of structured scarcity thinking, which technology today has greatly influenced. Humanity today is more connected than ever before in the history of humankind. It is now time for the scarce-based thought processes to transition. The narrative is there. And it is deeply embedded in the culture and traditions of over half of the world’s total population.

And if ever humanity succeeds, it will be because it has realised that it has suffered enough.
Jeanette Kwek, Deputy Head, Centre for Strategic Futures; Assistant Director (strategic Planning & Futures), Strategic Group, Singapore

Why Strategic Foresight?

We hear this question all the time: if you cannot accurately predict the future, what is the point of strategic foresight?

We appear to be at a global inflexion point, where the systems that have become comfortable and familiar over the last half-century seem to be rapidly decaying. An international backlash against the free flow of goods, people, and capital is unfolding. At the same time, the flow of ideas is accelerating, assisted by the Internet and global platforms – such as this one – for the free exchange of ideas. We have to contend with new challenges, such as economic dislocations caused by artificial intelligence, robotics, additive printing; and social change aided by the spread of social media platforms (and the rise of viral ‘fake news’). With technology accelerating the speed of change everywhere, is there any point to pretending that we can reliably foresee the future?

Well, no. But at the Centre for Strategic Futures, it is not our goal to accurately forecast future events. Instead, we have two major objectives. First, we aim to help decision-makers make better decisions today about tomorrow’s challenges, decisions which also (hopefully) have the effect of rendering our current forecasts meaningless. To do this, we have experimented with new ways of communicating foresight: trend cards, with bite-sized information and attractive graphics, work well in a workshop setting; immersive games help people to experience life in differing futures. Second, while acknowledging that strategic shocks are unavoidable, we aim to reduce their frequency and amplitude by actively seeking out the unknown. A ruthless curiosity about how, why, and how quickly the world is changing helps us prepare for potential shocks, even if we cannot yet clearly see their outlines.

Our hope is that with this mind-set, we will be more prepared to cope with the complex, wicked problems of tomorrow.
THROUGH THE EYES OF OTHERS: GLOBAL TRENDS TO 2030
There is little doubt that we are going through troubling times. Climate change is no longer just an apocalyptic forecast. Terrorism has changed its methods and ways for the worse. The resurgence of nationalism and populism is an essentially domestic threat with considerable – and potentially negative – international repercussions. Even inter-state rivalries are staging a comeback in certain quarters.

As the tectonic plates of international relations keep shifting, a new geopolitical accommodation will inevitably be found. Whether it will be more conducive to cooperation, stability, and prosperity or not it will be of our own making. Multipolarity is now a buzzword. Does the rise of new powers signify a new era of stability and prosperity? Or, on the contrary, will it add a greater dose of uncertainty to an already unpredictable future?

From a Brazilian perspective, multipolarity may be a positive development, but it is not a sufficient condition leading to a more stable and prosperous world. Unwanted are the ghosts of a bygone era in which a fragile balance of power governed the relations between a handful of great powers. Multipolarity will be what the established, as well as emerging global players, make of it. As the complex dialectic between the dyad competition and cooperation shapes the new contours of the international order, it is important that the latter takes the upper hand while the former is contained within agreed rules of the game.

The key to a cooperative multipolarity lies in strengthening global governance mechanisms in order to ensure that legitimate and effective decisions emanating from them reduce risks and provide global common goods. A renewed commitment to multilateralism is badly needed if the international community is to stand a chance of coming out of the current turbulent times stronger. Any other alternative would be ineffective at best and catastrophic at worst. Multipolarity and multilateralism are not the same thing, but they should walk hand in hand.
European observers of the Arab world are concerned about the waves of immigration coming from the sea’s southern shores. The worry is merited. In the past four decades, the Arab world’s population has increased from circa 180 to over 350 million. A majority of the young tens of millions are products of failed educational systems, and with few skills that correspond to the future of work, globally and in the region.

Militant Islamism is another worry. It has proven its durability and ability to evolve into different organisational shapes. And it will remain with us for years to come.

Three more concerns merit attention. The first is that a big percentage of those young Arabs are emerging into acutely distorted political economy landscapes – in most cases, plagued by a blur between power and wealth, institutional decay, and weak rule of law. This exacerbates the job creation challenge.

The second problem is that, especially in the eastern Mediterranean, the state order that has existed in the last half century is now crumbling. And, despite all of the multi-faceted confrontations that have been taking place in the region, no new order has established its foundations yet. That process will prove long and will unleash new waves of violence.

The third problem is that in most parts of the Islamic, and especially Arab world, societies have not yet solved the quandary of what is the role of religion (primarily Islam, but also Christianity) in public life. The confrontation, in the past six years, between, on one side, political Islam, and on the other, royal families, military establishments, and secular forces, have exacerbated that quandary.

But there are rays of light. The Arab world is witnessing an unprecedented wave of commercial and social entrepreneurship by a generation that is disillusioned by its past and present. Also, there are significant changes in young Arabs’ interactions with their heritage, culture, and even public space. Plus, new innovations in how many young Arab Muslims and Christians see the tenets of their religions, have the potential of easing the tension that has existed in many Arab societies for many decades between the role of religion and secular modernity. For the sake of its own security, Europe needs to intelligently engage with these innovators and entrepreneurs.
Chinese leaders and government still believe that the general trends of global development are globalisation, interdependence among nations, multilateralism, and free trade. However, they limit the term ‘globalisation’ to the economic arena; they do not believe there is globalisation in other areas such as politics, law and ideology.

Almost all the Chinese believe that China is rising and will continue to be rising in the next ten or twenty years, or even longer. The Chinese government’s long-term goal is to become a ‘developed country’ in terms of per capita GDP by 2049, when the People’s Republic of China celebrates its 100 years. Most Chinese believe that China can and will reach this national goal.

However, there are big differences in opinion among the Chinese on the balance of power trends caused by the ‘rising’ of China, India, and other developing nations. A small number of Chinese scholars, officials, and news media people believe China is already better than the developed West in many areas, and China would be the number one in the near future, since the West, especially the United States, is ‘declining’ in all major areas.

But most Chinese, including leaders, officials, scholars, and the general public, believe that China is not yet stronger nor better than the developed world, especially the US, in almost all areas. They believe China is and will continue to catch up with the West. But they believe that even if China’s GDP/economic size may overpass that of the US in ten or twenty years, China would not be as developed and strong as the US in other major areas such as the quality of the economy, science and technology, military, political system and ideology, international role and influence, and culture and ‘soft power’. China is and will continue to be a global economic power, but China is not likely to be a comprehensive global superpower; China is not the next USA.

Therefore, the Chinese leaders and government still believe that the world is continuing to become a multipolar one, with the US, EU, and East Asia (China, Japan, and the Southeast Asia) as the three ‘centers’ of the world.
Global Trends 2030: The Making of a New Geopolitical Order

The transit away from the Pax Americana of the 1990s-2000s to a new world order will have advanced significantly by 2030. It will be powered primarily by the growing importance of individual nation states, particularly the world’s major powers.

While the United States will continue reducing its overseas commitments, focusing instead on its domestic base, others will step in to fill the vacuum. China will rise to become a global geopolitical and geostrategic - not just geoeconomic - power, even if it will not seek to exercise US-style global leadership.

Europe will grow more consolidated internally and semi-autonomous internationally, but it will still largely follow the US lead. India will seek to expand its role in South Asia, the Middle East, and the Indian Ocean, but this effort will require much time and might face a pushback. Russia, estranged from Europe and finally separated from its former empire, will be playing a balancing/mediating role across Greater Eurasia.

Japan, still an ally of the United States, will take a more independent foreign policy posture in Eurasia. In other parts of the world, Brazil and Indonesia; South Africa and Nigeria; Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt will take more responsibility in their respective neighborhoods.

As a result, the G20 will become more important, further eclipsing the G7, a US-led caucus. BRICS, its non-Western equivalent, could gain in both stature and impact. Regional institutions, such as ASEAN, AU, MERCOSUR, and SCO1 will become pillars of the emerging regionally-grounded global order. Their actual capabilities will be tested by a host of non-state challenges and challengers, from illegal migration to ethnic strife, terrorism, climate change, or pandemics. By contrast, the United Nations will be less relevant as major power competition and rivalry will make both consensus-building in the UN Security Council and the institution’s reform more difficult.

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1. BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa; ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations; AU – African Union; MERCOSUR - Southern Common Market; SCO – Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

The transit [...] to a new world order will have advanced significantly by 2030. It will be powered primarily by the growing importance of individual nation states.
GEOPOLITICS 4.0: EMERGING CHALLENGES; NEW ACTORS
Geopolitics 4.0:
Emerging Challenges; New Actors

The existing central paradigms on how to organise around global problems tend to be anchored either on the nation-state as a key unit of analysis (including regional organisations and multilateral bodies which are platforms for interaction among nation-states), or on the market, price signals and incentives driving responses. These have worked in providing answers to some key issues – key conflicts in the case of nation-states, and the regulation of multinational corporations in the case of the market.

But certain limitations are becoming clearer in the face of emerging challenges, for which neither the nation-state nor the market are all that useful. These can include issues like climate change, which transcend existing geographical boundaries, and the domestic management of common pool resources, which are non-rivalrous but exhaustible and finite if their use (or abuse) is not managed properly. These include physical resources like forests or fisheries. Virtual resources like data or social capital present challenges of their own, since they are non-rivalrous but also non-finite, and suffer from underuse rather than overuse. When thinking about these resources, communities of citizens, rather than the State or market, seem more relevant as consequential actors.

Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom usefully articulated the paradigm of polycentric governance to address how states, markets and communities all need to provide interacting centres of power as we deal with new challenges. In particular, communities are needed more than ever and must be brought in much earlier so that their local knowledge, networks and capacities can be harnessed more effectively.

Unfortunately, in many instances communities are still seen as residual actors, incorporated into policy processes almost as an afterthought or as means to legitimate them, rather than as meaningful contributors in their own right.

The complementarity of governments, businesses and communities is particularly critical because each has its particular strengths, or highest purposes, and its dark sides. Governments are at their best when achieving scale and institutional capacity, but they can be slow in response to change. Businesses have more alacrity, but can be motivated by greed and avarice. Communities have the idealism and human focus to compensate for this, but can also be dogmatic when driven by single-issues – which is balanced by government’s ability to achieve scale. This mutual complementarity means that we need all three sectors on board to deal with issues that are increasingly complex.

One cause for optimism is that emerging digital technologies today (and arguably in the future) will make outreach efforts to communities much easier than in the past. Growing, albeit incomplete, online access; the Internet of Things; increased use of wearables; and proliferating online platforms allow for a greater scale of engagement and participation of communities in solving global issues.

This new emerging reality offers the possibility to build a truly polyarchic international governance system combining multiple, mutually enriching levels of policy- and decision-making, from micro to meso to macro, as we face new challenges head-on.
FORESIGHT FOR POLICY: CHARTING OUR WAY IN AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE
Ten years ago, the world had yet to experience the 2008 Great Financial Crisis. Yet even before disaster struck, an increasing number of people were aware of the unprecedented rate of default of mortgage repayments in parts of the USA. Similarly, in the following years, anyone who would have predicted that there would be a migration crisis in Europe, or the possibility of a return to nuclear war, would have been ignored. The implications of these potential crises were so uncomfortable and unfamiliar that they were overlooked until it was too late.

These situations also show that, while data-rich, model-based forecasting, is the foundation of evidence-based policy, it cannot be relied on for designing better policies or decision-making in situations characterised by ‘TUNA’ conditions – Turbulence, unpredictable Uncertainty, Novelty and Ambiguity.

Societies across the world are experiencing an exponential pace of change and face a growing list of globally connected, socially messy and puzzling challenges. New reality is not only faster paced; it is global and ultra-local – as well as emotional. The pace of technological innovation raises new hopes and fears. Some people are hugely optimistic about a ‘fourth industrial revolution’ and a new era of digital and other abundances. Others are anxious about cyber-risks the rise of smart machines or fearful of the potential misuse of human ability to re-engineer the building blocks of life. For example, global climate change is the poster child of a new era called the Anthropocene. Social complexity reflects a greater unevenness of experiences of globalisation across geographies and generations. Meanwhile, social media has enabled individuals to personalise ‘news’ to fit their beliefs and preferences.

Policymakers are grappling with a fundamental tension between our inability to know the past and our capacity to imagine and create the future. We can try to slow the pace of change. Or we can speed up our ability to learn our way into the future together, by using strategic foresight to exercise good judgement about what might be coming and to create and shape the future by working together. We can start by working with the future as a story – that is already emerging and never alone.

By learning with futures, we can reshape policy from a linear, fail-safe process aimed at incremental improvement into a more dynamic process of interactive learning and collaborative innovation. We can combine shared vision, with enhanced capabilities for sensing and use digital platforms to sustain (inter)action and create new ecosystems to inhabit. We can build teams that bridge different ways of knowing and in doing so, forge people coherence needed for policy coherence. We can avoid the tyranny of ‘one size fits all’ by encouraging constructive disagreement as a learning asset.

It matters how, not just what, you think about the future. It is full of assumptions and empty of facts. It is not a destination, but a call to action.


3. The cumulative activity of all humans over centuries is now having a detectable and faster impact than geological processes on the Earth’s natural life support systems (weather, oceans, ecosystems, etc).
WHAT IF CONNECTIVITY WERE THE NEW GEO-STRATEGIC GAME CHANGER?
The globalisation debate is saturated, but it remains more pertinent than ever. At the root of this discussion lies the notion of connectivity – exemplified by the increasing volume and sheer scale of intra and inter-regional movement of people, goods, services, capital, and data. Today’s reality is dominated by the opportunities and effects of connectivity – the megatrend of the 21st century.

In the current climate where globalisation is being challenged by isolationists and protectionists, the power of connectivity presents an opportunity for deeper and wider globalisation.

Sceptics readily note that growth in global trade is declining relative to global gross domestic growth. China is often cited as an example since its consumption represents two-thirds of its output and around 75% of its growth. In conjunction with the efforts China is making to keep commodity imports steady, what will propel its future growth is connectivity. Understanding this, the Beijing government has made connectivity a priority, as can be seen through its ‘One Belt, One Road’ project, which is the largest coordinated investment program in history intended to create new Silk Roads across Eurasia.

Similarly, President Trump’s aim to disengage the United States from global agreements is self-punitive as it disrupts America’s ability to compete internationally. Not only does his ‘America First’ mentality disregard the fact that tens of millions of domestic jobs are linked to exports, but major trade agreements will progress with or without the United States. The best example of the latter is the ‘TPP minus one’4 deal. Either countries get on board, or they get left behind – even the United States.

In fact, the majority of trading in developing markets is amongst each other, not with America. The percentage of exports sent by developing countries to the United States has dropped from 65% in 1990 to 35% today. In contrast, China is trading nearly $400 billion with Africa (more than the US) and $200 billion with Latin America (equal to Europe). Even the EU is moving away from focusing mainly on its transatlantic relationship with the United States towards other regions. Its trade with Asia exceeds its trade with America by $500 billion per year. These figures indicate that Europe and Asia are not waiting for America to make up its mind.

4. After the United States withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the remaining 11 signatories decided to revive the deal: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam.
Rather, as I note in my book *Connectography: Mapping the Future of Global Civilization*, they are busy creating the linkages that will support the new global order. This active, forward-looking mind-set by other players is not an attempt to out-maneuver America or become its new hegemon. Our world still uses tools provided by the United States, such as their financial system and technology. Rather, connectivity is fostering a type of distributive globalisation. It is enabling emerging markets like China to be a welcome and popular influence in Africa and Latin America, contrary to the wishes of the United States. This type of new trade and novel financial linkages, brought about by connectivity, signal the beginning of a more equal global economy with multiple regional anchors. In this multi-polar world, the most connected power will have the most leverage to set the rules of the game. Connectivity is the new currency.

**Ulrich Schulte-Strathaus, Aviation Industry Expert**

**Connectivity as a Geo-Strategic Game Changer: The Aviation Sector**

Historically, aviation has been one of four public modes of transport. The aviation sector contributed essentially to securing mobility of passengers by air travel. Given that the air-space above a given sovereign state is an integral part of sovereignty, accessing that airspace by non-national commercial aircraft is traditionally the subject of inter-governmental air service agreements based upon reciprocity.

However, over time, air transportation ‘matured’ into a service sector in its own right. It has become more than only a means of transporting goods and people from A to B. It is a service sector which can generate profits commercially, facilitate the economic growth of regions and provide geopolitical clout.

In 1992, the European Union finalised a process whereby the inter-governmental air-space agreements between EU Member States were superseded by an EU regulatory framework which set the parameters of the common rules applicable within the Single European Aviation Market. This newly created single market developed its own momentum. New pan-European business models provided for services within and between Member States and thereby contributed significantly to the development of the regions they connected. Connectivity became a key driver for economic growth and the European Union recently established a ‘connectivity index’ to measure the level of connectivity of a given region in Europe.

Connectivity became a *global* game changer for aviation with the rise of the global market presence of the Gulf States’ carriers Emirates, Etihad and Qatar. International connectivity from European airport hubs Paris, Frankfurt and London decreased in the past 10 years by well over 15% despite a growth in demand for international traffic, while it increased by 80% in the same period in Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Doha.
The Gulf States use their geographic location between Europe and Asia to connect incoming flights with outbound flights. The number of passengers using a stop-over boosted growth in local tourism, while the value of real estate, limited by the surrounding desert, increased significantly as financial and other investors established regional headquarters in this highly connected region.

Closer to Europe, Turkish Airlines tried to emulate the success of the Gulf carriers. Turkey identified its large domestic market, the increasing purchasing power of its middle class and comparably advantageous geographic location as assets to provide strong connectivity to, from, and via Turkey for connecting passengers. In view of recent political developments in Turkey, it is doubtful whether this high level of connectivity can be maintained.

In this ‘great game’ of connectivity, it remains to be seen when China will begin to ensure that its own economic, political and military clout is adequately reflected by connectivity, from and via China, to become and remain a, if not the, primary meaningful player in the global aviation market.

Kristin Shi-Kupfer, Director of the Research Area on Public Policy and Society, Mercator Institute for China Studies

‘RE: To Be Connected – How the Coming Generation is to Live’

China’s Push for Connectivity Should Be a Global Wake-Up Call

China is becoming the most influential data power in the world. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has the world’s biggest internet population and the highest mobile internet penetration rate. National digital ecosystems like Tencent’s ‘World of WeChat’ embrace nearly all areas of life from hailing a taxi, making a medical appointment, to managing your household appliances and your bank account.

Beijing promotes connectivity to push data-driven innovation to vitalise the economy. Under its new governance model of ‘Digital Leninism’, the leadership under Xi Jinping is setting up a so-called ‘Social Credit System’, a data-based monitoring and evaluation system to nudge the ‘rectification’ of citizens’ behaviour according to the Chinese Communist Party’s norms and laws.

With connectivity concepts like the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ or ‘community of destiny of mankind’, a tool to boost the legitimacy of the regime, China offers countries a seemingly open and shapeable ‘win-win’ framework – with only basic legal and no moral strings attached.

With connectivity concepts like the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ [...] China offers countries a seemingly open and shapeable ‘win-win’ framework – with only basic legal and no moral strings attached.
These notions of internal and external connectivity should be a wake-up call for Europe in two respects: First, the Chinese leadership has understood the powerful combination of a grand vision, an appellative language and a scientistic (not necessary scientific) reference framework as a tool for – in the worst sense of a totalitarian-turning system – bringing people in line to submit themselves to a dictated goal.

Second, Beijing increasingly claims that its governance concepts, recently referred to as the ‘China solution’ are superior alternatives to liberal democracy and market capitalism.

They are not.

Concerning domestic connectivity, China struggles to straighten out vested bureaucratic interests and regulate excessive commercialisation to insure product safety and data protection.

Looking outward, some countries take on the ‘Belt and Road initiative’ as an easy-earned investment and use it as a bargaining chip vis-à-vis liberal democracies. But the economic success of Xi Jinping’s signature project has yet to be proven and resistance against Chinese influence is growing in neighbouring regions.

China’s push for connectivity hits us at a time when in Europe and in the United States we are struggling with our concepts of political and economic order. People are feeling more and more estranged from established political elites and institutions. Citizens are less motivated to value their rights and exercise their duties because their sense of belonging to an ‘imagined community’ (Benedict Anderson) is shattered. Many of us witness a lack of faith and trust in a common bond which could motivate us to restrain ourselves and – voluntarily or even happily – commit ourselves to a common cause beyond securing existing stocks. In this regard, our societies and the Chinese society are very close in experiencing similar processes.

We need to develop a vision of connectivity that builds on technological possibilities, uses political and commercial interests as drivers, but has the courage to challenge people to move beyond personal convenience and profit. We need to develop a framework which offers incentives to commit to a common cause that gives meaning to our individual as well as communal existence.

A practical starting point could be to introduce the famous question of the theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer to policy planning and evaluation, namely ‘how the coming generation is to live’.
WHAT IF ‘WINTER WERE COMING’? IS EUROPE PREPARED FOR THE SECURITY CHALLENGES TO COME?
We are almost 500 million Europeans and we still largely depend on 330 million Americans for protection and for diplomatic initiatives that are essential for European security. This is unsustainable – and not just because of the positions of President Trump. The right time to develop Europe as a more credible security and diplomatic actor is now.

The good news first. In foreign and security policy, Europeans want ‘more EU’, not less: 75% are in favour of a common EU defence and security policy, according to a recent Eurobarometer poll.

Europeans clearly sense that our nation states are too small, too insignificant, and too weak to deal with the massive foreign and security challenges on our own. Most of them understand - Brexit notwithstanding - that the best way to defend and advance European interests across the globe is do so jointly, and collectively.

The EU Must Become a More Credible Defence Actor

A few short pointers on what we should do:

First, EU diplomacy must be strengthened. It begins with giving the EU and its representatives a stronger role in multilateral negotiations, like we did for the Iran negotiations. It continues with a formula suggested by Radek Sikorski: first, Member States should decide whether a certain foreign policy issue would best be addressed unilaterally or collectively. If the answer calls for a collective approach, EU institutions should then be provided with any assistance they need. And why don’t we go a step further and introduce qualified majority voting into EU foreign and security policy decision-making?

Second, Europe’s defence capabilities which have declined significantly need to be enhanced. Defence arrangements of EU Member States suffer from fragmentation. Large sums of money are spent inefficiently and ineffectively. The necessary and overdue steps of integration, and of pooling and sharing, will require ‘top-down’ decision-making at the level of EU heads of state and heads of government. Security and defence is an area where citizens expect more, not less, from the EU. If the EU wants to be perceived as part of the solution rather than as part of the problem, let’s act now!
The first premise for robust and seamless identity verification must entail trust – trust in the sources and trust in the verification channels. Without trust there can be no true validation.

Tackling the increasing counterfeiting of government issued documents requires organisations to think beyond the face-value of passports or driver’s licenses to establish an individual’s identity. Combating cybercrime and identity theft requires real-time, digital verification from government authorities that issue documents to individuals.

Establishing a seamless, secure and fool-proof link between document issuing authorities and businesses that need to verify an individual’s identity is paramount. Technology that delivers state-of-the-art identity verification capability while ensuring privacy is preserved and the complete security of personal information is imperative.

Sedicii’s core offering is an identity verification and management platform that uses Zero Knowledge Proof (ZKP) – a protocol allowing two organisations to discreetly verify whether they have the same information about a given person without either organisation exposing the information they hold to the other, thereby preserving the privacy of the individual. Consumers also have access to the platform and can see who holds information about them and can request changes or updates to their personal information if it is incorrect. They also receive royalties on transactions that involve their personal information.

Sedicii’s expertise in ZKP made possible a ground-breaking venture, wherein people could log in to websites without disclosing their passwords, but instead ‘proving to the site that they know their password’. Since the password is not transferred to the website, there is nothing for a hacker to steal.

The applications for the technology are vast and vary from anonymising financial transactions on a blockchain, to Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Know Your Customer (KYC) processes for account opening, to secure passport checking for airlines.

Rob Leslie, Founder & CEO, Sedicii Innovations; Co-founder, Kyckr

Privacy-Preserving Identity Verification
Europe is currently experiencing the highest terrorist threat the continent has seen for a generation, with hundreds of people affected by multiple terrorist incidents over the last three years. Meanwhile its affluent consumers and businesses are targeted daily by highly enterprising cybercriminal syndicates, who make billions of euros in criminal profit each year from attacks such as the WannaCry ransomware epidemic that affected 230,000 companies around the world in 2017. More traditional criminal pursuits, such as drugs trafficking, migrant smuggling and money laundering, are also operating at levels never seen before, as part of a criminal community in Europe that is made up of 5,000 groups and carries an estimated value of €115 billion in annual revenue.

This is the new security order for Europe. Underpinning its many elements are the key characteristics of globalisation that have facilitated the emergence of a more transnational form of crime and terrorism. The groups involved are multinational in nature and composition, they operate fluidly across borders and between multiple criminal sectors, and are served by a new-style platform economy, in which thousands of specialist providers of criminal capability offer their services to criminal kingpins and syndicates. Central to it all is technology, including a criminal marketplace environment on the Darknet that is trading in hundreds of thousands of illicit goods and services.

But there is hope, as technology is also a friend to law enforcement. Europol has used it to interconnect a global community of over 1,000 agencies involved in the investigation of crime and terrorism.

The data generated by this platform is inspiring a new age of intelligent solutions to cross-border criminality, allowing for greater operational impact and paving the way for a more joined-up Europe determined to adapt to our new security outlook.
Central to it all is technology, including a criminal marketplace environment on the Darknet that is trading in hundreds of thousands of illicit goods and services.

But there is hope, as technology is also a friend to law enforcement.
Hard and Soft Power in a Changing World
THE FUTURE OF STRATEGIC RIVALRY AND WAR
Although war appears to be as unpredictable as it is disruptive, there are certain elements to it that are entirely foreseeable. For instance, conflict, whether in the future or now, is always determined by a set of elements: the number of involved players, the points of contention, the level of violence and capabilities. In addition, statistical trends give us a certain indication of where, how, and even when, war is likely to erupt in the coming decade.

For instance, war will continue to thrive in ‘conflict clusters’, i.e. pocketed in certain regions of the world, rather than raging globally. Whereas Europe was such a cluster in the mid-19th to mid-20th century, Africa and the Middle East will continue to hold this title in the near future. Most of these wars will be fought internally (particularly in urban centres) rather than between states, which in turns implies a blurring of lines between combatants and civilians, large infrastructure destruction and war crimes. Nevertheless, interstate war has not disappeared – in the Middle East, for instance, every decade since 1945 has seen one of this type of conflict. It is therefore safe to assume that we will face another of this type – perhaps between Saudi Arabia and Iran – by 2030. Interstate war is also on the rise in Africa, particularly between one strong (‘vulture’) state and one weak one.

But despite these consistent trends, war will have changed in two significant ways by 2030. Firstly, the battlefield will have moved: obviously into the cyber domain, but also into airspace as both state and non-state actors will possess new degrees of air power. War will no longer be hybrid, but 360 degree in nature – in all places, at all times, using all means.

Secondly, the normative nature of human rights will continue to progress and expand globally, making war – or rather, human suffering – less and less acceptable. This has less to do with the expansion of democracy and more with global connectivity, allowing individual citizens to see, and voice their opinion on, war. For decision-makers, this has several implications: strategic communication will be multiple times more important than now; the pressure to minimise collateral damage will increase significantly; and the public demand to peacefully resolve conflicts, even abroad, will rise to new levels – particularly in democratic societies.

War will no longer be hybrid, but 360 degree in nature – in all places, at all times, using all means.
The 2030 World Will Be Owned by Carnivorous States

Forecasting is a daring enterprise. How can one anticipate, among the wide range of rising trends, those which will prevail from those which will be swept away by unexpected shocks or black swans, or from those which will fade away?

Different worlds are more or less likely to emerge in 2030 [...] One could very well prevail – a world where states will pursue their own narrow interests, develop bilateral and transactional relations while renouncing multilateralism.

However, the vexing difficulty to predict doesn’t mean that nothing can be predicted. Two basic principles of organisation will remain: the concentration of power and the degree of international cooperation. While their strength and combination might vary over time (power can be detained by one, plenty or no states, while international cooperation can be strong or weak), they will continue to organise the world in two axes.

Along these axes, different worlds are more or less likely to emerge in 2030: inter alia, a world of ‘Pax Americana’ where the United States will re-endorse their position of benevolent hegemon; a ‘Pacific War’ world in which the rivalry between the United States and China will structure international relations; a world where a ‘Concert of nations’ between the Western states, China and Russia exists and regulates relations through stable rules of the road... A few other worlds can be imagined, depending on the ability of certain states and non-state actors to rule and shape the international landscape.

While all these worlds might rise or co-exist in 2030, one could very well prevail – a world where states will pursue their own narrow interests, develop bilateral and transactional relations while renouncing multilateralism. Building mostly on the legacy of the Trump mandate, which might normalise protectionism, nationalism and populism, these states will challenge the Western consensus and international norms. The Middle East will remain a torn region under influence. The EU will struggle – often unsuccessfully – to defend its values and position within the world order. Meanwhile, other powerful states, similar to the Carnivores of the Jurassic Period, will impose their own version of international relations.
How Artificial Intelligence Could Disrupt Alliances

Western military alliances are delicate, as they require trust, constant consultation, and efficient dispute resolution to work properly. A smart adversary will therefore seek to sow discord and gum up decision-making. With a bit of skill and luck, this will cause the alliance to miss opportunities to gain military advantage in the field, or lose the will to fight altogether.

Artificial intelligence (AI) could soon make it easier for adversaries to divide and dishearten alliances. For example, AI can undermine trust by discrediting intelligence, making it far more difficult to tell truth from fiction. By producing high-quality audio or video spoofs of political leaders questioning the rationale for war or criticising fellow allies, adversaries could create confusion long enough to make irreversible gains.

AI also presents new means for skilled attackers to infiltrate encrypted networks between allied civilian headquarters, military commands, and capitals. AI will improve the ability to probe for weaknesses and in spoofing people with access to information.

Organisations such as NATO and the EU should insist on higher standards for protecting national classified communication, withdraw certification to compel Member States to up their game, update weapons systems to be more resistant and plan root-and-branch reviews of AI’s impact.

Artificial intelligence itself will be part of the answer, but AI’s military application carries political risk and will introduce new tensions to alliances. The sense of equality and co-decision among members could be at risk because of worries about accountability, especially when fighting in the future is done by machines and there is little time and space for human interference. If innocent civilians are killed, governments will be blamed despite having no control over the action itself.

This puts democracies at a distinct disadvantage. Undemocratic governments that are unconcerned about public reaction will have fewer qualms about removing humans from the loop. This strengthens the case for a broad international agreement on offensive military uses of AI, to reassure publics and prevent the most egregious applications of artificial intelligence in warfare.

Undemocratic governments that are unconcerned about public reaction will have fewer qualms about removing humans from the loop.
Our Member States’ military forces have to provide security, protect interests and defend territories. Their training and capabilities are shaped to fulfil these missions. It is the shared responsibility of political and military leaders to adapt both mission and military force to the challenges ahead. This continuous adaptation requires taking into account a steadily growing array of non-military factors.

Analyses about the trends we have to face in the area of security converge in saying that the future will be more complex, more volatile and less predictable. There is also a large consensus about the horizontal character of security. The hybrid threat, cyber, the external-internal security nexus or the development-security nexus are just a few expressions of the interwoven and multidisciplinary nature of security. It can be expected that this conference will draw an even more illustrative picture of these new conditions. To produce security, many fields have to be covered and coordinated, on the Member States’ level, as well as on the level of the EU. On both levels, progress has been made in this effort of coordination, but much remains to be achieved.

The judgement of how the military should develop and perform in the future has to be dynamic and comprehensive. Dynamic because it needs continuous adaptation; and comprehensive because it has to understand how the military will be embedded in the multifaceted national, European and global security environments.

A number of initiatives has been launched recently, by the European Commission, by the European External Action Service, by the European Defence Agency as well as by Member States, and recommendations have been made by the European Parliament, all pointing in one direction: Efforts are urgently needed to make cooperation in the security dimension of Europe, including the military, the first priority for all stakeholders. It can be expected that this conference will promote this insight.
Over the last years, cities and regions have been recognised as key actors for achieving the targets set out in major international agreements such as the Paris Declaration on Climate Change, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Reduction, the Convention on Biological diversity and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Moreover, a dedicated agenda with priority actions for cities has been developed both at the European level with the Urban Agenda for the EU and at the international level with the Habitat III New Urban Agenda. A specific Sustainable Development Goal (number eleven) is also devoted to ‘Making cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable’ by 2030.

More than a global trend, it is about a new governance fabric, a new mind-set to address global challenges (climate change, migration, natural disasters) and transnational problems (rise of inequalities, in-work poverty, fragmentation of societies) from a local point of view, based on:

- pragmatism and problem solving,
- networking and interdependence,
- creativity and innovation.

In order to meet the goals of the above-mentioned international agreements, cities are becoming key actors of open innovation. They promote innovative thinking and a systemic approach in view of bridging between technological, digital, social, cultural and nature-based innovation and by involving the use, application and transformation of scientific and technological knowledge in solving practical problems.

Finding an acceptable balance that enables a civilisation of sustainability is a fundamental challenge for twenty-first century cities. Conscious cities have to address all interacting global societal challenges, striving for strong sustainability. They can head through the age of scarcity and towards a new world order offering better chances for all citizens within the limits of the planet. Ensuring a sustainable transition and preserving social and territorial cohesion in a competitive globalisation therefore requires investing in a new multi-level governance model.

Finding an acceptable balance that enables a civilisation of sustainability is a fundamental challenge for twenty-first century cities.
The EU needs to radically re-think its strategic and institutional approach to climate and resource security. Inside the EU, we have not grasped the sheer extent of the challenge yet. Climate impacts and pressures on food and water security in the EU’s neighbourhood and specifically in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region should be a wake-up call. The expected increase in instability in the MENA region will affect the EU in many ways, including through increased migration pressures.

The EU’s efforts to build climate resilience should be based on a three-tier risk management framework. The foundation must be a credible climate policy. Every degree of global warming that is avoided reduces the severity of climate impacts and the amount of resilience-building required. Thus, in line with the Paris Climate Agreement, the EU needs to make full use of its commitment to cut ‘at least 40%’ of its GHG emissions by 2030. A mere 40% is not enough to stay below 1.5-2°C and undermines the EU’s climate diplomacy and its efforts in building resilience.

The second element for a domestic climate resilience strategy involves preparing, building and budgeting for a scenario with a 3-4°C increase in average global temperatures. As climate science demonstrates, the world might cross the 1.5-2°C thresholds even if ambitious measures are taken to reduce emissions. Planning for more extreme scenarios involves mobilising capital for sustainable infrastructure investment in the EU and developing a system for EU disaster risk insurance. Joint climate risk assessments across EU institutions and common operational responses are equally important. At the same time, the EU needs to integrate climate resilience into existing regional stabilisation strategies and investments by European institutions, especially in the MENA region.

Furthermore, a climate resilience framework needs to include contingency plans for a 5-7°C scenario. In such a scenario, the physical adaptation of critical infrastructure will not be sufficient. Entire cities will be flooded and whole stretches of land will become uninhabitable. The EU needs to develop a robust set of contingency plans, including disaster response mechanisms such as resettlement programmes and readily available emergency funds – both for its own citizens and for the EU’s neighbourhood.

Planning for more extreme scenarios involves mobilising capital for sustainable infrastructure investment in the EU and developing a system for EU disaster risk insurance.
The Arctic is changing faster than any other place on Earth. Temperatures that increase at twice the global average rate and abrupt and sustained collapse of ice coverage have had a shock effect on the region: the fifth ocean is opening up on the top of the world and right at Europe’s northern perimeter, with profound geopolitical consequences.

The changing climate exposes potentially strategically important sea lines and enables access to vast energy reserves, valuable minerals, metals, and abundant fish resources. It has brought to the forefront unresolved legal issues, including principles governing access to the new maritime channels and highlighted the military strategic value of the region, especially in light of Russia’s recent military modernisation and increasing tensions with the West.

The development in the Arctic is non-linear. A host of factors affects its pace and trajectory: yearly temperatures and ice cover variations, fluctuating energy prices and global shipping trends. Here, it is important to keep in mind long-term trends, rather than short-term fluctuations.

Access to Arctic maritime and air domains will continue growing, given expected trends such as increasing temperatures, accompanied by growing waves, coastal erosion, and unusual weather patterns that will affect mid-latitude continents.

The region will get more closely integrated into world affairs, and thus become more susceptible to spill-over from other parts of the world. Due to the projected global scarcity of mineral and biological resources, competition and rivalry for rich Arctic reserves cannot be excluded.

Given its dominant position, Russia’s policies and its relations with the outside world will have a particularly strong bearing on the regions’ development. Other emboldened stakeholders such as China and a possibly growing difference of interests between Europe and the United States may also interfere.

The region has a stable, multilevel governance regime. However, with growing challenges to the rules-based international order established after World War II, international cooperation and governance may become more difficult, especially in conditions of a severe crisis. At the same time, wild cards such as environmental disasters, extreme weather patterns, conflicts, unexpected regional alliances or disruptive technologies can have a high impact and alter or discontinue Arctic development in surprising ways. They will demand adaptability, resilience and perseverance.

Paradoxically, the same climate change trends that act as a threat multiplier also generate opportunities. To gain from them and manage the perils, it will be key for European states and other stakeholders to figure out how to use this area safely and in a sustainable manner, and how to project power without fuelling the spiral of insecurity that could spark tensions, risk of miscalculation and inadvertent escalation.
INTERNATIONAL RULES IN A ‘MIGHT IS RIGHT’ WORLD
Heather Grabbe, Director,  
Open Society European Policy Institute

Four Key Questions That Will Shape the Politics of Rights at EU Level

One of the great dilemmas for EU external action in 2017 is how to maintain coherence between its commitment to human rights in the world, and increasing contestation about rights in parts of Europe. The EU’s rights agenda has evolved over its history, but the scope of ‘human rights’ in its external policies – especially enlargement and neighbourhood policies – has always been larger than the role the EU plays in enforcing ‘fundamental rights’ in its Member-States.

Over the next dozen years, the politics of rights is likely to evolve in response to four questions:

• How dear do Europeans hold their rights? Public awareness and perceptions of the value of rights for all citizens and for minority groups varies across the EU. Some populations are active in defending their rights, while others seem content to let other priorities – such as physical and economic security – prevail.

• Who decides who gets which rights? Citizenship remains the source of many rights, putting national governments in charge of deciding who gets the full rights that citizens enjoy. Should the EU level provide additional guarantees for non-citizens, after Brexit and in the face of migration creating new categories of non-citizens and potential future citizens?

• Who decides whether rights are being respected? The sovereigntist turn is increasing contestation in some countries about the role of ‘unelected judges’ in Luxembourg and Strasbourg in deciding rights.

• Will the values crisis in Hungary and Poland result in a larger EU agenda on policing values, including rule of law and rights protections, at national level? It is still unclear whether the result will be an increase in EU-level scrutiny of governance in the member-states, or a long-term decline in the EU’s consensus around the values underpinning democracy, and the political will to defend those values. The outcome will have major implications for rights.

One of the great dilemmas for EU external action in 2017 is how to maintain coherence between its commitment to human rights in the world, and increasing contestation about rights in parts of Europe.
Global Trends 2030: A Dim Sense of an Evolving Global Order

In a world in geopolitical mutation there are surprises but little order. Given enough time, what seems impossible or unlikely occurs, and what looks certain or probable fades. For all the aggregate data that chart the rise of new world powers whose most common denominator is their non- and even anti-western identity, the global transfer of influence from the West to the Rest remains distant. Hold it, though: even in a post-American world, the United States will remain preponderant although no longer decisive; and even in a post-Western world, its Euro-Atlantic core will remain vital although no longer sufficient.

Moving into the faux multipolarity of the 2020s, we are all multilateralists. No power, however peerless, can remain for long without allies; no institution, however cohesive, can be without partners; no dimension of power, however necessary, can prove sufficient; and no issue, however significant, can prevail over all others. In the absence of moral and strategic clarity, managing and constraining the competition and rivalries between the United States and China, plus Russia and Europe, will be critical during the coming years.

First, relations between Russia and China will become increasingly unbalanced, as a matter of capabilities as well as a matter of interests. Russia is more concerned with China than China with Russia, but both countries are more interested in the United States and Europe than in each other.

Second, as Russia runs out of people, resources, and security space, its global overstretch will also run out of time. Patience, patience – Don’t indulge but don’t provoke: Russia is a threatening regional power, but its future is that of a demandeur state with, though not in, Europe.

Third, China’s rise as a world power will continue but at a slower pace and with some turbulence, at home and with its neighbours. Better, though, to engage an ever stronger and united China in the multilateral management of regional priorities of global concern.

Fourth, with disintegration not an option, the European Union needs a few good years and many good people to seek institutional finalité. Past Brexit, bigger may no longer look better but smaller would be too bad; and stronger is admittedly harder but weaker would prove dangerous.

Fifth, ‘America first’ is a slogan, but past the Trump moment it is unlikely to evolve into a durable strategic option. Relations with Russia and China matter to the United States, but an ever closer and more equal partnership with Europe will remain a strategic imperative.

Sixth, a pas de quatre is only a small piece of the choreography of the multipolar ballet ahead. Not to be ignored is a corps de ballet with dozens of poles or power and influence – states, institutions, and non-governmental organisations – whose local or regional reach can add to global disorder and regional instabilities, especially in the Greater Middle East and Northeast Asia.
Security and stability have become of immediate concern for everyone, but with many different meanings. As a consequence, perceptions of insecurity rise, and trust in our institutions erodes. Populist rhetoric plays on those fears and endangers substantive solutions. Temptations of ‘going it alone’ – Brexit, America First, Catalunya – erode multilateralism. Anxieties and fears of losing control grow in turn.

Consequently, the most significant risks are no longer found in the economic sphere, but in geopolitical and societal ones: Climate-change, involuntary migration, cyber-attacks, conflicts – they are high up on the list of likely risks. Democracy, rule of law and civic space, social protection systems – they are seen at a high level of risk.

Post-Atlantic, post-truth, post-West, post-liberal democracy, post-order – new rules are scarce, but are they necessary? Why do the old rules no longer hold?

‘Bilateralisation’ is one answer: states, especially big states, prefer to deal bilaterally, in a (quasi-) transactional mode; multilateral mechanisms created after the last break-down of common interest-approach 70 years ago suffer.

When rules for peaceful cooperation are broken, the political will to play by the rules is questioned, as is the effectiveness of compliance mechanisms.

So, how to respond?

Multistakeholder approach is one answer: Can business step in, looking beyond short-term gain, and contribute to global rules? Can civil society engage effectively? Will governments respond positively, rather than fearing criticism and accountability? The World Economic Forum propagates communities of purpose, the United Nations global compacts and regional strategies, and the Union’s own Global Strategy partnerships and responsibility. One year on, we discuss the way from vision to action.
The European Union as a unique model may need stronger political resolve, and improved marketing. International organisations should adapt, to avoid insignificance. One case in point is the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), ‘at the heart of the European security order’: Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian and also Euro-Mediterranean, it encompasses all 57 states from Canada to Mongolia; it has the normative, institutional and operational instruments for concrete engagement; and it has proven its unique importance in the crisis in and around Ukraine.

It is the place to engage Russia, and to support operational activities on new threats, radicalisation, disaster risk reduction, and on military-to-military cooperation, governance, democratisation and rule of law issues. But dangers of disengagement are real, as disagreements grow in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis.

With the appropriate strategic engagement, the European Union can use the OSCE as a prime partner not only to better realise its own Global Strategy and its objectives in its neighbourhood, but also to strengthen multilateralism globally. Thus, the European Union would demonstrate the continuing attractiveness of its model, especially vis-à-vis disinformation and different narratives from other parts the world.
GEOPOLITICS OF AN ECONOMICALLY INTERDEPENDENT WORLD
Hype and exaggeration are sure ways to bring a valid cause into disrepute. This is what has happened to globalisation. The decades of gradual liberalisation of trade and capital flows that followed post-war reconstruction fostered a resumption of global trade that was hugely beneficial. However, at exactly the point when economic analysis would suggest that these gains from trading more freely were largely exhausted, actual trade accelerated. This surge in trade was driven largely by higher commodity prices and could not deliver higher living standards for workers in industrialised countries.

Globalisation driven by higher commodity prices had different implications (for advanced economies) than globalisation driven by trade liberalisation: this new globalisation meant lower living standards in advanced countries as higher commodity prices diminished the purchasing power for OECD workers. The widespread popular disenchantment with globalisation can thus be easily explained: workers in Europe and the US were told that more trade would make everybody better off. But in reality there was no ‘surplus’ to be distributed, and workers just noticed a decline in their living standards.

Moreover, the most recent trade liberalisation initiatives (Trans-Pacific Partnership, Transatlantic Trade Investment Partnership) were essentially about regulatory convergence, for which one needs to over-ride deeply held national cultural preferences, thus making liberalisation much more contentious.

Thus, globalisation needs a new, much more modest, narrative – which focuses on its limited benefits and acknowledges trade-offs where they exist.
Challenged by a Historical Transition: Europe Should Be a Driver for Change or... It Could ‘Disappear’

Nowhere is the complexity of our interdependent world as evident as in the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Nowhere are the stakes so high, so finite and so important for the future of our world. In no other field are we called upon to literally imagine a new world, to use our human creativity, innovation and determination to transform accepted global models of development. Taking risks, embracing change and putting opportunities before problems is at the heart of an interdependent sustainable world in 2030 and beyond.

However, we will only be able to design this new world if we work transparently in partnership. A new global governance model is necessary, driven by bottom-up initiatives by local and regional authorities, civil society organisations and citizens. Young people in particular should be made partners in change. We will only be able to deliver the UN 2030 Agenda by building trust, decentralising governance to local actors and empowering citizens to create their own sustainable solutions. As His Holiness Pope Francis stated in his Encyclical letter on the environment, the protection of ‘...our common goods... [will] require a new and universal solidarity’.

It is the EU which should take the leadership in this transition and lead by example. Let us not forget that Europe’s share of global GDP is expected to decline from 25% today to 15% in the next few years. Similarly, our share of the global population will be reduced to 4% by 2020. So unless the EU takes rapid action and leads this change, we will lose our place and simply ‘disappear’ from the new geopolitical order!
We will only be able to deliver the UN 2030 Agenda by building trust, decentralising governance to local actors and empowering citizens to create their own sustainable solutions.
The ESPAS Young Talent Network
Looking back on my career as a successful female politician, which spans over two decades, I realise now, in 2035, how different my judgment could have been on many critical issues:

1. ‘Leaders’ are no longer only political leaders - leaders in today’s society no longer fit into the traditional mould of elected political leaders. Real power is in the hands of today’s internet titans - as Zuckerberg’s 2024 Presidential bid showed. The tech monopolies’ influence grew gradually but I failed to see how it became increasingly political: by deciding what was permissible online, what was worthy news and what rights to uphold, they began competing with legislators, shaping our values, our opinions and ultimately our society. When they capitalised fully on the treasure trove of data they had gathered, their power skyrocketed - now conditioning something as important as election outcomes is child’s play.

2. Leveraging big data and bridging the gap - with some delay, I jumped on the data bandwagon too. Big data is no longer the preserve of nerds. It informs almost every policy decision I make - from healthcare investments and crime prevention to what I should wear at my next TV interview. I also use it proactively, to bridge the gaps that have emerged in society: I see how the ‘smart generation’ is worlds apart from the elderly, how our vibrant urban areas are in stark contrast to our rural ones, and how social and economic disparities are constantly growing. Although our non-neutral internet has allowed these cleavages to grow, I use the data it gathers to focus on re-skilling and re-tooling.

3. Clever communication - like everyone else, I took advantage of the novelties of 24/7 news coverage and social media. Over time, however, especially after the 2020 launch of ‘YouLive©’ and its constant streaming of what I did and said, I spent too much energy on avoiding instant unpopularity. As the attention span of my electorate shortened, short-termism began driving my decisions. I also became enslaved to communication. Gone was the time we could invest in policies with long-term benefits. Gone were the times I could think aloud - that’s back office now. I’m just the show.

4. Sexism isn’t dead - in some pockets of resistance, female leaders like me still struggle to gain equal recognition and respect. I know this is nothing compared to the strong campaigns intersex people are leading, but I should have taken a stronger stand to try to catalyse change. On occasions I still receive as much media coverage over my appearance as my policies. And in the light of increasingly aggressive electoral campaigns, where personal insults replace political debate, we continue to be more vulnerable targets.

5. Avant-garde education - I am proud to have pushed to have global history taught as a compulsory subject in school but now I know that this is just the beginning. Many of the issues we are facing with widespread fake news, growing urban insecurity and the loss of jobs due to automation and globalisation, could have been avoided if we had prepared young citizens for a more complex and changing world.
Your Key Takeaways from the 2017 Annual ESPAS Conference

Write here!

Take a picture and share via Twitter - use #espas17
Navigating a More Turbulent World: The Importance of Anticipatory Governance

The world is changing swiftly. From terrorist attacks by non-state actors to North Korea’s aggressive nuclear ambition or the United States’ questioning of its commitment to global agreements and organisations, the liberal, multilateral global order established after the horrors of World War II to promote peace, security and prosperity, is increasingly under pressure.

2017 was also a year of change for the European Union. Like other world regions, Europe has been confronted with growing discord over liberal values and rising populism. And, with the United Kingdom formally triggering the process to exit the Union, a new chapter in the history of the EU was opened. But with it came an opportunity to look ahead, towards the longer term: to a future of 27 and beyond.

And, in a more interconnected and interdependent world, where change is increasingly fast-paced, agility and – more than that; anticipation – will become ever more important to deal with new challenges and crises, as well as to identify opportunities to prosper.

By combining data and trends together with ingenuity and vision, strategic foresight offers policy-makers a tool to prepare for the future, shape better policies and build up resilience.

Change and unpredictability need to be factored as constitutive elements of today’s reality and policy cycles. And strategic foresight and anticipation need to be mainstreamed into governments’ and international organisations’ modus operandi. The White Paper on the Future of Europe, tabled by the European Commission in March 2017, was a first attempt at doing this – focusing minds on the long-term perspective and on the transformative trends and drivers of change facing Europe and the world, and examining a series of options on how to deal with them.

It was an open acknowledgement that it is time to move beyond crisis management of the past years and recalibrate towards effective governance aimed at medium and long-term objectives.

But of course, this cannot be done in isolation: We cannot improve our internal security without looking beyond our borders. We cannot protect our natural environment without working in partnership with other countries. We cannot have a thriving economy without trading partners.

Never has it been so important to engage both within the EU and with our strategic allies and counterparts from around the world in order to reflect on common global trends and challenges, and on how to shape the rules and frameworks that will govern our future actions with an eye on the next generations.
The future relationships between the US, Europe and Asia will depend – not least – on the common assumption that, first, economic, and, then, political power will move from the West towards Asia. While the demographic and economic signs are quite clear, one must ask: How unified will the progress of the ‘West’ and Asia be on the global stage? And, if the assumption is correct, how likely is it that the transition of power will include conflict?

Currently, neither Asia nor the West are unified blocks. Both regions are divided into supporters and opponents to the current liberal order. In Asia, it is hard to imagine a unified path for the next decades when it comes to the rise of China, Japan, India or Indonesia.

Regarding the West, many observers think that, over the next twenty years, the US and Europe together will become less powerful in relative terms. But they may well retain – when unified – a ‘veto’ over changes to the global international system. However, will Europeans and Americans still want to be globally active, and is the transatlantic bond strong enough?

The worst scenario regarding the power transition would be war – possibly in the South China Sea, the Himalayas or the Red Sea; either a direct confrontation or a proxy war. Even small conflicts can escalate quickly in instances of great power transition. This would be a failure of epochal proportions for the international system.

There are other potential flashpoints between Asia and the West: Who pays for climate change? How to cooperate and compete in other parts of the world such as Africa and Central Asia? How to accommodate rising powers in international and regional arrangements?

Many, however, believe there is a good chance that this transition will be a peaceful one. Increased global and intra-Asian economic interdependence and growing and more powerful emerging middle classes in Asia might restrain leaders. In addition, the emergence of an Asian regional economic and security architecture may indeed bring long-term stability.

Ultimately, shared interests may outweigh points of difference, with enough efforts from both sides. A world in which the EU, the US and Asia all remain productive pillars of global decision-making is surely the desirable outcome for everyone.
The EU lives in an ever more troubled neighbourhood. It has a vital interest and a key responsibility in creating stability and fostering reform in the region. Over the past decades, the EU has relied on its rules-based enlargement policy to do so by expanding to the east and the south. There is a clear understanding that the accession process will be the answer to the challenges in the Western Balkan region. However, some of the key ingredients of this approach have also been applied *mutatis mutandis* to relations with partners with at best a distant perspective of membership or none at all.

By focusing the debate on accession we run the risk of trading a long-term dream for concrete and urgent measures and cooperation. This is certainly an issue in the Eastern Partnership process. The developments in Turkey add additional challenges in this respect. The experience with the Barcelona Process shows the clear limits to what can be achieved by a process building mainly on ‘enlargement recipes’. Situations like those in Syria or Libya anyhow require a different set of tools and skills and a greater emphasis on a Realpolitik approach. In this respect, the new trends in US foreign policy could force the EU to engage at a more operative level - a novel challenge.

In taking up these new responsibilities, success calls for a clearer setting of priorities and for dispassionate choices in the shorter term to achieve these. Without any illusions on morphing the regions into our clones in the foreseeable future, we should assess which policies offer the best chances to stem the present degradation and ensure our own security. Clear choices may be called for, for instance between ensuring stability and promoting democracy in the shorter term; between security at our common borders and migratory needs in the longer run; and between local actors when serious conflicts erupt, as opposed to our attempts to only mediate (Middle East Peace Process). However, lest we lose our own identity which is rooted in our values, such choices should always be made with the long-term aim of integrating both regions into the orbit of democracy, rule of law and human rights.

Bearing this in mind, there are a few important questions the EU will have to address over the coming years in order to become a real actor when it comes to foreign and security policy options in its wider neighbourhood:

- How and to which extent can we use the accession process where it is applicable to foster reform and stability? Which other actions/tools should complement it?
- What is the scope - if any - for using measures inspired by the accession process in relations with countries that will never join?
- How do we address the Turkey challenge?
- How do we shape our future relations with Russia?
- Will the transatlantic relationship remain a factor of stability and security in this respect? If not, or less so, how should we reposition ourselves?
- What other actors - in the region and beyond - should the EU engage with and how?

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7. The predecessor of the Union for the Mediterranean
Affirming Cooperative Multilateralism in the Face of Geo-Strategic Competition

In an increasingly complex and challenging international environment, commonly agreed norms, and the means to enforce them, are key. Without them, peace and security, prosperity and democracy – our vital interests – are at risk. This is why the European Union commits itself to a global order based on international law, including the principles of the UN Charter. It is the best path to ensure peace, human rights, sustainable development and lasting access to the global commons for all.

Our commitment translates into an aspiration to transform rather than simply preserve the existing system. A strong United Nations has to be the bedrock of the multilateral rules-based order, and develop globally coordinated responses with international and regional organisations, states and non-state actors. However, we need to ensure that today’s institutions for global governance reflect the realities of today and tomorrow.

Resisting change risks triggering the erosion of existing institutions and the emergence of alternative groupings to the detriment of the global order. In order to ensure that our world will be governed by right not might, the EU will stand up for the principles of accountability, representativeness, responsibility, effectiveness and transparency.

Just as our security relies on common international rules, our prosperity hinges on an open and rules-based economic system with a true level playing field. The EU has been an innovator in promoting new types of diplomacy, including our economic diplomacy to leverage its economic weight in the world to further promote international rules.

Looking ahead we will act as an agenda-shaper, a connector, coordinator and facilitator within a networked web of players. This means continuing to partner with states and organisations, but also stepping up our cooperation with the private sector and civil society and investing in pivotal non-state actors. We will sharpen the means to protect and empower civic actors, notably human rights defenders, to sustain a vibrant civil society worldwide.

Even as our security environment is becoming more fraught with uncertainty and danger, we cannot give in to the idea that security and prosperity are a zero-sum game. To the contrary, in the world where competition and not cooperation rules the day everybody will lose. This is why the EU has both a moral obligation and a strategic interest to lead by example on global governance.

Even as our security environment is becoming more fraught with uncertainty and danger, we cannot give in to the idea that security and prosperity are a zero-sum game.
In our contemporary globalised world, the local and the global are more and more interconnected and many phenomena experienced on an urban scale are in fact part of global trends. Understanding urbanisation, its consequences and causes is therefore crucial for ensuring a genuine response to the global issues of our time and to address the period ahead: city diplomacy contributes to conflict prevention, peace building and post-conflict reconstruction; urban leadership paves the way in fighting and mitigating climate change; cities and subnational levels are crucial with regard to security policies, fight against terrorism and radicalisation in our multi-cultural and fragmented societies.

The consequences of modern urbanisation must not be undermined and underestimated. Mega-cities and metropolitan regions, which are unquestionably two relevant phenomena of our 21st century, are essential game changers. In 2025, mega-cities are expected to house 25% of the global population and metropolitan regions will contribute up to 60% of world production (mostly in Asia).

The recent concept of urban geopolitics offers a privileged perspective to better understand the contemporary juncture.

Indeed, urban geopolitics reviews demographic, socio-economic and environmental trends, political transformation and technological disruptions, and explores the potential of cities to face their future in times of global uncertainty. Territorial foresight allows local and regional authorities to think, debate and shape the medium- to long-term future of their regions and cities. Territorial foresight as a participatory exercise, near to the human talent and policy-results-oriented, is fundamentally about the change of our societal model and sustainable transformation of our way of life.

Based on a vision of city design or a territorial model, mixing global trends and a local perspective, territorial foresight is a key tool in strategic planning for cities’ and regions’ leaders and citizens. However, the real opportunities, challenges and the risks of the 21st century wave of urbanisation also have an increasing relevance for national states and international organisations, as well as the European Union.

The European Committee of the Regions, which joined the ESPAS process in 2015, considers this innovative and unique platform as an opportunity to expand its cooperation with the other EU institutions by developing strategic thinking but also to promote territorial foresight and urban geopolitics, which could benefit the European Union’s capacity for strategic foresight as a whole.
Environmental Change: Trends and Challenges

The unprecedented pace of growth of the world’s population and economy in the last decades has had a severe impact on the environment and shows no sign of abating: by 2050 the Earth’s population is expected to increase from 7 billion to over 9 billion people and global GDP is expected to almost quadruple.8

Over the last 40 years, the European Union has put in place a broad range of environmental legislation with the most comprehensive modern standards in the world to address the most serious environmental challenges. The EU’s vision is: ‘In 2050, we live well, within the planet’s ecological limits. Our prosperity and healthy environment stem from an innovative, circular economy where nothing is wasted and where natural resources are managed sustainably, and biodiversity is protected, valued and restored in ways that enhance our society’s resilience. Our low-carbon growth has long been decoupled from resource use, setting the pace for a safe and sustainable global society’.9

However, the forecasts for the next 20 years point to mixed, if not negative, effects with regard to the protection of our natural capital and the shift towards a more resource-efficient and low-carbon economy aimed at safeguarding us from health, wellbeing and environmental risks. The sheer scale of economic and population growth will outpace progress on reducing environmental pressures.

In addition, global environmental changes, such as climate change and sea level rise, shortage of fresh water and rapid soil degradation, will increasingly have an adverse impact in foreign and security policy. To reverse these negative effects, traditional approaches are insufficient and will require a fundamental rethinking in light of new European and global realities.10

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) has called for a people-centred approach that takes into consideration the economic, social and environmental dimensions of development from a long-term perspective11 and encourages the involvement of civil society organisations and citizens at global, national and subnational levels to support a fundamental shift in governance, policies, lifestyles, practices and thinking.

Looking forward to the next decades, how can we achieve the 2050 EU vision of living well, within the planet’s ecological limits? How to realise the Sustainable Development Goals, the Paris Agreement and well-managed transitions to the low-carbon economy? How can we address international environmental and climate challenges more effectively? What policy framework can enable a bottom-up approach to sustainable development? What are the mechanisms to optimise the contribution of citizens and grassroots organisations in this fundamental shift?

8. OECD Environmental Outlook 2050
9. General Union Environment Action Programme to 2020 ‘Living well, within the limits of our planet’
10. The European Environment State and Outlook 2015; SOER 2015
11. EESC Opinion ‘The transition towards a more sustainable European future – a strategy for 2050’ SC/047
The sheer scale of economic and population growth will outpace progress on reducing environmental pressures.
Biographies
of the Contributors
to ESPAS 2017
Dr Stephanie Babst is Head of Strategic Analysis Capability for the NATO Secretary-General and the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee. She has been a member of NATO’s International Staff since 1998. She is currently the Head of the Strategic Analysis Capability (SAC) for the NATO Secretary-General and for the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee. In this capacity, she is responsible for preparing comprehensive assessments on potential upcoming crisis situations in geographical and functional areas of relevance and concern to NATO, as well as on their implications for the Alliance. Prior to joining SAC in 2012, she occupied various posts in NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division.

She began her career in 1991 as Assistant Professor for International Security Policy at the Institute of Political Science/Christian-Albrechts-University in Kiel, Germany, moving on to become Professor of Russian and East European Studies at the Federal Armed Forces Command & General Staff College in Hamburg.


Benoni Belli graduated in Law (Federal University of Santa Catarina), in his hometown, Florianopolis (capital city of the State of Santa Catarina), and holds a doctorate degree in sociology (University of Brasilia) and a master’s degree in political science (University of Campinas). He has authored two books published in Brazil: Zero Tolerance and Democracy in Brazil and The Politicization of Human Rights.
Carl Bildt is Chair of the Global Commission on Internet Governance and a member of the World Economic Forum’s Global Agenda Council on Europe. A renowned politician and diplomat, he served as Sweden’s Foreign Minister from 2006 to 2014, as well as Sweden’s Prime minister from 1991 to 1994. Under this capacity, he initiated and concluded Sweden’s accession into the EU in 1995.

Carl Bildt had been noted internationally as a mediator in the Yugoslav wars, serving as the European Union’s Special Envoy to Former Yugoslavia from June 1995, co-Chairman of the Dayton Peace Conference in November 1995, and High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1995 to 1997, immediately after the Bosnian War. From 1999 to 2001, he served as the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Balkans.

Dr Jason Blackstock is Head of the Department of Science, Technology, Engineering and Public Policy, at the University College London. With a unique background spanning research physics, Silicon Valley technology development, public policy, and global governance, Jason Blackstock is an internationally respected scholar, educator and policy adviser on the interface between science and public decision-making.

He joined University College London in 2013 to help establish its globally unique Department of Science, Technology, Engineering and Public Policy (UCL STEaPP). As Head of this innovative new department, he is leading the strategic development of STEaPP’s rapidly-expanding research, education and policy engagement programmes, all aimed at delivering on STEaPP’s socially-oriented mission to explore, experiment with, and improve the mobilisation of scientific and engineering knowledge in support of better public decision-making around the world.

Dr Jiří Buriánek is Secretary-General of the Committee of the Regions since June 2014. Prior to this, he was Director responsible for network industries (energy, transport, telecommunications/information society) and European infrastructures at the Secretariat of the Council of the European Union. Dr Jiří Buriánek also served as Enlargement Manager at the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre and as Secretary-General of PostEurop, the European branch of the UN Special Agency Universal Postal Union that unites 42 European Universal Service Providers. Following his PhD in European Law, he embarked on a legal career and worked as Manager in various large scale entities in the German public sector before he was seconded to the European Commission as a national expert for network industries (postal sector) in 1993.
Alexander CARIUS

Alexander Carius is Founder and Managing Director of adelphi, the Berlin-based independent think tank.

One of the leading consultants on environmental and development policy in Germany, he is in demand around the world as a speaker, facilitator, and adviser.

Alexander Carius works with a diverse range of actors to develop, design, and implement international negotiations, agenda-setting processes, and consolations. He translates scientific insights into practical options for governments, NGOs, industry associations and companies.

His research interests include the future of democracy and government in an increasingly amorphous and globalised world, global governance, sustainable resources management, climate change, crisis and conflict prevention, migration and displacement, and urbanisation.

He is a board member of various projects and journals and sat on the German government’s advisory panel on Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Peace Consolidation from 2005 to 2009.

Duncan CASS-BEGGS

Duncan Cass-Beggs is the Counsellor for Strategic Foresight at the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

He has a mandate to help strengthen strategic foresight and new approaches across the OECD and bring a stronger future focus to global dialogue on key policy issues. This involves working closely with OECD staff, national governments and leading foresight practitioners worldwide to explore disruptive changes that could occur in the future – and their implications for policy decisions today. The aim is to challenge prevailing assumptions and stimulate ongoing dialogue on the most adaptive policies for a rapidly evolving and uncertain world.

Before joining the OECD in December 2016, Duncan Cass-Beggs worked in the Government of Canada, most recently as Director of Strategic Foresight at Policy Horizons Canada, a central strategic foresight organisation that coordinates foresight and systems thinking across the government. He has a Masters in Politics of Africa and Asia from the University of London, and a BA in Political Science and Economics from McGill University.
Puruesh CHAUDHARY

Puruesh Chaudhary is a futures researcher and strategic narrative professional, and the Founder of Foresight Lab.

She is a Distinguished Fellow 2015 at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI). She has a professional master’s degree in international negotiation and policymaking from Institut De Hautes Études Internationales Et Du Développement, Geneva.

Her work mostly involves futures research, knowledge-collaborations and content intelligence within the framework of human security. She has worked with multilateral donors and aid agencies, news organisations and multinationals in advancing development efforts in Pakistan.

Featured amongst the World’s top female futurists, she is the Founder and President of AGAHI, a non-governmental organisation, which works extensively on creating shared spaces for interactive learning, collaborative thinking and knowledge sharing. Pakistan Foresight Initiative, a project of AGAHI aims to improve policymaking and strategic narratives on key priority areas of the Foresight Lab; facilitative platform – a think-ware that is engaging legislators, strategists, academicians and the community for developing shared understanding for effective implementation of decisions.

She has produced a foresight research compilation on Pakistan State of Future Index Anticipating 2027 – a single measure that indicates that the country is relatively improving over the next 10 years; The Future of Pakistan up to 2060 building on four possible scenarios; is a published co-author for The Future of Business – a critical insight on rapidly changing world; The Big Idea: Next Generation of Leadership in Pakistan needs a ‘New-Think – an analytical overview of foresight decision-making and strategic narratives in the country. Championing ‘Shaping the future of journalism’, Chaudhary has co-founded Pakistan’s annual journalism awards (The AGAHI Awards); content analysis framework (Media Credibility Index and Ethical Media Audit); created foresight research fellowship opportunities on ‘Peace and Technology’ with the Department of Strategic Studies, Quaid-e-Azam University and The China Study Centre of COMSATS Information and Technology Institute; and has developed academic-industry linkages. The Centre of International Media Ethics’ has honoured her to serve as its Ambassador to Pakistan campaigning for quality journalism in the country; she now sits on CIME’s Board of Advisers. She is a Mentor for the UN-Habitat Youth Fund Programme. Chaudhary is a Singularity University Alumni; and of the National Defence University in Pakistan. She has also been recognised as a Global Shaper by the World Economic Forum in 2011 and has been nominated to the Forum’s Expert Network on Global Agenda. Chaudhary is an ASPEN Alumni, a member of the World Futures Society and is on the Planning Committee of the Millennium-Project (Global Futures Studies and Research). Additionally, she is the co-founder of Media Development Trust, Director at Mishal Pakistan and a Founding Director for the Asia Institute of Public Policy. Chaudhary is invited to various international and domestic forums to speak on futures, storytelling and human security.

Jim CLOOS

Jim Cloos is Deputy Director-General in the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union where he oversees teams dealing with the preparation of European Council meetings, co-legislation, inter-institutional relations, and support to the rotating Presidency.

He started his career as a diplomat, working at the Permanent Representation of Luxembourg to the EU from 1987 to 1992 and eventually became the Deputy Permanent Representative.
During the Luxembourg Presidency in 1991, Jim Cloos actively contributed to the drafting of the Maastricht Treaty. After joining the European Commission, he headed the Cabinet of the European Commissioner in charge of Agriculture (1993-1995) and the Cabinet to the President (1995-1999). He was also Director for relations with the US in the Council Secretariat (2001-2006) and a close collaborator of the High Representative Javier Solana.

Simonetta COOK
Simonetta Cook is a political administrator in the European Council and Strategic Planning unit of the Council. She is involved in preparing and following up on the work of the European Council, and drafting briefings for its President. She joined the Council ten years ago, initially in the legal service and later in the interinstitutional relations team. In a former life, she worked in private practice specialising in corporate law and EU regulatory law. As an Anglo-Italian who grew up in Luxembourg, she always felt her interest in the EU was a given, but after plunging into the world of the European Parliament as part of her first work experience, she realised EU affairs had become a genuine passion. She holds a degree in law from the University College London, and a Masters in EU law from the College of Europe, Bruges.

Julien CRAMPES
Julien Crampes is a member of the ESPAS Young Talent Network and Adviser to the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee on the Eastern partnership, EU-UN relations and the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.

He is a Franco-British EU civil servant who joined the European Parliament in 2011. He previously worked for the Policy Department, covering Russia and the Eastern neighbourhood and advising former Presidents Cox and Kwasniewski on tackling ‘selective justice’ in Ukraine from 2011 to 2013. He was then the adviser to the Director-General for External Policies, focusing on internal management and relations with the European External Action Service (EEAS) from 2013 to 2016.

More recently, he joined President Schulz’s Cabinet to advise on the Western Balkans, Eastern neighbourhood, Russia and Asia (2016-2017).

He holds a BSc in politics from Bristol University and a master’s degree in international security from Sciences Po, Paris.
James ELLES

James Elles is Honorary President of the European Strategy and Policy Analysis (ESPAS), which he started in 2010 to examine long-term trends and focus on priority challenges facing the EU in the years ahead.

He was a British Conservative Member of the European Parliament for the South East region of the UK from 1984 to 2014. Since stepping down, he has remained active in a number of fields.

Apart from being Chairman of the South East Conservative European Network (SECEN), he is a member of the Steering Committee of the European Internet Forum (EIF) which he co-founded in 2000. He also continues to chair the Transatlantic Policy Network (TPN) which he founded in 1992.

Jon FINER

Jon Finer was Chief of Staff and Director of Policy Planning at the US Department of State from 2015 to 2017, where he previously served as Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy.

Before that he worked for four years at the White House, including the National Security Council staff and the Office of the Vice-President. Prior to entering government service, Jon was a foreign and national correspondent at The Washington Post, where he reported from more than 20 countries and covered conflicts in Gaza (2009), Russia/Georgia (2008) and Israel/Lebanon (2006); and Iraq (2003, 2005-2006). Jon spent a year in Hong Kong as a Henry Luce Foundation Scholar, working as a reporter and editor at the Far Eastern Economic Review. He has a law degree from Yale, an M.Phil. in international relations from Oxford, where he was a Rhodes Scholar; and an undergraduate degree from Harvard. He currently works in the private sector.

Ramona GABAR

Ramona Gabar is a member of the ESPAS Young Talent Network and works in the private office of the Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union.

Born in Bucharest in the worst times of the communist regime, she directly experienced the impact of bad politics on people’s daily lives, on their cohesion, optimism and courage. That experience transformed her into a fierce, categorical EU-enthusiast, committed to never going back to the ugly past. She is passionate about foresight, political communication and political strategy. A political analyst with an academic and professional background in Communication, Ramona has bachelor degrees in finances-banking and in journalism and communication, as well as a master’s degree in communication. She worked as a horizontal foreign affairs analyst focusing on hybrid threats, and as Chief Media Analyst focusing on open media intelligence, early warning and horizon scanning in the General Secretariat of the Council.
Dr Florence Gaub is Deputy Director at the European Union Institute for Security Studies where she heads the Middle East and North Africa programme.

Her work focuses on conflict, strategy and security, with particular emphasis on Iraq, Lebanon and Libya. She also works on Arab military forces more generally, conflict structures and geostrategic dimensions of the Arab region.

Previously employed at the NATO Defence College and the German Parliament, she wrote her PhD on the Lebanese army at Humboldt University of Berlin, and also holds degrees from Sciences Po Paris, where she also teaches, as well as from Sorbonne and the Ludwig-Maximilian University of Munich. Dr Florence Gaub is widely published and testifies regularly at governmental and parliamentary hearings on the region. She has conducted extensive field studies in Lebanon, Libya, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Nigeria and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In the Secretariat of the Economic Affairs Committee, she worked on banking, financial stability, crisis management and revamping the financial system post financial crisis. In the horizontal service, she gained a valuable insight into the coordination among parliamentary committees. In 2014-2015, she was seconded to the European Parliament’s Washington Office where she liaised with the US Congress and the administration on a range of issues spanning from finance and economy, to energy and climate change.

Zuzana Gentner Vavrova is a member of the ESPAS Young Talent Network and works in the Secretariat of the European Parliament’s Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee, where she focuses on collaborative economy, European Semester, and consumer side of financial services.

She holds degrees in finance, linguistics and literature, and a Master of Arts degree from the College of Europe. Having built up work experience in both the public and private sector, and driven by her interest in policymaking and the big policy questions the EU faces, she joined the European Parliament in 2005, where she gained experience in a number of areas and departments.

In the Secretariat of the Economic Affairs Committee, she worked on banking, financial stability, crisis management and revamping the financial system post financial crisis. In the horizontal service, she gained a valuable insight into the coordination among parliamentary committees. In 2014-2015, she was seconded to the European Parliament’s Washington Office where she liaised with the US Congress and the administration on a range of issues spanning from finance and economy, to energy and climate change.

Dr Heather Grabbe is Director of the Open Society European Policy Institute in Brussels.

From 2000 to 2009, she was Senior Adviser to then-European Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn, responsible for the Balkans and Turkey. Before joining the European Commission, she was Deputy Director of the Centre for European Reform think tank. Her academic career includes teaching at the London School of Economics, and research at Oxford and Birmingham universities, the Royal Institute for International Affairs (Chatham House, London), and the European University Institute (Florence).

Daniel GROS

Dr Daniel Gros is Director of the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) since 2000. Among other current activities, he serves as adviser to the European Parliament and is a member of the Advisory Scientific Committee of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the Euro 50 Group of eminent economists. He has held past positions at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Commission, and served as Adviser to several governments, including the UK and the US at the highest level.

Dr Daniel Gros is editor of Economie Internationale and International Finance. He holds a PhD in Economics from the University of Chicago and is the author of several books and numerous articles in scientific journals. His main areas of expertise are the European Monetary Union, macroeconomic policy, economics of transition to a market economy, public finance, banking and financial markets.

Johannes HAHN

Commissioner for Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, European Commission Johannes Hahn has held various management functions in the different sectors of the Austrian economy and industry, including as CEO of Novomatic AG for 5 years. Between 1992 and 1997 Hahn was Executive Director of the Austrian People’s Party Vienna. In 2002, he was elected Deputy Chairman of the Party and Chairman in 2005. Member of the Regional Parliament of Vienna from 1996 to 2003, he became Federal Minister for Science and Research in 2007.

He was the Member of the European Commission in charge of Regional Policy from 2010 to 2014. Since November 2014 he is a Member of the European Commission in charge of Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations.
**Sander HAPPAERTS**

Dr Sander Happaerts is a member of the ESPAS Young Talent Network and a Policy Analyst on Sustainable Growth in the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy.

He is responsible for environmental and climate issues and works with other services of the European Commission to integrate environmental concerns into cohesion policy investments across the EU.

Before joining the European Commission in 2014, he worked as a Research Manager and Lecturer on Environmental Policy and Sustainability Transitions at KU Leuven, Belgium. His research on regional policies for sustainable development was awarded in the 2012 Thesis Competition of the European Committee of the Regions.

With degrees in linguistics and international relations, Dr Sander Happaerts did an internship at the Belgian Permanent Representation to the United Nations in New York in 2006, where he followed Security Council affairs.

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**Sylvia HARTLEIF**

Sylvia Hartleif is Leader of the European Political Strategy Centre’s (EPSC) foreign policy team in the European Commission.

Prior to joining the EPSC, she was, for nine years, Senior Adviser to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the German Bundestag and Secretary of the Sub-Committee on Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.

From 2001 to 2003, she served as legal adviser to the Bundestag’s delegation in the Convention on the Future of Europe on which she has published articles and co-authored two books. Her earlier professional commitments include the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO, the World Bank and the European Commission.

A graduate of Harvard Kennedy School, USA, and the University of Passau, Germany, she is a member of the German Council on Foreign Relations and a Marshall Memorial Fellow of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
**Hadeel IBRAHIM**

Hadeel Ibrahim is the founding Executive Director of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, which was established in 2006 to support leadership and governance in Africa. She is also co-Chair of the Board of Directors of the Africa Center in New York, whose mission is to promote partnership, collaboration, dialogue and understanding between African artists, business leaders and civil society and their counterparts in the United States and beyond.

She serves on the Boards of the Mary Robinson Foundation for Climate Justice, the Clinton Foundation, the BMCE Bank of Africa, 1:54 Contemporary African Art Fair, and the Governing Board of the African Governance Institute.

She also serves on the Dean’s Advisory Council for the School of Architecture and Planning at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is a member of Amnesty International’s Secretary-General’s Global Council, a member of the International Advisory Committee & Jury of the London Design Biennale and is a Patron of Restless Development, a youth led development agency.

Hadeel Ibrahim previously served as a member of the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing, on the Boards of The Synergos Institute, Refugees International, the Carter Center (UK) and the FT/IFC Transformational Business Awards Judging Panel.

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**Wolfgang ISCHINGER**

Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger is Chairman of the Munich Security Conference (MSC) and Professor for Security Policy and Diplomatic Practice at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin.

He advises the private sector, governments, and international organisations on strategic issues. He has published widely on foreign and security policy with a focus on European and transatlantic issues.

From 2006 to 2008, he was the Federal Republic of Germany’s Ambassador in London and, from 2001 to 2006, in Washington, DC. He served as Deputy Foreign Minister (State Secretary) of Germany from 1998 to 2001.


From 2008 to 2014, he was also Global Head of Government Relations at Allianz SE, Munich.

Wolfgang Ischinger studied law at the universities of Bonn and Geneva and obtained his law degree in 1972. He did graduate and postgraduate work at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and at Harvard Law School, Cambridge/USA (MA, 1973).
He is a member of the Trilateral Commission, the European Council on Foreign Relations, and of the Governing Board of the Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute (SIPRI). He also serves on the Boards of the International Crisis Group (ICG), of the Atlantic Council of the US, of the American Institute of Contemporary German Studies (AICGS), of the American Academy in Berlin and of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP).

Shada ISLAM

Shada Islam is Director of Europe and Geopolitics at Friends of Europe (FoE), an independent think tank based in Brussels.

She works on issues related to the future of Europe, minority and integration challenges, as well as on Europe’s relations with emerging nations. She set up the Asia Programme for Friends of Europe in 2011 and also leads its work on global trade and development issues.

Shada is actively engaged in FoE’s new ‘Migration Action’ initiative aimed at encouraging reflection and discussion on Europe’s challenge of developing new policies and actions to deal with refugees and migrants. She has done extensive work on the challenges facing European Muslims as regards perceptions, discrimination and marginalisation. She also moderates key FoE debates and events and is the author of many publications and their weekly ‘Frankly Speaking’ column.

Shada previously worked at the European Policy Centre where she headed work on Asia and minority issues. As the former Europe correspondent for the Far Eastern Economic Review, Shada continues to write for leading international publications on issues related to Europe’s future and its global interactions and policies. She is frequently interviewed by international media and research institutes.

Luca JAHIER

Luca Jahier is a member of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) since 2002, working with the Section for Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship as well as the Section for Economic and Monetary Union and Economic and Social Cohesion.

He currently serves as the President of the EESC’s Various Interests Group (Group III). He was the President of FOCSIV (Federation of Development Cooperation NGOs) from 1994 to 2000.

He was among the founders of the Italian Third Sector Forum, and is former President of the National Council of the Christian Associations of Italian Workers, which promote employment and active participation in social life through their network of local branches, services, enterprises and ad-hoc projects.

Luca Jahier is a former international relations journalist and has several years of professional experience in development programmes, mainly in Africa.

Eva KAILI

Eva Kaili is a Member of the European Parliament representing the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and affiliates with the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D).

She chairs the Delegation for relations with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and is member of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy.
Prior to joining the European Parliament, Eva Kaili worked as a journalist and television news presenter. She has a bachelor’s degree in architecture and engineering from the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, a Master of Arts in International Relations and is currently studying towards a PhD in International Political Economy with the University of Piraeus.

She is also actively involved with Love146, an international organisation fighting against child slavery and exploitation.

Mary KALDOR

Mary Kaldor is Professor of Global Governance, Director of the Conflict and Civil Society Research Unit at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and CEO of the Department for International Development (DFID) funded Conflict Research Programme.

She has pioneered the concept of new wars and global civil society, and her work on the practical implementation of human security has directly influenced European and national politics. Prof Kaldor’s books include The Baroque Arsenal; New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era; and Global Civil Society: An Answer to War. Her most recent book is International Law and New Wars co-authored with Christine Chinkin.

She was a founder and co-chair of the Helsinki Citizens Assembly, a member of the International Independent Commission on Kosovo and convenor of the Human Security Study Group, which reported to Javier Solana and now to Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission.

Parag KHANNA

Parag Khanna is a Senior Research Fellow in the Centre on Asia and Globalisation at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore. He is also the Managing Partner of Hybrid Reality, a boutique geostrategic advisory firm, and Co-Founder & CEO of Factotum, a leading content branding agency.


In 2008, he was named one of Esquire’s ‘75 Most Influential People of the 21st Century’, and featured in WIRED magazine’s ‘Smart List’. He holds a PhD from the London School of Economics, and bachelors and masters’ degrees from the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He has travelled to more than 100 countries and is a Young Global Leader of the World Economic Forum.
Jeanette Kwek

Jeanette Kwek is the Deputy Head of the Centre for Strategic Futures (CSF), an internal think tank of the Singapore government focused on developing insights into future trends, discontinuities and surprises. Since 2015, the CSF is part of the Strategy Group in the Prime Minister’s Office.

Jeanette started her career in 2005 at the Defence Policy Office, MINDEF, where she worked on Singapore’s defence relations with international partners. In 2009, she moved to the Public Service Division, where she became one of the CSF’s founding members. Since the CSF’s move to the Strategy Group in the Prime Minister’s Office in 2015, Jeanette has been involved in developing the centre’s anticipatory capabilities in tandem with public service needs, and also with growing futures capabilities across the government.

Jeanette is a political scientist and economist by training, having graduated with honours from the University of Chicago in 2005.

Christian Leffler

Christian Leffler is Deputy Secretary-General for Economic and Global Issues at the European External Action Service (EEAS) and also served as the EEAS’ Managing Director for Americas.

Prior to joining the EEAS, he served as Deputy Director-General in the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Development Cooperation (2010), as Head of Cabinet of Vice-President Wallström (2007-2010), and as Director in charge of the Middle East and South Mediterranean in the European Commission’s Directorate-General for External Relations. He was also Senior Adviser to the European Commission’s Vice-President Catherine Ashton and assisted her in the preparation of the establishment of the new EEAS.

Previously, he had participated in the accession negotiations and the establishment of the new working structures of the Representation in the first year of active Swedish EU membership, becoming the first Swedish ‘Antici’. Christian Leffler also worked at the Swedish Foreign Service and in the Political Affairs Department of the Ministry in Stockholm.
Lotte LEICHT

Lotte Leicht is the European Union Advocacy Director and Director of Human Rights Watch’s Brussels Office since 1994. She is a lawyer by training who specialised in international human rights and humanitarian law. She frequently testifies before international intergovernmental organisations, has conducted human rights and humanitarian law investigations in various conflict zones, and written extensively on human rights issues for major publications. She is Co-editor of Monitoring Human Rights in Europe: Comparing International Procedure and Mechanisms.

Before joining Human Rights Watch, Lotte Leicht was Programme Director of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights in Vienna and a staff member at the Danish Centre for Human Rights. She graduated from Copenhagen University.

Rob LESLIE

Rob Leslie is the Founder & CEO of Sedicii Innovations. He is also co-founder of Kyckr (ASX:KYK) which is listed on the Australian Stock Exchange.

Kyckr provides organisational identity services for Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Know Your Customer (KYC) compliance to banks and other regulated financial institutions.

Rob has been named a World Economic Forum Technology Pioneer for his work with Sedicii utilising the zero knowledge proof protocol to secure personal information, protect identity and people’s privacy. Rob has been invited to speak at Davos on cybersecurity, identity and other technology issues and is a regular speaker at conferences around the globe on cyber related matters.

Aaron MANIAM

Aaron Maniam is currently a doctoral student at the Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University, on a Clarendon Scholarship. A World Economic Forum (WEF) Young Global Leader, he is currently on study leave from the Singapore government, where he was most recently Senior Director (Industry) at the Ministry of Trade and Industry, where he was responsible for coordinating economic policies and regulating the manufacturing, services and tourism sectors, as well overseeing long-term economic transformation.

He joined the Singapore government in 2004, serving on the North America Desk of the Foreign Service (2004-2006) and at Singapore’s Embassy in Washington DC (2006-2008), where he was the principal coordinator for Congressional liaison and issues relating to the Middle East. He was posted to the Strategic Policy Office (SPO) at the Public Service Division in 2008, where he worked on scenario planning and analysis of long-term trends relevant to Singapore. He was appointed the first Head of the Singapore Government’s newly-formed Centre for Strategic Futures (CSF) in January 2010, while retaining his SPO portfolio. In July 2011, Aaron was appointed Director of the Institute of Policy Development at the Civil Service College (CSC), which organises leadership training programmes for public sector talent (the top
Ann Mettler is the Head of the European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC), the in-house think tank of the European Commission. The EPSC provides specialised and forward-looking advice to European Commission President Juncker and consists of six teams, covering economy, social affairs, sustainable development, foreign and institutional affairs, as well as outreach and communication.

Prior to assuming her position in December 2014, Ann was for eleven years Executive Director of the Lisbon Council, a Brussels-based think tank. From 2000-2003, she worked at the World Economic Forum, where she last served as director for Europe.

Ann holds masters’ degrees in political science and European law and economics, and graduated with distinction from the University of New Mexico, USA, and the Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-University in Bonn, Germany.

Isabella Pirolo is a member of the ESPAS Young Talent Network and Policy Assistant to the Director of Innovation and Advanced Manufacturing in the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW). In her role, she ensures coordination of various files including industrial policy, Key Enabling Technologies, intellectual property rights, and social innovation.

Recently, Isabella cooperated with the European Policy Strategic Centre, the European Commission’s think tank, on the modernisation of European industry from an innovation and competitiveness angle. Before joining the European Commission in 2014 as a legal officer in the defence industry of DG GROW, she worked in the implementation of EU-funded space projects, supporting EU External Action. She obtained a Master of Arts in European Politics at the College of Europe with a thesis on EU military operation Atalanta and a master’s degree in law at the University of Verona with a thesis on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in ex-Portuguese colonies.
**Luis PLANAS**

Luis Planas is Secretary-General of the European Economic and Social Committee since March 2014. From 1986 to 1994, he served as a Member of the European Parliament and, from 1996 to 2004, was head of the private office of two successive European Commissioners. From 2010 to 2011, he was Spanish ambassador and Permanent Representative to the EU.

He was also Spanish ambassador to Morocco from 2004 to 2009 and has occupied a number of other positions at national and regional level in Spain. He was a member of the Spanish Parliament from 1982 to 1987 and three times served as regional minister in the government of Andalucía.

He holds a law degree from the University of Valencia. He is a regular speaker and has written articles and essays on European affairs.

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**Tarek OSMAN**

Tarek Osman is a writer, essayist, and documentary maker, and Senior Political Counsellor of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) for the Arab world, where he focuses on the political economy of the region and policymaking and reforms.

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**Marietje SCHAAKE**

Marietje Schaake has been serving as a Member of the European Parliament for the Dutch Democratic Party (D66) with the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) political group since 2009. She serves on the International Trade committee and is the spokesperson for the ALDE Group on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Schaake also serves on the committee on Foreign Affairs and the subcommittee on Human Rights. She is the founder of the European Parliament Intergroup on the Digital Agenda for Europe. Furthermore, Marietje Schaake is the Vice-President of the US Delegation and serves on the Iran Delegation and the Delegation for the Arab peninsula. She is a Member of the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace and is a Young Global Leader and a Member of the Global Future Council on Future of Digital Economy and Society with the World Economic Forum.

He is the author of *Islamism* (2016) and the international bestseller *Egypt on the Brink* (2010), published weeks before the country’s uprising in 2011. He wrote and presented several documentary series for the BBC, including *The Making of the Modern Arab World* and *Islam Divided: Sunni-Shia*. He has lectured on the history, socio-politics, and political economy of the Arab world at several universities.

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Ulrich SCHULTE-STRATHAUS

Ulrich Schulte-Strathaus is a leading aviation industry analyst, specialised in EU and international regulatory affairs, aviation market analyses, change management and competition law.

A lawyer by training, he held various senior management positions at Lufthansa German Airlines between 1981 and 2002; he led the political team during the airline’s privatisation and, as Corporate Vice-President for International Affairs, he represented the interests of Lufthansa in the German-US Open Sky negotiations, oversaw the anti-trust immunity (ATI) approval of the airline’s alliances, and secured the airline’s interests in international negotiations on traffic rights with other third countries.

In September 2002, he was elected as Secretary-General of the Brussels-based Association of European Airlines. During his 10-year tenure, he represented the interests of Europe’s established airlines on all aviation-related issues, and built a network of contacts with the European Commission, the European Parliament and Member States, as well as with the other players in the aviation value chain.

In 2012 Ulrich Schulte-Strathaus founded his own aviation consultancy based in Brussels. He has specialised on competition law, state aids, environmental policy and consumer protection and retained clients from the public and private sector.

He has published several articles and studies, notably on the EU-US aviation relationship, the options for trade protection in aviation, and industry developments. He has lectured on aviation-specific developments in universities, at conferences, and at World Economic Forum (WEF) events.

Sabrina SCHULZ

Dr Sabrina Schulz is Director of the Berlin office of E3G – Third Generation Environmentalism – an independent organisation acting to accelerate the global transition to sustainable development.

Her work focuses on the low-carbon transformation of the European economy, as well as climate diplomacy and climate risk.

Before joining E3G in 2012, she worked in various policy capacities for think tanks in Germany, the UK, the US and Canada. From 2009 to 2011, she was Policy Adviser for climate change and energy to the British High Commission in Canada. She is also a Board Member of Greenpeace Germany and a Policy Fellow at Das Progressive Zentrum in Berlin.

Dr Sabrina Schulz holds an MA in public policy and management from the University of Potsdam, for which she studied at the University of Konstanz and l’Université Catholique de Louvain, as well an MA in international politics and a PhD from Aberystwyth University.
Simon SERFATY

Simon Serfaty is Professor and Eminent Scholar at the Old Dominion University (ODU) in Norfolk, Virginia. He was also associated with the Centre for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) in Washington DC, where he served as Director of European Studies (1993-2003). In 2003, he became the first holder of the Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy (2003-2011), which he now holds as Emeritus. Prof Serfaty is the author of multiple books, including A World Recast (2013) and Un monde nouveau en manque d’Amérique (Odile Jacob, 2014). His essays have appeared in most leading journals on both sides of the Atlantic. He has been an expert witness for the US Congress and some national legislative bodies in Europe. In 2008, French President Sarkozy named him a Knight of the Legion of Honour, France’s highest civilian medal.

Kristin SHI-KUPFER

Kristin Shi-Kupfer is head of research on politics, society and the media at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS). She is an expert on media policy, digital society, and ideology in China. She previously worked as a research associate at the University of Freiburg’s Institute for Sinology. She earned her PhD from Ruhr University Bochum with a thesis on spiritual and religious groups in China after 1978. From 2007 to 2011 she was the China correspondent for the Austrian news magazine Profil, the German Protestant Press Agency epd, and Südwest Presse in Beijing. She also worked as a freelance contributor for other media like ZEIT Online, tageszeitung (taz), and Deutsche Welle in China.

In May 2017, Kristin Shi-Kupfer was appointed member of the expert committee of the German-Chinese platform on innovation under Germany’s Federal Ministry of Education and Research.

CHU Shulong

Dr Chu Shulong is Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the School of Public Policy and Management and Director of the Institute of International Strategic and Development Studies at Tsinghua University in Beijing, China. He is also a Professor at China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Party School, an adviser to China’s Central Television (CCTV) international reporting, and Director of the Centre for Northeast Asian Studies of Dalian University of Foreign Languages.

He was previously Director for the North American Studies Division of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). He was a senior visiting fellow at the Centre for US-China Relations of New York University in January 2013, at the Brookings Institution in 2006-2007, and the East-West Centre in Hawaii, the US in 2001.
Dr. Chu’s major areas of research are international relations and global development, Asian security and cooperation, US foreign strategy and China policy, the Sino-US relations, and China’s foreign policy and relations. His most recent publications include The Sino-US Relations in the Post-Cold War Era; Basic Theories of International Relations; China’s Foreign Strategy and Policy, and American Government and Politics (three volumes).

Professor Chu was awarded a master’s degree in law at Beijing University of International Relations in 1985, and a PhD degree in political science at the George Washington University in 1993.

Christian STROHAL

Ambassador Christian Strohal is the Special Representative of the Austrian Chairmanship of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). He advises the Chairperson-in-Office and coordinates the activities related to the structured dialogue on behalf of the Chairmanship.

Ambassador Strohal previously served as Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Austria to the office of the United Nations in Geneva, as well as to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). He also served as President of the Governing Bodies of the International Organisation for Migration, and as Vice-President of the Human Rights Council. Throughout his career, Ambassador Strohal has consistently focused on human rights work, serving as Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), as Ambassador and Special Representative for the 1993 United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, and as Director of the Office for Human Rights at the Austrian Foreign Ministry.

Alexander STUBB

Dr Alexander Stubb is Vice-President of the European Investment Bank since August 2017. His oversights include the Bank’s financing activities in the Nordics, Baltics and Eastern Partnership Countries; Funding and Treasury; Urban Development; Security and Defence; Corporate Responsibility, and Diversity and Inclusion.

Dr Alexander Stubb served as Prime Minister, Finance Minister, Foreign Minister, Trade and Europe Minister of Finland. His background is in academia and civil service, with a focus on EU affairs. He was a Member of the European Parliament from 2004 to 2008, Government Minister from 2008 to 2016, a Member of Parliament from 2011 to 2017, and Chairman of the National Coalition Party from 2014 to 2016.

He holds a PhD from the London School of Economics, has published 18 books and is a self-professed sports fanatic.

Paweł ŚWIEBODA

Paweł Świeboda is Deputy Head of the European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC), the in-house think tank of the European Commission.

Prior to joining the EPSC, he was President of demosEUROPA – Centre for European Strategy, an EU policy think tank based in Warsaw, from 2006 to 2015. Earlier, he was Director of the EU Department at the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the years 2001 to 2006 and EU Advisor to the President of Poland from 1996 to 2000.
A graduate of the London School of Economics and the University of London, UK, he is a member of a number of advisory boards of European think tanks as well as a member of the Global Agenda Council on Europe of the World Economic Forum. In 2013 to 2014, he was Rapporteur of the Review of European Innovation Partnerships.

Dmitri TRENIN

Dr Dmitri V. Trenin is the Director of the Carnegie Moscow Centre since 2008. He was the first Russian to be appointed to this position. He also chairs the research council and the Foreign and Security Policy Programme, and is a Senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.


For several years, Trenin taught area studies at the Defence University in Moscow. He was also the first non-NATO senior fellow at the NATO Defence College (1993) and, upon retirement from the military, a visiting professor at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (1993–1994). In 1994–1997, he was also a senior research fellow at the Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences. He received his PhD from the Institute of the USA and Canada, Soviet Academy of Sciences (1984).

He is the author of more than 10 books, including: Should We Fear Russia?; Russia and the World in the 21st Century; Unconditional Peace: 21st Century Euro-Atlantic as a Security Community; Post-Imperium: A Eurasian Story; Solo Voyage; Getting Russia Right; Central Asia: The Views from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing; Integration and Identity: Russia as a New West; The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization; A Strategy for Stable Peace: Toward a Euro-Atlantic Security Community; Russia’s China Problem; and others.

Dr Dmitri Trenin is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, the Russian International Affairs Council, the Russian International Studies Association, and other organisations.

Catarina TULLY

Catarina Tully is Founder of the School of International Futures, an independent consultancy that builds the capacity of business leaders, policymakers, governments and international organisations to use and gain value from strategic foresight.

She teaches and advises on emergent strategy, system stewardship and strategic foresight internationally, including at Moscow’s Presidential Academy for Public Administration and the United Nations Advisory Group for Goal 16 of the Sustainable Development Goals.

Catarina Tully is also a member of the Advisory Group of the British Foreign Policy Group. Previously, she was Strategy Project Director at the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Senior Policy Adviser in the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, but also worked across the non-profit and business sectors, including Christian Aid, Technoserve, World Bank, and Procter & Gamble.

She has a Social and Political Science degree from Cambridge University, a Master in Public Affairs (MPA) from Princeton and a Business and Finance Strategy Qualification (CIMA).
Justin VAÏSSE

Dr Justin Vaïsse is a French historian and the current Director of Policy Planning Staff at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

He specialises in the history of international relations and the history of the United States. He was an Associate Professor at the Paris Institute of Political Studies from 1999 to 2006 and a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution from 2007 to 2013.


Tomáš VALÁŠEK

Tomáš Valášek is Director at Carnegie Europe. His research focuses on security and defence, transatlantic relations, and Europe’s Eastern neighbourhood.

Prior to joining Carnegie, he served as the Permanent Representative of Slovakia to NATO and as President of the Central European Policy Institute in Bratislava (2012–2013). He was also Director of Foreign Policy and Defence at the Centre for European Reform in London (2007–2012) and Acting Political Director heading the Security and Defence Policy Division at the Slovak Ministry of Defence as well as Founder and Director of the World Security Institute, Brussels Office (2002–2006).

Tomáš Valášek advised Slovak Defence and Foreign Ministers, the House of Lords (UK), and the Group of Experts on the new NATO Strategic Concept. He writes for numerous newspapers and journals, including the Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times.

Ramón Luis VALCÁRCEL SISO

Ramón Luis Valcárcel Siso is Vice-President of the European Parliament, responsible inter alia for the Members’ Research Service and Library, relations with national Parliaments, as well as relations with the Committee of Regions (CoR) and the European Economic and Social Committee.
Prior to assuming this position, he was President of the Autonomous Community of the Region of Murcia from 1995-2014. He is a member of the Committee on Regional Development, the Delegation for relations with the Mashreq countries, the Delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean, and the European People’s Party.

As a former President and member of the Committee of the Regions of the European Union, Ramón Luis Valcárcel Siso was part of its Delegation in the European Convention that elaborated the Constitutional Agreement for the EU in 2003. He also served as President of the CoR Commission for External Relations (2004-2006).

Rob Wainwright is Executive Director of Europol since 2009.

Having overseen Europol’s transition from intergovernmental organisation to EU agency status in 2010, he ensured Europol’s position in the EU Policy Cycle for serious and organised crime and secured the establishment at Europol of the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3, 2013), the European Counter Terrorism Centre, and the European Migrant Smuggling Centre (both in 2016).

After graduating from the London School of Economics, Rob Wainwright’s career began as a British intelligence analyst, focusing on counterterrorism and organised crime. He served as Head of the UK Liaison Bureau at Europol and subsequently as Director International of the UK Serious Organised Crime Agency from its creation in 2006.

Klaus Welle is the Secretary-General of the European Parliament since 2009. In this capacity, he is the European Parliament’s most senior official.

Prior to this, he was Head of the Cabinet of the President of the European Parliament. From 2004 to 2007, he served as Director-General for Internal Policies at the European Parliament, and as Secretary-General of the EPP-ED Group in the European Parliament.

From 1994 to 1999, he held the post of Secretary-General of the EPP Party. Klaus Welle holds a degree in Economics from the University of Witten/Herdecke, Germany.

Dr Angela Wilkinson is Senior Director for Scenarios and Business Insights at the World Energy Council (WEC).

She works with WEC members, global partners and patrons to anticipate prepare and shape the global energy transition for the benefit of all.

She brings 30+ years’ experience in strategic advisory support to high-level leaders in government, business, and civil society, honed from working in public and private organisations in 20+ countries.

She is a world-class foresight and scenario planning expert, having conducted over 100 futures projects, including the direction of large, international, and multi-stakeholder initiatives.
Previous roles include Strategic Foresight Counsellor at the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); Director of Scenarios and Futures Research, University of Oxford; Head of Special Projects, Shell scenarios.

She has Board-level and International Advisory Board experience. She is Associate Fellow at the Said Business School, University of Oxford, and Fellow of the World Academy of Arts and Science. She has written two books on and published many articles on strategic foresight, scenario planning and global risk management. She is also CEO of Oxford Futures Limited – an independent consultancy specialising in helping leaders and their organisations to learn their way into the future. She has a PhD in Physics.

Guntram Wolff is Director of Bruegel. His research focuses on the European economy and governance, fiscal and monetary policy, and global finance.

He regularly testifies to the European Finance Ministers’ ECOFIN meeting, the European Parliament, the German Parliament and the French Parliament (Assemblée Nationale).

From 2012 to 2016, Guntram Wolff was a member of the French Prime Minister’s Conseil d’Analyse Économique. He is also a member of the Solvay Brussels School’s International Advisory Board of the Brussels Free University. He joined Bruegel from the European Commission where he worked on the macroeconomics of the euro area and the reform of euro area governance. Prior to this, he coordinated the research team on Fiscal Policy at Deutsche Bundesbank. He also worked as an Adviser to the International Monetary Fund.

Wolfgang Wosolsobe

Brigadier General Wolfgang Wosolsobe (ret.) is the former Director-General of the EU Military Staff (with rank of Lieutenant General) – a position which he held from 2013 to 2016.

Following his retirement in 2017, he remains strongly dedicated to the steady reinforcement of European Defence.

He first entered the Austrian Armed Forces in 1973 and his military career covered a broad spectrum of experiences on both national and international levels.

He accompanied the development of European Defence efforts from the early stages on. Highlights of his career in this particular endeavour were his role as Austrian Military Representative to EU and NATO and his assignment as Director-General of the EU Military Staff.
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