

## **HUMANITARIAN IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (HIP)**

### **HORN OF AFRICA**

**Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia<sup>1</sup>**

**AMOUNT: EUR 158 998 432**

**The full implementation of this version of the HIP is conditional upon the approval of the transfer by the Budgetary Authorities**

The present Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) was prepared on the basis of financing decision ECHO/WWD/BUD/2021/01000 (Worldwide Decision) and the related General Guidelines for Operational Priorities on Humanitarian Aid (Operational Priorities). The purpose of the HIP and its annexes<sup>2</sup> is to serve as a communication tool for DG ECHO<sup>3</sup>'s partners and to assist in the preparation of their proposals. The provisions of the Worldwide Decision and the General Conditions of the Agreement with the European Commission shall take precedence over the provisions in this document.

## **0. MAJOR CHANGES SINCE THE PREVIOUS VERSION OF THE HIP**

### **Third modification as of 4 October 2022**

The humanitarian emergency in the Horn of Africa has further deteriorated as a result of drought, conflict and the secondary effects of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, resulting in unprecedented levels of food insecurity. The latter is now considered as the world's worst acute food insecurity emergency in 2022. At the same time, the Horn continues to be affected by the worst drought in at least 40 years, leaving people facing famine-like conditions, with an actual famine declaration for parts of Somalia for the October-December projection period. Following four largely failed rainy seasons and an anticipated fifth season of below-average rainfall from October to December, coupled with exceptionally high food prices, in addition to conflict and disease outbreaks, the already severe humanitarian emergency in the region could further deepen.

In Ethiopia, FEWS NET projected food assistance needs for March 2023 places Ethiopia in a Phase 4 (Emergency) category; above 20 million people are across the country estimated to be food insecure according to the revised 2022 HRP<sup>4</sup>. In the drought-stricken southern and south-eastern pastoral areas of the country, Crisis level (IPC Phase 3), Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or worse outcomes are forecasted from October 2022 to January 2023 with a risk that more severe outcomes could occur; an overall 10 million people are estimated food insecure in the drought affected areas and nearly 4 million animals have perished according to the revised 2022 drought response plan.

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<sup>1</sup> Eritrea can potentially be covered by this HIP, but does not currently benefit from a conducive environment for the implementation of humanitarian aid actions.

<sup>2</sup> Technical annex and thematic policies annex

<sup>3</sup> Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO)

<sup>4</sup> Humanitarian Response Plan

In Somalia, nearly half of the population is in IPC3+ as of September 2022, more than 1.1 million people have been newly displaced by the ongoing drought, and a localised famine is projected for the October-December 2022 period. Persistent insecurity, armed conflict, as well as rising food prices and extreme poverty exacerbate the risk of widespread famine in Somalia. It is expected that 1.8 million children under five will be acutely malnourished, including 500 000 severely. 6.7 million people are projected to be in IPC3+, of which at least 300 560 likely to be in IPC 5 (famine).

In addition to the recently announced food security and nutrition interventions in all countries of the Horn from EDF<sup>5</sup> funds, the European Commission intends to further contribute to scale up the humanitarian response to the crisis in Ethiopia and Somalia and has thus mobilised an additional amount of EUR 20 million (EUR 10 million for Ethiopia and EUR 10 million for Somalia).

The purpose of this additional funding will be to address the most acute needs of people affected by the food insecurity, aiming at saving lives. The main identified needs include access to food and livelihood support, to health and nutrition services and to clean water. Further specifications are provided in the Humanitarian Implementation Plan Technical Annex.

### **Second modification as of 5 August 2022**

This modification is intended to transfer EUR 4 498 432 to be allocated to the IFRC pilot Programmatic Partnership action ‘Accelerating local action in humanitarian and health crises’.

### **First modification as of 27 of April 2022**

The Horn of Africa is experiencing one of its worst droughts in recent history, with 12-14 million people severely food insecure in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. The perspective of a new famine in Somalia is looming, while food and nutrition insecurity continues to grow at a fast pace in Ethiopia and in the Arid and Semi-Arid lands (ASAL) of Kenya.

Three back-to-back poor rainy seasons have severely affected large swathes of Somalia, southern and south-eastern Ethiopia, and northern and eastern Kenya. Moreover, the 2022 rainy season has started late, and remains scattered. Global forecasts predict another below average season. This severe drought comes on top of protracted and renewed conflict, the long-lasting impact of the desert locust infestation, the social economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, global food chain disruptions and increasing fuel prices.

Many households have limited, if any, capacity to cope with another (likely) poor harvest and livestock reproduction cycle. Staple food prices are skyrocketing in many drought-affected areas, due to a combination of macro-economic challenges, below-average harvests and rising prices on international markets, leaving families unable to afford the basics for their survival. Increased resource-driven conflicts are observed in the three countries, while families, farmers and herders struggle to find water with some reportedly walking over 30km to reach a functioning water source. Estimates from both southern Ethiopia and the ASAL regions of Kenya indicate that over 3 million livestock have died

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<sup>5</sup> European Development Funds

across the two areas (67% in Somali region of Ethiopia alone), while in Somalia, up to 30 percent of households' herd have died since mid-2021. Many disease outbreaks are reported, with cases of acute watery diarrhoea (AWD) and cholera, as well as a high number of suspected cases of measles in Somalia especially among displaced children, and dengue and chikungunya in Kenya and Ethiopia.

If the first rainy season of 2022 (the Gu season/April – June) fails as forecasted and without massive food assistance, by mid-2022, over 6 million people will be food insecure in **Somalia**, including thousands who will be facing famine (IPC 5 level). 1.4 million children under the age of five are severely malnourished and in need of urgent treatment. Over 700 000 persons left their homes in search of water, food and medical assistance. The majority of the internally displaced are going to unsanitary makeshift camps in urban and per-urban areas that were already sheltering many of the 2.9 million previously displaced due to conflict and extreme weather events. They have limited access to assistance, including basic services like health and no income generating opportunity. Based on previous displacement patterns, it is unlikely that they will return soon (or ever) to their places of origin.

The drought in eastern and southern **Ethiopia** is affecting at least 8 million people. The current drought is yet another setback for people whose coping strategies have been successively eroded by previous droughts, at times also inter-communal conflicts, and who have not had the time to recover between crises. Water shortages are at critical levels. An estimated 850 000 children will suffer from drought and conflict in all affected regions of Ethiopia. Severe acute malnutrition levels have surpassed the emergency thresholds in some areas. Close to 300 000 people have left their homes to look for water, assistance, and pastures for their livestock, creating further pressures on host communities.

In **Kenya**, where food and nutrition insecurity are a structural problem in the ASAL, 3.5 million people are considered to be food insecure, including over 750 000 in IPC 4. It is the highest number of people food insecure ever recorded in the country. In a continuing deterioration of the situation, over 800 000 children aged 6-59 months require urgent treatment of acute malnutrition. Many counties have long surpassed emergency thresholds for global acute malnutrition (GAM), like Mandera that reached 34.7%.

Urgent multi-sectorial life-saving assistance is needed to avoid a repetition of the 2011 famine in Somalia, which led to the death of an estimated 260 000 people.

In order to scale up the humanitarian response to this drought in Somalia, Ethiopia and in Kenya, the European Commission has mobilised an additional amount of EUR 32 000 000 (EUR 20 million for Somalia, EUR 10 million for Ethiopia and EUR 2 million for Kenya).

The purpose of this additional funding will be to address the most acute needs of people affected by the drought, aiming to save lives. These main identified needs include access to food and livelihood support; to health and nutrition services; to clean water for household consumption, but also livestock. Further specifications are provided in the Humanitarian Implementation Plan Technical Annex.

## 1. CONTEXT

Across the Horn of Africa (HoA) conflict remains the key driver of humanitarian crises, translating into massive displacements, acute food-nutrition insecurity and serious human rights and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) violations. It is regularly and increasingly exacerbated by climate change-induced natural disasters, pests and epidemics outbreaks. By end of 2021, around 23 million people are estimated in immediate need of humanitarian assistance in countries covered by this HIP<sup>6</sup>, with a deterioration trend caused by the economic and social impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, poor performing rainfalls in HoA lowlands over the past year increasing the risk of drought, climate outlook forecasting below average rainfalls for the next months, severe floods in some areas, increasing impact of conflict in **Ethiopia** as well as uncertain political and security stability in **Somalia**<sup>7</sup>.

The outlook for 2022 is grim. If the new rainy season fails, the Horn of Africa and in particular the South and South-Eastern **Ethiopia**, the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs) of **Kenya**, and **Somalia** may face a severe drought comparable to the 2017 one affecting mostly the pastoralist areas in the Horn. Since the end of 2020 and the eruption of the conflict in Tigray region of Ethiopia, the Horn of Africa region is facing a major risk of destabilisation due to the wide-ranging effect of this conflict on the country itself as well as on neighbouring countries, and power alliances shifts. Extreme ethnic violence and very serious allegations of human rights and IHL violations are common features of the Tigray conflict. Its impact on civilians is extremely severe, in particular in terms of food insecurity and protection – with over 2 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and 5.5 million<sup>8</sup> people in need of urgent assistance as of September 2021 (including population from Tigray, Amhara and Afar regions) and famine looming for up to 1 million people. This is in addition to the 11.3 million people in need of humanitarian aid outside of Tigray. Moreover, intercommunal / interethnic conflicts prevail in other parts of the Horn of Africa. All these conflicts destroy lives and livelihoods and drive large parts of the population into temporary or protracted displacements, as well as severe food insecurity.

Overall, the deteriorating situation in Ethiopia has the potential to further destabilise an already fragile region, notably with an escalation in tensions along the Ethiopia/Sudan border over the contested Al Fashqa area, against the background of tensions on the Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam (GERD), and more generally a risk of large-scale displacement across borders. In addition, new developments of the crisis beginning of November, in particular on the military front, have triggered the declaration of a State of Emergency in Ethiopia, may further contribute to the overall deterioration of the humanitarian situation and have an impact on security of civilians and humanitarian actors.

In **Somalia** the armed conflict between the government, regional security forces, and Al Shabaab is compounded by recurrent inter-clan fighting, tensions between the federal government and federal states, and, more recently, by tensions and sporadic clashes in

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<sup>6</sup> Hunger Hotspots FAO-WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity August to November 2021 Outlook (16.7 M in Ethiopia, 2 M in Kenya and 2.7 M in Somalia).

<sup>7</sup> IGAD's Food Security and Nutrition Response Strategy (August 2020) projects 25.23 M people by year end.

<sup>8</sup> 5,2 million people targeted for Food assistance in Tigray and 300 000 new IDPs in Amhara and Afar regions linked to the spreading of the conflict in those areas, Source Food cluster Aug 2021.

the context of the still ongoing election process. IHL and human rights violations are widespread. The government is assisted in its stabilisation efforts by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), supported by the EU and the international community, aiming at establishing peace through military and civilian missions, improving security and ensuring effective governance in Somalia.

Conflicts, violence and political crises in Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea (and neighbouring South Sudan with peace negotiations stalled) are expected to continue and worsen, resulting in continued if not increased displacement within and across international borders, despite restrictive measures linked to the COVID 19 pandemic. The Horn of Africa counts over 1.36 million refugees and asylum seekers already<sup>9</sup>, mainly from Somalia and South Sudan, but also from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Sudan, Burundi, Ethiopia and Yemen. However hosting countries in the Horn of Africa, with the exception of **Djibouti** and Somalia, are changing their policies and practices towards refugees, with many no longer being granted prima facie recognition despite little changes in the situation in their country of origin. In addition, in March 2021, the government of **Kenya** announced its intention to close all refugee camps by mid-2022.

Climate change is driving an increased frequency and intensity of droughts and floods, erratic rainfall and rising temperatures in the HoA, resulting in less time for affected populations to recover, further exacerbating pressure on pasture and water resources, in a context of already-degraded environments and eroded livelihoods. In terms of readiness for these impacts, the HoA countries rank low on the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN) index<sup>10</sup>: Somalia at 179/182, Ethiopia at 157/182, Kenya at 148/182, and Djibouti at 124/182. Thanks to air and ground control efforts, the recent desert locust infestation has been contained in most of the countries, but new generations of swarms are threatening crops and pastures in Ethiopia and to a lesser extent north-west Somalia.

Finally, beyond its immediate health impact, the COVID-19 pandemic is expected to trigger severe and longer-lasting socio-economic consequences in many countries in the region, pushing millions of people into extreme poverty, especially in urban areas and eroding livelihoods and increasing protection needs of vulnerable groups, such as refugees and IDPs. DG ECHO's FIT for 2021-2022 identified **extreme humanitarian needs in Somalia, critical humanitarian needs in Ethiopia, and high humanitarian needs in Djibouti and Kenya**. The vulnerability of the population affected by the crisis is assessed to be very high in all countries in the region.

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<sup>9</sup> Ethiopia and Kenya host some of the largest refugee caseloads in Africa. Source: UNHCR, July 2021

<sup>10</sup> The ND-GAIN Country Index summarises a country's vulnerability to climate change and other global challenges in combination with its readiness to improve resilience.

	Djibouti	Ethiopia	Kenya	Somalia
<b>INFORM Risk Index<sup>11</sup></b>	5.2/10	6.8/10	5.7/10	8.8 /10
Vulnerability Index	6.1/10	6.4/10	6/10	8.8 /10
Hazard and Exposure	3.8/10	7.3/10	5.3/10	8.9/10
Lack of Coping Capacity	6.1/10	6.8/10	5.9/10	8.8/10
<b>Global Crisis Severity Index<sup>12</sup></b>	2.7/5	4.5/5	2.7/5	4.4/5
Projected conflict risk	2.6/10	9.9/10	9.1/10	10/10
Uprooted People Index	5.3/10	8.5/10	7.7/10	10/10
Humanitarian Conditions	2.5/5	3/5	3.5/5	4.5/5
Natural Disaster Index	5.4/10	4.4/10	5.1/10	6.9/10
<b>HDI Ranking<sup>13</sup> (Value)</b>	166	173	143	N/A
<b>Total Population<sup>14</sup></b>	<b>988 002</b>	<b>114 963 583</b>	<b>53 771 300</b>	<b>15 893 219</b>

## 2. HUMANITARIAN NEEDS

### 2.1. People in need of humanitarian assistance

	Djibouti	Ethiopia	Kenya	Somalia
<b>Refugees/Asylum seekers</b>	33 577	785 322	520 061	25 368
<i>Disaggregated by gender &amp; age</i>	48% female / 52% male; 0-17: 44% 18-59: 53% 60+: 4%	52.1% female / 47.9% male 0-17: N/A 18-59: N/A 60+: NA	49% female / 51% male; 0 – 17: 52% 18 – 59: 45% 60+: 3%	46% female / 54% male 0-17: 46% 18-59: 51.1% 60+: 2.9%
<b>IDPs</b>	Not applicable	> 5 million	Not applicable	2.9 million
<b>Returnees</b>	Not applicable	940 000	0	131 633
<b>People in IPC (3-5) (in million)<sup>15</sup></b>	194 000	16 800 000	2 366 000	3 500 000
<b>Children under 5 affected by Moderate Acute Malnutrition</b>	15 000	3 200 000	412 233	839 000
<b>Children under 5 affected by Severe Acute Malnutrition</b>	5 000	1 000 000	111 141	162 000
<b>Out of School Children</b>	35 000	1 880 000 <sup>16</sup>	1 200 000 <sup>17</sup>	≥ 3 000 000

#### 2.1.1. Refugees, migrants and asylum seekers

In the Horn of Africa, protracted refugee caseloads co-exist with “new crisis” caseloads, usually in the same camps or settlements and in urban contexts, requiring an adapted and differential response, using a clear targeting approach towards the most vulnerable.

**Djibouti** hosts around 33 000 refugees and asylum seekers from Somalia, Ethiopia and Yemen. They live mainly in three camps all located in highly food insecure areas, with very limited access to any form of livelihoods and a full dependence on external food assistance, as well as in urban areas. In addition, Djibouti has become an epicentre of complex, bi-directional migratory flows across the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. While

<sup>11</sup> INFORM is a global, open-source risk assessment for humanitarian crises and disasters

<sup>12</sup> <http://www.inform-index.org/Global-Crisis-Severity-Index-beta>

<sup>13</sup> Humanitarian Development Index (HDI) developed by UNDP

<sup>14</sup> Inform Risk Index 2021

<sup>15</sup> Includes people affected by drought/ flood events as well as refugees

<sup>16</sup> Including children living in refugee camps and children IDPs

<sup>17</sup> Including 123 512 children living in refugee camps

these migratory flows slowed down in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic and related border closures, these have again picked up speed and average between 11 000 – 15 000 monthly movements. This includes a high number of women and children, including unaccompanied minors, the vast majority from Ethiopia. Migrants are particularly vulnerable, facing detention, deportation, violence and abuse along the migration roads and on the sea. In Djibouti, the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF)<sup>18</sup> approach is progressing slowly.

**Ethiopia** is the third largest refugee hosting country in Africa with close to 786 000 individuals, comprising South Sudanese (47.5%), Somalis (27%), Eritreans (18.6%), and Sudanese (5.8%) living in 24 refugee camps and out-of-camp / host community settings in peripheral regions of the country. More than 60% are below 18 years old. The refugee context has significantly deteriorated in the past months. Eritrean refugees have been directly and deeply affected by violence and insecurity since the onset of the Tigray conflict; they have been caught up between warring groups, two refugee camps have been completely destroyed and tens of thousands of Eritrean refugees were forced to flee – yet again – for their lives. As of September 2021, approximately 9 000 are still unaccounted for. They suffer reprisal attacks, abductions, deportations back to Eritrea, arrests, and violence for their perceived affiliation with one side of the conflict or the other. This is likely to persist. Additional influxes are expected to continue, especially from South Sudan due to worsening of the situation and renewed sub-national violence. However the slow and problematic registration processes for South Sudanese asylum seekers as well as rumours of an end to *prima facie* policy for the latter raise concerns about possible *refoulement*. In the meantime, the CRRF process is seemingly at standstill since over a year with little progress in its implementation. The Ethiopian government's pledges for refugees remains limited compared to the size of the refugee population and the level of their needs – they are therefore very highly dependent on external assistance.

The official number of refugees and asylum seekers in **Kenya** currently stands at more than 520 000 individuals, primarily from Somalia and South Sudan, but also from DRC, Burundi and Ethiopia. By the end of June 2021, there were over 226 600 refugees in the Dadaab camps, over 212 400 in Kakuma camp and Kalobeyei settlement and more than 82 000 in urban areas (mainly Nairobi), representing 43%, 41% and 16% of the caseload respectively. They entirely depend on international humanitarian assistance for their survival, given the ongoing encampment policy and the limited prospects for durable solutions, including voluntary return and local integration. Since its peak in 2017, the pace of voluntary repatriations has significantly reduced, due to persistent drought and the sustained conflict in Somalia; also, several returnees have subsequently returned to Dadaab camps but are ineligible for assistance.

On 23 March 2021, Kenyan Minister of Interior gave United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) a 14-day ultimatum to ensure closure of Dadaab and Kakuma camps. The UNHCR came up with a roadmap to close the camps. Eventually, the Kenyan government agreed to a revised closure deadline of June 2022. While the roadmap has roots in international principles and UNHCR recognised durable solutions, it nonetheless raises significant concerns about realistic and sustainable solutions for the majority of refugees originating from countries in which the current

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<sup>18</sup> <https://www.unhcr.org/comprehensive-refugee-response-framework-crrf.html>

conditions are less than conducive for return, namely South Sudan and Somalia. The UNHCR plans voluntary returns of 10 000 refugees to Somalia, 5 000 to Ethiopia, 5 000 to South Sudan, and 3 500 to Burundi by end of 2021. An intention survey and verification exercises were initiated in June and should further inform the range of durable solutions acceptable and feasible for refugees. However, the tight deadline for the camps closure compounded by the increasing political pressure in the run-up of the 2022 elections are raising alert signs for potential risks of a precipitated / rushed camps closure falling short of international principles and standards.

**Somalia** hosts some 25 000 refugees and asylum seekers mainly from Ethiopia and Yemen. There are no refugee camps in Somalia and refugees and asylum seekers are hosted by host communities in particularly Somaliland and Puntland. After biometric verification completed in August 2020 the number was reduced significantly by approximately 24% from some 33,000 refugees and asylum seekers, previously. Somali refugee movements have been reported to Kenya, where registration of new asylum seekers remain suspended in Dadaab refugee camps but has been estimated to approximately 16 000 persons.

#### *2.1.2. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)*

In 2021, the humanitarian situation of a large portion of the Ethiopian population seriously deteriorated. As of beginning of August 2021, there were over 5 million IDPs **in Ethiopia**, including close to 1.4 million forcibly returned IDPs. The Tigray conflict accounts for close to 2 million IDPs. The deterioration of the situation in other regions such as Oromiya (Wellegas) and Benishangul-Gumuz (Kamashi) and since August 2021, the conflict escalation into Afar and Amhara have also caused new waves of displacement. The heavy politicisation of internal displacement has often caused premature and coerced government-led returns processes which add further complexity and deteriorate the situation and fall short of the standards of the Kampala Convention ratified by Ethiopia in 2020: returnees unable to return to their houses for lack of security and accountability and tensions with local communities; secondary displacements; IDPs hiding within host communities in places of displacement for fear of being forcibly returned. Local authorities frequently refuse to recognise IDPs (notably secondary displaced people and IDPs coming from politically sensitive areas), effectively excluding them from humanitarian assistance. Pushed/ coerced returns of IDPs put them at risk of further violence, further weakens their highly depleted resources and cause avoidable additional public health risks related to COVID-19, while there is still no comprehensive national IDPs Strategy in place despite numerous requests for it to be developed. Those returns appear unsustainable, as shown by numerous cases of secondary displacements.

In **Somalia**, 2.9 million people (18.2% of the total population) are reported displaced mainly by conflict (359 000 new IDPs in Jan-Jun-21), drought (68 000 new IDPs in Jan-Jun-21 and floods (56 500 new IDPs Jan-Jun-21. Many live in Al Shabaab-controlled areas, where access and provision of humanitarian assistance is extremely complicated, if not impossible. Forced evictions of IDPs and urban poor continue to be a major risk in Somalia's urban areas with 74 473 people having been forcibly evicted from their homes from January to June 2021, including 48 297 in Banadir/Mogadishu. Although these figures have decreased by some 12% compared to same period last year, in part due to advocacy by the Protection Cluster and calls by the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) on a moratorium during COVID-19, evictions remain a significant protection issue, and disrupts livelihoods. Prevention interventions have managed to prevent evictions of 27



742 people from January to June 2021 up from 22 590 evictions or + 23% compared to same period in 2020.

#### *2.1.3. Deportees and returnees (cross-border)*

Due to COVID-19, voluntary repatriation programmes have been suspended in the region.

**Ethiopia** faces large-scale returns of Ethiopian migrants, mostly deported from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. After a reduced pace of deportations during the peak of COVID-19 in 2020/ early 2021, an estimated 62 506 individuals have been sent back to Ethiopia in the first 6 months of 2021, representing 170% more than throughout 2020. Pace of returns accelerated sharply around mid-June 2021 with 2 100 deportees per day (of which an average 560 unaccompanied minors per week). During their journey, and in detention before being deported, migrants are exposed to **extreme hardship** and **violence**, such as racketeering, kidnapping and torture for ransom, physical abuse, death, robbery and sexual assault. Limited support is provided upon arrival at Bole International Airport in Addis. Moreover, Tigrayan deportees (34% of the total caseload) are particularly affected as they are currently stranded / detained upon arrival in relation to the ongoing conflict. Prospects for returnees originally from Tigray are uncertain, as many returnees will not be able to return to their areas of origin due to security concerns in their communities or transit areas.

Assisted returns to **Somalia** have largely subsided since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, with only around 100 assisted returns till end of July 2021 (with around 20-30 returns from April after the announcement of closure of the Dadaab refugee camps) and 1 286 spontaneous returnees from Yemen.

Spontaneous cross-border movements are also observed in the context of the South Sudanese crisis. However, it is unclear if those returns are permanent or temporary as the outward movement (i.e. leaving South Sudan) is not monitored. In late 2019, with the promise of a peace agreement in South Sudan, returns were promoted by the government of South Sudan and by some refugee hosting nations. However, given the ongoing violence, stalled peace process, instrumentalisation of the return process, and now the COVID-19 pandemic, UNHCR still considers that the conditions for safe, voluntary, informed and sustainable refugee returns are not met in South Sudan, while at the same time it promotes support to the areas where spontaneous returns are happening.

#### *2.1.4. Populations affected by food insecurity and under-nutrition*

Due to the combination of crises (conflict, drought, floods, desert locust upsurge, economic shocks and impact of the COVID-19 pandemic), there were approximatively 23 million people severely food insecure in the region and in need of humanitarian assistance (including 16,8 million people in Ethiopia) as of August 2021, including up to 1 million people at risk of famine in Ethiopia. There are more than 1 200 000 severely acute malnourished children. These figures encompass the refugees in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti, who rely exclusively on external food assistance for survival and are often unable to meet their daily food needs, due to foreseen critical pipeline breaks, and foreseen further cuts in the food ration, already at only 64 % to 80% of the standard ration. Worrying signs of a new drought spell affecting the lowland pastoralist areas of the Horn have been observed over the past three months with two consecutive failed rain seasons and a forecast for below-average rainfalls in the coming months. Like in the 2016-2017 Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD) drought, the peak of the drought would be seen in

the first half of 2022. This would further increase the population in food and nutrition insecurity in the Horn.

## **2.2. Description of the most acute humanitarian needs**

### *2.2.1. Protection*

Internal and intercommunal conflicts/violence in Ethiopia and Somalia expose communities to human rights and IHL violations, such as killings, arbitrary detention, evictions, family links disruption, sexual and gender based violence, grave violations against children's rights (including child recruitment by armed forces), restrictions of movement and massive internal and cross-border forced displacement. In the context of the Tigray conflict, there are allegations of war crimes and possible crimes against humanity by armed forces. Moreover, the protection risks stemming from the direct correlation between natural disasters and conflict are insufficiently analysed, negatively impacting the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance. Due to extreme food insecurity and limited access to humanitarian assistance vulnerable people turn to negative coping strategies (such as early marriage, child labour, transactional sex) and migration, exposing themselves to high risks (migrants along the Eastern Corridor).

### *2.2.2. Food Security & Livelihoods*

Acute food insecurity skyrocketed in 2021 and is expected to persist through 2022 due to conflict, economic shocks, weather and climatic conditions. Several climate forecast models are predicting a third consecutive below-average rainfall season in the eastern Horn in late 2021<sup>19</sup>. In addition, the impact of COVID-19 on food production, supply chains and trade links, and on people's income activities, is taking its toll across the region, especially among urban households, widening food consumption gaps. The impact of the Tigray conflict, where starvation is allegedly being used as a weapon of war, have led to one of the most acute food crises in the world, with a huge number of people facing famine conditions. The intensification and spreading of the conflict to more areas in Ethiopia is further aggravating the food security situation. Moreover, inflation and currency depreciation are increasing, and it is expected that macroeconomic conditions will further deteriorate in the coming months, severely affecting access to food for large population numbers. Conflict-affected populations have also seen their livelihoods disrupted, looted, purposely destroyed and sources of food depleted. Despite efforts in some countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia to reinforce existing safety nets, the coverage remains insufficient. As needs increase, major access constraints coupled with insufficient current food assistance responses (inadequate coverage and reduced rations) have worsened the situation. Refugees in all countries are affected by food ration cuts as pipelines remain underfunded. There is a need to significantly scale-up timely, sufficient and effective food assistance to the severely food insecure, and to create synergies with self-reliance strategies to protect the livelihoods of households still able to cover their food needs. In addition, food security information systems should be reinforced, with more regular and quality data collection by the different actors, and active participation in analysis fora (as the IPC).

High rates of acute under-nutrition are still observed in numerous areas of the region, such as the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs) of Kenya, and drought- and conflict-

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<sup>19</sup> FEWSNET, July 2021: <https://fews.net/east-africa>

affected areas in Ethiopia and Somalia. Throughout the region, there are 5.7 million children under 5 who are malnourished, including over 1.2 million severely malnourished and in urgent need of treatment. Strategies and adaptations allowing continuity of services and complementarity with existing capacities are strongly encouraged.

### 2.2.3. *Health*

Health systems in the region are generally weak and under-resourced. The region is prone to recurrent epidemic outbreaks (cholera, polio, yellow fever, viral haemorrhagic fevers, measles, meningitis, kala azar, etc.). In many parts of the region, very low vaccination coverage, high under-nutrition rates, mass population movements, overcrowded IDP/refugee camps, and poor water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) conditions, sharply increase the risk of transmission of diseases and mortality. Infant and maternal mortality rates remain very high, especially in disaster-affected areas. In Ethiopia, the conflict has resulted in the destruction of basic social services in Tigray, including health facilities that lie in ruins (vandalised and / or looted). Medical supply chains are heavily disrupted and currently mainly rely on humanitarian actors with limited and constrained capacities. It will be critical to ensure continuity of care given the scope and extent of disruption of primary health services, which in turn have direct impact on the capacity to face rapidly rising malnutrition. It is also critical to fill gaps in secondary health care as part of life saving actions through proper and neutral referral systems, and to ensure the quality of drugs, medical equipment and nutrition products. The COVID-19 pandemic<sup>20</sup> has laid bare the weaknesses of the surveillance systems and emphasised the need to upgrade Early Warning Alert and Response systems (EWARS) in all countries.

### 2.2.4. *Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH)*

Regular and reliable access to safe water for drinking, hygiene and livestock is a major challenge across the region including in IDP and refugee camps and settlements. It is also an issue in urban areas in conflict zones where safe water supply depends on electricity that is regularly disrupted by belligerents. In Tigray region of Ethiopia, the conflict resulted in the destruction of water supply systems. The lack of clean water and inadequate hygiene and sanitation practices are identified as underlying causes of high mortality, under-nutrition and expansion of epidemics outbreaks. The lack of access to safe and nearby water and sanitation facilities increases the risk of women and girls' exposure to sexual harassment and violence. Competition over access to water also leads to conflicts between communities. There is a need to improve access to safe water and to upgrade the management and sustainability of WASH facilities/services, notably by promoting self-reliance. Environmental sustainability of WASH facilities/services should also be improved. Preparedness and response to water-borne or diarrheal diseases, as well as creation of effective barriers to transmission routes, should be strengthened.

### 2.2.5. *Shelter and Non-Food-Items (NFIs)*

The provision of shelters and NFIs is essential for refugee/IDP camps or settlements from the onset of a response and especially for newly displaced population, such as in

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<sup>20</sup> According to the WHO, the main challenges for an effective COVID-19 response is the lack of contact tracing, insufficient testing and inadequate coordination between national and county authorities.

Ethiopia and Somalia. It is also necessary for the increasing number of people affected by natural disasters, such as droughts and floods. Shelter modalities and settlement locations must fully take into account protection concerns, notably to ensure they do not contribute to any involuntary or premature return policies. The environmental sustainability of shelters and NFIs needs to be improved.

#### *2.2.6. Education in Emergencies (EiE)*

Indicators related to education remain extremely poor across the Horn of Africa region. An increase in school drops-out, often representing a negative coping mechanism resulting from lack of livelihoods, has been observed in all countries, as well as increased child protection risks for the most vulnerable children and adolescents, particularly for girls, who face the additional risk of early pregnancy and forced marriage. Overall, the quality of education across the region is a concern, with several barriers both on the supply and demand sides, such as high percentage of teachers being non-qualified, scarcity of learning spaces and educational material, high pupil to teacher ratios, insecurity and unsafe schools. Adolescent (over-age) boys and girls are often excluded from education due to the absence of alternative and/or accelerated learning possibilities, especially in crisis contexts and are exposed to further protection risks. Gender-based discriminations significantly hamper girls' education access and retention, especially transition to the secondary level. In refugee settings, many children remain out of school or lack an appropriate learning environment and education programmes. COVID-19 exacerbated these needs, as schools closed for months in the whole region, leaving millions of children out-of-school and at risk. Catch-up programmes will help these learners to recover lost learning, make up for content that was missed, and return to the appropriate place in the curriculum where they would be if the disruption had not occurred.

#### *2.2.7. Disaster Preparedness*

Despite the high exposure to multiple risks, including ongoing conflicts, epidemic diseases in humans and livestock, crop infestation and natural hazards, the overall regional capacity to prepare and respond remains insufficient as currently demonstrated by the lack of adequate early actions measures put in place despite early warning signs of below average rains and regional ongoing measures to end drought emergencies. Two consecutive poor rain seasons performance since the fall 2020 had negative consequences for food security in 2021, water access and are affecting in particular the pastoralist population. Inadequate and under-resourced disaster risk management systems and weak institutionalisation of disaster preparedness hampers the capacities of countries, communities and individuals to adequately prepare, anticipate and respond to crises. Alerts by existing early warning systems most often fail to trigger early action and response at the necessary level.

### **3. HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE AND COORDINATION**

#### **3.1. National / local response and involvement**

In the Horn of Africa, the capacities and/or willingness of governments to respond to natural and man-made disasters, and epidemics outbreaks remain limited.

The second phase of Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI) to "end drought emergencies in the Horn of Africa" by building sustainable livelihoods was launched by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development<sup>21</sup> (IGAD) for the period 2019-2024<sup>22</sup>. However, the recurrence of droughts across the region - with limited early action measures implemented despite early warnings alerts being provided indicating gaps in the implementation of the ending drought country programming papers- and the absence of a corresponding regional initiative on flood preparedness, indicates that much remains to be done, namely in terms of coordination and support to multi-risk Early Warning Systems (EWS), advocacy for transboundary approach, and overall resilience strengthening, to ensure adequate anticipatory or early response based on effective preparedness measures. In August 2020, IGAD launched the Regional Food and Nutrition Response Strategy, which outlines the interventions required to safeguard livelihoods, sustain gains made so far in relation to food availability and access, prevent and treat acute and chronic malnutrition, and ultimately save lives.

Challenged over the past 3 years by the worst desert locust infestation in decades, the East Africa Desert Locust Control Organization needs to be further supported. The June 2021 conference on desert locust produced a framework of actions for improving control capacities in the region (from surveillance to impact assessment and livelihood resilience) which was endorsed by IGAD countries and international donors (including EU).

The IGAD's Nairobi Declaration and Plan of Action 2017, initially specific to the Somali refugee situation, represents the regional application of the CRRF. These initiatives, subsumed into the Global Compact for Refugees (end-2018) aimed at bringing together humanitarian and development actors, including host governments, to contribute to a more holistic and predictable response to refugee situations; to support host populations and local authorities; and to facilitate a transition to local integration and durable solutions. The Nairobi Action Plan has so far translated into the Djibouti Declaration / Action Plan on Refugee Education (December 2017), and the Kampala Declaration / Action Plan on Jobs, Livelihoods and Self-Reliance for Refugees, Returnees and Host Communities (March 2019). A thematic meeting on Health is planned in the future.

In **Djibouti**, the overall local response is limited and relies on external support to address all identified humanitarian needs. The *Office National d'Assistance aux Réfugiés et aux Sinistrés* (ONARS) coordinates the provision of emergency assistance to people affected by displacement and natural disasters, but has limited capacity. On 13 September 2021, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Interior presented officially to the international community and to national stakeholders the new Migration Strategy of Djibouti, highlighting the importance of migrants' rights and need for protection.

Djibouti made strong commitments to the CRRF by passing national laws granting refugees and asylum seekers right to education, social protection, health care and work. The translation of these rights into concrete plans and actions has slowed down and the CRRF Steering Committee has not met since 2018.

The humanitarian response in **Ethiopia** is delivered through complex and tight collaboration between the government and humanitarian partners, which in the context of conflict and politicised ethnic violence, raises concerns about non-adherence to

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<sup>21</sup> IGAD members are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya and Uganda

<sup>22</sup> <https://resilience.igad.int/>

humanitarian principles – in particular neutrality and independence, international humanitarian law and the principles set in the Kampala convention. The National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC) and the Administration for Refugees and Returnees Affairs (ARRA), both under the Ministry of Peace, are the main government institutions to provide and coordinate humanitarian response, with a lead role in coordination, as well as implementation. However, the government's response capacity at regional and zonal level remains very limited. The EU support to contingency planning and budget should help build the capacity of regional and zonal governments to respond to new shocks. At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, an Emergency Coordination Centre (ECC) had been established at national level, managed by National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC). The ECC used to oversee the response in the quarantine sites, in close collaboration with the Emergency Operation Centre (EOC) established within the Ethiopian Public Health Institute (EPHI) of the Ministry of Health. However, after 6 months of effective pandemic control willingness, government priorities and resources available seems to have shifted.

Regarding refugees, the CRRF Coordination Unit established independently from ARRA was dismantled over two years ago and the Steering Committee has not met since mid-2018. Government's ownership, beyond ARRA, is badly lacking and the process has stalled. The four new directives fostering refugees' integration (refugee law) passed in December 2019 are still pending effective implementation.

**In Kenya** the national law governing the management of refugee remains enshrined in the 2006 Kenya Refugee Act supporting an encampment policy where refugees are restricted to residing in "designated areas". A revised Refugee Bill addressing some of issues related to encampment and socio-economic rights of refugees was endorsed by the Parliament in 2021 but is not yet assented into law by the President. Aside from the formal legal barriers that restrict prospects for refugee inclusion and self-reliance, there are also a number of informal barriers including administrative hurdles, stigma, and lack of awareness amongst refugees of their rights. Drought-related issues still remain under the remit of the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA), which addresses resilience in the ASALs and responds to emergency levels of food insecurity. While its existence is acknowledged, the capacity of the National Disaster Operation Center (NDOC) under the Ministry of Interior mandated to monitor, co-ordinate and mobilise national resources to respond to disaster incidents in the country has yet to be fully optimised in strengthening the collaboration of both state and non-state actors for humanitarian assistance. Following devolution, the county governments through the respective Ministries of Health are leading the integration of nutrition services in Primary Health Care. The Integrated Management of Acute Malnutrition (IMAM) remains the nationally approved approach to respond in areas where acute undernutrition had peaked. However, the county government investment in the implementation of the response has not always been sufficient, with gaps particularly noted in maintaining adequate supplies, outreach and case follow up.

Coordination and implementation of the COVID-19 response in Kenya is still led by the national Public Health Emergency Steering Committee under the Ministry of Health. The committee is supported at technical level by the National COVID-19 Task Force for joint planning, monitoring and information management. Both functions work in close collaboration with the UN, NGO and Red Cross. Through the Council of Governors, linkages are made through the county coordinating committees mirroring the structure at national level.

In **Somalia**, humanitarian capacities remain very limited at all levels. Humanitarian aid is under the authority of the increasingly assertive, but under-resourced, Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management (MOHADM). MOHADM has progressively taken the lead in coordination activities. At state level, the disaster management agencies of Somaliland (NADFOR) and Puntland (HADMA) have limited though increasing capacity and are supported by some external partners. However, the interaction between these entities and the Federal Member States' relevant ministries remains ill-defined and is at times competitive. Through donor-supported initiatives, the government has put in place coordination mechanisms for durable solutions to displacement through Durable Solutions Unit in the Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development, and in particular in Benadir/Mogadishu and Baidoa local durable solutions secretariats exists. New coordination platforms for COVID-19 programmes have been added last year. While a refugee law has been tabled in Parliament, it has not yet been read due to the ongoing process. An IDP law has also been drafted based on the Kampala convention.

### 3.2. International Humanitarian Response

In the region, the UN Appeals in 2021 amounted to over USD 4.37 billion; this comprised the total appeals for Ethiopia, Tigray crisis, Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya (Drought), the COVID-19 response plans, the UNHCR budgets for Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti, and for the Somali refugees and the IOM Regional Plan for Migrants.

In **Djibouti** there is a limited presence of humanitarian actors and donors. UNHCR's Refugee Response Plan 2021, budgeted at USD 18.1 million is just 53% funded as of August 2021, while the Djibouti component of IOM's Regional Migrants Response Plan, budgeted at USD 5.6 million, is 24% funded. A UN and partner COVID-19 Response Plan, budgeted at USD 30 million, and covering May – December 2020, was just 20% funded.

The humanitarian aid architecture in **Ethiopia** is complex and not fit to deal with a large scale crisis as the one in Tigray. It includes the Ethiopia Humanitarian Country Team to lead the overall humanitarian coordination through capacitated clusters, while donors are coordinating with each other through the Humanitarian Resilience and Refugees Donor Groups (HRDG and RDG) and the INGOs through the HINGO Forum. Common humanitarian services have been established, with UNHAS to provide air services, IOM DTM (Displacement Tracking Matrix) to provide core displacements data, OCHA to provide information and analysis on access, civil-military coordination unit. While the 2021 Ethiopia Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), elaborated jointly by the government and the UN has still not been endorsed by the government of Ethiopia, it was revised in September and is amounting USD 1.44 billion to assist 15.1 million people. On September 2021, the HRP was 33.7% funded. In addition, the 2021 Ethiopia Country Refugee Response Plan seeks USD 552.6 million for the implementation of their response activities. A separate Northern Ethiopia Humanitarian Response Plan (concerning the Tigray conflict) is seeking USD 853 million until the end of 2021 to assist 5.2 million people. Despite agencies' reallocation of funds and new funding received, the planned humanitarian response is facing a significant funding gap (USD 433 million on 19 July).

In **Kenya**, the main humanitarian situation is the refugee crisis and UNHCR leads coordination of humanitarian activities in the camps. UNHCR's overall revised appeal for the combined refugee situation in Kenya is USD 149.6 million; as of August 2021 this was 56% funded. The COVID-19 emergency appeal issued in April 2020 has not

been extended in 2021 as other bilateral programmes by International Financial Institutions have been initiated with the government of Kenya to tackle the effects of the crisis. Humanitarian response for the other emerging crises in the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs) counties is not systematised into a humanitarian response plan but mostly ad hoc, informed by analysis from formal government agencies and UN/ NGO partners coordinated by OCHA in the Kenya Humanitarian Partnership Team (KHPT) forum. On 30 September 2021, the UN launched a flash appeal for the drought response in Kenya for USD 139.5 million to assist 1.27 million people between October and December 2021.

In **Somalia** UN agencies, other donors, and several international NGOs are well established. Coordination takes place through the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and a fully activated cluster system. The Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for 2021 is over USD 1.09 billion aiming at covering 4 million people, with some 40 % financed as of end of August 2021 (the lowest at the same time in the last 6 years), excluding an additional USD 277 million humanitarian funding provided outside of the HRP.

### **3.3. Operational constraints**

#### *3.3.1. Access/humanitarian space*

Humanitarian access to people affected by crises, requires a continuous negotiation, dialogue and network with a wide range of stakeholders at different levels, including civil and military authorities, security forces, armed groups, youth, elderly, women's association, other influential actors. In **Ethiopia**, access to Tigray has been extremely difficult since the onset of the war in November 2020, with many administrative impediments, insecurity related to on-going hostilities and denial of access by armed actors, mostly on the Federal government's side, thus preventing meaningful scale up of emergency assistance. At time of writing, the operating environment is getting more and more restrictive and has brought most of the Tigray response efforts to a halt.

Across the region, a highly volatile and aggravating security situation is a major constraint for humanitarian operations. The increase in attacks directly targeting aid workers and the increased pressure and obstruction from various parties are extremely worrying trends, as it severely constrains the independence and impartiality of humanitarian operations, access and the overall humanitarian space for relief organisations. The situation is particularly acute in Ethiopia (North and South), Somalia (South and Central), and in the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia border regions. In Ethiopia, parties to the Tigray conflict and other stakeholders in regions affected by violence are failing on their obligation to protect humanitarian workers and assets. There are reports of harassment, intimidation, and smear campaigns against the international community, but more particularly targeting and affecting national staff. As of beginning of September 2021, 23 humanitarian workers had been killed since the onset of the Tigray crisis, while performing their duties, making the operational environment particularly volatile and at risk. The presence of Al Shabaab in 23 districts in Somalia continues to restrict access to some 1.3 million people.

#### *3.3.2. Partners (presence, capacity), including absorption capacity on the ground*

DG ECHO has an extensive partner network in all countries of the Horn of Africa. Insecurity and administrative requirements put in place by authorities, as well as context-specific difficulties, can affect DG ECHO and partners' capacity to undertake proper needs assessments and to monitor operations, as well as partners' capacity to deliver aid



in a timely, effective and accountable manner. Access is further restricted due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which has constrained the deployment, presence and movement of humanitarian workers and goods, both within countries and across borders, pushing many partners to adapt their ways of working by transferring responsibility and also risks to local implementing partners. Access to asylum seekers remains, at times, constrained in some countries.

### 3.3.3. *Other*

The risk of instrumentalisation of humanitarian aid remains high, leading to lack of independent assessment of needs and reducing access to those populations who rely most on humanitarian assistance for their survival. It also puts humanitarian workers' lives at risk and can lead to misperception regarding the independence and neutrality of the humanitarian action. In **Ethiopia**, the politicisation of the response by parties to the Tigray conflict is acute and particularly challenging as it affects directly the capacity to deliver assistance. This results in significant challenges to ensure a principled humanitarian response and puts humanitarian operations at risk and aid workers in danger. There is deep mistrust of the international aid community and, increasingly negative narratives against humanitarian organisations perceived as partial, creating a hugely constraining environment for humanitarian actors to operate. It is challenging to ensure adequate and independent monitoring of aid distributed in many areas of Tigray, given the access barriers (human resources, insecurity, etc.).

In order to provide assistance to the people most in need, especially in areas with difficult access, DG ECHO may allow as a last resort option the implementation of life-saving actions in **remote management modalities**. Partners will have to strictly comply with the guidelines laid out in the DG ECHO Remote Management Guidance note<sup>23</sup>.

## 4. HUMANITARIAN – DEVELOPMENT – PEACE NEXUS

The new Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) programming cycle is under preparation but some programmes funded under the 11<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund (EDF) for the period 2014-2020 will still be ongoing in 2022 with substantial resources programmed for food security and resilience.

The **EU Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF) for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa** (EUTF for Africa), which has been a key financing instrument allowing a nexus approach, particularly on forced displacement, will be fully contracted by the end of 2021, with some programmes continuing into 2022 and 2023 offering some limited nexus opportunities – such as the EUR 60 million “EU response to health and socio-economic impact of COVID-19 in the IGAD region”, with UNOPS/GiZ. Additional regional funding was also mobilised dedicated to Migration (Better Migration Management II) and also to support reforms to ease free circulation and persons between IGAD countries.

The **Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) and the rapid response action under NDICI** contribute to the implementation of the comprehensive approach to conflicts. Crisis response actions in the region respond directly to EU political priorities

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<sup>23</sup> [http://dgecho-partners-helpdesk.eu/actions\\_implementation/remote\\_management/start](http://dgecho-partners-helpdesk.eu/actions_implementation/remote_management/start)

and longer-term interventions are initiated for conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness.

In **Djibouti** the EU has mobilised EUR 110 million from the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF to support vulnerable communities and households in the sectors of Water and Solid and Liquid Waste Treatment, and Food Security. These interventions have allowed the EU to address some of the underlying structural factors that increase humanitarian needs. Specific vulnerable groups among refugee communities have also been supported via the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF. The EUTF (EUR 36.5 million) has constituted an important linkage between humanitarian and development, addressing durable solutions for refugees and access to services for migrants and their host communities. This nexus work has intensified during the COVID-19 pandemic, with complementary support provided through different EU instruments to migrants stranded in Djibouti, continuing throughout 2020 and 2021.

In **Ethiopia** nexus opportunities would have to be re-defined given the important changes of context (Tigray conflict and its spill over effect) and will depend on the decision taken regarding the NDICI programming. They could a priori be pursued in health and nutrition; in disaster preparedness and response; in human rights, IHL and protection; and in durable solutions to forced displacement (either by climate or human induced disasters), as well as reconciliation and resilience. To be noted that as a follow up to the joint DG ECHO - DG DEVCO RESET<sup>24</sup> programme, established in 2012, a DG DEVCO-funded Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Programme started in 2020. It aims at building governmental preparedness and response capacity at Federal and regional levels. Since 2016, under the EUTF, further complementarity was reached between humanitarian and development initiatives supporting the refugees and host communities within the wider framework of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), or peace and reconciliation in the context of inter-communal ethnic conflicts (Gedeo-West Guji).

Over recent years, the main focus of the nexus approach in **Kenya** has been the search for durable solutions for refugees. With a total of EUR 44.45 million through 3 programmes, the EUTF has been a leading supporter of the roll-out of the CRRF, in particular the innovative integrated settlement in Kalobeyi (Turkana county), and also through support to enhance the resilience of refugees and host communities. In addition, the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF has supported food security and resilience to climatic shocks in the ASALs. In continuation to 2021, key nexus opportunities for 2022 are relevant in addressing forced displacement, notably through the EU's continued support to the Kalobeyi Integrated Socio-Economic Development Plan (KISED), as well as the nascent Garissa Integrated Socio-Economic Development Plan (GISED), encompassing the Dadaab refugee camps, wherein refugees and the host community can live together peacefully, have access to social services and develop economic ties to build sustainable livelihoods. These processes remain valid and should be revitalised even in the current environment of camp closure as the long-term perspective is now more essential to achieve the outlook as foreseen in the camp closure roadmap. For the next programming period, innovative approaches within the nexus framework will be required including both refugees and on the most vulnerable and marginalised districts and populations in the ASAL counties. Opportunities are emerging for greater engagement in shock responsive social protection not only for the cash transfer SafetyNet programmes but also by

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<sup>24</sup> RESET stands for Resilience in Ethiopia

strengthening policies and procedures for inclusion of adaptation mechanisms in social services e.g. strengthening health system disaster preparedness and response capacity (surge capacity).

In **Somalia** the main relevant nexus interaction between humanitarian and development assistance is being established in 5 domains: i) linking humanitarian cash assistance with the shock-responsive components of the emerging safety net programmes promoted by the EU and other donors.; ii) in health and nutrition, reaching out to development donors (e.g. US, UK, Italy, Switzerland) on key concepts of Essential Package of Health Services and a more structural approach via health district programming; iii) on Education in Emergencies, DG ECHO has closely worked with the education cluster and with the long-term donors (in particular DG INTPA) to complement its emergency focus on IDPs and out-of-school children with medium-term interventions such as curriculum development, teacher training, capacity building of the Ministry of Education and inclusion of secondary education and TVET; iv) Protection issues and violations of IHL, where humanitarian actors alone can benefit from the long-term backing by development and political actors (advocacy, follow up of legislation such as sexual offences bill, evictions and tenure security) v) durable solutions for protracted IDP and growing urban migrants as well as urban/semi-urban IDP populations. The EUTF RE-INTEG Programme in Somalia was highlighted as a good example applying the HDP Nexus approach in its efforts to facilitate durable solutions to displacement and improved governance of migration. Further nexus opportunities for 2022 and beyond will also be consolidated in the DP/DRR domain, in particular to address the floods risk, whereas DG ECHO has been funding a disaster preparedness (DP budget line) action to address floods in the Shabelle river basin as of early 2021.

## **5. ENVISAGED DG ECHO RESPONSE AND EXPECTED RESULTS OF HUMANITARIAN AID INTERVENTIONS**

### General considerations for all interventions

The humanitarian response shall be compliant with EU thematic policies and guidelines that are described in detail in the HIP policy annex. Partners operating in conflict areas are requested to provide evidence of strong capacity in security management (experienced and adequate human resources, as well as means).

#### **5.1. Envisaged DG ECHO response**

As communities continue to be affected by conflict, violence, food insecurity, climate change and impact of COVID-19, ECHO will prioritise the response to most acute needs and most vulnerable communities / households / individuals, support common services and deepen its engagement with development and political/diplomatic actors towards enhancing compliance with IHL and International Refugee Law, and seeking long-term solutions to protracted situations, according to the respective mandates.

DG ECHO will adopt an **integrated multi-sectoral or cross-sectoral approach to programming that aims at meeting basic needs<sup>25</sup> of affected populations**. DG ECHO

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<sup>25</sup> Basic needs are the essential goods, utilities, services or resources required on a regular or seasonal basis by households for ensuring long-term survival and minimum living standards, without resorting to negative coping mechanisms or compromising their health, dignity and essential livelihood assets

**prioritises multipurpose cash (MPC) to meet basic needs**, complemented by other modalities, as appropriate, and timely referrals, to meet specific sectoral outcomes. Designing an integrated programme requires enhanced coordination and coherence across sectors, starting with joint assessments and continuing through the cycle with joint protection-sensitive vulnerability targeting, joint response/delivery and common monitoring and evaluation, leading to greater effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian assistance. As COVID-19 will remain a challenge, appropriate measures will be needed to continue delivering life-saving assistance in terms of physical protection, duty of care, messaging and communication, as well as creative solutions to ensure the continuity of activities.

As the entire Horn of Africa region keeps being impacted by recurrent disasters and harsh climatic conditions, such as regular floods and droughts, large and small-scale in nature, the humanitarian response in the region should take current and future climate risks into account. Disaster risk reduction and disaster preparedness should thus feature in the humanitarian aid programmes financed through this HIP, in order to strengthen early response capacity and coping capacities hereby increasing the resilience of people and institutions and reducing the impact of climate related disasters on the most vulnerable people. In this respect, DG ECHO will systematically address **Emergency Preparedness & Early Response** through a) emergency / rapid response mechanisms (E/RRM) as standalone actions b) flexibility measures (including “crisis modifiers”) embedded in other actions and c) disaster preparedness (DP).

Protection of civilians, advocacy for the respect of IHL, for enhanced humanitarian access and the respect of humanitarian principles will remain paramount in the context of Ethiopia and ECHO priority. Considering DG ECHO’s budget, mandate and comparative advantage in **Ethiopia**, its priority in 2022 will be to address the acute needs and ensure protection of people affected by conflicts or violence, i.e. populations in displacement, communities hosting/affected by conflict or displacement and populations returned/integrated/relocated. With conflicts, including ethnic based conflicts widely spread across the country and difficult to predict, DG ECHO’s approach will remain flexible to adapt to a very fluid situation and will notably focus on areas that are assessed as the most acute or that have been under-represented in the Humanitarian Response Plan (severity of need mapping), due to lack of data, partners and limited support capacity.

Moreover, DG ECHO will continue to ensure a rapid response capacity to new and rapid-onset conflicts and natural shocks, such as drought, floods, epidemic outbreaks and pests. Priority will be given to the most urgent and critical needs through an early response, depending on the nature of the shock, in an attempt to mitigate its impact and prevent a further deterioration.

Support to the refugee response will ensure that essential needs such as food, water and basic services are covered in the different refugee settings, with particular attention to new arrivals and acute needs. Meanwhile, dedicated attention will be provided to ensure that international protection space is maintained in accordance with Refugee Law, despite a challenging political environment. DG ECHO’s engagement in addressing urgent humanitarian needs of deportees will gradually decrease, with development-led reintegration initiatives taking over. However DG ECHO may still remain engaged in 2022, to address critical needs of particularly vulnerable groups such as unaccompanied minors.

DG ECHO’s support for the refugee crisis in **Kenya** and amidst the camp closure activities, will continue to prioritise basic survival services (food assistance, health-

nutrition, protection and education) for refugees and asylum seekers (including the undocumented) as long as they remain encamped. As the outlook of the operation in 2022 becomes clearer, the humanitarian support must be well articulated with the longer-term actions geared towards lasting solutions to the crisis within or outside of the camp closure roadmap. Complementarity with actions funded by other EU instruments and development donors will be emphasised avoiding overlap. Recognising the developing drought spell causing an acute food security and nutrition crisis in the ASAL regions, DG ECHO will continue to monitor needs, in permanent dialogue with other humanitarian and development donors, to ensure that the basic needs of the most vulnerable populations are met.

In **Somalia**, DG ECHO will prioritise actions based on a comprehensive context analysis, focusing on emergency response through life-saving activities for populations recently displaced by acute crises (conflict, drought, floods, and epidemics) or exposed to very high levels of food insecurity. DG ECHO will prioritise the response to this acute food insecurity, to the protection crisis; it will further strengthen integrated health-nutrition programming, continue Education in Emergency (EiE) programming particularly for displacement affected communities and out-of-school children, and finally, it will aim at increasing preparedness efforts and pre-positioning in order to respond swiftly to possible political or other shocks causing displacement.

In addition, and continuing the increased attention on disaster preparedness, support will be expanded to further strengthen early warning, preparedness and response capacity in case of floods. Actions aiming at improving flood-related disaster preparedness through capacity building, knowledge transfer and strengthening of locally owned systems: supporting 1) the proper dissemination of flood warning/mitigation/prevention related information and 2) the institutionalised and systemic preparedness and response capacity to recurrent floods may be expanded to the Juba river basin. A more strategic collaboration on prevention and river management with development donors will be needed and will be pursued as part of the strategy, notably through the Nexus Flood Task Force, of which DG-ECHO is already a member. Coordination and complementarity with other emergency preparedness & response mechanisms (e.g. emergency interventions under crisis modifiers, shock responsive component of existing safety nets) will also be prioritised.

Considering the satisfactory nexus approach for the refugee response, DG ECHO will, in **Djibouti**, continue to provide protection services and other types of assistance to vulnerable migrants, in coordination with the EU Delegation and in complementarity with EUTF-funded projects. It is estimated that the number of migrants from neighbouring countries will increase, notably due to the ongoing conflict in Ethiopia and possibly from Somalia. In case further funds become available, DG ECHO may also foresee a response in Education in Emergencies.

## **5.2. Other DG ECHO interventions**

**ECHO Flight**, providing safe air transport for humanitarian actors in order to reach people in need in locations otherwise not reachable or very difficult to reach, in particular in Kenya and in Somalia, is subject of a separate HIP.

The **Emergency Toolbox HIP** may be drawn upon for the prevention of, and response to, outbreaks of Epidemics. Under the Emergency Toolbox HIP, the Small-Scale Response, Acute Large Emergency Response Tool (ALERT) and Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) instruments may also provide funding options.