FINAL REPORT

EVALUATION OF ECHO’S HUMANITARIAN AID IN FAVOUR OF THE TIMORESE POPULATION IN EAST TIMOR AND WEST TIMOR

WATER AND SANITATION REPORT

GLOBAL PLAN JULY 1999-DEC 2000

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EVALUATION OF ECHO’S HUMANITARIAN AID IN FAVOUR OF THE TIMORESE POPULATION

Country of operation: East Timor
Name of main partners: Oxfam, ACF, UNICEF
Operation contract n°: ECHO/IDN/1999/02000-05000 and 2000/01000-04000
Dates & duration of the operation: 1 July 1999 – 31 December 2000
Total Amount: 28,637,000 EURO
Sector(s) concerned and description: Water Supply and Sanitation Sector

1.1.1.1. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVALUATION

Dates for the evaluation: March 4 to March 23, 2001
Report n°: ECHO/EVA/210/2000/01016
Name of consultant: Pam E. Minnigh
Purpose & methodology: Evaluation of the use and impact of water and sanitation interventions during the emergency phase in East Timor. Discussions with the implementing partners, the ECHO Correspondent, national and local authorities, several field visits, the review of documents and a short questionnaire, are the basis of this evaluation and its documented account.

CONCLUSIONS

Relevance
As 60-80% of the people of East Timor were displaced, and a similar percentage of homes destroyed, almost the entire population was eligible for support. Since nearly all piped water systems and a considerable number of wells were destroyed it was of utmost importance to supply fresh water by whatever means in the shortest possible period of time, in order to avoid communicable diseases. The number of victims, the security situation and the absence of alternative water sources, justified a first intervention in Dili and shortly thereafter, in the district towns, through the ECHO partners.

The transitional situation which came about after June 2000, called for another type of intervention. The focus shifted from urban to semi-urban and rural areas, as the major interventions in district towns were slowly taken over by different donors. ECHO partners, due to intense co-ordination efforts are now focussing on gaps which exist in the planning and implementation activities of the emerging authorities, such as school sanitation and related water supply. This is supplemented with hygiene education which was largely absent during the emergency situation, as water supply had the highest priority.

Effectiveness
The W&S interventions by ECHO have been very effective, since in a very short time a large number of people in the transit camps, Dili and in the district towns were provided with an acceptable quantity and quality of water. Locations were pre-selected based on assessments, resulting priorities and the existing security situation. The main choice of the ECHO partners was to rehabilitate wells and to use/reinstall hand-pumps, instead of repairing the already weak piped systems. This was very appropriate as it achieved the objective of delivering quickly sufficient water of an acceptable quality.

As the situation regarding the returnees did not develop according to the expectations, and there was and is no massive return movement, many partners still have an existing stock of materials, which is slowly being used in on-going activities in line with the existing conditions and prerequisites, and based on local and general co-ordination,
especially with WSS.

As has also been the case in East Timor, the relative cost-effectiveness of W&S in an emergency situation is always relatively low though appropriate, since the water systems put in place often use expensive (imported) materials, and are usually not meant to serve for a long time. Rehabilitation of existing systems is too time consuming, costly and would not effectively reduce the risk of communicable diseases. In the transition period to date, ECHO partners have implemented more cost-effective activities with an increased number of local staff. However, ECHO should realise that W&S activities, especially urban piped systems are by nature long term and cost intensive as they demand relatively expensive materials and professional supporting (international) staff. In East Timor the local capacity for specialised W&S activities is limited, as there are only 2 local NGOs who have some professional staff for W&S. Therefore, partners still depend much on substitution by international staff.

Efficiency

All ECHO partners in W&S have throughout displayed professionalism in assessing, organising and implementing their activities. In first instance, they have regarded the emergency situation and focussed on the priorities in the areas whereby they supported mainly district and sub-district towns. Due to the lack of competent local staff they have had to rely heavily on substitution staff. Only UNICEF has used a large number of local staff for their entrepreneurs activity for the supply of latrines. However, due to the very widespread implementation over the whole of ET and the remoteness of many areas, they still lack appropriate monitoring to guarantee an acceptable quality.

The administration at ECHO office in Dili is relatively complete, including continued assessments of the partners’ activities. However, due to the limited administrative capacity of the partners, the often-difficult field conditions for data collection, and the specific reporting conditions of the various donors, there have often been delays with the final reporting. It is also advisable to provide for a summary format of progress and final reports so that reporting to multiple donors can be streamlined and such reports shared amongst all stakeholders.

At the level of Brussels, there have been significant delays in project approval, contract delivery and follow-up of funding arrangements as well as feed-back, which impede the activities of ECHO in relation to the start-up of their project interventions as well as no-cost extensions or follow-up contracts. This particularly affects NGOs who are not in a position to pre-finance their activities.

Co-ordination, coherence and complementarity

All partners have been prudent in managing the funds of various donors to avoid duplication and overlap. Co-ordination improved considerably with the arrival of the ECHO Correspondent, and was institutionalised with the formation of the Water and Sanitation Services (WSS or WSA), of the Ministry of Infrastructure. ECHO has played a major role in establishing a coherent and complementary planning for their partners, who were pioneering the start-up of major water supply systems and more recently, a comprehensive rural activity plan based on water supply and sanitation for schools and their hinterland villages. This was a gap in the planning of PMU/ADB. In several localities preparations for urban water supply have been made which are continued by the local authorities (WSS) as they have been put in place in the last year. It will nevertheless be difficult to cope with the effects of the initial weak piped installations especially in the districts and an organisation (WSS) which is still in its start-up phase. The policy decision made by WSS/ADB to only fund rehabilitation and not reconstruction should be reconsidered on a case-by-case basis.

Impact & strategic implications

The impact of the initial relief interventions has been straightforward and although covering only a part of the population, has been as effective as could be expected under the circumstances. Pockets of un-served people especially in remote areas always
remain, and are still very difficult to reach. The ECHO partners are considering this aspect in this transitional period.

The strategy of the ECHO partners for W&S in the transitional period after June 2000, was geared towards rehabilitation and was more demanding. Due to the lack of capacity, human resources and a still practically absent WSS authority, interventions were more dispersed and specific, thus demanding the training and involvement of more local staff. In district towns, ECHO partners are also contracted by PMU/ADB (TFET Trust fund) to support governmental district staff of WSS. This newly created public agency responsible for the district town system, is continuing the initial rehabilitation activities funded after the events by ECHO. In rural areas, only slow progress is made, based on normal development principles, where the situation is not much different from the one before the events.

The consequences of choices made and absence of clearly defined roles between the initial ECHO partners and the newly created governmental bodies, make the transition to sustainable managed systems in urban as well as rural areas difficult. The strategic choice of the partners in the framework of ECHO, to work on W&S as complementary activities of the school emergency readiness project is just, since this aspect was omitted by PMU/ADB. However, these activities will already be based on development principles and therefore need to be incorporated into the process of village and/or community management. Especially urban, but also rural water supply, demands continuous, professional and capital intensive support, though it is doubted that the ET government will be able to guarantee this investment in the long term. By supporting W&S activities outside of refugee camps for the benefit of dispersed community groups, ECHO has in essence made a longer-than emergency-phase commitment, which is not sustainable if activities are not organised together with the community.

Through its experience of the Indonesian model, ET has inherited a very centrally dominated system which can severely hamper efforts to find a more suitable, cost-effective management system. Therefore, other types of management, including private initiatives should not be excluded and where possible explored. UNTAET/ETTA will have to make arrangements to guarantee sufficient ‘degrees of freedom’ for the communities, the government as well as private institutions to enable and decide on the development of an appropriate public/private mix which is affordable by either the government and/or the communities. In addition, an appropriate management system can only develop when discussions and agreements are made regarding the natural inclusion of water resources, watershed areas and land ownership issues, as they will form the basis of the stability of all in-country institutions.

**Visibility**

All partners have shown their appreciation by working on the visibility of ECHO through a display of ECHO stickers, special sanitation campaign stickers and documented statements. A large number of beneficiaries have even incorporated the name ECHO on their physical W&S constructions. The ECHO Correspondent has through her active involvement in meetings contributed considerably to the visibility of ECHO in the overall donor field.

**Horizontal issues**

**Gender:** Gender has not been a specific issue, as there has been no preference for or negligence of any group or gender. It has been families who have benefited from the W&S aid given. At a later stage, regarding sanitation and hygiene activities, more attention was given to informing women of the health risks related to water, and disposal of faeces and waste and they were integrated in planning and construction.

**LRRD:** Water & Sanitation programmes can be integrated into all aspects of the LRRD continuum, providing appropriate co-ordination and funding mechanisms are in place to support these. The TFET should be effectively monitored from this LRRD perspective in
relation to its support to Water & Sanitation programmes, especially with regard to cost-recovery, reconstruction and other public/private mix options for piped systems.

**Human rights:** The partners have respected the human rights of every group they have dealt with. Although every person has a right to support, it is not possible to include everybody in the interventions, due to the security, geographical and resources situation of the partners. Co-ordination and targeting attempted to ensure that as many people as possible were reached and the exclusion of specific pockets avoided.

**Security of the humanitarian staff:** The partners themselves are responsible for the security of their staff, materials and housing arrangements. They have co-ordinated their interventions in the field, regarding security, with the authorities present at the time of their interventions.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

As ECHO partners are able to give timely and professional support, they in turn need to be supported by providing an appropriate funding mechanism. This support needs to be flexible in terms of implementation time and budget, for the partners, especially NGOs, to adjust their support in relation to the needs situation on the ground. ECHO has fulfilled this role being a relatively quick and flexible funding outfit. However, ECHO should be aware that their planning and time needed for decisions is a crucial factor for partners to be able to plan and work effectively.

Partners for W&S depend on professional support in order to work for ECHO, in a direct emergency situation in the specific field of water and sanitation. They need to have access to material and specialised human resource report. This should be checked by ECHO before a contract is made with the partner. The specific qualifications of the partner, including the maximum acceptable workload during emergencies, should be taken into account when a proposal is presented and appraised. As ECHO deals with several partners, co-ordination is essential to cover a maximum number of beneficiaries and based on an integrated approach which covers a larger area and / or number of beneficiaries, instead of supporting individual activities at dispersed sites.

Water and sanitation interventions are intrinsically complex, and involve a longer-term commitment. Only in camps and where there are concentrated groups of people can specialised, standardised but costly (imported) equipment be used. In all other situations, interventions are not only costly and time consuming, but need to be planned and prepared in advance to be sustainable or at least serve for a mid to long-term solution, otherwise capital destruction occurs. Professional support for water supply, sanitation facilities as well as hygiene education is necessary to make a lasting impact. East Timor had weak water and sanitation facilities and coverage even before the ECHO intervention. W&S activities as initiated by ECHO partners addressed a need but they have to be continued and, therefore an acceptable mechanism should be in place before support can be transferred or finalised, and ECHO funding can be discontinued.

### LESSONS LEARNED

The main lessons learned is there are professional NGOs and UN agencies, which are able and willing to start activities in the front line, as soon as the security situation permits. They are able to make assessments and give professional support before other types of (larger) institutions have even materialised. To this end they need to be supported on short notice, and ECHO is the most effective funding agency to date. However, it is necessary that in larger scale emergencies, ECHO, as an emergency fund, establishes arrangements to start full-time co-ordination from an appropriate location in contact with the events.

Co-ordination in an early stage is essential especially when a reconnaissance period is over, W&S planning is starting and supplies are provided on a larger scale. The risk of duplication or an overemphasis of interventions in locations or areas needs to be avoided, as all affected people should have as much as possible the same access.
However, implementation is hampered as there was and is a fierce competition among all intervening partners in ET, for the very limited local human resources and professionals. This might interfere with co-ordination efforts.

W&S support is in essence a long-term commitment. ECHO needs to decide when it is appropriate to exit in view of the current transitional and subsequent development period. In view of the situation in the rural areas, it is appropriate to continue support as a joint and consistent effort, like support to the school readiness programme, as people also suffered major damage but for a long time could not be reached. This orchestrated, integrated, initiative of 6 NGOs and UNICEF fills a gap left by WSA/PMU, and gives long awaited support to rural villages. To initiate support with proper community based approaches and emphasis on environmental sanitation aspects, will right some of the wrong and at the same time redirect the way to sustainable solutions. However, ECHO and its partners will have to define benchmarks and standards to be able to streamline performance of all partners.
1 INTRODUCTION

This report will represent the evaluation made of the Water Supply and Sanitation Sector (W&S), as part of the ECHO Humanitarian Aid in favour of the Timorese Population during the period 1999 – 2000. The report is based on the standard ECHO format, the Terms of Reference (ECHO/EVA/210/2000/01016), and the questions asked during the briefing in Brussels (d.d. 28 February 2001), as provided for this mission. The evaluation and report is made by Pam Minnigh, who visited East Timor from the 4th until the 23rd of March 2001. During the mission the consultant had access to all documents at the ECHO representative office, and met with representatives of the ECHO partners, as well as with the European Commission, the Water and Sanitation Services including the Project Management Unit (PMU/ADB) within the Ministry of Infrastructure of the East Timor Transitional Administration (ETTA), the World Bank, and bilateral donors like AUSAID. Field visits were made to 5 of the 13 districts (Dili, Bobonaro, Ermera, Liquisa, and Manatuto) and extensive discussions were held with the partners in the field as well as with the WSS representatives in the districts. I hereby thank all partners, the ECHO Correspondent and all other respondents for taking part in the discussions and for their valued comments.

2 CONTEXT

2.1 POLITICAL AND SOCIAL-ECONOMICAL SITUATION

In the period before the ballot at the end of August 1999, the situation in Timor was already very tense. Due to the unrest, groups of inhabitants of specific areas, especially near the border, had already fled their homes. In anticipation, several international NGOs had already made their basic assessments of the situation and proposals were submitted to the ECHO representative office in Jakarta, and some had started working.

When the situation turned very violent, and as turned out a type of “the scorched earth” has been practised, a humanitarian drama followed. Of a population estimated before the ballot being 800.000 people, about 200.000 fled to West Timor, and between 300.000 and 400.000 (UN Reports) were internally (sometimes forcefully) displaced. In March 2001 it is reported that there are still about 60.000 – 120.000 people in the camps in West Timor. There are indications that the Indonesian army is trying to abolish the refugee camps, but the IDP’s only trickle in at a very low rate.

Based on the assessment by ADB (December 2000), the events in 13 districts and 63 sub-districts, including 440 villages, could be described as follows:

‘Damage was estimated to be between 65 and 80% of the buildings, private homes and infrastructure. In towns with public water supply systems, vehicles, pumps, and motors were removed, water treatment plants damaged; office, stores and other buildings burned; pipelines, tools, and spare parts stolen; storage tanks ruptured; latrines and septic tanks damaged; and water sources impaired. And with the burning of houses, water connections, including meters, were completely destroyed. None of the former water supply and sanitation institutions now exists.’

If these data are related to the status of the population in east Timor, where about 85% of the people are subsistence farmers, 20% live in or near Dili and the district towns, then it can be concluded that probably between 400.000 and 600.000 people are heavily affected by the events and have lost most of their livelihood. All civil servants lost their jobs and most of the businesses were destroyed.

In March 2001, about 1,5 years after the collapse of Timor, a new Timor, Timor Lorosae, is very much on the way to resurrect itself with the help of NGOs, numerous bilateral and multi-
lateral donors, with UNTAET–ETTA as its transitional government under a UN mandate. The 20 international NGOs in the emergency phase, growing to about 130 International and National NGOs at present, contributed in a vital way to the restoration of basic services and facilities as shelter, health facilities, water and sanitation facilities and food distribution. It is an overwhelming effort for a relative small country with limited resources but a very tragic history. The initial influx of international staff has left the Timorese somewhat dazed. Most of the qualified staff in every field has fled and there is fierce competition among the organisations to employ the few remaining well-trained people. A strong movement since June 2000 compels all organisations to include more local staff and to pay specific attention to their capacity building, the "Timorisation of Timor Lorosae".

In May/June 2000, the donors officially declared the emergency phase to be over, and the transition phase started towards full independence and self-reliance. After elections which are planned for August 2001, it is expected that UNTAET will hand over its mandate by 2002. Nevertheless, although the situation is relatively stable and secure, there is still a risk that underlying tensions will come to the surface around election time, as the national factions do not yet unanimously agree to the developments which are taking place in their country at the moment.

1.1.1.2.2 HUMANITARIAN NEEDS ASSESSMENT AND COVERAGE OF BENEFICIARIES

Assessments indicated that between 400,000 and 600,000 people were internally displaced and in need of assistance. Due to the geographical situation of the country, hilly and with many remote pockets, access by the relief agencies to all people in distress is very difficult to achieve. The events have taken place around the whole country, and therefore the programs and projects were executed in all districts, with emphasis on the border area. Priority needs as were assessed were water and sanitation facilities, health facilities and shelter.

The ECHO partners based their data on extensive field assessments, before the events and thereafter, as soon as the security situation allowed, and with a focus on Dili and the district towns. It was difficult as many people were still dispersed and the rural areas could not yet be reached. They based their assessments on the technical status of the facilities and former population data, and explored ways to quickly bring relief. Oxfam, specialised in emergency equipment, estimated to serve about 100,000 people, ACF-F (two contracts with overlap) around 20,000. Both have served this number although the number of returnees was less than expected. Furthermore, the number of beneficiaries served are difficult to estimate as other donors also funded ECHO partners in the same areas. UNICEF has in an early stage started preparing for extensive community consultations including mapping. They have not reached their estimated coverage of 63,000 people, as their method creating family latrine and water jars, takes more time to develop.

1.1.1.3.2 WATER AND SANITATION SECTOR IN EAST TIMOR

Water supply especially in urbanised areas is in essence a time consuming, capital and human resources intensive effort and not just a management and logistic arrangement. As in East Timor, water was one of the most essential needs, and quick delivery during emergencies had to be a main priority, despite the costs. After the initial emergency situation, water supply efforts always proceed in phases, which have different characteristics, conditions and prerequisites. Therefore planning and budgeting is complex, and if the conditions are not respected, all efforts will drain in a bottomless pit, as can be observed in many developing countries. Sanitation and hygiene information, except for the camps, is usually, like in ET, an issue which comes in a later stage when the situation has stabilised. Only UNICEF has made latrine construction part of the emergency phase, they delegated
water supply with hand pumps to ACF-F. As a result they have to deal with sometimes less accommodating circumstances, as the local capacity, monitoring and quality control are largely insufficient.

1.1.1.1.4. BEFORE THE EVENTS

The ADB report, summary sector reviews (December 2000), states that “prior to the crises, a public water supply network existed in 13 district towns and 49 of the 63 sub-district towns. The quality of the construction was generally poor and coverage was variable and low, commonly ranging from 25 – 40% in the central part of towns. All 440 rural villages had water supply of varying types but most were of a very low standard. Sanitation systems and solid waste management were generally lacking or in poor condition throughout the country”.

The urban and semi-urban water supply systems were managed by the PDAM (Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum, District Water Enterprise), on a (semi-) governmental basis at District level. These utilities were managed based on a centralised public services system. As stated above most systems already functioned at a very low capacity. Rural systems were effectively not managed by the government, but through the village authorities some type of control was executed. In many villages types of community water committees and users groups have been tried, but the structure was often weak due to the ambiguous roles and legal standing of both the community management groups and the government. Many rural systems, even the piped ones, did not function properly or not at all. Furthermore, Indonesian regulations stipulate that water is a public good, and therefore should be controlled by the government, as the sole keeper of this resource. This has often led to conflicts in villages, between villages, with the PDAM and the government.

1.1.1.1.5. DURING THE EVENTS

During the events of August, September 1999, the water and sanitation facilities in Dili, the district towns as well as in the villages were main targets of destruction. Most of these facilities have been destroyed which resulted in a total standstill of piped water supply, polluted wells and an absence of proper sanitary facilities. Due to the absence of proper water and sanitation facilities, there was a high risk of outbreaks of communicable diseases, especially those related to water, such as diarrhoea, dengue and malaria, or even cholera. Because Timor is a dry island, water shortage in general is also a risk.

The former management structure of the PDAM’s, with their staff having fled had effectively ceased to exist. Alternatives for urban piped water supply, like private electrical pumped systems, were limited as also the electricity supply had failed and wells were neglected. In the rural areas, the struggle for water has always been difficult, and people have to deal with situations whereby all available sources, close and far, need to be considered. Improvements made in villages, mainly through donor interventions over the last 20 years, have been destroyed, and the rural population is now more or less back to where it started.

1.1.1.1.6.

1.1.1.1.7. DURING THE EMERGENCY PHASE

Due to the effective response of the specialised NGOs, major problems in terms of water shortage and outbreak of water-related and other communicable diseases were prevented, there have been no reports of these occurrences on a large scale. However, there is always the difference in attention between urban and rural areas, whereby the latter represent the majority of the population. Due to security and access problems, urban areas like Dili, were the main focus of attention, whereas detailed assessments for rural areas were difficult to obtain. In the first months, all ECHO’s partners started in Dili and worked their way to the
district towns. OXFAM and ACF-F have effectively taken over the management and operation of the urban district systems, including the provision of materials and tools, and were in effect the caretakers. At national level they were the main counterparts of UNTAET. It has taken until mid 2000 for UNTAET to form a type of water and sanitation authority now known as the Water and Sanitation Services (WSS or WSA), which is part of the Ministry Infrastructure of ETAA.

Apart from the situation in the urban and rural areas, transition camps were made near Dili and the border areas. These were under the management of UNHCR and quick intervention, specialised water and sanitation facilities were installed among others by Oxfam and ACF-F. These are functioning to date as IDP’s are still expected and therefore the camps have not been dismantled yet.

1.1.1.7.1 PRESENT PHASE, TO MARCH 2001

Only recently has the formal water and sanitation sector become more pronounced. We were informed that since mid March WSS is called WSA, Water & Sanitation Authority and Administration. WSA has their head office in Dili, but they are still developing policies and plans for the WS&S services sector, including a national organisation structure and a strategic plan. Recurrent costs are financed by the UNTAET fund. WSA is supported by a Project Management Unit (PMU) managed by ADB. As part of the new Ministry of Infrastructure, WSA co-ordinates all W&S activities in the country, among donors and NGOs. Co-ordination is done via bi-weekly meetings.

WSA is already active in the districts as of mid 2000. Per district, one UNV manages a local staff of 4 to 6 persons. Their main task is to rehabilitate the former urban water supply systems in the district towns and occasionally in sub-district towns, and bring them back in the original state. The UNV has a contract for one year and might leave in June/July 2001, the local staff, a lot of them ex-PDAM, have been made civil servants.

Apart from the national structure installed, the external assistance has increased dramatically this last year. First of all, as of June 2000, ADB has become responsible for infrastructure, and they have created the Project Management Office (PMU) within WSA. An amount of US$ 4,5 million has been made available by the Trust Fund for East Timor (TFET) for FY 2000-2001. Their objectives are:

- to provide urgent assistance to rehabilitate and restore damaged and inadequate WS&S infrastructure throughout East Timor, and concurrently;
- to re-establish the human and institutional capacity needed to manage, operate, and maintain that WS&S infrastructure.

To achieve these overall objectives, the Project has three components:

Component 1: WS&S Sector Management and Investment Program
Component 2: Capacity Building and Institutional Development Program
Component 3: water Supply and Sanitation Implementation Program
  Component 3.1: WS&S Quick Response Facility
  Component 3.2: Dili Water Supply Repair and Rehabilitation Program
  Component 3.3: District Water Supply repair and Rehabilitation.

Other donors like JICA and CIDA are also assisting with urban water supply in Dili and in a number of district towns. Several NGOs, like the specialised W&S partners of ECHO (Oxfam, ACF-F), have received contracts with PMU/ADB and other donors to support urban water supply systems in district towns, and to work in rural areas.

Presently, rural areas are also being taken into account. UNICEF has used part of its ECHO funds to support SBSR, (Secretariado para o Saneamento Rural) Rural Water Supply and
Sanitation Secretariat. The Community WS&S Manager, Mr. Elias, is a former sanitarian who created the East Timorese Sanitation Organisation (ETSO) in September 1999. About 75 ex-sanitarians, former Health Centre Staff, are members of this professional organisation. UNICEF recruited 25 members now working as Field Monitoring Assistants for SBSR, one per sub-district. They are still paid by UNICEF and their main task is to support and monitor the village entrepreneurs, who build family latrines and water jars. Recently SBSR has become part of WSA and has a staff of 4 people, the Head of Community WS&S and 3 monitoring assistants. In a later stage SBSR will be fully financed by WSA. SBSR has to support community water supply and sanitation projects and has to co-ordinate with all NGOs and donors. SBSR is part of WSA and not the Ministry of Health to increase their direct impact at community level through shorter communication lines. WSA in the districts will soon be supported by one Community WS&S staff member.

AUSAID, apart from supporting individual NGOs since 1999, has a major program for rural water supply and sanitation which will begin shortly. Their former experiences indicated that a Community Based and Managed Water Supply program is needed. The word rural is avoided, as this does not cover all the areas where community initiatives are of major importance. They do not interfere with urban water supply, but can cooperate with community groups in (peri-)urban areas. For 3 districts, Cova Lima, Bobonaro and Viqueque, funding is reserved up to an amount of AU$ 7.5 mln. for a period of 3 years, starting in September 2001. The project will include a major training component for community facilitators, in co-operation with WSS, using the CFET fund. They would like 5 community facilitators as WSS staff members per district.

1.1.1.1.8.2.4 WATER AND SANITATION SECTOR IN WEST TIMOR

In West Timor the governmental structure has not changed, therefore the PDAM will be in charge of all the urban and/or piped water systems. In rural areas the government has only limited responsibility and types of community based management are in place, promoted over the last 10 years, as observed during former visits by the consultant. According to information of International NGO's and the ECHO Jakarta office, the refugees in the camps will be in a different situation as water supply and sanitation provision will largely depend on the camp management. It is expected that the government is trucking water as several of the camps are located in very dry areas. The fate of the estimated 60,000 – 120,000 inhabitants of the different camps (different data given by each agency and NGO) is largely unknown, since the UN and all other international staff, even from NGOs has left the island after the murder of 3 UNHCR staff members. A reconnaissance mission by the UN and other partners was planned to reassess the security situation in March, but it did not take place.

3 RELEVANCE

As 60-80% of the people of East Timor were displaced, and a similar percentage of homes destroyed, almost the entire population was eligible for support. Alternative water sources were not available, piped as well as non-piped systems were destroyed, and there was the risk of occurrence of communicable diseases. The main objectives as stated by the partners were straightforward and logical. They include access to safe and adequate drinking water supplies and the provision of a reasonable healthy environment. In first instance, due to the security situation, as well as the significant influx of IDP's looking for protection, the activities were focused on Dili and its suburbs. As soon as the situation permitted, attention spread out and focused on the district towns. After May/June 2000 more attention was given to the water supply in rural areas and environmental sanitation issues. The use of foremost NGOs and UN agencies as partners in emergency situations is very relevant and has been
extremely effective and timely. It has been the NGOs who have taken the (personnel) risks and have done the basic assessments whereupon most logistical arrangement decisions were made during the first half year.

The type interventions of the partners were relevant and critical. They chose for hand pumps in Dili and where possible in the district towns, repairs of piped systems were a second priority. The high water table in Dili gave easy access to a large supply of water, people know about hand pumps and they can repair it themselves. As no electricity was available, especially in the first 3 months, people could not use their own electrical pumps. However, after 3-6 months people have reinstalled their Sanyo, or electrical pump, even though electricity supply is still irregular. Repairing the damaged water system would have been too time consuming without not providing an adequate quantity of water in a short time. Simple water quality testing has been done by all intervening partners, using the practical Oxfam Delqua kit.

Activities for sanitation, hygiene promotion, solid waste, wastewater and drainage were relevant but were not a priority, except in the camps. Most shelter programs included a hygiene package so that personal hygiene was part of the emergency intervention.

In the transitional period, the activities of the ECHO partners are still relevant, as they have been able to adapt their planning. Through co-operation and co-ordination with the ECHO representative and WSS, they have been able to avoid duplication and concentrated on the major issues like water supply in rural areas, hygiene promotion activities, additional repairs of urban water systems as well as support to WSS in the districts in terms of planning, capacity building, and material supply.

4 Co-ordination, Coherence and Complementarity

4.1 Co-ordination of Administration

The first activities funded by ECHO began before the actual events took place. There was an emergency situation, in the sense that people were displaced, but very different from the situation after August 1999. In that time, all administration was still arranged from Jakarta. The Dili ECHO office only opened in March/April 2000, effectively 5 month after the crisis. All the assessments and appraisals had already been done by the ECHO partners active in the field. This late fielding of the Correspondent, and dependence of the activities on the decisions in Brussels, has caused delays in the processing and approving of proposals, and has stretched the resources of the NGOs, where it could have been avoided. Only because most of the specialised international NGOs have enough financial reserves and other sources of funding, it did not prevent them to become directly active in the field.

With the establishment of the ECHO office, the situation has changed as through co-ordination more appropriate support for partners could and has been given. As the administrative procedure for project proposal submission is often hampered by incorrect or incomplete procedures of the partners, this could be corrected in an earlier stage. However, because information is not always given timely to ECHO Dili, some parts of the procedure, especially the decisions, the contracts and the financial documentation, are not complete or only after a significant period of time.

Duplication and inappropriate coverage has been avoided as the correspondent has well kept track of all the intervening organisations, their planning and implementation. Brussels was advised by the correspondent about proposals outside the priorities of the UNTAET/ETTA and not based on joint donor strategies and planning, as ECHO Dili has tried
to get a consistent effort going in all the sectors where they intervene. Inter-NGO co-
ordination has improved as well as co-ordination with other stakeholders like WSA, the World
Bank and the UN agencies. For the W&S sector, the role of ECHO has been pronounced
through its partners. Only with regard to joint donor missions for W&S, the role and impact of
ECHO activities was not clearly recognizable in the documents. However, as most partners
are supported by several donors, the reporting based on different formats is time consuming,
which is a problem in an emergency. Therefore, it is advisable to have summary reports and
to allow for combined donor reports.
4.2 Co-ordination of WSA initiatives

A multi donor mission co-ordinated by ADB in April 2000 developed a water and sanitation strategy consisting of 3 components: (i) water and sanitation sector management framework, to include institutional and human resource development, tariff policy, assets management systems, standards, and legal and regulatory framework; (ii) water supply and sanitation works. This includes asset mapping and master planning of town water supplies funded by JICA; Dili water and sanitation rehabilitation by UNDP with funding from the Government of Portugal; rehabilitation of 15 town water and sanitation systems; community based water supply in rural areas; (iii) environmental health promotion, including community information campaigns, strengthening local NGOs who work in the sector, and developing the capacity of local and village groups for water management.

With WSA being very small and heavily substituted, many initiatives depend on multilateral and bilateral support. PMU is to rehabilitate district WS systems where building of new systems and reconstruction of existing systems is excluded. It is appropriate that ECHO will contribute via the school readiness program, whereby attention will be given to sanitation and hygiene education integrated in a related community water supply system, as this part was not covered by PMU/WSS. When not properly co-ordinated there might be overlaps with the Quick Impact Projects (QIP’s) from UNTAET/UNHCR and with the Community Empowerment and Local Governance Projects (CEP), financed through TFET. CEP is set to develop 341 village development councils, and to identify 214 sub-projects for rehabilitation of local infrastructure.

4.3 Monitoring of ECHO funded projects

Monitoring has been done mainly by the partners themselves, and they have been providing regular assessments. With the establishment of the ECHO representative office a start was made with an ECHO-monitoring system based on provided documents, but even more on personal contacts and field visits.

The ‘Framework Partnership Agreement’ between ECHO Brussels and the partner guarantees the quality of the intervention. The partner has to monitor and manage its own intervention, with emphasis on the technical aspects, this is not the task of the ECHO Correspondent. However, ECHO has indicated that they would like the Correspondents to make regular field visits and reports. This implies some type of technical monitoring. The role of the Correspondent in monitoring the ECHO partners has not been well defined. Firstly as a matter of principle, regarding the formal mandate, should the Correspondent monitor in detail the work done by ECHO’s partners, or is it just to check if the partners are at work? ECHO is first and mainly a funding agency, not an implementing one, but this point is about to become fuzzy by additional monitoring interventions. Taking into account that the partners have other donors and some activities are the result of joint financing. Secondly, the technical background of the Correspondent, what is her understanding of the activities, what can it contribute to a better implementation process? Thirdly, the time spend on these monitoring activities, as it is the Correspondent has already enough work managing the bureau as well as all the co-ordination activities. Monitoring of the Contract related to the progress and results attained as reported by the ECHO partners is necessary. This process should be timelier and should include feedback from ECHO Brussels to ECHO Dili, as well as by the Correspondent to the partner.

On the other hand, to ensure minimum standards, ECHO and its partners have to determine how the monitoring can be done most effectively. As W&S needs huge capital investments and professional substitution at a very early stage for a long period, screening (new) partners on these aspects is required during appraisal before a contract is rewarded. This aspect should become more explicit and be reinforced during appraisal.
1.1.1.1.8.1.1.5 EFFECTIVENESS

Specialised NGOs like Oxfam and ACF-F, who were present in Dili have been very effective in starting to supply people with water and some sanitation facilities in the residential areas. Emergency equipment for water supply and sanitation was supplied and installed in the transit camps. Oxfam and ACF-F are specialised in equipping camps as well as delivering technical support. UNICEF uses NGOs and contractors as sub-contractors of larger contracts for technical implementation, and are effective, as coordination unit for procurement, and due to their well-known mandate are able to establish coordination between NGOs and the government, as they were in Dili.

Transit camps were provided with specialised bladder and tank systems, as well as ready-made sanitation blocks, all imported emergency kits. In Dili town the partners have effectively reinstalled hand-pumps, Dragon type. Oxfam has supported the repair of the Dili water supply which has been functioning since April/May 2000, thereafter the water authority of UNTAET has taken charge.

In district towns and rural areas, this was similar, where possible pumps were reinstalled and in a later stage the NGOs started to repair the town WS systems. In rural areas the water situation has always been precarious, the effect is limited as options like rehabilitation or re-installation are very limited or not present. In March 2001, nearly all district town WS systems were partly functioning. The influx of IDP’s had not been as large as predicted, so some WS stock is being used for on-going activities.

After the initial emergency phase, we are now in the transition phase whereby the activities border on development initiatives. The strategy of the partners has changed accordingly and they have adapted well. They are still effective, but for WS&S the work cannot not be speeded up and becomes much more capital intensive. Therefore, with a decreasing number of international staff, a slowly increasing number of local staff, only a limited number of areas can be covered. As the quality of the systems before the events was already very low, the effectiveness of only repairs and rehabilitation, as done by WSS in the districts, is doubted.

1.1.1.1.8.1.2.6 COST-EFFECTIVENESS

Most of the W&S activities are essential but cost intensive, and in emergency situations one has to rely on expensive imported materials and tools, as was the case in ET. The Unit Costs by partners like Oxfam, ACF-F and UNICEF cannot be compared as the partners used different kits and materials, and the number of interventions was limited. In a later stage, the cost effectiveness was still low, as was expected. Especially piped systems which require repairs, rehabilitation and necessary reconstruction need substantial investments due to expensive parts, transport and operational costs and skilled technicians. Billing is one way to recover funds for O&M, however ETTA has not decided yet when they will and can start in Dili and all other towns. Presumably this will be after the elections, and as indicated might not be sooner than the end of 2002. It has to be understood that WS&S activities in developing countries, especially complex systems like piped ones, are in nature not very cost-effective nor short term, but of the utmost importance.

To improve the cost-effectiveness, it is important to have staff who are motivated and perform well, as was the staff of the ECHO partners. Staff performance of WSA is in question, as WSA staff in Dili as well as in the district towns have become civil servants with unlimited contracts and fixed salaries, without any way to measure their output. Performance indicators have not been defined and capacity of the staff is still very limited. Support and
supervision depends very much on the capacity of the (temporary, foreign) UNV member. There is no incentive for the staff to improve their performance, they have been given the job and like in the Indonesian time it is not specified what is expected more than their attendance. The question about responsibility and accountability of the staff, according to WSA, comes too soon. Nevertheless, first of all, without some kind of billing the effect of their activities cannot be measured. Secondly, how can adequate skills and resources be made available now and in future to guarantee continued operation. All initial capital investments made among others by ECHO, are at risk as there is no effective support, monitoring and control possible. Even complaints by the community will not have any effect, as the WSS unit will indicate that they do not have the resources to do more than they do already and, except for large users, nobody has to pay for the time being.

Although there are limited examples of private sector involvement in management of ‘potential-low/no-profit’ town water utilities. this aspect is being reviewed all over the world. It stands to reason that discussions between WSA and the ET government, are necessary to see if in future there are appropriate and affordable public-private mix options, to avoid a significant capital drain without appropriate development. To depend on civil servants without proper skills, support and motivation, is a very risky development and should not be an automatic choice.

7 Efficiency of the implementation

Before WSA was created, the ECHO partners were able to decide on their activities in a flexible and adaptive way. Lacking local capacity, an extensive need for substitution and financial resources and the security situation, limited the extent of the activities, but activities were implemented in an effective way in line with the local conditions. As the number of returning refugees was not as large as expected, some stock of W&S materials remained but has been or is used for on-going support. Now the situation has changed, there are many players in the W&S field, with each their own role and resources and fiercely competing for the available local resources.

ET, like any other developing country, faces a lack of funds, even routine budget, resources and capacity. NGOs and UN agencies have long working relationships but usually limited coverage due to their individual approaches and intensive way of working. There are always pockets in the country without support, due to geographical, hydro-geological and geomorphological differences. In most instances there is a weak cost-effectiveness relationship. In time cost effectiveness might increase, especially with increased employment of local staff, a decrease of international support to a minimum, and availability of materials on the local market. However, time must be allowed for changes and activities to take place as local decisions, especially based on community management take time especially for W&S interventions.

8 Strategy and impact of the interventions

1.1.1.8.1.2.1. technology choice

The immediate effect of the interventions by the ECHO partners especially in the towns have been felt on short notice. The choice made by the partners, especially in Dili, to use existing family wells, was appropriate. The rehabilitation and cleansing of family wells in town and the installation of hand pumps were practical and had a direct impact, as people were already familiar with these type of systems. However, it was not the solution in the long run. As soon as the electricity had been restored, many returning families opted to reinstall electrical pumps, and with the rehabilitation of the piped system, changed again their use pattern.
The choice of hand-pumps was also less favourable, although the type was known before the events. Imported from neighbouring Indonesia, this Dragon Pump is not very solid and within a period of 3 to 6 month it has been reported that more than 50% became inoperative (OXFAM, ACF). At the moment a discussion is held within the WSS context, to decide on a mutual approach of all intervening partners regarding particular pump brands, types and conditions, the standardisation of pumps.

1.1.1.1.8.1.2.2. transition towards development
In developing countries, with a weak point of departure to start with, the emergency is over when easy, although expensive, measures have been taken and a more or less stable situation is reached. Thereafter, the build-up of very cost intensive and time consuming WS systems will have to be planned and started. As in the case of ET, it is often doubted if repairs and rehabilitation will fix the problems, as they are much deeper embedded. Redoing or reconstruction might be options, but not as part of the ECHO package. This is an aspect to be addressed and funded in a sustainable way by the authorities and their own funding mechanisms, unless there is a gap which organisations present are not able to address. In those circumstances ECHO might choose to play an intermediary role. Support of rural areas is also part of the same question, in how far should ECHO contribute to development initiatives as it is in essence a long-term commitment. This should be seen in the light of equity, as rural population often does not get the attention as their urban brothers and sisters.

1.1.1.1.8.1.2.3. environmental impact
The environmental impact of W&S activities as such has been nil. However, the events in general have increased the environmental degradation as deforestation has occurred at a larger scale. Firewood is one of the sole income generating activities for relatively remote areas. This reinforces the negative effects of an instable soil, as landslides and severe erosion occur more frequently and risk damaging further development efforts.

ASSESSMENT OF PRESENT SITUATION REGARDING W&S
ECHO has to decide on an exit or fade-out strategy regarding their interventions in the field of W&S. In principle WSA has taken over most of the initial functions of the ECHO partners, but they concentrate on the urban systems. Sanitation, hygiene and waste related issues are only sparsely becoming part of the game, no different from the situation before the events. This evaluation raises some of the following issues:

First of all, WSA is setting up a public system, whereby the units managing urban water supply, are part of the government. This in itself limits ways to improve performance and to find other management systems more adapted to the situation. A public/private mix is not excluded by WSA, but the district organisation might not understand other concepts. All people involved, except for the UNTAET staff, only know about one type of centralised, governmental controlled systems as they were all trained in the tradition and practices based on this Indonesian system. To set up a public system is doubted to be very cost effective and might be a burden for the newly formed authority. Therefore, discussions on the consequences of this choice should be continued, including the EC representation, as the EC has stressed the importance of the Health and Infrastructure sectors. Up to now, TFET has been active in urban areas but reconstruction and rural support are not covered by their intervention.

Secondly, the WSS units as set up in the districts still lack resources. The quality of the UNV’s is very diverse, as is the quality of the staff. They do not have any petty cash and for materials they have to go to Dili. Most of these units are supported, by NGOs like Oxfam and
ACF under a PMU contract. These NGOs are strong and professional and the WSS teams tend to rely heavily on them, using them instead of profiting from their support to develop themselves. Roles and responsibilities have not yet crystallised and there is tension between the NGOs and the WSS staff. The NGOs are willing to go very far with their support and as the WSA expressed, they might even go too far, and might not be able to draw the line, to teach the WSS units how far they can go. The NGOs have a tendency to create a dependency of the WSS district teams on their expertise and material supplies, as they are not able and/or not willing to put in hard conditions and to negotiate. The NGOs are adamant that they are not contractors, although they have obtained contracts, according to WSA, based on their own assessments and conditions. The reality is probably somewhere in between but there is limited communication to right this situation.

Thirdly, to counter the risk of capital destruction, related to the initial ECHO investment, it is necessary to start billing in towns, where people were used to billing. Billing, even with flat rates, requires that the water system is running, and an inventory of and a renewed contact with the customers made. This should be one of the performance indicators for a unit as WSS. However, the Ministry of Infrastructure is not yet willing to pass bylaws enabling billing, as elections are coming up. WSA estimates that billing is not expected before the end of 2002. This in effect is counter productive to activities implemented by ECHO partners during the emergency and transitional period leading up to a consistent and sustainable development effort. If the EC considers additional investments in the urban water sector (TFET), it is advised to take this matter into account.

Efforts in the rural areas have been getting less attention. However, ECHO is gearing up to include water supply and sanitation facilities for schools, which was not provided for by TFET. This has been an integrated attempt by all partners, 6 and UNICEF, and they have decided on the strategy and conditions. The proposals were made in a uniform way. As this intervention is very diverse, encompassing many localities and different partners with each their own routines and approaches, there is a risk that monitoring and quality control will be weak, especially with new NGOs and an increasing number of local staff. ECHO together with their partners have to decide on benchmarks and performance indicators to ensure that the quality of the implementation by the individual partners is guaranteed.

As school W&S is coupled to village W&S, using community development principles is fundamental. Here is another risk as the role of the WSS unit, other related projects in the area, the policy and the approaches of the NGOs and the capacity of the villagers might be conflicting. WSA has indicated that the WSS district group is only to deal with urban matters, but at the same time SBSR and AUSAID are trying to add personnel for community management aspects. It is known that community managed systems in developing countries have limited sustainability and are hardly ever self-reliant. It will depend on the 'degrees of freedom' permitted by WSA and the district and village authorities, in what way the village systems are allowed to develop themselves. The spectrum from government to privately managed systems, including the use of subsidies and possible creations of associations, are options to be considered by the communities and their government. It also depends on the ownership and management of natural resources like water, and the land ownership, if communities can effectively decide on their future. Flexibility is asked of all stakeholders to try not to fixate the process and the outcome before all options have been considered. It is known that people in villages are willing to pay, as long as they get what they want. Policies to promote quality control, technology choices and transparency, are good measures, as long as they do not become straitjackets for communities and NGOs. Many of the rural communities will not be reached by the government even in the long term due to lack of resources.
In terms of awareness, all partners have co-operated in publicly acknowledging the support of ECHO. The visibility in the forum of donors, the transitional government and NGOs, has been guaranteed as the Correspondent of ECHO in Dili has attended regularly all co-ordination meetings, those of general importance as well as sectoral ones. During field visits it has become apparent that the visibility of ECHO is guaranteed by the placing of stickers on vehicles and ECHO as a name on physical constructions. However, in general, NGOs are also supported by other donors, therefore they have to be careful in attributing all credit to specific donors.

10 Horizontal Issues

10.1 Gender

In restoring availability of and access to water and rehabilitating the existing water supply, no specific attention was given to gender aspects. Only UNICEF, by training village entrepreneurs, has used a strict gender rule to include as many men as women. In the transition period, all partners have included sanitation and hygiene education, and they have put more emphasis on the importance of women and school children as agents of change.

10.2 Human Rights

No specific attention has been paid to this aspect as activities were implemented for the whole East Timorese population, without exceptions.

10.3 Security Issues

In principle the security the staff, materials and housing conditions, is the sole responsibility of the partners. To minimise the risk, all have always worked closely with the security forces and the civil police, and have abided to all the protocols prepared for UN personnel and third parties. They were informed when and where it was safe for them to travel, and as far as the Evaluation team has heard, no accidents have occurred during their interventions. The security situation for the partners in West Timor is as yet unknown.