EN

Case No IV/M.727 - BP / Mobil

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REGULATION (EEC) No 4064/89
MERGER PROCEDURE

Article 6(1)(b) NON-OPPOSITION
Date: 07/08/1996

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PUBLIC VERSION

MERGER PROCEDURE
ARTICLE 6(1)b DECISION

To the notifying parties

Subject: Case IV/M.727 - BP/Mobil
Your notification of 5 July 1996 pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation No. 4064/89

I INTRODUCTION

1. On 5 July 1996, the Commission received a notification from BP and Mobil concerning the establishment of a joint venture which will combine their European operations in the refining and marketing of fuels and lubricants.

2. After examination of the notification, the Commission has concluded that the notified operation falls within the scope of application of Council Regulation No 4064/89 and does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market and with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

II THE PARTIES

3. BP is a multinational oil exploration, petroleum and petrochemical group. BP has three core businesses: BP Exploration (oil and gas exploration and production), BP Oil (refining, marketing, supply and transportation) and BP Chemicals (manufacturing and marketing of petrochemicals and related products).

4. Mobil is a multinational oil, natural gas and chemical group. Mobil has three core businesses: Exploration and Production (oil and gas exploration and production), Marketing and Refining (refining, marketing, supply and transportation) and Chemical and Other Businesses (manufacturing and marketing of petrochemicals, speciality products and plastic packaging films).

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5. BP is essentially contributing the BP Oil activities in Europe to the joint venture. Mobil will contribute its Marketing and Refining activities in Europe.

III THE OPERATION

6. The business of the joint venture will include the operation of refineries, the acquisition of crude oil and further feedstocks for those refineries, the further refining and conversion of downstream products (e.g. lubricants), and the downstream supply, sale and marketing of refined fuels and lubricants products including both retail sales through service stations and sales to industrial and commercial customers. The geographic scope of the joint venture will be Western and Eastern Europe (including Western Russia) plus Cyprus and Turkey. The joint venture excludes the parent companies' activities in international trading, aviation, marine and shipping as well as their operations in exploration and production, gas marketing and chemicals. These will remain separate from the joint venture under the control of the parents individually.

7. The two parent companies will combine their fuels and lubricants businesses throughout Europe by means of partnerships (or their local equivalent) in each national jurisdiction. There will be two separate national partnerships for the parties combined fuels businesses and lubricants businesses. The partnership agreements in each jurisdiction will as far as possible be identical and based on the Pro Forma partnership agreements. The equity stakes in the partnerships will be different for fuels and lubricants. For fuels, BP will hold 70% and Mobil 30% whilst for lubricants Mobil will hold 51% and BP 49%. Profits and losses in each partnership will be shared in proportion to these shareholdings. The fuels business as a whole will be operated by BP as Fuels Operator whilst the lubricants business as a whole will be operated by Mobil as Lubricants Operator. Both operators will be under the control of the Supervisory Committee. In each jurisdiction, the Fuels Partnership will be operated by a BP affiliate and the Lubricants Partnership by a Mobil affiliate. There will be a substantial degree of integration between the fuels and lubricants activities.

8. The joint venture will come about through a series of agreements. These include a Framework Agreement, the Joint Venture Agreement and Pro Forma agreements for the establishment of national partnerships.

IV JURISDICTION

Joint control

9. The Joint Venture Agreement provides for the establishment of the Supervisory Committee and the definition of reserved matters which require unanimity between BP and Mobil. The strategic policy of the joint venture is governed by the Supervisory Committee on an individual country and European wide basis. BP and Mobil have equal voting rights on the committee. The Supervisory Committee will take decisions in the following areas: business plans, major acquisitions, closures, disposals and investments and certain other strategic decisions. The other strategic decisions include [...](1). The Strategic Business Plan will be presented to the committee [...](2) and will cover [...](3). In addition, the committee will set financial control parameters which will help to

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determine the Annual Operating Business Plan. Major acquisitions [...][4] will also be subject to the control of the Supervisory Committee.

10. The Fuels and Lubricants partnerships will be subject to the control of the Supervisory Committee. The partnership agreements will set out the powers and duties of the relevant fuels or lubricants operator and will allow that operator to have responsibility for the operational management of the business subject to the powers of the Supervisory Committee.

11. In the light of the above information, the joint venture is jointly controlled by BP and Mobil.

Full function joint venture operating on a lasting basis

12. The joint venture is established for an indefinite period [...][5]. The formation of the joint venture will lead to an integration of the two companies' activities through the formation of the joint venture, the national partnerships and the transfer of BP's lubricant activities to Mobil as Lubricants Operator and Mobil's fuel activities to BP as Fuels Operator. Employees will also transfer from one company to the other where appropriate eg BP lubricants employees will transfer to Mobil as lubricants operator. The joint venture will adopt a common brand image and the retail outlets will be rebranded with this new brand image.

13. BP and Mobil will make all the relevant fuels and lubricants assets available to the joint venture. Fuels assets will be made available to the Fuels partnership whilst lubricants assets will be made available to the Lubricants partnership. In certain jurisdictions, where the partnerships may not constitute distinct legal entities, the assets will be made available to the respective operator on behalf of the Fuels or Lubricants Partnership, as the case may be. The Fuels Operator will have the indefinite and exclusive right to use and manage all the fuels assets for the benefit of the joint venture subject to the Supervisory Committee. The Lubricants Operator enjoys a similar right. Even though the ownership of the assets is not transferred to the joint venture, this does not prejudice the full function nature of the operation as the joint venture will enjoy indefinite and exclusive use of those assets.

14. Certain activities will be excluded from the joint venture. The upstream activities of exploration and production will be carried on separately by the parties. In addition, international trading, basic research and development, aviation fuels and lubricants, marine fuels and lubricants and shipping will be kept out of the joint venture.

15. Exploration and production activities are excluded from the scope of the joint venture. There is relatively little vertical integration between the two companies' exploration and production activities and their downstream activities. This is indicated by the fact that for example BP currently purchases about [...][6] of its crude oil requirements from its own production activities.

16. The joint venture will take its own decisions on the purchase and sale of crude oil inputs and refinery outputs but will instruct BP's oil trading division (which will in effect act

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as a sub-contractor) to carry out the trading activities for the crude oil inputs to the joint venture's refineries and those fuels and lubricants surplus to the joint venture's own requirements. A similar arrangement will apply with Mobil in respect of lubricants. Both trading divisions will remain outside the joint venture.

17. The central research and development activities of BP and Mobil have not been included in the joint venture. The joint venture will be able to contract with BP and Mobil's own R&D centres or third parties to carry out the R&D requirements which those centres can provide. However, the joint venture will have the ability to carry out resource and technical support facilities, for example to carry out product quality assurance or to provide technical assistance to customers. The parties argue that it is these technical support activities that drive R&D activity in the industry. In addition, they argue that much of the R&D activity is not carried out by the oil companies but by other companies. This non oil company R&D includes the design and build of refineries and other oil production plants and the formulation of additives by additive suppliers. Other R&D is carried out by universities and other third party companies.

18. The parties are retaining their aviation fuels, marine fuels and lubricants and (in the case of Mobil only) their aviation lubricants businesses outside the joint venture. This is because of their international nature where companies demand worldwide deliveries. These activities are not essential to the operation of a joint venture in this sector, though they will take output from the parties' refineries and lubricants blending plants. [...](7)

19. The parties have also stated that they have a large number of existing joint ventures which each party has with third parties for various purposes eg oil refineries or pipelines. These joint ventures do not raise competition issues as they are of a very limited technical nature. [...](8), as these existing joint ventures in total account for [...](9) of the joint venture's expected turnover, the joint venture would still be able to operate on the market with the parent companies making the facilities available to the joint venture [...](10).

20. In the light of the above information, the operation will be a full function joint venture operating on a lasting basis.

Co-ordination of competitive behaviour

21. The excluded businesses set out above do not threaten to cause co-ordination of competitive behaviour. Even though the two parent companies will be present on the markets for aviation fuels, marine fuels and lubricants, exploration and production, shipping and petrochemicals these markets are distinct from those of the joint venture. These businesses will remain independent.

22. In the case of the business which is upstream from the joint venture: namely exploration and production, the joint venture will not be the principal customer of the parent companies (as mentioned in paragraph 15 above). For the downstream businesses, the petrochemicals activities of the parent companies currently source a minority of the requirements from their own refineries. In addition, the value added in petrochemicals

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businesses in general is significant. The parent companies will source substantial quantities of the requirements for aviation fuels and marine fuels and lubricants from the joint venture. Some value is added in delivering the product to the customer eg for aviation fuels, the quality requirements of the customer are high and therefore the quality control mechanisms for the delivery of the product from the refinery (where it will be purchased by the joint venture) and the point of delivery need to be stringent. However, the market shares of the parties in Europe at present are comparatively low, and the market for these products is likely to be wider given that customers often demand supplies on a worldwide basis. Therefore, there is no likelihood of competition distorting effects resulting from the possible co-ordination of these independent businesses through the creation of the joint venture.

23. Mobil has a 28% stake in Aral, the fuels retailing and wholesaling company principally active in Germany. The other shareholders are Veba (55%), Wintershall (15%) and a number of benzene producers with 2% between them. [...](11). Mobil has a right and is obliged under the terms of the Aral agreement to supply Aral with [...](12) of Aral's requirements for petrol and diesel for retail sale in Germany. [...](13). Mobil has rights to certain strategic information and to participate in meetings of the Aral shareholders, supervisory board, advisory board and other sub-committees of these committees. It does not participate in the day-to-day management of Aral. Mobil's stake in Aral will not be contributed to the joint venture, but will be retained by a Mobil subsidiary in Germany. Mobil will continue to fulfil its supply obligations but will receive all its supplies of fuels for Aral from the joint venture and will contribute its revenues from Aral to the joint venture.

24. Mobil is not present on the retail fuel market in Germany. For certain other products in Germany, and the operations Aral has in other countries, Mobil is a competitor of Aral (retail motor fuel in Austria, and some non-retail products in Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium and Austria). BP is currently a competitor of Aral in Germany.

25. As far as its continuing shareholding in Aral is concerned, Mobil's entry into the joint venture does not give rise to a likelihood of co-ordination of competitive behaviour between itself and BP. This is because as a result of the operation, all BP's activities in competition with Aral in the territory of the joint venture will be conducted through the joint venture. Similarly, Mobil's activities where it currently competes with Aral will also be contributed to the joint venture. In addition, following the formation of the joint venture, the parent companies have no incentive to re-enter its markets. Third parties have expressed some concerns about possible conflicts of interest which could arise as a result of Mobil's continuing shareholding in Aral and its entry into the joint venture which will compete with Aral in some markets. Whilst these concerns do not raise any issues of dominance, they might raise questions of restrictions of competition which could be addressed under Article 85.

26. In the light of the above information, the joint venture does not give rise to the likelihood of co-ordination of the competitive behaviour of undertakings which remain independent.

V COMMUNITY DIMENSION

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27. The world wide turnover for BP for 1995 was 50 billion ECU of which 38 billion ECU was generated in the Community. For 1994, the worldwide turnover of Mobil was 50 billion ECU of which 8 billion was generated in the Community. Neither BP nor Mobil generates more than two-thirds of its turnover in one member state. Accordingly, the operation has a Community dimension.

VI COMPETITIVE ASSESSMENT

Product market

28. The concentration covers a large number of product markets at a number of levels from the refining of crude oil downstream. The following activities can be identified: at the refining level, the refining of fuels and ex-refinery sales. Immediately downstream of refining is the manufacture and sales of base oils, the manufacture and sale of process oils and the manufacture and sale of slack wax (the latter products being by-products of various refining processes). At the distribution level downstream of refining, the operation covers the retail sales of fuels (petrol (ie gasoline), diesel and LPG); the non-retail sales of fuels (which is further subdivided into sales of diesel, fuel oil, LPG, gas oil) and the sale of bitumen. Also downstream of refining are the manufacture and sale of automotive lubricants and industrial lubricants.

29. At the refining and lubricant blending level, there is a considerable degree of supply side substitutability. Refineries can be run to produce different outputs of different types of fuels, base oils or other products. A refinery will not be able to change its product mix completely, but there are considerable flexibilities in its operation based on the input quality of crude oil and the way in which the refinery is configured. The actual output of the refinery will also react to the demand for different products and the market price for those products. Lubricant manufacture also has considerable supply side substitutability. In blending plants, base oils can be blended with different additives to manufacture different types of lubricants. Switching between different types of industrial or different types of automotive lubricants is a relatively simple operation. It is also possible to switch between industrial and automotive lubricant production using the same equipment, though it generally takes longer to clean out the system to ensure that there is no contamination between products.

30. On the demand side, there is much less substitutability. Both fuels and lubricants are manufactured for specific uses and are not substitutable for the vast majority of applications. However, distribution of these products may well occur together so that different products are always available at the same point of sale. For example, service stations will generally always sell petrol, diesel and sometimes LPG as they will seek to serve the maximum number of automotive customers and so the market shares for each type of fuel will roughly coincide with the aggregate market share. Accordingly, market data does not normally distinguish between different types of fuels. The aggregation of retail fuels into one category is supported by responses from third parties.

31. The non-retail sale of fuels is not similarly aggregated. The different fuels are supplied for different uses to different types of customer. The distribution channels can also differ significantly, the provision of fuel oil to a power generation plant will differ from the supply of LPG for domestic heating purposes. The investment required for these distribution channels will be different from that of retail fuels. For the two fuels which are sold in significant quantities in both retail and non-retail markets, namely diesel and LPG, the uses of the fuel depend on the distribution channel. Retail diesel is purchased

by users of diesel powered cars and other vehicles where the owner does not possess their own supply of diesel. Non-retail diesel is typically supplied to large scale transport companies with a substantial fleet of vehicles and their own storage facilities. Similarly, LPG will be supplied to vehicles through retail sites and to households for heating purposes though non-retail channels. Bitumen is distinct from non-retail fuels as it has a specific set of uses eg road construction and a small number of customers (a small number of independent resellers) which clearly differentiates it from other non-retail fuels.

32. On the demand side, there is little substitutability between different types of lubricants, especially industrial lubricants. Automotive customers are more influenced by factors such as the location of sale, brand strength and the price/quality relationship. Industrial customers are more likely to be influenced by the technological specification, the availability of the product and price (rather than brand). Automotive lubricants cannot sensibly be further divided as the range of products is fairly limited. Industrial lubricants have different customers for different types of lubricant, but this is not sufficient for the market to be further sub-divided. Some industrial customers demand the full range of lubricants for their operations from their lubricants supplier, rather than sourcing individual lubricants from different suppliers. This range effect, combined with the very strong supply side substitutability would seem to indicate a single market for industrial lubricants despite the specific products which are produced for different uses.

33. In this case the product markets do not have to be defined precisely as on the basis of the markets defined above, the operation does not create or strengthen a dominant position on any market.

Geographic market

34. On the basis of the information collected by the Commission, the relevant geographical market for ex-refinery sales appears to be EU or Western European wide. Refined products are traded ex-refinery in Western Europe at competitive prices which are freely available. The relatively small price differences in product prices between different regions in Europe are mainly due to the cost of shipping. Similarly, the relevant geographical scope for base oils manufacture and sale is the EU or Western Europe. There is significant cross-border trade of base oils in Europe and there are no tariff barriers or substantial cost discouragements preventing cross-border trade. The geographic markets for slack wax and process oils are national/EU-wide. Though traditionally, these products have been traded near to refineries, trade now takes place on a European wide basis or for export outside Europe.

35. Pricing policies of retail fuels are often set on a national level while prices are set at a regional or even on a local level. For certain member states, the petrol station network is not spread evenly across all the regions. However, the regional market shares for the parties in these member states generally correspond quite well with their national market share. Therefore, for these markets there is in this case no reason to define whether the market is regional or national. The only exception is the UK, where the parties have a market share (based on outlets of [...][(14)]) which is significantly higher than their national market share. However, this does not raise a competition problem and in any case, only BP is present in Scotland and the operation will not therefore lead to an addition of market shares. Therefore, even for the UK, the question of whether the markets are

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regional or national can be left open. In some countries prices are set at a national level and tend therefore to be uniform throughout the country. In other countries, the government sets the maximum prices on a national basis. Moreover, in those countries with well developed network of hypermarket/supermarket outlets prices tend to be set on a national level which has the effect of widening the geographical scope of the relevant market for retail fuels. Retail fuel brands are often European-wide which has the effect of further widening the market.

36. The parties argue that the relevant geographic market for the non-retail fuel products (diesel, fuel oil, gas oil and LPG) is at least national. This is because, even if the products are distributed on a sub-national level, there is price transparency, overlapping supply boundaries, exchange and supply agreements between suppliers and some purchasers who buy on a national basis. This has been confirmed by the Commission's investigation, and some third parties argue that the market definition is wider than national. On the basis of the information received by the Commission, the market for bitumen is national.

37. The parties argue that the relevant geographic markets for automotive and industrial lubricants are at least national and probably as wide as the EU (or Western Europe). The Commission's investigation has indicated that the relevant geographical scope for both products is at least national and likely EU-wide. Several customers are international and may prefer to deal with one supplier only on the basis of supply in several countries. In the last couple of years, tenders by major vehicle manufacturers have increasingly been made on a European-wide basis. Furthermore, lubricants are specified according to international standards. Likewise, for several industrial lubricants, since the machinery in which they are used is similar or identical across boundaries, the relevant market may be wider than national.

38. For all the above markets, their geographical scope can be left open since on the basis of the above market definitions the concentration will not create or strengthen a dominant position which will significantly impede competition.

Assessment

39. In all the markets covered by the operation, there are a number of common factors. The joint venture will compete against the other large transnational oil companies who are present across Europe in the same way as the joint venture. In addition, the parties will often face competition at a national level from a strong national player which operates wholly or primarily in that national territory. Finally, there are specialist companies who operate in one or a few market sectors such as lubricant only manufacturers.

40. In addition to the above competitors, in retail motor fuels there are also new entrants coming to the market in the form of supermarket and hypermarket companies expanding their operations to include the sale of retail fuels. This is particularly prevalent in the UK and France and increasingly so in Germany. These new competitors have adopted aggressive pricing strategies which the existing market players have had to match. National market players are also moving across borders into other countries and upstream producers are moving downstream into retail fuels.

41. The other common factor is the substantial overcapacity in the downstream oil industry. Refining capacity is in excess of supply, as is base oil manufacturing capacity. Environmental legislation creates a barrier to exit which indicates that the over-capacity

is likely to prove difficult to reduce in the short term. Refineries may well be sold rather than closed which will not reduce the over-capacity problem. The number of retail fuel outlets is falling across Europe and is expected to continue to fall, despite the entry of the supermarkets into this sector.

42. The operation covers a large number of markets. The Commission has analyzed the markets covered by the operation, in the light of the common factors indicated above, and investigated in detail those markets where the market shares are high. Market share tables for these markets are attached. The markets concerned are:

Retail motor fuels:	Greece, Germany, Portugal, Austria
Non retail diesel:	Germany, Greece, Portugal
Non retail fuel oil:	UK, Netherlands
Non retail gas oil:	Greece, Portugal, Germany
Non retail LPG:	Greece, Portugal
Automotive lubricants:	Austria, Greece, Sweden
Industrial lubricants:	Austria, Greece, Sweden
Slack wax:	EU.

43. Most of the tables use data provided by the parties based on the 1993 Wood Mackenzie report on the downstream oil market which was published in 1995. This has been updated where possible to take account of the information received in the course of the Commission's investigation. Where figures from 1995 are shown, these are figures supplied by the parties and updated to take account of further information received during the investigation.

44. According to the parties, in Europe (the OECD countries), the joint venture will have an overall market share for retail motor fuels of about 10% which will put it in third place behind Exxon and Shell. The combined market share in Greece for retail motor fuels is particularly high. The joint venture will face significant competition from the national players present on the Greek market, in particular EKO, as well as from Shell and Texaco who are also present. These companies will prevent the joint venture from enjoying a dominant position in retail motor fuels. The same arguments apply for the high non-retail diesel market share also in Greece.

45. For lubricants, overall the joint venture will have approximately 18% of the total market in Europe. The joint venture will have particularly high market shares in Austria for industrial lubricants and Greece for both automotive and industrial lubricants. In Austria, it is very unlikely that the joint venture will be able to create a dominant position. As stated above, there is considerable over-capacity in base oils (for the development of lubricants) which facilitates market entry for lubricant blenders if the joint venture attempts to exercise market power. At present at least 30% of the domestic demand for automotive lubricants in Austria is met by imports. The corresponding figure for industrial lubricants is even higher, in the region of 60-65%. This indicates that new entrants could supply customers in Austria which would prevent the joint venture from exercising market power. Similar considerations apply in Greece, where the joint venture enjoys a high market share for both automotive and industrial lubricants, though the possibility for imports to act as a competitive constraint on the joint venture is somewhat lower. However, new Greek entrants can enter the market and there are in any case strong competitors already on the market. For slack wax, which is a by-product of the base oil manufacturing process, the parties have a market share of approximately

[...][15] in the EU. However, competition exists from each base oil manufacturer and, independent slack wax suppliers who are not base oil manufacturers. The parties' market share, therefore, do not lead to any concerns on this market.

46. The Commission has also examined the issue as to whether the Mobil stake in Aral should lead to the combination of the market shares of the joint venture and Aral. The principal area of operation is Germany, where the combined market share for retail motor fuels would be about [...][16] and for non-retail diesel [...][17]. For some products Veba is also present on the market as well as the joint venture and Aral and therefore its market share should also be taken into consideration. If all of the market shares were combined, this would give rise to a market share of [...][18] for non-retail diesel and [...][19] for gas oil. Even if the market shares were to be aggregated, these market shares would not give rise to the creation of a dominant position. It would be simple for other companies to produce more diesel and compete with the joint venture, Aral and Veba on the non-retail diesel and gas oil markets. Barriers to entry for the distribution of non-retail diesel do not appear to be high, so the entry of new competitors will be possible.

47. There are no vertical effects as a result of the merger which give rise to serious doubts about the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. Both companies are already vertically integrated in that they are represented at a number of levels in downstream oil markets. Substantial trading takes place between the different levels, such as for the purchase of crude oils for refineries and the sales of ex-refinery fuels, base oils and other products. Nevertheless, the establishment of this joint venture does not change this situation so as to give rise to serious doubts.

48. It follows from the above that the proposed concentration will not create or strengthen a dominant position as a result of which competition would be significantly impeded in the common market or in a substantial part of it.

VII ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS

49. The notifying parties have requested that a number of restraints be declared ancillary to the concentration.

50. Clause 8 of the Framework Agreement provides that between the signature of that agreement and the signature of the joint venture agreement neither party will act outside the normal course of business in respect of the businesses to be contributed to the joint venture. This provision ensures that no material changes can be made unilaterally to the businesses of either party before the signature of the joint venture agreement.

51. Clause 21 of the Joint Venture Agreement provides that each of BP and Mobil will not for the duration of the joint venture directly or indirectly carry on or be concerned or interested within the territory any business which is similar to or is likely to be in competition with any part of the joint venture's business. This clause includes the sale of finished products for export and subsequent re-import into the territory in competition

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with any partnership. Clause 15 of each of the pro-forma fuels and lubricants partnership agreements mirror this general non-compete clause.

52. These clauses can be considered to be directly related and necessary to the concentration. The clause in the Framework Agreement is a clause which protects the parties in the limited period before the joint venture agreement is signed. The non-compete clauses reflect the reality of the withdrawal of the parents from the market of the joint venture. All these clauses can be considered as ancillary to the concentration.

VIII LINKS BETWEEN MOBIL AND ARAL

53. Even though Mobil's shareholding in Aral does not lead to the co-ordination of competitive behaviour between BP and Mobil, the supply arrangements and the information flows from Aral to Mobil following the entry of Mobil into the joint venture may raise issues under Article 85 of the EC Treaty. Therefore, this decision does not cover the supply arrangement between the joint venture, Mobil and Aral nor the information flows between Aral and Mobil.

IX CONCLUSION

54. For the above reasons, the Commission has decided not to oppose the notified operation and to declare it compatible with the common market and with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. This decision is adopted in application of Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation No 4064/89.

For the Commission,

Market Shares in Retail Motor Fuel (1993)

Country	BP	Mobil	Sum	Others
Austria	[5-15%]*	[5-15%]*	[15-25%]*	OMV: 22% Shell: 15.9% Exxon: 7.8% Agip : 7.4% Aral: 7.1%
Germany	[5-15%]*	-	[5-15%]*	Aral : 20.5% Shell: 13.1% Exxon: 12% DEA: 8% ELF: 6%
Greece	[15-25%]*	[15-25%]*	[30-40%]*	Shell: 17.5% EKO: 13.8% Texaco: 8.3%
Portugal	[5-15%]*	[10-20%]*	[15-25%]*	Petrogal: 50.6% Shell: 16.8% Exxon: 1.3% ELF: 1.2%

Market shares in Non-retail Diesel (1993)

Country	BP	Mobil	Sum	Others
Germany	[5-15%]*	[5-15%]*	[10-20%]*	DEA: ca 13% Shell: 12.4% Exxon: 14.4% Aral: 11.5%
Greece	[15-25%]*	[10-20%]*	[30-40%]*	EKO: 15.7% Shell: 16.5% Texaco: 7.9%
Portugal	[0-10%]*	[5-15%]*	[10-20%]*	Petrogal: 49% Shell: 17.2% Exxon: 0.6%

* Deleted business secret: approximate ranges indicated.

Market shares in Non-retail Fuel Oil (1993)

Country	BP	Mobil	Sum	Others
The Netherlands	[10-20%]*	[0-10%]*	[15-25%]*	De Humber BV: ca 20% Shell: 15.7%
United Kingdom	[15-25%]*	[0-10%]*	[20-30%]*	Shell: 21% Exxon: 10% Charringtons Ltd: ca 6% British Fuels Ltd: ca 6% UK Petroleum Products Limited: ca 5% Fina: 5% Texaco: 3%

Market Shares in Non-retail Gas Oil (1993)

Country	BP	Mobil	Sum	Others
Germany	[0-10%]*	[0-10%]*	[10-20%]*	Shell: 12.2% DEA: 11.3% Exxon: 11%
Greece	[10-20%]*	[0-10%]*	[15-25%]*	Shell: 12% EKO: 10% Texaco: 7%
Portugal	[0-10%]*	[10-20%]*	[15-25%]*	Petrogal: ca 70% Shell: 12.4%

Market Shares in Non-retail LPG (1993)

Country	BP	Mobil	Sum	Others
Greece	[10-20%]*	[0-10%]*	[20-30%]*	Petrogas: 37% Shell: 21.2% Petrolina: ca 10% EKO: 8.5%
Portugal	[10-20%]*	[10-20%]*	[25-3520%]*	Petrogal: 47% Shell: 13.7% Exxon: 7.4%

* Deleted business secret: approximate ranges indicated.

Market Shares in Automotive lubricants(1995)

Country	BP	Mobil	Sum	Others
Austria	[5-15%]*	[10-20%]*	[25-35%]*	Shell: 17.5%
Greece	[15-25%]*	[10-20%]*	[30-40%]*	Shell: 16% EKO: 6.85%
Sweden	[5-15%]*	[5-15%]*	[20-30%]*	Q8: 10.05%

Market Shares in Industrial lubricants(1995)

Country	BP	Mobil	Sum	Others
Austria	[15-25%]*	[20-30%]*	[40-50%]*	Shell: 22.7%
Greece	[10-20%]*	[15-25%]*	[30-40%]*	Shell: 23.9% EKO: 8%
Sweden	[0-10%]*	[15-25%]*	[20-30%]*	Q8: 6.26%

Market Shares in Slack Wax (1995)

Area	BP	Mobil	Sum	Others
EU	[10-20%]*	[0-10%]*	[15-25%]*	

* Deleted business secret: approximate ranges indicated.