

Gap		Phase in				Field					Need	Tool Requirements	Policy and Standards
Description	Prev	Prep	Resp	Rec	C	B	RN	E	Med				
Risks assessment, modelling and impact reduction	Lack of awareness regarding food defence in the food industry within production processes by food safety authorities and food inspectors. Lack of knowledge, guidelines and training on risk assessment methods adapted to Food Defence (ORM, VACCP, TACCP, CARVER+Shock). Lack of correlation between epidemiological information and foodborne issues.	X				X	X	X		X	There is a need to develop standardised methodology, processes and tools of risk assessment, as well as regulations allowing to set up standards for detection, identification, and monitoring. There is a need for evaluation of risks related to residual contamination levels regarding food defence.	Development of tools to support risk assessment of risks related to residual contamination levels regarding food defence. Development of new targeted and non-targeted sensors and rapid detection methods aimed to detect, to assess, to mitigate and to respond to food malicious contamination from chemical, biological or radionuclear agents, through the entire food supply chain.	CBRN Action Plan: (2) Ensuring a more robust preparedness for and response to CBRN security incidents (2.3, 2.4, 2.7), (3) Building stronger internal-external links and engagement in CBRN Security with key Regional and International EU Partners (3.1), (4) Enhancing our knowledge of CBRN risks. Standards for consideration: Standardised methodologies and protocols for assessing the vulnerabilities along the food supply chain. New standardised methods, processes and tools for risk assessment supported by regulations to set the standards for detection, identification and monitoring. Relevant standards and policy for consideration include: FSMA - Final Rule for Mitigation Strategies to Protect Food Against Intentional Adulteration – USA Regulation – 26 Maggio 2016; GFSI Benchmarking Requirements – GFSI Guidance document Version 7.1; BRC Global Standard for safety issue – V08 (August 2018); FSSC 22000 "Food Safety Systems Certification – v 4.1: July 2017; PAS 96:2017 – "Guide to protecting and defending food and drink from deliberate attack"; IFS Food – Standard for auditing quality and food safety of food products – Version 6.1 – November 2017; FSSC 22000 – Guidance on Food Defense – V1 – 10 April 2018.
Risks assessment, modelling and impact reduction	Lack of capabilities for real time threat assessment.	X				X	X	X		X	There is a lack of capabilities for real-time threats assessment which will be able to: 1. Detect and continuously monitor threats and hazards on the incident scene in real time; 2. Assess threat and hazard data to provide appropriate guidance and decision support to responders and commanders; 3. Provide visualization capability of threat locations and proximity to responders.	Potential solutions should detect, assess, and monitor active threats on the incident scene and should: •detect and identify emerging threats and hazards; •provide information on detected CBRNE agents; •allow responders to identify and designate the location (geolocate) of threats and hazards; •continuously monitor the status of identified threats and hazards on the incident scene; •display threat and hazard data in a manner that is designed to minimize distraction and cognitive failure; •generate an alert when active and passive threats and hazards are detected or evolve, based on agency-configured thresholds or parameters; •transmit threat and hazard data to authorized personnel; •be designed to minimize equipment burdens for the responder, while maintaining interoperability of components; •use a non-proprietary power source that provides sufficient power for an operational period; •be easy to operate, calibrate, and maintain throughout the service life; integrate with existing data sets, model outputs, and emergency response software systems to remotely capture and monitor hazard-related data in multiple topographies; •operate within multiple environments; •be designed to minimize price of system, consumables, and maintenance. •needs to be compatible with PPE and Respirators	CBRN Action Plan: (2) Ensuring a more robust preparedness for and response to CBRN security incidents (2.5 to 2.7), ((4) Enhancing our knowledge of CBRN risks. Standards for consideration: Compliance with Wireless Communications Protocols and Standards (e.g. IEEE 802.11); hardening, ruggedisation and IP design standards (e.g. MIL-STD); safety standards (e.g. CE) and the data format standard IEC 63047. Detection/Identification of compounds listed in NATO International Task Force 25 (ITF-25) list TICs and TIMs and in OPCW Scheduled lists of chemical agents. Equipment (tools, devices, platforms or systems) gap as identified by the IFAFRI International Forum to Advance First Responder Innovation study.
Risks assessment, modelling and impact reduction	Lack of common risk assessment processes, general knowledge regarding available methodology, processes for the sharing of results, measures and regulations for setting up minimum standards to ensure the use of adequate detection equipment, clear exceptions on privacy rights in case of extreme crisis situations in applicable legal framework at the EU level.	X				X	X	X		X	There is a need to prepare methodology and tools of risk assessment, residual risks of the secondary exposure process, allowable contamination levels which will be implemented in the EU Member States. Regulations according to set up standards for detection, identification, and monitoring.	Development of methodologies and tools to support the fast risk assessment of the residual risks of secondary exposure.	CBRN Action Plan: (2) Ensuring a more robust preparedness for and response to CBRN security incidents (2.4 to 2.5), (3) Building stronger internal - external links in CBRN security with key regional and international ,(4) Enhancing our knowledge of CBRN risks.

Risk Reduction	Lack of adequate control for access to food industry premises and labs. Insufficient security at research and industrial facilities; additional fail safes within industrial facilities focusing on limiting the consequences of sabotage by aggressors.	X				X	X	X	X	There is a need to develop standardised methodology, processes and tools of risk assessment, as well as regulations allowing to set up standards for detection, identification, and monitoring.	Development of standardised methodologies, processes and tools of risk assessment, as well as regulations allowing to set up standards for detection, identification, and monitoring.	#NA
First responders protection	Lack of standardised or universal and multifunctional (with integrated sensor systems) PPE for daily-use, that is not heavy and bulky. Lack of respiratory protection, with an extended range of protection from toxic agents. Lack of standardised PPE for EOD team. Lack of PPE usable for USAR in CBRN conditions.		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Find the optimum balance between comfort, systems integration and protection of PPE (standardised, light - for longer use, usable also at high temperatures, and including communication, localisation devices and sensors), which could potentially combine following futures: a) Respiratory protection system with an improved sound quality for communication; b) PPE which would accommodate the breathing apparatus; c) Gloves that allow to use touch screen devices and buttons; d) Protective suits against general toxic threats (with no changing of air filters); e) Rubble resistant PPE (tearing, close fitting) suitable for working in a CBRN environment. There is a need to develop a PPE for EOD team which will combine the characteristics of protection for CBRN agents and EOD threat. There is a need to develop a PPE for SAR team which will combine the characteristics of protection for CBRN agents and USAR conditions.	Development of standard and multifunctional, light, non-bulky and easily manoeuvrable PPE. The development needs to find the optimum balance between comfort, systems integration and protection of PPE (standardised, light – for longer use, usable also at high temperatures, and including communication, localisation devices and sensors): - For the Respiratory protection system there needs to be improved sound quality for communication and consideration for others ways to present information more easily to the operator; - For Respiratory protections to first responders to be able to protect towards a range of toxic agents; - To consider incorporation into PPE of a breathing apparatus; - For the gloves they need to be able to use touch screen devices and buttons; - For protective suits to be able to protect against general toxic threats (with no changing of air filters); - For protective suit to be rubble resistant (tearing, close fitting) and suitable for working in a CBRN environment. Development of a PPE solution for the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team which will combine the characteristics of protection for CBRN agents and EOD threat. Development of a PPE for SAR team which will combine the characteristics of protection for CBRN agents and USAR conditions , this should take into consideration that USAR teams can take 20 minutes to reach personnel.	CBRN Action Plan: (2) Ensuring a more robust preparedness for and response to CBRN security incidents (2.2, 2.8), 4.2 Harnessing the benefits of EU security research (4.2.2) Standards for consideration: EU regulation 2016/425
Critical infrastructures and networks	Critical Infrastructure Protection against CBRNE threats. Lack of minimum standards for security-relevant infrastructure. Lack of sufficient secure by design ventilation systems.	X	X			X	X	X		There is a need to improve protection of critical infrastructure against CBRNE threats. There is a lack of standardisation in relevant infrastructure security. There is a lack of secured and monitored system in the infrastructure (HVAC system, water system, etc.)	Development of an approach (system design) and tools (network of tools) allowing for efficient protections against CBRNE threats.	CBRN Action Plan: (2) Ensuring a more robust preparedness for and response to CBRN security incidents, (4) Enhancing our knowledge of CBRN risks. (2.7, 2.8), 4.2 Harnessing the benefits of EU security research (4.2.2) Standards for consideration: Compliance with Wireless Communications Protocols and Standards (e.g. IEEE 802.11); hardening, ruggedisation and IP design standards (e.g. MIL-STD); safety standards (e.g. CE) and the data format standard IEC 63047. Development of standards to support critical infrastructure security
Devices for detection and identification	Lack of CBRNE detectors for wash water and water used in food production processes.	X	X			X	X			There is a need to developed detection systems allowing to monitor wash water and water at different stages of food production processes.	Developed detection systems allowing to monitor wash water and water at different stages of food production processes.	CBRN Action Plan: (2) Ensuring a more robust preparedness for and response to CBRN security incidents (2.3, 2.4, (3) Building stronger internal - external links in CBRN security with key regional and international (3-1) Standards for consideration: Detection/Identification of compounds listed in NATO International Task Force 25 (ITF-25) list TICs and TIMs and in OPCW Scheduled lists of chemical agents; data format standard IEC 63047.

Devices for detection and identification	DIM CBRN device			X		X	X	X		There is a need to develop DIM CBRN device that is robust, usable, interoperable, 12 hours operation, secure real time transmission, auto-calibration and self calibrate. These device should potentially fulfil forensic chain of custody requirements for data. Rapidly identify hazardous agents and contaminants.	Development of DIM CBRN device that is robust and has 12 hours operation, is easy to operate, capable of self-calibration, and maintain throughout the service life. The device should allow easy integration or should be compatible with existing systems. It should provide secure real time transmission to authorised personnel and present appropriate information to the user in a clear manner. These device should also fulfil forensic chain of custody requirements for data collection.	CBRN Action Plan: (2) Ensuring a more robust preparedness for and response to CBRN security incidents (2.3, 2.4, 2.7), (3) Building stronger internal - external links in CBRN security with key regional and international (3-1) Standards for consideration: Compliance with Wireless Communications Protocols and Standards (e.g. IEEE 802.11); new PPDR (Broadway); hardening, ruggedisation and IP design standards (e.g. MIL-STD); safety standards (e.g. CE) and the data format standard IEC 63047. Detection/Identification of compounds listed in NATO International Task Force 25 (ITF-25) list TICs and TIMs and in OPCW Scheduled lists of chemical agents.
Devices for detection and identification	Rapid identification of hazardous agents and contaminants.		X	X	X	X	X	X		There is a lack of the capabilities for rapid identification of CBRNE agents which will be able to: 1. Detects hazardous agents and contaminants on the incident scene in real time; 2. Transmits hazard data to responders and commanders; and 3. Provides pertinent information regarding the threat or hazard.	Potential solutions should detect and identify hazardous agents and threats in real time. Potential solutions should: • Detect hazardous chemicals i.e., CWA, TICs, TIMs, VOCs; • Detect biological agents i.e., BWA; • Detect ionizing radiation i.e., alpha, beta, gamma; • Detect explosive compounds and precursors; • Detect levels of atmospheric gases (e.g., O2, CO); • Detect airborne particulate matter; • Identify the specific agent or isotope; • Measure quantity, volume, and concentration of hazards; • Provide pertinent information, including modes of exposure and protective action information (e.g., PPE, standoff distances, immediate treatments, decontamination requirements); • Detect, analyse, and provide feedback in real time; • Detect agent in all states; • Measure hazardous agents and contaminants continuously; • Allow no false negatives; • Allow no false positives; • Geolocate agents and contaminants within a set perimeter around response personnel on an incident-specific map; • Generate an alert when agents and contaminants are detected, based on agency-configured thresholds or parameters; • Transmit threat and hazard data to authorized personnel; • Be designed to minimize equipment burdens for the responder, while maintaining interoperability of components; • Use a non-proprietary power source that provides sufficient power for an operational period; • Be easy to operate, calibrate, and maintain throughout the service life; • Integrate with existing data sets, model outputs, and emergency response software systems to remotely capture and monitor hazard-related data in multiple topographies; • Operate within multiple environments; • Be designed to minimize price of system, consumables, and maintenance.	CBRN Action Plan: (2) Ensuring a more robust preparedness for and response to CBRN security incidents (2.5) Standards for consideration: Compliance with Wireless Communications Protocols and Standards (e.g. IEEE 802.11); new PPDR (Broadway); hardening, ruggedisation and IP design standards (e.g. MIL-STD); safety standards (e.g. CE) and the data format standard IEC 63047. Detection/Identification of compounds listed in NATO International Task Force 25 (ITF-25) list TICs and TIMs and in OPCW Scheduled lists of chemical agents.
Devices for detection and identification	There is a lack of miniature, fieldable and cheap tools and systems for sampling, detection and identification of CBRNE agents, which could be mounted on robots or drones.	X	X		X	X	X	X		There is a need for smaller, cheaper, lighter and fieldable systems for sampling, detection and identification which could be mounted on robots or drones. Such systems should allow to fulfil all requirements needed to carry out CBRNE forensic investigation.	Development of smaller, cheaper, lighter and fieldable systems that can be used for CBRN sampling, detection and identification which could be mounted on robots or drones. Such systems should allow to fulfil all requirements needed to carry out CBRNE forensic investigation. DIM information should be able to be transmitted to authorised personnel in 'real time'. The solution should be easy to operate, calibrate, and maintain throughout the service life. The solution should integrate or be compatible with existing service solutions.	CBRN Action Plan: (2) Ensuring a more robust preparedness for and response to CBRN security incidents (2.3, 2.3, 2.5, 2.6) Standards for consideration: Compliance with Wireless Communications Protocols and Standards (e.g. IEEE 802.11); new PPDR (Broadway); hardening, ruggedisation and IP design standards (e.g. MIL-STD); safety standards (e.g. CE) and the data format standard IEC 63047. Detection/Identification of compounds listed in NATO International Task Force 25 (ITF-25) list TICs and TIMs and in OPCW Scheduled lists of chemical agents.

Devices for detection and identification	Lack of stand-off detectors for CBRNE threats cheap enough to allow a spatially comprehensive deployment. Lack of working tools for point and stand-off detection of biological agents.		X	X		X	X	X	X	There is a need for improved stand-off detection of CBRNE threats in field and urban area, which will allow for better and more efficient situation awareness of possible CBRN clouds and contaminations, detection of explosives from safe distance.	Development of cheaper and improved stand-off detection systems for CBRNE that are suitable for use in the field and urban environments, surface contamination and aerosol. Information management and presentation to the user should be clear and easy to use. The solution should be easy to operate, calibrate, and maintain throughout the service life. The solution should integrate or be compatible with existing service solutions.	CBRN Action Plan: (2) Ensuring a more robust preparedness for and response to CBRN security incidents (2.3, 2.4, 2.5) Standards for consideration: Compliance with Wireless Communications Protocols and Standards (e.g. IEEE 802.11); hardening, ruggedisation and IP design standards (e.g. MIL-STD); safety standards (e.g. CE) and the data format standard IEC 63047. Detection/Identification of compounds listed in NATO International Task Force 25 (ITF-25) list TICs and TIMs and in OPCW Scheduled lists of chemical agents.
Devices for detection and identification	There is lack of more generic detectors, which would allow detection of the mixtures of toxic compounds.	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	There is a need for more generic multi-purpose detectors that can detect a mixture of chemicals and toxic compounds and provide faster analytical answers to first responders. A need for better on-site detection methods/detectors for rapid decisions when there has been an incident, or if want to detect preparations of illegal activities. There is a need to be able to use detectors (e.g Raman, IR) to provide better evaluation of authentic and complex samples that contain toxic substances and evaluate whether it is possible to conduct forensic analysis? (e.g. Can patterns reveal information on who prepared it?)	Development of generic multi-purpose detectors that can be used to detect a mixture of chemicals and toxic compounds for on-site detection to support rapid decisions when there has been an incident. The potential solutions should consider various strategies for combining the existing technologies. Develop the ability to use detectors (Raman IR?) for better evaluation of authentic and complex samples that contain toxic substances. The solution needs to support forensic analysis.(e.g. Can patterns reveal information on who prepared it?)	CBRN Action Plan: (2) Ensuring a more robust preparedness for and response to CBRN security incidents (2.3, 2.4, 2.5) Standards for consideration: Compliance with Wireless Communications Protocols and Standards (e.g. IEEE 802.11); hardening, ruggedisation and IP design standards (e.g. MIL-STD); safety standards (e.g. CE) and the data format standard IEC 63047. Detection/Identification of compounds listed in NATO International Task Force 25 (ITF-25) list TICs and TIMs and in OPCW Scheduled lists of chemical agents.
Devices for detection and identification	There is lack of simple, reliable, fast, robust, accurate, sensitive detection/analysis of both chemicals and biological agents.			X		X	X			There is a need for multi-purpose detection systems that are simple, reliable, fast, robust, accurate, and are sensitive for detection/analysis of both chemicals and biological-agents.	Development of portable multi-purpose detection systems that are simple, reliable, fast, robust, accurate, and are sensitive for detection/analysis of both chemicals and biological-agents.	CBRN Action Plan: (2) Ensuring a more robust preparedness for and response to CBRN security incidents(2.3, 2.4, 2.5) Standards for consideration: Compliance with Wireless Communications Protocols and Standards (e.g. IEEE 802.11); hardening, ruggedisation and IP design standards (e.g. MIL-STD); safety standards (e.g. CE) and the data format standard IEC 63047. Detection/Identification of compounds listed in NATO International Task Force 25 (ITF-25) list TICs and TIMs and in OPCW Scheduled lists of chemical agents.
Devices for detection and identification	Infrastructure and buildings should be ideally equipped with the CBRNE sensors allowing i.e. for detection of dangerous agents in the ventilation systems.	X				X	X			Design buildings with CBRNE detection and security taken into account (e.g. configuration of heating/ventilation in a way that reduces or prevents dissemination of agents, installing FAE igniters as countermeasures etc.)	Dedicated tools and systems, which should allow to protect infrastructure and buildings against CBRNE threats. The solution should be easy to operate, calibrate, and maintain throughout the service life.	CBRN Action Plan: (2) Ensuring a more robust preparedness for and response to CBRN security incidents (2.3, 2.4, 2.5) Detection/Identification of compounds listed in NATO International Task Force 25 (ITF-25) list TICs and TIMs, and OPCW Scheduled lists of chemical agents. Standard for consideration: the data format standard IEC 63047.
CBRN identification	Detection and identification of concealed dangerous materials (CBE agents) such as white powders in envelopes.					X	X	X	X	Improved detection and identification of concealed dangerous materials (CBE).	Development of improved detection and identification solutions for protection against concealed dangerous materials e.g. such as white powders in envelopes. The solution should be easy to operate, calibrate, and maintain throughout the service life. The solution should not be bespoke for one agent.	CBRN Action Plan: (2) Ensuring a more robust preparedness for and response to CBRN security incidents (2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7) Standards for consideration: Compliance with hardening, ruggedisation and IP design standards (e.g. MIL-STD); the data format standard IEC 63047. Detection of known biological agents e.g. those listed in US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Category lists. Detection/Identification of compounds listed in NATO International Task Force 25 (ITF-25) list TICs and TIMs, and OPCW Scheduled lists of chemical agents.

CBRN identification	Tools and procedures supporting first responders in easier recognition of contamination-related symptoms and allowing them to analyse correctly the situation.		X	X		X	X	X			Fast identification of affected people (and contaminated belongings).	Development of improved detection and monitoring at the crisis incident to quickly identify affected people and contaminated items. Solutions should ideally involve stand-off detection and monitoring systems and should present the information to the incident commander or medical personnel in a clear and informative manner. The solution should be easy to operate, calibrate, and maintain throughout the service life.	CBRN Action Plan: (2) Ensuring a more robust preparedness for and response to CBRN security incidents (2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7) Standards for consideration: Compliance with Wireless Communications Protocols and Standards (e.g. IEEE 802.11); hardening, ruggedisation and IP design standards (e.g. MIL-STD); safety standards (e.g. CE) and the data format standard IEC 63047. Detection/Identification of compounds listed in NATO International Task Force 25 (ITF-25) list TICs and TIMs
CBRN identification	Forensic CBRN teams are present only in a few countries in Europe. Lack of procedures for forensic activities in the hot zone. Forensic laboratories are not equipped for safe investigation of CBRN materials. Sampling on the incident site focuses on identification for health and safety purposes, not on forensic purposes. Current decontamination methods destructive towards forensic trace materials. Lack of methods for first analysis on the field. Sufficient on-site forensic capability is lacking.			X		X	X	X	X		CBRN Forensic capabilities are still needed to be developed in many countries. There is a need to prepare EU level SOP, standardisation documents, how to share information between EU countries in CBRN Forensics area. Especially in the area of sampling, decontamination methods, equipment. There is a need to equip forensic national labs to perform CBRN materials analysis. Lack of methods for sufficient on-site forensic - field analysis. Product to be laid or sprayed on a C/B/R device, or a pool or powder to fix them without modification of their nature (forensic).	There is a need to develop at the EU level SOP, standardisation documents, protocols for information sharing between EU countries in CBRN Forensics area. There is a need to develop methods for sufficient on-site forensic - field analysis also to some extent by the first responders. To achieve that there is need to develop basic forensic training curriculum for the first responders.	CBRN Action Plan: (2) Ensuring a more robust preparedness for and response to CBRN security incidents (2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7) CBRN Forensic. There is need to prepare EU level SOP, standardisation documents, how to share information between EU countries in area CBRN Forensics. Especially in the area of sampling, decontamination methods, equipment (Forensic national labs equipped to perform CBRN materials analysis. Lack of methods for sufficient on-site forensic - field analysis. Product to be laid or sprayed on a C/B/R device, or a pool or powder to fix them without modification of their nature (forensic). Possible implementation of STANAG 4359 (AEP-10) - NATO Handbook for Sampling of Chemical Warfare Agents Possible parallels with crime scene standards and practices (e.g. ISO/IEC 17020:2012 Requirements for the operation of various types of bodies performing inspection)
CBRN identification	There is a gap in the ability to provide geographical identification or the institutional source of a chemical agent used as part of the forensics.			X	X	X					There is a growing need for improved forensic inquiries into chemical attacks to forensics to track down the source of chemical agents - to definitively identify the geographical or institutional source of a chemical agent used.	Development of improved forensic capability to allow geographical sources or identification of the institution of the source to be made, chemical attribution signatures is one method that can be considered. An additional tasks should include development of a database of signatures of chemical agents (weapons) and their precursors.	CBRN Action Plan: (2) Ensuring a more robust preparedness for and response to CBRN security incidents (2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7)
Situation Assessment	The Command truck is equipped with limited number of sensors, such as wind direction and meteorology, providing information on the situational awareness. All the information on situational awareness is usually obtained from radio voice communication.			X		X	X	X	X		The big need for easy to use and clear "data on one screen" from heterogeneous sources, giving the whole picture and dynamically updatable.	Development of improved human machine interface for 'command' screens so that operational picture is clear and easily dynamically updated. Information should be managed so the user has access to the most appropriate information at the right time. Information will need to be tailored to the type of screen being used e.g. responder, command station, head set. Information needs to be presented in a manner that is designed to minimize distraction and cognitive failure.	CBRN Action Plan: (2) Ensuring a more robust preparedness for and response to CBRN security incidents (2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7) Standards for consideration, Common symbology, NATO APP-6 and the data format standard IEC 63047.
Situation Assessment	Joint Operational Picture and tactical command toolkit			X		X	X	X	X		There is a need for improved information gathering in real time for all forces that is managed, secure, prioritised and tailored to the role and force, supported by improved on scene command decision support.	Robust, intuitive, reliable and suitable for the operating environment. Adaptive flexible, and intelligent tactical command toolkit. Adaptive, flexible information management system for Joint Operational Picture. Needs to be able to be easily updated with new threats, procedures etc. Should be easy to operate and maintain throughout the service life. Should integrate or be compatible with existing service solutions.	CBRN Action Plan: (2) Ensuring a more robust preparedness for and response to CBRN security incidents (2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7) Standards for consideration, Common symbology, NATO APP-6 and the data format standard IEC 63047.
Decontamination and Depollution	Decontamination of CBRN contaminated forensic evidence				X	X	X	X			There is a need to develop procedures and materials, which will allow safe decontamination of forensic evidence.	Development of procedures and materials to support safe decontamination of forensic evidence.	CBRN Action Plan: (2) Ensuring a more robust preparedness for and response to CBRN security incidents (2.3, 2.6, 2.7) Development of procedures to support safe decontamination of forensic evidence.

Decontamination and Depollution	Lack of knowledge and generally accepted decision mechanisms (including standardisation of methodologies that determine acceptable [safe] contamination levels) to define reusability ("how clean is clean"), and to keep the balance between decontamination and rebuilding or replacement. Lack of guidelines or standards which comprise procedures of sampling, and how to accomplish a mission of resiliency after contamination.			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	There is a need to develop "How clean is clean" standards and EU wide defined mass decontamination procedures. There is a need to develop guideline or standards which consist procedures about sampling (how to built and perform sampling plan), decontamination (how to assess the level of contamination) and how to accomplish a mission of resiliency after contamination.	#NA	<p>CBRN Action plan: (2) Ensuring a more robust preparedness for and response to CBRN security incidents (2.3) (4) Enhancing our knowledge of CBRN risks (4.2.2)</p> <p>Development of EU standards to support "how clean is clean". There is a need to develop guideline or standards which consist procedures about sampling (how to built and perform sampling plan), decontamination (how to assess the level of contamination) and how to accomplish a mission of resiliency after contamination.</p>
Decontamination and Depollution	There is a lack of efficient and effective CBR decontamination systems that are environmentally friendly.				X	X	X	X				There is a need for efficient and effective CBR decontamination systems that are environmentally friendly. 'Dry' decon to be better understood and more widely practised. A capability for remediated/re-cycling on site any liquid decontaminate created from decon process/any mass decon showering.	Technique and/or substances for decontamination to prevent possible contamination of environment and groundwater.	<p>CBRN Action plan: (2) Ensuring a more robust preparedness for and response to CBRN security incidents (2.3) (4) Enhancing our knowledge of CBRN risks (4.2.2)</p> <p>Standards for consideration: National standards and procedures for Hazard response</p>