The impact of a policy on an outcome can be estimated by computing a double difference, one over time (before-after) and one across subjects (between beneficiaries and non beneficiaries). In its simplest form, this method requires only aggregate data on the outcome variable: no covariates or microdata are strictly necessary. If sample average data is available for beneficiaries and non beneficiaries for at least two time periods, the difference-in-differences (DID) method produces estimates of impacts that are in principle more plausible than those based on a single difference (either over time or between groups). However, some untestable assumptions are still needed in order to identify impacts through double differencing.
There are two ways to explain how double differencing produces impact estimates. The most intuitive is to start out with the difference in outcomes between beneficiaries and non beneficiaries, measured after the intervention has taken place (for example, the difference in average employment between supported and non supported SME, a year after the support has been provided.) As seen in the introductory chapter, such difference does not reveal the effect of the intervention, since beneficiaries tend to be different from non beneficiaries even in the absence of the intervention. This is what we called selection bias. Now, let us suppose we have data on the outcome variable for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries observed before the intervention takes place. Subtracting the pre-intervention difference in outcomes from the post-intervention difference eliminates one kind of selection bias, namely the kind related to time-invariant individual characteristics. In other words, if what differentiates beneficiaries and non beneficiaries is fixed in time, subtracting the pre-intervention differences eliminates selection bias and produces a plausible estimate of the impact of the intervention.
A stylized example
URBAN I and II were Community Initiatives funded through the Structural Funds, to promote regeneration in urban areas suffering from high unemployment, high levels of poverty and social exclusion, and poor environmental conditions.[1] Evaluating the success of these programmes involves answering causal questions, such as “did the urban regeneration programmes produce a positive effect on the socio-economic conditions of the areas involved?” The difference-in-differences method can provide an answer as long as the outcome of interest can be measured both before and after the implementation of the urban regeneration programme in a representative sample of both participating and non participating urban areas.
Let us take the impact on the unemployment rate: it is estimated by subtracting the difference observed between the two groups before the intervention from the difference observed after the intervention. The following picture provides a graphical illustration of this interpretation of the difference-in-difference method. On the horizontal axis we have time, with two points, one before and one after the urban regeneration initiative was implemented. Let us say, 2000 and 2006, as in the URBAN II initiative. On the vertical axis we put the unemployment rate. Each of the four circles in the graph represents an average: two are taken in 2000 and two in 2006, respectively among the 70 urban areas that received funding for urban regeneration, and among a sample of 70 comparable areas, located in the same cities, but not given any funding.[2]

Obviously, the difference observed between the two groups of areas in 2006 is not the impact of the programme: this difference could be caused entirely by the selection process—that is, areas with higher unemployment rate had better chances of being admitted into the programme. If taken as an indication of programme impact, the difference shown in the graph would represent a disappointing result: that URBAN produces no useful impact on the labour market, because after the intervention the unemployment rate is higher in the funded areas than in the unfunded ones.
The fallacy of this interpretation is fully evident when uses data on the unemployment rate observed before the intervention. Figure 1 shows that in 2000 the difference in the unemployment rate between the two groups of areas was even larger than in 2006. It is the reduction in the unemployment rate gap that can be interpreted as the impact of the programme.
However, the validity of this conclusion depends on a crucial assumption: that in the absence of URBAN, the trend among funded areas would have been similar to that of the unfunded areas. Graphically, this is tantamount to drawing a dotted line parallel to the trend observed among unfunded areas, but starting where the funded areas are in 2000. This dotted line points a square in 2006: this is the counterfactual, our estimate of what would have happened to the unemployment rate in URBAN areas had URBAN not been implemented.
An alternative explanation
An alternative way to explain how the double differencing identifies the impact of a policy is to start from the change observed over time among beneficiaries. This difference cannot be interpreted as the impact of the policy, because many other factors and processes unfolding over time, besides the intervention, might have caused the observed change. One way to take this “natural dynamics” into account is to compute the change over time observed among non-beneficiaries during the same period. Subtracting the change observed over time among non-beneficiaries from that observed among beneficiaries produces an estimate of the impact of the programme. It is the same estimate as that shown in Figure 1, because it depends on the same crucial assumption—that in the absence of the intervention the trend among the two groups of areas would have been the same. This different view of the same result is illustrated in Figure 2.

The results cannot be different than before: the four points did not move, the dotted line is parallel to the same solid line and thus leads to the same counterfactual. What is different is the line of reasoning used to interpret the data. In the first case, one stresses selection bias and the attempt to correct it by subtracting pre-intervention differences. In the second case, one stresses the other type of distortion, due to natural dynamics, and attempts to correct it by subtracting the change observed among non-beneficiaries. In both cases, one really makes the same assumption: that of “parallelism” between what actually happened and what would have happened without the policy.
[1]The first round of the URBAN programme was launched in 1994 and ran until 1999. URBAN I supported 118 European cities in 15 Member States and had a community contribution of €950 million. Its successor, URBAN II supported 70 programmes across 14 countries and received €754 million from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).
[2]ECOTEC (2009), in an attempt to apply DID to the URBAN II programme, compared the unemployment rate of the URBAN II area with the rate for the city as a whole.



