Looking forward: future migration trends and research needs for Europe

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Understanding and Tackling the Migration Challenge: The Role of Research

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“Epimenides did not practice divination about the future; only about things that were past but still obscure.”

(Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, III, 17, 10)
Can demographers and social scientists make reasonable predictions about migration flows?

To put it bluntly: NO

But let’s elaborate a little more...
DEMOGRAPHIC PROJECTIONS FOR MIGRATIONS

Scope and limitations
Pascal K. Whelpton: first example of a cohort-component projection (*AJS*, 1928)

**THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY**

**Volume XXXIV**  **September 1928**  **Number 2**

**Population of the United States, 1925 to 1975**

P. K. Whelpton
Scripps Foundation, Miami University
Whelpton’s statements (1928)

- Whelpton elaborated alternative forecast variants (high, middle, low)
  - But the users generally consider the central variant only, which is assumed to be more likely or realistic

- “These estimates represent simply what will happen under certain conditions of immigration, birth-rates, and death-rates, conditions that are believed to be reasonable, based on the experience of recent years”
Cohort-component method: stepwise estimates

- Initial population by sex and age (including the number of women of childbearing age)

**Fertility**
- Fertility rate by age
- Sex-ratio at birth
- Births during the year

**Mortality**
- Life table (survival rate at each age)
- Survivors at the end of the year

**Migration**
- Net migration by sex and age

Population by sex and age at the end of the year

Derived ratios: age structure, sex ratio, dependency rates ...
The population of DEVELOPED countries in year 2000 according to the UN projections published since the 1950s (millions)

All points = year 2000

Date of publication

The main reason: the unforeseen “Second demographic transition” (SDT)

- The big surprise of the “second demographic transition”
  - Later unions, later births, less births, **more deaths than births**
  - Unprecedented

- Started in **Germany** from 1970 onwards, followed by Central Europe (Hungary), then Southern Europe
  - Few exceptions: France, Iceland ...

- Consequences of SDT
  - Growing needs in care for the elderly and daycare for the children
  - Crucial role played by migration as “replacement” force

- A new challenge for demographers
  - No model B to figure out the future of the SDT
    - Projections are now a very difficult exercise
Probabilistic projections

3 families of models

- Keilman (2006): analysis of the fluctuations of times-series
- Lutz et al. (2010, VID/IIASA): explicit inclusion of arguments by experts, including the trends in net migration
- Bijak (in Raymer & Willekens 2008): Bayesian forecasts, updating “prior judgements” with time-series

However, frustrating results

- Huge prediction intervals (following slide)
- Not really usable for policy-makers
- Bayesian models: mainly useful in case of cyclical migration
Net migration (‰) for some Member States in 2010-2050
Probabilistic projections by VID/IIASA (2008) based on
Eurostat assumptions, median and 80% prediction interval
The divide between ordinary and extraordinary migrations

- **Ordinary migrations** = constant flows under international Human Rights conventions other than asylum
  - the right to marry whom you want
    (marriage migration to join a national)
  - the right to live in a family
    (family reunification with immigrant)
  - **Students?** More and more a *de facto* right
    (to study abroad in a good university)
  - And/or regular flows of workers within the local “migration system”

- **Extraordinary** migration = sudden and massive flows due to exceptional events
  - asylum seekers
  - economic exiles (e.g., Ecuadorians in 1999-2000)

- **Research needs**
  - What kind of links between ordinary and extraordinary migration?
An example of “ordinary” immigration: France 2005-2014
Legal permanent migrants from non-EU countries

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Population growth = “natural increase” (Births – Deaths) + “net migration” (Immigration – Emigration)

France (mainland)

Per 1000 inhabitants
Germany (East + West)

Per 1000 inhabitants

Taux d'accroissement migratoire
Taux d'accroissement naturel

Population aged 20-64 over the 5 coming decades for selected European countries (UN Prospects, median scenario)

- Sweden: +18%
- UK: +7%
- France: +1%
- Netherlands: -11%
- DE, IT, ES: -30%
- Hungary: -35%
- Croatia: -39%
- Poland: -42%

Years: 2015, 2020, 2025, 2030, 2035, 2040, 2045, 2050, 2055, 2060, 2065
Sensitivity of the projections to migration scenarios
1/ scenario with the current level (before 2015) of net migration
2/ zero migration scenario
While net migration cannot be predicted, we can foresee its growing importance for population dynamics

- Inexorably, the natural increase will decline in Europe within the next decades for two reasons:
  - baby-boomers will eventually die
    - more deaths
  - the number of women of childbearing age is declining
    - less births (even with constant fertility)

- Therefore, although we assume stable net migration rates in the future, they will necessarily account for a greater part of the population growth, and even a dominant part
More deaths, less births: inexorable decline of the natural increase in Europe, including UK and France

UN Prospects, 2015 revision

Absolute numbers, thousands

- UK
- France
- Poland
- Spain
- Italy
- Germany

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Consequences on migration policy

- Most of the national policies implemented by the Member States are focused on the control of migration inflows.

- The rationale:
  - limited receiving capacities (a concept which does not resist the proof of international comparisons)
  - the will to preserve the predominance of the natives (“national identity”)

- However
  A decrease in immigration by 20%, for example, will just postpone for a few years the moment in which migration will become the driving force of population growth.

- Better strategy: priority to integration policies
FACTORS OF PREDICTABILITY
Factors which (apparently) could make migration more foreseeable

- **Macro- or mega-factors**
  - “Global megatrends”
  - Human rights-driven migrations

- **Micro-behaviour**
  - The intentions/realization nexus

- **Push factors**
  - Forced migrations (as registered by UN HCR and IOM)
  - Self-perpetuated migration chains
  - Cyclical migrations (turn-over)

- **Pull factors**
  - Economic needs (considering the skilled/unskilled distribution)
  - Demographic needs (demand for caregivers)
  - “Magnet effect” / efecto llamada / appel d’air
  - Generosity of the social protection system (“benefits tourism”)
Global “megatrends” in mobility?

- In the long term, global megatrends such as
  - the globalisation of the economy
  - the global warming
  - faster online connectivity
  - intensification of conflicts (civil wars + international interventions)
  influence individual decisions on where to study, work, marry, raise children or retire

- But not necessarily towards a greater mobility:
  - extension of remote work
  - extra-costs of expatriation less affordable to companies
  - security reasons
  - seashores less attractive for climatic reasons
  - displaced persons in neighbouring countries
The need to have a more diversified view on the role of “migration chains” / networks / individual actors


The reversibility of Network analysis:
– “density” = poverty, “strong” ties = narrow and repetitive, etc.

Migration driven by emancipation aspirations
– women from men, children from parents or kin groups

A two-step process
– In the beginning, ethnic solidarity alleviates the cultural, psychological and financial costs of migration
– but thereafter, it can raise the cost of integration, reinforce the barriers (e.g. marriage migration instead of exogamy)
Sources of forced migration: at least 15 recent conflicts across the world (UNHCR report 2015)

- In the past five years, 15 conflicts have erupted, forcing millions of people to flee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Conflicts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire, Central Afr. Republic, Libya, Mali, northeastern Nigeria, DR Congo, South Sudan, Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Syria, Iraq, Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan, and several areas of Myanmar and Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Not to mention dictatorial regimes like *Eritrea*

- A strong need to intensify research on all these countries and beyond (on and with the South in general)
Scaling up aid spending, is it a solution to curb (and foresee) emigration from the South?

Assumptions:
- Emigration is due to (extreme) poverty
  - Syria = counter-example
- Aid is effective and accountable
  - See OECD’s measure of effectiveness, and the Paris Declaration Principles (2005) on mutual accountability

What evidence so far on the ODA/migration nexus?
- Sustained growth seems to curb emigration of unskilled labour while encouraging immigration of skilled labour

Reconciling two opposite visions
- Aid as an instrument to curb migration
- Migration as an instrument for development
  - I.e. migration itself (together with trade) seen as a “non-aid policy”
One unknown: the future behaviour of ex-communist countries towards immigrants

- Strong divide between liberal Europe and ex-communist countries in their attitudes vis-à-vis immigration
  - On the East side no experience of the massive contribution of migrants to the Reconstruction and Expansion periods (1955-1974)
  - 25 years after the Fall of the Wall the East/West divide persists within Germany (*next slide*)
  - Pegida movement mainly rooted in the New Länder

- In these areas, "receiving capacities" are more limited by political and historical factors than by economic ones

- A challenge for research and policy: analysing these brakes in Eastern and Central Europe
Germany 2011

Share of population with “migration background” (1st + 2nd gen.) by Land

Source: 2011 Census
Intentions to migrate: the gap between potential and actual migration

- Worldwide Gallup Survey: Potential Net Migration Index
  - aggregated surveys in 154 countries in 2010-2012
  - 520,000 adults aged 15 and +

“Ideally, if you had the opportunity, would you like to move permanently to another country, or would you prefer to continue living in this country?”

- If first answer: “To which country?”
  [only 1 response allowed]
“Potential” or ideal migration?

- Summing all Gallup surveys around 2011, \(13\%\) of the adults in the world would like to emigrate
  \[
  = 13\% \text{ of } 5.4 \text{ Billions } \approx 700 \text{ Millions}
  \]

- Millions of wishes by preferred destinations
  (extrapolated from the samples)
  - **US**: 138 (of which 19 millions from China)
  - **UK**: 42
  - **Canada**: 37
  - **France**: 31
  - **Saudi Arabia**: 29
  - **Germany**: 28
  - **Australia**: 26
Should these figures be taken seriously?

- “Ideal” questions give ideas to people
- According to the same surveys, Westerners are longing for expatriation as well:
  - 27% of the Germans,
  - 27% of the British,
  - 18% of the French
  - (≈5 times more than observed expatriations)
- NIDI and INED surveys in countries of origin:
  - less than 30% of potential migrants envisage to emigrate within 12 months
  - less than 2% have started preparations

⇒ A long way from dreams to reality!
⇒ “Potential” migration has little predictive power
The “Diversity Visa Program” (DV): permanent resident visas to persons from countries with low rates of immigration to the US

Requirements: high school education or two years of work experience

In 2015, during the 30-day application period

- 9.4 Million qualified entries on line (from the right countries)
- 14.4 Million with spouses and children

Applicants selected at random from the entries

= 125,514

Visas available:

= 50,000 → success rate: 0.35% (1/290)

A clue to potential migration?

- The list of countries deserves attention
On line applicants to the US DV Lottery, 2015

Not eligible in 2015: Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, mainland China, Colombia, Haiti, India, Jamaica, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, S. Korea, UK, Vietnam, etc.
When “rational” scenarios turn to be unrealistic

- Emergency proposal to relocate 120,000 refugees from Italy, Greece and Hungary (EC Plan, Sept. 2015)

- “Fair” allocation of asylum seekers across EU
  - proportional to the population
  - proportional to the wealth of destination countries
  - inversely proportional to the unemployment rate
  - inversely proportional to the demands already registered in the last 5 years

- Why did it fail? At first sight, a threefold problem of acceptance
  - public opinions: fears on security, cultural distance, “identity”
  - the states: national sovereignty
  - the migrants: they make their own choice
INTEGRATION INDICATORS

A dynamic view
Europe 2012-2013: unemployment rate at ages 15-64

Host country nationals → 3rd country nationals

Source: Labour Force Surveys

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Integration measures: 2 x 2 methods

In a broad spectrum of domains: education, housing, employment, income, fertility, language, sociability, cultural practices, civic behaviour, discrimination...
(see “Zaragoza indicators” used by Eurostat)

First dilemma

1. **Static** comparison of indicators between migrants and natives ➔ cross-cut survey

2. **Dynamic** comparison: measuring over time the alignment of a cohort of migrants with a reference population (natives, genders, generations)

   Do they move gradually closer? ➔ longitudinal survey

   Useful for prospective and defining targets

   Caveat: the importance of “segmented integration”
Example of a dynamic measure of integration

Source: ELIPA, Enquête longitudinale sur l’intégration des primo-arrivants (French Ministry of Interior)
**Integration measures: 2 x 2 methods**

Second methodological dilemma

A. **Crude** comparison of indicators

B. **Net** comparison “all other things being equal”

Example: academic success of natives *versus* migrants, **controlling for** age, gender, SEG, education of parents...

- Net comparisons may reveal discriminations

- They show that most of the differences are not due to innate properties but to a series of social handicaps

- *However*, local actors don’t tackle situations “other things being equal” but “all things unequal staying together”

_Caveat:_ Net comparison is but a thought experiment: If migrants were like natives they would do as well (see Maurice Halbwachs’ critique: a camel with all the properties of a reindeer would easily survive in Lapland)
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

New tools for new explorations
Actions and words around migration issues

- The migration debate: “A dialogue of the deaf”? (Marc Angenot, McGill)
- We need to analyse the arguments, not only the lexicon
  - the interplay of *logos*, *ethos*, *pathos* (reasons, symbols, emotions) in the debate
  - the discourse-fact nexus
- Towards a typology of the arguments handled in the migration debate
  see G. Perelman, A. O. Hirschman, D. Walton, R. Amossy, M. Angenot ...
  - the slippery-slope argument, the perverse effect, the Danaids jar, all arguments based on the fear of the future, the fear of uncontrolled chain of events, progressive invasion, eventual loss of identity ...
  - similarity versus alterity, universalism versus culturalism, etc.
  - logic of rights versus logic of interests (utilitarianism)
  - emergency aid versus long-term action
  - proactive versus “laissez-faire” policy
  - competition between insiders and outsiders, old-comers and newcomers
  - etc.
- To tackle these questions, we have to mobilise
  - Natural Language Processing, Data mining, digital humanities in general
  - but also combine political science, behavioural sciences and sciences of the mind