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Document 52021SC0381

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION on the ex post evaluation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF) 2014-2020

SWD/2021/381 final

Brussels, 13.12.2021

SWD(2021) 381 final

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

Accompanying the document

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION

on the ex post evaluation



of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF)



2014-2020

{COM(2021) 788 final}


Table of contents

1.Introduction

Purpose and scope    

2.Background to the intervention

a.    Description of the intervention    

b.    EGF objectives    

c.    Key specifics of the EGF intervention    

d.    Baseline and points of comparison    

3.Implementation / state of play

4.Method

a.    Short description of methodology    

b.    Limitations    

5.Analysis and answers to the evaluation questions

5.1.EFFECTIVENESS

a.    Re-integration rates and other effects of the EGF support    

b.    Availability of support for all eligible beneficiaries    

c.    Use of the EGF by Member States and by beneficiaries    

d.    Monitoring and reporting    

e.    Factors contributing to or hindering the achievement of objectives    

f.    Involvement of companies and social partners    

g.    Information and communication activities    

h.    Overall impact of the EGF    

5.2.EFFICIENCY

a.    Efficiency at case level    

b.    Efficiency at instrument level    

5.3.COHERENCE

a.    Complementarity with other EU policies and initiatives    

b.    Complementarity with national measures and instruments    

5.4.RELEVANCE

a.    Relevance of the scope of the EGF    

b.    Relevance of the intervention criteria of the EGF    

c.    Relevance of the NEETs clause    

5.5.EU ADDED VALUE

6.Conclusions and lessons-learned

Conclusions

Lessons-learned

Annex 1: Procedural information

Annex 2: Stakeholder consultation

Annex 3: Methods and analytical models

Annex 4: Case profile data by Member State and by sector

Annex 5: EGF intervention logic 2014-2020

Annex 6: The evolution of the rules of the EGF between 2007 and 2020

List of figures

Figure 1 The timeline of an EGF case from start to finish    

Figure 2. Large-scale restructuring events in EU-27, 2007–2020    

Figure 3. Monthly unemployment rates (% of active population), EU-27, 2007–2020    

Figure 4 Number of applications received 2007–2020 (without withdrawn and rejected applications) (based on EGF Database)    

Figure 5. Case applications per cause (left) and intervention criterion (right)    

Figure 6. Workers and NEETs targeted (left); men and women targeted (right)    

Figure 7. Beneficiaries assisted (left); workers and NEETs assisted vs targeted (right)    

Figure 8. Beneficiaries (workers + NEETs) targeted and assisted per Member State    

Figure 9. Change in re-integration rates per case (short term vs long term)    

Figure 10. Average absorption rate per Member State    

Figure 11. Relationship between total EGF amounts spent and number of beneficiaries helped, per Member State    

Figure 12. Breakdown of the 39 responses received by Member State    

Figure 13. NEETs targeted compared to NEETs reached    

Figure 14. Number of EGF cases per sector (NACE Rev. 2) for all 54 cases in 2014-2020    

List of tables

Table 1 Number of applications received 2007–2020    

Table 2. EGF applications received and amount requested by Member State, 20072020    

Table 3. Stakeholder consultation strategy: overview    

Table 4. Evaluation questions and sub-questions    

Table 5. General overview of the 54 applications received between 1 January 2014 and 31 December 2020    

Table 6. EGF applications sorted by Member States    

Table 7. EGF applications sorted by sector    

Table 8. EGF applications, including the breakdown by gender and age of targeted workers and helped workers    

Glossary

Term or acronym

Meaning or definition

Beneficiary

A person benefiting directly from an EGF measure

BRG

Better Regulation Guidelines

DG EMPL

Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion

EGF

European Globalisation Adjustment Fund

ERM

European Restructuring Monitor (Eurofound)

ESF

European Social Fund

ESF+

European Social Fund Plus

ESIFs

European Structural and Investment Funds

EU

European Union

FAQs

Frequently asked questions

GDPR

General Data Protection Regulation

ISSG

Interservice Steering Group

MFF

Multiannual financial framework

NEET

Person not in employment, education or training

PC

Public consultation

PES

Public employment services

QFR

EU Quality Framework for anticipation of change and restructuring

SFC

System for Fund Management in the European Union

SMEs

Small and medium-sized enterprises

SWD

Staff working document

YEI

Youth Employment Initiative

1.Introduction 

This staff working document (SWD) presents the results of the ex post evaluation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF) for 2014–2020. This evaluation was carried out in compliance with Article 20(b) of Regulation (EU) No 1309/2013, to assess whether the EGF reached its objectives during the period 2014–2020.

Purpose and scope

The findings of this ex post evaluation can provide lessons for the future implementation and design of the Fund. The evaluation assesses the EGF’s effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, relevance and the EU added value. It also examines the extent to which the EGF interventions complement and are coherent with other programmes such as the European Social Fund (ESF), the Youth Employment Initiative (YEI) and national measures. The evaluation covers all EGF cases 1 (i.e. approved applications) whose applications were received between 2014 and 31 December 2020. Applications received in 2020 are included but without analysis as the results will only be available in 2023. 

More information can be found in the evaluations roadmap 2 .

This SWD mainly builds on the results of the supporting study provided by external experts 3 (hereinafter Ramboll Management Consulting, SEOR (2020)). The study includes extensive stakeholder consultations (see Annex 2). It also includes, where appropriate, additional further evidence from previous reports, evaluations 4  and general experience in the management of the EGF, including the Commission internal EGF Database with all the EGF cases from 2007 to 2020. The fieldwork for the supporting study had just started when the COVID-19 pandemic broke out. More information about the limitations caused by the pandemic are presented in Chapter 4 below.

The results of this evaluation will be sent to the European Parliament, the Council, the Court of Auditors, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and to the social partners.

2.Background to the intervention

a.Description of the intervention 

The EGF is a European Union (EU) instrument, which aims to tackle the employment and social dimensions of structural change. The EGF was initially established in 2006 5 , with the aim of showing the EU’s solidarity with workers made redundant as a result of major structural changes in world trade patterns due to globalisation.

In response to the global economic and financial crisis, some clauses of the EGF Regulation were amended in 2009 6 . For the 20142020 7 programming period, the EGF covered redundancies caused not only by globalisation and the continuation of the global financial and economic crisis, but also by any new global financial and economic crisis. Due to the high youth unemployment rates in many parts of the EU, Member States were allowed to include, under certain circumstances, the same number of young people ‘not in education, employment, or training’ (NEETs) as workers made redundant in EGF applications 8 .

The EGF assistance takes the form of a coordinated package of personalised services. The EGF co-finances active labour market policy measures implemented by Member States with the aim of helping the largest possible number of beneficiaries find sustainable new jobs as soon as possible within 6 months after the end of EGF assistance. The Fund supplements national labour market measures when sudden collective redundancy processes put the public employment services under extraordinary pressure. It can also provide a more personalised approach to the most vulnerable redundant workers, such as disadvantaged beneficiaries, including young and older unemployed people and those at risk of poverty, enabling them to update their knowledge and skills, or benefit from other suitable measures (e.g. mobility allowances).

Member States’ applications must comply with one of the intervention criteria (i.e. conditions for EGF support) set out in Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 1309/2013:

· at least 500 redundancies over a period of 4 months in an enterprise in a Member State, including workers made redundant in its suppliers or downstream producers; 

· at least 500 redundancies over a period of 9 months, particularly in small or medium-sized enterprises, operating in the same economic sector 9 and located in one region or two contiguous regions 10 ;

· in small labour markets or in exceptional circumstances, when duly substantiated by the Member State concerned, an application for a contribution from the EGF may be considered admissible even if the intervention criteria in points (a) or (b) are not entirely met, when redundancies have a serious impact on employment and the local economy. This clause was amended in 2018 11 , adding the possibility to cover collective applications involving SMEs located in one region and operating in different economic sectors, where the applicant Member State demonstrates that SMEs are the main or the only type of business in that region.

The possibility for Member States to include, under certain circumstances, NEETs in EGF applications, was introduced in 2014, and extended until 31 December 2020, under different rules 12 .

The EGF is an emergency relief instrument, outside the ceilings of the multiannual financial framework (MFF). The EU has provided the EGF with a maximum annual ceiling of up to EUR 150 million (2011 prices). The co-financing of each case must be approved by the European Parliament and the Council. In practice, the annual amount used is dependent on the number and the requested amounts of the applications received. The maximum amount ever used in a given year was EUR 132.1 million (in 2010).

On 27 May 2020, in its communication The EU budget powering the recovery plan for Europe, the European Commission declared that the COVID-19 pandemic had resulted in an economic crisis, and set out a recovery plan for the economy. This included the EGF as an emergency tool to assist people who lost their jobs due to a global financial and economic crisis.

b.EGF objectives

The overall aim of the EGF was defined in line with Europe 2020 strategy, to contribute to smart, inclusive and sustainable economic growth and to promote sustainable employment in the EU. The EGF aims to express solidarity with and provide support to workers made redundant and self-employed persons whose activity ceased due to globalisation or a global financial and economic crisis.

In November 2017, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission jointly proclaimed the European Pillar of Social Rights. Among the pillar’s 20 principles and rights is a principle on how to help people to find and change their employment 13 . The EGF puts this principle into practice in the case of major restructuring events.

The EGF’s objective of improving participants’ education/training and labour market situation has two dimensions: solidarity and emergency relief.

Solidarity relates to supporting the re-integration of redundant workers into the labour market, with a particular focus on the most vulnerable groups of dismissed workers.

The emergency dimension refers to EU’s intention of providing reactive support in cases of unexpected mass redundancies when national administrations would find it extremely difficult to cope with the situation by themselves.

Main objectives of the EGF:

·demonstrate solidarity towards workers made redundant and self-employed persons whose activity has ceased

·offer assistance to workers made redundant so that they can re-integrate into the job market, finding high quality employment as soon as possible within 6 months after the end of EGF assistance.

Functioning

EGF assistance is provided mainly through active labour market measures, ranging from personalised guidance and training courses to assistance in setting up a business. These measures help beneficiaries return to employment as quickly as possible by enabling them to update their knowledge and skills or benefit from other suitable support. In many cases, the new skills respond to the needs of emerging economic sectors, so that they can help the region to maintain and develop its economic activities.

The EGF can be mobilised following a request (‘EGF application’) made by an EU Member State in need of assistance further to an unexpected major restructuring event. Applications are submitted by national EGF authorities to the European Commission. Under Regulation (EU) No 1309/2013, it is up to the Member State to decide on the working arrangements for the implementation of each case.

The Member State must include in its application to the Commission information such as:

-a detailed explanation of the causal link between the redundancies and globalisation or the global economic and financial crisis (the Member State is expected to provide a reasoned analysis supported by relevant data at the most appropriate geographical and sectoral levels);

-a description of the enterprise or enterprises affected;

-a detailed categorisation of the targeted redundant workers into several groups by gender and age group);

-a description of the redundancies’ expected impact on the local, regional or national economy and employment, including statistical and qualitative information; and

-a description of the package of personalised services to be financed, together with its planned budget.

The applications are then assessed by the Commission. For those it accepts, it proposes to the budgetary authority (the European Parliament and the Council) that the EGF be mobilised. Once the budgetary authority has adopted the decision to mobilise the Fund, the Commission pays the contribution to the applicant Member State.

In principle, cases may be implemented for a maximum period of 24 months from the date the application is submitted. However, Member States can start providing eligible services to the workers before this happens.

Once implementation is completed, the Member State must submit, within 6 months, a final report on the execution of the financial contribution, together with a statement justifying the expenditure. The final report must also include extensive qualitative information on the type of measures, main outcomes and lessons learned, as well as the characteristics of targeted beneficiaries and their employment status. A long-term report on the employment status of the beneficiaries is also submitted 18 months after the end of the implementation (see Figure 1 below).

Information about all EGF applications can be found on the EGF website 14 .

Figure 1 The timeline of an EGF case from start to finish

Source: European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (DG EMPL).

The overall intervention logic of the EGF is summarised in Annex 5.

c.Key specifics of the EGF intervention

Since January 2007, when the first EGF Regulation 15 entered into force, the rules of the Fund have been adapted several times in order to respond to the economic situation in the EU. Initially, in the 20072013 programming period, the EGF was operating under an annual maximum ceiling of EUR 500 million, and was targeting large-scale events in which a minimum of 1 000 workers were made redundant. Case implementation took place over a 12-month timeframe. The EGF was co-financing measures at a rate of 50% 16 .

Based on the experience of the 20072013 period, several changes 17 were introduced in 20142020 to improve the EGF’s effectiveness and efficiency and to adapt it to the economic situation within the EU. The changes included:

·the new criterion of any new global financial and economic crisis, besides the trade-related globalisation or the global economic and financial crisis;

·new categories of workers supported i.e. not only those with indefinite employment contracts, but also workers with fixed-term contracts, temporary agency workers, owner-managers of micro enterprises and self-employed workers;

·support to NEETs under certain conditions; 

·a lowered threshold of 500 redundancies. An even lower threshold was also acceptable under certain conditions for small labour markets or in exceptional circumstances 18 ; 

·a longer implementation period from 12 to 24 months; 

·shortened procedures to mobilise funding;

·co-financing rate raised to 60% (from 50%). 

The budget of an EGF application can also include, besides the co-financing of the coordinated package of personalised measures, the costs of the preparatory, management, information and publicity, control and reporting activities 19  .

The EGF does not cover passive social protection measures such as pensions. Nor does it cover passive allowances, i.e. allowances that are not conditional on the targeted beneficiaries’ active participation in job-search or training activities. The co-financing cannot replace actions that are the responsibility of enterprises by virtue of national law or collective agreements (e.g. redundancy pay, legal requirements to draw up a social plan – depending on the national law of the Member State concerned).

To provide proportional assistance, and in line with the findings of an audit of the 2007–2013 EGF 20 , the co-financing of allowances was capped at 35% of the total package of personalised measures. Such allowances can only be co-financed if they are directly connected to participation in EGF measures.

Member States can choose when to start implementing EGF measures: either before submitting the application to the Commission, as early as when the dismissals occurred, or from the date the application is submitted. They can even postpone the start of the implementation by 3 months 21 . This flexibility enables Member States to start helping beneficiaries right after the redundancies occur; these measures are also eligible for EGF co-financing. However, until the decision to mobilise the EGF is approved, Member States implement at their own risk. Member States can also end implementation before the 24 months have elapsed.

The 20212027 EGF Regulation 22  introduced significant changes, such as: 

·extended scope of eligibility (i.e. in what situations the EGF can provide support) to include any unexpected major restructuring;

·decreased threshold of dismissals from 500 to 200;

·aligned co-financing rate with European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) (while keeping the current 60% as a minimum);

·increase of the maximum annual ceiling up to EUR 186 million (2018 prices);

·common indicators and stricter requirements for reporting;

·NEETs no longer supported by the EGF.

The evolution of the main rules of the EGF between 2007 and 2020 is presented in Annex 6.

d.Baseline and points of comparison 

Context

The core drivers of globalisation used to be trade in goods and capital flows. Today, stimulated by rapid technological change, globalisation is increasingly knowledge-driven. Nowadays, most products are no longer made in one single country and global cooperation is increasingly essential  23 .

Global trade openness has boosted EU economic growth and competitiveness 24 , and has created job opportunities, but it can also result in significant job losses through business restructuring, offshoring and company closures. Globalisation and rapid technological advance have increased demand for skilled labour but reduced the number of jobs for low-skilled workers, particularly in the manufacturing industries 25 , the most exposed to offshoring. Workers made redundant within these industries – especially low-skilled and vulnerable workershave been hit particularly hard and struggle to acquire the necessary (new or more) skills to re-join the labour market 26 .

Eurofound’s European Restructuring Monitor (ERM) 27 is the most comprehensive source of data that records all announcements of redundancies in a certain year 28 . According to the ERM database, on average about 670 restructuring events (of any size) 29  occurred within the EU-27 on a yearly basis between 2007 and 2020, increasing from 435 in 2019 to 770 in 2020 (+77%). The latter is the highest total number since 2012 and can largely be attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic. Large-scale restructuring events (involving 500 or more job losses) have increased since 2018, reaching 172 in 2020 (+68% compared to 2019) (see Figure 2 below).

Figure 2. Large-scale restructuring events in EU-27, 20072020

 

Source: Eurofound, European Restructuring Monitor Database

Over 20142020, manufacturing accounted for the largest share of restructuring events, even though its share fluctuated over the years 30 . Manufacturing is the sector most affected by offshoring, accounting for about 83% of all offshoring cases in the EU-27 in the ERM dataset. During 20142020, there were seven EGF cases 31 targeting redundancies in the manufacturing sectors (see details in Table 5).

In recent years, the vast majority of larger restructuring cases are no longer triggered by trade-related globalisation, but by technological advances, especially automation, which is continuously increasing both in scope and in rate 32 . Technological advances such as digitisation or automation are a significant source of growth, but can also lead to adverse short-term effects on the labour market. Thus, investment in digital skills will be extremely important for industrial competitiveness 33 .

According to the OECD, recent data show that about 14% of jobs are at high risk of automation. By sector, the risk of automation is higher for manufacturing and agriculture, although jobs in a number of service sectors such as postal and courier services, land transport and food services also face a high risk. Going forward, the risk of automation is increasingly falling on low-educated workers. The COVID-19 crisis is likely to accelerate automation as companies reduce reliance on human labour and contact between workers, or re-shore some production 34 .

During the last decade, the general trend in employment rates has been positive. In 2019, 73.9% of the EU population aged 20 to 64 were employed, up from 69.2% in 2014. This was the highest rate since 2002. However, large differences in employment rate remained between Member States and between gender and age groups 35 .

Since March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic has led to lockdowns around Europe, which brought a wave of job losses. Poverty and inequality have risen, and the low-skilled and vulnerable people are the most affected. It also led to four EGF applications based on the COVID crisis being submitted at the end of 2020.

In the first half of 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic caused the deepest recession in EU history. Annual GDP fell by 6.4% in the EU in 2020 compared to 2019 36 . Monthly unemployment rates steadily increased starting from March 2020, from an average of 6.6% in March 2020, to 7.3% in December 2020, as shown in Figure 3 below.

Figure 3. Monthly unemployment rates (% of active population), EU-27, 20072020

Source: Eurostat, [ei_lmhr_m]

On youth unemployment, the overall trend has been comparable, i.e. a steady decrease since 2014 and a recent surge (since March 2020) linked to the COVID-19 crisis. However, even before the COVID crisis, the youth unemployment rate was above 20% in some regions across 10 Member States 37 .

Baseline

Employment policies are a shared competence between the EU and the Member States 38 . The EU aims to contribute to a high level of employment by supporting and, if necessary, complementing Member State action 39 . 

In line with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 40 , funding from the EU is granted when objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States alone, and where the EU intervention can bring added value. The EU’s main solidarity response consists of the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIFs) 41 and the EGF. The Cohesion Fund aims to support economic and social cohesion within the EU, while the European Social Fund (ESF) is the main instrument in the area of employment. The latter has a long-term anticipative multiannual strategic approach. This is not adapted to react rapidly in case of sudden major redundancies.

The EGF was set up to enable the EU to react to such unforeseen large-scale restructuring events. The restructuring challenges presented above are the responsibility of the national public employment services (PES). However, when unexpected large-scale restructuring events occur, with a significant impact on the regional labour market, the PES might have difficulties offering targeted measures with clear exit strategies to a large number of redundancies only through national programmes.

At the request of a Member State, the EGF can co-finance active labour market measures aimed at bringing the dismissed workers back into stable employment 42 . The EGF intervention supplements national labour market measures for redundant workers. It also creates European added value by increasing the number, variety and intensity of services offered to redundant workers, and for a longer time than would be possible without EGF funding 43 .

Under the first EGF Regulation (20072013), a total of 128 applications were received, out of which 15 were withdrawn and one was rejected by the Commission. The successful applications were submitted by 20 Member States and concerned 39 sectors. Assistance worth EUR 478 million was requested to help more than 105 000 workers.

The second EGF Regulation, covering 20142020, entered into effect on 1 January 2014. Applications submitted under the first Regulation continued to be implemented and were wound up under the rules of the first Regulation. Those cases are not covered by this evaluation.

From 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2020, 59 applications were submitted by Member States. Of these, 54 applications were approved, 4 were later withdrawn and 1 was rejected by the Council. These 54 approved applications requested EUR 173.4 million to support a total of 58 267 targeted people, of which 4 099 were NEETs. See Annex 4 for the overview of all 20142020 EGF applications received (without withdrawn and rejected applications).

In a 2019 report by the Directorate-General Joint Research Centre 44 , the RHOMOLO-IO modelling framework 45 was applied to the EGF in order to illustrate how the application of a standard input-output model 46 can generate a variety of results of interest for both researchers and policy makers. The key idea behind this model lies in the representation of sectoral interdependence. The RHOMOLO-IO simulations were performed on 23 EGF cases from 20142015. The results suggest that besides the direct effect of re-employment, EGF impacts have positive indirect effects, as each additional job created influences other sectors positively.

Trends can be observed from looking at the number of applications received from 2007 and 2020 (Figure 4 and Table 1 below). The crisis criterion was on a downward trend after 2014, when the EU was on a path of economic growth and decreasing unemployment. This lasted until 2020 when the COVID-19 crisis started, resulting in many jobs lost and a new wave of EGF applications under the crisis criterion. The trade-related globalisation criterion went through a similar trend, although it was used to a larger extent as the effects of globalisation are continuously affecting the labour force.

Figure 4 Number of applications received 20072020 (without withdrawn and rejected applications) (based on EGF Database)

Table 1 Number of applications received 20072020 (without withdrawn and rejected applications)

Source: EGF Database

Table 2. EGF applications received and amount requested by Member State, 20072020 (without withdrawn and rejected applications)

Member States 47 which have applied for EGF funding

Number of applications

EGF contribution (EUR)

Number of targeted beneficiaries

Average amount requested per beneficiary (EUR)

Belgium

14

42 940 897

18 615

2 307

Czechia

1

323 820

460

704

Denmark

10

63 680 782

6 234

10 215

Germany

11

56 134 386

15 639

3 589

Estonia

2

5 605 838

5 860

957

Ireland

10

67 720 204

11 209

6 042

Greece

9

43 267 750

8 074

5 359

Spain

24

51 556 535

15 735

3 277

France

9

99 655 342

19 444

5 125

Italy

14

63 885 181

14 396

4 438

Lithuania

5

2 861 619

3 013

950

Malta

1

681 207

675

1 009

Netherlands

19

35 186 039

10 359

3 397

Austria

6

27 998 090

1 952

14 343

Poland

5

2 575 712

1 806

1 426

Portugal

6

13 287 994

5 827

2 280

Romania

2

6 513 830

2 416

2 696

Slovenia

1

2 247 940

2 554

880

Finland

11

38 377 138

13 161

2 916

Sweden

6

27 502 116

5 868

4 687

Total

166

652 002 420

163 297

3 993

Source: EGF Database

3.Implementation / state of play

Description of the current situation

This section provides an overview of EGF implementation. It includes figures on EGF applications and covers the Fund’s performance by country and by economic sector defined at NACE Revision 2 division level. The profile of people targeted by the EGF (by sex, age and status of dismissed worker or NEET) is also reported.

Since the EGF became operational in 2007, the number of applications has been highly cyclical, responding with a delay to economic developments 48 .

The supporting study covered all EGF applications submitted between January 2014 and May 2020, of which one was rejected by the Council (still during the timeframe observed). There were also four withdrawn applications (of which one was later re-submitted), not included in the total mentioned above. The background of three of the withdrawn applications had been analysed and the findings have been included in the supporting study’s results. The reasons for the withdrawal of the three cases 49 were: (i) the need to gather more statistical data and references and re-submit the application; and (ii) the fact that a direct link between the redundancies and the global financial and economic crisis could not be demonstrated. The fourth withdrawn application 50 is not covered as it was withdrawn in 2021.

The cases for which applications were submitted in 2014 had already been evaluated during the mid-term evaluation of the 20142020 EGF 51 . The supporting study for the ex post evaluation also took into consideration the findings from these cases.

In what follows, only the 49 approved applications (i.e. EGF cases) 52  are considered, because the withdrawn and rejected applications did not receive any EGF funding. At the end of 2020, six EGF applications were received, of which one was later withdrawn. The five approved applications are partially covered in the overview of 20142020 EGF applications (Annex 4), as they had been approved by the budgetary authority when this staff working document was drafted.

Breakdown of EGF cases by event type and intervention criterion

In the majority of the 49 EGF cases (61%), redundancies were caused by major changes in world trade patterns due to globalisation, while the effects of economic or financial crises were the cause in 39% of cases. Most of the cases concerned redundancies in a single company (and its downstream suppliers) (criterion a), followed by ‘sectoral’ cases involving several companies operating in the same sector (criterion b). Exceptional circumstances or small labour markets (criterion c) constituted the smallest share of EGF cases (see Figure 5 below).

Figure 5. Case applications per cause (left) and intervention criterion (right)

 

Source: Ramboll Management Consulting, SEOR (2020), p. 11

Breakdown of EGF cases per Member State

In terms of geographical reach, these 49 EGF cases covered 12 Member States: Belgium (6), Estonia (1), Finland (7), France (5), Germany (3), Greece (8), Ireland (3), Italy (3), the Netherlands (3), Portugal (1), Spain (6) and Sweden (3). These Member States had benefited from the EGF during the 2007–2013 programming period as well, except for Estonia, which applied for the first time during 2014–2020.

The total number of people targeted was highest in Belgium (9 925), followed by France (9 620) and Greece (7 432). Only 12 EGF cases (from five Member States – Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal) used the possibility to support NEETs through the EGF, targeting 4 099 NEETs in total.

Breakdown of people targeted through EGF cases

Across all 49 cases, 49 562 people (workers and NEETs) were targeted via EGF measures. Of the 45 463 targeted workers, 70% were men and 30% women. The numbers differ significantly across cases, with a high number of female beneficiaries in cases assisting workers dismissed in traditionally ‘female-dominated’ sectors such as retail trade and the wearing apparel sector, and men beneficiaries in traditionally ‘male-dominated’ sectors such as transport and manufacturing (see Figure 6 below).

Figure 6. Workers and NEETs targeted (left); men and women targeted (right)

 

Source: Ramboll Management Consulting, SEOR (2020), p. 12

As for age groups, the 45 463 workers targeted belonged to the following age groups: 1524 (2.6%), 2554 (72%), 5564 (24%), and above 64 years old (1.4%).

Breakdown of cases per sector

The most common sectors were retail trade (6 cases) and automotive (5 cases). Computer programming and the manufacture of computers, electronic and optical products were each the subject of three EGF cases. The cases in the automotive sector targeted the largest number of beneficiaries, 10 299 people in total. The smallest number of people targeted in a single case was 276 persons in the jewellery sector.

Completed EGF cases 53  

Of the 49 EGF cases outlined above, 48 had ended by December 2020 and 46 had submitted their final report before the supporting study was sent to the Commission. The analysis of the results will only be based on these 46 final reports. Across these 46 cases, 39 596 people were assisted in total – 37 072 workers and 2 524 NEETs. This means that 82% of targeted workers and 62% of targeted NEETs were helped by the EGF (see Figure 7 below).

Figure 7. Beneficiaries assisted (left); workers and NEETs assisted vs targeted (right)

  

Source: Ramboll Management Consulting, SEOR (2020), p. 46

As for the distribution across Member States, the largest numbers of beneficiaries assisted were in France, Belgium and Finland, while the smallest numbers were in Estonia and Sweden. The rates of beneficiaries helped 54 ranged from 33% (Sweden) to 101% (Finland), as presented in Figure 8 below.

Figure 8. Beneficiaries (workers + NEETs) targeted and assisted per Member State

Source: Ramboll Management Consulting, SEOR (2020), p. 16

Across the 46 cases, about EUR 89 million in EGF funds were spent in total, compared to about EUR 151 million allocated. This gave an overall absorption rate of 59%. The average absorption rates for individual Member States ranged from 29% (Estonia) to 90% (Finland).

In 2020, 7 applications were submitted by 6 Member States (2 by Spain, and 1 each by Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands). Apart from one application from Spain submitted in May 2020, the remaining 6 applications were not covered by the supporting study because they were submitted in November and December 2020. Six applications have been approved and one was withdrawn. Of the approved applications, 2 were submitted under the trade-related globalisation criterion and 4 under the new economic crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The total EGF contribution requested for the 6 applications received in 2020 (without the withdrawn one) was almost EUR 18.1 million, targeting 9 205 workers.

An overview of all EGF applications submitted between 2014–2020, together with case profile data by Member State and by sector, can be found in Annex 4.

During the 20142020 period, to promote exchanges of best practice and provide information about the latest EGF developments, the Commission organised twice-yearly EGF contact persons’ meetings 55 and networking seminars (aimed at EGF implementers). Until end-2019, the meetings took place in Member States implementing EGF cases. As of March 2020, meetings took place online because of the COVID-19 pandemic. The EGF meetings and seminars received positive feedback from stakeholders (about 60 participants on average). 

4.Method

a.Short description of methodology

One supporting study was contracted out. The evaluation questions derived from the Better Regulation evaluation criteria were broken down into a number of sub-questions and agreed with the Interservice Steering Group. An appropriate mix of evaluation methods was applied, including different kinds of stakeholder consultations according to a predefined stakeholder consultation strategy. The research methods included:

-Desk research:

oAnalysis for each EGF case of all the data available in the SFC2014 (System for Fund Management in the European Union) database; 

oIn-depth analysis of the biennial report, the frequently asked questions, reports from the EGF contact persons meetings and networking seminars, EGF press releases, etc.;

oThe Commission internal EGF Database;

oData and literature review of existing data and literature was carried out at two levels: EU level and case level. The EU-level review covered legislative documents, previous evaluations of the EGF, studies and the proposal for the EGF 20212027. The case-level review was carried out by national experts in the 12 Member States that received EGF co-financing during the 20142020 period, and covered all relevant case information 56 ;

oThe Commission’s additional desk research.

-Consultation activities:

oOnline EGF networking seminar was organised by the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion in March 2020, as a first consultation activity. Relevant stakeholders were invited and the planned stakeholder consultations were discussed.

oTargeted online surveys:

§The 16 Member States 57 that did not apply for EGF co-financing during the 20142020 period were interviewed to uncover the reasons why they did not apply and to gather their views on the appropriateness of the application process and the Fund’s overall relevance.

§EGF beneficiaries were interviewed to gain a perspective on the experience and impact of the EGF support, and to gather views on how the EGF compares to other forms of support for redundant workers (and NEETs).

oPublic consultation: assisting the Commission in developing the questionnaire, and analysing the results of the public consultation. The results of the 12-week public consultation can be found in Annex 2.

oIn-depth interviews conducted at EU level and at case level with desk officers, managing authorities and other stakeholders, in particular for the case studies 58 .  

oOnline focus groups / (group) interviews with EGF beneficiaries to uncover whether and to what extent the EGF has had a (lasting) impact on individual beneficiaries, from the perspective of those who actually received the support.

-Case studies: addressing the research questions, based on desk research, interviews, targeted survey and focus groups. The case studies reports were not published.

-Counterfactual impact evaluation (CIE) to analyse how fast a person who receives EGF-funded support finds a new job compared to a person who did not receive EGF support.

The Commission based this evaluation mainly on the results of the supporting study, complementing it where appropriate with additional evidence from previous reports, evaluations, general experience in the management of the EGF and other sources such as the Commission’s internal EGF Database.

Further details on the methodology are explained in Annex 3.

b.Limitations 

The findings and conclusions are reasonably robust, as they are based on sufficient combination (‘triangulation’) of sources and tools, such as the data reported by the monitoring systems, the stakeholder consultation and case studies. However, the evaluation also faced several limitations. Firstly, the timing of the EGF ex post evaluation did not allow for analysis of EGF cases from 2020. Secondly, there were limited comparators with the 20072013 programming period, and sectoral analysis was not possible because of the overall small number of EGF applications. There were also difficulties in reaching EGF beneficiaries and identifying whether survey respondents actually benefited from EGF measures. On top of that, there were limited replies to the public consultation, inconclusive results from the counterfactual impact evaluation, and delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

These limitations were overcome during the study by collecting data from different sources such as surveys, in-depth interviews and a public consultation. These data sources provided opinions and perceptions of various stakeholders, which in some instances may be the only available source of evidence.

More details about the limitations are explained in Annex 3.

5.Analysis and answers to the evaluation questions

The evaluation questions that guided the evaluation process were set out in the terms of reference for the supporting study (see in Annex 3).

5.1.EFFECTIVENESS 

The effectiveness criterion assesses the extent to which the EGF objectives have been met at both instrument and case level. It also analyses the impact of the Fund as a whole. This was done in particular by analysing: (a) the extent to which the EGF manages to ensure sustainable re-integration of redundant workers; (b) the availability of support for all eligible beneficiaries; (c) the use of the EGF; (d) monitoring and reporting; (e) factors helping or hindering the achievement of objectives; (f) involvement of companies and social partners; and (g) information and communication activities. It also includes lessons learned from the EGF implementation and the Fund’s overall impact.

a.Re-integration rates and other effects of the EGF support

Re-integration rates

In all EGF cases, the main aim was to bring workers made redundant back into work as quickly as possible. Based on the available case data received by the Commission for 46 final reports 59 (out of 49 cases), the EGF has generally been effective in terms of the re-integration rates achieved, with an average re-integration rate of around 60%. The re-integration rate for worker beneficiaries varied between 33% and 88% 60 . This is higher than in the 2007–2013 programming period, and higher than the target of 50% set in the impact assessment for the 2014–2020 EGF 61 . However, this apparent improvement needs to be viewed with caution as the implementation period for cases was much longer during 20142020 (24 months or longer if the implementation started early) than in the previous programming period (12 months). 

For NEETs beneficiaries, in total 19% 62 of those helped by the EGF were employed, self-employed or returned to education by the time of submission of the final reports. One of the reasons for this result was given by some Member States, which underlined that NEETs were more difficult to engage and activate than dismissed workers 63 .

Overall, in the longer term (i.e. 18 months after the end of the implementation period 64 ), the total rate of re-integration across all cases was 60% 65 , practically the same as for the short-term results (6 months after the end of the implementation period). However, results improved in most Member States in the long term, with only three countries experiencing a decrease in the re-integration rate compared to the short term (see Figure 9 below).

Figure 9. Change in re-integration rates per case (short term vs long term) 66

Source: Commission internal EGF Database

According to the results of the online EGF beneficiary survey 67 carried out by the external evaluators, 42% of beneficiaries indicated that the EGF helped them find a permanent job, and 28% said it helped them find a temporary job, amounting to a total re-integration rate of 70% 68 . Also 42% of beneficiaries replied that it would have been much more difficult to find a job without the EGF. There is a certain degree of bias about the results, as half of the beneficiaries were from higher-educated ICT professionals, mostly from Finnish cases. They are not necessarily representative of the experience of all beneficiaries across all EGF cases and countries. A higher response rate from all Member States with EGF cases and among more vulnerable beneficiary groups would probably have delivered different results.

During the public consultation 69 , carried out via the EU’s Have Your Say 70  website, nearly all respondents indicated that the actions supported by the EGF helped redundant workers to find employment. A majority of respondents positively assessed the way the EGF catered to the needs of beneficiaries, through more targeted and personalised measures than via national policy instruments. However, only 15 of the 39 respondents were aware of the EGF.

A counterfactual impact evaluation (CIE) was carried out by the external evaluators for two EGF cases 71 in order to measure the EGF’s impact on the re-integration rates of beneficiaries compared to those who did not receive EGF support. The CIE compared the re-integration results of the treatment group (EGF beneficiaries) for two cases against a control group (a sample of similar size, consisting of persons with a similar background in terms of age, gender, educational background). The short-term results for both cases were generally inconclusive. In the long term, however, in one of the two cases, from the Netherlands, among those still without work after 12 months, those receiving EGF support ended up finding jobs 1.8 times faster than those who did not receive this support. This indicated that the EGF has been successful in providing assistance to people experiencing longer-term unemployment, thus to those who need it most, and also that the EGF adds value over and above what can be done at national level alone.

It is unclear whether the EGF had significant impacts on beneficiaries compared to what could have been achieved through alternative labour market measures at national or regional level. Although limited quantitative evidence is available, there are many examples 72 in which the EGF results exceed those achieved through mainstream national labour market measures.

As mentioned above, a new method used to compare outcomes, the CIE, provided some useful insights about the long-term effects of EGF intervention. Several stakeholders interviewed indicated that comparing re-integration outcomes with suitable comparators proved to be challenging in the absence of baseline indicators such as case-specific targets like quantitative re-employment objectives included in EGF applications. Such a comparison must take into account the skills of the targeted workers and the economic situation in order to make sense. However, in most cases detailed knowledge about participants is available only when people actually register for EGF measures, not when preparing the application.

Other effects of the EGF support

Further evidence was gathered from the online EGF beneficiary survey, which showed that beyond the re-integration rates, the EGF has broader impacts on beneficiaries’ general employability, such as new skills (77% of respondents), self-confidence gained (62%), increased motivation, reduced stress and new networks of contacts (59%). These less tangible, unexpected results of the EGF support are difficult to measure, considering the lack of medium- to long-term monitoring. The effectiveness of EGF support is measured only through the re-integration rates and there is no requirement for quantitative re-integration objectives in an EGF application.

Among the EGF beneficiaries who responded to the survey, the views on EGF benefits were overwhelmingly positive.

b.Availability of support for all eligible beneficiaries

One of the objectives of the EGF is to concentrate on the most vulnerable groups, especially disadvantaged, older and young unemployed persons by offering measures to stimulate them to remain in or return to the labour market.

Examples of good practice were found in German and Finnish EGF cases 73 , with measures tailored to disadvantaged or vulnerable groups. In Germany 74 , these measures included group formats fostering voluntary work and social exchange; young trainees of the dismissing company could continue their apprenticeships in other companies, while in Finland 75 specific coaching was offered to persons with a partial disability to work.

In the EGF application, Member States are required to include information about any specific category of measure for vulnerable groups or people with a longstanding health problem or disability, or members of a recognised minority. Such information is usually collected when the redundant workers/NEETs sign up for EGF measures and the information about the profiles or backgrounds becomes known.

The EGF applications provide insight only about the targeted beneficiaries’ age group and gender, and whether or not they are EU citizens. Across all 49 cases, the majority of targeted workers are male (70% of all targeted workers) and in the 25–54 age group (74%). This result is explainable because in most EGF cases dismissed workers came from predominantly male-dominated industries (e.g. motor vehicles). In most EGF cases, information about the gender of the dismissed workers is not available. However, where such data are available, there is no discrepancy between the percentage of men and women targeted and those dismissed.

The results for NEETs were generally positive. Although targeted only in a small number of EGF cases (12 out of 49), in those cases the young people targeted took up to a large degree the help offered (about 62%), which provided them assistance they would not have received through national mainstream services. However, the key challenge in supporting NEETs was engaging and activating them, as they are more difficult to identify and connect with and because their needs are different from those of redundant workers 76 .

Based on the information available, the EGF is flexible enough to provide tailored support to different groups; in some cases, specific support was included for vulnerable groups. However, the lack of data collection at the application stage and adequate points of comparison for measuring achievements makes it difficult to assess and draw firm conclusions about the EGF’s effectiveness in offering support to all eligible beneficiaries.

Extent to which support corresponds to needs and profiles of beneficiaries

There is widespread agreement across all stakeholder groups that the EGF is adequately tailored to the specific needs of the relevant target groups. EGF assistance also removed barriers to participation in measures by offering various types of allowance such as job search, training, and returning to study allowances (see below Use of EGF by Member States). In the public consultation, the majority of respondents (12 out of 16) positively assessed the way EGF catered to beneficiaries’ needs, highlighting that it altered the type of support normally available for redundant workers by Member States. According to the EGF beneficiaries’ survey, 69% of respondents agreed that the support they received had been tailored to their needs. Only 18% disagreed, while others were unable to provide a response.

Findings from the case studies show that different practices are used to match the beneficiaries’ needs and profiles with the support offered. In some cases (Belgium, Finland, Ireland), the needs of beneficiaries are identified by sending a targeted survey to each worker prior to designing the EGF measures. In other cases (e.g. France, Italy, Spain, Germany) a profiling and needs assessment is carried out via individual interviews at the start of the EGF implementation.

Interviews at EU level also pointed to an improvement over time in this respect, stating that EGF measures increasingly took into account the socio-economic context, therefore addressing workers’ needs in a holistic way, for example by providing additional support for childcare and benefits during the retraining process (in Spain).

There is substantial variance in the rates of beneficiaries helped and absorption rates across cases, even when taking into account the profiles and needs of beneficiaries (and in most cases also the needs of the labour market and local companies).

The EGF Regulation 77 allows for a certain degree of flexibility to reallocate funds between measures based on needs that may emerge during the implementation period, provided that the total EGF budget is not exceeded 78 . Budgetary flexibility is important and Member States used it for minor reallocations (of less than 20% of the planned budget) during the implementation of about 30% of cases. For reallocations above 20% of the planned budget, Member States must inform the Commission. These, however, have occurred only in about 10% of cases.

Processes for decision-making and implementation of the EGF

In principle, cases may be implemented for a maximum period of 24 months from the date of submission of the application.

Findings show that considerable delays in the start of EGF implementation were experienced in 15 out of 46 cases. The time between a Member State’s submission of an EGF application and the budgetary authority’s approval ranged between 20 weeks 79 and 36 weeks 80 during 20142020. These delays were to some extent due to the lengthy and complex application procedure at EU level, but also to the legal constraints and to the way the case was managed at national/regional level.

In practice, Member States often wait to receive formal approval from the budgetary authority before they start implementing the proposed measures. This is because they lack the financial capacity or the willingness to take the risk of starting implementation before the EGF co-financing is secured. This can lead to significant delays and therefore a shorter implementation period 81 .

Reasons for delays in the start of implementation are largely country- and case-specific. Considerable delays were seen for example in Greece (410 days on average) and in Spain (415 days) 82 .

The EGF was designed as an emergency response instrument. However, its mobilisation is not as quick as it should be, hindering its effectiveness. Despite this, the delays in mobilisation of the EGF do not mean that the EGF fails to target all the people who would in principle need support after losing their job. Targeting all redundant workers is the regular task of the public employment service or other national authorities. As the EGF aims specifically to target those who need it the most, i.e. the most vulnerable groups of workers made redundant, and to offer this help especially in regions that have been hit particularly hard by restructuring events, these situations rather seem to be pre‑requisites for EGF assistance.

Member States are responsible for the length of the application period and implementation of the EGF measures. In some cases, when Member States provide sufficient information in the application sent to the Commission, the approval procedures can be sped up.

c.Use of the EGF by Member States and by beneficiaries 

Overall, not all the funding available under the EGF is used. Between 2014 and 2020 83 , 49 applications were approved, with a total EGF contribution granted of EUR 157.3 million, compared to the EUR 150 million annual ceiling (in 2011 prices).

Being an emergency relief instrument, the EGF is not expected to fully spend its ceiling. Moreover, it needs a comfortable safety margin in order to be prepared for worst-case scenarios of mass redundancies. During times of stability and economic growth, it is expected that far less than the ceiling is used. As with all emergency relief instruments, it is not possible to accurately estimate the amount of assistance needed in a given year.

However, it is important to consider the reasons why some Member States did not apply for the EGF support and whether there could have been more possible cases. Evidence collected in the context of this evaluation confirmed previously identified barriers and identified a few other issues.

·Many Member States did not experience great job losses due to globalisation or the financial and economic crisis, or had limited institutional capacity or limited experience in applying for or implementing EGF cases 84 . This was the case particularly in central and eastern Europe and was largely confirmed by EGF contact persons in Member States that did not apply during 2014-2020. Especially Member States with limited experience applying for EGF support have difficulties in demonstrating the link between redundancies and globalisation or a crisis, or in demonstrating, under the criteria of small labour markets or exceptional circumstances, that the redundancies have a significant impact on the local or regional labour market.

·The other issues identified were a degree of overlap between the EGF and other EU instruments (such as the European Social Fund), or with national measures. Despite design differences between the EGF and the ESF, Member States with a higher ESF cofinancing rate in less developed regions 85 were more reluctant to apply for EGF. The majority of countries that did apply for EGF co-financing had an ESF co-financing rate of 60% or less, thus making EGF support more attractive. 

·The timing of the redundancies. Many major redundancies happen over a timeframe longer than what is set out in the EGF Regulation (4 or 9 months) and very often they occur in waves 86 . In order to target most redundancies, Member States might need to submit several applications, depending on the timing of the dismissals.

Identifying how many other restructuring events might have been eligible for EGF is challenging because of the limited data sources available. The European Restructuring Monitor remains the most comprehensive source of data for recorded announcements of redundancies. However, the timeframe of the redundancies is not always indicated. The ERM could serve as one indicator, but more comparative data are needed to draw conclusions. A few Member States permanently scan the market for new possible EGF cases, but most do not.

Use of EGF by Member States

As detailed in Chapter 3, 12 Member States applied for and received EGF support, covering a total of 49 cases 87 . In 46 of those cases, the final report was submitted before the supporting study was sent to the Commission.

The specific labour market measures and allowances offered to both redundant workers and NEETs differ considerably in scope and volume. The measures and allowances most commonly offered and taken up are set out below  88 .

·Job search assistance and case management this is quite broad, as it includes general information services to workers/NEETs, career guidance, advisory services, mentoring and outplacement assistance. These measures were offered in 48 out of 49 cases, targeting in total 68 021 workers and NEETs, for a total budget of EUR 69.3 million. The results from 46 final reports showed that these measures were provided to about 50 917 beneficiaries, for a total amount of about EUR 49.3 million.

·Training and retraining – this was offered in 45 cases and helped 73% of beneficiaries. This measure ranges from vocational training to full university degrees and to language courses, etc. A total of 2800 workers and NEETs were targeted by this measure, for a total budget of EUR 80.7 million. This measure was provided to 16 595 beneficiaries, for a total amount of about EUR 44 million.

·Promotion of entrepreneurship – this was offered in 35 cases and helped 48% of beneficiaries on average. This measure includes guidance and advice for self-employment through workshops, individual assistance in the creation of companies, tutoring meetings and mentoring activities. In total, 5 235 workers and NEETs were targeted, for a total planned budget of about EUR 32.6 million. This measure was provided to 2 460 beneficiaries, for a total amount spent of about EUR 26.2 million.

·Less commonly used measures are sheltered and supported employment and rehabilitation, and direct job creation. These measures targeted 1 068 workers and NEETs for the first measure, and 200 for the latter, with spending at EUR 5.5 million and EUR 3 million respectively. The first measure was offered in three EGF cases and helped 275 beneficiaries (of 1 068 targeted), for about EUR 1.4 million spent. The direct job creation measure was offered in one case, where it helped 9 beneficiaries (of 200 targeted). In most cases, this relatively low rate was due to people finding a job without support, or a lack of interest to participate due to low willingness for change. ‘Other’ measures included cooperation activities 89 like an enterprise survey and company visits.

·Allowances offered were mainly job search allowances, training allowances, subsistence allowances and mobility allowances. Job search allowances were targeted at 14 691 persons across 25 cases, training allowances at 11 822 persons across 21 cases, mobility allowances at 2 954 persons across 23 cases, and subsistence allowances at 5 306 persons across seven cases. Employers’ recruitment incentives, consisting of pay subsidies to encourage local companies to hire EGF beneficiaries, were used in 12 cases. Other allowances offered (in six cases) include allowances to return to studies, careers allowances and an allowance to access internet in one’s home. As for beneficiaries helped, training allowances had the highest average rate (65%), followed by job search allowances (64%), subsistence allowances (63%) and mobility allowances (33%) 90 . The main reason for the low take-up of mobility allowances is the low willingness for mobility among beneficiaries.

The EGF is complementing regular measures by increasing the level of aid, as confirmed by the stakeholder consultations. In many cases, EGF assistance removed barriers to participation in regular (or EGF) measures as assistance was offered for travel, accommodation, childcare or course material facilities. This was also confirmed by the evidence collected for the supporting study.

Use of the EGF for beneficiaries

Case research, including beneficiary surveys, identified considerable differences across EGF cases and Member States in the rate of beneficiaries helped (defined as the ratio of persons assisted over the number of persons targeted). The differences are mostly due to case-specific or country-specific factors. The take-up of EGF measures by beneficiaries is largely dependent on personal and contextual circumstances, although the way in which the measures are designed and implemented also play a role. Among the reasons that led to fewer people participating in the measures offered are:

ostrong national/local support systems that reduce the need for additional EGF support;

ogenerous compensation and training opportunities offered by the dismissing company;

odelays in the start of implementation of EGF measures (so that beneficiaries had already found employment  this also implies, however, that EGF assistance might not have been needed);

ofinding a job sooner than expected; highly-skilled people did not require much support;

ostrong labour markets enabling quick re-integration without EGF support;

opersonal reasons for beneficiaries not wanting to take part (e.g. poor public transportation possibilities, caring for family members, etc.);

olack of knowledge that measures actually exist (implying that the national authorities were not able to identify possible beneficiaries, and/or did not put enough effort into guidance measures); and

omeasures not being regarded as useful (implying that the package of measures was designed without closely involving the beneficiaries).

In total, across the 46 EGF cases analysed, 37 072 workers and 2 524 NEETs have been assisted (i.e. 39 596 beneficiaries in total). The rate of beneficiaries helped ranged from a low of 9% to a high of 113% 91 .

As explained above, the results of the beneficiary surveys indicated that the EGF support was perceived as very effective by most respondents and that the support they received was tailored to their needs. Dissatisfaction rates are case-specific, and also vary widely within countries. Most of the reported dissatisfaction stems from the fact that measures offered turned out not to be of the expected quality. However, in a few instances, a mismatch between measures offered and beneficiaries’ needs hindered participation 92 .

Little information is available on the specific characteristics of the beneficiaries targeted beyond gender and age group. Out of 49 562 persons targeted (workers and NEETs), 31 797 were men. This had been addressed in a study for the European Parliament’s Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality 93 . As mentioned in the mid-term evaluation of the 20142020 EGF, the figures reflect the gender segregation of jobs, and the fact that industries prone to larger restructuring because of globalisation, especially manufacturing, are predominantly male industries. However, this is case-dependent. There are also cases from the retail sector with a far larger number of female workers made redundant than men.

Use of the EGF support for NEETs

During 20142020, NEETs were targeted in only 12 out of the 49 cases 94 , by 5 countries 95 , accounting for 8.4% of all persons targeted through the EGF (4 099 NEETs out of 49 562 persons targeted). The conditions for supporting NEETs under the EGF were different during 20142017 and 20182020. In 2018, Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 revised the NEETs clause and extended it until 31 December 2020.

During 20142017, 19 Member States could potentially qualify for assistance targeted towards NEETs 96 . To include NEETs in an EGF case, at least some of the redundancies must have happened in a region eligible under the Youth Employment Initiative (YEI). The possibility has been used by Belgium, Greece, Ireland and Spain. However, these countries included NEETs in only a few of their EGF applications. Spain could have included NEETs in all applications, but preferred not to do so, as its co-financing rate under the YEI was far more favourable (at 93%) than the EGF co-financing rate.

During 20182020, the inclusion of NEETs in an EGF case became possible if at least some of the redundancies happened in a region with at least 20% youth unemployment. Only 2 Member States included NEETs in their applications under the new conditions: 1 application was submitted by Portugal 97  in 2018 and 1 by Belgium in 2019 (which was rejected by the Council).

In 20142020, the rate of NEETs helped ranged from 39% 98 to 100% 99 . Average rates of NEETs helped were particularly high in Ireland (91%) and Greece (85%), whereas Belgium struggled to engage with this target group (47%). Findings showed that the existence of the YEI alongside the EGF created a degree of ‘competition’ and information retention between operators; this meant that time was required to establish trust and participation so that young people could be adequately targeted and involved in the EGF projects 100 .

The limited use of EGF support for NEETs can be partly explained by the perception that the EGF is not the best avenue to target these young people and that other EU instruments (such as the YEI) are better suited for this type of support. However, in those cases where EGF support to NEETs was used, it was considered a key added value of the EGF (this was the case in Ireland). Also, in Belgium, the EGF allowed for experimentation with new types of support for this target group by extending the classic national support system to NEETs 101 .

See Annex 4 for figures per case on the NEETs targeted and assisted.

d.Monitoring and reporting

Under the EGF Regulation, Member States include in the application the number of persons targeted, broken down by gender and age group. Member States send to the Commission a final report 6 months after the end of the personalised measures, indicating the case’s outcome, including the beneficiaries’ employment status. Reporting about the beneficiaries is limited to their number, broken down by gender and age, and to the categories of workers. The Commission implementing decisions also require Member States to deliver data on the employment status of beneficiaries a year after the final report.

The effectiveness of the EGF support is measured only through the re-integration rates. There is no requirement for quantitative re-integration objectives in an EGF application, which makes it difficult to measure and monitor the effectiveness of EGF support, because there is no baseline against which results can be compared. This was also pointed out in the mid-term evaluation of the 20142020 EGF 102 .

According to interviewees at EU level, progress on case-specific objectives is poorly monitored by Member States 103 . The findings from the case studies show that in many cases there are no specific systems to keep track of the results beyond the end date of the EGF measures. Among the reasons for this are privacy concerns (e.g. Sweden) or most often because only the minimum information is collected for the employment status report, as mentioned above. Beyond the challenges related to privacy, there seems to be little burden associated with monitoring the results. Only Germany and France reported a burden in this context, while Belgium suggested that more monitoring should take place, including more qualitative results such as beneficiaries’ satisfaction, improved skills and self-confidence.

The 2021–2027 EGF Regulation includes specific common indicators and a beneficiary survey to monitor implementation and measure impact. The final report to be submitted by Member States will include not only re-employment rates, but also some qualitative information, such as the qualifications gained at the end of the operations. This should improve the monitoring of EGF effectiveness in the future. The Commission’s proposal to set case-specific targets and to include reporting by type of employment was not included in the final agreement of Parliament and the Council on the EGF Regulation for the 2021–2027 period.

e.Factors contributing to or hindering the achievement of objectives

The external experts performed a thorough qualitative analysis of the information available to identify which factors help or hinder the achievement of EGF cases’ objectives. This analysis was primarily based on the case reports and on interviews with case stakeholders. It confirmed the factors already identified in the mid-term evaluation and the Commission’s biennial reports, and added additional factors.

The success factors 104 contributing to the effectiveness of the EGF are:

·The Member State’s past experience in EGF implementation and the institutional capacity to adopt a coordinated approach with all relevant stakeholders seems to be an important success factor. The success of EGF cases also benefits from building on existing partnerships and delivery structures for employment and social policies, together with a solid social dialogue. 

·Tailored measures to the individual needs of beneficiaries. The EGF allows for intensive, individualised support, usually much more than national or regional measures. Member States can experiment via the EGF with innovative measures and, if proven successful, they integrate them into the regular measures of national or local authorities or of the dismissing enterprise. 

·Availability of support services in close proximity to the target group. For example, in Spain and Belgium EGF offices and reconversion units were set up in locations close to the target groups.

·Provision of support by a small group of implementers. In Sweden, the case was managed by a small group of PES staff with a better understanding of the needs of the target group. In Spain, a relationship was established between the case counsellors and the beneficiaries, who established a joint WhatsApp group and remain in contact today.

·Background of workers and willingness to actively participate in EGF measures. Workers with higher levels of education or with more versatile and transferable skills are likely to find new employment faster than the lower skilled.

All these success factors reinforce the idea that personalised, individualised support services are highly beneficial for finding a quality job. However, success factors are largely case-specific, and there are factors that cannot be controlled, such as the economic situation in the country/region, the supply and demand for labour and the unemployment rate.

Factors hindering the effectiveness of the EGF are:

·Issues related to the profiles of beneficiaries, e.g. age, low levels of education or limited knowledge of the local language. Age is a commonly reported factor hindering the reach of the EGF. Older people face greater challenges than younger people. Redundant workers close to retirement age tend to be less inclined to participate in EGF measures. This is the case when they are eligible for early retirement or for generous unemployment benefits to bridge the gap until retirement, or when their job loss had a considerable impact on their mental state and their self-confidence in being able to secure a new job.

·Difficulties in reaching and activating redundant workers and NEETs. In many Member States, privacy issues have made it difficult to reach the specific people who are going to be dismissed, as in some cases (mainly sectoral) enterprises do not disclose the information about these workers. Also, NEETs were often difficult to reach and engage with, and they did not always consider the measures made available to them relevant and interesting.

·Workers’ low willingness for mobility and change. Depending on the case specifics, reasons for this included proximity to the work place and home, scepticism about the EGF project, reluctance to switch career paths, and workers’ rigid expectations regarding their potential new job. Member States partially mitigated these challenges with workshops focusing on willingness for change and mobility and also with travel grants.

·Problems and delays with designing and implementing EGF measures. These included delays in the selection of implementing partners and in procurement of training courses; submission of an application long after the reference period for redundancies; long and complicated national procedures; weak institutional capabilities and design of policy instruments; limited cooperation between stakeholders and capacity to implement innovative measures of interest to beneficiaries.

f.Involvement of companies and social partners

As already identified in the mid-term evaluation of the 20142020 EGF, notable success factors for EGF cases included the development of effective partnerships and appropriate delivery mechanisms, strong cooperation between the delivery partners, including social partners, and a coordinated approach 105 . This was largely confirmed by the supporting study through case research.

The degree of involvement of social partners and companies in the design and provision of coherent support packages varies across Member States and cases, as it is largely based on their regular support systems. Some examples from case studies showed that either social partners are involved early on in the restructuring negotiations, with the public employment service coming in as a secondary actor, or companies laying off workers are required by law to be involved in implementing active labour market measures, which they contribute to both financially and with personnel.

Generally, it is clear that the involvement of former employers boosts the effectiveness of EGF cases. In Finland, it was found that when companies are involved in implementing EGF measures, it helps with the provision of information and measures for guiding beneficiaries back into the labour market as soon as possible.

The involvement of social partners is also generally very well received. However, some issues were encountered relating to the involvement of companies and social partners 106 .

g.Information and communication activities

The EGF Regulation requires Member States to provide information on and publicise the funded actions, highlight the role of the EU, and ensure that the EGF contribution is visible. It also requires the Commission to maintain and regularly update an internet website, provide information on the EGF, and provide guidance on the submission of applications, as well as information on all applications.

At Member State level, for successful communication on the EGF cases, all relevant stakeholders at national, regional and/or local level need to be aware of the opportunities available from the EGF. Findings showed, however, that in some Member States there is higher awareness of the EGF if social partners participated in delivering some of the measures. In other Member States, not all relevant stakeholders are aware of the EGF and its potential benefits.

The survey of 13 Member States who did not apply during 20142020 found that the general level of knowledge about the EGF is low 107 . As reported in the public consultation, workers’ organisations in Germany, Finland, Belgium and Spain were generally aware of the EGF, but workers were not. The same results emerged from the survey to EGF beneficiaries. The main objective of the communication activities is to inform participants about the EU intervention. This is usually done during or after implementation because in the initial stages (i.e. before formal approval from the budgetary authority), the measures are implemented using national funds and there is little visibility of the EGF.

The Member States are responsible for providing information about the EGF and choosing the best suited communication actions. However, this is not done to the same degree in all cases. While many of the Member States have created dedicated EGF websites to provide information about every EGF project and the workers are informed about the role of the EU in the support they receive, the findings show that Member States were consistently underspending the budget planned for information and publicity activities. In some cases the information and publicity costs were absorbed by the Member States outside of the EGF framework, or costs were simply lower than expected.

The involvement of social partners and companies in the design and implementation of EGF measures was helpful in reaching (potential) beneficiaries, as their contact details are otherwise not known. For example, in Finland an online portal was established by the dismissing company (Microsoft) to communicate information about recruitment events and vacancies. In Sweden, a contact centre was established at the Volvo Trucks plant where the majority of the target group had previously been working.

Little feedback was collected from beneficiaries on the usefulness and effectiveness of communication activities, although evidence of the lack of awareness shows that there is room for improvement.

At EU level, the EGF website 108  is constantly updated with information about EGF applications, EGF publications (the biennial report, the frequently asked questions, press releases, etc.), events and news. Twice a year, the Commission organises EGF contact persons meetings and EGF networking seminars, to discuss issues of common interest. Views on their usefulness and effectiveness, however, are mixed. The majority of Member States consulted were of the opinion felt that the EGF networking seminars had been useful, as they allowed for knowledge sharing, and cross-fertilisation of new ideas and experiences, but are not used to their full potential. Recently, the Commission also started sharing information via social media (Twitter). Nevertheless, there is always scope to do more in this respect.

h.Overall impact of the EGF

Overall, it is difficult to draw robust conclusions about the impact of the EGF, especially at case level where implementation and results depend heavily on the specificities of the labour market and the target group, and because the results are not monitored and reported on in an accurate and comparable way. Nevertheless, evidence indicated a clear positive impact. The results of the CIE also pointed to the EGF having a positive influence on beneficiaries’ likelihood to find a job, especially in the long term (after 12 or more months of unemployment).

The EGF has been successful in providing targeted emergency support adapted to the needs of dismissed workers, while ensuring enough flexibility for the support to be integrated into Member States’ national systems, including through highly individualised and tailored support measures. A significant number of beneficiaries have been re-integrated into the labour market, and even those who were not have likely gained new skills, qualifications or social networks. On top of this, the lessons learned from the design and implementation have been used to improve support to workers in the future. The Fund has shown solidarity towards workers and NEETs alike, and supported them in finding sustainable employment.

In the Member States, the use of the EGF has improved overall awareness about the Fund among authorities at national, regional and local level (depending on who is involved). In Member States with previous experience and delivery mechanisms, the EGF serves as a tool to test innovative measures, which could later be mainstreamed in employment and social policies.

Several lessons have been learned from the implementation. At Member State level, lessons were learned about the application process, design, early start and accessibility of the measures. At EU level, lessons were learned about the design of the Fund, the need for more or different data collection, about how more flexibility is needed in adapting the funded measures and about the need to improve communication activities (see lessons learned in Chapter 6).

5.2.EFFICIENCY

The efficiency criterion analyses to what extent the costs associated with the implementation of the Fund were justified considering the results (defined as the rate of re-integration of beneficiaries). It also analyses if there are any inefficiencies or unnecessary burdens at case or instrument level that should be addressed to improve the Fund’s efficiency in the future. The analysis was made at both case and Member State level.

a.Efficiency at case level

According to the stakeholder consultations, the amounts available for the measures are considered to be sufficient. Most respondents to the public consultation believed that the same results could not have been achieved with less resources or in a shorter period of time.

The average absorption rate of the 46 EGF cases was 59%, with the lowest observed rate being approximately 2% 109 and the highest 100% 110 . The absorption rate varies significantly between Member States (see Figure 10 below), sectors, cases and different measures and activities. It is very case-specific and not necessarily indicative of good or bad case implementation.

Reasons for discrepancies include:

·an overestimation of budgets by Member States and the inclusion of high safety margins due to insufficient information on the profiles and needs of potential beneficiaries during the planning stages;

·an overestimation of interested beneficiaries or unforeseen changes (e.g. workers finding a new job on their own, especially when there are delays in implementation); and

·more available funding at Member State level than initially expected, resulting in less EGF co-financing being used.

Figure 10. Average absorption rate per Member State 111  

For each Member State, the number of EGF applications received is in brackets

Source: EGF Database

The cost-efficiency of the EGF considers the degree to which the costs incurred are proportionate to the results (i.e. the number of beneficiaries helped). No concrete conclusions could be drawn on the degree to which the results per beneficiary were cost-efficient. This is because the resources spent per case, and the number of beneficiaries helped as a result, differed considerably by case, sector and Member State. Comparing results across cases is irrelevant because of the specificities of each case.

In the majority of the 46 cases, the actual cost per worker was lower than initially planned. From the comparison of the absorption rate of EGF funds (the percentage of the spending of the assistance granted) and the rate of beneficiaries assisted, it was clear that the large majority of cases were more cost-efficient than initially planned. In other words, in 80% of EGF cases, each euro of EGF funds helped more people than planned in the initial budget. In addition to the current average re-employment rate of 65% there is empirical evidence from the RHOMOLO-IO simulations 112  performed on 23 EGF cases from 20142015, which suggests that the Fund has positive indirect effects, as each additional job created influences other sectors positively. The findings were that the dimension of these indirect impacts varies across case studies, ranging from a minimum of 20% up to 50% of the total jobs generated.

At Member State level, after comparing the total EGF amount granted per Member State against the number of beneficiaries assisted, it was found that the general trend is that more beneficiaries were assisted in countries that received more EGF funding. A higher number of beneficiaries requires more financial resources (see Figure 11).

Figure 11. Relationship between total EGF amounts spent and number of beneficiaries helped, per Member State 113

Source: EGF Database

The analysis of the EGF final reports and the case studies shows that a higher cost per beneficiary is influenced by the cost of the measures and by the number of participants. Variations in cost-efficiency result from a range of factors. These include the scale of the layoffs, the labour market situation, the targeted beneficiaries’ individual circumstances and skills, alternative measures already provided by the Member State, the services’ cost, the number of beneficiaries helped and how easy or difficult it was for them to be re-employed after participation in EGF measures. This was also noted by the Commission in its 2017 and 2019 biennial reports on the EGF.

At sectoral level, no analysis is possible. However, average cost per beneficiary at sectoral level varies considerably, with the clear outliers being air transport (an average cost of EUR 4 833 per beneficiary 114 ) and call centres (average cost of EUR 571 per beneficiary 115 ).

Cost-effectiveness looks at the relationship between costs and results, i.e. the number of beneficiaries re-integrated. In some cases, cost savings resulted from networks and processes already established from previous EGF cases.

Case research did not reveal any correlation between the level of absorption and the re-employment rate. This re-confirms similar findings from the ex post evaluation of the 2007–2013 EGF 116 . 

As the mid-term evaluation of the 2014–2020 EGF pointed out, the case studies also showed that many of the implementation costs (i.e. managing and monitoring costs) are fixed, independently of the size of the case. The reporting of such expenditure as a percentage of the total of the overall EGF assistance granted is frequently seen as not giving a fair picture. This is because smaller cases that incur more or less the same costs as larger ones inevitably look ‘inefficient’ as the percentage of implementing costs is a higher part of the total.

Evidence suggests that there is room for efficiency gains. The main inefficiencies are related to processes or procedures at national and/or regional level, which lengthen the timeframe. Some examples of inefficiencies are issues with the procurement of training courses or partnerships established with delays.

As a general rule, EGF assistance is more costly than regular measures. However, according to the final reports and employment status reports for the EGF cases, EGF assistance leads to higher re-employment rates. An educated judgement as to whether additional costs are justified or not would also require further study of the societal costs of lower re-employment rates. This was also confirmed by the mid-term evaluation of the 2014–2020 EGF 117 .

b.Efficiency at instrument level

Most stakeholders interviewed and most respondents to the public consultation indicated that the decision-making process is still considered lengthy and complex. Despite this, efficiency improves the more applications a Member State submits, thanks to lessons learned. There is little scope to reduce the length and complexity of the application process, as approval by the budgetary authority is required. The Regulation covering the 2014–2020 period imposed time limits: 20 weeks for the Commission to process the applications and 6 weeks for the budgetary authority to approve.

On average, across the 49 EGF cases approved during the 20142020 period, the process from the Member State’s application until approval by the budgetary authority took 202 days (29 weeks). The shortest application period was 141 days (20 weeks) and the longest 254 days (36 weeks) 118 . Approval by the budgetary authority took an average of 63 days (nine weeks) for the entire process. The six-week deadline was met in only 10 of the 49 cases 119 .

This shows that further efforts are needed to shorten the length of procedures. This finding already included in the EGF mid-term evaluation, was incorporated into the 2021-2027 EGF Regulation, with shorter deadlines for the Commission and Member States and without the need for Member States to demonstrate in applications the cause of the redundancies. However, the proposal to simplify the interinstitutional decision-making process on the mobilisation of the EGF was not accepted by the budgetary authority.

Based on the Commission’s experience in dealing with EGF applications, the most promising avenue to increase efficiency is to remove the documentation requirements on the analysis of globalisation or crisis criteria. Member States could save significant resources (time and money) when filing an application, and the Commission’s time to analyse an application would also be reduced. This simplification is included in the 2021–2027 EGF Regulation.

The publication by the Commission in May 2017 of the EGF frequently asked questions (FAQs) 120 proved useful for Member States 121 . The FAQs contain answers that serve as assistance and guidance during all the stages of an EGF case.

5.3.COHERENCE 

The coherence criterion looks at how well the EGF intervention works together with other EU policies and initiatives (particularly the ESF) and with national instruments that have similar aims. This is done in particular by analysing complementarity at both instrument and case level, overlaps or duplication, and measures taken to avoid this or to ensure complementarity.

a.Complementarity with other EU policies and initiatives

Most stakeholders agree that EGF complements the ESF in the area of employment policies by offering a reactive one-off support following specific restructuring events, in a more tailored, flexible and intensive manner than the ESF. The ESF has been designed to offer a more long-term approach, which also makes it possible to anticipate structural change, in contrast to the short-term one-off support offered by the EGF. The EGF is mobilised on a needs basis, when Member States require financial support to help dismissed workers, thus adding value. However, there is scope to better align the EGF and the ESF, as some Member States choose to fund EGF-type measures using the ESF because of the higher co-financing rate.

In the public consultation, nearly all respondents indicated that the EGF was strongly coherent with other support measures available at the EU level. However, in the survey aimed at Member States that did not apply for EGF co-financing during 2014–2020, more than half (8/13) indicated that they did not apply because the ESF was more favourable, easier and faster to mobilise in their country.

An extensive study was published in 2018 on the coherence, complementarity and coordination of the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIFs) and between various other instruments such as the EGF. According to this study, the EGF complements the ESF in its objective to improve employment opportunities, strengthen social inclusion and promote education, skills and life-long learning 122 .

The conditions to support the NEETs are similar via the EGF and the YEI, indicating a need for greater coherence between the programmes. The EGF does not require a link to be established between the NEETs and the redundancies, beyond at least some of the redundancies being in the same region, thus creating a degree of overlap – almost all NEETs who can be targeted through the EGF can also be targeted through the YEI. Given that the YEI specifically targets NEETs, and the limited use of the EGF for this purpose during 2014–2020, the YEI is the most appropriate tool for this type of support.

The Finnish authorities pointed out some synergies with EURES 123 (the European job mobility portal, part of the EU Programme for Employment and Social Innovation) to improve international labour mobility for EGF cases. In Finland, the unemployment rate of immigrants is much higher also among highly educated professionals, and the work done with the EURES network of PES offices helped laid-off persons of other nationalities avoid social exclusion. The measures included helping some of the redundant workers find a job in other Member States. Measures promoting international labour mobility had been offered to a limited extent in other cases, but they have not been taken up due to limited labour mobility.

b.Complementarity with national measures and instruments

In general, the EGF is flexible enough to adapt to the national contexts, although there are considerable differences between national support frameworks for the unemployed. Also, the EGF supports, complements and adds to measures or activities funded by national instruments. The EGF is well integrated into existing delivery models or models established for the EGF and operating within the mainstream frameworks 124 . All 16 national authorities that responded to the public consultation and the mid-term evaluation of the 2014-2020 EGF confirmed this conclusion.

In Member States with EGF cases during 2014-2020, no inconsistencies were observed. On the contrary, the EGF was widely considered as complementary to national support structures. In many cases, the EGF adds to what can normally be implemented in a Member State (e.g. through more intensive support because more funds are available, or by making it possible for beneficiaries to choose from a tailor-made array of training courses that is broader than those usually offered at national level).

In some cases the EGF is coordinated with the recommendations set out in the EU Quality Framework for anticipation of change and restructuring (QFR) 125 , which is the EU policy instrument setting a framework of best practice for anticipating and dealing with corporate restructuring. However, this is not indicated in the EGF applications (see lessons learned in Chapter 6).

In some cases 126 , the EGF intervention was part of a wider policy framework aimed at minimising the consequences of mass redundancies in a region. The EGF addressed the short-term employment consequences of the restructuring event and was implemented alongside a wider and longer-term economic growth plan for the area or region. This not only ensured coherence between the activities implemented by other regional and local stakeholders, but also amplified the sustainability of the EGF’s results.

5.4.RELEVANCE

The evaluation of relevance covers three core aspects: the continued appropriateness and usefulness of the scope of the EGF; its intervention criteria; and the extent to which the inclusion of NEETs in EGF cases met Member States’ needs.

a.Relevance of the scope of the EGF

The scope of the EGF relates to the causes that trigger redundancy events. By the end of 2020, the EGF could only be mobilised if the redundancies had been caused by either trade-related globalisation or a global financial and economic crisis. During the 2014–May 2020 period, there were 30 EGF cases (61%) relating to globalisation, and 19 (39%) linked to a global financial and economic crisis.

The number of EGF applications has always been cyclical and correlated with the general trend in employment and the economic realities in Member States. Between 2018 and 2020, only 11 EGF applications 127  were submitted, as European economies had recovered from the 2008 crisis, there were less large-scale restructuring events, and Member States were better equipped to deal with major restructuring events.

Since March 2020, the COVID-19 crisis caused a surge in job losses; this is likely to continue to cause business closures and job losses across Europe in 2021. At the end of 2020, four EGF applications had been received as a result of the COVID-19 crisis.

Different stakeholders, at EU level and in the Member States, pointed out that linking the need for EGF funds to the impact of globalisation has proven challenging for several applicant Member States. This has led in many cases to several revisions of the same application, resulting in efficiency losses in terms of time spent and staff involved in the application process. Further evidence is the fact that in 2019 one EGF application (EGF/2019/001 BE/Carrefour) was rejected because the Council perceived the link to major structural changes in trade patterns due to globalisation to be too weak.

A few Member States indicated through the public consultation and the online survey that the scope should be expanded to include layoffs resulting from more general restructuring events stemming from automation and digitisation. In the set-up for 20142020, the EGF excluded redundancies generated by intra-EU trade and offshoring within the EU, and did not account for job losses driven by digitisation and automation that were not linked to globalisation or a global financial and economic crisis 128 .

Globalisation has changed dramatically since the first design of the EGF. While globalisation, automation and offshoring were traditional causes for job losses, in recent years other trends are putting a strain on virtually all economic sectors. This includes demographic ageing, the shift towards a low-carbon economy, a decrease in the need for low-skilled labour and an increasing need for digital skills resulting from a general trend towards digitalisation.

The 2021–2027 EGF Regulation includes such recent trends by extending the scope to any large-scale restructuring event such as intra-EU nearshoring, digitalisation, transition to low-carbon economy, etc., thus striving to leave no one behind. Decisions for EGF co-financing will be based on the expected impact of the redundancies, rather than their cause. This results in more flexibility for Member States to target the needs of dismissed workers. Based on the evidence collected, this would fulfil the needs of stakeholders who raised concerns that the scope of the EGF was no longer fully appropriate and that it should be expanded.

b.Relevance of the intervention criteria of the EGF

The intervention criteria relate to the number of redundancies that occurred in a single enterprise or an economic sector. In case of redundancies in a particular economic sector, the emphasis is on allowing applications combining redundancies in SMEs operating in the same sector. Among the 49 cases covered by this evaluation, 27 concerned redundancies in a single enterprise, 13 were sectoral applications, and 9 used the derogation clause.

The threshold had been lowered from 1 000 redundancies in the 2007–2013 period to 500 129  in 2014–2020. Among the 49 cases covered by this evaluation, 21 concerned restructuring events involving less than 1 000 redundancies, which means that the lower threshold definitely triggered more applications.

As underlined in the mid-term evaluation of the 2014-2020 EGF and re-confirmed by most Member States, the thresholds for redundancies were considered too high and acted as barriers for applying for EGF funding. Among the countries that did apply for EGF in 2014–2020, only Ireland was consistently unable to meet the threshold of 500 dismissals. Nevertheless, even in Germany, a country where large-scale redundancies are most common, authorities suggested that lowering the threshold for redundancies should be considered as it is too limiting.

Several Member States and stakeholders indicated that the EGF’s accessibility would be improved by adapting the dismissal period to avoid the exclusion of workers falling outside the four or nine-month reference period.

Finally, from the interviews with national authorities some argued that the Fund’s relevance was hindered by the requirement for EGF cases involving multiple companies (‘sectoral’ cases) to be limited to the same sector. Large companies have developed the capacity to mitigate globalisation changes, whereas SMEs are still heavily affected by globalisation and the consequent restructuring, which warrants a more flexible approach to restructuring events involving more than one company.

In the 2021–2027 EGF Regulation, these three aspects have been addressed. The threshold for dismissals has been reduced to 200 workers and self-employed persons, the reference period for a single company remains the same (4 months) and that for a sector has been reduced to 6 months. A provision was added to make restructuring events involving at least 200 displaced persons in the same or different economic sectors and located in the same region eligible for EGF support.

c.Relevance of the NEETs clause

Youth unemployment in the EU had been steadily decreasing until the recent COVID-19 crisis. Since 2019, in several regions of the EU 130 youth unemployment rates have been above 20% 131 .

During the 20142020 period, the EGF was barely used to support NEETs, with only five Member States 132 including support to NEETs in their EGF cases. The existence of other EU instruments supporting NEETs suggests that the EGF might not be the most appropriate instrument for this purpose.

The results of the public consultation show mixed opinions. One third of respondents (6/16) are in favour of the support for NEETs. Three of the six respondents in favour came from Member States which used this derogation. Another third of respondents were against the inclusion of NEETs, arguing that NEETs constituted a different type of target group, requiring a specific and separate set of measures, and pointing out that other specific instruments for youth support already exist.

Among the Member States who had EGF cases and high youth unemployment, some (Italy, France) did not include NEETs in their EGF cases because the group was supported through the YEI or via other national instruments 133 . 

The 2021–2027 EGF Regulation acknowledges that other instruments are more suitable for providing assistance to NEETs, notably the ESF+.

5.5.EU ADDED VALUE

The EGF provides added value when compared to what Member States could have achieved alone through national measures targeted at helping workers made redundant. Although several stakeholders consider that some measures can also be funded through the ESF and that NEETs can be supported through the YEI, the EGF provides EU added value.

The results of the public consultation highlight that some 69% of respondents felt that the EGF represents an added value 134 . The majority (85%) of respondents to the beneficiary survey evaluated the EGF favourably in comparison with other sources of support at national/regional level, citing in particular the volume and scope of the EGF support, and it being more tailored to the specific needs of beneficiaries. 

The volume effects are defined as effects that show how the EGF has added volume compared to the national measures in place. Based on the case research and on the consultations, the majority of those involved in the delivery of the EGF confirm it has added volume effects to the delivery of services. Four ways in which the EGF adds to volume have been identified and set out below:

·The EGF enabled Member States to help more people than would be the case if they had to rely only on national funds.

·The EGF resources also enabled Member States to devote more time and financial resources to better assessing the beneficiaries’ needs and thus to provide more tailored support. In some countries with higher GDP per capita rates and lower ESF allocations, the EGF added financial support on top of the fixed allocations provided to Member States from the ESF.

·The additional EGF resources resulted in more intensive, targeted support than national measures did. The EGF increased not only the overall number of services, but also their variety. 

·The EGF makes it possible in some cases to add to existing active labour market measures already available in the Member States by extending the duration of the specialised services or the volume of support. Some national measures target only those who have been unemployed for a long time (e.g. 6 months to a year).

Scope effects arise when more people are targeted or there is an expansion of the measures offered compared to what would have been the case without the EGF support. The EGF has considerable scope effects, although this also varied considerably across Member States depending on national support systems.

Firstly, in almost all Member States 135 , the EGF allowed Member States to experiment with innovative active labour market measures that might not be normally available to redundant workers. The flexibility of the EGF allowed for greater personalisation of solutions for workers by taking into account their specific needs and aspirations; this aspect of the EGF was considered to contribute substantially to the success of the national measures, thus raising their effectiveness 136 . At instrument level, the EGF provided more targeted and individualised support to beneficiaries compared to what could be achieved by the ESF, which usually provides more horizontal and structural support.

Secondly, the EGF provides a scope effect, making it possible to provide support to different groups of beneficiaries. Usually, the national PES support targets those furthest from the labour market, e.g. the long-term unemployed or people with particularly low levels of skills and education. In contrast, the EGF allows support to be given all groups of people, from high-skilled workers to workers who are very difficult to place on the job market, need additional support or are lacking essential skills. Nevertheless, this scope effect is linked to the degree that the dismissing companies are involved in the design and implementation of the measures and in providing financial support to the redundant workers. The scope effect in terms of support to NEETs was considered as a key added value of the EGF in Ireland and Belgium.

Role effects relate to the extent to which innovative ideas tested and lessons learned from the implementation were incorporated into the regular package of provisions. These are more likely to become visible in the long term, so limited examples have been identified. In some countries innovations from the EGF have been (or will be in the future) mainstreamed at national level. In Belgium, for instance, over time several innovations 137 have been testedin EGF cases, to be mainstreamed into regional or national measures if successful. The EGF experiences have affected the national support services more broadly in Finland, where the national ‘change security model’ was adapted in 2016 to make it obligatory for employers laying off workers to participate in the implementation of labour market measures. In Spain, EGF cases have been used as a reference point in the design of other jobseeker-placement projects and local employment initiatives.

Process effects relate to the general improvement of delivery processes thanks to experiences during EGF implementation. Overall, this is the least common EU added value effect of the EGF, although examples of process effects exist in Finland, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Italy and Sweden. The EGF fosters cooperation between public- and private-sector stakeholders in the design and delivery of the measures in a way that other EU instruments do not. A process effect in terms of the procedures employed is less common. From the case research, the lessons from the EGF had only been applied to other EGF cases, but they may feed into policy discussions on future changes that would mainstream tested processes into regional or national provisions.

In terms of cross-region and cross-border effects, the evidence collected does not show any such effects.

Very few respondents to the beneficiary survey indicated that the EGF helped them find a temporary job (11/441 respondents) or permanent job (10/441 respondents) outside of their original country of residence. As the implementation of the Fund is left to individual Member States, there is limited cross-border coordination between Member States within the context of the EGF, which might be a limiting factor in producing cross-border effects 138 . Due to limited number of applications, further analysis on the cross-border effects was not possible.

6.Conclusions and lessons-learned

Conclusions

The overarching conclusions set out below are underpinned by evidence collected from the supporting study and from additional reports and studies. The conclusions also provide lessons for the Fund’s implementation and design. The findings and conclusions are considered reasonably robust, even if the results of the public consultation and of the beneficiary survey have to be taken with caution 139 .

On the effectiveness of the EGF, the Fund has successfully met its objective of solidarity towards workers made redundant and self-employed persons whose activity ceased due to restructuring events, while supporting them in re-entering the labour market. However, there are significant differences between cases and Member States. In this process, the EU strives to leave no one behind, and has also shown solidarity towards different groups, especially vulnerable ones, sometimes even improving their sense of belonging to the EU 140 , or their feeling of being listened to at EU level. Beyond reintegration into the labour market, the EGF has produced long-lasting effects on beneficiaries’ general employability, such as new skills and qualifications, increased self-esteem and new social networks from participating in EGF measures. Beneficiaries’ participation in a personalised orientation process made them feel more proactive, encouraged them to develop their personal and social skills and had a positive effect on their families. Even though this is not the key objective of the Fund, it is likely to help them find sustainable employment in the future.

Overall, the average re-integration rate of redundant workers into the job market improved compared to the previous programming period (from 49% to 60%). This rate depends on case specificities, but also on external factors and personal reasons. A more qualitative approach to evaluating effectiveness is necessary. For reporting purposes, the 2021–2027 EGF Regulation introduced a beneficiary survey to be carried out for each EGF case. 

On top of the positive results for the re-integration of beneficiaries, evidence from the RHOMOLO simulations suggests that the EGF has positive indirect effects, as each additional job created influences other sectors in a positive way. The scale of these indirect impacts varies across EGF case studies, ranging from a minimum of 20% up to 50% of the total jobs generated 141 .

There are several reasons influencing beneficiaries’ take-up of EGF measures. These are: (i) external factors such as the labour market situation; (ii) an early and intensive general information package; (iii) an early start to personalised measures; and (iv) continuous adjustment of measures in response to current developments.

The EGF supports all eligible beneficiaries in a more tailored and intensive manner than national measures and other EU instruments do. The EGF measures respond to beneficiaries’ individual needs and wishes, and ensure that all beneficiaries are treated equally. It helps to remove barriers of participation and enables tailored support to be provided to vulnerable and/or disadvantaged groups, e.g. by making available allowances for childcare or elderly care. The flexibility of the Fund in terms of the types of measures is highly appreciated.

EGF measures are always offered on top of regular national measures and/or intensify them. The help offered would otherwise not have been available. This is a clear sign of the complementarity and additionality of EGF measures.

At application stage, it is difficult for Member States to identify the needs and wishes of potential beneficiaries. Sufficient budgetary flexibility is needed to adapt the allocation of funds during the implementation of an EGF case in order to address needs effectively. Although reallocations of funds were possible during the 2014–2020 period and often communicated via the FAQs and EGF contact persons meetings, there seems to have been a lack of knowledge in some countries about this possibility.

The assessment showed that the application process and implementation of EGF cases tend to improve over time as Member States become more knowledgeable and aware of the EGF’s process and potential. However, sometimes finding the right evidence to justify a case 142 is a major challenge and prevents Member States from applying.  

A positive effect of the use of EGF assistance is that it fosters the development of a general delivery mechanism of restructuring assistance in Member States with little experience in dealing with mass redundancies. In Member States that can already build on a wealth of experience and delivery mechanisms, the EGF serves as a tool to test innovative measures, which could later be mainstreamed in employment and social policies. In half of the cases, Member States expressed a positive opinion on the guidance received from the European Commission during the application phase.

ESF co-financing rates higher than the EGF co-financing rate of 60% have been a factor discouraging EGF applications.

More data collection and monitoring requirements are needed to evaluate the EGF’s performance. EGF results are measured only in relation to re-integration rates. However, the effects of the Fund go far beyond this, helping beneficiaries acquire new skills, gain qualifications, build up self-confidence and establish social networks, which improve their overall employability.

Other factors influencing the effectiveness of EGF cases are: (i) the level of involvement of social partners and companies laying off workers in the measures’ design and implementation; (ii) the degree to which sufficient information on the possibilities of the Fund is available to workers and NEETs; and (iii) how far national procedures allow for smooth implementation. EGF cases sometimes start with a delay or planned measures cannot be implemented due to administrative issues.

The Commission promoting the use of EGF was considered an asset for the beneficiaries in several cases 143 . In some Member States, there is higher awareness of the EGF if social partners participated in delivering some of the measures, while in other Member States not all relevant stakeholders, including beneficiaries, are aware of the EGF and its potential benefits. There is scope to improve communication and awareness about the EGF among workers and their representative organisations at EU and Member State level.

Analysis of the efficiency of the assistance has shown progress in the absorption rates (i.e. use of the allocated resources) of EGF co-financing, which improved on the previous period, from an average of 55% 144 to 59%. In general, EGF cases tend to make partial use of resources allocated. Although some trends have been found across Member States, discrepancies are largely case-specific. The main reasons for a lower absorption rate are a better-than-expected labour market situation and eligible beneficiaries finding new jobs by themselves when there are delays in the start of EGF measures. Other reasons for lower absorption rates are Member States tending to overestimate budgets to reduce the risk of overspending, and the many unknowns at the time of application (e.g. the needs and interests of workers/NEETs, level of participation in EGF measures). Thus, the absorption rate of an EGF case is not necessarily an indicator for success.

The efficiency of the EGF is hindered by the long decision-making process at EU level, in spite of the substantial shortening of the timing and stricter deadlines for Commission and Member States compared to the previous programming period. Having such a lengthy process not only causes delays in implementation that hinder the effectiveness of EGF cases, but also acts as a barrier for certain Member States wanting to apply for EGF support. The decision-making process at EU level causes delays to project implementation, but procedures at national/regional level are a more significant hindering factor to efficiency.

80% of the EGF cases were more cost-efficient (costs compared to the number of beneficiaries helped) than expected, with the actual amount spent per beneficiary assisted lower than planned. In the long term, the EGF’s cost-effectiveness (costs compared to the number of beneficiaries re-integrated) improved in 68% of cases compared to the short-term results 145  .

On coherence, strong complementarities were found between the EGF and the European Social Fund (ESF), as they have different scopes and objectives, and complementarity is ensured through coordination between the Funds at national level. There is scope to better align the EGF and the ESF, as some Member States choose to fund EGF-type measures using the ESF because of the higher co-financing rate. This is particularly the case for support to young people, as both the EGF and the Youth Employment Initiative support NEETs in regions with high levels of youth unemployment, thus indicating that coherence could be improved. At case level, no overlaps with other EU or national funding could be identified.

The EGF is coherent with national, regional and/or local policies and offers sufficient flexibility to complement and/or add to the labour market measures provided by Member States at national level. The Member States’ use of the EGF could be better coordinated with the recommendations set out in the EU Quality Framework for anticipation of change and restructuring (QFR).

There was a high degree of relevance of EGF funding during the 2014–2020 period. Evidence also showed that the scope was relevant. At the same time, it would benefit from expansion to other major labour market challenges (like automation, digitisation and the transition to a low-carbon economy), in line with the EU’s strategic and long-term priorities.

The intervention criteria of the EGF were found to be relevant and useful. Several Member States indicated that smaller labour markets would benefit from lowering the minimum threshold for redundancies.

Supporting NEETs through the EGF was appreciated but used to a limited degree. Particularly those stakeholders with experience in the delivery of EGF measures questioned whether the EGF was the right channel to deliver assistance to NEETs. Although supporting NEETs through the EGF was appreciated in the 11 out of 49 cases that made use of it, the view prevails that other instruments, like the YEI, might be better placed for this type of support.

The EGF has been successful and generated considerable EU added value during 2014–2020. This is particularly true in terms of its volume, scope, role and process effects, though they differ per Member State and are largely dependent on national support structures. The added value is significant for volume effects, meaning that EGF assistance not only increases the number and variety of services offered, but also their level of intensity, striving to leave no one behind.

As the EGF is largely complementary to other EU instruments (notably the ESF), it adds value compared to their scopes and target groups. It achieves this by offering an additional source of financial support on a case-by-case basis and more targeted, tailored, and individualised support to the very specific and narrow target groups it seeks to assist.

Lessons-learned

On effectiveness, there are several key lessons learned from the implementation both at Member State and at EU level, which would improve the EGF.

At Member State level:

oFaster application process for Member States with previous experience in EGF cases. Those that have applied before for the EGF are more familiar with the application process and will prepare applications that are more complete in the future, leading to efficiency gains. This holds true even for Member States with little experience applying for EGF support. The use of EGF assistance also fosters development of a general delivery mechanism of restructuring assistance in Member States with little experience in dealing with mass redundancies.

oEarly start of national procedures to ensure early intervention. This includes, for instance, procurement of training courses as quickly as possible.

oDesign of the labour market measures. Many Member States acknowledged the importance of tailored support based on beneficiaries’ needs.

oImportance of physical proximity and easily accessible support to beneficiaries. In many cases, the EGF support has positively influenced the way active labour market measures are managed at national level and the partnerships that feed into them.

At EU level, the key lessons learned were:

oThe EGF would benefit from an extended scope adapted to all major challenges facing the European labour market (like automation, digitisation, transition to low-carbon economy).

oAs an emergency response instrument, the mobilisation of the Fund should be sped up by simplifying and shortening the application process, with less evidence required. This simplified process was included the 20212027 EGF Regulation and should improve the effectiveness of the EGF.

oThe success of EGF measures should be measured not only through re-integration rates, but also through more qualitative data like new skills and qualifications, social networks and self-confidence gained as a result of participation in EGF measures.

oThe effectiveness of the Fund should be evaluated more systematically at case level, especially regarding the category of workers benefiting from the measures (professional and educational background), their employment status and the type of employment found. If Member States were to develop case-specific targets, the measuring and monitoring of the EGF’s effectiveness would improve. However, some delivery partners were of the opinion that the monitoring and reporting requirements were already too burdensome.

oSome budgetary flexibility is needed for Member States to reallocate the EGF funds based on needs that emerge during implementation, granted that those changes are duly justified. This reallocation of funds was already possible during the 20142020 period, and used often for smaller amounts, although some countries seem to have been unaware of this.

oIt is important to maintain the flexibility of the EGF and the degree to which the EGF measures can be tailored to individual beneficiaries’ needs, backgrounds and interests. The flexibility to complement and/or add to the measures provided by Member States at national, regional and/or local level will ensure that the EGF continues to provide EU added value.

In general, the EGF could be better coordinated with the recommendations set out in the EU Quality Framework for anticipation of change and restructuring. While Structural Funds and EGF interventions are consistent with the principles set out in the quality framework, this policy instrument is not referenced in guidance to Member States when designing or implementing measures. In the 2021–2027 EGF Regulation, a requirement was introduced for Member States to indicate how the recommendations set out in the EU QFR were taken into account.

Another lesson learned for both Member States and at EU level is the need to improve communication activities. This can be achieved by explaining what measures and activities can be supported by the EGF and how, through communication adapted to different stakeholders (beneficiaries, companies and training providers) in addition to national EGF operators. The Member States should actively communicate and spread awareness about the EGF, especially among beneficiaries, as this is not done to the same degree in all countries. At EU level, the biannual networking seminars organised by the Commission could be improved with a more bottom-up approach, allowing for more experience sharing. As regards external communication, in the future more emphasis should be put on increasing the visibility of good practices, not only among Member States, but also for the wider public.

As underlined in the mid-term evaluation of the 2014–2020 EGF, another lesson re‑confirmed by this evaluation was on organisational learning and the timing of the evaluation. Case implementation should be finalised, as this ensures ample evidence can be collected, analysed and that the final results achieved are evaluated. The 2021–2027 EGF Regulation addressed the issue of the evaluation’s timing, in order to allow sufficient time for implementation of the EGF cases to be finalised.

The 2021–2027 EGF Regulation addressed many issues (e.g. the extended scope, simpler and faster application procedures, more data collection including a beneficiary survey, the co-financing rate, more communication requirements), based on lessons learned from the implementation of the EGF.

Annex 1: Procedural information

1.Lead DG, Decide Planning/CWP references

This evaluation was carried out by the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (DG EMPL) and included in the Commission’s Agenda Planning System (PLAN/2019/5352). DG EMPL drafted the evaluation roadmap, the stakeholder consultation strategy and the terms of reference (for the contract with external experts), and presented them to the Interservice Steering Group (ISSG) for feedback discussions and approval. DG EMPL also served as the main contact point for the external contractor and ensured the publication of all relevant evaluation documents. In the final phase of the evaluation, it is the responsibility of DG EMPL to:

·draft this staff working document;

·draft the report disseminating the evaluation findings to stakeholders;

·conduct follow-up activities, making sure the findings of the evaluation are taken into consideration for future policy design.

2.Organisation and timing

An ISSG was created in May 2019. The invitation launched on 29 April 2019 was addressed to the following DGs: BUDG, COMP, GROW, TRADE, REGIO, ECFIN, the Secretariat-General and the Legal Service.

The timing of the evaluation was as follows:

27 May 2019 –

24 June 2019

Publication of the roadmap and feedback period

18 July 2019 –

27 August 2019

Two rounds of consultation of ISSG via one meeting and one written procedure

27 September 2019

Request for services for the external study supporting the evaluation

19 December 2019

Signature of the contract for the supporting study with the consortium led by Ramboll Consulting Management

9 January 2020

1st meeting of the ISSG: kick-off meeting for the supporting study

17 February 2020

2nd meeting of the ISSG: draft inception report of the supporting study

17 March 2020

Stakeholder consultation event: EGF Networking Seminar, discussion of planned further consultations

25 June 2020

3rd meeting of the ISSG: draft interim report of the supporting study

10 June 2020 –

16 September 2020

Public consultation

13 November 2020

4th meeting of the ISSG: draft final report of the supporting study

14 January 2021

Revised final report of the study

July 2021

Written consultation on the draft staff working document

3.Exceptions to the better regulation guidelines

N/A

4.Consultation of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (if applicable)

N/A

5.Evidence, sources and quality

The main instruments used were:

An EU-wide public consultation, which was carried out and analysed with the assistance of the external team of experts.

A supporting study carried out by an external team of experts, through contract VC/2019/0815 146 , through DG EMPL Multiple Framework Contract VT/2016-027 for the provision of services related to the implementation of the Better Regulation Guidelines. The supporting study included background reseach and other methods and tools such as desk research, public consultations, case studies, interviews with stakeholders and focus groups (see Annex 2 for more details).

The Interservice Steering Group assessed the quality of the final report of the external contractors to be of very good quality.

The conclusions and findings of the evaluation are considered as robust, within the limitations and the mitigating measures described in Section 4 and Annex 3 to this staff working document.

Annex 2: Stakeholder consultation

According to the Better Regulation Guidelines, part or all of the consultation work can be conducted by an external contractor. After approval by the Commission’s Interservice Steering Group (ISSG), DG EMPL tasked the contractor with conducting the consultations in close cooperation with the Commission departments, to produce reports on each consultation activity and a synopsis report covering all consultation activities. All questionnaires used during the consultations were discussed and approved by the ISSG beforehand. Like all other deliverables, the reports were also subject to scrutiny and approval by the ISSG. The Commission did not conduct any further consultations. The report provided by the external contractor therefore presents a complete picture of the consultation activities. The evaluation study provided by the contractor also draws on the consultation activities. However, when drafting this staff working document, the Commission used the contractors report and the results of other specific consultations 147 to double check the validity of data. All reports on the specific consultations are annexed to the contractor’s report. They contain the results of the activities, including all responses to the online questionnaires, etc.

SYNOPSIS REPORT

1.Overview of consultation strategy 

To ensure that the general public interest of the Union – as opposed to special interests of stakeholder groups – is well reflected in this evaluation, and in the future design and implementation of the EGF, the Commission regards it as a duty to conduct stakeholder consultations and consult the various stakeholders as widely as possible.

The aim of these stakeholder consultations related to the EGF ex post evaluation was to deliver a high quality and credible assessment by allowing interested parties to provide feedback and suggestions on the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, impact and EU added value of the EGF supported actions. This also ensured transparency and accountability.

2.Roadmap

The evaluation roadmap was published on the Commission’s Have your Say 148 portal and made available for public feedback between 27 May 2019 and 24 June 2019. Five contributions (two from Italy and one each from Belgium, Germany and Denmark) were received and the findings were taken into account in the conclusions of this evaluation.

3.Stakeholder categories

The EGF stakeholders at all levels were consulted through a variety of means, ranging from a public consultation to online surveys and targeted interviews. Table 3 below presents an overview of the stakeholders reached through each consultation tool/method.

1)Workers organisations/redundant workers: Workers organisations and workers themselves can be directly affected. The EGFs beneficiaries are redundant workers (the most important stakeholders on an individual basis) and the organisations representing them. Depending on the Member State, some of these organisations might also be involved in implementing EGF measures. The interest of the individual redundant worker is very high, but that person’s influence rather low. The interest of the organisations representing the workers is also very high, but their level of influence depends among other things on the Member State in which they operate and the level of involvement assigned to them in the implementation of EGF measures.

2)NEETs: Under Article 6 of Regulation (EU) No 1309/2013, young people who were ‘not in education, employment, or training are eligible for EGF support under certain circumstances. The interest of NEETs is therefore very high, but their influence as individuals is rather low.

3)Citizens/general public: The general public constitutes the largest stakeholder group. On the one hand, the general public has an interest in how public funds are spent. On the other, even if the general public is not directly affected by EGF measures, they are indirectly affected by any active labour market policy measure. Due to the more indirect relationship and the fact that the EGF is one of many active labour market policy instruments, this group’s interest is often low. The same can be said for its influence, which is also quite low.

4)Industry/business: Even though the EGF does not provide any support to industry or businesses, they would have a general interest because of the EGF's nature as an active labour market policy instrument. However, there might be very high interest among some organisations representing local business in an area affected by mass redundancies that fall under the EGF provisions, and among organisations representing the interest of an industry strongly affected by globalisation or by the previous global financial and economic crisis. Their influence on the EGF measures is, however, usually low.

5)NGOs: NGOs that are not workers organisations and do not represent industries or businesses might still have an interest in the EGF. This group can include special interest organisations with a focus on environmental or gender issues. Their interest would generally be rather low, except regarding the particular causes they represent. Their general influence on the EGF is also rather low.

6)Private-sector bodies and professionals: Private-sector bodies are in most cases involved in implementing EGF measures and so both their interest and influence are high. They may be training bodies, universities, consultancies, advisers and various experts such as medical professionals, psychologists, lawyers, engineers, business and financial advisers, etc.

7)Public authorities: Politicians and national governments have, by definition, a major influence on EGF measures. Each EGF case needs to be approved by the national managing authority, usually a senior civil servant or even a minister, before being submitted to the Commission. The Commission proposal is then presented to the European Parliament and the Council. Due to the limited scope of the EGF, the overall interest of Member State public authorities is not considerable. The national EGF managing authorities, i.e. the contact persons of the EGF, have by definition a very high interest. They also have a high influence, as they are responsible for designing EGF measures in their respective Member States, and are in permanent contact with the Commission. Local authorities in areas affected by EGF cases have a rather high interest in the EGF. Even though they are often involved in implementing EGF measures, they usually do not have a major influence on their design. Their level of influence also varies depending on the Member State.

8)Research: Researchers representing academia or think tanks could have an interest in the EGF and, if they do, their findings might have an influence. These would usually be individual researchers, however, so that it would not make sense to consult researchers as a group.

Table 3. Stakeholder consultation strategy: overview

Stakeholders

Surveys

EU-level targeted interviews

National-/case-level targeted interviews and focus groups 149

Public consultation

EU-level stakeholders

X

EGF contact persons in Member States

X

X

X

EGF beneficiaries

X

X

X

Public authorities: local/regional level

X

X

Industry/businesses

X

X

Workers’ organisations

X

X

Private-sector bodies and professionals

X

X

NGOs

X

Citizens/general public

X

Research

X

X

4.Consultation methods and tools 

4.1.Public consultation

The aim of the public consultation was to ensure transparency in the evaluation process by involving the general public in a way that is complementary to the targeted consultation activities.

The public consultation was open for feedback between 10 June 2020 150 and 16 September 2020. The following dissemination strategies were used to advertise the launch of the public consultation on the EU Survey Portal: publication on DG EMPL’s website 151 , dissemination and reminders through social media accounts 152  and snowballing with the support of EGF contact persons.

The public consultation received 39 responses. Responses came from 17 different countries, of which 15 in Europe. There was an unbalanced geographical distribution, with 7 countries (Malta, Romania, Spain, Germany, Hungary, Italy and Belgium) responsible for around 66% of responses received (see Figure 12 below). Most respondents identified themselves either as representatives of a public authority or as (EU) citizens.

Figure 12. Breakdown of the 39 responses received by Member State

Source: Summary report of the public consultation on the ex post evaluation of the EGF 153

Most members of the public participating in the public consultation were female, employed and in the 35-44 age group. Younger age groups were considerably less represented. The majority of the respondents also indicated that they belonged to a large 154  or medium-sized 155 company at the national or local level.

4.2.Targeted online surveys with EGF beneficiaries and Member States that did not apply for co-financing

Two online surveys were run: one to gain insight into the experiences and impact of the EGF support provided to beneficiaries, and one to understand why certain countries did not apply for co-financing. The first online survey was aimed at EGF beneficiaries (end users), and the second at EGF contact persons in countries that did not apply for EGF funding in the 2014–2020 period.

Key results of the EGF beneficiary survey

The survey specifically aimed to gain a perspective on the experience and impact of the support from those it intends to help (EGF beneficiaries), and to gather views on how the EGF compares to other forms of support for redundant workers (and NEETs).

Some 1 306 completed responses to the survey were received, along with 351 partially completed results (i.e. people who started filling it out but did not get through the whole survey). Based on methodological considerations, 922 responses were considered in our analysis 156 . The responses received are geographically imbalanced, with half of the responses received from Finland, followed by Spain and Germany. No eligible answers were received from Estonia or Sweden despite support from EGF contact persons and reminders sent. This introduced a certain degree of bias, meaning that the results are not necessarily representative of the experience of all beneficiaries across all EGF cases and countries.

The majority of beneficiaries indicated that they had lost their job in 2016 and were in the 45–54 age group when they received help in (re-)entering the job market. Only a small number of respondents were between 15 and 24, hinting at a low representation of NEETs among EGF beneficiaries. The gender distribution was quite imbalanced in favour of male respondents, who made up more than half of the respondents.

Respondents who indicated that they were aware of having benefited from EGF measures were asked to indicate when this support started. The average length of EGF support is around 8 months. The majority benefited from the EGF for 6-12 months, followed by those who benefited for longer than 12 months. A smaller group benefited for 3-6 months or less than 3 months.

4.3.Member State-level interviews and focus groups

The fieldwork involved: (i) semi-structured interviews or focus groups in all Member States with cases; and (ii) case studies in 12 Member States, covering 31 EGF cases. About four interviews were carried out per case, and there were two overarching country-specific interviews.

These interviews targeted EGF managing authorities, case coordinators, delivery partners, social partners and former employers. The interviews and case studies were used as the main source of information to answer the evaluation questions and feed into case study reports.

4.4.EU-level interviews 

The purpose of the EU-level interviews was to add more in-depth qualitative evidence to data already gathered on the design and implementation of the EGF, and fill data gaps emerging from other consultation tools.

Eight semi-structured EU interviews were conducted with European Commission staff (three), (former) Members of the European Parliament (two), a social partner, and Member States (two) that did not apply for EGF support during the 2014–2020 period.

5.Results of consultation activities

5.1.Effectiveness

The EGF had been effective and had achieved its key objectives 157 . The objective of the EGF is clear, and almost all respondents believe it is appropriate. Nevertheless, there was room for improvement in the way the Fund was designed, managed and implemented. Respondents also indicated that there are both barriers and encouraging factors that determine the extent to which Member States apply for EGF support. Overall, Member States still did not use the EGF to its full potential, with several reasons for this identified. Those reasons included: (i) countries might not satisfy the EGF intervention criteria, (the minimum threshold of 500 dismissed workers was too high); (ii) the co-financing rate of EGF is for many countries lower than that available under the ESF; and (iii) there is still lack of awareness of the EGF and the funding possibilities it offers.

Interviewees agreed that the EGF had proven to be a useful tool in supporting dismissed workers. Most respondents also indicated that the EGF was more effective than national policies in supporting redundant workers. Additionally, EGF measures increasingly took into account the socio-economic context in which dismissed workers lived, therefore addressing their needs in a holistic way.

Furthermore, it appeared that the EGF results in high re-employment rates. On average, around 60% of dismissed workers were said to be re-employed after receiving EGF support, which indeed is reflected in the data. According to one interviewee, these rates appear higher than those achieved by the ESF. EGF measures also usually result in the creation of a social network around the dismissed workers, which is an unintended yet positive effect of the Fund.

Ultimately, Member States are responsible for ensuring that the short-term emergency relief provided by the EGF turns into sustainable, long-term effects. However, progress on case-specific objectives was said to be poorly monitored by Member States. This was because there was no structured process to follow up on EGF effects. Member States were only obliged to report on the number of people initially targeted and those who received EGF support.

Furthermore, because of the time lag between the application and the implementation period, the EGF might have failed to target all people who would in principle need support. At the same time, the time lag between implementation and application also ensured that only the people that would not find re-employment or training without the EGF were targeted by it.

Finally, the decision-making process at the EU level to finance/implement a case was considered lengthy. At the same time, it was also highlighted that the quality of applications received affected the length of the decision-making process – a well-written application fully meeting all the criteria would be processed faster than a poorly written one. It appeared that Member States had developed and improved their understanding of EGF over time, resulting in better applications and better implementation of cases.

5.2.Efficiency 

The Fund has been efficient in the use of resources. In fact, most respondents believed that the same results could not have been achieved with fewer resources. The majority of stakeholders also indicated that the same results could probably not have been achieved in a shorter period of time. Member States often overestimate costs, and hence returned unused funds. This suggests that the EGF funding was adequate to cover the expenses incurred by Member States.

The decision-making process is considered to be lengthy and would benefit from simplification. Linking the need for EGF funds to the impacts of globalisation had proven particularly challenging for applicant Member States. This resulted in some applications going through several iterations, which would need to be revised on multiple occasions by the different stakeholders involved. In turn, this resulted in efficiency losses in terms of time spent and staff involved in the application process.

However, a few stakeholders believed that the application process and requirements were not excessively complicated, although it involved a learning process on the part of the applicant authorities. Once the learning process was complete, subsequent applications would require fewer resources, both in terms of staff and financial resources. In fact, it appears that the Fund’s efficiency and how it is managed at EU level greatly improved over time.

5.3.Relevance

Among the 15 respondents who were aware of the EGF, the results concerning relevance were mixed. Most respondents indicated that the scope of the EGF is no longer entirely appropriate and useful, and that it should be made more flexible and broadened to consider emerging needs.

There is no unanimity as to whether the EGF intervention criteria are still relevant and useful – respondents were almost equally split on this aspect. Those who do not regard the criteria as still relevant specified that the threshold of 500 redundancies is no longer realistic, and that lowering it to 250 would result in increased use of the Fund.

However, not all stakeholders agreed that NEETs should be targeted by the EGF. Two main reasons were provided to justify this statement:

·The EGF was not seen as the most appropriate fund for NEETs. Other instruments – primarily the YEI are more specialised to provide tailored support.

·NEETs as a target group are very different from workers made redundant. Therefore, the connection between support to dismissed workers and NEETs is somewhat artificial and not justified.

Most stakeholders believed that the EGF intervention criteria would benefit from revision: further lowering the threshold of dismissed workers and lowering the dismissal period within which workers are eligible for EGF support would make the EGF more accessible to smaller countries. This in turn would make it more flexible to adapt to diverse needs. The other stakeholders believed the EGF was sufficiently flexible as it was mobilised based on needs.

5.4.Coherence

Most interviewees identified strong complementarity between the EGF and the European Social Fund, and also between the EGF and other support measures available at national level. The EGF and ESF allowed for the implementation of largely comparable measures. The EGF is a tailored, specific fund to target the needs of a very narrow group. This is not the case for the ESF, which is broader in its objectives and the people it targets.

Views on the EGF’s coherence with other EU policies were limited and could not be generalised.

5.5.EU added value 

All interviewed stakeholders at EU level thought the EGF had added value compared to what could have been achieved by the Member States themselves. Three key findings on the EGF’s added value emerged:

·The EGF was seen as a complementary resource to national measures. In the absence of the EGF, some Member States would have had very limited/no resources to address the needs of dismissed workers.

·The EGF provided rapid relief for emergency circumstances.

·The EGF demonstrated EU solidarity towards dismissed workers.

The EGF has also favoured a learning process and provided lessons that have been applied in other circumstances or improved implementation processes at national level.

Annex 3: Methods and analytical models

In 2019, in line with the Better Regulation Guidelines, the Commission published the roadmap 158  for this evaluation and organised a four-week online consultation. At the end of 2019, the Commission contracted out the supporting study 159 for the evaluation. The evaluation questions included in this study derived from the Better Regulation evaluation criteria were broken down into a number of sub-questions and agreed with the Interservice Steering Group 160 . The Commission’s stakeholder consultation strategy for this evaluation was also agreed with the ISSG and run by the external experts.

In line with the EGF Regulation, this evaluation is largely based on the supporting study carried out by external experts. The approach it took was as follows:

·collect and analyse the relevant evidence;

·provide answers to all evaluation questions;

·present evidence-based conclusions.

The evaluation was based on the overarching evaluation questions for each criterion; each overarching question was further detailed in sub-questions, as presented in Table 4 below. The evaluation work and the supporting study were structured around the conclusions reached on each of the questions.

The Commission based this evaluation mainly on the results of the supporting study and complemented it, where appropriate, with additional evidence from previous reports, evaluations and general experience in the management of the EGF.

Methodology and data sources

The supporting study is based on a complex methodology aimed at collecting robust evidence and providing well-informed answers to the evaluation questions. The main methods and data sources were mentioned in Chapter 4 of this staff working document. These methods and data sources are described in more detail below.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE METHODOLOGY AND DATA

The various sources mentioned above were triangulated and, where the evidence was insufficient or inconclusive, the sources were combined: these were data-based, documentary and perception-based sources, as well as quantitative and qualitative techniques, depending on the nature of the evaluation question and the strengths of the relevant data and approaches.

The main weaknesses and challenges mentioned in Chapter 4 of this staff working document are:

·Timing of the ex post evaluation. The figures in the supporting study are based on the situation at the end of November 2020, when it was sent to the Commission. The 2020 applications could not be evaluated and included in the study 161 because their results will only be available in 2023 (24 months for implementation). For earlier cases, there may be small differences in figures as the data were extracted from the electronic data exchange platform (SFC2014) at different times, while data may be corrected during the examination and acceptance of the final report.

·Limited suitable comparators for data from 20072013 remained an issue. A comparison with data from the 20072013 period is of limited use 162 because of several changes in the EGF’s design 163  (see Table 6 below) and the evolving economic context. This evaluation partially overcome this issue by using a new method of comparison through a counterfactual impact evaluation for two EGF cases from 20142020.

·The relatively small number of EGF applications received during the period covered by the evaluation (49 cases from 27 economic sectors) made it impossible to conduct sectoral analyses. To overcome this, based on the internal Commission EGF Database, overview tables on case profile data sorted by country and by sector were created; these can be found in Annex 4 164 . 

·The basic reporting requirements requested by the EGF Regulation 165 . In their final report, Member States have to state the type of action and main outcomes, the characteristics 166 of the targeted beneficiaries and their employment status. Data on beneficiaries are broken down by gender and by age groups. There are no common indicators to measure outputs and results. Similarly, no targets are set at the time of the application. Therefore performance cannot be assessed against planned outcomes. Overall, the available data are limited and do not allow for further statistical analyses of the categories of beneficiaries, or a further breakdown of beneficiaries based on type of dismissing enterprise 167 . This issue was already identified by the European Court of Auditors during the audit of the 2007–2013 EGF 168 , in the course of the mid-term and ex post evaluations of the 2007–2013 EGF 169 and in the mid-term evaluation of the 2014–2020 EGF 170 .

·The significant differences across cases, Member States and economic sectors made it difficult to formulate reliable conclusions on the EGF’s cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness.

·Reaching EGF beneficiaries was difficult, despite all efforts by the external evaluators, the Commission and the national EGF contact persons. Beneficiaries could not be reached in all Member States; reasons for this included General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 171 constraints, or because a long time had elapsed since beneficiaries participated in EGF measures.

·Difficulty identifying whether survey respondents actually participated in EGF measures. It is possible that persons who responded to the survey did not actually receive EGF support, or that they did but were not aware that the support provided was co-financed by the EGF.

·Public consultation alone cannot be considered as representative, so some mitigation measures have been applied, notably triangulation with other data sources.

·Counterfactual impact evaluation: this was a new method used for two EGF cases, one from the Netherlands and one from Ireland. Although the results were inconclusive because of data limitations, they provided relevant information about the effect of a single EGF intervention but not about the EGF as such.

·The COVID-19 pandemic caused considerable delays in data collection as travel was banned and the case studies had to be carried out via other electronic means. It also had an impact on the implementation of measures in one EGF case and very likely also on its longer-term results.

To overcome these limitations the study has collected data from a variation of data sources such as surveys, in-depth interviews and a public consultation. These data sources provided opinions and perceptions of different stakeholders, which in some instances may be the only available source of evidence.

Under the Better Regulation Guidelines, the public consultation is an important tool for collecting stakeholder input and views on EU policy initiatives. It cannot provide a fully representative view of EU public opinion, but it does offer a channel for those who care about a given issue to voice their opinion. A clear distinction was made between respondents who were well-informed about the EGF and others. Although a limited number of responses were received, the analysis of the responses was fed into the findings of the evaluation and triangulated with other sources of evidence.

The reliability and validity of the results presented in this study were ensured by triangulation, using various methods combining qualitative and quantitative data collection and analytical methods.

In conclusion, while acknowledging that there are some data gaps and methodical limitations, the evaluation presents well-informed, evidence-based and reliable answers to the evaluation questions (see Table 4 below).

Table 4. Evaluation questions and sub-questions

Questions and sub-questions

Section in staff working document

Data and info sources

Effectiveness (EQ1): The aim of the EGF is to demonstrate solidarity towards workers made redundant and to ensure for each EGF case that the largest possible number of beneficiaries find sustainable employment as soon as possible.

As an instrument, how effective was the EGF in achieving these aims?

At the level of cases, how effective was the EGF in achieving these aims?

1.1: To what extent is the support provided by the EGF used by Member States?

5.1.c

·Literature and data review

·Online survey of EGF contact persons in Member States which did not apply for EGF funding

·Targeted interviews

·Public consultation

1.2: To what extent is the support provided by the EGF used by beneficiaries?

5.1.c

·Literature and data review

·Targeted interviews

·Public consultation

1.3: To what extent was the co-financing rate appropriate?

5.1.c

·Literature and data review

·Online survey of EGF contact persons in Member States which did not apply for EGF funding

·Targeted interviews

1.4: To what extent have Member States offered EGF support to all eligible beneficiaries?

5.1.b

·Literature and data review

·Targeted interviews / online focus groups

·Online survey of beneficiaries – profiling questions

1.5: At case level, did the support offered and the way it is being offered correspond to the needs of the beneficiaries and their specific profiles?

5.1.b

·Literature and data review

·Targeted interviews / online focus groups

·Online survey of EGF contact persons in Member States which did not apply for EGF funding

·Online survey of beneficiaries

·Public consultation

1.6: What were the factors that helped or hindered the achievement of EGF cases’ objectives?

5.1.e

·Literature and data review

·Targeted interviews

1.7: At the level of cases, to what extent have the challenges identified been tackled?

5.1.e

·Literature and data review

·Targeted interviews

1.8: To what extent were case-specific objectives/aims established?

5.1.d

·Literature and data review

·Targeted interviews

1.9: To what extent were case-specific objectives monitored?

5.1.d

·Literature and data review

·Targeted interviews

1.10: Were the national monitoring systems timely and effective?

5.1.d

·Literature and data review

·Targeted interviews

1.11: How reliable was the data collected and was it sufficient?

5.1.d

·Literature and data review

·Targeted interviews

·Counterfactual impact evaluation

1.12: To what extent have Member States made use of the possibility of the EGF support to NEETs?

5.1.c

·Literature and data review

·Targeted interviews

1.13: At instrument level, did EU or national procedures in place ensure a swift and resource saving decision-making process and thus a quick implementation?

5.1.e

·Literature and data review

·Targeted interviews

·Online survey of EGF contact persons in Member States which did not apply for EGF funding

1.14: How effective was the EGF support for beneficiaries?

5.1.a

·Literature and data review

·Targeted interviews / online focus groups

·Online survey of beneficiaries

·Public consultation

1.15: How and to what extent has the EGF support had a short-term and medium-term impact on individual participants?

5.1.a

·Literature and data review

·Targeted interviews / online focus groups

·Online survey of beneficiaries

1.16: Were there any unexpected or unintended effects linked to the implementation of EGF measures?

5.1.a

·Targeted interviews / online focus groups

·Online survey of beneficiaries

1.17: How do the impacts observed compare with those achieved by:
(a) individuals who did not receive EGF support (the control group when available);

(b) similar re-employment projects at national or regional level?

5.1.a

·Literature and data review

·Targeted interviews / online focus groups

·Online survey of beneficiaries

·Counterfactual impact evaluation

1.18: To the extent of available evidence, what are the long-term effects generated by the EGF cases?

5.1.a

·Targeted interviews / online focus groups

·Online survey of beneficiaries

·Public consultation

1.19: What lessons have been drawn or could be drawn from EGF implementation, both by the Commission as well as by national, regional and local authorities?

5.1.h

·Targeted interviews

·Public consultation

1.20. To what extent have social partners contributed to the design and provision of coherent support packages?

5.1.f

·Targeted interviews / online focus groups

1.21. To what extent have companies contributed to the design and provision of coherent support packages?

5.1.f

·Targeted interviews / online focus groups

1.22. To what extent have Member States incentivised local companies to employ dismissed workers?

n/a

·Targeted interviews / online focus groups

1.23: What was the overall impact of EGF? (based on results of previous questions)

·Instrument level

·Case level

5.1.i

·Literature and data review

·Targeted interviews / online focus groups

·Online survey of beneficiaries

·Public consultation

1.24: To what extent have the information and communication activities of

·the Commission

·Member States

proven useful and reached the dismissed workers and EU citizens?

5.1.g

·Literature and data review

·Targeted interviews / online focus groups

·Online survey of beneficiaries

Efficiency (EQ2): To what extent were the results of the EGF per beneficiary cost-efficient? Are there significant differences in EGF cost-efficiency between and within Member States and per economic sector defined at NACE Revision 2 division level? If so, what is causing them? And how do these differences relate to the EGF support as a whole?

2.1: To what extent were the results of the EGF per beneficiary cost-efficient?

5.2.a

·Literature and data review

·Targeted interviews

·Public consultation

2.2: At case level, to what extent could the same results have been achieved with fewer resources and/or in a shorter period of time?

5.2.a

·Literature and data review

·Targeted interviews

2.3: At case level, to what extent are the costs incurred justified, given the benefits which have been achieved?

5.2.a

·Literature and data review

·Targeted interviews

2.4: What is the overall and case-by-case absorption rate of the funding support from the EGF to Member States?

5.2.a

·Literature and data review

2.5: At instrument level, to what extent were the procedures related to the application and allocation of EGF funding efficient?

5.2.b

·Literature and data review

·Online survey of EGF contact persons in Member States which did not apply for EGF funding

·Targeted interviews

Coherence (EQ3): How coherent is the EGF intervention with other European Union programmes and national instruments?

3.1: How coherent is the EGF intervention with other European Union programmes?

5.3.a

·Literature and data review

3.2: How coherent is the EGF intervention with other national instruments?

5.3.b

·Literature and data review

3.3: At instrument and case level, to what extent have Member States ensured the complementarity of EGF support with other European Union instruments, such as the European Social Fund, the Youth Employment Initiative, or national instruments in Member States?

5.3.a

·Online survey of EGF contact persons in Member States which did not apply for EGF funding

·Targeted interviews

·Public consultation

3.4: If applicable, are there any lessons learned for ensuring complementarity?

5.3.b

·Targeted interviews

3.5: At case level, to what extent have there been overlaps between EGF support and other interventions in the Member States?

5.3.a

·Literature and data review

·Online survey of EGF contact persons in Member States which did not apply for EGF funding

·Targeted interviews

·Public consultation

3.6: At case level, to what extent have there been synergies between EGF support and other interventions in the Member States?

5.3.a

·Literature and data review

·Targeted interviews

·Public consultation

Relevance (EQ4): How relevant is the EGF?

4.1: To what extent was the scope of the EGF as defined in Regulation (EU) No 1309/2013 appropriate and useful for its aims?

5.4.a

·Literature and data review

·Targeted interviews

·Public consultation

·Online survey of EGF contact persons in Member States which did not apply for EGF funding

4.2: To what extent were the intervention criteria of the EGF as defined in Regulation (EU) No 1309/2013 appropriate and useful for its aims?

5.4.b

·Literature and data review

·Targeted interviews

·Public consultation

·Online survey of EGF contact persons in Member States which did not apply for EGF funding

4.3: To what extent did the EGF support to NEETs reflect the needs of Member States?

5.4.c

·Targeted interviews / online focus groups

·Public consultation

EU added value (EQ5): What is the EU added value of the EGF intervention? 

5.1: At case level, what is the EU added value of the EGF intervention?

5.5

·Literature and data review

·Targeted interviews / online focus groups

·Online survey of beneficiaries

·Public consultation

5.2: At instrument level, what is the EU added value of the EGF intervention?

5.5

·Literature and data review

·Targeted interviews / online focus groups

·Online survey of beneficiaries

·Public consultation

5.3: To what extent does the aid offered by the EGF replace or complement measures or allowances which the Member State would provide in the absence of EGF funding?

5.5

·Literature and data review

·Targeted interviews

·Public consultation

5.4: Were there any cross-region and/or cross-border effects of the EGF cases implemented?

5.5

·Literature and data review

·Targeted interviews / online focus groups

·Online survey of beneficiaries

5.5: At case level, what has been the EU added value of EGF measures targeted at NEETs?

5.5

·Literature and data review

·Targeted interviews / online focus groups

·Online survey of beneficiaries

·Counterfactual impact evaluation

Annex 4: Case profile data by Member State and by sector

Under Article 20(3) of the EGF Regulation, evaluations must include the figures showing the number of applications and cover the performance of the EGF by country and by sector, to assess whether the EGF is reaching its targeted recipients. The tables in this annex provide an overview of the 2014–2020 EGF cases. There are 54 cases in total, of which the results are available for 46 cases. Due to the small number of cases, profound analyses per Member State or per industrial sector were not possible.

The most important general data on cases covered by this evaluation are given below.

For completeness of the exercise and for information purposes, we present overview tables on cases, sorted by Member State and subsequently per sector. The final table in this annex presents workers targeted in EGF cases, including the breakdown by gender and age of targeted workers.

The figure below offers a comparison between the number of NEETs targeted by the respective cases offering support to NEETs, and the actual number of NEETs supported.

Figure 13. NEETs targeted compared to NEETs reached 172

Source: Ramboll Management Consulting, SEOR (2020), p.36

Table 5. General overview of the 54 applications received between January 2014 and 31 December 2020 (without withdrawn 173 and rejected 174 cases) 

Case ref. 

Case name

Member State  

Sector (NACE)

Intervention criterion

Globalisation / crisis

EGF amount requested   (€)

EGF amount spent (€)

Workers targeted

Workers helped

Average EGF amount spent per worker

EGF/2014/001

Nutriart

EL

Bakery products

a

Crisis

6 096 000

1 536 355

508

249

6 170

EGF/2014/002

Gelderland and Overijssel

NL

Construction of buildings

b

Crisis

1 625 781

1 167 559

475

467

2 500

EGF/2014/003

Aragon

ES

Food and beverage services

b

Crisis

960 000

804 140

280

274

2 935

EGF/2014/004

Comunidad Valenciana metal

ES

Manufacture of fabricated metal products

b

Crisis

1 019 184

321 877

300

174

1 850

EGF/2014/005

GAD

FR

Slaughterhouse

a

Crisis

918 000

442 749

760

559

792

EGF/2014/006

PSA

FR

Automotive

a

Globalisation

12 704 605

12 464 172

2 357

2 357

5 288

EGF/2014/007

Andersen Ireland

IE

Jewellery

c (Exceptional Circumstances)

Globalisation

1 501 200

1 089 699

138

138

7 896

EGF/2014/008

STX Rauma

FI

Building of ships and boats

a

Globalisation

1 426 800

1 311 961

565

589

2 227

EGF/2014/009

Sprider Stores

EL

Retail trade

a

Crisis

7 290 900

2 482 743

761

517

4 802

EGF/2014/010

Whirlpool

IT

Domestic appliances

a

Crisis

1 890 000

1 572 723

608

608

2 587

EGF/2014/011

Caterpillar

BE

Manufacture of machinery and equipment

a

Globalisation

1 222 854

829 415

630

501

1 656

EGF/2014/012

ArcelorMittal

BE

Manufacture of basic metals

a

Globalisation

1 591 486

1 443 884

910

780

1 851

EGF/2014/013

Odyssefs Fokas

EL

Retail trade

a

Crisis

6 444 000

2 293 466

600

379

6 051

EGF/2014/014

Aleo Solar

DE

Solar modules

a

Globalisation

1 094 760

533 480

476

408

1 308

EGF/2014/015

Attica Publishing Services

EL

Publishing

b

Crisis

3 746 700

816 310

705

205

3 982

EGF/2014/016

Lufthansa Technik

IE

Repair and maintenance of aircraft and spacecraft

c (Exceptional Circumstances)

Globalisation

2 490 758

1 790 014

250

253

7 075

EGF/2014/017

Mory-Ducros

FR

Land transport

a

Crisis

6 052 200

4 393 239

2 513

2 513

1 748

EGF/2014/018

Attica Broadcasting

EL

Broadcasting

b

Crisis

5 046 000

1 214 929

928

349

3 481

EGF/2015/001

Broadcom

FI

Wholesale trade

a

Globalisation

1 365 000

876 467

500

374

2 343

EGF/2015/002

Adam Opel

DE

Automotive

a

Crisis

6 958 623

3 811 240

2 692

2 621

1 454

EGF/2015/003

Ford Genk

BE

Automotive

a

Globalisation

6 268 564

4 753 175

4 500

4 500

1 056

EGF/2015/004

Alitalia

IT

Air transport

a

Globalisation

1 414 848

23 436

184

184

127

EGF/2015/005

Computer programming

FI

Computer programming

b

Globalisation

2 623 200

2 008 001

1 200

1 356

1 481

EGF/2015/006

PWA International

IE

Repair and maintenance of aircraft and spacecraft

c (Exceptional Circumstances)

Globalisation

442 293

442 293

108

86

5 143

EGF/2015/007

Hainaut-Namur Glass

BE

Manufacture of glass

b

Globalisation

1 095 544

814 869

412

342

2 383

EGF/2015/009

Volvo Trucks

SE

Automotive

a

Globalisation

1 793 710

1 120 124

500

450

2 489

EGF/2015/010

MoryGlobal

FR

Land transport

a

Crisis

5 146 800

409 3159

2 132

2 132

1 920

EGF/2015/011

Supermarket Larissa

EL

Retail trade

a

Crisis

6 468 000

2 045 939

557

497

4 117

EGF/2015/012

Hainaut Machinery

BE

Manufacture of machinery and equipment

b

Globalisation

1 824 041

726 183

488

355

2 046

EGF/2016/001

Microsoft

FI

Computer programming

a

Globalisation

5 364 000

4 559 861

1 441

1 629

2 799

EGF/2016/002

Ericsson

SE

Computers, electronic and optical products

a

Globalisation

3 957 918

933 939

918

224

4 169

EGF/2016/003

petroleum and chemicals

EE

Chemicals

c (Exceptional Circumstances)

Globalisation

1 131 358

821 523

800

492

1 670

EGF/2016/004

Comunidad Valenciana Automotive

ES

Automotive

c (Exceptional Circumstances)

Globalisation

856 800

173 161

250

134

1 292

EGF/2016/005

Drenthe Overijssel Retail

NL

Retail trade

b

Crisis

1 818 750

853 871

800

754

1 132

EGF/2016/008

Nokia Network Systems

FI

Computers, electronic and optical products

a

Globalisation

2 641 800

2 641 800

821

777

3 400

EGF/2017/001

Castilla y León mining of coal

ES

Mining of coal and lignite

c (Labour market)

Globalisation

1 002 264

631 186

339

198

3 188

EGF/2017/002

Microsoft

FI

Computer programming

a

Globalisation

3 520 080

2 937 160

1 000

883

3 326

EGF/2017/003

Attica retail

EL

Retail trade

c (Exceptional Circumstances)

Crisis

2 949 150

602 708

725

217

2 777

EGF/2017/004

Almaviva

IT

Call centre

a

Crisis

3 347 370

812 669

1 610

1 423

571

EGF/2017/005

Retail

FI

Retail trade

b

Globalisation

2 499 360

1 581 287

1 500

1 467

1 078

EGF/2017/006

Galicia wearing apparel

ES

Apparel

c (Exceptional Circumstances)

Globalisation

720 000

306 818

303

146

2 101

EGF/2017/007

Ericsson

SE

Computers, electronic and optical products

a

Globalisation

2 130 400

290 092

900

80

3 626

EGF/2017/008

Goodyear

DE

Rubber and plastic products

a

Globalisation

2 165 231

1 171 002

646

622

1 883

EGF/2017/009

Air France

FR

Air transport

a

Globalisation

9 894 483

9 846 483

1 858

1 858

5 300

EGF/2017/010

Caterpillar

BE

Manufacture of machinery and equipment

a

Globalisation

4 621 616

4 068 634

2 285

1 772

2 296

EGF/2018/001

Financial service activities

NL

Financial service activities

b

Crisis

1 192 500

486 410

450

179

2 717

EGF/2018/002

Norte Centro Lisboa wearing apparel

PT

Apparel

b

Globalisation

4 655 883

N/A

730

N/A

N/A

EGF/2018/003

Attica Publishing Activities

EL

Publishing

b

Crisis

2 308 500

N/A

550

N/A

N/A

EGF/2020/001

Galicia shipbuilding ancillary sectors

ES

Building of ships and boats

c (Exceptional Circumstances)

Globalisation

2 054 400

N/A

500

N/A

N/A

EGF/2020/002

Estonia Tourism

EE

Tourism

c (Exceptional Circumstances)

Crisis

4 474 480

N/A

5 060

N/A

N/A

EGF/2020/003

GMH Guss

DE

Manufacture of basic metals

a

Globalisation

1 081 706

N/A

476

N/A

N/A

EGF/2020/004

KLM

NL

Air transport

a

Crisis

5 019 218

N/A

1 201

N/A

N/A

EGF/2020/005

Swissport

BE

Warehousing, support activities for transportation, Services to buildings & landscape activities

a

Crisis

3 719 224

N/A

1 468

N/A

N/A

EGF/2020/007

Finnair

FI

Air transport

a

Crisis

1 752 360

N/A

500

N/A

N/A

Totals 2014-2020

173 400 703

89 942 205

54 168

37 072

2 426

Source: EGF Database

Table 6. EGF applications sorted by Member States (without withdrawn or rejected applications)

Member State  

Case ref. 

Case name

Sector (NACE)

Intervention criterion

Globalisation / crisis

EGF amount requested   (€)

EGF amount spent (€)

Workers targeted

Workers helped

Average EGF amount spent per worker

BE

EGF/2014/011

Caterpillar

Manufacture of machinery and equipment

a

Globalisation

1 222 854

829 415

630

501

1 656

BE

EGF/2014/012

ArcelorMittal

Manufacture of basic metals

a

Globalisation

1 591 486

1 443 884

910

780

1 851

BE

EGF/2015/003

Ford Genk

Automotive

a

Globalisation

6 268 564

4 753 175

4 500

4 500

1 056

BE

EGF/2015/007

Hainaut-Namur Glass

Manufacture of glass

b

Globalisation

1 095 544

814 869

412

342

2 383

BE

EGF/2015/012

Hainaut Machinery

Manufacture of machinery and equipment

b

Globalisation

1 824 041

726 183

488

355

2 046

BE

EGF/2017/010

Caterpillar

Manufacture of machinery and equipment

a

Globalisation

4 621 616

4 068 634

2 285

1 772

2 296

BE

EGF/2020/005

Swissport

Warehousing, support activities for transportation, Services to buildings & landscape activities

a

Crisis

3 719 224

N/A

1 468

N/A

N/A

DE

EGF/2014/014

Aleo Solar

Solar modules

a

Globalisation

1 094 760

533 480

476

408

1 308

DE

EGF/2015/002

Adam Opel

Automotive

a

Crisis

6 958 623

3 811 240

2 692

2 621

1 454

DE

EGF/2017/008

Goodyear

Rubber and plastic products

a

Globalisation

2 165 231

1 171 002

646

622

1 883

DE

EGF/2020/003

GMH Guss

Manufacture of basic metals

a

Globalisation

1 081 706

N/A

476

N/A

N/A

EE

EGF/2016/003

petroleum and chemicals

Chemicals

c (Exceptional Circumstances)

Globalisation

1 131 358

821 523

800

492

1 670

EE

EGF/2020/002

Estonia Tourism

Tourism

c (Exceptional Circumstances)

Crisis

4 474 480

N/A

5 060

N/A

N/A

EL

EGF/2014/001

Nutriart

Bakery products

a

Crisis

6 096 000

1 536 355

508

249

6 170

EL

EGF/2014/009

Sprider Stores

Retail trade

a

Crisis

7 290 900

2 482 743

761

517

4 802

EL

EGF/2014/013

Odyssefs Fokas

Retail trade

a

Crisis

6 444 000

2 293 466

600

379

6 051

EL

EGF/2014/015

Attica Publishing Services

Publishing

b

Crisis

3 746 700

816 310

705

205

3 982

EL

EGF/2014/018

Attica Broadcasting

Broadcasting

b

Crisis

5 046 000

1 214 929

928

349

3 481

EL

EGF/2015/011

Supermarket Larissa

Retail trade

a

Crisis

6 468 000

2 045 939

557

497

4 117

EL

EGF/2017/003

Attica retail

Retail trade

c (Exceptional Circumstances)

Crisis

2 949 150

602 708

725

217

2 777

EL

EGF/2018/003

Attica Publishing Activities

Publishing

b

Crisis

2 308 500

N/A

550

N/A

N/A

ES

EGF/2014/003

Aragon

Food and beverage services

b

Crisis

960 000

804 140

280

274

2 935

ES

EGF/2014/004

Comunidad Valenciana metal

Manufacture of fabricated metal products

b

Crisis

1 019 184

321 877

300

174

1 850

ES

EGF/2016/004

Comunidad Valenciana Automotive

Automotive

c (Exceptional Circumstances)

Globalisation

856 800

173 161

250

134

1 292

ES

EGF/2017/001

Castilla y León mining of coal

Mining of coal and lignite

c (Labour market)

Globalisation

1 002 264

631 186

339

198

3 188

ES

EGF/2017/006

Galicia wearing apparel

Apparel

c (Exceptional Circumstances)

Globalisation

720 000

306 818

303

146

2 101

ES

EGF/2020/001

Galicia shipbuilding ancillary sectors

Building of ships and boats

c (Exceptional Circumstances)

Globalisation

2 054 400

N/A

500

N/A

N/A

FI

EGF/2014/008

STX Rauma

Building of ships and boats

a

Globalisation

1 426 800

1 311 961

565

589

2 227

FI

EGF/2015/001

Broadcom

Wholesale trade

a

Globalisation

1 365 000

876 467

500

374

2 343

FI

EGF/2015/005

Computer programming

Computer programming

b

Globalisation

2 623 200

2 008 001

1 200

1 356

1 481

FI

EGF/2016/001

Microsoft

Computer programming

a

Globalisation

5 364 000

4 559 861

1 441

1 629

2 799

FI

EGF/2016/008

Nokia Network Systems

Computers, electronic and optical products

a

Globalisation

2 641 800

2 641 800

821

777

3 400

FI

EGF/2017/002

Microsoft

Computer programming

a

Globalisation

3 520 080

2 937 160

1 000

883

3 326

FI

EGF/2017/005

Retail

Retail trade

b

Globalisation

2 499 360

1 581 287

1 500

1 467

1 078

FI

EGF/2020/007

Finnair

Air transport

a

Crisis

1 752 360

N/A

500

N/A

N/A

FR

EGF/2014/005

GAD

Slaughterhouse

a

Crisis

918 000

442 749

760

559

792

FR

EGF/2014/006

PSA

Automotive

a

Globalisation

12 704 605

12 464 172

2 357

2 357

5 288

FR

EGF/2014/017

Mory-Ducros

Land transport

a

Crisis

6 052 200

4 393 239

2 513

2 513

1 748

FR

EGF/2015/010

MoryGlobal

Land transport

a

Crisis

5 146 800

409 3159

2 132

2 132

1 920

FR

EGF/2017/009

Air France

Air transport

a

Globalisation

9 894 483

9 846 483

1 858

1 858

5 300

IE

EGF/2014/007

Andersen Ireland

Jewellery

c (Exceptional Circumstances)

Globalisation

1 501 200

1 089 699

138

138

7 896

IE

EGF/2014/016

Lufthansa Technik

Repair and maintenance of aircraft and spacecraft

c (Exceptional Circumstances)

Globalisation

2 490 758

1 790 014

250

253

7 075

IE

EGF/2015/006

PWA International

Repair and maintenance of aircraft and spacecraft

c (Exceptional Circumstances)

Globalisation

442 293

442 293

108

86

5 143

IT

EGF/2014/010

Whirlpool

Domestic appliances

a

Crisis

1 890 000

1 572 723

608

608

2 587

IT

EGF/2015/004

Alitalia

Air transport

a

Globalisation

1 414 848

23 436

184

184

127

IT

EGF/2017/004

Almaviva

Call centre

a

Crisis

3 347 370

812 669

1 610

1 423

571

NL

EGF/2014/002

Gelderland and Overijssel

Construction of buildings

b

Crisis

1 625 781

1 167 559

475

467

2 500

NL

EGF/2016/005

Drenthe Overijssel Retail

Retail trade

b

Crisis

1 818 750

853 871

800

754

1 132

NL

EGF/2018/001

Financial service activities

Financial service activities

b

Crisis

1 192 500

486 410

450

179

2 717

NL

EGF/2020/004

KLM

Air transport

a

Crisis

5 019 218

N/A

1 201

N/A

N/A

PT

EGF/2018/002

Norte Centro Lisboa wearing apparel

Apparel

b

Globalisation

4 655 883

N/A

730

N/A

N/A

SE

EGF/2015/009

Volvo Trucks

Automotive

a

Globalisation

1 793 710

1 120 124

500

450

2 489

SE

EGF/2016/002

Ericsson

Computers, electronic and optical products

a

Globalisation

3 957 918

933 939

918

224

4 169

SE

EGF/2017/007

Ericsson

Computers, electronic and optical products

a

Globalisation

2 130 400

290 092

900

80

3 626

Source: EGF Database



Table 7. EGF applications sorted by sector (without withdrawn or rejected applications)

Sector (NACE)

Case ref. 

Case name

Member State  

Intervention criterion

Globalisation /crisis

EGF amount requested   (€)

EGF amount spent (€)

Workers targeted

Workers helped

Average EGF amount spent per worker

Air transport

EGF/2020/007

Finnair

FI

a

Crisis

1 752 360

N/A

500

N/A

N/A

Air transport

EGF/2017/009

Air France

FR

a

Globalisation

9 894 483

9 846 483

1 858

1 858

5 300

Air transport

EGF/2015/004

Alitalia

IT

a

Globalisation

1 414 848

23 436

184

184

127

Air transport

EGF/2020/004

KLM

NL

a

Crisis

5 019 218

N/A

1 201

N/A

N/A

Apparel

EGF/2017/006

Galicia wearing apparel

ES

c (Exceptional Circumstances)

Globalisation

720 000

306 818

303

146

2 101

Apparel

EGF/2018/002

Norte Centro Lisboa wearing apparel

PT

b

Globalisation

4 655 883

N/A

730

N/A

N/A

Automotive

EGF/2015/003

Ford Genk

BE

a

Globalisation

6 268 564

4 753 175

4 500

4 500

1 056

Automotive

EGF/2015/002

Adam Opel

DE

a

Crisis

6 958 623

3 811 240

2 692

2 621

1 454

Automotive

EGF/2016/004

Comunidad Valenciana Automotive

ES

c (Exceptional Circumstances)

Globalisation

856 800

173 161

250

134

1 292

Automotive

EGF/2014/006

PSA

FR

a

Globalisation

12 704 605

12 464 172

2 357

2 357

5 288

Automotive

EGF/2015/009

Volvo Trucks

SE

a

Globalisation

1 793 710

1 120 124

500

450

2 489

Bakery products

EGF/2014/001

Nutriart

EL

a

Crisis

6 096 000

1 536 355

508

249

6 170

Broadcasting

EGF/2014/018

Attica Broadcasting

EL

b

Crisis

5 046 000

1 214 929

928

349

3 481

Building of ships and boats

EGF/2020/001

Galicia shipbuilding ancillary sectors

ES

c (Exceptional Circumstances)

Globalisation

2 054 400

N/A

500

N/A

N/A

Building of ships and boats

EGF/2014/008

STX Rauma

FI

a

Globalisation

1 426 800

1 311 961

565

589

2 227

Call centre

EGF/2017/004

Almaviva

IT

a

Crisis

3 347 370

812 669

1 610

1 423

571

Chemicals

EGF/2016/003

petroleum and chemicals

EE

c (Exceptional Circumstances)

Globalisation

1 131 358

821 523

800

492

1 670

Computer programming

EGF/2015/005

Computer programming

FI

b

Globalisation

2 623 200

2 008 001

1 200

1 356

1 481

Computer programming

EGF/2016/001

Microsoft

FI

a

Globalisation

5 364 000

4 559 861

1 441

1 629

2 799

Computer programming

EGF/2017/002

Microsoft

FI

a

Globalisation

3 520 080

2 937 160

1 000

883

3 326

Computers, electronic and optical products

EGF/2016/008

Nokia Network Systems

FI

a

Globalisation

2 641 800

2 641 800

821

777

3 400

Computers, electronic and optical products

EGF/2016/002

Ericsson

SE

a

Globalisation

3 957 918

933 939

918

224

4 169

Computers, electronic and optical products

EGF/2017/007

Ericsson

SE

a

Globalisation

2 130 400

290 092

900

80

3 626

Construction of buildings

EGF/2014/002

Gelderland and Overijssel

NL

b

Crisis

1 625 781

1 167 559

475

467

2 500

Domestic appliances

EGF/2014/010

Whirlpool

IT

a

Crisis

1 890 000

1 572 723

608

608

2 587

Financial service activities

EGF/2018/001

Financial service activities

NL

b

Crisis

1 192 500

486 410

450

179

2 717

Food and beverage services

EGF/2014/003

Aragon

ES

b

Crisis

960 000

804 140

280

274

2 935

Jewellery

EGF/2014/007

Andersen Ireland

IE

c (Exceptional Circumstances)

Globalisation

1 501 200

1 089 699

138

138

7 896

Land transport

EGF/2014/017

Mory-Ducros

FR

a

Crisis

6 052 200

4 393 239

2 513

2 513

1 748

Land transport

EGF/2015/010

MoryGlobal

FR

a

Crisis

5 146 800

409 3159

2 132

2 132

1 920

Manufacture of basic metals

EGF/2014/012

ArcelorMittal

BE

a

Globalisation

1 591 486

1 443 884

910

780

1 851

Manufacture of basic metals

EGF/2020/003

GMH Guss

DE

a

Globalisation

1 081 707

N/A

476

N/A

N/A

Manufacture of fabricated metal products

EGF/2014/004

Comunidad Valenciana metal

ES

b

Crisis

1 019 184

321 877

300

174

1 850

Manufacture of glass

EGF/2015/007

Hainaut-Namur Glass

BE

b

Globalisation

1 095 544

814 869

412

342

2 383

Manufacture of machinery and equipment

EGF/2014/011

Caterpillar

BE

a

Globalisation

1 222 854

829 415

630

501

1 656

Manufacture of machinery and equipment

EGF/2015/012

Hainaut Machinery

BE

b

Globalisation

1 824 041

726 183

488

355

2 046

Manufacture of machinery and equipment

EGF/2017/010

Caterpillar

BE

a

Globalisation

4 621 616

4 068 634

2 285

1 772

2 296

Mining of coal and lignite

EGF/2017/001

Castilla y León mining of coal

ES

c (Labour market)

Globalisation

1 002 264

631 186

339

198

3 188

Publishing

EGF/2014/015

Attica Publishing Services

EL

b

Crisis

3 746 700

816 310

705

205

3 982

Publishing

EGF/2018/003

Attica Publishing Activities

EL

b

Crisis

2 308 500

N/A

550

N/A

N/A

Repair and maintenance of aircraft and spacecraft

EGF/2014/016

Lufthansa Technik

IE

c (Exceptional Circumstances)

Globalisation

2 490 758

1 790 014

250

253

7 075

Repair and maintenance of aircraft and spacecraft

EGF/2015/006

PWA International

IE

c (Exceptional Circumstances)

Globalisation

442 293

442 293

108

86

5 143

Retail trade

EGF/2014/009

Sprider Stores

EL

a

Crisis

7 290 900

2 482 743

761

517

4 802

Retail trade

EGF/2014/013

Odyssefs Fokas

EL

a

Crisis

6 444 000

2 293 466

600

379

6 051

Retail trade

EGF/2015/011

Supermarket Larissa

EL

a

Crisis

6 468 000

2 045 939

557

497

4 117

Retail trade

EGF/2017/003

Attica retail

EL

c (Exceptional Circumstances)

Crisis

2 949 150

602 708

725

217

2 777

Retail trade

EGF/2017/005

Retail

FI

b

Globalisation

2 499 360

1 581 287

1 500

1 467

1 078

Retail trade

EGF/2016/005

Drenthe Overijssel Retail

NL

b

Crisis

1 818 750

853 871

800

754

1 132

Rubber and plastic products

EGF/2017/008

Goodyear

DE

a

Globalisation

2 165 231

1 171 002

646

622

1 883

Slaughterhouse

EGF/2014/005

GAD

FR

a

Crisis

918 000

442 749

760

559

792

Solar modules

EGF/2014/014

Aleo Solar

DE

a

Globalisation

1 094 760

533 480

476

408

1 308

Tourism

EGF/2020/002

Estonia Tourism

EE

c (Exceptional Circumstances)

Crisis

4 474 480

N/A

5 060

N/A

N/A

Warehousing, support activities for transportation, Services to buildings & landscape activities

EGF/2020/005

Swissport

BE

a

Crisis

3 719 224

N/A

1 468

N/A

N/A

Wholesale trade

EGF/2015/001

Broadcom

FI

a

Globalisation

1 365 000

876 467

500

374

2 343

Source: EGF Database

Table 8. EGF applications, including the breakdown by gender and age of targeted workers and helped workers (without withdrawn or rejected applications)

Case ref. 

Case name

Member State  

Sector (NACE)

Workers targeted

Men targeted

Women targeted

Targeted age group 15-24

Targeted age group 25-54

Targeted age group 55-64

Targeted age group >64

Workers helped

EGF/2014/001

Nutriart

EL

Bakery products

508

337

171

1

466

41

0

249

EGF/2014/002

Gelderland and Overijssel

NL

Construction of buildings

475

440

35

15

356

104

0

467

EGF/2014/003

Aragon

ES

Food and beverage services

280

97

183

26

232

22

0

274

EGF/2014/004

Comunidad Valenciana metal

ES

Manufacture of fabricated metal products

300

258

42

9

276

15

0

174

EGF/2014/005

GAD

FR

Slaughterhouse

760

487

273

6

620

133

1

559

EGF/2014/006

PSA

FR

Automotive

2 357

1 896

461

2

968

1 387

0

2 357

EGF/2014/007

Andersen Ireland

IE

Jewellery

138

36

102

1

126

11

0

138

EGF/2014/008

STX Rauma

FI

Building of ships and boats

565

496

69

7

322

234

2

589

EGF/2014/009

Sprider Stores

EL

Retail trade

761

112

649

37

720

4

0

517

EGF/2014/010

Whirlpool

IT

Domestic appliances

608

422

186

32

514

62

0

608

EGF/2014/011

Caterpillar

BE

Manufacture of machinery and equipment

630

607

23

42

475

113

0

501

EGF/2014/012

ArcelorMittal

BE

Manufacture of basic metals

910

871

39

25

840

45

0

780

EGF/2014/013

Odyssefs Fokas

EL

Retail trade

600

65

535

6

554

39

1

379

EGF/2014/014

Aleo Solar

DE

Solar modules

476

262

214

3

374

98

1

408

EGF/2014/015

Attica Publishing Services

EL

Publishing

705

391

314

12

616

71

6

205

EGF/2014/016

Lufthansa Technik

IE

Repair and maintenance of aircraft and spacecraft

250

220

30

12

167

70

1

253

EGF/2014/017

Mory-Ducros

FR

Land transport

2 513

2 137

376

18

2 054

436

5

2 513

EGF/2014/018

Attica Broadcasting

EL

Broadcasting

928

521

407

12

892

22

2

349

EGF/2015/001

Broadcom

FI

Wholesale trade

500

442

58

1

489

10

0

374

EGF/2015/002

Adam Opel

DE

Automotive

2 692

2 583

109

60

1 926

706

0

2 621

EGF/2015/003

Ford Genk

BE

Automotive

4 500

3 956

544

19

3 239

1 240

2

4 500

EGF/2015/004

Alitalia

IT

Air transport

184

129

55

0

178

6

0

184

EGF/2015/005

Computer programming

FI

Computer programming

1 200

660

540

24

1 008

156

12

1 356

EGF/2015/006

PWA International

IE

Repair and maintenance of aircraft and spacecraft

108

98

10

2

88

17

1

86

EGF/2015/007

Hainaut-Namur Glass

BE

Manufacture of glass

412

403

9

0

315

97

0

342

EGF/2015/009

/Volvo Trucks

SE

Automotive

500

387

113

55

375

61

9

450

EGF/2015/010 FR/

MoryGlobal

FR

Land transport

2 132

1 740

392

2

1 721

408

1

2 132

EGF/2015/011

Supermarket Larissa

EL

Retail trade

557

194

363

0

529

28

0

497

EGF/2015/012

Hainaut Machinery

BE

Manufacture of machinery and equipment

488

460

28

29

284

175

0

355

EGF/2016/001

Microsoft

FI

Computer programming

1 441

864

577

0

1 296

144

1

1 629

EGF/2016/002

Ericsson

SE

Computers, electronic and optical products

918

643

275

0

22

589

307

224

EGF/2016/003

petroleum and chemicals

EE

Chemicals

800

565

235

31

427

334

8

492

EGF/2016/004

Comunidad Valenciana Automotive

ES

Automotive

250

241

9

0

192

58

0

134

EGF/2016/005

Drenthe Overijssel Retail

NL

Retail trade

800

570

230

492

243

64

1

754

EGF/2016/008

Nokia Network Systems

FI

Computers, electronic and optical products

821

608

213

6

644

167

4

777

EGF/2017/001

Castilla y León mining of coal

ES

Mining of coal and lignite

339

328

11

0

332

7

0

198

EGF/2017/002

Microsoft

FI

Computer programming

1 000

740

260

0

950

50

0

883

EGF/2017/003

Attica retail

EL

Retail trade

725

408

317

0

107

438

180

217

EGF/2017/004

Almaviva

IT

Call centre

1 610

334

1 276

0

1 375

223

12

1 423

EGF/2017/005

Retail

FI

Retail trade

1 500

355

1 145

103

1 129

263

5

1 467

EGF/2017/006

Galicia wearing apparel

ES

Apparel

303

50

253

2

230

71

0

146

EGF/2017/007

Ericsson

SE

Computers, electronic and optical products

900

600

300

1

622

272

5

80

EGF/2017/008

Goodyear

DE

Rubber and plastic products

646

641

5

15

461

168

2

622

EGF/2017/009

Air France

FR

Air transport

1 858

974

884

0

661

1 196

1

1 858

EGF/2017/010

Caterpillar

BE

Manufacture of machinery and equipment

2 285

2 113

172

2

2 022

263

0

1 772

EGF/2018/001

Financial service activities

NL

Financial service activities

450

183

267

38

291

104

17

179

EGF/2018/002

Norte Centro Lisboa wearing apparel

PT

Apparel

730

83

647

12

568

150

0

N/A

EGF/2018/003

Attica Publishing Activities

EL

Publishing

550

320

230

3

466

80

1

N/A

EGF/2020/001

Galicia shipbuilding ancillary sectors

ES

Building of ships and boats

500

470

30

17

36

391

56

N/A

EGF/2020/002

Estonia Tourism

EE

Tourism

5 060

1 970

3 090

700

3 330

1 030

0

N/A

EGF/2020/003

GMH Guss

DE

Manufacture of basic metals

476

455

21

7

293

175

1

N/A

EGF/2020/004

KLM

NL

Air Transport

1 201

933

268

35

789

353

24

N/A

EGF/2020/005

Swissport

BE

Warehousing, support activities for transportation, Services to buildings & landscape activities

1 468

1 086

382

83

1 185

199

1

N/A

EGF/2020/007

Finnair

FI

Air Transport

500

280

220

19

340

141

0

N/A

Total workers targeted and helped

54 168

36 521

17 647

2 024

38 733

12 741

670

37 072

Source: EGF Database



Figure 14. Number of EGF cases per sector (NACE Rev. 2) for all 54 cases in 2014-2020 175


Annex 5: EGF intervention logic 2014-2020

Source: based on Ramboll Management Consulting, SEOR (2020), Study supporting the ex post evaluation of the EGF 2014-2020, Final Report, p. 93.

Annex 6: The evolution of the rules of the EGF between 2007 and 2020

   Source: DG EMPL, based on Commission staff working document on the mid-term evaluation of the EGF 20142020, SWD(2018) 192/16.5.2018, p.14

(1) The overview of all EGF cases received during 20142020 is included in Annex 4.
(2) https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/2148-Ex-post-evaluation-of-the-European-Globalisation-Adjustment-Fund-2014-2020-  
(3)  Study supporting the ex post evaluation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (2014-2020), (hereinafter ‘Ramboll Management Consulting, SEOR (2020)), See published study here: ( https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/ceb95383-a24f-11eb-b85c-01aa75ed71a1 ).  
(4)   Ex-post evaluation of the EGF 2007-2013 , (2015), The mid-term evaluation of the EGF 20142020, (2018).
(5)  Regulation (EC) No 1927/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on establishing the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund, OJ L 406, 30.12.2006, p. 1.
(6) For details see Regulation (EC) No 546/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 amending Regulation (EC) No 1927/2006 on establishing the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund, OJ L 167, 29.6.2009, p. 26, and Annex 6 to this SWD.
(7)  Regulation (EU) No 1309/2013.
(8) The use of the derogation under Article 6(2) was initially permitted until 31 December 2017, provided that at least some of the redundancies within the meaning of Article 3 occurred in NUTS 2 level regions eligible under the YEI. The support could be rendered to NEETs under the age of 25 in NUTS 2-level regions eligible under the YEI or, where Member States so decide, to NEETs under the age of 30.
(9)  Defined at NACE Revision 2 division level See Regulation (EC) No 1893/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006, OJ L 393, 30.12.2006, p. 1.
(10)  Defined at NUTS 2 division level See Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003, OJ L 154, 21.6.2003, p. 1.
(11)  Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, OJ L 193, 30.7.2018.
(12) For details see below the section on Use of the EGF support for NEETs.
(13) See principle 4 (Active support to employment) of the European Pillar of Social Rights.
(14)   https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=326&langId=en
(15)  Regulation (EC) No 1927/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on establishing the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund, OJ L 406, 30.12.2006, p. 1.
(16) Together with temporary inclusion of the crisis criterion, the co-funding rate was raised from 50% to 65% from 1 May 2009 to 30 December 2011.
(17) The changes were introduced largely based on the EGF’s mid-term evaluation for the period 2007-2013 . They were later re-confirmed by the EGF ex-post evaluation 2007-2013 , the European Court of Auditors’ special report No 7 (2013) on the EGF , and the European Parliament’s European Implementation Assessment of the EGF 2007-2014 .
(18)   Article 4(2) of Regulation (EU) 1309/2013 explains the conditions for small labour markets and exceptional circumstances: when duly substantiated by the Member State concerned, an application for a contribution from the EGF may be considered admissible even if the intervention criteria in points (a) or (b) of Article 4(2) are not entirely met, when redundancies have a serious impact on employment and the local economy.
(19)  Article 7(4) of Regulation (EU) 1309/2013.
(20)   ECA (2013), p. 28
(21) Article 16(4) of Regulation (EU) 1309/2013.
(22)   Regulation (EU) 2021/691 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021on the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers (EGF) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1309/2013
(23) European Commission, Reflection Paper on Globalisation. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/reflection-paper-harnessing-globalisation_en  
(24) Ibid. 
(25) Ibid. 
(26) European Parliament, (2019). Globalisation's impact on employment and the EU, 20.8.2019, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/economy/20190712STO56968/globalisation-s-impact-on-employment-and-the-eu  
(27)   European Restructuring Monitor | Eurofound (europa.eu)
(28) Restructuring announcements are recorded in the ERM based on a screening of the main media sources in each of the Member States.
(29)  In order to be included in the ERM database, an individual restructuring case must involve the announced loss or creation of at least 100 jobs, or employment effects affecting at least 10% of a workforce of more than 250 people. For the purpose of this evaluation, only cases involving job losses were considered.
(30) According to the ERM, the share decreased from 41% (20022007) to 29% (20152016) and recently increased to 43% (2020).
(31)  EGF/2015/007    BE/Hainaut-Namur Glass, EGF/2015/012 BE/Hainaut Machinery, EGF/2016/002 SE/Ericsson, EGF/2016/003 EE/Petroleum and chemicals, EGF/2017/007 SE/Ericsson, EGF/2017/008 DE/Goodyear and EGF/2020/003 DE/GMH Guss.
(32) OECD (2017),  The next production revolution: implications for governments and businesses , p. 26.
(33) European Commission, DG CONNECT (2017), A concept paper on digitisation, employability and inclusiveness – the role of Europe , p. 10.
(34) OECD (2021), What happened to jobs at high risk of automation?
(35)   File:Employment rate age group 20 to 64, EU-28, 2002-2018 (%).png - Statistics Explained (europa.eu)  
(36) Eurostat, table namq_10_gdp and table namq_10_a10_e.
(37)  Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden. Overall youth unemployment rates in 2019 exceeded 20% only in Greece (35.2%), Spain (32.5%), Italy (29.2%) and Sweden (20.1%) Eurostat, [lfst_r_lfu3rt].
(38) Articles 2 to 5 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
(39) Articles 145 and 147 TFEU.
(40)  Article 5 of the Treaties (2002) C 325/01.
(41) The ESIFs include five different funds: two structural funds [the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF)] and the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund ( https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013R1303 ).
(42) See Commission SWD SEC(2006)274 European Globalisation adjustment Fund (EGF) – Impact Assessment, p. 18, which bases its analyses on the OECD’s Trade and Structural Adjustment: Recommendations for Good Practice (2005). The Commission later designed its own framework to tackle the challenges of restructuring, the EU Quality Framework for anticipation of change and restructuring (QFR), see Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2013)882 final .
(43)   https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52018SC0192&from=EN  
(44)   Joint Research Centre)
(45)    RHOMOLO is the spatial computable general equilibrium model of the European Commission. For details, see https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/rhomolo .  
(46) See page 6 of the JRC Technical Report mentioned in footnote 45.
(47)  Member States are listed based on the EU protocol order according to the Roman alphabetical order of their geographical names in the original language(s).
(48) OECD (2013), Back to work: Re-employment, earnings and skill use after job displacement, p. 13 .
(49)  EGF_2015_008 GR/Supermarket Larissa, EGF_2016_006 FI/Helsinki-Uusimaa Education and EGF_2016_007 NL/Gelderland-Overijssel social work.
(50) EGF/2020/003 ES/ Cataluña automotive.
(51)   The mid-term evaluation of the EGF 2014-2020 , (2018) – Final Report, ICF.
(52)  The 49 EGF cases from EGF/2014/001 to EGF/2020/001 (inclusive) are listed in Table 5.
(53) Ramboll Management Consulting, SEOR (2020), p. 16.
(54)

 Rate of beneficiaries helped is defined as the ratio of persons assisted over the number of persons targeted.

(55) Contact persons are nominated by the authorities of the Member States responsible for the EGF. The authority of each Member State decides who will represent it.
(56)  Case applications, final reports and employment status reports; the Commission’s proposals and decisions by the Budgetary Authority; and any additional documents like audits and evaluations of specific cases.
(57) Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the UK.
(58) A total of eight interviews were conducted at EU level, with European Commission staff (3), (former) Members of the European Parliament (2), a social partner (1), and Member States that did not apply for EGF support during the 20142020 period (2). At national and case level at least four interviews were conducted per case, together with two overarching country-specific interviews.
(59) Member States report on the re-integration rate in the final report of a case, due 6 months after the end of the implementation period.
(60)  Commission internal EGF Database.
(61)   Commission Staff Working Paper – Impact Assessment SEC(2011) 1130 final, p.33
(62) NEETs were targeted in 12 cases. However, data cover only 11 cases with available final reports at the time of drafting of the study by the external evaluators, Ramboll Management Consulting, SEOR (2020), p. 43-44.
(63) EGF final reports.
(64) Member States report on the re-integration rate also in a case’s employment status report, due 18 months after the end of the implementation period.
(65)  EGF employment status reports.
(66)  This graph includes all 20142020 EGF cases for which both the final report and the employment status report were available when the supporting study was sent to the Commission. It thus covers 37 (out of 49) cases. 
(67)  1 347 completed answers were received from EGF beneficiaries, but only 950 passed the validation criteria for replies and have been covered by the analysis of the survey results, i.e. only 3.5% of the total beneficiaries assisted.
(68) Ramboll Management Consulting, SEOR (2020), p. 44.
(69) The 39 responses considered in the analysis came from 16 EU countries and 1 from the USA. Respondents identified themselves as: public authorities (16), or as EU citizens (16); other groups being: NGOs (1), academic/research organisations (1), trade unions (1), non-EU citizens (1) and ‘other’ respondents (3) ( https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/2148-Ex-post-evaluation-of-the-European-Globalisation-Adjustment-Fund-2014-2020-/public-consultation ).
(70)   European Globalisation Adjustment Fund – final evaluation (2014-20) (europa.eu)
(71) One in the Netherlands (EGF/2016/005 NL/Drenthe Overijssel retail) and one in Ireland (EGF/2014/016 IE/Lufthansa Technik).
(72)  EGF case studies. 
(73) Ramboll Management Consulting, SEOR (2020), p. 38.
(74)  EGF/2017/008 DE/Goodyear and EGF/2015/002 DE/Adam Opel. 
(75) EGF/2016/008 FI/Nokia Network Systems.
(76)  European Commission (2019), Report from The Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the activities of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund in 2017 and 2018.
(77) See Article 16(5) of Regulation (EU) No 1309/2013.
(78) Ramboll Management Consulting, SEOR (2020), p. 39.
(79) EGF/2014/014 GR/Odyssefs Fokas.
(80) EGF/2017/009 FR/Air France.
(81)  Of 46 cases, 24 started when intended, 7 cases started before the application date, and the remaining 15 started later than envisaged.
(82)  Commission EGF Database.
(83) The 49 cases analysed by the external experts include EGF applications received between 2014 and 2020 and approved by December 2020. The remaining five EGF applications received at the end of 2020 (without the withdrawn one) are not included in this analysis.
(84)  See the literature on the subject Lucian Cernat & Federica Mustilli (2018): Trade and Labour Market Adjustments: What Role for the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund?, European Commission (2017), Report on the 19th meeting of the Contact Persons of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF), Claeys and Sapir (2018): The European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: Easing the pain from trade?.
(85) ESF co-financing rates vary between 50% and 85% (95% in exceptional cases) of the total project costs, depending on the relative wealth of the region.
(86)  Mid-term evaluation of the EGF 2014-2020, SWD(2018) 192/16.5.2018, p.26.
(87) The supporting study did not cover the six EGF applications submitted at the end of 2020.
(88)  EGF case studies.
(89) EGF/2014/008 FI/STX Rauma and EGF/2015/001 FI/Broadcom.
(90)  The total amounts spent for each type of allowance were: EUR 11.3 million for training allowances, EUR 6.3 million for job search allowances, about EUR 9 million for subsistence allowances and EUR 0.4 million for mobility allowances.
(91)  9% (EGF/2017/007 SE/Ericsson 2) and 113% (EGF/2015/005 FI/Computer programming and EGF/2016/001 FI/Microsoft 1). Reach rates of more than 100% can be attributed to additional workers being made redundant after the application deadline. Such people can (under certain conditions) still be included for support if this can be achieved within the agreed budget. Source: Final reports of EGF cases. 
(92)  Mid-term evaluation of the EGF 2014-2020, SWD(2018) 192/16.5.2018, p.30.
(93)   European Parliament (2016), Assessment of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund from a gender equality perspective, p. 13 and 34.
(94)  NEETs were also targeted in the EGF/2019/001 BE/Carrefour Belgium application, but because it was rejected by the Council it has been omitted from the numbers here.
(95)  Belgium targeted in total 700 NEETs, Greece 2 098, Ireland 446, Portugal 730 and Spain 125.
(96) For the EGF Regulation, these are Member States with regions where youth unemployment rates were above 25% in 2012. However, in some Member States, the situation has improved over time: based on 2015 figures, only 15 Member States fell into this category.
(97) The final report for EGF/2018/002 PT/Norte Centro Lisboa wearing apparel was not available when the final evaluation study was drafted, so its results were not included in the evaluation study.
(98) EGF/2015/002 BE/Hainaut Machinery.
(99)  In the case of Spain (EGF/2017/001 ES/Castilla y León mining of coal), the initial number of NEETs targeted was 125. However, the interest was higher than expected, so the number was adjusted to the maximum possible – 198. All 198 NEETs were reached, resulting in a 158% rate of beneficiaries helped, which is reported here as 100% considering the target was changed. 
(100)  This was reported in all three EGF cases in Wallonia since 2015 – EGF/2015/007 BE/Hainaut-Namur Glass, EGF/2015/012 BE/Hainaut Machinery and EGF/2017/010 BE/Caterpillar. 
(101)  Case studies of Belgian EGF cases.
(102)  Mid-term evaluation of the EGF 2014-2020, SWD(2018) 192/16.5.2018, p.42.
(103)  Final reports of EGF cases.
(104) Ramboll Management Consulting, SEOR (2020), p. 49.
(105)  Mid-term evaluation of the EGF 2014-2020, SWD(2018) 192/16.5.2018, page 23. 
(106) Ramboll Management Consulting, SEOR (2020), p. 55.
(107) Across the 13 Member States that replied, it was indicated that these stakeholders were aware of the EGF only ‘to a limited extent’ or ‘not at all’ in 7 cases relating to NEETs and 9 cases relating to workers made redundant, self-employed persons or workers threatened with redundancy.
(108) https://ec.europa.eu/egf  
(109)  The absorption rate in this case (EGF/2015/004 IT/Alitalia) was 1.66%. This is a clear outlier, as the second lowest absorption rate was 20.21%. The absorption rate was this low because out of the 1 200 dismissed workers, only 184 signed up to take part in the active labour market measures offered by the EGF. However, almost half of them (90 out of 184) were directly re-employed by Alitalia SAI Spa and did not benefit from EGF funding. Many others found a new job on their own because they were highly skilled, and benefited from special short-term work schemes that were quite generous, which limited workers’ interest in participating in the measures offered with the help of the EGF.
(110) Ramboll Management Consulting, SEOR (2020), p. 59.
(111)  The graph only takes into account the 46 cases which have been completed and for which a final report was submitted to the Commission by end-November 2020. For that reason, Portugal has been excluded, because no final report had been submitted by that time. 
(112)   JRC (Joint Research Centre) Technical Report, The RHOMOLO-IO modelling framework: a flexible Input-Output tool for policy analysis (2019)
(113)  The number of beneficiaries helped in this graph is based on the results presented in the final reports (6 months after the end of the implementation period). It thus covers the 43 cases for which a final report was submitted to the Commission before 10 July 2020. 
(114)  Of the two cases in this sector, one barely spent any of the allocated funds (only 1.6%), at an average cost of EUR 127.37 per beneficiary, while the other spent almost all of the allocated resources (99.5%), at an average cost of EUR 5 299.51 per beneficiary. Therefore, we cannot speak of a correlation between the cost per beneficiary helped and the sector. 
(115) Ramboll Management Consulting, SEOR (2020), p. 64.
(116)   EGF ex-post evaluation 2007-2013 (2015) , p. 83. The rates of expenditure per beneficiary and the outcomes achieved were compared with previous EGF cases implemented in the same Member State.
(117)  Mid-term evaluation of the EGF 2014-2020, SWD(2018) 192/16.5.2018, p. 33.
(118) For this case, translation of the application was needed (see Article 8(2) of the EGF Regulation), and this took 4 weeks. However, this cannot be considered a delay. Only the extra 3 weeks for the budgetary authority to approve (9 weeks instead of normally 6) can be considered a delay.
(119) Ramboll Management Consulting, SEOR (2020), p. 67.
(120)   http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=22041&langId=en  
(121)  For the avoidance of doubt, it should be stressed that a guidance document obviously cannot replace a legally binding act, thus the two are not interchangeable.
(122)   Study on the coordination and harmonisation of ESI Funds and other EU instruments - Regional Policy - European Commission (europa.eu) , p.88.
(123)   https://ec.europa.eu/eures/public/homepage .
(124)  Mid-term evaluation of the EGF 2014-2020, SWD(2018) 192/16.5.2018, p. 31. 
(125)   COM(2013)882 final
(126)  For example EGF/2015/003 BE/Ford Genk and EGF/2017/001 ES/Castilla y León mining of coal. 
(127) Of which one rejected in 2019 (EGF/2019/001 BE/Carrefour) and one withdrawn in 2021 (EGF/2020/006 ES/Cataluña).
(128)  Lucian Cernat & Federica Mustilli (2018): Trade and Labour Market Adjustments: What Role for the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund? p. 80. 
(129) The 500 dismissals threshold was first introduced for a limited period during 20092011 by Regulation (EU) 546/2009 amending Regulation (EC) No 1927/2006.
(130) In 2019, youth unemployment over 20% was measured in some regions across 10 Member States – Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden. Until 2018, similar rates were experienced in Cyprus and Croatia as well.
(131) 20% youth unemployment is the minimum threshold to include NEETs in EGF cases since 2018.
(132) Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland.
(133) In France, YEI is channelled through national or local-level instruments targeting young people, like Garantie Jeune or the Accompagnement Intensif des Jeunes. Spain could have included NEETs in all applications, but preferred to use this option in only one case due to that case’s specificity (remote area) as its co-financing rate under the YEI is far more favourable (at 93%) than the EGF co-financing rate. In one Belgian case, the respective region was not eligible under the YEI. Italy applied for the inclusion of NEETs in one application, which had to be rejected as the respective region was not eligible under the YEI.
(134) Ramboll Management Consulting, SEOR (2020), p. 140.
(135) In Belgium, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Finland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden.
(136)  EGF case studies.
(137) Examples include the workshops reflecting on self-confidence and self-esteem, awareness and support for entrepreneurship, and the setting-up of the Coup de Boost project targeting NEETs.
(138) Ramboll Management Consulting, SEOR (2020), p. 81.
(139) Limited replies (39) were received during the public consultation. Of these 39 replies, only 15 respondents were aware of the EGF. The public consultation alone cannot be considered as representative. Regarding the beneficiary survey, only 950 replies were covered by the analysis, i.e. only 3.5% of the total beneficiaries assisted. There is a certain degree of bias about the results, as half of them were from higher-educated ICT professionals, mostly from Finnish cases. Thus, they are not necessarily representative of the experience of all beneficiaries across all EGF cases and countries.
(140) For example, the EGF case (EGF/2017/010 BE/Caterpillar 2 received rapid advice from former Commissioner Marianne Thyssen who, before the Belgian State took a position, recommended that the EGF be asked to intervene.
(141) RHOMOLO simulation performed in 2019 on 23 EGF cases from 20142015 by the Joint Research Centre.
(142)  This is because an application for EGF support to redundant workers must be justified by showing that redundancies occurred as a consequence of ‘globalisation’ or the ‘global financial and economic crisis’. In small labour markets or in exceptional circumstances, it must be proved that the redundancies have a ‘significant impact’ on the economy, especially on employment levels.
(143) See footnote 174.
(144)  Ex-post evaluation of the EGF 2007-2013 (August 2015), p. 39.
(145)  Long-term is 18 months after the end of the implementation of EGF measures, while short-term is 6 months after the end of the measures.
(146)    The link to the final report is: Study supporting the ex post evaluation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (2014-2020) - Publications Office of the EU (europa.eu)
(147) Outcome of discussions which took place during the regular EGF contact persons’ meetings and networking seminars, including the extraordinary EGF contact persons’ meeting in January 2018, which was fully dedicated to the post-2020 EGF Regulation.
(148)   https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/2148-European-Globalisation-Adjustment-Fund-final-evaluation-2014-20-_en
(149)  The results from national-level interviews are not included in this report, but in separate unpublished case study reports.
(150)  The delays between the questionnaire’s finalisation and its launch were caused by: (i) the need to translate the questionnaire into all official EU languages; and (ii) the initial reluctance of the Secretariat-General to run the public consultation during the summer period.
(151)   https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=326&furtherNews=yes&newsId=9731  
(152)  DG EMPL’s twitter account: https://twitter.com/EU_Social/status/1280518635195424769 and https://twitter.com/EU_Social/status/1298172732350312448  
(153)   https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/2148-Ex-post-evaluation-of-the-European-Globalisation-Adjustment-Fund-2014-2020-/public-consultation_en
(154)  250 or more employees.
(155)  50 to 249 employees.
(156)  Considering the risk of ‘false positives’, i.e. the survey reaching persons it was not intended for (persons who did not receive EGF support), the survey questionnaire contained a significant number of profiling questions aiming to exclude such persons from the analysis. As a result, the analysis presented in this appendix covers 922 respondents that (i) completed the questionnaire and (ii) passed the profiling questions that filtered out people that likely were not part of our target group.
(157)  To show solidarity with workers who had lost their jobs in large-scale redundancies resulting from changes in global trade patterns.
(158) https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/2148-Ex-post-evaluation-of-the-European-Globalisation-Adjustment-Fund-2014-2020-  
(159) The final report: Study supporting the ex post evaluation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (2014-2020) - Publications Office of the EU (europa.eu)
(160) Under the Better Regulation Guidelines, an ISSG involving representatives of all key stakeholders within the Commission departments needs to be established and consulted during all key steps of the evaluation process.
(161) In total 46 final reports were analysed out of 54 EGF cases during the 20142020.
(162) Please see the Ex-post evaluation of the EGF 2007-2013 , (2015) and the mid-term evaluation of the EGF 2014-2020, (2018).
(163) The ex post evaluation of the 20072013 EGF had also considered the identification of comparators as a major challenge (See p. 90).
(164)  Under Article 20 (3) of the EGF Regulation , evaluations ‘shall include the figures showing the number of applications and shall cover the performance of the EGF by country and by sector, so as to assess whether the EGF is reaching its targeted recipients’.
(165) See Article 18 of the EGF Regulation.
(166) Besides gender and age groups, if available, Member States also include in an EGF case’s final report information about the beneficiaries nationality, whether they have a long-lasting health problem or disability, whether they are part of a minority group, and their professional (ISCO) and educational levels (ISCED-2011).
(167)  For example the principal enterprise, or suppliers or downstream producers; or especially in the case of sectoral applications, also SMEs or the self-employed.
(168)   European Court of Auditors (ECA) (2013), Special Report No 7: Has the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund delivered EU added value in reintegrating redundant workers?, p. 28 .
(169)   Mid-term evaluation of the EGF 2007-2013 (2011), p. 52 and EGF ex-post evaluation 2007-2013 .
(170) The mid-term evaluation of the EGF 2014-2020 , (2018) – Final Report, ICF, p. 16
(171) Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1).
(172)  This graph is based on 11 out of the 12 cases that targeted NEETs. The excluded case is EGF/2018/002 PT/Norte Centro Lisboa wearing apparel, as no final report was available when the supporting study was sent to the Commission.
(173) The four applications withdrawn were: EGF/2015/008 EL/Supermarket Larissa, EGF/2016/006 FI/Helsinki-Uusimaa Education, EGF/2016/007 NL/Gelderland-Overijssel Social Work and EGF/2020/006 ES/Cataluña automotive.
(174) The only case rejected during 20142020 was EGF/2019/001 BE/Carrefour Belgium.
(175)  Four applications belong to more than one activity sector and have therefore been counted several times
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