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Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO)

Evaluation of ECHO's 2001 Intervention Plan in Colombia
Assessment of ECHO's Future Strategy in Colombia
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VOLUME I MAIN REPORT

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ACRONYMS

ACNUR-UNHCR Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados
 United Nations High Commission for Refugees

ACNUD- UNHCR Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos
 United Nations High Commission for Human Rights

CE Caritas Española

CRC Cruz Roja Colombiana- Colombian Red Cross

CRE/ SRC Cruz Roja Española-Spanish Red Cross

CRF / FRC Croix Rouge française-French Red Cross

CICR / ICRC Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja / International Committee of the Red Cross

CISP Comitato Internazionale per lo Sviluppo dei Popoli / International committee for the development of the People

DIH / HIR Derecho Internacional Humanitario / Humanitarian International Right

LFPM-EML Logical Framework Planning Matrix-xEstructura del Marco Lógico

FDM Fundación Dos Mundos

ICBF Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar

MPDL Movimiento por la Paz, el Desarme y la Libertad

PTM Movimiento Paz y Tercer Mundo

OIM Organización Internacional para las Migraciones-International Organisation for Migrations

OPM-OMS Oficina Panamericana de la Salud - Organización Mundial de la Salud

PAHO-WHO Pan American Health Organisation – World Health Organisation

PMA / WFP Programa Mundial de Alimentos / World Food Programme

PS Pastoral Social

RSS Red de Solidaridad Social

SI Solidaridad Internacional

UNICEF Programa de las Naciones Unidas para la Infancia-United Nations Children Fund

USAID United States Agency for International Development

UTC Unidad Técnica de Coordinación / Red de Solidaridad Social

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Humanitarian internally displaced persons (IDP) crisis in Colombia is unique. It is a low-intensity, creeping and half-forgotten crisis, which has only recently come into the limelight. The crisis is a direct outcome of an internal conflict that began decades ago as a revolutionary social reaction against the high inequality in wealth distribution in Colombia, which inequality is directly linked to the lop-sided land ownership structure in the country. Until recently, no fundamental response had been given to this crisis by succeeding Governments and today the gap between the affluent Colombian middle class, which is a new reality, and the rest of the pauperised rural and urban population is very wide indeed. The various guerrilla movements had their ups and downs. The most important one - M19 - opted more than a decade ago for a legal form of opposition and now there remain two important armed guerrilla groups, namely the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN). Most of their political agenda has been lost along the way during their struggle with the Colombian State and they have been allowed to retire to safe havens, a concession obtained under half-pledged and ill-observed "peace agreements". The violence these groups engage in is matched, even dwarfed, by the paramilitary forces that emerged as the results of the landlords' reaction to the exactions and violence of the guerrilla. The conflict has escalated in the past few years as the paramilitary forces gained in man- and firepower and expanded their activities to most parts of Colombia. The peace process has come to a virtual standstill and now consists of token references to the peace agreements. The most probable outcome of the confrontation in this presidential election year (2002) is an intensification of the conflict with military activities all over the country, the almost empty region of the Amazons excepted. The civilian population constitutes the main victim of the conflict, especially that of the rural areas, where it is routinely expelled from the areas of domicile and exposed to indiscriminate massacres and death threats. The strategy employed by both sides in the conflict is based on instilling wide-spread fear, leading to mass expulsion, which is followed by land appropriation. In the case of the guerrilla, this strategy is evidence of how far it has departed from its original ideals.

The number of IDPs is known only by approximation, as a result of laxity in data collection and processing, legal impediments and double counting, and because of the fact that IDPs' movements are typically hard to keep track of. Available estimates vary between 500,000 and 2,000,000 IDPs. It is well-known however, that there are concentrations of IDPs - who tend to converge on five Departments - and that there has been a sudden, very significant increase (of about 50%) in the number of new IDPs in 2001 in comparison with the year before. It is likely, that 2001 has seen the emergence of some 150,000 to 200,000 new IDPs, as a direct outcome of the acceleration of the confrontation and the spreading of local conflicts to adjacent areas. The larger part of expulsions are caused by paramilitary forces.

ECHO was the first to respond, as early as 1997, at a time when the Government of Columbia (GOC) and most, if not all, of the donor organisations ignored the creeping humanitarian crisis. Since then the GOC has acknowledged the importance of the IDP-issue and has taken steps to meet it. First, the Red de Solidaridad Social (commonly referred to as "RED"), which originally targeted the needs of the elderly and infirm, was given the additional task of attending to the IDPs. The RED comes under the direct chairmanship of the Vice-President and is co-ordinating the activities benefiting IDPs. Second, the RED has asked and received the assistance of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, in spite of the fact that helping IDPs is not part of the latter entity's mandate. (UNHCR in Colombia has to do its own fundraising; ECHO contributes a good part of its financial resources). Third, the GOC has requested the help of non-governmental organisations (NGO) to tackle the IDP-issue. ECHO has accumulated a wealth of experience and has learned many lessons throughout the five years it has worked in Colombia with its Partners under its Global Plan.

The review of the operations of ECHO's 2001 Intervention Plan suggests that, notwithstanding the inclusion of elements of emergency humanitarian assistance, the projects implemented represent what are termed, in ECHO's strategy, "post-emergency" solutions. This is the outcome of a broad and diversified strategy for providing emergency humanitarian assistance (including food, health and housing) to the displaced population, accompanied by income-generating activities enhancing the displaced population's

capacity to sustain itself and survive. In all these actions, the psycho-social component has had an important role as a facilitating tool for promoting and strengthening methods for self-protection, peaceful resistance to expulsion and land abandonment, and prevention of future displacements. The gradual modification of the intervention strategies employed reveals that the latter were and continue to be based on finding new formulae for responding to the needs of the displaced population. Thus, it can be shown that an evolution has taken place away from the simple delivery of basic products to more efficient and effective ways of humanitarian assistance (through the practice of food parcels (“markets” in Colombia), the provision of health services, the distribution of materials and tools, income and sustenance generating efforts, as well as the employment of psycho-social measures). In this context of accumulating experience with regard to project implementation, ECHO’s Partners can be perceived as having increased their knowledge of their respective working areas, especially with regard to the profiling of beneficiaries, allowing for greater adaptability to prevailing circumstances and unforeseen events.

The evaluation of the operational activities of ECHO’s Partners also provides evidence however, that the positive effect emanating from the above mentioned accumulation of experience may be undercut by these Partners’ sometimes ill-developed institutional capacity. Important differences in organisational efficiency, with their concomitant effect on projects’ output and results, were observed.

In general, the proposals presented by the Partners to establish their eligibility for participation in the 2001 Plan were not totally satisfactory in their formulation. In some cases, this led to inappropriate allocation of the resources made available to the Partner concerned and a loss of efficiency. At the same time however, it is clear that the effectiveness of this kind of project tends to depend more on the Partner’s accumulated experience and its knowledge of how to operate in the field, than on appropriate objective formulation.. This confusion may be illustrated by the excessive or mistaken definition of the contents of the so-called “productive packages”, which are often presented as *productive projects*, while in practice they merely represent temporary emergency solutions for the needs of displaced people

It may be noted that the overhead cost of the activities carried out by the Partners tends to be high. The explanation lies in the Partners’ personnel costs which amount to an average of 30% of the funds allocated. Transport costs frequently claim another 25% of the budget.

The ECHO Colombia Office has put in place a permanent co-ordination mechanism, which has contributed to improving the link between the objectives and aims of the programmes, on the one hand, and the results and output of the Partners’ ECHO-funded activities, on the other hand. This mechanism has further been instrumental in improving co-ordination between the activities of the various Partners. It is felt, by both the Partners themselves and the monitors, that advantage should be taken of the existing mechanism to establish a more “horizontal” relationship between ECHO and its Partners and increase the scope for the formulation and promotion of new initiatives. In other words, the co-ordination mechanism could be used to develop a creative process of project and programme formulation between equal partners.

It is clear that the current staffing of the ECHO Colombia Office puts limits on that entity’s ability to cope with the effective monitoring of and appropriate follow-up for a total of 17 projects, implemented by 14 different Partners, and covering 19 of the country’s provinces.

There is exists a need for ECHO to discuss further with the Partners the issue of visibility, i.e. ensuring that wide-spread transparency exists with regard to the origin of the financial resources made available by ECHO. The use of the ECHO-logo in Partners’ documentation is not sufficient. Partners’ should undertake to clearly set out to beneficiaries, using every available means, that the provenance of the assistance is the EU, in general, and ECHO, in particular.

In general terms, it may be concluded that the projects monitored had a positive impact. Not only in terms of the results of the individual projects, but also in terms of a gradual increase in the overall impact of the 2001 projects in comparison with earlier interventions. It is very clear that the living conditions of beneficiary IDPs has improved significantly, when compared with their earlier circumstances, as a direct result of the interventions.

The Partners’ operations tend to take due cognisance of the gender issue. Not because tackling this issue represents a goal in itself, but because doing so represents a psycho-social facilitating measure which generates equity. The Partners’ recognise that displacement burdens women doubly in that they face new

challenges and roles on top of their traditional marginalized position. However, the Partners also realise that they have not yet begun to address effectively the promotion of “masculinity”, as an alternative to “machismo”. This issue is an important one in the displacement situation, in which the male’s role is fundamentally altered because he is forced to remain in hiding and tends to become dependent upon a woman (wife or companion). This situation tends to heighten “machismo”-elements in the behaviour of male IDPs.

With regard to the issue of human rights, all Partners were found to be sensitive to the need for “emergency humanitarian assistance” to act in favour of human rights, while making a clear distinction between “humanitarian action”, on the one hand, and the implementation of activities for the defence and promotion of human rights, on the other hand.

In order to enhance the impact and long-term sustainability of the results of the projects, it is important to consider any possibilities to build upon and follow-up on interventions already initiated. The need to do so relates directly to the limited financial resources at the disposal of the State and public entities for promoting impact and ensuring sustainability. Thus, effective and lasting solutions aiming to make IDPs less dependent on emergency humanitarian assistance should be actively considered. In particular, this involves finding a way in which the currently existing grey area between humanitarian assistance, on the one hand, and post-emergency assistance, on the other hand, can be further reduced, by making the latter a logical, and well-designed and planned continuation of the former. In this context, it is important to identify and take advantage of that particular moment in the assistance planning process where linking relief and rehabilitation with development (LRRD) can be made operationally included.

It is therefore advisable, that ECHO should lay down the criteria (as opposed to establishing definitions) with regard to the content of, respectively “humanitarian assistance”, “post-emergency assistance” and “return & re-settlement”. In addition, the review of previous experience suggests that ECHO should identify and put in place those conditions likely to enhance sustainable self-sufficiency of the beneficiaries of its IDP-targeted programmes. In particular, and in parallel to the implementation of the 2002 ECHO Intervention Plan for Colombia, ECHO and AIDCO should start the joint formulation of a programme of rehabilitation and re-settlement, based on the following key criteria:

- the complementary and continuing character of post-emergency measures;
- their area-based orientation;
- their explicit incorporation of updated needs analyses and review of lessons learnt; and
- with a basis in enhanced co-operation between ECHO’s Partners.

With regard to the 2002 ECHO Intervention Plan, the design and planning potential of the Logical Framework Planning Matrix (LFPM) should be used to the full. The LFPM was not primarily designed to facilitate the monitoring of programme implementation and the evaluation of programme results. The methodology is intended first and foremost to achieve clarity about the relationship between objectives, goals, output, results, activities and inputs of any programme during the design and planning stage of the programme, in an interactive and reiterative process between programme stakeholders. A well-employed LFPM may be subject to modification at later stages during the preparatory phase of the programme. The LFPM should present in clear, unambiguous language the objectives and goals to be achieved, the detailed output and results to be aimed for and the activities to be implemented. For each of these categories, the LFPM should include clearly qualified and, where possible, quantified indicators of achievement, cast in a form that allows easy verification of their degree of attainment at any time during implementation. The LFPM should further identify clearly the sources of information available and actually used to verify the degree to which the indicators of achievement have been met. ECHO should point out to its Partners that the inclusion of an LFPM in their proposals is not merely a matter of formal compliance with project documentation requirements, but that the LFPM methodology should be actively utilised in establishing agreement amongst stakeholders with regard to purposes, outcomes and activities of the programme during its design and planning stage.

With regard to the psycho-social component, the process of strengthening its mechanisms of implementation should be continued, taking into account the proposals contained in the relevant document¹ prepared between the Pan-American Health Organisation (PHO), ECHO and the NGOs. At the same time, for the purpose of creating the pre-conditions for sustainable conditions, efforts must be made

¹ Basic Guidelines for the Psycho-social attention of displaced populations as a consequence of the Conflict in Colombia". www.col.ops-oms.org/desplazados/documentos/LineamientosPsychosociales.htm

to reinforce financially those components which the psycho-social dynamics support (such as food, health, financing of small business and activities generating incomes and productive packages).

The ECHO Colombia Office should induce the various Partners to take the necessary steps to: (a) improve co-ordination between stakeholders and the institutions involved, as well as between Partners involved in the same and similar programmes; (b) improve their project formulation and management skills; (c) systematise the experience made and lessons learnt and sharing such with other Partners; and (d) continue strengthening the links with and between its Partners.

An assessment of ECHO's future strategy in Colombia must of necessity focus on two main sets of issues: policy issues and operational issues. The very first basic policy-related question is: "Should ECHO phase out its operations in Colombia?" In the opinion of the monitors, it should not do so at present, because of the increase in the number of IDPs observed in the last two years, due to the radicalisation of the paramilitary groups, in particular the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). It is seen as unlikely, that the peace negotiations will resume in a serious manner before a change in the country's administration as a result of the elections scheduled to take place in August 2002². On the contrary, the paramilitary groups appear to be preparing for an increase in their activities, so enabled by military hardware and software made available to the regular army under the Plan Colombia, part of which finds its way to the paramilitaries groups. The flow of IDPs therefore is certain to increase at the same pace that the military operations expand, i.e. rapidly. In this situation, ECHO is the only important donor that can quickly respond to emergency situations facing IDPs, through its Partners, the International Committee of Red Cross and Crescents (ICRC) in particular, and in co-ordination with RED. Paradoxically, the humanitarian assistance needs are not very clear. They are generally formulated by the Partners and these tend to overlook needs assessment in the process of formulating their proposals

ECHO should base its strategy for the 2002 Action Plan on the lessons learnt so far and in particular on those learnt in the course of implementing the 2001 Plan. The activities undertaken in the emergency phase should not change substantially, and should consist mainly of food aid delivered through the ICRC network. Some food and non-food assistance may continue to be distributed by the Partners to IDPs, but on a complementary basis and in only those areas where the ICRC or RED are not present.

Post-emergency activities are often difficult to define and ECHO implicitly recognises that some of these activities have a "logical" life span which is longer than the strict one-year duration stipulated at present. In fact, ECHO has financed some Partners (e.g. UNICEF) for up to four years in, fundamentally, similar projects. Provided that the need for assistance with a duration in excess of one year can be based on a satisfactory rate of achievement of *ex ante* formulated objectives and in accordance with the project's LFPM, a continuation of the activities beyond this time limit may be considered.

An area-based approach should be considered an advantage, as it will concentrate the funds where they are most needed, will carry a higher value-added and will avoid overlaps with other donors' activities. The rural areas, as well as the capitals of districts (*municipalidades*), should have priority. The issues surrounding IDPs in the capitals of departments are intrinsically different and are more related to urban pauperisation and shantytowns issues not within ECHO's mandate. IDPs living in shantytowns cannot be easily distinguished from the rest of the population there and it would be difficult, and perhaps inappropriate, to design assistance projects specifically targeting such IDPs.

A community-based approach is recommended. ECHO's strategy, while continuing to provide emergency humanitarian assistance to IDPs, should also take into consideration the re-integration of this group of Colombian citizens into the mainstream of the country's socio-economic development. It is proven that a psycho-social approach represents one of the success stories in setting up groups of IDPs that share a common experience and that could form the basis for a new start in life. The psycho-social approach also allows preparing the ground for income-generating projects qualifying for LRRD support.

The most important operational issue with regard to implementing activities benefiting IDPs concerns LRRD. Though the LRRD concept is a difficult one in the context of IDP-targeted emergency programmes (because of the short-term nature of emergency measures) there are possibilities to employ LRRD in post-emergency interventions in the aftermath of a crisis. LRRD must be dealt with even before the start of a crisis that can be anticipated, through keeping in close contact with the task managers of

² In the second half of January 2002, the existence of the "safe haven" areas was extended until 7 April 2002. Few believe that a peace accord will be signed before April 2002, in spite of pledges by both sides.

projects likely to continue in the longer term under programmes financed by ECHO. In the case of the EU for instance, contacts between the external relations Directorate General (RELEX) and the EuropeAid Co-operation Office (AIDCO) are currently improving continuously, with information being exchanged on an organised basis. Collaboration on the Up-rooted Initiative, targeting up-rooted people in selected countries world-wide³, must however be improved, as a direct formal and legal link with ECHO is foreseen in the Regulation for that Initiative. Links should also be established in the field with the Magdalena Medio Project that foresees a large number of community-based investment measures. The prospects for LRRD are limited however, because the Magdalena Medio project is essentially of the prevention type where displacement is concerned. Prevention is an area where ECHO is not really mandated, and into which it should perhaps not enter.

The process of increasing coherence between the various EU-programmes benefiting Colombia is well underway. Both RELEX and the entities entrusted with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) agree on the fundamental aim, i.e.: to assist the peace process. Important amounts of money have been earmarked for this purpose. There is however scope for friction between RELEX and AIDCO in this sphere. Whereas RELEX has the responsibility for co-ordination and the overall concept of assistance, AIDCO needs to take policy and strategic issues into account in its process of project identification and implementation. The dividing line between the roles of the two organisations is therefore subject to interpretation and compromise, which does not always lead to the same perspective. While ECHO's views are duly taking into account in RELEX's overall programming, ECHO should be more pro-active in its relation with AIDCO, particularly with regard to the Up-rooted Initiative. The co-ordination on this Initiative between ECHO and AIDCO at the level of the Commission Services at Headquarters (CSHQ) is weak. The working relationship at field level between AIDCO, the Commission Services at the Delegation (CSD) and the ECHO Colombia Office however, is well-developed and effective.

The co-ordination between ECHO's Partners is gradually improving. The Partners have set-up two co-operation groups - unfortunately competing ones - to discuss matters of common interest. A further step would be for ECHO to encourage that proposals are submitted by consortia of Partners, rather than by several Partners in parallel and separately for different aspects of the same intervention. This would help to lower the high overhead costs of all Partners and take advantage of specialisations on the part of Partners. Partners tend to be un-enthusiastic about consortia, due to fears of conflict on the repartition of financial resources in a consortium set-up. In this context, it is worth pointing out that only a few years ago, consultancy companies were similarly not very keen to form consortia for joint operations. Since then, consortia have become the norm rather than the exception in the consultancy sector.

The presence of an expatriate in each project for which a proposal is submitted by Partners for financing recommended; such to ensure compliance with the proposal, as well as to assist the monitoring of projects. At the same time, eligible local institutions should be integrated into projects through the provision of in-house staff. Although independent staff brought in on *ad hoc*-basis can often be trained more quickly and is often immediately operational, the disadvantage of employing independents is the very low value-added to local institutions.

ECHO's strategy for its Action Plan 2002 cannot be isolated from the outcome of the violence that is threatening the very stability of the State of Colombia. While respecting its mandate, ECHO should actively participate in the peace efforts that are being undertaken by an array of national and international organisations and institutions. In particular, ECHO cannot dissociate itself from the initiatives of the EU at large and the CFSP in particular, which aim to support Colombia's quest for peace and the reinforcement of the State's basic functions: security, justice, equality, education and health. Current arrangements in Colombia in any of these areas are not functioning satisfactorily at present, in spite of the presence of the necessary legal and organisational framework. ECHO's strategy should take into consideration the reintegration of IDPs into the main socio-economic mainstream of the country. This should orientate the objectives of the Action Plan along the following basic considerations:

- humanitarian assistance criteria cannot easily be established in a post-emergency situation. It is recommended that ECHO commission a study specifically dedicated to this issue. The matter is being debated at present in a number of fora, as well as within ECHO and amongst Partners. Where ECHO is concerned, selection criteria are needed to assess assistance proposals and help the process of selecting the most interesting ones. Two aspects of the selection process in particular should be improved. First,

³ The Initiative allocates 4.5 MEUR for interventions benefiting up-rooted people in Colombia in 2002.

the procedure for the acceptance of expatriate expert's curricula vitae should include an interview, if CV review raises questions with regard to the qualifications of the expert. As an adjunct, it is advisable to create a small database of high quality experts. Since ECHO works with a limited number of Partners, the creation of the database should not be too arduous a task. Second, the lessons learned and the experience gained by the Partners over time, as they relate to the scope of the proposed project, should be subjected to explicit presentation, review and comment;

- needs assessments must also be explicit and directly related to the concerns of IDPs. The needs assessments address the salient questions with regard to the objectives and activities of project proposals, and should anticipate the presentation in the proposals of extensive, methodologically correct logical framework planning matrices;
- for the main part, emergency assistance must continue to be entrusted to the ICRC. Only highly vulnerable people (children, lactating and pregnant mothers, as well as elderly people) should continue to be assisted by the Partners. The delivery of Post-emergency assistance will be the responsibility of the Partners;
- co-operation and collaboration with State institutions is essential to ensure sustainability. Whenever possible, detached staff from these State institutions should be involved in interventions in preference of free-lance local experts, even if detrimental to the efficiency (but not the effectiveness) of project delivery;
- project proposals should pay extensive attention to coherence with the other EU instruments;
- an area-based approach should lead to further rationalisation of ECHO's interventions and to savings on Partners' overhead costs. The area-based approach should be introduced as a priority in the following areas: Antioquia, Uraba, Choco, Meta, Nariño, Putumayo and lower-Magdalena;
- a community-based approach, leading to community-based activities for and the consequent re-establishment of self-esteem and confidence amongst people who suffered similar events, should be established;
- psycho-social activities offer the best way to reconstruct IDPs socio-economic balance and may lead, through productive income-generating projects, to promising LRRD links. Psycho-social activities included in Partners' proposals, should take all due heed of horizontal synergy through co-operation with other Partners and stakeholders;
- human rights' defence and advocacy does not form part of ECHO's mandate. ECHO should stay clear of active measures in this sphere so as not to compromise its impartiality as a donor of emergency assistance and enhance its operational security; and
- the forming of consortia between Partners should be encouraged in order to create synergy and take advantage of different Partners' specialisations and expertise.

Close co-operation between ECHO's operations in Colombia and the EU's main intervention instruments should be given all due attention. The Up-rooted People Initiative constitutes a case in point. More proactive measures should be taken at ECHO's Brussels headquarters to make sure that the part of the Regulations of the Up-rooted People Initiative pertaining to co-operation is adhered to fully. ECHO should take advantage of and actively stimulate the possibilities of collaboration of projects financed by EU Member States and benefiting IDPs in Colombia. To this purpose, the existing links between ECHO and the Member States should be further developed. ECHO should stay away from involvement in initiatives under the Plan Colombia, as long as the latter's objectives and plans of action do not coincide with those of the EU in general, and ECHO's in particular.

MAIN REPORT

Preamble

This Evaluation of the Intervention Plan of *ECHO in Colombia – 2001* and the Assessment of ECHO's future strategy for Colombia are based on the reading of data, field visits to the projects, conversations with the beneficiaries and interviews carried out with various persons, starting with those responsible for the direct implementation of the activities, and including public officers or representatives of private organizations. The meetings carried out with the executives of ECHO's Partner organizations, responsible for the projects, as well as with the technical teams, when appropriate, were of the utmost importance. Thus, we are to remark that the conclusions reached in the present report, are the result of verified and cross-referenced data, within the framework of what was read, seen and discussed.⁴

The present report counts with 7 sections as follows:

The Questions	The Answers
What is the Context?	1. Background
What are the Issues?	2. IDPs
What are the Responses ?	3. IDPs and Humanitarian Assistance
What are they Worth?	4. Evaluation 5. Lessons learnt 6. Conclusions
What are the Lessons Learned?	7. Assessment of ECHO's Future Strategy for Colombia <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Policy Issues ▪ Operational Issues
Where to Go?	8. The Action Plan
What are the Instruments ?	9. The Instruments

1. Background

1.1 La Violencia

Violence is not new in Colombia. In modern times (1945-2000) the civil population has been increasingly taken hostage of the conflict by the guerrillas and the extreme right movement (paramilitares: AUC, Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia) resulting in thousands of violent civil deaths (manifolds the armed groups ones) and huge displacements. Violence is now the most important political issue of GOC (Government of Colombia), and will certainly be one of the main topics of the coming (May 2002) presidential election. Displacement issues will probably not be given the same priority by the authorities. Displacement of non-ethnic population of Colombia is not new and has even been considered as promoting small farmers' socio-economic development in some parts of the country (Eje Cafetalero, Magdalena Medio). The difference is now that civilians are evicted violently, whereas before they were invading new areas voluntarily in search of a better socio-economic situation. La Violencia, in the case of the guerrilla, aimed to demonstrate that the State was unable and / or unwilling to answer to the inequalities of the Colombian poor (90% of the population). It has certainly proved that the State is unable to eradicate it. The paramilitary reaction tends to replace the State in its duty to insure order and security and aims to contain and eradicate the guerrilla. Whereas the guerrilla forces remain stable at

⁴ Please, refer to the appendices for the Field Visits and the activities carried out in each of the places.

some 30,000 insurgents the AUC forces increase rapidly and now number more than 9,000 soldiers. As a result military operations have increased manifolds as well and violence is now present in most parts of the country. To the “traditional” areas of violence – Magdalena Medio, Chocó, Uribe- new regions have to be added like the Putumayo, the Northern and Southern Pacific, and the guerrilla routes. Violence in Colombia is multi polarised and is not the result of a conflict between two ideologies only, as in most other countries confronted to IDPs issues. The paramilitares and the guerrilla forces are themselves divided into various independent groups with very large autonomy that sometimes oppose each other violently. This makes all the more difficult any attempts to negotiate peace accords. Except for the ancient agreement with M-19 guerrilla movement years back that integrated it into the democratic system of the country, all attempts have so far backfired.

1.2 Narcotraffic

The narcotraffic activities had traditionally little to do with displacement. It can even be said that these illicit activities were fixing the producers of coke to the land, insuring a stable income, higher than with traditional activities. It also attracted poor farmers, in search of land and improved incomes, into the vast and empty Department of Putumayo. Narcotraffic had contacts with the guerrilla that protected the production in return for a share in the benefits. The AUCs have admitted⁵ that they also financed part of their activities through deals with the narcotraficantes. The recent movement of the AUCs in the South, together with the reinforcement of the legal army through the US-induced Plan Colombia and the fumigation policy has lately disrupted the Narcotraffic activities in the Putumayo mainly. However coke growers are used to move: many went to Bolivia (Santa Cruz) years back, returned to Colombia when the crack down got serious there and now move to the Pacific. This resulted in a transfer of the coke production to the Nariño department and the pacific coast in a relatively orderly manner. The expected dramatic displacement that was supposed to follow the fumigation process and the increased military operations, resulting not only in a flow of IDPs but also of refugees to neighbouring Ecuador, has not taken place. In particular, though they transited through Ecuador, very few refugees stayed in that country and were merely transiting back to Colombia and the Nariño Department. There is however a rapid increase of IDPs to Nariño but this is due to the “normal” confrontation between the armed groups, and not (yet?) to the fumigation policy.

1.3 State, Institutions and Development

As a result the State services have collapsed dramatically in many regions. (health, education, justice, infrastructure, trade...) This has even be oficialised, as the State retired from areas totalling more than 42.000 sq. km. remaining in the hands of the guerrilla. (zona de despeje: safe haven areas.) where the state presence has all but disappeared and the State normal functions have not been replaced because the armed groups -i.e. the guerrilla and their feuds- have no real political objectives, except the ownership of the land for their own personal agenda in the short term and an ever recessing aim of taking the political power in the longer term. In addition, whereas Colombia has one of the most developed and democratic political system in Latin America, the actual political mechanisms are plagued by corruption, feudalism, caudillo and clientele attitudes, as well as an inefficient administrative system. As a result most of the normal Institutions of a democratic country are increasingly inoperative or severely curbed. Paradoxically Colombia is recipient of vast amounts of money for development purposes among which the United States and the European Union are the two most important Donors.

1.4 Internal Conflict and Civil Society

The longest active internal conflict in Latin America and one of the longest in the World has permitted the emergence of very many local NGO's that are involved in trying to keep alive a decaying civil society. Recipe and studies from academic circles abound. Some components of the civil society however still exist, often under death threats. The toll paid by outspoken or influential leaders, lawyers, journalists, ministers, judicial, Alcalde (mayor), ethnical minorities -Indians and Negroes-. is high, either by deaths or kidnapping (more than 3.000 in 2001) for ransoms. Lately signs of resistance to the armed groups activities have been recorded, mainly in the Indians and Negroes communities who refused to obey the armed groups demands, mainly concerning displacement, actively opposing violence with passive resistance methods.

1.5 From a forgotten crisis to the limelight

⁵ General Castaño, head of the AUCs, admittance on 10 December 2001.

For many years the Colombian conflict was all but ignored. It was a forgotten crisis that attracted little interest outside Colombia, and little assistance from outside Donors. It was considered an internal conflict that had to be resolved internally. And it developed without much recognition or interference from outside actors. The guerrilla movements even had a liaison office in Europe (Brussels) that did not attract much attention and was not frowned upon. That attitude changed slowly as from the mid nineties when the much publicised drug cartels (Cali, Medellin with the legendary Pablo Escobar) became organised and flooded USA and the world with heroin (up to 90% of the world production.). Huge anti-drugs programme were financed by the USA that at present culminates with the Plan Colombia, a comprehensive Plan of US \$1,350 millions that has many collateral objectives. At the same time the EU became involved into the peace efforts of GOC, with a radically different approach from the USA. Assistance began in 1997 with Humanitarian Aid assistance through ECHO. RELEX stepped in actively and the EU approved a development assistance package of nearly € 150 millions over 5 years⁶. The various component of the packages includes € 34,8 millions for the Magdalena Medio, and the newly created Up-Rooted People facility (€ 4,5 millions in 2002⁷). As usual with EU grants, there is a Human Rights component that amounts to € 3 millions, and which is very relevant.

1.6 Peace, status quo or war⁸?

Colombia is at the cross road. Sporadic peace efforts have failed in the last few years. Guerrilla has spread out in many areas, and so have the paramilitaries. External intervention is now a fact as the Plan Colombia becomes operational. Civil casualties are on the rise and so is rural insecurity. As elections near, the margin of freedom of the present Government shrinks considerably and the conflict is now hostage to electoral propaganda from the presidential candidates. None of these really envisages a peaceful resolution. It is most likely that there will be an intensification of the military activities and that the old recipes will be applied by both sides: massacres, displacements, deaths threats, economic blockades, random kidnappings, and compromising agreements with the narcotraficantes. This inevitably will result in more displacements and greater needs for humanitarian assistance.

2 Internal Displaced Persons

2.1 What is an IDP?

In Colombia an IDP does not correspond to a clear cut definition. Basically an IDP is a person (or family) that has moved internally usually as a result of violence, and could in theory, and often in practice, return to his original dwelling. However it could also be that violence triggers a decision to move that, in view of deteriorating economics situation in rural areas and an inability to cope with it, would have been taken anyway. Displacement can be an individual decision (so call “gota a gota”, droplet) or a community decision (massive displacement). In the great majority of the massive displacement it is induced by fear or direct threats, and always taken in a matter of one or two days. Individual IDPs tend to head for a departmental capital where they blend into anonymity and massive displacement to a municipal capital. Individual IDPs usually have no plans of returning ever, massive displacement are more inclined to return once things eventually settle down, and many have indeed returned. (Hence the great amplitude of the statistics that do not take return, among others things, into account.). Some are “nomadic” IDPs moving momentarily to neighbouring safer areas in municipalities when armed groups move in, and actually walking back to feed their animals and tend their field during the day. In view of this complexity exact counting of IDPs varies widely, corresponding to a grey area, and sometimes culminating into figures fetishism that, through excessive exactness, leaves aside a significant part of those IDPs that need assistance. The main official source of IDPs is the list elaborated by RED. This is the only source recognised officially by GOC, and based on the Unique System of Registration (SUR Sistema Unico de Registro) and National System of Estimates of the Displaced Persons (SNEPD, Sistema Nacional de Estimacion de Poblacion Dezplazada) However many IDPs, proportion unknown, do not register with RED, though this is the compulsory step to get official assistance⁹. They do not register for an array of reasons, the main one being fear that their name would fall in the hands of the armed groups that would

⁶ €105b in programmable aid and € 35 in non-programmable aid. .

⁷ Reduced from € 6 Millions due to the Afghan Crisis

⁸ The word “war” (guerra) is widely utilised in Colombia instead of “civil” war, seldom used.

⁹ Mainly three months food assistance and access to health and education, though there are many documented shortcomings.

take revenge, fear being paradoxically the motive to flee and also the main motive for not getting assistance. Another important glitch is related to double counting or up-dating : IDPs register upon arrival, and then sometimes return, sometimes move over to other places, sometimes adapt quickly to a new environment and are not to be considered as IDPs any more. This explains in great part why the RED figures though limited by the registration process are quite higher than the ones provided by another source: the RUT. RUT of the Pastoral Social (Catholic Church) is widely implemented in the country and does not have any triggering assistance mechanisms linked to its listing. On the other hand it does not register systematically IDPs and might be under-evaluated in some locations where the Church is less well represented. Another traditional source of IDPs counting is CODHES that is usually higher in its estimates than RED, and quite secure. ICRC also has statistics on the assisted people only that can indicate trends from one period to another. A conservative figure would indicate that there are about 250,000 IDPs in cumulative figures as from January 2000 to June 2001

2.2 Geography of IDPs

As the IDPs are the result of the internal conflict their pattern tends to reflect its evolution. Curiously the Colombian Institutions speak of expulsion Departments and reception Departments. In a given span of time it can be both, and often IDPs are multiple movers. With the radicalisation of the conflict IDP's originates mainly in the zones where the armed groups actors confront each other. The tactic of the AUCs being to immobilize the guerrilla and cut its supply lines IDP's at present originates mainly from the corridors utilised by the guerrilla, around the safe haven zones, or the region isolated by internal economic blockade set up by the AUCs. The main reception Departments at the end of 2001 are Antioquia, Bolivar, Magdalena, Bogotá, Atlántico, Valle del Cauca, and Chocó (according to RED) that is about 130,000 persons –65% of the total. The RUT figures overlaps only partially the same Departments and ranks Bolivar, Meta, Antioquia, Valle de Cauca and Choco as the main reception Departments, covering 12500 families corresponding to 79% of the total IDPS in the first 9 months of 2001 (It should be noted that those same five Departments are also the five most important expulsion Departments (58500 families), though not in the same ranking order, except for Bolivar). The RED figures also indicates that the same Departments are the ones that have the largest numbers of returnees, with the noticeable exception of Bolivar. (30% of IDPs returned at country level in the span of 18 months, 2000-2001). In addition there is a very clear indication that the paramilitaries are the main cause of displacement and that the increase in displacement is directly linked to the extension of the paramilitaries activities. (45% of the causes of displacement are imputed to the AUCs as against 12% to the guerrilla). Geographically this distribution shows a very distinctive pattern, that could be utilised to rationalise and possibly identify the most probable areas of IDPs in the medium term (6 months to one year): (i) Antioquia, (ii) Valle del Cauca and the coffee belt, (iii) around the federal district of Santa Fe de Bogotá, and, (iv) newly, the Department of Nariño, (from Putumayo). This corresponds to the traditional areas of the guerrilla activities and their traditional routes of supply, (i, ii, and iii), and to the new destinations of coca cultivation. This also now corresponds to the main activities of the paramilitaries. The Valle del Magdalena with greater emphasis on Magdalena Medio raises a very fundamental issue. It is a region with a large number of IDPS. It is also a region where Donors are concentrated with development projects. (EU, World Bank, US AID, Bilateral Assistance e.g. Japan....) totalling well over €100 millions in the next few years. (see § 7.1.4.)

2.3 Urban and Rural IDPs

Individual IDPs are usually the ones that wish to disappear in the urban environment of Department capitals. (Many do not register as IDPs for that very reason, and do not want to attract the attention on their status, even at the cost of being ignored by the aid programmes e.g. health). Massive IDPs usually invade a municipal site not too far away from their original dwellings and are later joined by individual IDPs once the site is more or less secured, starting to form a shanty town of their own, at the expense of the municipality, which usually cannot cope with it and needs assistance. Assistance to urban IDPs is much more difficult to organise than assistance to rural IDPs as they are much more dispersed and their needs are usually quite different. The urban environment is a total break from their mode of reference, predominantly rural, and the feeling of losses and the inability to cope much stronger than in communities that keep a binding relationship within the group. It is extremely arduous to take care of urban and rural communities within the same programme, and strategic choice should be made both by the funding agency and its Partners. Similarly assistance programmes should not be mixed.

3. IDPs and Humanitarian Aid

3.1 National support

GOC has taken a number of initiatives to address the IDP's issues. The most important one being the inclusion in the objectives of the Red de Solidaridad Social-Red- (Social Solidarity Network) of the co-ordination of the actions in favour of the IDPs and depending directly from the vice president of GOC. While this direct link is a positive fact enabling political decision to be taken rapidly, bypassing the notorious Colombian red tape, it is also a weakness for sustainability as a change of policy (e.g. after an election) can change its objectives, budget or efficiency. RED has funded /co funded with PMA some € 10 millions in "productive" projects, for 11,000 families, € 5,5 millions for housing projects for 3000 houses. The total RED investment concerning IDPs amounts to some € 50 millions in the 2000-mid 2001, according to their latest yearly report. They are not very visible and probably not operational as yet for most of them. In addition Red has signed agreements with UNDP, WFP, UNHCR, USAid, OIM. While strongly criticised, mainly because of its registration policy and perceived failures in co-ordinating assistance to IDPs, the RED has improved considerably in the last few months and is now an unavoidable major actor in IDPs attention. Bienestar Familiar has a national coverage of supplementary paying-food for children enrolled in the primary education system of the country and is present wherever a school is functioning. It includes IDPs children, with special financial provision aiming at subsidising the financial burden of paying for food. The Church¹⁰ -through its "Pastoral Social" activities is present nationwide. Its organisation enables it to be a privileged observer of the conflict and its consequences. It has very close links with a number of national and international NGOs dealing with IDPs, including ones financed by ECHO, acting as implementing local Partner (PTM, Caritas Española). National NGOs involved in IDPs activities are very active and extremely numerous. (CEDAVIDA, Progresar, Cruz Roja, Minuto de Dios, , ...) and invested through RED some € 5 millions in emergency assistance in 2000-mid 2001, though this is not very visible nor clear.

3.2 International support

The UN family is well represented in the country. UNHCR at the special request of GOC has an office and several sub office operating since nearly three years. It operates in Colombia according to a special decision that authorise to extend its mandate (which only allows to deal with refugees) to IDPs. Its operations are very much depending on funds raising as no funds are transferred from Geneva HQ. (ECHO funds nearly half of its activities in Colombia). CICR receives a large contribution from ECHO (€1,7 millions, recently -January 2002-increased to 2,3, Millions Euros.) . It has a special understanding with the Red to attend the immediate needs in case of massive displacement (whereas the Red attends the smaller displacement-less than 50 families-). WFP has a large programme of support extending beyond the three months limit of intervention from the Red, especially in its food for work programme.

The "Plan Colombia"¹¹ started operating in Colombia in the social field, with a large amount of money (US\$ 45 Million in 18 months) to be distributed through reputable organisation and NGOs (UNICEF, World Vision, Profamilia, Fupad, IOM...). This amount of money in the social field has to be compared to the total amount of money available that amounts to some US\$ 1,350 millions earmarked for military equipment and assistance in a coca eradication programme. The link between Plan Colombia and the US strategy of coca eradication has generated within Colombia a large debate that is generally negative. It has not been possible to obtain a clear view of the Plan's social strategy, even after visiting USAid representation in Bogotá. The activities have not yet fully started. The Red is to receive some US\$ 13,5 millions for emergency attention (Atención de emergencia) to IDPs and returning operations (restablecimiento de familias desplazadas). The emergency programme aims at attending some 31,000 IDPs families¹² with food aid and basic goods in the south (Putumayo, Nariño), Bolivar South, Cauca and Catacumbo. The returning programme aims at implementing 11 agricultural production projects benefiting 1000 IDPs families. In addition the so called "Field in Action" (Campo in Acción) programme aims at investing in production projects (US\$14 millions for 4,225 rural families), in voluntary

¹⁰ Father Deroux S.J. has been awarded on 11 December 2001 the international price for peace for his actions in Magdalena Medio .

¹¹ This acronym has now been abandoned

¹² That is nearly the total number of IDPs in the first nine months of 2001!

eradication of illicit (i.e. coca) cultures (US\$ 39millions, for 40,000 families) and in ecologic projects (US\$ 3,5 millions). These projects will have to be presented by farmers'associations-51 have been presented so far for a total amount of US\$ 12 millions- for palm oil en cacao production. There is a close overlapping between the Plan Colombia potential beneficiaries and the coca production area. It is also suspected that some sort of double standard approach may be adopted. On the one hand there are provisions for displaced and returning people, but on the other hand there is a promotion for cash crops that are better adapted to medium and large estates modes of production. At the present moment it is not feasible to have an overview of the Plan Colombia strategy and early achievements for lack of information and transparency

Bilateral support is important from Spain and Italy, and many of the NGOs operating with ECHO funds also operates with important funds from the Spain Development Agency and Italy. However those funds are not earmarked for IDPs, and ECHO remains the only European Agency directly involved in IDPs matters, until such a time that the up-rooted people initiative becomes operational.

There is a full consensus between the Member States and the CFSP on the political support to the GOC in its efforts to reach a peace agreement with the armed actors. This has still to be translated into emergency or development programme co-ordination between Member States in Colombia.

The EU has reiterated its assistance to the peace efforts on the political level, lately with the cancellation of the visa of the armed actors, and with two development initiatives: the Magdalena Medio Development Plan and the Up-rooted people budget line. (see hereunder § 7.2.2.)

3.3 ECHO's support

ECHO has been providing assistance since 1997 to internally displaced people in Colombia, with 10 MEURO of funding in 2001¹³. The 2001 Intervention Plan in Colombia continues to provide humanitarian assistance to vulnerable groups of internally displaced people. The 2001 intervention's strategy consists of emergency assistance during and immediately following the displacement; post-emergency assistance including shelter, health care and sanitation; small-scale income-generation activities, the so called "productive packages"; and psychosocial support in the main areas of reception as well as punctual support to return and resettlement processes if security conditions are provided and the institutional support is also assured. Up to now ECHO's presence in Colombia has been justified since the Colombian administration did not have the capacity or the political will to take over assistance to IDPs. With the exception of ICRC, which receives contributions from ECHO (€1,7 million) and some EU Member States, organisations funded by ECHO were basically the only institutions providing support to IDPs. This is now changing rapidly since law 387 has been enacted and RED is getting more organised and more efficient, together with its supporting Partners, including ECHO. In 2001 ECHO has supported the activities of 15 Partners located in areas where most of the IDPs are to be found. The present evaluation mission has analysed 8 of those projects, a synthesis is presented here under.

4. Evaluation of ECHO 2001 Intervention Plan

4.1. Relevance

4.1.1 Intervention Plan of ECHO 2001: emergency and post-emergency

In the Intervention Plan ECHO 2001 for Colombia¹⁴, the planned strategy was centred on three points: (i) improve the geographical coverage, in areas with absence or low presence of humanitarian organizations; (ii) select its Partner according to their proven competence and working experience with displaced people, and, (iii) adjust the actions in accordance to the phases present in the assistance to internal displacement (emergency, post-emergency and return/re-settlement). Within this Plan's framework, the 17 projects that were originally approved intended to provide attention for a displaced population calculated between 150,000 and 200,000 people in 19 of the 32 departments of the country. The funds allocated for this

¹³ 1997: € 4,5 Millions, 1998_1999-2000 : € 6,5 Millions.

¹⁴ *Humanitarian Aid in favour of Displaced Colombian Population. Draft Intervention Plan (March 2001)*; p. 9.

purpose (10 million Euros) were distributed as follows: 6.2 million Euros for post-emergency responses, 2.4 million Euros for emergency humanitarian assistance, channelled directly to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 0.7 million of which were taken from the reserve funds; 1.0 million Euros for the operations of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (ACNUR); 0.1 million Euros as the budget of ECHO-Colombia¹⁵. 0.3 million Euros were left in reserve funds.

From the point of view of the distribution of the resources within the approved Plan, on the question of whether the projects financed by ECHO correspond, in a strict sense, to emergency humanitarian assistance, the answer would be no, as only 24% of the resources were destined for this purpose, while 72% were used for post-emergency and return/re-settlement response. The distribution, among sectors¹⁶, of the financial resources destined to ECHO-Colombia within the humanitarian needs package, following own eligibility criteria, was verified in the evaluation carried out on eight¹⁷ of the 17 projects approved for implementation of the ECHO 2001 Intervention Plan. In fact, emergency assistance is overwhelmingly carried out by CICR while the purposes and characteristics of the Partners' activities correspond to what is defined, in ECHO's strategy, as post-emergency and return/re-settlement responses (food complements, health care, housing, transportation...)

4.1.2 Intervention Strategy of ECHO's Partners :Components of Emergency Humanitarian Assistance

From the viewpoint of the implementation strategy and its connection with the Plan, it is important to emphasize the intervention systems used by the eight Partners, which were assessed in the areas in which they carry out their work. In this respect, and from a global vision, we saw the setting up of certain styles, or ways, maybe not always completely original, but well-thought out and duly oriented, to bring assistance to the displaced populations, including the humanitarian components of emergency (food, health, housing, etc.), as well as promoting productive activities, aiming at obtaining the necessary income for the people to survive. In all these actions, the psycho-social component played an outstanding role. Even though these intervention styles were taken from what was observed during the implementation of the Plan 2001, they belong, basically to a process of changes that has been going on for the last few years, in similar projects, also financed by ECHO.

In this broad and diversified intervention strategy¹⁸, the institutions that stand out in the field of **food and nutritional attention** are: "*Cáritas Española (C-E)*", "*Movimiento por la Paz, el Desarme y la Libertad (MPDL)*" and "*Paz y Tercer Mundo*" (PTM), the availability of food achieving greater coverage, both through the community feeding centres (C-E and MPDL) and the basic items shops (PTM). In the field of **health attention**, we can highlight the actions of PTM, *the Spanish Red Cross*¹⁹ (CRE), and the French Red Cross²⁰ (CRF), also for the initiatives taken to ensure access for a higher percentage of the affected population. In **housing**, the proposed solutions were integral (complete housing, including latrines), as well as partial (giving of materials and tools²¹), some of the programs being participative. On the other hand, there are only isolated experiences of temporary housing and transportation assistance, also present in the Plan, since these were mainly limited to measures of personal protection, due to security reasons.

4.1.3 Productive packages

Regarding the so-called "productive packages", the actions reflected different intervention characteristics, due to reasons that go from the need for an urgent response for the beneficiary population in terms of income, to the type of solution offered, which are in line with the terms implicitly established by ECHO, that is, projects should not extend for more than one year. Besides semantic considerations concerning the "productive projects²²", the main objective pursued was to contribute to the establishment of a minimum of sustenance, through income generation. In this sense, the productive proposals oriented towards becoming long lasting solutions, promoted by the "*Comité para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos*" (CISP) and *Solidaridad Internacional (SI)*, combined with initiatives aimed at obtaining income in a very short-term,

¹⁵ ECHO Colombia. Presentation carried out on 1 December, 2001. The figure corresponds to the total amount approved.

¹⁶ Food and nutrition, health, housing, water and sanitation, psycho-social support.

¹⁷ It's important to indicate that, mostly, the comments on the projects presented by the assessed Partners found in the "fichops" (*fiche d'operation*) of ECHO-Colombia were oriented mainly to suggesting expansions and improvement in the valuing of the needs, to suggest cut outs of the resources allocated to determined sectors (mainly health) and to the disbursement connected with the execution. In other words, the projects are not questioned on their correspondence to *emergency humanitarian assistance*.

¹⁸ We have to sep in mind that the values that follow correspond to the eight Partners selected, and thus, the experience of the remaining ones is not excluded in the case of determined components, such as the ICRC in food and health attention.

¹⁹ The reference to the CRE corresponds here to the operations in Magdalena Medio (Cimitarra River).

²⁰ The reference to the CRF corresponds here to its operations in Putumayo.

²¹ Specifically, wood for columns, roof made of zinc sheets, nails and tools.

²² This topic will be discussed later on in the point related to efficiency.

such as the buying/ selling of products, stand out. The type of solution proposed by CRF was also focused towards the setting up of small, sustainable, personal businesses (buying and selling of goods). Other solutions were rather oriented towards achieving food security, thus facilitating the means necessary (seeds and tools) for community level crop production.

4.1.4 Psycho-social component

The most characteristic feature in the implementation strategy of the Plan carried out by the Partners, has been the psycho-social component as a facilitating tool of social processes, which appears as a cross cutting theme. In fact, in both types of initiatives, the ones that include components of humanitarian emergency assistance (food, health, housing), as well as in the "productive" solutions, this component appears as a facilitating tool, enabling the reconstruction of the community's social tissue. The Partners were very emphatic in indicating the role that psychosocial dynamics have played as a way to organize the people and to get consensus on the different proposed solutions. The relevance of the topic is underlined by the Partners' efforts to improve their own institutional capability, through the support, in some cases, of specialized institutions or of experts in the field. One important result of these efforts is the publication of a document called "Basic Guidelines for the Psycho-social attention of displaced populations as a consequence of the Conflict in Colombia". This document, a summary of the experience reached, is the outcome of a cooperative experience between OPS/ECHO/NGOs²³, and is aimed at identifying minimum criteria (not "recipes") through the different approaches to reality, that could guide future work in a more systematic way.

From a strategic perspective, due to their transversal nature, the psycho-social dynamics achieved at least partially to: (i) promote the recovery of the psychological-emotional equilibrium of the displaced people, as individuals which made it possible to support them in a "life project"; (ii) to promote the re-composition of the family and community tissue, aiming at strengthening the right of "belonging" of the displaced person, who refuses to leave the land where he/she was born or his/her friends and family; (iii) and to start a process of citizenship building, through the reactivation of civil society. This triple orientation brought by the use of the psychosocial element in the development of projects, has enabled the different components to acquire a different direction and character, supporting or complementing social processes. Even though there is an absence of indicators for measuring in an objective (quantitative) way the real impact of psycho-social dynamics in the three described orientations, it is also important to recognize that there is evidence of the responses of the population in contributing, in an organized way, to the improvement of the goods and services they receive or in the "productive activity". Likewise, the advances achieved in the promotion and strengthening of organizational forms aimed at generating mechanisms of protection and/or prevention; pacific resistance to the abandonment of land; or the design of mechanisms to avoid, as much as possible, future displacements.

The fact that these or other results haven't been properly quantified -mainly due to the formulations of the proposals- doesn't cancel the existence of an overall process of improvement in the quality of the execution of humanitarian assistance. This improvement, apart from ECHO's requirements, the impulse given to psycho-social dynamics has led the Partners to position themselves in the phase of post-emergency responses, in the so-called "gray zone" between emergency humanitarian assistance and long lasting solutions (so as not to call them development solutions), in which, nevertheless they have tried to "obtain a minimum grade of self-sufficiency, taking into account, as far as possible, the long-term development objectives"²⁴.

These lessons or readings derived from the actions carried out by ECHO's Partners constitute a concrete response to the conditions of insecurity in the lives of those populations that are forced to move to other places, and to the actions of the receptive communities, as a consequence of the permanent emergency imposed by a conflict which tendency is to become even worse. But, also, due to its own style of responding to the emergency, these same lessons represent real possibilities so that the communities resist displacement to the extent that they can reappear as a civil society response.

4.1.5. Main Conclusions on Relevance .

- There is a real, although empirical, knowledge, of the issues that affect the various intervention areas (features of the conflict, profile of the beneficiaries, extent of the needs, etc.), that makes it possible to have adequate and timely responses. However, paradoxically, in the formulation of the proposals the Partners, without exception, do not properly identify the issues or do not

²³ Refer to www.col.ops-oms.org/desplazados/documentos/LineamientosPsychosociales.htm. In the appendices comments on this document are made, taking as a reference the visits of the evaluators.

²⁴ Règlement du Conseil N° 1257/96 du 20 juin 1996 concernant l'Aide Humanitaire. Office Humanitaire de la Communauté Européenne (ECHO); Article 2, d.

formulate them properly, though they usually find adequate solutions during the implementation.

- The focusing of the actions in certain sectors (food, health, productive activities, institutional strengthening, etc.), varies from one Partner to another, as a consequence of different factors, that operate in an independent and combined way, e.g. the accumulated experience in the geographical area where the displaced people are, which affects the implementation strategy and process as does the dispersion of the displaced population and their specific immediate needs. The presence of other institutions, mainly governmental, is also a factor that conditions the capacity of response to the problems.
- The interest in coordinating efforts with local institutional structures (public or private) is not a common feature for all Partners. However, in the case of those Partners who base their actions in the establishment of links with local institutional structures, a conscious effort to strengthen the capacities of these institutions was evident on their part. Other Partners, who carry out projects through local counterparts practically don't maintain active relationships with local institutions, or are in any case weak or directed towards determined organisms.
- The capacity some Partners have reached in the development of coordination mechanisms with other institutions, mainly governmental, in order to expand coverage during the execution of the project or beyond the project, does not guarantee their continuity, neither in coverage, nor in duration, mainly due to the financial limitations of the government entities.

4.2 Effectiveness

4.2.1 New humanitarian assistance strategies.

The accumulated experience of some of the Partners, which is shown in the modification of the intervention strategies, has been and continues to be based in finding new formulas to respond effectively to the increasing needs of the displaced population²⁵. It is like this that the simplest ways of providing basic products through the practice of "markets"²⁶, or of health services, or the distribution of materials and tools and psychosocial attention, have evolved into more efficient and effective ways of providing humanitarian assistance. For example in connection to food, these practices have, in some cases, made it possible to improve the nutritional diet of the most vulnerable population –lactating children and expectant mothers- through the "community feeding centres" and, in other cases such as "stores"²⁷, to expand the coverage of their food supply in communities where due to the pressure of the armed groups, access facilities to the markets are scarce. Likewise, in the health sector, in some cases where due to the same reasons the assistance has been oriented to training promoters, not only in what is known as western medicine, but also in taking advantage of the possibilities offered by the so-called traditional medicine²⁸. In this way, it has been possible to expand the attention coverage, even though without being able to achieve a total solution in the field of preventive health. In other cases, the attention given by the health brigades is very professional, but limited to the field of medical attention, for example being noticeable the absence of initiatives aimed at expanding the assistance's coverage. The relationship with the national entities is limited and the free time is not fully taken advantage of during the consultations with the local population. The achievements obtained with the expansion of attention coverage through the health brigades are also important, and the coordination with the various official organizations, such as Hospitals and Municipalities, has contributed to this.

4.2.2 Life Project and Productive Projects

Regarding the productive packages²⁹, even though they comply in general terms with their short-term goals (to aim that the displaced population obtains the necessary income for sustaining itself), their effectiveness is lessened when the Partner tries to give it a lasting character, or sustainability, as this is far from possible. This is due to various reasons, both financial and technical-operational, among which the following stands out: the amounts allocated as seed capital are very limited (about 150 and 200 Euros per person) for the direct purchase of products, or through the purchase of raw materials, materials and tools

²⁵ Needs that tend to concentrate in the same sectors, that is, food, health, housing, psycho-social attention, income generation, etc

²⁶ This is the name given to the packages supplied to the displaced families, and that contain basic food and other products.

²⁷ The "stores" are centres for the provision of products of great demand, located within the communities. From the warehouses, which are strategically located, a determined group of "stores" is supplied. The project included the initial supply of the warehouses so that they, later on, can be self-financed through the purchase-sale of products, including those produced in the communities themselves.

²⁸ As an example, in Bhutan, using funds from the EU, a development project was funded for medicinal plants for a period of five years, with the active participation of the local population.

²⁹ Later on, when dealing with the topic of efficiency, we'll give some details on the extent and contents of this denomination.

for the establishment of a small business or a micro-enterprise. Another factor that influences the limited possibilities of sustainability of the productive packages is the difficulties existing in forming cohesive groups, since the type of displacement “por goteo”³⁰ (individual or small displacement) doesn’t necessarily bring together people from the same places, which makes the integration process slower, in spite of the psycho-social dynamics. Other practices that limit real possibilities of sustainability are the training programs for the formulation of projects that are not complemented, as they should, with the necessary financial resources for their implementation, which in turn implies the risk of generating in people, expectations that will not be satisfied. Unlike this method found in the activities of some of the Partners, in others it was possible to verify that apart from training and technical assistance, financial support is provided, although as mentioned before, in limited amounts (an average of 180 Euros per person). In some cases, the funds are destined to the establishment of small individual businesses or micro-enterprises and in other cases, through incentives toward the formation of cohesive groups for the accomplishment of joint activities.

On the relative effectiveness that the productive packages may have, for the reasons presented above, which turn their possibilities of durability or sustainability precarious, is added -due to the pressure of the armed groups- the always latent risk of people having to leave once again, their temporary place of residence or return with their new belongings.

The presented arguments have to be seen as limitations for reaching a better expansion of the income-generating activities, and not as objections to them. Certainly, the evidence shows the need for these activities in order to guarantee the survival of the displaced populations once the emergency is overcome. Even more so when the given assistance that follows the “emergency” criterion has a temporality that lasts no more than three months. On the other hand, even though these negative factors could lead to the idea of stopping the support given to the displaced population through productive packages, the fact is that, they do not minimize the value that the psycho-social practices have in the process of recovery of a life project. That is to say, that the productive project, in the extent it allows the displaced person to feel less dependent, represents the goal of a process that is started and progresses with the recovery of the self-esteem and capacity of coping with their “duelos”³¹ (mourning), as well as the re-composition of the family and the community environment network, the handling and overcoming of fear, the understanding of real significance of violence, etc. Apart from these achievements on individuals, the psycho-social dynamics have also created community opportunities that foster the beginning of broader social processes, as an important step for the citizenship building.

Training has been present in the organization processes that ECHO’s partners apply in their intervention strategies. Whether oriented towards the strengthening of the communities; the creation of the community feeding centres and the stores; the training of health promoters; the impulse of productive activity; the fact is that in all the training programs set up by the Partners in which it was possible to review implementation contents and methodology, the psycho-social element appears as the essential complement of the technical-formative component. If there had not been such a complementary relationship between the need to recreate the individual life project and the promotion of the productive project, results such as the ones presented would certainly not have been achieved. It is evident that the impulse of these programs inevitably positioned the Partners in the activities of post emergency assistance. However, most of them tried as much as was possible, to remain within this phase, attempting to give minimum continuity possibilities to those projects with emergency assistance contents. Additionally, some activities promoted by a small number of Partners have been based on training programs for institutional strengthening and human rights, positioning them within the third phase of assistance of the 2001 Plan: the return/resettlement phase

In this context of accumulated experiences in the implementation of projects, apparently similar as they belong to the same attention sector (food, health, housing, etc), ECHO’s Partners have gained knowledge in their respective work areas, and particularly, in the profile of the beneficiary, enabling them to adapt to different circumstances and unforeseen events. Furthermore, in terms of effectiveness, there are various advantages in the actions that characterize ECHO’s Partners in comparison with other project executors promoted through bilateral and multilateral cooperation programs including the RED. Unlike ECHO’s Partners, in other local and international organizations there is not only a lack of experience in the implementation of projects, but also a lack of knowledge of the different expressions that displacement adopts in each region, resulting in only one intervention strategy and one implementation strategy.

³⁰ Referred to the procedure which people carry out in an individual manner or in small groups of the same family, as opposed to the massive displacements that tend to concentrate people in specific places.

³¹ Expression used in Colombia to describe the losses, not only of beloved ones, but also of the material things that accompany the life of the displaced person, that is, whatever they lose when abandoning the place where they used to live permanently.

4.2.3. Training

Training is present in the Partners strategies. Whether these strategies have been oriented to strengthening the communities, to creating “community dinners” and “shops”, to training health promoters, or to creating productive activities in all the training programs implemented by the Partners the psycho-social component is an essential part. As a matter of fact, it would not have been possible to achieve results like the ones already mentioned, if it hadn't been for this complement between the need of redoing the individual life project and the productive one.

The implementation of these programs has been done, inevitably, within the post emergency activities, aiming at giving those projects a minimum of possibilities of continuation while still meeting the criteria of emergency. However two Partners ACNUR, mainly, and PTM, in a minor scale, based their training on institutional strengthening and the topic of human rights, thus, placing both of them within the third phase of assistance to displacement of the 2001 Plan: the one of the return/resettlement.

4.2.4. Main Conclusions on Effectiveness

The Partners have innovated in meeting humanitarian assistance needs in post emergency situations with new forms of intervention that have made it possible to optimise -in quality and population coverage- the availability of goods and services provided through the projects. The main innovations relates to the improved provision of food to the most vulnerable people through comedores or shops providing basic supplies. Income generating projects have often been linked to psycho social attention tending to reconstruct a life project through self esteem and confidence and training provided in this reconstruction process.

However a analysis of these methods and innovations has not yet been conducted in a systematic way. In consequence the lessons learned have not yet been transformed into criterion for further ECHO strategy and assistance in similar situations Training activities carried out by the Partners were mainly directed towards group activities wit IDPs with the aim of rebuilding a life project prioritising psycho social activities.

4.3 Efficiency

4.3.1 Institutional Capacity

The evaluation of the operative activities of ECHO's Partners shows that the experience accumulated to respond to the problem of displacement can be lessened due to the weak implementation capacity. It depends, to a great extent, on the degree of commitment of the Partner's in the execution of the projects. In this regard, it is necessary to distinguish those Partners that directly carry out the projects from those who do it through local counterparts. This distinction is important as it has direct incidence on the way the institution's technical and financial resources are allocated in the different cycles of the project, from the identification and assessment of the real needs of the displaced people, to the institution's response capacity, basically in what concerns organization and/or planning of the activities.

The field visits showed that, the Partners who act as direct executors also had more comprehensive organization structures fit to the different planned responses in the technical proposals and for this, being able to rely on multidisciplinary teams. On the other hand, those Partners that carry out projects through agreements with local organizations have more reduced technical teams, or just one or two professionals whose responsibility is limited to the monitoring of their counterparts' activities.

4.3.2 Monitoring

The differences in the levels of organization are most clearly seen in the monitoring function, therefore the effectiveness of the results of projects financed by ECHO is conditioned by the degree of commitment the Partner has as a direct executor or an intermediary. Indeed, in projects carried out under the direct responsibility of the Partners the monitoring function is carried out in a more thorough manner, as it is oriented at measuring the performance level that is being achieved during the implementation of the activities, as a guarantee of effectiveness. These actions are reinforced by the fact that the expatriate responsible for the execution is involved in the monitoring process. Partners who are not direct executors show signs of less thoroughness in the monitoring process, seemingly performing a mere act of

surveillance of the execution of the agreements, as the follow-up is carried out by one or two technicians who fulfil multiple functions. In these situations, the impression is that the Partners delegate all the responsibility to counterparts, without having appropriate follow-up and evaluation of the actions they carry out. At the time of this evaluation, however, the achievements of the signed agreements related basically to terms of reference and service costs were unknown.

4.3.3 Formulation of Proposals

Aside from unanticipated events such as the conflict's dynamics, that may hinder or complicate the normal execution of the projects, there are also other causes that diminish the efficiency of the projects' execution. Among them is the little capacity of execution observed in some Partners, mainly due to the low quality of the project-formulation. In general, the proposals presented by the Partners in order to become eligible within the framework of the Plan2001, are not entirely satisfactory in their formulation. This explains why in practice there is a loss of efficiency in the allocation of the resources³² and why these projects' viability depends more on accumulated experience -how to implement projects in the field- than on proper formulation and planning of the activities. Even though this fact can be acceptable from an empirical point of view, it does not avoid the loss of effectiveness and greater achievements of the project. The low quality in the formulation of the projects and in the presentation of the reports is a weakness observed in all the Partners. It's necessary to insist on this because it has an effect in the allocation of resources, both technical and financial, as well as preventing the full use of valuable experiences. In this respect, the most relevant points are:

- The low estimates of the assessment of needs, in terms of the impact produced, as a condition to have a better definition of the problem and the issues at stake;
- The low use, at least explicitly, of the lessons learnt, even more so when projects in the same sectors have been implemented with ECHO's;
- The explicit absence of the points that are supposed to coincide with the strategic global vision of intervention of the Partner (as an institution) with the one of ECHO, in order to meet the problems of IDPs. The coincidences in the vision of both the executing institution and the financing one should not be taken for granted, as it is the strategy that defines the process of the project's execution and demanding a modification in the Partner's implementation strategies could well be belated³³;
- From the methodological perspective, there are conceptual errors as there is confusion of objectives with activities. This explains in part, why in the proposals that are formulated and in the reports that are presented there is an absence of both performance and results indicators, aside from the difficulties that can be encountered during their elaboration (especially those related to qualitative assessments or to the maturing time of the projects.
- Also, from the methodological angle, there is an excessive adhesion to the Logical Framework (EML) that diminishes, among other aspects, the richness of the presentation of the problem, the backup of the solutions proposed, the presentation of the planned strategies and the quality outcomes expected by the end of the project. On the other hand, there is no adequate use of the EML, as a tool for the planning of the project's activities, objectives and expected results as well as for the adequate definition of the indicators.

4.3.4 Productive Packages

Another important point to take in consideration and that has a connection with the approach of post-emergency assistance, is the excessive or mistaken definition of the contents given to the productive packages being referred to as productive projects. In its strict sense, experience shows that a productive project requires time to mature, which in practice would exceed the term of the projects funded by ECHO (no more than one year). In addition, implementation is not immediate but it usually gears up when at least a third of the financing period has already passed. In the majority of the work carried out by the Partners, the solutions are of the emergency type and oriented to generating temporary income for the displaced people. Even in the set of initiatives promoted by some Partners, only a reduced number (of the ones found) would correspond to the category of productive projects, such as the recovery of the sugar cane crops and the assembling of a "trapiche" or the growing of tilapia. The productive activities promoted by other Partners, using psychosocial dynamics, are within the solutions of emergency, that is, small businesses or personal micro-enterprises, oriented to get the displaced people to generate income. Other experiences observed correspond to agricultural productive activities, through groups of producers inside the communities, aiming at guaranteeing the supply of basic agricultural products (food security) in the short term. Attention should be given to the direction and character of these productive packages,

³² During the visits made to the working areas, we could see that the objectives proposed in connection to "productive projects" and to the water and sanitation projects, respectively, would not be fulfilled within the terms that had been planned.

³³ This situation has become evident in the case of PTM, in connection with their position about the topic of human rights. They assume it from an activist perspective, which doesn't coincide with ECHO's vision.

more than to their denomination. That is, in terms of the possible opportunities offered to the displaced, and also of the nature and use of ECHO's resources. According to these two criteria, in that they are activities that generate temporary income – used as "seed capital" – they can be in a legitimate way, part of the post-emergency response, as they become concrete solutions that make it possible for the displaced to start obtaining income by themselves.

4.3.5 Operation Costs

It is extremely difficult, probably impossible, to compare in a significant manner the costs of operation of the various partners in the proposals because the basic variables are often unknown e.g. the number of beneficiaries of food parcels (known exactly beforehand) cannot be compared to the number of people attending the medical consultations, that are known only after they actually attended. The cost per beneficiary is thus only known after the project is completed, to the extent that statistics are correctly collected. (They usually are). It is consequently quite impossible to compare costs at the proposal level. Such an analysis can only be done ex-post and is of little use in selecting the proposals. Some costs however can be compared e.g. transports cost, or personnel costs. They are in all cases very high except for UNHCR that has a structure of its own and where these cost can hardly be broken down. As an example the ratio of personnel costs to the total costs varies between 23 and 35 % of the costs.

	C-E	CISP	CRE	CRF	MPDL	PTM	SI	ACNUR
CP / FA (%)	30	23	29	35	26	29	28	19

The explanation for these high costs would be in the personnel costs, which on average amount to 30% of the allocated funds, and even reaching 35%. Likewise, in the operations of some Partners, there is an understandable incidence in the transportation costs, in certain cases due to the conditions in the field, and in others, due to the geographical dispersion of the activities³⁴. The operation costs, as a criterion for the eligibility of the proposals must be a variable taken into consideration, as it implies the evaluation of the intervention strategy, mainly when considering aspects such as: the geographical difficulties of the region itself, or those resulting from the conflict's own dynamics; the interest of the Partner to cover extensive areas (one or more Departments); the configuration of the work teams, which could result in an increase of the number of personnel, This also open the grounds for questioning the Partner on its cost structure and eventually justify changes in the breakdown of the proposal budget. Furthermore, it's important to mention that in Partners that do not carry out the projects in a direct way but through local counterparts, there is an increase of operation costs implicit in the agreements set for the implementation of determined activities, such as training, technical assistance or any other service. In fact, these increase costs³⁵ that modify the initial cost structure the Partners present to ECHO and this is why they should be part of the assessment of the proposals.

4.3.6 Monthly Coordination Meetings poop

Regarding the responsibilities of the Office of ECHO-Colombia, the permanent coordination with the Partners are commendable. In this sense, the monthly meetings that are held as a mechanism to improve the quality of the activities carried out are an important aspect. Likewise, another important aspect is the implementation of the thematic teams, which has made it possible to systematize experiences and improve methodologies in similar working areas. Monthly meetings as a permanent mechanism have not only contributed to keeping coordination links, but also enabled contacts among the Partners themselves, strengthening the initiative of creating a dialogue and agreement entity called Forum. However, it is accepted that the meetings should follow different dynamics than the present one- both in achieving a more horizontal relationship between ECHO and its Partners, as well as in constituting a locus that fosters the creation and promotion of new initiatives. In this aspect, for example, it would be convenient that these monthly meetings serve to initiate actions connected with the quality of the projects' formulation; the recovery of the lessons learnt by ECHO-Partners as a group; the mutual transference of knowledge and accumulated experiences; the analysis of common problems, etc. All oriented as a possibility of formulating joint strategies of intervention, whether for ECHO itself, or for new proposals such as up-rooted populations³⁶.

4.3.7 Monitoring and Follow up

On the monitoring and follow-up of the operations the Partners carry out, the present limitations of the personnel of ECHO in Colombia are evident. Apart from coordination activities that have to be performed as an office of international cooperation, it is materially impossible for two people (including the Expert) to efficiently and effectively carry out the administration of 17 projects developed with 14 Partners,

³⁴ Regarding operation costs, this is an aspect to be considered as a criterion for the evaluation of the proposals.

³⁵ Through the services provided by the local third parties as executors, the costs of personnel, infrastructure and other concepts are being included. For example, training involves the cost of the instructor, the premises, equipment, etc.

³⁶ See the second part of this report, page ...

covering 19 districts/provinces of the country. Moreover, when the characteristics of the intervention the Partners use are not uniform and even more when not all of them implement the projects directly but through local counterparts. This makes it binding for ECHO to redefine its mechanisms and tools of monitoring and follow-up, which are not limited to the filling out of forms³⁷. On this respect, it is necessary to indicate that the form ECHO uses for the monitoring doesn't allow for either a comparative and evaluative analysis of the objectives and outcomes planned or achieved, or of the strategies applied. In addition, the form is not even coherent with the EML³⁸ required in the proposal, where the absence of the analysis based on strengths / weaknesses and opportunities / threats (SWOP) stands out. It is basically limited to request performance indicators and not of results, and much less of impact. On the other hand, the unspoken underlying differences in perspective between ECHO and its Partners, may create future limitations for an adequate and timely evaluation of the proposals the counterparts will present for ECHO's 2002 Intervention Plan.

4.3.8 Visibility, Transparency and Security

Visibility is seen as a matter of the transparency of the received financial resources' origin and it constitutes another relevant topic that the ECHO-Colombia Office must address with the partners. Visibility does not have a uniform treatment by all the Partners, as it is subject to the importance and attention they want to give to it. For some, there is a problem between security and visibility, choosing the first under the argument that the best security is given by public recognition and or mandate of the organization itself. For others it is a commitment to the European organization that funds the activities, and must therefore be publicly recognized, whereas the safety of everybody is guaranteed. Finally, a few seem indifferent to the issue of visibility, in the sense it is not awarded much significance.

Aside from the mechanisms used to show said visibility, which should not be limited to the exhibition of a logo, the origins of the aid funds and how and why they are channelled through particular Partners should be openly explained to the beneficiaries. The conclusion extracted from the different arguments presented by the Partners in relation with the visibility, whether they are correct or not in their attitude towards it; it is clear that ECHO-Colombia will have to jointly address it as a matter of transparency, to be done proactively and firmly, studying the particular features of each intervention, in order to adopt the most convenient measures.

The mechanisms used to show said visibility should not be limited to the exhibition of a logo, but the origins of the aid funds and how and why they are channelled through particular Partners should be openly explained to the beneficiaries; the conclusion extracted from the different arguments presented by the Partners in relation with the visibility, whether they are correct or not in their attitude towards it; it is clear that ECHO-Colombia will have to jointly address it as a matter of transparency, to be done proactively and firmly, studying the particular features of each intervention, in order to adopt the most convenient measures.

Regarding the issue of security, all the Partners have developed adequate systems, although the degree of use is not completely efficient in some cases. It's important to emphasize that in this aspect, the ECHO-Colombia Office taken care of this aspect and remains attentive so that the Partners don't relax the measures applied.

4.3.9. Main Conclusions on Efficiency

The possibilities of success of projects executed by the counterparts respond more to field-action than to good proposal formulation and activity planning. In this respect, the Partners don't take advantage of accumulated experience and of lessons learnt in order to achieve a better allocation of the resources, both technical and financial.

Costs of personnel and transport are extremely high and will have to be reviewed for future proposals, though they are difficult to compare.

Monitoring of the partners activities cannot be insured properly with the present reduced ECHO field staff in Bogotá

Due to a lack of systematisation of the experiences and the lessons learned, eligibility criteria are not properly identified and decisions on the selection of proposals are still very much made without proper justifications. Decisions however are primarily analysed in the field, which is an excellent method as it is based on a collective memory of the past projects, both at institutional and staff level.

³⁷ This topic is part of what was stated in connection to the topic of low quality of the presentation of the proposals and reports.

³⁸ Logical Framework Structure

4.4 Impact

4.4.1 The Intervention Strategy

The impact that is expected through the projects funded by ECHO can be seen from two different perspectives: (i) as a global answer to a determined situation, which in this case is displacement, and (ii) as a tentatively long-lasting and efficient solution to concrete problems. As a global answer, that is, as a whole, it can be considered that the projects did have a positive impact, as a particular style of intervention, and even more so, as a process undertaken in order to find qualitatively better responses to similar previous initiatives. From this perspective, when compared to the situation generated by displacement, the actions carried out reflect a significant improvement in the life conditions of the population. In addition, apart from the emergency response itself that answers to its own dynamics, said improvements in the life conditions of the displaced person may be explained by the activities implemented in the post-emergency assistance phase.

Although the impact achieved as a particular style of intervention cannot be credited to a pre-planned strategy and even less to agreements between ECHO and its Partners, it can however, be considered to be the result of two evident facts: on one hand the clear understanding ECHO has of the problem of displacement as a phenomenon that has different expressions and consequently needs specific solutions; and on the other hand, the accumulated experience of these organizations, which to a certain extent facilitated ECHO's decision to work, or continue doing so, with them.

4.4.2 Gender Equity

The particularities implied in facing gender equity in emergency situations make the impact less visible. However, in the operations carried out by the Partners, gender is undertaken as a transversal topic, together with an equity perspective. It begins with the recognition that the displaced woman is a double victim, since new challenges and roles are added to her traditionally marginalized situation without there being a previous process of self-evaluation.

Like this, on top of having to face the limitations and risks that displacement itself produces, she is forced to undertake the leader-role at home, in spite of the presence of her husband or companion, due to the permanent pressure that armed groups exert on men, old and young. As a result of this, the activities carried out with women or those in which they participate, the topic of gender has mainly answered to the need of recovering women's emotional stability, as well as the strengthening of their human capacities, instead of an empowerment issue. However, the topic holds another not yet solved challenge, when the matter of masculinity has to be faced as an alternative to machismo. Indeed, as it has been presented before, the pressure that armed groups exert on displaced males has made the traditional role as home leader, responsible for the family's survival, to be altered into a person forced to remain hidden and dependent of a woman (wife or companion). This sudden change in male and female roles certainly affects men's self-esteem and must be addressed as a part of gender dynamics, usually directed to women. In doing so, equity and gender relations' principles will have to be applied, so as not to reproduce situations and ways of life that must be overcome.

4.4.3 Human Rights

With respect to human rights, all the Partners recognize that emergency humanitarian assistance means, by itself, to act in favour of human rights, as far as its immediate purpose is the preservation of human lives. In connection with the 2001 Plan, this principle should imply that in the intervention strategy for the execution of the projects, the difference in the meaning between humanitarian action, and the implementation of defence and promotion of human rights activities, was clear to the Partners.

In that context, and in relation to the projects execution dynamics', three different groups have been identified. The first group of Partners doesn't include specific activities for promoting human rights in their projects. The second group is made up of Partners who include the promotion and training in the topic of human rights within their activities, under the different expressions, such as human rights of first and second generation, International Humanitarian Rights (IHR), displaced people's rights, etc. A third group, in addition to training and promotion activities, undertakes a public stance against acts of human rights violations.

Regarding public postures towards actions of human rights' violations³⁹ and their connection with ECHO's visibility and transparency, the emphasis of this matter is placed on the risk that the strictly

³⁹ In this aspect it should be very clear that the position of the Partners is unique -indeed one of rejection- in concrete situations of human rights' violations, here with a particular reference to those actions that have a national impact in public opinion and that are publicly condemned. On this respect, it's important to indicate that through this explanation, there is no intention whatsoever to only consider as violations, actions that have greater repercussion.

humanitarian meaning of the intervention is subject to, that is, in of a conflict that does not respect humanitarian rules, to contribute to the obstruction or conditioning by the armed actors of the open implementation of activities and its direct implications for the displaced population.

4.5 Sustainability

In addressing the topic of impact a second aspect directly linked with sustainability was mentioned: the tentative long-lasting and efficient solution to concrete problems as a condition for displaced people to become less dependent on emergency humanitarian assistance. But, to refer to long-lasting solutions, entails the promotion and impulse of activities or projects that mainly correspond to the post-emergency assistance phase. Here the expected impact becomes relative due to the absence of continuity or sustainability of the activities, in what concerns both the beneficiary as well as the period of execution the activity requires⁴⁰. Partners that have been precisely carrying out productive projects have to face the problem of having to abandon the beneficiary once he/she receives a supposedly durable solution. Likewise, any productive activity cannot go further than the training stage and the providing of financial resources, as the term for ECHO's project would be exceeded⁴¹. It is necessary to properly consider the impact-sustainability approach, in order to assess within ECHO's plans, how and to what extent it would justify to initiate activities that will not be able to continue. And not only for reasons related to the terms of ECHO's projects, but mainly for the limited capacities public institutions have for undertaking larger commitments, even when, according to the law, it is of their competence to be in charge of the displaced population's attention⁴². During the interviews held with government employees and other actors, regarding the possible transfer of activities that some Partners are executing such as, the community feeding centres, the stores or the health brigades⁴³, the conclusion reached was that there was no guarantee of continuity in the attention, and in cases where it could be done provisionally, the quality would be diminished. In general, there are no real possibilities of a government response that could give continuity to the multiple and diverse initiatives in favour of the displaced population and that are in the process of implementation; on behalf of the government there is simply no integrated plan that considers the problem of displacement as state issue, that is as part of a socio-economical structural crisis, in which the conflict becomes an added difficulty to the situation. What can rather be found, are immediate and isolated responses when a problem that has directly to do with the Red rises, or in an indirect way with other public institutions, according to Law 387. In fact, the risk of losing a large number of displaced population support activities due to lack of funding through ECHO or other sponsors is latent, and even more so for directly involved state institutions, as it is a growing demand for attention with scarce financial resources to meet it. From the abovementioned it is derived that, in the context ECHO's mandate of emergency humanitarian attention, the problem of sustainability has to be considered first, as a matter of previously initiated programs that due to their relative impact or success must (or should) be preserved in the immediate plans; this is the case of community feeding centres, stores, health brigades and the promotion and strengthening of organization modes through the development of psycho-social dynamics. Only at a second stage should the possibility of continuity of activities that assist the same displaced population be taken into account. What certainly concerns the Partners is how to understand and how ECHO understands the impact-sustainability criterion⁴⁴ in connection with what is called the grey zone. In fact, during the work meetings held during the visits, the Partners coincided in stating that ECHO itself lacked clarity in defining the boundaries between emergency humanitarian assistance, in its most strict version, and post-emergency assistance, including the return and resettlement of the population. For ECHO's Partners, this lack of clarity does not only have a theoretical dimension -as it is found in the phases of assistance to the internally displaced population of the 2001 Plan-, but also a practical dimension, in the sense that it demands that the implemented projects, supposedly for humanitarian emergency, be sustainable and with impact. As far as the boundaries between emergency humanitarian assistance and post-emergency assistance are made clear in practice, the process of linking

⁴⁰ For example, if we are dealing with *productive projects* in the strict sense, this entails, apart from training and financing, technical assistance for the set up and operation, monitoring etc., activities that usually take more than a year.

⁴¹ Unless some of these Partners plan to continue providing assistance with resources from other institutions.

⁴² For private institutions (NGO's), the difficulty is a practical one, since in general they develop their own programs with a previously established coverage.

⁴³ As it can be observed, no reference is being made to the so-called "productive projects", in which any continuity difficulties would be justified.

⁴⁴ There was also an opportunity to discuss this topic with the Partners and members of Forum that were not included in the assessment.

humanitarian assistance with rehabilitation and development will also be clarified in its initial stage and especially, its mechanisms⁴⁵. In this situation, the psycho-social component will have to perform the relevant role of project facilitator, as it has done in the execution of the 2001 Plan, that is, as a transversal axis to the applied intervention strategy and as one of the necessary links between humanitarian assistance and durable solutions. In relation to the abovementioned, what would rather be missing, is the definition of which fields of competence would include certain initiatives so as to be undertaken by ECHO –in spite of the grey zone- or by the program of assistance for up-rooted populations, and this in order to not only avoid continuity voids, but also to efficiently contribute to the creation of propitious spaces for future interventions.

4.6. Main Conclusions on Impact and sustainability:

The impact on IDPs is significant in improving their life conditions.

Gender issues also includes strictly man issues in so much as his traditional role is often negated in displacement and further reduced because of threats by armed groups.

Humanitarian assistance and human rights defence and advocacy are two distinct matters that should not overlap. ECHO's basic principle is impartiality, and any infringements to this principle will further increase insecurity related to staff and programmes.

The sustainability of the processes initiated within the framework of humanitarian assistance will depend, to a great extent, on the efforts the Partners make in promoting or improving coordination mechanisms, mainly with state institutions.

5. Lessons Learnt

Even though ECHO's 2001-Intervention Plan in Colombia is still an ongoing process, the implementation evidences a set of lessons which relevance resides in being the result of the experience ECHO and its Partners have been accumulating in order to provide more effective responses to the problem of displacement since 1997⁴⁶. Among the main lessons learnt the following stand out:

- ECHO and its Partners have practiced a unique and effective style of providing humanitarian assistance in a context of exclusion, responding with adequate solutions to each regional situation and to the unforeseen events the conflict compels.
- ECHO and its Partners have given humanitarian assistance responses that are not limited only to strict emergency situations. In this sense, the immediate actions of post emergency have provided the displaced population with minimum conditions of self-sustainability.
- ECHO's Partners do not take advantage of the lessons learnt or of the accumulated experience in order to improve the formulation of their proposals, in its different aspects: the assessment of needs for a precise identification of the problem/problems to be solved; a more objective justification of the proposal; appraisal of the expected outcomes and impact; formulation of operation strategies; valuation of external factors, etc. On the other hand, the same experience doesn't induce some of them to improve their levels of organization and operation.
- ECHO and its Partners have facilitated social processes that have been created within the framework of humanitarian assistance. Its sustainability depends on the value they give to ECHO's present intervention strategy within the framework of assistance programs for up-rooted people, in the intermediate and long term. This entails: the definition of different stages, according to the evolution of the conflict; the delineation of the scope of action (local / regional); the promotion of joint actions among Partners; the establishment of coordination mechanisms; definition of operative tools; the calculation of impact, etc.
- The continuity of some of the activities initiated by ECHO and its Partners within the framework of the 2001 Plan– community feeding centres, health brigades, support to small, income-generating projects- that will depend, to a great extent on the efforts of the Partners to promote or improve coordination mechanisms, mainly with government institutions.

⁴⁵ LRRD, Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development.

⁴⁶ Most of the Partners that participate in the 2001 Plan have been doing so since 1997.

- The psycho-social dynamics have become, due to their transversal character, an important axis of ECHO and its Partners' intervention strategy. Their application in emergency actions show that parallel to the process of the communities' organization for improving the quality and efficiency of the distribution of goods and services, it's also possible to create the conditions required for the construction of citizenship.
- The intervention style that ECHO and its Partners have developed, places them in propitious conditions for initiating new processes of action against the problem of displacement; mainly in the formulation of joint intervention strategies, whether within ECHO's framework, or for new proposals, such the assistance for up-rooted populations' initiative. On this aspect, the psycho-social dynamics and the productive projects implemented with durable criteria represent an important link between assistance, rehabilitation and development (LRRD), that is, between emergency humanitarian assistance and durable solutions.
- The actions that ECHO and its Partners carry out regarding gender equity and relations must not be limited to work with women, by reason of their traditional situation of exclusion. Men must also be included, since the pressure the armed actors exert on them have turned them into socially invisible characters.
- When implementing emergency humanitarian assistance, ECHO and its Partners are giving direct and objective responses to preserve people's lives, that is, undertaking the defence of human rights from a strictly humanitarian position, from which it is taken into account that the open realization of the activities should not be obstructed or conditioned.
- Apart from security reasons, the beneficiary population has the right to the visibility and transparency of the support granted, that is, to know the origin and channels through which they receive the funds.

6. Recommendations

6.1. The practical results of the intervention experience carried out by ECHO, together with its Partners, suggest that this Office sets certain criteria -rather than establishing definitions-, in respect to the conceptual content that the expressions emergency humanitarian assistance, post-emergency assistance and return/re-settlement should have in determined contexts. Thus, starting from the fact that it is a question of clarifying the so called grey zone, the criteria could be the following:

- The characteristics adopted by the internal displacement related to the conflict's dynamic, mainly in what concerns the number of displaced people and the method used (massive or drip-displacement);
- The existence or not of spontaneous processes of re-settlement and return;
- The urgency of assisting the same displaced population and its environment;
- Type and volume of the offered assistance;
- The possibility of extending the present -short term- assistance with long term initiatives; mainly if it is a question of finding links that will allow the actions' continuity.

6.2. In the same sense, though as an alternative to the previous suggestion, the lessons learnt recommend that ECHO should identify and execute effective and timely mechanisms tending to guarantee the creation of propitious conditions for the sustainable self-sufficiency of the beneficiaries. In this respect, and parallel to the implementation of the 2002 ECHO Intervention Plan for Colombia, ECHO and the DG/RELEX could jointly start, the formulation of a program of rehabilitation and re-settlement, in support of the displaced populations, based on the following criteria:

- I. To complement and continue post-emergency projects, focusing attention in:
 - The strengthening of the personal and institutional capacities;
 - The impulse of productive activities (training, technical assistance and financing);
 - The impulse and strengthening of community organizations and citizenship construction;
 - The strengthening of the psychosocial component as a transversal element.

- II. Area based intervention approach, based on an updated diagnosis of the needs and lessons learnt;
- III. Support to Consortium processes among ECHO's Partners, in order to promote joint work, from an area-based and sustainable perspective.

6.3. From the conclusions related to efficiency it is suggested that the Partners should improve their technical level in the formulation, managing and evaluation of the projects. The strengthening of their proposals and operative capacities, should allow, additionally, a re-orientation of objectives and methodological scope of the partial reports and the closing of the projects. The Office of ECHO Colombia should address this task through an adequate strategy, in which the participation of the Partners' central offices should be increased.

6.4. Facing the 2002 ECHO Intervention Plan, the adequate use of the logical framework approach should be stressed, emphasizing in the elaboration of performance and results indicators by objectives from the proposals' formulation stage. That is, not only aiming at facilitating the normal monitoring and follow-up process by the Partner, as by ECHO, but mainly as mechanisms to measure the expected impacts -though relative in certain cases- that the projects reach and to identify possible links with additional long term initiatives as well.

In this context, the logframe should not be a limiting factor so that in the proposals' formulation, the accumulated experience and the lessons learnt are not visualized. These strengths should rather be translated in substantial elements in the projects' formulations, in terms of: evaluation of the identified needs; type of answer offered; justification; results and expected impacts; expected objectives; strategies to be applied; evaluation of externals factors; etc.

6.5. The elements taken from experience and the lessons learnt, should serve ECHO as an important point of reference for establishing a set of minimum criteria through which proposals presented by organizations wishing to participate in the execution of ECHO's 2002 Intervention Plan or other future ones, may be evaluated and qualify as eligible. The following are suggested criteria of eligibility, among others that ECHO may identify:

- A cost structure reflecting that the direct benefits of the available financial resources are mainly destined towards displaced populations; this means that the cost-benefit ratio of a particular intervention must be adequately assessed;
- Clarity within the project's strategy -where it corresponds-, on how are eventually expected the participation of local counterparts in the project's different components, including budgetary aspects.
- The existence of convergences between the strategic objectives of the Partners with those found in ECHO's intervention plans as well as convergence in intermediate and long term strategies and their possible links to the present ongoing actions.

6.6. Regarding the psychosocial component, the strengthening of its mechanisms of implementation should be continued, starting from the achievements reached and the proposals contained in the document made in cooperation with OPS, ECHO and NGOs (Basic Guidelines for the psychosocial assistance to the displaced populations.) In the same way, and with the purpose of creating the conditions for long lasting solutions, efforts must be made to reinforce with financial resources those components to which the psychosocial dynamics support (as food, health, financing of small business and activities generating incomes, productive projects, etc.).

support

6.7. The Office of ECHO-Colombia must support the Partners in strengthening coordination with institutions, governmental and non-governmental, national and international.

6.8. It is important to systematize the experiences and lessons learnt assuming them as a joint commitment between ECHO and its Partners with the purpose of elaborating guiding criteria -not recipes- to be used as a referential framework to similar actions implemented in other areas of the country or even in other countries.

6.9. The relationship between the ECHO-Colombia Office and its Partners should follow two clear and necessarily complementary directions. First, to continue strengthening the existing links, in order to promote and support joint actions between Partners; and, second, ensuring the

transparency of all actions. For this purpose, the Office of ECHO-Colombia should look for adequate and timely mechanisms of follow up.

7. Guidelines of ECHO's Future Strategy for Colombia⁴⁷.

The evaluation of ECHO's 2001 Intervention Plan for Colombia exposed here above has highlighted a number of issues that should be taken into account for a possible future strategy for ECHO in Colombia. They fit mainly into two main sections : Policy Issues and Operational Issues.

7.1 Policy Issues

7.1.1 Humanitarian Assistance Needs

Is Colombia still in need of Humanitarian Assistance from ECHO? The answer is yes. The radicalisation of the armed groups, together with an increasing collapse of the State basic functions in safety nets and other essential obligations justify the presence of ECHO, because of the direct dead threats to a increasing part of the country's civil population that is taken hostage. The first difficulty may reside in the fact that a solid part of the population is just as badly off as the displaced people and that no specific programmes had been considered in the past to address the improvement of their specific situation. This might now change with the new EU programmes⁴⁸, that will be reviewed⁴⁹, and possibly with the Plan Colombia in its social component (?); Nevertheless Colombia is a very vivid candidate for a poverty alleviation programme coupled with good governance⁵⁰. The second difficulty lies with the paradox of Colombia, one might say the surrealistic dimension of this fragmented socio-economic society, that has all the tools of a perfect democracy, that doesn't work! It is certainly not within ECHO's mandate to intervene in this process of decaying State responsibilities. It could even be argued that it is not within ECHO's role to take care of the consequences of the State neglectness even in its humanitarian dimension. It is the role of the State to attend to the needs of its own citizen and though the number of IDPs might in Colombia be one of the highest in the world the absolute number is not incommensurate with Colombia's resources. Furthermore the IDPs issue does not respond to an emergency situation criteria in most cases. It is rather a creeping phenomena that is sometimes more acute but never takes a dimension that could not be met adequately. It is also an issue that changes constantly in its dimension and its location. Some are IDPs one day and several weeks later have returned, but can still be in need of reinsertion on their own premises (housing, tool, seeds, animals..). Displacement can happen virtually anywhere in the inhabited part of the country, that is excluding the Amazonas. IDPs can also be economic migrants that are part of the "normal" rural exodus phenomena that is irrelevant to the IDPs issue. Furthermore in what relates to IDPs' needs the legal tools exist –law 387 and the RED- but its application in the field is far from being efficient as yet. A (unknown with precision) part of the IDPs still have no access to the basic needs that are guaranteed by legal provisions.

What then makes IDPs eligible for ECHO's assistance? The death threats are. In this sense IDPs are really the victims of violence that is not for the moment under control. Most of the IDPs are civilian that are not part of a conflict they try to avoid, and are highly vulnerable in the sense that they are powerless to intervene or have any influence on the course of it. Death threats are the triggering facts that turn a civilian into an IDP. This fits well within ECHO's mandate.

In this context prevention (to flee) could also be considered as a legitimate criteria for assistance. Is preventing displacement an emergency issue and an humanitarian one? Will support to resisting the armed groups' demand for eviction qualify for assistance from ECHO? From a civil society development point of view it certainly does. Does it fit with Echo's mandate? Some of the NGOs funded by ECHO answered positively to that dilemma (PTM, and in part the Red Crosses did). Resistance is an act within the range of Human Rights grounds, but not only. It is also a road leading to LRRD. Communities that resist, mostly Indigenous and Afro-Colombian ones so far, have a better chance to accept and actively participate in community development projects e.g. small scale productive activities, microprojects, civil society and good governance. Resistance to move also strengthens the sense of ownership of the land, of

⁴⁷ TORs say "assessment" while "guidelines" is more accurate.

⁴⁸ See § 7.2.2.

⁵⁰ in a period of four years (1998-2001) 16 MP lost their seats for criminal activities, 8 are in prison, 5 have been assassinated, and 14 are sequestered

home, and directly clashes with the eviction process.⁵¹ However resistance to eviction is not that simple and straightforward. Firstly resistance to eviction may come from the pressure of one armed group to prevent displacement imposed by another one. It puts the population in a no-win situation. In this case displacement is a never ending process. Resistance puts the communities under direct threats and live exposure. Secondly resistance to eviction does not necessarily mean that humanitarian assistance is needed. In this sense it should not qualify for ECHO's support. The criteria for assistance should be based on a review case by case to eventually decide that humanitarian assistance is needed.

OPERATIONAL CONCLUSIONS: Violence has increased in the last few months resulting in an increase of displacement. In spite of the on-going bilateral political contacts with a departing government, between GOC and ELN, as well as with FARC, there is a built-up in favour of a war solution to the guerrilla activities. This will result, if verified, in an increase of casualties and sufferings for the civilian population. ECHO should continue to be present in Colombia albeit in a transitional mode, until the development of the peace process is well established. In the short term this is far from heading in the right direction, in spite of the recent (January 2002) Peace negotiations. In the short term, there will be an increase in displacement. ECHO should not yet consider a phasing out strategy as long as the prospect of a negotiated resolution of the conflict (optimistic scenario not considered likely by most observers at present) or an increase in war operations are not clearly defined. In the latter case ECHO's presence will be an essential part of the relief operations. Resistance to displacement does not qualify in se for humanitarian assistance. However a review on a case by case basis may lead to exceptions to that principle.

7.1.2 Emergency and post emergency

The evaluation sample of the Intervention Plan 2001 shows that only 17% of the activities funded by ECHO relates to emergency assistance as compared to 62% for post emergency assistance. This should not come as a surprise. It is in fact a direct reflect of the singularities of the IDPs issues. Emergency usual non-food items are not in great demand. It does not mean that they are not needed, but the magnitude of the requests is not that great. Food aid is not crucial: RED, ICRC (with ECHO's funding) and WFP provide enough food for IDPs even if limited to three months in the case of RED and CICR. In addition CICR also provides non-food items with ECHO's funding. A significant number of IDPs, mostly those who move massively to the next municipality, receive some food and shelter assistance from parents in the neighbourhood. In addition food aid and shelter are only needed for a limited span of time because in 30% of the cases IDPs return. Post emergency activities quickly become the priority, and this is reflected in the Partners' proposals. The action Plan 2001 specifically endorsed post emergency and rehabilitation activities as possible actions to be covered by the proposals and this opportunity has been utilised. Post emergency measures are difficult to select. ECHO itself implicitly recognises that post emergency activities are difficult to implement in a sustainable way in a one-year period: it has in several instances renewed several contracts for a further period of one year or even more (e.g. UNICEF, French Red Cross) with little changes in the overall objectives, areas or beneficiaries. These contracts were all to be considered of a post emergency, or rehabilitation nature. Multi-year activities carry its own limitations: it is increasingly difficult to stop such projects abruptly. If mostly post emergency opportunities exist, purely emergency situations being more or less under control, should ECHO still consider remaining present in the country? The answer is again yes but under a number of conditions. (i) Post emergency proposals must contain a fair amount of sustainability, albeit with a hand over to another donor or local institutions after the proposal is actually running and being implemented. This conditions must apply to every proposals and can take a number of different forms, the training component being the most important. If a solid training practical on-the-job training programme is included then e.g. health or housing proposals could be justified. (ii) local Institutions must always be fully integrated into the programmes, mainly with detached staff. This is different from the present widespread habit of having (very competent) staff hired for the length of the project: it does not train or improve the institutional staff capabilities.

OPERATIONAL CONCLUSIONS: Emergency and Post Emergency should be more clearly defined by ECHO. The way to do it is to include possible post emergency measures right from the start of the operations by identifying indicators linked to the logical framework. More thorough

⁵¹ A house to live in and a piece of land are the two priorities of all the evicted people.

monitoring of the objectives, not only the actions, by the Partners would allow ECHO to decide whether to continue financing further over a one-year period. ECHO should continue to fund large operational organisations with proven capabilities to react quickly to emergency food aid situation (CICR) It should consider only limited food aid through Partners funding for highly vulnerable people, and initiatives directly supporting post emergency activities (comedores) or supplying resisting communities with the basics. Non-food aid should be limited

7.1.3 Multi-annual contracts?

Most Partners complain, this is not new, of the short length of the contracts. They argue that in post emergency issues one year is too short to accomplish anything very substantial. This is a issue that should be dealt seriously as it may have many operational consequences. Firstly there is a confusion on ECHO's objectives. Time wise ECHO has a long term vision that takes place in a short term span, and ECHO should explain this better, as it is not obvious. ECHO is certainly not indifferent to the long term objectives of development and its methods. On the contrary it strives to reach a form on integration with development institutions, firstly with the EU instruments On the other hand ECHO is prisoner of its own vagueness, so ascertain some Partners, in its mandate that seems to imply that it could also venture into multi annual contracts through post emergency or rehabilitation activities. It is true that in Colombia, and elsewhere, ECHO has in several occasions renewed contracts on very similar technical basis, and sometimes many years in a row. This has introduced some uncertainties among the Partners. Does ECHO fund some proposals for more than a year, and in this case what sorts of proposals? Does ECHO fund more easily specialised agencies of the UN for more than a year? (e.g. in Colombia: UNICEF or UNHCR). Secondly, if there were some opportunities to have some contracts renewed, what would be the recipe? This could implicitly orientate the choice of proposals towards some fields were an extension would be more plausible than others. (e.g. health). Thirdly the lack of insurance that a project could be extended makes some Partners oblivious of the basic requirements of project implementation, monitoring and lessons learned, that if properly carried out could help them to possibly attain that objective. The uncertainties that the Partners are facing for the possible extension of their contracts often relies in a general lack of internal monitoring of their own activities. It is often difficult to justify an extension of a contract on the ground of an array of qualitative and quantitative un-related criteria. A proper monitoring of the on-going activities is seldom carried out, albeit integrated in the proposal. Most Partners make no allusion to the lessons learned with past similar projects they carried out nor consequently do they make proper linkages for future activities. It seems that there is no institutional memory even with long-established Partners e.g. French Red Cross. If monitoring was properly performed, then it would be easier to justify possibly a continuation of the operation, albeit with changes induced by the lessons learned. This entails the identification of a certain number of indicators that, if met, could trigger a possible continuation of the activities. These indicators should be identified in the logframe, avoiding the confusion occurring frequently between actions and objectives. An extension should never be a right. It should always be eventually granted after a proper evaluation of the outputs and a proper identification of the objectives to be met. It should also compulsively include a phasing out strategy that includes a sustainability assessment.

Operational conclusions. In a low intensity IDPs crisis but with unexpected twists, renewal of contracts can only be considered if a proper monitoring, and evaluation, of the project is made. Monitoring must be built-in into the project and into the logframe. The rationale of the renewal must always be linked to the former project. Further analysis is needed to identify a set of criteria for a continuation of the activities (renewal of contract) of a partner of a proposal.

7.1.4 Area-based projects?

Partners' proposals at present loosely sticks to the regions that have most IDPs. However within the region activities for a given Partner are sometimes geographically far apart and consequently attendance to IDPs can be can delayed for transport, logistics or time availability reasons. Partners argue that one of the criteria put forward by ECHO is that priority should be given to those areas where few or no other donors are present. This is a very wide criteria because as far as IDPs are concerned there are up to now very few organisations taking care of them, and the field is thus quite open according to that criteria. Earlier in this report it has been highlighted that there is quite a clear geographical pattern for IDPs location, linked directly to the armed group area of activities, in particular the paramilitaries that are the cause of most of the expulsions. Some Departments and within the Departments some municipalities receive the bulk of the IDPs. Acknowledging this fact would it be realistic to favour an area-based approach for IDPs attention? As long as IDPs was not a wide spread phenomena, that is until the end of the last decade, that would not have been a worthwhile option. All IDPs had to be attended. Now that the

phenomena has spread out at national level, and now that the issue has been recognised as a national priority by GOC and that GOC has taken important measures to meet the challenge, an area-based approach might be a valuable option. ECHO cannot meet the needs of some 150,000 / 250,000 scattered IDPs. The cost per unit would immediately sky rocket due to the inclusion of marginal IDPs and the value added might not be justified. An area-based approach would avoid to disperse the assistance efforts at the margin, concentrating limited resources on a maximum of beneficiaries. (This remark would also be valid for components of the project. An area-based approach would also permit to better identify the areas most likely to receive a flux of IDPs and be better prepared. It would also permit to identify and concentrate on identifying regions where the confrontation between the guerrilla and the paramilitaries would undoubtedly cause displacement. An area-based approach would also allow to have a better “negotiation” position to hand over activities in a sustainability approach.: no development actor wants to pursue scattered and fragmented activities. It would also allow a co-ordination, albeit a convergence, with these development actors⁵². Follow up must be clearly defined area wise, beneficiary wise and component wise, and this is easier with area-based projects. If this approach is accepted it is essential that ECHO identify its choice in the Action Plan so that proposals coincide with the selected areas. These areas have been identified in § 2.2.: (i) Antioquia, (ii) Valle del Cauca and the coffee belt, (iii) around the federal district of Santa Fe de Bogotá, and, (iv) newly, the Department of Nariño, (from Putumayo). This corresponds to the traditional areas of the guerrilla activities and their traditional routes of supply, (i, ii, and iii), and to the new destinations of coca cultivation. This also now corresponds to the main activities of the paramilitaries. The Valle del Magdalena with greater emphasis on Magdalena Medio raises a very fundamental issue. It is a region with a large number of IDPS. It is also a region where Donors are concentrated with development projects. (EU, World Bank, US AID, Bilateral Assistance e.g. Japan....) totalling well over €100 millions in the next few years. (see § 7.1.4.) In that area ECHO should strictly concentrate on emergency assistance (mainly through ICRC) and co-ordinate with the uprooted people initiative and the Magdalena Medio Peace Laboratory.

It would exclude the Departmental capitals, pending a few well motivated exceptions. Departmental capitals usually attracts exclusively individuals, or individual families, that mostly want either to hide because of fear into the city anonymity or take advantage of the many small jobs that could be available (e.g. maids), or both. Assistance in large cities where shantytowns abound -and are the first stop for IDPs- also raises immediately the question of partiality in an environment where everybody is equally badly off: why them and not us? For reasons explained above most massive displacements are directed towards municipalities. This is where ECHO should be active in priority. This is where the integration with the local authorities (Alcaldia, Health, Red, Bienestar, ...) can best be achieved because these institutions are on the demand side, overwhelmed by the dimension of the issue that often is larger than their offer. This is also where training activities for the Institutions is most useful and where the value added is highest.

OPERATIONAL CONCLUSIONS. ECHO should concentrate its efforts towards IDPs originating from confrontation areas and in priority at the level of the municipalities. An area-based approach should be favoured on the basis of cost and efficiency and higher value added to IDPs assistance. The priority areas are): .: (i) Antioquia, (ii) Valle del Cauca and the coffee belt, (iii) around the federal district of Santa Fe de Bogotá, and, (iv) newly, the Department of Nariño

7.1.5 Community-based activities ?

Should ECHO’s strategy, while caring for humanitarian assistance to IDPs, also take into consideration the reintegration of this group of Colombian citizens into the main streams of the country socio economic development? Yes and this relates directly to the efforts made in income generating projects promotion in post emergency situations. Should ECHO promotes the emergence of a civil society protest? While assisting IDPs is certainly the first step towards the recognition of a basic civil issue, ECHO should not be promoting pro actively the emergence of a civil society protest as an objective of its assistance, in the same way that the promotion of human rights is not advisable. On the other hand the emergence of a civil society protest is strengthened by ECHO activities, and heightened through a community-based approach. A community-based approach should be adopted as soon as the emergency situation has subdued, and that post emergency actions are considered. When a massive displacement takes place this is rather obvious. On the other hand when displacement are more scattered and / or when IDPs congregate together from various origin, the urgency is to attend at the loneliness, self-depreciation, gender issues, and many other issues that confronts them. Life objectives have to be reconstructed, and a tested method relies on group therapy to meet the objective. This does not mean that the outcome of the therapy should be a group project. It means that reconstruction is easier when exchanging experiences and trying to cope

⁵² It might be debated whether too much isolation does not automatically exclude sustainability .

through a dialogue. Communities based on a shared traumatic experience can then be reconstructed and community-based-or-not- income-generating projects can be identified and started. The importance is that IDPs take conscience that their fate is shared by many others and that community-based activities help them to overcome their trauma. As a result this is the first step towards the civil society emergence and the empowerment of IDPs of their own strength and improvement of their living standards. Lessons learned in the implementation of the action Plan 2001 have shown that those Partners that have achieved most are those that have integrated that community-based psycho social approach in their programme. It could even be said that the programme is only a mean to develop the reconstruction of the IDP. What is important is to create a locus where the community of IDPs can express itself and share the stress of an experience that destroyed their life objectives and from there rebound, with the assistance of the Partners. The locus can be a housing construction, a shared project in a community, an interval between medical attendance, a youth awareness programme, an income generating project..... virtually anything that provides the opportunity to takes conscience that through a group awareness life can take again a positive direction and escape from the IDP stigma. One of the successful recipe has been the psychosocial⁵³ approach. It should be prioritised in future proposals.

Operational conclusions.. A group reconstruction approach for IDPs should always be part of the proposals and should be the pivotal point for selection. Group therapy should be systematised .

7.1.6 Humanitarian Aid and Human Rights

Humanitarian Aid is part of the Human Rights, But Human Rights is not part of Humanitarian Aid! Humanitarian Aid activities are intrinsic to Human Rights objectives. Both put the respect of life as the basic their basic indisputable objective. Should human rights advocacy and defence be part of humanitarian assistance? Probably not. Humanitarian assistance is impartial, not neutral. Its role is not to denounce infringements to a world-accepted rule. Promoting and implementing humanitarian assistance is in itself a testimony of the human rights predominance. On the other hand the promotion and defence of human rights has a wider –and different- meaning. In a sense the respect of the human rights would automatically prevent the displacement policy. Humanitarian assistance cope with the results of a wrong policy that contravene the human rights dogma. In addition, in Colombia, the human right concept, even more: the word itself, often carries a death sentence. Human rights defenders have been a privileged target for threats and assassinations. Human rights defence is a very serious security issue for the IDPs as well as for the Partners. ECHO should of course support the human rights cause but should not embark on specific programmes / Projects having the defence of Human rights as specialisms. It would jeopardise its position of impartial organisation tending to IDPs.

OPERATIONAL CONCLUSIONS: ECHO should carefully examine the content of the proposals and avoid any direct links with Human Rights programme that may endanger its impartiality and / or security of the participating Partners.

7.1.7 Gender issues

They are particularly relevant in the displacement context. More than % of the registered IDPs are women. They are in charge of running the family or what is left of it: quite often old parents and young children. The other members have been either killed, are in hiding (even if present in what is called home) or evaded to departmental capitals to avoid forced recruitment by the armed groups. In spite of this predominant role bestowed on women by the circumstances overloading them with additional work, and quite at odds with the machismo society they were accustomed to, Partners' proposals did not particularly emphasised this component. However lessons learned has taught that women are more receptive to psychosocial activities and that most of the income generating projects were implemented by them⁵⁴. The gender issues should also refers to men. They are the most threatened by the armed groups and their traditional role fall into pieces when displaced. They have no more references and little to occupy themselves, leading to self depreciation and / or family violence.

OPERATIONAL CONCLUSIONS: Gender issues should be given a proactive role in Partners' proposals. Specific measures addressing head of family women should be integrated into the IDPs capacity building programmes. The reconstruction of the men project of life should also be given

⁵³ See Appendices for a detailed discussion.

⁵⁴ An exceptional case relates to a just turned 11 year old girl attending the workshop on microprojects activities, running a stand in the market place in the morning and attending school in the afternoon. She supports her psychologically affected mother and 5 sisters / brothers, her father serving a 2 ½ prison sentences for violence against his wife.

better attention.

7.2. Operational issues

7.2.1. Criteria

Humanitarian Assistance criteria are not simple to establish in a post emergency situation. A specially committed study should probably be devoted to it. It is being debated at present in many fora, as well as in as in ECHO and among Partners. In ECHO selection criteria are needed to assess the proposals and help in justifying the most interesting ones. Among Partners the need for criteria is felt at identification and preparation stage of the proposal. Ideally they should coincide. They seldom do. For the moment the approach to criteria is very often a negative one: Both ECHO and its Partners know what should not be considered and which criteria should not be retained. This negative approach might be not be all that bad, as a second best option. . It allows to keep a large degree of freedom and initiative in the proposals, and allows ECHO to consider proposals that would not be proposed within a thigh frame of criteria. (This being the first option.) Such an pragmatic approach rehabilitates the concept of expertise coupled to experience, and relying on the lessons learned. Expertise and experience relies primarily on people, not on the institutions. Lessons learned relies more on the institutions. The basic criteria for humanitarian assistance should consequently relate first to the staff: It might be useful to actually interview the staff proposed by the Partner. This could be heavy administratively wise at the beginning, but from one year to another a list of competent and responsible staff can be gradually set up so that ECHO can even demand that a certain staff be included in the proposal. (It could also demand that a certain staff be removed). CVs in this case should be carefully drafted by the Partners, possibly adapting the usual EU format.⁵⁵ The experience of the Partners as a company should also be carefully documented in relation to the TORs. Lessons learned within the field identified in the TOR's must be explicitly commented and links clearly made with the actual proposal. It is not enough to state that the "Partner has a solid experience in the field that vouches for its accomplishment of the TORs". ECHO might also want to check that the Partners TA has effectively participated in drafting the proposal. If these two basic criteria are respected, then a fruitful discussion can be started between ECHO and its Partners on an ad-hoc basis for a given proposal. It would probably also contribute to a better presentation of the required timely reports. (Apart from the fact well known in ECHO that the format needs large upheavals), and insure a better monitoring system. As a preliminary and provisional contribution to the elaboration of criteria all the sections under § 7 in this report should be carefully assessed before a proposal gets the green light.

OPERATIONAL CONCLUSIONS: The essence of humanitarian assistance in post emergency situations might be difficult to systematise into a list of criteria. Selection of proposals must concentrate basically on expertise and experience of the leading staff, and the lessons learned of the Partner. Tight screening of these might involve interviews. Section § 7 of this report sets the basic guidelines.

7.2.2. Linking Relief to Rehabilitation and Development. (LRRD)

Linking relief to Rehabilitation and Development has been on ECHO's agenda since the inception of its activities and few, if any, satisfactory answer has been provided. ECHO's assistance is fundamentally based on emergency. The fundamental paradox between emergency assistance and the possible devious effect of assistance is always, of course, in favour of giving priority to emergency assistance without to much thoughts of the possible after effects. In emergency situations assistance is given in function of events on which ECHO has little or no leverage because of its impartial statute. Emergency situation require immediate action and immediate mobilisation of the Partners. Are the specialised agencies of the United Nations or ICRC better prepared than NGOs to face emergency situations on a grand scale? Probably yes. ECHO has financed these agencies in many instances and Colombia is no exception, particularly in what relates to food aid (ICRC). LRRD operations start in the post crisis phase, when there

⁵⁵ The EU format lists the experience. The Asian Development Bank, for instance, relates the requirements of the TORs to the actual experience, so that for each point of the TORS there is a documented corresponding experience.

are alternatives for proposals selection, and it does not start in the field. It starts in HQ and it even starts before an humanitarian crisis becomes acute by exchange of information and keeping posted on the forthcoming strategy of the development counterparts. In the case of the EU, the antagonism between humanitarian aid and development only begins to recede, and particularly in the wake of the political decisions that have been taken for Colombia. Exchange of information takes place with AIDCO and Relex. This essential link would permit a better selection of proposals and favour those that would have a better chance to carry on with development funding. Two EU initiatives are worth mentioning in this sense.

- **The Up-rooted People Regulation.** This initiative specifically focus on collaboration with ECHO emphasising that a “very close co-operation will be systematically sought”. € 6 millions⁵⁶ has been earmarked for Colombia in 2002, and € 10 millions each for 2003 and 2004 (that is an equivalent amount to ECHO’s one). The priorities is to strengthen the local institutional capacity through community-based programmes (economic recovery, health and education, social cohesion, psychological recovery and human rights and the rule of law.) The five priory departments are Antioquia, Chocó, Bolivar, Santander and Putumayo. Funds will be channelled through NGOs and Un Agencies. The objectives of the initiative and the location of its activities answers nicely to ECHO’s worries about LRRD. The question then is again: shouldn’t ECHO phase out and let the up-rooted people initiative come in? This should be the case, and a very good opportunity for ECHO, if the flow of IDPs were stabilised. It is not. 2001 has seen an increase in expulsions of at least 50 % as compared to 2000, and the radicalisation of the antagonist armed groups will most probably result in a further acceleration of displacement. ECHO will still have to face an emergency situation, and a post crisis aftermath that the up-rooted instrument is not able nor allowed to meet. Both instruments are likely to cohabit and consequently will have to delineate their field of activities and their limits, hence a permanent dialogue. The length of the cohabitation is very much dependent on the evolution of the conflict and its consequences. It would at least last throughout 2002. Cohabitation is for ECHO an opportunity to apply more strictly its mandate, and possibly to reduce its financial commitment. Likely component that would have to be shifted from ECHO to the up-rooted initiative in post crisis situation is health, long term “productive packages” and possibly sanitation.

- **Peace Laboratory (Laboratorio de Paz).** The Peace laboratory in the Magdalena Medio is cofunded⁵⁷ by the EU for 8 years, and two phases, for a total EU contribution of € 34,8 millions and executed by the (National) Corporation for Peace and Development (Consortio para la Paz y el Desarrollo) It is active in 29 municipalities and two departments capitals and aims at helping communities to identify and implement sustainable –mainly rural–development projects. Since it started 30 months ago the programme has invested € 3,5 millions in 90 projects. Though not directed specifically towards IDPs the Programme is active in one of the region where a great numbers of these are present. There are very few contacts however between this programme and ECHO’s activities in Colombia⁵⁸. ECHO will have to carefully assess its presence in the Magdalena Medio which is a region that is overflowed with funds. None of the programmes however are specifically directed towards IDPs in the region and ECHO should strictly limit itself to emergency assistance, possibly only through ICRC. It should also be taken into consideration that a successful Magdalena Programme might heightens the activities of the armed groups in the region protesting the involvement of a peace process they might disagree with.

- There are good opportunities for LRRD proposals, though many of the Partners have not been conscious of those opportunities. They have been more aware of the limitations that ECHO’s policy seems to put on the pursuit of post emergency activities that could be considered as development activities and hence out of ECHO’s mandate. However most, if not all, of the Partners have put forward community development as their best strategic choice to attend post emergency activities. Whether they did it through comedores, health attendance, housing projects, so called “production package” activities –“income generating” would be a better wording–or last but not the least psychosocial approach (see annex ...), it all aims at creating, or strengthening community development as the main tool. It helps to counteract the negative and self depreciating attitude of the displaced people at the same time that it helps to reconstruct values, self esteem and empowerment of the individual as well as the community bounds. However most Partners tend to implement their programme with little attention to sustainability. Some have even proposed to

⁵⁶ Possibly only € 4,5 millions, due to the Afghan crisis.

⁵⁷ Signature of the Project document is imminent.

⁵⁸ In a two pages presentation of the programme in the leading newspaper of Bogotá (El Tiempo, 29 November 2001) on the occasion of the remittance of the National Peace Prize to Father Deroux, there was no mention of the EU funding, though all the other co-financiers were duly cited. So much for visibility!

change the wording “sustainability” for “continuity” stressing the need for multi-year funding, a gross conceptual error.

OPERATIONAL CONCLUSIONS: ECHO should insist that Partners include a strong, measurable community development component in their proposals, and a credible support to and collaboration with local institutions. On the other hand ECHO should make a determinant effort to define and qualify its understanding of LRRD, and to identify a practical working process for it.

7.2.3. Coherence and co-ordination (EU)

Coherence of the EU programmes is improving but is still far from being smoothly and orderly arranged. DG RELEX is in charge of the co-ordination of the EU programmes for Colombia that amounts until 2006⁵⁹ to some € 105 millions in programmable assistance (traditional financial and economic co-operation) and some € 35 millions in non-programmable assistance. (ECHO included). RELEX is preparing at present a document on coherence to be included in its annual policy papers preparing the programming exercise (Budgetary lines 310 and 311). Coherence at the level of the Commission is insured in broad terms when the policy papers are circulated to the Quality Support Group that includes all the Commission Services, before its adoption. It is then up to Europaid to identify the Projects and to implement them. This is the first opportunity for divergence. Without having a definite say in the project selection, RELEX has some firm opinions and guidelines on what the Projects should be and does not automatically agree on the operational interpretation of its programming exercise. There are already some divergence between RELEX and the Unit in charge of the uprooted people initiative implementation. RELEX would be in favour of two or three large projects. It does not seem that the Unit in charge of the uprooted agrees with that approach. It would rather have an NGO approach, ipso facto limiting the scope of projects. The uprooted initiative is now operational and it works closely with the Delegation in Bogotá. NGOs (e.g. Solidaridad Internacional) and UN specialised agencies (UNHCR) have already sent in project proposals (5), without any formal call for interests. The danger is that without any directing TORs, apart from the very succinct description of the initiative in the published Regulation, the proposals will be poorly targeted and probably extremely vague. Also, in spite of the very strong commitment made in the Regulation to co-ordinate with ECHO it does not seem that in operational terms this commitment has been properly respected. It is certainly unfortunate that the coherence with ECHO cannot be insured right from the start in a programme that is custom made for enforcing that coherence. Would it be that ECHO’s vast and successful experience based on lessons learned with reputable Partners would be by passed? It is still time to avoid having another missed opportunity. ECHO’s coherence with RELEX is good. However the debate on the role of RELEX vis-à-vis PESC might have some consequences in the future on ECHO’s role, in particular in what refers to the radicalisation on terrorism after September 11th. The Colombian armed groups have been added to the terrorist list and this could have effects on the security of the humanitarian staff and induce some divergence in the coherence of their actions.

Coherence with Member States policies is good at field level. This is heightened by the fact that many Partners are also funded by bilateral sources. This quasi automatically insure a degree of convergence in the implementation process of the Partners, which is beneficial to the coherence concept.

Operational conclusion. Coherence is improving. ECHO should insist that it should be consulted for the uprooted initiative and that it should be able to participate fully in the selection process as stated in the uprooted initiative regulation

7.2.4. Humanitarian Aid Co-ordination (Partners)

There are two fora grouping a number of International NGOs active in the country. (Forum and Dial, the former being more “southern” and the latter more ‘northern’). Each consortium hold mutual information meetings for their members and tend to have a common policy towards their objectives and activities. These contacts and the similarities in the programmes of some of them has resulted in a high level of co-ordination of activities at field level e.g. Solidaridad Internacional (S) and Movimondo (I). The next logical step would be to present common Partners Consortium proposals for ECHO 2001, promoting an economy of scale-particularly in overheads and enhancing each of the Partner’s relative strength and specialisms. This has not yet happened because some financial sharing issues have not been resolved between Partners. Co-ordination is also insured through ECHO’s field office holding a monthly common meeting with all the Partners. While this is an interesting initiative, it could be more fruitful if a theme of interest to all could be announced in advance so that the discussions are more thoroughly shared.

⁵⁹ This is when the present funding of the Commission ends. In 2005 there will be a renewal of the Commissioners.

Operational conclusions. Consortium proposals should be encouraged in order to make economies of scale and to favour specialisms.

7.2.5 Institutional Capacity Building

The main key to sustainability, apart from budgetary resources, relates to the capability of the local institutions to carry on the activities initiated with the assistance of a foreign donor / agent. Among the Partners of ECHO, those which best fulfil this criteria are the ones which implements the project through a local Partner. Partners that are implementing directly the programmes are less likely to involve local Partners and are therefore less likely to achieve a high level of sustainability. This raises an important paradoxical point. Projects that are directly implemented by the Partners are usually better managed and have a greater immediate impact. On the other hand local entities are less concerned in Projects where their participation and / or their influence in the decision making process is lessened. The question could then be whether it is more profitable to have a well executed project or a project that involves better the local entities? The question is rather irrelevant as the answer is that both should be insured. As the implementation process of most of the Partners deals with groups or communities, the involvement of local entities is essential. Phasing out of the Partner is likely to be less dramatic in a situation where the co-operation and support of the local entities is insured from the start, and where departure does mean more than a simple handing over of the equipment. However some Partners should be reminded that capacity building does not only concerns individuals but also and foremost local institutions. The involvement of local institutions however is very often related to the dedication of the individual heading it. The involvement of the local institutions allows to integrate the Partners' programme into the institutions' strategy. In consequence Partners' proposals should always detail the modus operandi of the institutional involvements, including the ways to monitor it throughout project implementation. The best way to insure institutional participation is to have capable national staff detached to the project. In Colombia there is no shortage of efficient well trained staff, the limitation being the budgetary constraints of many national institutions. The intervention of the project would be welcomed by many entities allowing them to keep-and train-valuable staff. The alternative being utilised by many Partners is to hire staff from the market. Very often that staff is well trained having been employed by former assistance projects, sometimes having been employed by the same Partner for years, and is immediately operational. Whereas this is valuable for the Partners' efficiency, it has little value added at the institutional level, and should consequently be limited to the situation when no other national institutional staff can be hired. Sustainability –or continuity- is also better insured when follow ups actions are initiated as e.g. up-rooted people initiative, that will also utilise NGOs and UN specialised Agencies that will have the same demands for national entities involvement. The existing pool of national officers trained through some of the ECHO's funded projects will boost right from the start the efficiency of the project falling into the LRRD category.

OPERATIONAL CONCLUSIONS. ECHO should make it mandatory that the Partners' proposals includes in details the mechanisms of involvement of (a) local counterpart (s) and Institutions. It should be included in the logframe, together with the objectives and the expected results so that monitoring is possible.

7.2.6 Security measures and visibility.

Security is of high concern for nearly all Partners, with the exception of PTM⁶⁰. As per contract with ECHO, the Partners must have a security system and contingency security plans. They have it, and most of them have a local staff member in charge of security, some of them with long track records in security measures enforcement. Security measures includes regular reports to the base of the exact location of the staff and known attitudes in case of incidents. One of the best protection from the armed group is the uniform, t-shirts etc ... wearing the ECHO logo. However it is a pity that the new logo doesn't mention anywhere the word "Europe" or "European Union" and the golden stars are often mistaken for American ones, a serious breach of security. Also in a Spanish language area it is unfortunate that "Humanitarian Aid Office" only appears in English or French! In some area the Red Cross forbids wearing other uniform that the (very heavy and hot) Columbian Red Cross one, mentioning however the Partners' name, but not ECHO's. The argument is that only the Red Cross is allowed in armed groups area of confrontation, which is a correct statement. Some MS (Spain representation in Bogotá) do not agree with this approach and insists that whatever the security situation is, ECHO's logo and paraphernalia should be

⁶⁰ PTM has lost one international staff in an unclear accident with the armed group last year. A priest from Pastoral Social was also killed.

clearly stated, affirmed and visible. This however would not be compatible with the very strict rules and regulations of both the ICRC and the national Red Crosses.

OPERATIONAL CONCLUSIONS: Strict observance of security measure and control of availability of security items (radio communications / satellite telephones) is an absolute prerequisite for field operation of the Partners. Failing to do so may lead to cancellation of the contract, as it endangers not only their own staff but incidents may lead to endanger the whole ECHO funded and European programmes in the country. Visibility of ECHO must be subordinated to security measures.

8. The Action Plan (2002)

ECHO's strategy for the Action Plan 2002, cannot be isolated from the outcome of the violence that is threatening the very stability of the democratic, though highly fragmented, State of Colombia. Within its mandate ECHO should actively participate in the Peace efforts that are undertaken by an array of national and international organisations and institutions. In particular ECHO cannot dissociate itself from the initiatives of the European Union and the CFSP approach supporting Colombia quest for peace and reinforcement of the State basic functions: security, justice, equality, education and health. None of these are functioning satisfactorily at present, though the legal and organisational tools exist. ECHO's strategy while caring for humanitarian assistance to IDPs should also take into consideration the reintegration of this group of Colombian citizens into the main streams of the country, as well as the emergence of a civil society protest. This should orientate the objectives of the Action Plan. These objectives should mainly be (i) An area-based approach, (ii) A strengthening of mutually supporting actions e.g. psycho social and production projects and (iii) support to Partners Consortium set up. This would lead to the following basic guidelines.

- **Needs assessments.** This is the one and foremost starting point of a balanced and logical Action Plan. So far none of the rationale for ECHO's intervention has been correctly addressed and presented by the Partners, though an implicit justification is commonly expressed. A correct and explicit identification of the needs is not a mere requisite to comply with ECHO's rules. A correct presentation of IDPs needs serves directly the purposes of identifying both the objectives and the activities of the operations. The objectives allows to conduct a properly balanced evaluation, and the activities allows to carry on proper management through a built –in monitoring system. Partners must make clearly the distinction in their needs assessments.
- **Emergency assistance** will continue to be met principally by CICR and RED with ECHO funds. Other Partners (NGOs) would only intervene to complement these Agencies' immediate emergency attendance. The Partners will also attend to the humanitarian assistance needs of those IDPs that are not met by the afore-mentioned Agencies and will continue to address the humanitarian assistance needs of the most vulnerable groups of IDPs (Children, lactating and pregnant women, old people) after the usual three months of attendance by RED. Food aid through Partners will be restricted to most vulnerable cases, like comedores and possibly basic supplies to resisting communities enduring blockades, while CICR will continue its distribution of food in close co-ordination with the Red. Food assistance to returning IDPs will be given until first harvesting. Non- food essential items will also be provided in the emergency phase and only to complement, when necessary, other donors intervention. The Colombian poor society is relatively large, and the measures taken in favour of the IDPs raised a keen interest within the other poor groups that are now demanding that the same set of measures be applied to them. These demands put more pressure on the institutions to act, which in itself is a direct link to development induced by ECHO's intervention This is a further incentive to start poverty alleviation projects based on the experience acquired by ECHO and its Partners.
- **Post emergency** activities that are most likely to strengthen a community-based approach with perceived opportunities for possible LRRD development will be given the priority. Components likely to be included includes groups psychotherapy relief through income-generating and microprojects, partial housing rehabilitation material, basic marketing services, health primary

health care linked to primary health care officers' training, children special attendance like PACO awareness programme, refectories, basic water provision and sanitation in IDPs encampment or "invasiones" areas, and a proactive, efficient gender approach, including men.

- **Co-operation and collaboration** with state institutions is essential in order to make a phasing out strategy easier in 2003-2004 when and if the (low intensity) emergency subsidies and other EU instruments take over the post emergency issues. In particular co-operation with RED should be maintained so as to enable its staff to follow up on ECHO's actions. RED is well endowed and should be supported in order to improve-and there are large improvement opportunities- its field co-ordination role that is at the basis of the IDPs issues. However ECHO should keep well apart from Plan Colombia which is also funding massively RED, as long as transparency in its objectives is not insured, and as long as its hidden agenda is not duly clarified.

- **Institutional Building / Capacity Building** relies more on hands-on activities of staff than formal training and seminars. Although these are important for capacity building objectives, national staff effective full time involvement in Partners' activities are pivotal for the sustainability of the operations. It also helps building up a reserve of competent national staff that would eventually be made available for down stream development projects taking over from ECHO activities.

- **Coherence** with the other EU instruments will be given a definite priority. In future proposals explicit references should be made to the existing EU instruments and others, and operational measures should be described so that coherence will be objectively tackled and not any more be a mere lip service exercise.

- **An area based approach** : ECHO will rationalise its interventions setting up an area-based approach for its intervention giving priority to those regions that are most likely to have the greatest number of IDPs. The areas will include the confrontation areas between the armed groups. The priority areas for ECHO should be Antioquia, Uraba, Choco, Meta, Nariño, Lower Magdalena and possibly Putumayo. Other geographical areas may qualify on an ad-hoc and properly justified basis and as emergency requires. There will be a priority to attend IDPs at municipal level where the majority of IDPs are located, whether grouped IDPs or individuals. In this latter case individual IDPs will be attended while efforts will be made to integrate them into group activities.

- **A community-based** approach should be adopted as soon as the emergency situation has subdued, and that post emergency actions are taken. A variety of actions can be started, e.g. income-generating projects, microprojects, health attention, selective food aid, handicrafts,... The importance is that these actions lead to a support to community-based activities, that are the first step towards the civil society emergence and the empowerment of IDPs of their own development and improvement of their living standards, hence an exit of assistance needs.

- Group **psycho-social activities** open a promising lead for ECHO's funding. Psychotherapy methods tending to reconstruct one's objectives and balance through occupational activities should be given priority as a transversal approach. It should be systematically organised within communities of IDPs as the experience gained has shown that this is a valid approach that has produced opportunities and a basis for further LRRD links and initiatives.. It serves two purposes namely the community based approach and the construction of a project that gives back confidence and empowerment to the IDPs in reintegrating them into normality, hence diminishing the burden they represent in assistance. Community occupational therapy also will make easier the promotion of LRRD links, setting the grounds for further larger development projects. This is not easy to organise as it addresses only a fraction of IDPs but it has a definite multiplication effect.

- ECHO will strictly respect an impartial approach to its assistance. This will include a very cautious review of **Human Rights** contents in the Partners proposals. While facilitating Human Rights activities ECHO should not be perceived as a Human Rights enforcement or Human Rights advocacy organisation.

- Alliance and **Consortium** between Partners will be supported in order to enhance each one's capacity and specialisms into wider objectives, and making economies of scale promoting a better effectiveness of the use of available funds

9. The Instruments

Colombia is for ECHO an exceptional opportunity to put to work an number of instruments that will allow its policy and its experience to fully integrate the objectives of the EU and to answer adequately to most of the IDPS' basic issues. The EU has taken an unequivocal political position concerning Colombia, which is to fully support the efforts of the State towards a resolution of the conflict. This political decision is accompanied by important funds (as seen in §. 7.2.2.) that basically attend prevention issues (Magdalena Medio) and rehabilitation and reintegration issues (Uprooted People initiative) To this must be added the related Human Rights budgetary line of credit. Those lines of credit that are clearly post emergency do not replace ECHO's actions. They complement it downstream. It give ECHO some indications on the relay that can be utilised. It gives ECHO the opportunity to use mechanism that were lacking up to now. ECHO can now refer to legal instruments within the Community that gives it a legal right to actually be part of a procedural decisional process. This is clear with the Uprooted People Initiative that is directed to IDPs. It is less clear with the Magdalena Medio programme because project identifications takes place in Colombia for established communities, bottom up style, but the knowledge that ECHO has of the country should give it good hints of what's going on and help it in its selection process of Partners proposals in the same region. The Human Rights line of credit is another opportunity for ECHO to work along-not with- another basic EU initiative. The existence of these intra Community instruments should encourage ECHO in pursuing its efforts of co-ordination and collaboration with DG RELEX and AIDCO - this collaboration seems to be well on tracks with RELEX and the Delegation - and, why not, its lobbying efforts. A first attempt would be to have a proactive participation in the Quality Support Group that is a prerequisite for RELEX's annual programming. .

Other instruments refers to bilateral assistance. MS have assistance of their own, either through official national assistance agencies, or through private foundations. Few, if any, work directly in humanitarian assistance. They finance actions in small or larger development activities. This is an untapped source of collaboration for ECHO. These instruments could in fact be much closely co-ordinated with ECHO's objectives without basic changes in the MS objectives. Most of the Partners of ECHO also implement bilateral development projects with their own government, but one has the impression that there are no links whatsoever between those projects executed with MS funding and ECHO's. Co-operation would be mostly beneficial to both donors, as Partners try to consolidate their approach for a number of reasons like economy of scale, design of a common policy, support of common objectives.

All existing instruments do not have the same measure of usefulness and Plan Colombia is one of them. Although in theory a close co-ordination and / or collaboration with Plan Colombia could be advisable, the opacity of their activities, and the probable hidden agenda curtail the possibility of establishing further links. The magnitude of the available funds (US\$ 30 for IDPs) and its use should however be closely monitored in order to avoid potentially damaging overlapping with ECHO's funding.

APPENDIX

- 1. Psycho social**
- 2. Human Rights**
- 3. Field Visits**
- 4. Interviews nand co-ordination meetings**

APPENDIX 1

EL COMPONENTE PSICO-SOCIAL EN LOS PROYECTOS ECHO

Pese a que no es la única expresión de violencia, el conflicto está dejando profundas huellas en la sociedad colombiana, que de no ser atendidas como corresponde, harán difícil que la paz tan buscada encuentre las condiciones propicias para consolidarse.

La dinámica del conflicto en sus diferentes manifestaciones provoca presión sobre las poblaciones y configura un escenario de desplazamiento que impacta no sólo en la salud física de las personas sino, además, en la mental. Es decir, no sólo afecta las necesidades primarias, inmediatas, de alimentación, vestido, techo; sino, además, aquellas otras necesidades, también primarias pero de efecto mediato, como la de equilibrio en las emociones, la conducta, las expectativas y aspiraciones.

Frente a las demandas de asistencia de emergencia que generan estas necesidades, inmediatas y mediatas, las respuestas tienden a orientarse hacia aquellas que afectan directamente la conservación de la vida de las personas. Sin embargo, esta respuesta prioritaria a esas necesidades *visibles* (carencia de alimentos, vestido, techo) tiende, en algunos casos, a pasar por alto aquellas otras necesidades, *invisibles*, que también destruyen, aunque con lentitud, las vidas de las personas y de los grupos (familia, comunidad), en una dimensión distinta.

La paz no requiere, únicamente, que la sociedad se mantenga *físicamente* intacta. Requiere, además, que esa sociedad esté intacta, sana, en todas sus capacidades emocionales, volitivas, de conducta. Es decir, una sociedad caracterizada por una *calidad de vida*, material y espiritual (psicológica), capaz de garantizar que esa paz sea duradera.

Este hallazgo de la necesidad de dar *asistencia humanitaria de emergencia* en esa doble dimensión -física y psicológica- corresponde a la experiencia acumulada por ECHO y sus Socios desde 1998. En sí, se trata de un triple hallazgo que el trabajo psico-social ha puesto en evidencia:

Aquél, puesto de manifiesto en una forma de intervención de la acción humanitaria basada en la convicción de que el desplazado no es un *objeto de atención* sino un *sujeto afectado* en su integridad física y psicológica;

Por el lado práctico, que ha permitido no sólo mejorar la calidad (*efectividad*) de la atención humanitaria en bienes y servicios (alimentarios, salud, vivienda), a través de programas apoyados en las dinámicas psico-sociales; sino, además, ingresar en el terreno mismo en donde se construye, desde lo personal, el tejido social.

Que abre posibilidades de construir las soluciones duraderas, desde la emergencia.

Este triple hallazgo ha hecho que ECHO y sus Socios hayan dado pasos importantes de diálogo y concertación en el campo psico-social, que se han materializado en el documento *Lineamientos básicos para la atención psicosocial a poblaciones desplazadas como consecuencia del conflicto en Colombia. Resultado de una experiencia de Cooperación OPS/ECHO/ONGs*. Definitivamente, este documento constituye uno de los logros más importantes en lo que ha sido el proceso de acciones conjuntas basadas en planes que recogen, por lo menos en la práctica, las lecciones aprendidas; pese, incluso, a las dificultades para conceptualizar y operativizar la *asistencia para la emergencia*. Es más, hace que, ahora, sea posible configurar un escenario favorable de trabajo dentro de la misma *asistencia humanitaria para la emergencia*; y, además, poder iniciar un proceso de vinculación -el *LRRD*- entre estas iniciativas propias de la emergencia, con las de los programas de atención a las *poblaciones desarraigadas*.

APPENDIX 2

DERECHOS HUMANOS Y EMERGENCIA

El rasgo más característico del conflicto armado colombiano es que no reconoce norma humanitaria alguna. El conflicto armado genera de manera permanente violaciones a los derechos humanos, una de cuyas expresiones es el *desplazamiento forzado*.

El *desplazamiento forzado*, constituye una violación, entre otros derechos, al de la pertenencia a un territorio. Es decir, el derecho de las personas a ocupar un espacio físico que considera suyo por razones histórico-culturales y de tradición étnica, que le brinda, por lo menos, un mínimo de oportunidades de sobrevivencia. Desde esta perspectiva, los desplazados, con respecto a los pobres tradicionales, se encuentran, además de excluidos de un sistema, desposeídos o arrancados de un lugar de permanencia, al margen de que posea o no el derecho de propiedad. Con el *desplazamiento forzado* se viola, en definitiva, el derecho a la pertenencia a un territorio, a una cultura, a una comunidad.

Con la violación a este derecho, se inicia un proceso sistemático y simultáneo de violación de otros derechos que tienen como efecto directo, si no la desaparición física inmediata de las personas, sí el riesgo inminente de perder la vida como consecuencia de la situación precaria en la que queda expuesta por falta de alimentos, de atención de la salud, de albergue, etc. Y no sólo eso, sino despojado, además, de su estado de equilibrio emocional (psicológico) para enfrentar su nueva situación.

En ese contexto, la respuesta inmediata a esa violación de los derechos más elementales de las personas es la *asistencia humanitaria para la emergencia*, que se constituye, así, en defensa directa y concreta en favor de los *derechos humanos*. Con ello no se anulan otras formas, también legítimas, de defensa de los derechos humanos, que suelen expresarse desde formas de promoverlos, de capacitar en sus principios rectores e instrumentos, hasta la adopción de posiciones públicas de rechazo a actos violatorios de ellos.

Lo anterior deja en claro la diferencia fundamental, en su significado, entre la de defensa de los derechos humanos como respuesta concreta de acción humanitaria y aquella de realización de actividades de defensa y promoción de los derechos humanos. De ello se desprende que cuando ECHO, por mandato, asume la libre realización de la *asistencia humanitaria para la emergencia*, en el mismo sentido, por un principio de visibilidad y transparencia, busca evitar que los actores armados de un conflicto que, como ya se dijo, no respeta normas humanitarias, la impidan o condicionen.

APPENDIX 3

VISITAS DE CAMPO

1. COLOMBIA

Popayán

15.11.2001

Visita a asentamientos con presencia de desplazados

Propósito:

Tomar contacto directo con beneficiarios de proyectos urbanos financiados con recursos a través de Solidaridad Internacional (SI). Se entrevistó a desplazados que realizan actividades de generación de ingresos, como: compra/venta de productos diversos; costura; elaboración de quesos; reparación de calzado; entre otros.

Reunión institucional convocada por Solidaridad Internacional (SI) y Movimondo

Propósito:

Obtener información directa de los actores locales (personas e instituciones) en relación a:

- El contexto socio-político de la región;
- El fenómeno del desplazamiento;
- La atención al desplazado;
- El papel desempeñado por la contraparte ECHO
- Conclusiones de la visita de evaluación

Participantes:

Jimena Lehmann, Directora RSS - Cauca

Constanza Ossa, Consultora UTC-RSS, Cauca

Henry Caballero, Gobernador Encargado, Departamento del Cauca

Juan M. Rosen B., Personería Municipal Encargado de DD.HH.

María López Balcázar, Directora Unidad Popayán, Dirección Departamental de Salud del Cauca.

Martha Oliviero, Representante Movimondo - Colombia

Alberto Martos, Movimondo – Cauca

Eduardo Irigoyen, Coordinador Proyecto ECHO-SI, Cauca

Ignacio Martín E., Representante SI - Colombia

Antoine de Haulleville

Carlos Lecaros

16.11.2001

Reunión con ONGs y organismos internacionales que ejecutan proyectos con recursos financieros ECHO.

Propósito:

Tener la oportunidad de conocer y participar en la reunión de coordinación mensual que realizan las ONGs y organismos internacionales que ejecutan proyectos con recursos ECHO. Esta presencia era importante, toda vez que no todos los proyectos ejecutados por estas instituciones eran materia de evaluación de la misión.

El evento permitió no sólo exponer los objetivos de la misión, sino , además, poder sostener reuniones particulares o concertar encuentros posteriores con las instituciones cuyos proyectos ejecutados con recursos ECHO no constituyen materia de evaluación.

Participantes:

Contrapartes de ECHO

17.11.2001

Reunión sobre componente psico-social, con Fundación Dos Mundos, Solidaridad Internacional y Movimondo

Propósito:

Ampliar información sobre el componente psico-social en términos de:

- Relevancia en el tema del desplazado;
- Marco conceptual y metodológico de su aplicación;
- Experiencias realizadas sobre su aplicación en la atención al desplazado;
- Resultados e impacto obtenidos y lecciones aprendidas

Cabe destacar que la Fundación Dos Mundos es un organismo especializado en el tema que, además de realizar trabajos de intervención directa, capacita e intercambia experiencias con otras instituciones.

Participantes:

Véronique Martín (FDM)

Ignacio Martín (SI)

Eduardo Irigoyen (SI)

Sandra V. Salazar (SI)

Martha Oliviera (MM)

Alberto Martos (MM)

Antoine de Haulleville

Carlos Lecaros

Visita a proyectos productivos

Propósito:

No obstante que los proyectos ECHO ejecutados por SI no eran materia de evaluación por parte de la misión, se aceptó la invitación de esta organización que desarrolla actividades conjuntamente con Movimondo. En este sentido se visitaron dos proyectos productivos.

Actividades:

- Visita a proyecto agropecuario desarrollado por 90 familias en espacio cedido temporalmente por la Fundación Universitaria Popayán. Los seis grupos de trabajo organizados se dedican al cultivo de hortalizas y maíz, apoyados con capacitación y asistencia técnica. Asimismo, a la crianza de pollos de engorde y producción de huevos; y tienen previsto para el futuro inmediato la crianza de cerdos.
- Visita a Toes, resguardo de indígenas de la etnia Páez, que acoge a 50 familias desplazadas. SI asiste en el cultivo a estos desplazados en actividades agrícolas (cultivo de hortalizas, maíz, trigo) y principalmente, en el cultivo de tilapia en piscinas cedidas temporalmente por la comunidad.

Villavicencio (Cáritas Española)

18.11.2001 Reunión con Cáritas España y Equipo de la Pastoral Social de la Diócesis de Villavicencio

Propósito:

Tomar conocimiento directo en relación a:

- El contexto socio-político de la región y las características que adopta el fenómeno del desplazamiento;
- Conocer la estrategia de intervención global de la Pastoral Social de la Diócesis de Villavicencio, como institución a la que acompaña Cáritas Española para la ejecución del proyecto ECHO.
- La actuación del equipo técnico ejecutor del proyecto ECHO, a fin de evaluar su idoneidad.

Participantes:

José Luis Barreiro, Cáritas Española / Colombiana

Miguel Torres U., Cáritas Española, Villavicencio

P. Ricardo Martínez, Director Secretaría Pastoral Social, Diócesis de Villavicencio
Alexandro Rivera S., Promotor Comunitario, Coordinador ECHO Villavicencio
Hermana. Gloria I. Rodríguez, Acompañante “La Nohora”

Hermana. Rita Gasparini, Acompañante “La Reliquia”

Diana Yaneth Aristizábal, Promotor Comunitario

Gujemar Rojas V. Acompañante “La Nohora”

Claudia Ramírez, Acompañante “La Reliquia”

Sandra L. Acosta, Nutricionista

Olga L. Ochoa, Auxiliar Enfermería

Flor Nelly Enciso, Psicóloga

Nubia M. García C., Asistente SNPS, Región Sur-Oriental Colombiana

Olga E. Rincón, Archivo y Contabilidad.

Antoine de Haulleville

Carlos Lecaros

19.11.2001

Reunión con Obispo de Villavicencio, Cáritas España y Equipo de la Pastoral Social

Propósito:

Como continuación del día anterior:

- Compartir con el Obispo de Villavicencio los propósitos de la misión evaluadora ECHO;
- Ampliar información relativa a otros programas que desarrolla actualmente la Pastoral Social en materia de desplazamiento y respuesta a la problemática de la pobreza;
- Conocer las perspectivas de actuación de la Pastoral Social para el próximo año, principalmente con respecto al desplazado.

Ambas reuniones, complementadas con las visitas de campo, constituirían insumos importantes para evaluar la participación de Cáritas Española como administradora, en este caso, de los recursos ECHO.

Participantes:

José Luis Barreiro, Cáritas Española / Colombiana

Miguel Torres U., Cáritas Española, Villavicencio

Monseñor Octavio Ruiz, Encargado de la Diócesis de Villavicencio

P. Ricardo Martínez, Director Secretaría pastoral Social, Diócesis de Villavicencio
Equipo de la Pastoral Social

Visita a Comedores en el Asentamiento “La Reliquia”

Propósito:

Tomar contacto directo con los beneficiarios inscritos en los comedores instalados en esta comunidad con recursos ECHO. En el denominado Comedor No. 1 se atiende a 300 niños y en el Comedor No. 2, a 413 niños, además de lactantes y madres gestantes.

Actividades:

- Entrevistas a beneficiarios directos

Visita a Comedor en el Asentamiento “La Nohora”

Propósito:

Tomar contacto directo con los beneficiarios inscritos en los comedores instalados en esta comunidad con recursos ECHO. Se tiene instalado un comedor para atender a 150 niños.

Actividades:

- Entrevistas a beneficiarias del comedor
- Reunión con madres que participan en dinámicas psico-sociales
- Almuerzo en el mismo comedor con equipo de Cáritas Española y equipo de la pastoral Social
- Observación de la construcción de un tanque y filtro de agua para el servicio del comedor y de la comunidad.

Medellín (Comité Internacional para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos, CISP)

20.11.2001 **Visita Municipio Cocorná**

Propósito:

Tomar conocimiento directo sobre un desplazamiento iniciado el día 13 de noviembre desde las veredas próximas al municipio hacia el centro urbano, a raíz de la masacre de 13 campesinos habitantes de dichas veredas.

Actividades:

- Entrevista con el Director de Planeación Municipal
- Entrevista a desplazados recién llegados al coliseo y colegio del Municipio, en donde se albergaban, a ese día, unas 200 personas y 300 personas, respectivamente; ello, no obstante que las autoridades se referían a un desplazamiento de aproximadamente 2,500.
- Entrevista a Personero Municipal de DD.HH., Sr. Luis H. Alzate

Visita Vereda Guacale, Municipio San Francisco

Propósito:

Conocer en el terreno el apoyo recibido por desplazados en proyectos productivos, con recursos ECHO:

- Soluciones agrícolas: cultivo de caña de azúcar destinada a obtener semillas mejoradas para renovar plantaciones existentes; construcción de trapiche; capacitación y asistencia técnica.
- Solución pecuaria: crianza de animales menores (gallinas), destinada a mejora de la dieta familiar y generación de ingresos.

Actividades:

- Entrevista a agricultor de caña de azúcar y productor de panela:
- Entrevista a señora beneficiaria para la crianza de pollos de engorde y producción de huevos para autoconsumo.

21.11.2001

Reunión Institucional

Propósito:

Obtener información directa de los actores locales (personas e instituciones) en relación a:

- El contexto socio-político de la región;
- Características del fenómeno del desplazamiento;
- Atención al desplazado;
- Papel desempeñado por la contraparte ECHO
- Conclusiones de la visita de evaluación

Participantes:

Rodolfo Zapata; Delegado Departamental RSS

Omar W. Higueta; ICBF/ Técnico Atención a Desplazados

Luz D. Giraldo Vélez; Gobernación de Antioquia, Secretaría de Agricultura / Proyecto Poblaciones Desplazadas

José A. Velásquez; Municipio de Cañasgordas, Director UMATA

John F. Soto; Municipio Argelia, Director UMATA

P. Neid A. Marín B.; Pastoral Social Santa Fé de Antioquia

Jesús M. Rúa Arias; Alcalde Municipio de Uramita

Aldemar Valencia A.; Alcalde Municipio de San Vicente

Teresita Sánchez C.; Municipio San Vicente / Secretaria de Desarrollo Humano y Agropecuario

Luz M. Londoño; Alcaldía de Huango, Planeación Municipal / Jefe de Obras Públicas

Iván Agudelo; Alcalde Municipio Alejandría

Jairo H. Cano; Municipio de Heliconia / Director Umata

Libardo Montoya; Municipio de Heliconia / Auxiliar

Jaime González; Alcalde Municipio Victoria

Antoine de Haulleville
Carlos Lecaros

Reunión con Equipo CISP

Propósito:

Entre otros temas relativos al desarrollo de sus actividades, tomar conocimiento directo en relación a:

- El contexto socio-político de la región y las características que adopta el fenómeno del desplazamiento;
- Conocer la estrategia de intervención global de CISP, dentro de la cual se inserta, específicamente, la estrategia de intervención del proyecto ECHO;
- Formas de intervención en los diferentes componentes del proyecto, de manera más específica;
- Buscar respuestas a interrogantes surgidas de la lectura de documentos relacionados con el proyecto y las visitas de campo.
- La actuación del equipo técnico ejecutor del proyecto ECHO, a fin de evaluar su idoneidad
- Conclusiones de la visita de evaluación

Participantes:

Giuseppe Ferrando, Coordinador General ECHO
Pasquale Totaro, Asistente del Coordinador ECHO / Antioquia
María Eugenia Gómez, Administradora ECHO / Antioquia
Marcial Apablaza, Coordinador Local ECHO / Eje Cafetero
Lucelly Giraldo, Coordinadora Local ECHO / Urabá
Jorge Humberto Alzate, Coordinador Local ECHO / Antioquia
Antonio José Salazar, Responsable de Programa ECHO / Antioquia
Liliana Buritica, Monitoreo CISP / Antioquia
Diana Arroyave, Psicóloga ECHO / Antioquia
Layda Zuluaga, Trabajadora Social ECHO / Antioquia
Fanny Agudelo, Trabajadora Social CISP - ICBF / Urabá
Patricia Chavarria, Trabajadora Comunitaria ECHO / Antioquia
Jaime Madrigal, Ingeniero Agrónomo CISP / Eje Cafetero
Adriana María Chalarca, Logista ECHO / Antioquia
Jorge Iván Pino, Conductor Logístico CISP / Antioquia
Madelene Ramírez, Comunicadora Social CISP / Antioquia
Mónica Jiménez, Recepcionista CISP / Antioquia
Ana María Osorio, Servicios Varios CISP / Antioquia
Angel Leudo, Vigilante CISP / Antioquia

Antoine de Haulleville
Carlos Lecaros

Cartagena (Movimiento para la Paz, el Desarme y la Libertad, MPDL)

22.11.01 Reunión de Coordinación y Exposición de Avances

Propósito:

Tomar conocimiento de las actividades previstas para la misión. Asimismo, adelantar aspectos relativos a MPDL y los proyectos ejecutados con recursos ECHO, destacando las interrogantes surgidas de la lectura de documentos.

Participantes:

Jesús Carrasco, Representante MPDL
Jael Moya, Coordinadora

Antoine de Haulleville

Carlos Lecaros

23.11.01

Visita al Municipio de “El Corozal” (Departamento de Sucre)

Propósito:

Tomar conocimiento directo de la ejecución de los componentes: alimentación, actividades psico-sociales; vivienda.

Actividades:

- Visita a comedor infantil (*Comedor Infantil en el Espacio Comunitario*), en el que se atienden a 200 niños y 30 madres gestantes
- Entrevistas a señoras beneficiarias, ayudantes en la cocina y pre-seleccionadas para la entrega de “paquetes productivos urbanos”
- Revista de las viviendas construidas, bajo la modalidad de “solución” (construcción completa, incluida letrinas)
- Conversación con técnicos responsables de la ejecución del componente respectivo del proyecto.
- Entrevista a beneficiarios a fin de conocer sus apreciaciones sobre el proyecto.

Visita al Municipios de Palenque (Departamento de Bolívar)

Propósito:

Tomar conocimiento directo de la ejecución de los componentes: alimentación, actividades psico-sociales; vivienda.

Actividades:

- Visita a comedor infantil, en el que se atienden a 100 niños.
- Revista de las viviendas construidas, bajo la modalidad de “mejoras”, mediante la entrega de materiales para estructura y techo, y asistencia técnica en la construcción (el llamado “bareque”) Se conversó en el terreno con el técnico responsable de la ejecución del componente respectivo del proyecto.
- Sólo a manera de referencia, pues no se observó parcela o actividad alguna, se trató con el técnico responsable sobre el componente “paquetes productivos agrícolas”; es decir, su modalidad, características, beneficiarios, fecha de inicio, etc.)
- Entrevista a beneficiarios a fin de conocer sus apreciaciones sobre el proyecto.

Entrevista al señor Alfredo Yépes de los Ríos, Coordinador General RSS – Bolívar; y Srta. Soledad Aguilar, Coordinadora Zonal

Propósito:

Tomar conocimiento de las actividades que realiza la RSS en atención al desplazado y las relaciones que mantiene con el MPDL.

Entrevista a la señora Brigitte Rack, Nutricionista del Grupo Programático, ICBF

Propósito:

Tomar conocimiento de las actividades que realiza el ICBF en atención al desplazado y las relaciones que mantiene con el MPDL; en particular a lo relativo al tema de la transferencia de la atención de los comedores infantiles construidos en las zonas de intervención de esta ONG, con recursos ECHO.

Reunión con Equipo MPDL

Propósito:

Tomar conocimiento directo en relación a:

- El contexto socio-político de la región y las características que adopta el fenómeno del desplazamiento;
- Conocer la estrategia de intervención global de MPDL, dentro de la cual se inserta, específicamente, la estrategia de intervención del proyecto ECHO;
- Formas de intervención en los diferentes componentes del proyecto, de manera más específica;
- Buscar respuestas a interrogantes surgidas de la lectura de documentos relacionados con el proyecto y las visitas de campo.

- La actuación del equipo técnico ejecutor del proyecto ECHO, a fin de evaluar su idoneidad
- Conclusiones de la visita de evaluación

Participantes:

Jesús Carrasco, Representante MPDL
 Jael Moya, Coordinadora
 Yeraida Tobón, Trabajadora Social
 Liliana Castro, Trabajadora Social
 Yirlania Hernández, Psicóloga
 Gina González, Arquitecta
 Claudia Comas, Trabajadora Social
 Otros miembros del Equipo

Antoine de Haulleville
 Carlos Lecaros

Quibdó (Paz y Tercer Mundo, PTM)

26.11.01 **Diálogo con señoritas Rita Paiva da Cruz y Laura Clarke, miembros de Brigadas de Paz Internacional (Peace Brigades International).**

Además de interesarse en los objetivos de esta institución, se abrió una conversación sobre ayuda humanitaria y derechos humanos; neutralidad e imparcialidad; Plan Colombia; entre otros.

Reunión con médicos del proyecto que ejecuta PTM

Propósito:

Abordar el tema de la capacitación para la formación de promotores en primeros auxilios, tratamiento de enfermedades básicas y cirugía primaria, que impulsa PTM en las comunidades asistidas por el proyecto. Esta iniciativa incluye la difusión de la medicina “tradicional”, a partir de la sistematización de conocimientos existentes en el medio.

Participantes:

Dr. Carlos Oliveros, Médico
 Sr. Luis A. Trujillo, Investigador en Medicina Tradicional

Antoine de Haulleville
 Carlos Lecaros

Visita a Boca de Opogadó

Propósito:

Observar la dinámica del curso de salud que se dicta a las comunidades que se ubican en un tramo de la ribera del río Atrato, a 75 minutos en lancha del municipio Vigía del Fuerte.

Actividades:

- Dialogar con los beneficiarios y beneficiarias del curso, que se forman como promotores de salud dentro de sus comunidades. Cabe señalar que estas comunidades que no constituyen grupos de desplazados forman parte de aquellas que se resisten a la idea de verse forzadas a desplazarse.

Reunión con responsables del curso de salud

Propósito:

Indagar sobre alcances, contenidos y metodología del curso de salud (mental y física). Se abordaron, además, otros temas relativos a PTM

Participantes:

Srta. Alicia de la Torre, Médica
 Srta. Sandra Pacheco, Psicóloga

Antoine de Haulleville
Carlos Lecaros

27.11.01 **Quibdó**
Reunión con Pastoral Social

Propósito:

Conocer la labor que desarrolla la Pastoral Social de la Diócesis de Quibdó, en favor de las comunidades que integran su ámbito. Asimismo, tomar conocimiento de los objetivos y actividades que realiza la Asociación Campesina Integral del Atrato Medio (ACIA)

También se abordó el tema del conflicto, en cuanto a las características que adopta en el departamentos del Chocó; el Plan Colombia; las posibilidades de salida del conflicto.

Participantes:

P. Jesús Albeiro, Coordinador de la Pastoral Social
Sr. Julio Valencia, Miembro del Consejo Comunitario ACIA
Sr. Octavio Rojas, Miembro del Consejo Comunitario de ACIA

Antoine de Haulleville
Carlos Lecaros

Entrevista a la señora Inocencia Lemos de Uribe, Directora ICBF – Regional del Chocó

Propósito:

Conocer las actividades que realiza el ICBF en atención al desplazado y las relaciones que mantiene con PTM y la Pastoral Social.

Reunión con Equipo MPDL

Propósito:

Tomar conocimiento directo en relación a:

- El contexto socio-político de la región y las características que adopta el fenómeno del desplazamiento;
- Conocer la vinculación de los proyectos que financia ECHO, dentro de la estrategia de intervención que aplica PTM.
- El carácter de la coordinación entre PTM y la Pastoral Social
- Alcances y rasgos característicos de la intervención en los diferentes componentes del proyecto, en particular de los alimentos y la salud.
- Lecturas aprendidas de la experiencia.
- Monitoreo y seguimiento del proyecto
- Conclusiones de la visita de evaluación

Participantes:

Jesús Flores, Coordinador General PTM – Colombia
Alfonso Bescolsa, Coordinador PTM - Chocó

Antoine de Haulleville
Carlos Lecaros

Urabá / Apartadó (Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados, ACNUR)

29.11.01 **Entrevista al sr. Harold Gómez, Coordinador del Proyecto que la Fundación COMPARTIR ejecuta, por convenio con el ACNUR**

COMPARTIR capacita para el empleo a viudas de desplazados. La capacitación se da en el marco de una formación integral dirigida a conformar micro empresas y pequeños negocios; en la que se incluye dinámicas de trabajo grupal orientadas a fortalecer su personalidad.

Entrevista a cinco señoras, viudas, que participan en una capacitación

Reunión con la Pastoral Social

Propósito:

Conocer el trabajo que realiza la Pastoral Social de la Diócesis de Urabá, teniendo en cuenta, además, que esta instancia de la Iglesia Católica tiene convenio con el ACNUR para ejecutar proyectos con fondos ECHO.

III. Participantes:

Sra. Teresa Jiménez, Acompañante PS en el tema Microempresas
Sra. Mariela Bernal, Acompañante PS en el tema Comedores para niños desplazados
Sra. Gloria Valencia, Acompañante PS en el tema Comedores
Sra. María Mendoza, Acompañante PS en el tema Comunidades de Paz y Mujeres

Sr. Giovanni Lepri, Oficial de Proyectos ACNUR
Sr. Gérard Fayoux, Jefe Oficina ACNUR – Urabá
Srta. Ana Paula Gómez Silvestre, Oficial de Campo ACNUR – Urabá
Carlos Lecaros

Visita a tienda constituida por cuatro mujeres viudas, asistidas por la Pastoral Social

La tienda destinada a la venta de alimentos fue montada con contribución (parcial) de fondos ECHO.

Visita a Proyecto ejecutado por CEDAVIDA, en el municipio de Turbo

Se asistió a la clausura del curso de capacitación implementado por esta contraparte del ACNUR, orientado a constitución de microempresas y pequeños negocios, que incluye aspectos formativos de la persona, en la que se tiene en cuenta el carácter de desplazado. Se tuvo la oportunidad de escuchar testimonios de los beneficiarios sobre el curso seguido y sobre sus perspectivas futuras, en particular sobre la necesidad de obtener créditos.

Visita a Proyecto ejecutado por OPCION LEGAL, en el municipio de Turbo

Se asistió a la clausura del curso “Pedagogía y Protección de la Niñez en Urabá”, implementado por esta contraparte del ACNUR que estuvo orientado a la constitución de microempresas y pequeños negocios. El curso incluye un componente psico-social de carácter formativo para la persona y grupos humanos, que es replicado por los participantes, maestros todos ellos, en sus comunidades. Se tuvo la oportunidad de escuchar testimonios de los beneficiarios sobre el significado del curso y su impacto posible dentro de sus comunidades.

Reunión con Equipo ACNUR – Urabá

Propósito:

Entre otros temas relativos al desarrollo de las actividades, tomar conocimiento directo en relación a:

- La relación del ACNUR con sus contrapartes
- Formulación de los proyectos del ACNUR y visibilidad de la participación de las contrapartes
- Las características de los proyectos que ejecuta el ACNUR a través de sus contrapartes, incluyendo monitoreo, seguimiento e impactos
- La sistematización de las experiencias
- La visibilidad de ECHO
- Conclusiones de la visita de evaluación

Participantes:

Sr. Giovanni Lepri, Oficial de Proyectos ACNUR
Sr. Gérard Fayoux, Jefe Oficina ACNUR – Urabá
Srta. Ana Paula Gómez Silvestre, Oficial de Campo ACNUR – Urabá

Carlos Lecaros

Reunión con Equipo ACNUR – Urabá (Continuación)

30.11.01

Barrancabermeja (Cruz Roja Española)

30.11.01 Visita a Barancabermeja y el valle de Cimitara

El proposito fue de evaluar el trabajo que realiza CRE a traves de su Unidades Movil de Salud. Las actividades se desarrollan con la participacion de la Cruz Roja Colombiana que tiene la responsabilidad de implementar el proyecto. El evaluador acompañó en el valle de Cimitara una unidad movil durante dos dias.

Entrevista con padre Jorge Serano, s.j. El Jesuit Refugees Services trabaja en la region del Magdalena Medio desde amuchos años. El padre critica ECHO por no tener estrategia a mediano y / largo plazo, por la anualidad de los proyectos financiado por ECHO, y por la eficiencia de los proyectos productivos. Tambien critica ECHO por no tener colaboracion y/o coordinacion con los proyctos de Magdalena Medio. El padre no cree en una logica de paz. Aunque critico de los paramilitares, el AUC por lo menaos asegura el orden.

Reunion con Mikel Usazbiaga Flores representante de la Cruz Roja Española en Colombia y Melvis Rodriguez Mendez, coordinadora operaciones y seguridad de la Cruz Roja Colombiana.

Presentacion de las actividades de la Cruz Roja Colombiana que implementa sola el proycto, como sub contractador de la Cruz Roja Española. Asimismo se adelantaron comentarios respecto a sistematización de las experiencias, lecciones aprendidas y el tema psico-social. A parte de las Unidades de Salud que se desarrollan segun el programa, los objetivos de saneamiento ambiental y de rehabilitacion de escuelas todavia no han empezado. Finalmente, se planificó sobre las actividades a desarrollar el siguiente día.

01.12.01 y 02.12.01.

Visitas de terreno en el Valle Cimitara, (Yiondo, municipio de San Juan Ité) con una Unidad Movil de Salud, en sus consultorias medicas mensuales. El equipo consiste de dos médico y sus auxiliares, un ondotólogo y sus auxiliares, una vacunasora, una microscopista, un instructor APS, dos coordinadores PACO, conductores. Los promotores de salud no son presente por causa de seguridad. (tendrian que haber un promotor por vereda en el municipio (Total 64 solo hay 9). Las consultas se hacen en los centros de salud que estan abandonados desde mas de un año y rehabilitado por la CRC. En dos dias se atienden unos 100 pacientes por centro de salud y se distribuyen medicamentos. En los espacios, el equipo de PACO trabaja con los niños y los acompañan afectivamente. « entre la guerra y la paz solo falta un lapiz ».

Participantes

Mikel Usazbiaga Flores representante de la Cruz Roja Española en Colombia
Melvis Rodriguez Mendez, coordinadora operaciones y seguridad de la Cruz Roja Colombiana
Ignacio Esteban Cortés, coordinador PACO
Estaban Francisco Santo Dominguo Apoyo en PACO
Sandra Milena Madera, Apoyo en PACO
Rubén Dario Cruz, instructor APS
Javier Suarez, Médico
Carlos Arturo Guerrero Home, Médico

Nelson Mauricio Cordero Rueda, Odontólogo
Sandra Edith Sanchez Pinzon, auxiliar de odontología

Antoine Eric de Haulleville

Mocoa (Cruz Roja Francesa)

05.12.2001

Visita a Puerto Umbría (Municipio de Villagarzón)

El propósito fue evaluar el trabajo que realiza CRF en atención a la salud, a través de la Unidad Móvil de Salud (UMS). Las actividades se desarrollan en el Puesto de Salud, en coordinación con la Secretaría de Salud del Municipio de Villagarzón. Se dialogó con un grupo de Promotoras que dan apoyo en las veredas, con la finalidad de conocer en qué medida CRF apoya su labor. Asimismo, se conversó con usuarios del servicio, aprovechando la dinámica grupal que aplica CRF durante la espera para pasar a consulta.

Entrevista a Srta. Lorena Palomares, Secretaria de Salud del Municipio de Villagarzón (Villagarzón)

Conocer las actividades de coordinación que realiza CRF, conjuntamente con este Municipio. Asimismo, el tipo de atención que recibe el desplazado, en materia de salud.

Reunión con CRF

Propósito:

Adelantar exposición del trabajo que realiza CRF en el departamento del Putumayo. Asimismo se adelantaron comentarios respecto a sistematización de las experiencias, lecciones aprendidas y el tema psico-social. Finalmente, se planificó sobre las actividades a desarrollar el siguiente día.

Participantes:

Srta. Cécile Le Metayer, Delegada CRF – Putumayo
Sr. Gerardo Portela B., Coordinador Médico
Sr. Milton López Ruiz, Trabajador Social

Antoine de Haulleville
Carlos Lecaros

06.12.2001

Reunión en Hospital “José María Hernández”, de Mocoa

Propósito:

Conocer la problemática de la salud en el departamento y el tratamiento que reciben los desplazados. Asimismo, conocer cómo se desarrollan las coordinaciones entre CRF y el Hospital.

Participantes:

Srta. Jannet Carvajal, Asesora de la Gerencia del Hospital
Sra. Yolanda Gaona, Responsable de las Actividades Interinstitucionales.
Srta. Cécile Le Metayer, Delegada CRF – Putumayo
Sr. Gerardo Portela B., Coordinador Médico CRF

Antoine de Haulleville
Carlos Lecaros

Entrevista al sr. Eduardo Alomía Belalcázar, RSS delegado Departamental del Putumayo

Propósito:

Conocer las actividades que realiza la RSS en el departamento, poniendo énfasis en las coordinaciones interinstitucionales. En este aspecto, se indagó sobre la participación de la CRF. Asimismo, se trató sobre el Plan Colombia.

Visita a asentamiento de desplazados Caliyacu

Se visitó este asentamiento en donde viven 11 familias desplazadas en situación muy precaria. Se trató sobre la ayuda recibida por la Red; su futuro inmediato en cuanto a generación de ingresos; asentamiento definitivo y vivienda; niñez; etc.

Asistencia a capacitación en terapia *Tiempo Libre Productivo* (TLP)

Se asistió a una capacitación sobre Contabilidad Básica y Cooperativismo, a cargo de un profesor del Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje (SENA), perteneciente al Ministerio de Agricultura. Este curso formaba parte de la terapia Tiempo Libre Productivo (TLP) que promueve CRF, en la que participaban unos 30 desplazados. Se dialogó con participantes sobre las razones de su desplazamiento, su situación actual y perspectivas.

Entrevista al sr. Heraldo Muñoz, Director del Hospital de Villagarzón

Se conversó sobre la situación de la salud en el municipio, en particular de la atención que se da a los desplazados. También sobre la coordinación con la Secretaría de Salud del Municipio y la labor que desempeñan las promotoras. Finalmente, sobre las relaciones CRF – Hospital.

Visita a proyectos productivos

Propósito:

Se visitaron tres proyectos productivos surgidos de la terapia Tiempo Libre Productivo (TLP). Uno de ellos, un puesto de venta de verduras en el mercado de Mocoa y los otros, una granja de pollos de engorde y crianza de cuyes con el mismo propósito, respetivamente.

Reunión con Equipo CRF

Propósito:

Tratar temas relativos al desarrollo de las actividades de CRF. Entre otros temas, se dialogó sobre:

- Sostenibilidad de las actividades
- Apoyo psico-social
- Género
- Derechos Humanos
- Lecciones aprendidas
- ECHO
- Conclusiones de la visita de evaluación

Participantes:

Srta. Cécile Le Metayer, Delegada CRF – Putumayo

Gerardo Portela B., Coordinador Médico CRF

Andrés Arcos O., Coordinador de Seguridad CRC

Carmen E. Mejía, Médico

Roberth James Rivadeneira, Trabajador Social

Milton F. López, Trabajador Social

Aylen Revelo Trejo, Trabajadora Social

Rosario Salas R., Trabajadora Social

Rosa Guerrero Zambrano, Auxiliar Contabilidad

Graciela del Pilar Herrera Ch., Psicóloga

Clever F. Córdoba, Coordinador Logístico

John Mario Muñoz, Conductor

Oscar Zambrano Revele, Conductor

Mercedes Togrereros, Asiopa.

Antoine de Haulleville

Carlos Lecaros

APPENDIX 4

ENTREVISTAS Y REUNIONES DE COORDINACION

2. BÉLGICA (Bruselas)

06.11.2001	<i>Briefing</i> , sobre la Consultoría	<u>Participantes:</u> Dra. Paula Vázquez Andres Felices-Sanchez
06.11.2001	Reunión de Coordinación	Dr. Jesús Orús, Comisión Europea, Direction General de Relaciones Externas Vitorio Tonutti, AIDCO
07.11.2001	Johanna Langenkamp María Clara Martín	ACNUR, Jefa Unidad Instituciones Europeas ACNUR, Oficial de Asuntos Europeos
07.01.2001	José Luis Marbán García	Comisión Europea, Administrador General Oficina de Cooperación EuropeAid
07.01.2001	Peter Billing	ECHO

3. COLOMBIA

Bogotá

13.11.2001	Dr. Fernando Medellín Robin Hissong Patricia Luna	Red de Solidaridad Social (RSS), Director RSS, Jefe Unidad Técnica Conjunta RSS, Unidad de Atención a Población Desplazada
13.11.2001	Sra. Leila Lima Sr. Fabio Varoli	ACNUR, Representante para Colombia ACNUR, Representante Adjunto
13.11.2001	Sr. Adriano Kuepfer	CICR, Coordinador Asistencia Humanitaria
14.11.2001	Sr. Pedro Luis Rojo	ECHO, Responsable Colombia
14.11.2001	Sr. Ramón Mestres Sr. Juan José Peña	Delegación CE, Consejero de Cooperación Delegación CE, Agregado de Seguridad
14.11.2001	Sra. Jennifer Vernoooy Sr. David E. Gould Srta. Laura Zambrano	USAID, Oficial de Programa de Desplazados USAID, Gerente de Programa USAID, Gerente Programa de Desplazados

14.11.2001	Sr. Eduardo Alvarez Peralta	WHO/PAHO, Representante para Colombia
15.11.2001	Sr. Els Kocken	PMA
29.11.01	Sra. María Teresa Uribe	(en Medellín)
03.12.2001	Sr. Manuel Manrique Sr. Ennio Cufino Sr. César Romero	UNICEF, Representante UNICEF, Representante Adjunto UNICEF, Coordinador Nacional Programa Desplazados
03.12.2001	Sr. Ramón Mestres	Delegación Comisión Europea, Consejero de Cooperación
03.12.2001	Mons. Héctor F. Henao G.	Secretariado Nacional de Pastoral Social – Sección de Movilidad Humana
04.12.2001	Sra. Leila Lima Sr. Fabio Varoli	Sra. Leila Lima Sr. Fabio Varoli
04.12.2001	Sr. Georges Comninos Sr. Adriano Kuepfer	CICR, Jefe de la Delegación CICR, Coordinador Asistencia Humanitaria
04.12.2001	Sra. Robin Hissong	RSS, Jefe Unidad Técnica Conjunta
04.12.2001	Sr Embajador de España Sr. Vicente Sellés Zaragozi	Embajada de España, Embajada de España / AECI, Coordinador General
07.12.2001	Sra. Mónica Zaccarelli D.	OPS / OMS, Programa de Emergencias y Desastres / Proyecto Salud y Desplazamiento
10.12.01	Sr. Walter Cotte	Cruz Roja Colombiana, Director
10.12.01	Sr. Diego Beltrand	OIM, Jefe de Misión
11.12.01	Sra. Gloria Moreno	Corporación Medios para la Paz, Directora
11.12.01	Sr. Anders Kompass	ACNUDH, Director

13-nov-01	8:30	RSS Fernando Medellín	Calle 7 No. 6-48	3362214
	11:00	ACNUR Leila Lima	Calle 114 No. 9 - 01	6291620
	17:00	CICR Adriano Kuepfer	Calle 76 No. 10 - 02	3131183
14-nov-01	8:30	ECHO Pedro Luis Rojo	Calle 92 No. 15 - 48 of 407	2182095/2182486
	10:00	Delegación CE Ramon Mestres	Calle 97 No. 22 - 44	6216043
	14:00	USAID Laura Zambrano	Cra 69 No. 43B-44 Piso 5	4236880
	16:00	PAHO Eduardo Alvares Peralta	Cra 13 No. 32 - 76 Piso 5	3367100
15/11/01	8:00	PMA Els Kocken	Calle 121 No. 15 A - 55	6296092
03/12/01	8:30	UNICEF Manuel Manrique	Trv. 38 No. 100 - 25 Piso 3	6357255
	11:30	Delegación CE Candido Rodriguez	Calle 97 No. 22 - 44	6216043
	15:00	Embajador de Belgica	Cra 4A No. 25B-27 Frente al parque,casa amurallada, porton verde del centro	
	18:00	PASTORAL SOCIAL Monr. Hector Favio	Henao Carrera 47 No.- 84 - 85	3114055
04/12/01	8:00	ACNUR Favio Varoli - Leila Lima	Calle 114 No. 9 - 01	6291620
	11:00	CICR Georges Comninos	Calle 76 No. 10 - 02	3131183
	13:00	RSS Robing Hessong y Patricia Luna	Calle 7 No. 6 - 48	3362214
	15:45	EMBAJADOR DE ESPAÑA	Carrera 7 No. 78 - 01	6211294-3210108
07/12/01	15:00	OPS - Mónica Zacarelli	Calle 92 No. 15 - 48 of 407	2182095
10/12/01	9:00	Debriefing (Paula Vazquez, Michael Gowen)		ECHO
	16:30	Cruz Roja Colombiana Walter Cotte	Ave. 68 No. 66 - 31 Bloque sur	Celular 2292775
	17:00	OIM Diego Beltran	Carrera 14 No. 93B - 46 Piso 3	6227774Ext 147
11/12/01	11:00	Anders Kompas	Calle 114 No. 9-01(1407)	6292189

15-nov-01	14:15	Bogotá - Popayan	Avianca	
16-nov-01		Reunión Coordinación ECHO		
17-nov-01	15:55	Popayan - Bogotá	Avianca	ECHO
18-nov-01	16:00	Bogotá - Villavicencio	Aires	Caritas
19-nov-01	17:00	Villavicencio - Bogotá	Aires	
20-nov-01	6:00	Bogotá - Medellín	Aces	CISP
22-nov-01	9:25	Medellín - Cartagena	Avianca	MPDL
24-nov-01	18:45	Cartagena - Medellin	Avianca	
25-nov-01	8:15	Medellin - Quibdo	Satena	PTM

27-nov-01	10:00	Vigia del Fuerte -Medellin		
28-nov-01	15:50	Medellín Apartado	Satena	ACNUR
29-nov-01	14:15	Apartadó - Bogotá	Satena	
30-nov-01	6:00	Bogotá - Barrancabermeja	Aces	CRE
1-déc-01	16:55	Barrancabermeja - Bogotá	Aces	
3 y 4 Dic/01		Bogotá		
5-déc-01	6:00	Bogotá - Villagarzón	Latina	CRF
7-déc-01	11:00	Villagarzon - Bogotá	Latina	

12-déc-01 Actualizado

APPENDIX 5

METHODOLOGY USED IN THE EVALUATION

This Evaluation of ECHO's 2001 Intervention Plan and Assessment of ECHO's Future Strategy in Colombia is based on document analysis and field visits to the projects. The documents that were reviewed included the Partners proposals, the Fiche op as well as the progress reports and other monitoring reports carried out by the Office of ECHO-Colombia. Documents handed out by third parties, such as reports, or assessments of the activities prepared prior to this mission were also consulted. Various approach were adopted for the visits in order to obtain the greatest possible amount of information on the implementation of the projects and their impact. In the field interviews were conducted with the technicians in charge of the projects, cross checking the information with the one obtained directly from the beneficiaries. Besides, within the time available, interviews were conducted with the people that had relevant connections with the project, such as public officers, people in charge of the institutions that participate in the projects, and, if appropriate, with representatives of the others NGOs and civil society representatives.

On the other hand, as a mechanism to evaluate the execution and the technical capacity of the institution a two-stepped dialog was utilised: first, to discuss with the persons in charge of the operations with respect to the questions raised after reading the documents and field visits then to conclude through a general meeting with the complete staff of the project. This would provoke sometimes heated discussions and clarify the basic issues of the project e.g. the direct or indirect role the parties have; the priorities in their operations, the inter-institutional relationships, transversal variables (psycho-social techniques, gender, human rights), Impact and sustainability of the actions, visibility and safety, etc. The aim was to minimise the risks of pre-conceived ideas, incomplete reading of documents, and subjectivity in the analysis sometimes derived from proposals that were not well formulated and incomplete reports.

Under this context, even though all the parties involved knew about the mission with due anticipation, not all of them demonstrated a good organization in the agenda of meetings, interviews and visits. Among those who did the places to visit and the activities to be carried out corresponded to what had been pre-established. The mission however was able to modify it according to its own priorities, except in areas that were considered as dangerous, suggesting interviews with offices or other people linked with the project, re-orientating various topics of the agenda and conducting meetings according to the mission's own dynamics. In this sense the conclusions of this report were thoroughly verified, information was cross checked and within the limits of what was read, seen and discussed¹.

¹Check Appendix 3 regarding the Field Visits in which the activities implemented in each place are detailed.