



## **European Employment Observatory**

### **The development of employment policy in the EU leading up to the European Employment Strategy 1997**

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## Contents

		Page
1	Introduction	3
2	Early Days of European Integration	4
3	From the Treaty of Rome to Enlargement (1958-1972)	5
4	Start of the Enlargement Process (1972-1980)	7
5	Leading up to the Maastricht Treaty (1980-1992)	7
6	From Maastricht to the Treaty of Amsterdam (1992-1997)	8
7	Overview	11
	Selected References	12
	Annex 1: Statistical Information	13



## 1. Introduction

The principal objective of this short paper is to provide an overview of the development of employment policy in the European Union (EU), leading up to the implementation of the European Employment Strategy (EES) in 1997. It plots the chronology of relevant developments – some of which are directly related to employment, while others are more generally aimed at the broadly defined social policy arena – with the key milestones represented by major pieces of European ‘legislation’.

This paper has been written in the framework of the work programme of the European Employment Observatory (<http://www.eu-employment-observatory.net>) upon a request from the European Commission.

At this stage, it is important to understand what is meant by the term ‘employment policy’. Here, the definition provided by Gold (2009) serves the purpose. He sees it as: *‘policy governing the relationship between employers and workers, and their rights and responsibilities, as well as on measures adopted at EU level to assist those seeking to enter or re-enter the labour market, particularly the unemployed and economically inactive’*. Importantly, this definition encompasses not simply the relationship of those in employment, but also those currently without work and tackling the latter has been a fundamental part of the measures taken since the very start of European integration.

Employment policy has also to be seen in the wider context of ‘social policy’ or the ‘social dimension’, defined by Hine (1998) as *‘the principles by which a government seeks to affect the distribution of income, working conditions, and other circumstances ... through tax and benefits arrangements, labour market regulation, health and safety regulation, and special opportunities for vulnerable or underprivileged groups’*. In the context of the EU, this concern manifests itself in a range of interventions that can include regional policy, support for restructuring in industry, as well as more obvious areas, such as equality of opportunity and health and safety. As such, employment policy is a subset of social policy, but exploring the complexities of this interdependence is beyond the scope of this short review.

Employment policy, while prevalent throughout the history of European integration, was much more fragmented prior to the consolidation brought about by the EES, but as will be demonstrated below, it was a major factor in the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) – considered to be the basic building block of the European Economic Community (EEC) that arose from the landmark Treaty of Rome in 1957.

The expansion of the EU in 1973, 1980, 1986 and 1995 – and perhaps more significantly (post EES) with the accession of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe - made employment issues and how they might be influenced more complex, but, at the same time, more imperative that they should come under scrutiny. For example, key issues linked with the free movement of labour, such as the transferability of qualifications and workers’ rights took on a new significance when the EU was emerging as a more cohesive and collaborative entity.

Gold (2009) also provides a useful chronological structure under which to consider the different stages of employment policy development. This has been in part adopted for this



paper. In this typology, he identifies the following four periods with his broad assessments of policy activity:

- 1958-1972 – Limited activity;
- 1972-1980 – Intervention;
- 1980-1992 – Mixed fortunes;
- 1992-1997 – Reappraisal.

From 1997, the theme is ‘reappraisal’ or consolidation, and the direct promotion of employment and a significant switch in favour of ‘soft’ law rather than the ‘hard’ legislative approach evident in the formative years of the EU.

## **2. Early Days**

According to Casey (2009), the ‘provenance’ of the EES can be traced back to the Treaty of Paris 1951 that established the ECSC comprising six countries – Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Gold (2009) goes a little further back and sees the origins of collective employment policy in all aspects of European integration that started shortly after the end of the Second World War, though much of the incentive here was both economic and political – aiming for stability through collaboration.

Both coal and steel were important sectors in Europe that were essential to the post-war rebuilding and subsequent economic development. Ensuring an adequate supply of labour to employers (public and private) was considered essential. As such, the provisions of the Treaty included commitments to improving the living conditions of workers and the provision of assistance with their training. The sectors were going through a period of significant change in the early 1950s, with the development of production methods and growing international competition. So the firms were facing some of the restructuring and adjustment responses that are all too familiar today. In response, the ECSC introduced measures such as support for short-time working, retraining programmes and additional financial support to workers displaced, with the finance partly derived from a levy on output from each employer and partly through support from the collective budget of the ECSC. There were also elements of a regional policy in that the very nature of the coal and steel sectors meant that they were concentrated in certain locations among the six Member States.

Clearly this collective approach to a common problem (albeit of varying intensity from country to country), coupled with the availability of financial support through the grouping of resources and the establishment of a collective budget, represents an embryonic employment policy and the progenitor of the European Social Fund (ESF) – though this did not find its current form until the next milestone in European collaboration – the Treaty of Rome in 1957.

However, the development of the ECSC into a more extensive economic union was not necessarily seen as the natural way forward, since support among the existing six Member States was, by all accounts, far from universal. France, in particular, appeared to be opposed to further integration, ostensibly because of concerns over the effect on the level of wages and social security arrangements and how these might become an issue in the relative competitiveness of Member States, once such a union was underway. However, such concerns were not enough to stop the creation of the new European Economic Community (EEC) as set out in the Treaty of Rome 1957.



### 3. From the Treaty of Rome to Enlargement (1958-1972)

Reference in the Treaty of Rome to social policy<sup>1</sup> in its broadest sense was considered to be rather vague and lacking in any precision on actions to be followed and their timeframe. Of the 248 Articles contained in the treaty, only 12 of them covered social policy issues. According to Holloway (1981) '*what is perhaps more remarkable is that any part of the Treaty at all was devoted to social policy*', because the treaty was all about creating an economic entity. Social policy only became relevant in so far as it was essential for this aim.

In a sense, this gave the newly formed European Commission (EC) an opportunity to develop its own power base in the social arena, though always within sight of the individual controls that Member States could exercise. The impression is given that it was expected that the operation of a large competitive economic area would influence such factors as employment costs and standards, leading to some process of harmonisation<sup>2</sup> – though the fact that there would be winners and losers in this process was not fully catered for in any support policies.

In the Treaty, the issue of employment was more alluded to than directly referred to, though was evident in the stated objective of: '*to promote .... a high level of employment and social protection, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity*'. Within this, the only direct employment-related objective was to establish the free movement of workers, facilitated through such measures as the transferability of social security entitlements, for example. There was also a commitment to guarantee the right of equal pay for men and women which was, of course, an important provision that has provided a platform for a more comprehensive and embedded approach to equality in the EU in subsequent years.

In all this, the role of the Commission was more to be one where it promoted the sharing of experience through consultation, comparative research and the issuing of 'opinions'<sup>3</sup> – activities which have continued and indeed been strengthened by, for example, the Strasbourg Summit of 1989 (which, for example, provided for the creation of the European Employment Observatory and the '*Employment in Europe*' report) and the mutual learning provisions of subsequent measures under the Luxembourg Process, leading to the EES. In the formative years of the EEC, the Commission also established technical collaboration and consultation with the International Labour Office (ILO), which had a long history to draw on. This meant, for example, that the gathering of statistical information across the Member States could benefit from the various guidelines developed by the ILO to ensure a high degree of compatibility<sup>4</sup>. Employment policy could also use some of the legal precedents already set in this international arena.

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<sup>1</sup> The social policy aspect of the Treaty was contained in Article 117.

<sup>2</sup> 'Harmonisation' in this sense really refers to the process of aligning the social security systems among the Member States – something that has not been achieved. However, harmonisation has spread to many more aspects of employment and social policy as the EU has matured, though the pressures from expansion have made this an even more difficult process.

<sup>3</sup> Opinions from the Commission are the least strong of the edicts issued and have endured through the various stages of development of the EU, with 'recommendations' suggesting the need for a firmer response from Member State governments and 'directives' requiring appropriate action.

<sup>4</sup> For example, the comparability of unemployment statistics was first raised in 1925 at the Second International Conference of Labour Statisticians, though it was 1954 and the eighth conference before proper guidelines were formulated and adopted – and are still current.



The Treaty of Rome recognised the potential effects on employment from the process of economic integration (something that was brought into sharper focus later on with the realisation of the Single Market). The removal of tariff barriers between the Member States and other changes were expected to lead to more geographical and occupational mobility<sup>5</sup> and this led to the genesis of the ‘Social Fund’ that is still extant. Therefore, the formative years of the EEC (perhaps up to the mid-1960s) can be seen as a period when the success in removing the economic barriers between Member States allowed more attention to be focused on the employment and social implications of this activity.

It was around 1967 that the medium-term economic programme of the EC formally recognised the role of labour as a key aspect in the economic development of the Community of then six Member States. It was two years later when the Council agreed (*‘somewhat reluctantly’* according to Collins (1972)) to convene a general conference on employment<sup>6</sup> for representatives from Member State governments, trade unions and employers – as well as the Commission. This met in April 1970 and, according to Collins, *‘effectively established the principle that national employment policies must be brought more closely together’*.

The term *‘social dumping’* entered the European vocabulary at an early stage and reflected concern over the differences between Member States in their labour legislation, social security charges and, of course, wage levels, that could result in one having an ‘unfair’ advantage over another. However, with just six Member States engaged in an embryonic grouping, it was not given much attention and in reality did not lead to any great transfer of investment and jobs – though may have influenced certain decisions on regional policy. Social dumping became a more sensitive issue as enlargement progressed, firstly with the accession of the United Kingdom and Ireland in 1972 that brought a different approach to employment policy and started the long-running debate about the relative merits of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ versus the ‘Continental’ models that was to permeate future developments – not least, the concept of *‘Flexicurity’* in the post EES period. However, concerns over old-fashioned social dumping were resurrected with the accession of the Member States from Central and Eastern Europe in the current decade.

By the end of this period, the unemployment rate for the six Member States of the EEC had started to increase again from 3.4 per cent at the start (1958), through a low of 1.4 per cent in 1969, to 2.2 per cent in 1972 – though still, technically, being full employment. However, much of the success in keeping unemployment low was down to improvements in employment measures at a national level through, for example, improved levels of unemployment benefit, better and longer help with jobs search and the use of targeted active measures – though the latter may have been assisted through the European funding. However, according to Collins (1975), achieving full employment did not necessarily mean continuing working in the same job and here could perhaps be seen the genesis of the concept of *‘employability’* where people would be given the skills and support to move between jobs with the minimum of (frictional) unemployment<sup>7</sup>.

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<sup>5</sup> Article 123 of the Treaty of Rome endorsed the EC to facilitate geographical and occupational mobility.

<sup>6</sup> As covered in Bulletin 1969 No 3 and Bulletin 1970 No 1.

<sup>7</sup> The period of the EEC up to around 1972 was characterised by labour shortages (albeit with varying degrees of intensity between the six Member States) and so this would have facilitated low levels of frictional unemployment.



#### **4. Start of the Enlargement Process (1972-1980)**

The EEC had lasted for 14 years with just the founding six Member States. So the process of enlargement that started in 1972 with the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom marked a significant point in the development of European integration. Furthermore, in terms of the countries joining, the UK and, to a lesser extent, Ireland represented an important shift in the philosophy of labour market policy in general and the approach to intervention in particular.

This period also saw attention switching to the identification of ‘priority sectors’ that included migrant workers, those in employment affected by the quickening pace of technological change and the usual problems of sectoral change and regional inequality. All of these issues are, of course, still relevant today and, in a sense, the much more targeted approach to the initiation of employment policy within the EU (as embodied by the EES, for example) can be traced to this development in approach.

This period is also marked with what was arguably the first clear reference to a goal of ‘full employment’. This arose from a Council Resolution in 1974 and was enshrined in the First Social Action Programme Resolution<sup>8</sup> that covered some significant employment related initiatives grouped under the three main objectives of: ‘full and better employment’, ‘improved living and working conditions’ and ‘worker participation’.

However, this period was mostly noted for its emphasis on the traditional employment-related issues of equal opportunity, employment protection, health and safety at work, and employee participation that had emerged with the original EEC and where the influence of the three new Member States (in 1972) was only beginning to be felt.

#### **5. Leading up to the Treaty of Maastricht (1980-1992)**

The main approach to encouraging the creation of employment and helping the unemployed benefit from any new jobs was firmly based on the two strands of what Casey (1993) calls ‘exhortation’ (the encouragement of certain approaches through the mechanism of ‘resolutions’ without any compulsion and resources) and the direct allocation of financial support for traditional employment and training measures, chiefly through the mechanism of the ESF. However, this period also saw efforts to progress with directives on such areas as part-time working, temporary working, parental leave and employee participation effectively blocked, with only measures on equal treatment of workers and health and safety managing to be adopted relatively unscathed.

Here, the power of the veto was all important and one Member State in particular (the UK) took exception to any of the draft directives that would have the effect of increasing labour costs for employers or affect the concept of labour market flexibility. However, the UK did take advantage of its presidency of the EU in 1986 to get through an ‘*Action Programme on Employment Growth*’ that endorsed the need for deregulation and labour market flexibility. While the proposals were seen as relatively weak, they probably made a more important

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<sup>8</sup> This arose out of the 1972 Paris Summit that charged the Commission to develop the EC’s first Social Action Programme.





contribution to advancing the general perception in the EU that less, rather than more, employment policy might be useful.

1983 saw a substantial realignment of the ESF to cope more directly with key contemporary issues, such as increasing youth unemployment, long-term unemployment, increasing female labour force participation and the inevitable demands of increasing technological change – where training played a big part. Further reforms to the ESF followed in 1988<sup>9</sup> to cope with the new demands posed by the accession of Spain and Portugal (1987) and agreement on the Single European Act (1986).

The mid-1980s also saw the introduction of what were to become typical employment policies in response to growing unemployment – work sharing and reduced working hours, along with early retirement measures. These were essentially national policies endorsed at a European level, but not all Member States embraced this approach of making the existing pool of jobs go round further<sup>10</sup>. It was an approach that endured remarkably well and it was not until the 1990s that the first serious efforts were made to consign this approach to history.

However, Bastian (1998) categorises the 1980s as a period when the EU was taking what he calls an ‘*over ambitious regulatory approach*’, though based on achieving consensus, where possible. Nevertheless, the focus was still on how to create jobs for those out of work by redistributing the existing stock of jobs.

The development of employment and social policy prior to 1987 was undoubtedly hampered by the requirement of a unanimous vote on the Council. Since any one Member State could effectively exercise a veto, this led to the blocking of many potential initiatives. However, this all changed in 1987 with the Single European Act (SEA) which effectively diluted the need for unanimity and brought in Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) which, as Gold (2009) points out, ‘*radically altered the balance of power between the Commission, European Parliament and Council*’.

## **6. From Maastricht to the Treaty of Amsterdam (1992-1997)**

The period marked by the treaties of Maastricht (1992)<sup>11</sup> and Amsterdam (1997) was probably the most significant in the change of thinking on employment policy within the EU. It witnessed a change of attitude towards the objectives and targets for employment and a heightened level of consensus emerged.

Maastricht remains a landmark in European integration with its objectives of the single market and European economic and monetary union as a prerequisite to bring it about. It also saw the introduction of the ‘Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG)’ to monitor progress towards the goals set. Each Member State had to submit annual ‘*convergence reports*’ on

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<sup>9</sup> The ESF was refocused with the setting of five new objectives: 1. Promoting the development of the least developed regions; 2. Assisting areas of industrial decline; 3. Combating long-term unemployment; 4. Integrating young people into employment; and 5. Promoting (a) adjustments to agricultural areas and (b) rural development.

<sup>10</sup> The United Kingdom, for example, partially embraced the approach through limited measures aimed at encouraging job sharing, for example, but was never really fully on board.

<sup>11</sup> The Treaty of Maastricht effectively brought the three separate ‘ECs’ (the ECSC, European Atomic Energy Community, and the EEC) together under a new European Union.





progress against a range of measures – some of which covered employment – and after scrutiny by the Commission, where a Member State was felt to be falling short of expectations, it could issue draft recommendations on how it should proceed. As such, the BEPGs, while broader in their coverage than the current National Reform Programme (NRP) reports, represent the basis for this type of direct reporting and response.

The provision in Maastricht for the implementation of the ‘*Social Action Programme of the Social Charter*’ or the ‘*Social Protocol*’ included directives on part-time working, works councils, parental leave, etc, that were either already in place in some Member States or were adopted by others<sup>12</sup>. Examining the general approach taken in the Social Chapter leads Gold (2009) to conclude that it represented the ‘*high-water level of the interventionist approach to workers’ rights*’, after which the emphasis on policy moved significantly away from hard law and towards soft law approaches, alongside the promotion of employment.

Importantly, the provisions of Maastricht dealing with the introduction of the European Monetary System (EMS) and the new unit of currency to go with it – the EMU – meant that Member States effectively had their options reduced for intervening on the demand side to create jobs in the traditional manner. Instead, they had to look to essentially supply side measures to combat unemployment, such as increasing growth within the EU, freeing up the state sector through privatisation and undertaking reforms to the welfare system to give more emphasis on ‘*welfare to work*’.

In 1993, the Commission issued a White Paper – ‘*Growth, Competitiveness and Jobs*’ – that recognised the persistent problem of large-scale unemployment and sought to tackle this head on through a series of potentially job creating measures to include work sharing, reduced working hours, wage restraint, lower social security charges for employers and incentives for training. Underpinning it was an aim of halving unemployment<sup>13</sup> by creating 15 million jobs by the year 2000 – a rate of job creation that was (and proved to be) very challenging for the EU in general and many of the Member States in particular. One problem with this kind of target is that it cannot reflect the economic circumstances and job creation potential of individual Member States. Also, given the low level of geographical mobility among the EU-15 at the time, surplus jobs created in one Member State were unlikely to help a shortfall of jobs in another. Nevertheless, endorsement of the White Paper became a prominent agenda item for the Essen Council in 1994.

The Essen Council of Ministers was an important meeting for two particular reasons. The first was overtly political and related to the EU’s response to the opening up of Central and Eastern Europe and pressures this would exert on making decisions on enlargement. The second was more immediate and concerned the persistently high unemployment in the existing 15 Member States, which appeared even worse when set against those of the main competitor nations<sup>14</sup>. It was at this time that the concept of ‘*jobless growth*’ began to appear to reflect the fact that economic growth in the EU Member States (albeit modest in many cases) was not leading to the creation of many new jobs and so having little effect on the

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<sup>12</sup> Except the UK which objected to many of the provisions in the Social Chapter and it was not until 1997 and the new Labour government that the attitude changed.

<sup>13</sup> This objective was not achieved - the rate of unemployment for the EU-15 in 2000 was 7.7 per cent against 11.2 per cent in 1994.

<sup>14</sup> At the time of Essen Council, the unemployment rate in the EU-15 was over 11 per cent, while in the USA it was 5.7 per cent and in Japan 3.5 per cent.



stock of unemployed. As Bastian (1998) critically points out, *'the arthritic condition of continental Europe's labour markets has kept the door shut on the unemployed'*.

The so-called *'Essen Conclusions'* proposed that employment policy should be focused on five areas as follows:

- Investment in vocational training;
- Increasing the employment intensity of growth;
- Reducing non-wage labour costs;
- Improving the effectiveness of labour market policy;
- More help for groups particularly affected by unemployment.

However, these notional target areas were not really backed up by any specific requirements on actions by Member States and, inevitably, not much happened as a result in the immediate period afterwards.

However, the Essen Council took the economic monitoring approach and applied it firmly to employment. The Council charged the Commission, working in conjunction with ECOFIN (the grouping of economic and finance ministers) and the Labour and Social Affairs Council (comprising ministers of labour) to produce a composite report, drawing on the national reports leading to an annual assessment and, where necessary, developing recommendations on policy initiatives – but, essentially, at a European Community level. It was to be later on when the scrutiny and recommendations were focused at a Member State level (established in the Treaty of Amsterdam) and adapted for the new National Action Plans (NAPs) under the EES.

The influence of the OECD *'Jobs Study'* (1994) must be considered, as it drew attention to the effect that a high level of employment protection can have on economic growth and, ultimately, job creation. It advocated governments to deregulate their labour markets and many EU Member States were receptive to this. So, in a sense, the EU was compelled to follow this line of thinking. However, as Gray (2009) points out, the requirements of Maastricht in effect reduced the intervention options available to Member States because of the restrictions on government borrowing, and this led to the burden of labour market adjustment switching to individual workers and jobseekers, with governments taking a less direct role.

The OECD was also critical of the approach taken by many EU Member States in tackling unemployment through work sharing policies or encouraging early retirement in order to create opportunities for the young unemployed to fill a job – which often was unrealistic given the skill levels of some of those leaving the labour force. It linked this somewhat short to medium term strategy with longer term concern over the developing so-called *'demographic time bomb'*, that would see a naturally ageing workforce put greater pressure on the cost of pensions which would have to be financed from a diminishing working population.

It could also be argued that employment policy in the 1990s was following rather than leading any trends. For example, the growth in part-time working evident in many Member States was reacted to by the Commission in seeking to introduce improved terms and conditions for such workers. It was an approach that was less likely to raise any negative



feedback from Member State governments, yet gave the EU a role as arbiter of employment protection.

Between the landmark Essen Council and the Treaty of Amsterdam, pressure on the Commission to be seen to be responding to the unemployment problem resulted in the '*Pact for Confidence and Jobs*' in 1996 under the watch of Commission President Jacques Santer. This effectively reaffirmed the need for wages to be kept preferably below or at least in line with inflation, so that job creation measures could work.

The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) marked the start of a new period in EU employment policy and it brought into sharper focus the issues first raised in Essen three years earlier. A key provision was giving power to the Commission to make recommendations to individual Member States and to monitor progress. The Luxembourg '*Jobs Summit*' in 1997 was responsible for the first set of employment guidelines. It was here that the notion of '*flexicurity*' (as it is known today) was first articulated under the '*adaptability*' pillar. Though as demonstrated earlier, the basic ingredients were not completely new, and initial thinking was probably triggered by enlargement in the 1970s. The term '*employability*' also formally entered the lexicon as one of the Employment Guidelines, though its origins as a concept can be traced back to the 1970s.

## 7. Overview

Writing in 1998, Jackman claims that the persistence of unemployment in much of the EU that started in the 1970s '*must be counted one of the most conspicuous failures of the EU*'. Furthermore, this has to be contrasted with the earlier days of the EEC when the 1950s and 1960s were marked by a period of virtually full employment – among the six signatories to the Treaty of Rome. Perhaps some of the failure to grasp the problem of unemployment was due to the widening of the EU from 1972, making control from Brussels more difficult. However, the changing world economic climate, globalisation and the spectacular growth in the emerging economies added to the difficulties in introducing effective employment policy.

In the early days of the EEC, there was no commitment to full employment (though there was adherence to a policy of tackling unemployment which, arguably, is working towards a similar objective). It was well into the 1980s before one did emerge, with the 1986 *Action Programme on Employment Growth* also indicating acceptance of the view that less labour market regulation may be a good thing. This developed into a commitment to maximising the '*employment rate*' under the EES, but was essentially the same goal of creating jobs for all. However, even after almost six decades of European collaboration, it is nevertheless true that most of the mechanisms available to tackle labour market issues are still with national governments rather than in Brussels.

With the Lisbon Treaty, the approach to employment policy in the EU has come almost full circle. The formation of the EEC in the Treaty of Rome was all about economic integration and employment and social issues were almost an afterthought. Gradually, social policy appeared on the agenda as a key plank of integration, reaching its zenith in Maastricht and its Social Chapter, after which the realities posed by the push for monetary union and the need to create real jobs meant a softer approach to employment policy was followed from the Amsterdam Treaty and beyond – all influenced by the steady enlargement of the EU and recognition that one size was never going to fit all.



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## Annex 1: Statistical Information

Information on basic labour market indicators covering employment and unemployment have been compiled since the formation of the EEC in 1958, but changes in the sources and methods of these statistics mean that there is no guaranteed compatibility over the long period to 1997 and beyond.

The benchmark Community Labour Force Survey (LFS) was introduced in 1983 for the first time, covering the then 12 Member States. Subsequent countries acceding to the EU were required to implement their own survey, adopting the conventions established by Eurostat. Prior to 1983, the information on employment and unemployment was essentially compiled from national statistical sources – normally administrative data, though some Member States did have their own household surveys prior to the adoption of the LFS standards.

In terms of employment, the main indicator used before 1997 was total employment and really it was only after this period that the '*employment rate*' became the key measure and target. However, Eurostat have calculated comparable employment rates for the period from 1987 for the EU-12.

The availability of the data also improved markedly in 1997 and results from the LFS (and other sources) are all available on-line via the Eurostat website from that year onwards. Before this year, the information is only available in published form, mainly in the publications of Eurostat, but also in the '*Employment in Europe*' report which has been published annually since 1989.

**Table 1a: Total Employment EU-12, 1980-1990**

Year	Total (000)	% Male	% Female
1980	127529	64.2	35.8
1981	126483	63.9	36.1
1982	125442	63.6	36.4
1983	124971	63.2	36.8
1984	125175	62.9	37.1
1985	125698	62.6	37.4
1986	126711	62.3	37.7
1987	128880	61.9	38.1
1988	131130	61.5	38.5
1989	133254	61.2	38.8
1990	135554	60.7	39.3

Source: Eurostat (LFS).



**Table 1b: Total Employment EU-15, 1991-2000**

Year	Total (000)	% Male	% Female
1991	153401	59.6	40.1
1992	151408	58.8	41.2
1993	147996	59.0	41.0
1994	147120	58.7	41.3
1995	148728	58.6	41.4
1996	149605	58.3	41.7
1997	150724	58.2	41.8
1998	153251	58.1	41.9
1999	155791	57.6	42.4
2000	158907	57.4	42.6

Source: Eurostat (LFS).

**Table 2: Employment Rate EU-12, 1987-2000**

Year	Total	Male	Female
1987	48.9	63.3	35.8
1988	49.4	63.6	36.5
1989	50.1	64.0	37.2
1990	50.8	64.4	38.3
1991	51.2	64.1	39.3
1992	50.5	62.8	39.2
1993	49.5	61.1	38.8
1994	49.0	60.1	38.6
1995	49.1	60.1	38.8
1996	49.1	59.8	39.2
1997	49.3	59.8	39.5
1998	49.8	60.3	40.1
1999	50.5	60.6	41.0
2000	51.2	61.2	41.9

Source: Eurostat (LFS).

**Table 3: Part-Time Employment EU-12, 1987-2000**  
(Percentage of all employment)

Year	Total	Males	Females
1987	13.1	3.9	27.9
1988	13.2	3.9	28.1
1989	13.2	3.8	28.0
1990	13.5	3.8	28.4
1991	13.5	3.9	27.9
1992	14.2	4.1	28.9
1993	14.7	4.4	29.8
1994	15.4	4.7	30.7
1995	15.8	5.1	31.3
1996	16.2	5.4	31.6
1997	16.8	5.7	32.5
1998	17.3	6.0	33.1



1999	17.7	6.1	33.6
2000	17.9	6.2	33.8

Source: Eurostat (LFS).

**Table 4a: Unemployment Rate EU-12, 1983-1990**

Year	Total	Male	Female	Youth	LTU (long-term unemployment)
1983	9.5	8.4	11.3	21.8	N/A
1984	10.2	9.0	12.1	22.8	N/A
1985	10.4	9.2	12.4	22.4	N/A
1986	10.4	9.0	12.5	21.6	N/A
1987	10.2	8.6	12.6	20.6	52.8
1988	9.5	7.8	12.2	19.0	52.1
1989	8.7	7.0	11.3	16.9	51.6
1990	8.1	6.5	10.4	16.1	48.6

Source: Eurostat (LFS).

**Table 4b: Unemployment Rate EU-15, 1991-2000**

Year	Total	Male	Female	Youth	LTU*
1991	8.2	7.0	10.0	16.1	43.5
1992	9.3	8.1	10.9	17.9	42.3
1993	10.0	9.1	11.2	21.2	43.8
1994	10.4	9.4	11.6	21.7	49.3
1995	10.0	8.9	11.4	21.6	51.0
1996	10.1	9.1	11.4	21.6	50.6
1997	9.8	8.8	11.2	20.9	51.0
1998	9.3	8.2	10.7	19.4	49.8
1999	8.5	7.5	9.9	17.7	48.6
2000	7.7	6.7	8.9	16.0	47.8

\*EU-12 figures

Source: Eurostat (LFS).