Discussion: Extending Working Life

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- ▶ Is there political support for adjusting PAYG pension systems by postponing retirement?
- Shows political feasibility of postponing retirement age.
 Voters may prefer to postpone retirement because
 - the net wealth of the pensions they expect declines due to an ageing society (Income Effect)
 - net benefits decrease relative to income from work reducing incentives to retire early (Substitution Effect)

- Carefully executed study aiming for quantitative results by calibrating the model
- ► Are general equilibrium effects quantitatively important? Are they relevant at all for small open economies?
- Politico-economic equilibrium in two-dimensional policy space 'generated' by structure induced equilibria: Is there a convincing motivation?

- Essentially there is a median voter story behind the results. While this may be a good first approximation, political decision mechanisms may be more intricate resulting in different outcomes given voters' preferences
 - Influence of interest groups
 - Institutional arrangements, e.g. voting systems, matter for aggregating individual preferences into political outcomes.
- ▶ Results are robust against various modeling choices. How do results respond to changes in the calibration? Is there a sensitivity analysis?

- Survey of ageing and pension reforms in Europe
- ► Employment rates in age bracket 55-64 increased from 36% to 44% (but are still low.)
- On a more disaggregate level on finds:
 - Considerable variance between countries
 - Employment rates for women more than 15 percentage points lower
 - ► Hugh difference in employment rates between low and high skilled about 25 percentage points
- ► Early exit benefits make up a share of appr. 20% of those leaving the work force aged 55-64.

- Pension reforms group into:
 - Restricting eligibility conditions
 - Incentives for employees to work longer
 - Training measures
 - Incentives for employers to hire older workers
 - Improving working conditions

- Report argues for more systematic evaluation of reform measures. However, there are some things we already have an idea about:
 - ► E.g., incentives for employers to hire older workers may result in displacement effects, deadweight losses, stigmatizing older workers...
 - Results of causal analyses of labor market policies may be informative.

- Analysis of changes in perceptions of life expectancy and working lives on savings and other macroeconomic variables in small and large open economies.
- It is argued that
 - an increasing working life reduces savings.
 - higher life expectancies increase savings.

- ► Evidence on study's motivation, e.g. Benartzi and Thaler (2007)
- ▶ How is the model calibrated? How well does it explaining other stylized facts of the European economies?
- Schizophrenic agents:
 - Motivation builds on agents' mis-perception of life expectancy resulting in inadequate savings decisions
 - Analysis rests on rational expectations model
- What are policies to align perceptions on life expectancies?

Summing up

It is not only about what measures work making pension systems sustainable but also what measures are politically feasible.