Auctions by the transitional common auction platform
6th Report
August 2013

Auction platform: European Energy Exchange (EEX)

Auction dates/reporting period:
1, 5, 6, 8, 12, 13, 19, 20, 22, 27, 29 August 2013
Editor's note: This report has been prepared by the Commission with the assistance of DLA Piper UK LLP and CEFIN BV, who are working under a contract for the Commission, on behalf of the following Member States: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. These Member States have approved this report under the rules in the Joint Procurement Agreement to procure common auction platforms. The report complies with the requirement laid down in the fourth subparagraph of Article 10(4) of Directive 2003/87/EC.¹

Methodology: The report is based on the reports submitted by EEX, on the discussions in regular meetings between the Commission, its advisors and EEX and on any further relevant information available to the Commission. The authors of the report did not actively verify EEX’s compliance with the specific rules and provisions applicable under European or national law.

For reasons of confidentiality and proper enforcement of the applicable rules, the report refers only to public reporting on the auctions and not to any non-public reports.

Disclaimer: The authors have made every effort to ensure that the information provided is complete, correct and precise for the reporting period. Nevertheless, the report is based on limited information available to the authors in a market context where much information has to remain confidential. The authors did not actively verify the information. Therefore, the authors and the Member States on whose behalf this report was drafted deny any responsibility or liability whatsoever for its contents, regardless of the nature of such contents. Any reliance by any person or entity on the information provided in this report is solely at that person’s or entity’s own risk.

Glossary: terms and expressions written in italics are included in the glossary.

Executive summary

This report covers the auctioning of emissions allowances in the period August 2013. In that period, EEX, in its capacity as the common auction platform, auctioned a total of 19,453,500 EU general emission allowances (‘EUAs’) for the third trading period on behalf of those EU Member States that participate in the transitional common auction platform (participating Member States). As stipulated in the Auction Regulation, the volume auctioned in auctions held in August is half of the volumes auctioned in auctions held in the other months of the year.

The total amount raised from the 11 auctions held during the reporting period was EUR 85,400,865. Taking into account the volumes per auction, the weighted average clearing price during the reporting period was EUR 4.39 per EUA.

During the reporting period 52 bidders were eligible to bid in the auctions, of which 35 qualified as operators in the EU ETS.

All auctions were held securely and smoothly and no irregularities or deviations from the requirements were observed.

Generally, the auction clearing price was in line with the price signal in the secondary market. Both prices increased at the start of the reporting period, decreased during the middle of the period and picked up again at the end of the reporting period.

During the reporting period, EEX did not hold any auction for EU aviation allowances (‘EUAAs’) as these auctions were put on hold following the Commission’s proposal for a derogation for aircraft operators with respect to flights into and out of the EU in 2012 (the ‘stop-the-clock’ proposal). This proposal was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council on 24 April 2013.2

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Section 1. Results of the auctions

During the month of August 2013, EEX, in its capacity as the transitional common auction platform, auctioned a total of 19,453,500 EU general emission allowances (‘EUAs’) valid for the third trading period on behalf of all 24 EU Member States that have contracted EEX and appointed it as the transitional common auction platform. As stipulated in the Auction Regulation, the volume auctioned in individual auctions held in August was half the volume auctioned in auctions held in the other months of the year, i.e. 1,768,500 for each August auction.

The total amount raised from the 11 auctions held during the reporting period was EUR 85,400,865 (see Graph 1 and Table 1). Taking into account the volumes per auction, the weighted average clearing price during the reporting period was EUR 4.39 per EUA. This is an increase of EUR 0.20 per EUA compared with the previous reporting period.

Graph 1 Total auction revenue per auction (euro)
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Table 1 Auction revenues per Member State (euro)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>August</th>
<th>August</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2,221,340</td>
<td>2,414,500</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
<td>4,056,360</td>
<td>15,428,655</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2,100,615</td>
<td>772,640</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>193,160</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>5,408,480</td>
<td>410,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2,004,035</td>
<td>169,015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>531,190</td>
<td>5,360,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>5,553,350</td>
<td>2,824,965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>13,835,085</td>
<td>4,901,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2,680,095</td>
<td>1,448,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>8,764,635</td>
<td>700,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1,158,960</td>
<td>2,462,790</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Detailed information per auction can be found in Annex I.

Auctioning Member States

At the start of the reporting period, all the auctioneers of all 24 participating Member States had been admitted and recognised by EEX/ECC and were participating in the auctions.

In accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 30(7) of the Auctioning Regulation, pending the procurement, appointment and listing of its opt-out auction platform, Poland contracted EEX to auction its share of allowances to be auctioned. These auctions started on 16 September 2013 and will be covered as from the next report.

As from 1 July 2013, Croatia has joined the European Union, which enabled it to become a party to the Joint Procurement Agreements so as to auction its share of allowances on EEX. The preparations for this are on-going. The start date remains to be determined.

The Member States of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) that are Party to the European Economic Area (EEA) have also stated their intention to make use of the transitional common auction platform. The Commission is currently discussing the arrangements for the use of the platform with these States. It is not yet clear when the transitional common auction platform will start to auction allowances for the EEA-EFTA States.

3 In accordance with the Auctioning Regulation, half of the 'early auctions' for 2012 and all allowances allocated free of charge to electricity operators on a transitional basis pursuant to Article 10c of the ETS Directive are to be subtracted from the volume to be auctioned by a Member State. For these reasons, until the end of 2013 no allowances are to be auctioned for Cyprus.

4 Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.
Auction clearing price

During the period under consideration, the auction clearing price for the EUAs moved between EUR 4.28 and EUR 4.57 per allowance (see Graph 2). The lowest auction clearing price in this reporting period is EUR 0.29 above the lowest auction clearing price during the previous reporting period. The highest auction clearing price in this reporting period is EUR 0.02 per allowance above the highest auction clearing price of the previous reporting period.

Graph 2: Auction Clearing Price (ACP) & Maximum bid & Minimum prices bid [euro/ton]

For all auctions, the auction clearing prices were equal to, or between, the best-ask and best-bid prices on the EEX secondary market for spot Phase-3 emission allowances. In general, the auction clearing prices were also in line with the prices of carbon products (spot and futures) on other trading venues, and with the clearing prices of other auctions of emission allowances conducted during the period.

During the reporting period the price volatility was significantly lower than during the previous reporting periods. The price movements did not show a clear upward or downward trend during the reporting period.

Maximum and minimum prices bid

The highest prices bid in the auctions were on average EUR 0.10 per EUA above the clearing price (see Graph 2).
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The lowest prices bid in the auctions were on average EUR 1.96 per EUA below the clearing price. This difference was relatively small for the first three auctions and rather stable for the remainder of the reporting period.

The difference between the maximum price bid and the minimum price bid in the auctions varied with the lowest values during the first three auctions in the reporting period. The average was higher compared to the average for the auctions conducted in the preceding month.

**Cover ratio**

The cover ratio — the bid volume as a proportion of the available volume in the auction — (see Graph 3) moved in general between a value of 3 and just over 6 during the reporting period. The average was about 30% higher than the cover ratio during the previous reporting period, but account should be taken of the lower volumes auctioned in August. The lowest cover ratio during the reporting period was 3.32 at the auction of 13 August 2013 with the highest cover ratio being 6.14 at the auction of 1 August.

**Graph 3** Cover ratio: bid volume versus available volume

The number of active bidders (see Graph 4) per auction ranged from 13 to 19. The average number of active bidders was 17, which is one less than the average number of active bidders during the previous reporting period. The number of successful bidders per auction ranged from 5 to 14 during
the reporting period. The average number of successful bidders was 10, which is two less than the average number of successful bidders during the previous reporting period.

Overall, the number of active bidders per auction showed a slight downward trend during the reporting period. The number of successful bidders per auction showed a clear downward trend during the reporting period.

**Graph 4 Number of bidders and number of successful bidders**

![](image)

**Average volume per bidder and average volume won by successful bidders**

The average bid volume per bidder (see Graph 5) ranged from 326,111 to 649,875 EUAs. The average bid volume per bidder showed a slight downward trend during the reporting period.

The average volume won by successful bidders ranged from 126,321 to 353,700 EUAs. The average volume won by successful bidders showed a slight upward trend during the reporting period.

The average bid volume per bidder and the average volumes won by successful bidders during the reporting period was about 40% lower than during the previous reporting period. Again, it should be noted that the volume auctioned in August was half of the volumes auctioned in the other months of the year.
During the reporting period almost all bidders bid on their own account with only about 0.2% of the bid volume being submitted by intermediaries on behalf of a client. Operators, including business groupings of operators, accounted for about 40% of the total auctioned volume during the reporting period (see Graph 6).

Investment firms, including persons exempt, accounted for almost 20% of the total auctioned volume during the reporting period.

Credit institutions accounted for about 40% of the total auctioned volume during the reporting period.

Overall, compared to the previous month, the share of the operators decreased with about 8% and the share of investment firms, including persons exempt, decreased with about 3%. The share of the credit institutions increased with about 11%. For individual auctions, the fluctuations of these shares are relatively significant, though.
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is used by EEX to measure market concentration. The HHI is calculated as the sum of the squares of all successful bidders’ shares (in %) of the total auctioned volume. The HHI ranges from a value of 0 (perfect competition) to 10 000 (a single monopolistic buyer).

A common interpretation of the HHI is that a score below 1500 is ‘not-concentrated’, between 1500 and 2500 is ‘moderately concentrated,’ and above 2500 is ‘highly concentrated’.

Apart from a spike of 5282 for the auction of 22 August 2013, the HHI moved between 1100 and 2800. The average HHI during the reporting period, including the aforementioned spike, was 2105 (see Graph 7). This is higher than the average level during the previous reporting period, which was 1675. Without the spike the average HHI during the reporting period would have been 1790.
Fair and open access

EEX verified that each auction participant belonged to one of the categories of eligible bidders set out in Article 18 of the Auctioning Regulation. During the reporting period, the number of bidders admitted to the auctions increased from 49 to 52. Most of the active participants in the carbon market are assumed to have been admitted to bid in the auctions.

Of the 52 companies eligible to bid in the auctions 35 were EU ETS operators, 8 were investment firms and 6 were credit institutions (see Table 2). The 3 other companies eligible to bid in the auctions were persons exempt from the authorisation requirements in EU financial law, because their trading and investment services activities are only ancillary to their main business (Article 2(1)(i) of Directive 2004/39/EC), that were authorised under national legislation implementing the Auctioning Regulation to bid for allowances in the auctions.

Throughout the period, EEX actively promoted the auctions in view of attracting bidders.
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**Table 2** Eligible bidders per category at the end of the reporting period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of participants</th>
<th>Operators</th>
<th>Investment firms</th>
<th>Credit institutions</th>
<th>Business groupings</th>
<th>Persons exempt From MiFID requirements (Article 2(1)(i) Directive 2004/39/EC)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Participants admitted to EEX’s emissions spot secondary market</em></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Participants eligible to bid in the auctions</em></td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(of which:) Participants eligible to bid in the auctions on behalf of clients</em></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(of which:) Auction-only participants</em></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of the admitted participants made use of the option of ‘auction-only access’ to the auctions. Most bids were submitted by the bidder; only about 0.2% of the bids were submitted by intermediaries on behalf of a client.

No irregularities or deviations from the admission and access requirements were found.

**Transparency**

All auction results were published in accordance with Article 61 of the Auctioning Regulation, never later than 15 minutes after the close of the bidding window.

There was no need to adjust the auction calendar during the reporting period.

EEX revised its webpage on auctioning where necessary for keep it up to date.

**Technical and operational aspects**

No irregularities or deviations from the requirements were found as regards the auctions themselves or the clearing and settlement processes.

EEX’s Market Surveillance department surveyed all auctions with a view to detecting any market abuse, money laundering, terrorist financing or other criminal activities. No such wrongdoing was publicly reported. EEX’s Market Surveillance department takes its instructions only from SMWA (Saxony’s Ministry for Economy and Employment) and is independent of the exchange itself.

No infringements of the confidentiality requirements were identified.

**Other aspects**

No problems or issues were identified as regards coordination of the auctions between the various auction platforms.
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Section 3. Overview of, and any updates on breaches of provisions or ongoing proceedings

No breaches or problems of non-conformity were reported. There were no proceedings on such breaches or problems of non-conformity dating from before the reporting period.

Approval of the report

Comments of the auction platform on the draft of this report and the way they have been taken into account

EEX made no comments on the report.

Date of approval by the Member States: 14 October 2013

Place & date: Brussels, 21 October 2013
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Glossary

Auction calendar
Document setting out the bidding windows, individual volumes and auction dates of the auctions in a given calendar year. See Articles 11, 13 and 32 of the Auctioning Regulation.

Auction-only access
Access to the auctions without becoming a member of or participant in other markets organised by the auction platform.

Auctioning Regulation

Auctioneer
Entity appointed by a Member State that offers the allowances to be auctioned to the auction platform and receives the auction proceeds due to the appointing Member State. See Articles 22 and 23 of the Auctioning Regulation.

Back-loading

Best-bid and best-ask prices
The best-bid price is the highest price any buyer is willing to pay and the best-ask price is the lowest price any seller is willing to accept.

Business groupings
Groupings of operators or aircraft operators. See Article 18(1)(d) of the Auctioning Regulation.

Bidding window
Time during which bidders can submit bids. See Article 8(1) of the Auctioning Regulation.

Clearing
Processes preceding the opening of the bidding window, during the bidding window and following the closure of the bidding window until settlement, involving the management of any risks arising during that interval including margining, netting or novation or any other services carried out possibly by a clearing or settlement system. See Article 3(31) of the Auctioning Regulation.

Cover ratio
Total bid volume divided by the available volume in the auction.

Credit institution
Credit institution as defined in EU legislation on credit institutions (Article 4(1) of Directive 2006/48/EC).

ETS Directive
EU general allowance (EUA) Allowance to emit one tonne of CO2-equivalent, see Article 3(a) of the ETS Directive.

EU aviation allowance (EUAA) Allowance to emit one tonne of CO2-equivalent that can be used by aircraft operators. See Article 12(2a) and (3) of the ETS Directive.


Participating Member States All EU Member States except Germany, Poland and the UK, which decided to opt out from the joint procurement of a common auction platform pursuant to Article 30 of the Auctioning Regulation.

Persons exempt Persons exempt from the authorisation requirements in EU financial law because their trading and investment services activities are only ancillary to their main business (Article 2(1)(i) of Directive 2004/39/EC) and that have been authorised under national legislation implementing the rules laid down in the Auctioning Regulation to bid for allowances in the auctions. See Article 18(2) of the Auctioning Regulation.

Secondary market Market in which persons buy or sell allowances either before or after they are allocated either free of charge or through auctioning. To be distinguished from the ‘primary market’, which consists of the auctions of allowances.

Settlement Payment on delivery of the allowances. See Article 3(34) of the Auctioning Regulation.

Spot secondary market Secondary market for allowances with delivery within 5 days from the transaction.


TARGET-2 bank account Bank account in the TARGET2 system, which is an interbank payment system for real-time processing of cross-border transfers throughout the European Union. TARGET2 replaced TARGET (Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System) in November 2007.

Third trading period The period 2013-2020. Allowances are valid during a given period without distinction as regards the year within that period. See Article 13 of the ETS Directive.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Auction Price €/tCO2</th>
<th>Minimal Price €/tCO2</th>
<th>Maximal Price €/tCO2</th>
<th>Mean Price €/tCO2</th>
<th>Median Price €/tCO2</th>
<th>Auction Volume tCO2</th>
<th>Total Amount of Bids</th>
<th>Cover Ratio</th>
<th>Total Number of Bidders</th>
<th>Total Number of Successful Bidders</th>
<th>Total Revenue €</th>
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<tr>
<td>29-8-2013</td>
<td>4.57</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>1 768 500</td>
<td>9 412 000</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>4.36</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>3.90</td>
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<td>4.27</td>
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<td>3.32</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7 569 180</td>
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<td>1.99</td>
<td>4.54</td>
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<td>4.38</td>
<td>1 768 500</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>7 781 400</td>
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