

THE SOCIAL PARTNERS AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVENESS: TELECOMMUNICATIONS

EIRO representativeness studies aim to identify the relevant national and supranational associational actors (i.e. the social partner organisations) in the field of industrial relations in selected sectors. The impetus of these studies arises from the goal of the European Commission to find and recognise the representative social partner associations to be consulted under the Treaty provisions. Hence, this study is devised to provide basic information needed to set up sectoral social dialogues. Therefore this study has to address two main tasks. The first one is to find out the relevant national associations on both sides of industry. Accordingly, relevant associations are understood as sector-related social partner organisations in the sense that their membership domain includes the sector, and that they are either involved in sector-related collective bargaining or affiliated to a sector-related European association. Second, the sector's relevant European associations must be analysed. This study deals with telecommunications and consists of three main parts: (i) a summary of the sector's economic background; (ii) an analysis of the social partner organisations in all member states of the EU, with the exception of Sweden, plus Bulgaria and Romania, with special emphasis on their membership, their role in collective bargaining and public policy, and their national and European affiliations; (iii) an analysis of the relevant European associations, in particular their composition of membership and their capacity to negotiate.

General aim and conceptual remarks

The goal of this representativeness study is to identify the relevant national and supranational associational actors (i.e. the trade unions and employer associations) in the field of industrial relations in the telecommunications sector, and how these actors relate to the sector's European interest associations of labour and business. The impetus of this study and similar studies in other sectors arises from the aim of the European Commission to identify the representative social partner associations to be consulted under the Treaty provisions. Hence, this study is devised to provide basic information needed to set up sectoral social dialogues. The effectiveness of the European social dialogue depends on whether its participants are sufficiently representative in terms of the sector's relevant national actors across the EU member states. Hence, only European associations which meet this precondition will be admitted to the European social dialogue.

Against this background this study has to address two main tasks. The first one is to find out the relevant national associations on both sides of industry (i.e. the national social partner organisations). Against this background this study has to address two main tasks. The first one is to find out the relevant national and European associations on both sides of industry (i.e. the *social partner organizations*). Second, the structure of the sector's relevant European associations, in particular their composition of membership, must be analyzed. This requires clarifying the unit of analysis at both the national and European level of interest representation. This study includes only associations whose membership domain is "*sector-related*" (see below). At both the national and European level a multiplicity of associations exist which are not social partner organizations in the sense that they essentially deal with industrial relations. Hence, there is a need for clear-cut criteria which enable analysis to differentiate the social partner organizations from other associations. As regards the national level, classification as a sector-related social partner organization implies fulfilling one of two definitional criteria: The associations must be either a party to "sector-related" collective bargaining or a member of a "sector-related" European association of business or labour is on the Commission's list of European social partner organizations consulted under Article 138 of the EC Treaty. Affiliation to

such a European association and involvement in national collective bargaining are of utmost importance to the European social dialogue. In line with the criteria for the national associations, this study includes those European associations that are on the Commission's list of consultation. In addition, we consider any other sector-related European association which has sector-related national social partner organizations under its umbrella. Hence, our design to identify the sector-related national and European social partner organizations is both "top-down" and "bottom-up".

For the purpose of this study we define the sector in terms of NACE classification. This is to demarcate an 'interest space' which is common to all EU member states, such that cross-national comparability of the findings is assured. Put more specifically, telecommunications is defined as embracing NACE 64.20 with the exception of cable TV and radio activities. Cable TV and radio activities are left out, since their problems and related interests are distinct from telecommunications in the genuine sense, with the consequence that their associational system tends to differ from 'mainstream' telecommunications as well.

The domains of the unions and employer associations (and, concomitantly, the purview of collective agreements) are likely to be not congruent with this NACE demarcation. Hence, we include all unions, employer associations and multi-employer collective agreements which are 'sector-related'. Being sector-related applies to the following four patterns:

- (1) Congruence: the domain of the association/the purview of the collective agreement is identical with the NACE demarcation, as specified above.
- (2) Sectionalism: the domain/purview covers only a certain part of the sector, as demarcated by the above NACE demarcation, while no group outside the sector is covered.
- (3) Overlap: the domain/purview covers the entire sector plus (parts of) one or more other sectors. However, it is important to note that we do not include general (i.e. sector-unspecific) associations which do not deal with sector-specific matters.
- (4) Sectional overlap: the domain/purview covers part of the sector plus (parts of) one or more other sector.

As regards the European level, there are currently two sector-related associations which are on the Commission's list of European social partner organizations consulted under Article 138 of the EC Treaty: UNI EUROPA, with its telecom section, and the European Telecommunications Network Operators' Association (ETNO). Hence, affiliation to either UNI EUROPA Telecom or ETNO is one sufficient criterion for classifying a national association as a social partner organization. Note, however, that the constituent definitional criterion is a sector-related membership domain. This is important in the case of UNI EUROPA due to its multi-sectoral domain. This study will include only the affiliates to UNI's telecom section, provided that their domain is sector-related.

The collection of quantitative data, such as those on membership, is essential when it comes to investigating the representativeness of the social partner organisations. Unless cited otherwise, this study draws from the country studies, as provided by the national centres. It is often difficult to find precise quantitative data. In such cases, we seek to give rough estimates rather than leave the question blank, given the practical and political relevance of this study. However, if the reliability of an estimate is doubtful, this will be noted.

In principle, quantitative data may stem from three sources:

- (1) official statistics and representative survey studies;
- (2) administrative data (e.g. data on membership provided by the respective association which are then used for calculating the density rate on the basis of available statistical figures on the potential membership of the association);

(3) personal estimates made by representatives of the respective association.

While the data sources of the economic figures are generally statistics, the figures on the associations are either administrative data or estimates. While the data sources of the economic figures are generally statistics, the figures on the associations are usually either administrative data or estimates. Furthermore, one should note that several country studies present data also on unions and business associations that do not meet the above definition of a sector-related social partner organization, so as to give a complete picture of the sector's associational "landscape". For the above substantive reasons as well as for methodological reasons of cross-national comparability, such unions and business associations will not be considered here.

The study consists of three main parts: We will begin with a very brief summary of the economic background of the sector. We will then analyse the social partner organisations in all member states of the EU, with the exception of Sweden, plus Bulgaria and Romania, i.e. 26 European countries. The third part deals with their counterparts at European level. Each section will contain a brief introduction which explains the concept of representativeness in greater detail, followed by the empirical findings. This is because representativeness is a complex phenomenon that requires separate consideration of the national and European level for two reasons. On the one hand, one has to take account of how representativeness is captured by national regulations and practices. On the other hand, the national and European associations differ in their tasks and scope of activities. The concept of representativeness must be suited to this difference.

Finally, it is worth emphasising the difference between the scholarly and political aspects of this study. While providing data on the representativeness of the associations under consideration, this study does not arrive at any definite conclusion on whether the representativeness of the European social partner organisations and their national affiliates is sufficient for admission to the European social dialogue. The reason for this is that defining criteria for sufficient representativeness is a matter of political decision rather than an issue of scholarly analysis.

The economic background of the sector

Since the early 1990s telecommunications has undergone a process of profound restructuring in the EU member states. Originally organised as some kind of state monopoly, telecommunications have been transformed into a business sector as a result of deregulation of market entry and liberalisation of services, often accompanied by full or partial privatisation of the former monopoly provider. This restructuring affected also labour relations in that the employment relationship shifted from public-sector regulations to private-law status. However, in several countries such as Austria, Belgium and France, where the employees of the state monopolies were employed under the terms of civil servants, the employees could maintain this status even after restructuring. In these circumstances, one finds a coincidence of public and private employment regulations in the sector. Public-law regulations continue to be important, since the former monopoly providers are usually by far the largest companies in terms of employees and still obtain also a very strong market position especially in the area of fixed-line communications.

Table 1 gives an overview of the development from the early 1990s to the early 2000s, presenting a few indicators which are important to industrial relations and the social dialogue. In all member states the number of companies more or less increased, reflecting the opening up of the market. Likewise, both total employment and the number of employees usually grew. There are, however, some cases recording a decrease in employment: the Czech Republic, Germany, Romania and Slovakia. Greece is a borderline case, as total employment moderately expanded, while the number of employees slightly decreased. In most countries the number of employees comes close to the total number of employment. This indicates that the sector is usually characterised by relatively large companies as well as by standard employment, although a notable number of

small companies also exist mainly in the area of internet services. In this respect, Bulgaria is an outlier, as the country's total employment is considerably higher than the number of employees. Male employment clearly prevails in the sector in almost all countries. Again, Bulgaria is distinct, with a majority of female employment. In Lithuania and Romania the share of female employment is almost 50%

Table 1 also shows that the sector is rather small. Its share in both aggregate employment and the number of employees is below 1% in the vast majority of countries, and this share is always smaller than 2%.

The national level of interest representation

In many member states statutory regulations explicitly refer to the concept of representativeness, when allotting certain rights of interest representation and public governance to unions and/or employer associations. The most important rights addressed by such regulations include the formal recognition as a party to collective bargaining, the extension of the purview of a multi-employer collective agreement to employers not affiliated to the signatory employer association, and the participation in public policy and tripartite bodies of social dialogue. Under these circumstances representativeness is normally captured as membership strength of the associations. For instance, statutory extension provisions usually allow for extending a collective agreement to unaffiliated employers only when the signatory union and employer association represent (i.e. organise) 50% or more of the employees within the agreement's domain (see 'Collective agreement extension mechanisms in EU member countries', IST, Typescript).

As outlined above, the representativeness of the national social partner organisations interest us here in connection with the capacity of their European umbrella organisations for participation in the European social dialogue. Hence, the role of the national actors in collective bargaining and public policy-making constitutes another important component of representativeness. The effectiveness of the European social dialogue tends to increase with growing ability of the national affiliates of the European associations to regulate the employment terms and to influence national public policies which affect the sector. As cross-nationally comparative analysis shows (see 'The metamorphoses of corporatism', F Traxler, *European Journal of Political Research*, 43, 2004), there is generally a positive correlation between the bargaining role of the social partners and their involvement in public policy. Social partner organisations which are engaged in multi-employer bargaining are incorporated in state policies significantly stronger than their counterparts in countries, where multi-employer bargaining is lacking. The explanation for this finding is that only multi-employer agreements matter in macroeconomic terms, such that they set an incentive for the governments to persistently seek the cooperation with the social partner organisations. If single-employer bargaining prevails in a country, none of the collective agreements will have a noticeable effect on the economy due to their limited purview. In consequence, the basis for generalised tripartite policy concertation will be absent.

The upshot of these considerations is that representativeness is a multi-dimensional concept that embraces three basic elements: (i) the membership domain and the membership strength of the social partner organisations; (ii) their role in collective bargaining; and (iii) their role in public policy-making.

Membership domains and membership strength

The membership domain of an association, as formally established by its constitution or name, demarcates its potential members from other groups which the association does not claim to organise and represent. As pointed out above, we consider here only associations whose domain relates to telecommunications. For reasons of space, it is impossible to delineate the domain

demarcations of all the associations in detail. Instead, we document how they relate to the sector by classifying them according to the four patterns of ‘sector-relatedness’, as specified by the above conceptual remarks in the introductory section. As regards membership strength, one has to differentiate between strength in terms of the absolute number of members and strength in relative terms. The literature usually refers to relative membership strength as density (i.e. the ratio of actual to potential members). In addition, there is also a difference between unions and employer associations, when it comes to measuring membership strength. Union membership simply means the number of unionised persons. Aside from taking the total membership of a union as an indicator of its strength, it is also reasonable to disaggregate this figure by gender. The case of employer associations is more complex, since they organise collective entities, i.e. companies that employ employees. Hence, there are two possible measures of membership strength, one referring to the companies themselves, and the other one to the employees working in an association’s member companies. For a sectoral study like this, measures of membership strength of both the unions and employer associations have also to take account of how the membership domains relate to the sector. If a domain is not congruent with the sector demarcation, the association’s aggregate density (i.e. density referring to its domain) may differ from sector-specific density (i.e. density referring to the sector). We will first present the data on the domains and membership strength of the unions and then shift to the employer associations.

The union data on both domains and membership strength are documented in Table 2, which lists all unions meeting the two definitional criteria for classification of a sector-related social partner organisation, as established by the conceptual remarks. Only one of these unions has demarcated its domain in a way which is congruent with the sector definition. This underscores the fact that statistical definitions of business activities rather differ from the lines along which employees identify common interests and band together in unions. Domain demarcations resulting in overlap or sectional overlap are most frequent. Overlap arises from fairly differing modes of demarcation that range from general (i.e. cross-sectoral) domains to domains which cover telecommunications understood in broad sense. Domains which embrace both telecommunications and postal services are also widespread (e.g. GPF of Austria), sometimes in combination with newspapers and other media (e.g. the Czech OSZPTNS and ESTAL of Estonia). Sectional overlap usually emanates from domain demarcations which focus on certain categories of employees which are then organised across several or all sectors. Employee categories are specified by various parameters such as high qualifications (e.g. managers and other distinct professions, see the British CONNECT), distinct occupations (e.g. electricians, see DEF of Denmark), and employment status (e.g. white-collar employees, as is the case of GPA of Austria and Denmark’s HK Privat). Public-law employment is another criterion of employment status which has caused a kind of sectional overlap which is rather specific to the sector. As mentioned above, telecommunications was part of the state sector for a long time and the telecommunications employees already employed before restructuring managed to retain their public-law status in several cases. As a consequence of this, unions specialised in the public sector, such as CGSP of Belgium, CPSU and PSEU of Ireland, organise parts of telecommunications, in addition to the state sector in the genuine sense. Finally, sectionalism ensues from the existence of company unions in several countries like Denmark, Spain, and Estonia. Company unionism is even more widespread than Table 2 suggests. In the case of Poland and Slovenia peak organisations of company unions are listed, whose aggregate domain overlaps the sector. The sector’s company unions often centre on the former monopoly providers (see, for instance, the sector’s company unions in Denmark and Spain). The former monopoly structure of the sector is one reason why company unionism tends to be more widespread there than in most other sectors across Europe. As long as telecommunications was a state monopoly, a union specialised in this sector was actually a company union. Nowadays company unionism as well as company-centred bargaining (see below) is fostered by the fact that the former monopoly providers still obtain a predominant

position in the sector, especially in terms of employment and unionisation (see below). For instance, around half of the sector's employees work in these companies in Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Ireland, Poland and Slovenia. For the corresponding company in Denmark and France, an employment share of even more than 70% and 90% is reported, respectively.

As the domains of the unions often overlap with the demarcation of the sector, so do their domains with one another in the case of most countries. Table 2 also informs about these inter-union domain overlaps. Inter-union overlaps of domains are endemic. In the vast majority of countries the domain of any of their sector-related unions overlaps with the domain of all the others. Depending on the scale of mutual overlap, this results in competition for members.

Turning to the membership data of the unions, one finds that the group of female employees is the minority in most of the unions. Nevertheless, there are a notable number of unions, where the share of female members is above 50%. At a first glance, this is amazing, since the sector's employment is generally dominated by male employees. Closer consideration shows that the domain of all unions recording a majority of female members is overlapping in relation to the sector. Hence, the predominance of female members in these unions is likely to originate in areas of their domains other than telecommunications. At any rate, there is a clear country effect on the gender-related membership composition. Female predominance correlates with certain regions of Europe: The Nordic countries (i.e. Denmark and Finland), the Baltic countries (i.e. Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia) and some countries of Central and Eastern Europe (i.e. Romania and Slovakia). Outside these regions only Belgium registers a female majority. The high female unionisation rates in the Nordic and Baltic countries are well in line with corresponding figures on the composition of the cross-sectoral national union confederations (see [TN0403105U](#)).

The absolute numbers of the unions' members differ strongly. Their records range from several hundred thousands of members to fewer than one hundred. This considerable variation reflects differences in the size of the economy and the comprehensiveness of the membership domain rather than the ability to attract members. Therefore, density is the measure of membership strength which is more appropriate to a comparative analysis. Domain density is 50% or higher in more than one third of all unions which document figures on density. More than half of the unions for which data are available organise more than 25% of the employees within their domain. Most of the remaining unions record a density of in between 15 and 25% of their potential members. Compared to the density referring to the unions' domain on aggregate, their density in telecommunications tends to be lower. In accordance with this, the distribution of sectoral density is more polarised than is the case of aggregate density. Sectoral density is 50% or higher in the case of around one quarter of the unions for which data are available. Sectoral density of more than half of the unions is lower than 15%, implying that there are relatively few cases of a density in between 15 and 25%. The lower sectoral density relative to aggregate density is also evident from those unions for which figures on both measures are recorded. In all these cases sectoral density is more or less below density on aggregate with two exceptions: the Portuguese SINTTAV and the Finnish Metallityöväenliitto have a higher proportion of members in the sector than on average. One can infer from these findings that telecommunications is usually not the membership stronghold of the unions whose domain includes this sector. Furthermore, anecdotal evidence from the country reports suggests that unionisation rates strongly vary across the sector's companies. The former monopoly providers are usually highly unionised, whereas unionisation is low in the newly established companies. For instance in Spain, 60% of the workforce of the former monopoly provider, Telefonica, is unionised, as compared to a density of 20% in telecommunications as a whole. These differences appear to be extremely high in some countries of Central and Eastern Europe, such as Lithuania and Poland, where any union presence is lacking in the new companies. Two factors account for this polarisation of union membership strength in the sector. On the one hand, the high unionisation of the former

monopoly providers dates back to the time before restructuring, when they formed part of the public sector, where the unions are well established. On the other hand, it is especially hard for unions to achieve a footing in new companies in times when the socio-economic conditions are generally detrimental to their associability, as the negative trend in unionisation across Europe underscores. As will be outlined below, this polarised pattern of unionisation feeds through to the sector's pattern of employer organisation and the system of collective bargaining. In addition to this sector effect on unionisation, one finds again a country effect. The level of both sectoral and aggregate density of the sector-related unions is particularly high in the two Nordic countries which generally stand out in terms of very strong unions.

Table 3 presents the membership data on the employer associations. Only 12 of the 26 countries register employer organisations. In the other countries there is no association that meets the definition of a social partner organisation, as introduced above. This situation does not mean that business has remained unorganised. Generally, business interest organisations may also deal with interests other than those related to industrial relations. Organisations specialised in matters other than industrial relations are commonly designated as trade associations (see [TN0311101S](#)). Sector-level trade associations usually outnumber sector-level employer associations (see 'Business associations and labour unions in comparison', F Traxler, *British Journal of Sociology* 44, 1993). This holds true also for telecommunications. In the countries, where employer associations have not been formed, sector-related business associations exist, which exclusively or primarily perform the task of a trade association. In the telecommunications sector trade associations mainly represent commercial, technical and product-market related interests vis-à-vis the authorities and the national regulatory agencies.

The existing sector-related employer associations usually obtain a monopoly-like status, since there is always only one single employer association established except for Belgium and Slovenia. In most cases, their domains are rather encompassing, implying overlaps with the sector. The domains of the Irish IBEC and the two Slovenian associations are general. The Danish DI covers the entire industry, understood in the broad sense. The other organisations embrace such areas as information technologies, television and radio activities, postal services, and/or transport in general in addition to telecommunications. The Italian ASSTEL covers a domain which is fairly congruent with the sector. In several countries the presence of the general association emanates from the fact that either no sector-specific employer association exists (i.e. Belgium) or the general associations conduct collective bargaining at central level that includes the sector (i.e. Belgium, Ireland and Slovenia). While all the unions listed in Table 2 are voluntary, two employer organisations rest on obligatory membership due to its public-law status as chambers: The Austrian FTR and the Slovenian GZS. In Slovenia, however, recent legislation stipulates that obligatory associations are entitled to conclude collective agreements no longer than for a transitory period of three years.

As regards the two chamber organisations, density of both companies and employees is 100% by law. Density is relatively high also in the case of the voluntary associations. This especially holds true for density of employees covered. All associations for which data on employee density of their domain or the sector are available cover at least 50%. Even association recording a sector-related company density of 10% or lower (i.e. DI, the Slovenian ZDS and the Slovak Employer Association of Transport, Postal Services and Telecommunications) cover 50% or more of the sector's employees.

The density ratio of the employees is higher than density of the companies with regard to both the aggregate domain and the sector-related domain. This indicates a generally higher propensity of the larger companies to associate. Since there is usually one single very large company or a few large companies in the telecommunications sector, a rather low density of companies nevertheless combines with a very high density of the employees in the sector. There are only two voluntary

associations (i.e. the Danish DI and the Finnish TIKLI) for which all measures of density are available. As the aggregate density of the companies is higher than its sector-related counterpart in both cases, they suggest that telecommunications create extraordinary problems of member recruitment for employer organisations, as is the case of the unions. Due to the special (i.e. highly concentrated) economic structure of the sector an employer association can nevertheless arrive at a sector-related density of the employees which is higher than the aggregate density of the employees, as the case of DI underscores. Hence, the key question is whether the sector's employers band together in employer associations at all. Complete absence of sector-related employer associations in the majority of the 26 countries documents the sector-specific obstacles to recruiting employers more strikingly than the lower sector-related density relative to aggregate density does.

Collective Bargaining and its actors

Table 2 lists all the unions engaged in sector-related collective bargaining. As already noted above, their bargaining activities are often company-centred, leading to a relatively high share of employees covered by single-employer bargaining in several countries, as compared to multi-employer bargaining. Despite the numerous cases of inter-union domain overlap, there are relatively few cases of inter-union competition for bargaining rights: In France, CFDT, CGT and UNSA call for a reform of labour law, so as to privilege the "majority" collective agreements at all levels. In Germany, Poland and Romania, the unions compete for getting the companies to recognise them as a party to collective bargaining, something which tends to generally block collective negotiations in the Polish case. In Austria, a conflict between the sector's traditional labour representative, GPF, and the private-sector white-collar union, GPA, emerged, when GPA invaded into the sector after its restructuring. Meanwhile, the conflict is settled in that the two unions jointly negotiate the sector-level collective agreement. Likewise, rivalries over bargaining rights and participation in public policy are reported for the sector's principal unions in Portugal (i.e. SINTTAV, STPT, and SINDELCO). However, they also cooperate in matters of bargaining. Overall, cooperation prevails. In several countries, namely Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Spain, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, and Slovakia, some or even all unions of the sector have joined forces, forming bargaining cartels to negotiate with the employer side. One sector-specific reason for this is that the former monopoly providers are the hub of organised industrial relations. This sets an incentive for the unions to cooperate, when it comes to negotiating with these companies. Otherwise, the unions run the risk that some of them – or even all of them but one single union preferred by the employer – are excluded from the bargaining process. This situation applies to the predominant provider of Romania, where the Federation of Trade Unions in Telecommunications is not recognised. In France and Spain, statutory regulations exclude sector-related unions from the bargaining process, if they lack legal recognition of being representative: For example in France, unions not enjoying the legal status of being representative are not allowed to conduct collective bargaining. By law, this status applies to CFDT, CGT, CFE-CGC, CFTC, CGT-FO and their affiliates. Other unions can apply to the courts for recognition as a representative organisation. For the sector's employees under the terms of private law, only the affiliates to those confederations that possess this status by law are representative, when it comes to sector-level bargaining. For the public sector (including the sector's employees under public law) distinct criteria are in operation according to which CFDT, CGT, CGT-FO and UNSA are representative. Regardless of this the government also admits CFTC, CFE-CGC and FSU as parties to the public-sector bargaining rounds. In Spain, only unions which have elected delegates to a company's workers' committee can engage in single-employer bargaining. In the case of Telefonica, this holds true for CCOO, UGT, CGT, UTS, ATS and STC with 4, 4, 2, 1, 1, and 1 delegate(s), respectively. As regards sector-level bargaining, only unions which record more than 10% of all delegates to workers' committees across the

sector's companies are admitted as bargaining parties (i.e. CCOO and UGT for telecommunications). However, unions not meeting the criterion for representativeness can join an agreement by signing it.

In fewer than half of the countries employer organisations, which conduct sector-related collective bargaining, exist (Table 3). Since only two of them (i.e. Belgium and Slovenia) count more than one employer association, issues of inter-associational relations recede into the background. It is, however, worth mentioning that in the case of both the Netherlands and Slovenia the domains of the two established sector-related employer associations overlap with each other. Nevertheless, there is no evidence of inter-associational rivalries. This may change in Slovenia, when the legal capacity of the obligatory associations to conclude collective agreements expires within three years according to the new law on collective agreements.

Table 4 gives an overview of the system of sector-related collective bargaining in the 26 countries under consideration. The standard measure of the importance of collective bargaining as a means of employment regulation is collective bargaining coverage which documents the total number of employees covered by collective bargaining as a proportion of the total number of employees within a certain segment of the economy (see *National labour relations in internationalized markets*, F Traxler, S Blaschke and B Kittel, Oxford University Press). Accordingly, the sector's rate of collective bargaining coverage is defined as the ratio of the number of employees covered by any kind of collective agreement to the total number of employees in the sector). To delineate the bargaining system, we employ two further indicators: The first one refers to the relevance of multi-employer bargaining, compared to single-employer bargaining. Multi-employer bargaining is defined as being conducted by an employer association on behalf of the employer side. In the case of single-employer bargaining, it is the company or its subunit(s) which is the party to the agreement. This includes the cases where two or more companies jointly negotiate an agreement. The relative importance of multi-employer bargaining, measured as a percentage of the total number of employees covered by a collective agreement, thus indicates the impact of the employer associations on the overall process of collective bargaining. Finally, Table 4 shows whether statutory extension schemes are applied to the sector. For reasons of brevity, we confine this analysis to extension schemes designed to extend the purview of a collective agreement to the employers not affiliated to the signatory employer association, while we do not deal with extension regulations targeting the employees. Regulations on the employees are not important to this analysis for two reasons. On the one hand, extending a collective agreement to the employees who are not unionised in the company covered by the collective agreement is ILO standard, aside from any national legislation. On the other hand, there is good reason for employers to extend a collective agreement concluded by them even when they are formally not obliged to do so. Otherwise, they would set an incentive for their workforce to unionise. In comparison to employee-related extension procedures, schemes that target the employers are far more important to the strength of collective bargaining in general and multi-employer bargaining in particular. This is because the employers are capable of refraining from both joining an employer association and entering single-employer bargaining in the context of a purely voluntaristic system. Therefore, employer-related extension practices increase the coverage of multi-employer bargaining. Moreover, when being pervasive, they induce employers to join their employer association, since membership enables them to participate in the bargaining process and to benefit from the association's related services in a situation when the respective collective agreement will bind them in any case (see *National labour relations in internationalized markets*, F Traxler, S Blaschke and B Kittel, Oxford University Press).

As far as the sector's collective bargaining coverage is concerned, around half of the 18 countries for which figures are documented register a very high coverage rate of 80% or more. In five countries (i.e. Luxembourg, Poland, the UK, Portugal, and Bulgaria) the coverage rate is around

or below 50%. Depending on national circumstances, several factors, sometimes interacting with each other, account for the generally high coverage rates: Multi-employer bargaining coincides with a high density of both the unions and employer associations (i.e. Denmark). Multi-employer bargaining is backed by pervasive extension practices (e.g. Belgium). France and Finland are examples of high coverage buttressed by both high employer density and pervasive extension practices. In the case of Austria and Slovenia, obligatory membership in the employer associations works as a functional equivalent to pervasive extension. Finally, the high economic concentration of the sector in terms of employment may give rise to very high coverage even when there is only single-employer bargaining, provided that the sector's key companies are covered. This is evidenced by Lithuania and Malta. However, less supportive conditions appear to dampen the coverage rate strongly. Characteristically, only single-employer settlements exist in all the countries with a coverage rate of 50% or lower.

For most countries, at least a rough estimate can be made with regard to the relative importance of multi-employer bargaining. Multi-employer bargaining prevails only in seven countries, if one includes also Slovenia (see below). In Finland, France and Italy, all the employees covered are under the terms of a multi-employer bargaining. This also applied to Slovenia until June 2006, when the expiration of the general, central-level agreement leaves only one company under the terms of a collective agreement which covers almost 50% of the sector's employees. It should be noted that multi-employer bargaining does not mean sector-level bargaining in all these cases. In Ireland, Romania and, until recently Slovenia, the sector is covered by an all-encompassing central agreement. The Romanian agreement is complemented by single-employer bargaining that embraces around 63% of the sector's employees. In France centralised bargaining covering the public sector as a whole includes the sector's employees still employed under public-law terms. Likewise, the sector's public-law employees are covered by centralised employment regulation of the state sector in Austria. However, only *de facto* negotiations can be conducted for Austria's public sector, since it is excluded from the right to collectively bargain.

Multi-employer bargaining is completely absent in 14 countries, where exclusively single-employer agreements are negotiated. This predominance of single-employer bargaining across Europe can be traced to the properties of the sector, since single-employer bargaining prevails in a notable number of countries (e.g. Germany, Spain, and Portugal), where multi-employer agreement is otherwise the most common pattern. Even in Austria and Belgium, where statutory regulations strongly back multi-employer bargaining, the multi-employer settlements determine the employment terms of no more than half of the employees covered on aggregate. The other half is employed by the former monopoly provider for which a separate agreement is negotiated. Therefore, the sector's high concentration, in particular in tandem with the special status of the former monopoly provider with regard to employment relations, has paved the way for widespread practices of single-employer bargaining. This situation sometimes contrasts with what the unions would prefer. In Latvia they have in vain called the existing sector-related business associations to take on the role of a bargaining party and have asked for support from the government in this matter. In contrast to what one may expect, very few agreements exist in countries under prevalent single-employer bargaining. No more than one single company agreement, each concluded for the principal provider, is reported to exist in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Lithuania, Latvia, Luxembourg and Poland, while all the other companies of the sector are uncovered. Slovenia has joined this group since 2006 for the above reasons. The high coverage rate in terms of employees thus conceals a very low coverage in terms of companies in several countries. In some countries like Bulgaria the impact of the one and only agreement extends its formal purview, since the uncovered companies tend to orient their employment terms towards the principal provider. In other countries, the one and only collective agreement carries little weight even with regard to the company covered. For instance, the agreement for the blue-collar workers of P&T Luxembourg is merely an amendment of the collective agreement for the

employees of the state sector. The agreement on Telekomunikacja Polska S.A., concluded in connection with ongoing privatisation, dates back to 1998. Since that time, only some amendments have been made.

Since extension schemes can be applied only to multi-employer settlements, the widespread practice of single-employer bargaining limits their use even in cases where labour law provides for such schemes. Extension practices characterize Belgium, Romania, Finland, France, and Slovakia. As is generally typical of Belgium, Finland and France, these practices are pervasive there, whilst they are rather limited in the remaining two countries. If one refers to the aim of extension provisions, i.e. making multi-employer agreements generally binding, one should also mention the provisions for obligatory membership in the chambers of Austria and Slovenia. They create an extension effect, since the chambers of the two countries are parties to multi-employer bargaining. Another functional equivalent to statutory extension schemes can be found in Italy. According to the country's constitution minimum conditions of employment must apply to all employees. The labour court rulings relate this principle to the multi-employer agreements, such that they are seen as generally binding (see 'Collective agreement extension mechanisms in EU member countries', IST, Typescript).

In all these cases the coverage rate is very high. Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Romania, and Slovenia all record a maximum of 100%. With 72%, Slovakia marks the lower limit of coverage in this group of countries.

Participation in public policy-making

Interest associations may partake in public policy in two basic ways: They may be consulted by the authorities in matters affecting their members; and they may be represented on 'corporatist' (i.e. tripartite) committees and boards of policy concertation. We confine our considerations to cases of consultation and corporatist participation which are suited to sector-specific matters. Consultation processes are not necessarily institutionalised, such that the associations consulted by the authorities may vary with issues and over time, namely changes in government. Moreover, the authorities may initiate a consultation process on an *ad hoc* basis rather than regularly. Given this volatility, Tables 2 and 3 designate only those sector-related unions and employer associations that are consulted *usually*.

The unions are consulted in the majority of countries. Since a multi-union system is established in almost all countries, one cannot rule out the possibility that the authorities prefer certain unions or that the unions rival for participation rights. However, in most countries where a noticeable practice of consultation is given, any of the existing union takes part of the consultation processes. Spain, Portugal and Malta are the exceptions to this rule. In the case of Spain and Portugal, access to sector-related consultation processes is bound to a union's affiliation to one of the major union confederations (i.e. CCOO, UGT; CGTP, UGT) that are represented on the country's chief board of corporatist cross-sectoral policy concertation (i.e. CES). Likewise, inter-union conflicts over participation in public policy are rare. Such rivalries are reported only for Hungary and Portugal (involving SINTTAV, STPT, and SINDELCO).

Due to their monopoly-like position in most countries, any conflict over participation rights is absent in the case of the sector-related employer associations. In the majority of the countries, where such associations exist, they are usually consulted in sector-related matters. Furthermore, if employer associations exist, then their opportunity to participate in consultation processes does not differ from that of the unions. Generally, each of the two sides of industry is either consulted or not consulted. As noted above, employer associations in the sense of the above definition of a social partner organisation are not established in 14 (i.e. 15, with Slovenia, from 2006 onwards) of the 26 countries. This does not mean that business is excluded from consultation procedures in

these countries. Under these circumstances, the numerous sectoral trade associations are usually consulted. In Hungary the trade associations are the main partners of the authorities in matters of sector-related policies. In addition to these associations of business, the large companies themselves may directly be involved in consultation procedures, in particular when policy-making follows the pattern of a 'company state' rather than that of an 'associative state' (see *Business and politics in Britain*, W Grant, Macmillan).

Turning from consultation to tripartite participation, one finds that sector-specific tripartite bodies are established only in a few countries (i.e. Denmark, Spain, France, and Slovakia). In Bulgaria such a body was established until the privatisation of the principal provider in 2004. In Slovenia a tripartite committee for postal services and telecommunications has been inactive since its formation. Table 5 summarises the main properties of the active boards. With the exception of the Slovak body which rests on a bipartite agreement of the social partners, they are all based on statute. Their tasks fairly differ. Most of them deal with matters other than industrial relations. As far as their composition is concerned, there is one interesting difference between the unions and business associations. In all cases except for Slovakia, the cross-sectoral union confederations are represented on the bodies either exclusively or together with their sector-related counterparts. On the side of business, only sector-related associations participate. This suggests that, compared to their confederal cross-sectoral peak organisations, the sector-related business associations have a stronger role in sector-specific matters of public policy than is the case of their union counterparts. Several of the business associations which are represented on the boards are not listed in Table 3, since they do not meet the criteria of a social partner organisation. This implies that they primarily perform the tasks of a trade association. In some countries the profile of sector-specific corporatism reflects the outstanding position of the former monopoly providers. In Belgium a separate Joint Committee for Belgacom is in operation. Several specific boards exist for France Telecom. They all have a statutory basis. In contrast to the boards listed in Table 5, they deal with industrial relations rather than public policy issues, and they are bipartite bodies, composed of representative company management and from those unions that are present in the company.

THE EUROPEAN LEVEL OF INTEREST REPRESENTATION

At European level, eligibility for consultation and participation in the social dialogue is linked to three criteria, as defined by the Commission. Accordingly, a social partner organisation must (i) be cross-industry, or relate to specific sectors or categories and be organised at European level; (ii) consist of organisations which are themselves an integral and recognised part of member states' social partner structures and with capacity to negotiate agreements, and which are representative of all member states, as far as possible; and (iii) have adequate structures to ensure the effective participation in the consultation process. As regards the social dialogue, the constituent property of these structures is the ability of an association to negotiate on behalf of its members and to arrive at agreements that bind them.

In accordance with this, this section on the European associations of the telecommunications sector will analyse their membership domain, the composition of their membership and their ability to negotiate.

As will be outlined in greater detail below, there is one European association each on the two sides of industry which are of importance to the sector: This is UNI EUROPA as the representative of labour, and ETNO for business. Hence, the following analysis will concentrate on these associations, while providing supplementary information on others which are linked to the sector's national industrial relations actors.

As far as the membership domain is concerned, UNI EUROPA which in turn is linked to UNI GLOBAL and the European Trade Union Confederation, is differentiated into 13 sectors which gather the corresponding national unions: commerce, electricity, finance, gaming, graphical, hairs and beauty, business and information technology services (IBITS), media and entertainment, postal, property services, social insurance, tourism and telecom. In consequence, the membership domain of UNI EUROPA is overlapping relative to the sector. In contrast to other European associations of business, ETNO does not organize associations. Its unit of membership is the company itself. As ETNO argues, direct company membership is preferable, since national business associations do not exist in many EU member states, or otherwise are exclusively dedicated to commercial, technical or market related issues vis-à-vis the national regulatory authorities. Full members of ETNO may be those undertakings established in Europe and providing therein electronic communications networks. Hence, ETNO's membership domain largely corresponds with the statistical demarcation of the sector.

Turning to the composition of membership, one should note that in the case of both UNI EUROPA and ETNO the countries covered extend the 26 countries examined here. However, we consider here only membership of the 26 countries. Furthermore, we will confine our consideration to the affiliates to UNI EUROPA's telecom section only. For UNI EUROPA TELECOM, Table 6 documents the list of membership. Accordingly, there are no national affiliations in two cases (i.e. Hungary and Malta). As far as available data on membership of the national unions provide sufficient information on their relative strength (Table 2), one can conclude that UNI EUROPA TELECOM covers the sector's most important labour representatives in the remaining 24 countries. In several countries (i.e. Austria, Finland and the UK) UNI EUROPA's membership includes any of the existing sector-related national unions. ETNO has direct company membership in all of the 26 countries under examination, with the exception of Lithuania (Table 7). ETNO gathers primarily the major telecommunications companies many of which belong to the group of former monopoly providers. In the EU-25 ETNO's members employ around 1,022,000 employees on aggregate. 14 of the largest 20 telecom companies in terms of revenues are affiliated to ETNO (see 'Facts and Figures', ETNO, n.d.). With direct company membership, ETNO structures are not tied to the national systems of business associations. This raises the question of how these structures relate to the above Commission criterion of representativeness which requires European associations to cover organisations which are themselves an integral and recognised part of member states' social partner structures and with capacity to negotiate agreements. As noted above, collective bargaining is conducted either mainly or exclusively at company level in most of the 26 countries (Table 4). In these circumstances, the companies themselves are the agents of business in industrial relations, while employer associations are absent. Put more specifically, the very large companies, in particular the former monopoly providers are the key actors and vanguards of business in the sector's systems of single-employer bargaining. They are usually affiliated to ETNO. In the case of the smaller number of countries, where multi-employer bargaining is all-encompassing, ETNO can be linked to the national bargaining process indirectly in two possible ways. First, its member companies may conduct bargaining within its own realm, such that their agreements complement the sector-level settlements. Second, ETNO's members, when affiliated to the national employer associations, can influence their goal formation and bargaining strategies.

The third criterion of representativeness at the European level refers to the capacity to negotiate on behalf of one's own members. In the case of UNI EUROPA the members of the social dialogue committee and the secretariat are empowered to sign agreements in the name of all affiliates by the regular, and statutory, Steering Group and Committee meetings. ETNO has the capacity to negotiate and sign agreements on behalf of its members once it has received a mandate from its members to do so.

As a proof of the weight of UNI EUROPA and ETNO, one has also to look for other European associations that may be important representatives of the sector. This can be done by reviewing the European associations to which the sector-related unions and employer associations are affiliated.

For the unions, these affiliations are listed in Table 2. One finds that European organisations other than UNI EUROPA represent only a small number of both sector-related unions and countries. This involves the European Metalworkers' Federation (EMF), with six affiliations covering five countries; the European Public Service Unions (EPSU), with six affiliations and four countries; the European Federation of Public Service Employees (EUROFEDOP) and the European Transport Workers' Federation (ETF), both with each four affiliations and countries; the European Mine, Chemical and Energy Workers' Federation (EMCEF), with four affiliations and three countries; Eurocadres, the European Trade Union Committee for Textiles, Clothing and Leather (ETUF-TCL) and the European Federation of Trade Unions in Food, Agriculture and Tourism (EFFAT), each with two affiliations from two countries; the European Federation of Building and Woodworkers (EFBWW), with two affiliations and one country; and the European Confederation of Executive and Managerial Staff (CEC) with one affiliation. Even though the list of affiliations in Table 2 may be incomplete, this review underscores the principal status of UNI EUROPA as a voice of telecom employees, all the more since many of the above affiliations to other European organisations reflect the overlapping domains of the affiliates rather than a real reference of the affiliations as such to telecommunications. Exceptions are those European organisations which organise public-sector employees or certain professions or employee groups whose interests crosscut the confines of telecommunications.

An analogous review of the memberships of the employer associations can be derived from Table 3. This shows that organisational links of the sector-related employer associations with European Federations hardly exist. There are only four Federations each recording no more than one association from our sample: The European Federation of Management Consultancies Association (FEACO), the International Council of Management Consulting Institutes (ICMCI), the European Information, Communications and Consumer Electronics Industry Technology (EICTA), and the European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation and of Enterprises of General Economic Interest (CEEP).

Commentary

In comparison to other sectors, telecommunications stands out as a relatively new sector, the origins of which were rooted in a state monopoly. This evolution has led to high economic concentration in the core area of the sector, insofar as the former monopoly providers still obtain a predominant position in product markets and employment in the field of network operation in most of the European countries.

These economic properties have put their stamp on the national industrial relations systems. In response to deregulation and liberalisation new industrial relations structures have developed: New unions and new employer associations were formed, associations from other sectors invaded in telecommunications, and new bargaining structures were set up which intersect with remnant machinery of public-sector industrial relations. This development has given rise to highly polarised structures in several respects. New private-law employment relations often co-exist with the older public-sector ones, something which is echoed by parallel structures of interest representation and bargaining. Most essentially, this has led also to a polarisation between the old and the new segment of the sector in terms of whether industrial relations are organised. Both the unions and employer associations have encountered serious difficulties in organising the newly established companies. The strongholds of the unions are still the former monopoly providers,

while employer associations have not been formed in the majority of countries. This has made single-employer bargaining more important in the sector than is the common pattern in many countries. Concomitantly, the former monopoly provider has often developed into the gravity centre of the sector's industrial relations system. In extreme cases, the sector concludes only one collective agreement which is concluded for this provider.

Nevertheless, a comparison with recent figures on cross-sectoral collective bargaining coverage in the EU-25 member states (see 'After Enlargement', P Marginson and F Traxler, *Transfer*, 11, 2005) indicates that the sector's bargaining coverage is more or less higher in 13 of the 15 countries for which comparable data are available. This can be traced to the sector's specific market structures and industrial relations patterns: Coverage is boosted by the fact that the former monopoly providers, which are generally covered, still record the lion's share in employment. However, collective bargaining as well as organised industrial relations may decline to the extent that this predominant employment position of the principal providers may fade away.

Overall, the polarising properties of the sector affect the associability of business more than that of labour. While the sector's employers have refrained from forming a social partner organisation in the majority of countries, national business associations, where acting as social partner organisations, have not set up a sector-related European employer confederation. Reflecting the predominance of the sector's companies over business associations in most of the national industrial relations systems, ETNO, the sector-related voice of the employers at European level, admits only companies as members. Hence, employer associations, which are still the key industrial relations actors of business in a notable number of countries, and which may gain importance as relevant actors in some of the new member states, are excluded from membership. Regardless of this, ETNO as well as its labour counterpart, UNI EUROPA, are unmatched as the European speakers of the employers and employees, in particular since there is no other European organisation which can compare with them in terms of organising relevant sector-related industrial relations actors across the European states.

Table 1. Socio-economic trends in telecommunications

		Countries												
		AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ ^g	DE	DK ^g	EE	ES	FI	FR	GR ^f	HU ^g
A	1993	1	333	n.a.	3 ^b	n.a.	n.a.	45	n.a.	n.a.	128	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	2004	~ 600 ^a	520	903	34 ^c	942 ^d	1,344 ^e	244	94	69	198	426	70	864
B	1993	n.a.	n.a.	42,600	2,419 ^b	36,300	246,000 ^{b,g}	16,048	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	idem.	30,296	n.a.
	2004	~ 20,000 ^a	n.a.	52,100	2,825 ^c	31,300 ^d	218,000 ^{e,g}	20,705	2,865	65,221	20,330	147,627	32,135	n.a.
C	1993	n.a.	n.a.	16,600	1,946 ^b	22,400	168,000 ^{b,g}	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	24,135	n.a.
	2004	n.a.	n.a.	23,100	2,082 ^c	22,200 ^d	142,000 ^{e,g}	n.a.	1,900	44,837	11,838	n.a.	23,223	n.a.
D	1993	n.a.	n.a.	26,000	473 ^b	13,900	78,000 ^{b,g}	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	6,161	n.a.
	2004	n.a.	n.a.	29,100	743 ^c	9,100 ^d	76,000 ^{e,g}	n.a.	1,000	20,384	8,492	n.a.	8,912	n.a.
E	1993	n.a.	27,404	n.a.	n.a.	35,500	n.a.	~16,000	n.a.	n.a.	15,326 ^b	n.a.	29,995	n.a.
	2004	~ 20,000	30,424	32,357	n.a.	29,400 ^d	78,603 ^d	~20,650	2,848	64,751	19,832	~ 170,000	29,714	19,131
F	1993	n.a.	21,498	n.a.	n.a.	21,600	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	9,952 ^b	n.a.	23,928	n.a.
	2004	n.a.	21,724	15,538	n.a.	20,900 ^d	54,618 ^d	n.a.	1,900	44,418	11,766	96,873	21,336	n.a.
G	1993	n.a.	5,906	n.a.	n.a.	13,900	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	5,375 ^b	n.a.	6,607	n.a.
	2004	n.a.	8,700	16,819	n.a.	8,500 ^d	23,985 ^d	n.a.	1,000	20,333	8,066	60,149	8,378	n.a.
H	1993	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.74	0.7 ^b	0.6	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1.2	n.a.
	2004	0.5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.66 ^d	0.6 ^e	0.8	0.68	0.36	0.86	0.56	1.1	n.a.
I	1993	n.a.	0.95	n.a.	n.a.	0.84	n.a.	0.8	n.a.	0.35	0.85	n.a.	2.3	n.a.
	2004	0.6	0.93	n.a.	n.a.	0.74 ^d	0.2 ^d	0.8	0.67	0.3540	0.96	0.67	1.1	0.74

A = Number of companies, B = Aggregate employment, C = Male employment, D = Female employment, E = Aggregate employees, F = Male employees, G = Female employees, H = Aggregate sectoral employees as a percentage of total employment in the economy, I = Aggregate sectoral employees as a percentage of the total number of employees in the economy.

n.a. = not available, ^a = 2006, ^b = 1995, ^c = 2000, ^d = 2005, ^e = 2003, ^f = including postal services, ^g = including cable TV and radio activities, ^h = 1991, ⁱ = 2001, ^j = 1998, ^k = 2002, ^l = 1994, ^m = companies with > 5 employees, ⁿ = companies with > 9 employees, ^o = 1996.

Table 1. Socio-economic trends in telecommunications (continued)

		Countries												
		IE	IT	LT ^g	LU	LV	MT	NL ^g	PL	PT ^g	RO	SI	SK	UK
A	1993	n.a.	212 ^h	n.a.	36 ^b	n.a.	n.a.	685	240 ^l	n.a.	148	21 ^b	103 ^o	n.a.
	2004	55	782 ⁱ	297 ^d	69 ^k	n.a.	32 ^e	1385	278 ^d	n.a.	2,216	117 ^d	99 ^d	9,722
B	1993	n.a.	107,303 ^h	n.a.	423 ^b	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	206 ^{l,m}	30,653 ^h	94,914	1,634 ^b	13,831 ^o	167,624
	2004	14,400	113,340 ⁱ	6,706 ^d	958 ^k	n.a.	1,950 ^e	n.a.	3,630 ^{d,n}	40,745 ⁱ	57,943	4,635 ^d	9,413 ^d	264,215
C	1993	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	2,418 ^j	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	20,788 ^h	n.a.	1,091 ^b	n.a.	124,616
	2004	n.a.	76,865 ⁱ	3,468 ^d	2,897 ^k	n.a.	1,545 ^e	n.a.	n.a.	25,218 ⁱ	n.a.	3,154 ^d	n.a.	185,534
D	1993	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1,169 ^j	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	9,865 ^h	n.a.	544 ^b	n.a.	43,008
	2004	n.a.	32,612 ⁱ	3,238 ^d	1,282 ^k	n.a.	405 ^e	n.a.	n.a.	15,527 ⁱ	n.a.	1,481 ^d	n.a.	78,681
E	1993	n.a.	106,903 ^h	n.a.	414 ^b	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	77,442 ^{l,m}	29,641 ^h	89,315	1,627 ^b	13,813 ^o	164,873
	2004	14,400	108,523 ⁱ	6,483 ^d	948 ^k	n.a.	1,942 ^e	n.a.	55,787 ^{d,n}	38,856 ⁱ	46,354	4,612 ^d	9,396 ^d	260,477
F	1993	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	40,379 ^{l,m}	20,064 ^h	46,355	1,075 ^b	8,421 ^o	122,204
	2004	n.a.	76,097 ⁱ	3,245 ^d	n.a.	n.a.	1,537 ^e	n.a.	32,949 ^{d,n}	23,977 ⁱ	24,058	3,120 ^d	5,815 ^d	182,243

G	1993	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	37,063 ^{l,m}	9,577 ^h	42,960	542 ^b	5,392 ^o	42,669
	2004	n.a.	32,426	3,238 ^d	n.a.	n.a.	405 ^e	n.a.	22,838 ^{d,n}	14,879 ⁱ	22,296	1,478 ^d	3,581 ^d	78,234
H	1993	n.a.	0.74 ^h	n.a.	0.19 ^b	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.5-0.6 ^l	0.74 ^h	0.94	0.002 ^b	0.62 ^o	0.68
	2004	0.72	0.69 ⁱ	0.45 ^d	0.33 ^k	n.a.	1.3 ^e	n.a.	0.41 ^d	0.88 ⁱ	0.71	0.005 ^d	0.43 ^d	0.93
I	1993	n.a.	1.13 ^h	n.a.	0.20 ^b	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.8 ^l	0.94 ^h	1.34	0.002 ^b	0.68 ^o	0.79
	2004	n.a.	1.06 ⁱ	0.53 ^d	0.35 ^k	n.a.	1.5 ^e	n.a.	0.5 ^d	1.02 ⁱ	1.04	0.006 ^d	0.45 ^d	1.07

A = Number of companies, B = Aggregate employment, C = Male employment, D = Female employment, E = Aggregate employees, F = Male employees, G = Female employees, H = Aggregate sectoral employees as a percentage of total employment in the economy, I = Aggregate sectoral employees as a percentage of the total number of employees in the economy.

n.a. = not available, ^a = 2006, ^b = 1995, ^c = 2000, ^d = 2005, ^e = 2003, ^f = including postal services, ^g = including cable TV and radio activities, ^h = 1991, ⁱ = 2001, ^j = 1998, ^k = 2002, ^l = 1994, ^m = companies with > 5 employees, ⁿ = companies with > 9 employees, ^o = 1996.

Table 2. Data on the unions (2004/05)

Country	Domain comprehensiveness	Members	Female membership ^a	Union density		Collective bargaining ^b	Consultation ^b	National and European affiliations ^c
				Domain	Sector			
AT								
GPA*	SO	277,015 (2005)	43.7	18.6	n.a.	1	1	ÖGB, UNI, Eurocadres
GPF*	O	62,558 (2005)	24.2	80.0	85.0	1	1	ÖGB, ETF, UNI
BE								

CGSP Telecom-Aviation	SO	n.a.	24.5	n.a.	n.a.	1	0	<i>FGTB, UNI</i>
CSC Transcom Telecoms	SO	4,500	20	35.0	14.8	1	0	<i>CSC-ACV, UNI, EUROFEDOP</i>
SLFP-Groupe Belgacom	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	0	<i>CGSLB, UNI, EPSU</i>
CNE	SO	120,000	> 50	n.a.	n.a.	1	0	<i>CSC-ACV, UNI</i>
LBC	SO	297,000	> 50	n.a.	n.a.	1	0	<i>CSC-ACV, UNI</i>
SETCa	SO	343,420	53	n.a.	n.a.	1	0	<i>FGTB, UNI, EMF</i>
CGSLB	O	220,000	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	0	<i>CGSLB, UNI</i>
BG								
TUFC*	O	3,062	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.	<i>CITUB, UNI</i>
FC 'Podkrepa'	O	2,315	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.	<i>CL Podkrepa, UNI</i>
DTUC*	O	754	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.	<i>ADTU</i>
TUC*	O	84	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.	<i>ITD</i>
NTUAC Promenia	S	48	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.	—
CY								
EPOET	0	1,470	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	0	<i>SEK, UNI</i>
SIDIKEK	0	490	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	0	PEO
PIEU	0	340	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	0	—
CZ								
OSZPTNS*	O	~ 3,700	28.3	14.8	12.24	1	1	UNI
OOPR*	SO	312	n.a.	n.a.	1.1	1	1	—

DE									
ver.di *	O	n.a.	~ 32	n.a.	n.a.	1	1	<i>DGB, EPSU, UNI</i>	
IG Metall*	O	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	1	<i>DGB, EMF</i>	
IGBCE*	O	n.a.	~ 44	n.a.	n.a.	1	1	<i>DGB, EMCEF</i>	
Transnet*	O	2,700	~ 17	n.a.	n.a.	1	1	<i>DGB, ETF</i>	
CGPT*	O	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	1	<i>CGB</i>	
DK									
Dansk Metal*	O	139,000	5	80	75	1	1	<i>CO-industri, LO, UNI</i>	
HK privat*	SO	160,000	75	~ 50	40	1	1	<i>CO-industri, LO, UNI</i>	
AC-Tele*	S	n.a.	31	n.a.	100	1	1	<i>AC</i>	
Lederforeningen i TDC*	S	> 1,800	44	78	100	1	1	<i>FTF</i>	
DEF*	SO	30,000	1	80	75	1	1	<i>CO-industri, LO, UNI</i>	
EE									
ESTAL*	O	2,000	60	26	25	1	1	<i>EAKL, UNI</i>	
Eltel trade union*	S	83	5	16	2	1	0	—	
Elion trade union*	S	306	40	18	10.7	1	0	—	
ES									
FCT CCOO*	O	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	1	<i>CCOO, UNI</i>	
FCTM UGT*	O	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	1	<i>UGT, UNI</i>	
ELA	SO	106,025	35.2	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0	UNI	
STC*	O	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	0	—	
COBAS*	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	0	—	
AST*	S	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	0	—	

APLI*	S	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	0	—
UTS*	S	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	0	—
FI								
YTN (with IL, SEFE and TEK)*	SO	110,000	~ 25	75	70	1	0	AKAVA, UNI, Eurocadres
TU*	SO	125,722	45.5	79	55	1	0	STTK, UNI, EMF, EMCEF, EFBWW, ETUF-TCL, EFFAT, ETF
Sähköalan ammattiliitto*	SO	31,301	~ 4	88	80	1	0	SAK, UNI, EMF, EMCEF, EFBWW,
Metallityöväenliitto*	SO	167,400	20	88	95	1	0	SAK, UNI, EMF
FR								
CGT-PTT*	O	~ 15,000	33	n.a.	n.a.	1	0	CGT, UNI
CGT-FO-COM*	O	~ 15,000	40	n.a.	n.a.	1	0	CGT-FO, UNI
CFTC-PTT*	O	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	0	CFTC, EUROFEDOP
F3C-CFDT*	O	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	0	CFDT, UNI
SNT-CFE-CGC*	O	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	0	CGC, CEC-Media@managers
SUD-PTT*	O	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	0	Groupe des 10 Solidaires
UNSA-Télécoms*	O	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	0	UNSA
GR								
OME-OTE	n.a.	16,302	19.6	100.0	n.a.	1	0	UNI
HU								
TÁVSZAK*	S	2,500	n.a.	27	13	1	0	MSZOSZ
PHDSZSZ*	O	7,362	n.a.	7.8	n.a.	1	0	SZEF, EUROFEDOP

IE								
CWU*	O	19,500	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	1	ICTU, UNI
CPSU*	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	1	ICTU, EPSU, UNI
PSEU*	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	1	ICTU, EPSU, UNI
IMPACT*	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	1	ICTU, EPSU
IT								
SLC-CGIL*	O	92,564	35.0	n.a.	12.5	1	0	CGIL, UNI
FISTEL-CISL*	O	52,511	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	0	CISL, UNI
UILCOM-UIL	O	37,409	35.0	n.a.	14.4 ^d	1	0	UIL, UNI
UGL-COM	O	114,064	30.0	n.a.	1.7	1	0	UGL
LT								
LRDPS	O	4,500	53.5	41.4	34.5	1	0	LPSK, UNI
LU								
FLTL*	O	3,000	n.a.	8.3	6.2	1	1	OGB-L, UNI
LCGB*	O	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	1	—
Syndicat des P&T	O	1,900	35.0	n.a.	18.5	0	1	CGFP, UNI
LV								
LSAB*	O	4,072	55	82	n.a.	1	1	LBAS, UNI
MT								
GWU*	O	46,489	n.a.	n.a.	65	1	0	ETF, EFFAT, EPSU, ETUF-TCL, EMF, EMCEF
UHM*	O	25,901	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	1	EUROFEDOP

NL								
AbvaKabo*	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	1	<i>FNV, UNI</i>
FNV Bondge- noten*	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	1	<i>FNV</i>
Bond van Tele- compersoneel*	C	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	1	—
CNV Publieke Zaak	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	1	—
CNV Diensten boten	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	1	—
CMMF/VPP	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.	—
De Unie	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.	UNI
PL								
SKPT NSZZ Solidarnosc	SO	6,000	n.a.	n.a.	10	1	0	<i>NSZZ Solidarnosc, UNI</i>
FZZPT	SO	4,000	n.a.	n.a.	7	1	0	<i>OPZZ</i>
ZzliT	SO	2,000	n.a.	n.a.	2	1	0	<i>FZZ</i>
KZZPT	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	0	<i>FZZ</i>
Council of Federations of In- House Union organisations*	O	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.	—
ZZ Kontra	O	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.	—
PT								
SINTTAV*	O	~ 7,200	38	14.2	15.4	1	1	<i>CGTP, CPQTC, UNI</i>
STPT*	n.a.	4,520	40	25	12	1	0	UNI

SINDETELCO*	O	~ 8,000	47	7	5	1	1	UGT, UNI
SNTCT*	O	~ 11,000	n.a.	19	0.5	1	1	CGTP, CPQTC, UNI
STT* ^e	O	1,400	n.a.	3	0.3	1	1	CGTP
SERS* ^e	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.	UNI
SITese* ^e	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.	UNI
FENTCOP* ^e	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.	n.a.
SICOMP* ^e	O	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.	n.a.
TENSIQ ^e	S	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.	n.a.
USI* ^e	O	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.	n.a.
SETN* ^e	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.	n.a.
FENSIQ* ^e	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.	n.a.
SNE* ^e	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.	n.a.
SNAQ* ^e	SO	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	n.a.	n.a.

RO

FTUT*	O	12,000	68.9	n.a.	25.9	1	1	UFS Atlas, CNSLR Fratia
FTURC*	O	2,000	43	n.a.	4.3	1	1	UFS Atlas, CNSLR Fratia
RomTelecom TUF*	O	8,300	56.6	63.6	17.9	1	1	Cartel ALFA, UNI

SI

SDPZ*	O	31,000	30	n.a.	21.6	1	0	ZSSS
TS	S	~ 1,500	~ 32	n.a.	33.9	1	0	UNI

SK

SOZ PT*	O	3,550	60	24.6	13.9	1	1	KOZ SR, Assoc. of Trade Unions in Transport and Communications,
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								EUROFEDOP
SPOJE*	O	8,476	68.6	n.a.	12.9	1	1	<i>KOZ SR, Assoc. of Trade Unions in Transport and Communications, UNI</i>
UK								
CWU*	O	258,696	20	45-50	40	1	1	<i>TUC, UNI</i>
CONNECT*	SO	19,648	19	24	8	1	1	<i>TUC, UNI</i>

n.a. = not available

^a = As a percentage of total union membership, ^b = yes = 1, no = 0, ^c = National affiliations put in italics; only affiliations to sectoral European associations, ^d = Figures inflated, ^e Small unions organizing usually no more than 200 employees in the sector

* = Inter-union domain overlap, UNI = UNI Europa Telecom

O = Overlap, SO = Sectional overlap, S = Sectionalism

Table 3. Data on the employer associations (2004/2005)

Country	Domain comprehensiveness	Density								Collective bargaining ^a	Consultation ^a	National and European affiliations ^b
		Membership			Companies		Employees					
		Type ^a	Companies	Employees	Domain	Sector	Domain	Sector				
AT												
FTR	O	0	~ 600	~ 20,000	100	100	100	100	1	1	<i>WKÖ, ICMCI, FEACO</i>	

BE

	FEB-VBO	SO	1	30,000	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	0	—
	Agoria	SO	1	1,400	~ 300,000	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	0	<i>FEB-VBO</i>
BG	n.e.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
CY	n.e.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
CZ												
	CUPTP	O	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	1	—
DE	n.e.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
DK												
	DI	O	1	6,500	~ 325,000 ^c	35	9	70	90	1	1	<i>DA</i>
EE	n.e.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
ES	n.e.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
FI												
	TIKLI	O	1	191	55,000	70	~ 30	90	70	1	0	<i>EK</i>
FR												
	UNETEL-RST	SO	1	80	61,770	n.a.	19 ^d	n.a.	90 ^d	1	0	—
GR	n.e.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
HU	n.e.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
IE												
	IBEC-TIF	O	1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	~ 40	n.a.	51	1	1	—
IT					89,600 ^c							
	ASSTEL	C	1	28		63.6	3.0	n.a.	n.a.	1	0	<i>FEDERCOMIN, CONFIN-DUSTRIA</i>
LT	n.e.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

LU	n.e.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
LV	n.e.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
MT	n.e.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
NL												
	ICT-Office*	O	1	60	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1	1	—
PL	n.e.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
PT	n.e.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
RO												
	Communications Employer Organization	O	3	27,597	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1 ^e	1	<i>CNPR</i>
SI												
	ZDS	O	1	10	~ 3,000	n.a.	10	n.a.	65	1	0	—
	GZS	O	0	~ 200	100	100	100	100	100	1	0	EICTA
SK												
	Employers Assoc. of Transport, Posts and Telecommunic.	O	1	30	~ 70,000	n.a.	2%	n.a.	72%	1	1	<i>RUZ SR, CEEP</i>
UK	n.e.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

O = Overlap, S = Sectionalism, n.e. = not existing, * = Inter-associational domain overlap, n.a. = not available

^a = yes = 1 no = 0, ^b = National affiliations put in italics; only affiliations to sectoral European associations, ^c = full-time equivalents, ^d = public-sector employees excluded, ^e = Indirect involvement in bargaining via higher-order confederation

Table 4. The system of sectoral collective bargaining (2004/2005)

Country	CBC	Share of MEB in total CBC (%)	Extension practices
AT	100	50	(2)
BE	100	50	2
BG	30.5	0	0
CY	n.a.	0	0
CZ	n.a.	MEB prevailing	0
DE	n.a.	0	0
DK	90	MEB prevailing	0
EE	77	0	0
ES	97	0	0
FI	~ 90	100	2
FR	100	100	2
GR	n.a.	0	0
HU	67.5	0	0
IE	n.a.	MEB prevailing	0
IT	100	100	(2)
LT	80	0	0
LU	<20 ^a	0	0
LV	n.a.	0	0
MT	~ 85	0	0
NL	n.a.	n.a.	0

PL	~ 50	0	0
PT	23	0	0
RO	100	n.a.	2
SI	100; <50 ^b	100; 0 ^b	(2) 0 ^b
SK	~ 72	~ 72	1
UK	39	0	0

CBC = collective bargaining coverage: employees covered as a percentage of the total number of employees in the sector

MEB = multi-employer bargaining relative to single-employer bargaining

Extension practices (including functional equivalents to extension provisions, i.e. obligatory membership and labour court rulings):

0 = no practice, 1 = limited/exceptional, 2 = pervasive. Cases of functional equivalents are put in parentheses.

^a = Referring to NACE 64, ^b = From June 2006 onwards.

Table 5. Tripartite sector-specific boards of public policy

Country	Name of the body and scope of activity	Origin	Participants	
			Unions	Business associations
DK	EU-Special Committee for IT and Telecommunications: EU policies targeting telecommunications	Statutory	LO Dansk Metal HK Privat	DI, DHS, HTS
ES	Quality Control Commission for Telecommunication Services: Quality Control and audit in the sector.	Statutory	CCOO UGT	ASTEL ASIMILEC
FR	Joint bargaining commission:	Statutory	CFDT, CFE-CGC,	UNETEL-RST

	Collective bargaining		CFTC, CGT, CGT-FO	
SK	Body for postal services and telecommunications: employment, wage and social policy, working conditions, changes in legislation.	Agreement between the social partners	SOZ PT, SPOJE	Employer Association of Transport, Posts and Telecommunications

Table 6. Members of UNI EUROPA-TELECOM* (2006)

AT	GPA,GPF
BE	CGLSB/ALCVB, CGSP TELECOM – AVIATION, CNE-CSC, LBC-NVK, SETCa
BG	PTT-Podkrepa, TUFC
CY	EPOET
CZ	OS ZPTNS
DE	ver.di
DK	DEF, Dansk Metal, HK
EE	ESTAL
ES	ELA-Zerbitzuak, FCT CC.OO, FTCM-UGT
FI	YT-IL, Metallityöväenliitto, Sähköalojen ammattiliitto, YT-SEFE, YT-TEK, TU
FR	F3C-CFDT, CGT-PTT, CGT-FO-COM
GR	OME-OTE
HU	—
IE	CPSU, CWU, PSEU
IT	FISTEL-CISL, SLC-CGIL, UILCOM
LT	LRDPS
LU	Syndicat des P&T
LV	LSAB
MT	—
NL	AbvaKabo, De Unie
PL	SL NSZZ
PT	SERS, SINDETELCO, SINTTAV, SITESE, SNTCT, STPT
RO	RomTelecom, TUF, FTUT
SI	TS

SK	SPOJE
UK	CONNECT, CWU

** List confined to the 26 countries under examination; sector related associations.*

Table 7. Members of ETNO* (2006)

AT	Telekom Austria
BE	Belgacom
BG	BTC (Bulgarian Telecommunications Company)
CY	ATHK
CZ	Cesky Telecom
DE	Deutsche Telekom
DK	TDC
EE	Elion Enterprises Ltd
ES	Ono, Telefónica
FI	Elisa Corporation, Finnet Group, Telia Sonera (Sweden/Finland)
FR	TDF, France Telecom
GR	OTE
HU	Invitel, Magyar Telekom
IE	EIRCOM
IT	Telecom Italia
LT	—
LU	P&T Luxembourg
LV	Lattelekom
MT	Maltacom
NL	KPN

PL	Netia Holdings, Telekomunikacja Polska
PT	Portugal Telecom
RO	RomTelekom, Radiocom
SI	Telekom Slovenije
SK	Slovak Telecom
UK	BT (British Telecom)

** List confined to the 26 countries under examination.*

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<i>Country</i>	<i>Abbreviation</i>	<i>Full Name</i>
AT	FTR	Federal Organisation of Telecommunications and Broadcasting Companies
	GPA	Union of Salaried Private Sector Employees
	GPF	Post and telecommunications workers' union
	ÖGB	Austrian Federation of Trade Unions
	WKÖ	Austrian Federal Economic Chamber
BE	CGSLB/ACLVB	Federation of Liberal Trade Unions of Belgium
	CGSP TELECOM-AVIATION	General Confederation of Public Services Telecom-Aviation
	CNE-CSC	National Federation of White-Collar Workers
	CSC Transcom Telecoms	Confederation of Christian Trade Unions
	CSC-ACV	Confederation of Christian Trade Unions
	FEB-VBO	Federation of Belgian Companies
	FGTB	Belgian General Confederation of Labour
	LBC-NVK	National Federation of White-Collar Workers

	SETCa	Belgian Union of White-Collar Staff, Technicians and Managers
	SLFP-Groupe Belgacom	Free Trade Union of Civil Servants
BG	ADTU	Association of Democratic Trade Unions
	BTC	Bulgarian Telecommunication Company
	CITUB	Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria
	CL „Podkrepa“	Confederation of Labour „Podkrepa“
	DTUC	Democratic Trade Union of Communications
	FC "Podkrepa"	Federation of Communications “Podkrepa”
	ITD	Independent Trade Union
	NTUAC „Promania“	National Trade Union Association of Communications ‘Promania’
	PTT-Podkrepa	Fédération des PTT "Podkrepa"
	TUC	Trade Union of Communications
	TUFC	Trade Union Federation of Communications
CY	EPOET	Free Pancyprian Organisation of Telecommunications Employees
	PEO	Pancyprian Federation of Labour
	PIEU	Pancyprian Independent Employees' Union
	SEK	Cyprus Workers' Confederation
	SIDIKEK	Local Authority Workers’ and Employees’ Trade Union
CZ	CUPTP	Czech Union of Postal, Telecommunications and Press Distribution Employees
	OOPR	Radiocommunication Workers’ Trade Union Organisation
	OS ZPTNS	Trade Union of Employees in Postal, Telecommunications and Newspaper Services of the

Czech Republic

DE	CGB	Christian Federation of Trade Unions
	CGPT	Christian posts and telecoms workers' union
	DGB	German Confederation of Trade Unions
	IG BCE	Mining, Chemicals and Energy Workers' Union
	IG Metall	Metalworkers' Union
	Transnet	Rail Workers' Union
	ver.di	Unified Service Sector Union
DK	AC	Danish Confederation of Professional Associations
	AC-gruppen i TDC	Group of Professionals in TDC
	CO-industri	Central Organisation of Industrial Employees
	DA	Confederation of Danish Employers
	Dansk Metal	National Union of Metalworkers
	DEF	Danish Electricians' Union
	DI	Confederation of Danish Industries
	FTF	Salaried Employees' and Civil Servants' Confederation
	HK privat	Union of Commercial and Clerical Employees in Denmark/Private
	Lederne i TDC	Managers in TDC
LO	Danish Confederation of Trade Unions	
EE	EAKL	Confederation of Estonian Trade Unions
	Elion trade union	Elion trade union
	Eltel trade union	Eltel trade union
	ESTAL	Estonian Communication Workers' Trade Union
ES	APLI	Asociación Profesional Libre e Independiente
	AST	Alternativa Sindical de Trabajadores

	CCOO	Comisiones Obreras
	CGT	General Confederation of Labour
	COBAS	Comisiones de Base
	ELA	Basque Workers' Solidarity (ELA-STV)
	FCT CC.OO	Federación de Comunicación y Transporte de CC.OO
	FTCM-UGT	Federación de Transportes, Comunicaciones y Mar
	STC	Sindicato de Trabajadores de Comunicaciones
	UGT	General Union of Workers
	UTS	Unión Telefónica Sindical
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FI	AKAVA	Central Union of Special Branches
	EK	Confederation of Finnish Industries
	ERTO	Federation of Special Service and Clerical Employees
	IL	Insinööriliitto (Union of Professional Engineers)
	Metallityöväenliitto	Metalworkers' Union
	Sähköalan ammattiliitto	Electrical Workers' Union
	SAK	Central Organisation of Finnish Trade Unions
	SEFE	Suomen Ekonomiliitto (Finnish Association of Graduates in Economics and Business Administration)
	STTK	Finnish Confederation of Salaried Employees
	TEK	Tekniikan Akateemisten Liitto (Finnish Association of Graduate Engineers)
	TIKLI	Employers' Association
	TU	Union of Salaried Employees
	YTN	Federation of Professional and Managerial Staff
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FR	CFDT	French Democratic Confederation of Labour
	CFE-CGC	French Confederation of Managerial Employees –

		General Confederation of Professional and Managerial Staff
	CFTC	French Christian Workers' Confederation
	CFTC-PTT	Post and Telecommunications Workers Federation
	CGC	General Confederation of Commerce
	CGT	General Confederation of Labour
	CGT-FO	General Confederation of Labour – Force Ouvrière
	CGT-FO-COM	CGT-FO Communication Workers Federation
	CGT-PTT	CGT Post and Telecommunications Workers Federation
	F3C-CFDT	CFDT Communications, Consulting and Cultural Workers Federation
	FO-COM	Force Ouvrière Communication
	SNT-CFE-CGC	CFE-CGC National Telecommunications Union
	SUD-PTT	SUD ("Solidaire, Unitaire, Démocratique") Post and Telecommunications Workers Federation
	UNETEL-RST	Telecommunication Employer Association
	UNSA	National Federation of Independent Unions
	UNSA-Télécoms	UNSA Telecommunications Workers Federation
GR	OME-OTE	Greek Telecom Employees' Federation
HU	MSZOSZ	National Confederation of Hungarian Trade Unions
	PHDSZSZ	Trade Union Federation of Posts and Communications Employees
	SZEF	Forum for the Co-operation of Trade Unions
	TÁVSZAK	Telecommunication Trade Union
IE	ATGWU	Amalgamated Transport and General Workers' Union
	CPSU	Civil, Public and Services Union

	CWU	Communication Workers' Union of Ireland
	IBEC	Irish Business and Employers Confederation
	IBEC-TIF	Telecommunications and Internet Federation of IBEC
	ICTU	Irish Congress of Trade Unions
	IMPACT	Public Sector Trade Union
	PSEU	Public Service Executive Union
IT	ASSTEL	Association of Telecommunications Service Companies
	CGIL	General Confederation of Italian Workers
	CISL	Italian Confederation of Workers' Unions
	CONFINDUSTRIA	Confederation of Italian Industry
	FEDERCOMIN	Federation of Information & Communication Technology Sector
	FISTEL-CISL	Federation of Entertainment, Information and Telecommunications - Italian Confederation of Workers' Unions
	SLC-CGIL	Communication Workers' Union - General Confederation of Italian Workers
	UGL	General Labour Union
	UGL-COM	General Communication Workers' Union
	UIL	Union of Italian Workers
	UILCOM	Union of Italian Communication Workers
	UILCOM-UIL	Union of Italian Communication Workers - Union of Italian Workers
LT	LPSK	Lithuanian Trade Union Confederation
	LRDPS	Lithuanian Communication Workers Trade Union
LU	CGFP	Confédération générale de la fonction publique
	FLTL	Syndicat imprimerie, médias et culture - trade union

		responsible for the telecommunications sector within the OGB-L
	LCGB	Luxembourg Christian Trade Union Confederation
	OGB-L	Luxembourg Confederation of Independent Trade Unions
	Syndicat des P&T	Syndicat des Postes et Télécommunications du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg
LV	LBAS	Free Trade Union Federation of Latvia (En)
	LSAB	Communication Workers Trade Union
MT	GWU	General Workers' Union
	UHM	Union of United Workers
NL	AbvaKabo	AbvaKabo FNV
	AWVN	General Industrial Employers' Association
	CMP/VPP	Union for middle and higher staff
	CNV	National Federation of Christian Trade Unions
	De Unie	DE UNIE, union for industry and services
	FNV	Dutch Trade Union Federation
	ICT-Office	branch association of IT-, Telecom-, Office- and Internet companies in the Netherlands
	VNO-NCW	Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers
PL	FZZ	Forum of Trade Unions
	FZZPT	Federation of Telecommunications Employee Trade Unions in the Republic of Poland
	KZZPT	Confederation of the Telecommunications Employee Trade Unions
	NSZZ Solidarność	NSZZ Solidarity
	OPZZ	All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions

SKPT NSZZ Solidarność	National Section of Telecommunications Employees of NSZZ Solidarity
SL NSZZ	Sekretariat Łączności NSZZ Solidarność
WZZ Sierpień 80	August '80 Free Trade Union
ZZ Kontra	National Board of the Kontra Trade Union
ZzłiT	Trade Union of Engineers and Technicians

PT	CGTP	General Confederation of Portuguese Workers
	CPQTC	Portuguese Confederation of Technical and Scientific Staff
	FENSIQ	National Confederation of Unions for Technical Staff
	FENTCOP	National Union of Transports, Communication and Public Works
	SERS	Union of Engineers in Southern Portugal
	SETN	Portuguese Union of Engineers Graduated in the EU
	SICOMP	Communications Union of Portugal
	SINDETELCO	Democratic Union of Communication and Media Workers
	SINTTAV	National Union of Telecommunication and Audiovisual Workers
	SITese	Union of Administrative, Commerce, Hotel and Service Workers
	SNAQ	National Union of Technical Staff
	SNE	National Union of Engineers
	SNTCT	National Union of Post and Telecommunication Workers
	STPT	Union of the Workers of the Portugal Telecom Group
	STT	National Union of Telecommunication and Audiovisual Communication Workers

	TENSIQ	National Union of Technical Staff in Telecommunications
	UGT	General Workers' Confederation
	USI	Union of Independent Trade Unions
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RO	Cartel ALFA	National Trade Union Confederation
	CNPR	National Confederation of Romanian Employers
	CNSLR Fratia	National Confederation of Free Trade Unions of Romania Fratia
	FTURC	Federation of Trade Unions in Radio Communications
	FTUT	Federation of Trade Unions in Telecommunications
	RomTelekom	RomTelecom Trade Unions Federation
	TUF	Trade Union Federation
	UFS Atlas	Federative Trade Unions Union
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SI	GZS	Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Slovenia
	SDPZ	Trade Union of Workers in Transport and Communications
	SELEKS	Trade Union of Electronic Communications of Slovenia
	TS	Telekom Slovenije (Trade Union of Electronic Communications of Slovenia – SELEKS)
	ZDS	Association of Employers of Slovenia
	ZSSS	Association of Free Trade Unions of Slovenia
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SK	KOZ SR	Confederation of Trade Unions of the Slovak Republic
	RUZ SR	National Union of Employers
	SOZ PT	Slovak Trade Union of Posts and Telecommunications
	SPOJE	Communications Trade Union Association
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UK	CONNECT	Union for Professionals in Communications

CWU	Communication Workers Union
TUC	Trades Union Congress

EUROPE	CEC	European Confederation of Executive and Managerial Staff
	CEEP	European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation and of Enterprises of General Economic Interest
	EFBWW	European Federation of Building and Wood Workers
	EFFAT	European Federation of Trade Unions in Food, Agriculture and Tourism
	EICTA	European Information, Communications and Consumer Electronics Industry Technology Association
	EMCEF	European Mine, Chemical and Energy Workers' Federation
	EMF	European Metalworker's Federation
	EPSU	European Federation of Public Service Unions
	ETF	European Transport Workers' Federation
	ETUC	European Trade Union Confederation
	ETUF-TCL	European Trade Union Federation : Textiles, Clothing, Leather
	Eurocadres	ETUC Council of European Professional and Managerial Staff
	EUROFEDOP	European Federation of Public Service Employees
	FEACO	European Federation of Management Consulting
	ICMCI	International Council of Management Consulting Institutes
	UNI	Union Network International Europe Telecom

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