Climate change remains a defining global challenge of our times which, if not vigorously and urgently controlled, will put at risk not only the environment but also world economic prosperity and development. As underscored by recent debates within the UN Security Council, climate change is a risk-multiplying threat with a broad strategic dimension. It is critical to put the world on a low emission and resource efficient development path, and thereby limiting global temperature increases to less than 2°C, as agreed in 2010. Core European interests are at stake in the climate field, be it in security terms as recognised by the European Security Strategy or in economic terms to ensure a level playing field and long-term growth prospects for EU business.

The UN climate negotiations have entered into a decisive phase towards a new, global legally binding international agreement that needs to be completed by 2015. The challenge is therefore twofold: 1) successfully completing the negotiating process through intensive outreach activities with a wide range of countries and stakeholders, striving for an ambitious coalition and the necessary political momentum, and 2) fostering climate action to stay on track towards the 2°C objective and supporting partner countries in preparing for their respective commitments by 2015 and in moving towards more climate resilient societies.

The EU has for some time now been playing a leading role, through its own climate policy but also by projecting it internationally. It is time to further step up efforts and develop a strategic toolbox to deploy an effective EU climate diplomacy and strengthen the EU’s voice internationally in support of the 2015 Agreement and of a low emission development path. Building on the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions of July 2011, this reflection paper outlines some ideas on how to deploy an even more strategic climate diplomacy through joint and mutually reinforcing actions by the EEAS, Commission services and Member States, in their respective and complementary roles and competences.

1. State of play and challenges

*The case for climate ambition is unequivocal.* If unaltered, current world emission trends would lead to warming levels with consequences that are neither manageable nor compatible with today’s prosperity levels and development progress gained over decades. Extreme weather events are becoming more frequent, intense and damaging. Last year, for instance, the world witnessed a devastating drought in the Sahel compounding instability in the region. Extreme rain flash floods and landslides occurred in Bangladesh and the Philippines. Hurricane Sandy inflicted damages of more than $ 50 billion in the US alone, not to mention recent and severe droughts in the US. Yet, keeping global warming within the agreed below

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1 Non paper of the EEAS and Commission services.
2°C limit is still achievable, economically advantageous and a security imperative as demonstrated by a series of authoritative reports from the IPCC and international organisations, such as the World Bank, which in its recent "Turn down the heat" report substantiates the devastating impacts a 4°C path would have. The costs of inaction or of pursuing a "business as usual" scenario are a "wake up" call for urgent and ambition action. Neither the EU nor indeed any country would be immune to the effects of such a scenario and to the daunting costs and implications. More preventive diplomacy and political lobbying for climate ambition are needed to avoid future systemic and unmanageable crises.

UN climate negotiations are making progress and reaching a decisive phase. The challenge will be to build on the substantial but fragmented acquis and move into a single regime. Challenges underpinning the design of the 2015 Agreement are outlined in a consultative Communication by the Commission (annexed).

The EU is no longer a lonely frontrunner in terms of climate action. After Copenhagen and for the first time, a large number of countries, including the US and other major economies, but also middle and low income countries, representing all together more than 80% of global emissions, have committed internationally to domestic emission reduction efforts. Many countries have committed to pledges and have taken or are in the process of taking domestic action. While this represents a promising starting point and shows that climate action is now happening in many places, it is not sufficient to ensure a climate safe future. Even as the global economic growth slowed, human induced greenhouse gas emissions continue to rise dramatically.

EU Climate diplomacy has become more assertive and joined-up. European diplomatic leadership has played an important role in supporting and complementing the UN climate negotiating process. The 2011 joint EEAS/Commission services paper on climate diplomacy, endorsed by the FAC conclusions of July 2011, remains relevant. It is being implemented through the reinvigorated Green Diplomacy Network and other initiatives including the organisation of UN Security Council debates and other international conferences and events. The EU was also instrumental to the success of Durban, notably through the emergence of a strategic cooperation with key partner Countries sharing the EU's ambition on climate change and being vulnerable to climate change. This basis should be further strengthened in the light of the new challenges ahead of us by 2015. The fact that 2 out of the next 3 rounds of negotiations (UNFCCC COPs 19 and 21) will take place in the EU (PL in 2013 and FR in 2015) adds to the EU’s responsibilities.

2. Shaping conditions for climate ambition: the role of EU climate diplomacy

Renewed political momentum on climate change at the highest levels needs to be built including to deal with the security dimension. Success in 2015 will necessarily require the support of the highest political level, and the regular involvement of not only Environment Ministers, but also of Foreign Affairs and Development Ministers, as well as those responsible for Finance. A strategic and coordinated EU effort is needed and climate change should be addressed more systematically in bilateral contacts, but also in all relevant multilateral or plurilateral fora (e.g. G8/G20) dealing directly or indirectly with climate change. This includes further mainstreaming climate change into discussions of strategic foreign policy threats.
A staged approach up to 2015 is called for. 2013 and 2014 will need to see broad-based confidence building internationally through intensified political dialogue and exchanges and public diplomacy efforts, which should help frame national debates, in particular in our strategic partners as well as other key emerging and developing countries. For the EU this means that an even more active, strategic and concerted advocacy must be deployed. Such EU advocacy must be based on a deep understanding of partner countries’ positions, constraints and stakeholder interests, that is to say the underlying political economy that shapes the debates on climate change. Generic EU narratives will be developed linking climate change to economic development, prosperity, needed transitions as well as international security and migration, to be adapted and tailored to specific and local circumstances. This should also help preparations for the Leader’s event called for by UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon in September 2014, which in turn should help mobilise support for the 2015 UN climate conference.

The fight against climate change is a key component of sustainable development. The clear need for consistent and mutually reinforcing positions in other international processes, notably with regard to the follow-up to Rio+20 and the post-2015 development framework and related financial tracks is evident. A post 2015 Development vision will need to be fully consistent and supportive of the transition towards a low emission and energy efficient and climate resilient development. Future Sustainable Development Goals as well as the post 2015 vision should duly reflect this and support and encourage low emission actions and strategies. This will in turn facilitate the emergence of the 2015 Climate agreement.

Renewed impetus shall be given to supporting domestic policies and actions towards low emission and climate resilient economies. The EU should actively and strategically support low emission and climate resilient development and promote the strong link and coordination with disaster risk management polices at domestic level with a broad range of partners, from emerging economies to the most vulnerable countries, depending on their respective responsibilities and needs. This will be critical for the 2015 Agreement but also to generate the necessary emission reduction efforts needed to stay on track towards the 2°C objective.

A strategic alliance for ambition shall be nurtured. One key element has enabled the UNFCCC negotiations: the strategic cooperation that the EU initiated with countries sharing its vision about the overall level of ambition. This strategic cooperation with third countries forged consensus and rallied a critical mass of support for ambitious, yet realistic, outcomes. Building upon and further expanding this "coalition of ambition" will be essential to ensure a successful outcome in 2015. The EU should strengthen it further, notably through intensified dialogue on the 2015 Agreement, the "mitigation gap" and shared win-win opportunities that combine climate and economic benefits for sustainable development. EU leadership – as well as the prospects for maintaining this cooperation in the negotiations – will rest on its own capacity to develop an ambitious 2030 framework as well as its capacity to keep delivering on climate finance.

3. Suggested EU priority climate diplomacy actions

With a view to achieving the strategic diplomatic goals set out above and to contribute to fostering peace and stability the starting point would be to further operationalise the three strands of climate diplomacy that were identified in July 2011. The main points are outlined below. In addition, the EEAS and Commission services, in close collaboration with Member States, could be mandated to draw up and begin implementing as soon as possible a detailed climate diplomacy toolbox, with overall and partner-specific milestones identified out to 2015, and develop EU narratives and other tools to support this.
(i) Strand 1: climate change as a strategic priority in diplomatic dialogues and initiatives

The EU will actively use events and processes at the highest level for consistent political messaging in support of climate ambition and the 2015 objectives, in particular:

- by supporting the EU position and messaging on the UNFCCC process ahead of negotiating sessions and Conferences of the Parties;
- by raising climate as a political issue on the occasion of bilateral summits and high-level dialogues or any other relevant bilateral contacts;
- in relevant G8 and G20 work streams;
- by supporting the initiative of the UN SG Ban Ki Moon to convene a leaders’ summit on climate change in 2014;
- by thoroughly engaging the UN system as a whole, including by supporting activity in the UN Security Council, in complementarity with the UNFCCC as the central norm setting entity, and by mainstreaming climate considerations into the other relevant UN processes (such as the post-2015 development framework and Sustainable Development Goals) so as to develop a robust and mutually supportive international governance system in support of low emission development;
- by developing and deploying common narratives and concerted messaging (e.g. on climate science/IPCC reports, the nexus between climate change and low emission sustainable development the costs of inaction, on climate and security).

The EU should invest even more strategically into its bilateral relations with individual partners and groups of climate-progressive countries to ensure convergence and shared leadership on climate ambition. Special attention needs to be paid bilaterally to the largest emitters, but also to other key players or groupings, including middle income countries and the EU’s neighbours with which climate dialogue should be reinforced. Targeted strategies will need to be developed by the EU. Climate should be included as a priority area in all EU-third country/region strategies.

Extensive concerted outreach and intelligence gathering will need to be deployed by our respective diplomatic networks with coherent messages using our channels on the spot.

EU Delegations and national diplomatic networks can jointly assess, for the host country in question, national climate policies and politics, identify priority levers for influence, tailor narratives and recommend climate diplomacy initiatives to engage partner country government and civil society. Within the framework of the Green Diplomacy Network, focal points in EU Delegations have been nominated to enhance necessary coordination with Member States resources. Various financial instruments, such as the Partnership Instrument, shall be mobilised in support.

(ii) Strand 2: Support to low-emission and climate resilient development

Climate and development actions are largely intertwined, contributing to inclusive growth for sustainable human development which cannot be thought of without limiting climate change. The EU as largest provider of Official Development Assistance overall promotes a common and comprehensive approach to financing for development, including climate change actions as part of the “Agenda for Change” and consistent with the EU objective of reaching 20% of climate expenditure in the next programming cycle.

The EU needs to strengthen its overall communication of the significant support it collectively provides globally and to individual recipient countries. A compelling narrative and hard facts on EU support to climate action are crucial. As a reliable partner the EU will
want to demonstrate that previous UNFCCC decisions, such as on Adaptation, Technology and Finance, are fully implemented thereby reinforcing trust in the multilateral climate regime. Likewise, we need to strengthen the effectiveness, complementary and leveraging effect of this support at the country level through further exchanges and more transparency within the EU on the spot (including joint programming when relevant) so as to maximise synergies and avoid duplication.

**Further the integration of climate considerations in the broader aid portfolio.** We will emphasise mutually reinforcing climate and development co-benefits as well as further demonstrate that one Euro or one Dollar spent on climate or climate-related objectives can serve multiple purposes, such as energy, development and poverty eradication, biodiversity or resilience to climate impacts to take a few examples. The EU emphasises the catalytic role that ODA has in facilitating increased financing from other sources. EU should strengthen efforts to create instruments and platforms that support leveraging of financing from multiple sources, in particular from the private sector. Climate-smart investments contribute to growth, poverty reduction and low-emission, climate and disaster resilient economies. The right enabling policy environments for attracting investments from all sources is crucial in this regard. Low-emission development strategies and policy design by partner countries should be supported as part of governance reforms for inclusive growth for human development.

**(iii) Strand 3: The nexus between climate, natural resources, prosperity and security**

Climate change is a strategic threat which will have security impacts, many of which will flow from economic impacts. Climate-induced threats to natural resource security and economic stability have already started to materialise. The EU and Member States have been leading international efforts to address the issues at hand which are now also taken up by developing and emerging countries. More preventive diplomacy needs to be conducted, in particular by:

- **sharpening an EU narrative on the intricate links between climate change, international and human security** and natural resource scarcity and on how these links shape future prosperity, stability and development. This includes examination of climate impacts in developed, as well as vulnerable, countries. Specific communication tools should by elaborated and updated as appropriate;

- **continued awareness raising** at the highest political level internationally, notably within the UN system, in other regional bodies and by encouraging developing and emerging countries to address the issues, including through continuing the series of climate security conferences in different host cities building on the recent conference in South Korea. The UN Secretary-General could be encouraged to nominate a UN climate security envoy. Further discussion in the UN Security Council should be promoted;

- **raising climate and resource (water) security in bilateral political dialogues** with particularly vulnerable countries and regions. Priorities for targeted bilateral outreach would be defined and regularly reviewed through the *ad hoc* steering group on climate security under the Green Diplomacy Network in coherence with other existing groups working on related matters;

- **engaging with business** on how climate change-induced risk is affecting business continuity and/or revenues via supply chains, insurance costs or other channels;

- **engaging with low-emission and climate-progressive business organisations**;

- **engaging with institutional investors** *(asset holders such as public pension funds funding large-scale infrastructure)* whose investment decisions are crucial for transitioning the
world economy into a low-emission future and preventing lock-in in high-carbon and resource-inefficient infrastructure;

- **elaborating and sharing of briefing, outreach and training material on climate** and resource security among EU diplomatic networks, and where relevant, tasking of EU and MS diplomatic networks to generate early warning information on related risks;

- **coordinating with EU and international initiatives to continue to assess and manage climate and resource security risks** (such as EU policies on disaster risk reduction, and at the UN level through the Hyogo Framework for Action on DRR or the ENVSEC consortium).