

HOUSE OF LORDS

European Union Committee

6th Report of Session 2008–09

Civil Protection and Crisis Management in the European Union

Report with Evidence

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The European Union Committee

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The Government are required to deposit EU documents in Parliament, and to produce within two weeks an Explanatory Memorandum setting out the implications for the UK. The Committee examines these documents, and 'holds under scrutiny' any about which it has concerns, entering into correspondence with the relevant Minister until satisfied. Letters must be answered within two weeks. Under the 'scrutiny reserve resolution', the Government may not agree in the EU Council of Ministers to any proposal still held under scrutiny; reasons must be given for any breach.

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(Q) refers to a question in oral evidence

(p) refers to a page of written evidence

Civil Protection and Crisis Management in the European Union

Introduction

1. Preserving the safety and security of its citizens is the first duty of every State. In the modern world that often requires them to act in concert with other States. In this short inquiry we have examined how the mechanisms set up by the European Union assist the Member States in supporting one another when faced with natural or man-made catastrophes, including those perpetrated by terrorists, and in supporting third countries in times of crisis. We have looked in particular at how these mechanisms work with other international organisations with a similar remit, often operating in the same place, at the same time and with a similar purpose.
2. This inquiry has been conducted by Sub-Committee F, a list of whose members is set out in Appendix 1. They did not issue a call for written evidence, but took oral evidence from witnesses in the Commission and the Council Secretariat, and from the United Kingdom Minister responsible for civil contingencies. A list of the witnesses is in Appendix 2. To all of them we are most grateful.
3. **We make this report to the House for information.**

Civil Protection: the Community Mechanism

4. In October 2001 a Council Decision was adopted establishing a Community Civil Protection Mechanism (the CCP Mechanism) “to facilitate reinforced cooperation between the Community and the Member States in civil protection assistance intervention in the event of major emergencies, or the imminent threat thereof, which may require urgent response action.”¹
5. This mechanism was intended “to help ensure better protection, primarily of people but also of the environment and property, including cultural heritage, in the event of major emergencies, i.e. natural, technological, radiological or environmental accidents occurring inside or outside the Community, including accidental marine pollution.” A Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) was set up, accessible on a 24/7 basis, and a Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS) for communication between the MIC and the contact points in the Member States.² Each Member State identified emergency intervention teams which could be despatched at not more than 12 hours’ notice. In the case of a

¹ Council Decision of 23 October 2001 establishing a Community Mechanism to facilitate reinforced cooperation in civil protection assistance interventions (2001/792 EC, Euratom) (OJ L 297, 15.11.2001, p 7). The Decision was based on a Commission proposal made in January 2001, but after the events of 9/11 there was political momentum in the Council for its adoption the following month.

² In addition to the 27 Member States, the three countries of the EEA (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) participate. Recently Croatia has joined as a candidate country.

- major emergency a Member State could request assistance either directly from other States or through the MIC.
6. In February 2006 the Commission proposed revising the 2001 Decision. The changes made to the CCP Mechanism in the recast Decision were not major. The Decision was adopted on 8 November 2007, and is the instrument now in force.³ Detailed rules are contained in a Commission implementing decision.⁴
 7. One change made in the recast Decision was that, instead of referring only to natural emergencies, for the first time it also referred to man-made disasters and acts of terrorism.⁵ On the face of it, this appeared to be significant, but Mr Hans Das, the deputy head of the Civil Protection Unit, told us that this only reflected the reality of the situation since 2001; Member States had always agreed that terrorist attacks had the potential to lead to requests for assistance. (QQ 12, 18)
 8. Because the CCP Mechanism was originally designed to deal principally with environmental disasters, within the Commission it was the Directorate-General for the Environment which took responsibility for it. This is still the case, despite the fact that the Mechanism is now intended to deal with disasters which could not be described as environmental. The two witnesses who came to explain to us the working of the Mechanism therefore came from DG Environment.
 9. Mr Das explained to us that the MIC has three roles: monitoring ongoing disasters and new disasters; information sharing; and coordination, especially in the case of emergencies outside the EU, to avoid duplication and make the best use of available resources. (Q 1) For sharing information the MIC distributes to the Member States the *MIC Daily* to alert them to new and imminent emergencies. The MIC derives its information principally from the Member States, other organisations such as the UN, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
 10. The operations of Member States' teams during an EU civil protection operation are managed entirely by the Member States; all offers of assistance are made on a wholly voluntary basis. It is up to each Member State to decide whether or not to offer assistance in response to a request. The MIC's involvement is limited to facilitating the coordination at European level of all of the Member States' operations, and to making sure that everything runs smoothly from a technical perspective, and that there is no duplication between the Member States themselves, or between Member States and other partners. (Q 1)
 11. As an example of an emergency outside the EU, Mr Das mentioned the terrorist attacks in Mumbai which involved a number of European citizens.

³ Council Decision of 8 November 2007 establishing a Community Civil Protection Mechanism (recast) (2007/779 EC, Euratom) (OJ L 314, 1.12.2007, p. 9).

⁴ Commission Decision of 29 December 2003 laying down the rules for the implementation of Council Decision of 23 October 2001 establishing a Community Civil Protection Mechanism to facilitate reinforced cooperation in civil protection assistance interventions (2004/277 EC, Euratom) (OJ L 87, 25.3.2004, p.20).

⁵ Article 1(2): "The protection to be ensured by the Mechanism shall cover primarily people but also the environment and property, including cultural heritage, in the event of natural and man-made disasters, acts of terrorism and technological, radiological or environmental accidents, including accidental marine pollution, occurring inside or outside the Community, taking also into account the special needs of the isolated, outermost and other regions or islands of the Community."

There was also a large delegation of Members of the European Parliament in Mumbai. The French Presidency therefore decided to activate the MIC, and a Swedish medical emergency aircraft was despatched for the medical evacuation of a number of injured EU citizens, including United Kingdom citizens. (QQ 11, 14)

Crisis Management: the Joint Situation Centre

12. On two previous occasions we have examined the operation of the Joint Situation Centre (EU SitCen), and taken evidence from the Director, Mr William Shapcott. The first such occasion was an inquiry in 2002–03 by Sub-Committee C into the civilian crisis management capabilities of the then new European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).⁶ The second was the more recent inquiry by Sub-Committee F into the EU's response to terrorism following the Madrid bombings on 11 March 2004.⁷ On that occasion Mr Shapcott gave a full explanation of the origins and development of SitCen up to that date.⁸
13. There have been developments since then, and in his evidence to us Johnny Engell-Hansen, the Head of the Operations Unit at SitCen, explained the current position. "I can broadly describe the role of the EU SitCen as to contribute to the early warning work of the Council and the European Union. We undertake situation monitoring 24 hours a day, seven days a week. We do situation assessment with a view to supporting EU policy-making. We provide facilities and organisational infrastructure for the crisis taskforces. We provide Brussels-based support and assistance to the EU field activities, including those of the Secretary General, High Representative, EU Special Representatives, EU ESDP missions, et cetera. In its work SitCen is assisted by the secondment of national experts in analytical functions who work side-by-side with Council officials. This arrangement allows SitCen to benefit from exchanges of information with Member States including with diplomatic services, intelligence and security services, and SitCen in Brussels also works closely together with the intelligence directorate of the EU military staff." (Q 92)
14. On crisis management, Mr Engell-Hansen explained that the EU Emergency Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA) were designed to ensure rapid and coordinated EU cross-sector policy responses in a serious crisis. The CCA provide Member States and their permanent representations with a political platform for exchange of information and coordination of action in the case of a serious emergency or crisis. "The criteria are normally that it should affect several Member States, the EU as such, and there should be an element of time criticality". It would then require an exceptional EU level policy response. The role of SitCen is "to provide the main operational and infrastructural backbone for supporting the EU Presidency and Member States in implementing these CCA arrangements in a crisis situation." (Q 92)

⁶ *EU—Effective in a Crisis?* (7th Report, Session 2002–03, HL Paper 53). The current Chairman of Sub-Committee F, Lord Jopling, was then Chairman of Sub-Committee C.

⁷ *After Madrid: the EU's response to terrorism* (5th Report, Session 2004–05, HL Paper 53)

⁸ Q 152: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldselect/lducom/53/53.pdf>

Coordination of EU early warning mechanisms

15. We asked the witnesses from the MIC and SitCen about coordination between the two bodies: the first run by the Commission, the second part of the Council Secretariat. Both were emphatic that there was a clear distinction between their roles, that there was no duplication of effort, and that they worked well together. In the words of Mr Das, “The mandate of the Mechanism is very specific; it focuses on ... the facilitation of civil protection assistance in the case of major emergencies. SitCen’s role is probably much wider and different in that it focuses on early warning situation awareness and intelligence-gathering for a wide variety of political purposes.” (Q 22) Mr Engell-Hansen thought that many of the intelligence products used by SitCen were not relevant to the MIC; but where information was relevant, it was shared readily. (Q 110)
16. Mr Bruce Mann, the Head of the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat, agreed that there was a distinction between their roles. He said that during the Mumbai terrorist attack the delineation between the MIC and SitCen—that is, between the domestic consequences and the overseas consequences, especially in foreign policy and security policy—was very clearly understood and respected. (Q 51)
17. We accept that the roles of the two bodies are distinct. SitCen draws on information from a much greater range of sources, including the intelligence and security services, and assesses and analyses the information for the benefit of the Member States; and unlike the MIC, it plays no part in the facilitation and coordination of operations. But when a crisis does occur they are, in Mr Mann’s words, “both part of the same machinery for handling that crisis, both its overseas components and its domestic components”. (Q 51) There is a considerable danger of overlap in their work, and we think they must be vigilant to ensure that there is no duplication of effort.
18. Mr Mann did also have words of warning about any further elaboration of security mechanisms. “The Union has a whole range of early warning and alert mechanisms⁹ ... It came to a point where we were beginning to say, hang on a moment, we are proliferating alert mechanisms, there are financial issues inside there but more importantly perhaps there are operational issues ... Before we put substantial money into a new alert mechanism we just need to pause and look at all the other ones that are out there, and make sure that we can capture those who operationally need to know that an emergency is about to occur and that by proliferating mechanisms we do not get information lost in the fog.” (Q 60)

⁹ These include: Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF), for exchange of information on measures taken to ensure food safety; Rapid Alert System for Non-Food Products (RAPEX), for exchange of information about serious risks to the health and safety of consumers; Rapid Alert System in case of Biological and Chemical Threats (RASBICHAT), for information exchange, consultation and co-ordination for the handling of health-related issues related to attacks; European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange (ECURIE) for information exchange about the status of the accident, meteorological conditions, national countermeasures taken etc.; Early Warning System on Communicable Diseases (EWRS), to alert public health authorities on outbreaks with greater than national dimensions; Commission General Rapid Alert System (ARGUS), for information exchange and political coordination in case of a major multi-sectoral crisis; Animal Disease Notification System (ADNS), for information exchange about outbreaks of infectious animal diseases; and Phytosanitary network (EUROPHYT), for exchange of information about interceptions of harmful organisms or of non-compliant or prohibited plants and plant products.

19. We have considerable sympathy with this view. **We believe the European Union, and in particular the Commission, should keep a watchful eye on the interfaces between the many existing alert mechanisms to ensure that they remain relevant and effective, and should resist any further proliferation. Coordination of the coordinators should be a priority.**

Relations with NATO and other bodies

20. The report of this Committee on “civilian ESDP” to which we referred in paragraph 12 recommended more effective cooperation between the EU and several key organisations, in particular NATO, the UN, OSCE, and relevant NGOs.¹⁰ We put to all our witnesses questions designed to discover whether, especially in the case of NATO, cooperation had improved. We do not overlook that the 26 members of NATO include five countries which are not Member States of the EU,¹¹ while six of the EU Member States are not members of NATO.¹²

NATO and the Management Information Centre

21. We drew to the attention of Mr Das a report adopted by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly on 14–15 November 2006 which pointed out that the MIC could be seen as the equivalent of the NATO Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response and Coordination Centre (EADRCC). Both organisations had their own early warning systems, their inventories of national capabilities and their mechanisms for sharing information and communicating during crisis. There were other similarities and overlaps, and in the event of a disaster many Member States would have to choose which organisation to use. Yet, at the date of that report, there was no structured division of labour or framework for co-operation between NATO and the EU either in the field of natural disasters or in the field of terrorism. Institutional rivalry remained strong. The report continued: “There is literally no institutional dialogue between NATO and the European Commission, and other EU institutions are very reluctant to allow any such contacts in the near future. The current situation, in which both institutions develop their own mechanisms independently from each other and with only minimum coordination, is clearly not satisfactory.”¹³
22. Mr Das accepted that the MIC and EADRCC had similar functions, and that some countries requested assistance through one of the systems while others did so through both simultaneously. But there were also important differences in how they operated. The EADRCC relied on a wider network of partner countries than the EU, but their mandate area was more limited because the MIC operated on a worldwide basis, responding to disasters all over the world while the EADRCC focused on emergencies within the NATO partner countries. The MIC routinely sent coordination teams on site to make sure that the European assistance was properly received and correctly distributed; it could support Member States with the transport of

¹⁰ *EU—Effective in a Crisis?* (7th Report, Session 2002–03, HL Paper 53), Chapter 3.

¹¹ Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey and the United States, though Iceland and Norway are part of the MIC.

¹² Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden.

¹³ *NATO and Civil Protection*, report 166 CDS 06, paragraph 87. The Special Rapporteur who drafted this report was Lord Jopling, a member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the Chairman of Sub-Committee F.

assistance, and could provide co-financing for the transport. If a country was affected by a disaster and wanted to receive assistance very quickly, in reality it would often use all the channels available, and make a request for assistance to the United Nations, to NATO and to the EU MIC.

23. Mr Das told us that he had some good news to bring us. Cooperation between the MIC and the EADRCC had improved recently: “There is a full and clear understanding between all Member States that in all emergencies which simultaneously involve the MIC and the EADRCC we will be sharing information on the assistance that we are providing and the actions that we are undertaking ... That practical exchange of information has taken place already for several months. There is certainly scope for further cooperation in the future but that will also depend upon the political willingness of Member States to go in that direction.” But France, supported by a few other Member States, had particular concerns about cooperation between the MIC and the EADRCC being too close. (QQ 27–31)
24. The Minister was more sanguine. “Look, there was a problem between the way these two institutions communicated and shared information. I am assured that many of those problems have been ironed out under the leadership of President Sarkozy and the way that the French now engage with us.” But, he added, if the Committee felt that more effort needed to be put into making sure those institutional arrangements worked better, he invited us to say so in our report; if we did so, he would take that observation very seriously. (QQ 63–64)
25. We do indeed believe that more needs to be done to improve communication and cooperation between the MIC and the EADRCC; and we would say so even in the absence of an invitation from the Minister. There may have been some improvement since 2006, but it seems to us that there is still some way to go. **If, as appears, the stumbling block is political reluctance, the Government should emphasise to those States which continue to have concerns that the two bodies, instead of duplicating their work (with the financial consequences this entails), would do better to support and complement one another.**
26. **The overall aim should be, in this as in other areas of policy, to ensure a much closer working relationship between the EU and NATO than has ever existed in the past. We would hope that the NATO 60th anniversary summit in Strasbourg in April could endorse that objective.**

The Situation Centres of NATO and the EU

27. We asked Mr Engell-Hansen about cooperation between EU SitCen and NATO SitCen. He told us that while EU SitCen had good information exchanges with many international organisations—he mentioned the UN, the World Food Programme, UNHCR, UNICEF, OCHA (the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), the African Union—that was not the case with NATO. The structures were there, and EU SitCen contributed, but got practically nothing in return from NATO; and what they got was of very little value. The reason was probably that the NATO SitCen was under severe restrictions as to what it was allowed to share, and when; there were very elaborate release procedures for information which caused significant delay, so by the time it could contribute, the information was of little practical value.

28. Mr Engell-Hansen referred to the withdrawal by NATO of permission for EU SitCen officials to follow training courses at the NATO school in Oberammergau on the ground that EU security clearances were insufficient guarantee to allow EU officials to participate in NATO courses requiring a security classification. “As a Dane, I find it frustrating, perhaps even insulting, that the same kind of security clearance procedure is undertaken by the national Danish authorities and passed on to NATO and to the EU institutions but, just because the institutions have signed off, I could no longer participate in these courses; whereas officials from a partnership country in, say, central Asia, were allowed on those courses. My colleagues also could not.”
29. We find it extraordinary that an individual whose security clearance is otherwise adequate should be told that, because he works for the EU, his security clearance can no longer be accepted. As a matter of principle, it is unacceptable. As a matter of practice, if it impedes necessary exchanges of information between the Situation Centres of NATO and the EU, it has the potential to be harmful.
30. **The Government should look into NATO policy on security clearance. If NATO has genuine concerns about EU security clearance, those concerns should be declared and addressed. But unless there are good arguments to the contrary, the criteria used to assess the security clearance of individuals should be the same whether they work for national Governments or international institutions.**

United Kingdom participation in training exercises

31. We were concerned by the apparent failure of the United Kingdom to participate in exercises designed to test preparedness against CBRN attacks,¹⁴ and asked Tom Watson MP, the Parliamentary Secretary at the Cabinet Office with responsibility for civil contingencies, why the United Kingdom had not participated in one of NATO’s main annual exercises in Biograd, Croatia, in May 2007. The NATO official report on the exercise lists 19 States as having “participated in the exercise by deploying teams”; the United Kingdom is not among them but, so the Minister told us, “we provided expert training, we had expertise directing the exercise, and we were involved in the assessment of the response arrangements afterwards”. (Q 77)
32. Subsequently the Minister wrote to the Chairman of Sub-Committee F a letter which we print with the evidence at p 25, together with the detailed list which the Minister attached. From this it appears that the sole British participant was a person from the London Fire Brigade who “contributed to training on the NATO non-binding guidelines on CBRN for participants in the exercise, and acted as both Directing Staff and Assessor.” Later exchanges explain that “in his capacity as a member of the exercise Directing Staff, the UK expert covered the Local Emergency Management Agency. He also trained exercise participants in the run-up period, and acted as an Assessor.” From the NATO report it appears that “Staff positions in the Directing Staff (DISTAFF), On-site Operations and Co-ordination Centre (OSOCC) and Assessors Team” were also filled by persons from 23 other States.

¹⁴ Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear attacks.

33. "Participation" is an elastic word. To our witnesses it plainly signifies any sort of United Kingdom involvement other than as an observer only; even on that basis the United Kingdom has participated in only 11 of 31 EU or NATO exercises between 2000 and 2008. Using the NATO criterion, "participated in the exercise by deploying teams", it seems that the United Kingdom has participated in none of the annual NATO exercises, and in only one of the EU exercises, Operation Torch, a CBRN disaster victim identification exercise which the United Kingdom hosted in October 2008. Mr Mann described this as "an EU-wide CBRN exercise had been held in the United Kingdom a month earlier to which Member States came." It seems that only two Member States came: Germany and the Netherlands.
34. In November 2008 the French Presidency arranged a CBRN exercise, VAR 2008, in France, which it regarded as one of the major events of the Presidency in the field of civil protection. Mr Mann explained that the reason the United Kingdom had not participated in this was because of Operation Torch. A purely United Kingdom domestic CBRN exercise was held at the same time; as the Minister said, "we were quite stretched". (QQ 77-79)
35. We are surprised that such similar exercises should have been arranged so close together. Yet it seems that the bunching of exercises in the spring and early autumn is not uncommon. Mr Mann said: "I think that is a point which we will certainly take up with the Commission and partner countries." (Q 81) He should do so. **Holding similar exercises at similar times can bring little added benefit, and is wasteful of financial and other resources. We urge the Government to work for much better coordination of the timetables for exercises.**
36. We do not however see the bunching of exercises as a reason why the United Kingdom should have participated (in our use of the term) scarcely at all in EU or NATO exercises over the last nine years. **This is a country more susceptible than most to terrorist attacks, including perhaps CBRN attacks. The United Kingdom should be playing a full part in all major EU and NATO exercises. We find the current level of United Kingdom participation unacceptably low.**

Preparedness against biological attacks

37. We asked Mr Das to what extent the MIC was involved in monitoring the preparedness of the Member States against biological attacks, and in particular whether persons working in their emergency services were adequately vaccinated against such attacks. (Q 25) Mr Das replied that the MIC was not involved in this; within the Commission it was the responsibility of DG SANCO, the Directorate-General for Health and Consumers. The reply we subsequently received from them explained that vaccination and the monitoring of it were both the responsibility of the Member States. These questions had been discussed in the Health Security Committee between 2002 and 2004, but without coming to a conclusion. That Committee had also discussed the possibility of monitoring Europe-wide medicine sales on a daily basis as an indicator that a biological attack might have taken place. However there was no agreement on how such monitoring would be organised or funded, so here too there was no Commission involvement.

38. We accept that these are primarily matters for the Member States. For precisely this reason, we believe that there is a strong case for cooperation between them on the preparedness of their emergency services.

Security at the 2012 Olympics

39. There is considerable public interest about security issues at the Olympic Games in 2012, but most of it is confined to the Olympic venue itself. Not much is heard about security in the five London boroughs which are hosting the Games, and which seem to us to be at least as vulnerable. We asked Mr Das what the MIC might be able to do to assist. He explained that the MIC had in the past arranged to have European teams placed on standby during large sporting events, such as the Euro 2004 football championship where Portugal asked for CBRN decontamination teams to be kept on standby. The teams were kept on alert in their own countries but were ready to travel very quickly should the need arise. The Commission would be ready to help the UK in making the best possible preparations.
40. We felt it was not too early for these issues to be considered, and Ms Esmé Dobson, who also gave evidence for the MIC, agreed that it would be good to use the opportunity to prepare really well in advance. We were told that there had so far been no approach to the MIC by the United Kingdom, but this did not surprise Mr Das; he felt there was still sufficient time to put in place whatever contingency plans were necessary at European level. (QQ 32–38)
41. The Minister's comment was: "We can definitely learn using MIC through the French experience of the Rugby World Cup and the other Games and that process will take place. We are four years away from the Games but I am absolutely certain that we will be involved in that." Neither this, nor anything else he said, met our concerns about the need now to reassure local communities that appropriate action is being and will be taken. (QQ 83–88)
42. **We do not believe that it is too soon to involve the MIC in preparations for security issues, not just within the Olympic venue but also in the surrounding boroughs. We urge the Government to contact the MIC without delay to begin work on back-up support for our own national security arrangements, even if a formal request for assistance is not needed until nearer the time.**

APPENDIX 1: SUB-COMMITTEE F (HOME AFFAIRS)

The members of the Sub-Committee which conducted this inquiry were:

- Lord Avebury
- Lord Dear
- † Lord Faulkner of Worcester
- Baroness Garden of Frognal
- Lord Hannay of Chiswick
- Lord Harrison
- Baroness Henig
- Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts
- Lord Jopling (Chairman)
- Lord Marlesford
- Lord Mawson
- Lord Richard

† from 3 February 2009

Declarations of Interests:

A full list of Members' interests can be found in the Register of Lords Interests:

<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld/ldreg.htm>

Interests declared by Members relevant to the inquiry:

- Lord Dear
 - Former Chief Constable, West Midlands Police*
 - Former HM Inspector of Constabulary*
- Lord Hannay of Chiswick
 - Chair, United Nations Association UK*
 - Member, Advisory Board, Centre for European Reform*
 - Member, Advisory Board, European Foreign Affairs Review*
- Baroness Henig
 - Chair of the Security Industry Authority*
 - President of the Association of Police Authorities*
- Lord Jopling
 - General Rapporteur to the Committee on Civilian Aspects of Security in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly*
- Lord Mawson
 - Promoting Water City, a vision for Olympic legacy in East London (non-remunerated)*

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear
CCA	EU Emergency Crisis Coordination Arrangements
CCP Mechanism	Community Civil Protection Mechanism
CECIS	Common Emergency Communication and Information System
Civil Protection Unit	Civil Protection Unit, DG Environment, European Commission
DG Environment	Directorate-General for the Environment, European Commission
DG JLS	Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and Security, European Commission
DG SANCO	Directorate-General for Health and Consumers, European Commission
DISTAFF	Staff positions in the Directing Staff of NATO
EADRCC	NATO Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response and Coordination Centre
EC	European Community
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EU SitCen Mechanism	Joint Situation Centre of the EU Council Secretariat Community Civil Protection Mechanism
MIC	Monitoring and Information Centre, Civil Protection Unit, European Commission
NATO SitCen	NATO Situation Centre
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGOs	Non-governmental organisations
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSOCC	On-site Operations and Co-ordination Centre of NATO
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

APPENDIX 3: RELEVANT REPORTS

Recent Reports from the Select Committee

The Treaty of Lisbon: an impact assessment (10th Report, Session 2007–08, HL Paper 62)

Relevant Reports prepared by Sub-Committee F (Home Affairs)

Session 2002–03

EU—Effective in a Crisis (7th Report, HL Paper 53)

Session 2004–05

After Madrid: the EU's response to terrorism (5th Report, HL Paper 53)

Session 2005–06

Behind Closed Doors: the meeting of the G6 Interior Ministers at Heiligendamm (40th Report, HL Paper 221)

Session 2006–07

After Heiligendamm: doors ajar at Stratford-upon-Avon (5th Report, HL Paper 32)

Schengen Information System II (SIS II) (9th Report, HL Paper 49)

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