AUCTIONS BY THE TRANSITIONAL COMMON AUCTION PLATFORM

The world’s largest auctioning of emissions allowances

June 2014
In 2013, more than 40% of allowances allocated under the EU ETS have been auctioned instead of being allocated free of charge. Auctioning emission allowances at that scale is unprecedented and delivers valuable experience for auction design in other carbon markets and for other environmental assets.

Auctioning is the most transparent method of allocating allowances and puts into practice the principle that the polluter should pay. With some limited exceptions, from 2013 electricity generators must buy all their allowances: experience shows that they have been able to pass on the notional cost of allowances to customers even when they received them for free.

Most of the allowances to be auctioned are allocated to States on the basis of their historical share of emissions from EU ETS installations. Ten per cent are allocated to the least wealthy EU member states and the remaining 2% is given as a ‘Kyoto bonus’ to nine EU member states which had most reduced their greenhouse gas emissions.

At least half of auctioning revenues, and all of the revenues from auctioning allowances to the aviation sector, should be used to combat climate change in Europe or other countries.

EEX (Leipzig) conducts the auctions for 26 Member States covering about two thirds of the total auctioned volume. For the remaining volume, Germany and the United Kingdom have appointed EEX and ICE Futures Europe (ICE, London) respectively.

For further information: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/auctioning/index_en.htm
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Editor’s note: This report has been prepared by the Commission on behalf of the following Member States: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croat Republic, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. These Member States have approved this report under the rules in the Joint Procurement Agreement to procure common auction platforms (except for Poland, whose comments were requested separately). The report complies with the requirement laid down in the fourth subparagraph of Article 10(4) of Directive 2003/87/EC.¹

Methodology: The report is based on the reports submitted by EEX, on the discussions in regular meetings between the Commission, its advisors and EEX and on any further relevant information available to the Commission. The authors of the report did not actively verify EEX’s compliance with the specific rules and provisions applicable under European or national law.

For reasons of confidentiality and proper enforcement of the applicable rules, the report refers to reporting on the auctions held based on information provided by EEX. Any data not directly related to the auctions is based only on public reporting and not on any non-public reports.

Disclaimer: The authors have made every effort to ensure that the information provided is complete, correct and precise for the reporting period. Nevertheless, the report is based on limited information available to the authors in a market context where much information has to remain confidential. The authors did not actively verify the information. Therefore, the authors and the Member States on whose behalf this report was drafted deny any responsibility or liability whatsoever for its contents, regardless of the nature of such contents. Any reliance by any person or entity on the information provided in this report is solely at that person’s or entity’s own risk.

Glossary: terms and expressions written in italics are included in the glossary.

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Executive summary

This report covers the auctioning of emissions allowances in the period June 2014. In that period, EEX, in its capacity as the common auction platform, auctioned a total of 22 476 000 EU general emission allowances (‘EUAs’) in 12 auctions for the third trading period on behalf of those EU Member States that participate in the transitional common auction platform (participating Member States).

All auctions were held securely and smoothly and no irregularities or deviations from the requirements were observed. Generally, the auction clearing price was in line with the price signal in the secondary market. The table below contains a summary of the information concerning the conducted auctions.

During the reporting period, EEX did not hold any auction for EU aviation allowances (‘EUAAs’). In response to the positive developments at the ICAO Assembly in October 2013, the EU decided to restrict the coverage of the ETS for aviation to emissions from flights within the European Economic Area (EEA) for the period up to 2016. Following the amendment to the EU ETS rules for aviation, auctioning of aviation allowances is expected to restart in September 2014.

The June auctions at a glance:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General</th>
<th>June 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total volume auctioned (EUA)</td>
<td>22 476 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount raised from the auctions (€)</td>
<td>124 329 740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average clearing price (€/EUA)</td>
<td>5.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total bid volume</td>
<td>136 372 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cover ratio</td>
<td>6.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participation</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of eligible bidders</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of participating bidders</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of successful bidders</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average number of bidders per auction</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average number of successful bidders per</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>auction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Auction data</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average total volume bid per bidder</td>
<td>660 901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average bid size (volume per bid)</td>
<td>124 763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average volume won per bidder</td>
<td>180 673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average range of bids (€)</td>
<td>3.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Section 1. Results of the auctions

During the month of June 2014, EEX, in its capacity as the transitional common auction platform, auctioned, in 12 auctions, a total of 22 476 000 EUAs valid for the third trading period on behalf of all participating Member States.

The total amount raised from the 12 auctions held during the reporting period was EUR 124 329 740 (see Graph 1 and Table 1). Taking into account the volumes per auction, the weighted average clearing price during the reporting period was EUR 5.53 per EUA. This is an increase of EUR 0.512 per EUA compared with the previous reporting period.

Graph 1 Total auction revenue per auction (euro).
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Graph 2 Auction revenues per auction as from July 2013.

The total amount raised from the auctions held between 13 November 2012 and 30 June 2014 was EUR 3,907,214,035 (see Table 1).

Table 1 Auction revenues per Member State (euro)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member State</th>
<th>13 November 2012 – 31 May 2014</th>
<th>June 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>93,044,920</td>
<td>3,584,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>162,719,310</td>
<td>6,472,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>99,668,285</td>
<td>1,559,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>2,359,150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>129,380,355</td>
<td>862,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>80,775,260</td>
<td>3,219,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>24,337,630</td>
<td>132,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>227,830,540</td>
<td>8,894,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>577,117,360</td>
<td>22,104,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>111,755,750</td>
<td>4,281,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>365,678,610</td>
<td>14,006,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>66,828,110</td>
<td>3,850,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>59,228,015</td>
<td>2,389,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>643,833,710</td>
<td>24,693,360</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Auction volume</th>
<th>Bid volume</th>
<th>Cover ratio</th>
<th>Bidders</th>
<th>Successful bidders</th>
<th>Price</th>
<th>Revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 2014</td>
<td>22 476 000</td>
<td>136 372 000</td>
<td>6.07*</td>
<td>17.58*</td>
<td>10.75*</td>
<td>€ 5.53*</td>
<td>€ 124 329 740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2014</td>
<td>20 766 500</td>
<td>133 689 500</td>
<td>6.44**</td>
<td>17.36**</td>
<td>11.72**</td>
<td>€ 5.018**</td>
<td>€ 104 208 535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2014</td>
<td>23 130 000</td>
<td>177 597 500</td>
<td>7.68</td>
<td>17.67*</td>
<td>10.83*</td>
<td>€ 5.19*</td>
<td>€ 119 948 325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2014</td>
<td>42 048 500</td>
<td>280 163 000</td>
<td>6.66**</td>
<td>17.35**</td>
<td>11.75**</td>
<td>€ 6.42**</td>
<td>€ 269 929 405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2014</td>
<td>52 667 000</td>
<td>216 991 500</td>
<td>4.12**</td>
<td>19.68**</td>
<td>14.30**</td>
<td>€ 6.38**</td>
<td>€ 336 162 075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2013</td>
<td>39 078 000</td>
<td>130 983 000</td>
<td>3.35**</td>
<td>21.48**</td>
<td>16.09**</td>
<td>€ 4.61**</td>
<td>€ 180 068 050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2013</td>
<td>56 161 000</td>
<td>225 489 500</td>
<td>4.01**</td>
<td>19.91**</td>
<td>15.01**</td>
<td>€ 4.50**</td>
<td>€ 252 482 700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2013</td>
<td>59 642 500</td>
<td>248 905 500</td>
<td>4.17**</td>
<td>20.16**</td>
<td>15.72**</td>
<td>€ 4.85**</td>
<td>€ 289 295 510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2013</td>
<td>55 982 500</td>
<td>175 589 000</td>
<td>3.14**</td>
<td>14.13**</td>
<td>19.36**</td>
<td>€ 5.18**</td>
<td>€ 289 930 690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2013</td>
<td>19 453 500</td>
<td>93 944 000</td>
<td>4.83*</td>
<td>16.73*</td>
<td>9.82*</td>
<td>€ 4.39*</td>
<td>€ 85 400 865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2013</td>
<td>48 461 000</td>
<td>175 212 000</td>
<td>3.62*</td>
<td>17.64*</td>
<td>12.36*</td>
<td>€ 4.19*</td>
<td>€ 203 155 435</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* average

**volume-weighted average (when the volume of allowances sold varied between auctions within a month, see auction volumes in Annex I)

Auctioning Member States

At the start of the reporting period, the auctioneers of the participating Member States had been admitted and recognised by EEX/ECC and were participating in the auctions.

In accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 30(7) of the Auctioning Regulation, pending the procurement, appointment and listing of its opt-out auction platform, Poland contracted EEX to auction its share of allowances to be auctioned. These auctions started on 16 September 2013. Due to the back-loading, no auctions were held for Poland in June 2014.

On 1 July 2013, Croatia joined the European Union, and it has become a party to the Joint Procurement Agreements so as to auction its share of allowances on EEX. Croatia has however not
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established the necessary arrangement for the auctioneer to be admitted and recognised by EEX and ECC. Hence, the starting date remains to be determined.

The Member States of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) that are Party to the European Economic Area (EEA)\(^3\) have also stated their intention to make use of the transitional common auction platform by aggregating their volumes to those auctioned on behalf of the participating Member States. The preparations for this are on-going.

Auction clearing price

During the period under consideration, the auction clearing price for the EUAs moved between EUR 4.94 and EUR 5.84 per allowance (see Graph 3). The lowest auction clearing price in this reporting period is EUR 0.35 above the lowest auction clearing price during the previous reporting period. The highest auction clearing price in this reporting period is EUR 0.56 per allowance above the highest auction clearing price of the previous reporting period.

Graph 3 Auction Clearing Price (ACP) & maximum prices bid & minimum prices bid [euro/ton].

For all auctions, the clearing prices were within a range of EUR 0.05 or less from the mean of the best-ask and best-bid prices on the EEX secondary market for spot emission allowances and in average equal to the average of that mean. In general, the auction clearing prices were also in line with the prices of carbon products on other trading venues, and with the clearing prices of other auctions of emission allowances conducted during the period.

\(^3\) Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.
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The auction clearing price showed a slightly upward trend during the reporting period.

Maximum and minimum prices bid

The highest prices bid in the auctions were on average EUR 0.35 per EUA above the clearing price (see Graph 3).

The lowest prices bid in the auctions were on average EUR 3.58 per EUA below the clearing price (see Annex I for the data per auction).

The range of bids (average difference between the maximum price bid and the minimum price bid) in the auctions was EUR 0.52 higher than the difference for the auctions conducted in the preceding month (see Annex I).

Graph 4 Auction clearing price, maximum bid and minimum bid as from July 2013.

Cover ratio

The cover ratio — the bid volume as a proportion of the available volume in the auctions — (see Graph 5) moved between 4 and 8.21 during the reporting period. The average was about 5.7 % lower than the average cover ratio during the previous reporting period. The lowest cover ratio during the reporting period was 4 at the auction of 19 June 2014\(^4\) with the highest cover ratio being 8.21 at the auction of 24 June 2014.

\(^4\) 19 June was a public holiday in some regions of Germany and in other countries.
Graph 5 Cover ratio: bid volume versus available volume.

Graph 6 Cover ratio as from July 2013: bid volume versus available volume.
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Number of Bidders

The number of active bidders per auction ranged from 11 to 22 (see Graph 7). The average number of active bidders was 18, which is slightly more than the average number of active bidders during the previous reporting period. Overall, the number of active bidders per auction did not show a clear upward or downward trend during the reporting period.

The number of successful bidders per auction ranged from 8 to 15 during the reporting period. The average number of successful bidders was 11, one less than the average number of successful bidders during the previous reporting period. Overall, the number of successful bidders per auction did not show a clear upward or downward trend during the reporting period.

Graph 7 Number of bidders and number of successful bidders.

In total, 33 different bidders participated in the auction (see Graph 8). Five of them participated in all auctions during the reporting period. Fourteen of them participated only in four or fewer auctions during the reporting period.
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**Graph 8** Number of auctions in which each bidder participated (bidders are identified by numbers).

**Graph 9** Number of bidders and successful bidders as from July 2013.
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Average bid volume per bidder and average volume won by successful bidders

The total volume of bids for the 12 auctions amounted to 136 372 000 EUAs, which is 2% more than the previous period. With 33 bidders during the month, this makes an average of 4 132 485 EUAs per bidder. Per auction, the average total bid volume per bidder ranged from 360 000 to 863 308 EUAs during the reporting period (see Graph 10), with average of 660 091, which is 4.96% lower than the average in May 2014. This average did not show a clear upward or downward trend during the reporting period. The standard deviation of the average total bid volume per bidder for the individual auctions ranged from 487 650 to 1 089 985, and over the entire month was 5 824 601.

The average bid size ranged from 80 207 to 153 740 per auction, with an average of 124 763. This average was about 2.89% higher than during the previous reporting period. The average number of bids per bidder ranged from 3.86 to 7.93 per auction, with an average of 5.33.

The total volume auctioned amounted to 22 476 000 EUAs. With 29 successful bidders during the month, this makes an average of 775 034 EUAs per successful bidder, which is 10.4% lower than the average in May 2014. Per individual auction, the average volume won by successful bidders ranged from 124 867 to 234 125 EUA, with average of 180 673 which is 9.2% higher than the average in May. This average did not show a clear upward or downward trend during the reporting period. The standard deviation ranged from 109 829 to 322 491, and over the entire month was 1 100 803.

Graph 10 Average bid volume and volume won per bidder.
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Graph 11 Average bid volume and volume won per bidder as from July 2013.

Volume of successful bids per bidder category

During the reporting period almost all bidders bid on their own account, with 0.11% of the volume submitted by intermediaries on behalf of a client. Operators, including business groupings of operators, accounted for about 63.4% of the total auctioned volume during the reporting period, compared to 62.8% in May 2014 (see Graph 12).

Investment firms, including persons exempt, accounted for about 22.1% of the total auctioned volume during the reporting period, compared to 22% in May 2014.

Credit institutions accounted for about 14.4% of the total auctioned volume during the reporting period, compared to 15.1% in May 2014.

However, the shares of successful bids per category showed some fluctuations over the period. The standard deviation of the shares was 18%, 8%, 13% and 5% for operators (including business groupings of operators), investment firms, credit institutions and persons exempt respectively.
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**Graph 12**: Volume of successful bids per bidder category.

**Graph 13**: Volume of successful bids per bidder category as from May 2013.
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The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is used by EEX to measure market concentration. The HHI is calculated as the sum of the squares of all successful bidders’ shares (in %) of the total auctioned volume per auction. The HHI ranges from a value of 0 (perfect competition) to 10 000 (a single monopolistic buyer).

A common interpretation of the HHI is that a score below 1 500 is ‘not-concentrated’, between 1 500 and 2 500 is ‘moderately concentrated,’ and above 2 500 is ‘highly concentrated’.

In general, the HHI moved between about 1 100 and 3 800 (see Graph 14) and the average HHI during the reporting period was 2 086. The HHI calculated as the sum of the squares of all successful bidders’ shares (in %) of the total auctioned volume in the reporting period was 1 040.

Graph 14 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.
Section 2. Implementation of and compliance with the applicable rules

Fair and open access

EEX verified that each auction participant belonged to one of the categories of eligible bidders set out in Article 18 of the Auctioning Regulation. During the reporting period, the number of eligible bidders was 66. Most of the active participants in the carbon market are assumed to have been admitted to bid in the auctions5.

Of the 66 companies eligible to bid in the auctions (including auction only participants), 45 were EU ETS operators, 10 were investment firms and 7 were credit institutions (see Table 3). The 4 other companies eligible to bid in the auctions were persons exempt from the authorisation requirements in EU financial law, because their trading and investment services activities are only ancillary to their main business (Article 2(1)(i) of Directive 2004/39/EC), that were authorised under national legislation implementing the Auctioning Regulation to bid for allowances in the auctions.

Throughout the period, EEX actively promoted the auctions in view of attracting bidders.

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5 This assessment is based on the auction participants’ activity in EEX’s secondary market and general market knowledge of EEX
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Table 3 Eligible bidders per category at the end of the reporting period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of participants</th>
<th>Operators</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stationary</td>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>Investment firms</td>
<td>Credit Institutions</td>
<td>Business groupings</td>
<td>Persons exempt From MiFID requirements (Article 2(1)(i) Directive 2004/39/EC)</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants admitted to EEX’s emissions spot secondary market</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>117</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants eligible to bid in the auctions</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Of which:) Participants eligible to bid in the auctions on behalf of clients</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Of which:) Auction-only participants</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Four of the admitted participants made use of the option of ‘auction-only access’ to the auctions.

No irregularities or deviations from the admission and access requirements were found.

Transparency
The results were published in accordance with Article 61 of the Auctioning Regulation, not later than 15 minutes after the close of the bidding window.

EEX revised its webpage on auctioning where necessary for keeping it up to date.

Technical and operational aspects
No irregularities or deviations from the requirements were found as regards the auctions themselves or the clearing and settlement processes.

EEX’s Market Surveillance department surveyed all auctions with a view to detecting any market abuse, money laundering, terrorist financing or other criminal activities. No such wrongdoing was publicly reported. EEX’s Market Surveillance department takes its instructions only from SMWA (Saxony’s Ministry for Economy and Employment) and is independent of the exchange itself.

No infringements of the confidentiality requirements were identified.

Other aspects
No problems or issues were identified as regards coordination of the auctions between the various auction platforms.
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Section 3. Overview of, and any updates on breaches of provisions or ongoing proceedings

No breaches or problems of non-conformity were reported. There were no proceedings on such breaches or problems of non-conformity dating from before the reporting period.

Approval of the report

Comments of the auction platform on the draft of this report and the way they have been taken into account

EEX made no comments on the report.

Date of approval by the Member States: 18 August 2014

Place & date: Brussels, 19 August 2014
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Glossary

Auction calendar
Document setting out the bidding windows, individual volumes and auction dates of the auctions in a given calendar year. See Articles 11, 13 and 32 of the Auctioning Regulation.

Auction-only access
Access to the auctions without becoming a member of or participant in other markets organised by the auction platform.

Auctioning Regulation

Auctioneer
Entity appointed by a Member State that offers the allowances to be auctioned to the auction platform and receives the auction proceeds due to the appointing Member State. See Articles 22 and 23 of the Auctioning Regulation.

Back-loading

Best-bid and best-ask prices
The best-bid price is the highest price any buyer is willing to pay and the best-ask price is the lowest price any seller is willing to accept.

Business groupings
Groupings of operators or aircraft operators. See Article 18(1)(d) of the Auctioning Regulation.

Bidding window
Time during which bidders can submit bids. See Article 8(1) of the Auctioning Regulation.

Clearing
Processes preceding the opening of the bidding window, during the bidding window and following the closure of the bidding window until settlement, involving the management of any risks arising during that interval including margining, netting or novation or any other services carried out possibly by a clearing or settlement system. See Article 3(31) of the Auctioning Regulation.

Cover ratio
Total bid volume divided by the available volume in the auction.

Credit institution
Credit institution as defined in EU legislation on credit institutions (Article 4(1) of Directive 2006/48/EC).

ETS Directive
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EU general allowance (EUA) Allowance to emit one tonne of CO2-equivalent, see Article 3(a) of the ETS Directive.

EU aviation allowance (EUAA) Allowance to emit one tonne of CO2-equivalent that can be used by aircraft operators. See Article 12(2a) and (3) of the ETS Directive.


Participating Member States All EU Member States except Germany, Poland and the UK, which decided to opt out from the joint procurement of a common auction platform pursuant to Article 30 of the Auctioning Regulation.

Persons exempt Persons exempt from the authorisation requirements in EU financial law because their trading and investment services activities are only ancillary to their main business (Article 2(1)(i) of Directive 2004/39/EC) and that have been authorised under national legislation implementing the rules laid down in the Auctioning Regulation to bid for allowances in the auctions. See Article 18(2) of the Auctioning Regulation.

Secondary market Market in which persons buy or sell allowances either before or after they are allocated either free of charge or through auctioning. To be distinguished from the ‘primary market’, which consists of the auctions of allowances.

Settlement Payment on delivery of the allowances. See Article 3(34) of the Auctioning Regulation.

Spot secondary market Secondary market for allowances with delivery within 5 days from the transaction.


TARGET-2 bank account Bank account in the TARGET2 system, which is an interbank payment system for real-time processing of cross-border transfers throughout the European Union. TARGET2 replaced TARGET (Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System) in November 2007.
### Third trading period

The period 2013-2020. Allowances are valid during a given period without distinction as regards the year within that period. See Article 13 of the *ETS Directive*. 

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**Auctions by the transitional common auction platform**

**June 2014**
Annex 1 Results of individual auctions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Auction Price €/tCO2</th>
<th>Minimal Price €/tCO2</th>
<th>Maximal Price €/tCO2</th>
<th>Mean €/tCO2</th>
<th>Median €/tCO2</th>
<th>Auction Volume tCO2</th>
<th>Total Amount of Bids</th>
<th>Cover Ratio</th>
<th>Total Number of Bidders</th>
<th>Number of Successful Bidders</th>
<th>Total Revenue €</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>