HUMANITARIAN IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (HIP)
SYRIA REGIONAL CRISIS

The full implementation of this version of the HIP is conditional upon the necessary appropriations being made available from the 2017 general budget of the European Union.

AMOUNT: EUR 234 400 000

The present Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) was prepared on the basis of financing decision ECHO/WWD/BUD/2017/01000 (Worldwide Decision) and the related General Guidelines for Operational Priorities on Humanitarian Aid (Operational Priorities). The purpose of the HIP and its annex is to serve as a communication tool for ECHO's partners and to assist in the preparation of their proposals. The provisions of the Worldwide Decision and the General Conditions of the Agreement with the European Commission shall take precedence over the provisions in this document.

0. MAJOR CHANGES SINCE PREVIOUS VERSION OF THE HIP
First modification (May 2017)

SYRIA - EUR 114 400 000

A request to mobilise an additional amount of EUR 64 400 000 for humanitarian projects to be implemented in Syria in 2017 in response to the worsening of the crisis has been made.

In 2017, the conflict continues unabated, magnitude of humanitarian needs is overwhelming in all parts of Syria, where civilians are subject to on-going attacks, and public infrastructures being constantly bombed.

On 29 December 2016, a ceasefire agreement was reached between the Government of Syria and armed opposition groups (AOGs). The ceasefire entered into effect on 30 December. The cessation of hostilities has not resulted in an expansion of access for humanitarian assistance and personnel, that could have helped mitigate the seriously deteriorated living conditions for populations in both government and opposition-controlled areas. The situation has been worsening by the day and fighting is ongoing in places like Eastern Ghouta, Idlib, Homs and Raqqa, triggering new needs and displacements. The intensity of displacement is stronger than ever. March 2017 is reported as the highest month in number of people displaced in the last year with 213 919 new IDPs.

Parties to the conflict continue to carry out widespread and systematic violations of human rights, with children and women particularly susceptible to abuse and exploitation. Most recent examples are the chemical weapon attacks on Khan Sheikhoun on the 4th April, which killed at
least killed at least 87 people, and the bomb blast in Rashidin, which killed at least 126 people in
an attack near buses carrying evacuees from two besieged government-held towns of Foua and
Kefraya, in Idlib province.

In April, increased tensions have been affecting the Southern governorates and continuous heavy
air operations have been conducted in Idleb and Hama, 26 reported attacks on health
infrastructures/staff for March only in Hama, Idleb, Raqqa and Da’ra, in parallel to continuous
indiscriminate bombing. In these areas, the main priorities are treating the wounded and the sick,
and providing food aid, water, sanitation and hygiene, healthcare and shelter. In the health sector
particularly, the long-lasting consequences of the conflict include shortages of qualified medical
personnel and life-saving medicines and the destruction of health infrastructure, leaving many
without access to basic medical care. Medical facilities continue to be targeted by aerial
bombardments, resulting in fatalities and destruction of facilities.

Despite the completion of evacuations and the end of the fighting in Aleppo city, the
humanitarian situation is dire, the scale of destruction is massive, and needs are enormous. Main
findings indicate that shelter solutions, wash, emergency education, protection are overarching
priorities. In other parts of the country where military offensives and airstrikes continue, basic
services and infrastructures are still severely affected, with particular reference to the disruption
of water supplies.

All over the country, evacuations are ongoing without international protective presence;
detention is still a risk for many IDPs staying at different temporary sites, the large presence of
munitions and UXOs in public places and residential areas. Lack of civil documentation, family
separation, widespread traumatization and high prevalence of persons with special needs are also
important protection concerns.

The UN-coordinated response plans for Syria and the region combined require US$8 billion for
2017. For Syria only, the 2017 UN Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) requests funds for the
amount of USD 3,4 billion, which is currently funded only for 14,8% (funding gap USD 2,9
billion).

The additional EU funding will allow ensuring timely, adequate and appropriate provision of
humanitarian assistance to respond to the recent aggravation in the crisis and to the increasing
needs, inter alia, in terms of protection, food, health services and medical supplies, and WASH,
in line with an Whole of Syria approach, from every possible entry point (cross line and cross
border). It will aim at supporting displaced people, as well as supporting humanitarian
preparedness and contingency plan. It will also allow strengthening the humanitarian footprint
and presence of implementing partners. ECHO will keep implementing a Basic Needs Approach
(BNA) strategy to be adopted, as an operational framework which intends to refocus
humanitarian assistance on supporting quality humanitarian interventions to respond to primary
needs of the most vulnerable wherever they are in a timely, adapted and strategic manner.
Particularly, the BNA includes, as main components, First line Response, Immediate post-
emergency assistance and Link with long term programming.
1. CONTEXT

Inside Syria:

Conflict continues to ravage lives within the Syrian Arab Republic (Syria), with no end in sight. Well into the 6th year of the crisis, unrelenting, indiscriminate and disproportionate violence, ever escalating in its unrestrained savagery, causes civilian victims, injuries, internal population displacement, both repeated and new, at intolerable scale. The ensuing complex and fluid humanitarian crisis generates ever mounting levels of unacceptable suffering, hardship and deprivation, further compounded by a now collapsed economy. The IMF estimates that more than 75% of the Syrian economy has been destroyed. Disregard for international humanitarian (IHL) and human rights law (IHRL) by all parties to the conflict – and principally the Government of Syria's military and proxies – is deliberate and pervasive, aggravated by blatant impunity and limited impact of international remedial action – United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolutions (SCR) such as 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2254 (2015) are only partially implemented albeit unanimously adopted. Targeting of civilian infrastructure and humanitarian workers contributes to deteriorating conditions of life, with the functionality of basic services significantly compromised, resulting in poor and irregular provision. The proliferation of warring parties, armed groups and frontlines is further weakening any resilience left in the Syrian people to survive this catastrophic, growingly internationalized conflict. As the social fabric unravels, the emergence of fractured and fragmented communities is mirrored by heightened protection threats to the civilian population based on their perceived sectarian identity.

Renewed international diplomatic efforts gained momentum in early 2016, resulting in a fragile cessation of hostilities which drastically reduced violence for about six weeks. In combination with local level truce agreements, the cessation enabled the UN-backed International Syria Support Group (ISSG) humanitarian task force to facilitate the delivery of desperately-needed aid, albeit well below what was required, to besieged and ‘hard-to-reach’ areas throughout the country. As limited and partial humanitarian access gains eroded over time, violence resumed. Whilst diplomatic efforts are ongoing, there are no clear or immediate prospects for a political settlement to this ruinous conflict. In the coming period, further violence and instability are expected to prevail, their repercussions contributing to volatility in the sub-region and beyond.

The lack of humanitarian access has reached unprecedented proportions in this crisis. Hindering and/or denying humanitarian assistance has become a tactic of war. Likewise, during political negotiations, humanitarian access has been instrumentalised by opposing sides for their own purposes, seeking trade-offs which proved to be short-term at best. With humanitarian principles continuously pressurized by operational modalities dictated by extremely insecure and volatile environments, quality of the response was sidelined in view of the humanitarian imperative of saving lives. Over time, limited demonstrable outcomes accumulated. It is therefore now crucial that basic minimum conditions for aid delivery be re-defined, reflecting learning available to date.

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1 IMF working paper WP/16/23 "Syria's conflict economy", June 2016
In neighboring countries:

Despite enormous efforts and resources expended, the living conditions of refugee populations have deteriorated. Major social, economic and status/legal challenges are directly affecting the lives of Syrian refugees who crossed international borders seeking protection in neighboring countries. With approximately 2,725,000 Syrian refugees registered in Turkey, 1,033,000 in Lebanon, 656,000 in Jordan, 249,000 in Iraq and 115,000 in Egypt, the strain put by the protracted Syrian refugee crisis on these countries’ resources and infrastructures has been immense, also on account of pre-existing fragility. In both Lebanon and Jordan, security considerations increasingly dominate discussions relating to the Syrian refugee issue. Lebanon de facto closed its border in 2015; Jordan in 2016. The number of Syrians seeking to enter Jordan rose rapidly from the end of 2015, with over 80,000 people stranded at the north-eastern border (also known as the ‘Berm’). Whilst social tensions between refugees and host communities result from the competition for limited services and scarce resources, refugees continue to face obstacles to renew their legal stay or limiting their capacity to access available services. In some of the neighboring countries, Syrian refugees are subject to curfews, arbitrary arrests, forced encampment as well as restrictions on movement and access to services. This conundrum disproportionately affects their capacity to work in compliance with the employment legislation of host countries and consequently pushes the most vulnerable segments of the refugee population - after exhausting their coping resources due to protracted displacement - into a downward spiraling socio-economic vulnerability and negative coping mechanisms.

The growing trend of practices by neighboring countries equivalent to *refoulement* of Syrian asylum seekers and refugees, as well as Palestinian Refugees from Syria (PRS), despite serious risks to their physical safety, is of grave concern. With varying degrees, the closure of borders with Syria, as well as stricter internal controls and discriminatory security screenings, are giving rise to important protection concerns. The confluence of these factors will also inevitably lead to greater pressure for much needed - and to date still inadequate - resettlement to third countries. International cooperation and burden-sharing continues to be urgently needed to protect Syrian refugees and address this humanitarian crisis.

ECHO’s Integrated Analysis Framework for 2016 identified high to extreme humanitarian needs in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt. The vulnerability of the population affected by the crisis is assessed to be very high.

From June 2016, the ECHO humanitarian response in Turkey is no longer covered by the financing decision under the HIP Syria Regional Crisis. Humanitarian operations in Turkey and Iraq should therefore be referred to the respective HIPs for Turkey and Iraq.

2. HUMANITARIAN NEEDS

a. Affected people / potential beneficiaries:

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4 Amnesty International - [https://www.amnesty.org](https://www.amnesty.org)
5 INFORM Risk Index values (on a scale 1 to 10) for 2016 are: Syria: 6.7; Lebanon: 5.5; Egypt: 4.6; Jordan 3.8.
Inside Syria:

Since 2011, more than 11 million Syrians have been displaced, both within (over 6.6 million IDPs\(^6\)) and outside their country (over 4.9 million refugees\(^7\)); the combined estimate roughly amounts to half of the country’s pre-crisis population. All 14 Syrian governorates have been affected by the conflict, with many people displaced multiple times. By August 2016, an estimated 900 000 people were newly displaced as a direct result of the conflict, with no sign of reprieve. Although carrying out accurate and timely assessments is a major challenge in Syria, estimates indicate that 13.5 million Syrians are in need of some form of humanitarian assistance\(^8\). Amongst these, more than 6 million are children and some 5.5 million live in so-called ‘hard-to-reach’\(^9\) areas across 163 locations. Some 590 200 are trapped in at least 18 areas besieged by either government forces and/or non-state armed groups, representing a 39\% increase from the previous HIP. With the siege of Aleppo, this will likely further escalate. Approximately 80 000 people are stranded on the Jordanian border at the Berm.

Syria hosts more than 32 000 asylum-seekers and refugees, mainly from Iraq, with much smaller numbers of other origins. In addition, 450 000 PRS are also living in Syria, 280 000 of whom have been internally displaced\(^10\). Following the outbreak of widespread conflict in Iraq, citizens of that country have been displaced to Syria since December 2013.

In neighboring countries:

Refugees from Syria represent the largest refugee population in the world. With more than 1.03 million registered Syrian refugees, Lebanon accounts for the highest refugee per capita worldwide; Jordan has the second highest per capita ratio, with more than 656 000 Syrian refugees on its territory. In Egypt, 115 000 Syrian refugees account for approximately 62\% of the registered refugee caseload in country.

The impact of the Syrian refugees on these countries also affects, either directly or indirectly, other refugee populations (e.g. PRS, Iraqi, Yemeni, Sudanese, Somali, Eritrean, Ethiopian, etc.), often living in already overcrowded and poor urban settings. Vulnerable host communities will not be excluded from ECHO’s action in support of Syrian refugees as resources allow.

b. Description of most acute humanitarian needs:

Inside Syria:

An abhorrent feature of the conflict in Syria is the blatant disregard by all parties to the conflict for the rules of war as enshrined in IHL. There is no safety for civilians in Syria, as no area is left unaffected by conflict-related violence. Although the tragic count of fatalities is difficult to verify amidst different biased statistics put forward by all parties to the conflict, and the lack of


\(^7\) UNHCR - [http://www.unhcr.org/576408cd7](http://www.unhcr.org/576408cd7)

\(^8\) UN-OCHA

\(^9\) As per UN designation - An area that is not regularly accessible to humanitarian actors for the purposes of sustained humanitarian programming as a result of denial of access, including the need to negotiate access on an ad hoc basis, or due to restrictions such as an active conflict, multiple security checkpoints, or failure of the authorities to provide timely approval.

\(^10\) DRC - 2016
independent verification due to the inaccessibility of many areas, the UN special envoy for Syria estimated that 400,000 people were killed by April 2016\textsuperscript{11}. The conduct of hostilities is the key determinant of civilian suffering. The illegal use of weapons, starvation and displacement that have become part of a military strategy, attacks against health facilities and schools, a restrictive interpretation of the humanitarian space, are just a few examples in a regrettable long list of other brutalities, which are not an inevitable consequence of war but rather serious violations of IHL\textsuperscript{12}. Women and men, girls and boys are regularly victims of rape and sexual violence. Coupled with a lack of viable asylum options the most vulnerable, especially women, children and the elderly, who have exhausted their assets, suffer grave consequences. The savagery unleashed by this conflict calls for unhindered, full, sustained and unconditional humanitarian access, as an emerging ‘need’ inside Syria.

Unprecedented economic contraction has left the population bereft and destitute. The destruction and disrepair of key social and civilian infrastructure marks the unraveling of essential public services, negatively impacting every aspect of daily life. As of 2015, Syria witnessed a reversal in all of its 12 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)\textsuperscript{13}; the average life expectancy for Syrians dropped from 79.5 years in 2010 to 55.7\textsuperscript{14}; Syria’s economy lost an estimated USD 255 billion\textsuperscript{15}. In the health sector, the picture is equally dire, with 26% of public hospitals no longer functioning; 33% partially functioning and 55% of the pre-crisis health workforce no longer active. Security and movement restrictions also severely hinder access to all forms of medical care, coupled with a critical shortage of life-saving medicines and medical supplies. The use of water as a weapon of war continues. 70% of those living in Syria lack regular access to safe water, with treated water having become scarcer and costlier due to fuel shortages. Securing adequate access to water, both in terms of quantity and quality, is a major challenge to prevent recurrent disease outbreaks in areas where water is scarce or unsafe and hygiene conditions are poor, and especially where there is an increased demand from concentrated population displacement. Destruction of housing stock has been sustained in the major cities and throughout the country’s urban and peri-urban areas; over 400,000 houses were fully destroyed and 1.2 million damaged. Growing proportions of children and adolescents are out of school, particularly in opposition-held areas, with repercussions to last for generations to come.

Household purchasing power continues to weaken; over 50% of the working age population is unemployed, subsidies largely ceased and inflation is soaring. With 67% Syrians now living in extreme poverty, the food security situation of the most deprived families continues to deteriorate, whilst their dependence on external assistance rises. Rapid nutrition assessments, last conducted in 13 governorates in 2014, found 7.2% global acute malnutrition (GAM) and 2.3% severe acute malnutrition (SAM) rates among children under five years old.

In neighboring countries:

\textsuperscript{11} Other recent estimates of the number of casualties include the figure of 470,000 (Syrian Centre for Policy Research, February 2016) or of 430,000 (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, September 2016), with no official UN estimates provided in the recent period.

\textsuperscript{12} Protection of civilians - ICRC statement to the UN Security Council, 2016

\textsuperscript{13} Syrian Centre for Policy Research (SCPR) - 2015

\textsuperscript{14} UNRWA-SCPR - 2015

\textsuperscript{15} SCPR – 2016
The closure of borders with Syria, as well as more stringent controls and discriminatory security screenings (based on place of origin, tribal affiliation, gender and age among others) for civilians who fled the conflict, have raised protection concerns in Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt. Over time, as savings and household resources are exhausted, worsening conditions result in growing risks of exploitation and widespread use of negative coping mechanisms (notably child labor and early marriage, transactional sex) as survival strategies. Therefore, addressing gaps in assistance for those refugee segments with increasing recourse to negative, undignified and unsustainable coping strategies, should continue.

At the same time, with the crisis protracting, the majority of refugees living in host countries require assistance in the form of more comprehensive access to public services such as education and livelihoods. Although complementary interventions by development actors have partially addressed these situations, more remains to be done and at an accelerated pace, following opportunities opened by pledges made in February 2016 at the London ‘Supporting Syria and the Region’ Conference (London Conference).

In Lebanon, the adoption of new residency regulations for Syrians in January 2015 placed an additional strain on refugees and impacted severely on their ability to obtain valid residency permits. Of particular concern are the growing numbers of refugees with illegal status as their valid registration documents expired over time due to burdensome and expensive bureaucratic requirements. Access to assistance and services for those without valid documents has become more difficult. Their capacity to seek employment has been curtailed. They currently experience significant limitations on their freedom of movement, due to fear of arrest, detention, and harassment. Consequently their access to livelihoods and to vital services has been hampered. Growing poverty, increased dependence on debt and resorting to negative coping mechanisms (e.g. child labor; exploitative work) are linked to the absence of legal status. According to the Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees (VaSYR), the percentage of households where all members held valid residency permits nearly halved from 58% in 2014 to 29% in 2015; a further drop in 2016 is projected by preliminary findings. As a result, ever larger numbers of refugees run the risk of deportation, eviction, coerced and forced return (refoulement), as well as imprisonment. Due to the Lebanon’s ‘no camp’ policy, 41% of Syrian refugees live in substandard housing units, with approximately 18% residing in informal settlements. The percentage of households living below the Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket16 doubled from 2014 to 2015; based on Inter-Agency Coordination findings, the average debt per household reached nearly USD 1 000, as compared to USD 842 in 2015. Moreover, in areas of large concentration of refugees, strains on public services are growing. As the crisis gets protracted, the impact of hiked demand is placing enormous stress on already weak public services, resulting in growing tensions with host communities.

In Jordan, 78.5% of the persons of concern registered by UNHCR are living in hosting communities, whilst 21.5% in camps. Movements in and out of camps are strictly controlled. According to the 2015 Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF), 86.5% of Syrian refugees in urban areas live below the Jordanian poverty line17. Northern and eastern Jordan display the highest proportion of high and severely vulnerable refugees, with over 80% of Syrian refugees

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16 <USD87 per capita/month - VASyR, 2015
17 68 JOD/month
reverting to emergency coping strategies, often with negative consequences. 81% of Syrian refugees are under 35 years of age; severely vulnerable families have more family members, more children and display a higher dependency ratio. The Ministry of Health (MoH) requires since November 2014 Syrian refugees to pay health users’ fees equivalent to those applied to non-insured Jordanians for all types of services provided, thus negatively impacting access to healthcare, in particular secondary care. Several challenges (e.g. loss of original documentation; associated costs and fees; etc.) continue related to Syrian refugees’ capacity to obtain Ministry of Interior (MoI) cards, these being essential to access Government’s services. Despite efforts by the Government to simplify procedures and extend ‘grace periods’ temporarily lifting fees for issuance of legal permits to work, the number of Syrian refugees enrolling for these remain below target, leading to cases of forced encampment for those caught in illegal employment. Humanitarian organizations routinely report on cases of deportation, possible refoulement.

At the Berm, in August 2016 approximately 80 000 people, comprising both genuine asylum seekers and other mixed populations, are stranded in no-man's-land, with numbers swelling since November 2015, despite Azraq camp having received, as of end of June 2016, a total of 21 306 new arrivals from the Berm. Living in precarious settlements remotely located in the desert, the large majority of these asylum seekers remain in need of urgent humanitarian assistance. Following an attack to a Jordanian military post at the Berm in late June 2016, the provision of assistance has been drastically reduced from that moment onwards by the authorities. Current restrictions prevent humanitarian actors to ensure assistance being delivered with adequate modalities and at the necessary quality and quantity. Several options are currently being researched, not only to ensure lifesaving operations to rapidly resume at the Berm in the respect of the humanitarian imperative but also to identify the best potential sustainable solutions in line with humanitarian principles.

Egypt remains a transit and destination country within a context of mixed migration and refugee flow. Figures on new arrivals, new registrations and asylum applications are on the rise between January and July 2016, compared to 2015. 90% of the registered Syrian refugees live below the poverty line, in overcrowded and impoverished urban and semi-urban settings. For registered Syrian and Sudanese refugees, the Government of Egypt formally provides access to public education and health services. However, access to those services is severely constrained as multiple barriers negatively affect Syrian refugees’ capacity to benefit from them, predominantly due to the overstretched capacity for the host population itself. Refugees from other crisis, whilst sharing similar vulnerability to Syrian ones, do not have access to formal education and additionally suffer linguistic barriers and discrimination, further contributing to their marginalization.

3. HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

   a. National / local response and involvement

   Inside Syria:
   Humanitarian response within Syria is primarily delivered through the Syrian Arab Red Crescent Society (SARC) with its 14 governorate branches, 80 sub-branches and network of volunteers. Following economic decline, deliberate targeting in hostilities and death/displacement of

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18 <USD75 per capita/month – UNHCR
qualified human resources, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic (GoS)’s capacity to deliver public services through various line ministries has shrunk. Outside GoS’ controlled areas, it completely collapsed. The GoS facilitates the sporadic delivery of humanitarian aid mostly, but not exclusively, to government-held areas, through the Ministry of Local Affairs High Relief Committee, which issues authorisations for humanitarian organisations to work inside Syria. In addition, as many as 120 national NGOs are partnering with the UN in delivering of the assistance across 6 hubs in Damascus, Homs, Tartous, Aleppo, Qamishli and As-Sweida. International NGOs operating from Damascus are subject to limitations in entering into partnerships with national NGOs or to establish new sub-offices. Syrian NGOs and CSOs, as well as local councils, play a crucial role in facilitating and delivering humanitarian assistance across borders, from all operational hubs, primarily from Turkey, Jordan and Iraq.

The delivery of humanitarian aid remains hindered by severe and deliberate restrictions by all parties to the conflict as well as by those exerting territorial control. The lack of independent needs assessments and post distribution monitoring act as complex limiting factors in all situations within Syria. Restrictions on movement, including visa approvals, and burdensome administrative procedures imposed on humanitarian actors by the GoS continue, with requests for the facilitation of interagency convoys to besieged and hard-to-reach areas often remaining unanswered, delayed or put on hold. At the same time, all 18 besieged areas as per UN designation were accessed, at least once, by humanitarian agencies in 2016.

In neighboring countries:

Despite significant funding allocated in response to their needs, refugees' vulnerability has increased further in 2016 in comparison to the previous ECHO HIP. Lebanon and Jordan are not signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention (International Refugee Law – IRL).

In Lebanon, the Government clarified its policy towards refugees in October 2014 and set up a Crisis Cell led by the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), MoI and Ministry of Labour (MoL), in an attempt of assuming an active role in the response to the refugee crisis. Entry regulations in force from early January 2015, the indefinite suspension of the UNHCR registration process and the ‘de-registration’ of those refugees who had entered the country since that date reflect a de facto border closure for Syrians seeking safe asylum. The 'pledge not to work' that refugees must sign to obtain a residence permit and the high cost of the renewal fee for residence permits together with the cumbersome related paperwork are having severe adverse effects on the majority of refugees such as illegal stay, increased exposure to labour exploitation and limitations to their freedom of movement. These issues push refugees to resort to negative coping strategies. Moreover, in Lebanon, governance capacity is negatively constrained by confessional divisions, leading to a weak provision of services.

At the 2016 London Conference, the Government of Lebanon presented a Statement of Intent in which it committed to improve certain regulatory conditions negatively affecting Syrian refugees; In return the EU committed to step up support through various policies to strengthen Lebanon's resilience and accelerate its development and growth. An EU-Lebanon Compact (under negotiation) is the framework that will ensure Lebanon delivers on its London commitments although so far the situation remains unchanged.
In Jordan, the MoI is responsible for all refugee related issues in Jordan, including for PRS. The Minister of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC) approves humanitarian assistance projects in coordination with relevant line ministries. Following the definition of the 2016-18 Jordan Response Plan (JRP) by the Government of Jordan, a robust response, with preliminary indications of a switch towards a longer term structural response embedded, has been implemented. In this context, MoPIC requirements for project approvals improved, thus reducing implementation delays, notwithstanding that more efforts for bureaucratic simplification should be put in place. The requirement to include a minimum 30% of Jordanian vulnerable families in all refugee-related programming continues, at the same time it is straining limited humanitarian assistance budgets. The role of the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) in the management of refugees, particularly on the borders, is more prominent following their closure.

The London Conference concluded with a Compact, aimed at turning the refugee crisis into a development opportunity. In return for continued international assistance, Jordan committed amongst other to provide job opportunities for Syrian refugees, linked to the opening up of the EU market which should lead to increased investments and employment creation in Jordan. Subsequently, EU and Jordan adopted a joint decision at the Association Committee in July 2016 on a time-bound simplification of rules of origin whereby created employment would benefit Syrian refugees together with Jordanians. As per the EU-Jordan Compact annexed to the partnership priorities for 2016/18-20, Jordan has targeted 200 000 job opportunities for Syrian refugees, 50 000 of which by the end of 2016. Encouraging implementation has been noted. Another landmark commitment made by Jordan in London was to ensure that every child in the country will be entitled to education from the 2016/17 school year. This has also been reflected in the EU-Jordan Compact.

In Egypt, restrictions introduced over time curtailed support provided by local NGOs and CSOs, with the plight of non-Syrian refugees shadowed. Registered refugees nominally benefit of access to public education and health services, which are at the same time struggling to provide for the endogenous population in first place due to both overstretched demand and capacity issues.

b. International Humanitarian Response

Despite significant financial resources made available, needs continue to far outweigh contributions. In 2016, according to the UNOCHA Financial Tracking Service (FTS), Syria is the top global recipient of emergency funding. Specifically:

- The 2016 Humanitarian Response Plan for Syria (HRP) has a budget of USD 3.19 billion. Following the ‘Whole-of-Syria’ (WoS) approach, the Syria HRP integrates humanitarian efforts from within the country and across its borders.
- The 2016 Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) estimates the funding needs at USD 2.48 billion.
- The 2016 Jordan Response Plan (JRP) requests funds for USD 2.7 billion.
- The 2015-2016 Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP), with a budget of USD5.5 billion, combines life-saving humanitarian and long-term interventions to help boosting the capacities of countries in the region as they continue hosting millions of Syrian
refugees. The 3RP aims at providing direct assistance to close to 6 million refugees and host communities.

By end-August 2016, donor contributions to humanitarian programmes for the Syria Crisis amounted to the following:
- The HRP has received USD1.077 billion, or 34% of its funding requirements.
- The 3RP (Syria Regional Refugees and Resilience Plan) has received USD2.15 billion, or 47% of its funding requirements.
- The LRCP has received USD726 million, or 29% of its funding requirements.
- The JRP has received USD614 million, or 20.5% of its funding requirements.
- The UNHCR-led 3RP has received USD2.187 billion, representing 48% of its total budget.19
- The Egyptian chapter of the 3RP is funded at USD 43.6 million, representing 30% of its total budget. The UNHCR component of the same has received USD 27 million or 44%. The UNHCR appeal for non-Syrian refugees is funded at USD 4.3 million, representing 24% of its total budget.

ECHO response to date

The EU is the leading donor in the international response to the Syria crisis, having mobilized more than EUR 6.9 billion in assistance since the beginning of the crisis. Out of this, EUR 4.9 billion has been humanitarian aid to Syrians in need of lifesaving assistance, including EUR 1.5 billion from the EU budget. The EU’s humanitarian funding for 2016 as announced at the London Conference on the Syrian crisis on 4 February 2016 amounts to EUR 445 million, breaking down as follows: Syria EUR 140 million (roughly 52% for cross-line and 48% cross-border), EUR 53 million for Jordan, EUR 87 million for Lebanon and EUR 165 million for Turkey.

Inside Syria:

The relevant and above mentioned UN SCRs urged the Syrian authorities to promptly facilitate safe and unhindered humanitarian access through the most effective ways, including across conflict lines and, where appropriate, across borders from neighboring countries20, in accordance with the UN guiding principles of humanitarian emergency assistance. Despite these being in force since February 2014, with passage of humanitarian assistance further allowed to enter Syria without notification to the GoS in 2015, humanitarian access inside the country remains a key constraint faced by the international assistance community. In areas under government control, UN agencies experience relatively better access than INGOs, despite access to affected populations remaining a paramount challenge for any humanitarian actor. UN agencies operate from a limited number of sub-offices and can partner with local NGOs/CSOs in addition to SARC. Only 16 INGOs are registered to operate in Syria from Damascus, a small number.

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20 The unanimous adoption of resolutions 2165 (2014) and 2191 (2014) specifically authorized UN agencies and their partners to use border crossings with Turkey, Jordan and Iraq (Bab al-Salam, Bab al-Hawa, Al-Ramtha and Al-Yaroubiyah) to deliver humanitarian assistance to people in need inside Syria.
relative to the scale and scope of the crisis, with significant limitations placed on their capacity to deliver humanitarian assistance. The GoS is notified in advance of each shipment and the UNMM was established to oversee loading in neighboring countries and confirm the humanitarian nature of consignments. There has been a very gradual scale-up of assistance provision by UN agencies from Turkey and Jordan. The majority of humanitarian assistance delivered cross-border to mostly opposition-controlled areas continues to be provided by international and Syrian NGOs. The aggregate differential value of cross-border activities by UN agencies still remains to be demonstrated.

In late 2014, under the co-leadership of the Regional Humanitarian Coordinator (RHC) and the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC), a single coordination system (WoS), encompassing operations from Damascus, the cross-border hubs of Turkey, Jordan and, to a lesser degree, activities from Iraq, was established. Aimed at capturing all assistance delivery through regular, cross line, and cross border operations, this system - despite efforts - is yet to result into a coherent, harmonized, multi-sectoral response strategy.

In neighboring countries:

The 3RP was developed under the leadership of national authorities to ensure protection, humanitarian assistance and to strengthen the resilience of the affected population. The 3RP integrates and is aligned with existing and emerging national plans, including the JRP, the LCRP, the Iraq Strategic Response Plan (SRP), and country responses in Turkey and Egypt.

In 2014, the UN created the position of RC/HC in Jordan and Lebanon to lead the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). UNHCR is leading the inter agency coordination for the Syrian Refugee Response while UNRWA is in charge of the coordination for the assistance to PRS. Sector coordination relies on multiple set ups varying in between hubs, these being clusters, working groups or other modalities. Despite the existence of coordination fora, the response to refugee needs remains fragmented rather than being fully integrated, harmonized and streamlined.

INGOs presence in Egypt remains very limited. Administrative restrictions have been experienced in 2016 by INGOs in Lebanon.

c. Constraints and ECHO response capacity

The fall-out of the Syria crisis on its population and the sub-region will continue to worsen in the near future in absence of a political solution. It is paramount that no race to the bottom towards the discounting of the application of humanitarian principles and standards by ‘tailoring’ to the significant operational constraints is entertained. At all levels, from local to international, humanitarian assistance has been subjected to military and political expediency. As it is critical to consider that humanitarian assistance is neither the answer nor the solution to the political nature of this conflict, ‘normalization of the unacceptable’ should be avoided, irrespective of legitimate frustrations and fatigue in the 6th year of this protracted crisis.

Humanitarian access progressively reduced following conflict dynamics and pervasive insecurity for humanitarian workers. Constrains faced by humanitarians deteriorated from restrictions to
access within Syria to these being now experienced for all cross-border operations, combined with systematic denial for specific situations/areas; interference in assistance delivery by all parties to the conflict, ranging from imposing burdensome administrative procedures to multiplication of check-points; shifting frontlines; targeted, indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure necessary for delivery of humanitarian services to the vulnerable population, such as health professionals and medical facilities.

The WoS coordination architecture - although a positive development in principle - has yet to be translated into a more effective coordinated response across multiple hubs. Whilst the system should be flexible enough to respond to needs efficiently and effectively, practice to date is relatively static. Well into the 6th year of the crisis, it is of paramount importance that the efficiency and efficacy of coordination mechanisms (information sharing, operational coordination and management) is streamlined to maximize consistency and complementary response strategies. Diffused leadership and strategic guidance needs to be urgently remedied. Changes should be introduced following a long due review.

The accountability of remotely-managed operations conducted in a volatile environment is a persistent concern. The robustness and reliability of innovative approaches (alternative procedures) to remote management developed as a direct result of the Syria crisis need to be continually examined and improved. Similarly, support to local partnerships with Syrian CSOs and NGOs, the cornerstone of the response inside Syria, has to be made more systematic, transparent, accountable and relevant. The participation of those in need of assistance to designing response strategies need to be reinforced.

As contested areas inside Syria are consolidated, significant population return to specific geographical areas are unlikely in the near future. The viability of the Syrian state, as well as of the stability of neighboring countries, in particular Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Turkey are at stake. A sudden deterioration of the security environment is a permanent concern.

Populations’ needs largely outweigh and surpass the capacity of humanitarian actors to respond, both physically and financially. Finite humanitarian aid budgets pale in comparison to the sheer scale of identified needs and demonstrate the necessity of complementary and joint programming with development actors. Absorption capacity of humanitarian actors needs to be further reflected upon, to ensure delivery of quality and effective assistance.

Restrictive government regulatory frameworks and policies on asylum, assistance and registration will continue to have a negative impact on the pace, coherence and viability of the humanitarian response. In Lebanon, preserving the autonomy and efficiency of the humanitarian response, whilst working closely along the Government guidelines, remains a key issue for humanitarian operations. More restrictive administrative and unpredictable procedures put a further strain on the capacity of INGOs to operate and collaborate towards the optimization of the response. This will remain a key issue for the ECHO operation in 2017.

ECHO’s response capacity is articulated around its wide network in the field, including presence in the key hubs in the region (Amman, Beirut, Gaziantep and Damascus), and our substantive funding, delivering on the EU’s London commitments. ECHO is accordingly uniquely placed to
coordinate and liaise with different humanitarian actors both as regards the operational strategy for humanitarian delivery and as regards humanitarian advocacy.

d. Envisaged ECHO response and expected results of humanitarian aid interventions:

ECHO's response will not be sufficient to cover all of the most urgent needs in Syria and in the region. Therefore, life-saving activities will be prioritized; partners will be required to clearly demonstrate systemic solutions to identified problems to ensure the widest as possible coverage to assist the most vulnerable wherever they are located, upholding quality programming standards. As the crisis protracts and specific concerns intensify, quality of information and data analysis remains central to ensure accurate identification of gaps and prioritization of response. In the Technical Annex to this HIP, operational recommendations in protection, health, WASH, food security, education in emergencies (EiE) and basic assistance will further guide partners to increase the impact and coherence of the proposed interventions.

Humanitarian Diplomacy\(^{21}\) (HD) should be conducted by partners at all levels, calling upon all parties to the conflict and those engaged in country to respect IHL, as well as to ensure the promotion of initiatives aimed at improving access and quality of humanitarian assistance as a minimum common denominator. Key advocacy messages must remain critically simple: vulnerable people within Syria should not be cut off from receiving assistance; those who managed to flee should not be confronted with closed borders; those who crossed international borders should not face policy made barriers to receive assistance. Given the grave threats posed to the legitimacy of humanitarian assistance for vulnerable people affected by the protracted Syria crisis, principled humanitarian action must be reinforced despite restrictions and obstacles, as enshrined in the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. A renewed coordinated focus on the most vulnerable must be operationalized, for them to receive the assistance they require beyond ‘being reached’. Relevance, quality and appropriateness of assistance interventions must improve though enhanced informed response analysis, systematically shifting decision making from ‘what can be done’ to ‘what must be done’. HD must continue to seek ways to improve access and protection for those suffering from the aftermath of the conflict in Syria, wherever they are now forced to live.

ECHO encourages a ‘one-refugee’ approach and will aim to support humanitarian interventions targeting the severely affected segments of the refugee population in need of protection and assistance irrespective of their country of origin. Both refugees and host communities will be considered eligible for ECHO assistance based on their specific vulnerability (no status based assistance is envisaged).

Inside Syria:

\(^{21}\) As defined by IFRC: “Persuading decision makers and opinion leaders to act, at all times, in the interests of vulnerable people, and with full respect for fundamental humanitarian principles”.
ECHO’s strategy within Syria will maintain a clear focus on multi-sectoral life-saving actions. This strategy hinges upon the full and active participation in existing coordination mechanisms of all partners, without exception. Consequently, partners are expected to provide an all-of-Syria analysis in their proposals and justification, including costing, for the choice of hub and method of delivery. The strategy additionally builds on complementary advocacy actions as part of a HD framework to sustain operational gains and improve the quality of deliverables. Specifically:

- **Protection** - the application of IHL, IHRL and IRL, inclusive of registration and legal stay; safe and equal access, including evidence-based advocacy, awareness and communication; protection monitoring.
- **Emergency response and preparedness** - including access strategies, contingency planning, severity scales and scenario/hotspots analysis leading to ‘triggers’ identification, and rapid first line multi-sectorial emergency response capacity to allow for flexible response to emerging ‘crises within the crisis’.
- **Health** - focus on improving access to quality services and assistance to war wounded and victims of violence, including GBV.
- **Operational coordination** - gaps in assistance provision including underserved or otherwise neglected communities to be addressed; support to common, integrated and targeted approaches to address basic needs and services and, to the extent possible, the identification of transition strategies (support to livelihoods / resilience).

Aside of first line emergency response, programming in under-served, contested, besieged, and areas with restrictive operational environment/prone to displacement, will be prioritized. WASH interventions will be considered; for the NFI/Shelter sector, ECHO will only assess supporting activities that respond to a specific shock with duly justified assessment and targeting. Secondary consideration will be given to the support of protracted needs of IDPs and host populations to reach basic minimum standards where gaps in life-saving assistance provision exist.

In achieving this strategy, the following will also be considered: an overarching emphasis on cost efficiency and effectiveness, including, but not limited to, vulnerability targeting, addressing basic needs with the most appropriate transfer modality (e.g. in kind, voucher or cash), improved inter-hub coordination and harmonization, capacity building, flexibility and reactivity of actions responding to newly emerging needs. Activities that address recurrent infrastructure costs (e.g. care and maintenance of basic service networks), although recognized as crucial, are beyond the scope of ECHO’s resources and capability and will not be given first priority. ECHO expects that all interventions adhere to basic protection principles of safe and equal access as well as appropriate considerations for special vulnerabilities (e.g. victims of violence, persons with disabilities). Partners’ humanitarian acceptance/access strategies should be explained and address urgent needs with the aim of building acceptance and providing integrated responses to entrapped populations over time. Basic information collection and, to the extent possible protection monitoring, will aim to increase the visibility of humanitarian needs in these areas. Allocations will follow a phased approach consistent with access growth. Timely and regular reporting into OCHA’s FTS is also required.

In the context of a crisis where direct implementation is not always a feasible modality, particular attention needs to be paid to the ability and capacity of partners (or their field-based implementing partners) to safely and impartially deliver appropriate humanitarian assistance with
adequate control mechanisms in place. Robust humanitarian project cycle management must be considered as a cornerstone of ECHO-funded operations. Special attention will be paid to thorough risk analysis and management across the project cycle, including optimizing risk-transfer arrangements. Demand-driven and sustained support to partnerships will be encouraged.

The strategy illustrated above will be applied to all operational hubs, including regular and cross-line operations from Damascus, and all possible cross-border operations from neighboring countries and methods of delivery - direct and remote management. Where remote modalities are considered, due diligence and compliance with the ECHO remote management policy will be required. Wherever possible and the situation allows, ECHO - together with other EU financial instruments (e.g. ENI) - will plan a gradual and combined dual track approach towards more resilience and stabilization-oriented activities.

In neighboring countries:

In Lebanon and Jordan in 2017, ECHO will cover the timely delivery of appropriate emergency assistance for newly-displaced populations as well as continue supporting the most vulnerable refugees and asylum seekers severely impacted by the protracted crisis. It is expected that these populations will be serviced through integrated and coordinated solutions providing a harmonized multi-sectoral first-line response. Host governments’ commitments at the London Conference should complement and reinforce development opportunities made available by both other EU instruments and international assistance donors addressing medium term structural and protracted needs (e.g. access to livelihoods, education, affordable health care), which are required until conditions are favorable for refugees’ voluntary and safe return to Syria. ECHO's action will ensure appropriate complementarity between humanitarian assistance and development support in line with the Joint Humanitarian Development Framework (JHDF) conceived for this purpose. Further EU actions will ensure a similar complementarity. The overall political framework for EU engagement with partner countries will be pursued along identified Partnership Priorities (and the annexed Compacts in the case of Lebanon and Jordan). ECHO will only consider supporting refugees who remain excluded from the above as a gap filling measure.

In Lebanon, ECHO will continue seeking the most effective planning of resources so that quality life-saving assistance is guaranteed to the most vulnerable segments of the population. Assistance to non-registered refugees unable/reluctant to register because of protection concerns is envisaged. Eligibility to assistance is to be decided on the basis of people’s vulnerability and not on legal status. Specifically:

- **Basic needs** - the most vulnerable refugees will be supported through multi-purpose cash assistance channeled through a harmonized, consistent and efficient delivery system.
- **Protection** - protection programming and evidence-based advocacy remain key in responding to the growing protection threats of refugees.
- **Health** - support to quality provision of secondary health care whilst encouraging the engagement of medium-longer term assistance to address the significant needs in this sector. Ad hoc and timely support to primary health care would be considered in complementarity with other EU financial instruments.
- **WASH/Shelter** - support for underserved refugee populations to reach basic minimum standards will be considered based on needs, context and vulnerability situation.
• *Coordination* – support to the coordination of humanitarian action, including improved data collection, information, management and analysis, monitoring and evaluation, will be considered.

*Integrated approaches* within and between organizations that seek economies of scale, a robust and efficient referral system and maximize geographic coverage are encouraged. Strict adherence to standard operating procedures developed by the relevant sector working groups is fundamental. Cost-effective approaches especially for care and maintenance, fostering links with municipal systems and the use of the appropriate technologies, arbitraging best-placed donors between ECHO or longer-term donors, will be promoted. Advocacy remains key in 2017 in coordination with the relevant humanitarian mechanisms in country.

In *Jordan*, ensuring timely, adequate and appropriate provision of humanitarian assistance to new arrivals, persons stranded in border areas and refugees living in camps or hosting communities will be ECHO’s priorities in 2017. *Protection* will remain a cross-cutting component across all sectors – addressing legal documentation is directly linked to the ability for refugees to increase their economic and social opportunities as well as those of the hosting communities; necessary advocacy for this will also be considered. Focus will continue on:

• Support to *life-saving humanitarian interventions (basic needs, inclusive of winterization; health; protection)* for the most vulnerable people as defined by the Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF) and on protection grounds (e.g. unregistered refugees, etc.).

• In camps, attention will be paid to improving access to *health* care for refugees. Support for basic infrastructure in camps will not be considered.

• Outside camps, *basic needs, health* (for those refugees with no access to health due to unresolved protection issues) and *protection* (including legal assistance and support for documentation) will remain ECHO’s focus. Provision of reproductive health services, inclusive of prevention and response to violence, including GBV cases, treatment of chronic diseases and support to the disabled will also be considered.

• Whilst phasing out from *WASH* capital investments, ECHO will continue to respond to needs to ensure emergency thresholds are met, most notably emergency needs of asylum seekers at the Berm, with life-saving, integrated *WASH* response.

In transitional situations (e.g. registered refugees in camps), ECHO will continue to facilitate and enable access for the most vulnerable if excluded from host government’s commitments and developmental assistance, with a view to ensure their mainstreaming into these.

In *Egypt*, due to the deteriorating conditions of the refugees and the increasing number of new arrivals, ECHO intends to consolidate its small-scale niche response initiated in 2016, focusing on *core humanitarian needs*. The response strategy is two-fold: strengthening protection, including child protection for the most vulnerable and enhancing access to emergency health and education services, including through education in emergency and informal education, whilst boosting oversight on new dynamics and trends, notably the refugees-migration nexus. Whilst the Syrian refugees remain ECHO’s entry point, the most vulnerable among other refugees groups and their hosting communities might also be assisted.
Thematic priorities:

Most of the thematic priorities detailed in the Technical Annex 2017 envisage their mainstreaming into enhanced quality humanitarian interventions. Compliance of partners’ proposals with thematic priorities is an assessment criteria which will be utilized by ECHO.

IHL/IHRL/IRL/Protection/Access/Legal assistance: Whilst recognizing that, beyond HD, advocacy and negotiation, humanitarian actors can do little to affect the willingness of parties to the conflict to abide by international legal norms, ECHO encourages every effort to do so. To increase the reach and footprint of humanitarian actors, sustained engagement with armed actors, local authorities and powerbrokers is required. ECHO is ready to support systemic access negotiation solutions available to all humanitarian actors and in support of timely emergency response across all operations hubs. Field-level interventions aimed at engaging with parties to the conflict specifically on IHL may be considered. ECHO will continue to advocate for and seek to support the development of comprehensive protection strategies inside Syria and in neighboring countries. These should be designed to monitor, identify and address protection risks and violations either directly (stand-alone) or in an integrated manner by achieving protection outcomes through other programmatic activities and protection-sensitive targeting; they should be supported by a clearly presented analysis of protection threats, vulnerabilities and capacities. Basic protection monitoring and referral within Syria and across borders that act as an early warning for new population movements (including returns) is encouraged; this should be combined with counseling and access to legal services for asylum seekers and refugees as well as outreach and services for persons with specific needs.

Forced displacement and migration: The Syria crisis is characterized by civilians that have been displaced by pervasive violence and loss of livelihood. These trends are unlikely to be reversed in the absence of a political solution.

EiE: Despite widespread commitment to preventing Syrian children from becoming a ‘lost generation’, combined efforts are far from achieving this goal and should continue. Within Syria, at least 25% schools are damaged, destroyed, or are being used to shelter displaced families; at least 2 million children and adolescents are not attending school. The security and access situation will likely continue to limit operational capacity in this sector. In neighboring countries, close to 50% of Syrian refugee children and adolescents are out of school. ECHO is ready to consider supporting projects for children protection, notably through non formal education schemes. As a result of recent JHDF exercises jointly carried in Jordan and Lebanon, ECHO will closely co-ordinate its intervention with the other EU instruments (ENI, Madad, etc.) already supporting structural and formal education programmes.

ECHO will continue to advocate for development actors to address the structural educational needs of children affected by the Syria crisis, while complementing with informal/non-formal education support that indirectly contribute to the goal where feasible in accordance with each government’s policy (e.g. this is not the case in Lebanon). Dedicated EiE actions but also multi-sectoral responses that closely link EiE with protection and supporting actions such as psychosocial support, mine risk education and provision of life skills, innovative projects to ensure enrolment, attendance and educational success for follow-on funding with development
donors may be considered on a case-by-case basis. The scope could also be enlarged beyond children (under 18 years old) to include youth and young adults if appropriately justified.

Partners will be expected to ensure full compliance with visibility requirements and to acknowledge the funding role of the EU/ECHO, as set out in the applicable contractual arrangements.

4. LRRD, COORDINATION AND TRANSITION

   a. Other ECHO interventions:

ECHO actively participated in the London Conference in February 2016, where more than €3 billion were pledged by the EU for 2016 alone, including €445 million for life-saving assistance to people affected by the Syria crisis, both inside Syria and neighboring countries. Since 2011, ECHO mobilized €608 million for provision of humanitarian assistance inside Syria, €356.1 million in Lebanon, €251 in Jordan and €4 in Egypt.

Under the 2016 Children of Peace decision, ECHO is supporting projects for emergency education of Syrian refugees in Egypt.

   b. Other concomitant EU interventions:

The EU has been leading the international response to the Syria regional crisis with more than €6.9 billion mobilized collectively, including humanitarian aid, stabilization and macro-financial assistance (Commission's humanitarian aid: €1.5 billion). Whilst humanitarian assistance remains pivotal, there is a need to set the foundations for a transition from humanitarian to longer-term interventions. Complementarities and synergies between actions supported by the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), the European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI), the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA), the Madad EU Trust Fund (Madad) and humanitarian funding in response to the Syrian crisis are captured and routinely reviewed in the Joint Humanitarian and Development Frameworks, which were developed by ECHO, Madad and DG NEAR to guide financial allocations in priority sectors on each country basis.

In Egypt, despite a multitude of EU instruments at play, the development nature of most of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) limits the scope for ECHO’s transition. ECHO is building upon synergies and complementarities for each funded action with other EU instruments such as the RDPP/AMIF (DG HOME) for protection/mixed-migration and the EU Trust Fund for Africa-North Africa window (EUTF NA).

   c. Other donors availability:

At the London Conference, over USD12 billion were raised in pledges – USD6 billion for 2016 and a further USD6.1 billion for 2017-20 to enable partners to plan ahead. Key humanitarian
donors (the US, UK, Sweden, Denmark and Germany) have generously contributed in 2016 to the Syria HRP; LCRP; JRP. Arab donors play a particularly important role in the financing of both the Syria HRP and JRP.

d. Exit scenarios:

Whilst it is too early to consider exit scenarios, the move towards increased coherence and complementarity with other financial instruments based on the JHDFs will be reinforced. In neighboring countries, where no new arrivals are recorded and the needs of refugees entered a care and maintenance phase (both in camp and outside of camps), the handover of ECHO to stabilization / development instruments (IcSP, ENI, IPA, DCI, Madad, EUTF NA, etc.) that are better placed to provide long-term development support will continue.

ECHO will continue to advocate for durable solutions for refugees in neighboring countries (including resettlement and access to livelihoods) and will call for increased funding and coordination from development donors, as well as hosting governments to address the protracted nature of the crisis.