The Helsinki Summit thus laid the foundations for a huge edifice which will undoubtedly complete the construction commenced 50 years ago by the founding fathers. It is now up to the Union's institutional players and also to its citizens to respond to the three fundamental questions concerning the future:

• Europe, how far and for whom?

The matter of the Union's geographical limits must now be addressed. What arguments, other than those corresponding to the need to respect democratic principles and the ability to take on board the acquis communautaire, namely all the common policies and Community legislation, are there to refuse access to the European Union to all the countries bordering on its current and future Member States?

• Europe, how?

Over the next decade, the move from a Union of 15 countries to nearly 30 naturally raises the question of its operation, the effectiveness of its decision-making procedures, its homogeneousness and its relationship with the citizen: a federal union of States including currency, defence and common citizenship, or else a free trade area supervised by arbitration bodies to ensure that the rules of competition are respected?

• Europe, what for?

With globalisation forcing States and societies to undertake a gigantic effort to adapt and prompting them to redefine the bases of the social contract in line with new rules valid on a planetary level, Europeans will need to examine what gives them their identity and brings them together as Europeans. Is there a model of development which is peculiar to our continent, based on common values and on the awareness of belonging to one and the same civilisation? Do Europeans share the same image of man's place in society and will they respond together to the challenges of the future, such as sustainable development and bioethics? Will they be ready to take responsibility together for their internal security and their collective defence?

All these questions make the European debate indissociable from the internal politi-cal debate in which every citizen is required to participate in the context of active democracy.

The current enlargement process: an investment for peace in Europe

'Europe was not built, and we had war'.
Robert Schuman declaration of 9 May 1950

The fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 was hailed as a wonderful beacon in the sky of the continent. The German people's aspiration for freedom and democracy, quickly shared by everyone in the Communist bloc, proved stronger than the dictatorship of the Leninist parties and withstood the threat from the Warsaw Pact armies. The Supreme Soviet in its turn, on 26 November 1991, confirmed the demise of the Soviet Union. The end of the cold war heralded a new world, less stable, but more open to the legitimate and irrepressible resolve of peoples to take charge of their destinies. Will Robert Schuman's vision of the continent in its entirety, reunified in peace and prosperity, finally be fulfilled? The European Community endeavours to bring suitable responses to the new requirements of countries at last freed from external domination, but undermined by ruined economies and searching for a stable and democratic political system.

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Phare programme in 1990 provided financial support for the new democracies of central and eastern Europe. Association agreements were signed with Hungary, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and then with the three Baltic States and Slovenia. In addition to emergency economic aid and assistance to smooth over the transition towards a market economy, however, a more ambitious process is shaping up for each of these countries, plus Cyprus and Malta: their membership in due course of the European Union.

The European Council meeting in Copenhagen on 22 June 1993 noted this aspiration and set out the conditions required for membership by an associated country:

- stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the primacy of law, and respect of human rights;

- the existence of a viable market economy and the ability to face up to the pressure of competition and the market forces within the Union;

- the ability of the candidate country to assume the obligations stemming from membership, and particularly to take on board the aims of political, economic and monetary union.

These political and economic criteria call for substantial efforts by the applicant countries and impose upon their population the heavy sacrifices of an economy undergoing reconstruction and transition. However, the European Union itself has accepted its moral and political responsibilities to peoples long condemned to a status quo by the dramas of history. The reunification of Germany, the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty signed on 7 February 1992 and leading 11 Member States to the introduction of the euro on 1 January 1999, followed by the signature and entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, reflect the Union's resolve to continue along the road to integration.

Reshaping the common policies, launching new ones in the sectors which will emerge, consolidating the internal market on the basis of a standard currency and thus favouring job creation, ensuring freedom of movement for the citizens within an area of internal justice and security, these are the main tasks set by the institutions to consolidate the edifice before opening its doors to the applicant countries.

The signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam on 2 October 1997 was a new step on the road to European integration. The applicant countries will be expected to take on board the whole of the EU's achievements up to and including this Treaty.

Stability at the Union's frontiers was the primary concern of governments in the 1990s. There was grave concern over the possibility of a further outbreak of territorial conflicts, ethnic hatred and nationalistic tendencies in areas which had been under the yoke of totalitarian regimes for a long time. The breakup of former Yugoslavia was already a warning of things to come in the shape of the disastrous conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, and threatened to spread to other regions. The solidarity shown by western Europe had to be commensurate with the risk of a flare-up in eastern Europe and the Balkans. The perspective of being an integral part of the European Union, its democratic institutions and its open economy has been and remains for the future an incentive for the progress which the young democracies of central and eastern Europe must achieve.

Through its decision to earmark a considerable part of the European budget to pre-membership and membership assistance for the applicant countries - EUR 80 billion, i.e. 11.83 % of the commitment appropriations for the period 2000-06 - the Berlin European Council of 25 March 1999 gave tangible expression to this need for solidarity. This is a vital investment for stability on the continent and the future of its reunification. But the challenge is not simply a financial one. It is first and foremost a political one and is in keeping with Robert Schuman's project. The reconciliation of the enemies of the first half of the 20th century will have been the major success story of the end of this century. The task awaiting the peoples of this other half of the continent which is converging towards the Union is on a similar scale: learning to live together in peace and tolerance, to overcome ethnic prejudice and the hatred of the past, to reconcile identities and interdependence. These new States which have just reconquered by pacific means their national sovereignty must also agree to abide by the common rules of the European Union. They must understand that the force of a Community is based on the joint exercise of powers freely transferred to institutions responsible for managing the common good of the Union.

Institutional reform for a strong, democratic Union

'The essential thing is to hold fast to the few fixed principles that have guided us since the beginning: gradually to create among Europeans the broadest common interest, served by common democratic institutions to which the necessary sovereignty has been delegated. This is the dynamic that has never ceased to operate, removing prejudice, doing away with frontiers, enlarging to continental scale, within a few years, the process that took centuries to form our ancient nations.'
Jean Monnet (Memoirs, p. 523)

Can a Union enlarged to over 25 Member States during the decade which has just started, a number which could subsequently rise to 30-35 countries, function with institutions designed in 1950 for six countries?

There is no doubt whatever that this spectacular development, while attesting to the success of the European undertaking, could well distort its foundations and weaken its decision-making mechanisms if reforms are implemented first. The European Community has gradually changed into a political Union on the basis of the dual legitimacy of a Union of States and a Union of peoples. The election of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage since 1979 and the gradual increase of its legislative and supervisory powers have brought a democratic ferment to the institutions. A union of 25 countries representing 500 million citizens will be one of the leading players in tomorrow's world.

The negotiations for the Amsterdam Treaty which came into force on 1 May 1999 had already endeavoured to incorporate into the texts and institutional practice this increase in the Union's responsibility both with regard to its own nationals and with regard to the rest of the world. But provisions were also needed to maintain the effectiveness of decision-making procedures and to safeguard the balance between the Member States as a function of their respective demographic weight. The Helsinki European Council on 11 December 1999 therefore decided to convene a new intergovernmental conference to decide what changes should be made to the European treaties by December 2000. This conference will be held during the first half of the year under the Portuguese Presidency and under the French Presidency for the second. Its purpose is explicitly to examine the size of the European Commission, the weighting of votes in the Council of Ministers and a possible increase in the number of decisions which could be taken by qualified majority. Other reforms could be adopted, shaped possibly by the vital need to have a Union which is bigger but still capable of taking effective decisions and providing a response to citizens' expectations. At the June 1999 European elections, the citizens showed they wanted greater transparency and greater proximity from the institutions: who takes decisions in the Union? how are decisions taken? how can checks be strengthened on how public money paid to the Community budget is used?

Plenary session of the European Parliament: an essential political role at the service of the citizens of Europe.

In a resolution voted on 18 November 1999, the European Parliament evaluated the scale of the institutional reform in progress and set an ambitious objective for it, namely the 'constitutionalisation' of the Union. The purpose of this is to bring Europe closer to its citizens, to clarify and make more comprehensible the different responsibilities of the common institutions. This exercise would involve unifying the treaties into a single text and differentiating between two parts:

- a constitutional part setting out the aims of the Union, fundamental rights and the provisions concerning institutions and decision-making procedures;

- a part describing the common policies, with provision for making review procedures more flexible.

Along with the representatives of the Member States, the national parliaments and the European Commission, the European Parliament is also involved in the drafting of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; the work began in December 1999 on the basis of a mandate given by the European Council of Cologne on 4 June 1999.

The Commission, presided since 15 September 1999 by Romano Prodi, has, with the support of the European Parliament, resolutely undertaken the reform of the Union. In a document submitted on 10 November 1999 by the President of the Commission and the Member of the Commission responsible, Michel Barnier, and entitled 'Adapting the institutions to make a success of enlargement', it states that the reform in progress is not only paving the way for enlargement but must also make it possible to bring stability to the European institutional system. The Commission emphasises the need to extend qualified-majority voting in the Council:

'The fact that the number of Member States is set to almost double means we have to go a great deal further. The interests of the various members will soon be so diverse that the working of the Union could easily be blocked (...). Qualified-majority voting should therefore become the norm, apart from a very few exceptions for issues which are truly fundamental or felt to be extremely sensitive politically'.

Jean Monnet had personally witnessed the experience of the League of Nations and had seen the limits of an institution in which each State had the power to say no. He felt that 'The veto was at once the cause and the symbol of this inability to go beyond national self-interest' (1).

The extension of qualified-majority voting in the Council, associated with the co-decision procedure with the European Parliament, and respecting the Commission's right of initiative, has been the cornerstone of the Community institutional system since its creation. Can a Union of 30 Member States be considered viable if one of them can bring any decision to a standstill simply by exercising its right of veto?

The strengthening, consolidation and enlargement of the Union must under no circumstances be dissociated or considered as irreconcilable imperatives. It is in the interests of the applicant countries to become part of an institutional system which is coherent in its structures and effective in its decision-making procedures. This system must also remain legitimate in the eyes of its citizens and be identifiable for non-member countries which expect the Union to address them in a single voice. The intergovernmental conference in progress should end by the close of 2000 and prepare the Union for the signature of the first accession treaties starting from 2003 provided negotiations with the applicant countries have been completed by then, and the treaties have been ratified by the Member States and submitted to the assent of the European Parliament. The June 2004 elections of the European Parliament, followed as from 2005 by the arrival of a new European Commission, will no doubt involve the peoples of central and eastern Europe and of the Mediterranean. This perspective presupposes that the Union's institutions and the governments of the Member States, along with those of the applicant countries, are ready to rise to the challenges. A Union which has succeeded in reforming its institutions, in expanding without becoming weaker, in consolidating its body of achievements while making strides forward along the road to political construction, will be the follow-up and the fulfilment of the dream of the founding fathers.

A political union to safeguard the security of Europe's citizens

A defence arm for the European Union in the service of peace

The desire of peoples everywhere for security and peace is one of the strongest and most legitimate foundations of the social contract between the citizen and the public authorities. In these modern times, international society has hardly been up to the task of guaranteeing this security throughout the European continent. The dramatic events in Bosnia, Kosovo and Chechnya cruelly affect innocent populations. They bring back the dark memories of the mass atrocities committed throughout the 20th century by armies or militias in the name of ideologies of hatred and exclusion.

The European Union has undertaken to rise to the challenge of violence. Not only by making the peaceful settlement of conflicts of interests the founding principle of the treaties, but also by projecting outside its frontiers a momentum for peace and security underpinned by active preventive diplomacy. This diplomacy is backed by financial resources, economic assistance and established know-how when it comes to settling conflicts.

The Maastricht Treaty, which came into force on 1 November 1993, codified and strengthened a set of rules and practices for diplomatic cooperation already used by the European Communities. The objective is set out in Title V of the Treaty: 'A common foreign and security policy encompassing all matters relating to the security of the European Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence'. The Amsterdam Treaty gives the CFSP new instruments while strengthening its consistency with the European Community's traditional external action. The Union now has political and administrative structures enabling it to speak 'with a single voice' in international politics. The high representative for the CFSP, also Secretary-General to the Council of Ministers, acts under the authority of the European Council and in close conjunction with the Commission to follow through the Union's diplomatic guidelines. The Union's vocation is to exercise its responsibilities on the world stage. It must take care to safeguard the common values, the fundamental interests, the independence and the integrity of the Union, as well as its security. It acts to maintain peace, to strengthen international security, to promote democracy and the rule of law.

The European Union is an economic, monetary and commercial power which is henceforth emerging as a diplomatic player with the resources to make its voice heard. Developments prompt the Union to avail itself of the Western European Union (WEU) which has competence for military matters. The Amsterdam Treaty opens up the long-term possibility of the full integration of the WEU into the European Union.The Helsinki European Council meeting of 11 December 1999 marked a further step in the construction of the European identity in terms of security and defence. The principle of an autonomous capacity to launch and conduct military operations under the direction of the European Union is a big step forward in asserting Europe's political role. The Washington Summit of 24 April 1999 bringing together the heads of governments of NATO welcomed 'the new impetus given to the strengthening of a common European policy in security and defence by the Amsterdam Treaty', emphasising that 'a stronger European role will help contribute to the vitality of our alliance for the 21st century, which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members' and that NATO therefore stood ready 'to define and adopt the necessary arrangements for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the alliance, for operations in which the alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an alliance' (2).

The Helsinki European Council accordingly drew the conclusions of the Union's political resolve to take on an autonomous capacity for European action within the Alliance. It decided that 'the Member States, cooperating on a voluntary basis in operations directed by the European Union must be capable by the year 2003 of deploying within 60 days and sustaining for at least a year military forces of up to50000-60000 persons'. These forces should be able to jointly carry out 'humanitarian and evacuation missions, peace-keeping missions and combat missions to manage crises, including missions to restore peace', as set out in Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union, amended by the Amsterdam Treaty. The setting up of a political and security committee, a military committee and a common headquarters will give the European Union the operational instruments needed to fulfil such missions.

The European Union is thus gradually erasing the sad memory of the failure of the European Defence Community which in 1954 had brought the momentum towards integration to a standstill. Events in Kosovo, the new geopolitical situation stemming from the end of the cold war, the need to build a political union commensurate with the Union's increasing weight in international affairs have made it possible to get this perspective of a strong autonomous Europe, capable of asserting its interests while respecting its alliances, on the road again.

Preventive diplomacy to guarantee the rights of minorities

Armed intervention is the last resort for democracies when all diplomatic means and negotiations have failed. The Union's foreign policy is by way of priority based on exporting the principles which have ensured its own peaceful development: the quest for the common good, the respect of law, arbitration through institutions, the rejection of discrimination and of the spirit of superiority.

These principles, on which the CFSP is based, have already proved fruitful and augur well for the future of the troubled regions of the continent. One of the first joint actions conducted by the Union pursuant to the Maastricht Treaty helped to secure the conclusion in Paris on 21 March 1995 of the Stability Pact. The purpose of this pact, managed since then by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, was to consolidate frontiers and ensure the respect of the rights of minorities in central Europe and in the Baltic States. The Union has advocated the method of regional round table negotiations in central and eastern Europe. This pattern of dialogue has led to bilateral and multilateral treaties between the States concerned, thus putting an end to old historical disputes.

By supporting the Stability Pact for south-east Europe, established in Cologne in June 1999 and stemming from the resolve to learn the lessons from the Kosovo war, the Union has once again sought to prove the peaceful virtues of dialogue and the quest for the common good. Can the regional round table method be applied to the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Mediterranean? The European Union has a vocation to be an 'engineer of peace' and regional integration, thus continuing the message which Jean Monnet delivered to the Parliament in Strasbourg on 30 November 1954: 'Between different countries, each one's advantage is limited to the results of its own efforts, to the gains obtained in relation to its neighbour, and to the difficulties it manages to transfer to it. In our Community, the advantage of each of the member countries is the effect of the prosperity of the whole'.

Moving around the Union in complete freedom and safety

The freedom to move around without checks or restrictions within the Community territory was already an objective and a right for the citizens of the Union in the Single European Act of 1986 and the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. It would have been unthinkable to have a single market where goods, capital and services could cross borders freely, but where people did not enjoy a similar freedom of movement. Over and above the economic logic designed to facilitate the mobility of labour and the best distribution of human resources, it is the concept of European citizenship which prevailed in justifying the removal of personal checks. The Schengen Agreements, signed on 14 June 1985, between five Member States and extended gradually to all the countries of the Union, with the exception of the United Kingdom and Ireland, have made it possible to give material expression to this measure which has been very well received by the people of Europe. How many of us today would surrender this elementary right to travel from Berlin to Lisbon or from Rome to Strasbourg just as freely as when we move around in our own country? The Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 incorporated the Schengen principles into the texts establishing the Union.

Freedom of movement for people and goods is the lynchpin of the European system. Its success is increasing all the time. The Community area of freedom, safety and justice defined in 1997 by the Treaty of Amsterdam must facilitate freedom of movement for people and introduce common standards for immigration and the right of asylum. Stronger judicial and police cooperation will at the same time help to prevent and punish international crime.

The calling into question of one of the traditional prerogatives of a State as part of its national sovereignty, frontier checks, could not be achieved without guaranteeing citizens that their safety would be ensured both in Europe as a whole and in their own countries. Public opinion is increasingly worried by day-to-day insecurity, petty and serious crime - boosted by illicit trafficking in arms and drugs - international crime, clandestine immigration and terrorism. If it is to be experienced as a benefit of the Union, the area of freedom must be accompanied by an area of security and justice. A vast effort has been undertaken to harmonise regulations on the right of asylum and immigration, to bring national legislations closer into line when it comes to civil law and civil procedure. Judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation also need to be strengthened in order to cope effectively with transnational crime. How paradoxical it would be if criminals could evade the law and proceedings because they find refuge in another Member State, leaving the police and the judges still powerless to to pursue them.

The Amsterdam Treaty has given a fresh boost to the construction of a Community area of security, freedom and justice. A five-year programme has been adopted involving the institutions of the Union in establishing common rules on immigration, the right of asylum, based on the respect of fundamental rights and making provision in due course for freedom of movement for immigrants in the Union. After this first phase during which unanimity is needed for the decisions to be taken by the Council, it will be possible to use the qualified-majority vote and the co-decision procedure whereby the European Parliament, the Commission and the Court of Justice can play their full part. As part of intergovernmental cooperation the Member States will also establish binding rules in criminal and police matters. Europol's resources will be stepped up in order to fight more effectively against drug trafficking and international crime. A new unit, Eurojust, will be introduced and will include prosecutors, magistrates and police officers in order to better coordinate the national authorities' efforts in the fight against organised crime.

During the Finnish Presidency, a special meeting was held at the Tampere European Council of 15 and 16 October 1999 to examine the implementation of the Amsterdam provisions. This meeting stressed the impact of these provisions on the daily life of the people of Europe: 'The enjoyment of freedom requires a genuine area of justice, where people can approach courts and authorities in any Member State as easily as in their own. Criminals must find no ways of exploiting differences in the judicial systems of Member States (...). People have the right to expect the Union to address the threat to their freedom and legal rights posed by serious crime. To counter these threats a common effort is needed to prevent and fight crime and criminal organisations throughout the Union. The joint mobilisation of police and judicial resources is needed to guarantee that there is no hiding place for criminals or the proceeds of crime within the Union'.

'We are not forming coalitions between States, but union among people', said Jean Monnet.

This prospect of a Union of security, external and internal alike, must obtain the support of the citizens and be achieved in a climate of transparency and democratic control. The European Council has stated its intention to instigate an open dialogue with civil society on the objectives and practicalities of this area being prepared. There is no doubt that the democratic debate is indispensable for such an ambitious project to come to fulfilment, just as there is no doubt that the Union will have an important and delicate task on its hands when it comes to negotiate, with the applicant countries of central and eastern Europe, the matter of taking on board the Union's accumulated achievements in this context in order to ensure the control of the external frontiers of a Union which will extend as far as the borders of Asia and Russia.

1  Jean Monnet, op. cit., p. 97.

2  NATO press release NAC-S(99) 64.