
COMBINED EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO SUDDEN-ONSET DISASTERS (2016-2020) AND OF DG ECHO'S PARTNERSHIP WITH THE INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES (IFRC)

FINAL REPORT

VOLUME II - ANNEXES

December 2022



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Framework Contract ECHO/E2/FWC/RC/2021/SI2

Contract No ECHO/ADM/BUD/2021/01201

Contract title: Combined evaluation of the European Union's humanitarian response to sudden-onset disasters (2016-2020) and of DG ECHO's partnership with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)

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Combined Evaluation of the European Union's humanitarian response to sudden-onset disasters (Part A) and of DG ECHO's partnership with the IFRC (Part B), 2016 - 2020

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TERMS OF REFERENCE



EUROPEAN COMMISSION
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR CIVIL PROTECTION AND HUMANITARIAN
AID OPERATIONS – DG ECHO

ANNEX I

Terms of Reference

for the combined evaluation of the European Union's humanitarian response to sudden-onset disasters (2016-2020) and of DG ECHO's partnership with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)

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1. EU HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS

1.1. FRAMEWORK

1. The **legal base** for Humanitarian Aid is provided by [Article 214](#) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and the [Humanitarian Aid Regulation](#) (HAR). The objectives of European Union (EU) humanitarian assistance are outlined there and could – for evaluation purposes – be summarized as follows: From a donor perspective and in coordination with other main humanitarian actors, **to provide the right amount and type of aid, at the right time, and in an appropriate way, to the populations most affected by natural and/or manmade disasters, in order to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity.**
2. The [European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid](#) (the Consensus) – which has been jointly endorsed by the Council, the EU Member States, the European Parliament and the Commission – provides a reference for EU humanitarian aid, and outlines the common objectives, fundamental humanitarian principles and good practices that the European Union as a whole pursues in this domain. The aim is to ensure an effective, high-quality, needs-driven and principled EU response to humanitarian crises. It concerns the whole spectrum of humanitarian action: from preparedness and disaster risk reduction, to immediate emergency response and life-saving aid for vulnerable people in protracted crises, or to situations of transition to recovery and longer-term development. The Consensus has thus played an important role in creating a vision of best practice for principled humanitarian aid by providing an internationally unique, forward-looking and common framework for EU actors. It has set out high-standard commitments and has shaped policy development and humanitarian aid approaches both at the European Union and Member State level. Furthermore, with reference to its overall aim, the Consensus has triggered the development of a number of humanitarian [sectoral policies](#).
3. The humanitarian aid budget is implemented through annual funding decisions adopted by the Commission, which are directly based on Article 15 of the HAR. The World Wide Decisions (WWD) define inter alia the total budget, and budget available for specific objectives, mechanisms of flexibility and for humanitarian operations in each country/region. The funding decision also specifies potential partners, and possible areas of intervention. The operational information about crises and countries for which humanitarian aid should be granted is provided through the General Guidelines on Operational Priorities for Humanitarian Aid and the '[Humanitarian Implementation Plans](#)' (HIPs). They are a reference for humanitarian actions covered by the WWD and contain an overview of humanitarian needs in a specific country or region at a specific moment of time.
4. DG ECHO has more than 200 partner organisations for providing humanitarian assistance throughout the world. [Humanitarian partners](#) include non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international organisations such as ICRC and IFRC and the United Nations agencies and specialised Member States agencies. Having a diverse range of partners is important for DG ECHO because it allows for comprehensive coverage of the ever-expanding needs across the world – and in increasingly complex situations. DG ECHO has developed increasingly close working relationships with its partners at the level of both policy issues and management of humanitarian operations.
5. DG ECHO has a worldwide network of **field offices** that ensure adequate monitoring of projects funded, provide up-to-date analyses of existing and forecasted needs in a given country or region, contribute to the development of intervention strategies and policy

development, provide technical support to EU-funded humanitarian operations, and facilitate donor coordination at field level.

6. DG ECHO has developed a two-phase framework for assessing and **analysing needs** in specific countries and crises. The first phase of the framework provides the evidence base for prioritisation of needs, funding allocation, and development of the HIPs.

The first phase is a global evaluation with two dimensions:

- Index for Risk Management (INFORM) is a tool based on national indicators and data which allows for a comparative analysis of countries to identify their level of risk to humanitarian crisis and disaster. It includes three dimensions of risk: natural and man-made hazards exposure, population vulnerability and national coping capacity. The INFORM data are also used for calculating a Crisis Index that identifies countries suffering from a natural disaster and/or conflict and/or hosting a large number of uprooted people.
- The Forgotten Crisis Assessment (FCA) identifies serious humanitarian crisis situations where the affected populations do not receive enough international aid or even none at all. These crises are characterised by low media coverage, a lack of donor interest (as measured through aid per capita) and a weak political commitment to solve the crisis, resulting in an insufficient presence of humanitarian actors.

The second phase of the framework focuses on context and response analysis:

- Integrated Analysis Framework (IAF) is an in-depth assessment carried out by European Commission's humanitarian country and regional teams (including experts and desk officers). It consists of a qualitative assessment of humanitarian needs per single crisis or per region, also taking into account the population affected and foreseeable trends.

1.2. SCOPE & RATIONALE

7. The European Union aims at being a **reference humanitarian donor**¹, by ensuring that its interventions are coherent with the **humanitarian principles**², are relevant in targeting the most vulnerable beneficiaries, are duly informed by needs assessments, and promote resilience building to the extent possible. The Commission also takes the role of – when necessary – leading, shaping, and coordinating the response to crises, while respecting the overall coordination role of the UN OCHA.
8. Interventions have a focus on **funding critical sectors and addressing gaps** in the global response, mobilising partners and supporting the overall capacity of the humanitarian system. As a consequence of the principled approach and addressing gaps in overall response, the EU intervenes in **crises**³ where vulnerability of affected people is the highest, i.e. severe, protracted humanitarian crisis situations where affected populations are receiving no or insufficient international aid and where there is little possibility or no political commitment to solve the crisis.. This refers primarily to protracted conflict situations, but can also refer to crises resulting from the cumulative effect of recurring natural disasters, or, a combination of different factors.
9. Actions funded comprise **assistance, relief and protection operations** on a non-discriminatory basis to help people in developing countries, particularly the most vulnerable

¹ I.e. a principled donor, providing leadership and shaping humanitarian response.

² Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality and Independence

³ See also http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/needs-assessments_en

among them, victims of natural disasters, man-made crises, such as wars and outbreaks of fighting, or exceptional situations or circumstances comparable to natural or man-made disasters. The actions should extend the time needed to meet the humanitarian requirements resulting from these different situations.

10. [Health](#) is both a core sector of humanitarian aid interventions and the main reference for measuring overall humanitarian response. With the global trends of climate change and a growing and ageing population, together with the increasing frequency and scale of natural disasters and the persistency of conflicts, humanitarian health needs are continuing to increase. Given the significance of Commission humanitarian health assistance for the health sector in emergencies, and of the sector for Commission humanitarian health assistance, the Commission developed a set of [Guidelines](#) (operational in 2014) to support an improved delivery of affordable health services, based on humanitarian health needs.
11. The poorest people carry the greatest exposure to the consequences of disasters such as **food insecurity and under-nutrition**. Insufficient food production or an inability of vulnerable people to purchase enough nutritious food leads to malnutrition and under-nutrition. Moreover, dramatic interruptions in food consumption heighten risks of morbidity and mortality. Addressing [under-nutrition](#) requires a multi-sector approach and a joint humanitarian and development framework. [Humanitarian food assistance](#) aims to ensure the access to and consumption of sufficient, safe and nutritious food in anticipation of, during, and in the aftermath of a humanitarian crisis. The European Commission is a member of the Food Assistance Convention and commits to provide a minimum of €350 million annually to alleviate food insecurity. The EU has largely exceeded its commitment in 2019 allocating in total €400 million for humanitarian food assistance and nutrition.
12. [Protection](#) is embedded in DG ECHO's mandate as defined by the HAR and confirmed by the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. The purpose of EU-funded protection interventions is to prevent, reduce and respond to the risks and consequences of violence, deprivation and abuse. The Staff Working Document Humanitarian Protection: Improving protection outcomes to reduce risks for people in humanitarian crises, released in May 2016, outlines the definition and objectives of the European Commission's humanitarian protection work. It provides guidance for the programming of protection work in humanitarian crises, for measuring the effect of interventions and for planning related capacity building activities. Besides targeted protection actions protection mainstreaming in all projects, regardless of the sector, is also key. This implies incorporating protection principles and promoting meaningful access, safety and dignity in humanitarian aid.
13. [Education in emergencies](#) is crucial for both the protection and healthy development of girls and boys affected by crises. It can rebuild their lives; restore their sense of normality and safety, and provide them with important life skills. It helps children to be self-sufficient and to have more influence on issues that affect them. It is also one of the best tools to invest in their long-term future, and in the peace, stability and economic growth of their countries. Yet it has traditionally been one of the least funded humanitarian sectors. With the level of funding at 1% of its annual humanitarian budget still in 2015, the European Commission increased this share to 8% in 2018 and reached 10% in 2019, with an unprecedented funding target of 164 million euros. Globally, less than 3% of global humanitarian funding is allocated to education.
14. [Urban areas](#) are complex settings to implement humanitarian assistance and are different from rural areas in terms of needs and vulnerabilities of the affected people. Furthermore, capacities, methods, and preparedness of local actors, institutions, and partners vary considerably between cities. Humanitarian actors, including DG ECHO, have developed an

extensive range of policies, practices, standards and tools for humanitarian work that are often adapted to rural areas, but far less to urban areas. In the past few years a number of studies have been conducted to explore the drivers of urbanization and its consequences and implications to humanitarian aid. Some of these studies have formulated suggestions on how international humanitarian aid can best engage with the changing settlement patterns.

15. [Humanitarian air services](#) (including ECHO Flights) provide a lifeline for millions of people who are caught up in humanitarian emergencies. When a crisis hits, guaranteeing fast and safe access to the field is vital to save lives. In contexts where there are no reliable roads, ports or other infrastructure, access to crises by land or water becomes difficult, if not impossible. Humanitarian air services are often the only way to get access to remote places and reach people in need. In addition to transporting humanitarian supplies and workers, humanitarian air services also carry out medical and security evacuations.
16. Strengthening the **gender** approach within the EU humanitarian aid is a commitment made in the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, which highlights the need to integrate gender considerations, to promote the active participation of women in humanitarian aid and to incorporate protection strategies against sexual and gender-based violence. A [Commission Staff Working document](#) has been established to address this issue.
17. The [cash-based assistance](#) approach (See [DG ECHO Thematic Policy document no 3](#)) ensures humanitarian aid reaches directly those with the greatest need in a timely manner. DG ECHO uses cash and vouchers and other alternative forms of humanitarian assistance only after thoroughly evaluating all options. It recognises that cash and voucher programmes have to be cautiously planned in order to prevent unintended inflation, depression or social imbalances in local markets while reaching the most vulnerable groups (women, children and the elderly). In March 2015, the EU developed [10 common principles for multi-purpose cash-based assistance](#) to guide donors and humanitarian partners on how best to work with multi-purpose assistance. The principles introduce the notion of a humanitarian response across sectors to address basic needs, with dignity, flexibility and choice for the beneficiaries. They stress efficiency and effectiveness while acknowledging that solutions are context-specific, and recall the need to uphold the humanitarian principles. The principles received political endorsement through the resulting Council Conclusions adopted in June 2015. Donors and partners are encouraged to take the principles into account when designing and implementing their responses to humanitarian crises. Cash-based assistance has played an increasing role in multi-sectoral response over the past few years.
18. Each year millions of people are forced to leave their homes and seek refuge from conflicts, violence, human rights violations, persecution or natural disasters. The number of [forcibly displaced persons](#) (refugees, asylum-seekers and internally displaced persons) has continued to rise in 2017, calling for increased humanitarian assistance worldwide. The majority of today's refugees live in the developing world, which means that they flee to countries already struggling with poverty and hardship. In April 2016, the European Commission adopted a new [approach](#) to forced displacement, aimed at harnessing and strengthening the resilience and self-reliance of both the forcibly displaced and their host communities. The new approach stipulates that political, economic, development and humanitarian actors should engage from the outset of a displacement crisis, and work with third countries towards the gradual socio-economic inclusion of the forcibly displaced. The objective is to make people's lives more dignified during displacement; and ultimately, to end forced displacement.

19. The EU attaches great importance to the link between humanitarian aid, as a rapid response measure in crisis situations, and more medium and long-term development action. The **humanitarian-development-peace Nexus** is complex and requires increased coordination – leading to joint humanitarian-development-peace approaches and collaborative implementation, monitoring and progress tracking. In order to address crisis situations, humanitarian, development and peace actors need to work from the early stage of a crisis – or, in case of slow onset events, before a crisis occurs. The common humanitarian-development-peace agenda has long been referred to as [Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development \(LRRD\)](#). The need to further invest in this approach was reaffirmed in the [Agenda for Change](#) in 2011 and reinforced by the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit. The [Council Conclusions on Operationalising the Humanitarian-Development Nexus of 19 May 2017](#) welcomed cooperation between EU humanitarian and development actors, including in the [framework of the EU approach to forced displacement and development](#). The Council encourages the Commission and the Member States to take forward humanitarian and development work in a number of pilot countries, starting with joint analysis and leading, where possible, to joint planning and programming of humanitarian and development partners. The response should address not only the humanitarian needs in a country (deriving from an environmental crisis (prolonged drought), a natural disaster or a conflict) but also the improvement of resilience with a view to better managing different types of risks. In a number of countries Joint Humanitarian and Development Frameworks (JHDF) have been developed as a basis for humanitarian and development planning and programming.

2. CONTEXT OF THE EVALUATION

This is a combined evaluation, consisting of the following two separate parts:

- Part A: will focus on **DG ECHO's Humanitarian response to sudden-onset disasters** ;
- Part B: will focus on DG ECHO's **Partnership with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies** globally.

2.1. DG ECHO'S HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO SUDDEN-ONSET DISASTERS

The IFRC defines the concept of disaster as a “sudden, calamitous event that seriously disrupts the functioning of a community or society and causes human, material, and economic or environmental losses that exceed the community’s or society’s ability to cope using its own resources. Though often caused by nature, disasters can have human origins”. A sudden-onset disaster is one triggered by a hazardous event that emerges therefore quickly or unexpectedly. Sudden-onset disasters can be associated with, e.g., earthquake, volcanic eruption, flash flood, chemical explosion, or a critical infrastructure failure.

Over the past five years DG ECHO has provided rapid technical assistance and funding to many unexpected emergencies. In 2016, the El Niño phenomenon occurred – one of the worst on record – and was set as a key priority to which the Commission allocated EUR 298 million in emergency humanitarian assistance. Also in 2016, the Commission supported the victims of tropical cyclone Winston in Fiji, and helped people affected by the earthquake in Ecuador, both through humanitarian and civil protection assistance.

The following year, the Commission again responded to numerous natural disasters around the world. In September 2017 for instance, for the response to hurricanes IRMA and MARIA in the Caribbean, the Commission allocated EUR 2.9 million to the most affected populations in eight severely affected countries (Cuba, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Saint Kitts and Nevis, St Maarten, and Turks and Caicos), in addition to the production of satellite maps, consular support and evacuation of EU citizens, transportation and delivery of in-kind assistance and provision of emergency response expertise.

In 2018, EUR 8.65 million were provided to respond to severe floods in Kenya, Ethiopia and Nigeria, earthquakes and a tsunami in Indonesia, and the effects of a tropical cyclone in the Philippines. Funding for responses to smaller disasters of a total of EUR 2.225 million was provided. It covered Tonga (tropical storm), Guatemala (volcano eruption), Laos (dam collapse), Venezuela (floods) or Haiti (earthquake). In 2019, two powerful cyclones hit Southern Africa and affected three million people in Zambia, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mozambique, Zimbabwe Malawi and the Comoros. The Commission responded immediately with humanitarian assistance to the affected countries, including an activation of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism in Mozambique.

Finally, last year, DG ECHO was once again at the forefront of the response in the aftermath of disasters. One of the examples was the response to the massive explosion that occurred in the port of Beirut, and sent an enormous blast wave across the city. DG ECHO also supported humanitarian assistance to people affected by the Taal volcano eruption in the Philippines; the floods that hit Iran and Pakistan; the floods in East, West and Central Africa; the floods and landslides in South and Southeast Asia; tropical cyclone AMPHAN in Bangladesh and India;


typhoon GONI and typhoon VAMCO in the Philippines; hurricanes ETA and IOTA in Central America, or tropical cyclone YASA in Fiji.

DG ECHO's response to sudden-onset disasters takes different forms, funding and tools. From the network of field offices to the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) operated within the DG, there are many structural elements that enable DG ECHO to support a coordinated and quicker response to disasters. Here below are described different components the Evaluator will have to explore and analyse.

2.1.1 THE EMERGENCY TOOLBOX

The Emergency Toolbox is a fund of four instruments designed to provide emergency humanitarian assistance to sudden-onset crises that could not be foreseen in DG ECHO's Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIPs). The fund can be mobilised to respond with first-line funding in the immediate aftermath of a crisis, only outside the EU. The four tools are: Acute Large Emergency Response Tool (ALERT), Epidemics Tool, Small-Scale Tool (SST) and support to IFRC's Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF).

The Emergency Toolbox HIP as such started in 2015 and originally had only 3 components, ALERT was introduced in the 2018 Emergency Toolbox HIP.



▪ Acute Large Emergency Response Tool (ALERT)

The Acute Large Emergency Response tool (ALERT) is the latest addition to the Emergency toolbox. Before its creation, emergency funding was channelled through a primary emergency financing decision designed to cover the first immediate needs of the people concerned in the hours and days after the outbreak of a new humanitarian crisis. In the same spirit ALERT is a first initial response which does not aim to cover all the needs. It facilitates appropriate support to populations affected by large-scale disasters. In particular, it targets emergency responses where the regional, national or sub-national response is broadly insufficient and where there are dire humanitarian needs. The guiding principle of ALERT is to ensure that funding is allocated quickly enough to maximise the impact of assistance in the short timescales immediately before a large scale disaster (early action), during a disaster or in the aftermath of a disaster. This tool was created to allow regional / country HIPs funding, in the context of large disasters, to be used for their initial purpose of a structured and planned response – where it otherwise might have been re-oriented from the original strategy to ensure a rapid response.

In the lead-up to, during, or in the aftermath of a large disaster, the potential variables involved may make it difficult to have an accurate picture of the greatest needs. It is recognised that flexible funding facilitates swifter responses to urgent needs. Therefore, in order to ensure a timely response when certain specific details are not yet available, a preliminary analysis of the

scale and effects of a large-scale disaster should be sufficient. This would need to be on the basis of the available information and present an analysis of what needs could be expected given the scenario. In the hours following a large disaster, information from the ground may not be available, but a certain amount of needs could be anticipated based on past experiences (e.g. emergency shelter in the case of earthquakes) and primary information (e.g. via social media). As much as possible, any needs assessment, however preliminary, is done jointly or in coordination with other relevant partners.

The expected areas of intervention include:

- Water and sanitation;
- Food assistance and nutrition;
- Emergency livelihood support;
- Health;
- Non-food items;
- Emergency rehabilitation of schools and other vital infrastructures;
- Shelter;
- Protection;
- Support to emergency communications;
- Transport and Logistics;
- Coordination.

As a reference point, the framework contractors should note that the ALERT instrument was activated in reaction to 16 disasters in 2020: the Taal volcano eruption in the Philippines; the floods that hit Iran and Pakistan; the desert locusts infestation in the Horn of Africa; the floods in East, West and Central Africa; the floods and landslides in South and Southeast Asia; tropical cyclone AMPHAN in Bangladesh and India; typhoon GONI and typhoon VAMCO in the Philippines; hurricanes ETA and IOTA in Central America, tropical cyclone YASA in Fiji; the explosion in Beirut, Lebanon; and to support the EU Humanitarian Air Bridge initiative. Between €750,000 and €4.1 million were allocated to each of these emergency responses.

▪ Epidemics Tool

The Epidemics Tool is focused on rapid response to epidemics, it also includes preparedness and response capacity as effective response is only possible with a good degree of preparedness.

The rapid response component includes: 1) Rapid field assessment during initial phases of outbreaks; 2) Provision of free curative primary and secondary health care (case management); 3) Temporary support to existing health centres and facilities through provision of drugs, vaccines, medical/laboratory equipment and water and sanitation products; 4) Organisation, implementation and supervision of mass vaccination campaigns; 5) Environmental health actions designated to control epidemics; 6) Data analysis during the outbreak and impact of action required; 7) Accompanying training of staff; 8) Transport and logistics, including medical evacuation; 9) Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) by improving WASH facilities, access to safe drinking water and the provision of basic hygiene items.

This sub-component of the Emergency Toolbox will not be part of the scope of this evaluation. A future evaluation focused on health will cover actions funded by the epidemics tool.

▪ Small-Scale Tool (SST)

The Small-scale Tool facilitates appropriate support to populations affected by disasters in terms of emergency response and preparedness where local response is insufficient, for which

a small scale intervention is adequate. It allows a rapid response to those disasters where the number of affected people is low or the unmet needs are not significant enough to prepare a specific HIP. Particular attention is given to mainstreaming disaster risk reduction and disaster preparedness into the response to the extent possible, to reduce vulnerability to future events and increase coping capacity.

Actions should aim, when possible, to strengthen the capacities of local communities and authorities to respond, thus increasing their resilience. The expected areas of intervention include:

- Water and sanitation;
- Food assistance and nutrition;
- Emergency livelihood support;
- Health;
- Non-food items;
- Emergency rehabilitation of schools and other vital infrastructures;
- Shelter;
- Disaster preparedness;
- Protection;
- Support to emergency communications;
- Transport and logistics;
- Coordination.

The Small-Scale Tool can be used for situations where the number of potentially affected people is up to 100 000 individuals, for an amount of up to EUR 500 000. It was used on 14 occasions in 2020, as follows: floods in Madagascar, Chad, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic and Laos; tropical cyclone HAROLD in Vanuatu; tropical storm AMANDA in El Salvador and Guatemala; tropical cyclone GATI in Somalia; hurricane IOTA in Colombia; the food and health emergency that arose in northern Argentina; the forced displacement triggered in Uganda; violence that broke out in South Sudan, the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and to assist vulnerable communities affected by COVID-19 in Colombia and South Africa.

▪ Support to IFRC's Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF)

The Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) was established by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) in 1985 to provide immediate financial support to Red Cross Red Crescent National Societies, enabling them to carry out their unique role as first responders after a disaster. It is a flexible emergency funding source that can provide support rapidly and in appropriate amounts for small, or medium-scale operations⁴. It provides funding to National Societies for pre-agreed early actions through the approval of early action protocols, loans for immediate response to major disasters, grants for the mobilization of resources and preparations for imminent crisis, and for the costs of small-scale relief operations. In 2020, the DREF allocated its highest amount to date: around EUR 30 million to allow National Societies to support more than 4 million people to anticipate and respond to small and medium scale disasters.

DG ECHO has contributed since 2008-2009 to the DREF with funding made available under a specific HIP. Whenever IFRC allocates a financial amount from the DREF to a National Society in a country eligible for EU humanitarian aid, DG ECHO can replenish this allocation. DG ECHO funding to the DREF can be used to replenish the allocations made to individual DREF

⁴ For further information regarding the DREF and the countries with DREF operations, an online dashboard can be consulted on the IFRC website <https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/dref/>

operations in full or in part, with a maximum amount of EUR 200 000 per operation and a minimum of 50% of the DREF operation, unless otherwise explicitly agreed upon by DG ECHO. However, it is worth noting that a DREF response is not dependent on funding by DG ECHO or any other donor – the response starts as soon as the DREF bulletin has been published.

| | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
|---------------------------------------|------|------|-------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| Funding | 3M | 3M | 3.9 M | 4,538,111 | 5.4M |
| Number of operations supported | 32 | 27 | 39 | 38 in 2019 and 5 in 2020 | 47 in 2020 and 7 in 2021 |

In accordance with the Financing decision, the following are eligible for EU funding:

- Funding for small-scale emergencies, for which no international appeal is likely to be launched.
- Funding for disaster response preparedness activities for imminent crisis that could not be planned in advance.
- Funding for the trigger based early action component of the Early Action Protocols funded by the Forecast based Action Fund.

The funds can be used for humanitarian needs, training of Red Cross/Red Crescent volunteers, deployment of response teams, search and rescue, evacuation and needs assessment. It could also cover disaster preparedness needs including but not limited to contingency planning and pre-positioning of relief supplies. And finally, it could also cover costs incurred by the Red Cross/Red Crescent National Society or Federation in relation to relief operations.

▪ Emergency Toolbox funding

DG ECHO has allocated resources to the Emergency Toolbox under the following [Humanitarian Implementation Plans](#) (HIPs):

| | |
|--------------------------------|------------------------|
| ECHO/DRF/BUD/2016/91000 | EUR 11,500,000 |
| ECHO/DRF/BUD/2017/91000 | EUR 8,000,000 |
| ECHO/DRF/BUD/2018/91000 | EUR 21,000,000 |
| ECHO/DRF/BUD/2019/91000 | EUR 27,878,516 |
| ECHO/DRF/BUD/2020/91000 | EUR 73,750,000 |
| Total 2016-2020 | EUR 142,128,516 |

The 2020 HIP saw a high number of modifications and budget increases over the year to adjust to the emerging needs. For instance in February 2020, the Epidemics Tool was strengthened with an additional allocation of EUR 30 million and in May, with EUR 10 million, to support COVID-19 response in third countries. The DREF support instrument and ALERT tool also saw several reinforcements through reallocation between instruments or new funding.

Overall from 2016 to 2020, approximately 168 actions in 62 countries were funded through these different HIPs. The beneficiary countries with five or more actions funded through the ETB HIPs are the following:

| Country | Count of Actions |
|-------------|------------------|
| PHILIPPINES | 11 |
| NIGER | 7 |
| BANGLADESH | 6 |
| GUATEMALA | 6 |
| SOMALIA | 6 |
| DRC | 5 |
| MADAGASCAR | 5 |
| PAKISTAN | 5 |

2.1.2 THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE MECHANISMS

The Emergency Response Mechanisms (ERMs) aim to provide rapid humanitarian assistance to the immediate needs of communities affected by localised emergencies. The ERMs ensure that a network of DG ECHO's partners have sufficient prepositioned resources (trained teams, cash, relief items) to allow a timely and effective response to urgent humanitarian needs. ERMs are country-specific but they offer flexibility about the area of intervention inside the country. For this reason ERM contractual arrangements have proven to be useful in countries where recurrent small-scale shocks can be anticipated even if the exact locations cannot. These shocks can either be conflict-related or natural disasters.

ERMs are more than just a flexible funding instrument, they are designed to improve coordination and harmonize approaches throughout the assessment, response and monitoring phases. The DG ECHO-funded ERMs may be different in the way they are organised as they are linked to specific context and rely on different implementing modalities. To date, ERMs have been active in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Iraq, Ethiopia and South Sudan.

2.1.3 FLEXIBILITY ("CRISIS MODIFIER")

Apart from stand-alone ERM actions, partners can also introduce flexibility ("Crisis Modifiers") to mobilise resources from on-going actions and swiftly respond to any new emerging shocks occurring in geographical contexts where they have capacities to intervene (a crisis within a crisis). The objective of the "Crisis Modifiers" is to timely address immediate, life-saving and essential needs across all sectors as a result of rapid onset disasters. Flexibility measures can be triggered to provide immediate life-saving response in the aftermath of a rapid onset crisis; such responses should be based on multi-risk analysis, and multisector preparedness plans, including, but not limited to prepositioning of stocks. The two main scenarios are: i) to fill the time gap while waiting for additional resources; ii) to respond to small-scale humanitarian needs which would otherwise remain unattended. Thus far, this instrument has been widely used in Africa and the Caribbean, but less so in other regions.

2.2 DG ECHO- IFRC PARTNERSHIP

2.2.1 INTRODUCTION

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) is a global humanitarian organization which coordinates and directs international assistance following natural and man-made disasters in non-conflict situations. The IFRC works with 192 National

Societies and over 13 million volunteers. The IFRC carries out relief operations to assist victims of disasters, and combines this with development work to strengthen the capacities of its member National Societies. The IFRC's work focuses on four core areas: promoting humanitarian values, disaster response, disaster preparedness, and health and community care. The unique network of National Societies - which cover almost every country in the world - is the IFRC's principal strength. Cooperation between National Societies gives the IFRC greater potential to develop capacities and assist those most in need. At a local level, the network enables the IFRC to reach individual communities.

The role of the IFRC secretariat in Geneva is to coordinate and mobilize relief assistance for international emergencies, promote cooperation between National Societies and represent these National Societies in the international field. The role of the IFRC field delegations is to assist and advise National Societies with relief operations and development programmes, and encourage regional cooperation.

The IFRC is a component of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, which includes the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies.

During the period 2016-2019, IFRC's *2020 Strategy* was in place. Enabling actions related to each strategic orientation described in the table below can be found on the [IFRC website](#).

| <u>IFRC Strategic orientations 2010–2019</u> |
|---|
| <p>1. Save lives, protect livelihoods, and strengthen recovery from disasters and crises</p> <p>Expected impacts:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > Effective preparedness capacities for appropriate and timely response to disasters and crises > Reduced deaths, losses, damage and other detrimental consequences of disasters and crises > Improved restoration of community functioning after disasters and crises. |
| <p>2. Enable healthy and safe living</p> <p>Expected impacts:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > Better personal and community health, and more inclusive public health systems > Reduced exposure and vulnerability to natural and human-made hazards > Greater public adoption of environmentally sustainable living. |
| <p>3. Promote social inclusion and a culture of non-violence and peace.</p> <p>Expected impacts:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > Greater public support for the Fundamental Principles and reduced stigma and discrimination > Lower levels of violence and more peaceful reconciliation of social differences > Fuller integration of disadvantaged people into their communities. |

The new IFRC Strategy 2030 “An Agenda for renewal” entered into force in 2020. It focuses on five strategic priorities:

1. Climate and environmental crisis
2. Evolving crisis and disasters
3. Growing gaps in health and wellbeing
4. Migration and Identity
5. Values, power and inclusion.

and **three enabling approaches**, i.e. for the IFRC Secretariat to be:

1. Engaged - with renewed influence, innovative and digitally transformed with greater emphasis on National Society Development;
2. Accountable - with an agile management and a renewed financing model with greater emphasis on National Society Development;
3. Trusted by communities, owned and valued by the membership with greater emphasis on National Society Development.

2.2.2 DG ECHO'S PARTNERSHIP WITH IFRC

The [Framework Partnership Agreement](#) applicable to the period covered by the evaluation was signed by the IFRC and the European Commission in 2014. Within this framework DG ECHO entrusts funds to IFRC in indirect management mode, through the conclusion of Indirect Management Delegation Agreements (IMDA).

Besides and in accordance with the Decision of the European Parliament and the Council on the Union Civil Protection Mechanism no 1313/2013/EU of 17 December 2013, the IFRC can request assistance through the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM). For this purpose, DG ECHO and IFRC signed an Administrative Arrangement in 2019 to ensure an effective joint action and set the framework for the more detailed and dynamic Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), which have been developed jointly.

An initial analysis of DG ECHO's humanitarian project database recorded 58 actions carried out by the IFRC with financial contributions from DG ECHO for a total value of over EUR 992 million globally – figures to be confirmed in the course of the evaluation.

Figure 1 Contract Amount signed by Partner

| Partners | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
|----------|----------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| FICR-CH | EUR 31 683 113 | EUR 13 969 002 | EUR 10 516 111 | EUR 512 816 501 | EUR 412 233 499 |

In 2019 IFRC was selected to become DG ECHO's partner in the implementation of the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) programme funded by the European Union and its Member States under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey. With the amendment signed in 2020, the total amount of DG ECHO contribution to the ESSN programme is EUR 900 million. Although the amounts contracted increased dramatically with this new partnership (see figure above), the number of agreements signed with IFRC remained relatively stable.

Figure 2 Agreements signed by Partner (by consumption year)

| Year | Number of agreements |
|------|----------------------|
| 2016 | 10 |
| 2017 | 11 |
| 2018 | 11 |
| 2019 | 10 |
| 2020 | 9 |

In 2019 and 2020 the European Commission was the largest donor to IFRC. Without including the ESSN programme, the European Commission was the third largest contributor behind the USA and the United Kingdom.

DG ECHO's partnership with IFRC was last evaluated in 2004. The final report can be retrieved on [our website](#).

Red Cross EU Office⁵ Evaluation of DG ECHO Coordination Process

In the second half of 2020, the Red Cross EU office launched an evaluation whose purpose is to assess how the DG ECHO coordination process has affected the Red Cross EU Office's Member's joint approach towards DG ECHO. The evaluation has focused on conducting an analysis to provide National Societies and the IFRC with knowledge and evidence on how they could further develop their partnership with DG ECHO.

At the time the combined evaluation will start, this study will be finalised. Nevertheless, both evaluations are separate exercises with different scopes and objectives. Furthermore, the work commissioned by the Red Cross EU Office is for internal purposes and not meant to be published. When relevant and to avoid duplications, the Red Cross EU office might share some parts of the study upon request.

3 PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

3.1 PURPOSE AND GENERAL SCOPE

Based on Art. 30(4) of the Financial Regulation and Regulation (EC) 1257/96, the purpose of this Request for Services is to have a combined, independent evaluation, covering the period of **2016 – 2020**, of

- Component A: the EU's **DG ECHO's Humanitarian response to sudden-onset disasters** ; and
- Component B: DG ECHO's **partnership** with the **International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies**.

⁵ The Red Cross EU Office is a membership office representing the 27 National Red Cross Societies in the EU, the British Red Cross, the Norwegian Red Cross, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). It helps to coordinate relations between its members and EU decision-makers and stakeholders, sharing their extensive experience and expertise in supporting vulnerable people and communities within and outside the EU.

Component A will **not** cover (i) the epidemics tool and COVID-response actions from the Emergency toolbox, and **not** (ii) Disaster preparedness funded-actions and activities, as these subjects will be addressed by separate evaluations⁶.

For component B of the evaluation, the contractor will not assess actions implemented as part of the COVID-response but the evaluation team will be expected to analyse possible developments in the partnership in the context of the COVID crisis.

The evaluation should provide:

- A retrospective assessment of DG ECHO's range of financial and operational instruments to respond to sudden-onset disasters, as well as the actions funded through these instruments, covering the evaluation criteria of **relevance, coherence, (EU) added value, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability**.
- A retrospective assessment of DG ECHO's partnership with the IFRC globally, with a focus on identifying lessons learned and good practices.

A maximum of **5 prospective, strategic recommendations** to support ECHO's future actions in addressing sudden on-set disasters and a maximum of **3 prospective, strategic recommendations** to support its partnership with the IFRC. These strategic recommendations could possibly be complemented by further, related, operational recommendations.

The main users of the evaluation report include inter alia DG ECHO staff at HQ, regional and country level, national and regional stakeholders, the IFRC and National Societies, other humanitarian and development donors and agencies.

The evaluation should take account of relevant existing evaluations and studies from the European Commission and its partners, such as (non-exhaustive): the Review of Rapid / Emergency Response Mechanisms (ERM), 2017, [DREF reviews, evaluations, lessons learnt](#) and the evaluation of DG ECHO's co-operation with the IFRC and IFRC activities funded by DG ECHO, including the partnership and activities with certain EU Red Cross National Societies, 2004.

3.2 EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The conclusions of the evaluation will be presented in the report in the form of evidence-based, reasoned answers to the evaluation questions presented below. These questions should be further tailored by the Evaluator, and finally agreed with the Steering Group in the inception phase.

Part A: Specific questions focusing on the humanitarian response to sudden-onset disasters

Relevance

1. To what extent were the different instruments and tools timely available and sufficiently flexible to support partners in providing a well-adapted response? *A comparative analysis as well as precise time measurement will be expected from the evaluation team as part of the reply to this EQ. The contractors are also invited to include in their*

⁶ As for DG ECHO's evaluation of the European Union's humanitarian interventions for disaster preparedness (2015-2020) will be conducted in parallel with this one. The two evaluation teams are expected to exploit relevant links between the two parallel evaluations.

judgement criteria specific elements regarding timeliness of the decision-making process and timeliness of the delivery of assistance to beneficiaries.

2. To what extent does the new methodology unifying the small-scale tool and ALERT baseline assessments introduced in 2019 allow a less polarised and more equitable approach to funding? *The Evaluator will be expected to consider potential gaps between estimated numbers of severely affected people by the baseline estimate methodology and real numbers of affected people on-site, and the effects of these gaps on funding decisions.*
3. To what extent did the implementation of actions funded through the different instruments and tools take into account the needs of the most vulnerable population, in particular women, children, elderly and persons with disabilities?

Coherence

4. To what extent were actions part of DG ECHO humanitarian response to sudden-onset disasters aligned with:
 - a. The DG's mandate as provided by the Humanitarian Aid Regulation,
 - b. The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid,
 - c. The humanitarian principles, and
 - d. DG ECHO's relevant thematic/sector policies?
5. To what extent was DG ECHO successful in coordinating its response with the interventions of other donors, including EU Member States, and by that avoiding overlaps and promoting synergies?

EU Added Value

6. What was the EU added value of DG ECHO's humanitarian response to sudden-onset disasters during the evaluation period?

Effectiveness

7. To what extent were DG ECHO's objectives (as defined in the HAR, the Consensus and the specific HIPs) achieved through its response to sudden-onset disasters? Which concrete results were achieved during the evaluation period?
8. At operational level, did the mix of existing instruments and tools enable DG ECHO staff to fund effective interventions?

Efficiency

9. To what extent did DG ECHO achieve cost-effectiveness in its response? What factors affected the cost-effectiveness⁷ of the response and to what extent?

⁷ The methodology applied for responding to this question must be based on the Cost-effectiveness guidance for DG ECHO evaluations, which is to be adapted to and applied proportionally to the current exercise.

10. Was the size of the budget allocated by DG ECHO to the response to sudden onset disasters appropriate and proportionate to what the actions were meant to achieve?

Sustainability/Connectedness

11. To what extent were Emergency Toolbox-funded actions followed by additional Country/Region HIP-funded projects and/or linked to recovery/development projects? What could be further done (enabling factors, tools, mechanisms, change in strategy, etc.) to strengthen links to interventions of development actors?

Part B: Specific questions focusing on DG ECHO's partnership with the IFRC

12. How well aligned were DG ECHO and the IFRC in terms of
- strategies and objectives?
 - needs assessments and vulnerability analyses?
 - advocacy priorities, communication campaigns and visibility efforts?
How well did IFRC succeed in adapting advocacy messages to a culturally appropriate communication while respecting DG ECHO visibility guidelines? How well did DG ECHO support this effort?
13. To what extent did a structured, strategic, timely and functional dialogue take place between the two partners, by what means and what has been the impact of this dialogue on funding trends between the two organisations?
14. To what extent did the DG ECHO-IFRC partnership succeed in:
- maximising efficiencies and decreasing management and related costs, including administrative burden?
 - improving cost-effectiveness in their response?
15. To what extent did the DG ECHO-IFRC partnership contribute to:
- Strengthening coordination within the Red Cross Movement (IFRC, ICRC, EU National Societies and beyond), and with other humanitarian actors, notably UN (e.g. during COVID-19 response)?
 - Strengthening a Nexus approach between the humanitarian response and development (e.g. DREF and climate, disaster risk reduction)? *Please identify internal/external factors that contributed to or hampered the outcome. The contractors are also invited to also assess the role of DG ECHO as lead for EU relations with IFRC in this respect.*

3.3 OTHER TASKS UNDER THE ASSIGNMENT

The Contractor should:

- Define and analyse **DG ECHO's portfolio** of actions, during the evaluation period,
 - for all actions responding to **sudden-onset disaster** and

- b. for actions implemented **by the IFRC** globally

Due to the spread of actions between several HIPs, the Evaluator should consider this mapping exercise as an extensive non automated exercise.

2. Identify the **main lessons learnt**
 - a. from DG ECHO's humanitarian response to sudden-onset disasters;
 - b. for the DG ECHO-IFRC partnership in general, including a specific attention to the DREF Support.
3. Conduct a minimum of 3 **case studies** for Component A and 2 for Component B of the evaluation.
4. Include a **specific analysis** on the unified methodology for ALERT and SST (*link with EQ2*)
5. On the basis of the research carried out for responding to the evaluation questions, and at a general level, identify the main factors **limiting the success of the actions** over the period covered by the evaluation.
6. Provide a statement about the **validity of the evaluation results**, i.e. to what extent it has been possible to provide reliable statements on all essential aspects of the intervention examined. Issues to be referred to may include scoping of the evaluation exercise, availability of data, unexpected problems encountered in the evaluation process, proportionality between budget and objectives of the assignment, etc.
7. Make a proposal for the **dissemination** of the evaluation results
8. Provide a French **translation** (in addition to the English version) of the executive summary of the Final Report
9. Provide an **abstract** of the evaluation of no more than 200 words

4 MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF THE EVALUATION

The Evaluation Sector of DG ECHO is responsible for the management and the monitoring of the evaluation, together with the DG ECHO Units responsible for the evaluation subjects, i.e. ECHO.A1 and ECHO.D1. Other DG ECHO Units and field offices will also be involved on an ad hoc basis during the course of the evaluation to facilitate the consultation process and information gathering. The DG ECHO Evaluation manager is the contact person for the Evaluator and shall assist the team during their mission in tasks such as providing documents and facilitating contacts. The Evaluation manager assigned to the evaluation should always be kept informed and consulted by the Evaluator and copied on all correspondence with other DG ECHO staff.

A Steering Committee, made up of Commission staff involved in the activity evaluated, will provide feedback on the evaluation exercise, and discuss the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation. IFRC staff will be consulted through all stages of the partnership evaluation component to ensure the highest possible participation, robustness of findings and usefulness of recommendations.

5 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

5.1 METHODOLOGY

In their offer, the bidders will describe in detail the methodological approach they propose in order to address the evaluation questions listed above, as well as the tasks requested for both parts of the evaluation. This will include a proposal for indicative **judgment criteria**⁸ that they may consider useful for addressing each evaluation question. The judgement criteria, as well as the information sources to be used in addressing these criteria, will be discussed and validated by the Commission during the Inception phase at a workshop facilitated by the Evaluator. This workshop will also give the evaluation team the opportunity to refine the evaluation questions, which will have to be included in the inception report, discuss the intervention logic, and analyse external factors at play.

To the extent possible the methodology should promote the participation in the evaluation exercise of all actors concerned, including beneficiaries and local communities when relevant and feasible.

The conclusions of the evaluation must be presented in a transparent way, with clear references to the sources on which they are based.

The Evaluator must undertake a number of **field visits**, to be proposed in the tenderer's offer and agreed in the inception phase. The set of field visits will have to take into account COVID-19 travel and meeting limitations as well as the security situation. The tenderers are also invited to foresee travel to meet IFRC staff and beneficiaries in Geneva and Brussels if the conditions allow it, or for instance in DRC, or in Turkey⁹. In the current context, the evaluation team will have to show a high degree of flexibility regarding the dates and modalities of the field visits, and back-up plans should be provided in the tenderer's offer, addressing the risk of not being able to carry out field visits at all due to health and security problems.

DG ECHO has a network of regional and country field offices which will provide a certain level of support to the evaluation team, mainly in the form of information and advice on practical issues like accommodation, transport and the like. It will not be able to provide direct support like organising their transport. The evaluation team will be responsible of catering for their own protection and security.

5.2 EVALUATION TEAM

In addition to the general requirements of the Framework Contract, as referred to in section 10.1 below, the team should include experts with previous evaluation experience of disaster response. Additionally, it is recommended that the team should have experience assessing institutional partnerships and a solid knowledge of the IFRC.

The contractors are invited to present two sub-teams, one for each part of the combined evaluation.

⁸ A judgement criterion specifies an aspect of the evaluated intervention that will allow its merits or success to be assessed. E.g., if the question is "To what extent has DG ECHO assistance, both overall and by sector been appropriate and impacted positively the targeted population?", a general judgement criterion might be "Assistance goes to the people most in need of assistance". In developing judgment criteria, the tenderers may make use of existing methodological, technical or political guidance provided by actors in the field of Humanitarian Assistance such as HAP, the Sphere Project, GHD, etc.

⁹ The countries visited in the frame of the partnership component will have to be validated by both DG ECHO and the IFRC counterparts.

6 CONTENT OF THE OFFER

- A. The administrative part of the bidder's offer must include:
1. The tender submission form (annex C to the model specific contract);
 2. A signed Experts' declaration of availability, absence of conflict of interest and not being in a situation of exclusion (annex D to the model specific contract – please use corrected version sent by e-mail on 12 April 2018).
- B. The technical part of the bidder's offer should be presented in a maximum of **30 pages** (excluding CVs and annexes), and must include:
1. A description of the understanding of the Terms of Reference, their scope and the tasks covered by the contract. This will include a graphic reconstruction of the intervention logic of the Commission's humanitarian activities concerned. It will also explain the bidder's understanding of the evaluation questions, including a first proposal of judgement criteria to be used for answering the evaluation questions and the information sources to be used for answering the questions. The final definition of judgement criteria and information sources will be validated by the Commission during the inception phase;
 2. The methodology the bidder intends to apply for this evaluation for each of the phases involved, including a draft proposal for the number of case studies to be carried out during the field visit, the regions to be visited, and the reasons for such a choice. The methodology will be refined and validated by the Commission during the desk phase;
 3. A description of the distribution of tasks in the team, including an indicative quantification of the work for each expert in terms of person/days;
 4. A detailed proposed timetable for its implementation with the total number of days needed for each of the phases (Desk, Field and Synthesis).
- C. The CVs of each of the experts proposed.
- D. The financial part of the offer (annex E to the model specific contract) must include the proposed total budget in Euros, taking due account of the maximum amount for this evaluation. The price must be expressed as a lump sum for the whole of the services provided. The expert fees as provided in the Financial Offer for the Framework Contract must be respected.

7 AMOUNT OF THE CONTRACT

The maximum budget allocated to this study is EUR 275 000.

8 TIMETABLE

The indicative duration of the evaluation is **10 months**. The duration of the contract shall be no more than **11 months**). The additional two months added are foreseen to be used on a longer desk phase and as buffer in case of delays due to fieldwork access limitations.

The evaluation starts after the contract has been signed by both parties, and no expenses may be incurred before that. The main part of the existing relevant documents will be provided after the signature of the contract.

In their offer, the bidders shall provide a schedule based on the indicative table below (T = contract signature date):

| Timing | Event |
|-----------------------|----------------------------|
| June 2021 T+1 week | Kick-off |
| T+3 weeks | Inception workshop |
| T+5 weeks | Draft Inception Report |
| T+6 weeks | Inception meeting |
| T+11 weeks | Draft Desk Report |
| T+12 weeks | Desk Report meeting |
| T+14 weeks | Final Desk Report approved |
| T+16– 22 weeks | Field visits |
| T+23 | Draft Field Report |
| T+24 | Field Report Meeting |
| T+31 weeks | Draft Final Report |
| T+34 weeks | Draft Final Report meeting |
| T+38 weeks | Final Report published |

9 PROVISIONS OF THE FRAMEWORK TENDER SPECIFICATIONS

- 1) **Team composition:** The Team proposed by the Tenderer for assignments to be contracted under the Framework Contract must comply with Criterion B4 (see Section 5.2.4 of the Tender Specifications for the Framework Contract).
- 2) **Procedures and instructions:** The procedures and instructions to the Tenderer for Specific Contracts under the Framework Contract are provided under Section 6 of the Tender Specifications for the Framework Contract.
 - Sections 6 – 6.4 are fixed and must be fully taken into account for offers submitted in response to Requests for Services. E.g. the **Award Criteria** are presented under Section 6.2.2;
 - Section 6.5 is indicative and could be modified in a Request for Services or discussed and agreed during the Inception Phase under a Specific Contract.
- 3) **EU Bookshop Format:** The template provided in Annex M of the Tender Specifications for the Framework Contract must be followed for the Final Report. Any changes to this

format, as introduced by the Publications Office of the European Union, will be communicated to the Framework Contractors by the Commission.

10 RAW DATA AND DATASETS

Any final datasets should be provided as structured data in a machine readable format (e.g. in the form of a spreadsheet and/or an RDF file) for Commission internal usage and for publishing on the Open Data Portal, in compliance with Commission Decision (2011/833/EU)¹⁰.

The data delivered should include the appropriate metadata (e.g. description of the dataset, definition of the indicators, label and sources for the variables, notes) to facilitate reuse and publication.


The data delivered should be linked to data resources external to the scope of the evaluation, preferably data and semantic resources from the Commission's own data portal or from the Open Data Portal¹¹. The contractor should describe in the offer the approach they will adopt to facilitate data linking.

¹⁰ If third parties' rights do not allow their publication as open data, the tenderers should describe in the offer the subpart that will be provided to the Commission free of rights for publication and the part that will remain for internal use.


¹¹ For a list of shared data interoperability assets see the ISA program joinup catalogue (<https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/catalogue/repository/eu-semantic-interoperability-catalogue>) and the Open Data Portal resources.

Annex – DG ECHO Support to the DREF: ERCC Maps


I. 2016




II. 2017




III. 2018



IV. 2019



V. 2020



PART A: EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO SUDDEN-ONSET DISASTERS, 2016-2020

ANNEX 1: EVALUATION MATRIX

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| EQ1 | To what extent were the mix of instruments and tools appropriate (i.e. coverage, modalities and budget), timely available and sufficiently flexible to enable DG ECHO to support the partners in providing an adequate response? |
| Rationale and coverage of the Question | |
| Background/ Understanding / coverage of the question | <p>This question will assess to what extent the mix of instruments and tools (i.e. the Emergency Toolbox with the exception of the Epidemics Tool, E/RRMs and crisis modifiers) were appropriately designed i.e. the mix of tools and instruments allowed DG ECHO to support partners in providing a timely and flexible response, at an adequate scale and coverage to the different types of sudden-onset disasters between 2016-2020. It will examine the strategic, managerial, and operational aspects of DG ECHO's instruments. This question will assess how well the tools and instruments collectively cover the different crises needs and contexts, but also look at each tool separately.</p> <p>In terms of timeliness, it will assess the length of the decision process from the occurrence of a crisis event until the implementation of the actions with the objective of identifying enabling and limiting factors, including the main sources of delays as well as any good practices.</p> <p>In terms of coverage, the question will inquire into the alignment of the set of instruments to respond to the different sudden-onset disasters in different country / regional contexts, including the appropriateness of each tool in terms of providing the relevant sectoral support. This will also consider whether it can respond at a sufficient scale. Yet, the extent to which the set of instruments are flexible enough to guarantee sufficient funding levels to match operational needs, will be analysed in detail in EQ10.</p> <p>It will also examine whether the existing tools and instruments are used according to their initial purpose and how their use has evolved over time and for which reasons. This will account for the different contexts (i.e. regional dimensions, types of disasters and field presence of DG ECHO or not) in which the instruments are deployed. The extent to which the different mechanisms and processes related to the activation of the different tools are adapted and contribute to a rapid and adequate response from the partners will also be reviewed.</p> |
| Judgement Criteria (JCs) and proposed indicators: | |
| JC.1.1 The set of tools and instruments (including ALERT, SST, DREF, Crisis Modifiers and ERMs) together and individually enabled DG ECHO to provide a <u>rapid</u> response to sudden onset disasters in different contexts | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Speed of response (number of steps and duration of each step) for each specific tool The timeliness of the support provided at the different levels of the response chain for each tool (i.e., before, during or immediately after a disaster, after the funding decision until implementation). Respect of the response/time lag specified in DG ECHO Emergency Management's Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the different steps, Comparison with timeliness and procedure with other similar instruments e.g. UN's Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), UK Government's Rapid Response Facility Extent to which anticipatory approaches have been supported when possible | |
| JC.1.2 The set of tools and instruments (including ALERT, SST, DREF, Crisis Modifiers and ERMs) together and individually enabled DG ECHO to provide an <u>appropriate</u> response to sudden onset disasters in different contexts | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Proposed indicators: | |

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The appropriateness of the response in meeting the emergency needs of affected populations and areas across types of sudden-onset disasters and humanitarian context (e.g. regional, DG ECHO's field presence or not, etc.). ○ Sectoral coverage of support provided through various instruments bearing in mind that these instruments are designed to fill the most urgent and pressing humanitarian needs (and not necessarily all humanitarian needs) ○ Role of DG ECHO's support in financing critical gaps – underfunded/ initial phases of a crisis, under-the radar crises ○ The relative coverage of the support provided compared to disasters that have occurred and/or for which DG ECHO was requested to intervene. ○ Gaps in coverage or delays in response requiring adaptations to the toolbox (or the introduction of a new tool). | |
| JC.1.3 The set of tools and instruments (including ALERT, SST, DREF, Crisis Modifiers and ERMs) together and individually are aligned with their initial purpose and objectives | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Extent to which each the instruments are being used in their 'pecking' order (CMs followed by DG ECHO's Emergency/Rapid Response Mechanism, Emergency Toolbox, top-ups or other donor support) ○ Factors that enable or prevent this from happening in practice ○ Main drivers of the evolution of the use of the set of instruments ○ For each instrument, extent to which they have been used according to their initial purpose ○ Strengths and weaknesses of each tool. ○ Recurrent patterns of usage and whether this is subsequently reflected in geographic HIPs | |
| METHODS AND TOOL | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Documentary review • Data analysis • Semi-structured interviews • Online surveys • Case studies |
| EQ2 | <p>To what extent DG ECHO's funded actions in response to sudden-onset disasters:</p> <p>a) ensured that the needs of the most vulnerable population (i.e. women, children, elderly and persons with disabilities) were accounted for in a context of emergency response,</p> <p>b) were aligned with DG ECHO's principled approach (i.e. Hum. Aid Regulation, European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, Humanitarian principles),</p> <p>c) were aligned with the relevant sectoral policy guidelines?</p> |
| Rationale and coverage of the question | |
| Background/ Understanding / coverage of the question | <p>This question examines:</p> <p>a) the extent to which DG ECHO supported projects were able to consistently target the most vulnerable groups, sub-groups and members of affected communities in terms of their ethnicity, socio-economic, gender and age dimensions (women, men, girls, boys, under 5yrs, PLW, elderly, disabled) addressing short term life saving humanitarian needs. The specific adaptability, strengths and weakness of each instrument option and how well each leans itself to enabling and supporting timely assessments that generate accurate data will be assessed to identify what trade-offs are made between the accuracy of data and the timeliness of the response. This question will also examine the quality of assessments undertaken and whether or not appropriate modalities of support were provided (e.g. cash vs In-kind</p> |

comparison), whether the selected sectoral support provided was appropriate (Food Security and Livelihoods, Nutrition, Health, WASH, Protection, Shelter/NFI, Camp Co-ordination, Education in Emergencies, Co-ordination, Emergency Communications and logistics), plus whether the geographical coverage of supported activities matched ongoing needs. The mainstreaming of protection and gender perspectives within activities will also be reviewed, as well as whether any beneficiaries or groups of beneficiaries have been excluded. The question also offers the opportunity to explore the participation of affected communities in the design and implementation of DG ECHO interventions, including participation to monitoring, feedback and complaint mechanisms.

- b) the coherence of DG funded interventions with both its own relevant internal policies and regulations, as well as those standards and principles accepted within the humanitarian community. The HAR Regulation No 1257/96 and the Humanitarian Consensus of 2007 are the key legal basis for the humanitarian aid activities funded by DG ECHO, whereas incorporating the humanitarian principles of Humanity, Neutrality, Impartiality and Independence¹² into operational activities is the externally expected standard. The incorporation of the programmatic principle of “do no harm” is also important and will be reviewed.
- c) how well interventions were aligned with DG ECHO’s 12 sets of guidelines/policies on how to implement EU humanitarian aid, per sector or theme, e.g., regarding food assistance, nutrition, health, and protection, as published on their website. These guidelines aim at helping partners, implementing EU-funded programmes, to better understand what is expected of them programmatically in terms of how they should utilise the funding received, while promoting best practices in the provision of sector specific humanitarian assistance.

JCs and proposed indicators:

JC. 2.1 DG ECHO supported activities were able to target the most vulnerable members of affected communities.

- Proposed indicators:
 - Approaches, methods and tools used by DG ECHO’s partners to identify most vulnerable members of affected communities
 - The supported activities were able to identify, target and include the most vulnerable members of affected communities within programmatic interventions.
 - The extent to which support was provided in a blanket or targeted manner, as appropriate.
 - Accuracy of support in terms of the identification of geographical locations requiring support.
 - The timeliness, quality, adequacy, and completeness of (rapid) needs assessments, including generating gender-age disaggregated data.
 - Evidence that no beneficiary groups in need of support have been excluded from programmatic activities.
 - Quality of risk analysis and mitigation measures.

JC. 2.2 DG ECHO support activities and modalities were appropriate to address beneficiaries’ priority needs.

- Proposed indicators:
 - The extent to which DG ECHO supported activities met the priority needs of the affected populations.

¹² First launched by the Red Cross and enshrined in International Humanitarian Law.
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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The appropriateness of response modalities (Cash v in-kind, CFW, etc) used to meet the most urgent and pressing needs ○ Adequacy of gender, age, PWD, and protection mainstreaming in sectoral responses. ○ Adequacy of targeted actions to cover specific needs. | |
| JC. 2.3 Affected communities have been appropriately involved in programme design and implementation (considering the constraints inherent to a rapid response). | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The extent of beneficiary participation in programming design and implementation. ○ The extent of beneficiary participation in programme monitoring. ○ Coverage and quality of community complaint/feedback mechanisms included in supported programmes. ○ Evidence of programmatic changes due to beneficiary input. ○ Level of support and commitment from DG ECHO in terms of incentivising AAP amongst its partners. | |
| JC.2.4 DG ECHO-funded operations are implemented in line with the relevant provisions of the HAR and the Consensus. | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Degree to which DG ECHO took specific actions to ensure coherence between relevant HAR provisions (art 1, 2, 3, 4, 10) and its supported interventions. ○ Degree to which DG ECHO took specific actions to ensure coherence between relevant Consensus provisions (art 22, 23-24, 25-30, 31-37, 39, 42-45, 53, 54-55, 70-71, 74, 76, 77-78) and its supported interventions. | |
| JC.2.5 DG ECHO-funded operations are implemented in line with humanitarian principles and the principle of do no harm. | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Degree to which DG ECHO took specific actions to ensure coherence between the principles of Humanity, Impartiality, Independence and Neutrality within its supported interventions. ○ Evidence of the “Do no harm” concept being applied (specifically with respect to gender and protection considerations). | |
| JC.2.6 DG ECHO-funded operations have been implemented in line with the relevant sector/thematic policies and guidelines. | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Degree to which DG ECHO supported interventions were coherent with relevant DG ECHO policies and guidelines. ○ The extent to which local partner staff were aware of the guidelines, understood how these can be put into practice, and took specific actions to ensure coherence of operations with guidelines. | |
| METHODS AND TOOLS | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Documentary review ● Data analysis ● Semi-structured interviews ● Online surveys ● Case studies |
| EQ3 | <p>To what extent was DG ECHO successful in coordinating with other actors (including EU Member States), notably in terms of avoiding overlaps and promoting synergies?</p> <p>What was the added value of DG ECHO’s humanitarian response to sudden-onset disasters in comparison to these actors?</p> |
| Rationale and coverage of the question | |

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| Background/ Understanding / coverage of the question | <p>This question examines how well DG ECHO was able to co-ordinate its funding with that of other rapid response mechanisms and sudden onset donors so as to generate complementarity and avoid duplication and therefore avoid the scenario whereby some crisis (or sectors within a crisis) might be overfunded while other face funding shortfalls. Similarly, when relevant, the evaluation will examine how well DG ECHO has been able to position itself amongst both EU member states and other emergency and development donors so as to best utilise its funding in order to reach common objectives. In this respect, how well DG ECHO has been able to identify gaps in funding for the overall response, either filling such gaps themselves or advocating amongst the donor community for such needs to be addressed, will be looked into. Also, how well DG ECHO have been able to integrate their sectoral support and generate synergies between sectors and other actors will also be analysed, as will the benefit of DG ECHO support to in country Emergency Response Mechanisms.</p> <p>This question will assess what support or expertise DG ECHO was able to deliver during humanitarian responses beyond the actual funding itself. The Evaluation will look at the extent of DG ECHO's influence in terms of its advocacy efforts, as well as any expertise it has been able to illustrate both in terms of sectors covered, and in its support to a co-ordinated coherent response. The question will also assess the comparative advantage of DG ECHO's approach compared to other donors from the perspective of relevant stakeholders and implementing partners, noting how it has evolved over time.</p> |
| JCs and proposed indicators: | |
| JC.3.1 DG ECHO facilitated co-ordination and coherence between EU and non-EU donors based on operational priorities, resources and the value-added of the relevant organisations. | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Degree to which DG ECHO took specific actions to ensure coherence of its actions with other EU and non-EU donors and international institutions (WB, IMF). ○ Participation, engagement and contributions to donor forums, Country Team meetings. ○ Evidence of DG ECHO advocacy efforts towards other donors in terms of filling identified gaps and needs. ○ Perception of other donors regarding the effectiveness of DG ECHO's coordinated support. | |
| JC.3.2 DG ECHO's funding has been targeted so as to avoid duplications, being either sectoral specific or integrated as required, generating synergies wherever possible. | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Evidence, or lack thereof, of sectoral shortfalls/overfunding in sudden onset emergency scenarios. ○ Contributions and usage thereof of funding allocated to Emergency Response Mechanisms. ○ Evidence of integrated multi sectoral support, including examples, when realised, of synergies gained between different funding streams and donors. ○ Perception of in-country actors regarding the effectiveness of DG ECHO's coordinated support. | |
| JC.3.3 DG ECHO's added value compared to other donors. | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The extent to which DG ECHO has successfully utilised its global field presence and sectoral expertise to improve humanitarian responses compared to other donors. ○ The extent to which DG ECHO has successfully utilised its advocacy efforts, for example, to ensure the adoption of good humanitarian practices to improve humanitarian responses compared to other donors. | |

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The extent to which DG ECHO has provided diversity within its funding portfolio compared to other donors. ○ Degree of DG ECHO's influence as a "reference donor" in terms of influencing other donors, including examples where DG ECHO played a leading role or a co-ordinating role. | |
| JC.3.4 How well DG ECHO's added value has improved over time. | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The extent to which DG ECHO has been able to increase its added value (as per above) over time. ○ Degree of DG ECHO's influence as a "reference donor" over time. ○ The perceived increase of DG ECHO's added value over time amongst key stakeholders. | |
| METHODS AND TOOLS | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Documentary review • Data analysis • Semi-structured interviews • Online surveys • Case studies |
| EQ4 | To what extent the mix of instruments and tools enabled DG ECHO to support partners in addressing critical unforeseen humanitarian needs in a timely manner and achieve concrete results? |
| Rationale and coverage of the question | |
| Background/ Understanding / coverage of the question | <p>This question assesses the overall effectiveness of DG ECHO's support to meeting sudden onset humanitarian needs, measuring programmatic success compared to individual project quantitative and qualitative objectives and indicators, illustrating how vulnerabilities and needs have been addressed. The question will also review how well cross cutting themes, i.e., gender and protection have been incorporated into supported interventions. Factors that have contributed to or limited overall success will be identified.</p> <p>This question will also evaluate the extent to which each tool and instrument available for DG ECHO offers a sufficient variety of funding levels, speed of response, and modalities of interventions, that could be utilised to generate effective interventions depending on the sudden onset humanitarian context. A sudden onset context where DG ECHO has an operational base and established partners will of course present a different response scenario to that of a country where DG ECHO has little operational experience or manpower and interventions might have to be implemented through a partner with less operational capacity or experience. In this respect, the extent to which some of the tools or instruments might support interventions more effectively than others will be analysed.</p> |
| JCs and proposed indicators: | |
| JC.4.1 DG ECHO and their partners have successfully delivered the necessary outputs and contributed to the achievement of planned outcomes. | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Level of achievement against project sectoral indicators outlined in proposed project documents and single forms. ○ Evidence that supported interventions have reached the most vulnerable. ○ Evidence that supported interventions have increased community level resilience. ○ Perceived satisfaction amongst DG ECHO staff, partners, local government that DG ECHO supported activities have achieved their objectives. ○ Degree of satisfaction of final beneficiaries (if/where possible) through beneficiary feedback mechanisms as to programmatic effectiveness. | |
| JC.4.2 DG ECHO and their partners have successfully managed to incorporate cross cutting issues such as humanitarian principles, gender and protection into their response. | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proposed indicators: | |

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Extent to which supported interventions have incorporated gender and protection aspects within their programme design and implementation. ○ Perceived satisfaction amongst DG ECHO staff, partners, local government as to the inclusion of humanitarian principles, and cross cutting themes in project activities. ○ Degree of satisfaction of final beneficiaries (if/where possible) through beneficiary feedback mechanisms as to the incorporation of cross cutting issues. | |
| JC.4.3 The comparative capacity of existing instruments and tools to generate effective interventions. | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The comparative effectiveness of interventions supported by different tools and instruments in varying sudden onset contexts. ○ The comparative effectiveness of interventions supported by different tools and instruments within similar operational environments. ○ The advantages and disadvantages of each tool or instrument in varying sudden onset contexts. ○ Evidence of changes in the effectiveness of different tools and instruments over time. | |
| JC 4.4 How the mix of tools and instruments available provided DG ECHO with sufficient flexibility so as to be able to fund effective interventions in different contexts. | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The range of instruments and tools is considered sufficiently broad enough so as to be able to respond effectively to all types of sudden onset emergencies. ○ Any perceived gaps or capacity shortfalls in the range of tools and instruments available. | |
| METHODS AND TOOLS | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Documentary review ● Data analysis ● Semi-structured interviews ● Online surveys ● Case studies |
| EQ5 | To what extent DG ECHO reached cost-effectiveness in its response, what are the enabling/mitigating factors? |
| Rationale and coverage of the question | |
| Background/ Understanding / coverage of the question | <p>This question aims at assessing if the DG ECHO support has been cost-effective, while identifying the explanatory factors that affect success or failure. According to the Cost-effectiveness guidance for DG ECHO evaluations developed by ADE in 2016, cost-effectiveness is defined as “the achievement of intended outcomes in relation to costs”. Following this guidance, the evaluation will split the analysis into two parts:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The cost-effectiveness of DG ECHO as a donor: which is of particular importance here as the efficiency (including timeliness) of the interventions will rely to a large extent on the quality of processes upstream. Three components of the overall cost-effectiveness of DG ECHO’s response, timeliness, an adequate budget allocation and connectedness with a longer-term response, will be analysed in detail respectively in EQ1, EQ6 and EQ7. This question will examine DG ECHO’s attention to cost-effectiveness in making strategic choices about its portfolio of assistance throughout the response period. This will include assessing the attention to cost-effectiveness when selecting partners and interventions (including in terms of the choices of service modalities), the extent to which the set of instruments avoid duplicating initiatives and interventions (linked to EQ2). It will also assess whether DG ECHO’s processes are geared toward cost-effectiveness, i.e. minimising transaction costs and administrative burden (including for the |

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| | <p>partners), measures to monitor the cost of interventions and support efficiency implementation, while ensuring their quality.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The cost-effectiveness of DG ECHO funded actions: i.e., assessing if the humanitarian actions funded by DG ECHO were efficient (i.e., how well were inputs converted into outputs) and then if they were cost-effective (i.e., achievement of intended outcomes in relation to costs). It also includes the identification of lessons learned, notably in terms of explanatory factors and good transferable practices. DG ECHO's 2017 cost-effectiveness guidance provides a minimum package of indicators and optional indicators for assessing cost-effectiveness to choose from. This will allow the evaluation team to tailor the approach to fit the specificities of the evaluation. The methodology will notably include a review of implemented operations, based on an in-depth analysis of project-related documentation. |
| JCs and proposed indicators: | |
| JC.5.1 DG ECHO took appropriate actions to ensure the cost-effectiveness of interventions supported by its tools and instruments. | |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Extent to which the selection of interventions and partners systematically included for cost-effectiveness considerations (e.g. timeliness of the partner, localisation of the partner, cost of interventions, coherence with action of other donors, etc.) ○ DG ECHO's budget allocations are based on operational needs, actions of other donors and DG ECHO objectives (related to EQ2). ○ Extent to which DG ECHO adopted specific measures to improve the efficiency of processes (notably in relation to "more classic" interventions), reduce transaction costs and administrative burden (including for the partners), monitoring the cost of interventions and support implementation. provide support Evidence of DG ECHO providing considering cost in relation to effectiveness and timeliness in making portfolio choices related to partners, sectors, approaches, geographical locations, beneficiaries and transfer modalities (C&V). |
| JC.5.2 Humanitarian actions funded by DG ECHO were cost-effective. | |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Evidence that actions funded by DG ECHO were cost-effective based on budget data (provided the data are available): cost per beneficiary, share of support costs, share of costs to beneficiaries in case of cash/vouchers interventions, etc. ○ Existence of cost guidelines/benchmarks ○ Extent to which an integrated multi-sectoral approach could be implemented (related to EQ4) ○ Rationale for the choice of the different modalities ○ Examples of good practice in cost-effectiveness. |
| METHODS AND TOOLS | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Documentary review • Data analysis • Semi-structured interviews • Online surveys • Case studies |
| EQ6 | Was the EU budget allocated to respond to sudden onset disasters distributed equitably and proportionate to what actions were meant to achieve? |
| Rationale and coverage of the question | |

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| Background/ Understanding / coverage of the question | <p>The Humanitarian Consensus clearly identifies “budget adequacy” as an objective of the EU which should “aim to demonstrate its commitment to humanitarian response by mobilising adequate funding for humanitarian aid based on assessed needs” (Art. 38). Between 2016 and 2020, DG ECHO has contributed increasingly large amount of funding to the Emergency Toolbox from EUR 8 million in 2016 up to EUR 32.75 million in 2020 (excluding the Epidemics Tool). While DG ECHO cannot be expected to fill all funding gaps, this question will assess whether DG ECHO’s funding to address sudden-onset disasters was sufficient, timely and coherent with contextual needs so that implementing partners could achieve programmatic objectives.</p> <p>The adequacy of the budget allocation will be examined at the global, instrument and intervention levels:</p> <p>At the global level, the question will investigate the drivers of the evolution of the budget allocation, to what extent it reflected the evolution of needs, and to what extent the budget allocations in the Geographic HIPs and funding decisions for Disaster Preparedness affect the frequency and type of instruments mobilised. It will also examine to what extent DG ECHO provides a large budget to its emergency response instruments in comparison to the global needs and other donors.</p> <p>At the instrument and intervention levels, the question will examine whether the mechanisms guiding the budget allocation – and notably the trade-off between the number of interventions funded and the size of the funding to each intervention – enable an equitable allocation of funds across the different types of crisis and instruments, and ensure that the interventions receive sufficient funding to achieve meaningful results.</p> <p>This will include an analysis of the precision of the baseline assessments in terms of predicting the number of person in needs (including qualitative feedbacks from field and desk staff), including the effects of unifying the methodology for the SST and ALERT, and how this has affected the distribution of funding.</p> <p>The question will also assess the timeliness of budget allocation and availability at the global, instrument and intervention levels and whether DG ECHO’s procedures enable a rapid mobilisation of the funds and therefore contribute to the efficiency of the response (related to EQ1 and EQ5).</p> |
| JCs and proposed indicators: | |
| JC. 6.1. Coherence between the increasing funding allocation, the needs and the purpose of the set of instruments at the global level | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Extent to which the evolution of the budget provided by DG ECHO adequately responded to the evolution of needs ○ Extent to which the mobilisation of the instruments is related to budget constraints in certain regions areas (notably regarding the geographic HIPs allocation and funding to disaster preparedness) ○ Analysis of the evolution of budget allocation by geographic areas, frequency of sudden-onset disasters, availability of other sources of funding | |
| JC6.2. Comparison between the share and importance of DG ECHO’s budget vis-à-vis sudden onset emergency appeals | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Proportion of DG ECHO funding compared to total humanitarian funding (appeals, actual funding) overall and – as relevant and feasible – per geographical area and sector. ○ Identified funding gaps (overall and per area / sector). ○ A comparison of DG ECHO funding with that of other main donors. | |

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Degree of satisfaction of DG ECHO, OCHA, clusters and partners' staff about comparative level of DG ECHO budget support. | |
| JC.6.3 Alignment between the level of DG ECHO funds provided and sectoral needs identified and addressed by partner activities. | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Extent to which the budget provided by DG ECHO to the partners was sufficient to meet identified needs across the variety of sectors of sudden onset disasters supported. ○ A clear rationale guides the choices related to the trade-off between the number of operations funded and the size of funding (for the different instruments) ○ The identification (and relative importance of) funding shortfalls, per geographical area and sector in sudden onset emergencies supported. ○ Degree of satisfaction of DG ECHO and partners' staff about adequacy of DG ECHO budget support. | |
| JC. 6.4 The extent to which baseline assessments methodologies have precisely estimated the needs and equitably allocated the funds | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Improved consistency in terms of the allocation of funds in proportion to affected populations. ○ A reduction in incidences when gaps in baseline assessments have led to mistakes in the allocation levels of funding. ○ Consensus amongst operational partners that the revised methodology creates less gaps in terms of assessing numbers affected. ○ The appropriateness of changes made to baseline assessment methodologies in terms of calculating accurate affected population numbers. ○ Trends regarding funding allocations to large- or small-scale disasters during the evaluation period. ○ The appropriateness of changes made to baseline assessment methodologies in terms of calculating accurate affected population numbers. | |
| JC. 6.4 Timeliness and flexibility of funding allocation to the different instruments and partners (related to EQ1 and EQ5) | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Extent to which funding availability slows down the speed of intervention for the different funding mechanisms across instruments ○ Degree of satisfaction of DG ECHO's staff and partners in the flexibility and timeliness of funding availability ○ Specific measures have been taken to improve funding mechanisms and reduce constraints | |
| METHODS AND TOOLS | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Documentary review ● Data analysis ● Semi-structured interviews ● Online surveys ● Case studies |
| EQ7 | To what extent were Emergency Toolbox-funded actions followed by additional Country/Region HIP-funded projects and/or linked to recovery/development projects? What could be further done (enabling factors, tools, mechanisms, change in strategy, etc.) to strengthen links to interventions of development actors? |
| Rationale and coverage of the question | |

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| Background/ Understanding / coverage of the question | This question examines the extent to which DG ECHO support has gone beyond immediate emergency life-saving response allocations, expanding support to look at resilience building, as well as establishing linkages with early recovery and developmental actors. This could occur either within the first funding allocation, or within follow up funding allocations when the emerging emergency has become an element of ongoing HIP planning. For example, some programmatic linkages, e.g. food security and livelihoods, have the potential for a durable impact, as would the expansion of emergency WASH provisions into a reliable long term water supply. The evaluation will look into incidences when this has occurred, and when opportunities have been missed, identifying the enabling and limiting factors that affect if sustainable interventions do occur, and as such how these can be encouraged or mitigated against. This question enables the evaluation to examine if DG ECHO specifically sought out sustainability opportunities within the programmes and reached out to establish working relationships with the relevant development actors |
| JCs and proposed indicators: | |
| JC.7.1 The extent to which DG ECHO supported interventions have led to resilience building activities in affected communities. | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The extent to which and examples of when resilience building and medium to longer term support has been incorporated into or added onto DG ECHO supported interventions. ○ Extent to which capacity building activities have been incorporated into or added onto DG ECHO supported interventions. ○ Degree of satisfaction amongst DG ECHO staff, partners, and beneficiaries with respect to how medium to longer term aspects have been incorporated into or added onto DG ECHO supported interventions. | |
| JC7.2. The extent to which DG ECHO supported interventions have established linkages with longer term development partners. | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Examples of linkages between DG ECHO supported interventions and longer-term development partner programmes. ○ Examples of missed opportunities for linkages with longer term activities. ○ Degree of satisfaction amongst DG ECHO staff and partners, with respect to the process on linking ongoing initiatives with longer term development partners. | |
| METHODS AND TOOLS | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Documentary review • Data analysis • Semi-structured interviews • Online surveys • Case studies |

ANNEX 2: LIST OF CONSULTED DOCUMENTS

2.1 IFRC documents

IFRC (2019). DREF Review - Lebanon Arafat Population Movement – MDRLb007.

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ANNEX 3: LIST OF INTERVIEWS***Desk phase***

| Stakeholders | Position | Unit/Country |
|------------------------------------|--|-------------------------------|
| DG ECHO | | |
| Headquarters | Policy Officer | A1 |
| | Team Leader | B2 |
| | Policy Officer | B3 |
| | Policy Officer | B4 |
| Field & Country offices | Disaster Risk Reduction & Rapid Response Coordinator | Dakar |
| | Technical Assistant | South Sudan / RRC Cameroon |

Field phase

| Stakeholders | Position | Unit/Country |
|------------------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------------|
| DG ECHO | | |
| Headquarters | Policy Officer | A1 |
| | Scientific Advisor | A3 |
| | Policy Officer | B2 |
| Field & Country offices | Project Officer | Philippines |
| | Head of Office | Nigeria |
| | Head of Office | Mozambique |
| | Head of Office | Niger |
| | Central America Desk | Guatemala |
| | Thematic Expert | Latin America and Caribbean |
| Red Cross | | |
| ICRC | Head of Delegation | Philippines |
| IFRC | Head of Delegation | Philippines |

| | | |
|--|--|-------------|
| Philippines Red Cross | Strategic Partnerships Manager | Philippines |
| Spanish Red Cross | Head of Office | Philippines |
| German Red Cross | Head of Office | Philippines |
| Implementing partners | | |
| Action Against Hunger | Country Director | Philippines |
| | Country Director | Nigeria |
| ADRA | Country Director | Philippines |
| CARE | Country Director | Philippines |
| Oxfam | Country Director | Philippines |
| Plan International | Country Director | Philippines |
| Relief International | Country Director | Philippines |
| Save the Children | Country Director | Philippines |
| World Vision | Country Director | Philippines |
| Solidarites International | Senior Expert Humanitarian, Development Programming and Strategy | Nigeria |
| Alliance for International Medical Action | Head of Mission | Nigeria |
| | Medical Coordinator | Nigeria |
| Nigerian INGO Forum | Deputy Director Northeast | Nigeria |
| | Humanitarian Access Advisor | Nigeria |
| Danish Refugee Council | Country Director | Nigeria |
| National Authorities | | |
| National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) | Deputy Director Planning | Nigeria |
| | Deputy Director Research and Forecasting | Nigeria |
| | Assistant Chief Planning | Nigeria |
| | Assistant Chief | Nigeria |
| | Assistant Director Monitoring and Evaluation | Nigeria |

| | | |
|---|---|-------------|
| Kidapawan City Local Government Unit (CLGU) | Head of City DRRM Office (MDRRMO) | Philippines |
| | Sanitary Inspector City Health Office | Philippines |
| Kidapawan Barangay Government Unit (BLGU) | Head of Barangay Local Government Unit and Barangay DRR Management Council (BDRRMC) | Philippines |
| Tiwi Municipal Local Government Unit (MLGU) | Head of Municipal DRRM Office (MDRRMO) | Philippines |
| | Head of Municipal Social Welfare & Devt Office (MSWDO) | Philippines |
| Tiwi Barangay Government Unit (BLGU) | Head of Barangay Local Government Unit & BDRRMC | Philippines |
| | Barangay Councillor/BDRRMC member | Philippines |
| | Barangay Councillor/BDRRMC member | Philippines |
| | Barangay Councillor/BDRRMC member | Philippines |
| | Barangay Councillor/BDRRMC member | Philippines |
| Virac Municipal Local Government Unit (MLGU) | Head of Municipal DRRM Office (MDRRMO) | Philippines |
| | Head of Municipal Health Office | Philippines |
| | Rural Sanitary Inspector | Philippines |
| Virac Barangay Government Unit (BLGU) | Barangay Councillor | Philippines |
| | Barangay Councillor | Philippines |
| | Barangay Councillor | Philippines |
| | Barangay Councillor | Philippines |
| | Barangay Councillor | Philippines |
| | Barangay Councillor | Philippines |
| | Barangay Secretary | Philippines |
| UN Agencies | | |
| OCHA | Humanitarian Affairs Officer | Nigeria |

| | | |
|---------------------|--|-------------|
| | Head of Office | Philippines |
| FAO | National Project Support Consultant | Philippines |
| UNDP | Country Representative | Philippines |
| UNFPA | Assistant Representative | Philippines |
| WFP | Country Representative | Philippines |
| UNHCR | Livelihoods and Economic Inclusion Officer | Nigeria |
| Aid Agencies | | |
| USAID | Head of office | Philippines |
| | Director | Nigeria |
| SIDA | Senior Desk Officer | Nigeria |

ANNEX 4: LIST OF FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS

| Stakeholders | Functional title | Sex | Location |
|---------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------|----------------------|
| Nigeria Case Study | | | |
| Local Authorities | | | |
| Facility Health Committee | Health Committee Chairman | Male | Kaita, Kastina |
| | Health Committee Member 1 | Male | Kaita, Kastina |
| | Health Committee Member 2 | Male | Kaita, Kastina |
| | Health Committee Member 3 | Male | Kaita, Kastina |
| | Health Committee Member 4 | Male | Kaita, Kastina |
| | Health Committee Member 5 | Male | Kaita, Kastina |
| LGA PHC Department | Director PHC | Female | Kaita, Kastina |
| | Essential drugs and Equipment Officer | Male | Kaita, Kastina |
| | M&E Officer | Male | Kaita, Kastina |
| | Routine Immunization Officer | Male | Kaita, Kastina |
| | Local Government Immunization Officer | Male | Kaita, Kastina |
| | Disease Control Officer | Male | Kaita, Kastina |
| Traditional Leaders | District Head | Male | Kaita, Kastina |
| | Allemi Village Head | Male | Kaita, Kastina |
| | Dankaba Village Head | Male | Kaita, Kastina |
| | Ba'awa Village Head | Male | Kaita, Kastina |
| | Kaita Village Head | Male | Kaita, Kastina |
| | Yanhoho Village Head | Male | Kaita, Kastina |
| | Yandaki Village Head | Male | Kaita, Kastina |
| | Dankama Village Head | Male | Kaita, Kastina |
| | Gishirawa Village Head | Male | Kaita, Kastina |
| Beneficiaries | | | |
| | Mother 1 | Female | Dankaba PHC, Kastina |

| | | | | |
|---|-----------|--------|----------------------------|------|
| Mothers of children under 5 years old treated for SAM | Mother 2 | Female | Dankaba Kastina | PHC, |
| | Mother 3 | Female | Dankaba Kastina | PHC, |
| | Mother 4 | Female | Dankaba Kastina | PHC, |
| | Mother 5 | Female | Dankaba Kastina | PHC, |
| | Mother 6 | Female | Dankaba Kastina | PHC, |
| Mothers of children under 5 who received health support | Mother 1 | Female | Dankama, Kaita, Kastina | |
| | Mother 2 | Female | Dankama, Kaita, Kastina | |
| | Mother 3 | Female | Dankama, Kaita, Kastina | |
| | Mother 4 | Female | Dankama, Kaita, Kastina | |
| | Mother 5 | Female | Dankama, Kaita, Kastina | |
| | Mother 6 | Female | Dankama, Kaita, Kastina | |
| | Mother 7 | Female | Dankama, Kaita, Kastina | |
| | Mother 8 | Female | Dankama, Kaita, Kastina | |
| | Mother 9 | Female | Dankama, Kaita, Kastina | |
| Mothers of children who have received measles treatment | Mother 1 | Female | Kaita Kastina | PHC, |
| | Mother 2 | Female | Kaita Kastina | PHC, |
| | Mother 3 | Female | Kaita Kastina | PHC, |
| | Mother 4 | Female | Kaita Kastina | PHC, |
| | Mother 5 | Female | Kaita Kastina | PHC, |
| | Mother 6 | Female | Kaita Kastina | PHC, |
| | Mother 7 | Female | Kaita Kastina | PHC, |
| | Mother 8 | Female | Kaita Kastina | PHC, |
| | Mother 9 | Female | Kaita Kastina | PHC, |
| | Mother 10 | Female | Kaita Kastina | PHC, |
| | Mother 11 | Female | Kaita Kastina | PHC, |

| Stakeholders | Functional title | Sex | Location |
|----------------------------|------------------|--------|----------------|
| The Philippines Case Study | | | |
| Local Authorities | | | |
| Community Centre | Elderly 1 | Female | Kidapawan City |
| | Elderly 2 | Female | Kidapawan City |
| | Elderly 3 | Male | Kidapawan City |
| | Elderly 4 | Male | Kidapawan City |
| | Elderly 5 | Male | Kidapawan City |
| | Elderly 6 | Male | Kidapawan City |
| | Elderly 7 | Male | Kidapawan City |
| Beneficiaries | Beneficiary 1 | Female | Kidapawan City |
| | Beneficiary 2 | Female | Kidapawan City |
| | Beneficiary 3 | Female | Kidapawan City |
| | Beneficiary 4 | Female | Kidapawan City |
| | Beneficiary 5 | Female | Kidapawan City |
| | Beneficiary 6 | Female | Kidapawan City |
| | Beneficiary 7 | Female | Kidapawan City |
| | Beneficiary 8 | Female | Kidapawan City |
| | Beneficiary 9 | Female | Kidapawan City |
| | Beneficiary 10 | Male | Kidapawan City |
| | Beneficiary 11 | Male | Kidapawan City |
| | Beneficiary 12 | Male | Kidapawan City |
| Day Care Centre | Beneficiary 1 | Female | Tiwi |
| | Beneficiary 2 | Female | Tiwi |
| Community Centre | Beneficiary 3 | Female | Tiwi |
| | Beneficiary 4 | Female | Tiwi |

| | | | |
|------------------|----------------|--------|-------|
| | Beneficiary 5 | Male | Tiwi |
| | Beneficiary 6 | Male | Tiwi |
| | Beneficiary 7 | Male | Tiwi |
| | Beneficiary 8 | Male | Tiwi |
| | Beneficiary 9 | Female | Virac |
| | Beneficiary 10 | Female | Virac |
| | Beneficiary 11 | Female | Virac |
| | Beneficiary 12 | Female | Virac |
| | Beneficiary 13 | Female | Virac |
| | Beneficiary 14 | Female | Virac |
| | Beneficiary 15 | Male | Virac |
| | Beneficiary 16 | Male | Virac |
| Community Centre | Beneficiary 17 | Male | Virac |
| | Beneficiary 18 | Male | Virac |
| | Beneficiary 19 | Male | Virac |
| | Beneficiary 20 | Male | Virac |
| Barangay Hall | Beneficiary 1 | Female | Virac |
| | Beneficiary 2 | Female | Virac |
| Community Centre | Beneficiary 3 | Female | Virac |
| | Beneficiary 4 | Female | Virac |
| | Beneficiary 5 | Female | Virac |
| | Beneficiary 6 | Female | Virac |
| | Beneficiary 7 | Female | Virac |
| | Beneficiary 8 | Female | Virac |
| | Beneficiary 9 | Female | Virac |

| | | | |
|--|----------------|------|-------|
| | Beneficiary 10 | Male | Virac |
| | Beneficiary 11 | Male | Virac |
| | Beneficiary 12 | Male | Virac |
| | Beneficiary 13 | Male | Virac |

ANNEX 5: LIST OF PROJECTS SELECTED FOR IN-DEPTH REVIEW

The FichOp and e-Single Forms of the following projects were reviewed:

| Country | Partner(s) | Sector | Year | Title of the Action | Type of disaster | Agreement ID |
|--------------|------------------|--|------|---|------------------------|-------------------------|
| ALERT | | | | | | |
| Afghanistan | IFRC-CH | Shelter and Settlements, and Food Security and Livelihoods | 2019 | ARCS emergency flood response in Nangarhar, Faraha and Helmand | Floods | ECHO/DRF/BUD/2018/91021 |
| Bangladesh | OXFAM-NL (NOVIB) | WASH, Shelter and Settlements, and Food Security and Livelihoods | 2020 | Emergency Response to meet the immediate food and other basic needs of people affected by Cyclone AMPHAN in the South-West Areas of Bangladesh | Cyclone | ECHO/DRF/BUD/2019/91037 |
| Ethiopia | IOM-CH | Coordination, Shelter and Settlements, Protection, and WASH | 2018 | Protection and Life-Saving Assistance for Disaster-Affected Internally Displaced Persons in Ethiopia. | Drought | ECHO/-HF/BUD/2017/91006 |
| Indonesia | ACTED-FR | WASH, Shelter and Settlements, and Operation | 2018 | Multi-sectoral emergency assistance to the earthquake and tsunami affected population in Palu, Sigi and Donggala in the province of Sulawesi, Indonesia | Earthquake and Tsunami | ECHO/DRF/BUD/2018/91018 |
| Lebanon | CICR-CH | WASH | 2020 | ICRC Wathab activities in Lebanon | Technological disaster | ECHO/DRF/BUD/2020/91014 |
| Mozambique | WFP-IT | Coordination | 2019 | Provision of Logistics Cluster Common Services in Support of the Humanitarian Community responding to Cyclone Idai in Mozambique | Cyclone | ECHO/DRF/BUD/2019/91008 |
| Nigeria | IFRC-CH | WASH, NFI and Health | 2018 | Nigeria floods Response | Floods | ECHO/DRF/BUD/2018/91013 |

| | | | | | | |
|--------------|-------------------|--|------|---|---------------|-------------------------|
| Philippines | ACF-ES | Food Security and Livelihoods, WASH, Shelter and Settlements, Protection, and Health | 2019 | Life saving humanitarian assistance to people affected by the Mindanao Earthquake | Earthquake | ECHO/DRF/BUD/2019/91024 |
| South Sudan | IOM-CH | WASH and S/NFI | 2019 | Integrated multi-sector assistance for vulnerable, conflict-affected communities in South Sudan | Floods | ECHO/-AF/BUD/2019/91019 |
| SST | | | | | | |
| Haiti | IFRC-CH | WASH | 2016 | Emergency Plan of Action Haiti: Hurricane Matthew | Hurricane | ECHO/DRF/BUD/2016/91018 |
| Congo | WFP-IT | Food Security and Livelihoods | 2017 | Emergency food assistance to displaced people in Pool and Bouenza departments | Human-induced | ECHO/DRF/BUD/2017/91009 |
| Pakistan | ISLAMIC RELIEF-DE | Shelter and Settlements, and WASH | 2018 | Balochistan Emergency Flood Response (BEFR) | Floods | ECHO/DRF/BUD/2018/91024 |
| Colombia | CROIX-ROUGE-DE | Health, WASH, and Shelter and Settlements | 2020 | Humanitarian aid and emergency relief in communities affected by the floods in Colombia | Floods | ECHO/DRF/BUD/2020/91026 |
| DREF | | | | | | |
| Multiple | IFRC-CH | Support to operations | 2017 | Overall Agreement | Multiple | ECHO/DRF/BUD/2017/91001 |
| Multiple | IFRC-CH | Support to operations | 2018 | Overall Agreement | Multiple | ECHO/DRF/BUD/2018/91001 |
| Multiple | IFRC-CH | Support to operations | 2019 | Overall Agreement | Multiple | ECHO/DRF/BUD/2019/91004 |
| Multiple | IFRC-CH | Support to operations | 2020 | Overall Agreement | Multiple | ECHO/DRF/BUD/2020/91001 |
| Multiple | IFRC-CH | Support to operations | 2021 | Overall Agreement | Multiple | ECHO/DRF/BUD/2021/91002 |
| E/RRM | | | | | | |
| Niger | COOPI-IT | Health and Nutrition | 2019 | Réponse d'urgence (RRM) aux besoins en soins de santé, nutrition et soutien psychosocial des populations vulnérables, déplacées et d'accueil, | Human-induced | ECHO/-WF/BUD/2019/91065 |

| | | | | | | |
|-------------|--------------|--|------|--|-----------------|-------------------------|
| | | | | touchées par la crise dans la région de Tillabéri, au Niger. | | |
| Cameroon | WFP-IT | Food Security and Livelihoods | 2020 | Life-saving food support to refugees, internally displaced persons and vulnerable local communities in Cameroon. | Human-induced | ECHO/-AF/BUD/2020/92024 |
| Nigeria | ACF-FR | Health, Nutrition and WASH | 2020 | Integrated Humanitarian Response for the Most Vulnerable Population in Mobbar LGA, Borno State, Northeast Nigeria. | COVID-19 | ECHO/-AF/BUD/2020/92040 |
| Ethiopia | IRC-DE | Coordination and Disaster Risk Reduction / Disaster Preparedness | 2019 | Emergency Response Mechanism (ERM) VII | Multiple | ECHO/-HF/BUD/2019/91030 |
| Zimbabwe | CARE-DE | Disaster Risk Reduction / Disaster Preparedness | 2019 | ZIMBABWE DISASTER RAPID RESPONSE MECHANISM | Multiple | ECHO/-SF/BUD/2019/91027 |
| Afghanistan | DACAAR-DK | WASH | 2018 | Emergency WASH Response Mechanism in Afghanistan | Human-induced | ECHO/-AS/BUD/2018/91012 |
| CM | | | | | | |
| Chad | WFP-IT | Food Security and Nutrition | 2019 | Ensuring vulnerable Chadian and refugee population receive adequate and timely food and nutrition assistance to strengthen their food security and nutrition situation | (Not-activated) | ECHO/-AF/BUD/2019/92025 |
| Chad | CICR-CH | Livelihoods | 2018 | ICRC Economic Security activities and Family link activities in Chad | Human-induced | ECHO/-AF/BUD/2018/92006 |
| DRC | ACTIONAID-IT | Education and Protection | 2020 | Building protective environment for people of concern through access to basic education and community based protection in emergencies | Human-induced | ECHO/COD/BUD/2020/91014 |

| | | | | | | |
|-------------|---------|--|------|--|---------------|-------------------------|
| DRC | DRC-DK | Education and Protection | 2018 | Réponse intégrée d'urgence aux besoins en protection de l'enfance et en éducation dans les territoires de Beni et du Lubero dans la province du Nord Kivu. | Human-induced | ECHO/COD/BUD/2018/91020 |
| Niger | IRC-DE | Nutrition | 2019 | Lutte contre la malnutrition infantile dans la région de Tillabéri, au Niger | Human-induced | ECHO-WF/BUD/2019/91055 |
| Philippines | CARE-NL | Food Security and Livelihoods, Shelter and Settlements, WASH, Protection, and Health | 2019 | REACH: Response to the Unmet Humanitarian Needs of the Most Vulnerable Conflict-Affected Populations in Mindanao | Multiple | ECHO-XA/BUD/2019/91016 |

ANNEX 6: CASE STUDIES ON DG ECHO'S RESPONSE TO SUDDEN-ONSET DISASTERS

4.1 Case study 1: The Philippines

A. Objectives & Rationale

This case study covers the implementation of the Emergency Toolbox in The Philippines over the evaluation period 2016–2020. The Philippines was selected as it was the main recipient of ETB funding between 2016–2020, with 10.3% of the total envelope excluding the Epidemics tool. It also received the highest number of funding allocations (16) and was frequently affected by a diversity of natural disasters including typhoons, floods, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. While the Philippines had mainly benefited from ALERT (83% of the ETB allocations), it also received DREF and SST allocations. Crisis modifiers were also utilized in the country. Throughout the evaluation period, DG ECHO maintained an antenna office in Manila and worked through partner consortiums.

B. Scope

This case study covers the entire evaluation period 2016–2020, with a stronger focus in recent years, as well as discussions on Typhoon Rai in 2021 as this was the most recent example of an ECHO response, and as such was in the forefront of current partner staff minds and experience.

It also focused on an analysis of the following aspects of the interventions in line with the evaluation matrix set out in the inception and desk reports:

- To what extent the mix of instruments and tools was appropriate, timely available and sufficiently flexible to enable DG ECHO support partners in providing an adequate response?
- To what extent DG ECHO's funded actions in response to sudden-onset disasters ensured that the needs of the most vulnerable population were accounted for in a context of emergency response, and were aligned with DG ECHO's principled approach.
- To what extent interventions were aligned with the relevant sectoral policy guidelines?
- To what extent was DG ECHO successful in coordinating with other actors?
- What was the added value of DG ECHO's humanitarian response to sudden-onset disasters?
- To what extent the mix of instruments and tools enabled DG ECHO to support partners in addressing critical unforeseen humanitarian needs in a timely manner and achieve concrete results?
- To what extent DG ECHO reached cost-effectiveness in its response, what are the enabling/mitigating factors?
- To what extent was the EU budget allocated to respond distributed equitably and proportionate to what actions were meant to achieve?
- To what extent were Emergency Toolbox-funded actions followed by additional Country/Region HIP-funded projects and/or linked to recovery/development projects?

C. Methodology

The case study relied on a mixed methods approach, to provide the basis for triangulation across methods and data sources. More specifically, the evaluation team relied on the following tools:

- i. Documentary review: The evaluation drew on a desk review of documentary evidence related to the Philippines as well as on project documentation for ETB implemented in the country.
- ii. Semi-structured interviews to collect primary qualitative data: semi structured key informant interviews for the case study were conducted in Manila by the Lead Consultant between March 7 – 16th 2022. In total 20 interviews were undertaken with DG ECHO Field Staff (1), ECHO partners (8), UN organisations (5), Red Cross Movement partners (5) and a USAID/BHA as alternative donor.

- iii. Field visits: At the same time, the national researcher visited ECHO project intervention sites in Mindanao (March 10-11) and the Bicol Region of Luzon (March 15-18) to talk with ECHO partners (ACF, Oxfam and World Vision), Local Government and Barangay Officials, and beneficiaries. (Please see the annex for the full itinerary).
- iv. Focus Group discussions with beneficiaries were conducted during the field visits
- v. Portfolio Analysis – as seen in section 1.5.

The case study was led by Jeff Duncalf (a core member of the Evaluation Team) with the support of a National Researcher Genela Cabural-Buhia. Additional support was also provided as required by other evaluation team members and ADE analysts.

D. Country profile

I. Natural disasters

The Philippines' location and geographical context makes the country exposed to the extremely high risk of coastal hazards and deadly volcanic eruptions. Located on the "Pacific Ring of Fire" and along the Pacific typhoon belt, at least 60% of the country's total land area is frequently subject to multiple hazards such as typhoons, floods, tsunamis, and earthquakes (Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance, 2021). In terms of natural hazards and exposures risks, the Philippines ranked third worldwide for three consecutive years from 2016 to 2018, entailing a very high level of societal vulnerability (World Economic Forum, 2016; 2017; 2018).

Recurrent disaster events have resulted in serious consequences on 74% of the population (Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance, 2021), in which the poorest often suffer the most due to the disrupted access to basic services and resources and the increased loss of livelihoods. In particular, the Philippines' food supply was detrimentally destroyed by large-scale disasters at a national scale with over 67,000 hectares of rice crops destroyed since 2013, compromising the livelihoods of nearly a million farmers (UNDRR, 2019) while exposing 64% of the population to chronic food insecurity (WFP, 2022). During the evaluation period 2016-2020, the Philippines were faced with two major massive-scale super typhoons: Haima in 2016 and Mangkhut in 2018. Typhoon Haima internally displaced to 2.3 million Filipinos (UN OCHA, 2016a), while contributing to the adverse effects to 400,000 hectares of rice paddy, maize, and high value crops (UN OCHA, 2016b). Typhoon Mangkhut damaged a total of 209,908 houses in four regions of the country and put 4.6 million people living in affected areas at risks of displacement (UN OCHA, 2018). In 2021, Super Typhoon Rai hit the country, affecting more than 11 million people in 11 of the country's 17 regions and leaving a swathe of destruction (WFP, 2022). As the second-deadliest disaster following the Haiti earthquake in 2021, the typhoon killed 405 people (UNOCHA, 2022) and displaced more than 1.7 million people (IFRC, 2022). Moreover, the typhoon casted lasting economic consequences with widespread damage to shelter, livelihoods, agriculture, and infrastructure.

Simultaneously, the Philippines is highly vulnerable to climate risks – a key factor contributing to the increase in the frequency of typhoons, floods and drought. The country was considered the fourth most affected country by climate change events in the world over the past two decades (Eckstein et al., 2021). In 2016, a strong El Niño episode resulted in forest fires and recurrent droughts in about a third of the Philippines, affecting the livelihoods of at least 285,000 farmers across 6 cities, 16 provinces, and 65 municipalities (UN OCHA, 2016a), while La Niña events caused flooding in low-lying farm (Sutton et al., 2019). Climate change related droughts led to the decreases in both agricultural outputs and incomes, which adversely impacted nutrition and dietary diversity. It was estimated that nearly a quarter of the population in Mindanao– one of the most affected provinces in the Philippines – experienced inadequate food consumption in 2016 (ibid.).

Figure 3. The Philippines map (UN Geospatial Unit, 2020)

II. Humanitarian assistance


The major donors active in the Philippines provide humanitarian assistance in forms of both bilateral fundings and funding through UN and EU agencies. According to data extracted from UNOCHA (as of February 24th, 2022), the country benefitted from a total of 115 million dollars in the period 2016-2020. The Government of Japan was the single largest humanitarian donor, providing 24 US million dollars (21% of total), followed by the US government with 22 million US dollars (19% of total). DG ECHO was the fourth biggest donor, with 14 million US dollars or 13% of total funds, working with key humanitarian partners on the ground to address the combined effects of natural disasters and climate change. Other key humanitarian donors included Sweden (6 million USD), Germany (4 million USD), the Central Emergency Response Fund (4 million USD), and United Kingdom (1 million USD). The government of the Philippines was also an important actor with 19 million US dollars.

E. Overview of DG Echo Portfolio in the Philippines

A total of 8.7 million euros were allocated as part of the ETB to the Philippines over the period of 2016-2020.¹³ While the country mainly benefitted from ALERT (82.3% of the ETB allocations), it also received DREF 8.6% and SST 9.1% allocations, albeit to a lesser extent in recent years. ETB projects were implemented in the country by six major partners: 33% of funds were allocated to Action Against Hunger Spain (ACF-ES), 21% to the International Organization for Migration (IOM-CH), 15% to Oxfam Belgium (OXFAM-BE), 12% the Spanish Red Cross (CROIX-ROUGE-ES), 11% to CARE Netherlands (CARE-NL), and 9% to IFRC (IFRC-CH) exclusively for DREF projects.

¹³ The data on ECHO funding by tool, year, and partner illustrated in this section was extracted from the HOPE platform (as of June 1st, 2021).

Figure 4. Funding allocation in million euros to ETB during 2016-2020, and % of individual ETB instruments by year.



Source: ADE's calculations based on the EU extraction from HOPE

In parallel with the ETB, DG ECHO responded to sudden onset disasters in the Philippines with crisis modifiers. Over the period 2016-2020, a total of 6.2 million euros were disbursed to two major partners in the form of CMs: 52% to Save the Children Spain (STC-ES) and 48% to CARE-NL.

F. Findings against evaluation questions

I. EQ1 To what extent were the mix of instruments and tools appropriate, timely available and sufficiently flexible to enable DG ECHO to support the partners in providing an adequate response?

For all reviewed projects implemented in the Philippines, funds appear to have been delivered in a timely fashion. There was consensus among DG ECHO implementing partners that were interviewed that the release of funds for ALERT and SST was overall fast. A characteristic example is the recent ALERT project in response to Typhoon Rai which released a start-up funding of €1.7 million within three days which allowed to get the response started. Additional funding of €10M was released later. Nevertheless, in some cases delays emerged, with partners specifically complaining about the length and complexity of the application process.

DREF and crises modifiers were described as particularly fast. As mentioned by the PRCS, who are the lead agency for the Red Cross Movement in the Philippines, DREF has been the easiest and quickest source of funding for them¹⁴ and can often include a capacity building component. Such DREF appeals were reported to have been approved within 47/72 hours. ECHO has supported a number of DREF projects over the review period in the Philippines, albeit not recently.¹⁵ For crisis modifiers, the lack of a new application process, rendered funding very much flexible, easy to release and therefore speedily utilised should disaster strike. ECHO is currently using crisis modifiers in the armed conflict response in Mindanao.

¹⁴ The PRCS can also get funding quickly from in-country donor national societies.

¹⁵ The maximum amount of funding from a DREF is 500,000CHF.

The speed of delivery was facilitated by a number of elements, including the prepositioning of stocks, the significant experience and expertise of DG ECHO, the extensive network of highly experienced partners already present on the ground, and finally the consortium based approach. The increased engagement in anticipatory action and forecast-based funding appears to be positively contributing to the timeliness of response.

Firstly, investment in DP and in particular in prepositioning of stocks has played a critical role. It must be remembered that the Philippines is affected by 20-25 typhoons a year, and as such the first line of response is the local government who have stockpiled supplies of food items¹⁶ and relief goods and established identified evacuation centres. They also disseminate information to local communities when there is a need to evacuate.¹⁷ In essence, this is a national emergency response or rapid response mechanism. When necessary DG ECHO and its implementing partners can tap into government and INGO preestablished mechanisms and utilise their prepositioned stocks. The provision of anticipated funding is key in this regard. ECHO contracts can indicate a date for the eligibility of funding well in advance of the date the actual contract is signed.¹⁸ Given the trust of local actors in DG ECHO, this allows them to start utilising their stocks immediately, with the expectation that these will be replenished when ECHO funding comes through. Some examples of this are the World Vision support provided in response to Typhoon Goni, and the SAVE stocks utilised after Typhoon Odette. Support items are therefore able to be delivered in a timely manner, without being affected by procurement delays.

Secondly, ECHO and its partners are becoming increasingly engaged in anticipatory action, piloting some small projects in and around the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), and forecast based funding. Such approaches should only facilitate the preparations for any expected disasters, as well as the timeliness of the respective responses. One point of concern however is that typhoons have the habit of changing path, and anticipated triggers in certain locations may not happen as expected. A certain amount of flexibility needs to be built into such mechanisms for them to function effectively.

Finally, ECHO utilises a consortium based approach relying on a network of highly experienced partners with strong field presence. Even prior to the disaster, particularly in the context of typhoons, international consortium members communicate with their field based NGO implementing partners and local government contacts to establish levels of preparedness, and then immediately after the typhoon, to assess the level of damage. ECHO fully utilises the data gathering capacity of the consortium members and their contacts so as to formulate their preferred response. This in itself contributes to the efficiency of the response. ECHO also gathers information through the Philippines Red Cross (PRCS), OCHA, the Govt., and other donors. ECHO's trusted consortium members have been working together over a number of years¹⁹ and, accepting the difficulty of the task, are able to put forward a multi sectoral proposal to ECHO within days of any disaster taking place. This is not easy, with each consortium member having to outline their sectoral element of the response. Although only an antenna ECHO office, the incumbent ECHO Head of Office in the Philippines has a good knowledge of the geographical coverage of INGOs and NNGOs, and as such can put a consortium together very quickly.

In addition to being timely, DG ECHO support in the Philippines has been flexible in that it has covered across all types of disaster, for example for the Kidapawan earthquake in

¹⁶ The Dept. Of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) provides food that is meant to last for six days.

¹⁷ Although the local communities are not always guaranteed to listen, and can be wary of leaving their home for the unknown conditions of the evacuation shelters. (Some family members can also be old and infirm).

¹⁸ For example, Adra, for Typhoon Goni, which struck on November 1st 2020, signed a contract on November 20th with a start date of November 1st.

¹⁹ The lead consultant evaluated one of ECHO's first consortium based responses to Typhoon Washi in 2013 which included similar consortium members.

Mindanao, the eruption near Lake Taal, and the ongoing conflict surrounding BARMM²⁰ in Mindanao, and has funded sectoral interventions as required, on a needs basis.

Overall, the mix of ECHO tools have been appropriate to the needs of ECHO, its partners, and the beneficiaries affected by such sudden onset disasters. Both the timely and flexible provision of funding across a range of sectors and geographical locations, have been critical in this regard. In addition, the experience and expertise of DG ECHO's partners have been invaluable. This might explain why ECHO consortium membership is seen as somewhat a closed shop,²¹ with entrance or admittance onto a consortium seen as an acceptance of an organisation's standard of implementation being at a certain respected level. Finally, the use of a consortium-based approach has expanded the geographical coverage of a response and contributed to ensuring a complementary multisectoral approach. Consortium members are also funded by other donors such as USAID/BHA, and are well respected within the Philippines humanitarian community, they also understand the contextual environment having worked in the country for a number of years.

II. EQ2. To what extent DG ECHO's funded actions in response to sudden-onset disasters ensured that the needs of the most vulnerable population were accounted for in a context of emergency response, were aligned with DG ECHO's principled approach, and were aligned with the relevant sectoral policy guidelines?

Overall, DG ECHO's approach towards sudden onset disasters in the Philippines has been "to go where it matters most, to go to the last mile, the most isolated areas, and to go to those with the least," all within an overriding emphasis on targeting support to those who are physically, socially and politically challenged. **Such an approach is aligned with DG ECHO's humanitarian principles,** as was confirmed during interviews with consortium partners.

DG ECHO in the Philippines has exhibited a strong commitment to reaching those most in need, according to Consortia partners, and has to a large extent been effective in doing so. According to local government officials, the required priority needs of the affected populations have generally been met immediately. This has been in the form of food, relief items, cash, hygiene kits, shelter repair, and WASH support, amongst others. According to them, the capacity of the given aid in reaching the most vulnerable may be variable depending on the size of the funding received, but not on the tools used to raise the funds or the approach employed for targeting, which are generally seen as appropriate.

Systematic needs assessments have been critical for ensuring that the most vulnerable are reached, with beneficiary lists being reviewed several times so that households with people with disabilities (PWDs), elderly, pregnant women and children, can be included.²² In the context of the ALERT project "Life-saving humanitarian assistance to people affected by the Mindanao Earthquake" (2019), implemented by Action Against Hunger (AAH), during the assessment process, the affected communities, such as Barangay leaders and community health workers, were involved. Furthermore, representatives from the community were present in local disaster response committees and beneficiaries were interviewed in the evacuation shelters in order to ascertain their needs. Feedback processes have been enabled both through the Barangay Leader and the relevant consortium partners. In the Mindanao response to disaster, AAH have used community volunteers within the WASH committees.

In the context of needs assessments, DG ECHO has largely benefitted from previously established consortium partner contacts with local NGOs and government officials (they are invariable already active in the region). **DG ECHO's consortium partners and local authorities**

²⁰ The Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.

²¹ Albeit some new consortium members have been initiated recently.

²² As mentioned was the case in Kidapawan.

are well experienced in conducting rapid²³ assessments in the Philippines context, with an attempt to include all of those areas seriously affected.²⁴ This was particularly the case for shelter damage assessments.²⁵ The importance of contacts on the ground explains why INGOs and NNGOs are employed more by DG ECHO than the UN agencies. The access to such information provides a basis for quickly formulating an ALERT proposal, which DG ECHO promptly approves, giving the agencies a green light to go ahead and respond. Afterwards, contracts follow soon.

Despite the strong emphasis on systematic assessments some challenges were identified by beneficiaries during focus group discussions. Some households indeed complained not receiving the expected and necessary support. This happened because during the needs assessments not all households were present, and some favouritisms occur. The errors, once identified, have been modified and other people found support from a different source.²⁶ The beneficiary list was in some cases often undertaken in cooperation with local government departments, Barangay Health Workers, and Barangay Leaders. DG ECHO acknowledges also the fact that local governments or politicians in the Philippines can sometimes fund one community over another.

DG ECHO has put particular emphasis in terms of the application of humanitarian principles provided to indigenous populations, which often live in remote mountainous or insecure areas that are hard to reach, according to consortium members. Partners are indeed required to provide support based on vulnerability and on the level of affectedness, not on the basis of political allegiance.

However, working with those marginalized communities, which are often less well supported by government services, and that are at times in conflict with governmental authorities, can lead the organisations and the people involved to be “red tagged”.²⁷ Humanitarian principles are also embedded within the consortium members practices. This stance has been supported by the ICRC who have negotiated an exemption with the government for humanitarian agencies in order to avoid such governmental labelling.

The DG ECHO thematic guidelines were only partly implemented. Two out of four agencies interviewed said they did use DG ECHO guidelines and mentioned attendance at trainings and workshops. The other two interviewed agencies did not however know about them. Newly formulated DG ECHO themes to be included in ALERT proposals, such as climate change, and environmental footprint, are very much relevant in the Philippines context, where the impact of typhoons, and the way they behave, will have an impact on how such disasters are anticipated, and therefore responded to. Similarly, the coastal areas, which is affected by environmental changes that affects aquaculture, require to be considered.

III. EQ3. To what extent was DG ECHO successful in coordinating with other actors (including EU Member States), notably in terms of avoiding overlaps and promoting synergies? What was the added value of DG ECHO’s humanitarian response to sudden-onset disasters?

DG ECHO successfully coordinated with other donors, although it was not necessarily the donor of reference in the Philippines. There was good coordination and joint leadership with USAID/BHA, the largest donor in the Philippines. This was due to their longstanding positive working relationship in terms of coordinating funding for implementing partners both for sudden onset disasters and resilience building or developmental activities. The coordinating role of DG ECHO was further strengthened by the recognized reputation of DG ECHO’s Representative within the

²³ For example, Govt. officials in Luzon reported World Vision arrived within days of the onset of the disaster.

²⁴ All 40 Barangays were covered in Kidapawan after the earthquake and all 25 affected Barangays of Tiwi were covered in the assessments, according to government officials.

²⁵ World Vision for example, have their own “Good Enough” rapid response assessment tool (GECARR).

²⁶ As per Governmental officials Bicol.

²⁷ In line with the communist label attached to the National People’s Army (NPA) who are largely associated with the indigenous population areas. The NPA is considered a terrorist organisation by the Philippine’s Govt.

humanitarian community. Although no official forum for donors' coordination exists in the Philippines, there was some level of information sharing between DG ECHO and other donors. It has been reported that donors would gather together and circulate information about funding availability prior to any impending super typhoon.

Coordination between ECHO's and other actors on the ground was overall positive, although the level of exchanges could be increased in some cases. DG ECHO has coordinating effectively with UN agencies in the Philippines. For instance, sharing of analysis, assessments and information from the field took place with UN OCHA. Albeit UN agencies are generally not included in the consortia, the recent typhoon Odette response saw DG ECHO donating funding to WFP for logistics support, notably as the remoteness of some of the affected areas required additional capacity and expertise. Coordination with UN agencies was also fostered as DG ECHO's sits in the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT)²⁸. On the other hand, there was limited coordination between DG ECHO and the IFRC/PRCS, despite both parties having expressed a willingness to work together in the future. Only some interaction took place between DG ECHO and the Spanish and German participating national societies, leaving room for improvement.

The multisectoral approach inherent within the consortium fosters synergies and complementarities generating benefits greater than the sum of the individual parts. Utilising a consortium of INGO/NNGOs, who have already submitted a joint planning proposal, makes it easier to avoid overlaps although this process is not always reported as perfect. Geographical coverage is normally agreed during the proposal writing process, and each individual NGO then works with each other and local government authorities to ensure that there is no duplication of effort at a local level.

DG ECHO's added value consisted in quickly providing funds to the most vulnerable and remote areas while upholding humanitarian principles. DG ECHO's has provided sizeable funding within 2-3 days of the onset of a disaster. The tools at the disposal of the antenna DG ECHO office facilitate efficiency and timeliness of the response in that they are set up to be administered quickly, i.e. the SST/ALERT, the inbuilt contract crisis modifiers, and the support they can provide to the DREF, if considered appropriate. The flexibility of its contracting procedure is a further element contributing to its speed.

DG ECHO's additionality also rests on the mobilized local knowledge and technical expertise grounded in the partnership with local and international INGO/NNGOs, but also in ECHO's staff longstanding experience. DG ECHO's knowledge of the INGO/NGO community capacity and resources available, the knowledge and experience that its consortium partners bring to the response, its understanding of the local context, its rapid deployment to the field are all regarded as key distinguishing characteristics. Furthermore, the technical expertise of the incumbent Head of Office, both in terms of process management, as well as implementation monitoring, is well renowned. Further specific technical expertise is provided by back up staff in Bangkok and Brussels when required.

IV. EQ4. To what extent the mix of instruments and tools enabled DG ECHO to support partners in addressing critical unforeseen humanitarian needs in a timely manner and achieve concrete results?

Overall, DG ECHO's mix of instruments and tools used for SoDs in the Philippines, enabled partners to quickly and effectively respond to critical beneficiary survival needs that arise within the first few days of any emergencies.

²⁸ The Humanitarian Country Team is composed of organizations that undertake humanitarian in-country actions and that commit to participate in coordination arrangements. It should include UN agencies, OCHA, NGOs, and components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

All tools were recognized for their speed in addressing needs. The tools generally enabled the recipient organisations to quickly respond to any type of sudden onset disaster and provide food, shelter, water, blankets, etc. as needed. This was particularly the case for DREF and Crisis modifiers. ALERT and SST were also described as fast but partners expressed the wish to simplify the application process by reducing the length of the single form to further improve the timeliness of the mechanisms.

Partner programmatic effectiveness was to a large extent achieved, according to feedback from the project site visits. Some variation was exhibited across areas of intervention based on the functionality of the consortium members involved and the operational context in which they were working. For example, the Livelihood, Cash and WASH interventions by AAH in Kidapawan were particularly appreciated by government officials, as was World Vision's shelter support in Bicol. Cross cutting issues such as gender and protection were, according to government officials, mainstreamed within the overall response, although there were complaints about how well the evacuation centres were set up. The consortium approach also allowed to expand coverage over a wider area.

The type of tool used did not affect consortium partner's programmatic effectiveness. Each of the tools presented distinct advantages, and were used accordingly based on the situation. For instance, crisis modifiers have the upside of not requiring a new application process allowing for the immediate release of funds. They also exhibit high levels of flexibility, enabling developmental or resilience building-programmes to switch to a sudden onset intervention. DREF has enabled the rapid mobilization of funds through the PRCS rapid response teams and their branch network to support beneficiaries. The PRCS is well supported by "participating" national societies (such as the Spanish and German) and the IFRC, and themselves are well experienced at undertaking emergency response activities, particularly in terms of search and rescue teams and mobilizing volunteers to work at a community level. ALERTs funded larger scale responses.

There were some concerns about the limited scope and unequal coverage of the tools to comprehensively address humanitarian needs. For instance, crisis modifiers and the DREF only deliver small amounts of money i.e. 500K CHF for the DREF. SST provides support to a comparatively small numbers of people i.e. less than 100,000, while ALERT funds larger scale responses. It was rather the follow-on appeals and secondary rounds of funding, that, together with resources provided by other donors funding, helped meet the ongoing emergency and recovery needs of the affected populations.

DG ECHO's close monitoring and assessment mechanisms positively contributed to generating learning for greater achievements of results. DG ECHO conducted frequent high-level monitoring to ensure interventions are going as planned. Performance feedback from ECHO was quoted as being "tough but fair" and educational. The sectoral expertise of the DG ECHO technical staff was also appreciated by the consortium members that could benefit from it. DG ECHO also organised debriefing workshops, follow-up assessments for each programs, coupled with some mid-term reviews, which enhanced lessons learnt.

V. EQ5/EQ6. To what extent DG ECHO reached cost-effectiveness in its response, what are the enabling/mitigating factors? Was the EU budget allocated to respond to sudden onset disasters distributed equitably and proportionate to what actions were meant to achieve?

In the projects reviewed for the Philippines, it was clear that DG ECHO had attempted to consider costs at both the design and the implementation stage. DG ECHO assessed the necessary programmatic and logistical costs through benchmarking. Cost assessments of newly funded actions were based on previous proposals. According to partners, DG ECHO sufficiently acknowledged different cost-effectiveness considerations, such as the costs of reaching the most remote beneficiaries, prioritizing the needs of those most in need. It also assigned a cap of 7% for administration costs.

ALERT/SST funding for the consortiums is based on the inherent multi-sectoral, multi-agency proposal and as such funds are typically distributed proportionately on the basis of what is expected from each partner. But, at times funding was equally distributed between partners who then have to tailor their activities to the level of funding available. These large international NGO partners have their own internal funding sources, plus alternative external sources, including USAID/BHA and the local embassies, so the DG ECHO funding is often “matched” by the consortium partners themselves. This is also anticipated by DG ECHO.

The degree of DG ECHO’s monitoring on expenditures varies across different tools. On the one hand, crisis modifier budgets are agreed in advance, normally set at approximately 10% of the contractual amount, and can be utilised, in agreement with DG ECHO, once pre-established triggers have been met. The use of funds also needs to be reported on a timely basis. On the other hand, DREF allocations are subjected to a lower level of control.

DG ECHO funding levels are reported as being larger than most other donors and are used across all sectors and on any type of disaster. However, some concerns were raised about the sufficiency of funds and scope of certain interventions. DG ECHO’s initial blanket support ensured coverage of basic needs, but subsequent support was often needed to further target the most vulnerable at the local level. In some cases, even taking into account government support, plus the total humanitarian sector funding, a number of critical needs remained unaddressed. The tools are not expected to cover the overall response needs. The emergency tools are there to allocate relatively small amounts quickly, and to get the response off the ground and ECHO funding was seen as adequate for this purpose. **Another issue that emerged was that currently DG ECHO and other donors only contribute to a sudden onset disaster in the Philippines if the government requests support.** This normally only happened in case of larger scale disasters. As a result, in recent years there has been limited funding to smaller-scale disasters. SST was last used in the Philippines in 2017.

VI. EQ7. To what extent were Emergency Toolbox-funded actions followed by additional Country/Region HIP-funded projects and/or linked to recovery/development projects? What could be further done (enabling factors, tools, mechanisms, change in strategy, etc.) to strengthen links to interventions of development actors?

There are some links between Emergency Toolbox-funded actions and capacity building elements inscribed in broader recovery projects. In some cases, short term ALERT/SST/DREF lifesaving interventions have been followed up by resilience building activities such as shelter repair or livelihood programming. Firstly, PRCS reports that DREF funds have been utilised to support capacity building activities, and interventions have also led to increased branch level logistical capacity. This has contributed to improving PRCS response capacity and consequently national disaster response capacity. Secondly, within the overall response, community level leaders and local response structures have also benefited from the experience of responding to a disaster, with lessons learnt activities enabling them to do better next time. Local level contingency plans have been updated.²⁹ Beneficiaries themselves have participated in trainings, for example, on shelter and this has improved their preparedness levels. Some Indigenous populations have been rehoused in permanent shelters away from their high-risk landslide prone former settlements.³⁰ Consortium partner activities have included an element of “build back better” within their sectoral programmes, notably in terms of shelter and WASH activities, as reported during the field visits. SAVE are able to merge their emergency activities into the ongoing health and education in emergencies programming. However, despite the inbuilt resilience building activities, affected communities still remain vulnerable to future typhoons or other natural disasters.

²⁹ As per govt. officials in Kidapawan.

³⁰ As per govt. official. in Bohol.

A comprehensive strategy linking emergency and development activities is largely missing. Despite DG ECHO's intention to work with development agencies, consortium partners and the wider humanitarian community sustain that there is a visible gap between humanitarian and development interventions.

Yet, new elements in DG ECHO's approach response hold some potential for positive long-term impact. One recent addition to partners' application process is the obligation to include climate change and environmental considerations in their proposal. This could have a positive impact especially considering that the Philippines are highly subjected to environmental damages, particularly along its coastlines and in the mountainous areas where landslides are a concern, and to climatic changes, including frequency, power, and the unpredictable trajectory of the typhoons. Future anticipatory action and forecast based financing activities of DG ECHO will also be beneficial in this respect. For instance, it would be more cost effective to improve housing prior to a typhoon than to do the repairs afterwards. DG ECHO's engagement with NGOs is a further positive factor in terms of the Grand Bargain localisation commitment. The capacity of such NGOs is gradually being built over time, as they learn from the INGO counterparts, and benefit from funding for both sudden onset and peace time programming.

4.1 Case study 2: Nigeria

A. Objectives & Rationale

This case study covers the implementation of the sudden onset tools in Nigeria during the evaluation period 2016-2020. Nigeria was selected as a case study country for the following reasons: (i) it was among the top-15 recipients of ETB funding (over the period 2016-2020), accounting for 2.2% of the total envelope excluding the Epidemics tool; (ii) it has benefited from all three tools (ALERT, DREF, and SST); (iii) the humanitarian context in the country is complex and challenging. It is chronically affected by both natural disasters and Human-induced crises; (iv) Emergency/ Rapid Response Mechanisms (E/RRMs) have also been utilized in the country alongside the ETB.

B. Scope

The case study examines the use of the various tools in Nigeria over the period 2016-2020 to respond to sudden onset disasters. This includes an analysis of:

- the relevance of the above tools in the context of Nigeria as well as appropriateness of the related functioning, processes, modes of interventions, etc.
- the timeliness of response.
- the extent to which these are responding to the most pressing needs.
- the use of E/RRM – origins, rationale, budget, delivery mechanism, geographic scope, activities etc.
- the added value of DG ECHO's tools vis-à-vis other donors' response.
- whether the effectiveness and efficiency of DG ECHO's tools varies in different crisis situations (Human-induced vs. natural disasters).
- complementarity between the Emergency Toolbox, crisis modifiers and E/RRM.
- the adequacy of budget allocations.
- issues affecting connectedness of DG ECHO's rapid response with DRR/ DP and longer-term recovery.

C. Methodology

The case study was based on a mixed methods approach, to allow for triangulation across methods and data sources. More specifically, the evaluation team used the following tools:

- Documentary review: The case study drew on project documentation (e-SF and FichOps) for selected ETB and E/RRM projects implemented in Nigeria as well as on a broader desk review of relevant literature and documentary evidence sourced from interviewed stakeholders and via internet searches.
- Semi-structured interviews: Semi structured key informant interviews were conducted with DG ECHO's implementing partners, local NGOs, national/ local authorities, as well other donors operating in the country. Interviews were conducted both virtually and in person with the support of the national researcher present in Nigeria.
- Field visits: The national researcher carried out visits two ECHO project intervention sites. Six focus group discussions were conducted with different types of beneficiaries (see annex 3 for more details).
- Portfolio Analysis: A detailed inventory of ETB and E/RRM actions implemented in Nigeria was developed on the basis of HOPE extractions. The evaluation team sought to complement this on the basis of interviews, in particular for E/RRMs and CMs. A less detailed inventory was developed for the rest of the donors present in the country as well for ECHO interventions in the country that are not associated with emergency response.

The case study was led by Charu Wilkinson (TL) with the support of a National Researcher Idoteyin Ezirim. ADE analysts also provided additional support.

D. Limitations

The scope of the research undertaken was limited by the time and budget available for the study. As such, the case study should not be regarded as a comprehensive evaluation of DG ECHO's rapid response in Nigeria.

The evaluation team was able to conduct two on-site visits as part of the case study research, but there are limitations to what can be achieved in a relatively brief period of time, particularly in terms of collecting feedback from communities and project beneficiaries.

There was general lack of awareness of the ETB among interviewed stakeholders. As such, stakeholders were unable to provide detailed feedback on the specificities of ETB tools. Moreover, frequent staff turnover (given the country context and rotation of humanitarian workers) has resulted in institutional loss of memory on past interventions.

Finally, several key donors and partners did not respond to the evaluation team's requests for interviews for various reasons.

Given the above caveats, the findings presented in this case study should be treated with caution and regarded as 'food for thought' rather than as a definitive source of evidence-based findings.

E. Context

I. A complex mix of Human-induced crisis and natural disasters

Most humanitarian needs in the country are related to conflicts, extreme violence by non-state armed groups, violence between herders and farmers and security issues resulting in population displacements and growing food insecurity. However, the population is also subject to natural disasters like floods and droughts.

Figure 5. Nigeria map (UN Geospatial Unit, 2014)

Since 2009, the Government of Nigeria has been fighting non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in the north-eastern states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe (the so-called BAY States). The years of armed violence has resulted in a dire humanitarian situation characterised by large-scale internal displacement and food insecurity. The north-east region of Nigeria has faced long-standing structural poverty and inequality, which are often seen as key drivers of the conflict. This has turned the crisis into one of 'the most pronounced, multi-faceted and complex humanitarian and development [crises] known to the international community today' (UNDP, 2018).

In 2021, the conflict dynamic has been influenced by changes in the leaderships and areas of influence of the two major NSAGs, both factions of Boko Haram initially: the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) and the jamā'atu ahl al-sunnah lidda'wati wa al-jihād (JAS). Both groups have intensified inter- and intra-NSAGs clashes, as evidenced by the targeting of the JAS leader, Abubakar Shekau, by ISWAP gunmen in May 2021, whereby ISWAP expanded its capacity and territorial control.

The long-running insurgency and violence in the Northeast has disrupted livelihoods, reduced market access, reduced localised food production shortfalls, all leading to growing food and nutrition needs. The situation has been further exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and related administrative restrictions. As a result, the following acute humanitarian needs emerged and persisted in June 2021:

- 8.7 million people were estimated to be in need of humanitarian assistance and protection (OCHA, 2021)
- 1.92 million internally displaced with a further 257,000 forcibly displaced Nigerians have sought refuge in Cameroon, Chad and Niger (OCHA, 2021).
- 80% of internally displaced persons are women and girls. Thousands of women and girls have been abducted since the crisis began in 2009 (CARE, undated). Many face gender-based violence,

including sexual violence, trafficking, and forced survival sex in exchange for food and basic items.

- 4.4 million people in the Northeast, Northwest, and North Central facing high levels of food insecurity and risk of famine (ECHO 2021).
- 1.2 million people without assistance (ECHO 2021).
- Malaria and highly contagious diseases including measles and cholera spreading across the country (IFRC, 2021).

Similarly, farmer-herder clashes have continued for decades in Nigeria's Middle Belt states of Taraba, Benue, Kaduna, Plateau, Nasarawa, and Adamawa (ACAPS, 2021). These clashes have left more than 1,300 people dead and displaced thousands of people across the country. However, there is a lack of recent available data on the amount of people affected by farmer-herder violence.

Nigeria also suffers from floods and droughts. The devastating effects of climate change, combined with a relatively weak economy and an under-protected, expansive environment, have also exacerbated the country's vulnerability to natural disasters.

Nigeria is especially susceptible to rising sea levels which result in recurrent floods. Due to its downstream location, Nigeria is also affected by flood responses (i.e., dams releasing water) by neighbouring countries like Niger and Mali. At least 20 percent of the population, including the whole spectrum from the rich urban residents to poor farmers and fishermen, is at risk of one form of flooding or another (Humanitarian Library, 2013). In 2019, heavy rains affected 21,056 households across the three states of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe, causing widespread flooding, casualties, and damage (UNOCHA, 2019). In 2020, 24,134 people were reported to be displaced due to severe flooding (UNOCHA, 2020).

Simultaneously, Nigeria suffers from increasing desertification. At the other end of the climate spectrum, up to 40 percent of the country's land area is now estimated to be subject to periodic droughts (CFR, 2021). Droughts can significantly affect large areas over a long period of time and cast a serious impact on regional food production and economic performance of large regions. Specific consequences include economic losses, destruction of ecological resources, food shortages and massive starvation, and reduced life expectancy for entire populations (Humanitarian Library, 2013).

The rapid population growth rate of approximately 2.7 per cent (WFP, 2021) nationwide and in areas that are subject to these disasters in the last two decades has placed more people at risk whenever an extreme weather event occurs (Humanitarian Library, 2013). Currently the most populated country in Africa and the seventh largest in the world with over 200 million people (WFP, 2021), Nigeria's population is expected to reach 450 million by mid-century (CFR, 2021). That has enabled natural disasters with increasing frequency and magnitude to further aggravate the highly fragile economic disparities while hindering improvements in human development and environmental sustainability (IFRC, 2021) in Nigeria where over 60 per cent of the total population live below the poverty line (WFP, 2021).

II. Humanitarian response architecture

The Government of Nigeria at federal and sub-federal level has demonstrated national willingness to take the lead in relief response in the country. At federal level, there are the Ministry of Finance, Budget and National Planning, the Ministry for Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development (FMHDS) and the Nigerian Centre for Disease Control (NCDC), which leads the response to COVID-19. At State level, there are the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) and the Agency for Sustainable Development and Humanitarian Response, established in Borno State 2019 to coordinate and support the provision of aid.

There is a wide array of structures in place to coordinate international humanitarian aid (see Annex 4 for more details), with the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) as the focal point. The HCT is led by a double-hatted UN Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), who is also the UN Resident Coordinator (RC), supported by a Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator (DHC). This dual role is seen by some as compromising the ability of the UN RC /HC to advocate effectively for humanitarian issues, while also locating the leadership of the response to Abuja, far away from the realities of the crisis in the north-east. While an operational HCT is located in Maiduguri, the humanitarian response

has struggled with a lack of access to certain populations and a lack of proximity with people affected by the conflict (ODI, 2022).

OCHA plays a key support role for coordination of response, including a critical role in the humanitarian civil-military coordination structure (CMCoord), as well as assisting the HC in the management of the Nigerian Humanitarian Fund (NHF). An active INGO Forum exists for coordination and information sharing purposes, commonly referred to as the NIF (Nigeria INGO Forum) and donors are regularly invited for updates.

The UN's leadership in the response was questioned repeatedly during this research, particularly regarding their lack of assertive advocacy to the government. Specific issues flagged by stakeholders are as follows:

- The HCT and OCT are not meeting regularly as designed. Therefore, discussions at ISCG level are not feeding into the OCT and HCT level in Abuja. As a result, the humanitarian response in Nigeria is not joined-up.
- Lack of effective coordination of the AWG by OCHA. Flexible funding needs to be accompanied with strong advocacy to improve humanitarian access to vulnerable populations in order to provide an effective rapid response.
- Lack of strong leadership / humanitarian representations from the UN to coordinate and advocate with the Borno state government.
- Lack of strong initiatives and actions (beyond verbal communication) to effectively improve access.

DG ECHO is one of the most active donors in terms of humanitarian advocacy and advocacy for improving the humanitarian response in the country. This was highly appreciated by partners. Given the persisting access constraints, however it was suggested by partners (INGOs) that DG ECHO should play an even bigger role in access advocacy. DG ECHO, along with other UN members and donors, were expected to strengthen their actions to hold OCHA accountable for its efforts to tackle major challenges on humanitarian access and coordination. Some partners even suggested that DG ECHO takes leadership in humanitarian advocacy given OCHA's limitations, but this goes beyond DG ECHO's mandate.

III. Challenges and risks for the humanitarian response

Insecurity and access limitations were repeatedly highlighted as critical operational challenges by interviewed stakeholders. It was also mentioned that the situation is deteriorating, both in terms of worsening of conflict and limitation of access. Access to people in need is a critical challenge in northeast Nigeria, where due to insecurity the humanitarian actors are relying heavily on UNHAS helicopters to visit locations outside of Maiduguri. Moreover, the authorities allow humanitarian operations to take place only in areas controlled by the Nigerian military. An estimated 85% of Borno is under the control, or strong influence, of NSAGs and completely inaccessible to humanitarian actors. Threats and violence against humanitarian actors from NSAGs on the one hand, and restrictions on humanitarian operations and bureaucratic controls by the Nigerian military on the other, are preventing organisations to reach out to people in need in areas not controlled by the Nigerian military. Security issues coupled with ongoing restrictions linked with active counter-insurgency operations³¹, have severely constrained humanitarian actors in terms of where they can deliver assistance and services, which compromises perceptions of their neutrality and independence.

In Nigeria, the military is positioned as a security provider and gatekeeper for humanitarian actors requiring extensive civil military relations capacity. At times, the government and the military have imposed restrictions on the volume of cash transported by humanitarian actors, banned certain types of goods, limited fuel and mandated military escorts for certain types and volume of cargo on specific roads.


³¹ It is understood that due to counter-terrorism legislation, humanitarian actors unable to establish adequate links with NSAGs to negotiate access

Financing for humanitarian operations is another challenge, with humanitarian actors' operations being underfunded. In addition to this challenge, humanitarian actors also face difficulties when it comes to recruiting experienced staff due to the insecure and difficult working and living conditions.

IV. Humanitarian assistance

The major donors active in Nigeria provide humanitarian assistance in forms of both bilateral fundings and funding through UN agencies. DG ECHO relies on its own budget. According to data extracted from the UNOCHA Financial Tracking Service (as of February 24th, 2022), the country benefitted from incoming humanitarian aid flows of a total of 3.9 billion US dollars in the period 2016-2020.


Figure 6. Annual incoming humanitarian flows to Nigeria, 2016-2020, USD million



Source: ADE's calculations based on UNOCHA FTS data (extracted on February 24th, 2022)

As the single largest humanitarian donor, the US government provided over 1.5 billion US dollars (40% of total incoming flows), followed by the UK government with 594 million US dollars (15% of total). DG ECHO was the fourth biggest donor with 304 million US dollars or 8% of total funds, working with key humanitarian partners on the ground to address the combined effects of natural disasters and Human-induced crises. Other key sources of incoming humanitarian aid flows included the World Food Programme (WFP) (184 million US dollars), Germany (326 million US dollars), Sweden (115 million US dollars), Central Emergency Response Plan (CERF) (91 million US dollars), and Canada (88 million US dollars).³²

³² The inclusion of WFP, CERF, and UNICEF in this list reflects UN OCHA's financial tracking systems. These organisations provide an important source of incoming humanitarian flows to Nigeria, by pooling funds from several donors.


Figure 7. Share of incoming humanitarian flows to Nigeria by donor during 2016-2020

Source: ADE's calculations based on UNOCHA FTS data (extracted on February 24th, 2022)

V. Overview of DG ECHO portfolio

ETB portfolio

A total of 1.8 million euros were allocated as part of the ETB to Nigeria over the period of 2016-2020.³³ While the country mainly benefited from ALERT (54% of the ETB allocations), it also received SST 33% allocations and DREF 13%, albeit to a lesser extent in recent years. ETB projects were implemented in the country by three major partners: 67% of funds were allocated to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and 17% each to the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and UNICEF.

Figure 8. Funding allocation in million euros to ETB during 2016-2020

Source: ADE's calculations based on HOPE data

³³ The data on ECHO funding by tool, year, and partner illustrated in this section was extracted from the HOPE platform (as of June 1st, 2021).

Table 1. List of ETB projects implemented in Nigeria 2016-2020

| Year | Contract number | Contract Title | Tool | Amount € | Partner | Type of disaster | Sectors covered |
|------|----------------------------|--|-------|-----------|-----------|------------------|--|
| 2018 | ECHO/DR F/BUD/2 018/910 13 | Nigeria floods Response | ALERT | 1.000.000 | IFRC-CH | Floods | WASH; Shelter and settlements; Health |
| 2018 | ECHO/DR F/BUD/2 018/910 04 | Provision of Shelter for Cameroonian Refugees in Benue and Cross River States (Nigeria) | SST | 300.000 | UNHCR-CH | Human-induced | Shelter and settlements |
| 2019 | MDRNGO 27 | Nigeria: Yellow Fever Outbreak | DREF | 80.000 | IFRC-CH | DREF Epidemics | Health |
| 2019 | MDRNGO 29 | Nigeria: Lassa Fever | DREF | 80.000 | IFRC-CH | DREF Epidemics | Health |
| 2019 | ECHO/DR F/BUD/2 019/910 19 | Humanitarian response for violence-affected children and women in Sokoto and Zamfara states, Nigeria | SST | 300.000 | UNICEF-US | Human-induced | Nutrition |
| 2020 | MDRNGO 30 | Nigeria: Floods | DREF | 80.000 | IFRC-CH | Floods | WASH; Multi-purpose cash transfer; Food security and livelihoods |

Source: ADE based on HOPE data

The use of E/RRMs

In parallel with the ETB, DG ECHO responded to sudden onset disasters in Nigeria with Emergency Response Mechanisms (ERMs). Over the period 2016-2020, a total of 15.9 million euros were disbursed to five major partners in the form of ERMs: 45% to Solidarités International (SI-FR), 28% to Action Against Hunger Spain (ACF-ES), 9% each to Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC-NO) and Danish Refugee Council (DRC-DK), and 8% to Action Against Hunger France (ACF-FR).


Table 2. List of E/RRM projects implemented in Nigeria

| Year | Project ID | Project Status | Partner Short name | Project Title | ECHO contribution € | Sectors covered |
|------|------------|----------------|--------------------|--|---------------------|--|
| 2016 | 2016/01330 | CLOSED | NRC-NO | Multi-sector emergency response to the basic needs of the vulnerable displacement affected population in northeast Nigeria | 1.496.333 | Shelter and settlements; WASH; Protection; Support to operations |
| 2016 | 2016/01327 | CLOSED | DRC-DK | Emergency Response in Nigeria - Addressing Critical Humanitarian Needs of IDPs and returnees through a Rapid Response Mechanism in North-eastern Nigeria | 1.494.020 | Support to operations; Shelter and settlements; Protection |
| 2017 | 2017/00827 | CLOSED | ACF-ES | Integrated humanitarian response to assist the most vulnerable populations in Borno and Yobe states, Northeast Nigeria | 4.441.663 | Nutrition; WASH; Support to operations; Health |
| 2018 | 2018/00091 | CLOSED | SI-FR | Improvement of access to basic nutrition, health and wash services for IDPS and host communities in Borno state. | 7.200.000 | Health; Nutrition; WASH; Shelter and settlements |
| 2020 | 2020/00182 | ONGOING | ACF-FR | Integrated Humanitarian Response for the Most Vulnerable Population in Mobbar LGA, Borno State, Northeast Nigeria. | 1.297.923 | Nutrition; Health; WASH |

Source: ADE based on HOPE data

Classical humanitarian actions – HIP allocations

The vast majority of DG ECHO funding in Nigeria was allocated through the annual country HIPs. During the period 2016-2020, DG ECHO allocated nearly EUR 255 million through the HIPs, 14 times more than the ETB allocations.

Figure 9. Annual HIP allocations to Nigeria, 2016-2020, EUR million

Source: ADE based on HOPE data

F. Main Findings

I. Relevance and appropriateness of DG ECHO's rapid response tools in the context of Nigeria

The ETB and crisis modifiers³⁴ have been used on a rather limited basis in Nigeria. The limited use of these tools is explained by the protracted nature of the crisis. Interviews suggest that ongoing programming is generally able to absorb the peaks in demand as they arise. They explained that the conflict is quite acute with peaks of violence and movements, but the current programming, including the systematic use of E/RRMs is able to absorb these influxes of people. The E/RRMs were overall seen as a key element of providing rapid response to localised emergencies.

"It is important to note that the ERRM is used to respond to an emergency on top of an emergency. For instance, while you are responding to needs of IDPs in camps, you have a new influx of IDPs. We are talking about life-saving interventions. Another example is you have a Cholera outbreak in IDP camps. In this case you need to respond in a very short period of time."

DG ECHO Partner in Nigeria

Overall, the mix of ECHO tools have been appropriate to address the needs of DG ECHO, its partners, and the beneficiaries affected by such sudden onset disasters in Nigeria in a timely and flexible manner. However, several actors have highlighted a number of limitations in DG ECHO's emergency response:

- Limited flexibility in terms of regions and sectors for E/RRMs. In the context of the constantly evolving context of Nigeria ("crises on top of crises"), there is a need to quickly adapt. It was mentioned that RRM funded by SIDA allow more flexibility in this respect.
- Strong focus on the Northeast. Two implementing partners raised concerns that needs in the Northwest, and to some extent in the South, were not sufficiently targeted (despite the fact that some ETB projects were implemented there). Although there was consensus that the strong emphasis on the Northeast was justified given the intensity of the crisis there, it was suggested that other regions could have benefitted from increased attention (crises described as "going under the radar").
- In some instances, protection and social cohesion considerations were not sufficiently considered from the very beginning of the response, which could suggest a need for further strengthening scrutiny by DG ECHO. For instance, one of the partners reported that in the context of a project responding to the needs of a new influx of IDPs in a camp, it was decided by partners to provide a different level of support to newly arrived IDPs compared to pre-existing residents of the camp. Although this was justified in terms of different levels of needs, it resulted in social tension among the two groups.

II. Effectiveness of DG ECHO's tools

Timeliness of response

The time window for response can range from 48 hours to 2 weeks. Stakeholders interviewed provided examples of how E/RRMs enabled them to respond within 48 hours to an influx of IDPs. It was indicated that the response time to epidemics ranged from 1 to 2 weeks. Examples were provided of response to measles outbreak within a week and response to a cholera outbreak within 2 weeks.

³⁴ Reportedly only one partner is using crisis modifiers in their contract with DG ECHO according to staff from the country office. Given the data limitations and the lack of a centralised system for recording contracts with crisis modifiers, this information could not be verified. But, knowledge of CMs amongst the interviewed partners was limited.

There are, however, several impediments to providing a timely response in the Nigerian context:

- Security and access issues: such as unpredictable changes in security situations or lack of access to insecure areas where there are regular attacks or when the activities can be implemented but it is not safe to gather people. Another issue is that contractors refuse to transport goods to the areas that are insecure
- Bureaucracy: bureaucracy further slows down response: need for authorisations (cash); in Borno, vendors need to be on a vetted list, and it was reported that acquisition of necessary military documents (for military escorts) is a very time-consuming process (4-6 months in Borno State)
- Delays in release of funding: partners reported that there is typically a time lag between declaration of an emergency (e.g. cholera outbreak) and release of funds. The time lag varies from emergency to emergency, but one partner cited the case of cholera outbreak in Yobe in 2021 when it took 2-3 weeks to get the validation for the use of funds.
- Logistical aspects: delays in procurement of drugs, WASH kits etc. or lack of human resources and logistics such as cars. Pre-positioning of supplies and staff capacity were seen as essential for ensuring timeliness of response. Partners mentioned that international orders of NSFI can take up to 2 months to arrive, although sometimes they are able to import supplies from Mali and Lagos in 2 weeks. The extent of pre-positioning is however, limited by funding constraints.

Achievement of planned outcomes

DG ECHO funded ETB and E/RRM actions were largely effective in achieving their intended outcomes despite the challenging operational context in Nigeria. A more granular analysis at sector level reveals the following patterns:

- Shelter: the share of target population who reported living in safe and dignified shelters in secure settlements by the end of the project, ranged from 83% to 100%. In all three relevant projects (2 RRM and one SST), the KOI target was achieved or exceeded.
- WASH interventions: the share of targeted population who reported having adequate WASH services and hygiene practices by the end of the project, ranged from 70% to 100%. Only in one of the 4 relevant projects (3 E/RRM, 1 ALERT) the KOI Target was marginally not reached.
- Nutrition: the share of the total number of discharged [as cured + defaulters + death] across all treatment facilities, over the period of programme which are discharged as cured, ranged from 90% to 96%. In all 3 relevant projects (2 E/RRM, 1 SST) the KOI Target was reached

Table 3. Share of key outcome indicators achieved by tool (2016-2020)

| Tool | % Of key outcome indicators achieved |
|--------|--------------------------------------|
| E/RRMs | 67% |
| ALERT | 67% |
| SST | 83% |

Source : ADE calculations based HOPE data

The extent to which these are responding to the most pressing needs

Interviewed partners confirmed that their actions were based on needs assessment and targeting of the most vulnerable using established methodologies and participatory approaches. Local health workers, community leaders and beneficiaries of an ongoing E/RRM project implemented by ALIMA (targeting cholera and measles outbreak and addressing malnutrition among children) highly appreciated the support provided by the DG ECHO funded action and explained how it has contributed to (i) improving medical infrastructure and facilities (building improvements, bed capacity, improved water supply, generators etc.) and (ii) provision of timely medical assistance. Local stakeholders including beneficiaries consulted, expressed a need for further support, both in terms of the services

provided as well as beneficiary targeting. It was clear that at least these actions were targeting the most pressing needs.

However, one of the stakeholders interviewed expressed a concern that the RRM in the country (including DG ECHO funded RRM) - especially those with activities in the nutrition sector- were being used to fill gaps in humanitarian response due to insufficient funding (i.e., they addressed broader needs rather than those directly emanating from "new emergencies"). This is, however, anecdotal evidence that could not be further explored or validated within the limited scope of research that could be undertaken as part of this case study. This is therefore, an issue that merits further examination by DG ECHO.

Another interviewee also pointed out that in hard-to-reach areas, overall response is often driven by what is feasible rather than what is most needed.

III. The added value of DG ECHO's tools vis-à-vis other donors' response

Besides DG ECHO's tools, there are three other sources of funding for providing rapid humanitarian response in Nigeria. These are briefly described below.

UN's Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)

CERF rapid response funds help UN agencies and their partners respond quickly to new humanitarian needs. Rapid response funds help support life-saving, humanitarian activities in the initial stages of a sudden-onset crisis or for slow-onset crises. They may also be used to respond to time-critical requirements or a significant deterioration in an existing emergency. Rapid response funds are disbursed as soon as possible. They can be used as soon as a disaster occurs and must typically be expended within six months.

CERF allocations to Nigeria amounted to USD 40 million during the evaluation period – see Table 2. The scale of funding released via CERF Rapid Response window is significantly larger than DG ECHO's funding to the country under the ETB and via E/RRMs. However, a major limitation of CERF funding is that it is only available to UN agencies (excluding OCHA).

Table 4. CERF Rapid Response allocations to Nigeria by UN Agency, 2016-2020

| Agency | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | Grand Total |
|--------------------|------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|
| FAO | 1.500.129 | | | 1.500.129 |
| IOM | 2.300.000 | 3.250.000 | 1.100.003 | 6.650.003 |
| UNDP | 272.409 | 282.519 | | 554.928 |
| UNHCR | 3.650.283 | | | 3.650.283 |
| UNICEF | 6.983.131 | 4.200.000 | 2.760.538 | 13.943.669 |
| UNPF | 1.036.342 | 356.171 | 762.002 | 2.154.515 |
| WFP | 6.995.380 | 750.780 | | 7.746.160 |
| WHO | 746.095 | 1.050.001 | 2.244.334 | 4.040.430 |
| Grand Total | 23.483.769 | 9.889.471 | 6.866.877 | 40.240.117 |

Source: CERF (2022). There were no allocations in 2019 and 2020.

Table 5. CERF Rapid Response allocations to Nigeria by emergency type, 2016-2020

| Emergency Type | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | Grand Total |
|---------------------|------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|
| Cholera | | | 2.252.605 | 2.252.605 |
| Displacement | 23.084.028 | 9.889.471 | | 32.973.499 |
| Flood | | | 3.959.223 | 3.959.223 |

| | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|------------|-----------|-----------------------|------------|
| Unspecified Health Emergency | 399.741 | | 655.049 ³⁵ | 1.054.790 |
| Grand Total | 23.483.769 | 9.889.471 | 6.866.877 | 40.240.117 |

Source: CERF (2022). There were no allocations in 2019 and 2020.

RRM set up by UNICEF and WFP

In 2016, UNICEF established an RRM together with WFP to supply food, nutrition and health support to people most in need in Borno and Yobe states by flying teams of specialists to remote areas where they stay up to six days³⁶. The RRM makes extensive use of helicopters and the pooling of logistics and telecommunications resources across the humanitarian community. The RRM provides a time-bound, first-line response, followed by sector-specific responses. Responses are mobilized through coordination by the clusters in the country and are implemented within two weeks to one month following the alert.

USAID/ BHA funding

USAID/ BHA is relatively flexible in its approach to modification of awards (grants). There is full line flexibility within the existing grant award (i.e., there is no need for budget amendment). Apart from this, like DG ECHO, there are two main types of contractual modifications: top-ups or request for additional funding and no -cost extension of timescale. The former can take 3-5 months, while the latter can take up to 90 days

They also have access to a flexible pot of money to respond to unforeseen disasters (pool of funds). Us responds through three mechanisms:

- The affected country requests US assistance.
- The US Ambassador in the country requests for funding to support host country in dealing with a disaster (response time can be as quick as a week).
- The US makes a decision to provide funding because it is in its interests.

Key elements of added value of DG ECHO's rapid response:

- Stakeholders interviewed were not generally informed to comment on the relative advantages and disadvantages of DG ECHO's rapid response tools vis-à-vis the above tools. Overall, the evaluation team could not identify any tools from other donors (UN-CERF, NHF, USAID/BHA, SIDA) that could provide response in such a rapid fashion as ALERT.
- Furthermore, a key element of DG ECHO's added value is the multisectoral approach inherent within the consortium approach to E/RRMs fostered synergies and complementarities across actors. Different partners were mobilized to cover specific issues linked to their areas of expertise (e.g., ALIMA involved in a number of different projects to address food security).
- Finally, DG ECHO's close monitoring and assessment mechanisms were seen as positively contributing to learning, with partners describing DG ECHO as "tough but fair".

IV. Coordination

As previously mentioned, there are a plethora of coordination fora within Nigeria, but interviews suggest that while these might be useful for information exchanges and avoiding duplication, they contribute little to pursuit of synergies and joined-up response. Indeed, many of the stakeholders interviewed were only able to comment on their specific activities and lacked awareness of the broader humanitarian response in the country. As a specific example,

³⁵ Returned by WHO as Lassa fever outbreak was declared over and the number of continuously declined just before the release of the CERF allocation, WHO decided to return the funds. (United Nations CERF (2018). Resident/ Humanitarian coordinator Report on the use of CERF funds Nigeria rapid response other health emergency. Retrieved from https://cerf.un.org/sites/default/files/resources/18-RR-NGA-30426-NR01_Nigeria_RCHC.Report.pdf)

³⁶ WFP (2021). Nigeria Country Brief. Retrieved from https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000135468/download/?_ga=2.146372788.1671739286.1647017062-680929925.1645605400

an RRM strategy for the country³⁷ was published in 2017. However, it was not mentioned by any of the stakeholders interviewed and as such it was not possible to ascertain the 'owner' of this strategy.

V. Issues affecting connectedness of DG ECHO's rapid response with DRR/ DP and longer-term recovery

Stakeholder interviews highlighted two main factors constraining links between rapid response and DRR/ DP on the one hand and links with longer-term recovery on the other:

- Insufficient action in terms of DRR/DP and limited anticipatory not only by DG ECHO, but across the humanitarian community.
- Many locations are not suitable for development programming as humanitarian needs are acute and massive. Donor budgets have reduced, so partners are focusing on addressing acute, life-saving needs

G. Conclusions

Given the country context (acute protracted crisis, shrinking humanitarian space), several actors argued that the ETB/ RRM are not enough to respond to sudden onset disasters in Nigeria. They need to be accompanied by additional actions integrated in DG ECHO's regular programming:

- Need for increased advocacy on access and improving the operating environment for humanitarian actors (bureaucracy and logistical constraints).
- Need for increased investment in DP, DRR and anticipatory action. Pre-positioning is essential for ensuring timeliness, effectiveness and efficiency of emergency response, given the particularly challenging context in Nigeria (logistical issues relating to procurement, transportation etc.),
- Need for increased focus on the nexus and the development of a clear strategy. A comprehensive strategy to inscribe ETB- funded actions in broader recovery projects or to link emergency and development activities is largely missing. It is up to the partners and their respective mandates to ensure sustainability of results. While acknowledging that the Nigerian context and in particular the security, in some parts of Nigeria are not conducive for operationalising the Nexus approach, areas for improvement remain.

4.1 Case study 3: Emergency Toolbox "Decision Chain" Analysis

A. Objectives & Rationale

Timeliness is a central objective for DG ECHO's response to Sudden Onset disasters. The objective of this thematic case study was to document the chain of events from the occurrence of a 'triggering' event (mostly unforeseen) until the implementation of the response on the ground, in order to identify the main challenges and measures undertaken by DG ECHO and the partners to enhance timeliness in the response.

B. Scope and focus

This case study covered DG ECHO's response to sudden onset disaster during the period 2016-2020, with a stronger focus on recent years. It focused on two Emergency Toolbox instruments: ALERT and SST. What makes these tools unique as compared to other emergency tools is that they are managed by procedures internal to DG ECHO.³⁸ DG ECHO has well-established emergency management Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for SST and ALERT,

³⁷ WFP (2021). Nigeria Country Brief. Retrieved from https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000135468/download/?_ga=2.146372788.1671739286.1647017062-680929925.1645605400

³⁸ The other tools depend indeed largely from external factors, such as DREF (managed by the IFRC) and E/RRM (initiated by international coordination mechanisms). For their part, Crisis Modifiers are smaller scale tools and can be activated by field offices by using a share of the existing partner's budget.

intended to ensure a timely response. A key component of this case study was the assessment of the role of SOPs and the degree of DG ECHO's compliance with them.

C. Methodology

The key steps in the methodological approach for this case study were as follows:

- a. Development of a robust sample of projects. The sample can be found in Table 6 (ALERT) and Table 7 (SST). The approach to sampling was purposeful and based on the following considerations:
 - Focus on 3 regions: Africa East/Central/South (E/C/S); Asia; and Latin America – Caribbean (LAC).
 - In each of the 3 above regions, selection of 3 ALERT and 3 SST projects building on the initial desk phase sampling and complemented by a random selection from HOPE, to allow for a sufficiently large sample.
 - Coverage of a mix of types of disasters (hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, sudden bouts of civil violence) as well as a mix of partners (UN agencies, INGOs, Red Cross agencies).
 - Coverage of the entire evaluation period with a stronger focus on recent years.

The selected sample of 18 projects (9 ALERT and 9 SST) was validated by the Steering Committee.

- b. Desk review of the FichOps (FO) and e-Single Forms (eSF) for each of the 18 actions, in order to ascertain the key dates of the emergency response process: triggering disaster, request to DG ECHO by the partner, comments by the concerned ECHO desks, date on which the agreement was signed and transmitted to the partner by DG ECHO, date of authorized starting of action, date of authorized eligibility of expenses. The review of FOs and SFs also included a complementary narrative about the triggering disasters, the action itself, elements of timeliness (indicators, statements) and other relevant considerations in terms of results achieved within the timeline, challenges to timeliness, and suggestions.
- c. Desk review of the compliance with the key steps of the published standard operating procedures (SOP).
- d. Key informants' interviews with DG ECHO and Heads of Office in the countries covered in the sample.
- e. Analysis of custom Key Results Indicators (KRI) related – directly or indirectly – to timeliness. The KRIs were extracted from the HOPE database and provided indications concerning the relevance of existing timeliness indicators (all of these are custom-made by the partners) and the expected lead times by the different instruments. The relevant KRIs were identified on the basis of keywords in French and English (timely, days, months, delays), and subsequently manually verified.

Limitations:

The Evaluation Team faced two key challenges in the context of this case study. Firstly, there was a lack of a systematic use of timeliness indicators to measure the timeliness of the responses. Timeliness KRIs are only sparingly used and are not always properly filled. The limited and inconsistent use of timeliness indicators prevented a systematic analysis of the magnitude of delays in the delivery of assistance and limited the generalizability of findings. Secondly, the evaluation team was constrained by the lack of access to information on the date on which the SST processes were launched. The documentation available on HOPE does not allow the identification of this date. As a result, the length of the decision-making process and subsequently the magnitude of delays (relative to the provisions of the SOPs) could not be accurately and systematically assessed and the Team had to rely on anecdotal evidence.

D. Findings

Both ALERT and SST were generally able to provide rapid responses to emergency needs that occurred after floods, hurricanes/ cyclones or earthquakes, largely thanks to the well-established Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Nevertheless, occasional delays were observed due to a number of challenges such as delays in the decision-making process by DG ECHO, limited capacity of partners, challenging national contexts (e.g. security situation and level of complexity of the crisis), and procurement delays.

I. ERCC (Emergency Response Coordination Centre) Decision-making

The SOPs foresee a lead time of only 48 hours between the initiation of the ALERT procedure and ERCC decision-making (see Annex 10.1 for more details).

For most implemented projects, the SOPs were well respected. For ALERT, decisions could be taken as quickly as 6 hours, with 64% of decisions taken in less than 24 hours (between 2018-2020). **Nevertheless, despite the general speed of the decision-making process, a significant number of ALERT projects faced delays.** For 19.4% of ALERT projects between 2018 and 2020, decision-making took more than three days: in one case it took 5 and in another one 10 days due to an administrative issue. Interviewed HoO attributed the delays to challenges in coordination due to a large number of stakeholders involved the process.³⁹ They also highlighted that, in some cases, there were delays in the launch of the decision-making process. Two HoO provided examples whereby they had to send multiple emails, before the decision-making process was launched by geo-desks or A1. They associated the tardiness in the reaction in those cases with the relatively lower visibility and smaller magnitude disasters, despite the urgency of the situation. **For SST, data on the length of the decision-making process was not systematically recorded by DG ECHO.** Although, overall, the decision-making process run smoothly, anecdotal evidence from interviews led to the identification of extensive delays in decision making for a few projects that were not approved in the end.

The use of the FLANDERS algorithm,⁴⁰ including the improvements implemented in 2019, with the introduction of a new unified methodology for both the SST and ALERT, contributed to the speed of the decision-making process. It allowed for the immediate provision of a recommended amount for first-line funding. However, various actors highlighted the artificiality of these estimates and the need to complement them as much as possible with field insights.

II. Selection of proposals and Contract signing

In the case of ALERT, for which the SOPs provide 14 days for signature of the contract after a decision is made on the eligibility of funds, **there appear to have been delays in the contract signing process due to challenges in completing the eSF which was seen as heavy by partners despite simplification efforts, difficulties in coordination across actors, and in some cases contextual factors such as security and access.** Only for 3 of the 8 projects for which there was available information, the contract was signed in line with the SOP timeframe. The average time between action start and contract signature was 28 days, with one project taking 57 days.


Nevertheless, these delays in contracting do not appear to have affected the timeliness of assistance delivery; largely due to the use of 'anticipated' dates of authorization of

³⁹ According to the SOPs a number of stakeholders need to be convened for the process to be launched: Director A has to convene a meeting inviting DG's assistants; relevant Director(s); HoU(s) of relevant geographical unit(s); HoU ERCC; HoU Security and Situational Awareness; HoU Communication or standby communication officer; while also informing the DG; CAB; relevant ECHO Office(s) and RRC(s). For more details on the different stakeholders involved, see Annex 4.1 page 72.

⁴⁰ FLANDERS is a Funding Allocation Algorithm used by DG ECHO for Natural Disasters. On the basis of three key inputs (the number of people potentially affected, the percentage of this number over the total population of the country, and the country vulnerability and lack of coping capacity (combined into one metric), it provides an estimate of the total amount of funds that should be provided.

action start and eligibility of expenses.⁴¹ Partners are able to start implementing their actions immediately after the triggering event, expecting to receive the funding upon contracting. As partners take financial risk in doing so, their trust in DG ECHO was key in this regard.

Figure 10. Comments regarding timeliness of response



Source: ADE's surveys of DG ECHO Partners and DG ECHO Staff on sudden onset disasters

III. Delivery of Assistance

1. ALERT

Overall, ALERT projects were completed on time but in several cases there were delays mostly in the beginning of assistance, depending on the national and crisis context and the implementing partner. In our sample, delays in the delivery of assistance were mentioned in 6 out of the 9 ALERT projects reviewed.

The **security situation and level of complexity of the crisis** in which the ALERT response was triggered constituted an important factor contributing to delays (i.e. armed conflict and Human-

⁴¹ This procedure of anticipated eligibility of funds is foreseen in the Technical Annex to the Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP and HIPTA) for the Emergency Toolbox, which states that "costs will be eligible from the triggering event". See Annex XX for more details.

induced crisis environment make it much more challenging to operate in a timely manner). This was the case for instance for the following two projects in our sample:

- **IOM – Ethiopia (Floods):** it was reported that the actual distribution of assistance in the form of emergency shelters and non-food items could not be carried out as per the plan due to « the security tensions in Gambella, the continuous movement of the IDPs in Somali and also the decision on allocation of land by the local authorities. » (eSF p.69).
- **NRC – Honduras and Guatemala (Hurricanes):** The difficult socio-political context was identified as an issue during the monitoring of the project: “Both countries where the action is implemented, have insecurity issues that can impact the delivery of the assistance and the normal development of the planned activities, for instance, violence, drug-trafficking, gang groups controlling bordering region and its population, etc”(FO, p.20). The sensitive socio-political context was also highlighted by an interviewed HoO involved in the project, who reported that the context created a need to embed protection in the project which required additional time for the response.

In addition, **the capacity of the partner along with procurement delays** was found to be an issue for ALERT. For example, ALERT IFRC led projects seem to encounter capacity issues related to the national Red Cross societies (and lack of coordination/support with IFRC). It should however be noted that projects led by the IFRC were operating in very complex settings with access constraints and where no other partners would be able to intervene, apart from Red Cross national society (*it is highly likely that it would have taken even longer for other partners to implement such projects in these areas if even possible*). For example:

- **ALERT IFRC – Nigeria (Floods):** late implementation of the project due to limited capacity of the national society and lack of support of IFRC (difficult coordination between the IFRC and the NS).
- **ALERT IFRC – Afghanistan (Floods):** activities were delayed due to problems with international procurement, lack of capacity of the National Society and lack of leadership on the project from IFRC (e.g. no pre-positioning). However, the project activities were taking place in a very difficult zone entirely under the Taliban’s control.⁴²

Logistical constraints and procurement delays were also an issue for the **ALERT IOM– South Sudan project (Floods)**. Assistance was successfully delivered in some areas within 14 days thanks to ‘Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) surge teams’ but was delayed in others due to constraints of logistics and procurement lead time. Overall, only 29% of the 42.000 targeted beneficiaries (R6.11) received assistance within 14 days. The partners explained that delays concerned mostly the Shelter and Non-Food Items (S-NFI) component as this was constrained by the logistics capacity available” and the fact that helicopter “capacity was limited”. Procurement delays were also critical. Although, IOM Core Pipelines immediately started the procurement process for 10,000 S-NFI and 10,000 WASH flood response kits, as soon as the ECHO funding support for flood response was activated, the procurement process was expected to take an average of 120 days limiting the speed of delivery. Interviewed HoOs highlighted the **importance of prepositioning of stocks in order to address procurement challenges, in particular in contexts where the crisis completely interrupts the market.**

Another determinant of timeliness of ALERT (related to capacity) is the integration of ALERT as a top-up within a broader action. When partners are already implementing a response and have the necessary processes in place, they can quickly react to a natural disaster. For example, in the case of IOM-CH (Ethiopia- Floods), ALERT was a top-up (Modification request) which led to include a new result in an action with a relatively large scale and scope. IOM was pre-selected to submit the MR because of its strong presence and capacity in the country, and more specifically its ability to import items and set up cash/voucher operations quickly: i.e. timing of the response guided the selection process. There is however, not information on the actual timeliness of response. One of the HoO indicated that an

⁴² These two projects were reviewed as part of the projects selected for in-depth review for the desk phase of this evaluation and are not part of the sampling specifically conducted for this case study.

active effort is made to integrate ALERT projects in existing ones to benefit from the established presence of partners. This was also associated with a lower administrative burden. However, some DG ECHO staff, despite acknowledging the relative speed and lower administrative burden of using ALERT as a top-up, expressed concerns about the openness/transparency of this process, arguing in favour of keeping the calls open to all.

The delivery modality of cash transfers was also associated with delays. In the 3 cash assistance projects for which relevant indicators were available, the indicator of “Average number of days between trigger (displacement, disaster, etc.) and first cash transfers received by beneficiaries » had a target of 10 days but the actual deliveries took significantly longer: 25, 28 and 39 days respectively. This also appears to have been the case for the sampled ALERT project by **ACF- ES in the Philippines (Earthquake)**. Although, no relevant timeliness indicators were provided, interviewed local government official reported that “the first support arrived within two weeks, WASH support was provided within 30 days, and within 60 days, cash support was provided to beneficiaries by phases/series.” According to them, delays in cash assistance were due to challenges in the identification and validation of the most vulnerable: “The CSWDO had provided the list of poorest of the poor but there appeared some issues – such as being politicized, questionable situation of individuals who were seen as well-off but were on the list, etc.” One interviewed HoO from Latin America also highlighted how the launch of cash assistance during SODs can be challenging. Only if such programs are already in place in the region can there be a timely response.

The maximum duration of an ALERT action is six months. In some projects reviewed, response to a large event was provided in as little as four months (i.e.. Completion of activities) which is considered a very timely response. Some examples are provided below:

- **Oxfam-NL – Bangladesh (Cyclone):** The project delivered in four months and was reported to have been very rapid and effective. The consortium was led by Oxfam with **good coordination** of the different partners, allowing for the coverage of more areas.
- **WFP – Mozambique (Cyclone):** WFP was able to provide a very rapid response in terms of logistics support (aerial assessments and provides air support to bring supplies, also storage etc.). This was accompanied by a rapid response from the International community in general including EU MS and EU Civil Protection.
- **NRC - Honduras and Guatemala (hurricanes):** “The action was fully implemented within the timeframe”(FO p20) and was reported to have effectively responded to the most urgent needs in protection (R1), shelter and WASH (R2).

Although the standard duration of 6 months for ALERT actions generally appeared sufficient to carry out the response, in 4 cases the timeline was considered too short by the partner. This was either because the procurement process was too long or all needs could not be covered which meant that the project duration had to be extended (in one case the duration had to be extended to 12 months) or (in two other cases) because there was no opportunity to prepare a suitable transition after the end of the ALERT intervention. For instance:

- **NRC - Honduras and Guatemala (Hurricane):** One of the identified lessons learnt was that (FO p21) “as predicted, the effects of [hurricanes] ETA and IOTA would run over the mid-term and six months of project activity were not sufficient to cover all needs”. One of the interviewed HoO involved in the project highlighted that the limited duration of the project, left a number of needs unaddressed. For instance, the full effects of the destruction of fields and crops on food security would only be visible after 8 months. Although these could subsequently be addressed by other projects, the failure to embed them in emergency response systems already in place was presented as a missed opportunity
- **ACF-ES – Philippines (Earthquake):** A modification request was submitted for an extension of seven (7) months to allow the consortium to deliver additional activities and reach a larger number of targeted beneficiaries (FO p 25). This solution (modification of ongoing project instead of funding a new contract) was used to avoid the risk of overlap and ensure greater coherence.

The funding source for this modification (800 000 EUR) came from the Top up of HIP 2019 rather than the ETB Toolbox.

2. SST

Overall, approved SST projects were completed on time and did not face significant delays in the delivery of assistance. Interviewed stakeholders attributed the relative speed, to the smaller scale of the crisis, the less challenging context, and the limited number of stakeholders involved (one partner). It was also suggested that SSTs was often used to respond to more protracted crises (Human-induced) with timeliness not being monitored to the same extent as ALERT. For instance, **for WFP-Congo-2017 (Human-induced)**, there is no mention of the timeliness of the response. This is quite logical given that this is not really a SOD response (IDPs since March 2016, raised in September 2016, appeal in July 2017, action took place in august 2017).

In our sample, delays in the delivery of assistance were mentioned in 2 out of the 9 SST projects reviewed. The causes of delays were out of the control of both DG ECHO and its Partners:

- **ICRC- South Sudan (Human-induced):** The projects was delayed significantly due to logistical constraints (e.g. floods) and COVID-19 restrictions imposed by the government since the onset of the epidemic in April 2020
- **Croix-Rouge-DE - Colombia-2020 (floods):** National anti-government strikes- the biggest the country had experienced in four decades- led to delays in distribution of aid kits.

Four of the nine reviewed projects, were explicitly acknowledged for their timeliness leading to the identification of lessons learnt mainly associated with the need for anticipatory action:

- Firstly, the **importance of prepositioning of stocks and partners in particular in isolated places** was highlighted. For instance, for the IFRC project in HAITI (Hurricane), it was reported (FO p. 17) that “the distribution of relief items began the week after the disaster occurred, thereby contributing to save lives. This was partially made possible by the fact that IFRC had a stock of NFIs prepositioned in Haiti before the Matthew landfall. The main lesson learned from this operation is that a stock for at least 5,000 people should be permanently prepositioned in country ready to be used immediately when a disaster occurs and immediately replenished after its usage”. Similarly, for the CARE project Vanuatu (Cyclones) it was reported (FO p21) that “The main lesson to this Action is related to preparedness : the prepositioning of stocks in Fiji and others islands would be a costly-effective investment and could consolidate a timely reasons in case of likely future disasters”.
- Secondly, the **importance of DG ECHO’s prior investment in DRR and DP:** For instance, for the IFRC – LAO PDR (Floods) it was reported that (FO p17) the partner noted that DG ECHO’s contribution and investment in disaster risks reduction (DRR) and preparedness for effective response had laid the foundation of policy and legal frameworks for Lao PDR to be able to facilitate and coordinate international and national response for disasters. This was also raised in interviews, with support for early warning systems being described as valuable.

IV. Challenges in monitoring of timeliness of response

Key results indicators (KRIs) to measure the timeliness of the responses for both ALERT and SST were not mandatory and were only sparingly used. Out of the 69 ALERT projects in our inventory for the period 2016-2020, only 16 had a KRI directly or indirectly associated with timeliness. Among the 9 ALERT events in our case study sample, only 2 had relevant timeliness KRIs. When it comes to SST projects only 1 of the 61 project, in our inventory had a relevant timeliness indicator.

Even to the degree that timeliness indicators were used, these did not show consistency and were not always properly filled. In this respect, the lack of guidance from DG ECHO does not appear conducive. For more details on the available timeliness KRIs and their analysis, see annex 6.

The limited and inconsistent use of timeliness indicators prevented a systematic analysis of the magnitude of delays and limited the generalizability of findings.



E. List of projects reviewed in depth**Table 6. Sampling of ALERT Projects**

| Region | Contract n° | Country | Partner | Type of disaster | Title of action | Budget | Start date | End date | Remark |
|--------|--------------------------|---------------------|------------------|------------------|---|-----------|------------|------------|---|
| Africa | ECHO/-AF/BUD/2019/91019 | South Sudan | IOM-CH | Floods | Integrated multi-sector assistance for vulnerable, conflict-affected communities in South Sudan | 2,149,999 | 01/04/2019 | 31/03/2021 | |
| | ECHO/DRF/BU D/2019/91008 | Mozambique | WFP-IT | Cyclone | Provision of Logistics Cluster Common Services in Support of the Humanitarian Community responding to Cyclone Idai in Mozambique | 1,000,000 | 21/03/2019 | 20/09/2019 | |
| | ECHO/-HF/BUD/2017/91006 | Ethiopia | IOM-CH | Floods | Protection and Life-Saving Assistance for Disaster-Affected Internally Displaced Persons in Ethiopia. | 2,000,000 | 01/04/2017 | 30/04/2019 | |
| Asia | ECHO/DRF/BU D/2019/91024 | Philippines | ACF-ES | Earthquake | Life saving humanitarian assistance to people affected by the Mindanao Earthquake | 1,300,000 | 11/11/2019 | 10/11/2020 | |
| | ECHO/DRF/BU D/2018/91018 | Indonesia | ACTED-FR | Earthquake | Multi-sectoral emergency assistance to the earthquake and tsunami affected population in Palu, Sigi and Donggala in the province of Sulawesi, Indonesia | 1,000,000 | 01/10/2018 | 31/03/2019 | |
| | ECHO/DRF/BU D/2019/91037 | Bangladesh | OXFAM-NL (NOVIB) | Cyclone | Emergency Response to meet the immediate food and other basic needs of people affected by Cyclone AMPHAN in the South-West Areas of Bangladesh | 1,000,000 | 01/06/2020 | 30/09/2020 | |
| LAC | ECHO/DRF/BU D/2020/91027 | Guatemala, Honduras | NRC-NO | Hurricanes | Emergency protection and humanitarian assistance for communities most affected by hurricanes Eta and Iota in Honduras and Guatemala | 555,000 | 01/12/2020 | 31/05/2021 | Only 5 ALERT partners? in LAC (not much choice) |
| | ECHO/DRF/BU D/2020/91028 | Guatemala, Honduras | CARE-FR | Cyclone | Providing urgent humanitarian assistance to meet the basic needs for WASH, Shelter, NFI and Protection for vulnerable households affected by Tropical Storms Eta and Iota in Honduras and Guatemala | 800,000 | 15/12/2020 | 14/06/2021 | As above |


| | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------|------------|--|---------|------------|------------|----------|
| | ECHO/DRF/BU D/2020/9103 0 | Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua | IFRC-CH | Hurricanes | Hurricane Eta & Iota – Central America | 550,000 | 12/11/2020 | 11/05/2021 | As above |
|--|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------|------------|--|---------|------------|------------|----------|

Table 7. Sampling for SST projects


| Region | Contract n° | Country | Partner | Type of disaster | Title of action | Budget | Start date | End date | Remark |
|--------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------|--|---------|------------|------------|--------|
| Africa | ECHO/- AF/BUD/2020/ 91022 | South Sudan | ICRC-CH | Human-induced | ICRC Protection of the Civilians, Water & Habitat and Health care activities in South Sudan. | 150,000 | 01/01/2020 | 31/12/2020 | |
| | ECHO/DRF/BU D/2019/9100 3 | Mozambique | IOM-CH | Floods | LIFE-SAVING SEED DISTRIBUTION TO CONFLICT-AFFECTED RETURNEES AND HOST COMMUNITIES AND FLOOD AFFECTED COMMUNITIES IN TETE, MOZAMBIQUE | 300,000 | 18/02/2019 | 17/06/2019 | |
| | ECHO/DRF/BU D/2017/9100 9 | Congo (rep. Brazzaville) | WFP-IT | Human-induced | Emergency food assistance to displaced people in Pool and Bouenza departments | 300,000 | 01/08/2017 | 31/01/2018 | |
| Asia | ECHO/DRF/BU D/2018/9101 0 | Laos | IFRC-CH | Floods | Red Cross response to flash floods in Lao PDR | 200,000 | 26/07/2018 | 25/01/2019 | |
| | ECHO/DRF/BU D/2019/9103 5 | Vanuatu | CARE-NL | Cyclone | Cyclone Harold Emergency Response | 300,000 | 07/04/2020 | 06/07/2020 | |
| | ECHO/DRF/BU D/2018/9102 4 | Pakistan | ISLAMIC RELIEF-DE | Floods | Balochistan Emergency Flood Response (BEFR) | 250,000 | 01/06/2019 | 30/11/2019 | |
| LAC | ECHO/DRF/BU D/2019/9100 5 | Cuba | OXFAM-BE | Cyclone | Inclusive Recovery of Basic Living Conditions for Families Impacted by Havana's Tornado | 300,000 | 01/03/2019 | 15/10/2019 | |
| | ECHO/DRF/BU D/2016/9101 8 | Haiti | IFRC-CH | Hurricanes | Emergency Plan of Action Haiti: Hurricane Matthew | 255,000 | 01/10/2016 | 31/03/2017 | |
| | ECHO/DRF/BU D/2020/9102 6 | Colombia | CROIX- ROUGE- Germany | Floods | Humanitarian aid and emergency relief in communities affected by the floods in Colombia | 350,000 | 01/12/2020 | 31/05/2021 | |

ANNEX 7: SURVEY RESULTS ON DG ECHO'S RESPONSE TO SUDDEN-ONSET DISASTERS**4.2 Survey SOD - DG ECHO Staff****Q1. Current position/role of the respondents.****Q2&3. Office & country that the respondents are based.**


Q4. Effectiveness of the instruments/tools in providing a rapid response to sudden onset disasters.




Q5. Effectiveness of the instruments/tools in providing initial and bridge funding to address critical and unforeseen humanitarian needs.




Q6. Effectiveness of the instruments/tools in responding to the most pressing needs of beneficiaries.




Q7. Factors constraining DG ECHO's ability to address critical unforeseen humanitarian needs in your regional/ country context in a timely and effective manner.



Q8. The extent to which the actions funded via the instruments/tools have made linkages with disaster risk reduction and preparedness programmes.




Q9. The extent to which the actions funded via the following instruments/tools have made links with recovery and longer-term development programmes.






4.2 Survey SOD - DG ECHO Partners

Q1. Type and specific organisation (N=86)




Q2. Current position/role of the respondents.(N=86)




Q3. Type of Office of the respondents. (N=86)**Q4. Country where the respondents are based. (N=86)**

In addition to the countries presented in the graph below, there was one respondent from each of the following countries: Burkina Faso, Italy, Sahel, Ethiopia, Sweden, Nicaragua, Vietnam, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Comoros, Nigeria, Jordan, Cameroon, Congo, Panama, Venezuela, Peru, Denmark, Guatemala, Ecuador, India, Madagascar


Q5. Familiarity with the instruments/tools of DG ECHO to respond to sudden onset disasters.




Q6. Effectiveness of the instruments/tools in providing a rapid response to sudden onset disasters.




Q7. Effectiveness of the instruments/tools in providing initial and bridge funding to address critical and unforeseen humanitarian needs.




Q8. Effectiveness of the instruments/tools in responding to the most pressing needs of beneficiaries.




Q9. The added value of DG ECHO's emergency response tools in comparison to available instruments across humanitarian actors.



Q11. The extent to which DG ECHO's tools contributed to better overall funding for under-funded / under-the-radar emergencies.




Q12. The level of adequacy of funding available through the tools to meet critical needs and bridge the gap to humanitarian response.



■ Not at all ■ Not entirely appropriate ■ Rather appropriate ■ Totally adequate ■ Do not know

Q13. The extent to which DG ECHO's instruments sufficiently flexible to provide anticipatory responses as opposed to (reactive) responses.




ANNEX 8: DETAILED PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS

General Analysis


Between 2016 and 2020, the overall budget allocated to humanitarian assistance through the Emergency Toolbox amounted to EUR 85 million⁴³. Within the evaluation period, the year 2020 registered a sharp unprecedented increase in the emergency toolbox budget, due to the special amount of resources allocated to the response to Covid-19. Between 2016 and 2019, the total budget allocated through the Emergency Toolbox was EUR 54 million, with yearly variations ranging from EUR 8 million in 2017 to EUR 20 million in 2019. In 2020 alone, the budget allocated to the Emergency Toolbox increased sharply up to EUR 32 million (Figure 11).

Figure 11. Total budget allocated between 2016 and 2020



Source: ADE calculations based on HOPE database

Figure 12. Share of budget allocated by tools between 2016 and 2020



Source: ADE calculations based on HOPE database


The Epidemics Tool (which was not analysed in this evaluation) channelled the largest share of the budget allocated the Emergency Toolbox in the period 2016-2020, accounting alone for the 41% of the total funding. This result is

⁴³ This amount does not include the epidemics tool

largely due to the exceptionally high amount of resources allocated to the response to Covid-19. If we exclude the year 2020, the Epidemics Tool represents 21% of the total funding between 2016 and 2019.

Of the three Emergency Toolbox components covered by the evaluation, ALERT accounts for the largest share of funds, representing the 34% of the budget. It is followed by the DREF (14%), and the SST (11%). Figure 13 shows the share of budget allocation per instrument over the evaluation period, excluding the Epidemic tool. ALERT represents the 56% of the remaining budget, followed by IRFC/DREF with 23% and SST with 19%.

Figure 13. Emergency Toolbox budget allocation 2016-2020 (excluding epidemics tool)




Source: ADE based on HOPE database

In the period 2016-2020, the Emergency Toolbox was activated 137 times in more than 60 countries through ALERT, SST and DREF. DREF was the most activated (197 times). However, DG ECHO was not involved in its activation since DREF is managed by IFRC. Despite its late creation in 2018, ALERT was the most activated tool (69 times) before SST (61 times).

Concerning geographic distribution, EUR 8,7 million (10%) of the Emergency Toolbox budget over the evaluation period was allocated to Philippines, EUR 4,7 million (6%) to Ethiopia and EUR 3.6 million (4%) to Somalia. Figure 14 below shows the budget allocation of the Emergency Toolbox for the fifteen main recipient countries (excluding the epidemics tool). It is worth noting that 80% of the total funding of the Emergency Toolbox was allocated between Africa and Asia (40% each). Latin America and Caribbeans countries received 13%.


Figure 14. Fifteen main recipient countries as share of total Emergency Toolbox budget, excluding Epidemics Tool (2016-2020)



Source: ADE calculations based on HOPE database and IFRC/DREF projects

If we do not consider the Epidemics Tool, the IFRC received by far the largest share of the Emergency Toolbox budget between 2016 and 2020 (29%), followed by the IOM (11%) and ACF-ES (5%). Figure 15 shows the allocations to the fifteen most important DG ECHO partners implementing actions financed through the Emergency Toolbox during the evaluation period. The IFRC stands as the main DG ECHO partner in the response to sudden onset disasters. ECHO has collaborated with 56 different partners over the period.


Figure 15. DG ECHO's main partners as share of the ETB's budget, excluding ET (2016-2020)



Source: ADE based on HOPE database

If we consider the sectorial repartition of the funding, shelter and settlements and support to operations are the most funded sectors with 14% both. They are followed by WASH (12%) and Disaster Risk Reduction/Disaster Preparedness (12%). The less funded sectors are Education in Emergencies (Eie, 1%) and health (5%). For the DREF, WASH is the most important sector with 125 projects (out of 196) having a WASH component. Health (120 projects) and Shelter (120 projects) are the other two most important components of the DREF projects (Figure 16).

Figure 16. Sectorial allocation of the funding of the Emergency Toolbox (excluding Epidemics and DREF)




Source: ADE based on HOPE

Analysis by tools

Acute Large Emergency Response Tool (ALERT)

ALERT was the main tool of the Emergency Toolbox through which funds were channelled. It represented, over the period, EUR 45 million (54% of the budget excluding epidemics tool). 45% of the ALERT funding was allocated to African countries, 44% to Asian/Pacific countries, 7% to Latin American and Caribbean countries and 4% to Middle East countries (Figure 16). The main recipient countries were Philippines (EUR 7.2 million), Ethiopia (EUR 4.3 million) and South Sudan (EUR 2.9 million). In Philippines, ALERT was activated 7 times to bring assistance to people affected by Mindanao earthquake in 2019 and to people affected by Super Typhoon Goni in 2020, for instance. The most important funding of DG ECHO through ALERT between 2016 and 2020 was allocated to South Sudan in 2019. It amounted to EUR 2.1 million.


Figure 17. Regional allocation of ALERT



Source: ADE Calculations based on HOPE

“Shelter and settlements” was the main sector funded by ALERT (20%). It is followed by Disaster Risk Reduction/Disaster Preparedness (16%), multi-purpose cash transfer (16%), WASH (10%) and Coordination (9%). The average amount received by beneficiary from ALERT funding is about EUR 12,6 (Figure 17).

Figure 18. Main sectors funded through ALERT




Source: ADE calculations based on HOPE database

Small-scale tool (SST)


The small-scale tool was the third largest instrument in terms of funding (19%). It was activated 61 times between 2016 and 2020. The first recipient region was Asia/Pacific with 38% of the SST funding. It was followed by the Latin America and Caribbeans (34%) and Africa (24%). In terms of funding, Colombia benefitted the more from the instrument with EUR 1.2 million allocated. It has served, for instance, to the Emergency response, containment, and prevention of the COVID-19 infection in the Department of Amazonas in 2019 (EUR 0.5 million, the maximum allowed). Venezuela (EUR 0.9 million) and Philippines (0.8 million) are the other most important benefitting countries (Figure 18).

Figure 19. Regional allocation of SST



Source: ADE based on HOPE

WASH was the most funded sector through the small-scale tool (25%). It was followed by “food security and livelihoods” (23%), health (21%), protection (10%) and “Shelter and settlements” (8%). These five sectors represented 88% of the SST funding over the period. The average cost per beneficiaries is about EUR 18 (Figure 19).


Figure 20. Main sectors funded through SST

Source: ADE based on HOPE

* other includes Nutrition (4%), Support to operations (3%), DRR/DP (2%) and MPCT (2%)

Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF)

The DREF was the second largest tool in terms of funding. It represented 23% of the Emergency Toolbox funding (without epidemics) between 2016 and 2020. 196 projects were implemented over the period. Asian/Pacific countries and African countries benefited the most from the DREF funding with 36% each (EUR 7.1 million). It was followed by Latin American and Caribbean countries (13%), Eastern North countries (9%) and Middle East (7%). The main recipient countries were India (EUR 0.8 million), the Philippines (EUR 0.7 million) and Indonesia (EUR 0.7 million). The average cost per beneficiary is about EUR 1.81 (Figure 20).

Figure 21. Regional repartition of the DREF funding (2016-2020)


Source: ADE based on HOPE

Emergency or Rapid Response Mechanisms (E/RRMs)

Centralised data on E/RRMs were not available within DG ECHO. E/RRMs cannot be easily identified on the HOPE database (as there is no identifier or flag for these actions). The evaluation team tried to identify such actions in the database using key words such as “RRMs”, “ERMs”, “Mechanism” or “mécanisme”. The evaluation team also conducted a mini-survey of geo-desks to collect this information; however, that survey received limited responses. Despite these efforts, the evaluation team could not compile a definitive list (and hence, form a full picture) of E/RRMs funded by DG ECHO.


A total of 76 contracts related to E/RRMs contracts over the period 2016-2020 were retrieved. They were put in place in 11 different countries: Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mali, Niger and South Sudan Republic. It represented a total amount of EUR 295 million.

Based on the extraction, the allocation to E/RRMs decreased between 2017 and 2020. It ranged between EUR 39 million (in 2020) and EUR 71 million (2017) (Figure 22).

Figure 22. E/RRMs funding between 2016 and 2020

Source: ADE calculations based on HOPE

The amounts allocated to E/RRMs were the most important by far in Afghanistan with EUR 71 million channelled and 19 contracts signed. It was followed by Iraq with EUR 50 million and Democratic Republic of Congo with EUR 43 million (Figure 23).


Figure 23. E/RRMs funding by countries

Source: ADE calculations based on HOPE

The most important implementing partner, between 2016 and 2020, was UNICEF with an allocation of EUR 65 million and 15 contracts in 5 different countries. The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) were the two other main implementing partners with, respectively EUR 63 million and EUR 27 million allocated and, respectively, 11 and 8 contracts. They were just followed by the German International Rescue

Committee (IRC) with EUR 24 million allocated and 2 contracts. More generally, funds were channelled through 18 different partners.

Figure 24. E/RRMs funding by partners




Source: ADE calculations based on HOPE

ANNEX 9: TOC NARRATIVE

The reconstruction of the theory of change for DG ECHO's response to sudden onset disasters aims at clarifying the EU's objectives in this respect, by mapping the logical chain from inputs and activities to expected outcomes and impacts. It serves as the backbone for the evaluation, clarifying against which objectives DG ECHO's response is being assessed. The final agreed version of the ToC diagram is presented in Figure 23 below. It is a generic ToC; in reality, there were inevitably different pathways to change, depending on specific hazard types and local contexts. The diagrammatic version is accompanied by a detailed narrative in the sections that follow.

Figure 25. ToC for DG ECHO's response to sudden-onset disasters



9.1 Inputs

DG ECHO is channelling four types of inputs as part of its response to sudden onset disasters:

- **Funding:** Between 2016 and 2020, the overall budget allocated to humanitarian assistance through the Emergency Toolbox amounted to EUR 91 million. Additionally, DG ECHO also provided funding to E/RRMs in selected countries to enhance the flexibility and rapidity, and provide predictable and coordinated response to recurring localised emergencies. It is estimated that DG ECHO allocated EUR 304 million to E/RRMs in 12 countries during the evaluation period. Finally, partners also had the possibility to include flexible funding in the form of crisis modifiers within their DG ECHO funded actions to respond to new or changing needs.
- **Expertise:** In addition to funding, DG ECHO's staff knowledge of humanitarian needs in crisis-hit regions, the local context and expertise in thematic areas (e.g. disaster preparedness, cash transfers etc.) are important inputs that inform DG ECHO's approach to sudden onset disasters. DG ECHO staff's inputs and expertise, financial and project management (including field monitoring, regular meetings with partners etc.) are essential inputs to project selection and implementation.
- **Institutional inputs:** DG ECHO's institutional inputs comprise policy frameworks; thematic guidelines; data, evidence and analysis; as well as its field network.
- **Strategic partnerships** with organisations such as IFRC and ICRC which aim to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of DG ECHO's humanitarian response.

9.2 Activities and outputs

As outlined in section 1, DG ECHO has developed four instruments to respond to sudden onset disasters. The activities and outputs associated with each of these is described below.

Emergency Toolbox (SST, ALERT, DREF)

Funding via SST and ALERT is allocated on the basis of criteria such as people in need, country vulnerability and used by partners to address the most urgent and pressing humanitarian needs stemming from a sudden-onset disaster. Typical areas of intervention included Food assistance, Health, WASH, Shelter, Non-food items, Nutrition, Emergency livelihoods support, Emergency rehabilitation of basic infrastructures, Disaster preparedness, Protection, Support to emergency communication, Logistics, and Coordination.

DG ECHO supports the following types of activities via DREF:

- Emergency relief covering health, water, sanitation, shelter, non-food relief items, food assistance, psycho-social support, protection, assistance to displaced people and information provision.
- Mobilisation, training and equipment of the Red Cross/Red Crescent volunteers, mobilisation and deployment of response teams, search and rescue, evacuation, and needs assessment.
- Disaster preparedness including early warning procedures, evacuation of those at risk, preparation of shelters, pre-disaster assessment of response capacity, implementation of a contingency plan, communications and pre-positioning of relief supplies, logistics, and human resource assets.

Multiple tools can be mobilised in parallel to respond to a specific emergency if the scale of the funding needs is too large to be met through a single tool.

Crisis Modifiers

A Crisis Modifier can be used as follows by DG ECHO's partners⁴⁴:

- To respond quickly to the most acute needs and potentially shorten the time gap whilst exploring potential additional resources (ALERT or top-ups).
- To allow for a very localised response to needs which may have remained fully unattended by a partner present in the area with an ongoing DG ECHO action.
- To activate early and/or anticipatory response(s) to the likely immediate consequences of natural hazards or other threats.

Typical activities of a Crisis Modifier response included⁴⁵:

- Emergency shelter, WASH, health and/or food or non-food items (NFIs) provided during the first phases of displacement.
- Emergency water supply provided in the first phases of an epidemic/displacement.
- Short-term unconditional and unrestricted cash transfers.
- Short-term food distribution, before food assistance is in place.
- Protection: services such as restoring family links, assistance to unaccompanied minors and other vulnerable groups, information and referral of lifesaving services.
- Emergency health, nutrition and vaccination.
- Preventive evacuation (for example from areas at risk of floods/cyclones).

⁴⁴ DG ECHO Guidance Note on Disaster Preparedness, 2021

⁴⁵ Ibid.

Emergency/ Rapid Response Mechanisms

E/RRMs typically focus on the following four activities:

- Pre-positioning of human, material and financial resources.
- Humanitarian Watch (rather than Early Warning System) and MSA (Multi Sectoral Assessment) including monitoring of humanitarian situation, post distribution monitoring
- Rapid multi-sector response
- Coordination with other parts of the humanitarian system

The weight attributed these different activities varied across contexts. There were differences across E/ RRM with regards to importance attached to needs assessment, coordination with each other and with the broader humanitarian system.⁴⁶

9.3 Results, outcomes and impacts

Overall, DG ECHO's instruments (Crisis Modifiers, Emergency Toolbox, E/RRMs) are expected to contribute to improving the speed, coverage and quality of humanitarian response via the following channels:

- Quick decision making, contractual flexibility and simpler processes
- Maintaining presence through pre-positioning of staff and resources
- Joint reflection and coordination with other actors
- Enabling a localized response

DG ECHO's instruments also contribute to:

- filling critical gaps in funding during the early phases of crises or in case of under the radar crises/ small scale emergencies;
- enhancing preparedness of local partners and actors;
- enhancing the capacity of local Red Cross/Red Crescent societies (via feedback provided by DG ECHO as part of its appraisal of DREF operations);
- improving evidence base for decision making (via humanitarian watch)
- improving coordination and collaboration.

9.4 Assumptions

The main assumptions underpinning the above causal mechanisms are as follows:

- Quick decision-making by DG ECHO;
- Partners have necessary expertise and capacity to respond quickly and appropriately;
- Early warnings translate into early action (anticipatory response only);
- Funding allocation methodology for SST;
- and ALERT is fit for purpose;
- Projects have sufficient mass / scale to meet critical needs and bridge gap to humanitarian response;
- Partners have good understanding of the context, vulnerability and risks;
- Response is sensitive to real needs and priorities;
- Most acute (most pressing & urgent) humanitarian needs are addressed (not necessarily all needs);
- Inclusive and transparent beneficiary prioritisation and targeting;
- Timely allocation and distribution of aid by partners;
- Increases in knowledge and capacity translate into improved humanitarian response;
- Funding flexibility and simpler processes do not reduce the accountability of humanitarian response;

⁴⁶ Inspire Consortium (2017) Review of Rapid / Emergency Response Mechanisms (ERM)
Final report – Part A (SOD)

- DREF feedback is used by IFRC to enhance operations and capacities of national societies (DREF only);
- Compliance with Internal Humanitarian Law and Humanitarian Principles.

9.5 External factors

The main external factors and influences are as follows:

- Frequency and scale of disasters which affects the scale and nature of humanitarian needs as well as the demand for and deployment of DG ECHO's instruments;
- Access to affected areas and communities in case of emergencies including security issues;
- Political economy factors such as national government's willingness to support humanitarian action. A hostile government can undermine humanitarian support by trying to instrumentalise it (for example by influencing targeting in a manner that excludes certain communities) or by preventing access
- Humanitarian and development aid architecture will determine the overall scale of funding available to meet needs. The actions of other actors can result in overlaps or complementarities or gaps in humanitarian response.
- National/ local infrastructure and capacity e.g. national/ local emergency preparedness, health infrastructure, social protection systems etc. has a bearing on the efficiency and effectiveness of DG ECHO's response.

ANNEX 10: ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE TIMELINESS CASE STUDY

10.1 *Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)*

A. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for ALERT

SOPs were defined by DG ECHO to guide the decision-making process for ALERT interventions. The SOPs include the following steps.

1.A. Normal office working hours

- ERCC Duty Officers immediately call HoU ERCC.
- A short internal meeting with HoU ERCC/ERCC duty officers/Analytical Team and Security Cell/ Geographic Unit is immediately convened in the ERCC

1.B. Outside normal office working hours

- ERCC Duty Staff immediately contacts on-call management function (M function).
- ERCC M function takes decision whether they and the administrative support function (X function) should immediately come to the office. M function contacts on-call communication officer who will need to be present within 2 hours if the DG triggers the Emergency Response Team
- Director A convenes meeting inviting DG 's assistants; relevant Director(s); HoU(s) of relevant geo unit(s); HoU ERCC, HoU Security and Situational Awareness, HoU Communication or standby communication officer, informing the DG; CAB; relevant ECHO Office(s) and Rapid Response Coordinator(s)

2. Director A proposal informed by the ALERT Assessment Process + available field input.

3. Director A proposes an amount to the DG. DG takes decision in consultation with CAB.

4. If DG's decision is positive, the decision and amount will be communicated to all Directors; HoU ERCC; HoU Security and Situational Awareness; HoU Communication or stand-by Communication Officer; HoU Contracts and Finance; Relevant ECHO Office(s); RRCs and other relevant units, copying the DG, relevant CAB members and ECHO E3 Decisions Contracts mailbox.

5. **Within 48 hrs of disaster info**, If DGs decision is positive, the decision and amount will be communicated to all Directors; HoU ERCC; HoU Security and Situational Awareness; HoU Communication or stand-by Communication Officer; HoU Contracts and Finance; Relevant ECHO Office(s); RRCs and other relevant units, copying the DG, relevant CAB members and ECHO E3 Decisions Contracts mailbox.

6. Geo desk drafts a communication announcing availability of funding and suggested deadline for proposals. The communication is sent via APPEL to partners by the Emergency Toolbox desk officer (or duty officers outside normal working hours). Relevant desk officer given as contact point. Geo unit leads on assessment and signature of contract/s within 14 days, keeping ERCC Unit informed.

7. Assistance is delivered to beneficiaries.

8. Indicator for timeliness is used (custom-made KRI).

B. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for SST

SOPs were defined by DG ECHO to guide the decision-making process for SST interventions. The SOPs include the following steps.

1. A proposal (MAIL) to consider the use of SST is submitted by either: Head of Unit (HoU) of a geo. unit (mail copying HoU ERCC and relevant ECHO CO) OR the ERCC Unit itself (to the HoU of the concerned geographical unit, copying the relevant ECHO CO)

2. Consultation between the ERCC Unit and the geo unit takes place. HoU ERCC may convene a meeting to discuss proposal.
3. HoU ERCC will take a decision within **5 working days** of the proposal for funding being submitted, engaging with Director A as necessary, of whether to use the SST funding and if so, how much.
4. If HoU ERCC decision is positive, it is communicated to the HoU of the relevant geo, Director of the relevant geo area and his/her assistant, ECHO CO, communication unit, CAB and Director General's assistants, ECHO E3 Decisions Contracts mailbox.
5. Geographical unit then takes forward the contract cycle with partners until end of operation ; contract signed.
6. Assistance is delivered to beneficiaries.
7. Indicator for timeliness is used (custom-made KRI).

As for ALERT, a KII with a responsible officer of DG ECHO confirmed that the **SOPs have been duly adhered to in all cases by DG ECHO**. The relevant information about the SOP compliance is stored in the staff email drivers.

10.2 Provisions for “anticipated” response in the Technical Annex for the HIP for the Emergency Toolbox

“Anticipated” response to shorten lead time and provisions of the Technical Annex for the HIP (Humanitarian Implementation Plan) for the Emergency Toolbox

The HIPTA include the following provisions.

The partners are supposed to be able to provide co-financing (HIPTA 3a) : “Under the EU Financial Regulation, grants must involve co-financing; as a result, the resources necessary to carry out the action must not be provided entirely by the grant. An action may only be financed in full by the grant where this is essential for it to be carried out. In such a case, justification must be provided in the Single Form (section 10.4). »... More specifically for ALERT (HIPTA chap 4): “Partners must have the capacity to respond immediately in the affected area. Partners must have the capacity in terms of structure, personnel and financial means, to respond effectively and immediately to the emergency on the scale required »;

‘Anticipated’ (i.e. before official signature of agreement between DG ECHO and partner) start of action and eligibility of costs are acceptable on the basis of the HIPTA provisions (chap 4) valid for both ALERT and SST. For instance in the latest HIP (2022): “ **Costs will be eligible from the triggering event** in 2022 . Actions may start from 01/01/2022...(footnote) The eligibility date of the Action is not linked to the date of receipt of the Single Form. It is either the eligibility date set in the Single Form or the eligibility date of the HIP, whatever occurs latest”.

The HIP specifies that “in order to ensure a timely response when certain specific details are not yet available, a preliminary analysis of the scale and effects of a large-scale disaster should be sufficient. This would need to be on the basis of the available information and present an analysis of what needs could be expected given the scenario. In the hours following a large disaster, information from the ground may not be available, but a certain amount of needs could be anticipated based on past experiences (e.g. emergency shelter in the case of earthquakes) and primary information (e.g. via social media). As much as possible, any needs assessment, however preliminary, should be done jointly or in coordination with other relevant partners ».

Rather strangely, the **provisions for the HIP do not mention in this regard the algorithm that was developed by DG ECHO A/1 in 2019** (and soon adopted), and which aimed at estimating the possible numbers of affected people even before any ground assessment is made by the partners.

10.3 Analysis of the sampled ALERT projects

A. Overview of lead time and compliance with SOPs for sampled ALERT projects

| | Africa E/C/S | | | Asia | | | LAC | | |
|--|---|--|--|--|---|--|---|---|---|
| | 2019/91019 | 2019/ 91008 | 2017/ 91006 | 2019/ 91024 | 2028/ 91018 | 2019/ 91037 | 2020/ 91027 | 2020/ 91028 | 2020/ 91030 |
| DATES IN SINGLE FORMS / FICHOPS | | | | | | | | | |
| Disaster trigger | Floods in S. Sudan around July 2019 triggering ALERT in Oct. and MR1, (R6) FO p30: 28/10/2019 | Cyclone Idai in Mozambique, landfall 14-15/03/2019. Logistics cluster (WFP) activated on 20/03 | Modification request (MR) 4, LFA R4 floods in Ethiopia; NO DATES | Mindanao earthquake (several in end 2019, including 04/11) | earthquake and tsunami hit Sulawesi on 28/09/2018 | Cyclone Amphan, 22-23/05/2020 | Hurricanes ETA (03-05/11) and IOTA (15-17/11) in Central America | Hurricanes ETA (03-05/11) and IOTA (15-17/11) in Central America | Hurricanes ETA (03-05/11) and IOTA (15-17/11) in Central America |
| Decision from ERCC via APPEL | 19/07/2019 | 19/03/2019 | 24/05/2018 | 05/11/2019 | 01/10/2018 | 21/05/2020 | 12/11/2020 (ETA) 23/11/2020 (IOTA) | 12/11/2020 (ETA) | 23/11/2020 (IOTA) |
| Request submission | FO p29: 1 st 31/10; final 04/11 | 22/03/2019 | FO p35 1 st 28/05/2018; final 30/05 | FO 1 st 08/11/2019; final 13/11 | FO 1 st 05/10/2018; final 22/10 | FO 1 st 26/05/2020 final 31/05 | FO 1 st 25/11/2020 final 04/12 | FO 1 st 25/11/2020 final 04/12 | FO 1 st 16/11/2020 final 04/12 |
| Final comment on request by DG ECHO | 06/11/2020 | 25/03/2019 | 30/05/2018 | 14/11/2019 | 23/10/2018 | 02/06/2020 | 07/12/2020 | 07/12/2020 | 08/12/2020 |
| Action start | 01/10/2020 (R6) | 21/03/2019 | No clear data for MR | 11/11/2019 | 01/10/2018 | 01/06/2020 | 01/12/2020 | 15/12/2020 | 12/11/2020 |
| Eligibility of expenses | No clear data for MR | 21/03/2019 | No clear data for MR | 11/11 | 01/10/2018 | 01/06/2020 | 01/12/2020 | 15/12/2020 | 12/11/2020 |
| Agreement signed / transmitted by DG ECHO | 14/11/2020 | 28/03/2019 | 06/06/2018 | 22/11/2019 | 29/10/2018 | 10/06/2020 | 22/12/2020 | 01/02/2021 (typo for 02/01 ??) | 08/01/2021 |
| Lead time: n° days from 1 st partner's request to eligibility of expenses | No clear data for MR | Anticipated (1 day BEFORE 1 st request) | No clear data for MR | Anticipated (3 days after 1 st request) | Anticipated (4 days BEFORE 1 st request) | Anticipated (6 days after 1 st request) | Anticipated (6 days after 1 st request) | 20 days | Anticipated (4 days BEFORE 1 st request) |

B. Africa East / Central / South

Action 1 : IOM in South Sudan, agreement ECHO/-AF/BUD/2019/91019

Trigger

- Abnormally heavy seasonal flooding devastated large areas of SSD in and after July 2019, with ultimately more than 900.000 people affected, triggering an ALERT in Oct. 2019

Action

- 01/10/20 – 31/03/21 (6 months).
- FO p32: OCHA – flood coordination meeting on 26/10/19, 1st request by IOM on 28/10.
- FO p7 new R6, indicator 1: To respond to this evolving emergency context, IOM will implement activities through its Emergency, Preparedness and Response (EP&R) Team

Timeliness

- The reports include Indicator of numbers rather than time (except final completion): “78.610 flood affected individuals (187% R6 / ALERT) were supported with relevant emergency WASH and/or Shelter/NFIs assistance »...” The flood response (R6 & R8) had been completed within the six months period defined by ALERT decisions”. Assistance delivery within 14 days was possible through ‘CCCM surge teams’ but limited elsewhere due to constraints of logistics and procurement lead time
- FO p15 LFA R6, Indicator 1: Number of targeted persons who receive an appropriate response within 14 days after the completion of the assessment (numbers combined with timeliness). This is also in the analysis below of the use of custom-made KRI for timeliness.
- FO p54, monitoring report 1 by DG ECHO, Points to be raised and addressed in the Interim Report : Result 6 Indicator 1: “The achievement reported is not entirely conform to the indicator itself which as a timeliness indicator was to quantify the number of beneficiaries to be reached within 14 days. Although the number reached, even with delays, is important, the timeliness of response (or not) is also relevant as this intervention was supported with an ALERT allocation. More details on what number of beneficiaries were reached within the 14 days would be helpful, in particular as it could verify as to how appropriate the indicator target was, or not”. R6 : 12.104 affected individuals, received assistance within 14 days (29% R6.11 42.000 targeted).
- Monit rep 6, p59 FO: The flood response (R6 & R8) had been completed within the six months period defined by ALERT decisions (MR01 (R6) 01/11/19 to 14/04/20 and MR04 (R8) 01/10/20 to 31/03/21).
- FO P72: comments on Interim report2: Result 6 Indicator 1: The achievement reported is not entirely conform the indicator itself which as a timeliness indicator was to quantify the number of beneficiaries to be reached within 14 days. Although the number reached, even with delays, is important, the timeliness of response (or not) is also relevant as this intervention was supported with an ALERT allocation. More details on what number of beneficiaries were reached within the 14 days would be helpful, in particular as it could verify as to how appropriate the indicator target was, or not. **@IR2: Closed** - *‘the partner clarifies that this was not always possible within the 14-day target, in particular regarding the S-NFI component as this was constrained by the logistics capacity available’ and helicopter “capacity was limited”. Explaining why “All six completed responses were completed between 21 to 69 days.*
- Reply to monit 1: the partner clarifies that this was not always possible within the 14-day target, in particular regarding the S-NFI component as this was constrained by the logistics capacity available” and helicopter “capacity was limited”. Explaining why “All six completed responses were completed between 21 to 69 days”. No additional info in final report.
- ALSO Result 8 (ALERT – Emergency flood response) Since the start of the flood response in Aug. 2020, IOM Core Pipeline has processed a total of 41 requests, of which 17 S-NFI and 24 WASH,

for 24 organizations : 100% of approved pipeline requests honoured by IOM within 72 hours (not relevant to ALERT process)

- NOTE: under R7 there was also a Crisis Modifier, which was activated in September 2020 following intercommunal conflicts, causing mass displacement, allowing to assist estimated 39.210 affected individuals in five states. This was done without notifying ECHO, following sub national violence, causing mass displacement...the partner formally took the engagement to “Confirming the need to notify ECHO in Juba by email when activating the crisis modifier in future »;

Other relevant considerations (effectiveness, challenges...)

- Effectiveness overachieved: final numbers reached for R6: 78.610 beneficiaries
- Monit 2 FO P51: The flood response as articulated in the Result 6 had been completed and would no longer form part of the further intervention, strictly limited to the time frame as defined by the ALERT funding envelope. As such, progress and achievement would not be confirmed until much later. To address this, a targeted desk review, covering exclusively Result 6 with regard to the operational quality and progress of the flood response intervention was undertaken. This was carried out through an internet-based conference call following the structure of the Logical Framework
- FO P52: **Indicator 1:** *Number of targeted persons who receive an appropriate response within 14 days after the completion of the assessment* – Target: 42.000; Achievement: 58.843 The breakdown across the services was: 58.843 received WASH services and 49.777 received S-NFI response. This confirms the number of people that were assisted. However, the partner clarifies that this was not always possible within the 14-day target, in particular regarding the S-NFI component as this was constrained by the logistics capacity available.
- In the Single Form there was very little information on ALERT, but more regarding the CM for Result 7: R7, final progress report: Indicator 2 (NOT IN LFA): In both Pibor emergency responses (February and July 2020) CCCM surge teams were able to mobilize within 7 days of the alert. Indicator 3: On average, CCCM, WASH and MHPSS teams responded within 14 days. CCCM responded to emergency displacements within 11 days (on average) with a range of 2-21 days and MHPSS teams within 14 days (page 96 of SF). Indicator 4: IOM reached 84% of the targeted population average between WASH, CCCM & MHPSS. 58.4% of the total targeted population reached with WASH EPnR response within 4 weeks after the beginning of the response.
- Challenges found in R8 progress report: Indicator 2 & 3: As soon as the ECHO funding support for flood response was activated, IOM Core Pipelines immediately started the procurement process for 10,000 SNFI and 10,000 WASH flood response kits. As the procurement process takes an average of 120 days, the supplies are expected to arrive in the country towards the end of 2020

Action 2 WFP: cyclone Idai in Mozambique, agreement ECHO/DRF/BUD/2019/91008

Trigger

- Tropical Cyclone (TC) IDAI made landfall during the night of 14/15 March near Beira City, Mozambique bringing torrential rains and winds.

Action

- Immediate response: Since 15 March, the Logistics Cluster has conducted road assessments by traveling on selected routes, assessing the accessibility and road conditions and collecting GPS coordinates. Additionally, the Logistics Cluster has conducted a series of assessments to determine storage needs and to evaluate the infrastructure in these locations (including roads, airstrips, warehousing).

- On 20 March the Logistics Cluster was activated to provide coordination, information management and facilitation of common logistics services in support of the response
- Action: 21/03/2019 - 20/09/2019 (6 months)

Timeliness

- No indicator of timeliness of initial response (all activities to be completed within the ALERT framework of 6 months)

Other relevant considerations (effectiveness, challenges...)

- Assessment FO p24 : very good capacity on the ground. WFP was the first Partner deployed in Beira and effective, to the extent it filled the overall coordination gap left by UNOCHA and ran the overall coordination the whole first Week. Important human resources and logistic means have been deployed very quickly.
- SF p7: The Logistics Cluster user satisfaction survey for cyclone Idai showed an average of 97.78% satisfaction rate (no numbers) with all the services offered. This was based on responses to a series of questions from 15 respondents (NNGO: 2, INGO: 7, ICRC/IFRC: 1, UN:3, Other: 2). No other numbers, this was an operation by the logistics cluster, focused on logistics.

Action 3: Ethiopia by IOM, agreement ECHO/-HF/BUD/2017/91006

Trigger

- Triggering disaster does not seem well described: no dates, no estimation of victims...

Action

- Modification Request 4 ALERT: Wide-spread flooding impacting and displacing significant population (NO DATES), road access due to heavy rains remains a challenge; mitigated through coordination with UNHAS, WFP, the Government of Ethiopia, to ensure access.
- The ALERT funding was announced in May 2018, incorporated as Result 4, addresses the immediate life-saving ES/NFI needs of 10,000 HH beneficiaries (55,000 individuals) in the context of "recent" widespread flooding... R4) In response to wide-spread flooding in « early 2018 », currently affecting 347,000 individuals, a total of 55,000 most vulnerable flood-affected IDPs (10,000 HH) will be assisted with the distribution of in-kind Emergency Shelter (ES) (10,000 HH).

Timeliness

- R4 (ALERT): no timeliness indicator. FO p37 : Since funding used for these activities arrives from ALERT funding, due to the need to utilise this funds 'timely', new result (R4) has been introduced

Other relevant considerations (effectiveness, challenges...)

- Effectiveness, Interim report 2, FO p52 : Result 4 - reporting under result 4 is indicating sub-optimal progress. progress values are rather low (0%, 22% and 32%). Although the retarded progress is well explained (During this reporting period, actual distribution was not done as per the plan due to reasons; the security tensions in Gambella, the continuous movement of the IDPs in Somali and also the decision on allocation of land by the local authorities). However even if all activities are resumed immediately it is likely that IOM will suffer from underachievement under result 4 also at the final report stage. However IOM has great ability to reallocate budget into activities and return of the funding is not envisaged or suspected
- FO P56 final report : not clear why ALERT achievements were lower than foreseen. "Costs associated with this result are reported slightly lower (15%), which seems to be aligned (but) limited compared to plan (as) number of beneficiaries reached (43K versus 55K planned) »: average size of HH is lower than foreseen?
- Challenges, external factors (SF p69) During this reporting period, actual distribution was not done as per the plan due to reasons : the security tensions in Gambella, the continuous movement of the IDPs in Somali and also the decision on allocation of land by the local authorities.

- SF p70 : DOES NOT SEEM SO URGENT, rather looks like an extension of existing activities: Lessons from the pilot cash-based & voucher intervention contribute to a context specific approach in emergency response that is open to a variety of modalities based on rapid market assessments in the locality.

C. ASIA

Action 4: ACF in the Philippines, agreement ECHO/DRF/BUD/2019/91024

Trigger

- FO p19: Last quarter of 2019 saw Mindanao struck by a series of powerful earthquakes, 31 October - 4 November 2019 ; last and most powerful on 22/12 (after ALERT)

Action

- Life saving humanitarian assistance to people affected by the Mindanao Earthquake, through cash transfer, WASH, emergency shelter and psychosocial support, health and protection services. 11/11/2019 - 10/11/2020 (12 months), EUR 1.3 million.

Timeliness

- 'Passive' timeliness indicator: "% of beneficiaries report that they receive aid in a timely manner..."
- VERY FAST: expenses were eligible even before the final request submission (11/11 against 13/11)
- FO p23, MR2: ALERT extended: This modification request proposes to lengthen the project duration from an initial five (5) months to now 12 months, an extension of seven (7) months. This will allow the consortium to deliver additional activities and reach the increased targeted beneficiaries. FO p 25: This MR constitutes the phase 2 of the ALERT intervention that is still ongoing and that consist in life saving humanitarian assistance to people affected by the recent Mindanao earthquake past December. After having consulted the legal and financial ECHO services and knowing that there is possible to extend an ALERT intervention through HIP funding, and to avoid having multiple contracts related to the same intervention, the partner has been asked to submit a MR under the ALERT ongoing project where the activities + funding proposed through the RQ 2020/00220 will be integrated. The funding source for this MR (800 000 EUR) come from the TOP UP of HIP 2019. This solution (MR of ongoing project instead of funding a new contract) will avoid the risk of overlap and ensure greater coherence.

Other relevant considerations (effectiveness, challenges...)

- Lessons learnt: FO p20: The short time of implementation under an ALERT intervention should definitely include a chance where the partners can help the community identify further needs beyond the timeframe of ALERT and how these needs should be endorsed to relevant stakeholder especially the local government. Modify what will be necessary in the proposal (if any), in agreement with ECHO, during the first phase of the implementation of the action.
- FO p55: LRRD after ALERT In addition, there is also essential, that during the implementation, in a later stage, the partner prepare the transition to the end of the ALERT intervention. It is essential to identify and bridge the gaps that would persist after the short-term period of immediate relief provided by ALERT. An option is to include an activity toward the end of the action wherein persisting needs are verified and necessary relief was sought

Action 5: ACTED in Indonesia, earthquake in Sulawesi, agreement ECHO/DRF/BUD/2018/91018**Trigger**

- Humanitarian needs 'derive' from an earthquake and subsequent tsunami, landslides etc that hit the island of Sulawesi in Indonesia at the 28th of September 2018. Initial reports confirmed 1424 fatalities, over 2549 injuries and 70,000 IDPs. While to some of the needs are responded to and taken care of by the agencies of the Indonesian Government especially in the major towns (ACUTE NEED BUT NOT LIFE SAVING), there are still some critical gaps that are unaddressed - especially in the rural areas where hardly any assistance has arrived. Following the deployment of its Emergency Response Team (ERT), who conducted a rapid needs assessment in affected areas from 4 to 8 October 2018, ACTED and its local partners propose to respond to the most urgent needs

Action

- The proposed action is designed to be implemented for the duration of 6 months as of 1st of October 2018.

Timeliness

- No timeliness indicators

Other relevant considerations (effectiveness, challenges...)

- REACH with UNOSAT has conducted analysis through Copernicus remote sensing that has identified heavily damaged houses (mainly in the Palu and Paluwest districts) indicating that there is an acute needs for shelter assistance for affected households. This preliminary rapid needs assessment along with the analysis conducted by REACH confirms that the priorities identified by ACTED are in line with the main priorities of the governmental authorities.

Action 6: OXFAM in Bangladesh, agreement ECHO/DRF/BUD/2019/91037**Trigger**

- The Needs Assessment Working Group (NAWG) conducted NAWG _situation overview and anticipated impact of Cyclone AMPHAN conducted on 19th May 2020 and the Bangladesh Cyclone AMPHAN NAWG Preliminary Impacts analysis on 23rd May 2020. The Office of the UN Resident Coordinator Flash update # 02 on Cyclone AMPHAN on 22nd May 2020. Oxfam in Bangladesh conducted a rapid needs assessment over the period of May 22 to 25, 2020.
- NO ALGORITHM ECHO 2019?

Action

- FO p12: The proposed project is for 4 months (01 June 2020 to 30 September 2020) with different eligibility date (25 May 2020). This is in with the timeline of ALERT decision

Timeliness

- FO p11, opinion Desk officer: Partner is already responding to the emergency, so the eligibility date of 22/05 is acceptable (??).
- NO timeliness indicator

Other relevant considerations (effectiveness, challenges...)

- Monitoring 1 19/07, FO p20 : DELAYS : Result-1: 'very limited progress' on R1(only water trucking, no progress on water supply facility and sanitation; R2: beneficiaries are still displaced and there is less hope to go back to their own shelter within the project period. R3: the partner just started the transfer of cash MPCG with limited numbers. Cash was transferred through Mobile Money Transfer mode ; this was effective.
- Monitoring 2: 29/09: it is found that Oxfam led consortium was finally able to implement the activities... LATE but finally OK: Oxfam Consortium with Christian Aid are able to reach more the approved numbers of beneficiaries (approved target was 129,600 individuals and finally Oxfam able to reach 139,325 individuals) within the stipulated timeframe. So, the project has been completed successfully within the timeframe as agreed and delivered the results in a timely manner and reached more than 100% beneficiaries as targeted.

D. Latin America and Caribbean / LAC**Action 7: NRC in Honduras and Guatemala, agreement ECHO/DRF/2020/91027****Trigger**

- On the 2nd of November, Tropical Depression 29, situated on the Atlantic coast of Central America, turned into a hurricane, named ETA. From the 3rd of November onwards, ETA, now a Category 4 hurricane, caused heavy rains and high winds, affecting several countries in Central America; in particular north-eastern Nicaragua and northern Honduras. On the 5th of November, ETA weakened to a Tropical Depression
- On the 15th of November IOTA became a hurricane category 1 and was rapidly taking strength and evolving to a hurricane category 5. On the 17th of November, it made landfall. Heavy rainfall followed the passage of IOTA, leading to life-threatening flash flooding, river flooding and landslides exacerbating the impacts caused by ETA

Action

- Emergency protection and humanitarian assistance for communities most affected by hurricanes Eta and Iota in Honduras and Guatemala by NRC
- 01/12/2020 - 31/05/2021 (6 months), 555.000€: FO p10 : the partner proposes a 6 months emergency intervention, starting on 01/12/2020 and ending on 01.05.2021, which is considered adequate for immediate emergency action

Timeliness

- No timeliness indicator in LFA

Other relevant considerations (effectiveness, challenges...)

- FO p10 : The total amount of beneficiaries has been increased from 6120 to 6320. Given the crisis, this still seems relatively low, but the partner is targeting particularly vulnerable groups. For the specific groups of vulnerabilities, it focusses on children, women and men. One could add other minority groups that might be affected and be particular vulnerable in this crisis: LGBTIQI+, Displaced persons (IDPs, asylum-seekers, returnees, refugees)
- Monitoring 22/04; FO p17: Overall, the project is on track with communities and beneficiaries who were highly appreciative of ECHO's support during and in the immediate aftermath of the emergency. Challenges: The main challenge identified during this monitoring the chronic socio-political context. Both countries where the action is implemented, HND and GUA have insecurity issues that can impact the delivery of the assistance and the normal development of the planned

activities, for instance, violence, drug-trafficking, gang groups controlling bordering region and its population, etc.

- Effectiveness final report FO p20: It allowed to respond to the most urgent needs in protection (R1), shelter and WASH (R2). The action was fully implemented within the timeframe.
- Lessons learnt: FO p21 : As predicted, the effects of Eta and Iota would run over the mid-term and six months of project activity is not sufficient to cover all needs

Action 8: CARE consortium in Honduras and Guatemala, agreement ECHO/DRF/2020/91028

Trigger

- As above, hurricanes ETA and IOTA

Action

- Providing urgent humanitarian assistance to meet the basic needs for WASH, Shelter, NFI and Protection for vulnerable households affected by Tropical Storms Eta and Iota in Honduras and Guatemala
- 15/12/2020 - 14/06/2021 (6 months), 800.000€

Timeliness

- Timeliness mentioned in formulation of LFA Result 2 and corresponding indicator, but NO deadline
 - R2: Affected populations have sufficient and timely access to household NFIs to meet their daily needs for cooking, eating and sleeping, as well as to community toolkits to assist in cleaning and repair activities.
 - Indicator R2.1: # of households who report being satisfied with the timeliness, quality, quantity and appropriateness of Non-Food Items to meet needs.

Other relevant considerations (effectiveness, challenges...)

- Objective : 8 555 households who were affected by Tropical Storms Eta and Iota in Honduras and Guatemala receive multisectoral assistance from CARE, GOAL and PLAN, in the sectors of WASH, NFI (Shelter & Settlements) and Protection, through a combination of in-kind and cash assistance.
- Effectiveness: objective overachieved: 42.775 beneficiaries targeted, 45.151 reached
- Monitoring 20/04 (4 months), FO p22: The project is well on track and is implemented by a functional consortium. For R2: Affected populations have sufficient and timely access to household NFIs to meet their daily needs for cooking, eating and sleeping, as well as to community toolkits to assist in cleaning and repair activities.
- Final report, FO p28: total duration of this actions is considered pertinent and sufficient considering it was an emergency response.
- R2: Indicator 1: 3 277 HH reported being satisfied with the timeliness, quality and appropriateness of NFI to meet needs vs 3 257 initially foreseen (100.6%).

Action 9: IFRC in Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, agreement ECHO/DRF/2020/91030

Trigger

- As above, response to Hurricanes Eta & Iota - Central America by IFRC

Action

- 12/11/2020 - 11/05/2021 (6 months), 550.000€.

Timeliness

- FO p12 : The action timeframe is appropriate for the proposed intervention. RC National Societies are already responding on the ground....
- this project includes the following KRI on timeliness for LFA result 1: “# of days between the crisis and the beginning of the response except for slow onset disasters ». However, the formulation of this custom KRI is somewhat cryptic (‘except for slow onset disasters?’), and the actual achievement (target 19 days) is not reported in HOPE
- IN LFA, no timeliness targeted for R1; indirectly only for R2 (indicator 1): Number of people having regular and timely access to soap to meet hygienic needs

Other relevant considerations (effectiveness, challenges...)

- Effectiveness: overachieved 35.160 beneficiaries targeted, 172.092 reached
- Monitoring 2 on 21/04/2021 : FO p25 : Activities for the distribution of WASH supplies are long overdue considering that the Action ends on May 11, 2021. However, all supplies have been purchased, are in the warehouse and the delays have been due to restrictions related to Covid-19.

10.4 Detailed analysis of the SST Sampled projects

A. Overview of lead time and compliance with SOPs for sampled SST projects

| | Africa E/C/S | | | Asia | | | LAC | | |
|---|--|---|---|--|---|---|------------------------------------|---|--|
| | 2020/91022 | 2019/91003 | 2017/91009 | 2018/91010 | 2019/91035 | 2018/91024 | 2019/91005 | 2016/91018 | 2020/91026 |
| DATES IN SINGLE FORMS / FICHOPS | | | | | | | | | |
| Disaster trigger | Spike of violence in S. Sudan (no date) | Rains before cyclone Idai (Mar 2019) | Armed conflict for 1 year, WFP survey Jul 2017 | Flash floods in Laos on 23/07/2018 | Cyclone Harold 06/04/2020 | Floods Feb-Mar 2019 in Pakistan (NDMA report) | Havana's Tornado on 27/01/2019 | Hurricane Matthew in Haiti on 04/10/2016 | Floods in Colombia 13-18/11 (hurricane Iota) |
| Request submission by partners | FO 1 st 15/01/2020 (global agr.) Final 16/06/2020 (specific) | FO 1 st 06/02/2019 final 07/02/2019 | FO 1 st 02/08/2017, final 31/08/2017 | 26/07 IFRC emergency appeal Request to ECHO on 02/08/2018 | FO 1 st 10/04/2020, final 15/04/2020 <u>SF: submission 06/04?</u> | 25/03/2019 | 18/02/2019 (not top emergency aid) | FO 1 st 07/10/2016 final 10/10/2016 | 26/11/2020 |
| Final comment on request by DG ECHO | 17/06/2020 | 08/02/2019 | 01/09/2017 | 07/08/2018 | 17/04/2020 | 26/04/2019 | 19/02/2019 | 11/10/2016 | 03/12/2020 |
| Action start | 01/01/2020 | 18/02/2019 | 01/08/2017 | 26/07/2018 | 07/04/2020 | 01/06 | 01/03 | 01/10/2016 | 01/12/2020 |
| Eligibility of expenses | 01/01/2020 | 18/02/2019 | 01/08/2017 | 26/07/2018 | 07/04/2020 | 01/06/2020 | 01/02/2019 | 01/10/2016 | 01/12/2020 |
| Agreement signed / transmitted by dg echo | 29/06/2020 | 14/02/2019 | 08/09/2017 | 10/08/2018 | 30/04/2020 | 24/05 modified to 01/06 (late SGA) | 01/03/2019 | 12/10/2016 | 11/12/2020 |
| Lead times: N° days from 1st partner's request to eligibility of expenses | Not measurable | 12 days | -1 day 'anticipated', some early data probably missing in files | 0 day 'anticipated' | 1 day 'anticipated' | 67 days | 11 days | -7 days 'anticipated' | 5 days, agr. 'anticipated' |

B. Detailed Analysis of SST Sampled projects in Africa E/C/S

Action 1: ICRC in South Sudan, agreement ECHO/-AF/BUD/2020/91022

Trigger

- Part of global ICRC action : 01/01/2020 – 31/12/2020 (12 months) ; As usual with 'neutral' ICRC, very little info on triggering disaster as this concerns inter-communal violence: "There was a spike in communal violence in many areas, particularly in Jonglei and Upper Nile » (no date, no name)

Action

- ICRC Protection of the Civilians, Water & Habitat and Health care activities in South Sudan
- The partner is requesting Euro 4.000.000 from ECHO, for a total project budget of Euro 31.818.772, the request thus corresponding to 12.6% of the resources, for a 12 month intervention
- FO p12: Response leveraging protection and assistance in support of acute vulnerability; aligned to HIP focusing on hard-to-reach/acute areas

Timeliness

- No timeliness indicators

Other relevant considerations (effectiveness, challenges...)

- FO p28 : The partner confirmed that activities have resumed in earnest end of July 2020. Activities during the course of the Action have been impacted due to logistical constraints (e.g. floods) and COVID-19 restrictions imposed by the government since the onset of the epidemic in April 2020
- FO p34 : The partner has commendably been able to reach far more people than initially anticipated at the start of the Action. FO p36 (final report): SO1 The partner reached 440.963 violence-affected people, IDP and host communities with WatHab interventions, far exceeding the target of 250.000 people. SO2: The partner only managed to achieve 35.7% (2.872 people) of the target of 8.040 people with surgical care including weapons wounded patients
- FO p35 final report : limitations to effectiveness due to strong local constraints: restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic have had a heavy impact on both the ICRC's capacity to bring sufficient numbers of specialized expatriate staff into the country to maintain its surgical activities and on its overall bed capacity to treat surgical cases. International Humanitarian Law and Human rights Law violations continue to be reported: indiscriminate attacks, destruction of health facilities, occupation of schools, recruitment of child soldiers and other misconduct by weapon bearers. The use of sexual violence and rape as a weapon of war is rampant and remains severely underreported across the country because of fear of retaliation and/or stigma.

NOTE: although the rationale (displacement due to spike of violence) corresponds to SST parameters, this may not be the case for the number of beneficiaries or the budget (the report does not make a difference between SST and 'other' activities).

Action 2: IOM in Mozambique, agreement ECHO/DRF/BUD/2019/91003

Trigger

- Side effects of cyclone Idai (04/03/2029) and political violence, food security of communities affected by rains and political tensions

Action

- IOM, life-saving seed distribution to conflict-affected returnees and flood affected host communities (10.800 individuals) in Tete, Mozambique

- 18/02/2019 - 17/06/2019 (4 months); seed distribution and other agriculture support to returnees

Timeliness

- No timeliness indicator
- FO p8 : Timeframe proposed short (3 months), but sufficient for the implementation of this rapid activities. It may however be too short to measure post-harvest production as suggested by the regional office.

Other relevant considerations (effectiveness, challenges...)

- FO p16 Monitoring 1, 17/06/2019: quite positive. The action was fully implemented and finished within the action's timeframe. The feedback from the beneficiaries who were met in the visited Districts (Moatize and Doa) was positive both about the quality and type of seeds, and the quality and usefulness of the tools provided. The positive impact of Result 1 was directly observed in Moatize where we saw fields with various vegetables, beans and maize growing. Result 2 was completed within the short time frame and farmers were now starting to prepare the fields and plant.
- FO p20, final report: As reported above under 'Beneficiaries' section, the Action managed to reach 22548 individuals. This was against set target of 21665 Individuals; representing an over-achievement at 104%.

Action 3: WFP in Congo Brazzaville, agreement ECHO/DRF/BUD/2017/91009

Trigger

- NO SUDDEN ONSET: (ongoing civil conflict for the past year, rapid increase in the number of IDPs from 12,986 in June 2016 to 81,000 in May 2017, growing food insecurity, access to health, WASH, education.

Action

- Emergency food assistance to displaced people; acute needs confirmed by survey and market assessment.
- The amount of € 300,000 requested from ECHO will make a difference by providing one month of assistance to approximately 15,000 IDPs. Delivery modality: electronic vouchers (money transfer) and in-kind. No resilience, but injected cash may boost local economy
- 01/08/2017 - 31/01/2018 (6 months). DG ECHO's contribution : 300.000€ out of 6.193.667,04
- Caritas is the implementing partner for WFP

Timeliness

- VERY FAST, expenses eligible on 01/08/2017; before complete request submission, comments and signature of agreement.
- NO timeliness indicator in LFA

Other relevant considerations (effectiveness, challenges...)

- Monitoring : «Globalement, le projet mis en oeuvre par le PAM se déroule correctement ».
- Final report : except DG ECHO, low funding level. Nonetheless, the share of reached beneficiaries is satisfactory compared to target (82,9%).

C. Detailed Analysis of SST Sampled projects in ASIA

Action 4: IFRC in Lao PDR, agreement ECHO/DRF/BUD/2018/91010

Trigger

- After days of heavy rainfall and floods, Lao's Xe-Pian Xe-Namnoy hydropower dam collapsed on 23 July 2018, releasing five billion cubic metres of waters down a tributary of the Mekong River and affecting residents of eight villages in the south-eastern province which borders Cambodia. According to UN Situation Report no.4 of 29 July, a total of 16,256 people were directly affected by the flash floods and 6,630 people were displaced
- On 26 July, IFRC launched an Emergency Appeal

Action

- DG ECHO action: 26/07/2018 - 25/01/2019 (6 months). Red Cross response to flash floods in Lao PDR, to meet the immediate needs of 7.500 people (1.500 households) from the most vulnerable affected communities with appropriate immediate humanitarian assistance

Timeliness

- No timeliness indicator, but: "Number of people reached with immediate humanitarian assistance to cover basic needs ».

Other relevant considerations (effectiveness, challenges...)

- Monitoring 21/08 : Physical access to the affected areas have been difficult. Continuous heavy rains caused the road to be very muddy and blocked most of land transportation. However, IFRC and partner Lao RC was able to access and provide speedy direct assistance to the affected population. With approval from the government, IFRC and LRC was also able to reached those difficult to access evacuation camps since the early days of intervention.
- Final report (FO p15) : The immediate needs of people affected by flash floods were primary met through this action together with other support from humanitarian actors, particularly National Red Cross Societies. As of the end of this action, the Partner and LRC assisted 7,430 people.
- FO p17: The partner also noted that DG ECHO's contribution and investment in disaster risks reduction (DRR) and preparedness for effective response has laid the foundation of policy and legal frameworks for Lao PDR to be able to facilitate and coordinate international and national response for disasters. On a related note for DRR planning, the government in consultation with relevant stakeholders is recommended to review and revise of the Lao's disaster management and contingency plan to include disasters associated with large foreign investment projects. Lao PDR has more than 50 hydropower dams in the country. This incident offered a valuable lesson about a safety of irrigation and hydropower water reservoirs

Action 5: CARE in Vanuatu, agreement ECHO/DRF/BUD/2019/91035**Trigger**

- Cyclone Harold in Vanuatu on 6 April ; 6000 beneficiaries

Action

- The Action will last only 3 months starting 7th of April ; Intervention period: 07/04/2020 - 06/07/2020

Timeliness

- NO timeliness indicator, but cyclone falls on 06/06, contract start on 07/04 and partners' 1st request is dated 10/04 (or 06/04?). SF p4 : assessment commenced 8 April
- FO p10: Issues for action / for follow-up: timeliness of the response with potential logistic bottlenecks for the procurement

- FO p11 appraisal : CARE is in position to deliver first relief assistance to 1200 households victims of cyclone Harold in shelter and NFI assistance in a timely manner
- FO p17 : The timeframe of the Action (3 months) was respected and no delays was reported (in spite of logistic challenges at the beginning due to lack of transport devices and inelasticity of local market and Government own prioritisation and anti Covid19 procedures

Other relevant considerations (effectiveness, challenges...)

- FO p17 : The final report has been submitted on 6/10/2020, 3 months after the end of the Action (7/07/2020). Through this action, CARE was able to directly assist 9 007 people who were severely affected by Tropical Cyclone Harold against a target of 6 000 people. This Action fits with DG ECHO strategy and priorities in the region as well as ALERT/SST core mandate.
- FO p21: The main lesson to this Action is related to preparedness : the prepositioning of stocks in Fiji and others islands would be a costly-effective investment and could consolidate a timely reasons in case of likely future disasters.
- LRRD FO p13 : The short time of implementation under a SST intervention should definitely include a chance where the partners can help the community identify further needs beyond the timeframe of this intervention and how the needs could be endorsed to relevant stakeholder especially the local government. In that sense, a very positive aspect is that this action will be part of a more comprehensive Action of CARE implemented with other donor funding with a 12 months duration.

Action 6: Islamic Relief in Pakistan, agreement ECHO/DRF/BUD/2018/91024

Trigger

- Balochistan Emergency Flood Response in February and March 2019 : no human casualties however there are damages to community infrastructure, productive assets and housing, according to secondary information by the NDMA

Action

- Timeframe: 01/06/2019 - 30/11/2019 (6 months) : The start date of the action has been changed to 1 June 2019, since the Specific Grant Agreement (SGA) was received late (on 09 May 2019) and the start date of the Action was indicated as 23 March 2019, a date that had already passed at the time we received the SGA. The signed SGA was sent back to Brussels on 29 May 2019.

Timeliness

- No timeliness indicator

Other relevant considerations (effectiveness, challenges...)

- Monitoring 17/12: all the activities are completed on time except the additional shelters (MR) still under construction due to seasonal rains.
- Final report: the partner has overachieved the targets, due to exchange gains because of PKR devaluation in 2019. The project benefited a total of 13,013 individuals against the target of 11,550. Establishment of community-based organization (CBOs) will provide a good base for future disaster responses in these communities
- LRRD: the partner still believes that WASH and shelter action requires more time and should be considered in future programming

D. Detailed Analysis of SST Sampled projects in LAC

Action 7: OXFAM in Cuba, agreement ECHO/DRF/BUD/2019/91005

Trigger

- A tornado hit the city of the Havana, Cuba on Jan 27th 2019 with 300 km/h winds. Assessment by the Govt, which indicated (when ?) to various agencies (Red Cross, UN and INGOs) that there is a need for a variety of non-food items ranging from hygiene items to household items

Action

- 1st request by OXFAM on 18/02, contract 01/03/2019 – 31/08/2019, 6 months extended to 15/10/2019 (7 months and 15 days - extension of 1 and half months to finalise response: the local institutions in charge of the logistics of the distributions have been facing serious difficulties due to the scarce availability of fuel, but also their lack of capacity to deliver such amount of materials), 300.000€
- Consortium of 3 NGOs: Oxfam, Humanity & Inclusion (HI), and CARE for supply of NFI and WASH kits, reconstruction tools to “Improve the basic living, hygienic and sanitary conditions for families impacted by the disaster, with special attention paid to inclusion (disabled) » in Havana, Cuba. The project aims to fill the gaps identified in the government assistance regarding families, recuperation and the inclusive reconstruction of urban resilience

Timeliness

- No timeliness indicators

Other relevant considerations (effectiveness, challenges...)

- Effectiveness very positive (FO p25 final report): the consortium managed to support 1.000 affected families (increased from 830 to 1,000) with familiar kits and sensitization, and 201 people with disabilities. Additionally, CARE together with HI and the UNAICC trained on inclusive construction and equipped 6 provincial reconstruction brigades
- Constraints: procurement: Purchasing and importation of supplies. it remains difficult to operate in Cuba, as the authorities are tightly controlling all foreign interventions : negative impact on relations with beneficiaries (FO p26).

Action 8: IFRC in Haiti, agreement ECHO/DRF/BUD/2016/91018

Trigger

- Emergency Plan of Action Haiti: Hurricane Matthew on 04/10/2016 (“Île des Anglais” only)

Action

- IFRC The affected Haitian population affected by Hurricane Matthew (50.000) has their basic needs covered through emergency WASH
- 01/10/2016 - 31/03/2017 (6 months).

Timeliness

- No timeliness indicator

Other relevant considerations (effectiveness, challenges...)

- FO p9: IFRC’s proposal has been framed during the first days of the crisis, focusing on most important components of the response in a prioritized sector and area. All components have been discussed at field level
- FO p8: ‘anticipated’ start date of the project is 1/10/2016 (3 days BEFORE hurricane) which is ‘totally acceptable’

- Effective : water network rehabilitated (destroyed by hurricane), training on cholera, aquatabs. 56.660 individuals covered (50.000 targeted)
- FO p17 (final report) : The action reached a total of 11,332 families or 56,660 people affected by Hurricane Matthew through the distribution of NFIs. Within these, 26,000 people have been reached under the WASH component: water provision, rehabilitation of 11 water catchment sources and rehabilitation of the chlorination system of two stations
- Lesson learnt: FO p17 : timely : the distribution of relief items began the week after the disaster occurred, thereby contributing to save lives. This was partially made possible by the fact that IFRC had a stock of NFIs prepositioned in Haiti before the Matthew landfall. The main lesson learned from this operation is that a stock for at least 5,000 people should be permanently prepositioned in country ready to be used immediately when a disaster occurs and immediately replenished after its usage

Action 9: Red Cross – DE in Colombia, agreement ECHO/DRF/BUD/2020/91026

Trigger

- Humanitarian aid and emergency relief in communities affected by the floods in Colombia. The action intends to tackle important and immediate humanitarian needs in remote areas of Colombia, namely Choco region and Providencia island. Both areas have been severely affected by the recent hurricanes and torrential rains, in particular Hurricane Iota (13-18/11/2020)

Action

- German Red Cross (with Colombian RC): Agreement : 01/12/2020 - 31/05/2021 (6 months), 350.000€

Timeliness

- No timeliness indicators, but no delays mentioned

Other relevant considerations (effectiveness, challenges...)

- Good effectiveness. There was no final report in FO, but in the SF most indicators were overachieved (more health centres rehabilitated, 40.000 people assisted vs 20.000 targeted)
- Risks : Limitations of access to areas where the presence of armed groups generates mobility and entry regulations. - Drastic changes in the relations between Colombia and its neighbour that lead to border closures. - Simultaneous emergencies that exceed the response capacity. - The situation regarding the COVID-19 pandemic remains stable.

10.5 Use of custom-made KRI (Key results Indicator) for timeliness in DG ECHO interventions

In addition to the sampling of 18 projects which was used for in-depth assessment, all Key Results Indicators (KRI) related to timeliness in emergency response projects were also extracted from the HOPE database.

Overall, the inventory developed by the evaluation team includes 238 DG ECHO-funded interventions in the form of ALERT, SST, CMs or ERMs⁴⁷ between 2016 and 2021. Out of these, KRI indicators for timeliness were found in 174 LFA results among 72 projects (30,2% of the total), as in many projects there were several results, each of them using a KRI for timeliness). All these KRI indicators were ‘custom-made’ by the partners, as there are no predefined KRI for timeliness in DG ECHO’s procedures.

- ALERT: 25 project results (2 in 2018; 17 in 2019; 6 in 2020)
- SST: 1 project result (in 2020)
- ERM: 137 project results (37 in 2016; 35 in 2017; 31 in 2018; 13 in 2019; 21 in 2020)
- Crisis Modifiers: 11 project results (3 in 2016; 1 in 2018; 5 in 2019; 1 in 2020; 1 in 2021)

Some of the custom-made indicators showed an overall consistency in their formulation and could tentatively be considered for a ‘standard’ KRI.

A. ALERT

Some indicators were not relevant (‘number of assessments carried out within XX days...), but a number of them (7) were globally consistent in their formulation and relevance and mentioned **an estimated time between crisis trigger and delivery of 14 days. A standard formulation could therefore tentatively be suggested as follows:**

- « **% targeted disaster affected beneficiaries receiving lifesaving response for within 14 days from the displacement/disaster/alert/ trigger** ».

One of the projects in the above sampling (contract 2019/91019 in South Sudan implemented by IOM) used the following indicator (n°1) for its LFA result 6 (ALERT): “ *Number of targeted persons who receive an appropriate response within 14 days after the completion of the assessment* ». The target was fulfilled only at 28,8% (12.104 beneficiaries out of 42.000 targeted).

Another LFA result (n°7) of the same project was also using a – different – KRI for timeliness “Number of days between the crisis and the beginning of the response ». In this case the objective of 14 days was achieved; however, result n°7 actually concerns a Crisis Modifier and not an ALERT activity as reported in HOPE.

There were a **number of close variations** – which can all be summarised with the above preferred formulation – such as “ % of flood affected persons receiving life saving support within 14 days of the flood trigger », “Number of targeted persons who receive an appropriate response within 14 days after the completion of the assessment », or “Number of days between the crisis and the beginning of the response (target 14, actual 14)”.

The timeline of 14 days was generally achieved or slightly overachieved (4 cases out of 7 relevant indicators).

It should be noted that the delivery modality of cash transfers seems to take longer: in 3 cases (2019), the indicator of “Average number of days between trigger (displacement, disaster, etc.) and

⁴⁷ DREFs are excluded from this analysis as these were managed and monitored by IFRC, and relevant performance indicators were not accessible through HOPE.

first cash transfers received by beneficiaries » had a target of 10 days but the actual deliveries took significantly longer: 25, 28 and 39 days respectively.

Some indicators have also mentioned a longer lead time: “ % of responses that begin within 22 days from the alert » or “Number of persons who receive an appropriate response within 29 days from alert »; they were largely overachieved (e.g. 18 days instead of 22).

B. SST

As **there was only 1 timeliness indicator for SSTs** (‘Number of days between the crisis and the beginning of the response’), it **could not be used for triangulated analysis**, although it was not positive (target 7 days, actual 14 days, equal to the average for ALERT).

NOTE: in 2019, an algorithm was introduced by DG ECHO, which allowed the preliminary calculation of the probable number of affected people, thus enabling the launch of the ETB process without having to wait for field assessments. However, **this algorithm is not explicitly mentioned in the indicators, which variously referred to “alert”, “crisis”, or “completion of assessment” as the starting point of the ETB process.**

Preliminary conclusions for ALERT and SST:

- the lack of a standard KRI for timeliness is not conducive to assessment and comparison;**
- existing ‘custom’ indicators tend to show that the **expected delay between crisis trigger and delivery of aid amounts to approximately 14 (fourteen) days**, which is rather slow to respond to an emergency (notwithstanding access and other challenges).
- Indicators do not mention the new algorithm introduced by DG ECHO in 2019**, which was designed to estimate the number of affected people before the detailed field assessments.

Although the ERM and Crisis Modifiers are not to be assessed in this case study, limited evidence from available data about indicators would show that the average expected delay between crisis notification and response tends to be significantly shorter (around half of the lead time) than either ALERT or SST.

For CMs however, data from available indicators is rather anecdotal and cannot be properly triangulated. Only 5 indicators out of 11 are usable (i.e. they are both relevant and filled in) and show that partial deliveries would happen within a period of between 3 and 7 days after crisis trigger. For instance in 2018 « % de l'assistance reçue en BNA et abris dans un délai de 7 jours entre la réception de l'alerte et le début de la réponse » target 60 / achieved 35 ; In 2019 « % of targeted newly displaced persons receiving first assistance 72 hours (3 days) from confirmation of displacement » target 90 / achieved 56 ; or “Number of newly displaced individuals receiving appropriate humanitarian assistance 72 hours (3 days) from confirmation of displacement » target 9030 / achieved 23605. In 2020 « Average number of days to respond to rapid onset emergency from the issuing of alert » target 7 / achieved 7.

It should also be noted that some CM indicators showed significant delays, although the reasons could not be investigated (in one case problems of access were mentioned). For instance in 2019: “Number of days between the alert and the beginning of the response » target 14 achieved 30.

The standard expected lead time for ERM seems to be 7 to 8 days, although the portfolio shows large variations, for reasons that could not be investigated. A range of relevant indicators shows instance the following.

- 2016 : «Délai moyen (Nombre de jours) entre la fin de l'évaluation des besoins et la réception de l'assistance par les bénéficiaires » target 7 days / achieved 6 days.

- 2017: « % des alertes, des rapports d'évaluation et des confirmations d'assistance qui ont été transmis à la coordination humanitaire régionale au maximum dans les 7 jours (7 jours après la réception d'une alerte, 7 jours après le retour de l'équipe d'évaluation, 7 jours après l'assistance) » ; target 100 / achieved 100
- % of RRM interventions validated by clusters and / or started within 5 days after completion of the multi-sectoral (MSA) and MEX: target 70 / achieved 75.
- 2018 : 4 similar indicators “% of interventions (multi-purpose) where delivery of assistance begins within 8 days of assessment completion »: target 90 / achievements between 34 and 89.

In many cases between 2016 and 2019, the ERM indicator started at the end of the assessment and the crisis trigger itself (“Average number of days between completion of assessment and ERM response commencing »). In such case, the target was usually 5 days, and the actual lead time was recorded between 6 and 12 days.

However, lead times can be much longer, for unspecified reasons. For instance, in 2020, in response to the indicator “Average number of days between the crisis and the beginning of the response », the target was 44 and the achievement 62 (reasons and locations unknown).

For specific sectors, the lead time of ERMs can also be longer, for example:

- in 2017 for food security: “Nombre moyen de jours entre la validation d'une alerte sur une crise alimentaire et l'intervention en assistance alimentaire », the target was 30 and achievement 38 days
- for NFIs (2018): 14 days; WASH (2020): 22 days and in 2017: 30 days ; shelter and settlements (2020) 22 days, 2017 and 2018: 30 days.

Preliminary conclusion for ERMs and Crisis Modifiers: based on limited documentary evidence, both modalities seem to be able to deliver emergency assistance to beneficiaries affected by a sudden onset crisis more rapidly than ALERT or SSTs: anecdotal evidence for CMs tend to show a lead time of respectively 7 days and 3 days, and more robust evidence for ERMs shows an expected lead time of around 7 days, against an average of 14 days for ALERT and SST projects.

10.6 Differences between ALERT and SST

The key parameters to distinguish ALERT from SST tools are as follows.

- a. **The ALERT tool allows DG ECHO to provide rapid first-line funding for the immediate response to sudden-onset large-scale natural and technological disasters, but not bouts of displacements due to (sudden or renewed) violence.** In this perspective 'sudden onset' should be understood as an event which 'could not be anticipated', contrary to Human-induced violence which is often brewing for a long time before exploding.

NOTE: this definition should however be carefully reconsidered. Violence can erupt suddenly even if early warning signs can often be detected with hindsight but would not necessarily be correctly interpreted (incidentally, this may also be the case for natural disasters). Furthermore, violence can rapidly affect more than 100.000 people considering rapid population growth and urban concentrations. Anecdotal evidence from a KII with a DG ECHO officer pointed out to some 'rare cases' where such violence concerned more people than the SST limit (below).

According to the HIP (Humanitarian Implementation Plan) for the Emergency Toolbox, ALERT facilitates the immediate response of humanitarian actors that are on the ground or that can be deployed rapidly. The guiding principle of ALERT is to ensure that funding is allocated quickly enough ('first initial response') to maximise the impact of assistance ('the immediate needs of the most vulnerable') in the short timescales immediately before a large-scale disaster (early action), during a disaster or in its aftermath. ALERT is also intended for disasters that develop suddenly, including the unanticipated deterioration of a pre-existing disaster (in which the distinction with SST is difficult to make). **Humanitarian needs for ALERT actions** are likely to be in sectors including food assistance, health, WASH, shelter, NFIs, nutrition, emergency livelihoods support, emergency rehabilitation of basic infrastructure, support to emergency communication, logistics and coordination. This list is **similar to the sectors of intervention envisaged under SST below, except for disaster preparedness.**

- b. **Large-scale disasters are those affecting more than 100 000 people or below if the people potentially affected represent more than 50% of an affected country's population.**

NOTE: this reference is unclear, as the HIP attempts to explain that "exceptionally, the ALERT can be used to respond to disasters where the number of people potentially affected is less than 100 000 if over 50% of the population of a country is affected by the disaster »: a 'country' would have to be quite small indeed, if 50% of its population would be less than 100.000 people.

- c. **The SST tool is designed to respond to a small-scale disaster, either recent or imminent but not necessarily of a 'sudden onset' nature, due to either natural or Human-induced disasters** ("all interventions considering needs and respecting criteria described in the HIP ») . The HIP (chap 2A) further specifies that humanitarian needs to be responded to by SST are likely to be in sectors including food assistance, health, WASH, shelter, NFIs, nutrition, emergency livelihoods support, emergency rehabilitation of basic infrastructures (such as schools), disaster preparedness, protection, support to emergency communication, logistics and coordination. **Actions should aim, when possible, to strengthen the capacities of local communities and authorities to respond, thus increasing their resilience.**

Small- scale disasters are defined as those which will affect or has affected up to 100 000 people. The estimation of the funding required is limited in all cases to a **maximum of EUR 500 000.**

The HIP (chap. 1A) for the Emergency Toolbox further specifies that «*The Small-scale Tool allows DG ECHO to provide a rapid response to disasters – natural and human-induced – where a limited response is appropriate. Small-scale disasters affect a relatively limited number of people but can have a serious negative impact on the lives and livelihoods of these populations. They can occur in remote or isolated areas, may not trigger a declaration of emergency and usually do not figure prominently in the news despite the serious humanitarian needs they create locally.*

It should be outlined that the **‘threshold’ of 100.000 affected people used in separating ALERT from SST is based on calculation by EM-DAT** (The Emergency Events Database - Université catholique de Louvain (UCL) – CRED), which state that : “Disasters with number of people affected $\geq 100\,000$ represent the upper 25% (approximately, by number) of all disaster entries for all continents excluding Europe in the EM DAT disaster database, which has data for number of affected people from 1900-2017...EM DAT also shows that a significant number of disasters with the number of people affected $\geq 100\,000$ have more than 60 mortalities, one of the two criteria (the other being 600+ house destroyed) used by UNISDR (United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction) to distinguish between high/low disaster loss scenarios (losses via intensive vs. extensive risk) ».

The table below provides an overview of these two tools ; it was prepared for the Desk study report.

Table 8. Overview of key features of ALERT and SST tools

| | |
|---|--|
| <p>Acute Large Emergency Response Tool (ALERT) Created in 2018</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Designed to provide a first response in case of disasters (does not aim to cover all needs) Activated in case of large-scale natural or technological disasters – but NOT displacements due to violence - (100,000 persons or over 50% of the population affected) Directorate A takes the lead Funding fed by the ALERT Assessment Process which provides a rapid assessment of the disaster’s expected impact and completed with a needs assessment Between 24-48 hours from the initial meeting and the announcement of the decision by ERCC via APPEL Assessment of proposals and signature of contracts using the Simplified Single Forms submitted to DG ECHO through APPEL within 14 days after receipt of the proposals by the geographical unit Initial duration of the action: up to 6 months Open to all DG ECHO partners with the capacity to respond immediately on an adequate scale in country |
| <p>Small-Scale Tool (SST) Created in 2015</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Designed to provide assistance on a limited scale (below 100,000 people affected) Up to EUR 500,000 per action (300,000 before the unified methodology) Activated to respond to all types of both natural and Human-induced disasters Proposal submitted by HoU of a geographical unit to ERCC Decision taken by ERCC within 5 working days after the submission of the proposal Geographical unit manages the contract cycle with partners Initial duration of the action: up to 12 months Open to all DG ECHO partners Simplified Single Forms or normal Single Forms if over 6 months to be submitted through APPEL |

PART B: DG ECHO'S PARTNERSHIP WITH THE IFRC, 2016-2020

ANNEX 1: EVALUATION MATRIX

Initially, the Terms of References (ToR) included four evaluation questions (EQs) related to the evaluation of the EU's partnership with the IFRC (i.e., Part B of this evaluation). All four questions were retained; however, questions EQ 8 and EQ 9 were adjusted to reflect the priorities of stakeholders gathered during the inception phase interviews.

| | |
|---|---|
| EQ8 | <p>How well aligned⁴⁸ were DG ECHO and the IFRC in terms of</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. strategies and objectives? b. prioritising crises and needs? c. advocacy priorities, communication campaigns and visibility efforts? |
| Rationale and coverage of the question | |
| Background | The principle of alignment in a partnership context implies the following: |
| Understanding / coverage of the question | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) Complementarity i.e., DG ECHO and IFRC share important core values, objectives and priorities as a basis for the partnership. This does not mean that the two organisations are 100% aligned (as the two organisations have different mandates) but rather that the differences either add value to each organisation or at the very least, do not create any compatibility issues. (ii) Equality which means that each organisation must respect each other's mandates, obligations, constraints and commitments. (iii) There are mutual (if different) benefits from the partnership for each partner |
| JCs and proposed indicators, main lines of approach, and sources of information: | |
| JC. 8.1 The alignment between DG ECHO's HIPs and policy guidelines with the IFRC's strategic priorities. | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Commonalities and divergences between IFRC's Strategy 2020 and the global objectives of DG ECHO (HAR, Consensus). ○ The extent to which divergences were complementary or problematic. ○ Coherence and complementarities between the sectoral and thematic priorities of each organisation. | |
| JC. 8.2 The alignment between the IFRC and DG ECHO prioritisation of crises and the needs of crisis affected populations. | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Approach/criteria used by the two organisations for prioritisation of crises and needs. ○ Similarities and differences between the types of crises prioritised by IFRC and DG ECHO. ○ Similarities and differences between the sectoral needs of crisis affected populations prioritised by IFRC and DG ECHO. ○ Contributing factors to which the differences in priorities can be attributed. ○ Whether the differences create any tensions or problems. | |

⁴⁸ Alignment in this context refers to the partners having similar or common objectives, strategies and priorities.

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| JC. 8.3 The alignment between DG ECHO's advocacy priorities, communication campaigns, and visibility efforts and those of IFRC. | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The extent to which the two organisations engage in advocacy and the types of topics they focus on. The extent to which IFRC and DG ECHO's advocacy activities share common or complementary objectives and approaches. Existence of mechanisms to identify and pursue joint advocacy priorities, communication campaigns and other visibility efforts Coherence and complementarity between how IFRC and DG ECHO conduct communication campaigns and maintain or promote organisational visibility. Internal and external visibility of the partnership | |
| JC. 8.4 The partnership is mutually beneficial and complementary | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Degree of complementarity between DG ECHO and IFRC (mandates, core competencies, resources brought to the humanitarian field). The two organisations respect the differences that arise from their different mandates and roles in the humanitarian landscape. They build on each other's comparative advantage Main benefits of the partnership for each partner and main drawbacks. | |
| Methods and Tools | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Documentary review Semi-structured interviews Online survey |
| EQ9 | To what extent had a structured, strategic, timely and functional dialogue took place between the two partners, by what means and what has been the result of this dialogue on collaboration and funding trends between the two organisations? |
| Rationale and coverage of the Question | |
| Background / understanding / coverage of the question | Dialogue is important not just for building trust and transparency, but also for ensuring effective coordination of response, identifying and acting upon opportunities for collaboration and addressing any thorny issues in a timely manner. This question will examine the quality and effectiveness of the dialogue between the two partners. The balance of the relationship between the two partners will be examined, as will how often the partners meet and on what basis decisions on future collaboration and funding are made. The timeliness, in terms of how quickly decisions can be implemented will also be reviewed. The evaluation will also consider how the dialogue can be improved in future. |
| JCs and proposed indicators, main lines of approach, and sources of information: | |
| JC.9.1 Regularity and quality of dialogue between the two partners. | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Frequency, type (formal/ informal) and scope of dialogues taking place of dialogue taking place at different levels. Satisfaction levels of both partners in how the relationship is managed, the scope of the dialogue, how meetings are arranged and conducted, and how decisions are made. | |

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Investment (time, effort, resources) in organising the dialogues and added value of the output/outcomes achieved through this investment Open and timely exchange of information. | |
| JC.9.2 Effectiveness of the dialogue between the two partners. | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Degree of clarity and common understanding on objectives of the partnership. Degree of commitment to the partnership at different levels (strategic, operational) within the two organisations. Existence of ways of dealing with potential disagreements. Opportunities for collaboration are identified and acted upon. How have lessons learned from implementation of the partnership been used to develop or enhance the partnership? How quickly any decisions are acted on or put in place? How have funding levels changed over the evaluation period and why? Whether funding has supported key areas of IFRC competence (health, community mobilisation etc.) How well did DG ECHO support IFRC advocacy and communication campaign efforts? | |
| Methods and tools | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Documentary review Data analysis (e.g., funding trends) Semi-structured interviews Online survey Country fieldwork |
| EQ10 | <p>To what extent did the DG ECHO-IFRC partnership succeed in:</p> <p>a. maximising efficiencies and decreasing management and related costs, including administrative burden?</p> <p>b. improving effectiveness and cost effectiveness in their response?</p> |
| Rationale and coverage of the Question | |
| Background / understanding / coverage of the question | <p>This question aims at assessing the extent that the partnership between DG ECHO and the IFRC has enabled the two organisations to deliver humanitarian aid more efficiently and effectively. This can include savings in management and administrative costs when parties have signed an Indirect Management Delegation Agreement (IMDA), based on the single form proposed to DG ECHO. The evaluation will investigate what efficiencies are generated through the partnership, whether operational, for example, in terms of the time taken to respond, or cost efficiencies, based on savings generated by already having an IFRC or National Society operation available to undertake emergency response activities in country. The evaluation will also explore whether and how the partnership has contributed to National Society capacity development and how this contributed to increased efficiency and effectiveness.</p> |
| Judgement Criteria (JCs) and proposed indicators, main lines of approach, and sources of information: | |
| JC.10.1 The DG ECHO-IFRC partnership has led to efficiencies and cost savings. | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Partnership provides IFRC with greater funding flexibility and predictability. | |

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Partnership's improvement of the speed of response. ○ Evidence of operational and financial efficiencies realised through the IFRC partnership. ○ Management related/administrative cost comparisons between IFRC and other FPA partners, and with other funding tools/instruments. ○ Indirect impact on influencing/reducing other DG ECHO partners indirect costs. | |
| JC.10.2 The DG ECHO-IFRC partnership has led to improved effectiveness. | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Contribution of partnership to increasing technical capacity and expertise in IFRC and DG ECHO, particularly in areas such as cash transfers, anticipatory actions, disaster preparedness, greening of humanitarian aid. ○ Contribution of partnership to increased capacity of National Societies. ○ Contribution of partnership to strengthening joint advocacy and communication efforts. ○ Contribution of partnership to joint humanitarian advocacy and diplomacy. ○ Partnership has led to improved innovations supporting cost-effectiveness. ○ Contribution of partnership to promoting the localisation agenda. | |
| Methods and tools | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Documentary review ● Data analysis for example, if feasible, cost effectiveness indicators – trend analysis, benchmarking) ● Semi-structured interviews ● Online survey ● Country fieldwork ● ESSN case study |
| EQ11 | <p>To what extent did the DG ECHO-IFRC partnership contribute to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Strengthening coordination within the Red Cross Movement (IFRC, ICRC, EU National Societies and beyond), and with other humanitarian actors, notably UN? b. Strengthening a Nexus approach between the humanitarian response and development? |
| Rationale and coverage of the question | |
| Background / understanding / coverage of the question | <p>This question looks at how the IFRC partnership could have had an impact within the Red Cross Movement in terms of co-ordination notably between the IFRC, the EU National Societies (traditionally stronger National Societies than in developing countries, who also act as donors) and Operating National Societies globally, but also with the ICRC. The evaluation will explore the extent to which Increased co-operation and funding from DG ECHO to the IFRC will have a beneficial effect throughout the Movement in terms of response capacity, and in meeting localisation commitments of the Grand Bargain. Due to its global presence and health expertise, the IFRC and its member National Societies had the potential to engage with relevant UN Country Teams as well as specific UN agencies and Government forums. How much the DG ECHO-IFRC partnership has further supported the presence of the IFRC at such high-level meetings will be reviewed. Similarly, IFRC's engagement in livelihood and resilience building activities at a community level, global and local DRR activities, as well as climate change interventions, as included in the IFRC 2020 and 2030 Strategy, makes it an important actor in terms of global humanitarian nexus activities. To what extent DG ECHO support to IFRC has expanded their activities in this field, and as such to strengthening humanitarian nexus activities in general, will also be analysed.</p> |

| JCs and proposed indicators, main lines of approach, and sources of information: | |
|--|---|
| JC.11.1 Co-ordination both internally within the IFRC Movement, and externally with other partners, has increased as a result of the DG ECHO-IFRC partnership. | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Perception levels of all Movement partners as to how the DG ECHO-IFRC partnership may have contributed to increased co-ordination within the Movement. ○ Evidence and examples of increased or improved co-ordination and capacities within the Movement. Specifically with the ICRC and EU National Societies. ○ Perceptions within the Movement of reduced competition for DG ECHO resources. ○ Perception levels of all Movement partners as to how the DG ECHO-IFRC partnership may have contributed to increased co-ordination with agencies outside of the Movement. ○ Evidence and examples of increased or improved co-ordination external to the Movement. ○ Perception as to how the coordinating role of IFRC through NRCS may have contributed meeting Grand Bargain commitments towards localisation | |
| JC.11.2 The DG ECHO-IFRC partnership has strengthened the nexus approach between humanitarian and development actors. | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Perception levels of all Movement partners as to how the DG ECHO IFRC FPA may have contributed to strengthening the nexus approach between humanitarian and development actors. ○ Evidence and examples of operationalising the humanitarian development nexus. ○ DG ECHO funding trends to actions of the IFRC that operationalise the nexus between humanitarian response and development. | |
| JC 11.3 These objectives are better achieved through the strategic partnership with IFRC | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proposed indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Stakeholder perspectives on whether the same results could be achieved in absence of the partnership, equally efficiently and effectively ○ Whether the synergistic effect ensures that the overall positive effect is greater than the sum of each partners' effects | |
| Methods and Tools | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Documentary review • Semi-structured interviews • Online survey • Country fieldwork • ESSN case study |

ANNEX 2: LIST OF CONSULTED DOCUMENTS

IFRC documents

a. Strategic documentation

IFRC (2010). Strategy 2020.

IFRC (2019). Amendment to new Indirect Management Delegation Agreement No. ECHO/TUR/BUD/2019/91011.

IFRC (2020). Background paper on Strengthening local resilience.

IFRC (2020). Background Paper on Sustainable National Societies: A renewed focus on National Society Development

IFRC (2020). Donor Advisory Group DAG – NSD session.

IFRC (2020). Donor Response for Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF).

IFRC (2020). Forecast Based Action Fund Procedure.

IFRC (2020). IFRC Donor Advisory Group Annual Meeting.

IFRC (2020). IFRC Global Flagship Initiatives 2021-25.

IFRC (2020). Panel discussion on National Society response to COVID-19.

IFRC (2021). DAG Virtual Meeting with IFRC Secretary General.

IFRC (2021). Donor Advisory Group Virtual Meeting with IFRC Secretary General.

IFRC (2021). Donor Response for Forecast based Action Fund (FBAF).

IFRC (2021). Donor Response: Top 30 by Donor.

IFRC (2021). Strategy 2030. <https://www.ifrc.org/sites/default/files/2022-06/Strategy2030-FR-.pdf>

b. DREF

IFRC (2018). Annual Report 2018: Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF).

IFRC (2019). Mozambique: Tropical Storm Chalane Final Report.

IFRC (2020). Annual Report 2020: Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF).

IFRC (2020). Bangladesh: Cyclone Final Report on Early Action.

IFRC (2021). Ecuador: Volcanic Ashfall Final Report on Early Action.

c. ESSN

IFRC & TRC (2020). Assessment report on Impact of COVID-19: On refugee populations benefitting from the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) Programme.

IFRC & TRC (2021). A Remote Focus Group Discussion Report: Exploring the Livelihoods of Women Refugees in Turkey.

IFRC & TRC (2021). A Remote Focus Group Discussion Report: Impact of COVID-19 on Daily Life of Refugees in Turkey.

IFRC & TRC (2021). Cash Assistance In Times of COVID-19: Impacts on refugees living in Turkey. <https://www.ifrc.org/sites/default/files/2021-ESSN-CashintimesofCOVID19.pdf>

IFRC & TRC (2021). Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) Post-Distribution Monitoring Report Round 11.

IFRC & TRC (2021). Findings from the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) Post-Distribution Monitoring Report Round 10: Cash in times of COVID-19: Socio-economic effects on refugees living in Turkey and the impact of cash assistance.

IFRC & TRC (2021). Findings from the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) Post-Distribution Monitoring Report Round 12: Deepening Poverty and Debt – Socioeconomic Impacts for Refugees in Turkey One Year on from COVID-19.

IFRC & TRC (2021). Global Payment Solution Research Study Inception Report.

IFRC & TRC (2021). Inception Report: Evaluative Learning Study for Phase III of the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) Assistance for Refugees in Turkey.

IFRC & TRC (2021). Inception Report: Shock Responsive Study for Phase III of the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) for Refugees in Turkey.

IFRC & TRC (2021). Intersectoral Vulnerability Survey: The Vulnerability Conditions of Refugees Living in Turkey.

IFRC & TRC (2021). Summary of Intersectoral Vulnerability Survey COVID-19: Increased Vulnerability Among Refugees in Turkey.

IFRC (2020). Assessment report on Impact of COVID-19: On refugee populations benefitting from the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) Programme.

IFRC (2020). Monthly Communication Update on Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN): May 2020.

IFRC (2020). Monthly Communication Update on Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN): June 2020.

IFRC (2020). Monthly Communication Update on Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN): July 2020.

IFRC (2020). Monthly Communication Update on Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN): August 2020.

IFRC (2020). Monthly Communication Update on Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN): September 2020.

IFRC (2020). Monthly Communication Update on Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN): October 2020.

IFRC (2020). Monthly Communication Update on Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN): November 2020.

IFRC (2020). Monthly Communication Update on Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN): December 2020.

IFRC (2021). Monthly Communication Update on Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN): January 2021.

IFRC (2021). Monthly Communication Update on Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN): February 2021.

IFRC (2021). Monthly Communication Update on Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN): March 2021.

IFRC (2021). Monthly Communication Update on Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN): April 2021.

IFRC (2021). Monthly Communication Update on Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN): June 2021.

IFRC (2021). Monthly Communication Update on Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN): July 2021.

IFRC (2021). Monthly Communication Update on Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN): August 2021.

Turkish Red Crescent (2019). Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) Programme Technical Analysis Report 2019.

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ESSN%20Programme%20Technical%20Analysis_0.pdf

d. Others

IFRC (2021). Lesson Learnt Workshop in Response to ECHO HIP 2021 Application Refusal.

IFRC (2021). Report on Lesson Learnt Workshop in Response to ECHO HIP 2021 Application Refusal.

e. Website articles

IFRC (2020). Press Release - Cash and Social Protection. <https://www.climatecentre.org/491/new-online-guidance-on-cash-and-social-protection-in-the-red-cross-red-crescent-movement>

IFRC (2022). Cash and Voucher Assistance. <https://www.ifrc.org/cash-and-voucher-assistance>

DG ECHO documentation**a. HIPs and HIP-TA**

ECHO (2021). Above-standard Visibility Plan in Turkey.

ECHO (2021). Above-standard Visibility Plan in Turkey: Annex to ECHO Single Form.

ECHO (2021). Africa Regional Office Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIPs): Emergency Toolbox.

ECHO (undated). Above-standard Visibility Plan in Turkey.

ECHO (undated). Above-standard Visibility Plan in Turkey: Annex to ECHO Single Form.

b. Framework agreements

ECHO (2019). Acceptance of new Indirect Management Delegation Agreement No. ECHO/TUR/BUD/2019/91011.

ECHO (2019). DREF Confirmation Reply to new Indirect Management Delegation Agreement No. ECHO/DRF/BUD/2019/91004.

ECHO (2020). ESSN structured discussions.

ECHO (2020). EU-IFRC Strategic Dialogue Agenda November 2020.

ECHO (2020). EU-IFRC Strategic Dialogue Monitoring Table November 2020.

ECHO (2021). Delegation Agreement for Procedure for the Mobilization and Allocation of the European Union Contribution to the DREF and the FBAF.

ECHO (2021). Guidance Note Disaster Preparedness.

ECHO (2021). IMDA Amendment No. 1: Amendment by mutual consent of Indirect Management Delegation Agreement No. ECHO/DRF/BUD/2021/91002.

ECHO (2021). Indirect Management Delegation Agreement No. ECHO/-AF/BUD/2021/92132.

ECHO (2021). Indirect Management Delegation Agreement No. ECHO/DRF/BUD/2021/91002 for Applicable Humanitarian Aid Actions Financed by the European Union.

ECHO (2021). Pilot Programmatic Partnership: Single Form 2021.

c. Activity reports and Internal notes

ECHO (2015). Annual Report.

ECHO (2018). Annual Report.

ECHO (2020). Monitoring Report on the Facility Results Framework in Turkey.

ECHO (2020). Note to the file: Contracting of Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) in Turkey.

ECHO (2021). Note on the Options on the future Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) in Turkey.

ECHO (2021). Note on the Options on the future Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) in Turkey: Annex I – Contextual Challenges and Opportunities.

ECHO (2021). Note on the Options on the future Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) in Turkey: Annex II ESSN Scenarios and Road Map 2021–2024.

ECHO (2021). Note on the Options on the future Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) in Turkey: Annex III – Readout of ECHO-IFRC workshop on scenarios.

d. Website articles

ECHO (2021). Turkey: EU provides further €325 million in humanitarian aid for refugees. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/news/turkey-eu-provides-further-eu325-million-humanitarian-aid-refugees-2021-12-02_en

ECHO (undated). The Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN): Offering a lifeline to vulnerable refugees in Turkey. https://ec.europa.eu/echo/emergency-social-safety-net-essn-offering-lifeline-vulnerable-refugees-turkey_en

Evaluations and research papers

British Red Cross (2022). British Red Cross Cash Hub. <https://cash-hub.org>

EU (2017). Joint Communication on Resilience.

EU (2021). Briefing Paper for European Humanitarian Forum Preparatory Webinar Tackling the humanitarian consequences of climate change: Scaling up DG ECHO's mandate of providing life-saving assistance (this is because a risk-based approach).

European Court of Auditors (2018). Special Report No. 27: The Facility for Refugees in Turkey. <https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/DocItem.aspx?did=47552>

GSDRC (2013). Helpdesk Research Report on Monitoring and evaluating civil society partnerships.

ODI (2020). Risk-informed approaches to humanitarian funding-Using Risk finance tools to strengthen resilience.

Red Cross EU (2020). The Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN). <https://redcross.eu/latest-news/the-emergency-social-safety-net>

Red Cross EU Office (2021). Evaluation of RCEU-ECHO Coordination Process: Presentation to DG ECHO.

S.H.E.R. Ingénieurs-Conseils s.a. (2004). Evaluation of ECHO's co-operation with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent societies (IFRC) and IFRC activities funded by ECHO, including the partnership and activities with certain EU Red Cross National Societies.

UN OCHA (2016). The Grand Bargain –A Shared Commitment to Better Serve People in Need.

UNDRR (2015). Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030).

UNHCR (2014). Turkey Fact Sheet 2014. <https://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/factsheets-and-dashboards>

UNHCR (2021). Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN). <https://globalcompactrefugees.org/article/emergency-social-safety-net-essn>

UNHCR (2021). Turkey Fact Sheet 2021. <https://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/factsheets-and-dashboards>

WFP (2018). Evaluation of the DG ECHO funded Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) in Turkey.

WFP (2020). ESSN Mid-Term Review 2018/2019).

World Bank (2015). Opportunities and Challenges from Working in Partnership: Findings from IEG's Work on Partnership Programs and Trust Funds.

World Bank (2020). Children on the Move: Progressive Redistribution of Humanitarian Cash Transfers among Refugees. (Policy Research Working Paper)

ANNEX 3: LIST OF INTERVIEWS***Desk phase***

| Stakeholders | Position | Unit/ Country |
|------------------------------------|---|----------------------|
| DG ECHO | | |
| Headquarters | Team Leader | D1 |
| | Head of Unit | D1 |
| Field & Country offices | Programme Team Leader | Turkey |
| | Technical Lead | Turkey |
| IFRC | | |
| Headquarters | Manager - International and Public Relations, Multilateral and International Financial Institutions | Geneva |
| | Director of Disaster and Crisis Prevention, Response and Recovery | Geneva |
| | Head, Anticipation hub, former IFRC FbA Focal point | Geneva |
| | Evaluation | Geneva |
| Field & Country offices | Head of Country | Turkey |
| | Desk Officer | Turkey |

Field phase

| Stakeholders | Position | Unit/ Country |
|---------------------|--|----------------------|
| DG ECHO | | |
| Headquarters | Director for the SSA, Asia, Latin America and Pacific | D |
| | Head of Unit Strategic Partnership with Humanitarian Organisations | D1 |
| | Desk Officer for relations with IFRC | D1 |
| | Policy Officer | B2 |
| | Advisor to Director | C |
| | Head of Unit | C2 |
| | ECHO Desk | C2 |

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|------------------------------------|---|---------|
| Field & Country offices | Programme Team Leader | Turkey |
| | Technical Lead | Turkey |
| | ESSN Programme Officer | Turkey |
| | Protection Programme Officer | Turkey |
| | C-ESSN Program Manager | Turkey |
| | Regional Thematic Expert in Food Security and Cash | Nigeria |
| | Global Thematic Expert in Cash and Basic Needs | Nigeria |
| DG INTPA | | |
| Headquarters | DRR Program Officer | F1 |
| DG CLIMA | | |
| Headquarters | International Relations Officer | D1 |
| DG HOME | | |
| Headquarters | International Relations Assistant | A3 |
| IFRC | | |
| Headquarters | Global Cash Lead | Geneva |
| | Cash Delivery Platform Senior officer | Geneva |
| | Manager - International and Public Relations, Multilateral and International Financial Institutions | Geneva |
| | Senior Officer DREF | Geneva |
| | Senior Officer Resource Mobilization and Multilateral Partnerships and International Financial Institutions | Geneva |
| | Manager Climate, Migration and Resilience | Geneva |
| | Senior Officer Disaster Relief Emergency Fund | Geneva |
| | Anticipatory Action Coordinator | Geneva |
| | Anticipatory Action Program Manager | Geneva |
| | Asia Pacific Head of Partnerships | Geneva |
| | Partnership in Emergencies Coordinator | Geneva |

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| | Senior Officer Recovery & Green Response | Geneva |
| | Under Secretary General for Global Relations, Diplomacy and Digitalization | Geneva |
| Red Cross | | |
| Red Cross EU | Director | Belgium |
| National Societies | Head of Country | Turkey |
| | Deputy Director General | Turkey |
| | ESSN Operations Manager | Turkey |
| | Director of International Policies and Partnerships | Turkey |
| | Head of Movement Relations and Partnerships | Turkey |
| | Learning and Capacity Building Team Lead | Turkey |
| | Head of Finance and Administration | Turkey |
| | ESSN Programme Advisor | Turkey |
| | Deputy Coordinator | Turkey |
| | Evaluation Liaison | Turkey |
| | Cash Based Assistance Programmes Coordinator | Turkey |
| | Cash and Markets Advisor | UK |
| | Head of the Anticipation Hub at Danish Red Cross | Denmark |
| National Authorities | | |
| Turkish Ministry of Family and Social Services | Director General of Social Assistance | Turkey |

ANNEX 4: CASE STUDIES ON DG ECHO-IFRC PARTNERSHIP

4.1 Case study 1: ESSN (Turkey)

The evaluation of the DG ECHO-IFRC Partnership sought to assess how the relations between IFRC and DG ECHO have evolved between 2016 and 2020 and built the current partnership. This case study examined the partnership in the frame of the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) programme in Turkey.

A. Objectives, Rationale & Scope

The ESSN was selected as a case study to inform the evaluation given its' strategic significance for the DG ECHO-IFRC partnership. This has been cited as a turning point in the relationship between DG ECHO and IFRC, in a large part due to the size, visibility and strategic significance of the programme. The scale of this agreement dwarfed other previous cooperation agreements between the two organisations. The case study learned from the partnership on this programme to draw out implications for the overall, future partnership arrangements between the two organisations.

The case study covered the entire period of IFRC involvement in the ESSN, from 2019 to 2021. The IFRC implementation of the ESSN started from April 2020 onwards, with an inception phase between September 2019 and April 2020. In addition, the findings were contextualised by comparison with the previous phase of ESSN implementation from 2016, prior to the handover of the management contract from WFP to IFRC.

As the focus of the evaluation was on partnership working, the case study did not primarily assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency of DG ECHO funded actions, implemented by IFRC, in the context of the ESSN (this has already been subject to a recent evaluation titled 'ESSN Mid-Term Review 2018/2019' in 2020). Therefore, the collection of primary data from beneficiaries was also outside of the scope of this case study.

B. Methodology

The case study addressed the full range of EQs and JCs identified for the evaluation as a whole. This included key questions on:

- How well aligned were DG ECHO and the IFRC in terms of (a) strategies and objectives? (b) prioritising crises and needs? (c) advocacy priorities, communication campaigns and visibility efforts?
- To what extent did a structured, strategic, timely and functional dialogue take place between the two partners, by what means and what has been the result of this dialogue on collaboration and funding trends between the two organisations?
- To what extent did the DG ECHO-IFRC partnership succeed in: (a) maximising efficiencies and decreasing management and related costs, including administrative burden? (b) improving effectiveness and cost effectiveness in their response?
- To what extent did the DG ECHO-IFRC partnership contribute to: (a) Strengthening coordination within the Red Cross Movement (IFRC, ICRC, EU National Societies and beyond), and with other humanitarian actors, notably UN? (b) Strengthening a nexus approach between the humanitarian response and development?

The case study relied on a mixed methods approach, to provide the basis for triangulation across data sources. This included the following methods:

- Documentary review: The evaluation drew heavily on a desk review of documentary evidence related to the ESSN. A comprehensive e-library was compiled (see Annex 1) through online research and with the support of interviewed stakeholders. A range of programme documents as well as other sources of documentary evidence, authored by DG ECHO, IFRC and other agencies, were collected. In total over 50 documents were reviewed.
- Semi-structured interviews to collect primary qualitative data: A total of 18 stakeholders were consulted through Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) to collect primary qualitative data. A

range of key international, regional, and national actors involved in the ESSN's planning and implementation were interviewed, including ECHO and relevant DG ECHO representatives, IFRC and Turkish Red Crescent (TRC)'s staff, DG NEAR and Turkish government officials. The complete list of consulted stakeholders is given in Annex 2. Interviews focused primarily on the following four key areas of the partnership: (i) benefits of the partnership, (ii) results of the partnership, (iii) strategic dialogues, and (iv) prospects of the partnership.

- **Quantitative analysis to inform the cost effectiveness analysis:** A range of quantitative data sources were identified and analysed in the context of the case study. Monitoring data from the ESSN, including planned and actual budget data, proved to be key sources of evidence on performance, enabling the evaluation team to understand what has been implemented in the ESSN and assess the quality of partnership. The collection of primary data from beneficiaries was outside of the scope of this case study.

The case study was led by Nick Maunder (core member of the Evaluation Team) with the support of a National Researcher with country expertise (Burcu Yacat Cakar). Additional support was also provided as required by other evaluation team members and ADE analysts.

C. Limitations & Challenges

The COVID-19 pandemic and security still restricted movements in Turkey. Despite the recent improvements regarding the Covid-19 pandemic, travelling to the field was still difficult in early 2022. Therefore, all the KIIs were conducted remotely through the Teams platform.

In addition, several interviewees (from TRC, DG ECHO and external organisations) were not able to accommodate the requested interviews. However, answers to the evaluation questions were provided in written form by TRC staff who could not participate in interviews.

D. The Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) programme

The ESSN was launched in October 2016 by the European Union, to help address the needs of refugees in Turkey, in the context of the migration crisis. Since the end of 2014, Turkey has been the largest refugee hosting country globally, largely due to the Syrian conflict. In 2021, it had a registered refugee population of around 4 million⁴⁹, up from 610,000 in the beginning of 2014⁵⁰. The overwhelming majority, 3.6 million, originated from Syria, with the remainder coming mainly from Afghanistan and Iraq⁵¹.

Funded by the EU and its member states under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, the ESSN was used to provide monthly cash assistance via debit cards to the most vulnerable refugees in the country to help them meet their basic needs such as rent, transport, bills, food and medicine⁵². By January 2021, the ESSN was supporting over 1.8 million people via TRC's Kizilaykart platform with each family member receiving a monthly assistance of 155 Turkish Lira (Turkish Red Crescent, 2022). Additional quarterly top-ups were provided based on family size and need for specialized care. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, an additional top-up of 1000 Turkish Lira was provided to beneficiaries in 2020 to help address their increased vulnerability – namely, sharp increases in debt levels and further difficulties in securing employment for refugees⁵³.

With a total budget of nearly EUR 2.25 billion between 2016 and the beginning of 2021,⁵⁴ the ESSN has been the largest humanitarian programme in the history of the EU.

⁴⁹ UNHCR (2021b). Turkey Fact Sheet 2021. Retrieved from <https://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/factsheets-and-dashboards>

⁵⁰ UNHCR (2014). Turkey Fact Sheet 2014. Retrieved from <https://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/factsheets-and-dashboards>

⁵¹ UNHCR (2021b). Turkey Fact Sheet 2021. Retrieved from <https://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/factsheets-and-dashboards>

⁵² Turkish Red Crescent (2019). Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) Programme Technical Analysis Report 2019. Retrieved from https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ESSN%20Programme%20Technical%20Analysis_0.pdf

⁵³ IFRC (2021i), "Monthly Communication Update on Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN): January 2021

⁵⁴ UNHCR (2021a). Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN). Retrieved from <https://globalcompactrefugees.org/article/emergency-social-safety-net-essn>

The ESSN has been implemented as a hybrid humanitarian aid project embedded in the national social-protection system⁵⁵. Until 2019, the programme was managed by the World Food Programme (WFP), under a contract from DG ECHO. The programme was implemented by WFP, in partnership with the Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) and the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services (MoFLSS) (Red Cross EU, 2020).⁵⁶ In 2020, the IFRC took over from WFP as the contract holder from DG ECHO. Responsibility for implementation remained with TRC and the MoFLSS.⁵⁷ The ESSN is the largest programme ever implemented by the IFRC.

There is the expectation of the progressive transfer of responsibility for the ESSN from DG ECHO to DG NEAR - possibly by early 2023.⁵⁸ As a first step, the C-ESSN was launched in July 2021 funded by DG NEAR as a Direct Grant to the Ministry of Family and Social Policies to support the most vulnerable refugee caseloads.

E. Findings

EQ8 How well aligned were DG ECHO and the IFRC in terms of (a) strategies and objectives? (b) prioritising crises and needs? (c) advocacy priorities, communication campaigns and visibility efforts?

JC. 8.1 The alignment between DG ECHO's HIPs and policy guidelines with the IFRC's strategic priorities.

This question was interpreted broadly to consider both the alignment at the level of official and public strategies and priorities, as well as alignment on important but less explicit priorities.

DG ECHO and the IFRC share a goal in expanding the use of cash transfers. The prioritization of cash transfers is in line with the Grand Bargain commitments undersigned by both EC and IFRC where cash-based programming has been described to fulfil the greatest impact when delivered as a single multi-sector transfer and through common mechanisms⁵⁹. The EU has committed to delivering 35% of the humanitarian assistance in cash transfers under the Grand Bargain⁶⁰. IFRC has also made commitments to delivering 50% of humanitarian assistance through cash by 2025⁶¹. Cash programming has been prioritized for further institutionalization within the Movement and embedded as an integral component of programming in IFRC's humanitarian assistance responses to crises⁶².

The partnership of IFRC with ECHO on ESSN enabled IFRC to engage in the provision of cash-based assistance through the largest cash programme ever implemented. This has both contributed directly towards realising the IFRC strategic goal, as well as building the overall Red Cross/ Red Crescent capacity to use cash transfers at scale.

DG ECHO and the IFRC share broad mandates and scale of operation. Both organisations operate at a global scale and have cross sectoral responsibilities for meeting the complete range of humanitarian needs. Therefore, there is a natural fit between the organisations underpinning the partnership.

The mandate of the DG ECHO is "to save and preserve life, to reduce or prevent suffering, and to safeguard integrity and dignity of the people affected by humanitarian crises by providing relief and protection"⁶³. DG ECHO operates

⁵⁵ ECHO (2021). Turkey: EU provides further €325 million in humanitarian aid for refugees. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/news/turkey-eu-provides-further-eu325-million-humanitarian-aid-refugees-2021-12-02_en

⁵⁶ In 2021 the name of changed to the Ministry of Family and Social Services (MoFSS)

⁵⁷ Renamed Ministry of Families and Social Services (MoFSS) in April 2021

⁵⁸ See Explanatory Memorandum to COM(2021)460 - Amending budget N° 5 to the budget 2021 Humanitarian support to refugees in Turkey and Turkey HIP https://www.eumonitor.eu/9353000/1/j4nvhdgk3hydzq_j9vvik7m1c3qyxp/vl8m7rsxpy0 and https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/funding/hip2021/echo_tur_bud_2021_91000_ta_v2.pdf

⁵⁹ "The Grand Bargain – A Shared Commitment to Better Serve People in Need", p.6. (Available from: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Grand_Bargain_final_22_May_FINAL-2.pdf)

⁶⁰ https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/cash-transfers_en

⁶¹ <https://www.ifrc.org/cash-and-voucher-assistance>

⁶² International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (2018) "Cash Transfer Programming Strategic Framework 2020 – 2025", p.3 (Available from: https://cash-hub.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2020/12/RCRCM-CTP-FrameworkEndorsed-CPWG-Gov-Board_June2018_v3_EDITED_V3-10.pdf)

⁶³ European Commission (2021) "General Guidelines on Operational Priorities for Humanitarian Aid in 2022", Commission Staff Working Document, p.3. (Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/aid_development_cooperation_fundamental_rights/how_we_provide_aid/documents/swd_2021_312_f1_staff_working_paper_en_v5_p1_1541249.pdf)

globally and under a multi-sectoral mandate. DG ECHO have prioritized a basic-needs approach through an integrated multi-sectoral programming aiming to address needs in a coordinated and demand-driven manner⁶⁴.

The ESSN partnership has enabled both organisations to progress on their broader strategic goals in relation to the use of Cash and Voucher Assistance (CVA). DG ECHO is benefitting from an alternative experienced and capable partner for the large-scale delivery of cash transfers, while the IFRC is strengthening its own capacities to deliver CVAs at scale. Furthermore, what is notable is that, in contrast to other UN partners which are generally aligned to a sectoral response, IFRC and DG ECHO share an objective of delivering multi-purpose cash transfers.

The ESSN partnership positions the “red pillar” as a complementary alternative to the “blue pillar”.

Several stakeholders referred to an explicit objective of the Director of DG ECHO in 2018 seeking to develop alternatives for large scale response to humanitarian crises to complement the UN system. In this respect, IFRC fits into the intention of DG ECHO to mobilize the “red pillar” as a potential partner to respond at scale to large humanitarian crises. The ESSN provided a “proof of concept” that IFRC does indeed provide a credible alternative partner to the UN for DG ECHO in the very largest crises.

JC. 8.2 The alignment between the IFRC and DG ECHO prioritisation of crises and the needs of crisis-affected populations.

DG ECHO and IFRC are aligned on humanitarian principles which provides a solid ground for the ESSN partnership. In practical terms, however, there are some differences in terms of assessing and responding to the needs of the crisis-affected populations for ESSN.

This was reflected in the discussions between DG ECHO and IFRC on the revision of targeting, in the context of the rising number of beneficiaries of ESSN by 2020 (also compounded by the impact of COVID-19) and of the prospective transition of the ESSN from DG ECHO to DG NEAR. While DG ECHO advocated for improvements or innovations in targeting so that the programme targets the most vulnerable to contain the ESSN caseload, IFRC, emphasised the increasing needs on the ground⁶⁵. Given the current vulnerability of the refugees in Turkey, IFRC tended to argue that the targeting criteria should not be narrowed, but rather expanded to target more people. At the technical level, DG ECHO agreed that needs were growing, and adjustments were made, including in the transfer value per beneficiary. However, ultimately there has been the requirement to operate within the framework of the December 2020 European Council Conclusions⁶⁶ and to continue supporting refugees in Turkey based on existing levels of funding. FRIT allocations to the ESSN have been substantiated by needs assessments (conducted in 2016 and 2018), and have sought to ensure the rollout of the programme without interruptions but they were effectively capped in the face of rising needs.

JC. 8.3 Alignment between DG ECHO’s advocacy priorities, communication campaigns, and visibility efforts and those of IFRC.

Visibility efforts and communication campaigns of DG ECHO and IFRC on ESSN Partnership were well-aligned. The main objective of the visibility and communication strategy on ESSN Partnership is “to raise awareness among EU citizens” on the positive impact of the programme on the lives of the refugees in Turkey. In this regard, the primary audience is identified as EU citizens, as taxpayers who are supporting refugees through the EU-funded humanitarian aid programme⁶⁷. The secondary priority audience is identified as general public in Turkey and the Turkish Government to be reached by TRC.

The components of the visibility plan and communication campaigns on ESSN are clearly identified and the targets are monitored regularly. The visibility plan was undertaken by IFRC through a digital communication campaign in Europe and Turkey, working with the press in the form of press releases, separate media visit missions by European and Turkish journalists, social media promotion at global and regional levels as well as content creation activities.

⁶⁴ European Commission (2021), p.8.

⁶⁵ IFRC – by mandate – utilizes a grassroots or bottom-up approach to assessing needs

⁶⁶ European Council (2020) “European Council Meeting (December 10-11, 2020) Conclusions” (EUCO 22/20), p.11. (available from: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/47296/1011-12-20-euco-conclusions-en.pdf>)

⁶⁷ DG ECHO “ESSN Above-standard Visibility Plan Documents – Initial Document and April 2021 Extension”, p.1-2.

In terms of monitoring, the targets and associated analytics are tracked monthly per platform (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube etc.) and reported in detail through the monthly communication reports by IFRC.

The progress so far with the visibility plan and communication campaigns on ESSN have been regarded as positive by DG ECHO. IFRC was regarded as successful in elevating visibility especially through their channels for a European audience. The digital campaigns organized were complemented by tools such as storytelling from the perspective of the refugees who benefit from ESSN. Here, the communication strategy clearly differentiates the ways and the formats to engage the audiences in EU and in Turkey. That is to say, the digital stories of the ESSN beneficiary refugees with certain skills, experiences, talents and passions were presented in connection with the people from selected EU Member States⁶⁸ while the campaign in Turkish⁶⁹ presents only the stories in 2022 to underline the impact of ESSN on refugee lives.

JC. 8.4 The partnership is mutually beneficial and complementary

DG ECHO – IFRC partnership contributes to the localisation agenda. DG ECHO has committed to localisation under Grand Bargain in provision of more support and funding tools for local and national responders so that the humanitarian action is as local as possible and as international as necessary⁷⁰.

IFRC – as the largest volunteer-based humanitarian network – is “uniquely placed to support people and communities before, during and after shocks and hazards”, through the reach of 192 National Societies⁷¹ to meet the needs and improve the lives of the vulnerable people. It is apparent that IFRC has a significant advantage over UN agency partners in terms of contributing towards the localisation agenda. The National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies possess a large network of local volunteers who are closely embedded with communities that they serve.

The IFRC argues that it has an intrinsic commitment to working with these National Societies over the longer term to support their development. This was seen to contrast with the partnerships that UN agencies have – as alternative DG ECHO partners for project implementation – which is much more focused on the narrow objectives of immediate project objectives and implementation.

DG ECHO has benefitted from a more diverse set of options for implementing partnerships at scale and improving the cost effectiveness of its response. As noted above one of the primary objectives of the partnership for DG ECHO was to establish a credible alternative to complement the dominant “blue pillar” for humanitarian operations. The ESSN partnership has been effective in demonstrating the credibility of this option and bringing these capacities to scale. Furthermore, an additional major objective for DG ECHO has been to drive down operating costs and improve overall efficiency. Again, the partnership was helpful in contributing to this objective. This is discussed in further detail in the following sections.

The partnership with DG ECHO on the ESSN brought significant benefits to IFRC. The scale of the ESSN partnership brought important benefits to IFRC as an organisation beyond the specific operation. On a global scale, the relationship between DG ECHO and IFRC was much deepened by increasing credibility of IFRC as a partner at scale. One of the factors considered in the ESSN contract award was that IFRC had not delivered programmes of similar scale for DG ECHO. The fact that they have proved capable of delivering has taken the relationship to a new level.

As an example of this, an IFRC interviewee recalled that 2-3 years prior to the ESSN contract they had been considering competing for an ECHO contract to provide support to migrants in Greece. However, they recognise that at that time they lacked some of the fundamental capacities to be able to bid for this particular contract. The ESSN experience has now given them exactly the sorts of capacities that would enable them to bid for similar contracts in future.

The ESSN partnership increased the profile and credibility of the IFRC amongst the wider humanitarian community. The ESSN partnership enabled the IFRC in particular, and International Red Cross and Red Crescent

⁶⁸ The campaign was run with citizens from Austria, Denmark, France, Netherlands, Romania and Spain for 2021 and from Germany, Italy, Sweden, Poland and Portugal for 2022 as cited on the campaign website – <https://powertobe.ifrc.org/>

⁶⁹ <https://powertobe.ifrc.org/tr>

⁷⁰ The Grand Bargain Document, p.5.

⁷¹ International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2018) “Strategy 2030: A Platform for Change”, p.5. (Available from: <https://www.ifrc.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/S2030-EN.pdf>)

Movement in general, to raise the bar in their capacity to deliver large scale cash programmes. Although IFRC had been conducting cash programming through National Societies prior to ESSN, this was on a much smaller scale⁷².

The decision to engage with DG ECHO on ESSN partnership enabled IFRC to position themselves as a much stronger and credible agency globally. The ESSN partnership has been leveraged to demonstrate the potential of IFRC and National Societies. This has contributed to both increased financing and a more influential role in humanitarian coordination, including cash coordination.

EQ9 To what extent had a structured, strategic, timely and functional dialogue took place between the two partners, by what means and what has been the result of this dialogue on collaboration and funding trends between the two organisations?

JC.9.1 Regularity and quality of dialogue between the two partners.

The ESSN negotiations were based on, and facilitated by, a strong and well-established partnership between the two organisations. IFRC and DG ECHO have a long- and well-established partnership that dates back to the Balkan crisis and the earliest days of DG ECHO operations. IFRC noted that they had adapted their own systems to align with the emerging DG ECHO requirements. The ESSN reportedly built on these strong organisational relationships and familiarity with each other's systems and strategic goals, which made the ESSN negotiations relatively smooth.

Dialogue took place at multiple levels and was frequent, open and transparent – although at times resource heavy. Both DG ECHO and IFRC reported frequent engagement to support the design and implementation of the ESSN. Complementary dialogues were reported at the strategic, managerial and technical levels. Dialogue took place both in formally organised forums and through regular informal contacts.

Dialogue occurred at multiple levels, including between the respective officers in Ankara as well as with the headquarters in Geneva and Brussels. In later stages it also involved conversations with the regional offices of both DG ECHO and IFRC. In Ankara, the dialogue was particularly strong and reported to have taken place on a near daily basis. Dialogue with Brussels was less frequent and occurred primarily around key points such as monitoring missions. The involvement of headquarters' teams was seen to introduce a degree of complication. While the dialogue with ECHO in Ankara and Brussels covered similar issues and agendas, the positions sometimes differed.

The dialogues were noted as being open and transparent, with the donor being approachable and supportive, although at times demanding, with short deadlines for response at difficult times of the year.⁷³ There was a good sharing of information, including regular reporting back on the parallel conversations with other stakeholders, such as the Government of Turkey.

However, according to IFRC and TRC staff, TRC was excluded from some technical dialogues during implementation. This was seen as creating some inefficiencies, given TRC's role as the key implementing partner. Several Red Cross Red Crescent stakeholders noted that it would have been preferable to have a trilateral dialogue, including TRC, rather than expecting IFRC to act as a go-between.

The negotiations for the ESSN agreements were regarded as time-consuming and resource heavy by IFRC. This was particularly true for the second phase of the IFRC agreement, where the implementation team was required to start the negotiations for the subsequent follow-up phase alongside their simultaneous technical implementation responsibilities. Conversely, DG ECHO argued that IFRC needed to develop the necessary expertise and staffing in term of contracting to align with ECHO processes and avoid disruptions to implementation.

The ESSN benefitted from IFRC acting as a single negotiating point of contact with DG ECHO. This was contrasted by IFRC with the rather more cumbersome and resource-heavy involvement of national societies in other ECHO programmes, including the Partnership Programme. The relationship between IFRC and DG ECHO on the ESSN is in some ways unique. TRC appreciated that under the ESSN IFRC acted as a single negotiating point of contact with DG ECHO on strategic and technical issues. This facilitated a relatively efficient and straightforward dialogue, compared to a scenario where donor support might be channelled through multiple European national societies. This

⁷² International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2014) "Case Study: Preparing to implement relief cash transfer programming at scale", available from: <https://www.calpnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/enifrc-ctp-preparedness-case-study.pdf>

⁷³ One example cited was the deadline for submission of the next phase proposal immediately after Christmas.

was contrasted with the subsequent negotiations on the PPP where DG ECHO has been keen to directly involve the 27 European national societies alongside the IFRC in the negotiations. This substantially increased the complexity and transaction costs to IFRC.

The platforms for dialogue between the two partners may need to be reviewed and expanded to reflect the growing scale and depth of engagement and collaboration. It was noted that the relationship between the two organisations has grown massively in the last three years particularly with the much larger financial commitments being made through the ESSN. It was argued that the platforms for strategic dialogue had not expanded in parallel. It was questioned whether the current arrangements remained fit for purpose considering these developments.

It was also noted that the dialogue was fragmented amongst multiple platforms that do not always link together well. For example, one respondent noted that they were engaged in multiple simultaneous conversations with IFRC on the use of cash in the ESSN and in the donor cash forum, and there were opportunities to improve the coherence between these different dialogues.

Some stakeholders reported IFRC could have been more strategic in the use of the Brussels office to support its negotiations with DG ECHO in Brussels. A comparison was drawn with the UN agencies who were seen as more adept in using their different offices to conducting high-level advocacy on their own behalf. It was further noted that several of the UN agencies benefitted from having the EU as a member/observer in their governing boards. DG ECHO currently chairs the IFRC Donor Advisory Group, which is a valid undertaking to further build strategic relations. However, the EU or other donors are not part of the governing body of any member of the red pillar, which makes strategic relations a bit more challenging than with the UN.

JC.9.2 Effectiveness of the dialogue between the two partners.

There was a degree of frustration between IFRC and DG ECHO on key objectives and activities of the ESSN partnership that the dialogue had not apparently fully resolved. Underpinning this, were differences in the extent to which the strategic leadership was seen to reside with DG ECHO or with IFRC. ECHO appeared to expect IFRC to provide greater strategic leadership in the ESSN and be more proactive, although there were divergent views within DG ECHO on whether it was realistic to place so much pressure on IFRC to come up with “big-picture” answers in such a difficult context. Conversely, IFRC appeared to want more clarity from DG ECHO on their strategy in Turkey.

A significant point of divergence was the approach to targeting. DG ECHO had requested to refine the targeting criteria in order to: (a) address inclusion errors; (b) address exclusion errors; (c) adapt the targeting to the evolving needs of the refugee population, and (d) contain the caseload that otherwise would naturally grow, and ensure optimal use of resource which are significant, but still limited. IFRC’s concern was that the data was showing a worsening trend with high exclusion error and that the revisions were too much focused on reducing the caseload. Moreover, IFRC was uncomfortable with this task, in particular acting as an interface between DG ECHO and the government of Turkey and would have preferred for DG ECHO to directly negotiate with the Government on this issue. Nevertheless, DG ECHO considered it is not the way it (DG ECHO) works, being up to the partner to directly negotiate with authorities, as per usual working method of DG ECHO. DG ECHO further stressed it is also facilitating the dialogue and supporting Partner’s effort.

During the evaluation period, the funding relationship dominated over the more strategic aspects of the partnership. This inevitably translated in an imbalance in power over decision-making given DG ECHO’s role as a donor. Moreover, the IFRC reportedly prioritised the funding relationship over bringing challenging issues to the attention of DG ECHO. At times, IFRC was faced with a balancing act between advocating on behalf of the national society and the demands of DG ECHO as the donor.

Interestingly, there were divergent opinions on the effectiveness of IFRC as a conduit for expressing the concerns and interests of TRC to the donor. Some interviewees reported that there was an improved outreach to the donor side through IFRC as it naturally had a more inclusive and cooperative approach to coordination with TRC. However, other self-critical comments by IFRC staff acknowledged that IFRC’s perceived interest in maintaining strong global relationships with DG ECHO could create a tension between maintaining a strong global relationship and representing the local interests of the national society.

EQ10 - To what extent did the DG ECHO-IFRC partnership succeed in: (a) maximising efficiencies and decreasing management and related costs, including administrative burden? (b)improving cost effectiveness in their response?

JC.10.1 The DG ECHO-IFRC partnership has led to efficiencies and cost savings.

The partnership with IFRC on the ESSN was heavily driven by DG ECHO's desire to improve the overall cost efficiency of the programme. There was evidence from a wide range of stakeholder interviews that the primary motivating factor in choosing the new partnership with IFRC to manage the ESSN was a response to the findings of the European Court of Auditors report in 2018.⁷⁴ The EU audit report clearly stated that, on a project which is really focused on cash delivery, there must be a lower indirect cost and much higher efficiency ratio. While there was a high degree of satisfaction with the technical performance of WFP in managing the programme, the unwillingness of the UN agency to negotiate on its Indirect Support Costs (ISC) was the deciding factor in the change of contract holder.

The cost efficiency of the ESSN has improved overtime and with the transfer of responsibility to the IFRC. There is strong evidence that the overhead costs of the ESSN have declined strongly overtime. The overall cost-efficiency of the programme is understood to have improved from 80:20 at the start of the programme (i.e., 80% of the total programme costs were transferred to beneficiaries in the form of cash) to a contractually mandated 90:10 ratio in the current IFRC managed phase. However, some care needs to be taken in interpreting this data. Clearly, there are significant setup costs at the start of the programme that mean that the cost efficiency would have improved overtime in any case.

That said, there was evidence that IFRC had succeeded in reducing overhead costs. The contractually agreed ISC cost was reduced from 6.5% to 3.85%. Furthermore, the IFRC shares the ISC (in the form of a management fee) with the TRC which can be seen as a positive use of funds that contributes to the capacity building of the national partner.

Direct support costs fell substantially during the IFRC phase. Interviewed IFRC staff reported that the number of staff employed by IFRC was less than half relative to the previous implementation phase. This partly reflected the capacity building work that had been achieved under WFP's stewardship and these costs would have shrunk anyway. To some extent, it also reflected the increased trust that IFRC had on TRC as its national partner which translated in a simplification of the accountability structures. The increased use of national staff by IFRC also contributed to reducing the total direct support costs.

Collectively, these savings, along with savings accruing from currency depreciation, were invested through the programme in the ESSN beneficiary caseload.

There is limited evidence that there has been a wider impact on reducing overhead costs amongst other humanitarian actors. There was limited evidence that the decision of IFRC to charge a lower ISC rate had a wider influence in the humanitarian sector in reducing these costs. While it was reported that some UN agencies were now accepting lower rates in exceptional circumstances - for example, projects implemented directly on behalf of recipient governments - in general, UN agencies have maintained their established rates.

IFRC had also made it clear that the rate negotiated for the ESSN was exceptional and would not necessarily be repeated in other projects. The reduced rate had been made possible by leveraging the work already done by TRC and would not necessarily be appropriate for the start-up of similar projects elsewhere.

JC.10.2 The DG ECHO-IFRC partnership has led to improved effectiveness of response

Stakeholders were satisfied that the ESSN remained overall an effective operation. This was heavily influenced by the continuation of TRC as the main implementing partner with its established capacities. There was a mixed response to perceptions of the extent to which IFRC was able to build on this established base to innovate and further improve effectiveness. However, it is important to note that IFRC took over the ESSN at a particularly challenging juncture. This coincided with a period of inflationary and economic pressures on the Turkish economy

⁷⁴ European Court of Auditors (2018) "Special Report No 27/2018: Facility for Refugees in Turkey: helpful support, but improvements needed to deliver more value for money" (Available from: https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR18_27/SR_TRF_EN.pdf)

alongside the COVID-19 crisis. Furthermore, IFRC highlighted that short one-year agreements did not provide an ideal environment for innovation.

Examples of improved effectiveness included the work done by IFRC and TRC on communication and visibility and capacity building in TRC. The innovative social media campaign within the EU commissioned by the IFRC to communicate the impact and effectiveness of the ESSN to EU citizens was well received and perceived. This aligned well with ECHO's own visibility strategy and priorities.

IFRC was also able to build on previous capacity building work done by WFP with TRC. While WFP had concentrated on providing functional "on the job training" to enable delivery of the programme, IFRC was able to complement this by focusing on strengthening the internal processes of TRC. For example, due to the close relationship with TRC, IFRC was much better placed to work on strengthening areas such as audit, monitoring, reporting and accountability.

It was felt that ESSN was at an appropriate juncture to transition more responsibility to the TRC and that the IFRC was well placed to support this transition. Overall, the IFRC capacity-building approach tended to take a longer-term perspective towards localisation and enhancing the organisational capacity of its partners, rather than a short-term perspective on project delivery. TRC was perceived to have come out of the process more autonomous and self-confident.

A strong monitoring capacity was broadly maintained. IFRC reportedly delivered an acceptable quality of analysis, although sometimes the analysis was perceived as not as robust as WFP's by DG ECHO staff. IFRC had to compete with the strong and well-established analytical capacities of the WFP Vulnerability Analysis and Measurement unit. IFRC lacked the extensive field presence that WFP had in place to underpin its monitoring capacities and assessments. On the flip side, it was appreciated that TRC had a much greater involvement in the monitoring process.

The need for better transparency and accountability on the ESSN was highlighted in the European Court of Auditors' Report (2018)⁷⁵ for the period when WFP was the contractor. Given the lack of access to the primary data of beneficiaries (the access was granted only over the anonymised data held by WFP) and associated limitations on monitoring by DG ECHO, the partnership with IFRC facilitated third-party monitoring mechanisms in ESSN as a response to accountability concerns. IFRC was able to secure improved access to beneficiary data to underpin improved verification and accountability and improve direct access to data by ECHO. Despite delays, IFRC managed to make progress with third-party monitoring mechanism to address the missing part of HH verification and externalising the audit exercise.

In several areas, there was a perception on the DG ECHO side that IFRC's proposal had promised improvements that did not materialise, by the time of this evaluation. Specifically, there was a strong interest in leveraging the ESSN to improve learning across the humanitarian community on the use of social protection systems to deliver humanitarian assistance. While there was a significant amount of learning produced out of the ESSN by the IFRC, the perception was that this had been mostly directed towards the internal benefit of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and there was relatively little learning for the wider benefit of the broader humanitarian community⁷⁶. This is discussed in more detail in the following section. There was also a perceived disconnect between learning activities and practical programme improvements – with the learning activities being somewhat abstract.

In addition, protection was seen as a relatively weak element of ESSN. DG ECHO hoped that IFRC would strengthen protection components. While there was some scale-up of operations in community centres with an orientation towards protection components, there was a perception that more could and should have been done on protection within the ESSN.

⁷⁵ *ibid*

⁷⁶ According to IFRC staff, this was partly associated with the fact that WFP was still conducting their impact assessments and IFRC was waiting for WFP to conclude all its reporting before starting its own. In the meantime, it was reported by IFRC staff that they coordinated with CALP, Cashcap, Cameleon, socialprotection.org to understand the type of learning that was coming out of these forums. The Evaluation Team could not independently verify this information.

EQ11 - To what extent did the DG ECHO-IFRC partnership contribute to: (a) Strengthening coordination within the Red Cross Movement (IFRC, ICRC, EU National Societies and beyond), and with other humanitarian actors, notably UN? (b) Strengthening a Nexus approach between the humanitarian response and development?

JC.11.1 Co-ordination both internally within the IFRC Movement, and externally with other partners, has increased as a result of the DG ECHO-IFRC partnership.

DG ECHO – IFRC partnership contributed to development of internal coordination within the IFRC network through several tools. The ESSN partnership enabled IFRC to strengthen the internal coordination within the movement through capacity building interventions as well as dissemination of knowledge and know-how within the learning framework mainly focused on internal learning rather than the entire humanitarian community.

Given that the previous phase of ESSN with WFP established a solid ground for initial capacity building and setting-up the programme at TRC, **capacity development trainings** were held for CVA and protection while also investing in workshops and training for utilization of tools such as Intersectoral Vulnerability Study⁷⁷, remote focus group meetings etc. On a broader scale, the learning from ESSN has been publicly available on the **“Cash in Turkey” webpage**⁷⁸ under the Resources section of the Cash Hub⁷⁹ that has been established as an online platform aiming at knowledge-sharing and information exchange for the cash practitioners in the Movement. As part of learning and sharing of best practices in ESSN, a **rotational delegation scheme** has been launched for cash experts and senior officers from National Societies of the countries aiming at large-scale cash programming. The scheme has been structured as a two-way exchange of resources and learning for 2-3 months, where delegates not only learn from ESSN, so that they bring the knowledge back and implement in their own National Societies, but also contribute and help enhance ESSN process.

As part of a digital transformation initiative, a project on **replication of Kizilaykart payment systems** of ESSN has been developed with a technical approach to learn about the technical setup of the platform, piloting adaptation and replication in other contexts. As part of this, data management system experience from ESSN has also been leveraged to the other National Societies within the Movement to help build capacities on information management for cash programming. The ESSN has been instrumental in positioning TRC as a leading National Society within the Movement through mutual dynamics of the reflection of the capacity, knowledge and know-how accumulated in ESSN into the Movement and the interest from the Movement to hear and learn from TRC and IFRC.

ESSN Partnership provided a basis for increased coordination within the Pilot Programmatic Partnership (PPP). ESSN partnership has provided the reputation and credibility to IFRC to engage into PPP with DG ECHO. PPP involves the provision of funds from DG ECHO for global outreach of humanitarian action by National Societies through IFRC.

There is mixed evidence on the contribution of DG ECHO – IFRC partnership to external coordination with UN institutions. Stakeholders felt that the IFRC had continued to engage widely in Turkey with a range of other humanitarian actors. To a large extent, this was a continuation of the coordination arrangements put in place by WFP. Stakeholders argued that the main obstacle to wider coordination for the IFRC is usually a lack of resources. For these respondents, the resources of the ESSN had enabled IFRC to fully coordinate with other partners – and this could be repeated elsewhere if the resources were available.

However, some stakeholders suggested that, as IFRC was not part of the UN family, it changed the nature and quality of their relationships with these other international agencies. For example, the UN family was perceived to coordinate more naturally around policy agendas, while IFRC was more comfortable in focussing on programmatic coordination.

⁷⁷ IFRC and TRC (2021) “Intersectoral Vulnerability Study: The Vulnerability Conditions of Refugees Living in Turkey – Round 11 (Available from: <https://cash-hub.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2021/06/IVS-report-210616.pdf>)

⁷⁸ <https://cash-hub.org/resources/cash-in-turkey/>

⁷⁹ <https://cash-hub.org/>

JC.11.2 The DG ECHO-IFRC partnership has strengthened the nexus approach between humanitarian and development actors.

Contextual challenges have imposed significant structural limitations over the progress towards shift from emergency to livelihoods. The current context in Turkey poses a set of challenges to the transition from ESSN to livelihoods. COVID-19 pandemic has increased the vulnerability of the refugee communities with adverse effects on livelihoods and employment⁸⁰ while rampant inflation and fall in economic output have led to significant deteriorations in economic conditions and narrowing down of already limited opportunities in the labour market. That being said, livelihood opportunities for refugee community had long been constrained, even in pre-March 2020 period, due to structural factors such as: limited employment opportunities in the formal sector due to skill or educational accreditation requirements; prevalence of seasonal, irregular or short-term jobs; low intake of the work permits as well as the quotas at the workplaces for refugee employment.⁸¹

Ongoing livelihoods programmes in Turkey are disconnected from the ESSN. There are a number of livelihood programs in Turkey run by the development partners and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) covering both host community and refugees, both ESSN beneficiaries and other non-eligible refugees.⁸² However, these programmes remain largely disconnected. It was specifically noted that the strategies and programmes of DG ECHO and DG NEAR on the nexus between ESSN and livelihoods programming appear to be poorly connected. In theory, there is an opportunity to better link humanitarian and development partners that have been working in parallel to each other. In practice, this is a challenging proposition. Stakeholders perceived that many of the livelihood opportunities were targeted to households with slightly higher capacities for work as a first step for livelihood programmes, rather than the more vulnerable households already supported by the ESSN. This is particularly relevant given the desire to maximise the impact of the limited resources available for job creation. It is unlikely that the collective resources available will achieve significant levels of job creation given the size of the refugee community in Turkey and the limited resources, which may be targeted where they are perceived to have the greatest impact and chances of success.

By 2018, there was an articulated desire by the EU to work across the nexus and link ESSN beneficiaries to livelihood opportunities.⁸³ The DG ECHO-ESSN strategy envisaged a process whereby the beneficiaries would be referred to livelihoods support, both in other TRC programmes and externally, which would eventually allow beneficiaries to graduate from the ESSN into formal employment and self-sufficiency. The partnership with IFRC was seen essential in fulfilling the transition strategy and move from humanitarian to development assistance. A series of discussions on the future of ESSN had been triggered by DG ECHO, with strong involvement of IFRC on producing and analysing a set of available scenarios with active involvement and participation of all stakeholders of ESSN. The establishment of a robust and systematized referral system to connect ESSN beneficiaries with other community centres and other livelihood programs emerges as the key issue that TRC has been working on. TRC has supported a number of Community-Based Training Programs. However, actions in this regard have been limited and there is no evidence that it has translated into employment for ESSN beneficiaries over the evaluation period.

The limited progress made by IFRC needs to be appropriately contextualised. Working across the nexus cannot be the primary responsibility of one of the humanitarian partners. Development partners, other humanitarian partners, authorities and donors need to take more responsibility for progress to be achieved.

⁸⁰ IFRC and TRC (2020) "Impact of COVID-19 on Refugee Populations Benefitting from the ESSN Programme – Assessment Report" (Available from: https://platform.kizilaykart.org/en/Doc/rapor/Covid19_Report.pdf).

⁸¹ Caro, L.P. (2020) "Syrian Refugees in the Turkish Labour Market", ILO report (available from: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-/europe/-/ro-geneva/-/ilo-ankara/documents/publication/wcms_738602.pdf)

⁸² 3RP (2022) "Turkey Country Chapter 2021-2022"p.9, p.21-24. (available from <https://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/3RP-2022-Documents-English-Version-v5.pdf>)

⁸³ This is reflected for instance in line 1 of the ESSN Single Form which reads as follows "This Action will enable over 1.8 million refugees to meet their basic needs through monthly cash assistance delivered via Turkish Red Crescent's Kizilaykart platform (<http://platform.kizilaykart.org/en>) and support referrals of identified protection concerns and potential referrals to livelihoods through the establishment of internal and external pathways."

4.2 Case study 2: Contribution to anticipatory approaches and future opportunities

A. Objectives

This case study took stock of DG ECHO's contribution to Forecast-based Action (FbA) through the partnership with IFRC. It also explored what role DG ECHO could play, going forward, in supporting the scale up of FbA.

The case study did not evaluate, i.e., it did not assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency or added value of DG ECHO funded forecast based actions implemented by IFRC. However, it used the experience gained and lessons learned from the implementation of these actions - to determine what role DG ECHO could play moving forward.

B. Scope

Following the commitments made at the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 through the Grand Bargain, DG ECHO and the wider humanitarian community have been seeking to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the response system.⁸⁴ At the same time, there has been a growth in the use of disaster risk financing as a means to having resources in place to respond prior to or as quickly as possible after a shock or crisis.

One such approach to disaster risk financing has been forecast-based action or anticipatory action, which enables actors to start their work before a predicted disaster strikes, with the aim of mitigating the risks of a specific forecast shock or taking protective action against a forecast shock. Such actions can prevent the loss of lives and livelihoods, significantly improving both effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian action by reducing the necessity for or the scale of humanitarian response needed (in the aftermath of an emergency).⁸⁵

Against this background, this case study examined:

- The use of FbA within DREF;
- DG ECHO's approach, criteria and limitations in supporting FbAF under DREF;
- The opportunities and challenges associated with utilising DREF FbA to support anticipatory humanitarian action in different crisis contexts;
- How the partnership has been used to exchange and build knowledge and expertise in FbA;
- Specific joint advocacy work undertaken by the two organisations on this topic;
- How the partnership could be leveraged to enhance DG ECHO's anticipatory action.

C. Methodology

The case study was based on the following sources of evidence:

- Interviews: Six interviews were undertaken with key stakeholders from the IFRC, Red Cross Climate Centre, Anticipation Hub and DG ECHO.
- Document review: A library of documents that was developed during the inception phase of the evaluation coupled with additional documents provided by interviewees were reviewed. The library contained relevant document from both DG ECHO and the IFRC on various aspects of FbA.

Limitations: Some DG ECHO officials refused our requests for interviews. This may have been caused by the start of the Ukraine conflict. As a result, the case study does not benefit from the full range of perspectives and institutional knowledge on the topic.

D. Context

⁸⁴ UNOCHA, 2016, The Grand Bargain –A Shared Commitment to Better Serve People in Need.

⁸⁵ ODI, 2020, Risk-informed approaches to humanitarian funding, Using risk finance tools to strengthen resilience.

The nature of humanitarian crises has become more protracted, unpredictable and complex. Crises are increasingly influenced by climate change, environmental degradation, unplanned urbanisation and by the intersection between disasters and conflict. International agreements such as the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR),⁸⁶ the Paris Agreement for Climate Change,⁸⁷ as well as the Grand Bargain have defined the international community's commitment towards reducing disaster risk, fighting climate change and improving the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian action.

Anticipatory action has garnered widespread interest within the humanitarian and development sectors as a result of its potential to address resilience objectives (as it straddles the humanitarian-development nexus), in addition to potential efficiency and effectiveness gains. A number of collaborative initiatives on anticipatory action have emerged in recent years. The Anticipatory Action Task Force was formed to encourage collaboration between UN agencies (WFP, FAO and OCHA), the IFRC and NGOs (Start Network). Risk Informed Early Action Partnership (REAP) brings development partners and the climate community together to leverage investment and financing in early action across sectors. The Anticipation Hub, run by German Red Cross together with the IFRC and the Red Cross Red Crescent Climate Centre (RCCC) and financially supported by the German government is a platform for technical assistance, sustained learning, and exchange on anticipatory action.

In 2017, the European Commission (EC) renewed its commitment to strengthening the resilience of partner countries including through the identification and prioritisation of preventive and adaptive measures through risk-informed investments.⁸⁸ The Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the EU's Humanitarian Action: New Challenges, Same Principles (2021) emphasised the need for preparedness and anticipatory action in responding to climate impacts and addressing environmental concerns through humanitarian aid.

As a result of these developments, and the changing humanitarian landscape, DG ECHO decided to review its work on disaster preparedness and promote a risk-informed approach to humanitarian action. DG ECHO's Disaster Preparedness Guidance Note issued in 2021 viewed preparedness as critical for timely and quality response operations as well as being a way of improving anticipation to reduce suffering, save lives and pre-empt or reduce humanitarian needs.⁸⁹ The guidance note recognised three key elements of FbA. These were:

- a comprehensive analysis of risks and forecasts, the establishment and/or strengthening of EWSs,
- the design of pre-agreed Early Action Protocols (EAP) defining triggers for actions, pre-agreed anticipatory actions and responsibilities,
- and the arrangement of flexible funds ready to be disbursed ahead of the crisis.

Since 2009, DG ECHO has been making earmarked contributions to the DREF of the IFRC so as to support a quick response to small and medium scale disasters. This is the only such pooled fund in the humanitarian system supported by DG ECHO. This support continues today and in 2019 expanded to support the Forecast Based Action Fund (FbAF) through an indirect management funding agreement.⁹⁰

E. Findings

This section summarises the evidence that has emerged from the interviews conducted and the document review undertaken. Findings are organised per case study question, with a view to contribute to future collaboration between DG ECHO and the IFRC on anticipatory action and feed into the broader evaluation report on the partnership between DG ECHO and IFRC.

⁸⁶ UNDRR, 2015 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030).

⁸⁷ <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement>

⁸⁸ EU, 2017, Joint Communication on Resilience.

⁸⁹ DG ECHO, 2021, Guidance Note Disaster Preparedness.

⁹⁰ ECHO/DRF/BUD/2019/91004 Signed Agreement registered under file n° 2019/00582/RQ/01/01.

The current use of FbA within DREF

As of March 2020, there had been seven activations of the fund in support of anticipatory actions with DG ECHO replenishing four allocations. Table 9 shows all seven activations, the number of households targeted and the contribution of DG ECHO to each of the activation. Table 9 also provides a breakdown of costs associated with readiness, pre-positioning and early action itself, as well as demonstrating the diversity of hazards that the FbAF has been used to address including floods, cyclones and volcanic eruptions.

Table 9 :FbAF activations and DG ECHO contributions (in CHF)⁹¹

| Country | Hazard | # HH targeted | Readiness costs | Pre-position of stock | Early Action cost | Total budget | ECHO contribution |
|---------------------------------|-------------------|---------------|-----------------|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------|-------------------|
| Mongolia | Cold Wave (Dzud) | 1000 | 44,175 | 0 | 205,643 | 249,818 | |
| Bangladesh | Cyclone | 7200 | 43,686 | 4,993 | 134,317 | 182,996 | 100,000 |
| Bangladesh | Flood | 3300 | 15,059 | 0 | 234,803 | 249,862 | 100,000 |
| Mozambique | Cyclone | 1500 | 69,563 | 76,343 | 103,484 | 249,390 | 70,000 |
| Mongolia | Cold Wave (Dzud) | 2000 | 0 | 0 | 293,454 | 293,454 | |
| Ecuador | Volcanic Eruption | 1000 | 59,819 | 80,841 | 105,926 | 246,586 | 50,000 |
| Mozambique ⁹² | Floods | 1500 | 57,635 | 79,454 | 112,238 | 249,327 | |

Current IFRC protocols for access to the FbAF require National Societies to have an approved EAP.⁹³ To date the IFRC has approved 17 EAPs with 38 under development. The scale for FbA has thus been limited.⁹⁴ An EAP is an official plan with a five-year life span⁹⁵ that encompasses the projected impact of a hazard on at risk communities. EAPs contain pre-positioning requirements, readiness activities and pre-agreed actions to be taken, should trigger thresholds be met, and carried a maximum budget of CHF 350,000 (including indirect costs).⁹⁶ The maximum budget was reportedly increased to CHF 500,000 in 2022. The development and approval of EAP takes time. Informants suggested the process can take a year (or even longer in some instances), thereby limiting the number of National Societies that have access to the FbAF. In addition, renewal of EAP's is required every five years, unless activated.

There have been a limited number of actions since DG ECHO started funding FbAF. The main reason for this is FbAF is used for crises with a probability of occurrence of once in a five-year period⁹⁷ rather than for use in recurrent crises. This leads to an inherent uncertainty associated with anticipatory action, which is based on forecasting the probability of future harm based on certain context specific defined assumptions.

Moreover, the scale of anticipatory action undertaken through the Fund has been targeted to a small number of households. Informants suggest that the deployment of FbA is limited by National Society capacities to respond and the short lead time for the actions, limiting the number of households targeted through early actions.

⁹¹ IFRC data.

⁹² This anticipatory action was triggered in 2022.

⁹³ IFRC, 2020, Forecast Based Action Fund Procedure.

⁹⁴ IFRC Forecast Based Action Dashboard.

⁹⁵ It may terminate earlier if and when the forecasted early action has been triggered.

⁹⁶ IFRC, 2020, Forecast Based Action Fund Procedure.

⁹⁷ The 5-year return period is a proxy indicator for extreme event. The EAPs are geared for extreme events.

DG ECHO's approach, criteria and limitations in supporting FbAF under DREF

DG ECHO integrates anticipatory action as part of its disaster preparedness approach. DG ECHO's Preparedness Guidance note 2021 defines its approach to preparedness as "allowing for an early and efficient response, helping to save lives, reduce suffering and pre-empt or decrease the extent of needs."⁹⁸ The approach commits DG ECHO to integrating risk assessment and analysis into its needs-based approach implying that humanitarian actions are designed and implemented to address and reduce risks and mitigate their impact.⁹⁹

Anticipatory actions are one of the targeted preparedness actions supported by DG ECHO as part of a risk-informed approach. Targeted preparedness refers to actions taken in advance of a hazardous and/or threatening event and aimed at improving the effectiveness of the response to it. This includes the development of early warning systems, the development of contingency plans, anticipatory actions, emergency pre-positioning of stock, and overall capacity building for early action/early response.¹⁰⁰

DG ECHO recognises that its preparedness work including support to anticipatory action straddles the humanitarian-development nexus and is critical for resilience and sustainability. In light of this, DG ECHO works closely with other EU services, particularly Directorate General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) and with the Directorate General for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement (DG NEAR) to promote complementarity and reinforcement of humanitarian and development initiatives.

DG ECHO has shown flexibility in its interpretation of the Humanitarian Aid Regulation of 1996 to enable support for DREF and the FbAF¹⁰¹. DG ECHO's humanitarian aid regulation (1996) defines DG ECHO's role as funding 'humanitarian aid operations'. A strict interpretation would exclude a pooled fund mechanism. However, such pooled funds were not the norm in the humanitarian system in 1996 and had not been foreseen. More recently, DG ECHO is exploring support to other pooled funds such as OCHA managed Country Pooled Funding Mechanisms and the CERF which is piloting anticipatory action.¹⁰²

Funding through the FbAF is contingent on scientifically defined triggers and thresholds detailed in EAP, which when reached, automatically generate an allocation from the FbAF, which is then replenished by DG ECHO. DG ECHO's contributions are guided by an indirect management agreement.¹⁰³ The agreement stipulates specific EU funding eligibility criteria including:

Allocations from the EU funding to the FbAF can be used to replenish the early action allocations made on the basis of individual triggers in full or in part, with a maximum amount of EUR 200 000 per activity and a minimum of 50% of the allocation made by the FbAF, unless otherwise explicitly agreed upon by DG ECHO.

Trigger based early actions covered by this funding can have a maximum implementing period of three months.

Modalities for mobilisation of DG ECHO allocations to the FbAF are also described in the agreement, highlighting communication channels and responsibilities. The agreement also places a limit of allocations to anticipatory actions of 20 percent from total EU funding of EUR 3,000,000 to the DREF.

There is an inherent tension for DG ECHO between a needs-based approach and a risk-based approach to planning and finance. The pursuit of a risk-based could potentially be reserving or reducing funding availability for emergency response in favour of preparedness or anticipatory action. DG ECHO's preparedness guidance note makes explicit the need for a risk-informed needs-based approach, thereby re-orienting the organisation from a purely life-saving humanitarian agenda to one that builds resilience, as well as meeting Grand Bargain commitments on improved aid effectiveness and efficiency. Tensions could arise between funding

⁹⁸ DG ECHO, 2021, Guidance Note Disaster Preparedness.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ DG ECHO permits the use of 20% of the funds committed to DREF to be used as part of the FbAF. It has funded DREF since 2009

¹⁰² ODI, 2020, Risk-informed approaches to humanitarian funding-Using Risk finance tools to strengthen resilience.

¹⁰³ ECHO/DRF/BUD/2019/91004 Signed Agreement registered under file n° 2019/00582/RQ/01/01.

being used for life saving response operations and the activation of anticipatory action, since the latter is based on forecasts, which may or may not have the predicted impact.¹⁰⁴

The opportunities and challenges associated with utilising the FbAF to support anticipatory humanitarian action in different crisis contexts

A number of challenges and opportunities can influence the effectiveness and efficiency of the FbAF. Some of these challenges and opportunities are external, requiring advocacy and influence, whereas others are internal and can be addressed through efforts to change existing protocols, procedures and systems.

Hydro-meteorological agencies do not generally have the mandate or expertise to do impact-based forecasting and in some countries, they have very low capacity. A current lack of impact-based forecast capability at national level means that there is a reliance on international meteorological and scientific forecasting. For example in Mozambique, Meteo France and Indian Ocean Regional Intervention Platform (PIROI) of the French Red Cross were used alongside the National Meteorological Institute of Mozambique to determine the likely strength and landfall of the cyclone, but this was not combined with an analysis of the impact of the hazard on the population.¹⁰⁵ In Bangladesh, the experience of Cyclone Amphan in 2020 has reportedly convinced the Bangladesh Meteorological Department to invest more in impact based forecasting an area they have not previously worked in.¹⁰⁶

The sustainability of anticipatory action requires government ownership. DG ECHO could play a stronger role, including through Member States,¹⁰⁷ in advocating with government partners to integrate anticipatory action in disaster risk management frameworks. This could be done through government legislation to alter limits in financing forecast-based action, improving operational capacities of disaster risk management agencies and supporting capacity building efforts.

DG ECHO support to the FbAF is not sufficiently complemented by wider support to capacity development of forecast based anticipatory action capacities of National Societies. Beyond rapid, predictable funding, DG ECHO, through the Programmatic Partnership, will support selected countries to develop or revise existing EAPs. These plans form the basis for anticipatory action in countries and include support to readiness, for example, training of volunteers and staff, as well as the pre-positioning of materials for pre-agreed anticipatory actions. DG ECHO has tended to focus its support to the actions taken following the triggering rather than support to readiness and pre-positioning activities which are an equally important component of anticipatory action. DG ECHO could expand its support through Disaster Preparedness budget lines for such activities, expanding its support beyond the EAP development and actions to incorporate a preparedness aspect to its support to anticipatory action by funding readiness and pre-positioning activities.

The lag between EAP activation and reception of funds from the FbAF meant that National Societies have had to rely on internal funding and in some cases are considering setting up their own emergency fund to ensure that early actions can take place. For example, in Mozambique, the National Society suggested the need for in-country contingency funds as a buffer against the time lag between activation of the EAP and arrival of funds in country, which totalled nine days.¹⁰⁸ A lesson from the Cyclone Amphan EAP activation in Bangladesh was the effectiveness of the pre-allocated decentralised funding available at branch level to implement early actions, counteracting the lag time between activation and receiving funds from the FbAF.¹⁰⁹ The ability of National Societies to maintain their own contingency funds is likely to vary. The IFRC is exploring solutions to reduce the time lag between activations and a National Society receiving funds by making funds available directly at country level once an EAP has been approved and validated and not yet triggered. This would allow National Societies to access funds immediately once an EAP is triggered.

The current cap of EUR 200,000 placed on anticipatory actions funded by DG ECHO does not adequately account for different National Society capacities. Given the significant differences in National Society

¹⁰⁴ For example, the FbAF may be activated for a cyclone which may not make landfall where initially predicted, or may not make landfall at all or dissipate prior to making landfall, however funding would have already been expended on evacuation of people and assets.

¹⁰⁵ IFRC, 2020, Mozambique Tropical Storm Chalane, Final Report Early Action.

¹⁰⁶ IFRC, 2020, Bangladesh Cyclone, Final Report Early Action.

¹⁰⁷ Using the Team Europe approach.

¹⁰⁸ IFRC, 2020, Mozambique Tropical Storm Chalane, Final Report Early Action.

¹⁰⁹ IFRC, 2020, Bangladesh Cyclone, Final Report Early Action.

capacities, placing a limit of EUR 200,000 appears relatively arbitrary in nature¹¹⁰. Informants suggested that the cap applies primarily to all DREF replenishments by DG ECHO and was established when the budgets of individual DREF operations were significantly lower. In addition, the overall DREF budget available was significantly lower (EUR 3 million) when compared to the number of DREF requests (estimated over 100 per year). This situation has changed since 2018 with DREF being topped up and more recently a significantly increased overall DREF budget allocation. Given the agreed need for greater scale of anticipatory action and in order to match context-specific needs, consideration should be given to increasing the cap based on National Society capacity to implement anticipatory actions. The IFRC itself is reviewing its internal ceilings for anticipatory actions.

The development of protocols by IFRC for less scientifically rigorous triggers for release of FbAF funding is an opportunity for DG ECHO to support the scale up of anticipatory action. Anticipatory action includes forecasting the probability of future threats based on context-specific assumptions. This involves dealing with uncertainty, and it potentially limits the triggering of the FbAF. To date, IFRC has relied on scientific data as a means to trigger the FbAF. Recent developments by IFRC to build systems, where less rigorous scientific data and more expert judgement is used to trigger release of funds from the FbAF, may generate a greater volume of anticipatory action. For example, in the Mozambique activation, despite the trigger not having been met as per forecasts, the decision was made to activate the protocol, as experts indicated a high probability of rapid intensification of Tropical Cyclone Chalane over the Mozambique channel due to favourable conditions (high sea surface temperature, high levels of humidity) in the channel.¹¹¹

How has the partnership been used to exchange and build knowledge and expertise in FbA

The partnership has had an ad hoc and opportunistic approach to the exchange and building of knowledge and expertise. More recently, IFRC has started to develop an Anticipatory action learning framework. Informants suggested there have been scattered studies and learning and that there is a need to strengthen research and learning objectives. The previous lack of evidence and body of work made an opportunistic approach to learning acceptable; however, with the current number of organisations and body of evidence, there is a need for more systematic capture of learning. The IFRC is currently developing a learning framework for anticipatory action, which will be supported by the Anticipation Hub. A key focus of the framework will be the translation of research, which is often scientific in nature and too complex for National Societies to understand, into digestible practicable and actionable learning. DG ECHO could support the dissemination of trainings and learning.

Despite the extension of an invitation to partner with the Anticipation Hub extended by the German Federal Government and the German Red Cross, a response by DG ECHO remains pending.¹¹² The Anticipation Hub¹¹³ collects and disseminates the evidence and learning on anticipatory action developed through its partnership with donors, NGO's, UN organisations and Red Cross Red Crescent Movement members. Partnering with the Anticipation Hub provides DG ECHO with an opportunity to access knowledge and influence the evidence and learning agenda of wider actors in the field of anticipatory action. Informants gave an example of the reach of the Anticipation Hub activities, such as the Annual Global and Regional Dialogue Platform on Anticipatory Action which, in 2021, brought together 2,500 participants across 130 countries.

DG ECHO sought and received inputs from the IFRC on its approach to anticipatory action as part of its new Guidance note on Disaster Preparedness. Informants suggested that inputs by the IFRC were valued and that the IFRC is more advanced than DG ECHO with regards to the thinking and approach to anticipatory action. The guidance promotes a risk-based approach to identifying and understanding needs, marking a fundamental shift in DG ECHO's needs-based approach. Through this risk-based approach DG ECHO has enabled support to anticipatory action as a means to increasing aid effectiveness and efficiency.

¹¹⁰ The Evaluation team was unable to identify DG ECHO's rationale behind the adoption of the existing CAP. Relevant DG ECHO staff were not available for interview.

¹¹¹ IFRC, 2020, Mozambique Tropical Storm Chalane, Final Report Early Action.

¹¹² EU-IFRC Strategic Dialogue 26 November 2020 MONITORING TABLE –updated 15/09/2021.

¹¹³ Governed by the German Red Cross, the IFRC and the RC Climate centre.

Specific joint advocacy work undertaken by the two organisations on this topic

The DG ECHO-IFRC partnership along with other partners has led to policy level engagement with key EU policy forming bodies. As part of the Anticipatory Action Task Force¹¹⁴, IFRC co-presented with FAO a policy brief on anticipatory action at the European Council Working Party on Humanitarian aid and Food Aid (COHAFA). The Working Party discusses the EU's humanitarian strategies and policies, as well as its response to humanitarian crises. The policy brief promoted a culture of working through learning, coordination and partnership amongst other tasks, such as additional resources for anticipatory action. This policy brief was developed in collaboration with DG ECHO and will be brought to the upcoming G7 meeting by the German government.¹¹⁵

Through DG ECHO's co-chair role of the IFRC Donor Advisory Group (DAG), anticipatory action was promoted through a recent policy dialogue. The policy dialogue took place in June 2021 and brought to the attention of donors the role that IFRC is playing in anticipatory action as well as the challenges faced in anticipatory action, including the limited scope and volume of delivery, the continued focus on more visible events such as tropical storms and cyclones, rather than on more complex crises such as droughts and the limited anticipatory action in fragile and conflict settings.¹¹⁶

DG ECHO, with the support of the IFRC, has promoted a "Team Europe"¹¹⁷ approach in support of anticipatory action through the European Humanitarian Forum (EHF). Informants reported that such an approach would bring Member States together under a coordinated and coherent approach in support of anticipatory action, to expand early warning systems to address hazards and their impact, integration of anticipatory action into national disaster risk management and climate change adaptation frameworks, as well as supporting research, exchange and coordination to address a wider scope of hazards through anticipatory action.

Pilot Programmatic Partnership: Anticipatory action is one of the elements of the ongoing pilot Programmatic Partnership.

How can the partnership be leveraged to enhance DG ECHO's anticipatory action?

DG ECHO support to the FbAF is not sufficiently complemented by wider support to capacity development of forecast-based anticipatory action capacities of National Societies. Investment in readiness and pre-positioning of materials would support scale-up of anticipatory action. Beyond rapid, predictable funding, DG ECHO, through the Programmatic Partnership, will support selected countries to develop or revise existing EAP. These plans form the basis for anticipatory action in countries and will include support to readiness, for example training of volunteers and staff, as well as the pre-positioning of materials. These activities are reportedly regularly under-funded. DG ECHO could expand its support through Disaster Preparedness budget lines for such activities.

DG ECHO and EU Member States could leverage the partnership at country and regional level to advocate with governments for the integration of anticipatory action into national disaster risk management frameworks. DG ECHO and member states should advocate for governments to make available the necessary finance and the necessary adjustments to legal frameworks for anticipatory action.

The partnership between DG ECHO and IFRC could promote greater engagement with entities addressing longer term issues that relate to forecast based anticipatory action. For example, the European Commission (DG INTPA) currently sits as an observer to the CREWS initiative which is a mechanism that funds Least Developed Countries (LDC) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) for risk informed early warning services. Through this forum, DG ECHO could promote greater efforts to enhance National Hydro-meteorological services infrastructure for impact-based forecasting and the link with humanitarian actors for last-mile early action.

¹¹⁴ Partners include IFRC, START NETWORK, IFRC, WFP and German Red Cross.

¹¹⁵ Through the G7 Famine Prevention and Humanitarian Crises Compact the G7 states commit to avert the deterioration in acute hunger worldwide and curb the growth of humanitarian needs – including through scaling up anticipatory action.

¹¹⁶ IFRC, 2021, IFRC DAG Policy Dialogue.

¹¹⁷ Team Europe approach refers to the EU and its member states.

DG ECHO could accept the German Federal Governments and the German Red Cross invitation to join the Anticipation Hub in order to more readily contribute from a donor perspective to research and development of anticipatory action while using this opportunity to build its own expertise and knowledge base on anticipatory action.

ANNEX 5: METHODOLOGY AND COVERAGE: SURVEY ON DG ECHO-IFRC PARTNERSHIP

Two online surveys were administered as part of this evaluation during the desk phase:

Targeted audience

The survey was disseminated to both DG ECHO and IFRC staff as follows:

- **IFRC staff:** The survey was disseminated to selected staff involved with DG ECHO either at a strategic level (notably involved in the development of the partnership with DG ECHO) or through the management and implementation of actions which benefited from the support of DG ECHO. This included staff at Headquarter, regional and cluster or country offices.
- Similarly, **DG ECHO staff** involved directly with the development of the partnership with IFRC or at policy level, and indirectly via the different activities implemented by the IFRC received the survey. This included staff at headquarters from the thematic, partnership and geographic units, as well as field staff at regional and country level.

To target an audience with sufficiently rich experience of the partnership, the survey was disseminated to the staff of a selected number of regions and countries. They were selected based on the intensity of the collaboration and funding and the diversity of contexts in terms of geography but also in terms of humanitarian contexts.

Issues covered

The questions included in the surveys were formulated to provide an overview of the perception of the key areas of the partnership to identify key issues that were then further explored in subsequent phases of the evaluation. More specifically, the areas covered include:

- Awareness on the different activities and components of the partnership;
- Intensity of collaboration in key areas;
- Intensity of coordination key areas.

Survey dissemination strategy

The survey was launched on 11 January online for a duration of 3 weeks (with the announced deadline on 28 January). A link to the survey was disseminated by email to a list of DG ECHO staff defined with the help of DG ECHO and to the IFRC staff directly by the IFRC. A reminder to reply the survey was sent at the beginning of the third week. While the deadline was set for 28 January,

The following measures were taken to increase the chances to reach a high response rate and to ensure that the targeted respondents had a relevant experience regarding IFRC and DG ECHO:

- Formulate clear and concise survey questions
- Design a short survey (not more than 10 min) and therefore focusing on key dimensions of the DG ECHO-IFRC partnership.
- Launch the survey on a user-friendly platform, which complies with the GDPR requirements of the European Union.
- Opt for “closed” multiple choice questions with only a limited number of “open” questions to collect specific examples.
- Send a reminder to respondents to maximise the number of respondents.

- Carry out a continuous follow up and communication with respondents in case they had issues with the surveys; and encourage the respondents to share the survey to other relevant partner representatives if they felt they were not the best person to reply.

Response rates and profile of the respondents


As some of DG ECHO staff were targeted for both surveys (i.e., for the survey on DG ECHO's response to sudden-onset disasters in the desk report for Part A and the survey on the partnership between DG ECHO and the IFRC) two separate emails were sent: one for 14 potential respondents who received only the survey on the DG ECHO-IFRC partnership and 60 others who also received both surveys. Out of the total 74 respondents, 19 responded to the survey which corresponds to a response rate of around 25%. DG ECHO respondents are equally shared between field staff and staff from HQ, half of whom are from the geographical desks. In terms of role in DG ECHO, around two thirds of the respondents are field or desk officers and a quarter have management level positions.


For IFRC staff, the survey has been sent by the IFRC to focal points in a set of regional/cluster/country offices with the request to disseminate the survey to knowledgeable staff. It is therefore not possible to precisely estimate a response rate for this survey. However, with 32 responses for a survey disseminated to around 10 focal points, the turnout appears satisfying. The large majority of IFRC respondents were based in field offices: around 50% in country offices and 35% in regional offices. The remaining 15% were based in the headquarters in Geneva. Around half of the respondent have management level positions (i.e., including Head of units/country offices).

For more details on the profiles of respondents, please refer to Annex 6 below.


ANNEX 6: RESULTS: SURVEY ON DG ECHO-IFRC PARTNERSHIP

DG ECHO Staff

Q1. Current position/role of the respondents.**N=19****Q2&3. Office & country that the respondents are based.**




Q3. The extent to which the respondents are aware that these different elements of the partnership between DG ECHO and the IFRC.




Q4. The extent to which DG ECHO and the IFRC are collaborating in the following areas.

N=19




Q5. The coordination between DG ECHO and the IFRC improved as a result of the strategic partnership.

N=14



Q6. The extent to which the coordination between DG ECHO and the IFRC improved in the following areas.


N=18




IFRC Staff

Q1. Current position/role of the respondents.


N=32

**Q2 and Q3. Office and country that the respondents are based.**

N=32




Q3. The extent to which the respondents are aware that these different elements of the partnership between DG ECHO and the IFRC.




Q4. The extent to which DG ECHO and the IFRC are collaborating in the following areas.

N=32




Q5. The coordination between DG ECHO and the IFRC improved as a result of the strategic partnership.

N=28



Q6. The extent to which the coordination between DG ECHO and the IFRC improved in the following areas.

N=29



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ECHO Mission


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