HUMANITARIAN IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (HIP)
SUDAN and SOUTH SUDAN

0. MAJOR CHANGES SINCE PREVIOUS VERSION OF THE HIP

I/ First modification 05/04/2013

This HIP is being modified to take into account the recent access World Food Programme (WFP) was granted in Blue Nile State (BNS) in areas under control of the Government of Sudan (GoS). Previously WFP only had access to two locations in BNS and this access was very restricted. In March 2013, an inter-agency team comprising WFP, UNDSS, Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) and cooperating partners Sudanese Red Crescent Society (SRCS) and Mubadroon (national NGO) conducted a rapid needs assessment in several locations across the six localities of Blue Nile State, for the first time since the conflict erupted in 2011.

Their findings estimated that 110,000 conflict–affected people in BNS are in dire need of urgent humanitarian assistance. These vulnerable population groups are those who were directly affected by the fighting.

Additional funding is hence required to preposition 13,300 metric tonnes of food before the rainy season. DG ECHO has earmarked EUR 2,000,000 to contribute to the operation. This funding will allow WFP to preposition food assistance ahead of the rainy season, avoiding hence the use of air drops which are very expensive and challenging.

This support will be given in the framework of a broader proposal, currently in negotiation phase, covering the needs for the Sudan for which an initial EUR 15,000,000 were earmarked.

The changes proposed for Sudan and South-Sudan will allow a simplification in budget repartition in order to facilitate the contracting process with the partner. Therefore, a transfer of EUR 2,000,000 was done from the "Humanitarian aid" budget line to the "Food aid" budget line within the HIP's budget.

This is the first modification of the 2013 HIP for Sudan and South Sudan.

II/ Second modification 14/06/2013

There have been significant recent changes affecting a number of contexts in both countries; all add up to increasing the humanitarian needs:

The conflict in Darfur has intensified. There are now an estimated 300 000 newly displaced people, i.e. more than those displaced in 2011 and 2012 combined; most are very vulnerable and highly dependent on humanitarian assistance. The conflict has spilled over into Chad where close to 50 000 Sudanese refugees, Chadians returnees and refugees from CAR, who had been in Darfur for some years, have crossed in a very short span of time.

The conflict in Jonglei has significantly increased since the beginning of the year. The newly displaced are estimated at close to 150 000 persons, most of which fully dependent on humanitarian assistance, amidst serious concerns about access which may entail expensive air operations, on account of insecurity and the start of the rainy season.
The number of refugees from South Kordofan and Blue Nile, who have fled to South Sudan, continues to increase, albeit at a slower pace than last year. OCHA estimates that it will reach 260,000 by end 2013, up from 205,000 at the end of 2012.

After protracted negotiations, the UNHCR has finally been able to open a new camp for the South Kordofan refugees in a safer location. It is now necessary to beef up the basic infrastructure at this location (Ajuong Thok, with a capacity of 20,000 refugees) in order to be able to attract and host the expected camp dwellers.

With several other major humanitarian crises elsewhere in the world, donor attention on South Sudan is waning; almost half-way through 2013, the CAP is funded at only 45.7%.

To address these new and unforeseen needs, EUR 6,000,000 have been added to the "Humanitarian aid" budget line of this HIP and a second assessment round has been opened (see revised section 5.3).

This is the second modification of the 2013 HIP for Sudan and South Sudan.

III/ Third modification 23/10/2013

Humanitarian needs in Sudan and South Sudan have further increased since the last modification (in mid-June) of this HIP. The humanitarian responses to various crises in both countries require additional resources and support in line with the increased needs in terms of food, protection, WASH, shelter, health care and medical supplies and nutritional items. It is also important to beef up the presence of partners providing basic services in key locations particularly in South Sudan's Jonglei State (Pibor County and beyond) and to further support vital air operations, after initial access constraints have been lifted.

The response to the continued refugee crisis in South Sudan needs further support along the rationalisation process initiated by UNHCR in Maban County as well as the need to increase partner capacity in the new refugee camp Ajuong Thok in Unity State.

In Darfur, increasing unrest and ongoing insecurity has resulted in additional displacements that have joined the recently verified caseload of 1.2 million IDPs living in camps. Permanent or seasonal returns of IDPs are hindered because of prevailing insecurity, which increase the dependency of these populations on humanitarian assistance.

It is important to support now early pre-positioning for humanitarian operations, including for nutrition and food items, ahead of the next rainy season (starting around April) to ensure a timely and cost-effective response in both countries.

To address these new and unforeseen needs, EUR 8,000,000 have been added to the "Humanitarian Aid" budget line of this HIP and EUR 3,000,000 to the "Food Assistance" budget line. A third assessment round has been opened (see revised section 5.3).

This is the third modification of the 2013 HIP for Sudan and South Sudan.

1. CONTEXT

Since the Republic of South Sudan became independent on 9 July 2011 the HIP has become regional covering both Sudan and South Sudan. A number of outstanding issues from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 which marked the end of the North-South civil war (border demarcation, citizenship rights and uncompleted deals on oil sharing revenues) remained unresolved and contributed to the eruption of violence in border areas in 2012.

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1 Description of the context at the time of the publication of the first version of this HIP in January 2013.
Although there are now two independent countries, there are several humanitarian issues linking both countries. The humanitarian situation in the region is multi-faceted.

In Darfur nine years into the conflict there is still no comprehensive political settlement despite the peace negotiations. The main armed opposition movements and several other splinter factions remain outside the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) process. A couple of the larger armed opposition groups – the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) – formed the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) in alliance with armed opposition movements in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. SRF forces have clashed with the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) both in Darfur and along the Sudan / South Sudan border areas since the beginning of 2012. Tribal clashes have also caused population displacement. Darfur remains a protection crisis characterized by large scale displacements, ongoing insecurity and localized conflicts between SAF, rebel groups and tribes. The continuous restrictions on humanitarian agencies and pressure to move from humanitarian assistance to recovery and development present a risk that the urgent humanitarian and protection related needs will slide into a forgotten crisis situation.

In the Transitional areas, situated along the border between Sudan and South Sudan, the conflicts that broke out in 2011 (the Abyei military occupation by Sudanese Armed Forces started in May 2011 – South Kordofan conflict started 6 June 2011 – Blue Nile conflict started 1 September 2011) remain unresolved. In South Kordofan (SK) and Blue Nile (BN) continuous fighting has displaced a large number of people. Following escalating tensions between Sudan and South Sudan, full-blown conflict erupted in March along the border areas of SK. Since then, relations have remained extremely tense between the two nations, although negotiations resumed in Addis Ababa in June. The lack of access and first hand information makes it impossible to know the extent and severity of what is happening on the ground. Estimates (August 2012) are of 665,000 people affected, including local communities and IDPs. In addition, 205,000 refugees have fled to South Sudan and to Ethiopia seeking protection and humanitarian assistance. In South Sudan, these refugees are concentrating in Unity state (62,000 SK refugees in August 2012) and Upper Nile state (106,000 BN refugees in August 2012). In both locations child mortality is double the emergency levels, due to diarrheic related problems, while provision of safe water remains a major challenge; delivery of food and NFIs are seriously hampered by lack of roads, flood prone environment, poor airstrips and fuel shortages. In Unity, the Yida camp presents additional challenges with regard to protection: proximity of the Sudan border exposes refugees to various threats; there are also concerns of aid diversion to warring parties and militarisation of the camp. It is unlikely that these refugees will return in 2013 and their numbers may well increase if the situation in SK/BN does not improve. Access for humanitarian actors remains a significant challenge in SK/BN, where it ranges from very limited in areas under GoS control to non-existent in areas under SPLM-N control. An agreement on humanitarian access has been in negotiation since February, through the agency of the African Union, the League of Arab States and the UN, culminating on 3 August with the signature of two bilateral MoUs. Negotiations on the implementation and technical details of these are still on-going. To this date, still no humanitarian aid has been provided from Sudan for areas under SPLM-N control.

In Abyei, the political and security situation remains tense given the stalemate in discussions on the final status of the region and the Abyei Area Administration has still not been

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2 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
3 Non Food Items (NFIs)
4 Government of Sudan (GoS)
5 Sudan People's Liberation Movement – North (SPLM-N)
established. Most of the 109,000 people who fled Abyei in 2011 remain displaced, as only 9,000 have returned to the Abyei area during the first half of 2012. However, there are some positive developments: by mid-2012 both countries withdrew their military forces and UNISFA (United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei) established a mission in the area.

The political and security situation in Eastern Sudan remains relatively peaceful. However, there are concerns that humanitarian indicators could be just as bad as in Darfur. While recognising that development activities are the priority in the East, humanitarian organisations try to implement projects linking relief to development. The East also has the largest concentration of refugees in Sudan and hosts a mixed situation with both protracted displacement (some for almost 40 years) and new caseloads. Approximately 86,000 refugees are registered by UNHCR\(^6\), mostly from the Horn of Africa. Most new arrivals are young men, and the GoS is reluctant to consider their request for asylum, as they consider them economic migrants. Human trafficking is a risk. Unfortunately access for humanitarian organisations was further restricted in 2012, with seven INGOs instructed to cease direct implementation of eight projects and to close their offices in the area. The seven INGOs were running programmes serving more than 600,000 people across a range of sectors, often in collaboration with, or in support of Government ministries.

Uncertainty remains for the estimated 500,000 people of South Sudanese origin still living in Sudan after the end of the transition period, on 8 April 2012. UNHCR and the Government of Sudan registered 109,000 people around Khartoum, who wish to return to South Sudan but lack the means to do so. The majority of these people live precariously in open spaces. The return process has diminished compared to previous years, but still 116,000 people have returned to South Sudan between January and August 2012. Depending on the agreements between the two governments and on fears of direct threat, there is potential for new large scale movement in 2013. Most are likely to be in need of humanitarian assistance, especially during the process of repatriation and for their immediate integration.

South Sudan became the newest country in the world on 9 July 2011, but started with problems that have led to significant humanitarian needs. South Sudan’s independence follows two decades of war that left the country as one of the most underdeveloped in the world, despite the fact that it's GDP per capita is relatively high, at 1.546 USD per person.

Although independence has created a number of development opportunities, the nation still faces significant challenges. Chronic lack of development and basic infrastructure in most of the country render its population extremely vulnerable to both natural and man-made disasters. Fighting over grazing land or access to water is common and poor harvests in 2011 further aggravated the situation. In 2011/2012, internal conflicts led to 200,000 people being in need of humanitarian assistance.

South Sudan is chronically food insecure. Annual Needs and Livelihood Analysis (ANLA) for 2011/2012 suggests that there might be as many as 4.7 million food insecure people in the country (i.e. over half of the population). Chronic food insecurity exacerbates any crisis and humanitarian needs. Although rainfall this year appears to be adequate, the country will remain largely food insecure in 2013. The nutritional situation is worrying, in particular in the areas bordering Sudan and in Jonglei State, where GAM\(^7\) has reached 32%.

The country is an oil producer; oil was being exported through Port Sudan (in Sudan), where it reached through a pipeline that crosses the territory of Sudan. Both countries widely disagreed in relation to the transit fees and in January 2012 Sudan seized several oil shipments to, in their logic, compensate for dues not paid by South Sudan. After negotiations failed,

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\(^6\) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

\(^7\) Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM)
South Sudan decided to stop oil production, although it represented 98% of its fiscal basis. This decision considerably stifled the country's development perspectives – and opportunities for transition from humanitarian to development cooperation – and economic outlook, pushing families further into poverty, increasing the numbers of those dependant on food assistance and perpetuating the general vulnerability.

Responding to humanitarian emergencies in South Sudan is complicated by: swamps, minefields, corruption and red tape, insecurity and lack of roads, airstrips, telecommunications infrastructure and a reliable supply chain of virtually all goods. 2013 is not likely to see any substantial improvement in this regard, and delivery of assistance will continue to be expensive and difficult.

2. HUMANITARIAN NEEDS

In Darfur, over 3.55 million people continue to require humanitarian assistance, including 3.2 million who receive some form of food aid. This includes the 1.7 million IDPs living in camps, the 80,000 newly displaced by violence in the first half of 2012, the 40,000 refugees from Chad, and residents and nomads. Access constraints linked to conflict, insecurity and administrative impediments have reduced the presence of humanitarian actors on the ground, preventing much-needed comprehensive assessment of humanitarian needs and in-depth analysis of the impact of humanitarian operations. While the situation of most long-term IDPs can be considered as relatively stable, insecurity and displacement continue to affect access to livelihood opportunities. Access to markets, self-sufficiency and coping mechanisms are eroded and cause aid dependence for food, health, nutrition, NFI, water and sanitation. Some refugees and IDPs are returning to their homes (37,444 IDPs and 1,145 refugees in the first quarter of 2012, all in North and West Darfur, 146,000 IDPs and 36,000 refugees since January 2011). However, they face significant challenges including a lack of basic services and livelihood opportunities, food insecurity and issues relating to land tenure and security. These are the consequence of historically low levels of government investment in and service to these areas and threaten the overall sustainability of returns.

Overall, an estimated 520,000 people have been displaced or severely affected by conflict in South Kordofan and 145,000 in Blue Nile. In addition, the UNHCR reports that 205,000 Sudanese refugees are now in South Sudan and Ethiopia (June 2012). South Kordofan was also affected by fighting between Sudan and South Sudan in the oil-producing area of Higlig, in late March 2012. In South Sudan, refugees from SK and BN arrive in Unity and Upper Nile states (62,000 and 106,000 respectively, as of August 2012). All are fully dependent on humanitarian aid, but it has been a challenge to provide adequate services. Delivery of food and NFIs is seriously hampered by lack of roads, flood prone environment, poor airstrips and fuel shortages. Child mortality is double the emergency levels, due to diarrhoea-related problems and provision of safe water remains a major challenge. As refugees are likely to remain displaced for a long time and there might be a further influx, it is crucial to have a long term strategy. The present camps location does not allow a sustainable response to the people's needs. The Yida camp (Unity state) presents additional challenges with regards to protection: proximity of the Sudan border exposes refugees to various threats and there are also concerns of aid diversion to warring parties; militarisation in the camp and forcible dissuasion of residents from moving out are serious protection issues.

Humanitarian access in South Kordofan and Blue Nile is very restricted. Agencies continue to support humanitarian operations but mostly through national staff and only in areas under

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8 Description of the humanitarian needs at the time of the publication of the first version of this HIP in January 2013.
GoS control; in Blue Nile movements outside the state capital are severely restricted also for national staff. The tripartite initiative (UN, AU, LAS) has been the main hope for negotiating humanitarian access for assistance from Sudan into SPLM-N areas, but despite some encouraging signs the GoS has not yet authorised any assistance into these areas. DG ECHO\(^9\) has been advocating for principled and meaningful access to all the victims of the conflict, implemented directly by international humanitarian agencies, using both national and international staff for needs assessments and monitoring. The same conditions should apply in areas under GoS control, where so far only limited assistance has been allowed and with serious constraints (no international staff for NGOs, strict travel restrictions for UN staff, no free movement for needs assessments). The tensions are so high that there is a risk that the situation will remain stalled in 2013.

**In Abyei**, most of the 109,000 persons that fled to Agok and South Sudan remain displaced. The returns have so far been limited (7,500 people returned to the outlying villages south of Abyei town, while around 1,500 people have returned to Abyei town) due to the risk of landmines and unexploded ordinance (UXO), food insecurity and lack of livelihood opportunities. However, there is an opportunity for large scale returns if the political process moves forward, in which case humanitarian activities to consolidate the return and address the needs of both Misseriya and Dinka communities will be crucial. An attentive do-no-harm approach must be followed, to avoid re-opening issues between these communities that could derail the return process.

The deadline for **people of South Sudanese origin** remaining in Sudan (estimated 500,000) to regularize their status ended on 8 April 2012, amid considerable uncertainty. There are growing concerns over protection issues and vulnerability; 16,000 southerners in the Khartoum “departure points” are considered among the most vulnerable. In 2013, their vulnerability is likely to increase. Deterioration in bilateral relations could result in expulsions of large groups of Southerners, who would need emergency assistance, including for their immediate integration.

**In the Eastern states** of Sudan the available information on humanitarian needs is very limited due to restricted access for INGOs, made worse by the closing down of eight projects in June 2012. The East suffers from chronic underdevelopment and neglect, and the necessary response should mainly be provided by development actors. There is the risk that a humanitarian emergency (most likely related to nutrition) may occur in 2013, but without proper access for needs assessments and response it would be challenging for humanitarian agencies to provide a timely response.

**Militia activities** remain a reality in South Sudan and conflicts between militias and Government troops are often brutal, creating massive displacements and fuelling humanitarian needs. Close to 35,000 persons (Aug 2012) are displaced in Unity State, mostly because of militia activities; they are often left with nothing, as their houses have been torched, crops looted and destroyed. Protection issues such as SGBV\(^10\) and child recruitment to militias are also common. Emergency distributions of food and NFI are essential, but access is hampered by landmines, poor roads and floods.

**Inter-tribal** conflicts have displaced 115,000 people in the first six months of 2012. In recent times these have been particularly brutal and large in Jonglei state, fuelled by scarce resources and animosity between tribes. Most victims need multi-sector emergency assistance for shelter, food, water and medical (including psychological) care.

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\(^9\) Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO)

\(^10\) Sexual Gender Based Violence (SGBV)
Due to a critical lack of infrastructure and chronic underdevelopment, natural disasters such as floods affect annually large numbers of people. In Jonglei state alone, around 30,000 people were in need of humanitarian assistance due to floods in 2012.

The challenges facing South Sudan are immense and there is little likelihood that the situation will improve dramatically in 2013. The GoSS\textsuperscript{11} has imposed severe austerity budgetary measures, following the oil production shut-down and the large scale donor-backed development programmes, expected after independence, have not yet kicked in.

3. HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE\textsuperscript{12}

1) National / local response and involvement

In both countries, humanitarian operations are still largely substituting for government responsibilities: line ministries remain weak because of lack of funding, capacity, or willingness to intervene. There is a crucial need for Khartoum and Juba to increase their budget transfers to line ministries and to the peripheral areas. In Sudan, the Government does provide some support, in the form of food and NFIs, for some areas where humanitarian agencies are not allowed.

2) International Humanitarian Response

The 2012 Humanitarian Working Plan for Sudan (mid-year review) stands at 1.05 billion USD. By August, 458 million USD had been received, constituting around 46\% of the appeal.

The 2012 Consolidated Appeal for South Sudan stands at 1.2 billion USD. By August, 577 million USD had been received, just below 50\% of the appeal.

3) Constraints and DG ECHO response capacity

Humanitarian presence in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile and to a certain extent the East is seriously undermined by insecurity and restrictions imposed by the authorities. Rebel controlled areas are often totally inaccessible. It is a daunting task to assess needs and deliver aid in an impartial manner, when hampered by obstructive procedures and a directive requiring all humanitarian aid to be channelled through local partners. Developments in 2012 (closure of projects in the East, very restricted or non-existent access for UN and NGOs in SK and BN, increasing administrative hurdles for visas and travel permits in Darfur) suggest that access constraints will not improve in 2013. Consequently, there is an extremely reduced capacity to deliver a timely response to emerging needs, to target the most vulnerable and to address protection needs. In Darfur, serious security concerns add to the administrative obstacles and, given the uncertainty of the political and security situation (the main armed groups are not signatories to the DDPD, inter-tribal clashes, militias out of control), it is unlikely that the situation on the ground will improve in 2013. The risk of temporary or definitive suspension of activities remains high. Incidents targeting humanitarian workers are occurring with disturbing frequency and are contributing to reducing humanitarian space. The staff of the African Union United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) has also been targeted, further undermining its capacity to fulfil its dual mandate of protection of the civilian populations and provision of security for the humanitarian community.

In Abyei access is a major issue: given the uncertainty over the jurisdiction of the territory, should assistance be channelled from Sudan or South Sudan? Despite persistent efforts by the humanitarian community in Sudan, access from the North is not yet possible. Currently, the

\textsuperscript{11} Government of South Sudan (GoSS)

\textsuperscript{12} Description of the humanitarian responses at the time of the publication of the first version of this HIP in January 2013.
bulk of assistance to Abyei town and to the areas south of the Bahr El Arab/Kiir river is channelled through South Sudan - with organisations running the risk of being accused by Sudan of entering its territory illegally, as long as the final status of Abyei is not decided.

In South Sudan administrative impediments (difficulties in obtaining visas and work permits, unclear tax regulations, imposition of fines) are also impacting negatively on the quality of operations. Insecurity is increasing and incidents (landmines, actions against humanitarian operations) are likely to continue and to affect operations. Assistance will remain particularly difficult and expensive due to logistical constraints (roads and airfield unusable during rainy season) and even more so if the border between Sudan and South Sudan remains closed.

In both countries, but particularly in South Sudan, the humanitarian community is overstretched and faces rapid turnover and scarcity of staff.

With permanent offices in Khartoum and Juba, DG ECHO will continue to closely follow each humanitarian situation, playing an active role in coordination, sharing information on humanitarian issues and promoting timely transition strategies. As the humanitarian situation in both countries is closely intertwined, the DG ECHO setup in Sudan and South Sudan remains integrated.

The outcome of DG ECHO-funded operations will largely depend on partners' capacity to manage the physical and financial risks, while abiding by core humanitarian principles, and ensuring acceptable standards of direct delivery, accountability, monitoring and impact evaluation. Actions that, from the outset, are not likely to be possible to monitor in an independent and effective way will not be accepted.

4) Envisaged DG ECHO response and expected results of humanitarian aid interventions

DG ECHO strategy for Sudan and South Sudan in 2013 remains comprehensive but flexible, given all the ongoing emergencies and uncertainties. Preparedness of the humanitarian community for different scenarios, with a capacity to quickly adapt strategies, is essential for the delivery of appropriate assistance.

DG ECHO will remain active on the advocacy front, in both countries focusing on safe and meaningful access and respect of humanitarian principles. All channels will be used, including through non-traditional donors. This engagement will be particularly important for the Transitional Areas and Darfur, where access to populations affected by conflict is a major concern.

Sectors of intervention:

Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) and strengthening communities' resilience to natural and man-made disasters will remain at the core of DG ECHO's strategy: epidemiological surveillance and the EP&R architecture in South Sudan will continue to be supported; efforts in Darfur to maintain a response capacity despite prevailing constraints will be maintained. Early prepositioning of humanitarian commodities is essential to allow a timely response to emergencies in terms of food, NFI/shelter, nutrition, medical kits, seeds and tools, while closely monitoring targeting and rationalizing distributions.

Food assistance is expected to remain one of the major sectors of intervention. In Darfur, the aim will be to further improve the targeting of food distributions. Emphasis will be given to the on-going re-verification of beneficiaries, promotion of alternative approaches such as cash and vouchers, access to adequate nutritious food, improving the analysis of livelihoods and the integration of this analysis into operational decision-making. This should ensure that any reduction in food assistance is based on a clear understanding of people's vulnerabilities and coping capacities. In South Sudan and in the Transitional Areas, there will be a focus on responding to new displacements and to severe, transitory food insecurity.
A focus on protection will be particularly pertinent for all types of displaced populations (IDPs, returnees and refugees) in both countries. All population movements accompanied by humanitarian actors must be voluntary, safe and sustainable.

Support to basic services will be adapted to contexts and constraints. DG ECHO worries that, in Sudan, the scope for principled and meaningful access for humanitarian agencies has already been severely eroded and is unlikely to improve. Under such conditions the window of opportunity for early recovery activities becomes narrow and risky. Therefore, the focus of DG ECHO's intervention will concentrate on offering basic services to the populations most affected by crises, while early recovery activities will only be supported when access is meaningful and the activities are likely to lead to tangible, lasting improvements.

- In Darfur and in the Transitional Areas, where independent access allows it, assistance in rural areas will focus on essential life-saving elements such as delivery of NFIs and provision of basic services: water, hygiene, health and nutrition. In the Darfur camps and urban settings, the classic services for care and maintenance will be rationalised with the aim of improving targeting. When conditions allow for the identification of sustainable solutions on issues such as return and urbanization, these may be pursued.

- In the Eastern states of Sudan DG ECHO will consider activities that target emergency needs, are clearly assessed and can be directly implemented by our partners.

- In Abyei DG ECHO will support humanitarian assistance to displaced and returning populations in the most cost-efficient and direct manner, while upholding the do-no-harm principle. DG ECHO's assistance shall not be used as a pull factor, but will follow people and contribute to promoting good relations between different tribal communities.

- In South Sudan priority will be given to areas where there are high caseloads of IDPs, refugees and returnees, recurrence of conflicts, flooding or epidemics, high levels of malnutrition and lesser involvement of other donors. In the areas considered as most critical, an integrated approach with provision of health and nutrition services, water, sanitation and food security, will be encouraged. When conditions allow, the ground will be laid for a mid-term objective of reducing acute malnutrition through a multi-sector intervention. For basic services delivered in non-emergency settings, efforts will continue to be made to hand over projects to development donors. Where possible, DG ECHO will consider components such as capacity-building, training of professionals, empowerment of local population and coordination with line ministries.

Coordination and common services, supporting partners in maintaining a safe and impartial approach is another sector where DG ECHO intends to intervene, to cover critical functions such as coordination mechanisms, air transport, security assessments and training, as well as reinforcement of the security set up, humanitarian demining and rehabilitation of essential infrastructure to allow humanitarian access. Assessments and surveys, aiming at gaining a better understanding of the context and changing needs, will be encouraged.

4. LRRD, COORDINATION AND TRANSITION

Given the challenges that Sudan faced in 2012, the country's fragile economic situation, the absence of significant public development investments and consequent deterioration of basic services, and the levels of uncertainty linked to the situations in Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei, it is much too early to identify any exit scenario. However, as soon as

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State-of-play at the time of the publication of the first version of this HIP in January 2013.
conditions allow, transition strategies will be identified in close coordination with other Commission services, EU partners, other donors and, where possible, local authorities.

**South Sudan** will remain a major humanitarian setting for the foreseeable future; there will be a long period during which both humanitarian and development instruments will be needed and DG ECHO will remain engaged in discussing and preparing the transition. The EU-MS joint programming exercise, in particular the sectors of health, food assistance/livelihoods and water, offers an opportunity to gradually transfer humanitarian operations implemented in non-emergency settings to development instruments. However, the process is still in its early stage and a shift from humanitarian to development assistance is not expected to occur in 2013. Oil production has not resumed and until that happens severe austerity measures will remain in place, hindering development plans. Considering the low social indicators, the target in LRRD is to ensure that development cooperation actors remain engaged and fund basic services so that humanitarian funding can focus on emergency response.

### 5. OPERATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DETAILS

The provisions of the financing decision ECHO/WWD/BUD/2013/01000 and the general conditions of the Partnership Agreement with the European Commission shall take precedence over the provisions in this document.

#### 5.1 Contacts

Operational Unit in charge: ECHO/B2 – Central Africa, Sudan and South Sudan

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**Contacts in the field**

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5.2 Financial information

Indicative Allocation: EUR 97 million


5.3 Proposal Assessment

Assessment round 1

a) Description of the humanitarian aid interventions relating to this assessment round: all interventions identified in section 3.4 of this HIP.

b) Indicative amount to be allocated in this round of proposals: up to EUR 80 million.

c) Costs will be eligible from 01/01/201315.

d) The expected initial duration for the Action is up to 12 months.

e) Potential partners: All DG ECHO Partners.

f) Information to be provided: Letter of intent16 based on the Single form format and including at least: area of intervention, sector(s), duration, beneficiaries, context/needs assessment, proposed response presented in the form of a logical framework (results, activities), estimated costs, amount of requested contribution, contact details.

g) Indicative date for receipt of the above requested information: by 30/11/2012.17

h) Commonly used principles will be applied for the assessment of proposals, such as quality of needs assessment, knowledge of the country/region, relevance and quality of the intervention logic, notably in relation to the HIP and to DG ECHO operational recommendations. Particular attention will be paid to the quality of management, security and monitoring plan.

Assessment round 2

a) Description of the humanitarian aid interventions relating to this assessment round: Interested partners are invited to submit single forms or modification requests for all response to the needs arising from the change of context, as described in this revised HIP (sections 0, 1 and 2), and in the sectors of interventions identified in section 3.4 of this HIP. While a certain priority will be given to expand ongoing operations, attention will also be given to new operations and/or partners where emergency needs warrant.

15 The eligibility date of the Action is not linked to the date of receipt of the Single Form. It is either the eligibility date set in the Single form or the eligibility date of the HIP, whatever occurs latest.

16 In case letters of intent are requested an initial analysis will be done on the basis of the information received, Single Forms and other sources, such as humanitarian programmes and appeals (CAPs or CHAPs). For the retained letters of intent, partners will be requested to submit a Single Form, which will be the subject of a more detailed assessment. Only accepted Single Forms can lead to the signature of an agreement.

17 The Commission reserves the right to consider letters of intent transmitted after this date, especially in case certain needs / priorities are not covered by the received letters of intent.
b) Indicative amount to be allocated in this round of proposals: up to EUR 6 million (EUR 6 million from the humanitarian aid budget line).

c) Costs will be eligible from 01/01/2013.\(^\text{18}\)

d) The expected initial duration for the Actions: up to 12 months.

e) Potential partners: All DG ECHO Partners.

f) Information to be provided: Single forms for new operations or modification requests for ongoing operations including at least updated context/needs assessment, location, duration, beneficiaries, log-frame and costs.

g) Indicative date for receipt of the above requested information: from 15/06/2013 onwards.

h) Commonly used principles will be applied for the assessment of proposals, such as quality of needs assessment, knowledge of the country/region, relevance and quality of the intervention logic, notably in relation to the HIP and to DG ECHO operational recommendations for Sudan. For areas with access difficulties, particular attention will be paid to the quality of management, security and monitoring plan.

Assessment round 3

a) Description of the humanitarian aid interventions relating to this assessment round: Interested partners are invited to submit single forms or modification requests for all response to the needs arising from the change of context, as described in this revised HIP (section 0/III), and in the sectors of interventions identified in section 3.4 of this HIP. Priority will have to be given to expand ongoing operations but attention will also be given to new operations and/or partners where emergency needs warrant.

b) Indicative amount to be allocated in this round of proposals: up to EUR 11 million (EUR 8 million from the Humanitarian Aid budget line and EUR 3 million from the Food Assistance budget line).

c) Costs will be eligible from 01/01/2013.\(^\text{19}\)

d) The expected initial duration for the Actions: up to 12 months.

e) Potential partners: All DG ECHO Partners.

f) Information to be provided: Single forms for new operations or modification requests for ongoing operations including at least updated context/needs assessment, location, duration, beneficiaries, log-frame and costs.

g) Indicative date for receipt of the above requested information: from 28/10/2013 onwards.

\(^{18}\) The eligibility date of the Action is not linked to the date of receipt of the Single Form. It is either the eligibility date set in the Single form or the eligibility date of the HIP, whatever occurs latest.

\(^{19}\) The eligibility date of the Action is not linked to the date of receipt of the Single Form. It is either the eligibility date set in the Single form or the eligibility date of the HIP, whatever occurs latest.
h) Commonly used principles will be applied for the assessment of proposals, such as quality of needs assessment, knowledge of the country / region, relevance and quality of the intervention logic, notably in relation to the HIP and to DG ECHO operational recommendations for Sudan and South Sudan. For areas with access difficulties, particular attention will be paid to the quality of management, security and monitoring plan.