



# Ex-post evaluation of Civil Protection Financial Instrument and Community Civil Protection Mechanism (recast) 2007-2013

## Final Report

Submitted by ICF International

16 December 2014



European  
Commission

Humanitarian Aid  
and Civil Protection

The opinions expressed in this document represent the views of the authors, which are not necessarily shared by the European Commission.

# Ex-post evaluation of Civil Protection Financial Instrument and Community Civil Protection Mechanism (recast) 2007-2013

Directorate-General Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection

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## List of abbreviations

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radioactive and Nuclear
CECIS	Common Emergency Communication and Information System
CPFI	Civil Protection Financial Instrument
CPM	Civil Protection Mechanism
CRED	Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters
DG DEVCO	Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development
DG ECHO	Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
DG ELARG	Directorate General for Enlargement
DG ENV	Directorate General for the Environment
DG ENTR	Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry
DG JUST	Directorate General for Justice and Home Affairs
DG SANCO	Directorate General for Health and Consumers
EC	European Commission
EEAS	European External Action Service
EFAS	European Flood Alert System
EFFIS	European Forest Fire Information System
EM-DAT	International Disaster Database
EMSA	European Maritime Safety Agency
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI	European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument
EP	European Parliament
ERDF	European Regional Development Fund
ERCC	Emergency Response and Coordination Centre
EU	European Union
EU CP Team	European Civil Protection Teams
EUFFTR	European Forest Fire Tactical Reserve
EWS	Early Warning System
GDACS	Global Disaster Alerts and Coordination System
HCP	High Capacity Pumping
HNS	Host Nation Support
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IPA	Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
INSARAG	United Nations International Search and Rescue Advisory Group
JRC	Joint Research Centre (European Commission)

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MED	Transnational programme of European territorial cooperation in the Mediterranean
MIC	Monitoring and Information Centre
MS	Member States (European Union)
NATO	North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OSOC	On-Site Operations Coordination Centre
PPRD	Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Natural and Man-made Disasters Programme (South and East)
PS	Participating States (European Civil Protection Mechanism)
SAR	Search and Rescue
SOPs	Standard Operation Procedures
TAST	Technical Assistance Team
UN	United Nations
UNDAC	UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNEP	UN Environment Programme
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USAR	Urban Search and Rescue

## Abstract

This report presents the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the ex-post evaluation of the Civil Protection Financial Instrument and Community Civil Protection Mechanism (recast) 2007-2013 – hereafter “the Mechanism”. The report aims to provide an objective assessment that can primarily serve as a basis for the Commission's report to the European Parliament and the Council on Mechanism actions in the period 2007 to 2013 and for internal reflection and debate about the approach to the Mechanism actions in the future.

The general purpose of the Mechanism was to provide, on request, support in the event of major emergencies, or the imminent threat thereof, and to facilitate improved coordination of civil protection response to all types of major emergencies occurring inside or outside the EU. The protection ensured by the Mechanism covered primarily people but also the environment and property. Under the Civil Protection Financial Instrument, financial assistance was given to improve the effectiveness of response to major emergencies and to enhance preventive and preparedness measures for all kinds of emergencies.

A total of €189.8 million was committed for the implementation of the Civil Protection Financial Instrument for the period 2007-2013. Whilst the majority of Mechanism actions were financed through the Civil Protection Financial Instrument, some actions were financed through additional funds granted by the European Parliament and the Council as well as other EU Instruments.

The evaluation concludes that the Mechanism was effective in achieving its overarching and specific objectives. Mechanism actions responded to stakeholders' needs, were cost effective and were in the majority of cases implemented efficiently. The Mechanism brought EU added value by strengthening the cooperation between Participating States; addressing gaps in national response capacities; starting to shift the focus towards a more prevention-related approach; providing a single contact point that coordinated the EU-level efforts; and bringing visibility to the EU via expressing solidarity to countries affected by major disasters. However, some room for improvement has been identified, including better embedding lessons learned into the Mechanism operation; further increasing the focus on prevention; and enhancing the added value of the Mechanism in responding to major disasters outside the EU by further exploring the links between civil protection and humanitarian aid and enhancing civil-military cooperation. The evaluation provides a series of general and specific recommendations to address these issues and to inform DG ECHO's future approach to the Mechanism.

## Executive Summary

### Objectives and scope of the evaluation

This report presents the results of the ex-post evaluation of the European Commission's Mechanism activities in the field of civil protection, implemented by the Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO). The evaluation was carried out by ICF International with inputs from four external experts: Vibeke Stockholm Weigelt, Volker Hüls, Anthony Vaux and Andrew Gluck.

The main objective of the evaluation was to assess the relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, and EU added value of the application of the Civil Protection Financial Instrument and the actions implemented as part of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism for the period of 2007 to 2013 (hereafter "the evaluation period"). The intended outcomes were to:

- Learn lessons from the implementation of the Mechanism and Financial Instrument over the evaluation period; and
- Provide greater accountability of the Commission' budget in the field of civil protection.

The evaluation primarily focused on the recast Community Civil Protection Mechanism (Council Decision 2007/779/EC, hereafter "the Mechanism") and the Civil Protection Financial Instrument (Council Decision 2007/162/EC, hereafter "the Financial Instrument")<sup>1-2</sup>. The evaluation used a mixed-method approach to collect evidence on the performance of the Mechanism and the Financial Instrument. The methodologies used included online surveys, interviews, document reviews, observations and case studies. Findings were derived from the triangulation of the evidence obtained through the different methodologies.

### Introduction to the Mechanism and the Financial Instrument

The general purpose of the Mechanism was to provide, on request, support in the event of major emergencies, or the imminent threat thereof, and to facilitate improved coordination of civil protection response to all types of major emergencies occurring inside or outside the EU. The protection ensured by the Mechanism covered primarily people but also the environment and property. Under the Civil Protection Financial Instrument, financial assistance was given to improve the effectiveness of response to major emergencies and to enhance preventive and preparedness measures for all kinds of emergencies. In order to meet these objectives the Mechanism comprised different actions (see Figure 1 below) during the evaluation period, all of which were analysed in detail as part of this evaluation.

A total of €189.8 million was committed for the implementation of the Civil Protection Financial Instrument for the period 2007-2013. Whilst the majority of the Mechanism actions were financed through the Civil Protection Financial Instrument, some actions were financed through additional funds granted by the European Parliament and the Council as well as other EU Instruments. National civil protection authorities also contributed by:


- Providing part of the co-financing required by the Financial Instrument;
- Having civil protection staff participating in the Mechanism actions; and,
- Providing in-kind resources (i.e. civil protection assets and equipment).

<sup>1</sup> The actions in third countries financed by IPA and ENPI instruments were also within the scope of the evaluation, as were pilot project and preparatory actions, financed through additional funds granted by the European Parliament and Council.

<sup>2</sup> In December 2013, the new Decision 1313/2013/EU on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism was adopted. As further discussed in the recommendations, some of the findings of this evaluation have already been addressed by the new Decision.



**Figure 1.1 Overview of the Mechanism actions**



## Main evaluation conclusions

The evaluation demonstrated that the Mechanism's components were designed to be cost-effective and were in most cases implemented efficiently. The mainstreaming of procedures, coordination of efforts, sharing of practices and capabilities all proved conducive to a swift and economical implementation. Overall, the implementation of the Mechanism was effective in achieving its overarching objectives as well as the objectives of specific actions.

The Mechanism actions were interconnected and complementary. The Mechanism as a whole was found to be relevant and consistent with other EU level actions and programmes in related fields. The importance of a coordinated emergency response at EU level was also recognised.

The Mechanism brought EU added value by strengthening the cooperation between Participating States; addressing gaps in national response capacities; and starting to shift the focus of the Mechanism towards a more prevention-related approach.

The EU added value of the Mechanism in responding to major disasters outside the EU was less straightforward due to the existence of bilateral support. However, the added value of the Mechanism for affected countries outside the EU was that they only had to deal with a single contact point, which coordinated the EU-level efforts, rather than rely on a multitude of bilateral contacts with different States. The coordinated EU emergency assistance also reduced the risk of duplication of efforts.

The Mechanism also brought visibility to the EU by ensuring solidarity between Participating States in the Mechanism and third countries.

However, there is room for improvement, for example by ensuring a better take up of the outcomes of the lessons-learned and by enhancing opportunities for operational and cross-sector learning.

### General recommendations

1. **Design and promote a civil protection collaboration hub or platform:** DG ECHO should consider designing an online tool to improve collaboration between past and current participants in the Mechanism. This could further contribute to the realisation of a sustainable EU civil protection community and improve the connectivity of its members.
2. **Adopt a knowledge management strategy and system:** The Mechanism may benefit from a knowledge-management strategy for the indexing and searching through lessons learned, administrative information, SOPs, project related information and training materials. This could also contribute to the wider dissemination and promotion of all civil protection actions and bring value to a maximum of relevant stakeholders.
3. **Rethink and re-structure the Lessons Learned Programme:** DG ECHO should consider adopting a matrix structure for systematically capturing and classifying the lessons learned and monitoring their impact on the various actions of the Mechanism. The nature and the focus of priorities in the annual calls for proposals should take account of the lessons learned from each of the actions of the Mechanism.
4. **Explore further the links between civil-military cooperation and humanitarian aid:** DG ECHO should ensure closer linkages and cooperation between the civil protection teams at EU and national level, military personnel and humanitarian aid workers. These closer linkages and cooperation could for example, take the form of a strategic framework.

## Evaluation of Mechanism actions

### Prevention-related actions

#### Prevention policy

The need for further action on prevention was first established by the 2009 European Communication on “a Community approach on the prevention of natural and man-made disasters”. This Communication specified the following objectives at EU level: (1) the development of knowledge-based disaster prevention policies at all levels of government; (2) linking the relevant actors and policies throughout the disaster management cycle by undertaking EU and national risk assessments; (3) mapping risks and disaster loss data; and (4) developing and exchanging risk management practices<sup>3</sup>.

#### Prevention projects

Prevention projects covered a very broad spectrum of activities. In total, 40 projects were expected to: (1) contribute to raising awareness and achieving closer cooperation between Participating States’ Civil Protection Authorities; (2) the identification of specific challenges or needs of civil protection services in partnership countries; (3) linking relevant actors and policies throughout the disaster management cycle<sup>4</sup>; and (4) the strengthening of national capacities.

#### Main findings on prevention-related actions

Overall, prevention-related actions **responded to the need for a knowledge-based disaster prevention policy**. The actions tackled different knowledge and intervention **gaps** related to: (1) risk assessments; (2) research on disaster loss databases; and (3) the exchange of good practices in disaster risk management at EU level. However, the evaluation indicated that further integration of prevention activities into national civil protection policies is still necessary. This integration should link prevention activities with preparedness and response policies.

Prevention-related actions also helped improving the connection between existing financial and legislative instruments and prevention elements in many other related EU policies (inter alia. regional,

<sup>3</sup> COM(2009) 82 final: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0082:FIN:EN:PDF>

<sup>4</sup> This also aimed at including early warning and prevention-preparedness-response-recovery.

environmental, health, climate change policies). They also **contributed to raising awareness and promoting EU Member States' cooperation in the field of civil protection**. Given that prevention activities and projects were only developed and implemented towards the end of the evaluation period, it is however too early to assess whether these objectives are being fully achieved.

In general, prevention-related actions were cost effective. The Prevention Policy reduced the potential duplication of efforts across related policy areas. The results of prevention related-actions could not have been achieved by Member States acting in isolation - indeed, most prevention actions and projects involved multiple partners from different Participating States who were not necessarily used to cooperating with one another. Most budgets of completed projects were considered as proportionate for the implemented activities. A significant numbers of projects aimed to establish common procedures (e.g. around risk assessments, situational analysis, etc.) at EU level.

### *Key recommendations on prevention-related actions*

5. **Introduce risk management guidelines:** Guidelines for drafting risk management plans should be published to incentivise Participating States to translate the knowledge generated through risk assessments into capacity planning. It could build on the knowledge of most advanced Participating States in doing national vulnerability / risk assessments and those willing to share these at EU level.
6. **Increase the focus of the Mechanism on prevention:** DG ECHO should consider further promoting prevention activities. For instance, the adoption of effective prevention strategies at national level could reduce the severity of some disaster types and improve the resilience of affected areas.
7. **Focus prevention projects on standards developed and exchange best practices:** DG ECHO should incentivise Participating States to adopt common models of preventing the occurrence or spreading of major disasters through common standards and/or operational procedures, etc. Prevention projects also could foster cooperation and share good practices, lessons learned and insights into how best to implement these at national level.

### Preparedness-related actions

#### *Training programme*

The training programme was aimed at enhancing the coordination of civil protection assistance provided by Participating States. The training programme was composed of the following elements:

- **Training courses**, which included two introductory, six operational, two management and two refresher courses<sup>5</sup>. These courses aimed at enhancing the coordination of civil protection activities and enhancing the complementarity of the intervention teams. They also aimed at making emergency response more effective. In total, around 4,700 civil protection experts and specialists were trained over the evaluation period.
- **EU level simulation exercises**, which served primarily as 'field tests' to establish a common understanding of cooperation in civil protection assistance interventions and to accelerate the response to major emergencies. Thirty-one table-top, command-post or full scale exercises tested and re-enacted contingency plans and decision-making procedures, as well as the provision of information to the public and the media.
- **Exchanges of experts**, which allowed for the secondment of around 900 national civil protection experts to administrations in other Participating States. These exchanges covered all aspects of emergency interventions. Their objectives were to enhance the understanding of civil protection procedures in other Participating States and to promote professional exchanges and networking across Participating States.

<sup>5</sup> Twelve courses: Community Mechanism Introduction Course (CMI), Technical Experts Course (TEC); Module Basic Course (MBC), Operational Management Course (OPM), Security Course (SEC), Information Management Course (IMC), International Coordination Course (ICC), Assessment Mission Course (AMC); High Level Coordination Course (HLC), and Head of Team Course (HOT).

### *Pilot project and preparatory actions*

During 2008-2010, a pilot project and preparatory action programmes were financed through additional funds granted by the European Parliament and Council. Preparatory action programme was established in order to test new ways of improving the EU's disaster response capacity. The preparatory action programme funded 17 projects. The Pilot Project – EU Forest Fire Tactical reserve (hereafter EUFFTR) – consisted of two fire-fighting planes and was a supplementary resource designed to reinforce the overall EU fire-fighting capacity.

### *Preparedness projects*

Preparedness projects covered a broad spectrum of activities. In total 36 projects were expected to: (1) contribute to raising awareness and achieving closer cooperation between Participating States' Civil Protection Authorities; (2) identify specific challenges or needs of civil protection services in partnership countries; and (3) link relevant actors and policies throughout the disaster management cycle<sup>6</sup> or strengthening national capacities.

### *Main findings on preparedness-related actions*

Preparedness-related actions were **largely in line with the needs of Participating States** and adequately addressed the needs of other relevant stakeholders, such as national civil protection authorities and professionals. The training courses involved the appropriate target groups and attracted a high numbers of civil protection actors. The simulation exercises were in line with the disaster types affecting the majority of Participating States and their associated needs. The exchange of experts programme was even slightly oversubscribed during the evaluation period. The module exercises<sup>7</sup> allowed for the identification of gaps in SOPs of modules, which were subsequently addressed in the development and implementation of guidelines for the modules. The preparedness projects, the pilot project and preparatory actions responded to important needs as identified from major disasters over time.

The **coherence and relevance of preparedness-related actions was overall ensured** via the lessons learned programme of the Mechanism. The extent to which identified lessons were effectively taken up in subsequent actions could however be improved. The individual components of the training programme were internally coherent<sup>8</sup> although at times the interconnection between its components was questioned<sup>9</sup>. Simulation exercises tested the interoperability between the Mechanism's actions<sup>10</sup>. Preparedness projects, pilot project and preparatory actions were selected according to mutually exclusive priorities and objectives thus avoiding duplication.

In terms of effectiveness, preparedness-related actions mainly contributed to a **common understanding of cooperation in civil protection interventions in Europe**. The training programme improved the skills, know-how and competences of experts through training courses, realistic simulation exercises and via the exchange of experts. This ultimately also contributed to **strengthening and making the response capacity of Participating States more effective** in case of disasters within and outside the EU. Similarly, modules and module exercises somewhat contributed to increasing the Participating States' response capacity by organising and testing the coordination of national capacities. Preparedness projects, pilot project and preparatory actions in particular contributed to raising awareness and to promoting EU Member States' cooperation in the field of civil protection. They also allowed for the testing of innovative arrangements to reinforce the EU's rapid response capacity.

<sup>6</sup> This also aimed at including early warning and prevention-preparedness-response-recovery.

<sup>7</sup> Although the development of modules is mainly related to response related actions, the modules exercises are more related to preparedness actions and are thus tackled in this section.

<sup>8</sup> E.g., the training curriculum linked the content and learning outcomes of the basic courses to those of the high-level courses.

<sup>9</sup> E.g., the exchange of expert programme was sometimes seen as an alternative to training courses and or as a networking opportunity rather than a forum conducive to exchanging knowledge and practices.

<sup>10</sup> Full-scale exercises allowed experts, interventions teams, liaison officers, modules, host nations, etc. to test, develop, explore and learn from all kinds of emergency scenarios and derive lessons learned.

The **budgets of preparedness-related actions were proportionate and appropriate with respect to their scope and objectives**. The competitive tendering for the organisation of elements of the training programme generally helped in controlling the costs of such actions<sup>11</sup>. The efficiency of module exercises was high considering the limited time that civil protection personnel at national level could devote to such exercises. This was strengthened by the identification of key lessons following the organisation of such exercises. The budgets for preparedness projects, pilot project and preparatory actions were adequate to implement the planned activities.

The main EU added value of preparedness related actions resided in **building a community of civil protection practitioners in Europe**. This community is characterised by: a common understanding of the Mechanism; a good understanding of the national civil protection systems; and a set of common and standard operating procedures. The EU added value of the training programme was found in the common body of knowledge generated through participation. The networking effects resulting from the training programme were also considered as bringing EU added value. Preparedness projects, the pilot project and preparatory actions contributed to the establishment of common procedures and standards and the development of additional response capacity.

#### *Key recommendations on preparedness-related actions*

- 8. Certify training course participants:** DG ECHO should introduce a systematic test at the end of each course to ensure that learning outcomes have been achieved. Passing these tests would be a condition for progressing through the training curriculum. This would ensure better coherence of the training groups and help to create trust among Participating States and Host Nations with regard to the minimum standards of assistance and the expected level of expertise.
- 9. Improve the effectiveness of the training courses:** DG ECHO should consider adopting a train-the-trainers approach in order to raise awareness of the Mechanism at national level. The training participants could disseminate the knowledge of the Mechanism more widely by using the training materials and the tools provided. In order to make the training programme more cost-effective basic courses may alternatively be replaced by e-learning sessions.
- 10. Define expert profiles:** DG ECHO should take a proactive approach in first mapping the skills and competencies required to manage emergencies in the field, in cooperation with the Participating States, followed by the development of profiles matching the needs identified. These profiles could serve both to inform the future design of the training courses, the selection of training participants and, ultimately, the selection of EU CP team members.
- 11. Involve general public in simulation exercises:** Simulation exercises could involve the general public and residents in risk prone areas where exercises are being run in order to raise awareness and increase the preparedness and resilience of society at large.
- 12. Continue improving interoperability and effectiveness of assets and procedures (SOPs):** The interoperability of equipment and procedures should be further enhanced. Preparatory actions could focus on further developing and testing innovative arrangements. Moreover, EU financing should be made available for "creating and maintaining" a voluntary pool of assets. Both recommendations have been already addressed as part of the new Decision 1313/2013 (Article 3(2b) and Article 9(2)).

#### Response-related actions

##### *Monitoring & Information Centre / Emergency Response Coordination Centre (MIC/ERCC)*

The objective of the **MIC/ERCC**<sup>12</sup> was to facilitate the immediate response efforts in the event of an emergency. It provided Participating States with a single entry point for civil protection information and coordinated the deployment of EU CP teams to affected areas. Through the MIC/ERCC, the Mechanism

<sup>11</sup> For instance, the cost per participants in training courses decreased over the evaluation period. Moreover, additional places or reduction in waiting time to access the training programme was noted by some Participating States or individual participants.

<sup>12</sup> The ERCC was inaugurated on 15 May 2013 and replaced the former Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC).



was activated 223 times and oversaw 72 missions, deploying 246 experts and 64 liaison officers during the evaluation period.

- The **Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS)** was at the heart of the MIC/ERCC. It enabled communication and information sharing between the MIC/ERCC and contact points of the Participating States. CECIS provided an integrated platform to: (1) send and receive alerts and details of assistance required; (2) show available assistance capacities; and (3) track the development of ongoing emergencies. At the end of the evaluation period, 150 modules and ten Technical Assistance Support Teams ('TAST') were registered on CECIS.
- **Detection and early warning systems** for disasters that could affect the territory of Participating States were interlinked through the MIC/ERCC and CECIS. Different early warning systems<sup>13</sup> were developed with the aim to reduce the impact of disasters by ensuring the timely and effective provision of information so that rapid actions could be taken.

### *Modules and module exercises*

Specialised emergency response units – known as modules – were assembled and made available to respond more quickly to emergencies both within and outside the EU. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) were defined for a total of 17 module types and TAST. These SOPs contained all predictable procedures during the deployment cycle. **Module exercises**, twelve in total, were organised to train registered modules that were likely to cooperate in a real emergency, to enhance their coordination and interoperability.

### *Transport of assistance*

The transport of assistance was developed in response to a transport deficit observed before the start of the evaluation period. The objective was to address the logistical and financial burden associated with the transport of civil protection assistance by Participating States to a country affected by a disaster. The Financial Instrument co-funded 134 transport operations (122 co-financing through grant, 9 co-financing through the Commission's contractor and 3 combined co-financing).

### *Main findings on response-related actions*

Response-related actions were **relevant to the needs of the stakeholders**: the replacement of the MIC by the ERCC and the incorporation of early warning systems are good illustrations of how the Mechanism has evolved over time to meet the needs expressed by stakeholders. Similarly, the introduction of transport assistance into the Mechanism helped addressing the lack of available transport means to move the offers of assistance by Participating States.

Response related actions were overall internally coherent. The MIC/ERCC significantly improved the coordination and complementarity of the assistance provided by Participating States. This applied to all types of interventions, including those targeting marine pollution disasters, inside and outside the EU.

The response related actions proved **effective, efficient, and flexible in delivering relief** in the context of major disasters. The MIC/ERCC allowed for the rapid and effective deployment of EU CP teams and modules and facilitated the coordination of EU interventions with Participating States and international actors. The provision of transport assistance was also considered as a major step forward for the Mechanism and proved a useful, effective and efficient tool.

The EU added value of response related actions was evident, offering a coordinated European response to emergencies in and outside the EU. The MIC/ERCC together with CECIS and early warning systems offered a **'one-stop-shop' for preparing for and coordinating the EU's response to major disasters**. The Mechanism was deemed at least as effective as bilateral assistance and provided additional value through its transport assistance to Participating States.

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<sup>13</sup> Including: Meteoalarm; Global Disaster Alerts and Coordination System (GDACS); European Flood Alert System (EFAS); and European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS).

### *Key recommendations on response-related actions*

- 13. Review the selection process of the EU Civil Protection Teams:** The composition of the EU CP Teams did not always match the needs in the field, due to the limited time and scope for the assessment of the specific needs of the affected countries and a deficient selection process. In order to review this process, the following actions are recommended:
- **Systematically deploy a liaison officer prior the provision of assistance in third countries:** DG ECHO should consider sending a liaison officer in the affected countries, whenever possible and effective, in advance (e.g. 48 hours) of the EUCP team. This would improve the fitness for purpose of the assistance provided (based on the assessment of actual needs on the ground) and ensure that the EUCP teams have the right skills mix and adapted profiles.
  - **Use expert profiles for the selection of the EU CP teams:** Expert profiles should be based on a clear assessment of the skills and competences required to manage emergencies in the field.
  - **Enhance the operational capacity of MIC/ERCC staff:** DG ECHO should apply strict minimum criteria when selecting staff and be able to 'refuse' candidates for secondments. Given that this kind of staff might be scarce, DG ECHO could make training conditional for the appointment of future staff.
- 14. Raise awareness on the benefits of using the transport contractor:** DG ECHO should advertise more broadly the advantages of using the transport contractor, as the transport support is not always considered by Participating States.

### Other actions

#### *Actions in third countries*

The aim of the actions in third countries was to: (1) further develop the civil protection capacities of third countries, (2) minimise the risk and possible effects of disasters; and (3) establish a more integrated and co-operative approach to disaster prevention, preparedness and management. Considering that natural and man-made disasters do not stop at EU borders, these actions were also meant to bring third countries closer to the Mechanism.

#### *Accidental marine pollution*

DG ECHO, alongside other Commission services and EU Agencies, organised nine responses to maritime disasters including oil spills and accidental discharges of hazardous waste during the evaluation period. Actions in this area also included the implementation of five prevention and preparedness projects, one civil protection exercise (Balex Delta) and the participation of at least 50 marine pollution experts in exchanges.

#### *Main findings on other actions*

- 15.** The actions implemented in third countries **corresponded to the needs identified** by both the beneficiary third countries and of the Participating States. Actions in third countries helped **reducing the vulnerability** of beneficiary countries to disasters. However, the efficiency of the actions in third countries may have suffered from a lack of an overarching framework for such actions. This could potentially lead to duplication of efforts, with similar actions being organised by the Mechanism focusing on non-EU actors and / or between regional programmes. Finally, the EU added value of actions in third countries is that it **enhanced the preparedness of third countries**.
- 16.** The involvement of the Mechanism in the response to accidental marine pollution was based on the necessity to coordinate the onshore and offshore response efforts to such events. However, the relevance of the Mechanism in this area was seen as somewhat limited by the stakeholders, considering its specific mandate and expertise covering a wide range of natural and man-made disasters. The actions in the field of marine pollution were considered as **effective in coordinating EU response efforts** in case of such events. Lastly, the Mechanism also brought together marine pollution and civil protection communities to **support and coordinate both onshore and offshore responses** in case of accidental marine pollution related events.

*Key recommendations on other actions*

- 17. Better coordinate actions in third countries and increase focus on prevention:** DG ECHO should consider developing an overall framework for actions in third countries, which would set joint objectives and actions across EU level programmes run by the European Commission, based on a mapping of actions and risks affecting the EU neighbourhood. This would incentivise joint risk management and response capacity planning.
- 18. Improve the cooperation between maritime and civil protection authorities:** DG ECHO could consider several actions to this extent, such as publishing guidance about the procedures to follow in the case of responses to accidental marine pollution; developing awareness raising activities about MIC/ERCC's role in the field of marine pollution and encouraging the organisation of exercises involving the civil protection and maritime authorities.



## 1 Introduction, objectives and scope of the evaluation

This is the Final Report for the *Ex-post evaluation of Civil Protection Financial Instrument and Community Civil Protection Mechanism (recast) 2007-2013*. The evaluation was commissioned by the Directorate-General Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO) in April 2014. The work is being undertaken by ICF International with inputs from four external experts: Vibeke Stockholm Weigelt, Volker Hüls, Anthony Vaux and Andrew Gluck.

The Final Report is the fourth deliverable of the study, presenting the findings of the evaluation as well as the key recommendations. This document should ideally be read in conjunction with the Annex to the Final Report, containing answers to all the evaluation questions. It is supplemented by four case studies presented in four separate documents.


As per the Terms of Reference, the main objective of this ex-post evaluation is to assess the relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency and EU added value (the 'evaluation issues') of the application of the Civil Protection Financial Instrument and all EU Civil Protection Mechanism actions specified below, for the period of 2007 – 2013:

- The functioning of the Monitoring and Information Centre ('MIC') /Emergency Response Coordination Centre ('ERCC') and associated tools e.g. tools for communication and information sharing and detection and early warning systems;
- The training programme comprising training courses, simulation exercises and an exchange of experts programme;
- The arrangements implemented in the context of the modules approach and module exercises;
- Prevention and preparedness activities funded through the Civil Protection Financial Instrument;
- The actions taken regarding the prevention policy framework, following the Commission Communication COM(2009)82;
- The operation of the transport provisions of the Civil Protection Financial Instrument;
- Actions taken under the Mechanism in the area of marine pollution;
- The functioning of the Pilot Projects and Preparatory Actions as per the Commission financing decisions ; and
- Actions related to Third Countries.

The overall scope of the evaluation is illustrated in Figure 1.1 overleaf.

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**Figure 1.1 Scope of the EU Civil Protection Actions covered by the Evaluation**



## 2 Main findings of the evaluation


### 2.1 General evaluation questions

This section sets out the key final findings for the general evaluation questions of the study.

#### 2.1.1 Q1 - To which extent did each of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism actions achieve its specific objective(s)?

Overall, the majority of Civil Protection Authorities considered that each of actions of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism have achieved its specific objectives. All Mechanism actions were perceived as effective although the degree of acknowledgment with regard to their effectiveness varied (see Figure 2.1).

**Figure 2.1 Most Civil Protection Authorities considered that all of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism actions have achieved their specific objectives**



**Source:** Online survey for national Civil Protection Authorities / national contact points.

**Question:** Average of responses given for all specific objectives listed for each Civil Protection Mechanism components. Between 8th of July 2014 and 18th of August 2014, the survey was sent to 35 countries.

The **MIC/ERCC** was considered effective in achieving its three key objectives: (1) the provision of useful, updated information on the actual status of an ongoing emergency; (2) support in co-ordination of EU assistance; and (3) establishing a communication hub. The swiftness of reaction from the MIC/ERCC to coordinating disaster relief efforts also improved over the evaluation period, as remarked by EU Participating States and international partners.

The **training courses** were considered effective in (1) enhancing prevention, preparedness and effective response; (2) ensuring effective response capability and complementarity of assessment and/or coordination teams, intervention teams and other resources; (3) as well as in improving the competence of the experts. They ultimately contributed to strengthening and making the response capacity of Participating States more effective in case of disasters within and outside the EU by training around 5,000 civil protection professionals. The impact of training courses on the effectiveness of the deployments was difficult to assess. The input from different stakeholders suggested that this impact could be improved. It was argued that the linkages between the courses' content, the participant profiles and the needs in the field were sometime missing.

**Simulation exercises'** objectives included (1) improving the response; (2) enhancing capacity and providing the necessary practice of teams; (3) improving and verifying procedures; (4) establishing a common language for the coordination of civil protection assistance interventions; (5) reducing the response time in major emergencies; (6) enhancing operational cooperation between the civil protection services of the Participating States; and (6) sharing lessons learned. The survey of National Civil Protection Authorities considered that simulation exercises were successful in achieving them. However, this finding could only be corroborated through the consideration of limited sources of evidence<sup>14</sup>. Evidence from selected individual simulation exercises showed that they were effective in identifying lessons learned related to operational and strategic collaboration and hence led to a common understanding of cooperation in civil protection assistance interventions and a better capacity to respond to major emergencies in these cases.

The **exchange of expert programme** was considered effective, to an extent, in achieving its specific objective to: improve experts' capabilities so as to respond to emergencies at national level and under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and for the purpose of coordinating and facilitating assistance outside the EU. Stakeholders recognised that it improved the competence of experts through upskilling and or building institutional capacity in Participating States. However, due to the fact that only a few experts were deployed during and or after their participation in the exchange programme, it remained unclear as to whether the exchange programme improved the capability of experts once deployed by the Mechanism.

**Modules and module exercises** had two specific objectives (1) to contribute to the development of a civil protection rapid response capability; and (2) to meet priority intervention or support needs under the Mechanism. The effectiveness of modules and module exercises was assessed via the survey of National Civil Protection Authorities and the review of qualitative evidence. The surveyed stakeholders considered that modules and module exercises were successful in reaching their specific objectives. Qualitative evidence supported the assessment that Civil Protection experts were trained on registered modules that were likely to be needed in a real emergency situation. Module exercises provided a greater opportunity to exercise and test the operability of modules internationally. Hence, modules and module exercises somewhat contributed to increasing the Participating States' response capacity by organising and testing the coordination of national capacities. Whether this led to a more rapid response and or met all priorities or need for support could not be exhaustively assessed. For instance, the case study on the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines showed that the greater flexibility and adaptability of the modules deployed to respond to a variety of situations would have been needed.

The specific objectives of the **prevention and preparedness projects** were to: (1) facilitate the sharing of knowledge, best practices and Information between Participating States; (2) enhance prevention and preparedness within the Union; (3) minimise the effects of emergencies on EU citizens; and (4) help EU citizens to protect themselves more effectively. The prevention and preparedness projects reviewed through desk research and interviews generally demonstrated that they improved preparedness and enhanced awareness of civil protection and/or accidental marine pollution professionals and volunteers. The extent to which prevention and preparedness projects reduced the effects of emergencies on EU citizens could not be assessed given the limited number of projects evaluated directly targeting EU citizens.

**Prevention policy** promoted three types of actions: (1) developing knowledge-based prevention policies; (2) linking actors and policies throughout the disaster management cycle; and (3) improving the effectiveness of existing financial and legislative instruments. Prevention activities contributed to the development of a framework on prevention policy but as they were only implemented towards the end of the evaluation period their effects could not be fully assessed: it remained a challenge for the EU to link the knowledge generated through risk assessments to risk management planning. It was suggested by stakeholders that more could be done to establish a closer link between actors involved in establishing a general framework

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<sup>14</sup> For instance, the extent to simulation exercise specific objective were achieved were hard to assess through desk research due to the low quality of certain technical reports.

for the sharing of information on risks and those in charge of risk management operational capabilities.

The **provision of transport assistance** was considered as a major step forward for the Mechanism and was considered as a very useful, effective and efficient tool. It made a major contribution in helping reduce the transport deficit and when it was used, the Mechanism was able to cope with most of the requests. Hence, transport assistance actions achieved all their objectives to (1) provide and share information on equipment and transport resources of Participating States with a view to facilitating the pooling of such equipment or transport resources; (2) assist Participating States to identify, and facilitate their access to, transport resources available from other sources, including the commercial market (3) assist Participating States to identify equipment available from other sources including the commercial market and (4) complement the transport provided by Participating States by providing additional transport resources necessary for ensuring a rapid response to major emergencies.

The Mechanism's actions in the field of **accidental marine pollution** have been effective in meeting their core objective: facilitating and coordinating the EU response to accidental marine pollution emergencies and disasters. Evidence gathered via the stakeholder survey and the review of the Mechanism activations has assessed the actions of the Mechanism in this area as being effective.

The **pilot project** which aimed to "improve mobilisation of additional operational resources and emergency support from Participating States to assist other Participating States in coping with forest fires" was effective in developing the response capacity. The case study on forest fires and stakeholders interviewed confirmed the effectiveness of developing forest fighting reserve capacities and making them available for deployment.

The **preparatory actions** were intended to: (1) enhance Europe's collective preparedness for major disasters; and (2) pave the way for an EU Civil Protection Force. Based on the analysis of the projects selected, the preparatory actions achieved their specific objectives. For example, the Urban Search and Rescue module working in Cold Conditions, the table of organization (TOE) and SOPs, as well as the creation of deployable units were some of the project outcomes produced by the preparatory action programme.

The aim of **actions in third countries** was to: (1) further develop third countries' Civil Protection capacities; (2) minimise the risk and possible effects of disasters; and (3) establish a more integrated and cooperative approach to disaster prevention, preparedness and management. Overall, the actions in third countries financed by the Civil Protection Mechanism and Instrument achieved, according to the survey, their specific objectives for 92% of Civil Protection Authorities. An array of evidence from desk research and stakeholder consultation corroborates this finding: Stakeholders underlined that the partner countries' knowledge and capacity in the field of civil protection increased and as such their vulnerability to disasters has been reduced. Activities also contributed to an increased cooperation, not only with the EU but also between partner countries in the target regions. It had led to a better awareness and knowledge of approaches and methods established in the Participating States as well as a better approximation of third countries to the Mechanism.

#### 2.1.2 Q2 - To which extent did the EU Civil Protection Mechanism actions contribute to the overall objective(s) of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and the Civil Protection Financial Instrument?


The Mechanism's actions aimed at facilitating cooperation in civil protection matters in the event of major emergencies or in situations where an imminent threat of such emergencies materialised. The overall objectives were to ensure a better protection of people and their property, cultural heritage and the environment in the event of major natural or man-made disasters, acts of terrorism, and CBRN accidents, including marine pollution, occurring both inside and outside the EU. More specifically, the Mechanism aimed:

- To facilitate and reinforce cooperation between the EU and the Participating States in civil protection assistance intervention in the event of major emergencies/ threats;

- To contribute to better preparedness;
- To contribute to developing response capacity at EU level;
- To contribute to effective, efficient , flexible and rapid emergency response interventions in the event of major (or impending) disasters;
- To support and complement the efforts of Participating States in the field of civil protection; and,
- To deliver tangible benefits resulting from the operation of the Mechanism.

The vast majority of Civil Protection Authorities considered that each of actions have contributed to the overall objectives of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and Financial Instrument (see Figure 2.2).

**Figure 2.2 Most Civil Protection Authorities considered that the actions implemented contributed to the overall objective(s) of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and the Civil Protection Financial Instrument**



**Source:** Online survey for national Civil Protection Authorities / national contact points.

**Question:** Based upon your experience with the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following general statements regarding the EU Civil Protection Mechanism Between 8th of July 2014 and 18th of August 2014, the survey was sent to 35 countries, amongst the 20 national contact points who responded, 17 answered the questions.<sup>15</sup>

Figure 2.2 hence demonstrates that individual actions did contribute to the overarching objectives of the Mechanism. However, it should be noted that the degree to which actions of the Mechanism contributed to achieving the objectives of the Mechanism and Financial Instrument could not be precisely measured by the evaluation. The extent to which each of the actions has contributed to the overall objectives of the Mechanism and Financial Instrument depended on their intervention logic (see Table 2.1).

<sup>15</sup> Note: The information is not available for the following Civil Protection Mechanism components: MIC/ERCC, Training courses, Exercises, Expert Exchange Programme, Pilot Project, Modules, Prevention and Preparedness Project, Transport, Actions in third Countries, and Marine Pollution.



**Table 2.1 Stakeholders' perception of the contribution of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and Financial Instrument's actions to their overall objectives**

EU CPM and FI objectives	EU CPM and FI actions and related actions								
	MIC/ERCC and Training programme Modules and Module exercises	Prevention and preparedness projects	pilot programme and preparatory actions	Prevention policy framework	Transport of assistance	Accidental Marine Pollution	Actions in third countries		
To facilitate and reinforce cooperation between the EU and the Participating States in civil protection assistance intervention in the event of major emergencies/ threats	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓		
To contribute to better preparedness		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓		
To contribute to developing response capacity at EU level	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓		
To contribute to effective, efficient , flexible and rapid emergency response interventions in the event of major (or impending) disasters	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓			
To support and complement the efforts of Participating States in the field of civil protection	✓	✓			✓	✓			
To deliver tangible benefits resulting from the operation of the Mechanism									

The extent of the contribution to the overall objectives of each of the actions implemented is commented below.

#### ■ MIC/ERCC:

The MIC/ERCC and its associated tools (CECIS and EWS) were key elements of the Mechanism. They were the backbones of the operational components of the Mechanism. All evidence supports the fact that the MIC/ERCC directly contributed to:

- Facilitate cooperation in civil protection assistance interventions in the event of major emergencies inside and outside the EU;
- The provision of support to affected Participating States; and
- Ensure the complementarity between the EU assistance and the assistance provided by the Participating States and international partners.

The rationale for the existence of the MIC/ERCC, CECIS and the EWS is that without such a platform and tools, the facilitation and coordination of the Participating States' assistance in case of emergencies would be very difficult. A large majority of Civil Protection Authorities stated that the MIC/ERCC positively contributed to the above objectives (see Figure 2.15). Case studies run by the evaluation, widely acknowledge the key contribution of the MIC/ERCC in facilitating cooperation in civil protection assistance, as well as supporting and complementing the assistance provided by Participating States.

#### ■ Training programme:

##### *Training courses*

A majority of National Civil Protection Authorities considered that training courses have mainly contributed to the following overall objectives of the Mechanism:

- To contribute to better preparedness; and
- To contribute to developing response capacity at EU level.

The above was corroborated by interviews with stakeholders: training courses were seen as contributing to the development of the response capacity and better preparedness in and outside the EU due to the fact that approximately 2,000 Civil Protection Professionals were trained over the evaluation period (5,000 since the start of the Training Programme in 2004); this led to improved coordination between the EU and Participating States' Civil Protection Assistance intervention in the event of disasters. Other stakeholders interviewed argued that training courses also contributed to the following overall objectives of the Mechanism:

- To support and complement the efforts of Participating States in the field of Civil Protection by organising basic and specialist training on the facilitation and coordination of disaster relief efforts in and outside the EU; and
- To contribute to the effective, efficient, flexible and rapid emergency response interventions as the vast majority of experts deployed in and outside the EU had undergone training.

### ***Simulation exercises***

However, taken as a whole simulation exercises are considered to have contributed to the Mechanism's overall objectives. The results of the survey of National Civil Protection Authorities demonstrated that those stakeholders considered that simulation exercises have contributed to:

- An effective, efficient, flexible and rapid emergency response interventions in the event of major (or impending) disasters – by improving the response time in major emergencies;
- Developing response capacity at national and EU level; and
- Reinforcing cooperation between the EU and the Participating States in civil protection assistance intervention in the event of major emergencies/ threats.

In addition to the above, anecdotal evidence shows that simulation exercises have contributed to better preparedness of Participating States. For instance, the funding of various full scale exercise scenarios, such as nuclear fall-out or marine pollution, allowed for the testing of procedures on a multinational level, often for the first time. Moreover, evidence shows that methodologies were further developed and adopted for real emergencies as a result of exercises.

### ***Exchange of experts programme***

A majority of Civil Protection Authorities regarded the contribution of simulation exercise programme to the overall objectives of the EU Mechanism and Financial Instrument as having:

- Facilitated cooperation in civil protection assistance interventions in the event of major emergencies by improving the range of competences in national authorities for on-site assistance and liaising addressing request from States requesting assistance; and
- Contributed to developing response capacity at EU level and to a lesser extent outside the EU.

This opinion was confirmed by the majority of experts participating in exchanges. The impact of courses on the effectiveness of the deployments was difficult to assess<sup>16</sup>.

### **■ Module and Module exercises:**

A majority of Civil Protection Authorities regarded the contribution of Modules and Module Exercises to the overall objectives of the Mechanism and Financial Instrument as having:

- Contributed to developing response capacity at EU level; and

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<sup>16</sup> The reason for this is that the only available evidence did not point towards greater efficiency on field as a result of the programme. A few stakeholders rather suggested that this impact could be improved. For instance, it was argued that the linkages between the courses' content, the participant profiles and the needs in the field were sometime missing.



- Contributed to effective, efficient, flexible and rapid emergency response interventions in the event of major (or impending) disasters.

The above was corroborated by the overall increasing number and types of modules and TAST registered in the CECIS database. Their deployment, as evidenced for example in the Polish Flood and Forest fire case studies, allowed for additional capacities to be deployed in an effective and rapid manner.

#### ■ **Prevention and preparedness projects:**

For National Civil Protection Authorities surveyed, Prevention and preparedness projects contributed to some extent to the implementation of the EU disaster prevention and preparedness policy frameworks. This was representative of the views of other stakeholders, who argued that prevention and preparedness projects contributed, albeit to a limited extent<sup>17</sup>, to enhancing better preparedness in Participating States.

#### ■ **Prevention policy:**

Desk research and stakeholder consultations have demonstrated that prevention activities contributed to better preparedness through the development of a framework on prevention policy at EU level. It should be noted that the work on prevention policy only started half-way through the evaluation period. Actions in this area were thus limited. Although the prevention activities contributed towards a better understanding and mitigation of risks, it remained doubtful however, whether, at the end of the evaluation period, the prevention activities had fully contributed to an enhanced capability to respond to disasters at EU level. This is due to a gap between the knowledge generated through risk assessments and risk management planning.

#### ■ **Transport provisions:**

With regard to the evidence collected, through desk research, the survey, interviews and the case study on forest fires, the provision of transport support and assistance at EU level contributed to:

- Improving coordination between the EU and the Participating States in civil protection assistance intervention in the event of major emergencies/ threats;
- Effective, efficient, flexible and rapid emergency response interventions in the event of major (or impending) disasters; and
- Supporting and complementing the efforts of Participating States in the field of civil protection.

Moreover, the different components of the transport assistance (i.e. pooling phase; identification of transport options on the commercial market; and co-financing) directly contributed to the key objectives of the Mechanism, which were to coordinate the provision of assistance and the deployment of this assistance when required.

#### ■ **Accidental Marine Pollution:**

A majority of Civil Protection Authorities considered that DG ECHO work in the area of marine pollution contributed to the overall objectives of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism.

Overall the activities developed by DG ECHO in the area of accidental marine pollution seemed to clearly support the key objectives of the Mechanism:

- To facilitate and reinforce cooperation between the EU and the Participating States in civil protection assistance intervention in the event of major emergencies/ threats; e.g. the MIC/ERCC coordinated the EU responses to marine pollution responses nine times during the period 2007-2013;

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<sup>17</sup> For example, a project coordinator noted that these projects contributed only to a limited extent to reduce the effects of disasters or to complement the efforts of Participating States in the field of civil protection. This was mainly due to limited dissemination of project results and lack of implementation of procedures and/or arrangements developed by these projects.

- To contribute to better preparedness and contribute to contributing to developing response capacity at EU level;
- To contribute to effective, efficient, flexible and rapid emergency response interventions in the event of major (or impending) disasters; and
- To support and complement the efforts of Participating States in the field of civil protection.

The above objectives were met mostly through the cooperation with EMSA, which provided expertise and logistical support (for example through its inventory of Stand-by Oil Spill Response Vessels). In the case of the Deepwater Horizon oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico, the MIC/ERCC coordinated the support provided by the seven Participating States and EMSA. Other activities developed by DG ECHO in this field (such as exercises and prevention and preparedness projects) also contributed to these objectives by building prevention and preparedness capacities.

#### ■ Pilot project and preparatory actions:

A majority of Civil Protection Authorities regarded the contribution of pilot projects and preparatory actions to the overall objectives of the EU Mechanism and Financial Instrument as having:

- Contributed to more effective disaster response; and,
- Supported and complemented existing capacities and contributed to the development of additional capacity.

The pilot project and preparatory actions contributed to strengthening EU rapid response capability, by responding immediately to critical needs arising from major disasters. For example:

- The EU FFTR pilot project was used to test and develop stand-by assets to fight forest fires in order to respond more quickly and facilitate coordination to major emergencies.
- The Cold Conditions Module project became the impetus for wider development work regarding the topic and more Participating States were analysing their capacities to conduct rescue operations in cold conditions.
- A module-creating project in Italy achieved the rapid response capability through the eventual deployment of the medical unit to Haiti.

Modules produced by the selected preparatory actions were designed to respond to disasters (both natural and man-made) in the framework of the Mechanism at the request of the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC).

#### ■ Actions in third countries:

Actions with third countries contributed to the overall objectives of the Mechanism in the following way:


- To facilitate and reinforce cooperation between the EU, Participating States and partner countries in the neighbouring regions in civil protection assistance intervention in the event of major emergencies/ threats;
- To contribute to better preparedness; and
- To contribute to developing response capacity at EU level.

Stakeholders underlined that through actions in third countries partner countries' knowledge and capacity in the field of civil protection increased, and as such their vulnerability to disasters has been reduced.

### 2.1.3 Q3 - To which extent were the findings and recommendations outlined in the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the evaluation of the application of the Civil Protection Mechanism and the Civil Protection Financial Instrument for the Years 2007-2009 taken into account by the end of the period under evaluation (end-2013)?

Overall, the majority of Civil Protection Authorities considered that the recommendations outlined in the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the evaluation of the application of the Civil Protection Mechanism and the Civil Protection Financial Instrument for the Years 2007-2009 have been taken in account. All past recommendations were perceived to have been implemented although the degree of acknowledgment varied (see Figure 2.3)<sup>18</sup>.

**Figure 2.3** Most Civil Protection Authorities considered that the findings and recommendations outlined in the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the evaluation of the application of the Civil Protection Mechanism and the Civil Protection Financial Instrument for the Years 2007-2009 were taken into account by the end of the period under evaluation



**Source:** Online survey for national Civil Protection Authorities / national contact points.

**Question:** Average of responses given for specific recommendation listed in survey questions relating to specific objectives or achievements of Mechanism actions. Between 8th of July 2014 and 18th of August 2014, the survey was sent to 35 countries.<sup>19</sup>

The extent to which the past recommendations have been implemented is commented for each of the Mechanism actions below.

#### ■ MIC/ERCC:

The MIC/ERCC has fully implemented the recommendations outlined in the evaluation. A strong majority of Civil Protection Authorities surveyed recognised that:

- The Mechanism has built up of the Monitoring and Information Centre so that it can play the role of operational centre for European civil protection intervention;
- The Mechanism has created a genuine 24/7 European Emergency Response Centre; and

<sup>18</sup> For further detail see question Q3 in the Annex of the Final Report, provided in a separated document.

<sup>19</sup> Note: The information is not available for the following Civil Protection Mechanism: Pilot Project, Prevention and Preparedness, and Marine Pollution.

- The successor of the MIC has evolved towards a more proactive anticipation/real time monitoring of emergencies and operational engagement/coordination.

More specifically, since the last evaluation of the Mechanism, the Commission increased its investment in the following components of the Mechanism:

- The Commission has considerably invested in its Early Warning Systems since the last evaluation. As demonstrated by the evolution of the budget allocated to EWS over the evaluation period, DG ECHO clearly decided to invest in these capacities since the last evaluation (the budget was of €700,000 in 2009 and of €1,600,000 in 2013).
- Since 2009, the Commission has considerably increased its investment into “Awareness-raising activities and the dissemination of good practices” (i.e. from a budget of €250,000 in 2008 to €1,180,000 in 2009 and a budget oscillating between €300,000 and €800,000 in the rest of the evaluation period).

Despite this positive assessment, it should also be noted that the Interim Evaluation highlighted the need to ensure the coherence between the political nature of civil protection and the humanitarian objectives of DG ECHO activities. The need to further integrate the Civil Protection Mechanism within the humanitarian field was also highlighted by this evaluation. More actions are therefore needed in this area.

#### ■ **Training programme:**

The Mechanism organised the training programme in such a way to increase preparedness of experts participating in the exchanges and staff during the exercise, regularly checked the alignment of the respective alignment of the training programme components (via lessons learned, annual meetings, needs assessments, etc.).

#### ***Training courses***

Training courses continued to be viewed as an important component of preparedness in the context of the EU civil protection cooperation. The developments of the EU training programme continued to ensure consistency among the different programmes at multiple levels. This was enabled through the continued or enhanced coordination between all training providers; although further integration between programmes may have been envisaged. In addition and despite the fact that more and more experts were trained with a decreasing input of financial means, the Commission should consider introducing online/remote training courses for basic information about the Mechanism so as to enhance the efficiency of the training courses so as to focus resources where they matter most.

#### ***Simulation exercises***

Civil Protection Authorities surveyed agreed that the exercise programme / framework was integrated and comprehensive (e.g. common glossary and agreed minimum requirements of an exercise methodology, vision on the disaster scenarios to be practised, risk assessments, etc.). However, at the end of the evaluation period, a quarter of survey respondents were still unsure whether it had been fully integrated with other Mechanism actions. Illustrative evidence as to why some Civil Protection had doubts was as follows:

- There was a missing link between the exercise conclusions and lessons learned in place in different countries and follow up actions at national level to examine the impact suggested changes on the operational procedures.
- Without an overarching strategy or framework for the EU civil protection exercise programme, the simulation exercises were not as cohesive as they could have been, and was not reflective of the overall needs for such exercises across Participating States: e.g. similar teams regularly exercised on similar scenarios.

#### ***Exchange of experts programme***

The survey results confirmed that the exchange of experts programme contributed to increasing the awareness of the Mechanism and of the exchange programme among Civil Protection organisations and professionals. They also showed that the exchanges were set up in such a way that experts on particular subjects were made available to other Participating

States on request (and not only for the purpose of humanitarian assistance outside the EU). This was also confirmed by experts surveyed who tended to have positive views with regard to the higher visibility of the exchange programme and reported a networking effect generated by the exchange which they acknowledged could be put into good effect in cases of requests from other Participating States.

■ **Modules and Module exercises:**

Desk research and stakeholder interviewed confirmed that more modules had been registered on CESIS and this facilitated the preparedness, and coordination of response intervention at Participating States and EU levels. Although guidelines and standard operating procedures improved interoperability and coordination more could be done in the future to enhance the inter-operability of modules by adopting international unified minimum requirements for modules' establishment.

Those modules were further tested in Module exercises as illustrated by Civil Protection Authorities in their qualitative responses: the reasons for participating in Module exercises were to train Module personnel in the international emergency environment; test national deployment procedures, improve operational procedures, develop the HNS coordination mechanism, as well as test logistical aspects of emergency interventions.

■ **Prevention and preparedness projects:**

The report from the Commission (COM (2011) 696 final) noted that potential/possible synergies with other EU programmes and policies financing instruments able to support certain aspects of prevention and preparedness activities should be encouraged. However, there was no evidence that potential synergies were exploited in the period considered by this evaluation (2007-2013). In one case only, a project financed through the financial instrument shared their results projects financed through other EU programmes or instruments.

■ **Prevention policy:**

The Report on the evaluation of the application of the Civil Protection Mechanism and Civil Protection Financial Instrument for the years 2007-2009 stipulated that the EU prevention policy framework should be able to address the various prevention aspects in different EU policy fields (environment, security, health and regional policies) and facilitate further cooperation among Participating States. The Commission Communication on the post 2015 Hyogo Framework showed that civil protection was integrated with 13 other EU policies and that there were at least 25 cross-sector legislative instruments, 43 strategies/programmes and about ten proposals for new legislation on cross-sector civil protection. Cooperation among participating states was supported by the Commission by the organisation of many expert meetings in Brussels, which gathered representatives of various national departments in Participating States, to exchange good practices. The findings and recommendations outlined in the evaluation report have therefore been followed up on.

■ **Transport provisions:**

Before assessing the extent of follow-up since the last evaluation, it should be noted that at the time of the previous evaluation the transport assistance had just been established, the findings and recommendations were based on very limited experience of the transport assistance. Despite this limitation, the report identified important findings. The new Decision setting the legal basis for the Mechanism provided new rules for the transport assistance. Financing threshold were increased, procedures were made more flexible and specific rules applied to ensure that the transport assistance was only used when required and that the most cost-effective option was chosen. The transport support provisions were clearly designed on the basis of the findings of the previous evaluation. Stakeholder surveyed confirmed their overall satisfaction with the leanness, adequacy and flexibility of procedures put in place to manage the financial assistance via direct grants awarded to Participating States.

■ **Accidental marine pollution:**

Marine pollution was not part of the previous evaluation but the report highlighted in its conclusion that coordination with EMSA was an area for improvement, with some duplication noted between the MIC and EMSA. Since then, the Commission and EMSA have invested considerable efforts to improve their coordination and clarify the role of both organisations. The cooperation framework was thus clearer at the end of the evaluation period.

■ **Pilot project and preparatory actions:**

The 2007-2009 evaluation of the application of the Civil Protection Mechanism and Financial Instruments pointed out that there was limited evidence that a more effective disaster response was achieved through preparatory actions and the pilot project. Nevertheless, these actions contributed to test innovative approaches and new ways of working.

Innovative applications and systems continued to be implemented and used in the period assessed by this evaluation. These contributed to guarantee a fast response and speed up the decision making process. For example, completed projects tested the following innovative tools: weekly forest fire video-conferencing, virtual learning environment modules and distance learning materials. Moreover, the pilot project and preparatory action related to the Forest Fire Tactical Reserve created standby assets which were used for a limited period of time (mainly over the summer months).

There was no evidence that preparatory actions were used to develop and test (operational) modules for the analysis and development of new mechanisms ('laws').

■ **Actions in third countries:**

Third country actions were not directly addressed as part of the Interim Evaluation covering the years 2007-2009. However, the report of the Interim Evaluation pointed towards a need for further increasing the strategic and operational cooperation with international actors and third countries. The majority of Civil Protection Authorities surveyed (80%) considered that the trend towards further cooperation continued as:

- 92% of Civil Protection Authorities considered that the establishment of a new Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection produced synergies and complementarities, in particular with regard to relief operations in third countries;
- 83% of Civil Protection Authorities considered that Actions with EU candidate and potential candidate countries (financed through IPA) contributed to increased cooperation between the EU and these countries in the area of civil protection;
- 83% of Civil Protection Authorities considered that Actions aimed at European Neighbourhood countries (financed through PPRD South and PPRD East) contributed to increased cooperation between the EU and these countries in the area of civil protection.

**2.1.4 Q4 - What were the key 'lessons learned' for each of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism actions?**

Stakeholders interviewed and or surveyed outlined a variety of lessons learned from the implementation of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and the Civil Protection Financial Instrument over the period 2007-2013. Lessons learned by action are further detailed in the core of this document<sup>20</sup>. The key lessons learned are presented below. Each component section contains a dedicated sub-section presenting the lessons learned that specifically apply to the component.

- Overall, there should be a better connectivity between all the components of the Mechanism mainly with regard to the implementation of lessons learned across all levels of governance.

<sup>20</sup> See section 2.2.4; section 2.2.6.7; section 2.3.1.1.7; section 2.3.2.1.7; section 2.3.3.1.7; section 2.4.3.7; section 2.5.2.7; section 2.6.1.7; section 2.7.3.7; section 2.8.3.7; section 2.9.1.7; and section 2.10.2.7.



#### **MIC/ERCC**

- The use of multiple systems (e.g. CECIS and PolRep<sup>21</sup>) has in some cases led to duplication of efforts and reduced the speediness of the coordination of efforts.
- There was a need for better coordination between Participating States and MIC/ERCC in terms of what constitutes an efficient intervention (i.e. MIC/ERCC led coordinated response vs. improved cooperation between Participating States in a bilateral or multilateral basis).

#### **Training programme:**

- The development of training programmes should focus on the capability of Participating States to work together (e.g. cooperation activities, etc.) and should focus on regular needs analyses.
- Stricter selection criteria for entering and progressing through the training programme would be beneficial.
- The Civil Protection Authorities should have the final say with regard to what exercises or projects are undertaken and whether these are truly relevant and will contribute to the development of the Mechanism.

#### **Modules:**

- The development of additional modules and sharing of best operational practices should be favoured. Lessons learned should be captured from the various elements of the Mechanism, compiled and shared with Participating States.

#### **Prevention and preparedness projects:**

- Investment in prevention and preparedness actions should be preferred to funding ad hoc response operations.
- The outcomes of prevention and preparedness projects were not sufficiently disseminated and in some cases were perceived as not very helpful for the implementation of the Mechanism.

#### **Transport assistance:**

- The timely availability of the transport means before and after operations was an issue and the administrative burden involved in the request for transport assistance too high.

#### **Pilot projects and preparatory action:**

- Pilot projects and preparatory actions related to prevention and preparedness of emergencies should be better communicated, coordination should be optimized, and a more inclusive approach integrating Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection should be introduced.

#### **Actions in third countries:**

- Actions in third countries could be better coordinated between the different levels and types of cooperation (e.g. different EU programmes, gaps between the Mechanism and Humanitarian Aid programmes, within the actions financed by those programmes, etc.).

#### **2.1.5 Q5 - Were there any apparent unintended / unexpected effects / risks, both positive and negative, of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism actions and the application of the Civil Protection Financial Instrument?**


Overall, Civil Protection Authorities indicated that unintended / unexpected effects or risks related to EU Civil Protection Mechanism actions and the application of the Civil Protection Financial Instrument did not materialise (see Figure 2.4). The qualitative responses related to “yes”, “other” or “N/A” were difficult to interpret given the lack of clarifications and comments

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<sup>21</sup> PolRep is an international pollution reporting system.

provided by the survey respondents. The risks or unexpected effects mainly related to the risk of duplication of efforts, coherence of actions funded across all levels of governance, risk of a lack of strategic direction with regard to how the actions of the Mechanism and Financial Instrument as well as related EU instrument fit together and build on one another.

**Figure 2.4 Most Civil Protection Authorities considered that there were no apparent unintended / unexpected effects / risks of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism actions and the application of the Civil Protection Financial Instrument**



**Source:** Online survey for national Civil Protection Authorities / national contact points.

**Question:** Were there any apparent unintended / unexpected effects / risks, both positive and negative, of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism actions and the application of the Civil Protection Financial Instrument?

Between 8th of July 2014 and 18th of August 2014, the survey was sent to 35 countries<sup>22</sup>.

#### 2.1.5.2 Examples of apparent unintended / unexpected effects / risks, both positive and negative, of each of the actions under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism actions and under the application of the Civil Protection Financial Instrument

Evidence from other data collection exercises is presented according to each Mechanism action:

##### ■ MIC/ERCC:

No unintended or unexpected effects were identified with regard to the MIC/ERCC. The key risks identified concerned the potential duplication of some of EMSA's functions in the field of accidental marine pollution and the difficult relation with EMSA which could be associated with such duplication. In order to tackle this risk the Commission and EMSA have invested considerable efforts in the clarification of their cooperation framework.

Moreover, anecdotal evidence illustrated that there was a risk that the sources used for the MIC/ERCC information products differed from those used (and trusted) by the affected Participating States, potentially leading to conflicting modelling and data outputs.

<sup>22</sup> Note: The information is not available for the following Civil Protection Mechanism: Exercises, Transport, and Marine Pollution



## ■ Training programme:

### *Training courses*

The biggest unexpected (positive) effect of training courses, mentioned by most stakeholders, was the networking effect among participants, which led to training participants starting several new common projects and other activities (e.g. prevention / preparedness projects, activities as part of the IPA instrument for pre-accession, research projects) after they had met during a training course. Possibly, this benefit could be further exploited in the future.

The issue of training many experts was that they ultimately could not all be deployed on emergency missions. Admission to basic courses may have created an expectation from the training participants that they could progress through the curriculum and subsequently be deployed, which was however rarely the case.

Lastly, there may have been some risk of duplication with the training offer of other organisations, e.g. UNDAC, NGO specific training, national training on external interventions, etc. It was suggested to regularly review the offer of other providers and, where possible, consider organising joint courses with in particular other international stakeholders

### *Simulation exercises*

The collected evidence did not enable us to identify any apparent unintended and/or unexpected effects or risks, both positive and negative associated with simulation exercises.

### *Exchange of expert programme*

The exchange of expert programme was sometimes seen by Participating States as an alternative to training courses to know about the Mechanism coordination and facilitation of disaster responses and or networking opportunity rather than a forum conducive to exchanging knowledge and practices. The exchange of expert programme was also limited in its capacity to organise specific exchanges.

## ■ Module and module exercises:

Anecdotal evidence illustrated potential risks or adverse effect as the absence of advanced long term planning of module exercises made their participation in module exercises difficult for some Participating States.

## ■ Prevention and preparedness projects:

Stakeholders interviewed reported risks of duplication as there were several funding mechanisms (e.g. Civil Protection funding mechanism, ERDF, IPA, MED Programme, etc.) supporting prevention and preparedness activities. Relevant stakeholders highlighted that coordination with other EU funded projects or national activities were important to promote experience exchange and mutual learning (e.g. through participation to conferences or other project events). For those projects with similar objectives, mutual learning activities should be fostered also during project implementation, as results achieved by one project could be used by another project, supporting the sustainability of results.

Some Stakeholders also highlighted the risk of limited EU added value in some of the projects focused on specific regions of the EU.

## ■ Prevention policy:

None of the stakeholders reported on any unintended, unexpected effects and risks under the prevention policy framework.

## ■ Transport provisions:

Three important risks and unexpected effects of the transport assistance have been identified:

- Firstly, during the evaluation period some of the Participating States were not keen on using the transport support scheme as they wanted to use their own assets so that they could be identified on the ground. Allowing Participating States enhance their visibility alongside the one of the EU could lead to important policy gains.

- Secondly, some Participating States were not prepared to share their aircraft capability. In some cases, most of the assistance was used nationally, and the Commission did not have access to that information. There were also obstacles that had to do with the capacity to manoeuvre aircrafts due to administrative requirements for deployment.
- Finally, some Civil Protection Authorities in the Participating States perceived a risk of delay when using the transport assistance due to the heavy and strict administrative procedure.

#### ■ **Accidental marine pollution:**

One of the main unintended effects from DG ECHO's activities in the field of marine pollution was the creation of an additional reporting tool in the case of marine pollution disaster (e.g. CECIS or CECIS for marine pollution to be launched after the end of the evaluation period). Different actors involved in the Civil Protection and Marine Pollution cooperation (Participating States, Regional Agreements and EMSA) stressed the difficulty to work with the multiple reporting and notification procedures of acute pollution in Europe. At the end of the evaluation period, Participating States in reporting marine pollution had to use the following tools:

- CECIS for request for assistance and information platform in the case of emergency;
- SafeSeaNet for maritime traffic information; and,
- Pollution Reporting System (PolRep) or other systems at regional level:

Each of these tools had different governing rules (i.e. regarding the access to third country), content and scope. This created an administrative burden which could have led to delays in the case of an emergency. This has been a recurrent remark and was extensively discussed in different fora. No single solution has been identified over the course of this evaluation. However, the creation of a CECIS dedicated to marine pollution was a step in the right direction as it finally answered the request of the marine pollution community to open this platform to third countries.

#### ■ **Pilot project and preparatory actions:**

The reviewed pilot project and preparatory actions achieved their overall objectives even though there were occasional delays in their delivery. One project, for instance, was delayed due to three major emergencies, which interfered with project management due to deployment of relevant team members.

#### ■ **Actions in third countries:**

No main risks or unexpected effects were reported by stakeholders. Anecdotal evidence reported that actions in third countries suffered from a lack of an overall coherent framework and thus there may have been a risk of duplication in the coordination of the different actions.

## 2.2 MIC/ERCC and related tools<sup>23</sup>

### 2.2.1 MIC- ERCC

#### 2.2.1.1 *Description of the action*

The Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) was established in 2001 and was the operational heart of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism until May 2013, when it was replaced by the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC). The MIC was set up to help the Commission facilitate the mobilisation of civil protection resources from EU countries and non-EU countries participating to the Mechanism, in the event of an emergency. The MIC provided countries with a single entry point for civil protection information. Any country affected by or at risk of being affected by a major disaster inside or outside the EU could request assistance from an EU country directly or through the MIC. The MIC had three key functions:

- **Provision of useful and updated information** on the actual status of an ongoing emergency;
- **Support in co-ordination of EU assistance** by matching requests from a disaster-stricken country with offers of assistance from participating states as well as identifying gaps in assistance; and
- **Communication hub** at headquarters level between Participating States, the affected country and dispatched field experts.

In addition, the MIC could offer technical support, including improved access to satellite maps. In the field, the MIC could coordinate the deployment of EU Civil Protection Teams to the affected site. In that case a MIC Liaison Officer was sent to the affected country to:

- Prepare the arrival of the team of selected experts;
- Closely plan and coordinate the activities of the team with the authorities of the affected country; and
- Streamline the communication between the MIC, the experts and the authorities of the affected country.

In May 2013, the MIC was replaced by the ERCC. The ERCC had extra capacity to deal with several simultaneous emergencies in different time zones, around-the-clock. The ERCC also supported a wide range of prevention and preparedness activities, from awareness-raising to field exercises simulating emergency response.

#### 2.2.1.2 *Activities*


Over the period 2007-2013, the MIC/ERCC was activated 223 times<sup>24</sup>. The majority of the activations were related to emergencies outside the Participating States<sup>25</sup> to the Mechanism – 132 activations compared to 91 within the Participating States. The annual number of activations over this period ranged from 26 (2007) to 38 (2012).

<sup>23</sup> Also refer to section 2.1 of Annex to this final report provided in a separate document.

<sup>24</sup> Activation is equivalent to any event open in CECIS (request for assistance, early warning (pre-alert), monitoring).

<sup>25</sup> EU28, Iceland, Norway and FYROM.


**Figure 2.5** Number of activations by region  
Participating States vs. non-Participating States, 2007 – 2013



**Source:** DG ECHO

Activation could take the form of an information message, information monitoring, early warning (or pre-alert) or request for assistance leading to deployment of teams on the ground. Over the period 2007-2013, most of Mechanism activations were requests for assistance (67% of the activations). In many cases, these requests for assistance were preceded by an early warning or pre-alert. In 13% of the cases early warnings were not followed by a request for assistance. Figure 2.6 provides an overview of the percentage of activations by intervention type over the period 2007-2013.

**Figure 2.6** Number of activations by type, 2007 – 2013 (n=223)




**Note:** The early warnings represented here are the ones which were not followed by a request for assistance.

**Source:** DG ECHO

During this period, the Mechanism was mainly activated for cases of forest fires (24%), floods (23%) and earthquakes (13%). The full breakdown of activation per types of hazards is presented in Figure 2.7. This breakdown varied considerably between the EU and non-EU activations (see overleaf Figures 2.9. and 2.10.).


**Figure 2.7 Mechanism activations for different types of hazards – 2007-2013**



*Source: DG ECHO*

According to the data provided by DG ECHO, the MIC/ERCC coordinated a total of 72 missions during the period 2007-2013. 246 experts and 64 MIC/ERCC Liaison Officers were deployed in the field during these missions. The data on deployments presented in Figure 2.8 were extracted from a presentation from DG ECHO<sup>26</sup>.

**Figure 2.8 Number of missions, liaisons officers and experts deployed by the MIC/ERCC – 2007-2013**




*Source: DG ECHO. It is noted that, following comparison of different data sources, there are inconsistencies in statistics on deployments. For the preparation of this figure, the study team has used a presentation from DG ECHO.*

<sup>26</sup> The analysis of the detailed datasets about the MIC/ERCC activations showed some discrepancies with these data. It is however impossible for the evaluation team to make conclusions on which data are the accurate one as the detailed dataset provides for example very limited information about the deployment in 2012 and 2013.

### 2.2.1.3 The MIC/ERCC's activations in the Participating States

The MIC/ERCC was activated 91 times within the Participating States during the period 2007-2013. In 43% of the cases, the MIC/ERCC was activated for forest fires, which mainly took place in Southern Europe. Floods, earthquakes and extreme weather conditions (mainly associated with snowfalls and exceptionally cold weather) taken together represented 34% of the total activations.

**Figure 2.9 Mechanism activations for different types of hazards in the Participating States – 2007-2013**




**Source: DG ECHO**

### 2.2.1.4 The MIC/ERCC's activations outside the Participating States

The MIC/ERCC was activated 132 times outside the Participating States from 2007 to 2013. These emergencies took place in 69 countries. Emergencies associated with floods represented the largest share (30%) of all activations. This was followed by earthquake (16%), emergencies associated with civil unrest and conflict (including intervention related to refugees and population displacement) and storms (these two types of emergencies represented both 13% of the total). Forest fires represented 11% of this total.

**Figure 2.10 Mechanism activations for different types of hazards outside the Participating States - 2007-2013**



**Source: DG ECHO**

## 2.2.2 CECIS

The Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS) was created with the intention of facilitating emergency communication (through a secured S-Testa) among Participating States. CECIS was overseen by the MIC/ERCC and it was the backbone of the operations led under the Mechanism. It provided an integrated platform to send and receive alerts, details of assistance required; to make offer assistance and to track the development of the ongoing emergencies as they happen in an online logbook. The end-users of CECIS were the MIC/ERCC and national contact points.

CECIS was also made available to authorities responsible for marine pollution. During the evaluation period, it was used for emergencies falling under the remit of both the civil protection and marine pollution authorities and could be used simultaneously by both for emergencies that concerned both parties (e.g. shoreline pollution):

- Civil Protection users had full access to CECIS and they connected to it through TESTA; and,
- Marine Pollution users could access CECIS through a different URL, but did not have access to all Civil Protection emergencies

However, marine pollution events were very different from other disasters. They involved many different stakeholders, both private and public and the international response was strongly focused on particular regional seas. Regional agreements were often in place to deal with marine pollution at sea-basin level. Some of the regional agreements included non-Participating States in the Mechanism, which meant that to be successful, any information and communication system for marine pollution response needed to include and give full access rights to these countries.

While this topic has been discussed for some time, Participating States agreed to create an additional version of CECIS dedicated to accidental marine pollution next to the CECIS existing for civil protection. The new CECIS for Marine Pollution<sup>27</sup>, which was to be launched after the end of the evaluation period, is further integrated with EMSA's operations.

## 2.2.3 Detection and Early Warning Systems (EWS)

Article 2(7) of the Mechanism Decision (Decision 2007/779/EC)<sup>28</sup> foresaw the development of detection and early warning systems. Detection and early warning systems aimed to reduce the impact of disasters by ensuring timely and effective provision of information enabling rapid actions to be taken. As such, they ensured preparedness for an effective response. The development of these systems was considered to support the Mechanism.

During the evaluation period the Commission organised a series of activities to contribute to the improvement of early warning systems, including their analytical capacity and rapid dissemination through appropriate information tools. The main activities included:

- The establishment of two expert groups to improve exchange of information and best practices: one within the Commission and one amongst the Participating States;
- The organisation of stakeholder conferences; and,
- The financing of projects to establish and interface alert tools with the MIC/ERCC and Participating States: The Commission, through the Civil Protection Financial Instrument, also financed a number of targeted projects fostering the rapid dissemination of alerts through the Civil Protection Network, relying mainly, but not exclusively on support from the Joint Research Centre (JRC) through Administrative Arrangements.

<sup>27</sup> See access page: <https://webgate.acceptance.ec.europa.eu/CECIS/login.jsp> After the evaluation period, CECIS consisted of two separate applications, but with a common access. Separate access was to solve the security issues associated with the use of CECIS for Marine Pollution. One of the key reasons to have a separated CECIS for marine pollution was that marine pollution authorities wanted to open CECIS to third countries. Civil Protection Authorities were more sensitive to security and that was one of the reasons for splitting the application.

<sup>28</sup> [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32007D0779\(01\)&from=EN](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32007D0779(01)&from=EN)



Examples of early warning systems managed by the Commission include:

- Meteoalarm;
- The Global Disaster Alerts and Coordination System (GDACS);
- The European Flood Alert System (EFAS); and,
- The European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS).

The European Commission also cooperated with other international organisations e.g. the European Mediterranean Seismological Centre<sup>29</sup> and the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission<sup>30</sup> to establish new and or develop existing warning systems.


## 2.2.4 Lessons learned programme

In addition to these developments; DG ECHO put in place a comprehensive feedback and information system that allowed for creating learning opportunities from its operations, to ensure that the MIC/ERCC stayed relevant in the long term by identifying key lessons and encourage their subsequent implementation.

The lessons learned programme involved a debriefing meeting after every mission, taking place in Brussels, where lessons learned were gathered by all team members. Additionally in most cases a follow-up mission to third countries took place to gather further information. All the compiled information was then further discussed and shared in respective committee meetings and with Participating States.

While the scheme reflected best management practices, Participating States were not convinced by its effectiveness (47% of those Civil Protection Authorities surveyed were either unsure or disagreed with the fact that lessons learned from deployments coordinated by the MIC/ERCC were gathered, implemented and disseminated, see Figure 2.11 below). While the collection of lessons identified seemed to be relatively effective – although some room for improvement had been identified - the key drawback of the system was related to the implementation of the lessons identified. Implementation was indeed a slow and difficult process as some areas fell under the authority of Participating States and the Commission had no control over their implementation at national level. There was thus a strong dependence on the willingness of the Participating States to implement the lessons identified.

**Figure 2.11 MS opinion on the following statement: “The lessons learned from deployments are gathered, implemented and disseminated”**



**Source:** Online survey for national Civil Protection Authorities / national contact points.

**Question:** Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the fact that the lessons learned from deployments been gathered, implemented and disseminated?

Between 8th of July 2014 and 18th of August 2014, the survey was sent to 35 countries, amongst the 20 national contact points who responded, 17 answered the questions.

Stakeholders noted the following shortcomings:

<sup>29</sup> The earthquake detection in the Mediterranean Area has been considerably improved by adding three sensors in Tunisia. The presence of these sensors in the North African area allows a much better and faster localisation and characterisation of earthquakes in the Mediterranean. <http://www.emsc-csem.org/#2>

<sup>30</sup> Cooperation on establishment a tsunami warning system for the North Atlantic and Mediterranean region, <http://www.ioc-tsunami.org/>



- The capture and dissemination of lessons identified on deployments did not always take place and was not systematic. For instance, the feedback from the requesting States is not always gathered in a systematic and orderly way;
- The implementation of the lessons identified on deployments took time and was subject to the willingness of each Participating State. Regular updates on the progress of the implementation of lessons identified at EU and at Participating State level would be useful;
- The people participating in the lessons learned meetings were not always the most relevant officers and sometimes lacked sufficient technical knowledge.

In order to solve these issues and improve this process, the following suggestions were formulated by the Participating States<sup>31</sup>:

- Ensure the participation of at least one representative from the affected country in the lessons learned meetings;
- More robust needs assessment prior to the deployment of EU CP Teams;
- More attention should be paid to logistic support for missions, particularly in the ICT field meaning that the hosts should provide CP team members mobile phones and laptops.
- A proactive approach to the dissemination of lessons learned to EU CP Teams providing assistance during deployment;
- Dedicated technical workshops involving relevant experts (e.g. technical personnel) during lessons learned meetings to address outstanding or unresolved questions<sup>32</sup>;
- A wide and systematic dissemination of lessons learned reports, translated in all EU languages, to all Civil Protection Authorities involved in the Mechanism;
- Common platform and or website for posting, sharing and disseminating lessons learned;
- The lessons learned matrix developed by DG ECHO was considered a useful tool, however it should have been shared and updated more regularly and provide information on the progress to address the lessons learned;
- Use of national contact points to support the implementation of lessons learned at Participating State level (e.g. by collaborating with the MIC/ERCC in the implementation of lessons learned after EU Civil Protection Team deployments, by stressing the value of lessons learned when preparing for future deployments);
- Develop an Action Plan for disseminating and implementing lessons identified.

Following requests by the Danish Presidency<sup>33</sup> and the Council<sup>34</sup>, DG ECHO invested substantial efforts in the development of a more systematic process to gather, analyse, disseminate and implement the lessons learned identified at the end of each MIC/ERCC's activation. As some of the proposals were still under development at the time of this evaluation it was not possible to assess them, however, the new developments seemed to go in the right direction and seemed to answer specific needs (e.g. consideration of the lessons learned identified from the exercises or additional data collection on the efficiency, effectiveness and coherence of the MIC/ERCC).

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<sup>31</sup> Stakeholder interviews and online survey for the national Civil Protection Authorities / national contact points. – Q8 - How could the effectiveness of sharing lessons learned be improved? - Number of respondents = 17.

<sup>32</sup> I.e. when similar issues are flagged repeatedly.

<sup>33</sup> The Danish Presidency organised a workshop on improving civil protection through lessons learnt in Copenhagen on 16-18 January 2012.

<sup>34</sup> The Justice and Home Affairs Council adopted Council conclusions on improving civil protection through lessons learnt on 26-27 April 2012 (Document 8149/12 available at: <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%208149%202012%20INIT>).


## 2.2.5 Intervention logic

The MIC/ERCC and its associated tools (CECIS and EWS) were key elements of the Mechanism. They were the backbones of the operational components of the Mechanism and therefore directly contributed to:

- Facilitate co-operation in civil protection assistance interventions in the event of major emergencies inside and outside the EU; and
- The provision of support to affected Participating States.

The rationale for the existence of the MIC/ERCC, CECIS and the EWS is that without such a platform and tools, the facilitation and coordination of the Participating States' assistance in case of emergencies would be very difficult.

**Figure 2.12 Intervention logic of the MIC/ERCC**



## 2.2.6 Final findings on MIC/ERCC and related tools

### 2.2.6.1 Relevance

#### 2.2.6.1.1 Overall relevance

All stakeholders who participated to our study considered the MIC/ERCC and its associated tools as very relevant for civil protection. This vision was shared amongst the Participating States, the international partners and the different services of the Commission. Civil Protection Authorities surveyed considered the MIC/ERCC as crucial element to ensure:


- An effective, efficient, flexible and rapid emergency response intervention in the event of major disasters;
- The effective deployment of EU Civil Protection Teams; and
- The complementarity of the EU interventions with the MS and international responses to major disasters.

As illustrated in Figure 2.13, Civil Protection Authorities surveyed<sup>35</sup> were satisfied with the monitoring, information management and coordination provided through the MIC/ERCC. DG ECHO also implemented several improvements to ensure the relevance of the MIC/ERCC and its associated tools. These mainly concerned:

- The replacement of the MIC by the ERCC, which ensured the 24/7 coverage of the coordination centre. This was one of the key shortcomings of the MIC.

The creation of a dedicated CECIS for marine pollution (launched after the end of the evaluation period) also responded to a key need of the marine pollution community (i.e. open CECIS to countries not participating to the Mechanism in the case of marine pollution).

**Figure 2.13 Civil Protection Authorities' opinion on the following statement: "I am overall satisfied with the monitoring, information management and coordination provided through MIC/ERCC"**



**Source:** Online survey for national Civil Protection Authorities / national contact points.

**Question:** Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statement: I am overall satisfied with the monitoring, information management and coordination provided through MIC/ERCC

Between 8th of July 2014 and 18th of August 2014, the survey was sent to 35 countries, amongst the 20 national contact points who responded, 17 answered the questions.

The relevance of the Commission's work in the field of EWS was also confirmed by the stakeholders and an internal evaluation of the EWS dated from 2010. As stated in this evaluation, the Commission successfully adapted its objectives (e.g. broaden the scope of the EWS initiative to different hazard types) to the overall needs expressed by stakeholders. For example, the initially strong focus on tsunami warning systems was gradually shifted towards a multi-hazard approach, which was in line with the needs of the Participating States (i.e. having access to commonly understandable alert signals and new technologies for alerting populations).

<sup>35</sup> Online survey for national Civil Protection Authorities / national contact points: Between 8th of July 2014 and 18th of August 2014, the survey was sent to 35 countries, amongst the 20 national contact points who responded, 17 took part to the MIC/ERCC.

### 2.2.6.2 Coherence

The MIC/ERCC has been the only unit at EU level involved in the coordination of all types of disaster response. It has been used to: centralise and monitor information; trigger the deployment of modules; manage the transport co-financing assistance and the associate transport pooling phase; launch requests for support in the case of disasters; manage the Early Warning Systems. The MIC/ERCC also ensured full coherence amongst the Commission services (see Table 2.2):

**Table 2.2 Examples of inter-service cooperation on civil protection matters in the European Commission**

Commission DG	Illustrative examples
DG SANCO	Deployed an ECDC health expert to Haiti and to Ukraine in the context of the H1N1 epidemic
DG ENV	Provided environmental advice for experts deployed by the Mechanism in Kolontar, HU
DG ENER	Provided expertise and dosimeters for experts deployed by the Mechanism in Fukushima (Japan)
EEAS/EUMS	Ensured the assistance to Pakistan through Military transport means
JRC	Contributed to the development of Early warning systems, mapping, analyses, pilot project on Improving Science based Advice for Emergency Response
DG ENTR	Provided Copernicus GIO EMS satellite images throughout the evaluation period
DG MOVE / EMSA:	Provided assistance and expertise during the Deepwater Horizon disaster in 2010, USA
EEAS / DG JUST	Provided assistance to EU citizens by activating consular protection mechanism as part of the Libyan crisis

**Source:** DG ECHO

The cooperation with the JRC was for example considered as very smooth by both DG ECHO and the JRC. Stakeholders highlighted in this regard the Administrative Arrangement which existed between the JRC and the Commission from 2008 to 2010 to maintain and further improve critical JRC services provided to DG ENV (which was in charge of the MIC then) and to develop new services in the area of the monitoring and alert tools available to the MIC.

The coordinated European approach facilitated by the MIC/ERCC is by its very nature complementary to actions carried out bilaterally by Participating States. The online survey revealed that a large majority of the Participating States considered that the MIC/ERCC has:

- Improved the coordination between the EU and the MS with regard to civil protection assistance during interventions (supported by 94% of the respondents); and
- Supported and complemented the efforts of the Participating States in the field of civil protection (supported by 88% of the respondents).

At international level, the activities coordinated by the MIC/ERCC were also considered as complementary to other international initiatives. All the international partners<sup>36</sup> interviewed in the framework of this study considered the MIC/ERCC as a reliable partner and as a very efficient tool able to provide information and channel support. The recent development of the MIC/ERCC such as the effective 24/7 coverage and the development of modules and training were considered as very beneficial for emergency interventions. This positive evaluation was shared by the Participating States, as 82% of the respondents consider that the services offered by the MIC/ERCC complemented the efforts carried out by other EU and international civil protection capabilities.

In addition, many of the reviewed lessons learned documents from various missions confirmed that the cooperation and interaction between the MIC/ERCC and the Commission Delegations,

<sup>36</sup> International Organization for Migration (IOM), UNEP, UN OCHA, UNISDR and World Bank.

EU CP Teams, international actors on site and local authorities had mostly been considered as very good (i.e. early contact when possible; efficient reporting of the different actions; good cooperation at Headquarter and field level).

According to the available data, the MIC/ERCC cooperated with other Commission services or other international civil protection capabilities 62 times during the period 2007-2013. This represents 28% of the MIC/ERCC activations. The level of cooperation varied from one operation to the other (see Table 2.3).


**Table 2.3 Illustrative examples of cooperation activities undertaken with International Organisations**

Organisation	Illustrative examples
NATO	Information and data exchange: In August 2008 forest fires affected Albania. The MIC/ERCC exchanged information with NATO Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC).
UNDAC	Deployment of joint assessment teams: The first time the MIC deployed a joint assessment team with another international organisation was in April 2009 during the floods in Namibia. The MIC team performed joint assessment operations with the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team onsite.
UNDAC	Development of joint MIC/ERCC-UN rapid environmental assessment teams: A joint MIC-UN rapid environmental assessment was performed in August 2008 following the storms in the Philippines.
UNEP / OCHA	Joint deployment on the ground: In South Korea in 2007 a joint UNEP/MIC assessment team was deployed in Seoul. The team was composed of four UN representatives, a member from EMSA, a MIC Liaison Officer and two representatives from France and Denmark. Later on, a joint deployment with an EU observers' team was deployed in Italy in 2012 following the Concordia ship accident. The team initially included three national officers, an officer from EMSA as well as a MIC Liaison Officer. It was then joined by an expert from the Joint UNEP/OCHA Environment Unit.

**Source:** DG ECHO

Overall, the cooperation amongst the different partners (Commission services and other international partners) was considered as good to very good by the MIC/ERCC.

**Figure 2.14 A majority of Civil Protection Authorities consider that the MIC/ERCC complements other Civil Protection Interventions**



**Source:** Online survey for national Civil Protection Authorities / national contact points.

**Question:** Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding the complementarity of the MIC/ERCC with other Civil Protection Interventions

Between 8<sup>th</sup> of July 2014 and 18<sup>th</sup> of August 2014, the survey was sent to 35 countries, amongst the 20 national contact points who responded, 17 answered the questions relating to MIC/ERCC.

### 2.2.6.3 Effectiveness

#### 2.2.6.3.1 Overall performance

The MIC/ERCC was considered an effective platform with the appropriate features and resources to achieve its objectives and to fulfil its functions. With regard to its three key objectives (i.e. Provision of useful and updated information on the actual status of an ongoing emergency; Support in co-ordination of EU assistance; and Communication hub), the following assessment of effectiveness can be performed:

- **Information sharing on the actual status of an ongoing emergency:** All Civil Protection Authorities surveyed considered that the MIC/ERCC successfully ensured communication between the EU level and the Member States. All the survey participants also confirmed that the MIC/ERCC was efficient at disseminating the information received from the early warning system.
- **Coordination support:** With regard to the coordination of the EU assistance in case of emergency, 94% of the Civil Protection Authorities surveyed considered that the MIC/ERCC was efficient in managing requests for assistance. The same percentage of Civil Protection Authorities surveyed considered that the MIC/ERCC was accessible and able to react immediately 24/7. This swiftness of reaction was confirmed by different international partners who noticed that the time needed by the MIC/ERCC to coordinate and deploy the EU assistance decreased over the last years. They also stressed that the MIC/ERCC provided robust information on the assistance available, which then enabled rapid decision-making and the deployment of the best transport support solutions available.
- **Communication hub during the operations:** 83% of the Civil Protection Authorities surveyed agreed that the MIC/ERCC played a central role as operational centre for European civil protection operations – see Figure 2.14.

#### 2.2.6.3.2 Deployment of EU Civil Protection Teams

With regard to the deployment of EU CP team, 77% of the Civil Protection Authorities surveyed considered that the MIC/ERCC could rapidly deploy EU Civil Protection Teams with the right expertise. However, 24% - or four Civil Protection Authorities surveyed - were unsure or even had doubts about the capacities of the MIC/ERCC in this field. Their key criticism was that **the expertise of the EU Civil Protection Teams' members was not always matching the requirements of the specific disaster or the variety of possible situations in the field**. This led to some of the Civil Protection Authorities questioning the procedure in place to select the experts staffing the MIC/ERCC. The stakeholders interviewed in the framework of the Japanese case study expressed similar doubts. In their opinion, the fact that the MIC/ERCC could only select those experts who were nominated by Participating States was problematic at times. The MIC/ERCC should be able to make amendments on the proposed experts in order to align the skills of the EU Civil Protection Teams with the actual needs in the field. The stakeholders also stressed that the vague request by some States (e.g. the one of Japanese authorities following the tsunami) also added to the difficulty to mobilise an EU CP team with the right expert profiles. This vision contrasted with the feedback received from some of the international partners who considered the members of the EU Civil Protection Teams as well trained and equipped with the right skills and competences.

On average and based on the analysis of different lessons learned documents, the deployment of EU Civil Protection Teams can be considered as successful in achieving their individual overall objectives i.e. “to help people in need and to facilitate the coordination of disaster response”. The extent to which deployments were successful or the extent to which performance improvements could have been made is hard to assess due to the specific nature and highly different circumstances of the varied emergencies which occurred. Every mission has a learning potential and major lessons drawn from the previous were taken into account in the next deployments. Examples of lessons learned from deployments in 2011 leading to very concrete actions are presented in Table 2.4.




**Table 2.4 Examples of lessons learned which have led to concrete actions**

Lessons learned	Concrete follow-up actions
After the assistance provided to Turkey, it would be interesting to know the monetary value of the in-kind assistance to ensure the cost-efficiency of the operation and for communication purposes.	Since then it is possible to introduce monetary values for assistance into CECIS and a link with EDRIS was under construction at the end of 2011.
It was noted after the deployment in Japan and Pakistan that EU Civil Protection Teams need logistical expertise for customs clearance, cargo handling, in-country transport, warehousing etc.	Following that observation, a Technical Expert Course was organised in March 2012 in Sweden specifically for logisticians, which included training on what we understand as logistics coordination within the Mechanism.
After the deployment in Japan and Cyprus it was noted that early deployment of MIC LO for early information and needs assessment allows rest of the team to "hit the ground running".	As an example, an early deployment of a MIC LO was arranged for the 2012 Bulgaria Floods, resulting in a clear and detailed request for assistance that adequately covered the specific needs.
After the deployment in Turkey it was noted that it is necessary to ensure careful definition of EU CP Team mandate to avoid raising sensitivities in affected country.	Since then, Draft Response Plans produced for all missions or emergencies that could trigger missions and the terms of reference in Experts' contracts have been made clearer.
After the deployment in Turkey, language skills in Turkish, Russian, and Arabic would be useful for some missions.	Since then different MIC LOs have undertaken Arabic courses
One of the main lessons learned from the operation of the MIC is the need for fully-fledged 24/7 staffing to handle two or more emergencies simultaneously.	The ERCC ensures since May 2013 a 24/7 coverage.

**Source:** DG ECHO, "Lessons learned matrix: key lessons identified in 2011"

**Figure 2.15 Most Civil Protection Authorities consider that the MIC/ERCC has been effective in performing its core functions**



**Source:** Online survey for national Civil Protection Authorities / national contact points.

**Question:** Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding the effectiveness of the MIC/ERCC:

Between 8<sup>th</sup> of July 2014 and 18<sup>th</sup> of August 2014, the survey was sent to 35 countries, amongst the 20 national contact points who responded, 17 answered the questions relating to MIC/ERCC.

### 2.2.6.3.3 EWS

With regard to the EWS, the MIC/ERCC has also been effective during the evaluation period. Through its cooperation with JRC and other institutions the MIC/ERCC managed to gradually



close existing gaps in disaster monitoring systems and to have access to state-of-the-art alert systems covering the full spectrum of hazards.

#### 2.2.6.4 Efficiency

Table 2.5 provides an overview of the budget allocated to the different functions of the MIC/ERCC, based on the Work Programmes for the evaluation period and provides this overview. In total, almost €20,000,000 was allocated to the MIC/ERCC and its different functions during the evaluation period. This sum encompasses the budget allocated to:

- The maintenance and further development of the MIC/ERCC;
- The deployment of EU Civil Protection Teams within the EU and outside the EU;
- The maintenance and further development of CECIS and the MIC/ERCC;
- Hosting CECIS, MIC security and resilience; and
- The development and management of EWS.

**Table 2.5 Overview of the budget (€) allocated to the different functions of the MIC/ERCC**

Years	MIC/ERCC	Deployment	CECIS	EWS
2007	190,000	850,000	650,000	225,000
2008	150,000	800,000	450,000	472,000
2009	290,000	850,000	290,000	702,000
2010	250,000	1,470,000	250,000	1,130,000
2011	620,000	650,000	620,000	1,200,000
2012	600,000	650,000	400,000	1,600,000
2013	1,500,400	550,000	300,000	1,600,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,600,400</b>	<b>5,820,000</b>	<b>2,960,000</b>	<b>6,929,000</b>

Notes:

1. The column MIC/ERCC encompasses the budget allocated to the "Maintenance and further development of the MIC"
2. Deployment includes both: Dispatching expertise (expert missions) in third countries and within the EU.
3. The Work Programme do not always provide information about the share of the budget allocated to MIC/ERCC and CECIS under the budget lines "CECIS hosting, MIC security and resilience" and "Maintenance and further development of CECIS and MIC", when this was the case the budgets have been split between CECIS (50%) and MIC/ERCC (50%) in the table
4. The budget allocated to Early Warning System for the years 2007-2009 is extracted from the internal evaluation of the EWS provided by the Commission to the evaluation team.

Source: Work Programmes 2007 to 2013.


The MIC/ERCC was particularly efficient in facilitating the provision of assistance in a coordinated way, which allowed an efficient usage of resources. Instead of having to exchange information and organising experts, relief goods and technical equipment bilaterally, the beneficiary countries were able to obtain instant and in many cases stand-by support in a matter of hours from one of the world's key players in the field of civil protection. The fact that since 2013 the ERCC was staffed and hence accessible 24/7 was another important factor of efficiency; especially with regard to planning and responding quickly to emergencies inside and outside the EU. The important budget allocated to the switch from MIC to ERCC seemed therefore justified and efficient.

The important budget allocated to the Early Warning Systems was used to develop a full multi-hazard coverage of near-real time Early Warning Systems. Participating States had free access to the Early Warning Systems provided by the MIC/ERCC through CECIS and the MIC/ERCC Portal.

As illustrated in Figure 2.16 the consultation with the Civil Protection Authorities confirmed this overall positive assessment. A large majority of Civil Protection Authorities considered that the MIC/ERCC positively contributed to:

- A more effective, efficient, flexible and rapid emergency response intervention in the event of major disasters;
- A more effective disaster response outside Europe;
- A more effective disaster response inside Europe through the dispatching of field experts and facilitation of transport and through the MIC/ERCC's information and coordination role.

**Figure 2.16 Most Civil Protection Authorities consider that the MIC/ERCC has been efficient in performing its core functions**



**Source:** Online survey for national Civil Protection Authorities / national contact points.

**Question:** Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding the efficiency of the MIC/ERCC:

Between 8<sup>th</sup> of July 2014 and 18<sup>th</sup> of August 2014, the survey was sent to 35 countries, amongst the 20 national contact points who responded, 17 answered the questions relating to MIC/ERCC.

#### 2.2.6.5 EU added value

The added value of having the MIC/ERCC organised at EU level is manifold:

- For the EU Member States and the other States participating in the Civil Protection Mechanism, the MIC/ERCC represented a 'one-stop-shop' for responding to disasters. CECIS was considered by all stakeholders as a very useful centralised information sharing platform and with clear European added value.
- With regard to its role of coordination of the assistance in case of disasters within the EU or outside the EU, the EU added value of the MIC/ERCC was less straightforward as bilateral forms of support already existed before the MIC/ERCC was set up and because there are already existing forms of international coordination (UNOCHA) for disasters outside the EU. However, by being able to offer a single 'package' of support, including EU civil protection experts and selected modules, the MIC/ERCC does provide added value over bilateral offers of single States. Also, by supporting transport pooling and providing co-financing for the transport of the assistance under certain circumstances (see Section 2.7 for more details about the transport assistance), the Commission clearly added value as it facilitated the deployment of teams and assistance which would not have occurred without its support.
- For third countries and international partners, the MIC/ERCC enabled them to reach out and to request assistance from 31 countries through one single platform. Without the MIC/ERCC, cooperation with the Participating States would have been more difficult.
- Lastly, Early Warning Systems enabled Participating States to access state-of-the-art alert systems covering the full spectrum of hazards.

#### 2.2.6.6 *Extent of follow-up on findings and recommendations outlined in the Report on the evaluation of the application of the Civil Protection Mechanism and Civil Protection Financial Instrument for the years 2007-2009*

**Table 2.6 Summary of the findings and recommendations from the previous evaluation and extent of follow-up on these findings**

Key findings and recommendation from the Interim evaluation	Extent of follow-up
The MIC Early Warning System is relevant and generally effective, although there are continued requirements for operational improvements.	The Commission has considerably invested in its Early Warning Systems since the last evaluation. As demonstrated by the evolution of the budget allocated to EWS over the evaluation period, DG ECHO clearly decided to invest in these capacities since the last evaluation (the budget was of €700,000 in 2009 and of €1,600,000 in 2013).
The evaluation stressed the need to continuously improve the services provided by the MIC to ensure Participating States buy-in and participation	By switching from the MIC to the ERCC and adding new features to the ERCC (e.g. 24/7 coverage) in 2013, the Commission clearly followed-up on this recommendation.
It appeared that there were gaps in dissemination and awareness or familiarity of the MIC among key civil protection stakeholders within the EU.	Since 2009, the Commission has considerably increased its investment into “Awareness-raising activities and the dissemination of good practices” (i.e. from a budget of €250,000 in 2008 to €1,180,000 in 2009 and a budget oscillating between €300,000 and €800,000 in the rest of the evaluation period).
Despite clear improvements in coordination and complementarity with Participating States and UN agencies, further cooperation and strategic dialogue have been limited more broadly.	Evidence from the stakeholders’ consultation showed that the coordination between the MIC/ERCC and national and international partners was very smooth during the evaluation period.
Some risks with the merger of Civil Protection into DG ECHO were identified regarding how the more political nature of civil protection would maintain coherence with the humanitarian objectives of DG ECHO activities.	The need to further integrate the Civil Protection Mechanism within the humanitarian field was highlighted by this evaluation. More actions are therefore needed in this area.

Source: [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2011/CP\\_Final\\_Report2.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2011/CP_Final_Report2.pdf) and ICF analysis

#### 2.2.6.7 *Key lessons learned*

The lessons learned scheme related to the MIC/ERCC in general is discussed in section 2.2.4 above. With regard to CECIS the following lessons learned were identified:

- The use of two parallel alerting systems led to a situation where duty officers did not have a full picture on which international assets were offered for assistance. This was due to the fact that some countries replied with POLREP only, some with CECIS only and some with both - and even offering different assistance with these two different systems. Extra work had to be carried out made due to these two parallel systems. CECIS did not have all the data fields POLREP has. Thus SYKE compiled POLREP and attached that to the CECIS. This caused delays and a technical solution to this should be found. Using duplicate systems for alerting and requesting/providing assistance in real pollution incident should not be continued.
- The pool and use of so-called “double – trained” (so far: UN and EU system), in the future possibly “multiple – trained”, experts with a sound understanding of more than one system should be increased and become a standard requirement for deployments.
- It is necessary to explore the operational relationships, between National focal points of Participating States, with the organisations responsible for the deployed resources.

With regard to Early warning systems the following lessons learned have been identified:

- Early warnings, which proved efficient and allowed the Participating States to react rapidly; should become standard procedure if it isn't already.

#### 2.2.6.8 *Unintended, unexpected effects and risks*

No unintended or unexpected effects were identified with regard to the MIC/ERCC. The key risks identified concerned the potential duplication of some of EMSA's functions in the field of accidental marine pollution and the difficult relation with EMSA which could be associated with such duplication. In order to tackle this risk the Commission and EMSA have invested considerable efforts in the clarification of their cooperation framework. More information about this is provided in Section 2.8.

#### 2.2.7 **Conclusions and key shortcomings**

The MIC/ERCC has positively evolved in the last years. The system has continuously improved its response mechanisms and operations. On average, the MIC/ERCC monitored, ran in pre-alert mode or provided assistance for around 30 activations per year since 2007. At the end of the evaluation period the ERCC was in a position to process real-time information on disasters, monitor hazards, and prepare experts and equipment for deployment. A large majority of stakeholders – both Participating States and international partners – considered that the MIC/ERCC had positively evolved in the last years and became more proactive in its different activities.

Despite this overall positive assessment, a few **weaknesses were identified by the stakeholders:**

##### **1. The lack of expertise and field experience of some of the staff working at the MIC/ERCC:**

- Evidence (i.e. lessons learned documents and interviews with different stakeholders) suggest that not all operational staff had a firm understanding of disaster management and did not have the necessary practical know-how derived from experience in actual deployments. This can be problematic as they do not fully grasp the urgency of deployments.
- As many MIC/ERCC staff were seconded to the MIC/ERCC from their Participating States, they only worked there for a couple of years. This can create issues of continuity and limit the transfer of knowledge between the teams.

As indicated above, **different stakeholders also expressed doubts about the procedure to select the members of the EU Civil Protection Teams.**

The above may have sometimes led to a mismatch of staff and situations within the centre or on the ground, following deployment. The Commission may wish to consider strengthening the minimum requirements for secondments and introducing the possibility to not accept staff put forward for secondments.

2. The Japan case study revealed that the most important obstacle during the preparation of the deployment in Japan was related to the **lack of information on the Japanese needs:** the EU did not receive a detailed request listing the necessary relief items but instead had to gather this information autonomously. It was also not clear in the different lines of communication what Japan wanted and what the Participating States had to offer. While improvement in this area depends very much on the countries requesting assistance, this is an indication that more efforts need to be made by the MIC/ERCC to access information and mainstream it to the relevant partners.

A final shortcoming identified by the stakeholders was that people working at the MIC/ERCC had a good understanding of the response phase but they lacked awareness about the **linkages with the humanitarian response, recovery and reconstruction phases.** A better integration of the humanitarian field into the civil protection framework would be desirable and beneficial for both the effectiveness and the longer-term development of the Civil Protection Mechanism.

## 2.2.8 Main recommendations

### Review the selection process of the EU Civil Protection Teams

The composition of the EU Civil Protection Teams does not always match the needs in the field. This is due to two key obstacles:

- Lack of awareness about the exact needs of the affected countries;
- Failure of the selection procedure that relies on the experts proposed by the Participating State. The head of the EU Civil Protection Teams and/or the MIC/ERCC has no say in the pre-selection of experts.

The following is recommended:

- **Systematically deploy a Liaison Officer prior the provision of assistance in third countries.** The Mechanism should consider sending a Liaison Officer in the affected countries in advance of the EU CP team. This would improve the fitness for purpose of the assistance provided (based on the assistance of actual needs on the ground) and ensure that the rights skills mix and team member profiles of the EU CP teams.
- **Enhance the operational capacity of MIC/ERCC staff.** DG ECHO should apply strict minimum criteria when selecting staff and be able to 'refuse' candidates for secondments. These criteria should ideally take into account the number of years of experience in the provision of civil protection assistance in the field. Given that this kind of staff might be scarce, DG ECHO could make training conditional for the appointment of future staff.
- **Use expert profiles for the selection of the EU CP teams.** These expert profiles should be based on a clear assessment of the skills and competences required to manage emergencies in the field.
- **Improve communication between civil protection experts involved during deployments.** The flow of information during deployments should be as fast as possible. Communication among partners and team members could be facilitated and improved by introducing elements in training courses on operational communications to achieve common protocols and standards.

### Review the lessons learned scheme taking place after the deployment of the EU Civil Protection Teams

The general criticism towards the lessons learned scheme is the lack of dissemination and implementation of the lessons identified.

The Mechanism should therefore consider adopting a matrix structure for systematically capturing and classifying the lessons learned and their impact on the various actions of the Mechanism. Lessons learned as part of one action can have wide-ranging implications for a series of other actions, which should be systematically captured, analysed, disseminated and implemented.

The following recommendations are made:

- Ensure the participation of representatives from the affected country in the lessons learned meeting taking place after deployment.
- Refine the lessons learned matrix system to put more emphasis on dissemination and implementation.
- Develop mechanisms and synergies to ensure that lessons learned documents and matrix are integrated in the development of the training programme.
- Establish single points of contact for lessons learned in the national Civil Protection Authorities to ensure implementation at national level and encourage exchange of best practices.

Article 13 of the new legislation (Decision 1313/2013/EU)<sup>37</sup> is setting the framework for the new lessons learned programme. The new programme is more structured but there is no detail about the participation of affected countries and/or the establishment of single points of contact in the MS. The Commission is currently reviewing its lessons learned programme but the exact features of the new Programme are not clear at this stage.

**Develop the Mechanism to ensure closer linkages and cooperation between civil protection, humanitarian aid and reconstruction**

DG ECHO could consider establishing a framework to ensure that linkages between the civil protection, humanitarian aid and rehabilitation and development activities are considered and taken into account in the delivery of civil protection, also in the field.

This is a cross-cutting issue which also links to DG ECHO's work in the area of LRRD (Linking Relief to Rehabilitation and Development) and should be mainstreamed in the various actions of the Mechanism. The experts involved in this study have stressed that this is an old and recurrent issue which may be difficult to tackle.

**Rethink and re-structure the Lessons Learned Programme.**

The Mechanism should consider adopting a matrix structure for systematically capturing and classifying the lessons learned and monitoring their impact on the various actions of the Mechanism. The nature and the focus of priorities in the annual calls for proposals should take account of the lessons learned from each of the actions of the Mechanism (simulation exercises included).

**Adopt a knowledge management strategy and system.**

Linked to the above recommendation, the Mechanism should consider adopting a knowledge-management strategy for the indexing and searching through lessons learned, administrative information, SOPs, project related information, training materials, etc. This could also contribute to the wider dissemination and promotion of all civil protection actions (simulation exercises included) and bring value to a maximum of relevant stakeholders.

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<sup>37</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:347:0924:0947:EN:PDF>



## 2.3 Training programme<sup>38</sup>

The training programme comprised three elements: (i) training courses; (ii) exercises and (iii) an exchange of experts system.


As stated in Article 5(5) of the 2007 Council Decision establishing a Community Civil Protection Mechanism, the overall objective of setting up a training programme was to enhance the coordination of civil protection assistance provided by Participating States through strengthening the complementarity of assessment, coordination and/or intervention teams and other resources<sup>39</sup>. The three parts of the programme were designed to establish a common understanding of cooperation in civil protection interventions and to accelerate the response to major emergencies.

The training programme comprised:

- Joint *training courses* included basic courses introducing the Mechanism as well as specialist courses for particular aspects of missions such as international coordination, all the way up to high-level courses for future mission leaders.
- Civil protection *simulation exercises* organised at EU level were designed primarily as field tests aiming to establish a common understanding of co-operation in civil protection assistance interventions and to accelerate the response to major emergencies. The exercises took the form of table-top, command-post or full scale exercises.
- The *exchange of experts* system allowed for the secondment of national civil protection experts to administrations of other Participating States on all aspects of emergency intervention.

Figure 2.17 below illustrates the intervention logic of the training programme.

**Figure 2.17 Intervention logic of the Civil Protection Mechanism training programme**



<sup>38</sup> Also refer to sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 of Annex to this final report provided in a separate document.

<sup>39</sup> Council Decision of 8 November 2007 establishing a Community Civil Protection Mechanism (recast), 2007/779/EC, Euratom




### 2.3.1 Training courses

Since its launch in 2004, the programme of training courses has continuously developed. The first cycle started with three courses: Information Management Course (CMI), Operational Management Course (OPM) and High Level Coordination (HLC), allowing already 652 experts to participate in the first three years. The fourth cycle in 2007 saw a doubling in the number of courses compared to the previous cycle, including from then onwards an Assessment Mission Course (AMC), Staff Management Course (SMC) and the first refresher course (HLC-R). From the 6<sup>th</sup> cycle onwards the programme was extended nearly every year. During the 10<sup>th</sup> cycle two courses – SMC and Media and Security Strategy Course (MSC) – were replaced by a Head of Team (HOT) and Security Course (SEC). In total twelve courses were offered at the end of the evaluation period ranging from introduction level via operational level to management level. The 11<sup>th</sup> cycle was kept unchanged.

The entry points into the training course programme were the Community Mechanism Introduction (CMI) Course, the Technical Experts Course (TEC) for specialised experts, and the online/distant preparation tools. In special cases (experts with large mission experience, high level representatives of national CP systems) a direct entry to the High Level Coordination Course was also possible. Figure 2.18 depicts the training curriculum available to experts from Participating States.

**Figure 2.18 Overview of the Civil Protection Mechanism training courses**



**Source:** DG ECHO internal note on training dated 28 November 2013

At the end of the evaluation period, seven different training delivery contractors (Lots) had been commissioned to carry out the training courses. With the exception of Lot 7, each contractor built a consortium with at least one partner coming from another Participating State and was selected through open calls for tenders. The last call for tender took place in 2011 and was organised in seven lots. Table 2.7 lists the contracted training centres in Italy, Sweden, Germany (twice), Denmark, Cyprus and Austria. The period of execution of Lots 1 to 6 was twelve months renewable for up to three times; Lot 7 ran for 48 months. The training courses ran in cycles, each starting during the month of June and ending in the course of May of the following year.

**Table 2.7 2011 Call for Tender - Framework contracts for services related to training courses**

Lot	Courses	Contractor	Partners
1	CMI	Italian Civil Protection Department (ICPD)	Scuola Superiore di Studi Universitari e di Perfezionamento Sant'Anna (IT) Studiare Sviluppo (IT) Republic of Croatia National Protection and Rescue Directorate (HR) United Kingdom Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat Emergency Planning College (UK)
2	MBC TEC	Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB)	The Fire Service College (UK) Administration for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief (SI)
3	OPM OMP-R	Bundesanstalt Technisches Hilfswerk (THW, DE)	Danish Emergency Management Agency – DEMA (DK) Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government, National Directorate for Fire and Emergency Management in Ireland (IE)
4	IMC ICC	Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA)	Bundesanstalt Technisches Hilfswerk – THW (DE) The Fire Service Academy Hamburg (DE)
5	AMC	Cyprus Civil Defence (CCD)	Bundesanstalt Technisches Hilfswerk – THW (DE) Johanniter-Unfall-Hilfe (DE) Directorate General of Fire Safety and Civil Protection (BG)
6	HLC HLC-R HOT	Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe (BBK, DE)	Main School of Fire Service (PL) Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior - BM.I (AT) Nederlands Instituut Fysieke Veiligheid (NL)
7	Online Preparation & Testing Tool	Best in Training (Bit, AT)	

**Source:** DG ECHO, 2011, "Call for Tender No ECHO/B.1/FRA/2011/02"

The nomination of participants in the training courses was done via the National Training Coordinators in the respective Participating States. The allocation of places in the training courses was done in consultation with the National Training Coordinators who identified national training needs. Based on the collection of these needs across Participating States, the Commission communicated the course quota to National Training Coordinators at the beginning of each cycle.

The European Commission financed 100% of the costs of training course attendance. The participation in training courses was free of charge for participants; flights, accommodation and food was organised and paid for by the course organisers.


Since 2004, a total of 5,308<sup>40</sup> course participants from almost all Participating States (except the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia) had attended the ten training course cycles.

<sup>40</sup> The actual number of experts cannot be verified as many have attended more than one training course and there was no information available about the individual identity of all course participants, in particular the early courses.

During the evaluation period from 2007 to 2013 4,657 experts attended training courses<sup>41</sup>. The number of available places in training courses was distributed through quota per country and the occupancy rates had been high throughout the evaluation period: on average 88.6% of all available spaces were filled by training participants or in other words 598 places were left unused<sup>42</sup>. Figure 2.19 shows the evolution of the number of training course participants over the evaluation period from the 4<sup>th</sup> to the 10<sup>th</sup> cycle.

The significant increase in training participants between the 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> cycle was due to the start of three further training courses (ICC, TEC and MBC) and the twofold increase in the number of available places for CMI, OPM, HLC and MSC (from 248 to 506 places).

**Figure 2.19 Evolution in the number of training course participants, 2007 – 2013**



**Source:** Official statistics on number of participants provided by DG ECHO

Only refreshers courses experienced varying levels of participation. The average occupancy rates were 56.6% for OPM-R and 66.4% for HLC-R respectively; which was relatively low in comparison to the other training courses<sup>43</sup>. The SMC and MSC, which were replaced in 2010, both had a participation rate of less than 80% (77.5% respectively 73.3%) and were not in line with average participation rates of usually 90% or more.


Figure 2.20 below shows the trends in numbers of participants per course over the evaluation period, with the basic courses attracting the highest number of participants. Figure 2.21 portrays the occupancy rate of training courses between 2007 and 2013.

<sup>41</sup> Official statistics on number of participants provided by DG ECHO

<sup>42</sup> Official statistics on number of participants provided by DG ECHO

<sup>43</sup> Official statistics on number of participants provided by DG ECHO


**Figure 2.20 Number of experts trained by course, 2007 – 2013<sup>44</sup>**



**Source:** Official statistics on number of participants provided by DG ECHO

**Note:** for the meaning of acronyms refer to footnote 44

**Figure 2.21 Occupancy rate of training courses, 2007 – 2013**



**Source:** Official statistics on number of participants provided by DG ECHO


**Note:** for the meaning of acronyms refer to footnote 44

<sup>44</sup> CMI = Community Mechanism Introduction Course; TEC = Technical Experts Course; MBC = Module Basic Course; OPM = Operational Management Course; SEC = Security Course; IMC = Information Management Course; ICC = International Coordination Course; AMC = Assessment Mission Course; HLC = High Level Coordination Course; HOT = Head of Team Course; OPM-R = OPM Refresher Course; HLC-R = HLC Refresher Course; SMC = Staff Management Course (stopped in 2013); MSC = Media and Security Strategy Course (stopped in 2013).

Figure 2.22 presents the share of training participants by Participating States. The share of training participants by Participating States is roughly in line with the overall population of these countries. Germany (449 participants or 9.6%), Italy (302 or 6.5%) and France (287 or 6.2%) sent most experts, Participating States like Sweden (274 or 5.9%) and Austria (255 or 5.5%) sent a relatively large group of experts when compared to their population size. Iceland (23 or 0.5%), Liechtenstein (35 or 0.8%), Luxembourg and Ireland (both, 37 or 0.8%) on the other hand sent the lowest number of experts respective to the size of their population over the evaluation period. The female participation rate in training courses was throughout the evaluation period 15%.

Figure 2.23 compares the number of deployed experts per year with the number of training participants per cycle. The evaluation period saw 4,657 course participants but only 246 experts deployed on emergency missions<sup>45</sup>. Extra care should be exercised when interpreting these numbers. On face value it seems like that only 5.74% of trained experts were deployed. This percentage is however misleading as it does not take account of the fact that most experts have participated in more than one course and that some experts have been deployed on more than one mission. As there was no available record of personal information on training participants and deployed experts, it is estimated that the real percentage of trained experts deployed is probably twice as high (i.e. higher than 10%)<sup>46</sup>. Additionally, the figures above also include MIC/ERCC Liaison Officers, as well as representatives from International Organisations (e.g. UNDAC, NGOs) and national experts that were trained on the CMI (i.e. host nation procedures) and thus never intended to be deployed on an EU CPT mission.

**Figure 2.22 Number of experts trained per Participating State, 2007 - 2013**




**Source:** DG ECHO data on training courses

<sup>45</sup> Official statistics on number of participants and experts deployed provided by DG ECHO respectively the ERCC

<sup>46</sup> Unfortunately there was no detailed information on individual training participants available. Considering that the majority of experts have at least participated in two courses (introductory and operational courses) the real number of individual training participants is not that high. In fact it must be close to the number of Community Mechanism Introduction Course participants (1,814) as it is unlikely that someone took this course twice. Furthermore, as some but not the majority of experts were deployed more than once, the real number of individual experts deployed can be estimated to be less than two hundred. As a result, it is more accurate to assume that the percentage of trained experts deployed is at least 10% or even higher.

**Figure 2.23** Number of experts trained per cycle and experts deployed over the evaluation period



**Source:** MIC/ERCC statistics on deployment and DG ECHO data on training courses

Table 2.8 provides an insight into the allocated budget according to the annual work programme and the respective number of participants and deployed experts.

**Table 2.8** Budget allocation and respective outputs

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Budget	2,410,000	2,800,000	5,160,000	5,000,000	4,900,000	4,500,000	4,000,000
Participants	319	315	401	858	875	938	951
Deployed experts	17	33	36	48	52	16	44

**Source:** DG ECHO Website as in November 2014, data from Annual Work Programmes, MIC/ERCC statistics on deployment and data on training courses.


### 2.3.1.1 Final findings on the training courses

#### 2.3.1.1.1 Relevance

Overall training courses were relevant to the Mechanism and the training courses generally involved the right target groups. However, in some instances Participating States did not send the most appropriate persons to training courses, especially in the high-level courses, as evidenced by the Civil Protection Authorities surveyed. Civil Protection Authorities considered that entry requirements were appropriately defined, advertised and enforced but to a lower extent than training participants.

Training needs and skills gaps were only assessed after the training courses were conducted, in general through lessons learned meetings and formal evaluations, and by relying on the experience of trainers and lecturers. According to stakeholder interviews, any systematic assessments of future needs were not carried out or only to a limited extent. By nominating experts for training courses, Participating States prevented the Commission from directly checking the correspondence between the skills mix of the training group with the identified needs on an individual level. That said the content and the learning outcomes from the training were considered relevant to the needs of Civil Protection Authorities and their staff; see Figure 2.24 and Figure 2.25.


**Figure 2.24 A majority of training participants considered that the training courses were well organised**



**Source:** Online survey for the training course participants.

**Question:** Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding the organisation of the training course(s) you attended. Between 14<sup>th</sup> of July 2014 and 18<sup>th</sup> of August 2014, the survey was sent to 30 countries, amongst the 122 training participants who were contacted, 59 answered the questions.

**Figure 2.25 A majority of Civil Protection Authorities considered that the training courses were relevant the needs of their organisation**



**Source:** Online survey for national Civil Protection Authorities / national contact points.

**Question:** Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding the relevance of the training course(s) to the needs of my organisation. Between 8<sup>th</sup> of July 2014 and 18<sup>th</sup> of August 2014, the survey was sent to 35 countries, amongst the 20 national contact points who responded, 19 answered the questions relating to training courses.

From the feedback from training participants, their rating of training courses, the results of the online survey and stakeholder interviews it appears that overall, the training offer is considered to be homogeneous and consistent across the different courses and training providers. The programme has thus been delivering good quality training regardless of the location. The feedback on training courses by participants was regularly discussed in formal meetings with the Commission and other stakeholders. However, the extent to which feedback has actually led to changes to the training programme is unclear, as this has not been documented.




Stakeholders did generally confirm that their suggestions appeared to have been taken into account. The document review provided little information on the homogeneity of the overall training offer and the teaching techniques of the different training providers.

### 2.3.1.1.2 Coherence

The linkage between training courses was coherent by design. The individual courses covered introductory, operational and management subjects and were interlinked with each other. Training courses were also operationally and strategically well aligned. Figure 2.26 illustrates online survey responses and the overall satisfaction of Civil Protection Authorities with the coherence and relevance<sup>47</sup> of the training programme.

**Figure 2.26 A majority of Civil Protection Authorities considered that the training programme contained the right content and led to the correct learning outcomes**



**Source:** Online survey for national Civil Protection Authorities / national contact points.

**Question:** Do you consider that the training programmes contain: (1) The right content in terms of skill and knowledge; (2) Lead to the correct learning outcomes matching the range of potential deployments. Between 8<sup>th</sup> of July 2014 and 18<sup>th</sup> of August 2014, the survey was sent to 35 countries, amongst the 20 national contact points who responded, 19 answered the questions relating to training courses.

Only in a few specific areas the linkages between training courses could be improved. For instance, one of the six stakeholders that were interviewed about the training courses considered that media management was not coherently addressed throughout the training programme.

### 2.3.1.1.3 Effectiveness

Overall, the training courses contributed to achieving the Mechanism's objectives. By bringing together experts from the Participating States, the training courses have not only improved the individual skills and competences of the experts but also helped to establish a common understanding for cooperation in civil protection interventions in Europe. The courses enabled experts to enhance the coordination of civil protection activities on the ground and strengthened the complementarity of intervention teams, thus, in theory, rendering emergency response more effective.

The actual impact of courses on the effectiveness of the deployments was difficult to demonstrate. The input from different stakeholders suggested that this impact could be improved. It was argued that the linkages between the courses' content, the participant profiles

<sup>47</sup> Note that although the question of the survey did not directly tackle the issue of relevance and coherence. However, the satisfaction of Civil Protection Authorities with the learning outcomes matching the range of potential deployments and knowledge acquired relates to coherence with other actions of the Mechanism and their needs with regard to the training programme. Therefore this survey question can be used as a proxy to assess the coherence and relevance of the training programme.

and the needs in the field were sometime missing. The training courses were in principle effective for preparing for a mission but as situations on the ground are hardly comparable, it was difficult to create real-emergency scenarios during training courses<sup>48</sup>. About half a dozen stakeholders furthermore argued that the Mechanism needed to define clearer profiles for individual members of the EU Civil Protection Teams. A mapping exercise could identify the exact needs in the field, which in turn could serve as a basis for a detailed definition of the required (soft) skills and competences of expert as part of the training programme. Such exercise may also help the Participating States in selecting and nominating experts from their national pool for participation in particular course<sup>49</sup>. The training course brochure could for example include a list of expected training outcomes for each course, as well as minimum requirements as to the profile of participants.

#### **2.3.1.1.4 Efficiency**

Following a two-year transition between 2009 and 2010, when the number of training courses offered doubled from six to twelve, the costs per participant have been constantly reduced (see Table 2.8). Over the last three years of the evaluation period, the programme has witnessed a constant increase of participants, while the amount of financial resources invested in the programme remained stable<sup>50</sup>.

Training participants confirmed that the participation in trainings organised on EU level created a common understanding for the Mechanism and could be generate efficiencies in terms of the provision of a coordinated European response to future emergencies. The possibility of meeting Civil Protection staff from Participating States and to network with colleagues was also considered an additional benefit for enhancing the coordination of civil protection assistance at a European level.

#### **2.3.1.1.5 EU added value**

Overall, training courses demonstrated a strong EU added value throughout the evaluation period. Training course participants not only gained skills and knowledge about the Mechanism but also strengthened the European network of civil protection professionals. This networking effect rendered cooperation or on-the-ground interventions easier, as often civil protection staff had met through the training programme. Another EU added value of the training programme related to the exchange of experience and learning from best practices. The Forest Fire case study revealed that especially the learning from the experience with real-life emergencies of other forest fires experts was considered as beneficial. Very often, stakeholders confirmed that common projects had materialised as a result of training participants meeting at a course.

A limited number of stakeholders also argued that the EU added value of training courses could be found in having a large number of experts trained in coordinating and facilitating the interventions in case of emergencies inside the EU. This was viewed as contributing to the overall preparedness of Participating States.

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<sup>48</sup> Class room training sessions by nature did not recreate realistic scenarios. Many stakeholders confirmed that the psychological pressure of a real emergency situations were hard to recreate in a safe environment. Thus, training courses were considered effective in teaching operational approaches but due to natural limitations class room training could not fully prepare experts for missions to disaster zones. One method to make training courses more realistic was to include former EUCPT members consistently as trainers who in turn were able to reflect on their real-life experience. However, some stakeholder argued that trainers should also have ideally training qualifications in order to lead of the Mechanism's training courses

<sup>49</sup> Note that the modules have adopted this approach to tighten the profile definition with regard to hard skills (technical skills)

<sup>50</sup> This might be due to the time-lag between the start of the programme and the adoption of the training programme by Civil Protection Authorities. However, this could not be tested during the evaluation.

### 2.3.1.1.6 *Extent of follow-up on findings and recommendations outlined in the Report on the evaluation of the application of the Civil Protection Mechanism and Civil Protection Financial Instrument for the years 2007-2009*

The Mechanism has implemented the recommendations of the previous evaluation to a great extent. Table 2.9 presents the key findings, recommendations and follow-ups made by the Commission.

**Table 2.9 Summary of the findings and recommendations from the previous evaluation and extent of follow-up on these findings**

Key findings and recommendation from the Interim evaluation	Extent of follow-up
Training courses have proven to be an asset in preparing national experts for civil protection assistance interventions and have significantly improved the response capability of the EU civil protection system.	Overall, the training courses were perceived by stakeholders as effective in providing a pool or deployable experts and improving EU response capacity. Training courses were viewed as important to enhance the preparedness of Participating States
Course contents were considered fully complementary to other training events provided at national and international level. Continued or enhanced coordination of training providers seemed to be required.	The development of the EU training system through the involvement of various national training providers may have ensured consistency amongst the national programmes through exchanges between trainers involved in the Mechanism.
Training courses have widened in scope of training activities including new types and more numerous courses. Considering the pressure on public financing led to the question of how to provide a more efficient civil protection training programme.	Even though more and more experts were trained with a decreasing input of financial means, the ICF evaluation team sees room for further improvement. The introduction of online/remote training courses for basic information on the Mechanism was recommended by ICF.
As a side effect, training courses have provided an excellent platform for experience sharing and networking among civil protection experts of Participating States. In the event of large scale emergency situations, such contacts and networks can make the crucial difference between the best possible relief intervention and a less optimal scenario.	The training courses were still considered to provide an opportunity for exchange and networking between Civil Protection professionals from all Participating States. Many stakeholders confirmed in the course of this evaluation that knowing the experts who one is deployed with, is a major advantage in emergency situations and can contribute to save precious time.
The organisation of exchange of field, exercise and training experiences and the sharing of lessons learned in a more structured way was reflected upon.	The Mechanism organised the training programme in a way to increase the preparedness of experts participating in the exchanges and exercises, and regularly verified the relevance and effectiveness of the respective design and content of the training programme (via lessons learned, annual meetings, needs assessments, etc.).

Source: [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2011/CP/COM-2011-696\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2011/CP/COM-2011-696_en.pdf) and ICF analysis

### 2.3.1.1.7 *Key lessons learned*

Civil Protection Authorities surveyed outlined different aspects that worked well in the training courses<sup>51</sup>:

- The organisation and structure of the courses;

<sup>51</sup> Online survey for national Civil Protection Authorities / national contact points. – Q21 - What did work well in the training course - Number of respondents = 19.

- The content of the courses and associated training material including theoretical and practical examples from the field<sup>52</sup>, role play and exercises applying the teachings, presentations, interaction between participants, etc.;
- The professionalism and highly competent lecturers; and
- The update of the training offer on a regular basis.

However, they also highlighted some elements that worked less well<sup>53</sup>:

- There was no assessment of the optimum number of experts needed to be trained with regard to the expert capacity to cope with the volume of deployments in framework of the Mechanism;
- Time-intensive courses sometimes made it difficult to retain the information;
- The assessment of training participants could be improved by making the provision of feedback by trainers on the individual performance mandatory and by sharing this feedback the national Civil Protection Authority which sent the participant to the course. The feedback would have helped individuals to decide whether they should continue with the training programme.

Lessons learned with regard to the training courses identified by survey participants and interviewees included:

- Different attempts have been made to better define the competences and skills required for providing assistance in the field. The National Training Coordinator Committee carried out a needs assessment in 2010 but the results were not used for adapting the training programme. The Mechanism also sought to develop profiles with a defined set of skills and requirements matching the needs on the field, but this was done without consulting the Participating States. It was suggested that the Mechanism should take a more participative approach, by first mapping the required skills and competences, in consultation with the Participating States and then adapting the training offer and putting in place minimum criteria for participation in the different courses offered as part of the training programme.
- The Mechanism should continue increasing and/or creating opportunities for all involved to learn about the various national and international civil protection systems, by means of training, exercises and alternative mechanisms (exchange of experts, secondments, etc.).
- Further training on the Host National support guidelines and methods would be beneficial to avoid coordination failures at operational and tactical levels. Possibly, the training programme could incorporate sessions / a course on what is expected from the liaisons officers of the Host Nations and Support nations involved in the field.

Also, there should have been a stronger connection between the lessons learned scheme and the training programme, so that important lessons would be taken on board in future courses. Whilst it was confirmed that this happened to a limited extent, a more systematic approach would be desirable. Also specific cross-sector training is highly recommended, to make sure that different technical teams (e.g. medical staff, communication experts, urban search and rescue experts) develop a common know-how and understanding of the different requirements and procedures during deployment.

#### **2.3.1.1.8 Unintended, unexpected effects and risks**

There is anecdotal evidence illustrating unintended effects. The biggest unexpected (positive) effect of training courses, mentioned by most stakeholders, was the networking effect among participants, which led to training participants starting several new common projects and other activities (e.g. prevention / preparedness projects, activities as part of the IPA instrument for

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<sup>52</sup> E.g. presenting the international environment of delivering the assistance in frame of the Mechanism

<sup>53</sup> Online survey for national Civil Protection Authorities / national contact points. – Q21 - What did not work so well in the training course(s)? - Number of respondents = 19.

pre-accession, research projects) after they had met during a training course. Possibly, this benefit could be further exploited in the future.

The issue of training many experts who ultimately do not get the opportunity to be deployed on emergency missions was flagged several times by interviewees<sup>54</sup>. Admission to basic courses may have created an expectation from the training participants that they could progress through the curriculum and subsequently be deployed through the Mechanism, which was however rarely the case<sup>55</sup>.

Lastly, there may have been some risk of duplication with the training offer of other organisations, e.g. UNDAC, NGO specific training, national training on external interventions, etc. It was suggested to regularly review the offer of other providers and, where possible, consider organising joint courses with in particular other international stakeholders.

### **2.3.1.2 Main Recommendations**

The main recommendations drawn from the findings contained under each evaluation criteria:

#### **■ Define expert profiles:**

The Commission should take a pro-active approach in first mapping the skills and competences required to manage emergencies in the field. This exercise should be done in cooperation with the Participating States. Based on this mapping, the Commission should then define a series of profiles matching the identified needs. These profiles and the associated skills and competences should serve as basis to inform the future design of the training courses. It should moreover be used to define the profiles of the experts which should attend these courses. Ultimately this could also feed into the selection process of the EU CP teams. This would help Participating States nominating the right kind of participants both for training attendance and EU CP team deployments.

#### **■ Improve the assessment of training participants through certification<sup>56</sup>**

Assessments at the end of each course should be introduced to verify the take-up of learning by the training participants. This will help to ensure the consistent delivery of assistance during emergencies and increase trust between Participating States with regard to the assistance they can expect from other countries.

#### **■ Strengthen the link between the lessons learned scheme and the training programme**

A stronger connection between the lessons learned scheme and the training programme would ensure that the most important lessons identified are taken on board in future courses. Whilst it was confirmed that this happened to a limited extent, a more systematic approach would be desirable.

#### **■ Improve the cost-effectiveness of the training programme**

In order to make the training programme more cost-effective, (part of) the basic courses could be replaced by e-learning sessions as it was argued by training participants that the content would not require group presentations but could be computer-based instead.

#### **■ Adopt a train-the-trainer approach**

The Mechanism should consider adopting a train-the-trainers approach to raise awareness of the Mechanism at national level in Participating States. Indeed, it was pointed out that learning outcomes of the Mechanism trainings did not benefit the colleagues of those who attended training courses offered by the Mechanism. In the future, the training participants could

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<sup>54</sup> Including among others: trainers and participants in training courses.

<sup>55</sup> Note that they could nevertheless be deployed on national missions.

<sup>56</sup> See Key lessons learned section.

disseminate the knowledge of the Mechanism more widely by using the training materials and tools provided at least for the basic introductory courses of the training programme

- **Strengthen the high level communication training course**

The Japanese and Philippines case studies revealed a lack of communicators and negotiators able to deal effectively with top senior officials in various levels of governmental bodies. The Mechanism should encourage the participation in HLC courses and specific components on communication with Top Senior Officials in developed countries could be added.

- **Improve gender equality as part of the Mechanism<sup>57</sup>**

The Mechanism, alongside with Civil Protection Authorities should act together to achieve a more balanced representation of men and women in the training courses (and in the Mechanism's actions overall).

### **2.3.2 Civil Protection Mechanism Exercises (or simulation exercises)**

Simulation exercises were organised by Participating States with co-financing from the Commission through annual calls for proposals. EU co-financing covered between 75 and 85% of eligible costs up to a maximum of €1 million<sup>58</sup>. A total of 31 exercises were selected over the evaluation period, with the majority having been held in 2007 and 2008.

The exercises provided opportunities to test, develop and re-enact contingency planning, decision-making procedures, provision of information to the public and the media etc., so as to be better prepared for similar real-life situations. Moreover, the exercises helped supervisors identifying further training needs for their staff involved in operations, while lessons-learned workshops organised in parallel served as a forum to identify operational gaps to be improved. Lastly, the exercises offered possibilities to learn from each other's expertise and network with other actors involved in the operation, ultimately enhancing operational co-operation between them.

The stated objectives of the exercises were as follows<sup>59</sup>:

- Improving the response capacity and providing the necessary practice of the teams meeting the criteria for participation in civil protection assistance interventions;
- Improving and verifying the procedures and establishing a common language for the coordination of civil protection assistance interventions and reducing the response time in major emergencies;
- Enhancing operational cooperation between the civil protection services of the Participating States; and
- Sharing lessons learned.

In order to meet these objectives, several types of exercises were conducted. The calls for proposals typically focused on three types of exercises: full scale exercises, command post exercises and table top exercises. DG ECHO provided the evaluation team with eleven evaluation reports which dealt exclusively with full-scale exercises.

In order to be eligible for funding, the exercises had to show the following minimum characteristics: inclusion in the exercise scenario of the activation of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism, respect of its legally based procedures as well as deployment of the various resources available to the Mechanism (intervention teams, coordination/assessment teams etc.) and participation of a minimum number of Participating States in the Mechanism. Therefore, these were complex exercises that offered the possibility of integration and simultaneous testing of various resources, tools, and aspects of the Community Civil

<sup>57</sup> This recommendation comes from an analysis of the gender of training course participants.

<sup>58</sup> The maximum EU contribution per project was raised from €500,000 (in the 2007 call) to €1,000,000 (in the subsequent calls) in order to allow for larger scale exercises to be conducted. The maximum EU co-financing rate was raised from 75% to 85% (in the 2009 call) in order to make it more attractive to apply for grants due to the fact that planning and conducting such large scale exercises requires significant human, material and financial resources.

<sup>59</sup> DG ECHO, 2014, "Simulation exercises", <http://ec.europa.eu/echo/en/what/civil-protection/simulation-exercises>



Protection Mechanism typically including two levels of coordination, operational coordination (at the Community and the national level) and coordination of field operations. Table 2.10 lists the exercises selected under the 2007-2013 calls for proposals.

**Table 2.10 List of exercises conducted over the evaluation period**

Year of approval	Project name	Scenario	Lead organisation	Country of lead organ.	Partner States	EC grant	EC contribution in %
2007	EU-2008 ERMES	Seismic event / Earthquake	Prefettura di Reggio Calabria	Italy	Romania, Lithuania	€325,438.00	73.13%
2007	EU ex ALBIS	Flooding	Technisches Hilfswerke THW	Germany	Czech Republic	€149,957.00	75.00%
2007	EU HUNEX Decathlon 2009	Flooding	Civil Protection Directorate of Budapest	Hungary	Italy, Slovakia, Poland	€288,840.00	72.42%
2007	EU HUROMEX	Flooding	National Directorate for Disaster Management	Hungary	Romania, Germany, Austria, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Croatia	€500,000.00	74.84%
2007	EU LUX 2007	CBRN accidents	Administration des services de secours; Technisches Hilfswerke THW; Ministère de l'Intérieur; Service Public Fédéral Intérieur; Federale Overheidsdienst Binnenlandse Zaken	Luxembourg, Germany, France, Belgium	Hungary, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal	n/a	n/a
2007	Exercise Torch	CBRN accidents and disaster victim identification	University of Leicester	United Kingdom	Luxembourg, Germany	€498,902.00	75.00%
2007	Restricted EU-Terror Attack	Terrorism related accidents	Direction de la Défense et de la Sécurité civile, Ministère de l'Intérieur et de l'Aménagement du territoire	France	Portugal	€448,581.00	75.00%
2007	SweNorEx 2009	Seismic event / Earthquake	Swedish Rescue Services Agency	Sweden	n/a	€352,551.00	74.02%
2008	EU Command Post	Seismic event / Earthquake	Ministère de l'Intérieur, de l'Outremer et des Collectivités Territoriales, Direction de la Sécurité Civile	France	Belgium, Germany, Italy Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Czech Republic, Hungary	€296,527.00	75.00%
2008	EU Danubius	Seismic event / Earthquake	National Committee for Emergency Situations (NCES)	Romania	Austria, Germany, Croatia, Hungary, Bulgaria	€300,000.00	75.00%

2008	EU Floodex	Flooding	Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, National Operations Centre, KLPD/LOCC	Netherlands	Estonia, Germany, Poland, United Kingdom	€870,000.00	74.94%
2008	EU SISMICAEX	Earthquake and induced CBRN accident	Dirección general de justicia e interior, Centro de Urgencias y Emergencias 112, Extremadura	Spain	Portugal	€260,126.00	75.00%
2008	EU TEREX	Seismic event / Earthquake	Presidenza del Consiglio del Ministri – Protezione Civile	Italy	Austria, Croatia, France, Slovenia, Russia	€864,225.00	75.00%
2008	EVROS	Flooding	Evros Prefecture	Greece	United Kingdom, Greece, Italy, Bulgaria	€459,989.00	75.00%
2008	ORION	Seismic event / Earthquake	Hertfordshire Fire & Rescue Authority	United Kingdom	Germany, Ireland, Denmark, United Kingdom	€953,900.00	70.00%
2008	POSEIDON	Other natural disasters	Region of Crete, Direction of Civil Protection	Greece	Cyprus, France	€535,462.00	75.00%
2009	EU CREMEX 2011	CBRN accidents	Ministry of Interior	Estonia	Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, Finland, Lithuania	€825,827.00	84.99%
2009	EU RICHTER 2011	Seismic event / Earthquake	Ministère de l'Intérieur, de l'Outremer et des Collectivités Territoriales, Direction de la Sécurité Civile	France	Italy, Portugal, Spain	€595,372.00	85.00%
2010	EU CARPATHEX 2011	CBRN accidents	The State Fire Service of Poland	Poland	Czech Republic, Hungary, Ukraine, Slovakia	€266,585.00	85.00%
2010	EU SKAGEX	Accident / marine pollution	Presidenza del Consiglio del Ministri – Protezione Civile	Italy		€953,137.00	85.00%
2011	BALEX DELTA 2012	Marine pollution	Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE)	Finland	n/a	€552,737.00	85.00%
2011	EU COMMAND POST 2012	Seismic event / Earthquake	Ministère de l'Intérieur, de l'Outremer et des Collectivités Territoriales, General Directorate for Civil Protection and Crisis Management	France	Belgium, Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands	€348,584.00	85.00%
2011	EU TARANIS2013	Flooding	Austrian Red Cross - Regional Branch of Salzburg	Austria	Croatia, Germany, Romania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Netherlands	€974,324.00	82.88%




2011	TWIST (Tidal wave in southern Tyrrhenian sea)	Seismic event / Earthquake	Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri – Protezione Civile	Italy	Croatia, France, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Malta	€977,230.00	85.00%
2011	Urban Creats	CBRN accidents	Ministère de l'Intérieur, de l'Outremer et des Collectivités Territoriales, Direction de la Sécurité Civile	France	Belgium, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain	€532,613.00	85.00%
2012	CURIEX	CBRN accidents	Spanish General Directorate of Civil Protection and Emergencies	Spain	Germany, France, Italy, Morocco, Portugal	€499,712.00	85.00%
2012	EU CoordEX 2014	Flooding	Emergency Services College / Crisis Management Centre Finland	Finland	Estonia, Germany	€279,946.00	84.63%
2012	EU PROMETHEUS 2014	Wildfire followed by a technological accident in a populated area	General Secretariat for Civil Protection	Greece	Italy, Cyprus, Croatia, Greece	€911,832.00	84.95%
2012	TRIPLEX	Flooding	Danish Emergency Management Agency, DEMA	Denmark	Germany, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, Estonia, Finland	€595,029.00	85.00%
2013 (not completed yet)	HarborEx 15	Industrial accident with CBRN element	Directorate for Civil Protection	Norway	Austria, Finland, Sweden	€985,028.00	85.00%
2013 (not completed yet)	MURA 2015	Flooding	Croatia-National Protection and Rescue Directorate	Croatia	Austria, Hungary, Slovenia	€416,248.96	85.00%

Source: DG ECHO, 2014, "Simulation exercises", <http://ec.europa.eu/echo/en/what/civil-protection/simulation-exercises>

On average, four exercises took place per year over the evaluation period, with more than half of the exercises being carried out in the first two years. Figure 2.27 provides the evolution of exercises over the years.


**Figure 2.27 Evolution of organised exercises over the evolution period**



**Source:** DG ECHO statistics on exercises

The 29 exercises that were completed and the two that were approved over the evaluation period covered nine different disaster types. Seismic activities/earthquakes, flooding and CBRN accidents accounted for more than 80% of all scenarios; the residual five included marine pollution, wildfires, terroristic activities and other disasters. Organisations from 18 Participating States have led the projects whereby France (5), Italy (4) and Greece (3) stood for the most active countries in this regards. With the exception of four (Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, Latvia and Switzerland), nearly all Participating States in the Mechanism have contributed during an exercise. Furthermore, three third countries were involved in simulation projects, namely Morocco, Russia and Ukraine. The (mean) average number of partner organisations involved in an exercise was 3.5. Figure 2.28 shows the breakdown of disaster scenarios.

**Figure 2.28 Breakdown of exercises by disaster scenario**




**Source:** DG ECHO statistics on exercises

A further breakdown of the exercises by type (i.e. proportion of table-top, command post or full-scale exercise) is not possible given the lack of documentation<sup>60</sup>. The Annexes of this document provide a list of exercises that have been used for the desk research.<sup>61</sup>

The average duration of organising and conducting a single exercise was 18 months. The Commission's financial contribution ranged from a minimum of €150,000 to a maximum of €985,000 and was on average €550,000 per exercise. Figure 2.29 illustrates the distribution of grant agreements according to budget size.

**Figure 2.29 Breakdown of exercises by budgetary envelop<sup>62</sup>**



**Source:** DG ECHO statistics on exercises

**Table 2.11 Budget allocation and respective outputs**

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Budget	5,000,000	5,470,000	1,650,000	2,000,000	2,000,000	2,100,000	2,100,000
Exercises	8	8	2	2	5	4	2

**Source:** DG ECHO Annual Work Programmes, MIC/ERCC statistics on exercises

### 2.3.2.1 Final findings on the simulation exercises

#### 2.3.2.1.1 Relevance

Like the training courses, the simulation exercises covered a wide variety of topics which were highly relevant to Participating States. The selected scenarios coincided with the most serious natural and manmade disasters in Europe identified by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) and the International Disaster Database (EM-DAT tool<sup>63</sup>). The majority of Participating States took part in the exercises, which further illustrates the relevance of the simulation exercises.

<sup>60</sup> The evaluation reports made available to the evaluator only dealt with full-scale scenarios.

<sup>61</sup> The Annexes have been provided in a separated document.

<sup>62</sup> For EU-LUX 2007 there was no official financial information available as a result the number of exercises in this chart only add up to 30 instead of 31.

<sup>63</sup> CRED, September 2014, "EM-DAT Database", <http://www.emdat.be/>



For Participating States, the incentives to partake in the calls for proposals were to be found in the resulting enhanced national capacities, the opportunity to learn from one another, networking and better communication with national Civil Protection Authorities and generating innovative ideas. On the other hand, the main difficulties that national Civil Protection Authorities encountered during their organisation related to the administrative burden (i.e. paper work and financial requirements) involved in responding to the calls.

The extent to which calls for proposal engaged the appropriate target groups could not be fully assessed, as the reason for non-participation in calls was not asked by the evaluator. Possibly, a lower number of proposals could relate to the capacity of the national Civil Protection Authorities to hold such exercises at the time of the call, or to other commitments either nationally or internationally<sup>64</sup>. Table 2.12 provides an overview of the number of proposals received, projects financed and percentage of proposals approved under each call.

**Table 2.12 Calls for proposals: proposals received and projects financed**

Call for proposal (year)	Proposals received	Proposals financed	Percentage of proposals approved
2007	14	8	57.1%
2008	16	8	50.0%
2009	3	2	66.7%
2010	5	2	40.0%
2011	7	5	71.4%
2012	8	4	50.0%
2013	5	2	40.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>53.4%</b>

*Source: DG ECHO statistics on exercises*

The low participation rate in the calls for proposals could also relate to the complexity and significant financial requirements of exercises, which may surpass the organisational and financial capacity of in particular some of the smaller Participating States. More than half of lead organisations came from countries with a population size larger than 20 million, whereas only three of the 31 organisations came from countries with a population size lower than five million<sup>65</sup> people.

It would therefore be advisable to simplify application, administrative and reporting procedures and thus scale down the financial requirements in order to ultimately enable the smaller Participating States to participate in a call for proposals for exercises. Other stakeholders suggested elaborating a better communication strategy to better inform Participating States about the Mechanism and its systematic approach in order to promote the overall purpose and value of the exercises. According to the Commission, first steps have been made in this direction in 2014.

### 2.3.2.1.2 Coherence

Simulation exercises were coherent with other actions of the Mechanism, especially because they allowed for testing the interoperability. Full-scale exercises allowed experts, interventions teams, liaison officers, modules, host nations, etc. to test, develop, explore and learn from all kinds of emergency scenarios. It included the holistic testing of table-top and command post

<sup>64</sup> In other words, the large scale and complex nature of the exercises did not represent an obstacle per se but the resources it demanded and the scarcity of available resources at national level might have been an obstacle.

<sup>65</sup> 25 of 32 Participating States have a population size of less than 20 million; 20 of 32 Participating States have a population size of less than ten million; twelve of 32 Participating States have a population size of less than five million.

approaches and the usage of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Host Nation Support (HNS) guidelines. All stakeholders confirmed that simulation exercises were the most relevant and coherent type of exercises organised. Depending on the scenario design, exercises also allowed for the integration of third countries which further enhanced the external coherence of the Mechanism.

No duplication of effort was noticed between the simulation exercises and the training courses or the Module exercises as their focus and modus operandi varied greatly and generated different but complementary outcomes.

#### **2.3.2.1.3 Effectiveness**

Although the grant agreements required each exercise to be evaluated, the individual evaluation approach of each exercise varied greatly, as organisers were responsible for designing their own evaluation methodology. As a consequence the evaluation reports provided qualitative and quantitative data which could not be compared. In addition, a large number of lessons learned was consistently gathered during all exercises and findings, conclusions and reports shared with relevant stakeholders. From the documents reviewed and stakeholders interviewed, evaluation results were overall fed back to the Mechanism. The extent to which lessons learned were implemented by the Mechanism could not be ascertained.

The exercises reviewed by the evaluator achieved their respective objectives, which in turn were in line with the overall Mechanism aims. Exercise objectives included training and exercising support capacities, promoting cooperation and procedures between sending and receiving states, providing a training environment for multinational Civil Protection actors and joint operations between UNDAC and EU CP Teams. However, due to the varying level of details included in the evaluation reports, it was not always possible to fully assess the achievement of objectives. Some evaluation reports contained robust evidence showing that participating organisations and experts confirmed their overall satisfaction with the achievement of related objectives, while others focused on operational issues and project management related lessons learned (e.g. logistics, site preparation, medical issues, etc.).

Interestingly, individual simulation exercises were successful in achieving cross-cutting goals. SweNorEx in 2009 for instance explored collaborative and cooperative possibilities between UNDAC and EU Civil Protection Teams, and TRIPLEX in 2012 provided an opportunity to further develop the operational and strategic collaboration between both the Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection field on national as well on community level.

Specific scenarios, such as nuclear fall-out or marine pollution, were tested for the first time in a large-scale exercise at European level. By achieving their individual main objectives – for instance better coordination and faster response times, exercises indirectly contributed to the overall objectives of the Mechanism. Moreover, evidence can be found that methodologies were further developed and adopted for real emergencies, and that the results of support models contributed to the implementation of other field exercises within the Mechanism and became the pillar of national emergency plans.

#### **2.3.2.1.4 Efficiency**

The size of budgets was appropriate and proportionate to what exercises were set out to achieve. However, stakeholders interviewed argued that the selection process of proposals and the accompanying competitive pressure had a negative impact on the cost-effectiveness of the exercises. In order to remain 'competitive' and have a chance to secure a grant, the coordinating or lead organisations had to tailor outputs and outcomes according to minimum requirements stated in the call for proposals. The majority of project coordinators reasoned that with additional financial input the exercises could have achieved much more. The perception amongst project coordination was that a scoring formula for attributing the grants giving more weight to the quality of calls for proposals may ultimately impact positively the value for money of simulation exercises.

The organisation of large-scale exercises, typically involving a number of multinational partners and training scenarios, tended to be expensive endeavours. Depending on the scope and complexity of the scenario the individual budgets varied greatly. Due to the specific characteristics of each scenario and the types of disaster framing the exercise, an appropriate efficiency comparison is very difficult. Nevertheless, there seems to be a strong relationship between the costs and the number of multinational partners and Participating States involved. On the basis of third-party financial and audit reports provided by the Commission, each exercise was proportionate to what they were set out to achieve.

#### 2.3.2.1.5 *EU added value*

At an individual level and organisational level, exercises were very beneficial for testing and developing skills and knowledge, but also for getting to know people before actual deployments and strengthening the European network among Civil Protection professionals. As mentioned above, the networking effect made cooperation between Civil Protection Authorities easier. Exchange of experience and learning from best practices was one of the key effects and provided strong European Added Value. In addition, exercises allowed for a better re-creation of emergency scenarios and were considered by stakeholders as complementary to class room training courses.

At a systemic level, a more extensive assessment would be required to understand whether Standard Operational procedures, capacities, level of collaboration, efficiency of intervention etc. were strengthened. Anecdotal evidence gathered on SweNorEx and TRIPLEX demonstrates that this has been the case. The extent to which those cases are representative of all exercises organised could not be tested by this evaluation<sup>66</sup>.

Lastly, based on the interviews with project coordinators, in at least five out of six cases exercises would not have taken place without the funding of the Commission. As a result the exercise programme can be regarded as providing European Added Value.

#### 2.3.2.1.6 *Extent of follow-up on findings and recommendations outlined in the Report on the evaluation of the application of the Civil Protection Mechanism and Civil Protection Financial Instrument for the years 2007-2009*

The table below responds individually to the key findings and recommendations and reports on the follow up made by the Commission.

**Table 2.13 Summary of the findings and recommendations from the previous evaluation and extent of follow-up on these findings**

Key findings and recommendation from the Interim evaluation	Extent of follow-up
Simulation exercises have proved to be an effective action to boost European preparedness for natural and man-made disasters.	The same was identified by this evaluation.
Exercises have suffered from the lack of integration into a more comprehensive exercise programme and mainly formed a series of proposals put forward by Participating States. Some interviewees stated that the EU should provide guidelines to ensure comparable levels and procedures for exercises (e.g. a minimum standard).	Civil Protection Authorities surveyed agreed that the exercise programme was well integrated and comprehensive (e.g. common language, agreed minimum requirements of an exercise methodology, vision on the disaster scenarios to be practised, risk assessments, etc.). However, at the end of the evaluation period a quarter of survey respondents were still unsure that it had been fully integrated with other actions of the Mechanism.
Full scale exercises have been posing significant challenges at all stages of the	There was still a missing link between the exercise lessons learned and recommendations and their

<sup>66</sup> Stakeholder interviews and evaluation reports contained varying detail of information on operational aspects and did not allow for an objectification of such findings.

Key findings and recommendation from the Interim evaluation	Extent of follow-up
<p>exercise cycle because they train at national and European level, and Participating States have not arrived at the same levels in their civil protection systems. A closer cooperation between European and national exercises was suggested in order to improve effectiveness, coherence, cooperation and complementarity.</p>	<p>take up at national level. The extent to which suggested changes are being implemented appears not to be monitored and followed up.</p>
<p>The establishment of an integrated and comprehensive exercise programme/framework needs to be considered in order to better serve the ultimate aim of improving operations. Several steps were suggested: drawing up of a common glossary and agreed minimum requirements of an exercise methodology, setting out of a vision on disaster scenarios, using the results of risk assessments and scenarios developed in the Participating States and the overview scenarios to be developed at EU level in the coming years, and consider important deployment scenarios for assistance interventions outside the EU.</p>	<p>No evidence was found for an establishment of an integrated and comprehensive framework for simulation exercises during the evaluation period. Without an overarching strategy or framework for the exercise programme, simulation exercises were not as cohesive as they could have been, and were not reflective of the overall needs for such exercises across Participating States: e.g. similar teams regularly exercised on similar scenarios. An overview of scenarios is still under production. Member States have to submit their national risk assessments by end-2015. It should be noted that Article 13(1)c of the 2013 Mechanism Decision specifically request the Commission to: “develop a strategic framework setting out the objectives and the role of exercises, a long-term comprehensive plan outlining exercise priorities, as well as set up and manage a programme of exercises”.</p>

Source: [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2011/CP/COM-2011-696\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2011/CP/COM-2011-696_en.pdf) and ICF analysis

### 2.3.2.1.7 Key lessons learned

Civil Protection Authorities outlined different aspects that worked well in the exercises<sup>67</sup>:

- The exercises were realistic (i.e. plausible scenario, representative of working conditions, feasible) and based on previous real life incidents.
- The exercises facilitated the exchange of information and knowledge between Participating States and the EU, joint training of staff participating in the exercises.
- The exercises provided an opportunity to train with international partners.
- The quality of the participants in the exercises was generally appreciated (e.g. experts planning the exercises, organising participating state, teams participating in the exercises, coordinating teams).
- Overall the added value of simulation exercise was to test response capability in different scenario and how the international and national actors worked together and cooperated with each other.
- Gaps and lessons learned were identified; preparedness plans and Host Nation Support concepts were tested.

However, they also highlighted some elements that did not work well during the exercises<sup>68</sup>:

<sup>67</sup> Online survey for national Civil Protection Authorities / national contact points. – Q31 - What did work well in the exercises? - Number of respondents = 19.

<sup>68</sup> Online survey for national Civil Protection Authorities / national contact points. – Q31 - What did not work well in the exercises? - Number of respondents = 19.

- The administrative requirements during the application for the grant and the conduction of the exercises could be simplified (e.g. paper work) as these have at times impacted unnecessarily the length of exercises.
- Media coverage of the simulation exercises could be improved and needs to be ensured by both the Commission and the organising authority in order to increase the visibility and awareness for the Mechanism.
- The organisation of the exercises could be improved by allowing for more flexibility in terms of planning<sup>69</sup> and budgeting<sup>70</sup>, as some organisation teams experienced difficulties to coordinate their efforts in the course of the project. Due to the complexity of a simulation exercise it could happen that unforeseen issues impacted operations and/or budget and thus it might have been hard to implement the exercises as initially planned.
- The quality of participating experts was sometimes questioned with regard to their lack of preparation or experience in the field of Civil Protection.

Further lessons learned identified through stakeholder interviews included:

- Command-post and table-top exercises should be inseparable elements of full scale exercises as they were considered to be the best way to test the core elements of coordination, cooperation and or command.
- Exercise participants argued that exercises were as a demonstration and did not have an added value either for the EU or for Participating States themselves. A minority of interviewees would have welcome deeper insights into how EU Civil Protection exercises should look like and how they should be evaluated.
- Exercising civil military relations, as for instance during the TRIPLEX exercise, should be continued (including pre-exercise workshop) so as to increase mutual awareness by introducing relevant subjects in courses for civilian personnel in disaster response and humanitarian aid. Exercises should critically examine civil-military co-location and embedment according to existing guidelines.
- Team members' skills should be made more visible at an earlier stage within the exercise team. Exercising participants/players" and "organisers should be blended together at the earliest opportunity. Team building opportunities and mechanisms should be included both beforehand as well as during the exercise.
- During the TARANIS exercise a core group of candidates were selected to attend an International Master class on evaluation in order to ensure a consistent, high quality outcome to all elements of the evaluation process. This provided a solid grounding in techniques and methodology that ensured the quality of data capture met the standards required. A continuation of this approach was regarded as beneficial.
- Operational procedures varied from nation to nation and therefore required a truly 'embedded' evaluator that fully understood both the skill set and the nuances of the national, regional, or local policy that the organisation team operated under.
- All evaluation reports should be shared to allow all practitioners to learn from the experiences of the few involved in any large-scale exercise.
- Involving general public and residents in the risk prone areas in areas where simulation exercises were run would have raised awareness of the risks and increased the level of visibility of the whole Mechanism.

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<sup>69</sup> One respondent commented that "information about the exercises should be sent to the Participating States much earlier in order to plan better their participation in the exercise."

<sup>70</sup> One interviewee argued that "some economic and financial aspects can evolve from the planning phase to the operational phase."

- Practicing emergency interventions under cold conditions was seen as complementary to similar exercises under “normal” weather conditions for SAR teams usually operating in earthquake affected areas.

#### **2.3.2.1.8 Unintended, unexpected effects and risks**

From anecdotal evidence collected, it was difficult to measure how the effectiveness of the simulation exercises contributed to reduction of the response time in major emergencies.

#### **2.3.2.2 Main recommendations**

The main recommendations drawn from the recommendations from the unaddressed recommendations of the Interim Evaluation and lesson learned not (fully) implemented are:

- **Involve general public in simulation exercises.**

Simulation exercises could involve the general public and residents in risk prone areas where exercises are being run in order to raise awareness and increase the preparedness and resilience of society at large.

- **Offer training for evaluators and setting up of mandatory evaluation criteria**

The Commission should consider providing a solid grounding in evaluation techniques and methodologies that ensure the quality of data capture meets the required standard, or introduce more specific evaluation requirements in grant agreements.

- **Explore further the links between civil-military cooperation and humanitarian aid.**

The Commission should consider further exercising civil military cooperation so as to increase mutual awareness of the respective roles of civilian and military personnel in the provision of disaster response and humanitarian aid.



### 2.3.3 Exchange of experts programme

The objectives of the exchange of experts programme were to improve experts' capabilities:

- To respond to emergencies at national level and under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism;
- For the purpose of coordinating and facilitating assistance outside the EU.

Since 2006 the delivery of the programme has been contracted to the German Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW). Interested actors were invited to submit their applications to their National Training Coordinator. If the application was approved, it was forwarded to THW where they looked for suitable partners (most of the times, the applicant indicated the preferred partner in their application). Each application was then approved by the Commission, which financed the cost of the exchange and travel and subsistence, while the host organisation proposed the agenda and planned activities.

Between June 2007 and December 2013, 882 experts from 29 Participating States took part in the programme. The main focus of these exchanges was on training and education activities, firefighter protection, risk assessment, mass evacuation and crisis management.

The EU financed travel and accommodation costs of participants in the exchanges but it did not cover the costs incurred by the host organisations. Circa € 0.5 million was allocated to this programme over a two year period. By September 2012, € 364.973 was spent on exchanges<sup>71</sup>, which were divided in two categories: A, for those including between two and six nights, and B between seven and 13 nights. Within each category, three price zones were identified. Average prices per person per night are detailed below in Table 2.14:

**Table 2.14 Exchange categories**

Category	Zone 1	Zone 2	Zone 3
A	€731	€744	€675
B	€722	€734	€668

Source: THW, 2012, "EU exchange of experts in civil protection – Final Report"

Germany (376), Austria (204) and United Kingdom (122) have been the leading Participating States in the EU Exchange of Experts programme participation (39.8% of the total number of experts sent or hosted). These same countries were also the most active in hosting experts during exchanges, while Poland ranked third (before France and Lithuania) in sending experts to other countries. Table 2.15 lists the top ten nations that sent or hosted experts.

**Table 2.15 Participants in exchanges of experts over the evaluation period (top ten nations)**


Sending State	No of experts sent	Hosting State	No of experts hosted
Germany	144	Germany	232
Austria	105	Austria	99
Poland	78	United Kingdom	78
France	55	Portugal	61
Lithuania	45	France	65
United Kingdom	44	Sweden	43
Estonia	41	Finland	38
Sweden	38	Cyprus	35
Portugal	33	Iceland	28
Latvia	32	Denmark	24

<sup>71</sup> Data refer back to 2010.

For the contract phase IV starting in September 2012 and running until October 2014, the THW Project Team estimated to exchange approximately 250 to 300 experts, with an average duration of five working days per exchange. Available data until July 2013 show that 120 experts have been exchanged during the first half of that year.

Figure 2.30 illustrates that during contract phase III 2011-2012, 35.4% of experts came from new EU Member States, against 40.3% in the previous phase and 38.1% over the evaluation period. These figures show a clear increase in the participation from these countries, with Poland ranking first with 78 experts exchanged followed by Lithuania (45 experts), Estonia (41 experts), Latvia (32 experts) and Czech Republic (27 experts). In total, only about 14% of experts exchanged were women, while nearly 21% of the experts claimed to have participated in an EU-Training-Course.

**Figure 2.30 Experts exchanged by contract phase and share of experts from new EU Member States**



*Source: DG ECHO, statistics on exchange of experts programme.*

### 2.3.3.1 Findings on the exchange of experts programme


#### 2.3.3.1.1 Relevance

The exchange of experts programme was set-up in response to requests from Participating States, which wanted a tool to improve their knowledge and learn from exchange of experience and practice. Although the programme targeted personnel dealing with civil protection, participation was not limited to national Civil Protection Authorities. Hence, prior to the commencement of the evaluation period the creation of the exchange of expert programme corresponded to a real need.

A large majority of participants and hosts described the administration of the programmes as helpful, clear and competent in the communicating aspects related to the organisation of the exchange programmes and providing sufficient information about the necessary travel details<sup>72</sup>. The survey of experts also corroborated this finding, as presented in the figure below.

<sup>72</sup> Findings emerging from the document review.

**Figure 2.31 A majority of experts participating in exchanges considered that their objectives aligned with those of the exchange programme objectives**



**Source:** Online survey for the Experts participating in exchanges.

**Question:** Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the fact that your objectives aligned with the exchange programme objectives. Between 8<sup>th</sup> of July 2014 and 18<sup>th</sup> of August 2014, the survey was sent to 25 countries, amongst the 362 Experts participating in exchange who were contacted, 132 answered the questions.

A few stakeholders commented on the fact that the volume of the exchanges was too limited and that the programme should have had the capacity to finance additional exchanges. This could be seen as an indicator that the exchange of expert programme was still very relevant at the end of the evaluation period.

Based on the feedback collected by means of evaluation forms in the Second Interim Report (January 2014), 94% of experts found their exchange of experience excellent and in 76% of the cases it was structured in line with their requirements.

### 2.3.3.1.2 Coherence

The exchange of expert programme was sometimes seen by Participating States as an alternative to training courses, to learn more about the Mechanism's coordination and facilitation of disaster responses and or networking opportunity rather than a forum conducive to exchange knowledge and practices. They thus questioned the internal coherence of actions funded under the Mechanism.

Awareness of and knowledge about the exchange of experts programme among national civil protection professionals were limited. Therefore, the distribution of participants in the exchange programme sent by Participating States was uneven. The exchange programme was seen as complementary to the training programme in the sense that it allowed to gain more practical experience of civil protection systems, methods and procedures in other Participating States.

### 2.3.3.1.3 Effectiveness

The exchange of expert programme could be considered to a certain extent effective in delivering against most of the objectives of the participants in terms of improvement in specialist skills and competences as well as coordination and facilitation of assistance. This judgement was confirmed by the majority of experts participating in exchanges and reinforced by the opinion of most of the Civil Protection Authorities.

Many experts reported that they had developed specialist skills directly applicable in their professional life; however, their expectation to be deployed in EU CP Teams within twelve months following the exchange was not met, mainly due to the absence of events requiring

such interventions. For the same reason more than one out of three Civil Protection authorities doubted whether their capability had actually improved because of the exchange programme.

In terms of implementation effectiveness, a majority of experts participating in exchanges (i.e. between 54% and 94%) considered that the administration of the programme was fit for purpose and that no implementation difficulties were experienced. Civil Protection authorities were of the same opinion.

In terms of evaluation of the effectiveness of actions undertaken experts were encouraged, but not obliged, to write a report. Only 111 evaluation forms, submitted from June 2011 - July 2012, have been collected by THW, which has an impact on the understanding of concrete success factors or shortcoming of the programme. While the programme was overall highly valued by both participants and host organisations, the feedback process from the experts can be improved as it is pivotal to the measuring the effectiveness of the programme.

#### 2.3.3.1.4 *Efficiency*

The administration of the programme was described by experts as helpful, clear and competent with regard to the organisation of the exchanges and the logistical arrangements (i.e. travel). In addition, the experts viewed the selection process as appropriate and conducive to achieving the aims of the programme.

However, Civil Protection Authorities considered that the entry requirements were not appropriately advertised. Despite the publicity made available through internet and brochures, a very limited share of participants learned about the Exchange of Experts programmes in though these channels. The vast majority of them were informed by more informal communication channels (through word-of-mouth of colleagues, from the National Training Coordinators and during EU training courses). Other authorities considered the overall capacity of the programme to organise expert exchanges limited, commenting on the long waiting times for experts to be assigned to exchanges.

#### 2.3.3.1.5 *EU added value*

The exchange of experience and learning from best practices was one of the key effects of the exchange of experts programme. It was commonly agreed that cooperation was much easier when people knew each other well and the exchange of experts brought strong connectivity at national and European level and allowed experts involved to extend their network with likeminded peers from other Participating States. The exchanges also allowed experts to put in practice theoretical knowledge and concepts. Without the financial assistance provided by the Mechanism, it was considered unlikely that such exchanges would have taken place.

#### 2.3.3.1.6 *Extent of follow-up on findings and recommendations outlined in the Report on the evaluation of the application of the Civil Protection Mechanism and Civil Protection Financial Instrument for the years 2007-2009*

**Table 2.16 Summary of the findings and recommendations from the previous evaluation and extent of follow-up on these findings**

Key findings and recommendation from the Interim evaluation	Extent of follow-up
Generally, meeting colleagues working in other Member States on the same issues greatly contributes to streamlining and easing communication in case of emergencies where time is critical.	This evaluation came to the same key finding. The vast majority of Civil Protection Authorities (94%) considered that the exchange of expert programme had contributed to increasing the awareness of the Mechanism and of the exchange programme among Civil Protection organisations and professionals.
As only a limited number of experts have been trained so far and there appears to be an ongoing need, it would seem useful to continue this	The exchange of experts programme has increased greatly in importance and until the end of the

Key findings and recommendation from the Interim evaluation	Extent of follow-up
scheme, and even considering making it more widely known.	evaluation about 900 people have participated in the scheme.
The programme is primarily organised as a learning opportunity for the experts sent abroad. In the context of enhancing cooperation among Participating States, it is worthwhile considering organising exchanges in such a way that experts on particular subjects are made available to other Participating States on request.	Most Civil Protection Authorities (62%) also considered that the Mechanism organised exchanges in such a way that experts on particular subjects were made available to other Participating States on request (and not only for the purpose of assistance outside the EU). Experts surveyed tended to have positive views with regard to the increased awareness of the exchange programme and reported a networking effect generated by the exchange, which they acknowledged could be put into good effect in cases of requests for activation of the Mechanism from other Participating States.

**Source:** [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2011/CP/COM-2011-696\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2011/CP/COM-2011-696_en.pdf) and ICF analysis

### 2.3.3.1.7 Key lessons learned

Civil Protection Authorities outlined different aspects that work well in the expert programme<sup>73</sup>:

- The organisation of the exchange of expert programme was smooth and the exchanges were well-prepared by the host organisations and coordinator;
- The content of the exchanges was appreciated (e.g. in terms of knowhow, ability to learn from past experience, provided training opportunities for experts not already trained in the training programme);
- The networking effect of the exchange was much appreciated; and
- The programme strengthened the ability for experts to exchange information and work practices.

However, they also highlighted some elements that did not work well in the expert programme<sup>74</sup>:

- The programme should be able to include more exchanges;
- Part of the EU financial support could be provided for host organisations;
- There appears to be only limited dissemination of the reports from the exchanges - it would be useful to disseminate these more widely;
- The high variety of EU languages was at times an obstacle for the sharing of information;
- Lengthy administrative procedures (approval) may in a few cases have hindered the participation of experts;
- The use of exchanges should be rationalised vis-à-vis the training component; and
- There was a strong imbalance across Participating States with regard to their participation in the programme.

<sup>73</sup> Online survey for national Civil Protection Authorities / national contact points. – Q39 - What did work well in the exchange programme? - Number of respondents = 16.

<sup>74</sup> Online survey for national Civil Protection Authorities / national contact points. – Q39 - What did not work well in the exchange programme? - Number of respondents = 16.

#### **2.3.3.1.8 Unintended, unexpected effects and risks**

A vast majority of experts that took part in the survey (90%) and that had participated in exchanges considered that there were no unexpected effects or risks. The exchange of expert programme was sometimes seen by Participating States as an alternative to training courses to know about the Mechanism's coordination and facilitation of disaster responses and or networking opportunity rather than a forum conducive to exchanging knowledge and practices. The exchange of experts programme was limited in its capacity to organise specific exchanges.

#### **2.3.3.2 Main Recommendations**

##### **■ Adopt a knowledge management strategy and system.**

The Mechanism should consider adopting a knowledge-management strategy for the indexing and searching through lessons learned, administrative information, SOPs, project related information, training materials, etc. This could also contribute to the wider dissemination and promotion of all civil protection actions and bring value to a maximum of relevant stakeholders. Applied to the exchange of experts programme, this means conveying that the programme is not an alternative to training courses but primarily a forum to exchange knowledge, experience and practices. In addition, as a very limited share of participants learned about the exchange of experts programme through the internet and official brochures, more should be done to make sure that these channels are user-friendly and accessible. DG ECHO should also pay close attention to informal communication channels (e.g. through word-of-mouth by colleagues, from national training coordinators, or during the Mechanism's training courses) and make sure that multipliers and opinion leaders have the necessary information to convey correct messages that encourage experts to participate in the programme.

##### **■ Encourage experts to write an evaluation report**

The feedback process of experts exchanged could be further improved as it is pivotal to measuring the effectiveness of the programme. Experts should be further encouraged, or even required, to complete an evaluation report at the end of the exchange in order to allow for continuous learning and programme improvement.

##### **■ Get the balance right**

The strong imbalance of participation in the exchange programme across Participating States needs to be addressed and other less represented countries need to be encouraged to send experts on exchanges. Participation from the maximum of Participating States may help in increasing the number of opportunities for participating in the programme and may solve the long waiting times as experienced in some Participating States.



## 2.4 Modules and Module exercises <sup>75</sup>

### 2.4.1 Description of the Modules

Modules and Technical Assistance Support Teams (TAST) are **pre-defined, specific and interoperable** assistance capabilities that can be deployed at short notice (max. twelve hours of a request for assistance). TAST is a type of module that provides technical support to an On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC). The main objectives of the TAST were to provide the EU-Experts and or assessment/coordination teams with office, telecommunication, subsistence and transport support on site. TAST may have also contributed to the self-sufficiency of other civil protection modules<sup>76</sup>.

The main impact expected by the deployment of these modules and TAST was to respond in a quicker manner to emergencies, taking into account that a rapid intervention can make a vital contribution in the immediate post-disaster phase<sup>77</sup>. The modules and TAST are highly specialised capabilities made of teams and materials with a specific expertise such as: search and rescue, high capacity pumping or aerial forest fire fighting. They are compiled and managed by Participating States<sup>78</sup> and can be used for interventions both within and outside the EU.

A technical framework has been put in place for seventeen types of modules and TAST<sup>79</sup>. Detailed procedural implementing rules on the modules were laid down in Council Decision 2008/73/EC<sup>80</sup> and Council Decision 2010/481/EU<sup>81</sup>.

#### Box 2.1 Types of modules

1. High Capacity Pumping
2. Flood Containment Module
3. Flood Rescue Module using boats
4. Water Purification
5. Medium USAR
6. Heavy USAR
7. Aerial Forest Fire-Fighting using helicopters
8. Aerial Forest Fire-Fighting using airplanes
9. Ground Forest Fire Fighting
10. Ground Forest Fire Fighting using vehicles
11. Advanced medical post
12. Advanced medical post with surgery
13. Medical aerial evacuation of disaster victims
14. Emergency temporary shelter
15. CBRN detection and sampling
16. SAR in CBRN conditions
17. Field hospital and  
Technical assistance support team (TAST)

At the beginning of December 2013, 150 intervention modules and ten TAST teams were registered in CECIS database. The database could be accessed by two users from each

<sup>75</sup> Also refer to section 2.5 of Annex to this final report provided in a separate document.

<sup>76</sup> <http://www.eutac-project.eu/7.html>

<sup>77</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/disaster\\_response/modules\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/disaster_response/modules_en.htm)

<sup>78</sup> all EU-28 MSs plus Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and FYROM

<sup>79</sup> COMMISSION DECISION of 29 July 2010 amending Decision 2004/277/EC, Euratom as regards rules for the implementation of Council Decision 2007/779/EC, Euratom establishing a Community civil protection mechanism, available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32010D0481:EN:NOT>

<sup>80</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:020:0023:0034:EN:PDF>

<sup>81</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32010D0481:EN:NOT>


Participating States as well as partner DGs of DG ECHO and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in France (read only access). Participating States were autonomous in their use of the database – it was their decision to register modules or not. In general, some Participating States preferred not to disclose their equipment and experts to other countries due to security concerns<sup>82</sup>.

It is noted that the number of modules and TAST registered in CECIS changes quite regularly as Participating States register new modules or de-register others. At the beginning of December 2013 France had registered 48 modules, which comprised 32% of all modules registered by Participating States in the CECIS database, followed by Germany (14) and Belgium (12).

Most modules registered were Urban Search and Rescue (USAR). 30 were medium (MUSAR), twelve heavy (HUSAR) and five in CBRN conditions. There were also a significant number of Ground forest fighting using vehicles (20), High Capacity Pumping (HCP) modules (24), and CBRN detection and sampling (17)<sup>83</sup>.

In order to interpret data on modules' deployments accurately, it is important to highlight that Participating States did not always provide their assistance through the Mechanism, but also through bilateral agreements or UN entities (see Figure 2.32). For this evaluation only data of module deployments through the Civil Protection Mechanism has been considered.

**Figure 2.32 Interaction of the Civil Protection Mechanism**



## 2.4.2 Description of Module exercises

The main objective of the European Civil Protection Modules Exercises (EU Modex) was to test and train modules / TAST and EU civil protection experts in order to prepare them for international operations in the framework of the Mechanism. In particular, module exercises aimed<sup>84</sup>:

- To test the reporting and operational command chain between the field, the national operational centres and the ERCC;

<sup>82</sup> Interview with Etienne MARCHAND, DG ECHO Unit B1, 25 June 2014

<sup>83</sup> List of registered civil protection modules and TAST as of 2 December 2013, provided by Dimitrios Pagidas, DG ECHO, B1- Emergency Response Unit

<sup>84</sup> DG Civil Security, Belgium, the European Civil Protection Modules Exercises, available at: <http://www.securitecivile.be/en/content/european-civil-protection-modules-exercises>


- To enhance cooperation between modules and the EU CP Teams; and,
- To test the coordination of EU Civil Protection assistance in accordance with established rules and regulations, international methodologies and guidelines as to establish a common understanding of the operational cooperation and accelerate the response.

Module exercises were delivered by contractors based on calls for tenders. During the evaluation period five table-top exercises (Lot 1) and twelve realistic module exercises were conducted. In 2010-2013, through these exercises the following modules were tested and relevant EU Civil Protection experts trained:

- Advanced Medical Post (AMP);
- Advanced Medical Post with Surgery (AMPS);
- CBRN detection and sampling;
- High Capacity Pumping (HCP);
- Urban Search and Rescue (USAR in:
  - CBRN conditions
  - Medium conditions (MUSAR)
  - Heavy conditions (HUSAR)
- Water Purification (WP);
- TAST; and
- EU CP Teams.

The figure below presents the intervention logic for modules and module exercises. Modules were developed to respond in a quicker manner to emergencies. Module exercises were testing the cooperation in linkage between different modules, EU CP Teams and the ERCC.

**Figure 2.33 Intervention logic for modules and module exercises**



## **2.4.3 Final findings on the Modules and Module Exercises**

### **2.4.3.1 Relevance**

Modules/TAST are pre-defined, specific and interoperable assistance capabilities that are established to respond in a quicker manner to emergencies. Every module was expected to develop Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), which should contain all predictable procedures during the deployment cycle of the module, e.g. preparedness, on-site command, deployment phase, reporting, handover and debriefing, as well as general and technical information of the respective module/TAST.

Whilst most of Civil Protection Authorities surveyed agreed that relevant guidelines and SOP were developed and implemented, consultation with other stakeholders and the case study visits showed a need for more international and unified guidelines and standards for establishment, operation and common procedures of modules.

USAR modules were using INSARAG (UN International Search and Rescue Advisory Group) guidelines for procedures and technical capabilities. For all other modules there were significant shortcomings regarding the guidelines and minimal requirements. More detailed standards for modules' development and operation (preferably compliant with INSARAG guidelines) implemented into the modules' SOPs and followed up by training and exercises could contribute significantly to the preparedness for missions.

Module exercises were seen by many stakeholders as essential and relevant to identify gaps in the operation of modules. Civil Protection experts of modules addressed these gaps therefore increasing the level of cooperation with other modules and EUCPT as well as improving the coordination of offered assistance.

### **2.4.3.2 Coherence**

The pre-defined and interoperable modules represent additional capabilities that can be deployed at short notice and thus are very important to achieve the Mechanism's objective to facilitate cooperation in the field of civil protection; especially when the capacities of an affected state are exceeded. The module exercises are coherent in so far as they test and train capabilities and procedures for real emergency interventions.

### **2.4.3.3 Effectiveness**

The data available showed that on overall the number of modules and TAST registered in the CECIS database has increased over the evaluation period. At the end of 2013 150 modules and ten TAST by 23 Participating States were registered. This shows that DG ECHO was closer to reaching the target set in its annual management plan (2012)<sup>85</sup> that every Participating State should have at least one module registered in CECIS database.

Over the evaluation period, the number of different types of modules registered increased. At the end of the evaluation period<sup>86</sup>, 16 different types of modules were registered. Most of modules registered were medium urban search and rescue (31 module registered) following by Ground Forest Fire Fighting using Vehicles (21 module registered) and high capacity pumping (18 modules registered). According to the online survey, these were also the types of modules being most often deployed.

In 2013, 15 missions took place with twelve modules - 8% of modules registered in the CECIS database (150 and ten TAST<sup>87</sup>) - being deployed through the Mechanism in 2013. However, modules can be deployed not only through the Mechanism but also based on bilateral agreements or responding to the UN calls. No data was available to analyse the number of modules which were deployed but not through the Mechanism. Therefore it is not possible to

<sup>85</sup> DG ECHO, Management Plan 2012, available at: [http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/synthesis/amp/doc/echo\\_mp.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/synthesis/amp/doc/echo_mp.pdf)

<sup>86</sup> Data from February 2014.

<sup>87</sup> List of registered civil protection modules and TAST as of 2 December 2013, provided by Dimitrios Pagidas, DG ECHO, B1- Emergency Response Unit

assess the extent to which DG ECHO has reached its target to ensure that MIC/ERCC was the natural partner to which the request for assistance would be forwarded.

In order to increase effectiveness of modules registered, stakeholders suggested to further develop unified minimum requirements and guidelines for the establishment of modules. In addition, there is an identified need for a quality control mechanism to ensure that registered modules comply with minimum quality requirements.

Overall, the modules were seen as being effective in terms of emergency response interventions and assistance to populations in need. 93% of the national authorities agreed that modules contributed to a more effective disaster response.

Most Civil Protection Authorities considered that the module exercises somewhat met their objectives, in terms of encouraging civil protection staff to take account of lessons learned and to introduce improvements to the operation of modules. They also agreed that the modules' post deployment feedback was adequately recorded, shared and used. Similarly, the post deployment feedback was considered effectively used in the module exercises.

In terms of effectiveness of implementation, the majority of national Authorities surveyed agreed that the administration of the module exercises was fit for purpose. However, it was suggested that more frequent opportunities to exercise the (inter)operability of modules even on a smaller scale and during less complex exercises would contribute to their sustainability in terms of skills gained. The case studies revealed similar results. Overall, the work delivered by the modules was seen as effective. However it was emphasised that interoperability between modules played a significant role, especially in large scale disaster, such as in the Philippines in 2013. Portugal, in the framework of the case study on forest fires, reported that foreign aerial modules were well received and that international teams were quickly able to participate in the firefighting interventions.

#### 2.4.3.4 *Efficiency*

Modules are national capacities and as such there was no detailed documentation on operational and/or financial efficiency available<sup>88</sup>. The efficiency of modules developed by preparatory actions is considered in section 2.9. The case studies acknowledge various aspects of the efficiency of modules deployed. For instance:

- The case study on forest fires revealed, that the creation of firefighting aerial and ground force modules was perceived by interviewees as a good development that worked very efficiently. One respondent acknowledged that these modules had been in place for a long time and thus teams from different countries knew how to work together well and what to expect in certain situations.
- In Poland, the BaltFloodCombat demonstrated high expertise and was adequately equipped (much needed high capacity pumps), self-sufficient and flexible in terms logistical support, ability to change location and the time spent on the operation (the initial duration of the mission was extended).
- In the Philippines, the work delivered by the modules was seen as efficient. However, room for improvement with regard to the adaptability of the modules in a fast changing environment was flagged by a few interviewees.

The efficiency of module exercises is important especially because of the limited time that personnel of national modules can devote to the Mechanism. Module exercises' contractors considered that administering three module exercises sequentially was an efficient approach to implement lessons learned from one exercise to the one following.

A significant share of Civil Protection Authorities surveyed was not certain that the annual selection and prioritisation of modules exercises was fit for purpose. During the evaluation process, module exercises did not focus equally on all modules (most of exercises were for

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<sup>88</sup> Also note that the evaluation questions as in the terms of reference for the study did not focus on the specific questions of efficiency in general and of modules in particular.

the following modules: AMP, AMPS, HCP, CBRNDET, WP and TAST), therefore not all civil protection experts had equal opportunities to exercise their modules.

Two stakeholders emphasized that it would be efficient to have workshops for the same type of module managers. It was seen that it could contribute significantly to the operational level, as a group of the same working on very similar issues would have a chance to communicate and share information on lessons learned, developments, etc. This kind of annual meeting is held for USAR teams through the INSARAG network but not available for other modules included in the Mechanism.

Whilst overall module exercises were perceived very positively, some stakeholders were unsure whether investing in preparing a significant number of modules and civil protection experts was efficient with regard to those actually deployed under Mechanism.

#### 2.4.3.5 *EU added value*

The EU added value from modules and module exercises under the Mechanism is clear, as it directly supports the national response to disasters in affected countries. Participating States profit from a wider pool of capacities, equipment and expertise. The testing of skills and procedures during module exercise creates a common understanding for coordinated assistance.

Stakeholders considered that the interoperability of the modules which were active in the Philippines provided significant EU added value, as all the modules had received common training / exercises prior to being deployed. Stakeholders also highlighted the importance of individual modules already working as a team before deployments.

#### 2.4.3.6 *Extent of follow-up on findings and recommendations outlined in the Report on the evaluation of the application of the Civil Protection Mechanism and Civil Protection Financial Instrument for the years 2007-2009*

Table 2.17 responds individually to the key findings and recommendations about modules and reports on the follow up made by the Commission.

**Table 2.17 Summary of the findings and recommendations from the previous evaluation and extent of follow-up on these findings**

Key findings and recommendation from the Interim evaluation	Extent of follow-up
The modular approach is [...] a means of enhancing the interoperability, the speed of deployment, the predictability of response, the support that is needed from the affected state, and the overall quality of effectiveness of European civil Protection interventions. The establishment of modules and the setting up of the modules database in CECIS facilitated the process of requesting and delivering assistance inside the EU, as it improved the planning at both donor and recipient ends.	The evaluation by ICF International confirmed this finding overall.
Civil Protection modules are generally considered as effective ways to boost European preparedness for natural and man-made disasters.	The evaluation by ICF International came to the same conclusion.
The concept of modules needs to be further strengthened by involving them in specific exercises.	The evaluation confirmed that the Commission has followed up on this recommendation by establishing specific modules exercises.
Work is progressing on developing standard operating procedures for modules, aimed at further improving interoperability and coordination on site and with headquarters. Guidelines on host nation support are also under development.	The evaluation confirmed that the Commission has followed up on this finding through the development of the Guidelines on Host Nation Support and the development of SOPs.

**Source:** [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2011/CP/COM-2011-696\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2011/CP/COM-2011-696_en.pdf) and ICF analysis



#### 2.4.3.7 *Key lessons learned*

Based on the analysis of a number of module exercise reports, the following key lessons were learned by project participants and coordinators:

- Module exercises allowed for the creation of a common understanding and a coordinated emergency response.
- It was seen that module exercises contributed to capacity building, increased knowledge about the mechanism, testing national capacities as well as best practices exchange.
- Imbalance of the exercising opportunities for different modules
- Modules were seen as increasing the national response capacity and thus highly appreciated when the domestic capabilities of a State are overwhelmed.
- The interoperability of modules was regarded as very effective and efforts should be continued to harmonize procedures and equipment.
- Some of stakeholders consulted considered that only a limited number of modules registered were fully prepared and organised to be deployed internationally and in particular in countries outside the EU.

#### 2.4.3.8 *Unintended, unexpected effects and risks*

Anecdotal evidence illustrated potential risks or adverse effects: the absence of advanced long term planning of module exercises made their participation in module exercises difficult for some Participating States.

#### 2.4.4 *Main recommendations*

- **Continue improving interoperability and effectiveness of assets and procedures (e.g. SOPs).** The interoperability of equipment and procedures should be further enhanced. For the modules this means:
  - Setting out minimum requirements for registering modules and international guidelines: In order to increase effectiveness of modules registered, it was advised to develop unified minimum requirements and guidelines for their establishment.
  - Furthermore more international and unified guidelines and standards for establishment, operation and common procedures of modules would be welcomed. More detailed standards for modules' development and operation (preferably compliant with INSARAG guidelines) implemented into the modules' SOPs and followed up by training and exercises could contribute significantly to the preparedness for missions.
- **Availability of response capacity**

The need for training a great number of modules was questioned by many civil protection experts considering the share of modules being actually deployed under the Mechanism is relatively low. The new legislation calls for the establishment of a pre-committed voluntary pool of modules, experts and response capacities. This may have a potential beneficial effect on efficiency as well as effectiveness.

- **Organise smaller but more frequent opportunities to exercise**

Many stakeholders suggested organising more frequent module exercises to test the interoperability of modules at a smaller scale and during less complex exercises. This would contribute to the sustainability of skills that the civil protection experts gain in the process.

## 2.5 Prevention and Preparedness Projects<sup>89</sup>

Each year the Mechanism financed a set of prevention and preparedness projects selected through call for proposals. The Commission provided up to 75% co-financing (up to a maximum of €500,000 per project) for these projects.

### 2.5.1 Description of prevention and preparedness projects

The prevention projects were funded by the Commission with the following expectations<sup>90</sup>:

- Identification of specific challenges or needs of civil protection services in the partnership countries, in relation to climate change-related emergencies - particularly natural disasters and assessment of existing solutions;
- Development of knowledge based disaster prevention policies, including adaptation to climate change (introduced as of 2010 Work Programme)
- Assessment of the implementation of Community and/or National legislative instruments supporting Participating States action in the field of prevention (introduced as of 2010 Work Programme);
- Improvement of cooperation between actors involved in disaster prevention and those active in the response and recovery through the development of procedures and/or minimal standards (introduced as of 2010 Work Programme);
- Fostering of best practices, training, and awareness-raising in disaster prevention, including awareness-raising of citizens with regard to specific safety issues connected with climate change and promoting safe behaviours at home and/or abroad;
- Improvement of the linking of the relevant actors and policies throughout the disaster management cycle, including early warning – prevention-preparedness-response-recovery (introduced as of 2011 Work Programme);
- Improvement of the effectiveness of existing policy and financial instruments with regard to disaster prevention (introduced in 2011 Work Programme);
- Implementation of the UN Hyogo Framework for Action (introduced as of 2012 Work Programme);
- Implementation of the EU Regional strategies and their action plans (introduced as of 2013 Work Programme);
- Strengthening of national capacities (introduced as of 2013 Work Programme).

As for the preparedness projects, the Commission expected the following results for the 2007-2013 period<sup>91</sup>:

- Improvement of technical performance and reduction of risk and stress for civil protection professionals and volunteers, ultimately leading to better protection for all citizens in any kind of emergency situation;
- Increased awareness and skills of responders (civil protection professionals and volunteers) and the general public (introduced in the 2008 Annual Work Programme);
- Assessment and implementation of solutions to specific civil protection and marine pollution needs and/or challenges at regional and cross border level (introduced in the 2012 Work Programme);

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
<sup>89</sup> Also refer to section 2.6 of Annex to this final report provided in a separate document.

<sup>90</sup> As defined in the Annual Work Programmes for the 2007--2013 period. No specific thematic priorities were defined in 2008 and 2009 Work Programmes.

<sup>91</sup> Expected results as defined in the 2007-2013 Annual Work Programmes.

- Contribution to the EU Regional strategies and their action plans (introduced in the 2013 Work Programme).

**Figure 2.34 Intervention logic for prevention and preparedness projects**



The projects covered a range of activities including:

- Training;
- Awareness raising;
- Development of risk assessment tools and methodologies; and,
- Small-scale exercises and training based on joint design, planning, development and implementation of innovative civil protection activities, including procedures, techniques, tools, etc.

Table 2.18 shows the number of projects submitted and actually co-funded.

**Table 2.18 Prevention and preparedness projects submitted and co-financed (2007-2013)**

Call year	Submitted	Co-financed
2007	48	6
2008	18	8
2009	31	12
2010	55	12
2011 (two stage procedure)	131	9
2012	46	12
2013	42	17
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>371</b>	<b>76</b>

Source: DG ECHO

Table 2.19 and Table 2.20 below provide an overview of the number of prevention projects and preparedness projects co-funded during 2007 – 2013.

**Table 2.19 Overview of prevention projects under Financial Instrument in period 2007-2013**

Call year	Nr of projects	Total funding (€)	Beneficiaries	
			Lead organisations (Participating State)	Participating organisations (Participating State)
2007	6	1,469,262.00	BE, DK, EL (2x), ES, SE	BG, EL, ES, CY, FR, UK, FI, DE, IT, DK, SE, EE
2008	3	1,046,708.00	IT (2x), UK	DE, IT, ES, EL
2009	5	1,840,605.50	DE (2x), EL (2x), IT	DE, NL, ES, EL, IT
2010	9	2,849,677.00	BG (2x), DE (2x), FR, EL (3x), IT (2x)	AT, IT, ES, BG, UK, FR, EL, DE, NL
2011	5	2,263,550.00	EL, ES, IT, SE, UK	FI, DE, IT, ES, CY, EL, BE, EE, FI, NO, LV, PL, SE
2012	5	2,238,224.00	EL (2x), IT (2x), NL	UK, PT, DE, ES, EE, BG, PT, BE, DE, SI, EL, FR, IT, RO
2013	7	3,258,221.00	ES (3x), IT (2x), SE, UK	BE, DK, FR, NO, SE, DE, EE, LV, PL, NL, IT, ES, FI, DE, IE, UK
<b>2007 - 2013</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>14,966,247.50</b>		


Source: DG ECHO website

**Table 2.20 Overview of preparedness projects funded under the Financial Instrument 2007-2013**

Call year	Nr of projects	Total funding (€)	Beneficiaries	
			Lead organisations (PS)	Participating organisations (PS)
2007	in the 2007 call, only prevention projects were co-funded			
2008	5	1,577,304.00	AT, CH, EL, DE, FR,	DE, UK, PL, AT, BE, BG, FI, FR
2009	7	2,471,905.00	AT(2x), IT, NL, RO, SE, NO,	FR, IT, HR, EL, DE, BE, NL, ES, RO, NO, IS, SE
2010	3	949,802.00	IT, LU, NL	HR, IT, SI
2011	4	1,515,260.00	DE, MT, SI (2x)	AT, HR, RO, FR, IT
2012	7	2,550,565.00	AT, DE, EL, FR, IT (2x), IC,	BG, FR, LV, RO, DE, NO, DK, CZ, EL, IT, IE, PL, FI, PT, CY, UK
2013	10	3,317,788.00	AT (2x),ES (3x), HU, IT (3x), LV	IT, EL, MK, HR, CY, PT, AT, BG, UK, LV, FR, ES, SE, HU, RO, HU, DE, LT
2007 - 2013	36	13,851,886.00		

Source: DG ECHO website

**Figure 2.35 Main focus of the prevention and preparedness projects in terms of the nature of the emergency (2007-2013)**



**Source:** N=76, Based on data provided by DG ECHO

Figure 2.35 above illustrates the focus of these projects in terms of the nature of the emergency. Most projects (42 out of 76) tackled natural disasters, such as flooding, mountain related disasters and forest fires. 26 projects had no specific disaster-focus and eight projects related to man-made disasters, including transport accidents, pollution and CBRN accidents. In terms of project outputs, most projects (28 out of 76) contributed to the development of Civil Protection Modules, 23 projects focused on enhancing cooperation between selected Participating States (23) 14 fed into national training programmes. The rest of the project outputs were directly or indirectly related to MIC/ERCC procedures, simulation exercises, transport assistance provisions and the exchange of experts programme.

## 2.5.2 Final findings on the Prevention and Preparedness Projects

### 2.5.2.1 Relevance

Prevention and preparedness projects selected for the 2007-2013 period were in line with the specific objectives defined in the call for proposals. The annual preparation of the call for proposals, the selection and monitoring process were relevant to the needs of those organisations responsible for Civil Protection activities at national and EU level. For instance, a project coordinator interviewed reported that the requirements established in the call for proposal were not cumbersome and were generally similar to the activities carried out daily by project partners involved in Civil Protection activities at national level or local level.

With regard to the selection of projects, the current selection process was fit for purpose. Nevertheless, the duration of the selection process could be reduced. In the period considered by this evaluation, it took between five and six months for project participants to be informed whether their project had been selected. A faster selection process could speed up the implementation of the project activities and thus ensure the faster delivery of project results.

With regard to the monitoring process, 58% of national Civil Protection Authorities regarded this process as transparent and straightforward. During the 2007-2013 period, some requirements were modified (e.g. financial audits were no longer required). Good communication between the Commission and the selected projects was ensured by establishing a direct communication channel between the responsible Commission official and the project leading organisation.

### 2.5.2.2 Coherence

Prevention and preparedness projects selected in the period considered by this evaluation were in line with the priorities established annually in the call for proposals. In addition, actions implemented were coherent with those carried out by other EU funding mechanisms with similar objectives. For instance, in the Area-wide Assessment of Risk Evaluations (BE-AWARE) project, there was an exchange of information and partial project results with other projects funded through different instruments (e.g. ERDF).

Nevertheless, the Commission official responsible for prevention and preparedness projects and one project coordinator noted that priorities established in the call for proposals were defined too broadly, thus frequently leading to the submission of vaguely defined projects. Better defined priorities could lead to more focused projects, which could contribute more effectively to the EU policy framework. Furthermore, better defined priorities could avoid duplication of efforts caused by the existence of similar EU funding mechanisms (e.g. ERDF, IPA, MED Programme, etc.).

### 2.5.2.3 Effectiveness

Prevention and preparedness projects implemented between 2007 and 2013 contributed to raising awareness and to promoting EU Member States' cooperation in the field of civil protection (general objectives of these projects).

Project results were in line with those established in the annual work plans and mainly contributed to:

- Enhancing **preparedness of Civil Protection Authorities and of the public in case of emergencies at national level (preparedness projects)**. Five projects out of the 22 selected contributed to strengthening preparedness of Civil Protection Authorities and services in case of hazardous events, such as floods, earthquakes, CBRN incidents, etc...
- Improve **skills and awareness of civil protection and/or marine pollution professionals and volunteers (preparedness projects)**. Two projects out of the 22 selected (POSOW and NEREIDs) focused on enhancing knowledge and capacities of operators (professionals and volunteers) in the field of civil protection and marine pollution.
- Facilitate **development of disaster prevention strategies (prevention projects)**. In three cases, projects supported Participating States in developing disaster prevention strategies. For example, the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region flagship project 14.3 on Macro-regional Risk Scenarios and gaps identification (EUSBSR 14.3) contributed to "developing scenarios and identify gaps" for all main hazards in the Baltic Sea Region. The project resulted in a macro-regional risk/hazard/scenario assessment and facilitated the development of disaster prevention strategies for the Baltic Sea region.
- Raising **public awareness and disseminate good practices (prevention and preparedness projects)**. 17 projects out of the 22 selected contributed to raising awareness among Civil Protection Authorities and volunteers on specific issues. At the same time, these projects contributed to disseminating good practices and exchange of information.
- Strengthen **existing policy and financial instruments with regard to disaster prevention and preparedness (prevention and preparedness projects)**. For example, the ALPSAR project contributed to reinforcing the existing Protocol for cooperation for Search and Rescue (SAR) in the Alps along the common border between Slovenia and Venice (Italy) for Mountain Rescue (developed in 2006). The solutions and procedures developed in ALPSAR became operational for the Italian and Slovenian mountain rescue services as of March 2013.
- Improve the **link between relevant actors and policies throughout the disaster management cycle, including early warning (prevention-preparedness-response-recovery)**. For example, the Tsunami information centre for the North-East Atlantic and



Mediterranean (NEAMTIC) project contributed to the identification and exchange of good practices between the national and regional warning systems and mitigation for coastal inundation in the North-East Atlantic and Mediterranean (NEAM region).

Nevertheless, the impact and sustainability of prevention and preparedness projects was limited:

- Some projects highlighted the need for standardised procedures at national level with regard to Civil Protection activities. Although most EU Member States agreed on the need to adopt common standards in relation to disaster management, the implementation of such standards was not regarded as straightforward by most stakeholders interviewed.
- Project results were generally not implemented or continued after project completion. Concrete project outputs (e.g. guidelines or procedures developed) were generally not implemented at national level because of a lack of national funding or because of a lack of a necessary transnational coordination mechanism. In other cases, projects might have only provided other Participating States with food for thought on how to improve their own preparedness practices.
- Project results were not extensively promoted and made visible to other national Civil Protection Authorities and to the general public. A survey conducted among national Civil Protection Authorities showed that seven of 16 national Civil Protection Authorities interviewed were unsure about the level of dissemination of project results. In most cases, communication activities were limited to a restricted audience (e.g. only to national Civil Protection Authorities and experts from Participating States) or to a limited number of EU Member States (mainly citizens in the project's Participating States).

#### **2.5.2.4 Efficiency**

The overall budget available for prevention projects over the period was €14,225,000. The budget available for preparedness projects was €10,400,000 for the 2008-2013 period<sup>92</sup>.

Prevention and preparedness projects implemented were delivered at a reasonable cost. Most budgets available for completed projects were proportionate with regard to the activities implemented. The size of the budget was also appropriate given the project's duration and expected outcomes. Average budget available was €445,000 per a 24 month project.

In most cases, completed projects developed concrete outputs (i.e. reports, websites, information tools, training materials, articles etc.). Conferences or national seminars to present the main project results were organised in most cases. Several projects managed to complete planned activities without spending the whole budget. It has to be noted that savings were generally not significant (between €1,000 and €30,000).

The POSOW project<sup>93</sup> provides a good example of a project with an appropriate budget size. All planned activities were implemented and the budget enabled not only to produce training materials and manuals but also to develop a pilot training course that was tested with volunteers. Additional activities were also implemented within the budget, such as translation of presentations and posters in training host countries, logistical arrangements of training courses and other translations.

A majority of Civil Protection Authorities agreed that the size of the budget was appropriate and proportionate to what the projects were set out to achieve.

#### **2.5.2.5 EU added value**

Prevention and preparedness projects achieved results which could have not been achieved by Participating States in isolation. Most projects involved several partners from different Participating States. Some projects aimed to establish common procedures and/or standards

<sup>92</sup> No preparedness projects were co-funded in 2007.

<sup>93</sup> Preparedness for Oil-polluted Shoreline clean-up and Oiled Wildlife interventions (POSOW), more information are available at: <http://www.posow.org/>

to improve national response capacities. Moreover, transnational disaster interventions were deemed to be very challenging and in need of effective coordination mechanisms.

Some projects had an exclusive EU dimension. A preparedness project<sup>94</sup>, for instance, aimed to contribute to the implementation of the EU Host Nation Support Guidelines (HNSG Implementation) in Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia and Poland.

Stakeholders interviewed noted that prevention and preparedness projects improved mutual knowledge and contributed to build trust across Participating States and Civil Protection Authorities. Good working relationships were established, which proved to be crucial in emergency situations – especially in relation to transnational disaster interventions. In addition, these projects supported the establishment of informal channels between national authorities responsible for emergency situations.

#### **2.5.2.6 *Extent of follow-up on findings and recommendations outlined in the Report on the evaluation of the application of the Civil Protection Mechanism and Civil Protection Financial Instrument for the years 2007-2009***

The report from the Commission (COM (2011) 696 final) noted that potential/possible synergies with other EU programmes and policies financing instruments able to support certain aspects of prevention and preparedness activities should be encouraged. However, there was no evidence that potential synergies were exploited in the period considered by this evaluation (2007-2013). One out of 22 projects selected as part of the studied sample<sup>95</sup>, shared their results with other EU programmes or instruments.

#### **2.5.2.7 *Key lessons learned***

Based on the analysis of the 22 projects selected, the following key lessons were learned by project participants and coordinators:

- Good coordination between partners was crucial (At least one representative from each organisation involved in the project should participate in all the steering committee meetings because it allowed for cooperation and discussion on the fundamental aspects of the project during the meetings)
- Exchange of information and experience between Participating States were deemed as essential for guaranteeing the success of the project.
- To maximize the effects of implemented actions, projects' concrete outputs should be transferable to all other Participating States.
- To implement effective cross-border cooperation, full support from all governance levels involved in the project (public administration, NCP and civil protection operators) was deemed as necessary.

#### **2.5.2.8 *Unintended, unexpected effects and risks***

Stakeholders interviewed highlighted possible risks of duplication caused by multiple funding mechanisms (e.g. Civil Protection funding mechanism, ERDF, IPA, MED Programme, etc.). The following strategies were suggested to strengthen synergies and to avoid duplication of efforts:

- Better coordination arrangements (e.g. through coordination mechanisms between all relevant EU funding tools in order to increase the efficiency of funded projects with a view to build upon past projects and existing regional arrangements).
- Narrowing down the priorities for the selection of projects to avoid duplication of efforts.

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<sup>94</sup> Implementation of the EU Host Nation Support Guidelines (HNSG Implementation) coordinated by the Icelandic Red Cross

<sup>95</sup> As presented in Annex 6, 11 out of 40 prevention projects and 11 out of 36 preparedness projects have been selected for this evaluation.

Relevant stakeholders highlighted that coordination with other EU funded projects or national activities were important to promote mutual learning (e.g. through participation to conferences or other project events). For those projects with similar objectives, mutual learning activities should be fostered also during project implementation, as results achieved by one project could be used by another project, supporting the sustainability of results. For example, the BE-AWARE project shared results with the AXES<sup>96</sup> and ARCOPOL<sup>97</sup> projects<sup>98</sup>.

Another unintended effect relates to the fact that certain prevention projects were perceived as having value only for their implementers and participating organisations<sup>99</sup>.

### 2.5.3 Main recommendations

#### ■ **More focused prevention and preparedness projects delivering outcomes applicable to a large range of Participating States.**

The prevention and preparedness projects supported by the Mechanism should be more focused and deliver outcomes (e.g. standards, common practices) which could then be implemented by as many Participating States as possible. Prevention projects could also foster cooperation and share good practices, lessons learned and insights into how best to implement these outcomes at national level. This could be achieved by developing more focused calls for proposals.

#### ■ **Design and promote a civil protection collaboration hub or platform.**

DG ECHO should consider designing an online tool to improve collaboration between past and current participants in the Mechanism. This could further contribute to the realisation of a sustainable EU civil protection community and improve the connectivity of its members.

For instance, Prevention projects – co-funded in the 2007-2013 period – were not generally linked to national programmes. Most Participating States developed their own methods, processes and knowledge base for assessing and managing the risks they are exposed to. There was however no clear information sharing strategy between Participating States. The lack of coordination between national authorities and the unclear definition of responsibilities also impeded necessary investments in prevention.

#### ■ **Take into account the Lessons Learned.**

The nature and the focus of priorities in the annual calls for proposals should take account the lessons learned from each of the actions of the Mechanism. In the case of prevention and preparedness projects, this would imply defining programme priorities to incorporate lessons learned from each of the Mechanism's actions as part of the annual programmes.

#### ■ **Adopt a knowledge management strategy and system.**

The Mechanism should consider adopting a knowledge-management strategy for the indexing and searching through lessons learned, administrative information, SOPs, project related information, training materials, etc. This could also contribute to the wider dissemination and promotion of all civil protection actions and bring value to a maximum of relevant stakeholders. Such a strategy could for instance: promote the transferability of project outcomes in a maximum of national contexts, as some projects co-financed in the 2007-2013 funding period seemed to bring value primarily to the project participants and end beneficiaries. Projects co-financed through the Mechanism (with a regional focus) should nevertheless produce solutions or procedures that could be transferred to other Participating States not directly

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<sup>96</sup> This project aimed to develop eNavigation tools.

<sup>97</sup> <http://www.arcopol.eu/home.aspx?id=en>

<sup>98</sup> Interview with project coordinator

<sup>99</sup> This finding is extracted from the qualitative / open ended responses from the survey run with Civil Protection Authorities.

involved in the projects. Projects should also include a clear dissemination strategy as part of the call or their project design.

■ ***Increase the focus of the Mechanism on prevention rather than response.***

The Mechanism should consider further promoting prevention activities as this proved to be more efficient than focusing solely on response strategies. For instance, the adoption of effective prevention strategies at national level could reduce the severity of some disaster types (e.g. Forest Fires) or the resilience of affected areas. Due to the importance of prevention measures (e.g. in reducing forest fire severity), prevention projects could promote advocacy strategy and awareness raising campaigns in this regard, considering that the higher frequency of adverse events may have a number of drivers (e.g. for forest fires rampant urbanisation, climate change and or global warming).

## 2.6 Prevention Policy<sup>100</sup>

The necessity for further action on prevention was first established by the 2009 European Communication on “a Community approach on the prevention of natural and man-made disasters”. It described the aims of prevention activities as: (i) where possible prevent disasters from happening, and ii) where disasters are unavoidable, taking steps to minimise their impacts<sup>101</sup>. It outlined an EU approach on the prevention of natural and man-made disasters, which stipulated the following four actions:

- The development of knowledge-based disaster prevention policies at all levels of government;
- The establishment of a link between the relevant actors and policies throughout the disaster management cycle;
- The improvement of the effectiveness of existing financial and legislative instruments; and,
- The strengthening of international cooperation in the field of prevention.

The Council Conclusions of 30 November 2009, the European Parliament Resolution of 21 September 2010, and the Council Conclusions of April 2011 on the development of national risk assessments also reiterated the importance of prevention in the protection against disasters.

Four years on, the Decision No 1313/2013/EU on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism also underlined, in the preamble, that the Union Mechanism should include a general policy framework for Union actions on disaster risk prevention, the aim of which was to:

- “Achieve a higher level of protection and resilience against disasters by preventing or reducing their effects and by fostering a culture of prevention, including due consideration of the likely impacts of climate change and the need for appropriate adaptation action”.


To this end, reference was made to the development of risk assessments, risk management planning, the assessment of the risk management capability conducted by each Member State at national or sub-national level, an overview of risks prepared at Union level and peer reviews. It further underlined the crucial importance of ensuring an integrated approach to disaster management, linking risk prevention, preparedness and response actions, for which the Union Mechanism should include a framework for the sharing of information on risks and risk management capabilities.

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<sup>100</sup> Also refer to section 2.7 of Annex to this final report provided in a separate document.

<sup>101</sup> COM(2009) 82 final: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0082:FIN:EN:PDF>

Figure 2.36 Intervention logic prevention policy framework



## 2.6.1 Final findings on Prevention Policy

Desk research conducted in the context of this Study showed that the Commission has been working to implement the actions as stipulated in the 2009 Commission Communication by the development and implementation of various prevention activities. Table 2.21 presents the various prevention activities that have, to date, been undertaken.

The prevention activities achieved the specific objectives of the prevention policy framework, as stipulated in the 2009 Communication. For example, activities contributing to a knowledge-based disaster prevention policy included: risk assessments (guidelines on risk assessments and performance of national risk assessments); the overview of risks (published in the course of 2014 but prepared to a large extent during the evaluation period); the study on disaster loss databases; the exchange of good practices in disaster risk management, and; peer reviews.

Activities implemented to link relevant actors and policies throughout the disaster management cycle included the inclusion of prevention in the "lessons learned" programme (conducted following interventions) as well as the development of specific courses on prevention under the civil protection training programme.

Finally, to improve the effectiveness of existing financial and legislative instruments, disaster risk prevention elements have been included in many other relevant EU policies, e.g. the environment, agriculture and rural development, cohesion policy, solidarity fund, health, insurance, research, industry and infrastructure, integrated maritime policy and maritime safety and security, transport and energy, humanitarian aid development and security and conflict prevention.

The implementation of these prevention activities contributed to the development of a framework on prevention policy. However, stakeholders emphasised that prevention activities

were only developed and implemented towards the end of the evaluation period and that the prevention policy framework would therefore need more time to 'mature'. Although prevention activities have contributed towards an increased understanding and mitigation of risks, it remains doubtful whether, at the end of the evaluation period, the activities have fully contributed to an enhanced capability to respond to disasters. Stakeholders emphasised in particular that the generated knowledge through risk assessments was not effectively translated into capacity planning. Areas for further work would therefore include further advancements on data collection and sharing including data on disaster and coordinated capacity planning including the creation of buffer capacity.



**Table 2.21 Overview of prevention activities undertaken to date following the 2009 Commission Communication outlining an EU approach on prevention**

Activity	Aim	Description
2010 Guidelines on risk assessment <sup>102</sup>	Improving knowledge-base Risk assessment/risk analysis	The guidelines aim to improve coherence among the risk assessments in the Participating States in prevention, preparedness and planning stages and to make these risk assessments more comparable. The guidelines focus on five cross-cutting themes: governance, disaster planning, disaster data, risk communication and awareness-raising and research and technology transfer.
National risk assessments	Improving knowledge-base Risk assessment/risk analysis	The 2009 Council Conclusions for a Community framework on disaster prevention invited Participating States to further develop national approaches and procedures to risk management including risk analyses, covering the potential major natural and man-made disasters, taking into account the future impact of climate change. The performance of national risk assessments has now been made obligatory in the new EU Civil Protection Mechanism legislation and Participating States are required to submit a summary of their national risk assessment before 22nd December 2015 and from then on every three years.
2014 EU overview of risks <sup>103</sup>	Improving knowledge-base Risk assessment/risk analysis	Based on contribution from Participating States, the EU overview of risks presents a cross-sector overview of major natural and man-made risks that the EU may face in the future. It enables identification of risks and types of risks that are shared by Participating States or regions.
Disaster loss data	Improving knowledge base Making disaster data available and accessible to all	The Commission published a Study <sup>104</sup> in 2013 on existing standards and protocols for recording disaster losses. This Study was published in 2013 and may lead to recommendations for a European approach on disaster loss. The European dimension of loss databases is particularly important to understand and manage the trans-boundary effects of disasters and to ensure coherence with other international databases. It is also crucial in order to formulate better informed policies and disaster risk management strategies.
Identification and exchange of good practices in disaster risk management	Improving knowledge-base Setting standards for good practices in disaster prevention Improving risk governance	The Commission launched a disaster prevention Good Practices programme entitled “Strengthening the EU disaster management capacity – good practices on disaster prevention”. The programme aims to collect information from all Participating States across natural and manmade disasters regarding measures taken to prevent disasters and reduce vulnerability. This programme is expected to lead to the adoption of non-binding EU guidelines on minimum standards for disaster prevention. For the development of these minimum standards the Commission ordered a report <sup>105</sup> that: 1) compiles an inventory of good practices in DRM; 2) analyses the good practices to find general trends in how and why good practices occur; 3) to propose a number of draft guidelines for minimum standards on disaster prevention. Based on 400 examples of good practices from 37 countries, five themes towards European standards have been identified: governance, planning, disaster data, communication and education, and research.
Peer reviews	Improving knowledge-base Improving risk governance and accountability	Peer reviews are a useful tool for the participating EU Civil protection Mechanism states to learn from each other. They can assess each other's disaster prevention and disaster risk management strategies which contributes to better risk management policies and practices. The first such peer review was successfully done in the UK in 2012 <sup>106</sup> where peers from SE, IT and FI undertook a review of the UK disaster risk management

<sup>102</sup> SEC(2010) 1626 final

<sup>103</sup> SWD(2014) 134 final

<sup>104</sup> Joint Research Centre, “Recording Disaster Losses – Recommendations for a European Approach”, Report EUR 26111, 2013

<sup>105</sup> Ecorys, “Good Practices in Disaster Prevention”, Final Report, 29 January 2013.

<sup>106</sup> Peer Review report, United Kingdom 2013, Building resilience to disasters: assessing the implementation of the Hyogo framework for Action (2005-2015)



Activity	Aim	Description
		policy in the context of the Hyogo Framework for Action. The second peer review took place in Finland in 2013 with peers from AT, FR, UK and Georgia <sup>107</sup>
Extension of lessons learned programme to include prevention	Linking relevant actors and policies throughout the disaster management cycle	After each activation of the Mechanism, a "lessons learned" meeting is held in order to review the performance of the Mechanism and draw any key lessons learned. Following the Commission Communication in 2009, the Commission has extended this programme to also include elements of prevention.
Specific courses on prevention under civil protection training programme	Linking relevant actors and policies throughout the disaster management cycle	The Civil Protection Training Programme serves to prepare experts for interventions, thereby enabling an efficient, rapid and flexible response to disasters. The programme includes various different courses including basic courses introducing the Mechanism as well as specialist courses for particular aspects of missions. Following the 2009 Commission Communication, elements of prevention policy have also been incorporated under the training programme.
Organisation of expert meetings on disasters risk management	Linking relevant actors and policies throughout the disaster management cycle	According to stakeholder interviews, meetings are organised by the Commission where relevant authorities in the field of civil protection are gathered and where information and best practices are exchanged.
Inclusion of disaster risk prevention in other EU policies	Linking policies throughout the disaster management cycle as well as improving effectiveness of legislative and financial instruments	Disaster prevention is both affected by and in turn affects a number of policy fields. It is therefore important to mainstream disaster risk management across EU sector and hazard-specific legislation. The Communication on the post 2015 Hyogo framework for action <sup>108</sup> provides an overview of other EU policies contributing to disaster risk management. It shows that civil protection is integrated with at least 13 other EU policies and that there are in total 25 cross-sector legislative instruments, 43 strategies/programmes and some ten proposals for new legislation on cross-sector civil protection.

<sup>107</sup> Peer Review report, Finland, 2014 " Building resilience to disasters: assessing the implementation of the Hyogo framework for Action (2005-2015)

<sup>108</sup> SWD(2014) 133 final: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=SWD:2014:133:FIN>

#### 2.6.1.1 *Relevance*

The relevance of the prevention policy prior implementation was high. The frequency and severity of natural hazards has been increasing, whilst their effects are becoming more and more serious. It is considered more cost-efficient to prevent disasters from happening, or where not possible, to mitigate their effects. For example, for every €1 spent in disaster prevention, approximately €4-7 is saved in disaster response<sup>109</sup>. In view of the cost-effectiveness, stakeholders in Participating States repeatedly called for action on prevention, a view which was also shared by the Parliament and Council who produced several policy documents with a call for the development of a prevention policy framework<sup>110</sup>. The preamble of the Council Conclusions on a Community framework on disaster prevention within the EU of 30 November 2009 list the rationale for undertaking action on prevention e.g. recalling the importance of effective disaster prevention in saving lives and protecting the environment, property and cultural heritage, improving the resilience of the EU and its economy to increasing threats of natural and man-made disasters, etc. Hence the prevention activities responded to the needs of stakeholders at the beginning of the intervention.

The fact that the Prevention Policy Framework triggered a number of policy initiatives in the Civil Protection policy area as well as its mainstreaming in other policy areas provides evidence that the Prevention Policy Framework was still considered necessary by all stakeholders at the end of the evaluation period. This is certainly true in view of the fact that the development of a prevention policy framework is recent and therefore needs more time to mature.

#### 2.6.1.2 *Coherence*

Prevention Policy is linked to all stages of the disaster management cycle (prevention, preparedness, response) as well as the actors involved throughout (internal coherence). Moreover, disaster prevention has been fully integrated into other EU policies and is coherent with international disaster risk management policies and agenda (external coherence).

##### *Internal coherence*

With regard to linking different dimensions of civil protection, the Commission has established a programme of lessons learned from interventions and it extended the scope of the lessons learned programme to also include prevention. In a similar vein, actions were undertaken to increase training and awareness raising in the area of disaster prevention. For example, specific courses were developed on prevention under the Community training programme.

With regard to linking actors, the Commission encourages Participating States to implement coordinated mechanisms for crisis management, involving different public and private stakeholders and has organised expert meetings in Brussels in this respect to gather representatives of various national departments in Participating States.

In addition to such efforts, however, more could be done to further integrate prevention activities into national civil protection policies, linking prevention to preparedness and response. In this respect, a general framework for the sharing of information on risks and risk management capabilities would facilitate a more integrated approach at national level.

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<sup>109</sup> European Commission Factsheet on Disaster Risk Management:

[http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/thematic/disaster\\_risk\\_management\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/thematic/disaster_risk_management_en.pdf)

<sup>110</sup> SEC (2011) 1632 Final, Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact Assessment 2011 Review of the Civil Protection Regulatory Framework: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52011SC1632&from=EN>

## External coherence

### Integration with EU policies

Desk research shows that prevention activities have successfully been integrated in many other key EU policies such as the environment, agriculture and rural development, cohesion policy, solidarity fund, health, insurance, research, industry and infrastructure, transport and energy, climate change, and integrated maritime policy and maritime safety and security, humanitarian aid development and security and conflict prevention. An overview of all relevant EU instruments under different cross-sector EU policies relevant to disaster risk management was provided in the annex to the Commission Communication on the post 2015 Hyogo Framework for Action: Managing risks to achieve resilience<sup>111</sup>. It showed that civil protection was integrated with 13 other EU policies. In total, there were at least 25 cross-sector legislative instruments, 43 strategies/programmes and about ten proposals for new legislation on cross-sector civil protection.

### Integration with International disaster risk management policies

EU risk prevention work in the field of civil protection further complements and is coherent with international disaster risk management policies and agenda. EU legislation<sup>112</sup> on the Union civil protection mechanism explicitly stipulated that the Mechanism took due account of international commitments. The international disaster risk management policies and agenda were underpinned by the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) "Building the resilience of nations and communities to disasters", which stipulated the following five priorities:

- Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation;
- Identify, assess, and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning;
- Use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels;
- Reduce the underlying risk factors; and,
- Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels.

The EU has worked towards these goals through the further development of the civil protection mechanism and implementation of EU policies on civil protection as well as support provided through development cooperation and humanitarian aid. The Commission Communication on the post 2015 Hyogo Framework for Action took stock of these policies. It presented the main achievements related to disaster risk management in the EU. These are summarised in the table below which link the EU actions to the HFA priorities:

**Table 2.22 EU prevention actions and how they link to the HFA priorities**

EU action	HFA priority
Risk assessment and analysis	2
Encouraging learning and exchange of experience to further develop and implement risk management policies and practices	1, 2, 3, 5
Guidance for disaster prevention based on good practices	2
Data availability including establishing European standards and protocols for recording disaster losses	2

<sup>111</sup> Commission Staff Working Document: EU Policies contributing to Disaster Risk Management (SWD(2014)133 final). Available at: [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/news/post\\_hyogo\\_policies\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/news/post_hyogo_policies_en.pdf)

<sup>112</sup> Decision No 2007/779/EC, Euratom (the 2007 mechanism Decision): [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/;ELX\\_SESSIONID=knQTTx8CmGKsRyhX9p43yQWCT2dJvdChV6ZtrzhkhrvCnHGq5WY!-2060938318?uri=CELEX:32007D0779\(01\)](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/;ELX_SESSIONID=knQTTx8CmGKsRyhX9p43yQWCT2dJvdChV6ZtrzhkhrvCnHGq5WY!-2060938318?uri=CELEX:32007D0779(01)) and Decision No 1313/2013/EU which replaces the Mechanism Decision and the Financial Instrument Decision: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:347:0924:0947:EN:PDF>

EU action	HFA priority
Mainstreaming disaster risk management in other EU policies	5
Involvement of the private sector as a tool for disaster management	3
Strong synergies with adaptations to climate change	5
Using science and innovation for disaster risk management	3
Address cross-border impacts and cooperation activities with candidate, potential candidates and other neighbouring countries	1, 2, 5
Enhanced preparedness for response through the development of voluntary pool of pre-committed disaster response capacities, better response planning, a training network, and reinforced cooperation among authorities in the field of training and exercises including strengthened early warning systems	3, 5
EU support to developing countries with a focus on building resilience in crisis prone countries	1, 2, 3, 5

Stakeholders interviewed in the context of this study confirmed that EU policies were based on the international agenda in particular the HFA priorities, but emphasised the need that more could have been done on a bilateral basis with international partners such as the US, Russia and Japan in order to further explore potential benefits.

### 2.6.1.3 Effectiveness

Providing the relative novelty of the Prevention Policy for the Civil Protection Mechanism and Financial Instrument, the effectiveness of Prevention Policy in reaching its high level objectives<sup>113</sup> cannot be assessed in the context of this evaluation. However, the effectiveness of Prevention Policy in implementing its operational objectives is presented below<sup>114</sup>.

Overall, the effectiveness in implementing its operational objective can be deemed as successful. Desk research shows that prevention activities have been developed and implemented as illustrated in Table 2.22. The prevention activities each contributed to achieve a certain goal of the prevention policy framework as stipulated in the 2009 Commission Communication and the supporting Council Conclusions.

#### **Effectiveness in the development of knowledge-based disaster prevention policies at all levels of government**

Activities that contributed to a knowledge-based disaster prevention policy include: risk assessments (guidelines on risk assessments and performance of national risk assessments); the 2014 overview of risks; the study on disaster loss databases; the exchange of good practices in disaster risk management, and; peer reviews.

The knowledge-based disaster prevention policy was primarily based on risk assessment and risk analysis, which according to the 2010 guidelines on risk assessment constituted the basis for a successful disaster risk management strategy. They had the potential to reduce the risk of a disaster or the possible effects of a disaster by monitoring and mapping hazards, risks and vulnerabilities, and, performing risk analysis to enable the planning for appropriate risk mitigation measures. Risk assessments thus required appropriate mapping of the risks facing the EU, but crucially also information on the impacts of disasters (the associated losses in terms of human casualties, property and environment damage as well as economic loss). This allowed policy makers to properly assess the costs and benefit of different disaster prevention measures. In a way, risk assessments thereby linked threats to decision-making. The 2014

<sup>113</sup> i.e. i) where possible prevent disasters from happening, and ii) where disasters are unavoidable, taking steps to minimise their impacts (see previous section)

<sup>114</sup> i.e. Development of knowledge-based disaster prevention policies at all levels of government; Linking the relevant actors and policies throughout the disaster management cycle; Improving the effectiveness of existing financial and legislative instruments; Reinforce international cooperation in the field of prevention.

EU overview of risks and the Study on loss of data contributed towards the monitoring and mapping of hazards, risks and vulnerabilities in this very way.

Theoretically, such prevention activities were expected to raise awareness about the importance of risk prevention measures and to contribute towards a better understanding and mitigation of risks. The production of risk assessments was, in particular, expected to enable public authorities, businesses, NGOs and the general public to reach a common understanding of the risks faced and to help foster an inclusive debate about the relative priority of possible prevention and mitigation measures. However, stakeholders underlined that it remained a challenge for the EU to link the knowledge generated through risk assessments to risk management planning. As such, risk assessments have not yet led to the identification of appropriate mitigation measures and have not led to enhanced capacity to mitigate and/or respond to disasters.

### **Effectiveness in linking the relevant actors and policies throughout the disaster management cycle**

Activities were undertaken to link the different dimensions of civil protection (prevention, preparedness, response) as well as actors throughout the disaster management cycle. For example, the lessons learned programme was extended to include prevention and specific courses on prevention were developed under the Community training programme.

In addition, the European Commission has also aimed to increase risk governance by supporting the exchange of good practices on disaster management as to promote a culture of disaster prevention and is developing guidelines on disaster prevention, focusing on five cross-cutting themes: governance, disaster planning, disaster data, risk communication and awareness-raising, and research and technology transfer. Finally, peer reviews contributed to improve risk governance and accountability and in this way contributed to the development of better disaster prevention strategies. The first such peer review was successfully done in the United Kingdom in 2012 where peers from Sweden, Italy and Finland undertook a review of the UK disaster risk management policy in the context of the Hyogo Framework for Action. The second peer review took place in Finland in 2013 with peers from Austria, France, United Kingdom and Georgia.

Despite such efforts, a gap remained between the different elements of civil protection (prevention, preparedness and response) and more could be done to establish a closer link between actors involved in the disaster management cycle in terms of establishing a general framework for the sharing of information on risks and risk management capabilities.

### **Improving the effectiveness of existing financial and legislative instruments;**

Prevention aspects have been included in existing financial and legislative instruments. The Commission Communication on the post 2015 Hyogo Framework for Action showed that civil protection aspects were integrated with 13 other EU policies. In total, there were at least 25 cross-sector legislative instruments, 43 strategies/programmes and about ten proposals for new legislation on cross-sector civil protection. The incorporation of prevention aspects has increased the effectiveness of such instruments. For example, under the cohesion legislation Participating States are required to link investment in risk prevention and management to the existence of a national or regional risk assessment. The latter helped Participating States identifying appropriate mitigation measures in which Participating States could smartly invest. In this way the instrument has been made more effective and efficient.

### **Effectiveness in generating the intended impact**

Stakeholders interviewed in the context of this Study agreed that the prevention activities contributed to the development of a comprehensive framework on prevention policy and stated that the prevention activities can be seen as building blocks towards achieving these goals. The importance of, in particular, risk assessments was underlined and reference was made to the EU guidelines which were considered useful tools not only within the EU but also beyond (i.e. the guidelines, translated in Arabic language have influenced policy development on civil protection in Arabic countries). Stakeholders confirmed that certain prevention activities (notably risk assessments) had indeed contributed to a better understanding and mitigation of



risks. Some stakeholders also emphasised that the prevention activities had contributed to an increased awareness about the importance of prevention measures, underlining that politicians in Participating States increasingly recognised their cost-benefit and economic gains.

Whilst acknowledging the importance of the prevention activities, stakeholders emphasised however that the prevention policy framework needed more time to mature. For example, despite the useful guidelines on risk assessment and the overview of risks in the EU, data collection including data on disaster losses still needed further work. More crucially, stakeholders also argued that it remained a challenge for the EU to link the knowledge generated through risk assessments to planning. Linking risk assessments to coordinated capacity planning including the creation of buffer capacity (with help of EU funding) would have been an important area where further work was required at the end of the evaluation period. As the potential benefits of linking risk assessments to capacity planning had not been fully delivered, whether prevention activities have contributed to an enhanced ability to cope with major disasters over the period remained questionable. It should be noted that a new provision has been included in the cohesion legislation to link investment in risk prevention and management to the existence of a national or regional risk assessment.

#### **2.6.1.4 Efficiency**

The consensus amongst the Civil Protection community is that prevention is a cost effective and legitimate way to reduce human and economic costs of disasters. As mentioned above, the estimated rate of return of investing in prevention is €4-7 for every €1 spent<sup>115</sup>. Evidence pointed towards the fact that the prevention policy could have achieved greater efficiency for the Mechanism since stakeholders expressed doubts as to:

- The level of interaction with the other actions of the Mechanism: the outcomes of the prevention policy did not appear to have been taken into account in other areas. This may be due to the relatively new existence of the prevention policy. Although it was clear that prevention policy had influenced other policy areas, it was not clear as to how prevention policy outcomes influenced other policy areas in a way that was conducive to efficiency; and,

#### **2.6.1.5 Whether, at the end of the evaluation period, the prevention activities had fully contributed to an enhanced capability to respond to disasters at EU level. EU added value**

Prevention activities have demonstrated their EU-added value to the Mechanism and Participating States. Firstly, prior to the development of a strategic approach of disaster prevention policy at EU level, not all Participating States had developed policies aimed at prevention of disasters. The prevention activities undertaken have incentivised those Participating States to undertake efforts to develop prevention policies. In particular, the EU guidelines on risk assessments contributed towards more coherent methods for the conduction of national risk assessments and the 2014 EU overview contributed to a common understanding of where risks lie. Participating States have also benefitted further from the exchange of practices and expert meetings organised at EU level.

In addition, the common approach to prevention policy was more effective than separate national approaches on prevention, and hence brought EU-added value. In the 2009 Commission Communication the development of a comprehensive framework for prevention policy at EU level, highlighted elements of EU added value in view of the following rationale:

- Disasters do not respect national borders and can have a transnational dimension;
- Disasters can have a negative impact on Commission policies such as agriculture and infrastructure;

<sup>115</sup> DG ECHO Factsheet on Disaster Risk Management:  
[http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/thematic/disaster\\_risk\\_management\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/thematic/disaster_risk_management_en.pdf)



- Economic impacts of disasters may adversely affect economic growth and competitiveness of EU regions (and hence the EU as a whole), and finally;
- Community funding is often required to deal with the aftermath of disasters.

#### **2.6.1.6 *Extent of follow-up on findings and recommendations outlined in the Report on the evaluation of the application of the Civil Protection Mechanism and Civil Protection Financial Instrument for the years 2007-2009***

The Report on the evaluation of the application of the Civil Protection Mechanism and Civil Protection Financial Instrument for the years 2007-2009 stipulated that the EU prevention policy framework should be able to address the various prevention aspects in different EU policy fields (environment, security, health and regional policies) and facilitate further co-operation among Participating States. The Commission Communication on the post 2015 Hyogo Framework showed that civil protection was integrated with 13 other EU policies and that there were at least 25 cross-sector legislative instruments, 43 strategies/programmes and about ten proposals for new legislation on cross-sector civil protection. Cooperation among participating states was supported by the Commission by the organisation of many expert meetings in Brussels, which gathered representatives of various national departments in Participating States, to exchange good practices. The findings and recommendations outlined in the evaluation report have therefore been followed up on.

#### **2.6.1.7 *Key lessons learned***

Reviewing the evaluation of the prevention activities undertaken, the key lessons learned include the following:

- Various policy documents (e.g.) and the subsequent implementation of prevention activities have contributed to the development of a framework on prevention policy, but were only recently developed and implemented and thus need more time to mature.
- Prevention activities have, in particular, contributed to the development of a knowledge-base on prevention and more effective use was made of existing legislative and financial instruments. However, the objective to link different dimensions of civil protection (prevention, preparedness, and response) and actors throughout the disaster management cycle as stipulated in the 2009 Commission Communication was not fully met: a gap remains between prevention on the one hand and preparedness and response on the other as the knowledge generated through risk assessments are not translated into risk management planning. In this respect, prevention activities have contributed to an increased understanding and awareness of risks, but have not (yet) resulted in an enhanced capacity to respond to disasters.
- Similarly, the linking of actors throughout the disaster management cycle has not been fully achieved in the absence of a framework for the sharing of information.

#### **2.6.1.8 *Unintended, unexpected effects and risks***

None of the stakeholders reported on any unintended, unexpected effects and risks under the prevention policy framework.

### **2.6.2 *Main recommendations***

Following on from the key lessons learned, there could be merit in:

- **Design and promote a civil protection collaboration hub or platform.**

DG ECHO should consider designing an online tool to improve collaboration between past and current participants in the Mechanism. This could further contribute to the realisation of a sustainable EU civil protection community and improve the connectivity of its members. The new recast Decision already addresses better linking actors throughout the disaster management cycle by the development of a framework for the sharing of information.

Such a platform could for instance support Participating States in sharing their risk management plans between one another and with the Commission as foreseen by the 2013

Mechanism Decision. The generated knowledge needs to be linked through risk assessments to risk management planning and share risk management plans between Participating States in order to create better coordinated capacity planning eventually leading to the creation of buffer capacity.

■ **Introduce risk management guidelines:**

The Mechanism should publish guidelines for drafting risk management plans so as to incentivise Participating States to translate knowledge generated through risk assessments into capacity planning. It could build on the most advanced Participating States doing national vulnerability / risk assessments and willing to share these at EU level.

## 2.7 Transport of civil protection assistance<sup>116</sup>

### 2.7.1 Objectives and description

#### 2.7.1.1 *Legal basis and objectives*

Transport support and assistance related actions were introduced in 2007<sup>117</sup>, in response to the transport deficit which was observed in the previous years. Commission officials considered that before the introduction of the transport assistance, the offers made by Participating States in response to requests for assistance were either not forthcoming or were conditional upon the availability of transport means. Non-availability of transport means often led to the withdrawal of offers (about 20% of the offers)<sup>118</sup>. In addition, the Commission officials stressed that the available transport offer was not sufficient to enable the efficient pooling of assets from Participating States. Injecting financing was therefore seen as the solution to diminish logistical and financial burden on supporting and requesting countries.

Transport assistance was made available to Participating States offering assistance (i.e. not the affected country). Under Decision 2007/162/EC<sup>119</sup>, 100% of the transportation costs were paid upfront by the Commission; the Participating State providing assistance reimbursed then 50% of the total amount after six months upon the provision of financial and implementation reports and supporting documents (e.g. invoices) – so, in effect the EU co-financed 50% of the costs.

The Commission was responsible for supporting Participating States in obtaining access to equipment and transport resources by:

- The sharing or pooling of participating states' transport assets made available on a voluntary basis;
- The identification of transport assets available on the commercial market or from any other sources (via a broker); and,
- The use of EU funding to pay for the necessary transport assets.

Participating States could request EU financing for transport operations that covered vital needs and were complementary to the assistance already provided. There were strict conditions for the activation of the transport assistance, including:

- The Mechanism must have been activated;
- The affected country must have requested assistance through CECIS;
- The Participating State must have offered assistance;
- The offered assistance must have been accepted by the affected country;
- The offered assistance met vital needs arising from the emergency and complements the assistance provided by the Participating States;
- The assistance complemented, for emergencies in third countries, the overall Community humanitarian response, when present.

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<sup>116</sup> Also refer to section 2.8 of Annex to this final report provided in a separate document.

<sup>117</sup> Decision 2007/162/EC: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32007D0162&from=EN>

<sup>118</sup> This estimation was provided by a Commission official without references to the actual sources. The document provided to the evaluation team did not allow for confirmation of this figure as it was only covering the evaluation period (2007-2013).

<sup>119</sup> Decision 2007/162/EC: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32007D0162&from=EN>

**Box 2.2 New legal framework for the transport assistance under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism**

As stated in the recent Decision on EU Civil Protection Mechanism, the Commission can now cover 55% of the total eligible transport costs. Under specific circumstances, the EU can cover up to 85% of the total transport costs. This can be applied in the following situations:

- The costs relate to the transport of the capacities pre-committed to the voluntary pool; or
- The assistance is necessary to address a critical need and the assistance is not, or not sufficiently, available in the voluntary pool.

For specific cost categories the Commission can cover 100% of the eligible costs, if this is necessary to make the pooling of Participating States' assistance operationally effective and if the costs relate to one of the following:


- The short-term rental of warehousing capacity to temporarily store the assistance from Participating States with a view to facilitating their coordinated transport;
- The repackaging of Participating States' assistance to make maximum use of available transport capacities or to meet specific operational requirements; or
- The local transport of pooled assistance with a view to ensuring a coordinated delivery at the final destination in the requesting country.

Source: Decision 1313/2013/EU: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013D1313&from=EN>

**2.7.1.2 Description**

When all the conditions presented above were met, the Participating States could start a procedure to request the co-financing of their transport costs. The first stage of this procedure was a mandatory pooling phase facilitated by the Commission. If this phase was successful, the support was then pooled with other transport means already made available by other Participating States. If the search for pooling with other transport means was unsuccessful then the request for co-financing through grant and/or the use of the transport broker became eligible. The different steps in this process are presented in Figure 2.37.

**Figure 2.37 EU Transport of civil protection assistance – activation procedure**



Source: ICF

As shown in Table 2.23, the transport assistance was activated 156 times during the evaluation period. All these activations did not actually resulted in an official request for co-financing. Eleven activations were cancelled by the Participating States at different stage of the co-financing process (e.g. after the grant was awarded, after the launch of the pooling phase, before the launch of the pooling phase) and two activations were replaced by free

transport solution after the pooling phase. The Commission had thus no control over these cancellations.

The vast majority of the activations were followed by a request for co-financing (i.e. 143 in total during the evaluation period) and most of these requests were followed by a co-financing grant (122 in total). The transport broker was only used twelve times during the evaluation period: nine times as a standalone solution and three times in combination with a grant. While this figure is rather small it should be noted that these twelve activations all dated from the period 2010-2013, which demonstrates that the use of the transport broker gained in importance during the evaluation period. Similarly, in seven cases, the transport broker was activated but the Participating State decided to either cancel their operation or choose for an alternative transport solution.

During the 2007-2013 period, only four official requests for co-financing were rejected. In all four cases this was due to an administrative error by the Participating States – i.e. submission of the request after the actual transport operation – which made the request invalid. Importantly, at the time of this evaluation the administrative reimbursement procedures were still ongoing for five transport operations.

**Table 2.23 Analysis of the entries within the transport assistance system during the evaluation period**

Follow-up on the entries in the transport assistance system	Number of entries	Total EC net contribution*
Co-financing through Grant	122	€10,887,675
Co-financing through EC contractor	9	€178,488
Combined co-financing (Grant and EC contractor)	3	€29,411
Ongoing procedures**	5	-
Rejected due to administrative fault by Participating State	4	-
Cancelled by Participating States after grant was awarded	1	-
Cancelled by Participating States after launch of pooling phase and request to broker	7	-
Cancelled by Participating State before the launch of the pooling phase	3	-
Free operation after pooling phase	2	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>156</b>	<b>€11,095,574</b>

Notes:

\*The financial figures present the Commission's net contribution after reimbursement from the Participating States. It should be noted that some of the data communicated by the Commission are not definitive but only marginal changes are expected.

\*\* Ongoing procedures indicate requests for co-financing which have been awarded by the Commission but for which the reimbursement procedures are still ongoing.

**Source:** DG ECHO

Table 2.24 shows the number of entries within the Commission's transport assistance system per year; the number of entries followed by an official request for co-financing; and the number of co-financing grants actually awarded per year. Importantly, five ongoing procedures are not integrated into this category as the amount of support was not definitive at the time of this analysis. This table illustrates the Mechanism's capacity to provide transport assistance in a context of a high volume of requests. For instance, the number of co-financing grants allocated was multiplied by ten between 2009 and 2010.

**Table 2.24 Analysis of the number of requests and allocated co-financing through grants and transport broker (EC net contribution)**

Year	Number of entries	Number of request (grant and broker)	Number of co- financing	Total EC net-contribution*
2007	1	1	1	€30,418
2008	2	2	2	€207,641
2009	5	5	5	€217,484
2010	59	53	52	€2,942,110
2011**	56	49	46	€5,865,435
2012***	12	12	11	€121,451
2013***	21	21	17	€1,711,035
<b>Total</b>	<b>156</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>€11,095,574</b>

Note:

\*The financial figures present the Commission's net contribution after reimbursement from the Participating States. It should be noted that some of the data communicated by the Commission are not definitive but only marginal changes are expected.

\*\* In 2011, the Commission used the transport broker three times to facilitate transport with regard to the emergency in Japan. These three cases are not integrated in the analysis as it was not a request from a Participating State.


\*\*\* The financial data for 2012 and 2013 are incomplete as some of the data are not available yet.

Source: DG ECHO

Figure 2.38 shows the top users of transport assistance by the number of requests made and amount of co-financing received during the evaluation period. Sweden led the way by using the transport assistance 29 times during the evaluation period for a total co-financing of more than €3.8 million (Commission contribution). They are followed by Austria, which used the transport assistance 20 times during the period 2007-2013. However the total Commission contribution received by Austria was very low compared to Sweden (i.e. around €250,000).

The five countries which used the transport assistance the most during the evaluation period contains both 'small' (i.e. Austria and Sweden) and 'large' (i.e. France, Italy and the UK) Participating States. Hence, transport assistance benefited more or less equally small and large Participating States. 20 Participating States received co-financing during the evaluation period, indicating that the vast majority of the Participating States were well aware of the existence of the transport assistance. However, out of these 20, the five countries that used the transport assistance the most accounted for almost 70% of the requests for transport assistance.

Figure 2.38 Geographic distribution of the use of the transport assistance




Source: DG ECHO

## 2.7.2 Intervention logic

The intervention logic for the transport assistance is relatively straightforward as this assistance was developed in reaction to a transport deficit which prevented the development of EU disaster responses. Figure 2.39 presents the intervention logic in details.

Figure 2.39 Intervention logic for the transport assistance





## 2.7.3 Final findings on transport of civil protection assistance

### 2.7.3.1 *Relevance*

The establishment of the transport assistance answered a real need identified by the Commission at the beginning of the evaluation period. As stressed by a Commission official, around 20% of the civil protection assistance offered by the Participating States lacked transport means and many offers were conditional to the availability of transport means.

The development of the legal framework to enable transport support was thus highly relevant. Despite this need, Participating States were at first reluctant to use the assistance as it touched on sensitive issues of sovereignty and or control of the Participating States over their assets. However, the increased use of the transport assistance during the evaluation period showed that by the end of the evaluation period it had become a well-established financing instrument.

The evaluation team did not have access to information about the decision-making process in the Participating States on whether to offer assistance in cases of specific emergencies. It was therefore very difficult to evaluate whether the existence of the transport financial support offered by the Commission influenced these decisions. Nevertheless, the evidence consulted and collected so far suggest that the establishment of the transport assistance positively contributed to the decision to provide civil protection assistance in the Participating States. The increased use of the transport assistance between 2007 and 2013 support this finding. Moreover, anecdotal evidence from the online survey shows that the transport assistance proposed by the Mechanism could have speeded up the decision to offer assistance by reducing the overall transport costs. It could even have had a decisive impact on the Participating State's decision to offer civil protection assistance in some cases.

### 2.7.3.2 *Coherence*

The different components of the transport assistance (i.e. pooling phase; identification of transport options on the commercial market; and co-financing) directly contributed to the key objectives of the Mechanism, which were to coordinate the provision of assistance and the deployment of this assistance when required.

With regard to the coherence with other EU objectives and international partners, very limited information was available about the EU efforts in this field. No information was for example communicated about the coordination and collaboration with NATO's Movement Coordination Centre.

### 2.7.3.3 *Effectiveness*

**Overall, the transport assistance was considered as a major step forward for the Mechanism and was considered as a very useful, effective and efficient tool.** It made a major contribution in helping reduce the transport deficit and when it was used, the Mechanism was able to cope with most of the requests (i.e. the transport assistance had a level of flexibility and adequate support which enabled assistance to be provided). As shown in the Table 2.24, the transport assistance has considerably evolved since 2007. The transport assistance has demonstrated its capacity to respond to peaks in demand such as in 2010-2011.

Given the nature of the transport assistance provided<sup>120</sup>, the support was considered as very effective from an operational point of view. As shown in Figure 2.40, during the evaluation period the Commission covered on average 94% of the total eligible costs under the transport assistance scheme.


Despite the relative effectiveness of this financing format, some Participating States requested a different financing format in the last years of the evaluation period. They preferred a system where there would be less financial transactions between the Participating States and the

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<sup>120</sup> I.e. Pre-financing of the transport needs of the Participating State, with the Participating State reimbursing up to 50% of the costs and up to six months after the operations.

Commission, i.e. they would finance the transport costs upfront and would be reimbursed by the Commission after the submission of the required documents.

**Figure 2.40 Total transport assistance requested and awarded per year (€)**



*Note: the financial figures present the Commission net contribution after reimbursement from the Participating States.  
Source: DG ECHO*


The case study on forest fires showed that transport grants provided an additional, practical incentive to Participating countries to provide assistance by easing some of the financial 'burden' involved. There was no reported incident of withdrawal of offers of assistance for financial reasons in the case of forest fires during the evaluation period.

#### **2.7.3.3.1 Effectiveness of transport assistance through grants**

Out of the 143 requests for transport assistance, 134 were followed by co-financing related to 31 disasters within and outside Europe. In the vast majority of the cases (91%) this funding was allocated through a grant. Based on this figure, the Commission has done a very effective and efficient job in the provision of transport support through grant. A large number of grants was allocated over the evaluation period and only four requests were rejected due to an administrative fault from the Participating State (i.e. mainly due to a late submission of the request).

77% of Civil Protection Authorities who participated to the survey considered that the provision of transport support through grant contributed to improving the response to emergency. Timing was not considered an issue. However, 15% of the authorities considered that contractual arrangements could have been made more efficient.

**Figure 2.41 A majority of Civil Protection Authorities considered that the European Commission was effective in the provision of transport through grants**



**Source:** Online survey for national Civil Protection Authorities / national contact points.

**Question:** How effective was the European Commission in the provision of transport support through grants?


Between 8<sup>th</sup> of July 2014 and 18<sup>th</sup> of August 2014, the survey was sent to 35 countries, amongst the 20 national contact points who responded, 13 answered the questions relating to transport.

### 2.7.3.3.2 Effectiveness of transport assistance through transport contractor

With regard to **the provision of transport support through the transport contractor, the evaluation findings are less positive** as it was only used twelve times during the evaluation period. As stressed by different stakeholders, there is potential for considerable improvement in the use of the transport broker. Indeed, when it was used the transport broker seemed to be very adapted for situations requiring a high level of flexibility. During the deployment in Japan in 2011, the collaboration with the transport broker was for example considered extremely useful.

Compared to the figures presented above, 62% of the Civil Protection Authorities considered that the provision of transport through the transport contractor was equally effective. A majority of Civil Protection Authorities (54%) considered that the contractual agreements associated with transport grants and the transport contractors were effective and efficient for the urgent purposes of emergency interventions. Finally the majority of the Civil Protection Authorities did not consider timing an issue for the provision of transport support through a transport contractor.

**Figure 2.42 A majority of Civil Protection Authorities considered that the European Commission was effective in the provision of transport through the transport contractor**



**Source:** Online survey for national Civil Protection Authorities / national contact points.

**Question:** How effective was the European Commission in the provision of transport support through the transport contractor?

Between 8<sup>th</sup> of July 2014 and 18<sup>th</sup> of August 2014, the survey was sent to 35 countries, amongst the 20 national contact points who responded, 16 answered the questions relating to transport.

In total eleven entries within the transport assistance system were cancelled by Participating States due to various reasons (e.g. the Participating States found an alternative transport solution or the grant agreement was cancelled). In two occasions, the entries within the transport assistance system were followed by free operations provided by an external party (e.g., private transport operator or airline).

Finally, the Commission refused to allocate funding for transport assistance in four different cases during the evaluation period. In the majority of the cases, this refusal was due to a late submission of the request for transport assistance. Indeed, the requests had to be made before the actual transport operations once the Mechanism was activated.

#### **2.7.3.3.3 Effectiveness of transport assistance compared to overall objectives**

Overall and despite a few occasions where the transport assistance lacked flexibility and showed its limits<sup>121</sup>, it was a **very effective tool, which clearly contributed to the overarching objectives of the Mechanism**, and Civil Protection Authorities positively evaluated the transport assistance. They considered that the transport assistance reached its objectives in terms of:

- Providing and sharing information on equipment and transport resources that could be made available by the Participating States, with a view to facilitating the pooling of such equipment or transport resources;
- Assisting Participating States to identify and to facilitate their access to transport resources that may be available from other sources, including the commercial market;
- Complementing the transport provided by Participating States by providing additional transport resources necessary for ensuring a rapid response to major emergencies.

This positive assessment was confirmed by the different Commission Officials who participated in the consultation. They considered the transport assistance provided by the Mechanism a real added value. While they recognised that set up efforts took time, transport assistance clearly reached its goal and was appropriately financed to meet its objectives.

#### **2.7.3.4 Efficiency**

During the evaluation period **€62.9 million** were allocated to the transport assistance in the Annual Work Programme published by the Commission. This figure encompasses all the different actions related to transport both within and outside the EU. However as demonstrated above, the Commission's net contribution to the transport assistance was equivalent to around €11 million during the same period.

The table below illustrates the difference between the originally allocated budget and the final Commission contribution to transport assistance. Based on the nature of the support, the Commission had to pay 100% of the transportation costs upfront and the Participating States reimbursed the Commission after a maximum of six months. Table 2.25 shows the gap between the Commission's expected use of the transport assistance and the actual use by the Participating States.

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<sup>121</sup> For example the deployment in Japan demonstrated that with a co-financing limited to 50% and the strict limitation in terms of what can be co-financed it was very difficult to organise in-land transport solution.

**Table 2.25 Difference between the budgets allocated to the transport assistance and the EC net-contribution.**

Years	Budget allocated to Transport and logistics	Total EC net-contribution*
2007	€7,250,000	€30,418
2008	€8,200,000	€207,641
2009	€9,700,000	€217,484
2010	€9,030,000	€2,942,110
2011	€19,430,000	€5,865,435
2012	€4,050,000	€121,451
2013	€5,300,000	€1,711,035
<b>Total</b>	<b>€62,960,000</b>	<b>€11,095,574</b>

*\*The financial figures present the Commission's net contribution after reimbursement from the Participating States. Some of the data communicated by the Commission were not definitive at the time of drafting but only marginal changes were expected.*

**Source:** Annual Work Programmes 2007 to 2013.

As stressed by a Commission official, the price of transport solutions during an emergency could be often considerable and over-priced compared to a similar transport solution in 'normal' circumstances. Placed in the context of a shortage of transport means and some of the risks associated with going to affected countries, this could be seen as 'business as usual'. According to the Commission official, the selection of the transport solution was based on the best available solution and 'price fluctuations were difficult to anticipate, which makes it difficult to assess the efficiency of the transport assistance. However, the following observations could be made:

- First, the transport pooling phase mandated by the legal framework **led to efficient pooling and combined transport operations**. Although there is no figure about the cost-savings associated with this action, they could be substantial as transport resources were used more efficiently.
- Second, **the use of the transport broker was designed in a way which ensured cost-effectiveness**. Indeed, when contacted the transport broker had a four-hour window to come up with at least three different transport options. The requesting Participating State then chose which option to contract but was also entitled to not choose any of the options. However, considering the limited use of the transport broker and contractor, it can be argued that the efficiency of this system may not have been that optimal.

### 2.7.3.5 EU added value

The transport assistance proposed by the Mechanism brought EU added value by directly supporting the deployment of disaster support assistance in affected countries. Examples of EU added value include the action providing:

- Important cost-savings at Participating State and EU level by supporting the pooling of transport assets;
- Sufficient flexibility and allowing for important ad-hoc support when required by the situation in the field. For example during the intervention in Libya and Tunisia in 2011, the EU transport co-financing reached almost €5 million (Commission net contribution) due to the high number of flights associated with the repatriation efforts.

Without transport assistance Participating States would have been less prone to offer assistance in the case of disaster within or outside Europe.

### 2.7.3.6 *Extent of follow-up on findings and recommendations outlined in the Report on the evaluation of the application of the Civil Protection Mechanism and Civil Protection Financial Instrument for the years 2007-2009*

Table 2.26 presents the key findings and recommendations from the previous evaluation of the Mechanism covering the period 2007-2009. As the transport assistance had just been established, the findings and recommendations were based on very limited experience of the action. Despite this limitation, the report identified important findings. The new Decision set as the legal basis for the Mechanism by the Commission in December 2013 provided new rules for the transport assistance. It was clearly designed on the basis of the findings of the previous evaluation.

**Table 2.26 Summary of the findings and recommendations from the previous evaluation and extent of follow-up on these findings**

Key findings and recommendation from the Interim evaluation	Extent of follow-up
The procedures for use of the Transport Provision were complicated, and the documentation requirements are considered excessive and appear to represent a barrier to take-up.	The new legal framework revised the rules for the EU transport assistance. The system was more flexible and allowed for different shares of financing depending on the circumstances. Transport assistance was also integrated in trainings and exercises to facilitate its use by Participating States.
The current compensation rate (50%) was much debated in this evaluation.	The new legal framework set the co-financing rate at 55% with possibility for the Commission to co-finance up to 85% and 100% of the total eligible costs in certain circumstances.
There may be a risk that the Transport Provisions reduce the attention of individual Participating States with regard to ensuring that assistance really meets needs, and that assistance is provided as cost-effectively as possible taking into account also the opportunities of undertaking purchases on site or nearby.	Mechanisms were put in place to ensure that the transport assistance was only used when required and that the most cost-effective option was chosen. However, these mechanisms were already in place during the previous evaluation.
There has been less improvement in regular coordination and collaboration with NATO's Movement Coordination Centre.	No information was communicated about the coordination and collaboration of transport with international partners.

Source: [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2011/CP\\_Final\\_Report2.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2011/CP_Final_Report2.pdf) and ICF analysis

### 2.7.3.7 *Key lessons learned*

Despite the overall positive evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of the transport assistance presented above, a series of obstacles and opportunities for improvement have been identified. These include:

- The transport assistance could only be requested once the MIC/ERCC was activated, which could have led to delays in operations. No retro-active financing was made possible under the legislation in place.
- The mandatory pooling phase associated with the transport assistance procedure was considered too long and could have led to delays in the response operations.
- The application process for a transport grant was considered complex and stressful – especially as it happened at a critical time in the preparation of the Civil Protection operations. It was moreover considered very strict. However, the participation in the civil protection exercises and training tackling the transport assistance should ease this process.



- In some operations other organisations (such as UN or NATO) provided transport solutions such as Air Bridge at no cost for the Participating States. In these cases, there was no incentive for using the transport assistance from the Mechanism.
- The Japan case study showed the limits of the then existing transport assistance arrangement. Indeed, the Commission stressed in the lessons learned document that with a co-financing of 50% it was difficult and burdensome to organise in-land transport. The problem, however, was not the budget (which would be available) but rather the rigidity of the legislation. The new legal framework enables such flexibility.
- The availability of transport assistance using a transport broker was not sufficiently communicated, hence the low utilisation rate achieved despite the demonstrated advantages of using a transport broker (e.g. high level of flexibility, free the officers to take care of other elements of the deployment).

#### **2.7.3.8 Unintended, unexpected effects and risks**

Three important risks and unexpected effects of the transport assistance have been identified:

- Firstly, during the evaluation period some of the Participating States were not keen on using the transport support scheme as they wanted to use their own assets so that they could be identified on the ground. Allowing Participating States enhance their visibility alongside the one of the EU could lead to important policy gains.
- Secondly, some Participating States were not prepared to share their aircraft capability. In some cases, most of the assistance was used nationally, and the Commission did not have access to that information. There were also obstacles that had to do with the capacity to manoeuvre aircrafts due to administrative requirements for deployment.
- Finally, some Civil Protection Authorities in the Participating States perceived a risk of delay when using the transport assistance due to the heavy and strict administrative procedure.

#### **2.7.4 Main recommendations**

Before considering potential recommendations for the transport assistance, it is important to recognise that the new legal framework for the Mechanism<sup>122</sup> includes an important modification of the transport assistance. It enables more flexibility in terms of the amount of financing (up to 85% and event 100% financing under specific circumstances) and can finance additional elements of the logistics chain which should allow for more flexibility in the field (e.g. warehousing, repackaging and local transport). It also sets the basis for the development of a voluntary pool of pre-committed capacities from the Participating States. The new legal framework therefore already tackles some of the key issues identified in this evaluation.

##### **■ Enable 100% financial support for the transport of assets from the voluntary pool**

Despite the existing transport assistance, some stakeholders argued that there was still a lack of assets to transport the offered assistance. To address this, the transport of assets by Participating States from the voluntary pool could be eligible for 100% co-financing. The Commission proposed 100% co-financing for this type of transport in the proposal for the new legislation. However, in the end the new legislation only allows for a co-financing of 85% of the costs for the transport of the capacities pre-committed to the voluntary pool.

##### **■ Raise awareness of the benefits of using the Commission transport contractor**

The use of the transport broker has been very limited during the evaluation period despite the benefits it generated when it was used. The Commission should advertise the advantages of using the transport contractor more broadly through the development of a communication campaign / factsheet, or through briefings for Civil Protection Authorities.

<sup>122</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013D1313&from=EN>



## 2.8 Accidental marine pollution<sup>123</sup>

### 2.8.1 Objectives and description

#### 2.8.1.1 *Legal basis and objectives*

The responsibilities in the field of marine pollution at EU level are complex and have considerably evolved in the last decade. Until 2006, DG Environment was in charge of the implementation of actions under the Community Framework for co-operation in the field of accidental or deliberate marine pollution (hereafter referred to as Community Framework). DG Environment was assisted in that task by the Management Committee for Marine Pollution (MCMP), a committee of high level government experts. When the Community Framework ended in 2006, the responsibilities related to marine pollution response and preparedness were split between two actors: the Commission and EMSA.

Based on Article 1(2) of the Mechanism Decision<sup>124</sup> and Article 2(2) of the Civil Protection Financial Instrument<sup>125</sup>, the response to accidental marine pollution emergencies fell within the scope of EU civil protection assistance. The ERCC was thus responsible for the coordination of responses in the case of marine pollution. This coordination was based on a part of CECIS which was specifically dedicated to marine pollution<sup>126</sup>. This responsibility was confirmed by the recent Decision on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism adopted in 2013, which covered actions in the field of prevention of, preparedness for and response to marine pollution, with exception from the activities which are specifically allocated to EMSA.

The other key player at EU level regarding marine pollution is EMSA which was set up in 2002 following the Erika disaster in France<sup>127</sup>. However, it was only in 2007 after the end of the Community Framework that the Agency established a Consultative Technical Group for Marine Pollution Preparedness and Response (CTG MPPR) composed of Participating State pollution response experts which fell within the scope of its mandate as defined by the amended EMSA Regulation<sup>128</sup>.

EMSA has assumed the leading role in ensuring a uniform and effective level of maritime safety, maritime security, prevention of and response to pollution caused by ships as well as response to marine pollution caused by oil and gas installations<sup>129</sup> and providing technical and scientific assistance to the European Commission and Participating States. With regard to marine pollution EMSA offered the following assistance:

- Stand-by Oil Spill Response Vessels (request always via MIC/ERCC);
- Satellite imagery service for monitoring spills to complement surveillance and monitoring activities by aircraft (CleanSeaNet);
- Pollution response experts to assist national authorities (operational and technical support); and
- MAR-ICE network (for chemical spills at sea).

#### 2.8.1.2 *DG ECHO key activities related to marine pollution from 2007 to 2013*

DG ECHO developed the following activities related to marine pollution during the period 2007-2013:

<sup>123</sup> Also refer to section 2.9 of Annex to this final report provided in a separate document.

<sup>124</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32007D0779%2801%29&from=EN>

<sup>125</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32007D0162&from=EN>

<sup>126</sup> <https://webgate.acceptance.ec.europa.eu/CECIS/login.jsp>

<sup>127</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:208:0001:0009:EN:PDF>

<sup>128</sup> See the Communication “Cooperation in the field of accidental or deliberate marine pollution after 2007” available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52006DC0863&from=FR>

<sup>129</sup> New task given to the Agency by Regulation (EU) No 100/2013

- **MIC/ERCC:** During the period 2007-2013, the MIC/ERCC was activated nine times for marine pollution reasons. Out of these nine activations, four were for emergency situation located in Participating States (three in the EU and one in Norway) and five were outside the EU. Out of these nine activations, four led to the deployment of EU Civil Protection Teams. Involving a total of 13 experts and three MIC/ERCC Liaison Officers.
- **Prevention and Preparedness Projects:**
  - In the period 2007-2013, DG ECHO financed five projects on preparedness in relation to maritime pollution, out of 43 preparedness projects. The first projects related to marine pollution were approved in 2011. The five projects represented an investment of €1.8 million for DG ECHO, equivalent to 12% of the total budget allocated to preparedness projects.
  - Over the same period two projects on prevention were financed out of 40 projects. These two projects represented a budget of €902,500, equivalent to 4.5% of the total budget allocated to prevention projects.
- **Civil Protection exercises:** DG ECHO co-financed the first marine pollution exercise in 2012. This was the Balex Delta organised by Finland in 2012. This was the only exercise related to marine pollution during the period 2007-2013.
- **Modules:** None of the existing modules directly related to marine pollution. This did however not imply that some of the modules could not have been implemented for marine pollution emergencies.
- **Training courses:** None of the existing training courses are directly related to marine pollution. However, this does not imply that no one from the marine pollution community attended the existing training courses.
- **Exchange of experts:** No detailed information about the profile of the individuals participating to the exchange of experts was communicated to the evaluation team. The reports on the EU Exchange of Experts in Civil Protection showed that the experts with expertise in the field of response on shore to marine pollution were part of the groups which were the least represented in the exchange of experts – less than 50 experts with expertise in the field of marine pollution participated in 2009<sup>130</sup> and less than ten experts participated in 2012. EMSA ran EMPOLLEX Exchange of Experts Programme, which included at-sea response to marine pollution in its scope during the evaluation period.

## 2.8.2 Intervention logic

Given the specificity of marine pollution events, the intervention logic is not as straightforward for this action as for some of the other actions of the Mechanism. There are different reasons for this:


- First, marine pollution was a topic of the Mechanism as opposed to an action. This type of disaster was mainstreamed through actions of the Mechanism (i.e. there were modules and exchange of experts-activities related to marine pollution and maritime pollution experts had the opportunity to participate to civil protection trainings). In some cases, the intervention logic in the field of marine pollution was thus similar to these of the other components (i.e. the intervention logic for exchange of experts related to marine pollution was the same as for the other exchange of experts).
- Secondly, marine pollution events have specific characteristics which are very different from other civil protection emergencies. They involve many different stakeholders (public and private) and the international response to such events is strongly focused around particular regional seas. Regional Agreements in place at sea basin level are therefore the key players to ensure international cooperation and coordination.
- Finally, as exposed above, EMSA was a key player for maritime safety and for supporting Participating States in response to marine pollution at sea during the evaluation period. In

<sup>130</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2011/CP/Annex\\_IIIB.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2011/CP/Annex_IIIB.pdf)

comparison with the other actions of the Mechanism, DG ECHO was thus not the only player to develop actions in this area at EU level.

Despite this complexity, the Commission developed clear intervention logic for DG ECHO and the Mechanism in the field of marine pollution. As exposed below, the activities put in place for this field supported both the EU civil protection and the marine policy objectives.

**Figure 2.43 Intervention logic of DG ECHO in the field of marine pollution**



### 2.8.2.2 Contribution to the EU civil protection objectives

Overall, the activities developed by DG ECHO in the field of marine pollution contributed to the three key objectives of the Mechanism (i.e. facilitate coordination; provision of support; and protection of people, environment, property and cultural heritage):

- The MIC/ERCC coordinated the EU responses to marine pollution responses nine times during the period 2007-2013;
- When marine pollution disasters occurred within or outside Europe the MIC/ERCC also facilitated the support to the affected Participating States. These interventions often occurred in cooperation with EMSA which provided expertise and logistical support (for example through its inventory of Stand-by Oil Spill Response Vessels). In the case of the Deepwater Horizon oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico, the MIC/ERCC coordinated the support provided by the seven Participating States and EMSA.
- These different operations contributed to the protection of human lives and the environment.

The other activities put in place by DG ECHO in the field of marine pollution (exercise and projects) also contributed to these objectives by building **prevention and preparedness capacities**.

### 2.8.2.3 Contribution to the EU marine policy objectives

The Commission published a series of Communications and established schemes to ensure that DG ECHO's activities in the field of marine pollution were coordinated with the overall EU Maritime policy objectives. However in order to evaluate whether this was actually the case, it is important to identify what the EU maritime policy objectives actually were. In the Regulation establishing the Programme to support the further development of an Integrated Maritime Policy<sup>131</sup>, a series of detailed objectives were listed. This list included the following objectives relevant for DG ECHO:

- Contribute to the **development of cross-sector tools**;
- **Promote the protection of the marine environment**, in particular its biodiversity, and the sustainable use of marine and coastal resources and to further define the boundaries of the sustainability of human activities that have an impact on the marine environment. More precisely, the Programme shall support the protection and preservation of the marine and coastal environment, as well as prevent and reduce inputs to the marine environment, including marine litter, with a view to phasing out pollution; and,
- **Support the development and implementation of sea- basin strategies.**

**Different activities developed by DG ECHO clearly supported and contributed to these objectives.** They included:

- The **development of CECIS for marine pollution (in operation from late-2014)**, a cross-sector tool which aims to simplify the response to marine pollution and therefore to increase their efficiency. The tool is meant to provide a single entry point for a database of European pollution response assets and information. It is meant to be accessible for Participating States, Regional Agreement Secretariats, third countries that were contracting parties to Regional Agreements, DG ECHO and EMSA.
- The **development of marine pollution prevention and preparedness projects** clearly supported the objective of phasing out pollution by for example supporting the development of risk prevention measures (BE-AWARE) or the improvements of shorelines defences against marine pollution (ISDAMP+).
- **DG ECHO was also closely collaborating with the Regional Agreements** in place in the different EU sea-basins.

## 2.8.3 Final findings on accidental marine pollution

### 2.8.3.1 Relevance

The involvement of DG ECHO and the Mechanism into marine pollution disaster came from the need to coordinate the onshore and offshore responses to such events. Based on this need, the MIC/ERCC was appointed as the responsible body for the coordination of responses in the case of marine pollution<sup>132</sup>.

Despite this need to coordinate onshore and offshore operations, EMSA expressed some doubts about the need to involve DG ECHO in the management of disasters at sea, indicating that marine pollution events are very different from disaster requiring the intervention of Civil Protection Authorities. Moreover, the two communities (marine pollution and civil protection) involve very different actors. The marine pollution community involves many private actors which can endorse a variety of roles such as polluters, support for rescue services, etc. As will be discussed below, the Commission had established a series of mechanisms to ensure efficient cooperation between DG ECHO and EMSA.

<sup>131</sup> Regulation EU No1255/2011, available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2011:321:FULL&from=EN>

<sup>132</sup> As presented above, this responsibility was confirmed by the recent Decision on the Mechanism which re-established the division of tasks between the Commission and EMSA in the field of marine pollution.

### 2.8.3.2 Coherence

As demonstrated above in section 2.8.2.2, overall the activities developed by DG ECHO in the area of marine pollution seem to have clearly supported the key objectives of the Mechanism. As for other disasters, the MIC/ERCC coordinated the support of the Participating States in case of major marine pollution disasters inside and outside the EU. These actions then directly contributed to the protection of the environment. Other activities developed by DG ECHO in this field (such as exercise and prevention and preparedness projects) also contributed to these objectives by building prevention and preparedness capacities.

#### *Coherence between DG ECHO and EMSA*

The section also demonstrated that the actions developed by DG ECHO supported the broader EU maritime policy objective. In order to ensure the coherence between its different policies, the Commission set up a series of common objectives for the cooperation between EMSA and DG ECHO<sup>133</sup>. These common objectives included:

- To ensure a response to disasters that is as effective and consistent as possible: Agency staff members with specific experience are able to support the MIC and/or the affected State, while the Agency can assist the Participating States and the Commission with the supply and analysis of satellite imagery;
- To develop a mutual alert system;
- To integrate EMSA into the Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS) set up under the Mechanism;
- To embed EMSA's participation in missions on the ground by teams of experts.

In order to meet these common objectives, the Commission has set up different mechanisms to ensure a clear division of tasks between these two actors and good coordination. These mechanisms included:

- A consultative Technical Group for Marine Pollution Preparedness and Response (CTG MPPR): The CTG MPPR was a follow up to the MCMP which was previously run by DG Environment. It was run by EMSA and was composed of Participating States' pollution experts and representatives from DG ECHO. Its objective was to improve preparedness for and response to accidental and deliberate pollution from ships.
- A workshop on "Co-ordinated at-sea and shoreline pollution response": This series of workshops started in 2009 to consider the full response chain of marine pollution events. These workshops were organised within the framework of the CTG MPPR.

#### *Coherence between DG ECHO and Regional Agreements*

DG ECHO actively cooperated with four Regional Agreement developed in the EU sea-basins to ensure the protection of the marine environment. DG ECHO considered these Regional Agreements as the key elements of the EU framework to fight marine pollution. They were more relevant than the EU Civil Protection Mechanism as marine pollution occurred at their level. The collaboration between DG ECHO and the Regional Agreements was very strong and well organised. This cooperation took different forms:

- Participation in the work of the Regional Agreements as a contracting party;
- Financing of prevention and preparedness projects led by the Regional Agreements Secretariat. This was the case of the three following projects:
  - BE-AWARE I and II, coordinated by the Bonn Agreement Secretariat;
  - POSOW, coordinated by the Barcelona Convention secretariat.


In addition DG ECHO participated in the Inter-Secretariat Meeting between Regional Agreements organised by EMSA. The objective of these meetings were to facilitate and

<sup>133</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52006DC0863&from=EN>



strengthen the exchange of information and good practice between the various Regional Agreements, including working towards common projects with beneficial results for all.

**Figure 2.44 EU involvement in Regional Agreements to combat marine pollution**



**Source:** <http://ec.europa.eu/echo/en/what/civil-protection/response-to-marine-pollution>

### 2.8.3.3 Effectiveness

Considering the existing EU legal framework for accidental marine pollution, the effectiveness of the activities developed by DG ECHO in this field depended directly on the effectiveness of its collaboration with EMSA.

From an operational point of view DG ECHO has been effective in coordinating the EU response in the case of accidental marine pollution disasters inside and outside the EU. As stated above, the MIC/ERCC has been activated nine times for marine pollution reasons during the period 2007-2013 and all these activation have been positively evaluated. EMSA was involved with seven of these activations.

The nature of the DG ECHO-EMSA collaboration varied from one disaster response to the other. The following types of collaboration had been identified in the data transmitted by DG ECHO on the activation of the MIC:

- MIC assessment team was deployed in Ukraine in 2007 for shoreline response (outside EMSA's mandate);
- EMSA was part of the assessment or operational team deployed by the MIC. This was for example the case in the operation following a 10,000 tonnes oil spill in South Korea in 2007.
- EMSA was called upon by the MIC to provide advices on the operations. This was for example the case in 2009 when an oil spill was identified in the Celtic Sea. EMSA activated its mechanism to identify oil recovery vessels.

According to the short internal evaluation provided by DG ECHO, the cooperation with EMSA worked well for all the operations, the MIC's activities in the field of marine pollution were therefore considered as effective. As stressed by EMSA it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the ERCC in the field of accidental marine pollution at this stage as the ERCC has only been activated once since its launch in May 2013. It was activated in November 2013 for an oil spill in the Philippines. The ERCC deployed one French expert under the joint UNEP/UNOCHA mission in the Philippines.

Regarding the effectiveness of DG ECHO's other activities in the field of accidental marine pollution (i.e. prevention and preparedness projects, exercises, training, modules), the effectiveness varied from one activity to the other. In the field of prevention and preparedness

projects, the effectiveness of some projects was considered as very high. This was for example the case of the BE-AWARE I and II projects which enabled the development of oil pollution risk assessment studies in the North Sea which would not have been possible without the financial support of DG ECHO. On the contrary, in the field of exercises, the involvement of DG ECHO in the exercise BALEX was not considered as very effective by EMSA. Indeed, the exercise occurred every year independently of DG ECHO's support and in 2012, DG ECHO's involvement did not deliver the expected results according to EMSA. DG ECHO had a different perspective and stated that the additional funding from the Mechanism allowed the inclusion of more elements in the exercise and identifying areas where European and Mechanism's actions may still be better integrated.

#### **2.8.3.4 Efficiency**

The Work Programmes for the evaluation period did not provide information about the share of budget allocated to accidental marine pollution. Indeed, as accidental marine pollution is mainstreamed through the different actions of the Mechanism, it was integrated in the different budget lines. The evaluation team would have had to access more budgetary information in order to fully evaluate the efficiency of accidental marine pollution related actions.

#### **2.8.3.5 EU added value**

The EU added value of DG ECHO's activities in the field of marine pollution was related to its capacity to coordinate both onshore and offshore responses. By doing this, DG ECHO had the opportunity to bring the marine pollution and civil protection communities closer together and support cooperation and collaboration where needed. This was considered as an important added value by many stakeholders as these two communities usually work separately. Key initiatives which were considered as an added value for both communities included:

- The launch of a version of CECIS dedicated to marine pollution which is meant to be open to both communities and to third countries. It launched in late 2014<sup>134</sup>.
- The financing of prevention and preparedness projects in the field of marine pollution. The opening of these projects to the marine pollution communities was considered as an important element to bring the two communities together.

Concerning the last point, it was also recognised that the Mechanism represented an important new source of financing for projects in the field of marine pollution. The crucial importance of DG ECHO's financial support to projects such as BE-AWARE I and II was highlighted by the project coordinators and participants. DG ECHO was considered as the only source of funding available for this type of projects (R&D in the field of risk assessment). This project was a crucial point of the Bonn Agreement Working Programme and should lead to the development of risk assessment studies and evaluation of the preparedness to oil pollution accidents in each country of the Bonn Agreement in the period 2013-2016.

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<sup>134</sup> Before the establishment of CECIS for marine pollution, the same application was used by civil protection and marine pollution authorities:

- Civil Protection users had full access to CECIS and they connected to it through TESTA
- Marine Pollution users could access CECIS through a different URL, but did not have access to all Civil Protection emergencies

The new CECIS for Marine Pollution will allow further integration with EMSA (the application is ready, but will be rolled out later in 2014) – there will be two separate applications, but with a common access. It will also solve the security issues associated with the use of CECIS for Marine Pollution (i.e. one of the key reasons to have a separated CECIS for marine pollution was that marine pollution authorities wanted to open CECIS to third countries). Civil Protection Authorities are more sensitive to security and that is also one of the reasons for splitting the application.



#### **2.8.3.6 *Extent of follow-up on findings and recommendations outlined in the Report on the evaluation of the application of the Civil Protection Mechanism and Civil Protection Financial Instrument for the years 2007-2009***

Marine pollution was not part of the previous evaluation but the report highlighted in its conclusion that coordination with EMSA was an area for improvement, with some duplication noted between the MIC and EMSA. As demonstrated above, the Commission and EMSA have invested considerable efforts to improve their coordination and clarify the role of both organisations. The cooperation framework was thus clearer at the end of the evaluation period.

#### **2.8.3.7 *Key lessons learned***

This evaluation identified a series of opportunities to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the cooperation between DG ECHO and EMSA. Key elements include:

- Access to the EU CP training courses for marine pollution experts should be made easier;
- More training courses should be offered to the Participating States with regard to the use of CECIS for marine pollution emergencies;
- Applying the existing practices and procedures (e.g. training, modules, exchange of experts, etc.) in place within DG ECHO to the marine pollution sector would be an added value. Concrete actions and needs could be defined jointly by the Participating States and DG ECHO with the support of EMSA as appropriate.

While EMSA was not in a position to 'evaluate' the MIC/ERCC as it had been activated only once in the context of a large marine pollution event since its launch in May 2013, the following suggestions were made to ensure its effectiveness in the case of marine pollution:

- If the MIC/ERCC remains the coordination platform for marine pollution events, the understanding and expertise of the ERCC's officers in the field of accidental marine pollution would be considerably increased;
- More exercises involving the ERCC and the marine pollution community should be organised;
- Guidance about detailed procedures in the case of marine pollution should be published;
- Guidance about the interaction between the different players involved in marine pollution should be published;
- As the context of maritime pollution is very different from other disaster situations, specific procedures should be developed; and,
- There is a need for more communication and awareness raising activities on the role of the ERCC to make the private actors knowledgeable of the existence of the ERCC and what it does or does not do.

#### **2.8.3.8 *Unintended, unexpected effects and risks***

One of the main unintended effects from DG ECHO's activities in the field of marine pollution was the creation of an additional reporting tool in the case of marine pollution disaster (i.e. marine pollution CECIS). Different actors involved in the Civil Protection and Marine Pollution cooperation (Participating States, Regional Agreements and EMSA) stressed the difficulty to work with the multiple reporting and notification procedure of acute pollution in Europe. At the end of the evaluation period, Participating States in reporting marine pollution had to use the following tools:

- CECIS for request for assistance and information platform in the case of emergency;
- SafeSeaNet for maritime traffic information; and,
- PolRep or other systems at regional level:

Each of these tools had different governing rules (i.e. regarding the access to third country), content and scope. This created an administrative burden which could have led to delays in

the case of an emergency. This has been a recurrent remark and was extensively discussed in different fora. No single solution has been identified at this stage. However, the creation of a CECIS dedicated to marine pollution was a step in the right direction as it finally answered the request of the marine pollution community to open this platform to third countries.

#### 2.8.4 Main recommendations

As appeared from the analysis presented above, “accidental marine pollution” was a very distinct component of the Mechanism compared to the other ones:

- Firstly, it is a type of hazard and not an element supporting civil protection preparedness, prevention or deployment as many of the other components. Accidental marine pollution was therefore “mainstreamed” through the other components of the Mechanism (i.e. there were training-, modules-, exchange of experts-activities related to marine pollution) as any other type of disaster.
- Secondly, the characteristics of accidental marine pollution events are very different from the other disasters for which the Mechanism could be activated. This has not only been because it has involved a very specific community of stakeholders. It was the only type of disaster in which DG ECHO was not the key player ensuring international cooperation and coordination. Regional Agreements and EMSA have had a predominant role in this field.

Based on these observations, one could legitimately raise the question of what exactly should be the Mechanism’s role in the field of accidental marine pollution and how it should be treated within the existing structure. While many efforts have already been deployed to ensure efficient collaboration and cooperation amongst the different players active in the field of marine pollution we suggest DG ECHO to continue these efforts.

- **Evaluate the cooperation between DG ECHO, EMSA and the Regional Agreements in the field of accidental marine pollution**

Despite existing efforts, there is a need for improving further the cooperation between DG ECHO, EMSA and the Regional Agreements. A first step in that direction could be to evaluate the mechanisms currently in place (e.g. the CTG MPPR; the Workshops on “Co-ordinated at-sea and shoreline pollution response” and the Inter-Secretariat Meeting between Regional Agreements, DG ECHO and EMSA) in order to better understand the real needs and gaps in the current landscape. In addition, it would be useful to examine what the added value of the Mechanism in the field of accidental marine pollution could be (e.g. pure coordination role; development of dedicated modules; financing role for specific projects). Finally, the opportunities identified in coordination with EMSA and the Regional Agreements could be implemented.

- **Improve the cooperation between the maritime and Civil Protection Authorities in the short term:**

While the previous recommendation looks at improving cooperation in the long term, possible ways to improve current cooperation could include:

- Guidance about the exact procedures to follow in the case of responses to accidental marine pollution should be published;
- Develop more awareness raising activities about MIC/ERCC’s role in the field of marine pollution;
- Encourage the organisation of exercises involving civil protection and maritime authorities.
- Optimise the reporting at MS, regional and EU level in the case of accidental marine pollution events: The current three reporting systems that Participating States have to use in the case of accidental marine pollution were considered as burdensome and could lead to delays in responding to disasters. A thorough study of the different reporting systems should be undertaken in order to analyse how these processes could be improved and optimised.

## 2.9 Pilot project and preparatory actions in the area of civil protection<sup>135</sup>

During 2008-2010, the Commission ran a preparatory action programme on an EU rapid response capability with funding from the European Parliament. The aim of the preparatory actions was *“to test and implement innovative arrangements to enhance the availability of resources for European civil protection operations launched in the framework of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism”*. The Preparatory action programme covered all types of natural or man-made disaster. To this end, funding was made available for:

- The development and deployment of multinational modules;
- Impact or needs assessment studies;
- Equipment not available or limited to specific Participating States; and,
- Scientific back-up office/networks.

Table 2.27 provides an overview of the preparatory actions financed between 2008 and 2010, by indicating the year of the call, the project title, the leading beneficiary organisation and total eligible costs.

The pilot project European Forest Fire Tactical Reserve (EUFFTR) was used to test and develop stand-by assets to fight forest fires in order to respond more quickly and facilitate coordination of the response to major emergencies. The EUFFTR enabled a very fast deployment of Canadair aircrafts rented by France and benefiting from an 85% co-financing from the Commission.

**Table 2.27 Number of preparatory action programmes and pilot project (2008-2010)**

Year call	Type of action	Project title	Lead organisation	EC contribution (€)
2008	Preparatory action	BaltFloodCombat - Establishment of multinational flood response capability	Estonian Rescue Board	655,150
2008	Preparatory action	EU Rapid Response Capability 7	Ministère de l'Intérieur et e l'Aménagement du Territoire	997,600
2008	Preparatory action	EUTAC European Technical Assistance	The Johanniter	462,250
2008	Preparatory action	USAR Increase Capability of the Czech Urban and Rescue Team	Ministry of Interior - General Directorate of the Fire and Rescue Service of the Czech Republic	187,000
2008	Preparatory action	Pisa Advanced Response Team in Emergency (PISARTE)	Gruppo di Chirurgia per Interventi di Protezione Civile,	968,000
2009	Pilot project	EU FFTR 2009	Ministère de l'Intérieur, de l'Outremer et des Collectivités Territoriales, Direction de la Sécurité Civile – France	3,500,000
2009	Preparatory action	Action préparatoire pour une capacité de réaction rapide de l'Union Européenne (5 pays) Renforcement des capacités additionnelles de l'UE - EU ACR 5	Ministère de l'Intérieur, de l'Outremer et des Collectivités Territoriales, Direction de la Sécurité Civile	810,600
2009	Preparatory action	Cold Conditions module	Crisis Management Centre	1,132,000


<sup>135</sup> Also refer to section 2.10 of Annex to this final report provided in a separate document.

Year call	Type of action	Project title	Lead organisation	EC contribution (€)
2009	Preparatory action	Emergency Temporary Shelter - A reinforced concept	Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency	1,129,000
2009	Preparatory action	Emergency Temporary Shelter - Management System - EURETS	Arbeiter Samariter Bund Österreichs	299,300
2009	Preparatory action	European Flood response capacity	Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency	712,000
2009	Preparatory action	European rapid response capability in the field of water search and rescue	Veiligheidsregio Haaglanden	1,280,000
2009	Preparatory action	European Aerial Medical Evacuation Team – EURAMET	The Johanniter	534,100
2010	Preparatory action	BaltFloodCombat II -Establishment of multinational flood response capability	Estonian Rescue Board	960,000
2010	Preparatory action	EU SKAGEX 2011	Dipartimento della Protezione Civile, Italy	1,121,000
2010	Preparatory action	Development of Rapid Highly specialized Operative Units for structural evaluation of stability of buildings	Dipartimento della Protezione Civile, Italy	1,692,000
2010	Preparatory action	Cold Condition Module II for the EU Community Mechanism	Crisis Management Centre	1,391,000
2010	Preparatory action	Emergency Temporary Shelter – Camp support unit	Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency	891,000
2010	Preparatory action	EUFFTR 2010	Ministère de l'Intérieur, de l'Outremer et des Collectivités Territoriales, Direction de la Sécurité Civile	3,798,000

Source: DG ECHO

The intervention logic for the pilot project and preparatory actions is set out in Figure 2.45.

Figure 2.45 Preliminary Intervention Logic for Pilot Projects and Preparatory Actions



## 2.9.1 Final findings on the Pilot projects and preparatory actions

### 2.9.1.1 Relevance

The pilot project and preparatory actions contributed to strengthen EU rapid response capability, by responding immediately to critical needs arising from major disasters.

Stakeholders interviewed reported that the availability and readiness of the EUFFTR Canadair aircrafts was an asset for those Participating States in need of additional resources to fight forest fires.

The preparatory actions contributed to test innovative arrangements with the specific aim of facilitating the sharing and use of key resources and essential equipment among EU Member States. Modules produced by the selected preparatory actions were designed to respond to disasters (both natural and man-made) in the framework of the Mechanism at the request of the MIC.

Less costly alternatives for temporary shelter were developed within the Emergency Temporary shelter preparatory action, leading to an improved rapid response capacity to earthquake emergencies. The Camp support unit produced was useful also in other situations.

### 2.9.1.2 Coherence

Results achieved through the pilot project and preparatory actions were in line with the objectives established by the Commission. One of the main objectives of preparatory action programme was to make equipment and other resources available to be deployed to respond to disasters. For instance, a medical module developed in the frame of the PISARTE project was deployed in Haiti. As demonstrated by its deployment in Haiti, the unit through its high mobility and availability improved the level of protection of people affected by disasters.

As for the pilot project, it contributed to reinforcing the overall EU fire-fighting capacity. A Civil Protection Authority contact person stated that EU FFTR forces sent by the MIC played an important role in fighting forest fires in Greece during its implementation phase.

### 2.9.1.3 Effectiveness

Based on the analysis of the projects selected, the pilot project and preparatory actions achieved their specific objectives. Within the preparatory action, innovative arrangements were tested to reinforce the EU rapid response capacity. For examples, the Urban Search and Rescue module working in Cold Conditions, the table of organization (TOE) and SOPs, as well as the creation of deployable units were examples of project outcomes produced by the preparatory action programme. In two cases, training programmes were developed. Project coordinators noted in both cases that the training programmes were designed to be easily transferable to other Participating States.

As for the pilot project, it complemented Participating States' assets with additional capacities at EU level. The EUFFTR consisted of two fire-fighting planes (Canadair CL-215) which constituted an additional European resource designed to reinforce the overall EU fire-fighting capacities. Results achieved by the pilot project were assessed positively and led to new legislative proposals with regard to fire-fighting capacities.

It was noted that for certain countries with limited capacity (e.g. Portugal) assistance to fight forest fires was generally provided by neighbouring Participating States – due to the geographical proximity. Stakeholders interviewed stated that requests from assistance through the EUFFTR involved additional administrative steps compared to bilateral assistance between Participating States.

Nevertheless, compared to individual Participating State solutions the EUFFTR offered crucial support in case of rare but severe events of many large simultaneous forest fires. Table 2.28 shows a general overview of the EUFFTR and the number of deployments carried out.

**Table 2.28 EUFFTR - General overview and statistics**

EU Forest Fires Tactical Reserve (EUFFTR ) – Number of deployments				
Country	Date	Type of intervention	Duration <sup>136</sup>	No of drops
France (Corsica)	08.07.2009	Rapid intervention	3h40' each	25 drops each
France (Corsica)	23.07.2009	Rapid intervention	3h25' each	10 drops each
Italy (Sardinia)	24 – 26.07.2009	Rapid intervention	37h10' (18h + 19h10')	62 drops (29 + 33)
Portugal ( <u>Monte Real Airbase</u> )	14 – 20.08.2009	Prep. and detachment	Duration: 29h57' (16h27' + 13h30')	38 drops (21+17)
Greece (Attika)	22 – 25.08.2009	Detachment	Duration: 18h19' (5h20' + 12h59')	78 drops (23+ 55)
Portugal	05 – 12.09.2009	Prep. and detachment	Duration: 60h (30h + 30h)	60 drops
<b>Total flying hours: ca. 285h (145h + 140h) – Total no of drops: ca. 472 (240 + 232)</b>				

Source: DG ECHO

Moreover, most NCP authorities considered that the pilot project and preparatory actions contributed to more effective disaster response by complementing existing capacities rather than duplicating previous efforts/results. For example, through the BaltFloodCombat Module<sup>137</sup>, Poland received support from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to cope with a severe flood. Although the foreign resources were proportionally small in terms of personnel, specialised pumps provided by the BaltFloodCombat were crucial, in particular during the acute phase of the flooding<sup>138</sup>.

<sup>136</sup> Time for intervention operations

<sup>137</sup> The BaltFloodCombat Module is the rescue unit composed of firemen and logistic experts (in total 19 personnel) from Participating States.

<sup>138</sup> Information from the case study carried out in Poland



Nevertheless, there was little evidence of use of project results after project completion. For instance, the PIS.A.R.T.E project coordinator noted that the project components could be deployed anytime within and outside the EU in coordination with national authorities using the shared PIS.A.R.T.E. SOP. However, there was no evidence of actual deployment.

In most cases, project results/outcomes were shared with Civil Protection Authorities and operators of Participating States. In two cases, communication strategies developed within projects included preparation of handbooks, reports, brochures and online tools in different languages. Nevertheless, a project coordinator noted that dissemination of results was limited to Participating States directly involved in the projects.

#### **2.9.1.4 Efficiency**

The overall budget available for preparatory action programmes between 2008 and 2010 was €19,000,000. As for the pilot project, €3.5 million were earmarked in the 2008 EU budget. Budgets available for completed projects were adequate to achieve activities as planned.

50% of national Civil Protection Authorities interviewed agreed that pilot project and preparatory actions provided an adequate and timely financial support. Most activities were also implemented within the budget, leading – in some cases – to budget savings. In most cases, budgets were used to deliver concrete outputs, such as design of exercises and/or modules, training programmes and communication activities (e.g. reports, brochures, handbooks or guidelines).

#### **2.9.1.5 EU added value**

The pilot project and preparatory actions contributed to the development of additional capacity which otherwise might not have been developed by Participating States in isolation. This was also confirmed by half of the Civil Protection Authorities interviewed.

Moreover, project coordinators reported that cooperation between Participating countries was strengthened through participation in these actions. In most cases, preparatory actions contributed to deepen the understanding of Civil Protection Authorities' activities and operational procedures, leading to improved coordination between authorities in case of a major disaster.

For example, stakeholders involved in the BaltFloodCombat Module (BFC) highlighted that without the BFC coordination, the whole operation would have suffered, as various groups operating in different areas would have not had alternative sources providing reliable and binding information.

Finally, results achieved by the preparatory actions contributed to an overall EU assessment of capacity needs and use of standard procedures. For instance, after completion and dissemination of results from the Cold Conditions Module, other Participating Countries started to analyse their capacities to conduct rescue operations in cold conditions by assessing procurement needs as well as preparing standard operating procedures for their modules.

#### **2.9.1.6 Extent of follow-up on findings and recommendations outlined in the Report on the evaluation of the application of the Civil Protection Mechanism and Civil Protection Financial Instrument for the years 2007-2009**

The 2007-2009 evaluation of the application of the Civil Protection Mechanism and Financial Instruments pointed out that there was limited evidence that a more effective disaster response was achieved through preparatory actions and the pilot project. Nevertheless, these actions contributed to test innovative approaches and new ways of working.

Innovative applications and systems continued to be implemented and used in the period assessed by this evaluation. These contributed to guarantee a fast response and speed up the decision making process. For example, completed projects tested the following innovative tools: weekly forest fire video-conferencing, virtual learning environment modules and distance learning materials. Moreover, the pilot project and preparatory action related to the Forest Fire Tactical Reserve created standby assets which were used for a limited period of time (mainly over the summer months).



There was no evidence that preparatory actions were used to develop and test (operational) modules for the analysis and development of new mechanisms ('laws').

#### **2.9.1.7 Key lessons learned**

Based on the analysis of the pilot project and the five preparatory actions selected, the following key lessons were identified:

- Further focus on specific cross-sector training was deemed as necessary by relevant stakeholders interviewed. Additional training was regarded as important to share knowledge on technical and medical team procedures and to increase common know-how during deployment.
- Information about existence and availability of specific modules was not communicated widely among relevant stakeholders (Participating States & EU delegations).
- Results from actions related to prevention and preparedness of emergencies were not effectively communicated. Coordination should be optimised, and a more inclusive approach integrating Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection should be introduced.
- Pre-alerting proved efficient and allowed the Participating States to react rapidly. Stakeholders interviewed noted that this should become a standard procedure.
- Interoperability of equipment and procedures (SOPs) saved time. This should be further enhanced.
- Information should flow as quickly as possible. Communication among partners and team members could be facilitated and improved. This also applies to information sharing during modules' deployment.
- Stakeholders interviewed noted that team members' skills should have been made more visible at an earlier stage within the team. Team building opportunities and mechanisms should be included both beforehand (casual) the exercise as well as during the exercise (planning/strategic meetings).

#### **2.9.1.8 Unintended, unexpected effects and risks**

The reviewed pilot project and preparatory actions achieved their overall objectives even though there were occasional delays in their delivery. One project, for instance, was delayed due to three major emergencies, which interfered with project management due to deployment of relevant team members.

Communication among partners and team members could be facilitated and improved.

#### **2.9.2 Main recommendations**

- **Focus on innovation.** Preparatory actions should focus on developing and testing innovative arrangements. The added value of preparatory actions was to provide funding to new procedures, tools and assets which would have not been funded without the Mechanism or would have been implemented to a smaller scale (and only at national level). Future preparatory actions could address the following needs:
  - **Need for interoperability of assets and standard procedures (SOPs).** Interoperability of equipment and procedures (SOPs) should be further enhanced. This was only partially addressed by the Recast Regulation (Article 9(2)). The new legislation deals only partly with interoperability of assets.
  - **Improve communication between civil protection experts during deployments.** The flow of information should be as efficient as possible. Communication among partners and team members could be facilitated and improved by introducing elements in training courses on operational communications to achieve the use of common protocols and standards. If issues are due to the communication system, the EU could consider equipping all modules with "EU standard" communications gear. In some cases, communication problems are due to the Participating States' organisational

structures.. Information from DG ECHO Liaison Officers to national authorities was not transferred to other levels/organisations involved (e.g. Fire Service).

## 2.10 Actions in third countries<sup>139</sup>

### 2.10.1 Description of third country actions

Since natural and man-made disasters do not stop at EU borders, actions should be well co-ordinated between Participating States and third countries to better prevent, prepare and respond to possible disasters. The aim of actions in third countries was thus to minimise the risk and possible effects of disasters and to establish a more integrated and co-operative approach to disaster prevention, preparedness and management.

To this purpose, the EU implemented different actions in third countries which could be categorised as follows:

- International cooperation programmes with candidate countries and potential candidate countries (IPA); and,
- International cooperation programmes with European Neighbourhood countries (PPRD South and East);

For completeness it should be noted that different types of cooperation agreements (e.g. bilateral and/or multilateral) also exist with other third countries. However, these are outside the scope of the evaluation. These objectives and elements are addressed separately below.

#### Actions with candidate countries and potential candidate countries

The IPA Programme on Civil Protection cooperation for candidate countries and potential candidates<sup>140</sup> was funded under the Instrument for pre-accession Assistance (IPA) and managed by DG ECHO. It paved the way of candidate and potential candidate countries towards the EU in the field of civil protection, with the overall objective to reduce the vulnerability of those countries to natural and man-made disasters at local, national and regional levels<sup>141</sup>. The IPA Civil Protection Cooperation Programme I ran from December 2010 to November 2012<sup>142</sup>. The IPA part I Programme consisted of three main components:

- A training programme with exchanges of experts' component (lot 1);
- Regional large scale exercises (lot 2); and
- Workshops on key identified topics (lot 3).

#### Actions with European Neighbourhood countries

Beyond the candidate countries and potential candidates, the EU also cooperated with the European Neighbourhood countries through the Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Natural and Man-made Disasters Programme (PPRD South<sup>143</sup> and PPRD East<sup>144</sup>). The PPRD South Project is the "Euromed programme for the prevention preparedness and response to natural and man-made disasters". It ran for three years from 3 March 2009 to 3 March 2012 with a budget of €5 million<sup>145</sup>. PPRD South II is, similar to IPA II, not within the scope of this evaluation. The PPRD East Programme, the Eastern Partnership Flagship initiative for the

<sup>139</sup> Also refer to section 2.11 of Annex to this final report provided in a separate document.

<sup>140</sup> Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, (Kosovo under UNSCR 1244/99) and Turkey

<sup>141</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/about/IPA%20Brochure\\_16.09.2011\\_small.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/about/IPA%20Brochure_16.09.2011_small.pdf)

<sup>142</sup> Phase II of this programme was launched on 5 November 2013 and covered the period November 2013 to November 2015. Phase II is, however, not within the scope of this evaluation which only covers the period 2007-2013.

<sup>143</sup> Albania, Algeria, Bosnia Herzegovina, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Montenegro, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey

<sup>144</sup> Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine

<sup>145</sup> PPRD South II covers the period 2013-2016 and was again assigned a budget of €5 million<sup>145</sup>.

Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Natural and Man-made Disasters, mirrored the PPRD South Programme and covers the period 2010-2014 with a budget of €6 million.

Both PPRD programmes broadly aimed to contribute to the development of the partner countries' civil protection capacities for disaster prevention, preparedness and response through regional cooperation and to bring them, progressively, closer to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and improve cooperation among themselves. The PPRD East and South programmes included different areas of action, aiming for:

- An improved knowledge base concerning the current state of play;
- Strengthened prevention, preparedness and response capacities from the administrative, operational and legislative points of view; and,
- Wider information and awareness sharing.


Several activities were implemented to achieve such aims. Firstly, the programme aimed to develop and review assessment tools, e.g. available geo-referenced risk data and development of national and regional risk maps and Atlas. Secondly, the programme implemented a civil protection capacity building programme (including improved cooperation with the EU Mechanism) by means of e.g.: trainings and risk specific workshops; development of civil protection manual; regional exercises; exchange of experts and technical assistance; awareness raising campaign for prevention and preparedness.

#### **Actions with other third countries**

In addition, the Commission had signed different types of cooperation agreements with third countries such as Japan, Russia (signed in 2013), Moldova (2012) Ukraine (2008) and the United States (2011) that aimed to facilitate the exchange of best practices and knowledge, and take preparatory actions in the event of provision of civil protection assistance when disasters strike. For example, the arrangement between the EU and Russia focused on cooperation between the MIC/ERCC and its Russian counterpart and foresaw an exchange of personnel for one week a year in their respective operational centres .

Cooperation work was also conducted with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (through the EU-ASEAN Knowledge Exchange Activity) and China. The EU-China Disaster Risk Management project aimed to bring China and the European Union together to collaborate on disaster risk management through a regular exchange of capacity-building knowhow and of scientific and technological data, including early warning and forecast tools. The Programme was launched in 2012 and was funded through the Development Cooperation Instrument. The total budget amounted to €6 million. China provided €3 million of in-kind support to the project. The intervention logic for actions with third countries is set out in Figure 2.46.

Figure 2.46 Intervention Logic for Actions with Third Countries



## 2.10.2 Final findings on actions in third countries

Overall, evidence suggests that the IPA Programme and the PPRD South and East were successfully implemented and were effective in reaching their operational objectives. Stakeholders underlined that through activities such as training, exchange of experts, regional exercises and workshops the partner countries' knowledge and capacity in the field of civil protection increased and as such their vulnerability to disasters has been reduced. Activities contributed to an increased cooperation, not only with the EU but also between partner countries in the region. The activities have demonstrated their EU-added value as they have in various ways impacted on national policies and strategies by e.g. having contributed to the development of a national strategy on civil protection, identifying and closing gaps in civil protection legislation and practices, creation of a permanent liaison officer post etc. Moreover, the activation of the Mechanism in partner countries had brought an added-value in terms of the assistance provided, including equipment (e.g. aircrafts to fight forest fires) and extended resources. The activation of the Mechanism had also provided beneficiary countries with practical experience of the workings of the Mechanism and provided lessons learned in terms of response capacity and host national support structures.

The IPA and PPRD South and East programmes were effective in reaching their operational objectives, with the following activities judged to be particularly effective: disaster preparedness and response activities, trainings, exchange of experts and workshops. However, the effectiveness and efficiency of actions with third countries was reduced by the lack of an overall general framework for actions with all third countries.

### 2.10.2.1 Relevance

From a theoretical point of view, actions in third countries corresponded to the needs of both the beneficiary third country and to the Participating States. For the beneficiary countries, actions in third countries contributed to enhancing the national and cross border capacity to responding to disasters and to a better understanding of the capabilities of the Mechanism disaster's response. From the point of view of the Participating States, building capacity in neighbouring countries could help reduce the need for EU intervention in case of emergencies in third countries and in turn could prevent certain types of disaster from spreading and or increase the speed of the response in cases of disaster materialising in cross-border regions. However, the extent to which the above is true could not be tested due to limited evidence gathered with regard to the relevance of actions in third countries.

### 2.10.2.2 Coherence

Desk research and in particular stakeholder interviews indicate that the successful implementation of activities under the IPA, PPRD South and East programmes contributed to increased cooperation between candidate and potential candidate countries as well as neighbouring countries and the EU. For example, the Annual Action Programme 2012 for the ENP South region<sup>146</sup> stated that the relationship of trust between civil protection actors both within and between the regions has been reinforced and that the presence of two EU civil protection national authorities in the implementing consortium had fuelled an integrated and cooperative approach among the EU and ENP South partner countries.

All stakeholders also unanimously agreed that participation in the IPA, PPRD South and East programmes led to increased cooperation between candidate/potential candidate countries, neighbouring countries and the EU. The stakeholders underlined the usefulness of activities such as training courses, regional exercises and workshops where all relevant representatives in the field of civil protection are gathered to exchange information and experiences. This had not only led to better knowledge on the workings of the Mechanism, but also enabled participants to take stock of different approaches and expertise on civil protection in the region.

### 2.10.2.3 Effectiveness

Overall, evidence collected indicates that the objectives of the IPA Programme and PPRD South and East Programmes were met.

#### *Effectiveness of the IPA Programme in reaching its objective*

With regard to IPA, the final information letter published by the IPA Programme concluded that the **overall objective**, to reduce the vulnerability of the beneficiary countries (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey) had been **reached**. This included:

- The reduction of vulnerability of the beneficiary countries to natural and man-made disasters at local, national and regional levels;
- A contribution to the development of the beneficiaries' civil protection capacities;
- A better awareness and knowledge of approaches and methods established in the Participating States;
- A better approximation of the beneficiaries to the Mechanism.

The objectives of the IPA programme had been met following successful implementation of activities as foreseen. Under Lot 1, a total of 14 training courses were provided to 243 civil protection experts by 21 trainers from 13 Participating States. In addition, more than 15 exchanges took place whereby 77 experts were placed in eight Participating States as well as at the MIC in Brussels. Under Lot 2, two regional exercises took place in Slovenia in October 2011 (IPA SI Quake 2011) and the second field exercise (IPA CRO FLOODS 2012) in Croatia in May 2012. Overall, 420 rescue personnel from all eight partner countries, 70 rescue personnel from Participating States, and 124 observers and visitors (from beneficiary countries, and Participating States) participated in these exercises. Under Lot 3, a total of twelve workshops were organised on six civil protection topics for a total of 212 participants from the beneficiary countries who gathered with more than 33 experts from some 15 EU Civil Protection Mechanism Participating States, the Commission, UN, FEMA, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Finally also, under Lot 3, an analytical study on host nation support was carried out in order to get beneficiary countries prepared for receiving foreign assistance. The study aimed to depict the status quo within the beneficiary countries on which they can build, if necessary, to improve cooperation in future disaster relief operations.

The Final information letter published by the IPA Programme stated that everybody involved in the project looked "satisfactorily" back to a "successful" project. Participants rated the quality

<sup>146</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/documents/aap/2012/af\\_aap\\_2012\\_enpi-s\\_p2.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/documents/aap/2012/af_aap_2012_enpi-s_p2.pdf)



of the training courses with overall scores ranging from 4.59 to 4.97 on a scale from 1 (not satisfactory) to 5 (very good). Similarly, participants rated the conducted exchanges as either “good” or “very good”; with the host and sending organisations considering that the exchanges were a good mutual learning tool. Participants were equally satisfied with the regional exercises and workshops.

Stakeholders interviewed in the context of this ex-post evaluation confirmed that such activities had all satisfactorily been implemented. The usefulness of the training programme, exchange of experts as well as regional exercises was also underlined. Whereas most stakeholders were equally satisfied with the workshops, one stakeholder mentioned that some of the workshops were of too short duration and participants with different profiles were mixed in the same workshops which created confusion. Overall, all stakeholders unanimously agreed that the programme had been effective and that all their objectives had been reached. With regard to the latter, most stakeholders interviewed in the context of the Study stated that the Mechanism had been activated in their country on several occasions. Such “real-life” experience with the Mechanism had also greatly contributed to know-how of the Mechanism and had been a good opportunity to test their knowledge with regard to the host nation support concept. Stakeholders confirmed that the Mechanism had been effective in reducing the impacts of potential disasters.

### ***Effectiveness of the PPRD South and East Programmes in reaching their objectives***

The PPRD South and East programmes were successful in reaching their operational objectives. All stakeholders interviewed were very positive about the results achieved, which included: further development of national approaches to risk management; exchange and sharing of experiences between partner countries and with the EU; strengthened network of civil protection experts; improved knowledge about the Mechanism; strengthened institutional cooperation with the Mechanism; further development national and operational capacities for host nation support etc.

The PPRD East Programme Final Report<sup>147</sup> indicated that, during the period 2010-2014, more than 1700 participants directly benefitted from the programme and more than 15 million indirectly benefitted from the programme as audience shared information. The Final Report on the implementation of the PPRD East programme listed its main achievements:

- Developed capacities for disaster risk assessment and mapping and increased knowledge and awareness of disaster risk exposure in all six Partner Countries and at the regional level through the development and installation of Electronic Regional Risk Atlas;
- Increased theoretical and practical knowledge on the EU civil protection Mechanism, Flood Directive, SEVESO Directive, EU Disaster Risk Assessment and Disaster Risk Management approach through 32 workshops, seminars, trainings and exchange of experts with 712 participants;
- Civil Protection operational skills enhanced through three sub-regional and one regional table-top exercises attended by 93 participants;
- Triggered important developments in the partner countries’ civil protection systems through studies and recommendations on how to enhance legal and institutional framework for disaster risk management;
- Regional network of 41 journalists established and journalists’ skills of working with disaster risk information improved through the development of the Guide for Journalist Covering Emergencies;
- Increased disaster risk awareness of wide public through six national campaigns and the dissemination of the national versions of the Family Guide for Emergency Preparedness and response, the interactive poster for schoolchildren and the social TV;

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<sup>147</sup> PPRD East Programme, Final Publication.



- Created a solid ground for collaborative actions in the field of civil protection through a continued exchange of disaster management experiences and civil protection good practices including through the developments of the electronic Civil Protection Operational Guidebook and the Study on Host National Support and Cross-Border Movement of Assistance.

Similarly, the objectives of the PPRD South programme had been met following successful implementation of various activities which were largely similar to the ones undertaken in the context of the PPRD East Programme (e.g. Regional Risk Atlas, workshops, seminars, training courses, exchange of experts, studies, information campaigns, etc.). For example, the progress report on PPRD South of 2010<sup>148</sup> showed that as of September 2010, five regional training workshops and a table-top exercise had been organised and all ENP South partner countries participated in the preparation of a full-scale exercise.

Stakeholders interviewed in the context of this study confirmed that such activities were successfully implemented under both the PPRD South and East Programmes. Most stakeholders particularly welcomed workshops on risk-analysis and risk mapping as well as the regional exercises which provided real-life exposure to the Mechanism. However, for the future, stakeholders highlighted the need to focus more on prevention policies in line with the development of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism. Moreover, one of the stakeholders emphasised however that the establishment of two distinct programmes, thereby separating the Southern neighbours from the Eastern neighbours has resulted in a loss of knowledge insofar as the Southern countries are no longer informed/involved as to how the Eastern countries develop/operate their civil protection capabilities.

#### **2.10.2.4 Efficiency**

None of the stakeholders provided direct feedback on the efficiency of actions with third countries. However, from the overview and analysis of actions with third countries it may be inferred that the efficiency is reduced due to the lack of an overarching framework for actions: actions with third countries were diverse and consisted of various programmes and cooperation agreements, often with differing aims. The lack of framework to share information/practices or key lessons learned across different programmes may result in a loss of knowledge. One of the stakeholders referred, in particular, to the separation between the PPRD South and East programmes in this regard as detrimental to their efficiency.

#### **2.10.2.5 EU added value**

All stakeholders confirmed the EU added-value of the Mechanism through the financing of civil protection actions through these programmes. The most important result had been the reduction of the impact of disasters by improving the capacity in the field of civil protection. Participation in the activities impacted, in various ways, on national policies. For example, one stakeholder mentioned that knowledge generated through training courses was applied at national level when internal training facilities were created; another mentioned that participation in the regional exercises led to realisation of gaps in national legislation, which were currently being discussed at ministerial level, including the possibility of creating a permanent liaison officer post.

More generally, stakeholders explained that the activities contributed to the national civil protection strategy through four main areas:

- The development of assessment tools such as risk maps and the Atlas contributed towards the development of risk assessment and risk analysis;
- The trainings, workshops, study visits, and technical assistance missions contributed to the development of capacity-building in prevention and preparedness;

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<sup>148</sup> PPT Presentation by Antonio Barbera, PPRD South Monitoring and Evaluation Expert – document provided by the Commission.

- The regional exercises contributed to a better coverage and coordination of existing early warning mechanisms and to a better response capacity
- The information and communication campaign contributed to increased awareness of local people about the risks of disasters and provided them know-how on actions that could be taken to prevent, prepare and respond to disasters

Finally, most stakeholders interviewed in the context of this study referred to the EU-added-value of the activations of the Mechanism in their partner countries. The Mechanism had in most partner countries been activated on several occasions and in all instances the assistance provided brought substantial benefits in terms of assistance provided, including equipment (e.g. aircrafts to fight forest fires) and extended resources; benefits which could not have been delivered in the absence of such Mechanism. The activation of the Mechanism had also brought hand-on exposure to its workings and real practice in terms of host nation support and provided lessons learned in terms of response capacity. One of the stakeholders mentioned for example that they had come to realise that they needed faster and more practical internal procedures and less bureaucracy to have more dynamic operations on the ground.

#### **2.10.2.6 *Extent of follow-up on findings and recommendations outlined in the Report on the evaluation of the application of the Civil Protection Mechanism and Civil Protection Financial Instrument for the years 2007-2009***

Third country actions were not directly addressed as part of the Interim Evaluation covering the years 2007-2009. However, the report of the Interim Evaluation pointed towards a need for further increasing the strategic and operational cooperation with international actors and third countries. The majority of Civil Protection Authorities surveyed (80%) considered that the trend towards further cooperation continued as:

- 92% of Civil Protection Authorities considered that the establishment of a new Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection produced synergies and complementarities, in particular with regard to relief operations in third countries;
- 83% of Civil Protection Authorities considered that Actions with EU candidate and potential candidate countries (financed through IPA) contributed to increased cooperation between the EU and these countries in the area of civil protection;
- 83% of Civil Protection Authorities considered that Actions aimed at European Neighbourhood countries (financed through PPRD South and PPRD East) contributed to increased cooperation between the EU and these countries in the area of civil protection.

#### **2.10.2.7 *Key lessons learned***

No lessons learned were identified by the Civil Protection Authorities as part of the survey. However, Civil Protection Authorities outlined some possible improvements for the success of the actions in Third Countries<sup>149</sup>:

- Actions in third countries could be better coordinated between the different levels and types of cooperation (e.g. different EU programmes, gaps between the Mechanism and Humanitarian Aid programmes, etc.).
- Actions in third countries could benefit from joint programme development and cooperation with other international actors in the field;
- Actions could, in line with developments under the Civil Protection Mechanism, focus more on prevention policy and the linking of prevention to preparedness and response;
- Actions could focus more on host nation support and more specific country/region specific trainings based on geographies and typical types of disasters affecting these geographies;
- Third countries could be closely involved in the training programme and simulation exercises;

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<sup>149</sup> Online survey for national Civil Protection Authorities / national contact points. – Q77 - How could the level of success of the operations in Third Countries be further improved? - Number of respondents = 12.

- The financing of Actions in third countries should be made easier, clearer and simpler;
- Actions in third countries could make better use of the knowledge developed as part of the prevention and preparedness projects of the Mechanism.

#### **2.10.2.8 *Unintended, unexpected effects and risks***

No main risks or unexpected effects were reported by stakeholders. Anecdotal evidence reported that actions in third countries suffered from a lack of an overall coherent framework and thus there may have been a risk of duplication in the coordination of the different actions.

#### **2.10.3 Main Recommendation**

Following on from the key lessons learned of actions with third countries, there would be merit in:

- **Better coordinating actions with third countries**

Mechanism should consider developing an overall coherent framework for actions with all third countries, which would set joint objectives and actions across EU level programmes run by the European Commission. The Mechanism should consider mapping actions and analysing risks affecting the EU neighbourhood and use this knowledge to better link prevention-related actions in third countries to preparedness and response related actions, thus incentivising joint risk management and response capacity planning. More specific trainings can subsequently be developed targeting countries/regions where similar types of disasters occur.