Annex II : sport and internal market freedoms
The objective of this annex is to provide an overview of the established case law in the field of the Internal Market that directly relates to sport and, in this context, to contribute to a clarification of legal concepts based on the Internal Market freedoms and notably the free movement of workers and the free movement of services.
There is no EU legal instrument that applies exclusively or specifically to sport. However, sport-related activities, when they have an economic nature, are subject to the Treaty provisions and have been analysed in a number of judgments of the European Court of Justice. Over the years these rulings have helped to clarify in what way the provisions of the Treaty should be interpreted when sport-related questions are raised.
- Application of internal market freedoms to sport
- List of judgments directly relating to internal market freedoms in the area of sport
- Walrave and Koch, 12 December 1974, 36/74
- Donà, 14 July 1976, 13/76
- Bosman, 15 December 1995, C-415/93
- Lehtonen, 13 April 2000, C-176/96
- Deliège, 11 April 2000, joint cases C-51/96 and C-191/97
- Kolpak, 8 May 2003, C-438/00
- Simutenkov, 12 April 2005, C-265/03
- Meca-Medina, 18 July 2006, C-519/04
- ECJ rulings with regard to gambling and/or betting services
1 Application of internal market freedoms to sport
1.1 Application of the EC Treaty to sport
The Court had to establish first whether and to what extent sporting activities, and thus sporting regulations, are subject to the provisions of the Treaty. In the first ruling issued in this area (Walrave and Koch, 1974)[1] , the Court made it clear that the practice of sport insofar as it constitutes an economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 of the Treaty is subject to Community law. Sport activities come within the scope respectively of Articles 39 to 42 (regarding the free movement of workers) and of Articles 49 to 55 (concerning the free movement of services) if they have the character of gainful employment or remunerated service.
In any event, regardless of the specific form of agreement that accounts for the provision of sports, the Court has clearly stated that these Treaty provisions, by giving effect to the general rule of Article 12 of the Treaty, prohibit any discrimination on the basis of nationality in the performance of sport activities to which they refer.
In developing this reasoning, the Court made it clear in the Donà ruling[2] that the non-discrimination principle must apply to professional or semi-professional players who are providing services for remuneration or have signed an employment contract, i.e. are engaged in an economic activity.
In the Deliège judgment[3] the Court stated that the mere fact that a sports association or federation unilaterally classifies its members as amateur athletes does not in itself mean that those members do not engage in economic activities within the meaning of Article 2 of the Treaty.
More recently, in the Meca-Medina ruling[4] , the Court took another important decision with regard to the relation between sport and Community law: even if a rule concerns questions purely of a sporting nature and, as such, has nothing to do with an economic activity per se, this does not mean that the activity governed by that rule or the body which lays it down are not governed by the Treaty. If a sporting activity falls within the scope of the Treaty, it can be subject to all obligations resulting from Treaty provisions and a rule affecting it should thus be analysed from the perspective of a restriction to fundamental freedoms (and to competition law – see annex on competition issues).
1.2 Application of the EC Treaty to sport federation rules
The Court of Justice has clarified that rules established by sporting associations and federations, both on national and on international level, are subject to Community law even though they are not rules adopted by public bodies.
As early as in 1974 (Walrave) the Court confirmed that as far as fundamental freedoms which constitute the objective of the Community are concerned, the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of nationality must not be restricted to acts of public authorities but applies also to any rules which will regulate, in a collective manner, gainful employment and the provision of services, also when such rules are created by associations or organisations which are not public authorities and do not fall under public law. The Court explained this interpretation by stating that if the application of the non-discrimination principle were to be restricted to rules of public nature, it could be compromised and undermined by decisions or rules adopted by private parties.
Along these line, the Court confirmed in the Lehtonen ruling[5] that the abolition between Member States of obstacles to the freedom of movement for persons and freedom to provide services would be compromised if the abolition of State barriers could be neutralised by obstacles resulting from the exercise of their legal autonomy by associations or organisations not governed by public law, i.e. also sport organisations.
In the Bosman ruling of 1995[6] the Court stated that even though the principles of the freedom of association had been upheld by the Court several times and are protected by Community law, if rules are drawn up by sporting associations that result in a restriction of the freedom of movement of professional sportspeople, they cannot be seen as necessary to ensure the freedom of association, nor can they result from it. The Court also confirmed that the private rules of sporting associations may not restrict rights conferred on individuals by the Treaty, and neither the freedom of association nor the subsidiarity principle can be invoked to uphold such rules.
In addition, since working conditions are regulated in different ways in different Member States, the prohibition of discrimination must not be limited to acts subject to public law only. The Court also made it clear in the Bosman ruling that the prohibition of discrimination refers in the same way to relationships that govern an employment contract or a contract to provide services, as long as these relationships are entered into or take effect within the territory of the Community.
By such rulings the Court has made it clear that sport clubs, associations or federations have to take account of the non-discrimination principle when approving their internal codes and regulations. This principle has been used by the Court in later rulings which concerned restrictions on the participation of foreign players in games, selection procedures in competitions, transfer rules for football players, or the compatibility of anti-doping rules with competition law.
In the Bosman ruling the Court stated that the principle of the freedom of establishment not only prohibits the host Member State from treating foreign nationals in a discriminatory way on its territory, but also effectively prevents a Member State from imposing any limitations hindering its own nationals or companies from establishing themselves in another Member State. This also refers to rules established by sporting associations, which must not restrict any of the fundamental freedoms.
Similarly, as regards the free movement of workers, transfer rules adopted by a professional football federation are liable to restrict the possibility of a player to find employment in another Member State, and as such constitute an obstacle to this freedom. Such rules could only be justified if their objective was compatible with the Treaty and justified by reasons of public interest, and if they would not go beyond what is necessary to achieve this objective.
1.3 Free movement of workers and free provision of services
In the area of sport, the Court has mainly focused on two fundamental freedoms of the Internal Market: freedom of movement of workers and freedom to provide services.
1.3.1 Freedom of movement of workers (Articles 39 to 42 EC)
The application of the Community rules on free movement of workers to sport is not dealt with in any specific Community legal provisions. However, there is important case law of the European Court of Justice in this field. According to this case law, sport is subject to Community law when it constitutes an economic activity, whether by professional or amateur athletes. If sport involves gainful employment it will come within the scope of Article 39 of the Treaty and the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality contained in Articles 12 and 39 will apply. In addition Article 7(4) of Regulation 1612/68 on the freedom of movement for workers[7] will apply, so that collective agreements or any regulations concerning employment must be non-discriminatory. It must be stressed that the European Court of Justice has always given a broad interpretation of the concept of worker as covering a person who (i) undertakes genuine and effective work (ii) under the direction of someone else (iii) for which he is paid.
For the free movement of workers to be a reality, two main principles must be respected: there must be no discrimination on grounds of nationality, and there must be no obstacles to free movement. The general prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality is contained in Article 12 of the Treaty, and Article 39 deals with its application in the employment sphere. As explained above, this prohibition of discrimination applies not only to measures of public authorities but also to rules of sporting associations which determine the conditions under which sportsmen and sportswomen can engage in gainful employment.
In the Bosman case, the Court considered that Mr Bosman had accepted an offer of employment in another Member State, and that his personal situation was therefore covered by Article 39. Professional football was clearly an economic activity to which the Treaty could apply. The Court thus held that the transfer fee system between clubs aimed at compensating the old club for the training invested in a player who wanted to leave upon expiry of his contract was an obstacle incompatible with the free movement of workers. In addition, it held that Article 39 precluded rules which limited the number of professional players from other Member States who could play in football competitions. The only exception applies to matches which are purely of sporting rather than economic interest, such as competitions of national teams.
Some Association Agreements between the EU and third countries contain provisions on non-discrimination on grounds of nationality as regards working conditions and remuneration of workers who are legally employed in a Member State. Sportspersons from these countries, when engaged in gainful activity, can benefit from the Bosman case in that legally employed players would not be discriminated against when playing in a Member State. This means e.g. that players who are nationals of a country which has concluded such an association agreements with the Community cannot be excluded from the team sent out on the field on the basis of their nationality. This was the case in the Kolpak judgment[8] , which concerned a Slovak handball player in Germany before Slovakia's accession to the EU. The Court of Justice held that a rule which limits the number of players who may participate in certain matches relates to working conditions and that a limited opportunity for Slovak players, in comparison with players who were nationals of EEA Member States, to take part in certain matches involved discrimination prohibited by the Association Agreement. The same approach was followed by the ECJ in the Simutenkov ruling[9] , which concerned a Russian football player in Spain.
1.3.2 Freedom to provide services (Articles 49 to 55 EC)
According to the Court of Justice, the concepts of economic activity and the provision of services within the meaning of the Treaty define the field of application of this fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty and, as such, may not be interpreted restrictively.
The abovementioned general principles fully apply to the provision of services. As a consequence, since under the first paragraph of Article 50 services are considered to be services within the meaning of the Treaty if they are normally provided for remuneration, Article 49 may apply to sporting activities and to the rules laid down by sports associations. The Court has added (Bosman) that the general abolition of restrictions on freedom to provide services should be observed regardless of the source of the restrictions (i.e. regardless of whether they are put forward by State authorities or not). Moreover, activities performed in the context of the provision of services must be subject to the same principle of non-discrimination as those performed in the framework of an employment contract.
In the Deliège judgment, the Court stated that sporting activities and, in particular, a high-ranking athlete's participation in an international competition are capable of involving the provision of a number of separate, but closely related, services which may fall within the scope of Article 49 of the Treaty, even if some of those services are not paid for by those for whom they are performed. For example, the organiser of an international competition may offer athletes an opportunity to engage in their sporting activity in competition with others and, at the same time, the athletes, by participating in the competition, enable the organiser to put on a sports event which the public may attend, which television broadcasters may retransmit and which may be of interest to advertisers and sponsors. Moreover, the athletes provide their sponsors with publicity, the basis for which is the sporting activity itself.
In addition, it has to be recalled that the Court of Justice has clarified, from a general point of view, that the free provision of services under Article 49 benefits not only the providers of services but also the recipients of services. As a consequence, sport practitioners and users, such as spectators or participants to sport events, are also entitled to be protected by this fundamental freedom and therefore cannot be victim of discrimination based on nationality or on the place of residence (as regards for instance the participation fee for a sport event).
1.4 The specifity of sport
Without prejudice to the above, the Court has recognised certain specificities in the area of sport. The Court has also acknowledged the societal importance of sporting activities.
In general, the Court has held that sporting rules would not have to be subject to Community law only when they concerned issues of purely sporting interest. Such would be the case, for example, of nationality-based criteria for the composition of national teams. More specifically, the Treaty’s provisions concerning freedom of movement of persons do not prevent the adoption of rules or practices excluding foreign players from certain matches for reasons which are not of an economic nature, which relate to the particular nature and context of such matches and are thus of sporting interest only, such as, for example, matches between national teams from different countries. However, such restrictions must remain limited to that particular objective and cannot be relied upon to exclude the whole of a sporting activity.
The same applies to restrictions on competitions resulting from anti-doping rules adopted by sporting organisations. As confirmed in the Meca-Medina case, the sporting character of a rule does not remove from the scope of the Treaty the person engaging in the activity governed by that rule or the body which has laid it down. This important assertion confirmed that the Court will not apply blanket exemptions to sport-related activities when reviewing their relation to Community law.
The Court has also made it clear that each time when the sporting character of regulations is invoked, careful and strict analysis of the grounds for excluding a specific rule from the application of the Treaty must be undertaken. In the Bosman ruling, for instance, the Court declared that Article 39 (formerly 48) EC precludes imposing restrictions on the number of players of other nationalities taking part in football matches. Such restrictions would clearly restrict the possibility of players to participate in matches, and this would also be considered as a restriction of the players’ freedom of employment. The Court disagreed that such restrictions could be justified on non-economic grounds, such as the link between sporting clubs and their country, the need to train a sufficient number of players of a given nationality, or to help maintain competition between clubs.
Similarly, when referring to the specificities of sport in the Bosman ruling, the Court confirmed that the free movement of workers, which is one of the fundamental freedoms of the Community, cannot be restricted by a Member State by using the powers resulting from Article 151 (former Article 128), paragraph 1, EC which defines the Community’s obligation to respect national and regional cultural diversity.
The Court confirmed that the rules established by sporting associations must be in accordance with the Treaty provisions, also when referring to the internal organisation of sporting competitions. It is important to note that the Court agreed that the setting of deadlines for transfers of players may meet the objective of ensuring the regularity of sporting competitions, if this corresponds with the specificity of the organisation of a sport. However, the Court also pointed out that in the case of sporting rules, measures taken by sports federations may not go beyond what is necessary for achieving the aim pursued.
In addition the Court stated that restrictions on the participation of professional players from other Member States in sporting competitions and the imposition of deadlines which exclude those players from such competitions and put them in a situation less favourable than that of players from outside the EU, can be considered as an obstacle to one of the fundamental freedoms. The Court reconfirmed its earlier ruling that participation in sporting events and competitions by professional players should be subject to those freedoms, as such participation is the essential purpose of the players’ activity and any restrictions imposed on it should also be considered as restrictions on the players’ employment prospects.
1.5 Sources of funding for sporting activities
There has been no judgment of the European Court of Justice so far which would explicitly refer to the question of funding of sporting activities as a general interest objective that would justify restrictions on the fundamental freedoms of the Internal Market. However, sport has been mentioned as one of many good causes which are financed with revenues from the organisation of gambling services (such as lotteries, betting services, etc.). In many Member States there are special rules regarding the provision of such services, including provisions that reserve such services to particular operators.
The Court has made it clear that even though the financing of good causes, such as social works, charitable works, sport or culture can be supported in a significant way by the profits obtained from lotteries or other forms of gambling activity, this does not undermine the economic nature of these services, and as such does not automatically exclude them from the application of Community law. Moreover, even if it is not irrelevant that lotteries and other types of gambling may contribute significantly to the financing of benevolent or public-interest activities, that motive cannot in itself be regarded as an objective justification for restrictions on the freedom to provide services. In fact, it can constitute only an incidental beneficial consequence and not the justification for the adoption or continuation of restrictive policies.
2 List of judgments directly relating to internal market freedoms in the area of sport
Walrave and Koch, 12 December 1974, 36/74
This first ruling of the European Court of Justice which addressed sport established the basic principle that was to be repeated in all future rulings on sport. The ruling responded to a question raised by two Dutch nationals who participated in medium-distance cycling championships behind motorcycles as pacemakers, and who questioned the rule of the Union Cycliste Internationale which restricted their right to participate in the competition on the basis of their nationality.
In this ruling the Court confirmed for the first time that the practice of sport is subject to Community law in so far as it constitutes an economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 of the Treaty.
The Court also developed, for the first time in its case law, the general principle whereby the Treaty provisions apply not only to regulation issued by public authorities but also to any rules which regulate in a collective manner gainful employment or provision of services, regardless of whether the rules are developed by public or private entities. The Court also clarified the geographical application of the prohibition of discrimination, which is binding for all legal relationships that have been entered into or have taken effect within the territory of the Community. Finally, the Court agreed that questions of purely sporting interest may not be subject to the prohibition of discrimination.
The ruling was requested with regard to a rule of an Italian football federation which required that only players affiliated to that federation could participate in matches as professional or semi-professional players, when this affiliation in practice was limited to persons of Italian nationality.
In its ruling, the Court repeated that any discrimination on the basis of nationality with regard to employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment as well as the freedom to provide services was prohibited. The Court thus restated that any national provisions which aim at collectively regulating gainful employment and services, and which impose nationality-based limitations, are incompatible with Community law. Thus the rules of the Italian Football Federation limiting participation in football matches to players with Italian citizenship were incompatible with the provisions of the Treaty.
However, the Court also recognised that such rules were acceptable if they excluded foreign players for reasons which were not of economic nature and which were of sporting interest only.
Bosman, 15 December 1995, C-415/93
The Court’s ruling was to respond to a question from a Belgian Court examining the case of a Belgian football player whose transfer to a French club was not realised because his new and old clubs failed to reach an agreement regarding the transfer fee. The Belgian Football Federation refused to send the transfer certificate and the French club withdrew from the contract. Mr Bosman, the Belgian football player, also questioned the FIFA rule restricting the number of professional players who are nationals of other Member States and who may be fielded in national competitions.
The ruling confirmed that sport was subject to all relevant Treaty articles in so far as they refer to economic activities and that it was not necessary, for the purposes of the application of the Community provisions on freedom of movement for workers, for the employer to be an undertaking. All that was required was the existence of, or the intention to create, an employment relationship.
It also helped to clarify what are the limitations of decisions and regulations adopted by sporting organisations. The Court declared that those rules were subject to the Treaty, in so far as they do not have a specific sport-related objective only, and that the requirement for the transfer fee to be paid in case of recruitment of a player from another club following the expiry of his or her contract affected the player’s opportunities for finding employment. Finally, the Court stated that the Treaty precluded the application of rules laid down by sporting associations under which, in matches in competitions which they organise, clubs may field only a limited number of professional players who are nationals of other Member States.
Lehtonen, 13 April 2000, C-176/96
The ruling in the Lehtonen case referred to the transfer rules of the Federation Royale Belge des Sociétés de Basket-ball ASBL (FRBSB), which imposed certain restrictions regarding players previously registered in a federation of another country. According to the FRBSB regulations, the deadline for transfers of players within Europe was 28 February, after which date only players from outside Europe could be transferred. FRBSB rules specified dates during which transfers were allowed, and any transfer outside those dates resulted in the transferred player not being allowed to take part in a game.
The case in question concerned a basketball player of Finnish nationality who was engaged by a club affiliated to FRBSB but who, according to the International Basketball Federation (FIBA), failed to meet the required deadline for transfers. As a result, the club decided not to field the player until the end of the season’s games.
In the Lehtonen ruling the Court confirmed that a professional player who has signed a contract with his/her sporting club, under which he/she receives a fixed monthly remuneration and bonuses, should be considered as a worker. His or her work as a paid employee for the provision of services should be considered an economic activity and as such should be covered by the scope of the fundamental freedoms defined by the Treaty. With regard to the situation of Mr Lehtonen, the Court confirmed the characteristics that distinguish the employment relationship by reference to the rights and duties of both parties of this relationship, such as providing services for and under the direction of another person, for a certain period of time, in return for remuneration.
However, the Court considered that the setting of deadlines for transfers of players may meet the objective of ensuring the regularity of sporting competitions.
Deliège, 11 April 2000, joint cases C-51/96 and C-191/97
The Court ruled on the compatibility of a judo association’s rules that restricted the number of athletes from national federations that could participate in tournaments with the Treaty’s provisions, in particular the freedom to provide services.
The Court confirmed that sport is subject to Community law in so much as it constitutes an economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 EC. This also applies to the employment and/or services provided by semi-professional or professional sportspersons, provided they receive remuneration and their activity is genuine and effective, and cannot be regarded as purely marginal and ancillary. In this judgment, the Court identified a number of separate, but closely related, sporting activities which are liable to be covered by Article 49 EC even if some of these services are not paid for by those for whom they are performed. Amongst these activities are those involving different providers and recipients, such as: the organiser of an international competition who may offer athletes an opportunity of engaging in their sporting activity in competition with others; the athletes who, on the one side by participating in the competition, enable the organiser to put on a sport event, and on the other side provide their sponsors with publicity the basis for which is the sporting activity itself; the public who may attend such an event; television broadcasters which may retransmit it; advertisers and sponsors which may be interested by it.
The Court also stated, however, that a federation's rules which impose certain restrictions on athletes such as obtaining authorisation to compete in high-level competitions do not constitute a restriction on the freedom to provide services if they derive from the inherent need of the organisation of such competitions. The Court thus once again recognised that only needs of a purely sporting interest may allow for the imposition of restrictions to fundamental freedoms.
Mr Kolpak, a Slovak national, entered in March 1997 into a fixed-term employment contract for the post of goalkeeper in the German handball team TSV Östringen eV Handball, a club which played in the German Second Division. Mr Kolpak received a monthly salary, was resident in Germany and held a valid residence permit.
The Deutsche Handball Bund (DHB), which organises league and cup matches at federal level, issued to him a player's licence marked with the letter A on the grounds of his Slovak nationality. Mr Kolpak, who had requested that he be issued with a player's licence which did not feature the specific reference to nationals of non-member countries, brought an action before a national court challenging the decision of the DHB. He argued that the Slovak Republic was one of the non-member countries nationals of which were entitled to participate without restriction in competitions under the same conditions as German and Community players by reason of the prohibition of discrimination resulting from the combined provisions of the EC Treaty and the Association Agreement with Slovakia.
The Court concluded that Article 38(1) of the Association Agreement with Slovakia must be construed as precluding the application to a professional sportsman of Slovak nationality, who was lawfully employed by a club established in a Member State, of a rule drawn up by a sports federation in that State under which clubs were authorised to field, during league or cup matches, only a limited number of players from non-member countries that were not parties to the EEA Agreement.
Simutenkov, 12 April 2005, C-265/03
Mr Simutenkov was a Russian national who, at the time of the facts, was living in Spain, where he had a residence permit and a work permit. Employed as a professional football player under an employment contract entered into with Club Deportivo Tenerife, he held a federation licence as a non-Community player.
Mr Simutenkov submitted, through that club, an application to replace the federation’s licence which he held with a licence that was identical to that held by Community players. In support of that application, he relied on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia.
Following its Kolpak ruling, the Court held that the article dealing with non-discrimination in conditions of employment of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was of direct effect and was to be construed as precluding the application to a professional sportsman of Russian nationality, who was lawfully employed by a club established in a Member State, of a rule drawn up by a sports federation of that State which provided that clubs may field in competitions organised at national level only a limited number of players from countries which were not parties to the EEA Agreement.
Meca-Medina, 18 July 2006, C-519/04
See annex on competition issues.
ECJ rulings with regard to gambling and/or betting services
Schindler, of 24/3/1994, C-275/92; Läärä, of 21/9/1999, C-124/97; Zenatti, of 21/10/1999, C-67/98; Anomar, of 11/9/2003, C-6/01; Gambelli, of 6/11/2003, C-243/01; Lindman, of 13/11/2003, C-42/02; Placanica, Palazzese and Sorricchio, of 6/3/2007, joint cases C 338/04, C 359/04 and C 360/04. See also judgments: Comm. v Italy, of 26/4/1994, C-272/91; Familiapress, of 26/6/1997, C-368/95
The rulings in question concerned the restrictions on the free provision of gambling activities (such as lotteries, slot-machines management, betting services, etc.) and restrictions imposed by Member States on access to and provision of those services for reasons relating to the protection of consumers or the maintenance of order in society. Since in some Member States parts of the profits generated by lotteries may be allocated to public interest goals, including sport, questions were raised if the specificity of sporting needs may allow for restrictions on the free movement of gambling services in order not to decrease the level of these profits.
The Court has consistently held that gambling activities should be considered an economic activity. In Schindler, for example, the Court said that even if national laws provide that the profits made by a lottery may be used only for certain purposes, in particular in the public interest, or may even be required to be paid into the State budget, the rules on the allocation of profit do not alter the nature of the activity in question or deprive it of its economic character.
Furthermore, in the same ruling, the Court responded to the question whether national legislation, restricting access to and/or provision of services with regard to gambling, can be justified, inter alia, by the financing of public interest activities. The Court, after recalling the need to analyse the restrictions imposed by Member States on a case-by-case basis so as to assess the need for these restrictions and their proportionality, stated that even if it is not irrelevant that lotteries and other types of gambling may contribute significantly to the financing of benevolent or public-interest activities, that motive cannot in itself be regarded as an objective justification for restrictions on the freedom to provide services. Moreover, the restrictions cannot be justified by financial needs, which can constitute only an incidental beneficial consequence and not the real justification for the restrictive policy adopted.
[1] Of 12 December 1974, 36/74[2] Of 14 July 1976, 13/76
[3] Of 11 April 2000, joint cases C-51/96 and C-191/97. It is worth mentioning in this context that the Services Directive (2006/123/EC), which applies, inter alia, to sport activities, contains a recital dealing specifically with sport. Recital 35: "Non-profit making amateur sporting activities are of considerable social importance. They often pursue wholly social or recreational objectives. Thus, they might not constitute economic activities within the meaning of Community law and should fall outside the scope of this Directive". This is fully consistent with the abovementioned case law of the Court, whereby sport activities are covered by EC law insofar as they constitute economic activities.
[4] Of 18 July 2006, C-519/04
[5] Of 13 April 2000, C-176/96
[6] Of 12 December 1995, C-415/93
[7] Regulation 1612/68 of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community (OJ No L 257, 19.10.1968)
[8] Judgment of the Court of 8 May 2003 – Case C-438/00
[9] Judgment of the Court of 12 April 2005 – Case C-265/03
