Evaluation of Civil Protection Mechanism

Case study report- Philippines

November 2014

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List of acronyms

AMP	Advanced Medical Post
ASP	Associates Surge Pool
ERCC	Emergency Response Coordination Centre
ERR	Emergency Response Roster
ERU	Emergency Response Units
EU	European Union
EUCPT	Civil Protection Team
HC	Humanitarian Coordinators
HIP	Humanitarian Implementation Plan
IHP	International Humanitarian Partnership
LEMA	Local Emergency Management Authorities
NDRRMC	National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
OCD	Office of Civil Defence
OSOCC	On-Site Operations Coordination Centre
RC	Resident Coordinators
RDC	Reception and Departure Centre
RDC	Reception/ Departure Centre
RSO	Regional Support Officer
SBPP	Stand-By Partnership Programme
SCLS	Surge Capacity and Logistics Section
TAST	Technical Assistance Support Team
UN DAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UN OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
USAR	Urban Search and Rescue

Executive summary

On **8 November 2013 typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines,** resulting in heavy rainfalls, flash floods and landslides. Areas even up to 100 km from the epicentre of the typhoon suffered 80% of total destruction of public facilities, houses and commercial establishments. Communications, electrical power and transport access were heavily disrupted. During the height of typhoon Haiyan a significant spill of heavy oil occurred containing about a kilometre stretch of Estancia's coastline.

The humanitarian impact of the typhoon was very high. Up to July 2014 the government reported over **6,200 dead** and **four million displaced** people. In total, the typhoon affected between 14 and 16 million people. The United Nations estimated that within the first twelve months **577.4 million euro** were **needed for relief assistance and early recovery**.

In the morning of 8 November the Emergency Response Coordination Centre opened a new emergency in CECIS whilst the official request for assistance from the Philippine Embassy in Brussels was received on 10 November. In response, the European Civil Protection Mechanism ("the Mechanism") deployed **25 civil protection experts** in three consecutive waves of EU Civil Protection Teams (EUCPT). The first and third teams were deployed for ten days and the second team for 17 days. In addition, a EUCP **marine pollution expert** was deployed for four weeks to join a UNEP/OCHA mission to combat the oil spill.

By 9 December 2013, **26 Participating States** had provided **more than 135 million euro** of financial and in-kind assistance to the Philippines. In addition, a number of Participating States deployed national modules to the Philippines (e.g., Belgium, Italy, Germany, Spain and others). The European Commission provided **close to 3.6 million euro to co-finance the transport** of Participating States' assistance material and response teams and **40 million euro in humanitarian assistance** and **early recovery interventions**. Considering the large scale impact of the disaster, the financial support directly provided by the EU was non-trivial, representing roughly **7% of the total global funding**, which was an important contribution in particular in the regions where the Mechanism operated.

The Philippines' Mechanism activation was one of the first large-scale operations since the Emergency Response & Coordination Centre (ERCC) had transitioned from the previous Monitoring & Information Centre (MIC). Stakeholders consulted confirmed the **positive results of the changes** (e.g. the 24/7 availability of staff) and highlighted some **potential areas of improvements** (e.g. having more duty officers with field experience and to increase the analytical capacity of the ERCC).

Overall, stakeholders consulted considered the **Mechanism relevant and effective** with regard to its specific objectives. Stakeholders agreed that the selection and deployment of experts was coordinated well and very quickly. The modules deployed were perceived to be efficient in terms of their functioning, with in particular their interoperability being considered a strong added value. However, the mission to the Philippines was considered to have suffered some coherence issues, due to the initial **lack of clarity between the UN agencies and the Mechanism** on the role of the latter and the support which in particular the first EUCPT could provide. Gradually, the mission became better integrated and coordinated with the other international players.

The case study also shows that there is scope for increasing **cooperation and linkages between Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection structures within DG ECHO**. The current distinction is perceived as artificial by stakeholders and may lead to inefficiencies. Especially in the cases of disasters such as the Philippines, the integration of humanitarian aid experts in the ERCC and in missions could improve the overall effectiveness of the response.

1 Country context

The Philippines is located in the South-eastern Asia, in an archipelago between the Philippine Sea and the South China Sea, which is east of Vietnam. The Philippine archipelago is made up of 7,107 islands. The total land area of the Philippines is **298,170 km²** with a population of about **100 million people**[1]**.** The Philippines is the **seventh-most populated** country in **Asia** and the **12th most populated** country in the **world**.

The Philippines is divided into three island groups that are further divided into 17 regions. Each of the regions have their regional field Office of Civil Defence (OCD) that are coordinated through the central OCD[2]. At National level the Philippines have been implementing a civil defence policy already since 1954. In 2010 the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act was enacted. This Act, aimed to strengthen the country's disaster risk reduction and management system, was immediately passed in response to the massive effects of Typhoon Ondoy in 2009.

The OCD as the implementing agency of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC), has the primary mission of administering a comprehensive national civil defence and disaster risk reduction and management programme.

[1] About website, *Geography of the Philippines,* available at: http://geography.about.com/library/cia/blcphilippines.htm

[2] http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/index.php?option=com_contact&view=category&catid=5&Itemid=5

2 Background and impact of the disaster studied

The Philippines is one of the most vulnerable countries to natural disasters in the world. It is located astride the typhoon belt and is affected by 15 and struck by five to six cyclonic storms per year. In addition to that, the islands also experience landslides, active volcanoes, destructive earthquakes and tsunamis[3].

Typhoon Haiyan (locally called Yolanda) was one of the most destructive cyclones ever recorded. It struck the Philippines on 8 November 2013 resulting in heavy rainfalls, flash floods and landslides. The regions Leyte, Samar, Cebu, Bohol and Panay suffered most. Areas even up to 100 km from the epicentre of the typhoon suffered 80% of total destruction of public facilities, houses and commercial establishments. Communication, electrical power and transport infrastructures were heavily disrupted. The humanitarian impact of the typhoon was enormous, in spite of the preventative measures taken by the national authorities, including evacuations. The government reported over 6,200 dead and four million displaced people as of July 2014. Between 14 and 16 million people were affected by the typhoon, almost six million of those being children[4].

On 11 November 2013, the President of the Philippines declared a national state of calamity to help expedite relief operations and let international support come in immediately to support the relief efforts. The Typhoon Haiyan Strategic Response plan launched by the United Nations estimated that within the first twelve months, 577.4 million euro were needed for relief assistance and early recovery in order to complement the government's Yolanda Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan[5]. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), up to July 2014 (Figure 2.1) a total of 837 million US dollars (including all contributions - cash, in-kind, bilateral, and multilateral - for the response) were collected[6].

Figure 2.1 Funding for typhoon Haiyan, as of July 2014



During the height of typhoon Haiyan a significant spill of heavy oil occurred when a power barge ran aground at the shores of Estancia. According to the initial reports from the Philippines Coast Guard, around 800,000 litres of heavy oil spilled into the sea and were

[3] Library of Congress – Federal Research Division (March 2006) *Country Profile: Philippines*

[4] DG ECHO Factsheet – July 2014 – Philippines, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/philippines_en.pdf

[5] ECHO Factsheet – May 2014 – Typhoon Haiyan

[6] http://www.unocha.org/crisis/typhoonhaiyan/funding

washed ashore contaminating about a kilometre stretch of Estancia's coastline[7]. On 21 November, a joint environmental assessment by the UNDAC environmental emergencies expert, Environmental Management Bureau and the OCHA was undertaken.

[7] Joint assessment report: Oil spill in Estancia, Iloilo Province, Philippines resulting from typhoon Haiyan, 8 November 2013

3 The role and effects of the operational elements of the Civil Protection Mechanism in responding to the emergency

3.1 General description of the Mechanism assistance provided

In the morning of 8 November, the ERCC opened a new emergency in CECIS in 'Monitoring' mode. On 9 November, the ERCC changed the emergency status to 'Pre-alert / early warning'. A first team of European Commission's humanitarian experts (four in total) was deployed to Manila already on 8 November and was continuously monitoring the situation and in contact with ECHO partners (UN, Red Cross and NGOs) and EU Delegation to the Philippines. Within hours after the typhoon struck the team was deployed to the worst-hit areas to conduct a needs assessment.

Before the mechanism was officially activated by the government of the Philippines, the ERCC started organising and coordinating capabilities as it was evident that there would be a need for assistance. In particular, the ERCC started to coordinate the primary emergency support that Participating States (PSs) could offer, e.g. search and rescue, logistics, emergency water supply, emergency shelter and health care, non-food relief items and food assistance. On 9 November, the Philippine NDRRMC stated in a letter to the UN that it would welcome assistance to the Government's emergency efforts. The ERCC received a request for assistance from the Philippine Embassy in Brussels on 10 November[8].

In total, the European Civil Protection Mechanism deployed 25 civil protection experts within three EU civil protection teams (EUCPT), called Alpha, Bravo and Charlie. Team Alpha was deployed for ten days (12-22 November). The deployment was followed by team Bravo which was in the Philippines for 17 days and finally the mission was handed-over to team Charlie which was in the field for ten days (26 November to 6 December). In addition, on 27 November, a EUCP marine pollution expert joined a UNEP/OCHA mission responding to the oil spill. The expert was deployed for four weeks[9].

By 9 December 2013, 26 Participating States had provided more than 135 million euro of financial and in-kind assistance to the Philippines. In addition, a number of Participating States deployed modules to the Philippines, namely:

- Belgium deployed Advanced Medical Post (AMP) and Water Purification System (WPS) modules
- Italy provided a Technical Assistance Support Team (TAST) and AMP
- Luxembourg provided a TAST module with satellite communication equipment
- Germany provided a WPS module
- Spain provided a field hospital supporting a regional hospital
- France sent a military civil protection team
- UK charted a cargo aircraft used for transport actions with ground crews assisting with the handling of cargo.

The EC provided 3.6 million to co-finance the transport of Participating States' assistance material and response teams[10]. In addition, the European Commission provided 40 million euro in humanitarian assistance and early recovery interventions. This seems to roughly represent 7% of the total global funding (see section 2 above).

[8] DG ECHO crisis report, Philippines – Typhoon Haiyan, Nr 2

[9] ECHO Civil Protection Message n°5 - Philippines – Typhoon HAIYAN

[10] ECHO Factsheet – May 2014 – Typhoon Haiyan

3.2 General evaluation context

3.2.1 MIC / ERCC

The Philippines' Mechanism activation was one of the first large-scale operations since the ERCC had transitioned from the MIC and several stakeholders commented in particular on improvements as a result of this change.

3.2.1.1 Effectiveness

Especially during the crisis in the Philippines, the fact that the ERCC was operational 24/7 was perceived as one of the most essential improvements with respect to its predecessor, making the system overall more effective (in view of the time difference and the continuous exchange between the teams on the ground and in Brussels). Some commented on the rather frequent rotation of persons within the centre sometimes causing issues of continuity, but considered these to be minor. The lack of field experience of ERCC duty officers was also mentioned as occasionally impacting on the effectiveness of communications and subsequent actions, and it was advised that ERCC central staff should ideally include people who had worked on the ground, e.g. through rotation, or have more continuous interactions with the ECHO field network.

3.2.1.2 Efficiency

Overall, the ERCC was considered to have handled the Philippines crisis efficiently, in particular because of its new capacities and features. However, given that overall coordination on the ground was ensured by the UN agencies, its involvement was mainly limited to coordinating the EU inputs, organising the deployment of the EUCPT and assisting in the selection of the modules. In their mission report, the second EUCPT indicated that coordination between the ERCC with UNOCHA was efficient and that as a result, upon arrival of team Bravo there was a clear division of tasks.

Some stakeholders considered that the ERCC could have better organised the collection and storage of information relevant to the disaster, for example through a 'virtual' OSOCC where documents relevant to Mechanism could be saved, organised and reviewed. In the Philippines, all 15 clusters were uploading information onto their virtual OSOCC, but this turned out to be a rather chaotic process and it was difficult for EUCPT to understand which information was relevant to them. Having support from the ERCC in organising Mechanism-specific information would also facilitate reporting by EUCPT.

3.2.1.3 Relevance

The financial support directly provided by the EU, including the Mechanism, was non-trivial, roughly estimated at 7% of the total funding made available to the Philippines up to end July 2014 (see section 2). However, most ECHO funding related to humanitarian aid, with civil protection only constituting a minor part. Whilst considered as relevant, the contribution provided by the ERCC was relatively small, also given that it acted under the UN agencies.

A few interviewees positively commented on the increased analytical capacity of the ERCC, which in their view was not fully optimised during the Philippines crisis. This capacity could be much further exploited especially in case of similar large-scale disasters. For example, the ERCC could take a greater role in analysing information available on the crises in order to assess risks in different scenarios, to be able to anticipate what teams on the ground might face (e.g. in terms of possible disease outbreaks, infrastructure issues, etc.). Similarly, it could seek to collect and analyse data coming from traditional and new media, as these could help in the assessment of the risks.

3.2.1.4 Coherence and European added value

The overall mission to the Philippines was considered to have suffered some issues related to the coherence of the intervention, due to the initial lack of clarity between the UN agencies and the Mechanism on the role of the latter and the support it could provide (see section 4.2

below), which in particular affected the first EUCPT deployed. Gradually, the mission became better integrated and coordinated with the other international players.

3.2.2 Experts selection and deployment

3.2.2.1 Effectiveness

Whilst the ERCC, like other international players, had anticipated the potentially devastating effects of the typhoon, the scale of the emergency was initially underestimated. This meant that the first EUCPT deployed was not big enough to be fully effective and team members were spread over different locations. This was solved with the deployment of team Bravo (14 people compared to eight people in team Alpha). The overall selection of the EUCPT experts was considered to be fast and effective, with stakeholders positively commenting on the level of experience and skills of the civil protection experts who were deployed in the different teams.

Some interviewees considered that the deployment of the EUCPT was overall too short to become fully effective and to ensure continuity. Whilst certainly in similar crises experts should not be required to stay for weeks, a period of two weeks was perceived as rather short. In comparison, the UN is considering prolonging the length of deployments from the current three/four weeks to six weeks. Currently, on average, there is a rotation of two EU CP teams per one UN team.

During deployment, the logistics team of the EUCPT was seen as particularly useful. They were placed in the airport to coordinate incoming aid. The team was facilitating not only the aid from governments but also from NGOs, which was seen as an additional positive aspect of their actions.

3.2.2.2 Efficiency

As further elaborated in section 4.2 below, initial communications on cooperation between the Mechanism and UN agencies were held at central level, whereas there was little prior communication on the activation of the Mechanism and the subsequent deployments on the ground. This meant that initially, some additional efforts had to be made to agree on the inputs of the EUCPT. Both however adopted a flexible and pragmatic approach, with the first EUCPT still being able to provide useful inputs. Also, for the deployment of the first EUCPT, team Alpha, no TAST was available, which did impact on the extent to which the team could function properly (e.g. telecom and other connectivity issues occurred). An Italian TAST was subsequently dispatched for the second EUCPT, team Bravo, but delays in decision-making at national level meant that their deployment, and the shipment of their equipment, were behind schedule. The above shows that it is important to make Member States aware of the need for rapid decision making, as valuable time of other teams can also go lost as a result of delays.

3.2.2.3 Relevance

The three teams deployed increased in relevance with each deployment, with the last EUCPT, team Charlie, including experts specifically requested by the UN agencies (e.g. experts in recovery and livelihood), which helped to fill gaps in skills and competences identified on the ground. In general, the skills and expertise of the team members were considered to be strong and highly relevant for the tasks they were carrying out.

The teams could have been strengthened by the inclusion of humanitarian experts, given the size of the disaster and the fact that the Philippines were already vulnerable as a country). Stakeholders also considered that it would have been useful if the EUCPT had included a skilled negotiator, to facilitate interactions with local governments and to be able to manage the strong political agenda of some local and national stakeholders. For example, negotiations with a local government on the most appropriate place for the Belgian AMP took two days.

3.2.3 Modules

3.2.3.1 Effectiveness

Overall, the modules were perceived as effective and useful in handling the effects of the crisis. In particular, their interoperability was considered a strong asset especially when operating in complex crises of this kind. For example, the Belgian AMP module successfully linked to the German AMP module and together they were able to organise and carry out a significant number of surgeries. The modules operated directly through the UN cluster system but were supported, where necessary, by the EUCPT.

A few of the module staff deployed had only little experience with emergencies in third countries, which can be much graver in terms of the humanitarian drama, the lack of basic infrastructure and equipment, the overall chaos, etc. As a result, some staff found it difficult to handle the 'harshness' of the environment. One stakeholder commented on the lack of 'flexibility' of one of the modules, which was highly focused on completing its own task and unwilling to use their capacity for another purpose, purpose which was considered a priority by other international stakeholders on the field.

Similarly to the EUCPT, it would also be useful if modules were to include a team member with some negotiation skills, as in the Philippines they were in direct contact with local governments in order to arrange practical and logistical details (e.g. where to obtain fuel).

3.2.3.2 Efficiency

The modules were considered efficient in terms of their functioning and inter-module cooperation, especially regarding the poor means of communication available during the crisis.

Stakeholders also highlighted that, not only in the case of the Philippines but in general, some of the logistical arrangements around their operations could be dealt with more efficiently. For example, one module could provide the basic infrastructure, e.g., tents, for a longer period (4-6 weeks) while these could be used by other modules and rotating staff. The EUCPT could support the coordination of such logistical tasks.

3.2.3.3 Coherence and European added value

Stakeholders considered that the interoperability of the modules which were active in the Philippines provided significant EU added value, as all the modules had received common training / exercises prior to being deployed. Stakeholders also highlighted the importance of individual modules already working as a team before deployments.

4 Other relevant issues

4.1 Links with DG ECHO humanitarian aid

In addition to the activation of the Mechanism, DG ECHO also sent 15 EC humanitarian experts to undertake the needs assessments. These subsequently informed funding decisions and provided further support. To external stakeholders the distinction made by DG ECHO between Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection comes across as 'artificial' and potentially counterproductive, especially in large-scale humanitarian disasters like Yolanda. Both types of intervention require integrated support of a similar nature. From stakeholder interviews and reports highlighted that the European Commission's humanitarian experts and the EUCPT did not work together extensively, whilst external stakeholders assumed that they belonged to the same 'team'.

Also, DG ECHO with its humanitarian aid mission is present in many countries, including the Philippines[11]. The Regional Support Office (RSO) in the country has relationships with the local government, UN, Red Cross and different NGOs. This means that during an emergency a network is already existent, which in theory, should also be able to integrate the EUCPT. However, the extent of integration in the Philippines was overall low.

At an operational level, inefficiencies also seem to have occurred. For example, The EUCPT had their own communication channels with stakeholders on the ground and reporting system to DG ECHO. A lot of reporting could have been shared with the EC humanitarian experts, since the start of the mission. A single communication line with external partners would have further reduced the workload and avoided confusion.

On the basis of the above, there is scope to improve the links between the humanitarian and civil protection 'arms' of DG ECHO, in particular:

- A more integrated approach towards the delivery of humanitarian aid and civil protection, from start to end and better onsite cooperation between EC humanitarian and civil protection experts;
- The RSO should also be encouraged to exchange information with the Mechanism and the EUCPT deployed; and
- The RSO could possibly provide other forms of support to the Mechanism, such as assistance with local logistical arrangements.

4.2 Collaboration with UN agencies

The NDRRMC was tasked with the overall coordination of relief efforts. The coordination of the international response was handled by the UN On-Site Operations and Coordination Centre (OSOCC). The OSOCC was established in Tacloban with sub-OSSOCs in a number of places (such as Guiuan and Ormoc). A system of 15 clusters was set up.

UNDAC, like the ERCC, had pre-deployed experts to the Philippines, on 7 November 2013. Once the typhoon hit the country, five UNDAC members were immediately deployed to cities which appeared to have taken the hardest hit: Tacloban, Roxas and Coron. Eleven more UNDAC members were deployed to support the first humanitarian response, who worked closely with the EC experts. In addition, OCHA deployed a total of 114 persons, 32 of them as UNDAC members.

The initial deployment agreement between UNDAC and the Mechanism was discussed at the headquarters (HQ) level between the EU and UN, which set out that the Mechanism would support UNDAC on the ground. However, this was not well communicated to the regional UNDAC teams who were based and/or deployed in the Philippines (mainly from Australia and Asia), who had little understanding and knowledge of the Mechanism. This meant that initially, it was not immediately clear how the Mechanism, and in particular the EUCPT, could

[11] DG ECHO website, Where we work: *http://ec.europa.eu/echo/en/where/asia-and-oceania/asia-and-oceania*

contribute concretely to the work of UNDAC, although both adopted a flexible approach which helped avoiding inefficiencies. During the deployment of team Bravo, the team leader of UNDAC changed and the collaboration and integration further improved. OCHA subsequently made the request for team Charlie, asking for particular profiles of experts, given that there was a lack of UN capacity in recovery and livelihood expertise.

The case study illustrates the importance of continuous awareness-raising about the Mechanism with the different UN agencies and, possibly, the further development of guidelines on how collaboration should work on the ground. The Mechanism should also provide further guidance and training to EU and national experts on its role with UN entities when providing civil protection in third countries.

5 Counterfactual scenarios

Helping to save additional lives

Even though the overall international response to the Philippines disaster was very large in scale, the Mechanism provided an important contribution in the regions in which it operated, probably helping to save additional lives and improving subsequent recovery and rehabilitation.

Increased efficiency

Without the Mechanism, Participating States would have offered and deployed teams individually, which would have included individual exchanges with the Philippines authorities and the UN agencies. This would have led to a relatively higher administrative burden for entities which were already under extremely high pressure. The centralised system for requesting and offering assistance contributed the efficiency of assistance and relief efforts. In addition, the EUCPT helped to facilitate the coordination of modules and ensured good communication on the ground.

The specific contributions of the EUCPT to the coordination of the emergency were useful, but their inputs were not irreplaceable.

Higher relevance

The Mechanism supported the selection of highly relevant support modules, with the Mechanism reviewing the various offers of the Participating States and identifying the most relevant ones. Without the Mechanism, there could have been a risk that some modules deployed would have been less suitable for the tasks at hand and hence less effective.

Improved effectiveness

The contribution of the modules was significant and their effectiveness was most likely higher because of their interoperability and common 'working methods' (as a result of common training, exercises, protocols, etc.).

6 Conclusions and lessons learned

6.1 Conclusions and lessons learned on Relevance

Overall, stakeholders consulted considered the Mechanism relevant with regard to its objective to support the mobilisation of emergency assistance from Participating States in the event of major emergencies. The European Civil Protection Mechanism supported the deployment of relevant teams and modules and the ERCC facilitated coordination between all EU stakeholders involved. The relevance of the EUCPT could be improved by having clearer agreements with international partners in place beforehand on their potential role and inputs.

During the interviews several stakeholders saw that the ERCC could improve its analytical capacity significantly, in particular to provide on-the-ground teams (from the EU and other Participating States) with risks assessments, using different scenarios, and other analyses to support their activities.

6.2 Conclusions and lessons learned on Effectiveness

Overall stakeholders perceived the Mechanism as being effective. However, it was seen that some changes could improve the effectiveness:

- The effectiveness of the ERCC could be improved by having more duty officers with relevant field / humanitarian experience;
- For large scale humanitarian disasters in a third country which is already vulnerable, deploying civil experts with specific experience in humanitarian aid or embedding humanitarian experts in EUCPT could be beneficial;
- EUCPT teams would benefit from the participation of a skilled negotiator with experience in diplomacy;
- Similarly, the modules should also be better prepared for carrying out their tasks in a large-scale humanitarian disaster and for working in very difficult conditions (without electricity, sufficient food, etc.). Also, the need for staff to be flexible could be stressed.

6.3 Conclusions and lessons learned on Efficiency

Overall, the Mechanism was considered an efficient mechanism to decrease the burden of coordination of those managing, offering and receiving assistance.

The distinction made between the Humanitarian Aid and the Civil Protection structures by DG ECHO was perceived by external stakeholders as ‘artificial’ and potentially inefficient. Better links between the two could in particular improve the efficiency of reporting and communications, but also the efficiency of EUCPT deployments.

On the ground, the initial absence of a TAST led to some inefficiencies, showing the importance of early deployment of such teams.

6.4 Conclusions and lessons learned on Coherence

The EUCPT teams were, as is standard practice when disasters occur in third countries, deployed to support UNDAC/UNOCHA. Due to communications initially taking place at a higher level, the first team deployed needed to quickly integrate in the on-the-ground structures and agree on their role and tasks. The coherence (and relevance) of the EUCPT teams improved with the subsequent teams. The case study shows that there is room for further improvement with regard to relations with UN agencies, in terms of communications and practical agreements. Also, both parties would benefit from further guidelines, training / awareness raising on each other.

The ‘internal’ coherence between two DG ECHO structures – Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection – could be also improved. Better linkages between these would make the system stronger.

7 Methodology

For the purpose of the case study seven in-depth phone interviews were carried out. These interviews were conducted with different groups of actors involved in the emergency in Philippines in 2013.

The consultation process covered interviews with Liaison Officers of two EU CP teams deployed, one Team Leader, Team Leader of Technical Assistance Support Team (TAST) module and head of BFAST which is an Advanced Medical Post (AMP) module provided by Belgium. In addition to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism actors, UN OCHA was also consulted.

Table 7.1 Stakeholders contacted

Name	Position	Date of contact	Interviewed? Reason for refusal	Date of interview (if applicable)
Ionut Lucian HOMEAG	Unit B1, ERCC, ALPHA Liaison Officer	29 July 2014	√	1 August 2014
Orjan Nordhus KARLSSON	EUCPT Bravo, Team Leader	20 July 2014	√	28 July 2014
Herbert SARRI	EUCPT Bravo, TAST Team Leader	24 July 2014	√	6 August 2014
Giovanni DE SIERVO	EUCPT Charlie, Liaison Officer	25 July 2014	√	28 July 2014
Geert GIJS	Head of BFAST mission	4 August 2014	√	7 August 2014
Bernard JASPERS FAIJER	Rapid Response Coordinator, DG ECHO, Regional Support Office for East Asia, Southeast Asia and Pacific	25 July 2014	√	8 August 2014
Jesper LUND	Chief, Surge Capacity Logistics Section (SCLS), Emergency Services Branch (ESB), OCHA Geneva	25 July 2014	√	30 July 2014
Arlynn AQUINO	DG ECHO Manila	5 August 2014	Provided contact details and view on who to contact via email	6 August 2014
Marius DOGEANU	EUCPT Charlie, Team Leader	25 July 2014	No response	
Stephan FRAUENKNECHT	EUCPT Charlie, Logistics Expert	4 August 2014	No response	
Cristian IACOB	ERCC Duty Officer	4 August 2014	Out of office	
Maja KAMCEVA	ERCC Duty Officer	4 August 2014	Out of office	
Wayne BELIZAR	Representative in Tacloban, Department of Social Welfare and Development, Director IV, Management Information Systems Service	25 July 2014	No response	
Sjaak SEEN	OSOCC manager, UNDAC	29 July 2014	No response	
Florence PONCET	Marine Pollution expert, CEDRE	29 July 2014	No response	

Table 7.2 Documents reviewed

Reference	Description
Decision No 1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism	
DG ECHO Civil Protection Message n°1 - Philippines – Typhoon HAIYAN	
DG ECHO Civil Protection Message n°5 - Philippines – Typhoon HAIYAN	
DG ECHO Civil Protection Message n°7 - Philippines – Typhoon HAIYAN	
DG ECHO crisis report, Philippines – Typhoon Haiyan, Nr 1	
DG ECHO crisis report, Philippines – Typhoon Haiyan, Nr 2	
DG ECHO Factsheet – July 2014 – Philippines	
DG ECHO Factsheet – May 2014 – Typhoon Haiyan	
Joint assessment report: Oil spill in Estancia, Iloilo Province, Philippines resulting from typhoon Haiyan, 8 November 2013	
Lessons Learned Meeting Focusing on the European Initial Response to Typhoon Haiyan, ERCC, DG ECHO, EC, 20-21 March 2014	
Typhoon Haiyan, Team Alpha Final Report	Final report of the first EU CP team deployed to the Philippines
Typhoon Haiyan, Team Bravo Final Report	Final report of the second EU CP team deployed to the Philippines
Typhoon Haiyan, Team Charlie Final Report	Final report of the third EU CP team deployed to the Philippines